Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

2 – “Defend institutions. It is institutions that help us to preserve decency. They need our help as well. Do not speak of “our institutions” unless you make them yours by acting on their behalf. Institutions do not protect themselves. They fall one after the other unless each is defended from the beginning. So choose an institution you care about—a court, a newspaper, a law, a labor union—and take its side.”

– Timothy Snyder

“Nietzsche said the newspaper had replaced the prayer in the life of the modern bourgeois, meaning that the busy, the cheap, the ephemeral, had usurped all that remained of the eternal in his daily life.”

– Allan Bloom

"The life of the nation is secure only while the nation is honest, truthful, and virtuous."

– Frederick Douglass

1. Shoes. To me, shoes are not just an object. Shoes are freedom. (north Korea)

2. Washington Brief Ep. 45: North Korea Troops in Ukraine

3. Japan, South Korea, Doubt North Korean Hypersonic Missile Claims

4. North Korean artillery signals Russian desperation in Ukraine

5. Yoon's lawyer says impeached president will stand trial if indicted or arrest warrant issued

6. Nat'l Assembly rejects special probe bills targeting Yoon, first lady in revote

7. Presidential office denies flight speculations on Yoon

8. Nat'l police chief, ex-head of Seoul police indicted over martial law involvement

9. N. Korean media make no mention of leader Kim's birthday on anniv.

10. Ex-Pentagon official says Trump may not support South Korea's nuclearization

11. Why are supporters of South Korea’s embattled president adopting MAGA slogans and iconography?

12. How Bodyguards Are Keeping South Korea’s Leader From Detention

13. Frozen roads, fast cash: How North Koreans made fortunes smuggling cars to China

14. Sen. Kim vows to 'stand up vigorously' if Trump uses military, economic coercion against Asian allies

15. South Korea's Yoon faces new arrest attempt in fortified compound

16. A window into division: Where to catch a glimpse of North Korea near Seoul

17. New Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman: “North Korea, China, Russia, Iran Increased Aggression… U.S. Forces Reconstruction Urgent”

18. Expert: “International Law Should Be Applied to North Korean POWs Dispatched to Russia”

19. The Flawed U.S. Exit from Afghanistan in 2021: Lessons Not Learned

1. Shoes. To me, shoes are not just an object. Shoes are freedom. (north Korea)

From our good friend and a colleague at the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy) who is a conservative political leader in the United Kingdom and who is a survivor and escapee from north Korea.

These are powerful words. We must all work for the freedom of the Korean people in the north. Their suffering is unimaginable.

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ji-hyun-park-%EB%B0%95%EC%A7%80%ED%98%84-909a975a_ccp-activity-7282689128910000128-X8_0?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop

https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7282689128910000128/

Ji Hyun Park_박지현

• 1st

[“the pacta sunt servandau“] Author “The Hard Road Out”, Amnesty Brave Award, NatWest’s Chairman award at AWA. The Times Heroes 2021. Public Speaker

2h •

2 hours ago

“To be alive at all is to have scars.”

— John Steinbeck

I carry two deep scars.

One was caused by the North Korean dictatorship, and the other by the Chinese Communist Party.(hashtag

#CCP)

From the moment we are born in North Korea, we are stripped of freedom.

The North Korean regime treats its people as tools to sustain its dictatorship, denying them freedom of thought, expression, and even movement. People are categorized into a caste-like system called “Songbun,” which determines their fate based on their family background and political history. Effort or talent holds no value in this system.

North Korea is not just a dictatorship; it is a modern-day slave system that completely denies basic human rights. Every citizen is forced to live under the regime’s command, and any attempt to step outside of it is met with imprisonment, torture, or execution. The North Korean regime represents one of the most thorough and brutal systems of dehumanization in human history.

But North Korea was not the end of my suffering.

When I crossed the border seeking freedom, I encountered another oppressor—the Chinese Communist Party.

China does not treat North Korean defectors as mere illegal immigrants; they treat us as less than human.

Defector women are subjected to sexual exploitation and human trafficking, with Chinese authorities either turning a blind eye or outright enabling such atrocities. Those who are captured are forcibly repatriated to North Korea, a cruel act that violates international law and refugee protection principles. Once returned, defectors face torture, imprisonment in labor camps, or execution.

The Chinese Communist Party commits these crimes while evading responsibility before the international community. Their silence and violence further deepen the suffering of North Korean defectors.

The scars I bear are not only physical but also emotional.

These scars resurface every morning when I put on my shoes.

Shoes.

To me, shoes are not just an object. Shoes are freedom.

When I was first arrested by the Ministry of State Security after being repatriated from China, I couldn’t even find my shoes.

Shoes were scattered all over the prison corridors, and I had to wear someone else’s shoes because mine were gone.

In the labor camp, I wasn’t even allowed to wear shoes. I was forced to endure unimaginable abuse and persecution while barefoot.

Eventually, my feet became infected, and the flesh decayed to the point where my bones were exposed. Yet no one cared.

As flies laid eggs on my rotting feet and maggots crawled across them, I found myself envious of those tiny creatures for their desperate will to survive.

In a life where I was treated worse than a maggot, I came to understand the profound hope symbolized by putting on shoes every morning.

Today, I can freely wear shoes and walk wherever I choose. But when I think of those still suffering in North Korea, unable to even wear shoes, I realize that this freedom is far from light.

Activate to view larger image,

2. Washington Brief Ep. 45: North Korea Troops in Ukraine

Spend an hour with Greg Scarlatoiu, Joe DeTrani, Alexandre Mansourov and Larry Moffitt as they discuss the North Korean presence in Ukraine. (or Russia/Kursk).

Washington Brief Ep. 45: North Korea Troops in Ukraine

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IazVOQ-AaQ8&t=25s

The Washington Times Foundation

448 subscribers

views

Streamed live 16 hours ago

Kim Jong Un sent 11,000 troops and weaponry to join Russia’s fight in Ukraine in exchange for food and oil and likely assistance with their satellite and nuclear programs. Reportedly, North Korean casualties are increasing, some say exponentially. If that is indeed true, how will these mounting casualties affect Kim Jong Un, globally and at home? How resilient is the Russia-China-DPRK axis of authoritarian states? Does this axis negatively affect global governance? What are the challenges and opportunities for a President Trump administration?

Join veteran observer and analyst of North Korea and human rights, Greg Scarlatoiu,

and The Washington Brief Panel as they delve into the possible unintended consequences of North Korea’s move into the sphere of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

3. Japan, South Korea, Doubt North Korean Hypersonic Missile Claims

Japan, South Korea, Doubt North Korean Hypersonic Missile Claims - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · January 7, 2025

Rodong Sinmun Photo

North Korea claimed to have carried out a successful test-firing of a new hypersonic intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) on Monday, with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who observed the firing from a video feed, saying in a Tuesday state media release that the missile system will contain North Korea’s rivals in the Pacific.

Monday’s launch was the first by North Korea for the year, with its last launch on Nov. 5. The last hypersonic missile launch took place on Apr. 2, 2024.

State media Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the test-firing is part of plans to raise North Korea’s strategic deterrence’s durability and effectiveness.

“Just like the intentional purpose of all military powers, the development of new-type hypersonic missile is mainly aimed to steadily put the country’s nuclear war deterrent on an advanced basis by making the means of changing the war situation, the weapon system to which no one can respond, the linchpin of strategic deterrence,” said Kim, according to the KCNA report.

Kim also claimed the plan and efforts in improving its deterrence capabilities were for self-defense and not for offensive action. He went on to say the hypersonic missile system will reliably contain any rivals in the Pacific region that can affect the security of North Korea, according to the KCNA report, though he did not name who the rivals were.

KCNA also reported that the new hypersonic IRBM used new carbon fibre composite materials in the engine section of the missile. It was fired northeastward from a launching ground in a suburb of Pyongyang and reached its first peak at the height of 99.8 kilometers and the second peak at the height of 42.5 kilometers while making a 1,500-km-long flight at a speed 12 times the speed of sound. KCNA said the missile landed on the waters of a simulated target in the open sea, but Monday’s tracking data on the missile issued by Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) and South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSO) gave a different reading of the missile’s performance.

Japan’s MOD said in a Monday release that at around 12:01 p.m., North Korea launched at least one ballistic missile in a northeasterly direction from inland North Korea.

“Details are currently being analyzed in close cooperation between Japan, the United States, and South Korea, but it is estimated that the ballistic missile flew at a maximum altitude of approximately 100 km, traveled approximately 1,100 km, and fell in the Sea of Japan, east of the Korean Peninsula, outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ),” reads the release, which also condemns North Korea’s launch.

Japan Defense Minister Gen Nakatani, who is currently in Indonesia on an official visit, said in a Monday press conference that Japan had lodged its protest through diplomatic channels and in a Tuesday press conference stated that the MOD estimated that Monday’s launch was of solid-fuel-propellant IRBM.

“Further details, including whether the missile was a hypersonic weapon, are still under analysis,” Nakatani said.

South Korea’s JCS said in a Monday release that U.S. and South Korean intelligence authorities have been monitoring North Korea’s missile launch preparations. The South Korean military immediately detected and tracked the launch, with the missile travelling 1,100 km and then landing in the East Sea (Sea of Japan).

Information was shared with the U.S. and Japan, according to the JCS release.

“We strongly condemn the North Korean missile launch as a clear act of provocation that seriously threatens the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. The ROK military is closely monitoring North Korea’s various movements under a firm ROK-U.S. joint defense posture to ensure that North Korea does not misjudge the current security situation, and maintains the capability and readiness to respond overwhelmingly to any provocation,” reads the release.

On Tuesday, South Korean media agency Yonhap reported that JCS spokesperson Col. Lee Sung-un dismissed North Korea’s claims of the missile’s performance, saying that the U.S., South Korea and Japan’s analysis of the flight range was 1,100 km and that the missile did not reach a second peak as reported by KCNA.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command issued a statement on Monday.

“We are aware of the DPRK’s ballistic missile launch and are consulting closely with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, as well as other regional allies and partners. The United States condemns these actions and calls for the DPRK to refrain from further unlawful and destabilizing acts. We have assessed that this event does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel, or territory, or to our allies. We will continue to monitor the situation. The U.S. commitments to the defense of the ROK and Japan remain ironclad,” reads the statement.

Monday’s launch occurred while Secretary of State Anthony Blinken was in Seoul meeting South Korean officials.

In a joint press conference with South Korea Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, the two officials condemned North Korea’s launch.

“We condemn the DPRK’s missile launch just today, yet another violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions,” Blinken said.

Blinken also said the U.S. and South Korea had reason to believe that Russia intends to share advanced space and satellite technology with North Korea, and Russian President Vladimir Putin may be close to reversing a decades-long policy by accepting North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Japan’s Joint Staff Office also issued two releases on Monday on the movements on People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships around Japan.

The first release stated that on Thursday at 10 p.m., the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) sighted PLAN destroyers CNS Shaoxing (134) and CNS Hangzhou (136) sailing south in an area 68 miles northeast of Miyako Island, with the PLAN destroyers subsequently sailing in the waters between Okinawa and Miyako Island and entering the Philippine Sea. JMSDF minesweeper JS Kuroshima (MSC-692), a JMSDF P-1 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) of Fleet Air Wing 1 based at JMSDF Kanoya Air Base on the main island of Kyushu, and a JMSDF P-3C Orion MPA of Fleet Air Wing 5 based at Naha Air Base on Okinawa, shadowed the PLAN ships, according to the release.

At 4 a.m. Sunday, Dongdiao-class surveillance ship Kaiyangxing (796) was sighted sailing west in an area 43 miles northeast of the island of Tanegashima and subsequently sailed west through the Osumi Strait to enter the East China Sea. The release said that Kaiyangxing had sailed southeast in the waters between Okinawa and Miyako Island on Dec. 13 last year. Destroyer escort JS Tone (DE-234), minesweeper JS Aoshima (MSC-689) and a JMSDF P-1 MPA of Fleet Air Wing 4 based at Naval Air Facility Atsugi on the main island of Honshu, shadowed Kaiyangxing, according to the release.

news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · January 7, 2025

4. North Korean artillery signals Russian desperation in Ukraine

Interesting news. Here is some important information from Dr. Bruce bechtol that is overlooked by most analysts:

The Russians do not have these systems. Why? The 170MM howitzer was originally built to be a coastal defense gun. The Russians gave a few of these to the North Koreans in the 1970s. The North Koreans being North Koreans, they decided to put these guns on a T54/55 tank chassis to make them a completely different type of weapon - a GIANT "road mobile" self-propelled artillery system. The top speed of the 170s is about 11 Kms an hour (not kidding).

What does all that mean?

Either North Korean crews are manning these systems or Russian crews trained by North Koreans are manning them (less likely).

Much like the Bulsae system which is a hybrid of the Kornet Russian system. There is the "man-pack" version (which Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria had) and the version which is used on a light-armored vehicle (which was sold to the Russians). https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/Bulsae-3_(AT-14_Spriggan)_North_Korean_Anti-Tank_Guided_Missile_(ATGM) The North Korean version is different then the Russian version but the Russian version is the basis, the prototype if you will, of the North Korean system. Thus, again, either manned by North Korean crews or manned by Russian crews trained by North Koreans.

These are just two examples. There are more.

North Korean artillery signals Russian desperation in Ukraine

Story by Mateusz Tomczak • 4h • 2 min read

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/north-korean-artillery-signals-russian-desperation-in-ukraine/ar-AA1x6Xxa?ocid=msedgntp&pc=U531&cvid=e9c5087180944857b563f59982630e48&ei=36

M1989 Koksan, illustrative photo

A recording has emerged on social media showing North Korean M1989 Koksan self-propelled howitzers at the front in Ukraine. According to some experts, these images are a clear signal to the world and evidence of the deteriorating state of Russian artillery, strained by the prolonged war.

"This makes me very happy because it confirms suspicions about the terrible state of Russian artillery after almost 3 years of war—due to wear and tear, lack of barrels, and a dwindling supply of ammunition," wrote Jarosław Wolski, a Polish defense analyst, on his X service profile.

M1989 Koksan on the front in Ukraine

The first information about the possibility of introducing the M1989 Koksan into Russian army service appeared in October 2024. A few weeks later, photos showing the transport of these howitzers in Russia appeared online. At the time, it was suggested that the Russians were in the "initial familiarization" stage with North Korean artillery and might soon start using it in combat.

According to information provided by the North Korean regime, the M1989 Koksan is equipped with a 170 mm caliber gun with a barrel length of 50 calibers, allowing it to strike targets up to 37 miles away.

This impressive range, however, applies to special ammunition. With conventional explosive fragmentation shells, the maximum range is no more than 25 miles. This is still considerable, but analysts and experts question North Korean equipment's technical condition and accuracy.

An ally Russia can count on

"I've already written about the Koksans—briefly put; it's a system developed for terrorist shelling of Seoul. It's an exotic caliber and not very accurate. It's a sign of Russian desperation that they are incorporating it into their armament," wrote Jarosław Wolski.

At the same time, the appearance of the M1989 Koksan in Russia and now on the front in Ukraine illustrates the growing support Pyongyang is providing to Moscow. Initially, this mainly included ammunition, which often proved defective. Over time, this support expanded to include soldiers sent to the Kursk region and heavy military equipment.

How many M1989 Koksans have fallen into Russian hands has not been confirmed. Based on photos and recordings from transports, it is estimated that there could be as many as 50 of these howitzers.

Yoon's lawyer says impeached president will stand trial if indicted or arrest warrant issued | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · January 8, 2025

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- A lawyer for President Yoon Suk Yeol said Wednesday the impeached president is prepared to stand trial if he is indicted or an arrest warrant is issued, a day after a court granted an extension of a warrant to detain Yoon over his short-lived imposition of martial law.

The remarks by one of Yoon's legal representatives, Yun Gap-keun, came as the impeached president is facing a second attempt at being detained, after last week's first attempt failed due to an hourslong standoff between investigators and members of the presidential security service.

The lawyer also said the impeached president will accept due procedures if the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) requests a warrant to arrest Yoon and a court approves the warrant.

However, Yun stressed that the legal defense team of Yoon still refuses to comply with an investigation based on what it labeled as an "invalid" warrant to detain the impeached president.

"What's clear is that if the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials files (the warrant) to the Seoul Western District Court, which is outside the jurisdiction, we cannot accept it," Yun said, stressing that the jurisdiction over charges against Yoon lies with the Seoul Central District Court.

The CIO handling Yoon's martial law case attempted to execute the warrants to detain him and search the presidential residence last Friday, but it withdrew its officials from the site after a six-hour standoff with the Presidential Security Service blocking the entry.

The Seoul Western District Court granted the extension requested by CIO investigators after the initial warrant expired Monday.

The legal team also dismissed speculations Yoon had fled the presidential residence, saying his lawyers met him last night.

President Yoon Suk Yeol's legal defense team holds a press conference in Seoul on Jan. 8, 2025. (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · January 8, 2025

6. Nat'l Assembly rejects special probe bills targeting Yoon, first lady in revote

For Lee Jea Myung and his faction of the Minjoo/DPK - is some of their power and influence slightly slipping? Are cooler heads prevailing? Or are we seeing short term tactical moves while playing a longer strategic game?

(LEAD) Nat'l Assembly rejects special probe bills targeting Yoon, first lady in revote | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · January 8, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout as parliament rejects bills; CHANGES photo)

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- The National Assembly rejected two special counsel bills targeting impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol over his failed martial law bid and allegations surrounding first lady Kim Keon Hee in a revote on Wednesday.

The special counsel bill targeting Yoon calls for the designation of special prosecutors to look into insurrection charges related to Yoon's short-lived martial law imposition.

The bill was rejected in a 198-101 vote with one abstention and was ultimately scrapped as it failed to gain the two-thirds support required to override the president's veto.

The opposition parties unilaterally passed the bill at a plenary session last month before the Cabinet demanded the National Assembly reconsider its decision in a meeting chaired by acting President Choi Sang-mok.

The National Assembly holds a plenary session to vote on two special counsel bills targeting impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol over his failed martial law bid and allegations surrounding first lady Kim Keon Hee, and six other bills on Jan. 8, 2025. (Yonhap)

The opposition-controlled National Assembly also rejected another bill that calls for a special counsel probe into two key allegations involving the first lady over her alleged involvement in a stock manipulation scheme and interference in election nominations through a power broker.

The bill was voted down in a 196-103 vote with one abstention.

It is the fourth version of the bill targeting Kim following a similar proposal vetoed by Yoon, which was ultimately scrapped in a revote.

People Power Party floor leader Kweon Seong-dong earlier reaffirmed his party's official decision to vote against the special counsel bills, while the main opposition Democratic Party vowed to reintroduce the bills to the Assembly if they are rejected.

Parliament also voted down six more bills, including a controversial grain bill that was vetoed by then acting President Han Duck-soo, during the session.

The Grain Management Act mandates the government purchase of surplus rice to stabilize prices during market fluctuations. A similar bill was vetoed by Yoon in March 2023 and subsequently scrapped in a revote.

Other bills include the National Assembly Act, aimed at preventing the automatic submission of the government budget to the plenary session after the legal deadline, and the National Assembly Testimony Appraisal Act, which would require companies to submit requested data to lawmakers.

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · January 8, 2025

7. Presidential office denies flight speculations on Yoon

Presidential office denies flight speculations on Yoon | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 8, 2025

SEOUL, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- The presidential office on Wednesday denied speculations that President Yoon Suk Yeol might have fled his residence amid investigators' attempt to detain him for a probe into his short-lived imposition of martial law.

"(I) have heard the president is currently staying at the official residence," a presidential official with knowledge of the matter told Yonhap News Agency by phone, without providing further details.

Police said they are tracking Yoon's location amid rumors he may have fled from his residence in central Seoul as investigators led by the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) were mulling ways to arrest the impeached president.

Rep. Ahn Gyu-back of the main opposition Democratic Party claimed in an interview with KBS radio Wednesday that he had information Yoon has already left the residence and is hiding in a "third location."

During a parliamentary session Tuesday, Oh Dong-woon, chief of the CIO, told lawmakers he had heard nothing specific about whether Yoon remained home.

Buses are parked in front of the entrance of President Yoon Suk Yeol's official residence in Yongsan, central Seoul, on Jan. 8, 2024. (Yonhap

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 8, 2025

8. Nat'l police chief, ex-head of Seoul police indicted over martial law involvement

Nat'l police chief, ex-head of Seoul police indicted over martial law involvement | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 8, 2025

SEOUL, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- Prosecutors on Wednesday indicted the head of the National Police Agency and the former chief of the Seoul police over their alleged roles during President Yoon Suk Yeol's short-lived imposition of martial law, officials said.

Cho Ji-ho, commissioner general of the National Police Agency, and Kim Bong-sik, former chief of the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency, were indicted under detention on charges of insurrection and abuse of power over their activities during martial law on Dec. 3.

Cho is accused of sending police to the National Assembly during martial law to prevent lawmakers from entering the building and allegedly supporting military troops in their attempt to arrest key politicians.

Prosecutors believe their actions amount to inciting a riot with the intent to subvert the Constitution and abuse of power.

This compiled photo shows Cho Ji-ho (L), commissioner general of the National Police Agency, and Kim Bong-sik, former chief of the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency. (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 8, 2025

Hmmm...

N. Korean media make no mention of leader Kim's birthday on anniv. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · January 8, 2025

SEOUL, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's state media has made no mention of leader Kim Jong-un's birthday, which reportedly falls on Wednesday, despite speculation the North may formalize its celebrations this year amid its glorification campaigns for him.

North Korea has not officially designated Kim's birthday, known to be Jan. 8, for special celebrations, though the birthdays of late state founder Kim Il-sung and his successor, Kim Jong-il, have been marked as national holidays.

The Rodong Sinmun, a North Korean newspaper catering to the general domestic readership, carried a story on Kim's attendance at a ceremony to inaugurate regional factories on its front page Wednesday but provided no coverage of his birthday.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), which delivers news stories to external readers, also did not make any mention of Kim's birthday.

The possibility that North Korea may formalize his birthday this year has been raised as the country has been focusing on its glorification campaign fully to the incumbent leader.

Since early last year, North Korea's state media has rarely used the term the Day of the Sun for the birthday of Kim Il-sung, which falls on April 15. The move is seen as an effort to reduce Kim's reliance on his ancestors for authority and strengthen his status as a stand-alone leader.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un addresses a meeting of army battalion commanders and battalion political instructors in Pyongyang, held from Nov. 14-15, 2024, in Pyongyang, in this photo provided by the Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

In a related move, North Korea also ceased using the "juche," or self-reliance, calendar, symbolizing Kim Il-sung, last year.

Stamps, calendars and other state publications recently issued by North Korea have also abandoned the juche year-counting system.

Some experts in South Korea assess that the North's reservations regarding Kim's birthday may be aimed at distracting public attention from the leader's mother, Ko Yong-hui, originally a Korean resident in Japan, who resettled in the North and gave birth to him without officially marrying Kim Jong-il.

North Korea places significant importance on the Mount Paektu bloodline of the governing Kim family as the basis of its hereditary power.

The country has described Kim Il-sung as having fought against Japanese colonialism from the mountain, the highest on the Korean Peninsula. The North also called the mountain the sacred birthplace of Kim Jong-il, though historians and foreign officials have said he was born in Russia.

The date of Kim Jong-un's birthday was first discovered in 2014, when the KCNA described a North Korean visit by former American professional basketball player Dennis Rodman that year as taking place on the occasion of Kim's birthday.

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · January 8, 2025

10. Ex-Pentagon official says Trump may not support South Korea's nuclearization

Excerpts:

"I personally don't think President Trump would support South Korean independent nuclearization," he said during a virtual forum hosted by the Institute for Corean-American Studies, a nonprofit research organization.

"I think President Biden and President Trump may not agree on many things, but I think they agree on one thing, which is they both view nuclear weapons as an existential threat, and neither wants nuclear weapons to spread to other countries," he added.

Ex-Pentagon official says Trump may not support South Korea's nuclearization | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 8, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 (Yonhap) -- Incoming President Donald Trump may not support South Korea's independent nuclearization, a former senior Pentagon official anticipated Tuesday, stressing Seoul is "better off" under America's nuclear umbrella.

Vipin Narang, former acting assistant secretary of defense for space policy, made the remarks, voicing optimism that the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), the allies' nuclear deterrence body launched during the Biden administration, will continue at least "for the foreseeable future" under Trump.

"I personally don't think President Trump would support South Korean independent nuclearization," he said during a virtual forum hosted by the Institute for Corean-American Studies, a nonprofit research organization.

"I think President Biden and President Trump may not agree on many things, but I think they agree on one thing, which is they both view nuclear weapons as an existential threat, and neither wants nuclear weapons to spread to other countries," he added.

Vipin Narang, then acting U.S. assistant secretary of defense for space policy, speaks during a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., on Aug. 1, 2024, in this file photo captured from the center's YouTube account. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Though he described the North's nuclear program as advancing at "one of the highest rates in the world, matched only by China," Narang said it is better for South Korea to rely on America's "extended deterrence" pledge to use the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend its ally.

"I still believe that it's in South Korea's interest to ensconce itself in the extended deterrence umbrella because it's not as if South Korea can get nuclear weapons overnight. There will be a window of vulnerability against a nuclear North Korea that will have an incentive to try and stop South Korea potentially through the use of force," he said.

"In a world in which South Korea is pursuing its own nuclear weapons, then the U.S. probably doesn't have an obligation to defend it ... South Korea may be very vulnerable in that period."

Narang, currently the Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, expected that the NCG would remain under Trump, highlighting it is "in America's interest."

"The work streams that we've established mean that the NCG will at least persist, in my view, for the foreseeable future. I do think that the Trump administration will see that this is in America's interest," he said.

"It's a way to allow South Korea to contribute to the extended deterrence relationship in ways that I think the president will appreciate in the sense that it is a good 'bargain' for the U.S., and so I am hopeful that at least on the U.S. side, there will be some continuity," he added.

Under the NCG mechanism, the two allies are pursuing a model of "conventional and nuclear integration" in which the Asian ally uses its high-tech conventional military assets to support America's nuclear operations in an integrated way -- a shift that requires South Korea to take greater responsibilities in the alliance.

Rather, Narang raised concerns over whether South Korea's efforts for the NCG would continue in the midst of political uncertainties caused by President Yoon Suk Yeol's botched martial law bid and his subsequent impeachment last month.

"My bigger question is actually on the South Korea side ... what happens with the domestic political changes that are imminent and forthcoming in South Korea and the commitment to the NCG, given that President Yoon himself was so intimately ... and personally involved with the NCG," he said.

Apparently mindful of growing concerns over Trump's foreign policy approach, Narang underscored the importance of alliances.

"This notion that allies are liabilities or free riders is simply not true," he said, calling the allies "force multipliers." "When we provide a united front to our adversaries, we are stronger, and the allies provide capability and geography, and we share values."

The professor voiced worries over North Korea's fast-advancing nuclear capabilities as well as its deepening military alignment with Russia.

"I think on a percentage basis, North Korea's strategic programs are advancing at one of the highest rates in the world, matched perhaps only by China ... and it continues to expand and diversify its capabilities," he said without elaborating further.

Asked to describe Pyongyang's nuclear doctrine, Narang said Pyongyang has an "asymmetric escalation" posture under which a state deploys a nuclear arsenal to present a credible threat of a first nuclear strike or preemptive nuclear strike.

"No question. Asymmetric escalation, 100 percent," he said.

Commenting on the potential for South Korea's nuclear latency, Narang said the Asian country has the scientific and technical capability if it needed to pursue nuclear weapons, but the question is "how far could they go without getting detected?"

"I do think that if there is an effort to produce ... enough quantities of fissile materials to have ... an arsenal that is credible of independently deterring and defeating North Korea ... I think South Korea probably gets detected," he said.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 8, 2025

11. Why are supporters of South Korea’s embattled president adopting MAGA slogans and iconography?

Will things turn around for President Yoon?

As the Minjoo Party (DPK) continues to expose its true colors (which are anti-democratic in actuality) will the people see the party for what it really stands for and decide that it is better to stick with President Yoon?

There will be some real orony if that happens because President Yoon ordered martial law as an attempt to curb those anti-democratic forces that are threatening the republic.. It is likely that the Minjoo Party would not be exposed had he not taken such action. The government cannot rid the parties of anti-democratic elements but the people can vote them out of office.

Why are supporters of South Korea’s embattled president adopting MAGA slogans and iconography? | CNN

CNN · by Mike Valerio, Yoonjung Seo, Gawon Bae, Helen Regan · January 8, 2025

Supporters of suspended South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol attend a rally to oppose his impeachment near the presidential residence in Seoul, South Korea, on January 6, 2025.

Ahn Young-joon/AP

Seoul, South Korea CNN —

Crowds of people wrapped up against the bitter January cold clutch signs emblazoned with the slogan “Stop the Steal,” wave US flags, and don red MAGA-like hats.

But this scene is 11,000 kilometers (7,000 miles) away from Washington, DC, in the South Korean capital Seoul, where throngs of die-hard conservative supporters of the suspended President Yoon Suk Yeol have gathered outside his home to protect the embattled leader from arrest.

Yoon successfully resisted an attempt to detain him on Friday after an hours-long standoff with authorities over his dramatic but short-lived declaration of martial law in December that plunged the country into political chaos.

South Korean lawmakers voted to impeach Yoon last month, including some from within his own party. The conservative president remains in office, but with little to no real power. His political fate will be decided by the country’s constitutional court, likely in the spring, which will determine if he will be formally removed from the presidency or reinstated in office.

In the meantime, corruption investigators are determined to execute the arrest warrant on charges of insurrection and abuse of power. A sitting South Korean president has never faced criminal charges before, but the man at the center of the martial law maelstrom — who is himself a former prosecutor — says he will “fight until the end.”

Yoon, widely seen as a conservative firebrand and staunch US ally tough on China and North Korea, has urged his supporters to do the same.

As they hold vigil, Yoon’s supporters wave American flags alongside the South Korean Taegeukgi, its national flag. Red “Make America Great Again”-inspired hats are selling for about $5.50 at pro-Yoon rallies, the words “against the unlawful impeachment” stitched in white lettering in Korean.

And chants of “Stop the steal!” can be heard reverberating outside Yoon’s residence, the slogan popularized by US President-elect Donald Trump and his supporters to question the results of the 2020 US election.

Supporters of suspended President Yoon Suk Yeol gather to protest as investigators attempt to carry out an arrest warrant on January 3, 2025.

Gawon Bae/CNN

For Yoon’s conservative supporters who have the adopted the slogans and iconography associated with the MAGA movement, they see similarities between South Korea’s current political crisis and the US, where twice-impeached Trump is set to take office for a second term on January 20.

The US is South Korea’s most important ally, an alliance that has gone back decades.

South Korean conservatism, which includes Yoon’s ruling People Power Party, holds strong bonds with the American conservative and evangelical movements. And Yoon’s followers have claimed the April 2024 national election, which the opposition won in a landslide, was stolen from them.

They now believe a president may be stolen from them, too, despite a lack of evidence.

“I’m here for democracy. The election was rigged and we need to defend our country,” one Yoon supporter told CNN from outside the presidential residence Friday.

A slogan rooted in conspiracies

In his speech declaring martial law, Yoon labeled the opposition’s actions “clear anti-state behavior aimed at inciting rebellion,” referenced “threats posed by North Korea’s communist forces,” and vowed to “eliminate anti-state elements.”

His words echoed right-wing conspiracy theories that have been spread widely online by South Korean YouTube commentators and activists.

But they also mirrored rhetoric used by Trump against his opponents, with references to an “enemy from within” and the “radical left.”

In the US, “Stop the Steal” emerged as a battle cry for Trump and his allies to trumpet groundless claims that President Joe Biden was trying to steal the 2020 election. After Trump’s loss, his supporters stormed the US Capitol on January 6, 2021, in an attempt to thwart Congress’ certification of Biden’s win. Trump and his high-profile allies have espoused myriad claims of election fraud, none of which were verified or upheld in court.

That story rhymes in South Korea.

President Yoon’s conservative party lost the country’s April 2024 general election in a landslide, when all 300 seats in South Korea’s National Assembly were on the ballot.

Yoon suggested election fraud after his failed martial law declaration, alleging in a speech on December 12 that South Korea’s election computer systems were compromised by North Korean hackers.

Protesters with both American and South Korean flags and 'Stop the Steal' placards gather to show support for suspended President Yoon Suk Yeol, in Seoul, South Korea, near the presidential residence, on January 4, 2025.

Daniel Ceng/Anadolu/Getty Images

The allegations have never been substantiated by national election authorities, or the country’s judiciary. South Koreans all vote with paper ballots, and hard copies of their votes are preserved.

On the night he declared martial law, Yoon sent about 300 troops to the National Election Commission (NEC) offices. Security footage shows troops entering the building, with one solider appearing to take a photo of election servers. Later, former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun said troops were deployed there to look into the suspected election fraud.

“Yoon’s claims are exaggerated and not true,” the NEC said after Yoon’s suggestion of North Korean election interference. “No evidence of outside intrusion into the election system was found. The security system was enhanced prior to the April elections.”

Reuters/CNN

video

Many of Yoon’s supporters believe, without evidence, the president is being removed from office because he was investigating what he called election fraud.

“From the vantage point of Yoon’s supporters, it’s tempting to draw an analogy – even if it falls short of an exact apples-to-apples comparison – between him being driven from power now, in the middle of what was supposed to be his single term in office, and Trump losing power after the 2020 election,” said Hans Schattle, professor of political science at Yonsei University in Seoul.

Schattle adds that Yoon acted outside the limits of the constitution when he declared martial law and should be held legally accountable. The analogy his supporters are making to the “Stop the Steal” fabrication is “unsettling,” he said.

“The ‘Stop the Steal’ signs also represent an effort by the extreme right-wing in South Korea to make a connection with Trump (whom the South Korean government will soon be negotiating with once he returns to the US presidency) and defend their beleaguered president,” he said.

A strong US alliance

Analysts say the “Stop the Steal” slogan is a new phenomenon in South Korea, but the American flag has long been spotted at right-wing political rallies.

South Korea’s conservative electorate widely views the United States as a bastion of freedom, democracy, anti-communism, and the home of a strong evangelical Christian community.

The political right has also “long emphasized” the importance of the American alliance, the crucial US assistance during the Korean War in the 1950s and continued military and security allyship, according to Byungwon Woo, professor of international relations at Yonsei University.

The right, he said, has “accused the political left of souring the alliance and instead, approaching closer to China, being friendly to North Korea.”

It’s a feeling that was shared among Yoon’s supporters outside his residence on Friday.

“The other side, the left, they’re communists,” said one Seoul resident in his 60s. “We’re not all right-wing. We’re normal people who don’t want communism from the left.”

Supporters of suspended South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol gather near his residence in Hannam-dong, Seoul, South Korea, on January 4, 2025.

Chris Jung/NurPhoto/Getty Images

A leading voice of the evangelical right is Rev. Jun Kwang-hoon, who took the stage at a rally on Friday to defend Yoon’s martial law declaration.

“If President Yoon hadn’t declared martial law, the country would already be in the hands of North Korea!” he shouted.

Christianity in South Korea traces its origins to the northern regions of Korea, where missionaries first arrived and the faith thrived before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Tark Ji-il, a professor at Busan Presbyterian University, told CNN.

Christians who fled to the South to escape oppression under the communist regime held strong anti-communist views intertwined with a strong pro-American stance.

Jun, a Presbyterian pastor and former leader of the Christian right-wing Liberty Unification Party, has taken a central role at pro-Yoon rallies. The party campaigns on anti-communism, opposition to LGBTQ rights, and strong support for the US.

In this photo released by South Korean President Office via Yonhap, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks at the presidential residence in Seoul, South Korea, on December 14, 2024.

South Korean Presidential Office/Yonhap/AP

Jun and his followers share Yoon’s claim the 2024 election was rigged by North Korean hackers, and he frames his cause as a sacred war against “evil communism.”

Political scientist Schattle says Yoon may be projecting an image to his supporters that “he and his people are the only ones protecting South Korea from a never-ending North Korean threat and that keeping Yoon in power therefore saves South Korean democracy.”

“It’s also worth noting that Yoon’s foreign policy since he took office as president in 2022 has been driven by forging closer ties with the United States and Japan,” he said, the latter being “especially controversial in South Korea.”

Some Yoon supporters outside his residence hope Trump will hear their concerns and even come to his rescue.

“I hope that Trump will take office soon and raise his voice against the rigged elections in our country plus around the world so as to help President Yoon to return (to power) swiftly,” Pyeong In-su, 71, told Reuters.

CNN’s Jay Ganglani contributed reporting.

CNN · by Mike Valerio, Yoonjung Seo, Gawon Bae, Helen Regan · January 8, 2025

12. How Bodyguards Are Keeping South Korea’s Leader From Detention

How Bodyguards Are Keeping South Korea’s Leader From Detention

President Yoon Suk Yeol’s security service stopped an effort to detain him on insurrection charges and has vowed to do so again. Its roots are in the era of military dictatorships.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/08/world/asia/south-korea-yoon-bodyguards.html

Security personnel at the Seoul residence of Yoon Suk Yeol, the suspended president of South Korea. Mr. Yoon was impeached after a short-lived martial law declaration last month. Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

By Choe Sang-Hun

Reporting from Seoul

Jan. 8, 2025, 3:00 a.m. ET

South Korea’s Presidential Security Service, an agency assigned to protect the president, prides itself on being the “last bastion for a safe and stable state administration.” It is now at the heart of South Korea’s biggest political mess in decades, acting as a final line of defense to prevent criminal investigators from detaining President Yoon Suk Yeol on charges of insurrection.

Since his impeachment over a short-lived martial law declaration last month, Mr. Yoon has been holed up in central Seoul, in a hilly compound that is now surrounded by barricades of buses, barbed wire and the presidential bodyguards. He has vowed to “fight to the end” to return to office. But a majority of South Koreans, according to surveys, want him ousted and arrested, and a court on Tuesday granted investigators a new warrant to detain him.

The only thing standing between them and Mr. Yoon is the Presidential Security Service, or P.S.S., which blocked the first attempt to serve the warrant last Friday. When 100 criminal investigators and police officers showed up at his residence, the agency’s staff outnumbered them two-to-one and held them off, questioning the legality of the court-issued document. The two sides went back-and-forth during a five-and-a-half-hour standoff, before investigators abandoned efforts to detain Mr. Yoon.

Much like the Secret Service does in the United States, the P.S.S. protects sitting and former presidents, presidents-elect and visiting heads of state. Created in 1963 under the former dictator Park Chung-hee, the P.S.S. was once one of the government’s most powerful agencies, with the military strongmen relying on its loyalty to escape assassination attempts. As South Korea democratized in recent decades, it had largely receded into the shadows. But under Mr. Yoon, it began attracting unsavory attention from the public as its agents dragged away protesters during public events.

Mr. Yoon appointed Kim Yong-hyun, his most loyal ally, to serve as his first security service chief before promoting him to defense minister. Although South Korea is currently being run by an acting president after Mr. Yoon was suspended from office following his impeachment, the service has sworn to defend Mr. Yoon because he remains the sole elected leader.

The security service has warned that there could be a clash if investigators try again to detain Mr. Yoon. The agency includes hundreds of trained bodyguards and anti-terrorist specialists, who are backed by detachments from the police and military.

Image

Buses barricaded the entrance of Mr. Yoon’s residence on Wednesday.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

The police have ordered Park Jong-joon, the head of the security service, to appear for questioning on potential charges of obstructing justice, an order he has so far ignored. They threatened to seek a warrant to detain him if he continues to defy summons.

“We should not let the people see the unfortunate scene of government agencies clash,” said Mr. Park.

South Koreans who wanted Mr. Yoon arrested have expressed outrage at his refusal to cooperate. Park Chan-dae, the floor leader of the Democratic Party, the main opposition, called Mr. Yoon a coward for hiding behind his presidential guards and trying to “instigate civil war and bloodshed.”

“The President Security Service has turned itself into a private militia for Yoon Suk Yeol,” said Jung Ji Ung, a lawyer and president of the bar association for Gyeonggi, the populous province that surrounds Seoul. By rejecting the court-issued warrant, he added, the security service “has put itself above the judiciary.” The security spat has added to the state of confusion that has paralyzed South Korea since Mr. Yoon’s attempt to impose martial law. Multiple government agencies are investigating him on insurrection charges.

Caught up in the struggle are the police and military, which have been called upon by both sides to provide help. Compounding it all are ongoing legal disputes over who can investigate whom and who must follow whose orders in the wake of Mr. Yoon’s impeachment.

Mr. Yoon faces a two-track investigation: one political, and the other criminal. The first is by the Constitutional Court, which will begin hearings next week to decide whether to formally remove or reinstate the president. The second is an unprecedented criminal investigation, the first time officials have tried to detain a president who is still in office.

Investigators want to question Mr. Yoon to determine whether he committed insurrection when he ordered troops to seize the National Assembly and round up his political opponents.

Mr. Yoon and his lawyers have said his declaration of martial law was a legitimate use of presidential power to tame an unruly opposition, which has stymied his political agenda. They have fired a flurry of legal challenges against those who seek to arrest him.

On Wednesday, Mr. Yoon’s lawyer, Yoon Kab-keun, reiterated that the president would not accept a detention warrant, but he said the president would surrender himself if a court issued a formal and proper arrest warrant because he did not want to escalate “the conflict, confusion and division” in the country.

Until recently, government prosecutors had usually investigated all politically sensitive criminal cases.

Image

Mr. Yoon, left, with Moon Jae-in, then South Korea’s president, in 2019. Mr. Moon created the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials in 2020. Credit...Yonhap/EPA, via Shutterstock

But Mr. Yoon’s liberal predecessor, President Moon Jae-in, created the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials, or C.I.O., in 2020, and it took away some of the investigative rights of prosecutors. But the new agency’s role was never clearly defined, and it has fewer resources. Prosecutors have arrested many key figures involved in Mr. Yoon’s ill-fated martial law, including army generals and Mr. Kim, the former P.S.S. commander, who was a close partner in Mr. Yoon’s martial law decree.

The C.I.O., which has argued that the insurrection case falls under its jurisdiction, teamed up with the police for added support in a joint investigation. But the office’s resources were so limited that it could mobilize only 20 officials in its operation to detain Mr. Yoon last Friday.

Even with 80 police officers backing them, it was unable to get past the security service, which mobilized 200 agents and soldiers, who locked arms to form barricades.

Stung by the embarrassing failure, the investigation office and the police are regrouping. They have indicated if they try to detain Mr. Yoon again, they would bring along more officials. Some fear a violent clash if neither side backs down.

“We will make thorough preparations to achieve our goal in the second attempt,” Oh Dong-hoon, the investigation office’s chief prosecutor, told a parliamentary hearing on Tuesday.

Some opposition lawmakers are pushing bills to disband the security service and replace it with a security detail from the police.

They see it as a relic from decades ago, when South Korea’s military dictators feared North Korean assassins, as well as internal enemies, and used the presidential security detail as personal bodyguards, appointing their most trusted allies as their chiefs. (When the military dictator Park Chung-hee was assassinated by his national intelligence chief, Kim Jae Kyu, during a drinking party in 1979, Mr. Kim first shot Mr. Park’s chief bodyguard, Cha Chi Chol, whose influence eclipsed that of his spy agency.)

“The Presidential Security Service is a symbol of imperial presidency and a legacy of our authoritarian past,” said Shin Jang-sik, an opposition lawmaker who helped draft one bill to disband the P.S.S. “We need to stop it from acting above the law and acting like an agency of absolute power.”

Image

Mr. Yoon’s compound on Wednesday morning. The Presidential Security Service has warned that there could be a clash if investigators try again to detain Mr. Yoon.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea. More about Choe Sang-Hun

13. Frozen roads, fast cash: How North Koreans made fortunes smuggling cars to China

Grass roots indigenous capitalism.

That is a threat to Kim Jong un. The people are more capable than the regime's centrally controlled economy.

Frozen roads, fast cash: How North Koreans made fortunes smuggling cars to China

DPRK entrepreneurs exploited border gaps to sell used Japanese cars for a decade, even driving them over frozen rivers

Andrei Lankov January 8, 2025

https://www.nknews.org/2025/01/frozen-roads-fast-cash-how-north-koreans-made-fortunes-smuggling-cars-to-china/

Image: Pexels

North Korea is notorious for the elaborate lengths that it goes to import sensitive items in defiance of international sanctions, from missile components and refined petroleum to luxury bags and vehicles.

But there was a time in the not-so-distant past when high-value goods were not being shipped into the DPRK but out, and in the process making some North Koreans a lot of money.

If you found yourself at the border between North Korea and China in the late 1990s or early 2000s, especially during the dead of a frigid winter night, you might have occasionally witnessed an unusual scene — Japanese cars being driven across the frozen Yalu and Tumen rivers.

During the summer, it was even possible to see used vehicles being transported across the border rivers on makeshift pontoons.

This period marked the heyday of North Korea’s underground car-smuggling trade, when individual entrepreneurs and state companies took advantage of border vulnerabilities to make a profit even as the country’s economy struggled.

And while short-lived, this lucrative business helped jump-start capitalist enterprise in the country and provided fortunes that have funded economic activity in the DPRK in the decades since.

A car in North Korea | Image: NK News (Oct. 2016)

SMUGGLING DRUGS, ANTIQUES AND CARS

The mid-to-late 1990s were a chaotic yet opportunistic time for North Korean capitalism. Many people made large fortunes through activities that would have been illegal not just in North Korea but in many other countries.

Smuggling used cars was one such venture, with profits rivaling those of the drug trade and the illicit trafficking of (real or counterfeit) Koryo-era antiques.

In the 1990s, China was determined to protect its growing automotive industry, and it did so with steep tariffs on imported cars. The Chinese government imposed duties as high as 80% to 100% of the used vehicle’s value, often inflated by overestimations.

This created a major hurdle for legal car imports and sparked a booming black market for smuggled cars. By 1997, an estimated 33% of all used cars sold in China were foreign vehicles brought into the country illegally.

Smuggling cars into China wasn’t easy. Geography posed a significant challenge, as most cars had to be delivered by ship and passed through customs. Sometimes corruption or creative schemes helped but didn’t guarantee success.

However, a group of enterprising North Korean businessmen discovered a clever workaround. North Korea’s unique position made it an ideal gateway for smuggling used Japanese cars into China.

The entire deal looks a bit strange, largely because we are used to the idea that high-tech items are usually smuggled into North Korea. But in this particular case, the direction was the opposite: The vehicles were actually smuggled out of the DPRK to China, a much richer and much more advanced country.

The Tumen River bordering North Korea and China in winter | Image: NK News (Jan. 2017)

CROSSING THE ICE

In the late 1990s, a used car in good condition could typically be purchased in Japan for $2,000 to $3,000. At that time, shipping these cars to North Korea was still possible, as Japan had yet to impose the near-total embargo on sea traffic between the two nations. This restriction only came into effect around 2004-05, following the political scandal over the DPRK’s abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s.

Once the cars arrived in North Korea, they were imported legally, with moderate customs duties paid at the ports of entry. This straightforward process allowed DPRK traders to acquire vehicles at a relatively low cost, setting the stage for a highly profitable smuggling operation into China.

The vehicles were then driven to the Chinese border, where the real challenge began — smuggling them across the river. Winter was the preferred season, as the Yalu and Tumen rivers would freeze over with thick ice, allowing smugglers to drive the cars directly across.

However, enterprising individuals found creative ways to smuggle cars even during the summer, using makeshift ferries to occasionally float the vehicles across the rivers.

Some were even more inventive, placing cars in large waterproof iron boxes that were then dragged across shallow parts of the river by trucks. This method worked best in the upper streams, where the rivers were narrower and easier to cross.

At the time, the Chinese side of the border was largely unguarded, making these clandestine operations relatively easy to execute. Smugglers operated under the cover of night, choosing sparsely populated areas to avoid detection.

Meanwhile, the North Korean border guards did not bother with cracking down on this trade because most of the smuggling was done under the cover of the state-established foreign trade companies. These companies had de facto permission to be engaged in such activities.

A man with some goods and vehicles in North Korea | Image: NK News (April. 2018)

SERIOUS FORTUNES

In the late 1990s, the Neungna 88 Foreign Trade Company found smuggling used cars from Japan to China to be one of its most lucrative revenue streams. Officially, the company held licenses to import a significant number of used vehicles — up to 400-500 cars from Japan.

While some of these cars were designated for domestic use within North Korea, the majority had a different fate. Many of these vehicles were smuggled into China by businesspeople associated with the company, though in reality they often operated as semi-independent entrepreneurs.

Other imported vehicles were sold to individuals who would take on the risk of smuggling the cars across the border themselves.

By the late 1990s, this operation was highly profitable, earning the Neungna 88 Foreign Trade Company an estimated $300,000 to $400,000 in pure profit.

A vehicle purchased in Japan for just $2,000 to $3,000 could be resold in China for $7,000 to $8,000, and in some cases, even as high as $10,000. The associated costs — bribes, minimal customs duties, and other expenses — were relatively low, making the trade immensely profitable.

It helped that at least some smuggling occurred with the consent of the local Chinese authorities. In a somewhat curious case, five companies in the Chinese border city of Dandong suggested that they should start smuggling used cars (from the DPRK) to recover their losses — and received a semi-formal approval from the senior officials at the city administration. They brought in 272 cars before the business was interrupted.

Many North Korean entrepreneurs fondly recall making their first serious fortunes in the used car trade. However, this lucrative era, which lasted nearly a decade, came to an abrupt end around 2005.

China’s accession to the World Trade Organization led to a significant reduction in customs duties, making legal imports more affordable. Meanwhile, worsening relations between North Korea and Japan made importing used cars from Japan increasingly difficult and expensive.

With the smuggling trade no longer viable, North Korean businesspeople were forced to seek new opportunities in other markets.

Edited by Alannah Hill

14. Sen. Kim vows to 'stand up vigorously' if Trump uses military, economic coercion against Asian allies

I hope the Trump administration realizes that our Asian allies are going to be much more supportive of US policies during this term. They understand the president -elect's intent and operating style and are prepared to deal with it. There is no need for coercion like there was in the first term. Our allies know what is in their best strategic interests and fundamentally that means working with the president-elect and not against him. I hope the president-elect gives them a chance to prove themselves worthy of his respect and support.

Sen. Kim vows to 'stand up vigorously' if Trump uses military, economic coercion against Asian allies | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 9, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- Andy Kim, the first-ever Korean American senator, said Wednesday that if incoming President Donald Trump uses military or economic coercion against Asian partners, he would stand up "vigorously" against it.

Kim (D-NJ) made the remarks, a day after Trump refused to rule out employing military or economic coercion to retake the canal, which Panama took control of in 1999, and acquire Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory, in remarks that Kim cast as "confounding."

"We see a kind of belligerence like what we see right now with Donald Trump talking about Greenland or Panama," Kim said during a meeting with Korean and Asian American reporters.

"If he uses that kind of rhetoric or uses military or economic coercion with partners in Asia, I will stand up against that vigorously," he added.

Sen. Andy Kim (D-NJ) speaks during a press conference at the Capitol in Washington on Jan. 8, 2025. (Yonhap)

The senator noted that he is not positive about what Trump will do with regards to South Korea and the broader Indo-Pacific region, but he vowed to work to protect regional alliances and partnerships and reiterated his commitment to being a "bridge" between South Korea and the United States.

"I have sat down already with Sen. Marco Rubio as well as Congresswoman Elise Stefanik, and I have raised (with) them directly my desire to see the U.S. continue with the trilateral process, with the Quad and other types of actions that we have in the region," he said, referring to Trump's picks for his secretary of state and ambassador to the U.N.

"I told them that I am willing to work with the incoming Trump administration if they are going to engage on efforts to strengthen our alliances and our partnerships, but I will stand up against them if they take actions that I think are going to weaken those partnerships."

Commenting on concerns that Trump could seek a drawdown or withdrawal of American troops in South Korea, Kim warned of bipartisan pushback against it.

"If President Trump were to try that again or hint at that, I think there would again be very strong bipartisan pushback against that," he said. "That's something that I feel strongly about."

In November, Kim won the Senate seat for New Jersey that was up for grabs as former Sen. Bob Menendez resigned in August following his conviction on bribery charges. Kim took office last month, succeeding George Helmy who was appointed in August to succeed Menendez.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 9, 2025

15. South Korea's Yoon faces new arrest attempt in fortified compound

South Korea's Yoon faces new arrest attempt in fortified compound

By Jack Kim and Ju-min Park

January 8, 202511:55 AM ESTUpdated 28 min ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-yoon-faces-second-arrest-attempt-fortified-compound-2025-01-08/

Summary

Acting president urges peaceful arrest of YoonInvestigator says second arrest warrant will be the lastProtesters rally for and against Yoon amid arrest warrantPresidential compound fortified with barbed wire and barricades

SEOUL, Jan 8 (Reuters) - South Korea's impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol faces a new and potentially more robust attempt to arrest him for insurrection after a top investigator vowed to do whatever it takes to break a security blockade and take in the embattled leader.

Acting president Choi Sang-mok urged on Wednesday authorities to "do their best to prevent any injuries to citizens or physical conflict between government agencies" while executing Yoon's arrest warrant.

Protesters supporting and opposing Yoon braved freezing temperatures to stage rallies on the streets around the presidential compound on Wednesday after a court re-issued a warrant on Tuesday to arrest him.

The Presidential Security Service (PSS) has been fortifying the compound this week with barbed wire and barricades using buses to block access to the residence, a hillside villa in an upscale district known as Korea's Beverly Hills.

Yoon is under criminal investigation for insurrection over his failed attempt to impose martial law on Dec. 3, a decision that stunned South Korea and prompted the first arrest warrant for a sitting president.

He also faces an impeachment trial in the Constitutional Court.

One of Yoon's lawyers said the president could not accept the execution of the arrest warrant because it was issued by a court in the wrong jurisdiction and the team of investigators formed to probe the incumbent leader had no mandate to do so.

Yoon Kab-keun, the lawyer, also denied suggestions by some members of parliament that Yoon had fled the official residence, saying he had met the president there on Tuesday. He said they were "malicious rumours" intended to slander Yoon.

On Tuesday, Oh Dong-woon, head of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO), which is leading the investigation, apologised for failing to arrest the president last week after a six-hour standoff with hundreds of PSS agents, some of whom were carrying firearms, and military guards at the compound.

"We'll do our best to accomplish our goal by thoroughly preparing this time with great determination that the second warrant execution will be the last," Oh told a parliament committee.

Item 1 of 7 Pro-Yoon protesters take part in a rally to support impeached South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol near his official residence in Seoul, South Korea January 8, 2025. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu

[1/7]Pro-Yoon protesters take part in a rally to support impeached South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol near his official residence in Seoul, South Korea January 8, 2025. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

He declined to specify how many days the court had given before the new arrest warrant expired.

Oh did not object when members of parliament called for tough action to overpower the presidential guards and military troops inside the compound, but he declined to discuss what options were being considered to achieve that.

TACTICS

Various scenarios reported in local media included mobilising police special tactical units and heavy equipment to push through the barricades, followed by more than 2,000 police to drag out presidential guards, taking as long as three days if necessary to wear down presidential security agents.

Shin Yul, a Myongji University professor who has followed the political turmoil, said police had lots of experience with the tactical operations that were likely being considered. But safety should be a top priority, especially for protesters, he said, noting the risk of gunfire in a potential clash.

Although police have a clear advantage in terms of resources such as helicopters to drop in tactical units, force should not be the only option considered, said Lee Yung-hyeock, a Konkuk University professor specialising in law enforcement.

He cited "cognitive warfare" such as using loudspeakers to persuade PSS agents they could face personal repercussions by obstructing justice that could mean the end of their careers and possible criminal records.

Near Yoon's residence, Lee Jae-eun, 25, was among the hundreds of protesters demanding his arrest, saying he should either walk out and cooperate with authorities before being "dragged out" and arrested.

But Chung Woo-jae, a 25-year-old supporter of Yoon, said he was entitled to the security service's protection.

"The president Yoon has been elected by our country, by the people of this nation rightfully, and he deserves all the protection until he is proven guilty," Chung told Reuters.

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Reporting by Jack Kim, Cynthia Kim, Ju-min Park, Joyce Lee and Joyce Zhou; Editing by Ed Davies, Neil Fullick and Ros Russell

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

16. A window into division: Where to catch a glimpse of North Korea near Seoul

A lot of photos at the link. Many bring back fond memories of living in those areas so many years ago. I do not know how many hundreds of times I have crossed Freedom Bridge.

A window into division: Where to catch a glimpse of North Korea near Seoul

While the JSA is currently off-limits, there are many other inter-Korean sites worth visiting not far from ROK capital

https://www.nknews.org/2025/01/a-window-into-division-where-to-catch-a-glimpse-of-north-korea-near-seoul/

Chad O'Carroll January 8, 2025

The Joint Security Area (JSA) on the inter-Korean border | Image: NK News (March 2023)

Editor’s note: This article is the second in a multi-part series exploring key locations on the inter-Korean border that tourists can visit. Part one about remote border islands in the Yellow Sea can be read here.

No location best epitomizes the decades-long division of the Korean Peninsula as well as the Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom, where soldiers from North and South stand face to face next to the iconic blue conference buildings.

But while the site of inter-Korean summits and a meeting between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump is a great place for a photo op, entrance is often restricted due to inter-Korean tensions or security concert concerns, particularly since Travis King’s sprint across the border in July 2023.

Fortunately, the border city of Paju where Panmjom is located is also home to several other sites of inter-Korean significance, from a tunnel that North Korea dug in preparation for invasion to observatories where visitors can glimpse life on the other side.

Locations covered in part two of series: the Odusan Observatory, Imjingak Park and the Joint Security Area | Image: Google Maps, edited by NK News

ODUSAN OBSERVATORY

Perched on a hilltop just a 45-minute drive from Seoul, the Odusan Observatory offers an ideal vantage point to glimpse life on the other side of the Korean divide.

The observatory is located at the convergence of the Han and Imjin Rivers, where the distance between the two Koreas shrinks to just a quarter of a mile. The best way to get there, and to visit other North Korea-related sites in Paju, is to drive, take a tour bus or hire a taxi.

The reality that you are approaching the DPRK becomes clear not longer after departing Seoul, even while still miles from the border. Tank traps stand ready to stop invaders from the North and reinforced razor-wire fencing runs along the banks of the Han River. Highway signs used to mark the direction to Pyongyang, though this was recently removed.

Photos taken on the route to Odusan from Seoul show road signs to Pyongyang — since changed to drop the name of the North Korean capital — and reinforced razor-wire fences to stop intruders coming by river. | Image: NK News

Most of the time, visitors will have to park in a nearby lot and take a shuttle bus to the observatory, but on quieter days, it’s possible to drive directly up to the top of the hill it’s situated on.

There are binoculars and viewing galleries on multiple levels at the observatory. | Image: NK News

The landscape on the South Korean side is dotted with sleek, modern buildings and thriving commercial districts like the nearby Paju Premium Outlet, where affluent consumers can purchase luxury brands like Armani and Hugo Boss.

But just a mile away, in the North Korean hamlet of Maegol, the picture couldn’t be more different.

The buildings in Maegol are visibly run-down and dilapidated, many of them lacking even basic amenities like windows. Many of the surrounding hills are nearly stripped bare of trees, a testament to the country’s chronic fuel shortages and the desperate measures people take to stay warm during the bitter Korean winters. Vehicles, too, are a rare sight, with only the occasional bicycle or ox-cart plodding along the dusty roads.

This reality runs counter to common perception of North Korean border towns as “propaganda villages.”

Visitors can use binoculars provided on-site or bring a high-quality camera to zoom in on buildings across the border. | Image: NK News

Amid the poverty and decay, there are signs of North Korea’s state-enforced ideology.

Rising above the village is a Kim Il Sung immortality tower, a monument to the country’s eternal president and a fixture in nearly every DPRK town and city.

In recent years, parts of neighboring areas have undergone a noticeable transformation, with new, modern buildings rising up alongside the crumbling relics of the past.

The most striking example is the newly built village in Rimhan-ri of the Panmun district, a project that reportedly garnered the personal attention of North Korea’s Cabinet Premier Kim Tok Hun during a labor mobilization drive in 2020.

Maps and exhibition items displayed at the Odusan Observatory facility | Images: NK News

Odusan Observatory is open from Tuesday to Sunday each week. Visitors can check Kakao Map or Naver Map for rest spots on the so-called Freedom Road (National Route 77) for great views of the North, such as Dansoop Green Garden and DMZ Lounge.

A view of North Korea from a nearby cafe | Image: NK News

THE JOINT SECURITY AREA

For decades, the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom has served as both a symbol of the ongoing conflict between North and South Korea and a place for occasional reconciliation, drawing tourists, diplomats and world leaders alike to its famous blue conference rooms on the border.

Image: NK News

Despite its popularity, however, accessing the JSA is not always a straightforward affair.

At the time of writing, the area is completely closed to visitors in the wake of the Travis King incident, when a U.S. soldier made an unauthorized crossing into North Korea during a tour. Even during more stable times, trips can be canceled at a moment’s notice due to security concerns, and visitors must navigate a complex web of regulations and restrictions.

To enter the JSA, visitors must book in advance and register with the U.N. Command (UNC), either through an authorized tour company or, for educational, press, or government delegations, by contacting the UNC directly.

Once approved, visitors must adhere to a dress code and refrain from any behavior that could be seen as provocative, such as waving, cheering or attempting to communicate with North Korean personnel.

JSA tours start at the visitor center and then proceed through a series of checkpoints before arriving at the JSA proper. | Images: NK News

The tour itself begins at the JSA Visitor Center, where UNC officials provide a briefing on the history and significance of the site.

From there, visitors board a bus and pass through a series of checkpoints and barbed-wire fences, including near to the site of the 2015 inter-Korean landmine incident, before arriving at the JSA proper.

Here, amid the cluster of blue conference buildings that straddle the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), visitors can witness firsthand the surreal reality of a divided Korea.

Before Travis King’s sprint across the border, visitors could enter one of the blue meeting houses and take photos near the area where former U.S. President Trump shook hands with Kim Jong Un in June 2019.

But it’s unclear how restrictions will impact access once the area finally reopens to tourism in future.

Inside one of the blue buildings at the JSA | Image: NK News

The peace tree planted by Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un in 2018, which U.S. officials who work in the JSA said has nearly died several times. | Image: NK News

There’s also the blue footbridge used by Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae-in for a private but on-camera walk during the first inter-Korean summit of 2018.

The blue footbridge used by Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae-in for a private chat in 2018 | Image: NK News

A visit to the JSA is a stark reminder of the military reality of the Korean divide.

Tourists who look closely can spot remnants of some flashpoints of DMZ history, such as the 2017 defection by a North Korean soldier across the MDL. The incident left bullet holes in a building on the South Korean side of the JSA.

Bullet holes from the 2017 defection incident | Image: NK News

There’s also the Bridge of No Return, where POWs were once given the choice to cross over to the other side, and the spot where North Korean troops used axes to brutally kill two U.S. soldiers during a 1976 clash over a poplar tree.

The Bridge of No Return | Image: NK News

A rare aerial shot of the Joint Security Area, as taken from the 70-meter observation post. North Korea’s Panmungak Pavilion is visible on the left side of the photo, while South Korea’s Freedom House is on the right side. The blue buildings are for meetings between the two sides, as well as U.N. Command personnel. | Image: NK News

Also visible from the JSA is the North’s so-called propaganda village of Kijong-dong.

The DPRK initially constructed the village during the 1950s to look vastly superior to nearby South Korean towns, and it is home to a huge North Korean flagpole, which for over a decade was the largest in the world.

While guides in the JSA insist Kijong-dong is uninhabited, well-maintained farmland can be seen adjacent to it, and strong zoom lenses have shown multiple signs of life there.

North Korea’s mammoth flag sitting adjacent to Kijong-dong | Image: NK News

Those organizing their trip directly with the UNC, especially those with VIPs in their group, might be lucky enough to tour the military base adjacent to the JSA.

Those who do should keep an eye out for bonus locations like a par-3 golf hole dubbed “the world’s most dangerous golf course” and the Monastery Bar, where South Korean soldiers used to undergo hazing. There is also a gym, barber and restaurant facilities for those living on location.

Scenes from the military base adjacent to the JSA | Images: NK News

DORASAN, THE THIRD TUNNEL AND IMJINGAK

To reach the heart of Panmunjom at the JSA, visitors must first pass through the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), a heavily restricted area that serves as a buffer between the border and the rest of South Korea.

Access to the CCZ is tightly controlled, with visitors required to book a “DMZ Peace Tour” from Imjingak Pavilion, join a group tour with an authorized company or arrange a visit directly with the UNC. All visitors must present valid identification, such as a passport or Alien Registration Card (ARC), to gain entry.

But the CCZ doesn’t just provide access to the JSA. One of the other highlights is the Dorasan Observatory, the closest observation point in South Korea to Panmunjom.

From here, visitors can enjoy unparalleled views of the North Korean border city of Kaesong and the surrounding countryside. This includes the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a once-thriving joint economic venture between the two Koreas before South Korea companies pulled out in 2016.

For those with a keen eye and a zoom lens, the observatory also offers a rare chance to see the remnants of the inter-Korean liaison office, which North Korea blew up in 2020, and North Korean workers who have taken over ROK infrastructure there.

The Dora Observatory offers views into the neighboring Kaesong Industrial Complex. | Images: NK News

Just a short distance from the observatory lies the Dorasan Train Station, a decaying symbol of a bygone era of inter-Korean cooperation.

Built in 2002 as part of the Gyeongui Line, which once connected Seoul to Pyongyang, the station was envisioned as a gateway for travel and trade between the two Koreas. For a brief period, trains carried goods and workers to and from the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

But the service was suspended in 2008 amid rising tensions, and North Korea blew up a section of the Geyongui Line in the DMZ in Oct. 2024 as part of its efforts to sever ties with the South.

Today, the Dorasan station sits largely empty, open to occasional tour groups and extremely limited rail operations.

Photos taken inside the largely unused Dorasan train station | Images: NK News

Another must-see site in the CCZ is the Third Tunnel, one of four known infiltration tunnels dug by North Korea under the DMZ. It was allegedly located with the help of a defector.

Discovered in 1978, the tunnel — the closest of the four to Seoul — runs for over a mile at a depth of 240 feet and is large enough to accommodate 30,000 troops per hour.

Visitors can descend into the tunnel and walk along a portion of its length, gaining a sense of the scale and sophistication of North Korea’s military preparations.

A photo outside of the Third Tunnel, and a diagram showing its location and structure | Images: NK News

The last noteworthy spot to visit within the CCZ is Imjingak, a park located on the Imjin River. The atmosphere is almost like a theme park, and visitors can book on-the-spot but highly limited access to the JSA (if open), as well as the Third Tunnel, Dorasan station and Dora Observatory.

Freedom Bridge at the Imjingak Resort | Image: NK News

On the must-see list is the Freedom Bridge, which over 12,000 POWs walked across to get back to South Korea at the end of the Korean War.

An abandoned train at Imjingak | Image: NK News

Also at Imjingak is an abandoned steam locomotive train, covered in bullet holes, which was the last train to cross the border in the early days of the Korean War in 1950.

Then there’s the symbolic peace bell, a 21-ton bell that visitors can ring for 10,000 won.

The gondola to cross the Imjin River | Image: NK News

Arguably, the best attraction at Imjingak is the recently constructed gondola, connecting the park to the remnants of Camp Greaves, a U.S. military facility that served as an outpost of the 506th Infantry Regiment for 50 years.

Having bid farewell to its tenants in 2007, part of the base has now been reborn as the Camp Greaves DMZ Experience Center.

A renovated bowling alley at Camp Greaves | Image: NK News

There are also sobering reminders of division: Lining one section of Imjingak’s perimeter is a “Wall of Remembrance,” where Koreans separated by the war can leave heartfelt missives for their long-lost northern kin.

The Wall of Remembrance at Imjingak | Image: NK News

Ultimately, Imjingak is well worth a trip, especially since the park and the nearby Odusan observatory require pre-booking or special security security protocols.

Edited by Alannah Hill

17. New Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman: “North Korea, China, Russia, Iran Increased Aggression… U.S. Forces Reconstruction Urgent”

One of the fundamental missions of VOA is explaining US policy (and politics) to foreign target audiences.

This is a Google translation of the VOA report.

New Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman: “North Korea, China, Russia, Iran Increased Aggression… U.S. Forces Reconstruction Urgent”

2025.1.8

Lee Jo-eun

https://www.voakorea.com/a/7927839.html

Senator Roger Wicker, who was elected as the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee in the 119th U.S. Congress, emphasized the need to rebuild the U.S. military, citing the growing threats from North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran. The new Senate Republican leader presented strengthening the U.S. military and restoring deterrence as top priorities to counter forces disrupting the international order. Reporter Lee Jo-eun reports.

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Senator Roger Wicker, who was appointed chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee in the 119th Congress, has made strengthening the military to counter threats from North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran a top priority.

Military rebuilding is a top priority

“China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are all ruled by brutal dictators who are becoming more and more aggressive,” Republican Rep. Wicker warned in a statement on the 6th.

[Rep. Wicker] “Brutal dictators control China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and they are growing increasingly aggressive. Our national defense is not prepared to counter these threats. To deter our adversaries from moving against us, we must rebuild our weakening military.”

He continued, “Our national defense is not prepared to respond to such threats,” and emphasized, “We must rebuild our weakened military to deter enemy attacks.”

As the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee in the last Congress, Rep. Wicker has consistently called for stronger military capabilities to counter growing threats from hostile nations, including North Korea.

In particular, in the “Peace Through Strength” report released in May of last year, it stated that “Kim Jong-un continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region every year,” and that “in the absence of a diplomatic solution, the United States must ensure that its deterrence on the Korean Peninsula is not weakened.”

It also presented alternatives to strengthen deterrence, such as a nuclear sharing agreement in the Indo-Pacific region and the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula.

Senator John Boozman, a leading candidate for the Senate Appropriations Committee's Military Construction Subcommittee

Calls for continued military buildup

Senator John Boozman, a leading candidate for the Senate Appropriations Committee's Military Construction Subcommittee, also announced in a statement on the 6th that he would continue efforts to strengthen military power to respond to threats from hostile countries such as North Korea.

Republican Senator Boozman emphasized the importance of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, saying it will “strengthen our preparedness and deterrence in a world where competitors like China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea continue to test and disrupt the global order.”

[Rep. Boozman] “That's why it was so important to pass the FY25 NDAA and the policies it includes to strengthen our military. The bill also enhances our readiness and deterrence efforts as rivals like China, Iran, Russia and North Korea continue to test and disrupt the global order. “I am proud to support those efforts, including provisions that grow our national security footprint, and will continue advocating for a strong defense.”

He also expressed his intention to actively advocate for a strong national defense in the future, saying, “I am proud to support provisions that strengthen America’s national security position.”

The recently enacted National Defense Authorization Act includes provisions requiring the administration to strengthen extended deterrence against South Korea to counter growing threats in the region, including from China and North Korea, and to regularly prepare and report to Congress on trilateral security cooperation plans among the U.S., South Korea, and Japan.

Meanwhile, the 119th National Assembly, which opened on the 3rd, is accelerating the reorganization process to begin full-scale parliamentary activities.

Senator John Thune, the new Republican leader in the Senate

“The Republican coalition is broad, strong, and growing,” Senate Republican leader John Thune said in a plenary address on the 6th, declaring, “Now the work of making our agenda a reality begins.”

[Recording: Tune CEO] “The Republican coalition is broad and strong and growing. Now the work begins of delivering on our agenda. Mr. President, Republicans are ready to go... We're committed to restoring American strength to secure our nation and discourage the actors fomenting instability on the world stage.

“The Republican Party is ready,” Thune told President-elect Donald Trump, adding that he was “committed to restoring American power to keep our country safe and to deter those who seek to foment instability on the world stage.”

With the assignment of standing committees to the House and Senate currently in the final stages, each committee's activities are scheduled to begin in earnest after President-elect Trump's inauguration on the 20th.

Andy Kim, Democratic Party

In particular, in this Congress, Democratic Party Representative Andy Kim, the first Korean-American to be elected as a senator, has been assigned to the Financial Services, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Health, Education, and Labor committees.

In a recent interview with VOA, Rep. Kim said he plans to continue efforts to strengthen the U.S.-South Korea alliance through his Senate activities and raise concerns about a possible reduction in U.S. troops stationed in South Korea in connection with the confirmation of Senator Marco Rubio, Trump's nominee for Secretary of State in his second term.

This is Lee Jo-eun from VOA News.

18. Expert: “International Law Should Be Applied to North Korean POWs Dispatched to Russia”

I was asked the following question by the journalist and he used part of my response which I have posted below.

-North Korea and Russia have not officially acknowledged the deployment of North Korean troops, raising concerns about potential challenges in ensuring compliance with international legal norms for the treatment of POWs. Do you believe there should be specific measures in place by Ukrainian authorities or the international community to address the treatment of North Korean POWs?

The key point I wanted to emphasize and that he did not include is to ask what benefit does Ukraine or any country receive by NOT treating POWs in accordance with the Law of Land Warfare and Geneva Conventions?

First, any country that believes in freedom, the rule of law, and the rules based international order must follow the Law of and Warfare/Geneva Conventions and provide the required protection to all civilians and captured combatants. That should not be open for any debate. Ukraine should do the right thing because it is the right thing to do.

From a practical perspective we can ask why would a country NOT follow the Law of Land Warfare/Geneva Conventions? What does any country gain by not following them? What is the benefit to any country by not giving proper status and protections to civilians and combatants? Is there any strategic, operational, or tactical benefit from NOT following the Law of Land Warfare/Geneva COnventions?

It does not matter whether or not Russia and north Korea acknowledge the presence of north Korean forces and the fact that they do not acknowledge it does not absolve Ukraine from the responsibility for providing proper humanitarian protections.

it is important to understand war in terms of Carl von Clausewitz's primordial trinity which is a theory of war that describes war as a combination of three central elements:

Primordial violence, hatred, and enmity: A blind natural force

Chance and probability: A factor in violent and dangerous conditions

Subordination: War's use as a political tool, which makes it subject to reason

In short these three central elements are passion, reason, and chance (which some relate to the people, government and military respectively).

What you are describing by not providing protections under the Geneva convention is allowing passion to dominate (Primordial violence, hatred, and enmity) when in fact it needs to be tempered with reason (understanding that war is a political tool and must be subordinated to reason exercised by the government).

I hope this helps you to understand. And I would ask the question of anyone you interview for this: What benefit is there to Ukraine by not treating all prisoners under the rules of the Law of Landwarfare/Geneva Conventions? Make them describe why doing so would be better for Ukraine (or any country for that matter).

This ia Google translation of an RFA report.

Expert: “International Law Should Be Applied to North Korean POWs Dispatched to Russia”

WASHINGTON-Handeok In hand@rfa.org

2025.01.07

On September 24, 2023, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) personnel pass through an Armenian checkpoint on a road near the town of Korni Dzor in southeastern Armenia, heading towards the border with Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh region to provide assistance to victims of the conflict.

/REUTERS/Irakli Gedenidze

00:00 /07:19

Anchor : Recently, interest in North Korean prisoners of war has grown following reports that a North Korean soldier who was captured by Ukrainian special forces has died from injuries.

In particular, amid the rapid increase in casualties among North Korean troops deployed in the Russo-Ukrainian War, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has urged the warring parties to strictly comply with the Geneva Conventions regarding future North Korean prisoners of war.

This is reporter Han Deok-in reporting.

Many problems expected in identifying and treating North Korean prisoners of war

On the 27th of last month, South Korea's National Intelligence Service confirmed as fact a Ukrainian media report that the Ukrainian military had captured a North Korean soldier on the Kursk battlefield.

The National Intelligence Service also revealed that it confirmed through information sharing with allied countries that the soldier in question died from serious injuries.

As the number of captured North Korean soldiers is likely to increase in the future, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has repeatedly emphasized the importance of compliance with international humanitarian law regarding North Korean prisoners of war.

Najun Iqbal, Public Relations Officer of the East Asia Regional Office of the International Committee of the Red Cross, emphasized in a written interview with Radio Free Asia on the 6th, “Regardless of the nationality of the prisoners of war and the status of the diplomatic ties between States, according to the international humanitarian law, all POWs should be treated humanely and not subjected to any torture or degrading treatment….”

...It means that the ICRC should be promptly informed by the belligerents of the prisoners they hold in captivity and allowed full, regular , and unimpeded access to check on their internment conditions and duly inform their families. It also means that POWs should be able to keep connected with their families back home through correspondence.)

Ukrainian media outlet 'Militarny' reported on the 26th of last month that Ukrainian special forces captured a North Korean soldier in the Kursk region. South Korea's National Intelligence Service announced on the morning of the 27th, "We confirmed the capture of a wounded North Korean soldier through real-time information sharing with the intelligence agencies of friendly countries," and later that afternoon, "The captured North Korean soldier died from worsening injuries." / 'Warshal18' Telegram (RFA's own facial mosaic)

“The warring parties must ensure full access to the International Committee of the Red Cross to check the conditions of detained prisoners of war, and must make arrangements for prisoners to communicate with their families at home by correspondence,” added the Ikbal Public Relations Director.

The International Committee of the Red Cross is an organization officially mandated by the Geneva Conventions to protect prisoners of war and civilians, and thus has special powers under international law. Therefore, it can negotiate with warring parties to request permission to visit camps.

And with North Korea and Russia not officially acknowledging the deployment of North Korean troops, the ICRC said it “collects information on those detained and relays it to their home countries, helping families to find out if their missing loved ones are alive or dead.” The ICRC added that “the warring parties have a responsibility to cooperate with requests for the repatriation of the remains of the dead, and the ICRC can act as a mediator in such humanitarian matters.”

The Ukrainian Special Forces Command released the diary of Jeong Kyung-hong, a North Korean soldier who died in the Kursk region of Russia on the 28th of last month. The diary contains the following content: "I lost the trust of my country because of my past crimes, but my country gave me a new chance." / Provided by the Ukrainian Special Forces Command = Yonhap News

According to Ikbal, the ICRC has interviewed about 3,500 prisoners of war from both sides since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, and has facilitated the exchange of more than 9,700 personal messages between prisoners of war and their families.

But full access to all prisoners of war is not yet guaranteed, added Ikbal.

US: “ North Korean troops dispatched , fearing retaliation, committed suicide instead of surrendering ”

National Intelligence Service : “ North Korean soldier captured in Ukraine confirmed dead due to worsening injuries ”

Russian POW: “ Dispatching North Korean troops was rude and indiscriminate ”

“ North Korean POWs Should Actively Assist When Requesting Asylum in South Korea ”

“Unless North Korea and Russia officially acknowledge the dispatch of North Korean troops, complicated issues could arise in the process of identifying and repatriating prisoners of war,” said Yoshihiro Makino, a visiting professor at Hiroshima University in Japan and a foreign affairs correspondent for the Asahi Shimbun, appearing on RFA’s weekly program.

[ Makino Yoshihiro ] Currently, neither North Korea nor Russia acknowledge the fact that North Korean soldiers have been dispatched to Russia. I think it is also important to pay attention to whether North Korean prisoners of war will want to contact their families in the future. And the country that has taken in prisoners of war has an obligation to repatriate them to their home country after the battle is over. In this case, Ukraine is the country in question, and there is a possibility that Russia may falsify the identities of North Korean soldiers as Russians, so additional controversy is expected over the repatriation issue.

In particular, he added, “North Korean authorities operate a system in which captured North Korean soldiers are regarded as traitors and educate the people about this.”

In fact, according to testimonies from defectors, many North Korean soldiers are shot dead by their comrades rather than taken prisoner when they are injured in battle.

In response, reporter Makino said, “If captured North Korean soldiers wish to defect to South Korea, Ukrainian authorities need to respect their wishes.”

Kim Yu-nik, a researcher and analyst at the North Korea Human Rights Database Center (NKDB), a non-profit organization based in South Korea, also suggested in a recent report that “according to the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, North Korean prisoners of war are considered to have South Korean citizenship, and the government should consult with the Ukrainian government to guarantee them the option of repatriation to South Korea.”

“This is an important precedent that will serve as a model for human rights protection in the international community,” he said, citing the case of some North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war who fled persecution during the Korean War and settled in South Korea and Taiwan.

He also said that the forced repatriation of North Korean prisoners of war violates the principle of prohibition of forced repatriation under international law, and urged that not only the UN Security Council, but also various international organizations, including the International Labor Organization and the UN Human Rights Council, should prepare measures to respond to North Korea's systematic human rights violations.

A photo released by the Ukrainian Presidential Office on October 18, 2024, shows Ukrainian soldiers who were exchanged as prisoners of war (POWs) being reunited with their families at an undisclosed location during Russia's invasion of Ukraine. / Courtesy of the Ukrainian Presidential Office = AFP

North Korean POW response a critical test of the Ukraine war

David Maxwell, deputy director of the U.S.-based Asia-Pacific Strategy Center, also told RFA on the 7th, “Protecting prisoners of war is not just a duty, but has strategic importance.” He emphasized, “All countries that follow the international order based on freedom, the rule of law, and rules must comply with the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions and provide all civilians and prisoners of war with the necessary protection.” This is because Ukraine is no exception and because it is the right thing to do, beyond dispute.

Deputy Maxwell also warned that “not treating prisoners of war humanely is allowing emotions to dominate reason,” explaining that “respect for international law is essential to achieving the rational objectives of war.” He added that the protection of prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions is essential for Ukraine to maintain its moral legitimacy and the trust of the international community.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government has reportedly been waging psychological warfare, including using drones to scatter Korean-language leaflets, in an attempt to encourage North Korean soldiers to surrender.

The leaflet contained the message, "Surrender today and welcome tomorrow in South Korea," along with related instructions.

Also, last month, the psychological warfare targeting the North Korean military was expanded through a project called “I Want to Live,” and the Ukrainian General Intelligence Service emphasized the importance of psychological warfare, saying, “This could be an opportunity for North Korean soldiers to escape from the regime.”

As the possibility of North Korean prisoners of war increases as the war continues, international organizations and experts predict that the response to the North Korean prisoners of war issue will be a major test of international trust and diplomatic negotiations going forward, and they unanimously agree that complying with international norms on prisoners of war is not an option but a must.

This is Han Deok-in from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting.

Editor Noh Jeong-min, Web Editor Lee Gyeong-ha

19. The Flawed U.S. Exit from Afghanistan in 2021: Lessons Not Learned

I have.a north Korea concern. see below.

Excerpts:

The flawed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 serves as a stark reminder of the perils of strategic missteps, misaligned objectives, and inadequate preparation. These failures mirror the lessons that should have been learned from the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. Both conflicts exposed the dangers of mission creep, overreliance on fragile local forces, and insufficient planning for disengagement's humanitarian and operational complexities.

In Afghanistan, the failure to adapt to the realities of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the speed of the Taliban's resurgence revealed a profound disconnect between strategic objectives and on-the-ground realities. This mirrors Vietnam, where the collapse of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) similarly highlighted the limitations of U.S. support for corrupt and unsustainable local regimes. Both cases reflect strategic ineptitude in crafting realistic, achievable objectives and a failure to develop resilient local partners.

The humanitarian crises that followed both withdrawals—abandoned allies in Vietnam and the chaos at Kabul airport in Afghanistan—underscore a recurring failure to protect those who supported U.S. efforts. The tragic scenes of desperation and loss of life tarnished America's global reputation and demonstrated a lack of proactive evacuation planning despite prior warnings in both conflicts.

Intelligence failures also played a critical role. In Vietnam, policymakers underestimated the ARVN's vulnerabilities, just as intelligence assessments in Afghanistan failed to predict the rapid collapse of the ANDSF. These repeated failures highlight systemic issues in intelligence coordination and the inability to anticipate adversaries' strategies.

Accountability remains elusive in both cases. Although Vietnam's lessons were thoroughly documented and widely studied, they were ignored in Afghanistan. This repeated disregard raises serious questions about whether the U.S. can learn from its mistakes or whether institutional inertia ensures these errors will persist in future engagements.

The chaotic withdrawals from both Afghanistan and Vietnam expose a troubling pattern of strategic ineptitude. As the U.S. considers future interventions, the lessons of these twin failures must be internalized. For the sake of military personnel, American taxpayers, and the citizens of nations where the U.S. intervenes, it is imperative to break this cycle of flawed decision-making—failing to do so risks repeating the same catastrophic outcomes, with dire consequences for U.S. credibility, global stability, and the moral responsibility owed to those who serve and depend on America’s leadership.

I worry that Kim Jong Un has learned lessons from our strategic failure.

What Kim Jong-un May Learn from Biden’s Chaotic Afghanistan Exit

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2021/09/what-kim-jong-un-may-learn-from-bidens-chaotic-afghanistan-exit/

The Flawed U.S. Exit from Afghanistan in 2021: Lessons Not Learned

Examining the Parallels Between the US Withdrawals from Afghanistan & Vietnam

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/the-flawed-u-s-exit-from-afghanistan-in-2021-lessons-not-learned

Strategy Central

By & For Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth – January 8, 2025

Introduction

The United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 was marked by chaos, tragedy, and widespread criticism, both domestically and internationally. The 20-year war ended with harrowing scenes at Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport: desperate Afghans clinging to departing planes, the deadly bombing that killed 13 U.S. service members, and the abrupt Taliban takeover of the capital. Analyzing the factors leading to the disastrous withdrawal reveals a confluence of strategic missteps, intelligence failures, and political decisions. These decisions tragically often mirrored the strategic failure of Vietnam.

A Compressed Timeline

The 2021 withdrawal’s chaos stems from decisions made years earlier. In February 2020, the Trump administration signed the Doha Agreement with the Taliban, committing to a full U.S. troop withdrawal by May 2021 in exchange for Taliban promises to sever ties with al-Qaeda and negotiate with the Afghan government. Critics argued that the deal gave the Taliban significant leverage without ensuring enforceable guarantees. Despite these warnings, the agreement accelerated the momentum for withdrawal.

Following the November 2020 presidential election, President Donald Trump ordered a rapid troop drawdown, bypassing standard military and diplomatic protocols. The sudden directive, signed just days after the election, shocked senior officials, with then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley describing it as “potentially catastrophic” and “militarily unfeasible.” Ultimately, the order was not fully implemented, but it set the stage for instability by reducing U.S. forces to a skeleton presence.

When President Joe Biden took office in January 2021, he faced a dilemma: honor the Doha Agreement’s withdrawal deadline or risk renewed conflict with the Taliban. Biden extended the deadline to August 31, 2021, asserting that prolonging the war would not yield meaningful change. However, the administration’s timeline provided little room to adapt to the rapidly deteriorating situation on the ground.

The Final Days of Withdrawal

The withdrawal’s final phase was marked by chaos, violence, and tragedy. As the Taliban encircled Kabul in mid-August, thousands of Afghans rushed to Hamid Karzai International Airport, desperate to escape the impending regime. Images of people clinging to departing aircraft became a searing symbol of the withdrawal’s dysfunction.

In the chaos, U.S. forces scrambled to evacuate American citizens, Afghan allies, and other vulnerable groups. Operation Allies Refuge, one of the largest airlift operations in history, evacuated over 120,000 people. Yet, the operation was marred by tragic incidents, including the August 26 suicide bombing at Abbey Gate that killed 13 U.S. service members and over 170 Afghan civilians.

The evacuation’s disarray highlighted serious lapses in planning and execution. Military commanders were forced to negotiate directly with Taliban leaders to secure the airport perimeter, a stark illustration of the diminished U.S. leverage. Meanwhile, thousands of Afghan allies, including interpreters and their families, were left behind, sparking outrage and calls for accountability.

The Miscalculations

A significant miscalculation stemmed from overestimating the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Over two decades, the U.S. invested billions into training and equipping the Afghan military. Yet, the ANDSF suffered from systemic corruption, poor leadership, and reliance on U.S. support. When the U.S. withdrew its air support and contractors who maintained critical equipment, the ANDSF collapsed in a matter of weeks. General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, later described the speed of the collapse as unforeseen and a failure of intelligence assessments (The Washington Post).

The Trump administration's February 2020 agreement with the Taliban in Doha set the stage for the U.S. exit. The deal, which included a commitment to withdraw all U.S. troops, excluded the Afghan government from negotiations and emboldened the Taliban. Critics argue that this agreement undermined the Afghan government’s legitimacy and morale while signaling to the Taliban that they could wait out U.S. forces (Sandler, Foreign Affairs). The Biden administration inherited this framework and followed through, citing the risks of extending the war.

Despite U.S. intelligence warnings of a possible Taliban takeover, the speed at which the group captured provincial capitals and Kabul caught both the U.S. and Afghan governments off guard. A classified July 2021 U.S. intelligence report, later leaked, predicted that Kabul could fall within months after the U.S. withdrawal. Instead, it fell in mid-August, as President Ashraf Ghani fled the country (Rosenberg and Schmitt, The New York Times).

The evacuation effort was hindered by disorganized planning and reliance on an aging State Department bureaucracy. Tens of thousands of Afghans who had worked with U.S. forces, along with their families, were left behind, despite earlier promises of safe relocation. By the time the evacuation began in earnest, the Taliban controlled Kabul, complicating access to the airport. The attack by ISIS-K, which killed 170 Afghan civilians in addition to the U.S. troops, underscored the fragility of the situation (BBC News).

Lessons From Afghanistan

The chaotic withdrawal offers profound lessons for U.S. policymakers, military planners, and the broader international community. These lessons span strategy, execution, and the human cost of war.

Strategic Clarity and Realism

The withdrawal underscored the importance of aligning strategic objectives with on-the-ground realities. The U.S. entered Afghanistan in 2001 with the clear goal of dismantling al-Qaeda and ousting the Taliban. Over time, the mission expanded to include nation-building and democratization, ambitions that proved unsustainable. Future interventions must prioritize achievable objectives and maintain a clear exit strategy.

The Perils of Overreliance on Local Partners

The collapse of the ANDSF revealed the dangers of overdependence on fragile local institutions. While U.S. training programs focused on replicating Western military structures, they failed to account for Afghanistan’s unique social and political dynamics. Ensuring the long-term viability of local forces requires a tailored approach that addresses cultural, logistical, and operational challenges.

The Humanitarian Dimension

The withdrawal highlighted the moral imperative to protect civilians and allies in conflict zones. The failure to evacuate thousands of Afghan allies before the Taliban takeover damaged U.S. credibility and left vulnerable populations at risk. Moving forward, evacuation plans must be prioritized and implemented proactively, rather than as last-minute crises.

The Role of Intelligence

Intelligence failures contributed to the withdrawal’s chaos. Despite warnings about the Taliban’s capabilities, U.S. officials underestimated the speed of the ANDSF’s collapse. Enhancing intelligence coordination and integrating diverse perspectives can improve decision-making in complex environments.

Accountability and Oversight

The withdrawal exposed gaps in accountability at multiple levels, from senior policymakers to operational commanders. Transparent reviews and robust oversight mechanisms are essential to learning from past mistakes and preventing similar outcomes in future conflicts.

The Lessons Not Learned

The flawed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 shares striking parallels with the botched withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, underscoring recurring lessons in strategic planning, operational execution, and accountability. These lessons reflect critical areas where both operations faltered, with implications for future military and foreign policy engagements.

Strategic Clarity and Realism

Afghanistan and Vietnam reveal the dangers of mission creep and the failure to align strategic objectives with on-the-ground realities. In Vietnam, the initial goal of containing communism expanded into an unwinnable nation-building effort, just as in Afghanistan, the mission shifted from counterterrorism to ambitious democratization. In both cases, the U.S. failed to adapt its strategy to the shifting terrain of local politics and military feasibility. The lesson here is clear: future interventions must establish achievable objectives grounded in a realistic understanding of local contexts and maintain a clear exit strategy to prevent overextension.

The Perils of Overreliance on Local Partners

The collapse of U.S.-supported forces—South Vietnam’s ARVN in 1975 and Afghanistan’s ANDSF in 2021—underscores the risks of overdependence on fragile local institutions. Both instances reflect failures to build sustainable and resilient local forces, with U.S. training efforts overly focused on replicating Western military models rather than adapting to local conditions. Future training programs must prioritize cultural, logistical, and operational considerations to ensure the longevity and effectiveness of local partners, mitigating the risks of sudden collapse when external support wanes.

The Humanitarian Dimension

Humanitarian crises marred both withdrawals, with the abandonment of allies and vulnerable populations casting long shadows over U.S. credibility. In Vietnam, thousands of South Vietnamese who had supported U.S. operations were left behind as Saigon fell. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the failure to evacuate Afghan allies before the Taliban’s rapid advance left countless individuals at risk. Proactive evacuation planning must become a central component of future withdrawal operations, ensuring the timely protection of those who risk their lives in support of U.S. efforts.

The Role of Intelligence

Intelligence failures played a pivotal role in both chaotic withdrawals. In Vietnam, the collapse of ARVN forces caught many U.S. policymakers off guard despite clear indicators of their fragility. In Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence underestimated the Taliban’s capabilities and the ANDSF’s vulnerability. These missteps highlight the need for improved intelligence coordination, diverse analytic perspectives, and scenario planning to anticipate and mitigate worst-case outcomes in future operations.

Accountability and Oversight

Both withdrawals exposed significant gaps in accountability from senior policymakers to operational commanders. In Vietnam, debates over the conduct of the war lingered for decades, with no comprehensive review to assign responsibility for its failures. Similar calls for transparent reviews and oversight mechanisms have arisen in Afghanistan to prevent such outcomes in the future. Institutionalizing accountability through robust oversight and after-action assessments is essential to learning from past mistakes and fostering trust in U.S. military and foreign policy decision-making.

The withdrawals from Vietnam in 1975 and Afghanistan in 2021 underscore the need for strategic discipline, realistic objectives, sustainable partnerships, proactive humanitarian planning, and institutional accountability. As the U.S. prepares for future conflicts in an increasingly complex global environment, these lessons must inform a more adaptable, ethical, and effective approach to military engagement and withdrawal. Failing to heed them risks repeating the same mistakes, with dire consequences for U.S. credibility, allies, and broader strategic goals.

A Troubling Pattern of Strategic Disaster

The flawed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 serves as a stark reminder of the perils of strategic missteps, misaligned objectives, and inadequate preparation. These failures mirror the lessons that should have been learned from the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. Both conflicts exposed the dangers of mission creep, overreliance on fragile local forces, and insufficient planning for disengagement's humanitarian and operational complexities.

In Afghanistan, the failure to adapt to the realities of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the speed of the Taliban's resurgence revealed a profound disconnect between strategic objectives and on-the-ground realities. This mirrors Vietnam, where the collapse of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) similarly highlighted the limitations of U.S. support for corrupt and unsustainable local regimes. Both cases reflect strategic ineptitude in crafting realistic, achievable objectives and a failure to develop resilient local partners.

The humanitarian crises that followed both withdrawals—abandoned allies in Vietnam and the chaos at Kabul airport in Afghanistan—underscore a recurring failure to protect those who supported U.S. efforts. The tragic scenes of desperation and loss of life tarnished America's global reputation and demonstrated a lack of proactive evacuation planning despite prior warnings in both conflicts.

Intelligence failures also played a critical role. In Vietnam, policymakers underestimated the ARVN's vulnerabilities, just as intelligence assessments in Afghanistan failed to predict the rapid collapse of the ANDSF. These repeated failures highlight systemic issues in intelligence coordination and the inability to anticipate adversaries' strategies.

Accountability remains elusive in both cases. Although Vietnam's lessons were thoroughly documented and widely studied, they were ignored in Afghanistan. This repeated disregard raises serious questions about whether the U.S. can learn from its mistakes or whether institutional inertia ensures these errors will persist in future engagements.

The chaotic withdrawals from both Afghanistan and Vietnam expose a troubling pattern of strategic ineptitude. As the U.S. considers future interventions, the lessons of these twin failures must be internalized. For the sake of military personnel, American taxpayers, and the citizens of nations where the U.S. intervenes, it is imperative to break this cycle of flawed decision-making—failing to do so risks repeating the same catastrophic outcomes, with dire consequences for U.S. credibility, global stability, and the moral responsibility owed to those who serve and depend on America’s leadership.

Sources

Malkasian, Carter. "What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?" The Atlantic, September 2021.
Sandler, Ethan. "The Taliban’s Victory and America’s Defeat." Foreign Affairs, October 2021.
Rosenberg, Matthew, and Eric Schmitt. "The Afghanistan Papers: What Went Wrong?" The New York Times, September 2021.
"Afghanistan: Timeline of the U.S. Withdrawal." BBC News, August 2021.
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed: SIGAR-23-16-IP. 2023.
Shane, Leo III. "Trump Ordered Rapid Withdrawal from Afghanistan after Election Loss." Military Times, October 13, 2022.
Associated Press. "New GOP Report Blames Biden for Disastrous End to U.S. War in Afghanistan." AP News, 2023.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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