Quotes of the Day:
"The end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. For in all the states of created beings capable of law, where there is no law, there is no freedom."
– John Locke
"I despise people who go to the gutter on either the right or the left and hurl rocks at those in the center."
– Dwight D. Eisenhower
"I'm not concerned with your liking or disliking me... All I ask is that you respect me as a human being."
– Jackie Robinson
1. The next decade of strategic competition: How the Pentagon can use special operations forces to better compete
2. Doing the Wrong Thing Well: Flawed Security Policy for Ukraine
3. US intervention against Mexican cartels carries major risks. Here’s how to mitigate them.
4. Philosophy of the Individual and an American Theory of Special Operations
5. North Korean Troops Become Cannon Fodder for Russia
6. Wagner Soldiers ‘Are Just Children’ Compared to North Korean Troops – Ukrainian Commander
7. Can Donald Trump Really Contain China's Rise to Power?
8. Can Ukraine Survive Without U.S. Military Weapons?
9. Geopolitical Consequences of Ukraine’s Defeat
10. Drone War in Ukraine: Bombers, Kamikaze Strikes and Dogfights in the Sky
11. The United States Can’t Afford to Not Harden its Air Bases
12. Biden in late push to boost Indo-Pacific ties sends three pacts to Congress
13. 12-nation airborne drill in Japan focuses on defending remote islands
14. How Putin Lost Syria
15. Taiwan’s Military Is Not Prepared for a Trumpian World
16. Beyond Buzzwords: A Model for Strengthening Interoperability and Interior Lines
17. Corporate Transparency Act in Limbo: The National Security Risks of Anonymous Shell Companies
18. Spy vs. AI: How Artificial Intelligence Will Remake Espionage
19. China plans to blow Starlink out of the sky in a Taiwan war
20. Staunching The Rise of Terrorist Fighters
1. The next decade of strategic competition: How the Pentagon can use special operations forces to better compete
Key points:
This report outlines five ways the Department of Defense should use Special Operations Forces over the next decade to support US efforts in strategic competition. USSOF should be leveraged to:
- Enhance the US government’s situational awareness of strategic competition dynamics globally.
- Entangle adversaries in competition to prevent escalation.
- Strengthen allied and partner resilience to support the US strategy of deterrence by denial.
- Support integration across domains for greater effect at the tactical edge
- Contribute to US information and decision advantage by leveraging USSOF’s role as a technological pathfinder.
The thrust of the report (reading between the lines) is how SOF can be used in support of the joint force in preparation for major combat operations as a way to justify the force size (to those who view SOF from a conventional perspective). This report does a good job of showing SOF contributions to the joint force, both actual and potential (if decision makers would heed recommendations and provide the right authorities and permissions particularly in the area of information and influence). While this is a given I feel a deja vu with the 1980s when SOF (in particular SF) was fighting for relevance and force structure was focusing more on ways to conduct conventional operations (like direct action and special reconnaissance in support of numbered war plans which of course was the priority). This was done at the expense of conducting actual operations during low intensity conflict (and as we would say today, below the threshold of major war).
My recommendation to the authors yesterday was that in the next report they need to focus on SOF's ability to campaign in the gray zone of strategic competition. There needs to be a description of what General Fenton asks "What does winning look like" in the gray zone. In the report they discuss metric very generally and use concepts such as "thwarting, complicating, and distracting" but they do not describe "what winning looks" like because I get the feeling we only think of winning the conventional war. We do not think of winning in the gray zone. In defense of the report it cannot describe what winning looks like in every situation versus China, Russia, Iran, north Korea, and violent extremist organizations.
However, effective campaigning can determine what winning looks like for the given national security strategy. The bad habits we developed for the last 2 decades in the GWOT and our CT focus has been "policy by CONOP" and program execution instead of campaigning. By program execution I mean the cobbling together of Congressional program, e.g., 1202, 1206, 1207, 1209 or whatever are the current numbers for CT and irregular warfare and various tasks and then develop concepts using these programs to accomplish tasks that are often more tactical than strategic.
Ironically, the 2022 NDS placed a great emphasis on campaigning.
Campaigning will provide metrics for assessment and can be useful for Congressional oversight because the campaign plan can be used as the measure to evaluate activities and their effects. And of course campaigning is iterative and must be adapted based on changing assumptions and conditions. If we look to recent history, the execution of long term campaigns such as in EL Salvador, Plan Columbia, and OEF Philippines (which were decades long campaigns) we see adaptive campaigns for long duration that did not prepare for or lead to major conventional war (though you can make the case the relationships from OEF Philippines helped to build the trust among the militaries that provides the foundation for today's Philippines-US alliance posture versus China, an important long term strategic effect of relationships)
My point of the above is that we need to learn to conduct stand alone campaigns in the gray zone of strategic competition to determine what winning looks like. While the conventional joint force is correctly focused on preparing for major war in order to deter it, not every operation in the gray zone should be about preparing for major war (though that will always remain on the minds of the military personnel). This is the subtle shift in mindset that we must develop. We need to campaign to win in the gray zone rather than view every activity as preparation for war so as to deter it. Obviously that goes against the grain of conventional military thinking but we need elements of the US government to campaign and win in the gray zone just as we need the military to prepare to fight and win the nation' wars. And SOF has one foot in both camps which is why it needs to have an organic capability to plan and execute campaigns in the gray zone in support of national security strategy.
The other point I made about the report is that the focus is on SOF which is what we have focused on in every similar report since 1987 when USSOCOM and ASD SO/LIC were established with service-like authorities and responsibilities. However, we continue to overlook the intent of Senators Nunn and Cohen when they established the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. It is the second part of ASD SO/LIC that has long been forgotten . They intended to have a single organization with responsibility for LIC and what we later called Operations other than War (OOTW) and Military Operations Other than War which was one the evolutionary path to where we are today with the orphaned irregular warfare (IW). Of course ASD SO/LIC was never a resourced (and likely can never be) to own LIC or IW. But within the Department of Defense IW is always viewed as a lesser included case (as it must be when the department is charged with fighting and winning major wars) despite the development of interesting doctrine at DOD, the Joint Staff and within the services. There will always be the mind set that whatever the military does in the gray zone of irregular warfare during strategic competition will always be on the road to preparation for war with the intent of winning that war if deterrence fails. That is not the wrong mindset for the joint force. But we need to take another view of the gray zone of irregular warfare.
As I have previously and recently written:
Since the end of the Cold War, the US has tried to apply conventional and nuclear deterrence concepts to asymmetric threats. By definition, asymmetric threats, hybrid warfare, and gray zone activities cannot be deterred because they take place below the threshold of conventional war. They must be addressed with offensive political warfare capabilities that attack the adversaries’ strategies, create dilemmas, and exploit the inherent weaknesses and contradictions of totalitarian regimes. The U.S. has been unable to effectively execute such a strategy in the 21st Century because of a deterrence mindset, a fear of escalation, and being constantly in a defensive and reactive posture. The U.S. has not yet adopted a winning mindset for activities in the gray zone.
While the United States has maintained its relative conventional and nuclear superiority, it has adopted a largely defensive and reactive stance in the gray zone. This approach stems from the assumption that forces optimized for high-intensity conflict can easily "scale down" to address asymmetric threats. However, this perspective has left America vulnerable to adversaries who are actively and offensively competing in this ambiguous space.
The "Dark Quad" of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – collectively described as the axis of upheaval, chaos, or tyranny – have been creating dilemmas and attempting to disrupt and undermine U.S. national security strengths. In contrast, the U.S. has struggled to develop an agile, flexible, and offensive capability for operations in the gray zone.
The U.S. must work to maintain its conventional and nuclear military superiority because this offers the best chance of avoiding war. By doing so it neutralizes these threats which then can allow the U.S. to make very modest investments in its national security apparatus to be able to offensively and proactively compete and win in the gray zone.
The 34 page report can be downloaded at this link: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/The-Next-Decade-of-Strategic-Competition.pdf
The next decade of strategic competition: How the Pentagon can use special operations forces to better compete
By Clementine G. Starling-Daniels and Theresa Luetkefend
atlanticcouncil.org · by Patrick Fish · January 14, 2025
Africa China Defense Policy Intelligence Latin America Middle East National Security Security & Defense Terrorism United States and Canada
Report January 14, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET
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Strategic competition is likely to intensify over the next decade, increasing the demands on the United States to deter and defend against wide-ranging and simultaneous security challenges across multiple domains and regions worldwide. In that timeframe, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Force should more effectively leverage the competencies of US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to compete with US strategic adversaries.
Three realities facing the DOD over the next decade lend themselves toward leveraging USSOF more in strategic competition. First, the growing need to counter globally active and increasingly cooperative aggressors, while the broader Joint Force remains focused on the Indo-Pacific and Europe, underscores the value of leveraging USSOF to manage competition in other regions. Second, the desire to avoid war and manage competition below the threshold of conflict aligns with USSOF’s expertise in the irregular aspects of competition. Third, unless defense spending and recruitment dramatically increase over the next decade, the Joint Force will likely have to manage more security challenges without a commensurate increase in force size and capabilities, which underscores the need for the DOD to maximize every tool at its disposal, including the use of USSOF to help manage strategic competition.
The US government must harness all instruments of national power, alongside its network of allies and partners, to uphold international security, deter attacks, and counter efforts to undermine US security interests. Achieving this requires effectively integrating and leveraging the distinct roles of the
DOD, interagency partners, the intelligence community (IC), and the Joint Force, including components like USSOF that have not been traditionally prioritized in strategic competition. For the past two decades, USSOF achieved critical operational successes during the Global War on Terror, primarily through counterterrorism and direct-action missions. However, peer and near-peer competition now demands a broader application of USSOF’s twelve core activities, with emphasis on seven: special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, unconventional warfare, and direct action.
Over the next decade, the DOD should emphasize USSOF’s return to its roots—the core competencies USSOF conducted and refined during the Cold War. USSOF’s unconventional warfare support of resistance groups in Europe; its support of covert intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America; its evacuation missions of civilians in Africa; and its guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations helped combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. During that era, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict, and that is how USSOF should be applied in the next decade to help manage strategic competition.
This report outlines five ways the Department of Defense should use Special Operations Forces over the next decade to support US efforts in strategic competition. USSOF should be leveraged to:
- Enhance the US government’s situational awareness of strategic competition dynamics globally.
- Entangle adversaries in competition to prevent escalation.
- Strengthen allied and partner resilience to support the US strategy of deterrence by denial.
- Support integration across domains for greater effect at the tactical edge
- Contribute to US information and decision advantage by leveraging USSOF’s role as a technological pathfinder.
This report seeks to clarify USSOF’s role in strategic competition over the next decade, address gaps in understanding within the DOD and the broader national security community about USSOF’s competencies, and guide future resource and force development decisions. By prioritizing the above five functions, USSOF can bolster the US competitive edge and support the DOD’s management of challenges across diverse theaters and domains.
2. Doing the Wrong Thing Well: Flawed Security Policy for Ukraine
Excerpts:
If we are honest, we must recognize there are divergent views and priorities. The notion that alliances are permanent is fallacy as evidenced by global wars in the 20th century. Counterintuitively, the pressure by many eastern NATO members related to Ukraine may in fact lead to emergent circumstances that reveal the brittleness of the alliance and bring about its demise. Is it possible that Putin is playing a bigger political game centered on pitting national and alliance interests? It is beneficial to consider Colin Powell’s quip that if you wrestle with a pig, he has fun, and you get dirty. The current ambiguity about U.S. policy objectives and increasingly divergence of views within the alliance actually helps rather than hinder Russia.
It would greatly benefit the Ukrainian people, although unlikely in the near term, to achieve an end to the suffering and violence, achieve a durable political resolution of the causal factors, and have everyone agree on the path forward. History and human nature suggest there are winners and losers from the political outcome of armed conflict. The end of one war is the often steppingstone to the next. How the conflict terminates to sustain a peace is the most pressing question. United States policy makers must make clear eyed judgments about the goals, ways to achieve them, as well as the near- and longer-term risks to our interests.
Doing the Wrong Thing Well: Flawed Security Policy for Ukraine
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/15/doing-the-wrong-thing-well-flawed-security-policy-for-ukraine/
by Dr. Charlie Black
|
01.15.2025 at 06:00am
Among many national security challenges, the newly elected U.S. President will be confronted with making, communicating and implementing clear policy choices related to the Ukraine-Russian conflict. There is increasing international and increasingly heated domestic debate about U.S. support to Ukraine in over two years of war with Russia. The continuation of a policy that largely depends upon incremental war material support to aid Ukraine’s self-defense has proven ineffective in achieving military victory by Ukraine or political unity in Europe. According to the State Department, U.S. policy “is centered on realizing and strengthening a democratic, prosperous, and secure Ukraine more closely integrated into Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures.” This is a broadly ambiguous statement with much room for interpretation by allies and enemies alike. War in Europe continues as does the chance for escalation in scope and scale. The U.S. pursuit of ill-defined ends is akin to solving the wrong problem well. We no longer live in the bifurcated world where one is clearly on one side of an issue. Today the U.S., each of the NATO allies, Ukraine and Russia are entangled economically in ways that were not present in the Cold War. More than ever the U.S., European states, and the alliance itself experience tension due to competing self-interests and the interests of the alliance. The current Ukraine conflict represents a unique security challenge that requires reconsideration.
Even if only looking at the United States, there are different perspectives that fuel competing perceptions of the Ukraine-Russian war and what to do about it. On one hand there is President Biden’s promise to support for “as long as it takes.” This simplistic statement is not a reflection of a unified American people. Most recently a Bilateral Security Agreement between the U.S. and Ukraine states the U.S. policy is to “assist Ukraine in maintaining a credible defense and deterrence capability” which lacks specificity and is two years late. Internally, there are many questions associated with the financial and opportunity costs relative to other national interests such as deterring a patient, but aggressive, China or securing our own borders. Moreover, there is not agreement within either political party on the correct course and way ahead. The spectrum of debate in the information space is further shaped by international and sub sovereign stakeholders on both sides of the conflict. The issues surrounding Ukraine are a highly politicized topic inside the United States as are all US wars or interventions. It is within these circumstances that the United States policy makers have pursued a series of actions to help Ukraine win, despite the lack of consistently coherent and clear policy aim. I am confident our military is performing its assigned tasks well, yet the enacted policy is the wrong thing. We’ve supplied Ukraine war materials to include advanced air and land weapons systems along with training which might in fact contribute to Russian miscalculation and misinterpretation of US intentions. One example may be the employment of US supplied long range weapons to attack deep into Russia. As warned by the Russian Foreign Minister it may likely be perceived as an intentional escalation of the conflict by the US within unpredictable consequences. By many measures material support alone has not proven effective in shifting the tempo, intensity or duration of the war.
The late General Colin Powell, a greatly admired statesman and soldier, was famous for saying that “leadership is solving problems.” This war arguably began in February 2014 and has bedeviled three US Presidents, one of whom has been unable to unify the nation behind US and allies’ action in Ukraine. It is unclear what problem the last three Presidents and their administrations is trying to solve in Ukraine. Framing the problem at any level is often the most difficult challenge, especially when dealing with complex multi-variable issues with significant international interests. In as much as many wish differently, the U.S. is not overtly at war with Russia, nor is the NATO alliance or the European Union. Some might argue the war has evolved into a hybrid proxy as a hedge against an old opponent. This is not to say that the US and many other nations do not have interests or that they are not tipping the scale to their benefit. Framing the right problem and in what context is no easy task given the dynamic and murky character of a post-Soviet era in southeastern Europe. Famous systems thinker Russell Ackoff argued that positive and negative objectives are in tension meaning that getting rid of one undesired condition is not equivalent to obtaining what we do want. (See pages 20-24).
The lack of a clear U.S. political aim relating to the Ukraine conflict further exacerbates alliance cohesion and political division while giving Russia opportunities to exploit divisions of opinion and policy in Eastern Europe. Those that live within the “arc of instability” of Eastern Europe everyday feel the threat from Russian aggression, whereas others who are further removed from any perceived physical excursion by Russia are inundated with competing priorities. It is good to see more NATO members reaffirming a commitment to increased defense spending that had atrophied during decades of prosperity and elimination of an existential threat following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today Europe once again confronts a threat to its stability and possibly sovereignty thus rekindling the need for military credibility of the Atlantic Alliance. This is a good thing if they their actions and funding follow the political rhetoric. Time will tell.
Given the current complexities surrounding the war in Ukraine, there is value in revisiting the criteria for use of military force abroad first proposed over 30 years ago by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, Gen Colin Powell. In what became known as the Powell Doctrine, General Powell offered a series of questions that should be asked before the United States initiates the use of military force. In the contemporary geopolitical climate I suggest that Powell doctrine is relevant and can apply in competition below the level of armed conflict. As such, the core questions proposed might prove useful in making decisions about interventions abroad such as Ukraine. First, we must identify if there is a vital interest at stake. The second factor is whether there are clear and attainable objective(s), and this case agreed upon by the alliance members. The third question is how well the US has identified and fully assessed the risks, to include opportunity costs, as it relates to other security challenges. Perhaps most importantly, the Powell Doctrine asks leaders to articulate a plausible exit strategy so when the goals have been achieved and avoid endless entanglement. This requires articulating what winning looks like which can avoid capture due to the hybrid and dynamic character of contemporary war. The usual refrain is that the exit strategy is conditions based. The often-unanswered question is what specific conditions.
General Powell would agree with a condition-based end but require that those conditions be articulated before sending troops, resources, and funds to another nation’s war. It is necessary to reassess the entirety of the effort if initial conditions which led to the decision change. All of this is further complicated by the political dynamics of aging alliances composed of members with increasingly competing and often divergent interests. Most importantly, Powell asked political leaders to consider whether the conflict is supported by the American people. Although Presidential power has expanded over the past decades, it does not eliminate the fact that we are a republic whose citizens get a voice – or should – in any major US intervention or war.
According to a recent Center for Public Affairs Research poll, more than half of Americans want the United States to take a less active role in addressing global conflict. Moreover, a Quincy Institute Poll suggests 70 percent of Americans preference a policy to reach a negotiated end of the conflict in Ukraine. Looking to our allies in Europe, there is not homogeneous agreement on policy either. A survey in January 2024 across 12 European nations shows a “weak confidence in Ukraine’s chances for victory” over Russia and that it favors a negotiated settlement, but they are also not in favor of appeasement. These are not mutually exclusive ends meaning one can hold a perception that Ukraine can’t win while also desiring a termination of the conflict favorable to Ukraine. Those states with dependencies to Russian energy or wheat likely lean toward Russia, while those under non-kinetic attack will be more hawkish. Evidence increasingly shows less not more American and European support to continue the war. In democratic states, especially the U.S .the people get a vote whether we agree with their opinions. This is equally true for most European states.
The dispassionate fact is that two sovereign states are in conflict with one another driven by a variety of historical and contemporary causal factors. Far too much of the analysis on this topic oversimplify this war. No one debates the fact that Putin’s Russia is the aggressor when it invaded Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022. Despite consistent attempts to frame this conflict as good versus evil or some other binary choice, the reality is that it is not simple. It is not black and white and competes for priority among our citizens. There likely is general agreement that Russia is the aggressor while at the same time much greater divergence on what can or should be done about it.
This war is much more than Putin wanting to rekindle the Russian Empire or to dominate the West. This author argues that this war is another contemporary episode of centuries old collision of Western and other ontologies. How Russia and Ukraine see themselves, their interpretation of history, and themselves in the contemporary world are in competition. The projected realities are further shaped by ubiquitous media that serve up competing narratives about causes and solutions. Russia is viewed in the West as a revisionist power and an old adversary while Ukraine is presented as an aspirational NATO member. There is wide ranging debate about the complex causal factors for this war which merit more detailed analysis. Causal ambiguity makes it difficult for the United States, NATO and other interested parties to judge how to support or terminate hostilities as expressed by the Powel Doctrine. There is broad consensus that this war exemplifies the nature of war as a violent clash of moral and physical forces making this modern war both unique while at the same time similar to the past. As renowned strategist Colin Gray so clearly states, war has “one nature, with many characters.” For example there is the often-used false comparisons of Russian aggression to Hitler’s Germany. We live in a very different world than Europe in the 1930s.
It is important for broader context to highlight that many of the NATO alliance members have had and many still have long standing and entangled economic and social relationships with Russia and to a lesser degree Ukraine. This has become much more dynamic over the course of the past two years. Neither Russia nor Ukraine are members of NATO, although the alliance seems driven by a false assumption that any perceived appeasement on Ukraine might lead to Russian attacks on member Baltic states. Perhaps this is more evidence that we fail to objectivity assess Putin’s strategic logic. As such, NATO sees itself as the protective partner of Ukraine, a bulwark to further Russian aggression and to a lesser degree supports the sustained evolution of Ukrainian democratic governance. Beyond the continuation of gray zone active measures an overt attack on the alliance is illogical even for Putin who can achieve his goals other ways.
Likely to provoke some and despite contemporary aspirational roles for NATO, the original and core purpose of NATO is to be a defensive alliance. The conditions that birthed NATO to defend Western Europe against the threats posed by the Soviet Union and its formidable Red Army are not the same as those posed by the Russian Federation today. Yes, Putin’s Russia continues its egregious violence, meddles in the internal affairs of other states, and threatens the sovereignty of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia. The Russian military’s proven inability to win decisively in Ukraine as compared to the capacity of NATO members states to defend their territory remains a credible deterrent against attack on the alliance.
Fortunately for the NATO alliance, Putin’s actions have on one hand awakened some sleeping nations that Europe is in fact not free from war and acutely sharpened the debate about Russian aggression. One result has been an overall increase in NATO defense spending that reaches half of total global spending. It is estimated that 19 of 32 members states will reach or exceed defense spending goals with overall spending increased by 11%. However, there remains a disparity among states in terms of GDP percentage and rate of investment. Those closest to the Russian threat meet or exceed spending as a percentage of GDP, while many further removed have been slow to adapt.
There are clear moral arguments for political, economic, and military support to Ukraine, just as there are for other inter-state conflicts. As this author and many readers know too well, war is the worst of humanity. Interestingly, we the United States and others in the western world tend not to apply this moral rule equally or evenly. The truth is that we do not have equal interests everywhere in the world and thus often overlook similar moral injustices in other places. How many raised the alarm in the West over the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict? What about other state incursions of sovereignty by outside states? Although not the focus of this essay and certainly a position that will invite criticism, one can reasonably argue that the continued US intervention into Syria is illegitimate and comparatively similar to the Russian invasion of Ukraine – at least from Assad’s perspective who was the legitimate leader recognized by the United Nations. We could debate each aspect of this statement for weeks.
The point is that we the United States must be consistent, with our words matching our deeds. We do not consistently follow the “rules” we so aggressively argue must be sustained. What the United States often argues for is our interpretation of rules and norms, often in conflict with consensual international law. There are many international treaties that we have not ratified and ones we’ve signed but simply do not follow. In the eyes of signatory states, any US failure to ratify major international treaties diminishes our credibility as the proponent for a rules-based order. For example, in heightened competition with China we frequently assert freedom of navigation using the rules and precedence of UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) a treaty we have not adopted. Paradoxically, we often refuse to apply equally the same rules to our own territorial waters creating a divergence between words and deeds. For the United States some rules appear to be more important than others.
In a dynamic international system comprised of diverse states seeking their own interests, the context and perspective of others matter when making strategic judgments and policy choices to achieve more favorable political outcomes. Unfortunately, the judgments, priorities of interests and policies are state driven and do tend to diverge with supra national organizations like NATO. One can easily assume that Romanians are very attuned to the threats posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Comparatively, I doubt the average Spanish or French citizen gives as much thought to the military threat from Russia as they consider the consequences of illegal immigration and the illicit drug trade in the western Mediterranean Sea.
When evaluating Ukraine policy, one should respect the expertise and experiences of those practitioners who offer alternative ways to win in Ukraine. Neither the United States nor NATO have articulated a well-defined military objective nor a clear political aim for this conflict. The perpetual flow of military supplies and equipment to support a conventional war is not and will not achieve military victory. Neither industrial might nor the many visible and bold tactical successes by Ukraine special operations forces can overcome poorly formulated and dynamic US or NATO policy for the Ukraine-Russian war. Despite the adoption of more sophisticated ways and means Foch and Ludendorff would recognize the current state of conflict. The ways have devolved to trench warfare, with FPV drones instead of Spads, Maxims, and Fokkers. This war is analogous to putting old wine in new skins. The political challenge is to reflectively recognize and courageously overcome the sunk cost bias and path dependency that have become a cycle of reinforcing strategic failure. Any Ukrainian military victories, which of late are more common, do not address the underlying political factors that led Russia to armed violence will only achieve temporal advantage. War will inevitably reemerge until such factors are addressed and resolved
The last point for discussion is our need to cautiously evaluate US political aims separately from those as alliance member, the alliance itself, and its many diverse members. U.S. policy must contribute to achieving an attainable and desirable political outcome beyond the conflict itself.
If we are honest, we must recognize there are divergent views and priorities. The notion that alliances are permanent is fallacy as evidenced by global wars in the 20th century. Counterintuitively, the pressure by many eastern NATO members related to Ukraine may in fact lead to emergent circumstances that reveal the brittleness of the alliance and bring about its demise. Is it possible that Putin is playing a bigger political game centered on pitting national and alliance interests? It is beneficial to consider Colin Powell’s quip that if you wrestle with a pig, he has fun, and you get dirty. The current ambiguity about U.S. policy objectives and increasingly divergence of views within the alliance actually helps rather than hinder Russia.
It would greatly benefit the Ukrainian people, although unlikely in the near term, to achieve an end to the suffering and violence, achieve a durable political resolution of the causal factors, and have everyone agree on the path forward. History and human nature suggest there are winners and losers from the political outcome of armed conflict. The end of one war is the often steppingstone to the next. How the conflict terminates to sustain a peace is the most pressing question. United States policy makers must make clear eyed judgments about the goals, ways to achieve them, as well as the near- and longer-term risks to our interests.
Tags: Foreign Policy, Powell Doctrine, Russia, Ukraine
About The Author
- Dr. Charlie Black
- Dr. Charlie Black is the Co-Founder and Managing Partner at Xundis Global, LLC which specializes in helping clients navigate complexity and change. He is a scholar-practitioners who holds a PhD in Humanities from Salve Regina University and is a retired Marine Corps Infantry and Special Operations Officer with over thirty-five years of diverse experience. He currently serves as a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the University of South Florida’s Global National Security Institute and previously served as a Senior Non-Resident Fellow 2018-2022 at the Joint Special Operations University. His scholarly works focus on global complexity, the future of special operations, human insecurity, and integrated statecraft. He holds a Senior Professional position at John Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab and is a frequent speaker on complexity, national security and leadership as culture making.
3. US intervention against Mexican cartels carries major risks. Here’s how to mitigate them.
Excerpts:
The risks of hubris
Deploying US special operations forces against Mexican cartels is worthy of serious consideration. But history and logic caution against underestimating the adaptability and resilience of these violent transnational criminal groups. Strong military action absent conscientious preparations and close collaboration with the Mexican government risks triggering a cycle of retaliation. It could, for example, bring a surge of violence to US soil, destabilize border communities, and strain domestic resources. Integrating increased military pressure with strengthened partnerships, domestic preparedness, and systemic investments would ensure that the effort is more sustainable and effective.
The opioid crisis is a danger to US national security that demands urgent action, but that action must be measured, informed, and strategic. Anything less risks compounding the very threats Washington seeks to eliminate and bringing a bloody war directly to US streets.
January 14, 2025 • 8:15am ET
US intervention against Mexican cartels carries major risks. Here’s how to mitigate them.
By Doug Livermore
atlanticcouncil.org · · January 14, 2025
Is direct military intervention against Mexican drug cartels the answer to ending the US opioid crisis and improving security along the border? Several members of the incoming Trump administration have suggested deploying US special operations forces to combat cartels. The proposals are similar to how the United States has previously engaged in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency abroad, reflecting just how much the drug trade—especially fentanyl originating from China—has negatively impacted US communities.
But such unilateral military action would come with risks, as the cartels have a significant capability to retaliate. In addition, even considering military action would first require strengthening complementary efforts with the Mexican government and domestically among local and federal government agencies in the United States.
Mexican cartels are not merely criminal organizations; they operate as paramilitary entities with deep financial resources, global supply chains, and sophisticated logistical networks that extend into the United States. It is unlikely that such groups would passively absorb US attacks. Instead, as history shows, cartels are highly likely to retaliate both preemptively and reactively. They possess a substantial capacity for terrorism that, when coupled with their established presence within the United States, could escalate conflict far beyond what proponents of a purely military solution may anticipate.
Given their extensive experiences and expertise in combating elusive terrorist networks, oftentimes operating quietly in the shadows while supporting partners on the ground, US special operators are ideally suited for this fight. However, US special operators and their families would likely find themselves in the cartels’ crosshairs. But there are ways that the United States should prepare for such retaliation before Washington even considers such action.
A proven capacity for retaliation
Mexican cartels have demonstrated an uncanny ability to adapt and retaliate against perceived threats, as demonstrated throughout Mexico’s history.
Soon after Felipe Calderón became president of Mexico in 2006, he declared a “war on drugs,” deploying military forces against cartels. The result was a sharp escalation in violence. The cartels retaliated by targeting law enforcement, military personnel, and government officials. Entire police forces resigned in fear, and public officials were assassinated in broad daylight. Beyond physical violence, cartels also employed psychological tactics, using brutal killings and public displays of bodies to instill terror among the population.
On October 17, 2019, Mexican forces arrested Ovidio Guzmán López, the son of drug lord and former cartel leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán. The Sinaloa Cartel swiftly unleashed widespread violence. Using armored vehicles, machine guns, rockets, and other heavy weapons, approximately seven hundred cartel “sicarios” conducted widespread attacks against civilian, government, and military targets across Culiacán. The cartel’s campaign of terror overwhelmed Mexican authorities in what has become known as the “Battle of Culiacán” and “Black Thursday.” This incident underscored the cartels’ operational sophistication, which ranges from coordinating large-scale attacks to leveraging public fear. And amid all the violence, the government released Guzmán.
Throughout Mexico’s recent history, cartels have routinely retaliated against perceived threats to their operations, including media organizations and civilian populations. Of the reporters who have been slain, some had written negative reports about the drug cartels themselves, while others have exposed corruption among those politicians that the cartels pay off. By controlling narratives and instilling fear, they secure compliance and deter resistance. In some years, Mexico has proven itself to be even more deadly for reporters than active warzones such as Syria and Ukraine.
Given these examples, it is not difficult to imagine how cartels might respond if US forces launched cross-border operations. The difference, however, is that the retaliation could happen within US borders.
Hitting home
The US homeland is not immune to the consequences of engaging in direct military action against Mexican cartels, and such a campaign would not see the cartels simply ceding the initiative and sitting on their side of the border waiting to be attacked. The very networks that facilitate drug trafficking, spanning from cities (such as Los Angeles and Chicago) to rural communities, provide cartels with the infrastructure for potential retaliatory strikes. Cartels have a history of assassinating government officials in Mexico, and they would likely adopt terrorist tactics in the United States against political figures, law-enforcement leaders, and even military personnel. Extensive cartel connections to Chinese underground banking and US-based gangs could readily facilitate such actions against targets inside the United States.
Beyond physical attacks, cartels could engage in cyber operations, employing such capabilities to gather information on potential targets as part of criminal dealings. Their financial power also enables them to influence local politics and law enforcement through intimidation and corruption. Cartel cyber activity could bear significant effects for the target of such operations; and if the target (for example, a government department or agency) suspends its normal operations to repair its security walls, those effects could expand across communities.
Increasingly, Mexican drug cartels have turned to the “cybercrime as a service” economy, infiltrating government and commercial institutions to advance their criminal interests. By potentially coordinating cyber activities with campaigns of terror in cartel-influenced US neighborhoods, these groups could sow panic and destabilize communities, driving Americans to call for a cessation of operations against the cartels in Mexico.
What must come first
Any US military campaign to combat the cartels would only succeed if accompanied by a robust partnership with the new Mexican administration, led by President Claudia Sheinbaum (who has expressed a desire to fight organized crime more aggressively). Joint task forces, enhanced intelligence sharing, and specialized training programs can bolster Mexico’s counter-narcotics capabilities. Equally important is addressing systemic corruption within Mexico, which has long hindered efforts to dismantle cartel operations. By empowering its partners, the United States can achieve a greater impact without exacerbating the violence that unilateral actions alone often provoke. When and where no other options exist, the United States should launch appropriate unilateral operations against high-value cartel targets at the invitation of the Mexican government and in support of counter-narcotics objectives shared by the United States and Mexico.
Domestically, the United States must prepare for potential retaliation from cartels. Washington should enhance interagency coordination—specifically between the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security—to safeguard likely US targets and strengthen the United States’ ability to identify and neutralize cartel threats. Such coordination is outlined in the Department of Homeland Security’s 2016 National Protection Framework; it should include increased support to law enforcement countering cartel-affiliated gangs in the United States and measures to protect from potential cartel-led hacking or other cyber activity. Undertaking such initiatives to bolster domestic defenses now will set the necessary conditions before the incoming Trump administration can reasonably pursue a wider range of increased military activity directly against the Mexican cartels.
The United States will also need to address the sources of cartel power. The demand for illicit drugs in the United States fuels the cartels’ operations, making it imperative to invest in addiction treatment resources and public education programs. Reducing demand would undermine a significant source of cartel revenue. On the supply side, supporting economic development in Mexico can help create alternative opportunities for individuals who might otherwise be drawn into illicit activities. Such initiatives are not quick fixes, but they are essential components of a long-term strategy to weaken the cartels’ influence. Successfully doing so would also increase US influence in Mexico and the region, incentivizing mutually beneficial economic endeavors.
The risks of hubris
Deploying US special operations forces against Mexican cartels is worthy of serious consideration. But history and logic caution against underestimating the adaptability and resilience of these violent transnational criminal groups. Strong military action absent conscientious preparations and close collaboration with the Mexican government risks triggering a cycle of retaliation. It could, for example, bring a surge of violence to US soil, destabilize border communities, and strain domestic resources. Integrating increased military pressure with strengthened partnerships, domestic preparedness, and systemic investments would ensure that the effort is more sustainable and effective.
The opioid crisis is a danger to US national security that demands urgent action, but that action must be measured, informed, and strategic. Anything less risks compounding the very threats Washington seeks to eliminate and bringing a bloody war directly to US streets.
Doug Livermore is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group, the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, senior vice president for solution engineering at the CenCore Group, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.
4. Philosophy of the Individual and an American Theory of Special Operations
From Inter Populum: The Journal of Irregular Warfare and Special Operations. (From Arizona State University)
The entire essay can be accessed here: https://interpopulum.org/philosophy-of-the-individual-and-an-american-theory-of-special-operations/
Excerpt:
The primary purpose of the current discussion is to explore one foundational problem with the American theory that requires refinement—its ethos. It is difficult to describe why an American theory is different from other positions, or even why its namesake should permit it to be described as an American theory. Our intent is to provide an answer to why we need an American theory. Once we have a characterization of the theory that differentiates it from other positions, further refinement of the premises and principles in future work will be possible. So, what makes this idea an American theory of special operations, and is the theory unique to the U.S. and its society?
Philosophy of the Individual and an American Theory of Special Operations
One of the most pervasive challenges within Special Operations has been developing theoretical frameworks to foster critical thinking among members of this unique community—perhaps due to the diverse tasks and activities that should, in theory, stem from a unified guiding principle. The American theory of special operations is one stated position that describes the nature, value, and applications of special operations as a component of military power. Despite the apparent validity of this theory and its foundational ideas, it lacks a core ethos that distinguishes it from other positions. This discussion proposes an ethos called the “philosophy of the individual,” which builds on the idea that special operations forces cannot be mass-produced. Four critical elements comprise this philosophy and aim to explain why American special operations have achieved repeated success: 1) the quality of the product entering the training pipeline, 2) special operations training as an individual journey, 3) the reliance of special operations on individual initiative for team success, and 4) the diversity that fosters adaptability to produce operational success. This philosophy is explored in the context of the unique aspects of United States culture, highlighting how this environment is well-suited to produce effective special operations forces. Finally, the discussion examines the relative value of special operations theory and offers considerations for the future development of the American theory.
By
Adam T. Biggs & Lanny F. Littlejohn
Published
January 7, 2025
Adam T. Biggs, Naval Special Warfare Command
Lanny F. Littlejohn, Naval Special Warfare Command
Introduction
Special operations forces (SOF) demand special attention due to the unique challenges and requirements faced by the community. As such, many efforts focus on developing capabilities to support these operations, ranging from enhanced human performance programs to doctrine that underpins a complex cycle of training and redeployment. One question strikes at the heart of all efforts and doctrine to utilize special forces in support of national defense: what is the purpose of special operations? Ask three different people, and you may get at least four different answers in return. For example, Navy SEALs devote significantly more time to training for amphibious operations than Army Rangers or Marine Corps Raiders. Still, the question of purpose goes beyond a requisite list of mission capabilities. Purpose demands a strategic vision that bridges the operational realities of today with the future state of operations required to defend the nation.
CONTACT LCDR Adam Biggs | adam.t.biggs.mil@socom.mil
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government © 2024 Arizona Board of Regents/Arizona State University
The American theory of special operations is a critical piece of this strategic vision[i]. Its roots can be traced to warfare concepts such as relative superiority and Clausewitzian friction.[ii] As originally conceived, the core content revolved around premises and principles guiding the success of American special operations. Each stated proposition within the American theory expounds upon a concept critical to ongoing operations, including ideas such as emphasizing the value of the human element in warfare and the reliance of special operations on combat support services. Several ideas similarly overlap with the five SOF truths.[iii] However, the theory has not been directly linked to, nor translated into, doctrine. Nor is it without flaws—with one major flaw apparent in its namesake. Namely, although it is called an American theory, there is nothing uniquely American about it. The likely inspiration stems from observations primarily drawn from United States special operations. Pragmatic observations may produce a simple list of connected training principles, yet a list lacks synthesis and identity, leaving the American theory unable to answer critical questions. Is the U.S. success unique? What makes this theory different from other positions? Are some elements more central to the theory than others?
The primary purpose here is to identify the ethos underlying an American theory of special operations. Applying a philosophical purpose to this theory will underscore its message and define it among competing theoretical stances on special operations. In particular, the argument will focus on the philosophy of the individual, a core tenet of U.S. special operations that has implicitly guided selection and training throughout its history. Such foundational ideas will provide support and character to the development of the American theory and further set it apart from peer competitors.
The discussion will begin with an overview of the premises stated within the American theory. Next, the core philosophy of the individual will be presented in contrast to the SOF truth from which it is derived—special operations forces cannot be mass-produced. This contribution will be compared with other theoretical positions on special operations, as well as a debate on the value of theoretical inquiry in the field. Taken together, the goal is to advance the development of an American theory of special operations by proposing a foundational principle for its strategic vision.
Special operations represent a critical component of the military infrastructure, especially as the focus on strategic competition with peer and near-peer adversaries increases and integrated deterrence becomes a prime goal of US military strategy. Many explorations have examined the contributions of training procedures or the historical accomplishments of various SOF units. By contrast, theoretical evaluation delves into the purpose of special operations forces. Although there will be a later discussion about the relative value of theory in special operations,[iv] an early and highly influential theory of special operations is the theory of relative superiority.[v]
According to relative superiority, SOF personnel achieve a decisive advantage despite numerical inferiority by reducing the frictions of war, which represent the disparity between the actual and ideal performance conditions in combat[vi]. Chance and action interact to produce difficulties during conflict that may or may not be anticipated by military forces. With advanced training, specialized equipment, and small numbers, SOF personnel can reduce potential friction points to ensure higher-quality performance during missions. Other scholars have similarly sought to extend Clausewitzian ideas into SOF-specific contexts.[vii] Still, McRaven’s theory of relative superiority could be argued as the first, most fully formed, or at least the most influential theory describing the purpose of training and maintaining special operations personnel.
Recent discussions have attempted to expand upon the purpose and functions of special operations. Spulak[viii] and Kiras[ix] both explored the strategic contributions of SOF capabilities, which remain a critical consideration, but do not independently represent the type of theoretical contribution describing SOF functions as well as relative superiority. Another perspective builds upon foundations laid by McRaven’s theory of relative superiority, as well as the philosophy of SOF truths and SOF imperatives that define successful operations. This American theory of special operations “explains the nature, uniqueness, value, and application of this instrument of military power and the tensions that are inherent to it”.[x] Its full review outlines 26 premises and 14 principles that provide an intellectual framework for debating the future evolution of special operations. These principles incorporate several ideas put forth in the theory of relative superiority, which is, in part, why an American theory of special operations should be seen as founded upon the ideas of Admiral William McRaven.
There is an inherently intriguing reason to develop an American-specific theory. Although specialized military personnel have existed throughout the history of warfare, American personnel have achieved monumental successes through special operations with historic implications, most notably Operation Neptune Spear.[xi] The American concept has come to define what the world currently views as special operations. In turn, when developing a theory of special operations, it makes logical sense to explore the successes and occasional failures of the most successful organization. This approach likens theoretical explorations of special forces to developing theories of business and management, more so than the hypothesis-driven empirical sciences of chemistry or physics. Essentially, an American theory extracts factors common to success in special operations and interprets them as causal influences on operational success.
There is a logical flaw in this approach, however, as correlation does not equal causation. Despite the value in mining successful experiences of successful organizations for good behaviors and best practices, this approach describes what worked best in the past—not what will work in the future. There is some overlap between these concepts, yet the purpose of theoretical development for special operations has less to do with training successes today and more to do with anticipating future states that will ensure operational success tomorrow. Different theories provide contrasting ideas that enable critical thinking skills, thereby making the development and exploration of special operations theory essential for future operational success. Because the nature of special operations involves tackling emerging challenges and priorities, a retrospective-focused approach is insufficient without a more prospective integration of emerging challenges.
Another flaw is that the American theory largely describes a series of premises without truly synthesizing this information into an overarching concept. This method sometimes limits clarity because the premises overlap, if not become fully redundant. For example, the first two premises state that “special operations represent a distinct military capability of strategic value to national security” and “special operations have strategic utility”.[xii] These two premises appear to describe the uniqueness of special operations and their utility within the military structure, respectively, but they are insufficiently distinguished from one another. Additional analysis and synthesis will be necessary to refine the principles.
To compare where the theory currently stands in terms of educational development, Bloom’s taxonomy describes various educational levels based on learning objectives.[xiii] Earlier levels begin with knowledge and observation before progressing to synthesis and eventually creation. An American theory of special operations would currently be considered in the lower stages of this taxonomy, as the existing version lists a series of sometimes redundant premises with limited synthesis into a cohesive idea. Further synthesis would require aligning different premises within a suitable structure, such as connecting multiple premises to the first SOF truth: humans are more important than hardware. This delineation would emphasize the role of the human operator in special operations as a definitive dimension of the theoretical premises.[xiv] Despite the value in pursuing an American theory, this type of development remains a necessary next step.
The primary purpose of the current discussion is to explore one foundational problem with the American theory that requires refinement—its ethos. It is difficult to describe why an American theory is different from other positions, or even why its namesake should permit it to be described as an American theory. Our intent is to provide an answer to why we need an American theory. Once we have a characterization of the theory that differentiates it from other positions, further refinement of the premises and principles in future work will be possible. So, what makes this idea an American theory of special operations, and is the theory unique to the U.S. and its society?
The remainder of the essay can be accessed here: https://interpopulum.org/philosophy-of-the-individual-and-an-american-theory-of-special-operations/
5. North Korean Troops Become Cannon Fodder for Russia
I bet Seth Jones regrets not including Kim Jong Un in his book Three Dangerous Men. (I hate to say I told you so).
There are other assessments that say thenKPA forces are not being used as cannon fodder.
The point not made is that we should draw from this conclusion is the Russia-north Korea alliance will never have what the ROK-US Alliance has (mutual trust and shared operational capabilities - as well as shared values which is stronger than "ideological alignment"). And those whose only experience is in Iraq and Afghanistan have difficulty grasping the nature of the ROK/US alliance.
Excerpt:
As the failure of North Korea’s troops in Russia shows, coalition warfare requires more than ideological alignment. It requires shared operational capabilities and mutual trust—elements conspicuously absent in the Russia-North Korea partnership. If Ukraine and President Trump can continue to exploit these problems, then they can keep the axis on its heels.
North Korean Troops Become Cannon Fodder for Russia
A chance for Ukraine and Trump to set Putin back and drive a wedge between Pyongyang and Moscow.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/north-korean-troops-become-cannon-fodder-for-russia-shows-weakness-in-autocracy-axis-50c0a832?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1
By Seth G. Jones and Benjamin Jensen
Jan. 14, 2025 4:46 pm ET
Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un smile together in Pyongyang, North Korea, June 19, 2024. Photo: Gavriil Grigorov/Associated Press
North Korea’s deployment of soldiers to the battlefield in Ukraine has been an operational disaster. Their troops have performed poorly in combat, failed to integrate with the Russian military, and suffered significant casualties. The debacle calls attention to a larger trend: the critical weaknesses of the axis of autocracies consisting of Russia, North Korea, China and Iran.
Many of the roughly 12,000 North Korean soldiers deployed to the war have been sent to Russia’s Kursk Oblast, where Ukraine conducted a daring counteroffensive and seized Russian territory in August 2024. Although the forces deployed reportedly came from North Korea’s elite Storms Corps, they’re being used in a similar way as Russian prison units: for mine clearance and frontal assaults on fortified positions.
The combined North Korean-Russian forces have failed to take back significant territory in the face of a ferocious Ukrainian defense. The Ukrainian military has even seized additional territory around the Russian town of Sudzha. With distributed company-size attacks, Ukraine destroyed a battalion of North Korean and Russian soldiers. Ukraine effectively used electronic warfare, drone strikes, precision artillery and mechanized-infantry advances to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. Battlefield footage confirms North Korea’s ill-preparedness, showing disorganized retreats and valuable equipment left behind.
South Korean intelligence estimates that North Korea’s forces have suffered around 3,000 casualties—a quarter of the fighting force. At least 300 have been killed. In many battles, such as one near the village of Plekhove, North Korean formations launched costly “meat assaults” that consisted of human-wave attacks. Such casualties are astonishing. For comparison, this rate puts North Korean casualties nearly on par with one of the bloodiest battles of World War I, the Battle of the Somme.
Internal friction between North Korean and Russian forces—sparked by language barriers and insufficient training—is widely reported. In at least one case, these differences led to friendly fire when North Korean troops mistakenly attacked a convoy of Russian paramilitaries, killing eight soldiers.
The Kremlin’s reliance on North Korean forces creates an opportunity for Ukraine. By targeting these vulnerable units, Ukrainian forces can erode Russian combat effectiveness while sowing discord within the axis’s coalition. And they can create domestic problems for Vladimir Putin too: He acquired these foreign troops to avoid another mobilization. Destroying them will strip him of that luxury.
The Moscow-Pyongyang alliance extends beyond the front lines, however. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, North Korea has exported to Moscow several million artillery shells, short-range ballistic missiles and other munitions. In return, Moscow has supplied Pyongyang with advanced technology for satellites, air-defense equipment and millions of barrels of oil. There are even reports that North Korea plans to ask for nuclear technology from Russia. China and Iran have helped as well.
But the Trump administration can exploit these growing relationships too. By highlighting Mr. Putin’s treatment of North Korea’s troops as mere cannon fodder, Donald Trump can drive a wedge between Moscow and Pyongyang. The administration should also push back on the false narrative that the axis of Russia, North Korea, China and Iran is on the ascendancy. The North Korean failure in Russia, combined with the fall of Iran’s proxies in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza, points to the axis’ weakness.
As the failure of North Korea’s troops in Russia shows, coalition warfare requires more than ideological alignment. It requires shared operational capabilities and mutual trust—elements conspicuously absent in the Russia-North Korea partnership. If Ukraine and President Trump can continue to exploit these problems, then they can keep the axis on its heels.
Mr. Jones is president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Jensen is a senior fellow for the department’s Futures Lab and a professor at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting.
6. Wagner Soldiers ‘Are Just Children’ Compared to North Korean Troops – Ukrainian Commander
Another view of the nKPA (from a single Ukrainian soldier).
Where you stand depends on where you sit.
But what soldier makes a statement like this and how do front line soldiers judge whether the enemy is "morally stable?" Must be a translation issue.
Who is Yuri Bondar? Since this was posted on social media we should ask who may have really posted this? Are these really the words of a Ukrainian soldier (or even a Ukrainian "commander")? Is this someone who is from north Korea or a north Korean sympathizer trying to paint a picture of the nK soldiers?
Ten years of military service yields results? Some nKPA soldiers fire only three live rounds in their entire 10 yer enlistment.
Or maybe on this deployment north Korean soldiers have grown to be 10 feet tall.
Excerpts:
“They are extremely resilient, extremely well-trained, and morally stable.”
He went on: “Their level of small arms proficiency is extremely high – ten years of military service yields results. The number of defense force drones that the enemy managed to shoot down just using small arms is seriously surprising.”
Bondar said that DPRK troops carry out dynamic attacks, often catching Ukrainian defenders “off guard,” capturing positions even when outnumbered. He said that one of the commanders in Kursk told him, “… compared to the soldiers of the DPRK, the Wagner model of 2022 are just children – and I believe him.”
Wagner Soldiers ‘Are Just Children’ Compared to North Korean Troops – Ukrainian Commander
A Ukrainian soldier has described North Koreans fighting in the Kursk region as ‘disciplined, determined and fearless,’ in a post on social media on Saturday.
by Kyiv Post | January 14, 2025, 3:04 pm
kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · January 14, 2025
A Ukrainian soldier has described North Koreans fighting in the Kursk region as ‘disciplined, determined and fearless,’ in a post on social media on Saturday.
by Kyiv Post | January 14, 2025, 3:04 pm
Image from a November video by Ukrainian journalist Andriy Tsaplienko showing North Korean troops undergoing training in the Kursk region. Photo: Telegram
Yuriy Bondar, who served in Ukraine’s 80th separate airborne assault “Galician Lions” brigade, writing on Facebook said his unit was one of the first of Ukraine’s armed forces (AFU) to engage with North Korean troops in the Kursk region, adding that Pyongyang’s troops should not be underestimated:
“They are extremely resilient, extremely well-trained, and morally stable.”
Screenshot from video released by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky allegedly showing a captured North Korean soldier fighting alongside Russian forces in Kursk, Jan. 12. 2025.
He went on: “Their level of small arms proficiency is extremely high – ten years of military service yields results. The number of defense force drones that the enemy managed to shoot down just using small arms is seriously surprising.”
He then went on to corroborate reports, based on a notebook recovered from the body of a North Korean soldier killed, of the tactic they were using to take on Ukrainian drones which he put down to their “psychological resilience.” He said one of the group will act “as bait” to attract the attention of the drone while the others try to ambush it, shooting it down with their personal weapons.
Other Topics of Interest
The BBC reported on Tuesday how the Kyiv housewife was promised her POW husband would be better treated if she committed acts of treason.
Much of what Bondar wrote was supported in comments made to the New York Times (NYT) by “anonymized” Ukrainian soldiers at the weekend, who said that since the North Koreans had arrived fighting in the Kursk region had become “far more ferocious than before.”
An AFU lieutenant using the call sign “Alex” said, “The Koreans … are quite skilled in shooting, they have repeatedly destroyed drones, obviously they were primarily trained for this, so they try to destroy everything in the air.”
A platoon leader, identified as “Oleksii,” told the NYT: “The situation worsened significantly when the North Koreans started arriving. They are pressing our fronts en-masse, finding weak points and breaking through them.”
Bondar said that DPRK troops carry out dynamic attacks, often catching Ukrainian defenders “off guard,” capturing positions even when outnumbered. He said that one of the commanders in Kursk told him, “… compared to the soldiers of the DPRK, the Wagner model of 2022 are just children – and I believe him.”
He said that the DPRK soldiers rarely surrender. If they are wounded, their comrades just step over them leaving them where they lie and they use grenades to blow themselves up as Ukrainian troops approach. He added that the dead are doused with flammable liquid; their faces burned to disguise their identity.
To date Ukrainian authorities say they have only managed to capture three North Koreans, since they arrived in the Kursk region, one succumbing to his wounds shortly after being apprehended and the other two, who were also wounded, have been moved to Kyiv for questioning.
7. Can Donald Trump Really Contain China's Rise to Power?
I wonder what a discussion between Elbridge Colby and Elon Musk would be like?
Excerpts:
Furthermore, members of the administration who favor a consistent, national security-centered policy toward China will need to compete for Trump’s ear with other advisors who are likely to counsel against confronting China. “Kind of pro-China” Elon Musk has a Tesla factory in Shanghai and depends on Chinese supply chains. Not coincidentally, he has repeated Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and made Twitter more friendly to PRC propaganda. Vivek Ramaswamy, co-leader of the proposed “Department of Government Efficiency” along with Musk, has said Washington should abandon Taiwan once the US ramps up its own semiconductor production.
At least part of the incoming administration, including the man in charge, appears inclined to reduce America’s commitment to supporting its own liberal world order, relatively disinterested in nurturing US alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, and unenthusiastic about defending Taiwan. Beijing will not miss any opportunities to expand China’s strategic space at low cost.
Can Donald Trump Really Contain China's Rise to Power?
19fortyfive.com · by Denny Roy · January 15, 2025
Nascent great power China is seeking greater strategic influence within its neighborhood. Although Beijing attempts to cloak its agenda with benevolent-sounding gobbledygook such as Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, the PRC government has two clear objectives. The first is to gain ownership, acknowledged by the international community, over all the disputed territory that China claims. That includes a large swath of the earth’s surface stretching from the Yellow Sea through the East China Sea and Taiwan to encompass most of the South China Sea.
Second, Beijing aims to establish such leverage over the governments of nearby countries that none implements any major policy that Beijing opposes–such as security cooperation with the US or anything that reflects negatively on the Chinese Communist Party leadership.
Some of Beijing’s aspirations are irreconcilable with US strategic primacy in the western Pacific. As China keeps pushing, what kind of resistance is it likely to meet from the new US government? Due to several factors, Trump II will be prone to presiding over significant slippage in America’s position of strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific region.
Some of these factors are beyond Trump’s control. The circumstances underlying the bilateral competition have evolved unfavorably toward the US prior to Trump re-taking office. China’s global economic centrality is more deeply entrenched than ever, with China’s total trade surplus reaching a record high of nearly $1 trillion in 2024. Much of the world accepts China’s interpretation of major political events, viewing China positively and the US negatively. The governments of Muslim-majority countries even ignore Beijing’s systematic mistreatment of China’s Muslim Uyghurs.
More pertinently, China has become a more formidable potential opponent. Power stems from the ability of a state to militarily impose its will. China is not only a technological near-peer of the US, it has established superiority over the US in many important kinds of military manufacturing. Perhaps the most striking is shipbuilding, in which China reportedly enjoys 232 times the US capacity. The PRC navy and coast guards are already numerically larger, and add more new ships annually, than their US counterparts. China can also outproduce the US in other weapons systems such as military aircraft and cruise missiles. While the Pentagon is trying to organize the production of thousands of drones for battlefield use, a Chinese company reportedly received an order from its government for a million kamikaze drones. The US would be in danger of running out of munitions in a Taiwan Strait war.
In addition to these structural disadvantages vis-à-vis China, Trump’s commitment to “containing” China is questionable.
Perhaps the best way a great power can prolong its primacy is to win the support of other countries by persuading them they will benefit from the rules sponsored and enforced by the hegemon. This requires the hegemon to occasionally take a loss—by providing international public goods, for example, or by demonstrating willingness to be constrained by international law. The longer term intangible benefits of prestige and influence arguably compensate for the losses.
Trump, however, favors American unilateralism and is skeptical of international organizations. He insists that US global engagement should be immediately and visibly profitable for Americans. For him, US alliances in the Asia-Pacific do not have value as “force multipliers” in a coalition designed to counter aggressive behavior by China. Rather, he sees allies such as Japan and South Korea as wealthy defense free riders.
In 2020, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte cancelled the Visiting Forces Agreement between the US and the Philippines. Trump’s Secretary of Defense Mark Esper called the move “unfortunate.” Trump, however, said, “I don’t really mind if they would like to do that. It will save a lot of money.”
The returning president also opposes multilateral trade deals, which is why during his first term he quickly withdrew the US from participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Joining the institutions that set the terms of international trade would help America maintain international leadership, but Trump seems to think the downsides are greater.
Based on his public statements, Trump seems very interested in pressuring China into leveling its trade surplus with the US, but not very interested in the geostrategic project of blunting a Chinese bid for regional hegemony. The most salient points of a possible hegemonic conflict between China and the US are the South China Sea and Taiwan. According to the searchable Trump Twitter archive, which logs 80,000 tweets, Trump mentioned the South China Sea only once: “build a massive military complex in the middle of the South China Sea? I don’t think so!” And that was in December 2016, after his first election but before he took office.
Trump has said much more about Taiwan, but his comments are not about how failing to defend Taiwan from forcible unification with China would doom US strategic leadership in the Asia-Pacific. Rather, Trump has said that he resents Taiwan for allegedly taking America’s semiconductor business and for failing to pay the US for protection (both illegitimate complaints), that Taiwan is insignificant compared to China, and that Taiwan is indefensible.
Nominees for senior positions in the Trump II Administration include several people, such as Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz, who are very interested in preventing China from subjugating its neighbors. But there will be a persistent danger that Trump will overrule his China hardliners in the hope of getting a trade agreement with Xi Jinping that Trump can trumpet as a win for the American people.
In the past, Trump has not always backed up senior staff who took tough positions toward China. In April 2018 the Trump Administration forbade US firms from selling components to the Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE because it had violated US sanctions against Iran and North Korea. The US ban probably would have killed ZTE. In May 2018, however, Trump said he was letting ZTE off with a fine as a favor to Xi to facilitate a US-China trade deal. Three days previously, the Chinese government had reportedly agreed to provide $500 million in loans to a theme park in Indonesia affiliated with the Trump Organization.
While Trump’s State Department was “staunch in our support for freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly in Hong Kong” in 2019, Trump conspicuously avoided criticizing the PRC, saying instead it was a “very tough situation” and “I hope it works out for everybody, including China.”
The Trump White House labelled China’s Uyghur policy “genocide” in January 2021, probably at the urging of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. But asked a year later by New York Times interviewers if China was mistreating Uyghurs, Trump said “I would rather not say at this moment.”
Trump’s first administration called for a US ban on TikTok on national security grounds. In 2024, however, Trump abruptly flipped to opposing restrictions on TikTok. Media reports suggested Trump’s change of heart stemmed from a large donation from billionaire Jeff Yass, who is heavily invested in TikTok.
Former President of the United States Donald Trump speaking with supporters at a “Save America” rally at Country Thunder Arizona in Florence, Arizona. By Gage Skidmore.
Furthermore, members of the administration who favor a consistent, national security-centered policy toward China will need to compete for Trump’s ear with other advisors who are likely to counsel against confronting China. “Kind of pro-China” Elon Musk has a Tesla factory in Shanghai and depends on Chinese supply chains. Not coincidentally, he has repeated Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and made Twitter more friendly to PRC propaganda. Vivek Ramaswamy, co-leader of the proposed “Department of Government Efficiency” along with Musk, has said Washington should abandon Taiwan once the US ramps up its own semiconductor production.
At least part of the incoming administration, including the man in charge, appears inclined to reduce America’s commitment to supporting its own liberal world order, relatively disinterested in nurturing US alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, and unenthusiastic about defending Taiwan. Beijing will not miss any opportunities to expand China’s strategic space at low cost.
About the Author: Denny Roy
Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu, who specializes in Asia-Pacific security issues.
19fortyfive.com · by Denny Roy · January 15, 2025
8. Can Ukraine Survive Without U.S. Military Weapons?
There is no clearer statement of the problem than this.
Excerpt:
“This is a combination of an enemy that is determined to destroy us while we are supported by a risk-averse group of allies who want to make sure they are not drawn into the conflict, he concluded. “If Ukraine is to win this war, this disparity has to change, and people have to stop talking about ‘reducing military aid.’”
Can Ukraine Survive Without U.S. Military Weapons?
19fortyfive.com · by Reuben Johnson · January 15, 2025
Key Points and Summary: Ukraine’s survival against Russia hinges on consistent U.S. military aid. With artillery use at 6,000 shells daily and constant equipment and manpower losses, supply disruptions could halt Ukraine’s momentum.
-Meanwhile, Russia’s alliance with North Korea adds a brutal new dimension to the war, as North Korean soldiers employ fanatical tactics on the front lines.
-Despite ongoing U.S. and Western support, risk-averse policies and restricted aid have left Ukraine fighting with limitations against a well-resourced adversary.
-Experts warn that cutting military aid would lead to devastating consequences, making sustained support critical for Ukraine’s ability to resist Russian aggression.
The Ukraine War: From Bad to Worse if Trump Dumps Kyiv?
For months leading up to the 2024 presidential election, the issue of whether Ukraine could survive and continue to fight back against Russia’s military without United States military aid. This line of questioning stems from the unspoken assumption that a second Donald Trump Administration might reduce that aid—or even curtail it altogether.
Since the fall, and more so since Trump’s election victory in November 2024, the prospect of the withdrawal of US military aid seems less likely. However, if assistance to Ukraine was not canceled but just significantly scaled back, the consequences could be severe.
The most crucial point to remember, says a Ukrainian official in Kyiv who spoke to 19FortyFive, is the “constant, static usage of military items on the front lines. Vehicles are destroyed and have to be replaced. Soldiers are either killed – or if wounded have to be withdraw from combat. Reduced manpower causes a loss in firepower and too many vehicles out of action means a loss of mobility.”
Critical Shortages for Ukraine
One of the most serious problems is that of consumables on the battlefield, namely munitions.
This war has seen some of the highest rates of fire for, among other items, artillery shells, which the Ukrainian forces are burning through at a rate of 6,000 rounds per day.
“What most people in the US do not realise ,” said Yuri, a long-time Ukrainian colleague who regularly moves between the front and the rear area, “is the nature of logistics in this conflict. It is like a pipeline. If you do not keep the pipeline running with a steady flow of personnel, ammunition, POL, vehicles, etc. momentum screeches to a halt.”
These kinds of “reductions in military aid will cause the Ukrainian military to gradually lose combat power. Ukrainian cities will suffer more destruction as air defences weaken and more Russian missiles get through,” reads a CSIS study released on the war in late 2023. This dynamic has not changed in the intervening 12 months.
If the flow of munitions is disrupted, then Ukrainian troops have no choice but to fall back, and, as Yuri describes, “it takes three times the effort to reclaim that lost territory than it would have required to defend it.”
North Korea Enters the Fray
“What makes the situation for Ukraine worse,” said Yuri, “is that while the US and others are trying to work out how to send Ukraine less aid or how to limit what targets we are allowed to hit with the weapons we are provided, Moscow has allies willing to send more to support his war effort and without any restrictions whatsoever.”
He was referring to Russian president and former KGB Lt. Col. Vladimir Putin now putting North Korean soldiers into the war, per an arrangement he has made with Kim Jong-un, the current dictator of the regime in Pyongyang.
As a report late last year by the Atlantic Council concludes, the West has imposed only modest sanctions on the DPRK as “punishment” for intervening in the Ukraine war.
M1 Abrams Tank like in Ukraine. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
In the meantime, “Putin has skillfully exploited this fear of escalation, employing a combination of nuclear blackmail and talk of Russian red lines to intimidate Western leaders and convince them to limit their military support for Kyiv while imposing restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. As a result, the Ukrainian army finds itself forced to wage war against a military superpower with one hand tied behind its back,” reads the same report.
Yuri recounts for 19FortyFive just how brutal and devastating the North Korean soldiers are on the front fighting against the Ukrainian military. The phrase “fanatical” enters into numerous descriptions of their actions on the battlefield.
“The North Korean soldiers move forward as if they are almost determined not only to die, but to take others with them in the process,” he stated in a conversation just after the new year. “They will lose an arm or a leg and it does not matter – they will keep moving forward. They will throw themselves into a group of Ukrainian soldiers with a live hand grenade in their hands – killing themselves but trying to take as many Ukrainians with them in the process.”
ATACMS missiles Ukraine wants. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
“This is a combination of an enemy that is determined to destroy us while we are supported by a risk-averse group of allies who want to make sure they are not drawn into the conflict, he concluded. “If Ukraine is to win this war, this disparity has to change, and people have to stop talking about ‘reducing military aid.’”
About the Author: Reuben F. Johnson
Reuben F. Johnson is a survivor of the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and is now an Expert on Foreign Military Affairs with the Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego in Warsaw and has been a consultant to the Pentagon, several NATO governments and the Australian government in the fields of defence technology and weapon systems design. Over the past 30 years he has resided in and reported from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Brazil, the People’s Republic of China and Australia.
19fortyfive.com · by Reuben Johnson · January 15, 2025
9. Geopolitical Consequences of Ukraine’s Defeat
Download the 13 page PDF at this link: https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/IS-612.pdf
Excerpts:
Emboldened China, North Korea, and Iran
China and North Korea decided to strategically align themselves with Russia. This means that a path to disrupting this looming alliance and their revisionist designs in the Indo-Pacific region runs through Russia’s defeat in Ukraine. The argument that the United States ought to prioritize the Indo-Pacific theater over the European theater is problematic.[26] With the exception of the Patriot air defense systems and some air-to-air missiles, the types of weapons the United States has provided Ukraine are different from those it would need to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and the overall stimulation of the U.S. defense sector prior to contingencies with China starting is beneficial for the United States.
Most security assistance to Ukraine is appropriated separately from the Department of Defense’s base budget, meaning it is not funding that the Department of Defense or the U.S. defense industrial base otherwise would have. Over the past almost three years of conflict, the United States has committed a little over $21 billion a year on average in security assistance to Ukraine.[27] In an almost $30 trillion economy, the amount that the United States has spent supporting Ukraine is well worth exhausting Russia and states that support it, in addition to supporting U.S. jobs in many congressional districts.
The West’s collective reticence to decidedly support Ukraine to enable it to win is negatively impacting relations with other nations. Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described aid to Ukraine as “significant, but, at the end of the day, insufficient military support—enough to survive but not enough to bring the war to an end on favourable terms.”[28] At a conference in Estonia, Samir Saran, the head of the Observer Research Foundation, an Indian think tank, “almost mocked” the West’s inability to organize Russia’s battlefield defeat, despite Russia’s economy being twenty times smaller than the West’s.[29] In a stark indictment of the West’s lack of strategic vision and support for a Ukrainian victory, Saran went on to say:
There is one actor that has reorganised its strategic engagement to fight a war and the other has not. One side is not participating in the battle. You have hosted conferences supporting Ukraine and then do nothing more. But when it comes to action, Russia 2.0 is grinding forward. It tells countries like us that if something like this were to happen in the Indo-Pacific, you have no chance against China. If you cannot defeat a $2tn [trillion] nation, don’t think you are deterring China. China is taking hope from your abysmal and dismal performance against a much smaller adversary.[30]
Should Ukraine fail to decisively defeat Russia’s aggression, China and North Korea will likely be emboldened to pursue their more belligerent designs against U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere, and other countries will be less likely to resist them; they will be less certain of U.S. backing. In the words of Adm. Rob Bauer, the Dutch chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, North Korea went from “the most isolated country in the world” to “a player.”[31] He went on to ask “If you allow a nation like Russia to win, to come out of this as the victor, then what does it mean for other autocratic states in the world where the U.S. has also interests?”[32]
When the United States and its allies decided to align themselves with Ukraine, and China and North Korea decided to align themselves with Russia, the conflict took on much greater meaning than “just” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. No degree of denial on Washington’s (and the West’s) part can help it escape that reality. Therefore, in perceptions, Ukraine’s defeat would inevitably become the West’s defeat (and America’s), exacerbating U.S. geopolitical challenges globally.
Michaela Dodge, Geopolitical Consequences of Ukraine’s Defeat, No. 612, January 13, 2025
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Geopolitical Consequences of Ukraine’s Defeat
Dr. Michaela Dodge
Dr. Michaela Dodge is a Research Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy.
https://nipp.org/information_series/michaela-dodge-geopolitical-consequences-of-ukraines-defeat-no-612-january-13-2025/
Russia’s economic and societal adaptation for a long war is leaving Ukraine outgunned and outmanned, and its allies are left to scramble for ammunition around the world.[1] The bravery and dedication of the Ukrainians fighting for their loved ones and their country will become a part of future case studies on maintaining resilience, innovation, and morale against significant odds. Nevertheless, the worrisome trends, including a disadvantage in manpower, ammunition production and long-range weapons, leave a Ukrainian defeat a possibility, especially without U.S. help.[2] Perhaps just as worrisome are societal trends and what appears to be somewhat diminished support for aid to Ukraine.[3]
The United States has significant interests in Europe that are worth defending. The United States and the European Union (EU) plus the United Kingdom account for almost half of the world economy.[4] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states in Europe are America’s largest export market.[5] Ukraine is a part of Europe. What would be the geopolitical consequences of Ukraine’s defeat? In other words, why is it essential for the West, including the United States, to continue to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s unjustified, illegal, and brutal invasion?
Russia’s Threat to U.S. Interests in Europe Would Increase
Ukraine’s defeat would bring Russia geopolitically closer to Europe, including toward allies that used to be a part of the Warsaw Pact but joined the Alliance after the end of the Cold War.[6] It would be a humanitarian disaster for millions of Ukrainians who would be subjected to forced russification and brutalized by Russia. Putin would like to erase Ukraine as an independent state and Russia’s installed puppet regime would be organized to suppress Ukrainian language and culture.[7] Russia’s imperialism would not end with the conquest of Ukraine, and could be turned toward Moldova, Georgia, or even NATO countries that joined the Alliance since the end of the Cold War.
Russia’s leaders have always been offended by Russia’s diminished political influence in the former Warsaw Pact areas as a consequence of these states’ integration into Western political and military structures. That is also why various Russia’s “peace” proposals include what would effectively mean the restoration of Russia’s sphere of influence on former Warsaw Pact territories, including some current NATO member states.[8]
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is already a challenge to alliance cohesion because the perception of Russia as a threat to NATO differs within the Alliance, with countries closer to Russia’s border being generally more concerned about Russia’s imperialist designs and capabilities than countries farther away. Ukraine’s potential subjugation would be just the beginning of Russia’s post-Cold War aggression.
If Russia were able to conquer Ukraine and establish a more robust and permanent political and military presence there, its new geopolitical center of gravity would open further opportunities for Moscow’s hostile activities against targets in Europe, which could be conducted through proxies. Ukraine borders Hungary and Slovakia, both countries currently under governments that are sympathetic to Russia’s interests. It is conceivable that Russia could use geographical proximity to further infiltrate the European Union (EU) because Slovakia and Hungary are a part of the Schengen area and their governments are currently friendly with Moscow, unlike, for example, the Finnish government that can be trusted to protect its borders.[9] Europe is already concerned about Russia’s sabotage, and enabling additional opportunities for Russia to infiltrate it is likely to worsen the matter.[10] Russia has subjected NATO countries to cyber attacks, energy blackmail, and even killed citizens of NATO member countries.[11] These types of activities could lead to the destabilization of governments in targeted countries, the undermining of NATO and the EU, and, accompanied by Russia’s propaganda, an increase in anti-Americanism.[12]
Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”[13] Should Russia win in Ukraine, Moscow could call into question the integrity of NATO members’ commitment to Article V, even though Ukraine is not a NATO member state and its members are not pledged to come to its defense. Expressing the sentiment, Marko Mihkelson, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Estonian Parliament, asked in an aftermath of a particularly brutal attacks against Ukrainian civilians “If the great powers of the free world allow Russia to destroy a democratic European power before our eyes with impunity, what makes Russia believe that we will strike back if they attack a NATO country?”[14] If Russia defeats Ukraine, the United States would lose credibility as a guarantor of today’s global security architecture; an architecture that has allowed billions of people to prosper beyond any comparable time in humankind’s history. In fact, former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen said with regard to deterring China from a cross-strait attack that “A Ukrainian victory will serve as the most effective deterrent to future aggression.”[15] Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu argued that if the United States abandons Ukraine, China would “take it as a hint” that the United States and its allies would “back off” in the case of China’s sustained action against Taiwan.[16] The consequence would be a less prosperous world order that is less safe for the Americans, their allies, and the Free World’s interests.
Strain on U.S. Alliances Would Increase
NATO countries that are close to Russia’s borders like Estonia or Lithuania are already concerned about Russia’s long-term military potential because of Moscow’s economic war mobilization. These countries on average provide more assistance to Ukraine than the rest of NATO as a percentage of their GDP,[17] and have significantly increased their defense budgets.[18] In some cases, the effort to recapitalize and modernize their militaries started well before Russia’s full-scale invasion.[19]
Russia’s victory could add Ukraine’s resources to strengthen Moscow’s military power—and with an increase in military power would come an increase in Russia’s belligerence and imperial ambitions. Russia would seek to utilize Ukraine’s resources, including rare earths, steel, and technical expertise, to augment its own economy, currently focused on war production. Prior to war, Ukraine was the seventh largest global wheat producer with a majority of its exports going to Egypt and Indonesia.[20] Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused a two to three percent spike in wheat prices.[21] Russia is already plundering the territories it occupies in Ukraine, including forcing conscription and mobilization of the population in occupied southeastern Ukraine.[22] Russia’s future imperial ambitions would likely be centered around NATO countries, particularly those that were in the Soviet sphere of influence or a part of the Warsaw Pact.[23]
European NATO countries already face a near- to medium-term requirement to reinvigorate their militaries and defense sectors and increase defense spending. So far, the pace of most NATO countries doing so has been disappointing given the magnitude of the threat. In the future, NATO will either have to contend with a geopolitically closer, more aggressive, and emboldened Russia that wants to build on its success in Ukraine, or it will have to step up its support for Ukraine so that Ukraine can decisively defeat Russia,[24] and then rearm to deter any possible future Russian attack. Increasing European NATO members’ defense spending would also have the benefit of demonstrating that NATO Europe is taking its own security seriously and would help counter the “Europe is free loading” narrative that is becoming more prevalent within the U.S. political discourse.
The fiscal cost of helping Ukraine defeat Russia is arguably less than the United States would have to spend to reassure allies of America’s commitment to their security in the wake of Ukraine’s defeat. The United States would also have to bolster its military to deter, and if necessary, defeat Russia—and other states, e.g. China, that would be emboldened in the wake of Ukraine’s defeat.
Russia’s goals are not just regional, the subjugation of Ukraine, but are a symptom of Moscow’s broader desire for a confrontation with the West and for replacing the U.S.-led global security order with one led by authoritarian dictatorships, including Russia.[25] China would be the leader of this new China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea alliance, and the challenge they would present to the U.S.-led alliance structure and prosperity is serious.
Continued at this link: https://nipp.org/information_series/michaela-dodge-geopolitical-consequences-of-ukraines-defeat-no-612-january-13-2025/
10. Drone War in Ukraine: Bombers, Kamikaze Strikes and Dogfights in the Sky
Drone War in Ukraine: Bombers, Kamikaze Strikes and Dogfights in the Sky
19fortyfive.com · by David Hambling · January 15, 2025
Key Points and Summary: A new era of warfare is unfolding in Ukraine, where small drones dominate the skies in battles reminiscent of WWI’s early air combat.
-These inexpensive and versatile machines have transformed tactics, from kamikaze-style attacks to sophisticated AI-driven interceptors.
-Ukraine’s FPV drones counter Russia’s reconnaissance fleet, significantly disrupting artillery operations. The war also highlights the rapid evolution of drone technology, including armed drones and drone escorts. With over 1.2 million drones fielded by Ukraine last year, traditional airpower faces unprecedented challenges.
-This drone revolution, still in its infancy, signals a dramatic shift in modern combat and the importance of drone superiority.
Air War 2.0: How Small Drones Fight
A new type of air war is unfolding in Ukraine, one with curious echoes of WW1 and the early days of air combat. It is a battle of drone versus drone, with tactics and technology for attack and defense evolving fast. It is happening in a parallel universe to traditional air warfare, a space where existing weapons have been unable to reach.
Victory in this sphere will have insurmountable significance – greater perhaps than winning air superiority in previous wars.
Air War Beneath the Jets
In 2017, the Allies completely dominated the sky over Mosul during the operation to retake the city from ISIS militants. The United States Air Force A-10 Warthogs, Navy F/A-18s, and Marine Corps Harriers provided close air support while B-52 Stratofortresses delivered bombs from high altitude, collectively hitting up to 500 targets a week in the most intense phase of an air campaign against ISIS.
Simultaneously, allied forces on the ground were coming under an air attack.
ISIS was among the first groups to weaponize small consumer quadcopters, turning them into bombers dropping grenades and other small munitions. These were not used effectively and lacked anti-armor capability, but they caused casualties and delays among the attacking forces. At times, there were as many as a dozen ISIS drones in operation, and according to one BBC correspondent, bombs “fell like rain.”
“This last year’s most daunting problem was an adaptive enemy who, for a time, enjoyed tactical superiority in the airspace under our conventional air superiority in the form of commercially available drones,” Gen. Raymond Thomas told a Special Operations Forces Industry Conference.
US air defense systems were designed to tackle jets, helicopters, cruise missiles, and other large and fast-moving threats. Small, slow-moving aerial objects were of no interest, and radar systems usually filter out such objects as they are assumed to be birds.
Surface-to-air missiles, like the 1500-pound Mach 2 Pac-3 Patriot, can take out the most agile, high-performance aircraft even at extreme altitudes. But a Patriot is an impractical weapon for shooting down a $2,000 drone. And while an F-35 can shoot down small quadcopters, it will quickly run out of AIM-9X SideWinder missiles costing $2 million each. Even shoulder-fired Stinger missiles are in short supply and can cost $500k a shot.
Air War Ukraine
With hindsight, the proliferation of drones that are too numerous, too small, or too low for conventional air defenses would present a massive challenge. The challenges of battling drones has proven to be a new dynamic in Ukraine. While there are some instances of drones being shot down by missiles, SAMs are generally conserved for more valuable targets.
Drones have given rise to a new form of air war. It was inevitable that drones from the two sides would cross paths, and the first ever ‘drone dogfight’ was recorded in October 2022. An unarmed Ukrainian Mavic reconnaissance drone tackled and brought down its Russian counterpart.
Lancet Drone. Image Credit: Russian State Media.
When an enemy drone is an imminent threat, for example, directing artillery fire, an operator might decide to sacrifice their own machine by crashing into the opposing drone and destroying both. But skilled pilots soon developed more sophisticated tactics.
Drones have rotors on top, and their cameras point downwards. The ideal approach is to come from above, taking advantage of the enemy’s blind spot, and descend rapidly. The attacking drone’s body strikes the target’s whirling rotor blades. At least one blade will break and send the enemy drone spinning out of control to the ground, leaving the attacking drone undamaged.
Numerous such encounters followed, and both sides soon started work on dedicated interceptors. The Russians used their drones against Ukraine’s ‘Baba Yaga’ night bomber platform, while Ukraine set their sights much higher.
The Fixed Wing Threat
During this conflict, Russia has relied on its massive advantage in heavy artillery to pound Ukrainian positions. In recent months, the bombardment has been supplemented with hundreds of precision-guided glide bombs tossed from outside the range of air defenses, plus strikes with Lancet loitering munitions.
Such attacks all rely on precise intelligence about the positions of Ukrainian forces provided by ubiquitous drones. Russia has a mixed fleet of Orlan-10 and -30, ZALA, SuperCam drones, and others. Each type is typically assigned a specific role guiding airstrikes, artillery, or loitering munitions. The most common is the Orlan-10, which has a wingspan of 10 feet and a flight endurance of more than 12 hours.
Up until last summer, these platforms were able to operate freely in Russian-controlled airspace from where they could overlook Ukrainian positions.
Then, Ukraine started deploying interceptors. Ukraine uses FPV drones for this action. These drones are derived from high-speed racing quadcopters and are extensively used to attack tanks and other ground targets. With enhanced batteries and, crucially, a system that allowed air-defense radar to hand off the location of air targets to drone operators, a whole new type of warfare began.
At first, a few, then dozens, and then hundreds of videos were released on social media showing the intercept process. The FPV homes in on the reconnaissance drone’s position and approaches from above and behind, matching speed and vector and slowly moving into kill range. When close enough, the FPV operator detonates a shrapnel warhead, destroying both drones.
The interceptors cost $750 each compared to over $100k for a fixed-wing recon drone, so the exchange is more than worthwhile. More importantly, taking out these drones blinds Russian commanders. Artillery and other long-range systems become useless when they cannot see a target. Between August and September, when the intercept campaign took effect, strikes by Russian Lancet loitering munitions dropped from 180 to 81 and remained low.
Harop Suicide Drone. Image Credit: Industry Handout.
Evolution In Fast Forward on Drones
Seeing their drones repeatedly taken out, the Russians took action. Unlike larger and more complex systems, these weapons evolve fast, which cannot be modified quickly and easily.
One simple development was fitting the reconnaissance drones with a rear-facing camera. This addition can be something as simple as a cellphone camera. Still, it gives the drone pilot situational awareness and allows the pilot to take evasive action when they see an FPV coming. The added rear camera makes it more challenging for the interceptor pilot. If the target dodges long enough, the FPV will run out of battery power, as they only have 20 minutes or so of flight time. However, skilled interceptor pilots can still make the kill.
Another approach is fitting the recon drones with radio-frequency jammers. These detect the signal from an incoming FPV, lock, and broadcast noise to break the link with the operator. This strategy may succeed, but the need for the recon drone itself to maintain a video link and control signal limits its effectiveness.
Both sides have also developed net launchers, which, unlike an explosive charge, can be fired without damaging the drone that launches the net. There are no confirmed cases of Russian drones armed with rear-firing net guns, but designs have been discussed on Russian Telegram channels. Another proposal, not yet seen, is to trail long wires or streamers behind a drone to tangle the rotor blades of an approaching attacker.
The interceptor platforms are also evolving fast. While the initial version was essentially a repurposed ground-attack FPV, new designs are emerging. Ukrainian nonprofit drone makers Wild Hornets are already fielding a new type called Sting, a highly aerodynamic, bullet-shaped interceptor. A similar design, used to film Formula 1 racing, can reach over 200 mph.
With Sting, Wild Hornets want to extend the capability to bring down not just reconnaissance drones but also the larger Iranian-designed Shahid drones, which are hitting Ukraine on a high basis. In addition, Ukrainian FPV operators have already downed several Russian helicopters, but this takes a lot of luck as helicopters are so much faster. High-speed interceptors make such kills far more likely.
A Russian tank under attack by a drone from Ukraine. Image Credit: YouTube/Ukrainian military.
A recent Wild Hornets video shows the air launch of one of its interceptors. The group makes the Queen Hornet, a giant FPV drone with a 15-pound payload able to carry other drones and act as a flying radio relay. This technique allows operators to position a carrier in a region where enemy air activity is expected and only launch the interceptor drones when needed.
Interceptors have scored kills as high as 12,000 feet, an achievement likely made possible with air launch.
In another development, in late December, a video was released of a Ukrainian drone with a shotgun-type weapon blasting Russian quadcopters out of the sky. Such armament may become standard for interceptors and defensive mounts for larger drones, just as machine guns became standard on all combat aircraft during WW1.
Russia also appears to be developing more advanced interceptors, like the Vogan-9SP, which have not yet appeared in action.
Tactics are also evolving. We are already seeing cases of drone escorts, both for large drones and for ground units – one video from January 7th shows a Russian FPV providing cover for a tank and intercepting a drone bomber before it attacks.
Future Conflicts
It is tempting to assume that this will evolve into a WWII pattern, with packages of attack drones and fighter escorts being met by squadrons of interceptors or fighter sweeps across enemy territory to establish superiority. However, history does not repeat itself exactly. Things could be very different even in a year.
The other central question is where this leaves traditional airpower. Again, it might be natural to believe that in the next war, crewed aviation will continue as before. But the proliferation of large numbers of small armed or explosive hazards at up to 12,000 feet – Ukraine fielded more than 1.2 million drones last year – may keep aircraft and helicopters well back from the combat zone.
Bayraktar TB2 of the Ukrainian Air Force.
Finally, it is important to stress that the situation is evolving fast. Dedicated interceptor drones have been around for less than a year. In aviation terms, we may be in 1916, with significant developments ahead that will make the next generation unrecognizable. The most important limitations of small drones are the need for a link to the pilot and the pilot’s dogfighting skills. AI systems already fielded on a small scale in Ukraine remove these limitations. Expect smart, agile, autonomous fighters working in coordinated teams.
The drone war has become a key aspect of ground combat. Whoever gains superiority wins a massive advantage: with drone superiority, they can see and strike the enemy, who cannot see or strike them. Hopefully, Pentagon analysts are paying close attention. Russia may be behind Ukraine, but they have a big head start on the rest of the world, and China, the world’s largest producer of small drones, is learning how to put its capability to military use.
About the Author: David Hambling
David Hambling is a London-based journalist, author and consultant specializing in defense technology with over 20 years’ experience. He writes for Aviation Week, Forbes, The Economist, New Scientist, Popular Mechanics, WIRED and others. His books include “Weapons Grade: How Modern Warfare Gave Birth to Our High-tech World” (2005) and “Swarm Troopers: How small drones will conquer the world” (2015). He has been closely watching the continued evolution of small military drones. Follow him on X: @David_Hambling.
19fortyfive.com · by David Hambling · January 15, 2025
11. The United States Can’t Afford to Not Harden its Air Bases
Excerpt:
Executing an effective campaign to enhance the resilience of U.S. airfield operations will require informed decisions to prioritize projects and sustained funding. What is clear, however, is that U.S. airfields do face the threat of attack, and the current approach of largely ignoring this menace invites Chinese aggression and risks losing a war. Passive defenses, including hardening, are essential, and other countries have invested heavily in them to sustain airfield operations amidst attack. It is past time for the United States to do so again.
The United States Can’t Afford to Not Harden its Air Bases - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Thomas Shugart · January 15, 2025
For decades, the United States has relied on airpower and the qualitative superiority of its aircraft to gain an advantage over its adversaries. But that advantage is rapidly eroding. The Chinese military is fielding sophisticated air defense networks that include robust passive defenses, challenging sensors, and highly capable missiles and aircraft. In fact, by our calculations, the amount of concrete used by China to improve the resilience of its air base network could pave a four-lane highway from Washington, D.C. to Chicago.
China’s strike forces of aircraft, ground-based missile launchers, and special forces can attack U.S. airfields globally. The U.S. Department of Defense has consistently expressed concern regarding threats to airfields, and military analyses of potential conflicts involving China and the United States demonstrate that most U.S. aircraft losses would likely occur on the ground at airfields. Despite these concerns, the U.S. military has devoted relatively little attention to countering these threats compared to its focus on developing modern aircraft.
U.S. airpower concepts have largely assumed that U.S. forces would deploy to forward airfields uncontested and that small-scale forward threats to airfields could be nullified. However, China is capable of mounting large-scale, sustained attacks against U.S. and allied airfields in the Indo-Pacific elsewhere. To generate airpower amid this onslaught, U.S. and allied forces need to devote a radical level of effort to learn how to “fight in the shade.”
This is the subject of our new report for the Hudson Institute. In the report, we make two observations. First, China seems to expect its airfields to come under heavy attack in a potential conflict and has made major investments to defend, expand, and fortify them. Second, American investments have been much smaller in scale and scope. Given the Chinese military’s threat to air bases, the United States needs to both be ready to disperse and undertake an urgent campaign to rapidly harden the bases that it and its allies and partners need to operate from in the event of a conflict with China. America has done so before in the face of other threats. To not do so today invites aggression — and could result in losing a major war.
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Dealing with Past Threats
The U.S. Air Force has contended with varying levels and types of threats to its air bases. First, during the 1950s, concerns about the vulnerability of NATO air bases to nuclear attack led to the development of a dispersed operating concept to mitigate damage from nuclear and conventional attacks. Later, during the Vietnam War, aircraft losses due to mortar and rocket attacks prompted the Air Force to initiate the Concrete Sky program — a crash effort to build hardened aircraft shelters at the Air Force’s main operating bases in Vietnam. From 1968 to 1970, the Air Force built 373 such shelters, which it found to be effective in defeating attacks. It also conducted a study of air base vulnerability that prompted the construction of hardened aircraft shelters at air bases in Europe and the Pacific. The United States and its allies built roughly 1,000 by the end of the Cold War, including more than 100 in Japan.
In the first decades after the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force operated in support of U.S. combat operations from locations of relative sanctuary. About a decade into this period, analysts began to recognize that new weapons combining satellite-guided precision, long ranges, and submunitions could provide an otherwise inferior adversary with the means to disrupt or defeat U.S. Air Force combat and airlift operations in a conflict. For example, a 1999 RAND study estimated that — if sufficiently accurate and equipped with submunitions — a single Chinese ballistic missile could damage scores of American fighters parked at standard spacing intervals on an open ramp.
Hardening in the Indo-Pacific
To support of an invasion of Taiwan, open source Chinese publications call for seizing air dominance by using surprise attacks to destroy and paralyze an opponent’s air force on the ground. In recent decades, the Chinese military has been building what appear to be the capabilities to carry this out. China’s air force has developed a large force of cruise-missile-equipped strike aircraft. China’s Rocket Force has acquired over 1,000 medium-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting air bases across Japan and the Philippines, and 500 intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching Guam and the other Mariana Islands. That strike force — combining long range, precision guidance, and in some cases submunitions — appears to have made real the threat to U.S. air bases that analysts began to talk about years ago.
Analysts have explicitly called out robust passive defenses, such as hardened shelters for aircraft, as “the most cost-effective ways to improve air base resilience.” Unfortunately, Air Force leaders have a mixed record when it comes to base hardening. In 2022, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall voiced support for hardening Air Force bases in the Pacific, but the next year the then-Pacific Air Forces commander said he did not see base hardening as a cost-effective way to respond.
Since the early 2010s, the U.S. military has added only two hardened shelters and 41 non-hardened ones at airfields within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait and outside of South Korea. It also does not appear likely to add any new hardened shelters anytime soon. Including allied airfields outside Taiwan, combined military airfield capacity within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait is roughly one-third of China’s. As can be seen in Figure 1, without airfields in South Korea this ratio drops to one-quarter, and without airfields in the Philippines it falls to 15 percent.
To figure out what China has done to make its air bases resilient, we used commercial satellite imagery to generate estimates of the aggregate improvements to its air bases. In summary, China’s efforts dwarf those of the United States. Entering the 2010s with about 370 hardened shelters, the Chinese military has more than doubled that number, to over 800. The number of non-hardened shelters also more than doubled, giving China a total of more than 3,100 aircraft shelters — enough to shelter the vast majority of its combat aircraft. Over roughly the last decade, China has also added numerous runways and runway-length taxiways, and increased its ramp area nationwide by almost 75 percent. It now has 134 air bases within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait. These bases boast more than 650 hardened shelters and almost 2,000 non-hardened shelters.
Figure 1: Comparison of features at Chinese, U.S., and allied airfields within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, by location
This has created an imbalance (see Figure 2) in which Chinese forces would need to fire far fewer “shots” to suppress or destroy U.S., allied, and partner airfields than the converse. This imbalance ranges from approximately 25 percent to as great as 88 percent if the United States employed only military airfields in Japan. Strategically, this asymmetry risks incentivizing Beijing to exercise a first-mover advantage — China could strike first if it sees an opportunity to nullify adversary airpower on the ramp.
Figure 2: Estimated munitions required to neutralize airfields, by location
Recommendations
The United States can continue to largely ignore this menace and watch as risk levels increase, or it can face the reality and shape its forces and infrastructure to prevail.
One element of a competitive strategy to gain an advantage is to paradoxically motivate China to double-down on its defensive investment. To do so, the United States should continue improving its ability to strike Chinese forces and key critical infrastructure. By influencing Beijing to spend funds on additional defense measures, Washington can reduce the relative proportion of funds for alternative investments, including strike capabilities.
A strong offense alone, however, will not solve the Defense Department’s problems. Without a baseline level of resilience, it is reasonable to expect U.S. air offensive capabilities will be suppressed in a conflict. Thankfully, the suite of specific improvements is straightforward.
Defend Airfields
First, active defenses are essential to sustained air operations. In the 1980s, amid the threat of Soviet conventional air and ground attacks, the U.S. Army committed itself to “fund, equip, and man ground-based air defenses” as well as air base perimeter defense, for Air Force bases. Those Cold War agreements lapsed in the 1990s and early 2000s, and Army investments in air defense artillery forces have been relatively modest since.
Air base defense is arguably the most important mission the Army could perform in the Indo-Pacific, and Congress should robustly fund the air defense branch. Given competing priorities in the Army budget, this will require accelerating and deepening the Army’s shift of personnel and resources away from ground maneuver forces and toward air defense artillery.
Harden Airfields
Passive defenses are “the most-cost-effective ways to improve air base resilience.” But the military services have spent relatively little on them, which can include not only hardening but also redundancy measures, prepositioning of supplies, reconstitution capabilities, and camouflage, concealment, and deception measures.
To comprehensively harden airfields, the Defense Department will need to shift from treating each construction project individually to conducting a campaign of construction. A major, multi-year campaign of bundled construction at airfields inside and outside the United States — especially in the Indo-Pacific — would create a sustained push for military construction activities at bases, allow the creation of consortia of commercial contractors, and reduce construction costs.
Over the past couple of decades, there has been growing recognition that the U.S. military needs to invest much more in passive airfield defenses. Fiscal limits and a preference for funding other military systems, such as aircraft, have driven a lack of action. Congress could direct the department to rapidly compose a report that assesses the worldwide U.S. demand for airfield resilience measures, including hardened shelters, hardened fuel stores, reconstitution systems, and the like, and to prioritize funding a percentage of the demand each year in its budget submission.
Similarly, Congress could adopt an approach to directly identify and fund these systems. For example, for every new combat aircraft, it will acquire a new personnel bunker, hardened shelter, munitions bunker, or hardened fuel store for an airfield in the United States and another one in the Indo-Pacific. It should also explicitly authorize and appropriate the construction of shelters for high-value aircraft in the United States, such as the B-21, and ensure military construction proposals in the Indo-Pacific account for threats and are hardened. Of note, Congress recently authorized $289 million for hardened aircraft shelters at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, though the Air Force requested no such funds and it is unclear whether Congress will appropriate those funds.
Absent a major topline budget increase, the Defense Department will need to fund these investments by decreasing spending in other areas, such as reducing funding for the Department of the Army or aircraft procurement. Although reducing aircraft procurement is problematic, modest trades could have outsized positive effects. For example, procuring one fewer B-21 per year over five years could provide enough funding to build 100 hardened shelters in the continental United States, ensuring that in a conflict, Chinese forces will not be able to easily destroy the B-21 fleet in the United States. By buying one fewer F-15EX or F-35A per year, the Defense Department could resource 20 new hardened shelters in the Western Pacific each year.
Evolve the Force
The Defense Department should also accelerate the development and fielding of forces that enable operations that are less susceptible to China’s airfield attacks. This includes long-range aircraft and aircraft and weapons that can operate from short or damaged runways or operate independently of them. However, the U.S. military will not field these types of forces in large numbers until the 2030s, and it will still require active and passive defenses at airfields regardless of these changes in force design.
Counterarguments and Conclusion
Passive defenses may seem at odds with a predominantly expeditionary U.S. approach to warfare. Why spend limited resources on defenses at home and abroad when the U.S. plans on projecting power overseas? However, unless U.S. forces can defend airfields at home and abroad, they will be unable to support U.S. and allied interests in a conflict. As we consider investments in this area, we should be cautious of three seemingly sensible counterarguments.
“Hardening is not cost-effective — instead, rely on dispersal.”
In general, investments in other passive defenses are less costly and have a higher tactical benefit return than hardening. This has led some observers to think hardening is not cost-effective and is unwise. Even though hardening is relatively expensive and, in some cases, may be lower on the priority list of passive defenses, it is highly valuable, and a range of passive defense measures is necessary.
“U.S. forces need only do X.”
Some analyses overestimate the positive impact of single or limited facets of passive defenses, such as runway reconstitution or expeditionary fuel storage. Sustained air combat operations require an interdependent system of systems of personnel, fuel, munitions, maintenance, and other support assets. As it considers investments, the U.S. military will need to holistically enhance the passive defenses of airfields. This may require it to prioritize funding a comprehensive set of improvements to a limited number of locations, rather than attempting to field disjointed improvements to many sites.
“Forget hardening — rather, operate from range.”
Facing major threats to airfields in the Western Pacific, the Department of Defense could forgo fortifying airfields that could come under attack and instead adopt a force design that attempts to operate solely from range. Although the force design of U.S. air forces has become heavily reliant on short-range forces, the strategy of completely retiring from forward airfields has three flaws. First, operative forward airfields can provide three to five times as much capacity on station as distant airfields. Consequently, unless the size of U.S. air forces dramatically increases, they will be necessary to provide appropriate levels of capacity. Second, there is no sanctuary. China will likely be capable in the future of attacking U.S. forces at great distances — even within the continental United States. Third, it takes time to adjust force design. Given current airfield manufacturing timelines, it would likely take more than a decade for the Department of Defense to adopt enough long-range combat aircraft, tankers, and weapons to enable a solely stand-off approach or to adopt sufficient runway-independent capabilities. Such future forces will not solve current airfield challenges, and the ability to operate a major proportion of U.S. aircraft from forward airfields would still be highly valuable.
Executing an effective campaign to enhance the resilience of U.S. airfield operations will require informed decisions to prioritize projects and sustained funding. What is clear, however, is that U.S. airfields do face the threat of attack, and the current approach of largely ignoring this menace invites Chinese aggression and risks losing a war. Passive defenses, including hardening, are essential, and other countries have invested heavily in them to sustain airfield operations amidst attack. It is past time for the United States to do so again.
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Thomas Shugart is a retired U.S. Navy submarine warfare officer. He is an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and the founder of Archer Strategic Consulting.
Timothy A. Walton is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
Image: Tech. Sgt. Eric Summers (U.S. Air Force)
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Thomas Shugart · January 15, 2025
12. Biden in late push to boost Indo-Pacific ties sends three pacts to Congress
If this is so important, why wait until now?
Biden in late push to boost Indo-Pacific ties sends three pacts to Congress
AP · January 14, 2025
WASHINGTON (AP) — The Biden administration is seeking to shore up ties with countries in the Indo-Pacific in its waning days in office by sending to Congress three key agreements that would cement relations with critical allies and partners in a region increasingly dominated by China.
In separate notices sent to lawmakers on Tuesday, President Joe Biden asked for their approval of a civil nuclear cooperation deal with Thailand and the ratification of free association agreements with the Pacific island nations of Palau and the Marshall Islands.
None of the agreements is expected to meet with significant opposition from the incoming Trump administration, which in its last two years in office in 2019 and 2020 also sought to improve U.S. relations with these countries and their neighbors, mainly to counter growing Chinese influence.
The 30-year civil nuclear agreement with Thailand, which will take effect in 90 days barring congressional objections, will allow the transfer of sensitive but unclassified nuclear equipment, material and information designed to help the Southeast Asian nation meet its growing energy needs.
The so-called “compacts of free association” with Palau and the Marshall Islands, along with one for the Federated States of Micronesia, were approved in general by lawmakers earlier this year. But on Tuesday, Biden sent to Capitol Hill the specifics of the $7.1 billion agreements for Palau and the Marshall Islands.
Under the terms of the deals, the island nations will benefit from a variety of U.S. agencies, notably disaster relief, weather forecasting and postal services. And, in the documents released on Tuesday, banks based in Palau and the Marshall Islands will be eligible to apply for backing from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for their financial institutions.
FDIC insurance protects account holders from bank insolvency by guaranteeing that deposits up to a certain limit are covered by the federal government.
The Freely Associated States have a combined population of less than 200,000 spread across more than 1,000 islands and atolls, about 4,000 kilometers (2,500 miles) southwest of Hawaii.
In addition to Guam, the three states give the U.S. military a forward presence in the Pacific, including a missile test facility in the Marshall Islands and a high-frequency radar system being built in Palau.
The countries have had strong ties to the U.S. since American forces liberated them from Imperial Japan in World War II, but China has been working hard to win influence among them.
AP · January 14, 2025
13. 12-nation airborne drill in Japan focuses on defending remote islands
This is likely timed with the anniversary of Japan's airborne forces and its annual celebration. I recall being at Camp Narashino on a Sunday in January some 23 years ago with only a handful of Americans celebrating this anniversary on a very cold day while drinking hot sake out of bamboo cups.
They have come a long way.
Excerpt:
Airborne troops from the United States, Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Poland, the Philippines and Singapore participated in Sunday’s drill, a Japan Ground Self-Defense spokesman said by phone Tuesday.
12-nation airborne drill in Japan focuses on defending remote islands
Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson and Hana Kusumoto · January 14, 2025
Japan Ground Self-Defense paratroopers jump from an Air Force C-130J Super Hercules assigned to the 36th Airlift Squadron at Yokota Air Base in western Tokyo, Jan. 12, 2025. (Yasuo Osakabe/U.S. Air Force)
YOKOTA AIR BASE, Japan — American troops recently joined a 12-nation parachute drill near Tokyo to hone skills needed to recapture remote islands.
Airborne troops from the United States, Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Poland, the Philippines and Singapore participated in Sunday’s drill, a Japan Ground Self-Defense spokesman said by phone Tuesday.
Some Japanese government officials may speak to the press only on condition of anonymity.
Japan has been strengthening its ability to defend its southernmost islands, some of which are also claimed by China. The islands could become battlegrounds if war breaks out over nearby Taiwan.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has stated his intent to reunite the self-governing and democratic island with the mainland, by force if necessary.
Sunday’s operation began with U.S. Air Force C-130J Super Hercules from the 36th Airlift Squadron loading 20 U.S. Army and 46 Japanese paratroopers at Yokota in western Tokyo, according to a 374th Airlift Wing news release that day.
“The key objectives of these drops were to celebrate long-standing traditions, while increasing combat readiness between U.S. and international partners,” Capt. Jack Rollings, a C130-J pilot with the airlift squadron, said in the news release. “This sets the tone for a year of continuous growth, collaboration and operational excellence.”
A U.S. Army paratrooper with the 11th Airborne Division descends from a C-130J Super Hercules assigned to the 36th Airlift Squadron at Yokota Air Base, Japan, Jan. 12, 2025. (Yasuo Osakabe/U.S. Air Force)
A Japan Ground Self-Defense Force paratrooper conducts a final safety check before leading his team’s jump from an Air Force C-130J Super Hercules at Yokota Air Base, Japan, Jan. 12, 2025. (Manuel Zamora/U.S. Air Force)
Three planes from the squadron were involved along with aircraft from Japan’s 401st Tactical Airlift Squadron, of Komaki Air Base near Nagoya, Yokota spokesman Master Sgt. Nathan Allen said in an email Monday.
“In total, the event saw approximately 200 jumpers from 11 nations, bolstering an ironclad bond between allies and partners while further enhancing readiness and security in the region,” the wing’s news release said.
The paratroopers jumped from around 1,100 feet, Japanese national broadcaster NHK reported Sunday.
They landed at Camp Narashino in Chiba prefecture, near Tokyo, the wing’s release said.
Video of the drill posted to YouTube by the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force shows paratroopers landing in a grassy field before CH-47 helicopters arrive with sling-loaded artillery and armored vehicles.
Attack helicopters hovered and tactical vehicles and motorcycles maneuvered while ground troops engaged in mock hand-to-hand combat, according to the video.
More paratroopers — including members of Japan’s only parachute unit, the 1st Airborne Brigade — floated to the ground before CH-47s landed nearby and disembarked infantry carrying the flags of participating nations to conclude the exercise.
Members of the 11th Airborne Division in Alaska, the 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina and the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa were slated to participate in the drill, according to a Dec. 16 Japan Ground Self-Defense Force news release.
Japan’s Defense Minister Gen Nakatani observed the drop and told reporters afterwards: ”Ground forces are the last line of national defense,” Japan’s Asahi newspaper reported Sunday.
Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson and Hana Kusumoto · January 14, 2025
14. How Putin Lost Syria
How Putin Lost Syria
19fortyfive.com · by Michael Peck · January 14, 2025
Just a few years ago, Syria seemed proof that Russia had thrown off its post-Soviet blues. In 2015, the Assad regime – Moscow’s longtime ally in the Middle East – seemed on the brink of defeat by rebels. It was Russian airpower, advisors, special forces and Wagner Group mercenaries – alongside Iranian and Hezbollah fighters– that saved the Syrian government. More than a foreign policy triumph, it seemed a vindication of Putin’s crusade to restore what he saw as the glory of the Soviet empire.
More than 63,000 Russian soldiers served in Syria over the last decade, along with dozens of warplanes that pounded rebel positions as well as terror-bombing cities.
And after all that effort, what did Russia gain? Syrian president Bashar al-Assad is now in exile in Moscow, while the new Islamist government in Damascus has little affection for Russia. Even if the new government allows Russia to keep its prized naval and air bases in Syria, the Russo-Syrian special relationship is no more.
Can Russia Still Project Power?
How could this have happened? One mistake the Kremlin made was overestimating Russia’s ability to project power overseas, argues Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) think tank in Moscow.
“Moscow does not have sufficient military forces, resources, influence and authority for effective intervention by force outside the former USSR,” Pukhov wrote in an article for the Russian newspaper Kommersant. “And it can act there, in fact, only with the condescending permission of other strong powers and for as long as they allow it.”
“It is entirely possible to bluff with force and capabilities on the world stage, but it is important not to believe in one’s own bluff too much,” Pukhov warned.
Pukhov also faults Russia for not acting decisively: once it committed troops to Syria, it should have made sure that the Syrian government won the war. Instead, Syria was carved up: the Assad regime ended up reasserting control over two-thirds of the country, while rebel groups such as the Kurds, ISIS and Turkish-backed militants controlled the remainder.
Russian military power in Syria was “ not enough to completely defeat Assad’s opponents, especially in the context of their direct support from other powerful external players (the USA, Turkey, Arab monarchies),” Pukhov wrote. “And both the Russian side and the Syrian regime were forced to agree, in essence, to a compromise division of Syria, which in itself was a deferred defeat for Assad’s supporters.”
“The Assad regime, as a typical Eastern despotism, needed not ‘reforms’ to survive and maintain internal support, but demonstrative dancing over the corpses of its defeated enemies.”
Moscow believed that it could compel the rebels into signing a compromise peace that favored Russia. In Pukhov’s view, this merely gave outside powers – such as the U.S. – a chance to trap Russia in a quagmire. “It is hard to see why other powerful forces should have agreed to a deal on Moscow’s terms, and these wishes naturally ended up being built on sand. On the contrary, the demonstrated limitations of Russia’s military achievements only encouraged Russia’s adversaries to try to take revenge by increasing their involvement and wearing down the Russian side by imposing ever greater costs on it.”
Why Russia Failed in Syria
The result was that Russia strove to maintain a “rotten and ineffective status quo” to prop up the “decaying and delegitimized Assad regime.” But many of those troops eventually had to return home after 2022 to meet the insatiable demands of the Ukraine war.
“Sitting on two chairs (not fighting and not leaving) naturally ended in a fall when this status quo was violated by players on the enemy side,” Pukhov wrote.
There were many reasons why the Assad regime collapsed, of which the drain on Russian resources caused by the Ukraine war was only one. The Syrian government was brutal and corrupt, and its army demoralized and brittle.
Su-25 Frogfoot in operations in Syria. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Assad relied on support from Iran and its Hezbollah proxy, who did much of the hard fighting against the rebels. But that pillar collapsed after Hezbollah was decimated by Israel, and Iran became desperate to avoid war with the Israelis and Americans.
After failed wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, many Americans could only agree with Pukhov’s assessment of Russia’s Syrian venture. “In the modern world, victory is possible only in a quick and fleeting war. If you win effectively in a matter of days and weeks, but cannot quickly consolidate your success in military and political terms, then ultimately you will lose, no matter what you do.”
About the Author: Michael Peck
Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Business Insider, Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn
19fortyfive.com · by Michael Peck · January 14, 2025
15. Taiwan’s Military Is Not Prepared for a Trumpian World
I support the defense of Taiwan. But we have to ask, do we want to defend it more than the Taiwanese?
And if Taiwan is so important, what will we do if China is successful in subverting the Taiwan political system and engineering a democratic vote to reunify? What would we do in such a situation?
And if we believe that is one of China's courses of action (which I do), what can and should we do to help Taiwan to defend itself not only from a military invasion but from subversion as well?
Should we be advising Taiwan on developing resistance and resilience in the face of PRC overt and covert hostile action?
Taiwan’s Military Is Not Prepared for a Trumpian World
With the former president soon back in the White House, Taipei needs to rethink its defense strategy.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-01-15/a-gaza-cease-fire-deal-would-be-trump-s-win?sref=hhjZtX76
January 14, 2025 at 4:00 PM EST
By Karishma Vaswani
Karishma Vaswani is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China. Previously, she was the BBC's lead Asia presenter and worked for the BBC across Asia and South Asia for two decades.
Taiwan’s military needs to modernize, and fast.Photographer: I-Hwa Cheng/AFP/Getty Image.
Taiwan has lived with the existential threat of a Chinese invasion for decades, but the reelection of Donald Trump heralds a different era. Taipei could count on previous US administrations — the question is should they have the same level of confidence now?
The threat from the mainland is growing, though experts agree the most likely scenario is takeover by coercion rather than by force — still, the island’s military is woefully unprepared. In his New Year address, President Xi Jinping stated: “The people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family. No one can sever our family bonds, and no one can stop the historical trend of national reunification.”
This isn’t empty rhetoric. Beijing sees the democratic island as its own territory and views unification with it as part of the “Great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” An editorial this week by the Chinese ambassador to Australia further affirmed that position, saying: “There is but one China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China will never change.” It’s in stark contrast to how Taiwanese citizens feel: Polls have consistently shown they reject the idea of full unification with a Communist Party-controlled mainland.
I’ve been struck by the palpably apprehensive atmosphere in Taipei just days before the Trump inauguration on Jan. 20. Diplomats have told me that President Lai Ching-te is keen to build goodwill with the incoming administration. The island relies on US military support to deter Beijing, yet Trump isn’t providing the reassurance Taipei needs. He said the island “should pay” the US for its own defense, and, perhaps more worryingly, he’s not been clear that he would support the military stepping in if there were an attack — something President Joe Biden was able to consistently offer.
Taiwan Is a Top Recipient of US Arms Sales
American military equipment purchases from 1950 to 2022
Source: US Department of Defense, Council on Foreign Relations
Note: Not adjusted for inflation
It would be a mistake for the Trump administration to treat Taipei as a pawn in dealing with China. It sits at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, a region crucial to global trade and international security. It’s home to a multi-billion dollar semiconductor chip industry, critical in future technologies like artificial intelligence. Any transactional agreement struck with Beijing over Taipei’s fate would effectively hand all those valuable assets over to China.
Trump wants Taiwan to increase its defense budget from the current 2.45% of GDP to 10%. Military experts I’ve spoken to here say that figure is undeliverable and note that a more modest rise to 5% in the short-term is more realistic. This means Taipei must be prepared to deter Beijing’s advances alone, while also proving to the president-elect that it’s deserving of US protection.
China is watching all of this closely. Last year, it sent record numbers of warplanes across a US-drawn boundary in the strait. It also launched several bold military drills in the sea and air spaces around the island, exposing vulnerabilities. Beijing is expected to continue with these gray-zone tactics, which are likely to increase in size and scale.
The difference between the two militaries is night and day. Beijing has the world’s fifth most powerful armed forces, according to the Global Firepower Index of military capability, while Taipei stands at 22 out of the 145 surveyed.
Among the island’s first priorities must be increasing recruitment and improving training. Data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2022 report shows that the island’s 169,000-strong active military personnel are backed by some 1.66 million reservists. China’s People’s Liberation Army, by comparison, has 2 million active soldiers.
It’s not just the numbers, a 28-year-old sergeant and squad leader told me, asking to remain anonymous because he didn’t have permission to speak to the media. Unlike Ukraine, which has been at war against Russia since February 2022, Taiwan lacks the capacity to sustain warfare beyond a few months, he said. With limited supply and resupply channels, there isn’t much soldiers could do if China was to blockade or quarantine the island — among the ways it’s thought the PLA could take Taiwan.
Military conscripts, reservists and professional soldiers are also badly paid and poorly trained. The government is trying to fix this — it introduced a politically controversial move to extend conscripted service for young men from four months to one year. But many have complained that it’s a waste of their time, with training often including long stretches of idling.
Still, the lack of urgency in addressing the threat across the strait is bewildering. Compare that to tiny Singapore, where conscripts serve double that time in the national service — and their biggest challenge is Malaysia, not the mighty PLA.
At home, the political picture is problematic. The defense budget may be held up in parliament by the China-leaning opposition Kuomintang party, at a time when the island is at its most exposed. Plans to increase spending shouldn’t be hijacked by cynical squabbling. Instead of a domestic deadlock, Taipei must focus on improving deterrence.
This could come in the form of buying more US weapons, including the Aegis destroyer, a powerful warship equipped with advanced radar and missile systems that can track and intercept multiple threats simultaneously. Readying the reserve forces by training them and offering better pay would be another easy win and help to boost numbers. More reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned drones would allow the military to monitor the PLA while also taking the pressure off soldiers, exhausted by Beijing’s relentless activity.
This would show China that it won’t be easy to seize Taiwan. Xi is loathe to fight a war he won’t win outright. The trick is to keep convincing him that today is not that day. The new US president may well want to leave a legacy. History won’t judge him well if he abandons Taiwan.
More From Bloomberg Opinion:
-
China’s ‘Anaconda Strategy’ Is Slowly Choking Taiwan: Hal Brands
-
Taiwan’s New Leader Can’t Talk His Way Out of Trouble: Minxin Pei
-
The US Can’t Stay ‘Ambiguous’ in the Taiwan Strait: Andreas Kluth
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This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
Karishma Vaswani is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China. Previously, she was the BBC's lead Asia presenter and worked for the BBC across Asia and South Asia for two decades.
16. Beyond Buzzwords: A Model for Strengthening Interoperability and Interior Lines
Excerpts:
The success of building interior lines and achieving true interoperability hinges on sustained collaboration beyond major exercises. Through unclassified networks, tools like SeaVision, and real-world data, the US military can establish continuous situational awareness and enhance the operational capabilities of its partners. The approach adopted by the 1st MDTF during Balikatan 2023 demonstrates that strategic use of unclassified data not only empowers partner nations but also builds long-term relationships, trust, and coordination. 3rd MDTF is also expanding upon this capability to other countries in the Pacific. These engagements go beyond tactical-level training engagements. As William Nance noted in Modern War Institute, “By our own doctrine, we should be focusing more across our partners entire defense capacity, not just its tactical formations.”
To replicate and expand on this success, joint force units must focus on maintaining engagement between exercises, tailoring solutions to partner needs, and grounding collaboration in real-world scenarios. This ongoing commitment to interoperability will strengthen the collective ability to respond effectively in contested environments, fortifying both infrastructure and strategic alliances for future challenges.
Beyond Buzzwords: A Model for Strengthening Interoperability and Interior Lines - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Nathan D. Levy · January 14, 2025
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Across the US joint force’s global footprint, terms like “interoperability” and “build interior lines” are commonly heard. In Army service component commands and geographic combatant commands, these terms burst forth as clarion calls, concise expressions of what US forces must achieve in their areas of responsibility. After a tactical-level unit completes a task, commanders often state that they’ve built interior lines and developed interoperability with partnered nation X. Yet, in many cases, there is no metric by which to measure progress or success. Interoperability is not an end-state, but rather a means to an end. Operations that aim to improve interoperability should not do so with that as their final objective; they must also assist us in understanding posture requirements and, subsequently, help set priorities for infrastructure investments.
Too often, the US military—across all services—participate in combined (nation-to-nation) exercises with our partners, yet fail to extract the maximum value. The cycle is familiar: we conduct the exercise, exchange high-fives, swap patches, and depart. We do not maintain enduring relationships. The communication network built for each event is temporary, often leaving the partner nation without access to key information afterward. This often makes US presence a requirement for success in the exercise. We aren’t meeting our partners where they are, asking what they need, or working collaboratively to build lasting interoperability or interior lines. An annual exercise simply doesn’t achieve lasting impact. In many countries, there must be more continuous investment between exercises that helps inform our posture initiatives and prioritize infrastructure development.
The Problem
Component commands aren’t adequately staffed to maintain ongoing and on-the-ground relationships during most of what the joint force broadly categorizes as OAIs—operations, activities, and investments. The US military tends to interact with leadership from partner nations, but operational-level understanding of their militaries is limited. In most cases, units conducting OAIs are neither permanently stationed in these countries nor focused exclusively on one region. Tactical-level engagements lack the seniority needed to create programs or glide paths that build on prior investments, leading to a gap in understanding of partner capabilities at the operational level. This gap often leads to a lack of clarity across the US services on what to prioritize for joint infrastructure investments. How, then, can the US joint force build interior lines, with limited resources outside of major exercise windows, while expanding operational-level interoperability? The answer is by sharing more information.
A Potential Solution
In April 2023, the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force (1st MDTF) participated in Balikatan 2023 and found itself in a position to address this challenge. 1st MDTF was tasked with establishing a bilateral coordination center between two joint task forces: the United States’ I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Republic of the Philippines’ Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM). In typical US/ally exercise constructs, two common mistakes emerge: (1) we (US forces) focus solely on exercise-related intelligence, and (2) we overclassify all products for the exercise and place them on a temporary network nearly inaccessible to most partners. 1st MDTF took a different approach, opting to share real-world, unclassified information about NOLCOM’s area of operations using a sensitive but unclassified (SBU) network. The coordination center was dubbed the Combined Information and Effects Fusion Cell (CIEFC). During the CIEFC’s initial operation, Major General Jay Bargeron was the commanding general of 3rd Marine Division. While conducting a tour of the CIEFC, Bargeron, who is now the J5 for US Indo-Pacific Command, stated “This is how we transition to a joint exercise model.”
After the exercise, the CIEFC concept of real-world data sharing led to an invitation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines for 1st MDTF to continue an enduring, on-the-ground partnership with NOLCOM. This marked a significant step toward understanding capabilities of a major ally, and arguably greatly enhanced placement and access for the unit—in other words, building interior lines. At Land Forces Pacific Conference 2023, General Charles Flynn, commander of US Army Pacific, referenced the 1st MDTF CIEFC as a prime example of his concept of the Pacific’s strategic landpower network.
1st MDTF has been operating forward in the Philippines for more than twenty consecutive months—greatly contributing toward joint force understanding of the theater in a true competition environment. While 1st MDTF continues to operate and grow the CIEFC in the Philippines, the concept has also expanded into an exercise in Malaysia hosted by 3rd MDTF. Lieutenant General James Jarrard, the former deputy commander of US Army Pacific, discussed the CIEFC concept during an interview in Malaysia. He noted that bringing in new technologies to training events can help share multidomain awareness with our partners.
At its core, the CIEFC concept is a method to partner with an operational-level headquarters that assists the appropriate commander to understand threats in the operational environment. This concept is valuable even with countries the United States does not have a formal intelligence-sharing agreement with. As Flynn noted, Philippines commanders “can actually see into the maritime and air littorals,” informing decisions by the country’s leaders.
Leveraging Unclassified Information, Not Intelligence
The power of open-source tools, commercial imagery, social media, and SBU networks cannot be overstated. These tools foster operational awareness without compromising information managed by the US intelligence community, thereby enabling the sharing of near-real-time data with partner nations. By democratizing access to critical unclassified information, barriers thought to be imposed by classification guides become more permissive. This allows allies and partners to develop a shared understanding of the operational environment. Commercial satellite imagery, for instance, provides high-resolution data on terrain, movement, and infrastructure, empowering partners to make more informed decisions. Social media scraping tools also allow information about emerging incidents to be gathered and, more generally, foster an understanding of the information environment.
During Balikatan 2023, 1st MDTF’s choice to share real-world, unclassified data with NOLCOM resulted in deeper cooperation and a higher level of commitment. This approach empowered NOLCOM to operate with greater autonomy while still benefiting from US support. The SBU network became a vital conduit for continuous, safe information exchange beyond the exercise itself. The success of this approach underscores how unclassified tools can enhance situational awareness while maintaining operational security.
SeaVision: The Starting Point for Maritime Domain Awareness
SeaVision, a US Department of Transportation–sponsored maritime domain awareness tool, adds another layer of unclassified situational awareness. This web-based platform allows partners to track maritime vessels, analyze shipping patterns, and potentially detect irregular or illegal activity at sea. By integrating SeaVision into joint exercises and ongoing operations, US forces and their allies can develop a comprehensive maritime picture, enhancing the ability to monitor key areas and respond to emerging threats. SeaVision and similar platforms are routinely used by a range of US units and organizations in the joint force.
SeaVision’s capability to provide real-time insights into maritime traffic directly supports both US and partner operations. When applied in exercises like Balikatan, SeaVision extends the benefits of shared situational awareness beyond the exercise itself, enabling partners to manage their maritime domains proactively. Integrating SeaVision into routine operations strengthens partners’ independent operational capacities while contributing to joint mission objectives. With sponsorship from the United States, allies and partners can get access to SeaVision. And with minimal planning, additional layers of visualization can be added that normally only US service member accounts can display.
SeaVision gives our allies and partners a valuable understanding of vessels that are emitting publicly available electronic signatures as required by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. Those electronic signatures are referred to as automatic ship identification systems (AIS). SeaVision also gives our partners and allies the ability to assess how vessels are maneuvering in exclusive economic zones that might indicate the presence of suspicious activity. Large vessels maneuvering in irregular patterns could indicate illicit activity. A lack of electronic signatures is also telling as a vessels unwillingness to use its transponders may signal nefarious intent.
Flight Trackers: A Starting Point for Air Domain Awareness
Many allied and partnered nations use their equivalents of the United States Federal Aviation Administration to observe and manage airspace. Some militaries do not have radar capabilities or the ability to monitor airspace. If the military is not integrated with its country’s airspace management organization, it can lead to disjointed airspace awareness. An effective platform for monitoring airspace is a visualization tool that displays transponder data.
Websites like FlightAware and others that display transponder data provide a critical starting point for understanding what occurs in a nation’s airspace. Illicit and suspicious activity can be monitored by finding anomalies in routine information. Deviations in well-established patterns in the sea or air could indicate illicit activity.
Looking Forward: Lessons for the Joint Force
Building relationships is critical to expanding interior lines. Assisting our allies and partners in gaining access to information is a simple solution to building interest in what the United States can provide. This can be the mechanism to build interoperability. Tools like SBU networks and SeaVision enable US and partner forces to maintain situational awareness and continue refining coordination outside formal training environments.
This continuous sharing of information allows partner nations to develop a common operational picture, contributing to strategic depth. Interior lines are not just about supporting and reinforcing forces efficiently in a crisis but also about sustaining the network built during exercises for long-term readiness. Ongoing engagement, even remotely, ensures that partners remain prepared and that relationships and infrastructure essential to combined operations remain strong. To replicate the success of 1st MDTF’s model, joint force units can consider five principles:
- Focus on real-world scenarios. Exercises should integrate real-world information to ensure joint activities are immediately applicable to current operational challenges. This ensures that both US and partner forces develop skills and capabilities they can use in real scenarios, not just theoretical ones. For units that regularly participate in these exercises, consider between-exercise engagements that can contribute toward furthering interoperability and building infrastructure.
- Sustain engagement beyond exercises. Building interior lines and interoperability requires consistent investment. Units should develop mechanisms to maintain communication and information sharing between major exercises to prevent stagnation in relationships and operational capability.
- Tailor solutions to partner needs. Joint force units must actively engage with partners to understand their specific needs and objectives. Instead of relying on a one-size-fits-all approach, US forces should codevelop solutions that reflect each partner’s unique operational environment.
- Use sensitive but unclassified networks. By leveraging SBU networks and unclassified tools like commercial imagery and SeaVision, units can share relevant information continuously without the restrictions of classified systems. This encourages broader participation, fosters operational transparency, and allows partner or allied forces to take lessons learned back to their units. Most importantly, our partners and allies need access to the information we develop during exercises. Often, when we depart exercises, we take most of the learned information with us.
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Record and maintain interoperability metrics. Army Regulation 34-1, Interoperability is the only manual in the joint force that codifies four levels of interoperability (0–3), and the capabilities that joint forces and their partners need to achieve to be rated at each level. For example, a partner country without an intelligence-sharing agreement with the United States will never achieve level 3, and almost certainly won’t achieve level 2. Additionally, a digitally linked a common operational picture is rated as a level 3 capability. RAND noted in 2024 that a key to building interoperability is to continually assess, monitor, and evaluate metrics while integrating critical activities and strategic objectives.
Challenges to Implementation
Change, of course, can be difficult. If an effective new idea were easy, there’s a good chance we would already be doing it. In the case of the recommendations described above, two challenges stand out. The first is foreign disclosure. Sharing military intelligence or combat information in developed or mature theaters of operation can be considered routine. There are systems and processes in place for a foreign disclosure officer or representative to interpret applicable security classification guides (SCGs) for lawful disclosure of classified military information including military intelligence. In countries without an intelligence-sharing agreement with the United States, or specificity in the theater SCG, units must rely on theater-level approval to share information—and intelligence. The distinction is important. Information does not have analysis behind it, but intelligence does. A geospatial-intelligence specialist providing an unclassified commercial satellite image is information. A geospatial-intelligence specialist providing a satellite image with annotations and assessments is intelligence. This concept can become murky in practice, but a unit foreign disclosure officer can assist in navigating complexity of relevant policies.
The second challenge is finding the right partner unit and venue. Several militaries around the world are restructuring and acquiring new technologies to increase global or regional competitiveness. However, many militaries lack joint doctrine or have not rehearsed joint structure. This can lead to a lack of understanding of why an army would be interested in the maritime domain or why a navy would be interested in the land domain. Finding the right unit to assist in the concept hinges on finding the correct organization in a military to partner with. Consistently, an exercise concept that pairs a US service component with a partner service component limits our ability to exercise above the tactical level. Units must find the right partner unit and exercise to demonstrate value. In short, the joint force needs to expand beyond army-to-army or navy-to-navy exercises.
The success of building interior lines and achieving true interoperability hinges on sustained collaboration beyond major exercises. Through unclassified networks, tools like SeaVision, and real-world data, the US military can establish continuous situational awareness and enhance the operational capabilities of its partners. The approach adopted by the 1st MDTF during Balikatan 2023 demonstrates that strategic use of unclassified data not only empowers partner nations but also builds long-term relationships, trust, and coordination. 3rd MDTF is also expanding upon this capability to other countries in the Pacific. These engagements go beyond tactical-level training engagements. As William Nance noted in Modern War Institute, “By our own doctrine, we should be focusing more across our partners entire defense capacity, not just its tactical formations.”
To replicate and expand on this success, joint force units must focus on maintaining engagement between exercises, tailoring solutions to partner needs, and grounding collaboration in real-world scenarios. This ongoing commitment to interoperability will strengthen the collective ability to respond effectively in contested environments, fortifying both infrastructure and strategic alliances for future challenges.
Nathan D. Levy is a US Army major with United States Army Pacific’s 1st Multi-Domain Task Force. He is a veteran of several campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and has operational experience in Egypt, South Korea, Japan, Germany, Senegal, and the Philippines.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Nathan D. Levy
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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Nathan D. Levy · January 14, 2025
17. Corporate Transparency Act in Limbo: The National Security Risks of Anonymous Shell Companies
Excerpt:
While the CTA remains in legal purgatory, policymakers must prepare their next steps to ensure that US departments and agencies have the insight and tools needed to counter the rise of irregular threats veiled as US entities. The importance of beneficial ownership transparency cannot be overstated. If the appropriate US authorities are not able to gain insight into such information, or if the information is not comprehensive, timely, or executed properly, adversaries will continue to exploit US government shortfalls and be poised to gain a significant and enduring strategic advantage inside the homeland.
Corporate Transparency Act in Limbo: The National Security Risks of Anonymous Shell Companies
irregularwarfare.org · by Aurora Ortega · January 14, 2025
The cat-and-mouse game between regulators demanding greater corporate transparency and companies resisting new regulations is nothing new. Indeed, US corporate anonymity laws have long been exploited by criminals, terrorists, and kleptocrats to obfuscate their illicit financial activities and evade detection via shell companies. However, the modern era of strategic competition among great powers has witnessed an alarming novel variety of this game: state-backed adversaries exploiting US corporate anonymity laws to operate within US territory strategically. Such operations pose a distinct and irregular threat to US national security by affording state-sponsored malign actors a means of obtaining legal status in the United States, which enables them to hide in plain sight through anonymous shell companies while covertly conducting malicious activities.
In a refreshing episode of legislative effectiveness, Congress passed the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) as part of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, addressing this threat head-on. The act empowers the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to collect ownership information about businesses operating anomalously in the United States. Although FinCEN originally set a deadline of January 1, 2025, for companies to file the requisite ownership information, the Treasury Department, after a whirlwind of litigation in December, delayed the filing deadline until January 13, 2025. Just three days after that extension was granted, however, the Fifth Circuit rendered the CTA unenforceable until it determines its constitutionality. Employment of this crucial new authority thus remains stalled, leaving national security at risk. As the CTA’s fate remains unknown, policymakers must ensure that government departments and agencies are otherwise properly equipped with the tools and authorities needed to prevent foreign adversaries from leveraging anonymity laws to threaten US national security.
The CTA: The basics and the stakes
Under the CTA, businesses must submit a Beneficial Ownership Information (BOI) Report to FinCEN, providing unique identifying information—including legal names and addresses—of the individuals associated with the reporting company. These new requirements were specifically designed to enable law enforcement officials to disrupt financial crimes affecting communities and US national security. With the initial filing deadline of January 1, 2025 looming, courts heard numerous legal challenges to the CTA’s constitutionality in 2024, coming to differing conclusions. For example, while federal district courts in Virginia and Oregon upheld its constitutionality, an Alabama district court disagreed.
More recently and consequently, on December 3, 2024, a district court in Texas issued a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the CTA’s enforcement, finding it unconstitutional. In so doing, the court explicitly rejected the government’s argument that the act implicated foreign affairs. The government promptly appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which lifted the injunction on December 23. The appellate court, however, reversed course on December 26, reinstating the injunction. In explaining its reversal, the court said such action was needed to preserve the constitutional status quo while it considers the parties’ arguments in an expedited appeal. The government has since issued a statement making BOI filings voluntary and filed an application for a stay of the district court’s injunction to the Supreme Court.
With CTA enforcement stalled, the United States enters 2025 with an incomplete and inadequate toolkit to address the heightened national security risks that unregulated corporate anonymity poses in the context of great power competition.
Identifying the Vulnerability
To properly appreciate what is at stake with the CTA and the threat it was aptly drafted to address, take the benign example of Flannery Associates LLC. Flannery attracted national attention in 2023 after the Wall Street Journal revealed it had quietly purchased land worth nearly $1 billion surrounding Travis Air Force Base in California, as well as land around California’s interstate electrical grid system. The company, which was incorporated anonymously in January 2018 in Delaware—a state notorious for allowing individuals and entities to register anonymous limited liability companies (LLCs)—went to great lengths to hide its beneficial ownership information for years despite persistent and prolonged government investigations, aggravating concerns among US federal and state officials about a potential national security threat.
Fortunately, Flannery’s beneficial owners—a group of Silicon Valley elites—diffused the national security concerns in August 2023 by voluntarily revealing their identities and intentions: building a utopian city on the land they purchased.
Unfortunately, the rigmarole surrounding the company exposed a significant vulnerability beyond the government’s current reach that adversaries can—and do—leverage to gain a strategic advantage inside the United States. And China has been one of the most active and eager malign actors in this space.
Spacious skies, fruited plains, and Chinese shell companies
On May 13, 2024, President Biden issued an order prohibiting the Chinese-backed company MineOne Partners Limited from buying and continuing to invest in a cryptocurrency mining facility near Warren Air Force Base, which is responsible for nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles. The order, which cites national security risks as its primary motivation, was based on a referral from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), the government body responsible for ensuring foreign investment does not undermine US national security. Such orders, however, while necessary and effective against the specific companies they target, only apply to foreign investments. This creates a loophole that foreign adversaries can exploit using American shell companies.
Take, for example, US private equity firm YZY Capital Holdings LLC, incorporated in Wyoming in July 2021. Its American status allows it to operate “below the radar” without triggering regulatory flags, including when it purchased two plots of land in Wyoming, one near Warren Air Force Base and the other by critical energy infrastructure. A New York Times report describes YZY as a “sprawling” conglomerate that, in addition to operating a crypto-mining business, owns car dealerships, a biotechnology company, and financial firms. However, according to the LinkedIn profile of one of its employees (which has since been removed), the company is in fact the American investment wing of the Chinese company Youzhiyou Group.
YZY’s corporate documents originally listed its principal address in New York and its “organizer” as Qian Yuan, a Chinese businessman and member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who has previously served as a government advisor in Wuhan, China. However, in September 2022, Yuan’s name was removed from the official corporate documents. At the same time, the company changed its registered agent and provided the agent’s address in Wyoming as the firm’s principal address—an apparent attempt to retroactively anonymize the beneficial ownership of the company. Like Delaware, Wyoming allows individuals and entities, including foreign entities, to register anonymous LLCs.
Or take the Chinese military company Hesai Group, which the Department of Defense (DoD) added to its list of entities identified as Chinese military companies operating in the United States in January 2024. Hesai controls 47 percent of the global market share for LiDAR technology, which is tied to China’s military through the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, a state-owned dual-use electronics manufacturer that produces technology for the People’s Liberation Army and is critical to China’s military civil fusion program. Before its listing, Hesai registered in Michigan as a US company called America Lider—without ever disclosing its true beneficial owner or ties to the Chinese government. While irritating and concerning for policymakers and regulators, such evasion is completely legal. And without the CTA or new legislation in its stead, it will remain so.
Anonymous Companies in the Cyber Domain
The threat presented by corporate anonymity isn’t confined to the material world: it expands into the cyber domain. Indeed, foreign malign cyber actors often lease US infrastructure as a service (IaaS) products via command-and-control providers to carry out malicious cyber activities against US targets while obfuscating their foreign connections. Combined with US corporate anonymity protections, such tactics make it extremely difficult for US officials to track and obtain information about these adversaries through legal processes. A study by the cybersecurity firm Halcyon found that Cloudzy, an obscure US cloud service company, provided web hosting and internet services to more than a dozen different state-sponsored hacking and ransomware groups. According to the study, Cloudzy was leasing server space from IaaS providers and reselling it to no fewer than seventeen different state-sponsored hacking groups from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Vietnam, thereby enabling adversaries to conduct attacks against US entities directly from US servers.
Cloudzy, formerly known as RouterHosting LLC, was registered in Wyoming in March 2023. While corporate documents do not reveal Cloudzy’s beneficial ownership information, by mapping out the company’s digital footprint, Halcyon found that the company is “almost certainly” a cut-out for a group operating out of Tehran. In December 2023, Reuters reported that Cloudzy’s chief executive, who was based in Dubai, denied turning a blind eye to malicious activity and claimed to have dissolved the Wyoming company. Nonetheless, Reuters found that the Cloudzy case was just one of at least three instances in late 2023 in which cybersecurity experts implicated Wyoming LLCs in high-profile hacking activity.
Pulling off the Cloak—Or Not
Over the past few years, US policymakers have enacted several measures to address strategic threats by foreign adversaries inside the United States. Unfortunately, they have fallen short of comprehensively addressing systemic vulnerabilities and loopholes that permit adversaries to operate as legal US entities.
For example, upwards of 24 states have adopted or expanded restrictions on investments from adversarial countries. In June 2023, the National Agricultural Law Center reported that several states have prohibited the sale of agricultural land to foreign entities outright with no exceptions. In October 2023, Arkansas became the first state to require Chinese companies to divest from all agricultural land ownership in the state.
While such legislation has helped defend against adversarial use of US farmland, no currently enforced state or federal law addresses the possibility that foreign adversaries can use anonymous US companies to mask their identities. The current legislative landscape also doesn’t address the possibility that foreign entities from non-adversarial countries could secretly act as cut-outs or proxies to purchase or develop land on behalf of a foreign adversary.
Similarly, CFIUS has issued several new rules and regulations to counter foreign investments in the United States. For example, under its real-estate instructions, property transactions near an expanded list of military installations trigger the committee’s review authorities. However, none of CFIUS’s current powers can apply to foreign adversaries hiding behind anonymous US shell companies without the ability to first verify the beneficial ownership information.
Recognizing these lapses, CFIUS should forego its list-based approach for monitoring real-estate transactions and establish a designated authority to determine whether a military installation qualifies as sensitive based on a set of established criteria. Additionally, the types of sensitive sites within CFIUS’s purview should be expanded to include US critical infrastructure and sensitive non-military government facilities. Both of these changes would ensure that CFIUS’s ability to address potential national security threats is not overly restricted without revealing the nation’s most sensitive sites to adversaries.
Additionally, while the federal government continues to fight for the CTA in the courts, Congress should pass new legislation authorizing key US departments and agencies—such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, and Department of Agriculture—to conduct security reviews of any entity—foreign or domestic—seeking to purchase land near any US military installation, sensitive non-military government facility, or critical infrastructure. This would obstruct foreign adversaries’ ability to use anonymous US companies or American cut-outs to gain proximity to sensitive sites. Congress should also prepare to go back to the drawing board on addressing corporate transparency, should the courts nix the CTA entirely.
Conclusion
While the CTA remains in legal purgatory, policymakers must prepare their next steps to ensure that US departments and agencies have the insight and tools needed to counter the rise of irregular threats veiled as US entities. The importance of beneficial ownership transparency cannot be overstated. If the appropriate US authorities are not able to gain insight into such information, or if the information is not comprehensive, timely, or executed properly, adversaries will continue to exploit US government shortfalls and be poised to gain a significant and enduring strategic advantage inside the homeland.
Aurora Ortega is a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University, affiliated with the Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC). Ms. Ortega is also a U.S. Government professional, who has served in various positions within the US Departments of Defense and the Treasury.
Standardized Disclosure. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
Main Image: Photo by David Jones on Unsplash
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18. Spy vs. AI: How Artificial Intelligence Will Remake Espionage
Excerpts:
Intelligence and military communities are committed to keeping humans at the heart of AI-assisted decision-making and have created the frameworks and tools to do so. Agencies will need guidelines for how their analysts should use AI models to make sure that intelligence products meet the intelligence community’s standards for reliability. The government will also need to maintain clear guidance for handling the data of U.S. citizens when it comes to the training and use of large language models. It will be important to balance the use of emerging technologies with protecting the privacy and civil liberties of citizens. This means augmenting oversight mechanisms, updating relevant frameworks to reflect the capabilities and risks of AI, and fostering a culture of AI development within the national security apparatus that harnesses the potential of the technology while safeguarding the rights and freedoms that are foundational to American society.
Unlike the 1950s, when U.S. intelligence raced to the forefront of overhead and satellite imagery by developing many of the key technologies itself, winning the AI race will require that community to reimagine how it partners with private industry. The private sector, which is the primary means through which the government can realize AI progress at scale, is investing billions of dollars in AI-related research, datacenters, and computing power. Given those companies’ advancements, intelligence agencies should prioritize leveraging commercially available AI models and refining them with classified data. This approach enables the intelligence community to rapidly expand its capabilities without having to start from scratch, allowing it to remain competitive with adversaries. A recent collaboration between NASA and IBM to create the world’s largest geospatial foundation model—and the subsequent release of the model to the AI community as an open-source project—is an exemplary demonstration of how this type of public-private partnership can work in practice.
As the national security community integrates AI into its work, it must ensure the security and resilience of its models. Establishing standards to deploy generative AI securely is crucial for maintaining the integrity of AI-driven intelligence operations. This is a core focus of the National Security Agency’s new AI Security Center and its collaboration with the Department of Commerce’s AI Safety Institute.
As the United States faces growing rivalry to shape the future of the global order, it is urgent that its intelligence agencies and military capitalize on the country’s innovation and leadership in AI, focusing particularly on large language models, to provide faster and more relevant information to policymakers. Only then will they gain the speed, breadth, and depth of insight needed to navigate a more complex, competitive, and content-rich world.
Spy vs. AI
Foreign Affairs · by More by Anne Neuberger · January 15, 2025
How Artificial Intelligence Will Remake Espionage
Anne Neuberger
January 15, 2025
Under surveillance in Shanghai, December 2022 Aly Song / Reuters
Anne Neuberger is Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for Cyber and Emerging Technology on the U.S. National Security Council. From 2009 to 2021, she served in senior operational roles in intelligence and cybersecurity at the National Security Agency, including as its first Chief Risk Officer.
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In the early 1950s, the United States faced a critical intelligence challenge in its burgeoning competition with the Soviet Union. Outdated German reconnaissance photos from World War II could no longer provide sufficient intelligence about Soviet military capabilities, and existing U.S. surveillance capabilities were no longer able to penetrate the Soviet Union’s closed airspace. This deficiency spurred an audacious moonshot initiative: the development of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. In only a few years, U-2 missions were delivering vital intelligence, capturing images of Soviet missile installations in Cuba and bringing near real-time insights from behind the Iron Curtain to the Oval Office.
Today, the United States stands at a similar juncture. Competition between Washington and its rivals over the future of the global order is intensifying, and now, much as in the early 1950s, the United States must take advantage of its world-class private sector and ample capacity for innovation to outcompete its adversaries. The U.S. intelligence community must harness the country’s sources of strength to deliver insights to policymakers at the speed of today’s world. The integration of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly through large language models (LLMs), offers groundbreaking opportunities to improve intelligence operations and analysis, enabling the delivery of faster and more relevant support to decisionmakers. This technological revolution comes with significant downsides, however, especially as adversaries exploit similar advancements to uncover and counter U.S. intelligence operations. With an AI race underway, the United States must challenge itself to be first – first to benefit from AI, first to protect itself from enemies who might use the technology for ill, and first to use AI in line with the laws and values of a democracy.
For the U.S. national security community, fulfilling the promise and managing the peril of AI will require deep technological and cultural changes and a willingness to change the way agencies work. The U.S. intelligence and military communities can harness the potential of AI while mitigating its inherent risks, ensuring that the United States maintains its competitive edge in a rapidly evolving global landscape. Even as it does so, the United States must transparently convey to the American public, and to populations and partners around the world, how the country intends to ethically and safely utilize AI, in compliance with its laws and values.
MORE, BETTER, FASTER
AI's potential to revolutionize the intelligence community lies in its ability to process and analyze vast amounts of data at unprecedented speeds. It can be challenging to analyze large amounts of collected data to generate time-sensitive warnings. U.S. intelligence services could leverage AI systems’ pattern recognition capabilities to identify and alert human analysts to potential threats, such as missile launches or military movements, or important international developments that analysts know senior U.S. decisionmakers are interested in. This capability would ensure that critical warnings are timely, actionable, and relevant, allowing for more effective responses to both rapidly emerging threats and emerging policy opportunities. Multimodal models, which integrate text, images and audio, enhance this analysis. For instance, using AI to cross-reference satellite imagery with signals intelligence could provide a comprehensive view of military movements, enabling faster and more accurate threat assessments and potentially new means of delivering information to policymakers.
Intelligence analysts can also offload repetitive and time-consuming tasks to machines to focus on the most fulfilling work: generating original and deeper analysis, increasing the intelligence community’s overall insights and productivity. A good example of this is foreign language translation. U.S. intelligence agencies invested early in AI-powered capabilities, and the bet has paid off. The capabilities of language models have grown increasingly sophisticated and accurate—OpenAI’s recently released o1 and o3 models demonstrated significant progress in accuracy and reasoning ability—and can be used to even more quickly translate and summarize text, audio, and video files.
Although challenges remain, future systems trained on greater amounts of non-English data could be capable of discerning subtle differences between dialects and understanding the meaning and cultural context of slang or Internet memes. By relying on these tools, the intelligence community could focus on training a cadre of highly specialized linguists, who can be hard to find, often struggle to get through the clearance process, and take a long time to train. And, of course, by making more foreign language materials available across the right agencies, U.S. intelligence services would be able to more quickly triage the mountain of foreign intelligence they receive to pick out the needles in the haystack that really matter.
The United States must challenge itself to be first in the AI race.
The value of such speed to policymakers cannot be underestimated. Models can swiftly sift through intelligence data sets, open-source information, and traditional human intelligence and produce draft summaries or preliminary analytical reports that analysts can then validate and refine, ensuring the final products are both comprehensive and accurate. Analysts could team up with an advanced AI assistant to work through analytical problems, test ideas, and brainstorm in a collaborative fashion, improving each iteration of their analyses and delivering finished intelligence more quickly.
Consider Israel’s experience in January 2018, when its intelligence service, the Mossad, covertly broke into a secret Iranian facility and stole about 20 percent of the archives that detailed Iran’s nuclear activities between 1999 and 2003. According to Israeli officials, the Mossad collected some 55,000 pages of documents and a further 55,000 files stored on CDs, including photos and videos—nearly all in Farsi. Once the archive was obtained, senior officials placed immense pressure on intelligence professionals to produce detailed assessments of its content and whether it pointed to an ongoing effort to build an Iranian bomb. But it took these professionals several months—and hundreds of hours of labor—to translate each page, review it by hand for relevant content, and incorporate that information into assessments. With today’s AI capabilities, the first two steps in that process could have been accomplished within days, perhaps even hours, allowing analysts to understand and contextualize the intelligence rapidly.
One of the most interesting applications is the way AI could transform how intelligence is consumed by policymakers, enabling them to interact directly with intelligence reports through ChatGPT-like platforms. Such capabilities would allow users to ask specific questions and receive summarized, relevant information from thousands of reports with source citations, helping them make informed decisions quickly.
BRAVE NEW WORLD
Although AI offers numerous benefits, it also poses significant new risks, especially as adversaries develop similar technologies. China's advancements in AI, particularly in computer vision and surveillance, threaten U.S. intelligence operations. Because the country is ruled by an authoritarian regime, it lacks privacy restrictions and civil liberty protections. That deficit enables large-scale data collection practices that have yielded data sets of immense size. Government-sanctioned AI models are trained on vast amounts of personal and behavioral data that can then be used for various purposes, such as surveillance and social control. The presence of Chinese companies, such as Huawei, in telecommunications systems and software around the world could provide China with ready access to bulk data, notably bulk images that can be used to train facial recognition models, a particular concern in countries with large U.S. military bases. The U.S. national security community must consider how Chinese models built on such extensive data sets can give China a strategic advantage.
And it is not just China. The proliferation of “open source” AI models, such as Meta’s Llama and those created by the French company Mistral AI and the Chinese company DeepSeek, is putting powerful AI capabilities into the hands of users across the globe at relatively affordable costs. Many of these users are benign, but some are not—including authoritarian regimes, cyberhackers, and criminal gangs. These malign actors are using LLMs to rapidly generate and spread false and malicious content or to conduct cyberattacks. As witnessed with other intelligence-related technologies, such as signals intercept capabilities and unmanned drones, China, Iran, and Russia will have every incentive to share some of their AI breakthroughs with client states and subnational groups, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Wagner company, thereby increasing the threat to the United States and its allies.
The U.S. military and intelligence community’s AI models will become attractive targets for adversaries. As they grow more powerful and central to U.S. national security decision-making, intelligence AIs will become critical national assets that must be defended against adversaries seeking to compromise or manipulate them. The intelligence community must invest in developing secure AI models and in establishing standards for red teaming and continuous assessment to safeguard against potential threats. These teams can use AI to simulate attacks, uncovering potential weaknesses and developing strategies to mitigate them. Proactive measures, including collaboration with allies on and investment in counter-AI technologies, will be essential.
THE NEW NORMAL
These challenges cannot be wished away. Waiting too long for AI technologies to fully mature carries its own risks; U.S. intelligence capacities will fall behind those of China, Russia, and other powers that are going full steam ahead in developing AI. To ensure that intelligence—whether time-sensitive warnings or longer-term strategic insight—continues to be an advantage for the United States and its allies, the country’s intelligence community needs to adapt and innovate. The intelligence services must quickly master the use of AI technologies and make AI a foundational element in their work. This is the only sure way to ensure that future U.S. presidents receive the best possible intelligence support, stay ahead of their adversaries, and protect the United States’ sensitive capabilities and operations. Implementing these changes will require a cultural shift within the intelligence community. Today, intelligence analysts primarily build products from raw intelligence and data, with some support from existing AI models for voice and imagery analysis. Moving forward, intelligence officials should explore including a hybrid approach, in line with existing laws, using AI models trained on unclassified commercially available data and refined with classified information. This amalgam of technology and traditional intelligence gathering could result in an AI entity providing direction to imagery, signals, open source and measurement systems on the basis of an integrated view of normal and anomalous activity, automated imagery analysis and automated voice translation.
To accelerate the transition, intelligence leaders must champion the benefits of AI integration, emphasizing the improved capabilities and efficiency it offers. The cadre of newly appointed chief AI officers has been established in U.S. intelligence and defense to serve as leads within their agencies for promoting AI innovation and removing barriers to the technology’s implementation. Pilot projects and early wins can build momentum and confidence in AI’s capabilities, encouraging broader adoption. These officers can leverage the expertise of national labs and other partners to test and refine AI models, ensuring their effectiveness and security. To institutionalize change, leaders should create other organizational incentives, including promotions and training opportunities, to reward inventive approaches and those employees and units that demonstrate effective use of AI.
The White House has created the policy needed for the use of AI in national security agencies. President Joe Biden’s 2023 executive order regarding safe, secure, and trustworthy AI outlined the guidance needed to ethically and safely utilize the technology, and National Security Memorandum 25, issued in October 2024, is the country’s foundational strategy for harnessing the power and managing the risks of AI to advance national security. Now, Congress will need to do its part. Appropriations are needed for departments and agencies to create the infrastructure needed for innovation and experimentation, conduct and scale pilot activities and assessments, and continue to invest in evaluation capabilities to ensure that the United States is constructing reliable and high-performing AI technologies.
Intelligence leaders must champion the benefits of AI integration.
Intelligence and military communities are committed to keeping humans at the heart of AI-assisted decision-making and have created the frameworks and tools to do so. Agencies will need guidelines for how their analysts should use AI models to make sure that intelligence products meet the intelligence community’s standards for reliability. The government will also need to maintain clear guidance for handling the data of U.S. citizens when it comes to the training and use of large language models. It will be important to balance the use of emerging technologies with protecting the privacy and civil liberties of citizens. This means augmenting oversight mechanisms, updating relevant frameworks to reflect the capabilities and risks of AI, and fostering a culture of AI development within the national security apparatus that harnesses the potential of the technology while safeguarding the rights and freedoms that are foundational to American society.
Unlike the 1950s, when U.S. intelligence raced to the forefront of overhead and satellite imagery by developing many of the key technologies itself, winning the AI race will require that community to reimagine how it partners with private industry. The private sector, which is the primary means through which the government can realize AI progress at scale, is investing billions of dollars in AI-related research, datacenters, and computing power. Given those companies’ advancements, intelligence agencies should prioritize leveraging commercially available AI models and refining them with classified data. This approach enables the intelligence community to rapidly expand its capabilities without having to start from scratch, allowing it to remain competitive with adversaries. A recent collaboration between NASA and IBM to create the world’s largest geospatial foundation model—and the subsequent release of the model to the AI community as an open-source project—is an exemplary demonstration of how this type of public-private partnership can work in practice.
As the national security community integrates AI into its work, it must ensure the security and resilience of its models. Establishing standards to deploy generative AI securely is crucial for maintaining the integrity of AI-driven intelligence operations. This is a core focus of the National Security Agency’s new AI Security Center and its collaboration with the Department of Commerce’s AI Safety Institute.
As the United States faces growing rivalry to shape the future of the global order, it is urgent that its intelligence agencies and military capitalize on the country’s innovation and leadership in AI, focusing particularly on large language models, to provide faster and more relevant information to policymakers. Only then will they gain the speed, breadth, and depth of insight needed to navigate a more complex, competitive, and content-rich world.
Spy vs. AI
Foreign Affairs · by More by Anne Neuberger · January 15, 2025
How Artificial Intelligence Will Remake Espionage
Anne Neuberger
January 15, 2025
Under surveillance in Shanghai, December 2022 Aly Song / Reuters
Anne Neuberger is Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for Cyber and Emerging Technology on the U.S. National Security Council. From 2009 to 2021, she served in senior operational roles in intelligence and cybersecurity at the National Security Agency, including as its first Chief Risk Officer.
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In the early 1950s, the United States faced a critical intelligence challenge in its burgeoning competition with the Soviet Union. Outdated German reconnaissance photos from World War II could no longer provide sufficient intelligence about Soviet military capabilities, and existing U.S. surveillance capabilities were no longer able to penetrate the Soviet Union’s closed airspace. This deficiency spurred an audacious moonshot initiative: the development of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. In only a few years, U-2 missions were delivering vital intelligence, capturing images of Soviet missile installations in Cuba and bringing near real-time insights from behind the Iron Curtain to the Oval Office.
Today, the United States stands at a similar juncture. Competition between Washington and its rivals over the future of the global order is intensifying, and now, much as in the early 1950s, the United States must take advantage of its world-class private sector and ample capacity for innovation to outcompete its adversaries. The U.S. intelligence community must harness the country’s sources of strength to deliver insights to policymakers at the speed of today’s world. The integration of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly through large language models (LLMs), offers groundbreaking opportunities to improve intelligence operations and analysis, enabling the delivery of faster and more relevant support to decisionmakers. This technological revolution comes with significant downsides, however, especially as adversaries exploit similar advancements to uncover and counter U.S. intelligence operations. With an AI race underway, the United States must challenge itself to be first – first to benefit from AI, first to protect itself from enemies who might use the technology for ill, and first to use AI in line with the laws and values of a democracy.
For the U.S. national security community, fulfilling the promise and managing the peril of AI will require deep technological and cultural changes and a willingness to change the way agencies work. The U.S. intelligence and military communities can harness the potential of AI while mitigating its inherent risks, ensuring that the United States maintains its competitive edge in a rapidly evolving global landscape. Even as it does so, the United States must transparently convey to the American public, and to populations and partners around the world, how the country intends to ethically and safely utilize AI, in compliance with its laws and values.
MORE, BETTER, FASTER
AI's potential to revolutionize the intelligence community lies in its ability to process and analyze vast amounts of data at unprecedented speeds. It can be challenging to analyze large amounts of collected data to generate time-sensitive warnings. U.S. intelligence services could leverage AI systems’ pattern recognition capabilities to identify and alert human analysts to potential threats, such as missile launches or military movements, or important international developments that analysts know senior U.S. decisionmakers are interested in. This capability would ensure that critical warnings are timely, actionable, and relevant, allowing for more effective responses to both rapidly emerging threats and emerging policy opportunities. Multimodal models, which integrate text, images and audio, enhance this analysis. For instance, using AI to cross-reference satellite imagery with signals intelligence could provide a comprehensive view of military movements, enabling faster and more accurate threat assessments and potentially new means of delivering information to policymakers.
Intelligence analysts can also offload repetitive and time-consuming tasks to machines to focus on the most fulfilling work: generating original and deeper analysis, increasing the intelligence community’s overall insights and productivity. A good example of this is foreign language translation. U.S. intelligence agencies invested early in AI-powered capabilities, and the bet has paid off. The capabilities of language models have grown increasingly sophisticated and accurate—OpenAI’s recently released o1 and o3 models demonstrated significant progress in accuracy and reasoning ability—and can be used to even more quickly translate and summarize text, audio, and video files.
Although challenges remain, future systems trained on greater amounts of non-English data could be capable of discerning subtle differences between dialects and understanding the meaning and cultural context of slang or Internet memes. By relying on these tools, the intelligence community could focus on training a cadre of highly specialized linguists, who can be hard to find, often struggle to get through the clearance process, and take a long time to train. And, of course, by making more foreign language materials available across the right agencies, U.S. intelligence services would be able to more quickly triage the mountain of foreign intelligence they receive to pick out the needles in the haystack that really matter.
The United States must challenge itself to be first in the AI race.
The value of such speed to policymakers cannot be underestimated. Models can swiftly sift through intelligence data sets, open-source information, and traditional human intelligence and produce draft summaries or preliminary analytical reports that analysts can then validate and refine, ensuring the final products are both comprehensive and accurate. Analysts could team up with an advanced AI assistant to work through analytical problems, test ideas, and brainstorm in a collaborative fashion, improving each iteration of their analyses and delivering finished intelligence more quickly.
Consider Israel’s experience in January 2018, when its intelligence service, the Mossad, covertly broke into a secret Iranian facility and stole about 20 percent of the archives that detailed Iran’s nuclear activities between 1999 and 2003. According to Israeli officials, the Mossad collected some 55,000 pages of documents and a further 55,000 files stored on CDs, including photos and videos—nearly all in Farsi. Once the archive was obtained, senior officials placed immense pressure on intelligence professionals to produce detailed assessments of its content and whether it pointed to an ongoing effort to build an Iranian bomb. But it took these professionals several months—and hundreds of hours of labor—to translate each page, review it by hand for relevant content, and incorporate that information into assessments. With today’s AI capabilities, the first two steps in that process could have been accomplished within days, perhaps even hours, allowing analysts to understand and contextualize the intelligence rapidly.
One of the most interesting applications is the way AI could transform how intelligence is consumed by policymakers, enabling them to interact directly with intelligence reports through ChatGPT-like platforms. Such capabilities would allow users to ask specific questions and receive summarized, relevant information from thousands of reports with source citations, helping them make informed decisions quickly.
BRAVE NEW WORLD
Although AI offers numerous benefits, it also poses significant new risks, especially as adversaries develop similar technologies. China's advancements in AI, particularly in computer vision and surveillance, threaten U.S. intelligence operations. Because the country is ruled by an authoritarian regime, it lacks privacy restrictions and civil liberty protections. That deficit enables large-scale data collection practices that have yielded data sets of immense size. Government-sanctioned AI models are trained on vast amounts of personal and behavioral data that can then be used for various purposes, such as surveillance and social control. The presence of Chinese companies, such as Huawei, in telecommunications systems and software around the world could provide China with ready access to bulk data, notably bulk images that can be used to train facial recognition models, a particular concern in countries with large U.S. military bases. The U.S. national security community must consider how Chinese models built on such extensive data sets can give China a strategic advantage.
And it is not just China. The proliferation of “open source” AI models, such as Meta’s Llama and those created by the French company Mistral AI and the Chinese company DeepSeek, is putting powerful AI capabilities into the hands of users across the globe at relatively affordable costs. Many of these users are benign, but some are not—including authoritarian regimes, cyberhackers, and criminal gangs. These malign actors are using LLMs to rapidly generate and spread false and malicious content or to conduct cyberattacks. As witnessed with other intelligence-related technologies, such as signals intercept capabilities and unmanned drones, China, Iran, and Russia will have every incentive to share some of their AI breakthroughs with client states and subnational groups, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Wagner company, thereby increasing the threat to the United States and its allies.
The U.S. military and intelligence community’s AI models will become attractive targets for adversaries. As they grow more powerful and central to U.S. national security decision-making, intelligence AIs will become critical national assets that must be defended against adversaries seeking to compromise or manipulate them. The intelligence community must invest in developing secure AI models and in establishing standards for red teaming and continuous assessment to safeguard against potential threats. These teams can use AI to simulate attacks, uncovering potential weaknesses and developing strategies to mitigate them. Proactive measures, including collaboration with allies on and investment in counter-AI technologies, will be essential.
THE NEW NORMAL
These challenges cannot be wished away. Waiting too long for AI technologies to fully mature carries its own risks; U.S. intelligence capacities will fall behind those of China, Russia, and other powers that are going full steam ahead in developing AI. To ensure that intelligence—whether time-sensitive warnings or longer-term strategic insight—continues to be an advantage for the United States and its allies, the country’s intelligence community needs to adapt and innovate. The intelligence services must quickly master the use of AI technologies and make AI a foundational element in their work. This is the only sure way to ensure that future U.S. presidents receive the best possible intelligence support, stay ahead of their adversaries, and protect the United States’ sensitive capabilities and operations. Implementing these changes will require a cultural shift within the intelligence community. Today, intelligence analysts primarily build products from raw intelligence and data, with some support from existing AI models for voice and imagery analysis. Moving forward, intelligence officials should explore including a hybrid approach, in line with existing laws, using AI models trained on unclassified commercially available data and refined with classified information. This amalgam of technology and traditional intelligence gathering could result in an AI entity providing direction to imagery, signals, open source and measurement systems on the basis of an integrated view of normal and anomalous activity, automated imagery analysis and automated voice translation.
To accelerate the transition, intelligence leaders must champion the benefits of AI integration, emphasizing the improved capabilities and efficiency it offers. The cadre of newly appointed chief AI officers has been established in U.S. intelligence and defense to serve as leads within their agencies for promoting AI innovation and removing barriers to the technology’s implementation. Pilot projects and early wins can build momentum and confidence in AI’s capabilities, encouraging broader adoption. These officers can leverage the expertise of national labs and other partners to test and refine AI models, ensuring their effectiveness and security. To institutionalize change, leaders should create other organizational incentives, including promotions and training opportunities, to reward inventive approaches and those employees and units that demonstrate effective use of AI.
The White House has created the policy needed for the use of AI in national security agencies. President Joe Biden’s 2023 executive order regarding safe, secure, and trustworthy AI outlined the guidance needed to ethically and safely utilize the technology, and National Security Memorandum 25, issued in October 2024, is the country’s foundational strategy for harnessing the power and managing the risks of AI to advance national security. Now, Congress will need to do its part. Appropriations are needed for departments and agencies to create the infrastructure needed for innovation and experimentation, conduct and scale pilot activities and assessments, and continue to invest in evaluation capabilities to ensure that the United States is constructing reliable and high-performing AI technologies.
Intelligence leaders must champion the benefits of AI integration.
Intelligence and military communities are committed to keeping humans at the heart of AI-assisted decision-making and have created the frameworks and tools to do so. Agencies will need guidelines for how their analysts should use AI models to make sure that intelligence products meet the intelligence community’s standards for reliability. The government will also need to maintain clear guidance for handling the data of U.S. citizens when it comes to the training and use of large language models. It will be important to balance the use of emerging technologies with protecting the privacy and civil liberties of citizens. This means augmenting oversight mechanisms, updating relevant frameworks to reflect the capabilities and risks of AI, and fostering a culture of AI development within the national security apparatus that harnesses the potential of the technology while safeguarding the rights and freedoms that are foundational to American society.
Unlike the 1950s, when U.S. intelligence raced to the forefront of overhead and satellite imagery by developing many of the key technologies itself, winning the AI race will require that community to reimagine how it partners with private industry. The private sector, which is the primary means through which the government can realize AI progress at scale, is investing billions of dollars in AI-related research, datacenters, and computing power. Given those companies’ advancements, intelligence agencies should prioritize leveraging commercially available AI models and refining them with classified data. This approach enables the intelligence community to rapidly expand its capabilities without having to start from scratch, allowing it to remain competitive with adversaries. A recent collaboration between NASA and IBM to create the world’s largest geospatial foundation model—and the subsequent release of the model to the AI community as an open-source project—is an exemplary demonstration of how this type of public-private partnership can work in practice.
As the national security community integrates AI into its work, it must ensure the security and resilience of its models. Establishing standards to deploy generative AI securely is crucial for maintaining the integrity of AI-driven intelligence operations. This is a core focus of the National Security Agency’s new AI Security Center and its collaboration with the Department of Commerce’s AI Safety Institute.
As the United States faces growing rivalry to shape the future of the global order, it is urgent that its intelligence agencies and military capitalize on the country’s innovation and leadership in AI, focusing particularly on large language models, to provide faster and more relevant information to policymakers. Only then will they gain the speed, breadth, and depth of insight needed to navigate a more complex, competitive, and content-rich world.
Anne Neuberger is Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for Cyber and Emerging Technology on the U.S. National Security Council. From 2009 to 2021, she served in senior operational roles in intelligence and cybersecurity at the National Security Agency, including as its first Chief Risk Officer.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Anne Neuberger · January 15, 2025Foreign Affairs · by More by Anne Neuberger · January 15, 2025
19. China plans to blow Starlink out of the sky in a Taiwan war
Not a surprise.
The question is can the network be defended?
More questions:
How dependent would Taiwan be on the network?
How dependent would the US and its allies be on the network?
And The real question is would Musk halt use of his network by China's enemies in order to protect his investment?
China plans to blow Starlink out of the sky in a Taiwan war - Asia Times
China touts new AI-powered disruption techniques that would mimic hunting whales to seek and destroy SpaceX satellites in war time
asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · January 14, 2025
China’s bold moves to counter Starlink’s military applications with cutting-edge satellite disruption methods spotlight the pivotal role space would play in a Taiwan Strait conflict.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Chinese scientists have developed a method to target SpaceX’s Starlink satellite constellation. SCMP says the method simulates a space operation that could approach nearly 1,400 Starlink satellites within 12 hours using 99 Chinese satellites.
The research, led by Wu Yunhua, director of the aerospace control department at Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, was published in the Chinese academic journal Systems Engineering and Electronics and highlights Starlink’s military applications as witnessed in the Ukraine war.
The Chinese team’s computer simulation suggests that China could effectively track and monitor the operational status of Starlink satellites, which are equipped with lasers, microwaves and other devices for reconnaissance and tracking. The SCMP report notes that the method uses a new binary AI algorithm to mimic the hunting strategy of whales.
Wu’s team claims to have developed an unprecedented technology that enables computers at the ground control center to generate a comprehensive and reliable action plan in less than two minutes.
It also says the research has received significant funding from the Chinese government and military, with the Harbin Institute of Technology also participating in the project.
Asia Times has previously reported that China is reportedly developing anti-satellite technologies to counter the perceived military threat posed by the Starlink network, which has demonstrated strategic utility in Ukraine by enabling real-time battlefield coordination.
Chinese researchers advocate “soft and hard kill methods” to neutralize Starlink’s decentralized constellation, which provides resilient communication through over 2,300 satellites.
Targeting individual Starlink satellites is deemed inefficient; instead, China has explored disruptive technologies, including the Relativistic Klystron Amplifier (RKA), a high-power microwave weapon capable of disabling sensitive satellite electronics. However, deploying such systems faces challenges, including satellite overheating and energy demands.
Additionally, China has created sophisticated directed-energy weapons such as solid-state lasers mounted on satellites and is exploring the potential of X-ray lasers—ideas originating from the US’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—to take out several satellites in a single attack. This approach aims to reverse the cost-exchange imbalance of traditional anti-satellite weapons.
The rationale for these programs stems from Starlink’s proven military advantages, such as boosting US drones’ and stealth fighters’ data speeds by 100-fold, and its pivotal role in Ukraine’s battlefield successes, including the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva.
China’s focus on such technologies reflects a broader strategy to mitigate Starlink’s capabilities and maintain space superiority, particularly in scenarios like a Taiwan conflict.
Noting Starlink’s effectiveness in the Ukraine war, Juliana Suess mentions in a January 2023 article for the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) that Taiwan, inspired by Ukraine, is developing its Low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite communications system.
Suess says that the project, announced by the Taiwanese Space Agency in December 2022, aims to provide Taiwan with a sovereign capability for independent communications in the event of a Chinese invasion.
She notes the system is designed to ensure resilience against potential attacks on Taiwan’s undersea cables, which currently form the backbone of its external communications.
In a July 2024 report for the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, Charles Mok and Kenny Huang highlight the vulnerability of Taiwan’s undersea cables, which the island relies on for its internet connectivity.
Mok and Huang note that Taiwan operates 15 submarine cables, which carry over 99% of global data and connect it to international digital networks. However, its location in an earthquake-prone region and proximity to geopolitical tensions heighten the risk of accidental or deliberate cable damage.
They note recent incidents of severed cables near Taiwan, allegedly involving Chinese vessels, have raised concerns about potential digital blockades. They point out that repairing undersea cables is time-intensive, with limited global repair fleets exacerbating delays.
In line with the vulnerabilities of Taiwan’s undersea cable infrastructure, The War Zone reported this month that Taiwanese authorities have accused a Chinese-owned vessel, the Shunxin-39, of severing an undersea communications cable near Keelung Harbor.
The War Zone says the incident is the latest in a series of similar events affecting Taiwan’s underwater infrastructure. The report notes that the Shunxin-39, registered in Cameroon but owned by a Hong Kong company headed by a Chinese national, was found to be operating under multiple identities, raising suspicions of deliberate sabotage.
According to the report, Taiwan’s coast guard attempted to intercept the vessel for investigation, but rough weather prevented boarding. It then mentions that the ship continued its journey to South Korea, where Taiwanese authorities requested assistance with the investigation.
The War Zone says that the damaged cable, part of the Trans-Pacific Express network, is crucial for connecting East Asia with the US West Coast. The report says that although communication was rerouted with minimal disruption, the incident highlights the vulnerability of Taiwan’s undersea infrastructure.
While satellites do not suffer such vulnerabilities, Mok and Huang say their high cost and lower data capacity make them an inadequate substitute for undersea cables.
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Furthermore, Marc Julienne mentions in a November 2024 report for the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) that while ambitious, Taiwan’s LEO satellite program faces several key challenges.
First, Julienne points out that the reliance on foreign partners for satellite launches highlights the absence of indigenous launch capabilities, a significant hurdle to achieving comprehensive space power status. Although plans are in place for autonomous launch vehicles, he says progress remains slow, with test flights scheduled only for 2028.
Second, he says the limited experience in space-based communications among Taiwan’s traditional space actors and the lack of satellite communication expertise within its industrial base complicate efforts to develop a domestically controlled LEO broadband satellite constellation.
Julienne says these challenges are compounded by Taiwan’s geographic and geopolitical vulnerabilities, such as reliance on submarine cables for internet connectivity, which are prone to natural disasters and potential sabotage by adversaries.
He mentions that Taiwan’s efforts to enhance “communication resilience” through satellite constellations are essential but require significant financial and human capital investments. However, he says Taiwan’s burgeoning space sector struggles to attract and retain talent, with many engineers favoring higher-paying opportunities in semiconductors or working overseas.
Finally, Julienne says navigating the geopolitical sensitivities of space development, particularly in maintaining civilian oversight and avoiding provocative military applications, adds complexity to Taiwan’s ambitions.
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asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · January 14, 2025
20. Staunching The Rise of Terrorist Fighters
A view from Singapore.
The PDF in proper format can be accessed here. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/CO25005.pdf
Staunching The Rise of Terrorist Fighters
By Rohan Gunaratna
RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at RSISPublications@ntu.edu.sg.
Staunching The Rise of Terrorist Fighters
By Rohan Gunaratna
SYNOPSIS
The conflicts in Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and Syria will have a generational impact. The 7 October 2023 attack against Israel in Gaza and its consequences have set back the prospects of a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue and may attract a new wave of foreign fighters to embark on terrorist activities like what was seen following the military debacles in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. What can be done to stem another rise of the terrorist fighters?
COMMENTARY
The 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas triggered an overwhelming military response by Israel on Gaza. The next day, in support of Hamas, the Lebanese Hezbollah attacked Israel with rockets and artillery, forcing the evacuation of an estimated 96,000 Israeli civilians from northern Israel. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) retaliated with drones, artillery shelling, and airstrikes on Hamas and Hezbollah targets throughout Gaza and Lebanon, respectively. The large number of Palestinian deaths and injuries – with more than 45,000 reported killed by 28 December 2024 in Gaza alone – generated a global reaction, sparking hate crimes and religiously motivated terrorist attacks against Israelis and Jews worldwide.
In Singapore, the terrorism threat has also been elevated, and although this has been managed effectively, its impact is significant. After Israel’s response to Hamas’ attacks, Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) arrested at least five Singaporeans who had become radicalised by the conflict. Three of them even planned to travel to the Middle East to fight for the Palestinians. Radicalised online, they trained or had planned to obtain training to fight in Gaza against the IDF. They practised how to kill and had either gone to or planned to visit shooting ranges in Thailand and Indonesia to train in the use of firearms.
The three radicalised Singaporeans, Muhammad Indra Aqmal Effendy, a 21-year-old lift mechanic; Mohamad Latiff Rahim, a 41-year-old director of a digital marketing company; and Nurisham Yusoff, a 44-year-old security guard, were arrested in October and November 2024. Indra and Nurisham had planned to fight for Hamas against the IDF in Gaza, while Latiff had planned to fight for Iran-linked threat groups. The latter was also willing to carry out attacks in Singapore if instructed.
After seeing online content showing the killing of Palestinian civilians by the IDF, Indra was emotionally affected. He consumed extremist materials on armed jihad and martyrdom. He wanted to fight for Hamas and die a martyr in the belief that this was a legitimate form of armed jihad. Indra prepared to travel to Gaza. He searched online for travel routes and identified a foreign contact based in the Palestinian territories he thought could help. He practised his skills in unarmed combat and “shooting” with toy guns at home. He also searched online for shooting ranges in Batam (Indonesia), where he could train with real weapons.
Based in Bangkok (Thailand), Latiff viewed online content on “end of times” prophecies in 2010 and was convinced it would happen in his lifetime. Believing it was his duty to fight the enemies of Islam during the end of times, he prepared himself by visiting a shooting range in Bangkok in 2022. The 7 October 2023 attacks in Gaza further convinced him that the end of times was imminent and that Iran’s Supreme Leader would soon issue a call for Muslims to engage in armed jihad. He practised with kitchen knives and simulated attacks on vital parts of the body.
Nurisham was exposed to radical and segregationist foreign preachers when searching for religious knowledge on social media in 2020. To him, martyrdom was the easiest way to atone for his sins and enter heaven during the impending end of times. Online extremist materials linked to the Israel-Hamas war convinced him that it was his religious obligation to fight in Gaza. He posted extensively on social media about the war, hoping that someone would help to get him into the war zone. Nurisham also believed that his military training in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) during his earlier military conscription would be helpful. He had planned to visit a shooting range in Batam.
Based on the ISD’s investigations, the three men were unrelated. They acted alone, and there was no indication that they had radicalised or recruited others. Their family members were unaware of their violent plans.
Preventing Similar Cases
To mitigate the spillover effects of overseas conflicts in Singapore, the government should work with community partners to raise public awareness of the risk of radicalisation driven by such foreign conflicts. Such radicalisation – to the point of bearing arms to fight overseas as jihadists – is not new to Singapore. In the late 1990s, several Singaporeans radicalised by the war in Afghanistan between the Taliban and forces allied to the US travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan for terrorist training. In the 2000s, a few travelled to Syria to help establish a global Islamic caliphate. Today, some want to travel to the Middle East to fight or to conduct terrorist attacks at home.
As a community, Singapore’s Muslims are committed to religious harmony and social
cohesion at home. They have supported the peaceful resolution of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. However, given the impact of social media, which spins narratives and amplifies extremist propaganda, some Muslims in Singapore have become radicalised. To ensure the stability and security of Singapore, every effort must be made to prevent such outside antagonisms and struggles from spilling into Singapore. Those concerned about the plight of Palestinian civilians can provide aid through official humanitarian channels.
Singaporeans have confidence in their government’s ability to protect them. However, the threats posed to Singapore’s security arising from global and regional developments are reaching a point where community support is vital to pre-empting any possible attack. Singaporeans should remain vigilant even after the situation in the Middle East stabilises. Everyone has a role in securing Singapore and protecting fellow citizens and residents. No terrorist attack can take place if everyone is oriented towards detecting suspicious indicators, signs, and clues of radicalisation and reporting them to the authorities.
Rohan Gunaratna is Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He was Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) in RSIS from February 2004 to December 2018.
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore
Block S4, Level B3, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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