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Quotes of the Day:
“War is the father of all things.”
– Heraclitus
"Those who cannot understand how to put their thoughts on ice should not enter into the heat of debate. "
– Friedrich Nietzsche
"When a man can't find a deep sense of meaning, they distract themselves with pleasure."
– Vickor Frankl
1. U.S. is ready to work with acting President Choi, strongly supports 'ironclad' alliance: State Dept.
2. UN “Trusts Korea’s Commitment to Democratic Principles” … UK “Will Continue Cooperation”
3. US-Japan, Drafting Extended Nuclear Deterrence Guidelines… “Response to North Korean Nuclear Threat Also Affects Security on the Korean Peninsula”
4. Ukraine discloses diary of fallen N.K. soldier | Yonhap News Agency
5. Rallies for, against Yoon's impeachment held 1 km apart
6. [Special Roundtable: The Path North Korea Is Taking] ① “Complete Severance from South Korea Due to Regime Instability”
7. N. Korea pays farm workers in devalued currency instead of grain
8. N. Korean youth shift to low-key end-of-year celebrations as cultural restrictions tighten
9. Editorial: Another impeachment could push Korea into chaos
10. Trump's N. Korea policy may shake up security landscape on Korean Peninsula: think tank
11. Navigating political crises in Korea and Germany
12. Martial law and ‘K-defense’
13. Fallen Crypto Tycoon Do Kwon to Be Extradited to U.S.
14. North Korean defectors report highest-ever life satisfaction in 2024: Survey
1. U.S. is ready to work with acting President Choi, strongly supports 'ironclad' alliance: State Dept.
Korea's friends, partners, and allies, are showing support for Korean democracy.
We should keep in mind that the strong ROK/US alliance is in US national security interests for a free and open Indo Pacific as well as defense of US interests in Northeast Asia. The alliance supports US interests around the world from South Korea's partnership as a member of the Arsenal of Democracy to its membership in multilateral organizations to include NATO's IP4.
(LEAD) U.S. is ready to work with acting President Choi, strongly supports 'ironclad' alliance: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 28, 2024
(ATTN: COMBINES with article slugged 'Pentagon-S Korea-impeachment'; UPDATES throughout)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Dec. 27 (Yonhap) -- The United States is ready to work with South Korea's acting President Choi Sang-mok and "strongly" supports the "ironclad" alliance with the Asian country, a State Department spokesperson said Friday, after the National Assembly voted to impeach acting President Han Duck-soo.
The spokesperson made the remarks after Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Choi took over following Han's impeachment less than two weeks after Han took over for President Yoon Suk Yeol who was impeached for his botched imposition of martial law.
"As the Secretary said, the most important thing is that the Republic of Korea has demonstrated its democratic resilience, and we strongly support the Korean people throughout this process," the spokesperson said via email in response to a question from Yonhap News Agency.
"We've seen it follow, peacefully, a process laid out in its constitution, and we're ready to work with Acting President Choi and the ROK government," the official added. ROK is short for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.
The spokesperson reiterated America's commitment to the bilateral alliance.
"We strongly support the ironclad alliance that joins our two countries together and that's done so much over the last few years," the spokesperson said. "In recent years, that Alliance has made enormous strides, and the United States looks forward to partnering with the ROK on achieving further progress."
Maj. Pete Nguyen, a Pentagon spokesperson, issued a similar statement.
"We reiterate our support for the Republic of Korea, its citizens and democratic processes, and the rule of law. Our commitment to the U.S.-ROK Alliance is ironclad," Nguyen told Yonhap News Agency via email.
Yoon was impeached on Dec. 14 over his short-lived martial law imposition. He will be suspended until the Constitutional Court decides whether to reinstate or unseat him from office.
The impeachment motion against Han was introduced by the main opposition Democratic Party after he refused to appoint additional justices to the Constitutional Court that will adjudicate Yoon's impeachment trial.
Ruling People Power Party lawmakers protest National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik's decision to set the quorum for acting President Han Duck-soo's impeachment at 151 votes, as main opposition Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung (C) walks to his seat, in the main hall of the National Assembly in Seoul on Dec. 27, 2024. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 28, 2024
2. UN “Trusts Korea’s Commitment to Democratic Principles” … UK “Will Continue Cooperation”
Again, Korea's friends, partners, and allies, (and the UN) are showing support for Korean democracy.
This is a Google translation of a VOA report.
UN “Trusts Korea’s Commitment to Democratic Principles” … UK “Will Continue Cooperation”
2024.12.28
https://www.voakorea.com/p/9079.html
The UN Secretary-General said he trusted South Korea's commitment to democratic principles in the first impeachment of a South Korean acting president. The UK said it would continue to work closely with South Korea. Reporter Ahn So-young reports.
Regarding the impeachment of Acting President Han Duck-soo of South Korea, the United Nations stated on the 27th, “(Secretary-General) António Guterres is aware of the ongoing political situation in South Korea.”
[United Nations Secretary-General's Spokesperson's Office] “The Secretary-General is aware of the ongoing political developments in the Republic of Korea. He expresses his confidence in the Republic of Korea's steadfast commitment to democratic principles, ensuring a peaceful and stable path forward."
“He expresses his confidence in South Korea’s firm commitment to democratic principles that ensure a peaceful and stable future,” said Florencia Sotto Niño, deputy spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General, in response to VOA’s request for comment on the matter.
The Foreign Office building in London, England.
When asked by VOA to comment on the impeachment vote against the acting president, the British Foreign Office said, “This is a matter for the Korean people and their constitutional procedures.”
He added, “We will continue to work closely with Korea, which is an important partner of the UK.”
[British Foreign Office Spokesperson] "This is a matter for the people of the Republic of Korea, and their constitutional process. As an important partner of the UK, we continue to work closely with the Republic of Korea."
Ministry of Foreign Affairs building in Prague, Czech Republic.
“Trust in Korea’s democratic system”
“We do not comment on internal procedures of our partners,” the Czech Foreign Ministry said in response to VOA’s request for comment that day.
He then emphasized, “We have confidence in Korea’s democratic system.”
[Czech Foreign Ministry Spokesperson] “We do not comment on internal processes of our partners. We have confidence in Korean democratic institutions.”
Earlier, on the 27th, the National Assembly of Korea held a plenary session and passed the impeachment motion against Acting President and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo through a secret vote by the members.
The impeachment bill included five grounds for impeachment, including his actions as Prime Minister, such as cooperating with the convening of the State Council before martial law, and his actions as acting Prime Minister, such as refusing to appoint Constitutional Court justices.
Accordingly, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Strategy and Finance Choi Sang-mok assumed the role of acting president.
Prior to this, on the 26th, acting president Han refused to appoint three Constitutional Court justices recommended by the National Assembly, requesting that the ruling and opposition parties "submit a plan through agreement."
In response, the Democratic Party of Korea, the main opposition party in Korea, introduced a motion to impeach Acting President Han, claiming that he intentionally obstructed the formation of the Constitutional Court.
This is Soyoung Ahn from VOA News.
3. US-Japan, Drafting Extended Nuclear Deterrence Guidelines… “Response to North Korean Nuclear Threat Also Affects Security on the Korean Peninsula”
This is a Google translation of a VOA report.
US-Japan, Drafting Extended Nuclear Deterrence Guidelines… “Response to North Korean Nuclear Threat Also Affects Security on the Korean Peninsula”
2024.12.28
https://www.voakorea.com/a/7916426.html
The two governments have drawn up guidelines on extended deterrence, which would allow the United States to defend Japan with all its power, including nuclear weapons. Experts say this measure is a signal that the United States is seriously assessing the nuclear threat from North Korea, and that it will also affect the security of the Korean Peninsula. Reporter Cho Eun-jung reports.
The U.S. government said it has drafted its first guidelines on extended deterrence with Japan.
The State Department and Department of Defense said in a press release on the 26th, “The alliance faces increasingly serious strategic and nuclear threats,” and “The governments of Japan and the United States are committed to strengthening extended deterrence to promote stability in the region and prevent the outbreak of conflict.”
[Ministry of State] “The Alliance faces an increasingly severe strategic and nuclear threat environment. The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America are committed to reinforcing extended deterrence in order to promote regional stability and deter the outbreak of conflict. Based upon accumulated discussion primarily through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD), the Governments of Japan and the United States have formulated the Guidelines for Extended Deterrence.”
He also said, “The governments of the US and Japan have established extended deterrence guidelines based on discussions accumulated through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD).”
“Maximizing deterrence… Also including strategic messages”
It also said, “This document strengthens existing alliance consultations and communication procedures related to extended deterrence,” and “The joint guidance also includes strategic messages to maximize deterrence and strengthen U.S. extended deterrence measures, reinforced by Japan’s defense capabilities.”
[State Department] “This document reinforces the Alliance’s existing consultation and communication procedures related to extended deterrence. The Guidelines also address strategic messaging to maximize deterrence and enhance measures for US extended deterrence, bolstered by Japan's defense capabilities. The Alliance will continue to explore how best to ensure extended deterrence is strong and credible.”
The U.S. government said, “The U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to seek the best way to ensure strong and credible extended deterrence going forward.” However, the content of this guideline has not been made public.
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a press release with the same content on the 27th.
“Expanding consultation, communication, and planning between the US and Japan”
Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation
Bruce Klingner, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, told VOA in a telephone interview on Tuesday that the announcement “shows that there is an ongoing discussion between the United States and Japan about extended deterrence, encompassing nuclear weapons, conventional forces, and missile defense.”
He evaluated it as “a measure that emphasizes extended deterrence while expanding consultation, communication, and planning on a wide range of military issues between the US and Japan.”
[Recording: Researcher Klingner] “It's a continuation of ongoing discussion between the US and Japan about extended deterrence which is not only nuclear weapons as is commonly thought of but also conventional forces and missile defense. So this is yet another step in expanding the consultation, communication and planning between the US and Japan on really broader military issues but also highlighting extended deterrence. The second aspect, I think is almost a message to the Japanese Prime Minister. When he assumed office in late September, he had advocated nuclear sharing between the US and Japan which drew a lot of raised eyebrows about what did he mean actually.”
He then evaluated that this announcement was “also a signal to Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.”
“Many people were puzzled as to what Prime Minister Ishiba actually meant by the ‘nuclear sharing’ between the U.S. and Japan that he mentioned immediately after taking office,” said Klinger.
He said, “This announcement could be a way to get Prime Minister Ishiba to back down from his nuclear sharing proposal by emphasizing that the extended deterrence dialogue between the U.S. and Japan has been ongoing.”
“Responding to North Korea’s Nuclear Threat… Also Impacting South Korea’s Security”
David Maxwell, Vice President, Asia Pacific Strategy Center
David Maxwell, deputy director of the Asia-Pacific Strategy Center and former chief of staff for operations at the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, said in a phone interview with VOA on the 27th that the U.S. and Japan drafting and publicly announcing extended deterrence guidelines “sends a signal that they are committed to extended deterrence and that they are taking the threat from North Korea in particular very seriously.”
[Recording: Deputy Representative Maxwell] “By having the talks and reinitiating the guidelines and publicly declaring that really sends a signal that we are all committed to extended deterrence and that we assess the threat from North Korea in particular to be acute and that we must demonstrate “Our commitment to extended deterrence, to deter war and deter nuclear attack.”
He said, “In order to deter war and deter nuclear attacks, we must demonstrate our commitment to extended deterrence.”
Deputy Secretary Maxwell said that the US-Japan extended deterrence also affects security on the Korean Peninsula, adding that “everything is interconnected.”
He stressed that “it is very important to understand that deterring a nuclear attack from a hostile actor is in the interests of all three countries, the U.S., South Korea and Japan.”
Earlier in July, President Yoon Seok-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden adopted the 'Joint Statement on the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula,' which outlined a strong response to North Korea's nuclear provocations.
The Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), established in July 2023, completed its nuclear deterrence and nuclear operations guidelines in just one year.
Although the content of the guidelines was not made public, the US-South Korean leaders emphasized in a joint statement that “any nuclear attack by North Korea on South Korea will be met with an immediate, overwhelming, and decisive response.”
This is Eun-Jeong Jo from VOA News.
4. Ukraine discloses diary of fallen N.K. soldier | Yonhap News Agency
Ukraine discloses diary of fallen N.K. soldier | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr
Lee Haye-ah
All News 22:20 December 28, 2024
SEOUL, Dec. 28 (Yonhap) -- Ukraine's military on Saturday disclosed the diary of a North Korean soldier killed in action in Russia's western front-line region of Kursk.
Ukraine's special operations forces said the diary belonged to Jeong Kyeong-hong, equivalent to a private under South Korea's military ranking system.
"The crime I committed cannot be forgiven but my fatherland gave me a new opportunity in life," Jeong wrote in an entry, noting he betrayed the North's ruling party after being given the opportunity to be promoted to platoon sergeant major.
"If we win here and return to the fatherland, I will make a petition to the mother party," he added, without elaborating on what the petition will be.
The diary suggests North Korea likely sent convicts among the troops it deployed to Russia to fight against Ukraine, with a possible promise to grant them a pardon upon their return.
"In this operation, I will run at the front of the line and follow the orders of comrade commander-in-chief unconditionally and thoroughly even if I have to give up my life," Jeong wrote.
This image captured from video released by Ukraine's military shows a presumed North Korean soldier under attack from Ukrainian forces in Russia's western front-line region of Kursk. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
This photo, released by Ukraine's special operations forces, shows a diary entry written by Jeong Kyeong-hong, a North Korean soldier killed in action in Russia. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
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5. Rallies for, against Yoon's impeachment held 1 km apart
Huge disparities between the organizers' and police estimates on the sizes but it is pretty clear there are more people in support of Yoon (anti-impeachment) than there are in favor of impeachment based on multiple reports.
Rallies for, against Yoon's impeachment held 1 km apart | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · December 28, 2024
SEOUL, Dec. 28 (Yonhap) -- Tens of thousands of people gathered in downtown Seoul on Saturday to rally for or against the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol in the wake of his short-lived imposition of martial law.
Police estimated 35,000 people took part in anti-Yoon rallies near Gyeongbok Palace as of 5:10 p.m., though organizers put the number at over 500,000.
K-pop music blared through loudspeakers as protesters dressed in thick winter gear waved light sticks and chanted, "Immediately arrest Yoon Suk Yeol."
People calling for President Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment hold a rally in front of Gyeongbok Palace in Seoul on Dec. 28, 2024. (Yonhap)
Some called on the Constitutional Court to remove him from office while others demanded the dissolution of Yoon's ruling People Power Party (PPP).
Lee Jae-myung, the leader of the main opposition Democratic Party, was reported to have visited the site.
Just 1 kilometer away, near Gwanghwamun Station, Yoon's supporters held their own rally.
"Impeachment is invalid," read a sign held up by a protester. "Arrest Lee Jae-myung," another read.
PPP Rep. Yoon Sang-hyun made an appearance and addressed the supporters from a stage.
"We failed to stop the impeachment motion against our own party's president. I apologize to our honorable patriot citizens," he said before bowing on his knees.
Police said around 35,000 people were gathered at the rally as of 5:10 p.m., while organizers claimed the number was close to 3 million.
People supporting President Yoon Suk Yeol hold a rally near Gwanghwamun Station in Seoul on Dec. 28, 2024. (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · December 28, 2024
6. [Special Roundtable: The Path North Korea Is Taking] ① “Complete Severance from South Korea Due to Regime Instability”
This is a very important report (A google translation of the RFA report). There is a lot to parse in this.
We must not lose sight of the fact that the regime is facing the very real threat of internal instability. We must not be distracted with nuclear threats and rhetoric from the regime or the South Korean democratic political situation.
[Special Roundtable: The Path North Korea Is Taking] ① “Complete Severance from South Korea Due to Regime Instability”
https://www.rfa.org/korean/news_indepth/the-north-korea-regime-instability-relations-12272024101608.html
WASHINGTON-Noh Jeong-min, Seo Hye-jun nohj@rfa.org
2024.12.27
Representative Ri Jeong-ho (far left), a former high-ranking official of Room 39 of the North Korean Workers' Party, and Jiro Ishimaru, representative of the Osaka office of Japan's Asia Press (far right).
/RFA PHOTO
00:00 / 00:00
[ Host ] Hello , everyone . As we close out 2024 and enter 2025, I am Noh Jeong-min, the host of today's [RFA Special Panel Discussion : The Path North Korea Is Taking ], where we diagnose and analyze the current state of North Korea's politics , economy , and society . We have connected the two of you at the same time .
First, we have Jiro Ishimaru, the representative of the Osaka office of Asia Press , a Japanese media outlet that reports on internal news from North Korea . We also have Ri Jeong-ho, the representative of the Korea Prosperity Development Center and former high-ranking official of Room 39 of the North Korean Workers ' Party . Good morning, both of you .
Representative Ishimaru is still covering the news inside North Korea, so he knows North Korean news faster and more accurately than anyone else . Also, Representative Lee Jeong-ho has experienced the Kim Il-sung , Kim Jong-il , and Kim Jong-un regimes in North Korea , and as a former high-ranking official in Room 39 of the Workers' Party , he is someone who can analyze the North Korean system and policies well . That's why I'm looking forward to today's discussion .
Through these two people, we will discuss the current state of North Korean society, where North Korea is headed , and what steps it will take in the future .
“ The biggest North Korean news of the year is ‘ South Korea hostile policy ’ and ‘ Russian troop deployment ’”
[ Host ] First, before we get into the full-fledged discussion, let 's hear your overall assessments of North Korea in 2024. There have been many incidents and accidents in North Korea this year . First, Representative Ishimaru , as someone who has observed and covered North Korea more closely than anyone else this year , what is your overall assessment of North Korea ?
[ Ishimaru Jiro ] Yes. If you analyze it from the perspective of the Kim Jong-un regime , the economic chaos is serious . There are also many international issues and difficulties, but I think there was great success in deepening relations with Russia while getting involved in the Ukraine war . When you think about the pluses and minuses , I think it was a year with many pluses for the Kim Jong-un regime .
[ Host ] CEO Lee Jeong-ho, how would you evaluate this year ?
[ Lee Jeong-ho ] I think this year was one in which North Korea focused on military power and continued international isolation , and the economic difficulties of its people reached their peak . This year , Kim Jong-un visited a uranium enrichment facility for the first time ever and showed his strong will to develop nuclear weapons . In terms of strengthening military power, he showed off his military power by testing solid-fuel-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), reconnaissance satellites , and various types of missiles . He also provided Russia with a lot of weapons and ammunition and dispatched about 12,000 troops . Looking at this, it shows that Kim Jong-un is prioritizing strengthening military power over the stability of his regime, rather than the prosperity of the country and the improvement of the quality of life of the people . If these funds were used to secure food , I believe that the current situation in which North Korean people suffer from hunger and suffering would be overcome .
According to the 'Recent North Korean Military Trends' report distributed to the press by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 23rd, North Korea is continuing to prepare to launch balloons against the South while strengthening security along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) between the South and the North, and it is assessed that there is a possibility that it will launch an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)-class hypersonic missile around the end of the year. The photo shows North Korean soldiers installing barbed wire in the frontline area. / Courtesy of Yonhap News, Joint Chiefs of Staff
[ Host ] I asked you both a question in advance so that the discussion could proceed smoothly . When I asked, " What do you think is the biggest news or important incident that happened in North Korea this year ? " , both of you gave the same answer . You chose " hostile policies toward South Korea " and " efforts to erase unification " as the most important incidents . North Korea declared South Korea a separate country through a constitutional amendment .
Mr. Lee Jeong-ho, why did you think this case was the most important ?
[ Lee Jeong-ho ] I believe that Kim Jong-un's declaration of the Republic of Korea as a separate nation through a constitutional amendment and the officialization of the policy of ' hostility toward Korea ' and ' erasing unification ' is a very serious anti-national historical incident that denies the history and ethnic identity of the Korean Peninsula . This is because the Korean Peninsula has maintained the identity of a single nation and a single ethnicity for thousands of years . Although it was divided after the liberation in 1945 , ethnic , historical , and cultural homogeneity still remains . Therefore, Kim Jong-un's latest measure can be seen as an act of trampling on this homogeneity and historical legitimacy .
I believe that Kim Jong-un's act of defining South Korea as hostile and erasing the word " unification " itself shows how insecure his regime is . He has revealed his intention to designate North Koreans as hostile and build a higher wall of isolation so that they cannot yearn for a free and prosperous Republic of Korea . This is a very despicable act that undermines the long history and identity of the people in order to maintain his power , and I believe it deserves to be condemned by the entire nation .
In the past, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il , regardless of their true intentions , maintained an attitude of pursuing “ independent peaceful unification ,” “ federal unification ,” and “ unification by our own people ” through the Basic Agreement between the South and the North. However , Kim Jong-un is damaging these claims of his predecessors and even the legitimacy of the hereditary regime .
[ Ishimaru Jiro ] Yes . It would not be an exaggeration to say that Kim Jong-un already made an " anti-unification , anti-national declaration" at the end of 2023. He also made another declaration in January 2024. I was shocked by the fact that he abandoned his national identity and basic ideology of " aiming independent, peaceful unification . " He also declared that " Korea is not the same people ." When we ask " What should we think of this? " I think that he could no longer bear the burden of having relations with Korea, whether in a cooperative or confrontational situation , and the weight of Korea's very existence . Therefore, rather than a " hostile policy toward Korea, " I think it is an " anti - Korea policy " that aims for complete severance .
I visited North Korea in 1995 , 1997 , and 1998 , and interviewed about 1,000 North Koreans who defected to China in the 1990s and early 2000s , and they really didn't know much about South Korea . I was a little surprised by that , but since the Kim Jong-il era, through repeated economic cooperation, exchange , and confrontation, a large number of North Korean defectors went to South Korea , and then a large amount of information entered North Korea . As a result, the expectation of support from South Korea and the atmosphere of admiration for South Korea grew and spread among the residents .
Meanwhile, talking to North Koreans and our North Korea reporting partners , I think there are many doubts among North Korean residents, the military , and officials about whether we need the Democratic People's Republic of Korea anymore . Wouldn't the Republic of Korea be enough ? From Kim Jong-un's perspective, this environment could be a very big threat to the maintenance of a system based on a sole leadership system, so I think he may have implemented a strong policy of erasing South Korea from within North Korea, rather than a hostile policy, even if it means abandoning the basic ideology of the country .
[ Host ] CEO Lee Jeong-ho , do you have anything to add here ?
[ Lee Jeong-ho ] Yes . Kim Jong-un is the leader of North Korea , but in fact, our Korean peninsula has existed as a single nation and a single country for thousands of years . However, it is unacceptable for Kim Jong-un, a hereditary leader, to create two countries at will . This is probably because the system is so unstable that he is trying to build a wall with South Korea to create his own kingdom , but I think this is impossible .
“ Eliminate all South Korean influence in North Korea … Select a thorough severance ”
[ Host ] You both emphasized the instability of the regime as the background . In 2019 , the Kim Jong-un regime closed its borders and strongly controlled the inflow of external information , especially South Korean culture, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic . At the same time , it controlled the speech and thoughts of North Korean residents through laws such as the “ Act on Rejecting Reactionary Cultural Thought ,” the “ Act on the Protection of Pyongyang Culture and Language , ” and the “Act on Guaranteeing Youth Education . ” In other words , do you think that this background is related to the current “ anti-unification policy ” and “ hostile policy toward the South ” ? [ Ishimaru Jiro ] Of course . As I said earlier , they want to eliminate all South Korean influence within North Korea . They have continued to control things by saying things like “ No. Don’t watch South Korean dramas ,” and “ Don’t accept remittances from South Korean defectors . ” Despite this , residents and officials continue to watch South Korean dramas , and the influence is even reflected in their speech . It is truly a shameful law even on a global scale , but the fact that they created the law ( to control it ) while knowing that must be because they judged that ' it would be difficult to complete the anti-Korean policy ' without extreme measures internally .
[ Host ] Representative Lee Jung-ho also said before, " High-ranking officials in North Korea also watch South Korean dramas and secretly use South Korean products . " [ Lee Jung-ho ] Yes . That's right . Didn't Kim Jong-un close the borders for 4~5 years due to the COVID-19 pandemic ? Blocking outside information means that the system is that unstable , and I think he took such extreme measures because of such extreme anxiety . I think that the recent enactment of the " Act on Rejecting Reactionary Culture and Ideology ," the " Act on Guaranteeing Youth Education ," and the "Act on the Protection of Pyongyang Culture and Language " to control individuals' thoughts and language by law clearly shows the reality of that oppressive system. These things also clearly reveal Kim Jong-un's anxiety about maintaining power and lack of confidence. Also, if the North Korean system is superior to South Korea's, what would he be afraid of to create such laws to control things? I think this is evidence that Kim Jong-un himself thinks the North Korean system is inferior to the South Korean system . North Korea is the most closed country in the world , so if Korean culture such as Korean dramas and K- pop spreads to North Korean citizens, it will arouse their longing for a free and prosperous South Korean society , and it will become a powerful catalyst for them to realize the reality of the world . That is why the North Korean regime defines even the use of Korean expressions as an act of treason against the system and punishes them . As Representative Ishimaru said earlier, this is an extremely absurd control .
“ North Korea’s major economic policy change … Return of the initiative in trade , manufacturing , distribution , and sales to the country ” [ North Korean News ] Operation of freight trains exclusively for ‘ state-owned stores ’
[ Room 39, Lee Jeong-ho's Eyes ] " Close North-Russia Relations , a Choice Kim Jong-un Wished for Since the Beginning of His Rise "
Former North Korean Official : “ If the Russian Troop Deployment Fact is Revealed, North Korean Residents Will Inevitably Be Agitated ”
“ If news of the deaths of North Korean troops is known , unrest and discontent will spread .”
A North Korean soldier with red tape on his leg (a mark used to identify North Korean soldiers) holds his head as a Ukrainian drone flies by. / Official Telegram account of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO)
[ Host ] Another major incident in North Korea this year that both of you mentioned was the dispatch of North Korean troops to Russia . This was an incident that shocked the entire world . News about it is still being reported . First of all, Representative Ishimaru , is there any new news coming out of North Korea recently regarding the dispatch of North Korean troops to Russia ?
[ Ishimaru Jiro ] On October 18 , the South Korean National Intelligence Service announced that "( North Korea ) had dispatched troops to Russia . " Immediately after, I asked five Asia Press interviewees living in the northern region . However , none of them knew . They did n't really know what it meant to dispatch troops to Russia . They also said that they couldn't find any evidence of movement in the military . However, as we continued to request investigations, information about the dispatch began to spread little by little . One interesting thing is that the news came from parents who had sent their sons to the military . It's already been about two months . Now, many people are well aware that troops were dispatched to Russia . However , the locals probably still don't know that they are participating in the war in Ukraine or how many troops have been dispatched .
And parents are naturally worried about the dispatch of troops. However, many ordinary citizens responded , " Now that we have friendly and allied relations with Russia , we will receive a lot of help and support , and in return , shouldn't we also support Russia in its difficult areas? " That is still the atmosphere .
[ Host ] Mr. Lee Jeong-ho, why did you choose the dispatch of North Korean troops to Russia as one of the most important events of the year ?
[ Lee Jeong-ho ] The news of the Russian troop dispatch has not been officially reported ( in North Korea ) and is not well known among North Korean residents , but at least the North Korean military leadership or high-ranking officials of the Workers' Party will know . Because there was a preparation process , they had no choice but to know . Also , since 10,000 people went , their families will all be there , and there are officials related to this . So this will spread , and if news of many casualties on the battlefield spreads, there will be unrest and discontent within the country . There may also be cases of parents who lost their children raising complaints and protesting .
[ Host ] Not only Ukrainian intelligence authorities, but also the U.S. Department of Defense recently officially confirmed that North Korean troops are fighting on the front lines and that there have been a lot of casualties . There are also videos on social media showing casualties that appear to be North Korean soldiers , so it's only a matter of time before they enter North Korea . If this fact were to become known, wouldn't there be a lot of unrest within North Korea ?
[ Lee Jeong-ho ] Yes . There is definitely a nursery rhyme .
[ Ishimaru Jiro ] But since information communication with North Korea is currently blocked, I think it will take a long time for such videos or photos to spread . However, if there are casualties, of course the parents should be notified at some point . Especially from a mother's perspective, there is nothing more important than her son , so I think it is quite possible that if such words start to come out, there will be a small social unrest .
North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Jong-gyu (left) and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko exchange instruments of ratification of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in Moscow on the 4th. / Yonhap News, capture of the Telegram of the Russian Embassy in North Korea.
[ Host ] North Korea-Russia relations have also shown considerable closeness this year . Last June , a North Korea-Russia summit was held in Pyongyang . How would you two evaluate North Korea-Russia relations ?
[ Lee Jeong-ho ] I think that North Korea and Russia strengthened military cooperation through two summits last year and this year , and signed a “ comprehensive strategic partnership agreement ” and the dispatch of North Korean troops . This is an unprecedented and significant event in the history of the North Korean regime . It is the first time in decades that North Korea has signed a military agreement with Russia . This can be said to be Kim Jong-un’s desperate self-survival strategy and an extreme choice for the stability of the regime . As I said earlier , when North Korean soldiers die fighting in foreign battlefields , it is a sacrifice without justification . In the past, when North Korean soldiers sacrificed themselves while defending their country or performing the sacred mission of unifying the country, they spoke of it as glorious , but if the soldiers who were dispatched this time die, from the perspective of the North Korean people, it will not be a noble sacrifice but a meaningless sacrifice .
Also, I think that the relationship between North Korea and Russia has gone beyond a simple friendly relationship and has been reorganized militarily according to the strategic needs of the two countries. As I said earlier , this is the first time since the Cold War in the 1980s that North Korea and Russia have resumed such close military cooperation .
[ Ishimaru Jiro ] I think the greatest achievement of the Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea is the revival of the bloc . As you know, the bloc itself disappeared around 1990 when the Cold War structure collapsed . China and Russia established diplomatic relations with South Korea , and there was no country in the international community that sympathized with North Korea's position . A very specific example is that Russia and China also agreed to the UN Security Council sanctions resolution following North Korea's nuclear test in 2017. However , in this situation where the bloc was destroyed, I think the greatest significance is that North Korea, which was very isolated, was able to recreate the bloc after 34 years .
And isn't it clear that the Putin regime ( in Russia ) had a very difficult time ? Because they asked North Korea for help . But I think there were a lot of deals between Kim Jong-un and Putin . They must have gotten a lot in return, not just weapons and technology, but also oil, vehicles, and machinery . From Kim Jong - un 's perspective , I think he negotiated well with Putin and achieved a lot of results thanks to the sacrifices of those who fought in the Ukrainian war .
This is Jeongmin Noh of RFA Radio Free Asia .
Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Editor Kim Sang-il
7. N. Korea pays farm workers in devalued currency instead of grain
We must observe for indicators of internal instability.
N. Korea pays farm workers in devalued currency instead of grain - Daily NK English
"Workers would prefer their usual grain payments, or ideally, U.S. dollars - though they dare not voice such preferences publicly," a source told Daily NK
By Seon Hwa - December 27, 2024
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · December 27, 2024
On Oct. 10, the Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported that 'the Kangan Farm in Unpa county and Woram Farm in Kumchon county of North Hwanghae province have completed their harvest distribution,' claiming they 'achieved developments in grain production through patriotic passion and the power of science and technology.' (Rodong Sinmun/News1)
North Korea has taken an unprecedented step: paying farm workers in devalued local currency instead of their usual share of crops.
A source in North Pyongan province reported recently that farm workers in Yongchon and Yomju counties received cash payments rather than grain. Similar reports from Sukchon county in South Pyongan province suggest this practice may be nationwide.
Traditionally, collective farm workers receive a portion of crops proportional to their year’s work, though state and military quotas typically reduce their share to 40-60% of what they’re owed. While this system kept workers in poverty, it at least ensured basic food security during shortages.
The switch to cash payments has alarmed workers, who received 4,500 won per kilogram of rice owed. For example, a worker entitled to 300 kilograms received 1.35 million won. However, this rate significantly undervalues the grain – rice was trading at 9,000 won per kilogram in Pyongyang markets as of Dec. 7, effectively halving workers’ compensation.
“Even though households with multiple workers are receiving seemingly large sums like 4-5 million won – an amount rarely seen here – they know this money won’t buy the grain they’re actually owed,” the source explained.
Adding to workers’ concerns, the payments allegedly include donpyo (cash vouchers) worth 50,000 won each. These vouchers typically trade at a discount to their face value, further diminishing workers’ real compensation.
“Workers suspect the government is deliberately shortchanging them with devalued currency. They’re questioning what happened to the bumper crop that state newspaper Rodong Sinmun celebrated,” the source said.
Faced with depreciating currency, farm workers are rushing to purchase corn, which costs roughly half as much as rice. However, this surge in demand could drive up corn prices as well.
“Nobody wants to hold onto domestic currency given its unstable value,” the source added. “Workers would prefer their usual grain payments, or ideally, U.S. dollars – though they dare not voice such preferences publicly.”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · December 27, 2024
8. N. Korean youth shift to low-key end-of-year celebrations as cultural restrictions tighten
Excerpt:
“These gatherings notably lack the usual praise for party leadership or pledges of loyalty – it’s simply about having fun,” the source added. “In a way, isn’t their focus on pure enjoyment itself a subtle critique of the leadership’s restrictions on their freedom?”
N. Korean youth shift to low-key end-of-year celebrations as cultural restrictions tighten - Daily NK English
The parties typically take place in spacious, quiet homes of well-off families, with parents often preparing the food
By Seon Hwa - December 27, 2024
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · December 27, 2024
On July 30, the Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported that over 110 high school graduates from North Pyongan Province 'volunteered' to work at socialist construction sites. /Photo source: Rodong Sinmun/News1
North Korean youth are holding more subdued end-of-year celebrations compared to previous years, according to a source in North Hwanghae province.
The parties, scheduled between Dec. 22-29, hold similar significance to South Korean celebrations – a time for reflection on the year’s achievements and setbacks while sharing encouragement and entertainment. However, North Korean gatherings traditionally carry distinct political and propagandistic elements, with participants expected to praise state leadership and pledge loyalty to the Workers’ Party and Kim Jong Un.
Youth celebrations are breaking from this pattern, trending toward more personal gatherings focused on friendship rather than regime devotion. This is especially true for graduating high school seniors, who view these as final celebrations with classmates.
“Students are investing more in these farewell parties – collecting enough money for at least 3 kilograms of rice, compared to 2 kilograms for regular gatherings,” the source said. “They’re planning full-day events with sports and walks around the neighborhood.”
Most parents support these expenses, believing these may be their children’s last chances for carefree enjoyment. Teachers and local officials have been generally accepting of these gatherings rather than viewing them as problematic.
The parties typically take place in spacious, quiet homes of well-off families, with parents often preparing the food. However, one strict limitation remains: South Korean cultural content is forbidden under recently passed laws targeting foreign influence – the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act, Youth Education Guarantee Act, and Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act. This restriction has become particularly severe this year as authorities emphasize their “two hostile states” stance toward South Korea.
“Students can no longer openly enjoy South Korean music like before,” the source noted. “While some view this restraint as ‘mature,’ many young people feel frustrated by this obvious repression.
“These gatherings notably lack the usual praise for party leadership or pledges of loyalty – it’s simply about having fun,” the source added. “In a way, isn’t their focus on pure enjoyment itself a subtle critique of the leadership’s restrictions on their freedom?”
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · December 27, 2024
9. Editorial: Another impeachment could push Korea into chaos
The DPK is playing with fire.
Editorial: Another impeachment could push Korea into chaos
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2024/12/27/HP3Z3ZD2QRFSVH746ZBQFUQ6ME/
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2024.12.27. 08:54
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Choi Sang-mok. / News1
The Democratic Party of Korea plans to pass an impeachment motion against acting president Han Duck-soo in a National Assembly plenary session on Dec. 27. Regardless of whether an acting president can be impeached by a simple majority rather than a two-thirds vote, it is highly likely that Han will no longer be able to perform his duties politically. Another impeachment would plunge the country into an unprecedented situation in which an acting president would be replaced by yet another acting leader.
Under current law, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Choi Sang-mok would take over, assuming the role of acting president, acting prime minister, and finance minister all at once. Such a scenario would be unthinkable in any stable democracy. The South Korean economy, still fragile from the aftermath of the martial law debacle, has just begun to show signs of recovery. The trust and commitment demonstrated by Korea’s allies, including the United States and Japan, have been crucial to stabilizing the economy.
But what would happen if South Korea ended up with an acting president of an acting president? After the martial law incident, the economy suffered a shock marked by foreign investors selling off Korean stocks, the won’s sharp depreciation against the dollar, and consumer and investment sentiment indicators dropping to the lowest levels since the 2008 global financial crisis. Korea’s sovereign credit rating remains intact, but the situation remains precarious, with the efforts of the Han administration holding it together by a delicate thread.
A second acting president would heighten the country’s political risks and trigger a second economic shock. The value of the won is likely to decline sharply, raising dollar borrowing costs. Adding potential higher tariffs under a second Trump administration would make economic recovery even more challenging.
The Democratic Party seems to expect Deputy Prime Minister Choi to comply with their demands. But what if he adheres to the same principles as current acting president Han? Will they move to impeach him as well? Will there be a third acting president? At what point does this cycle end, and what would become of the country then?
A Democratic Party spokesperson recently claimed that it is possible to impeach five cabinet members simultaneously. Such a scenario risks paralyzing the government as it prevents the cabinet from meeting its quorum. The opposition party is suggesting that they do not mind pushing the country into anarchy and chaos. The Democratic Party must abandon its impatience and obsession with an early presidential election and work towards a resolution through compromise with the ruling party. Such an approach would be far more persuasive to the public than heavy-handed political pressure.
10. Trump's N. Korea policy may shake up security landscape on Korean Peninsula: think tank
I think given all the priorities of the incoming administration and the South Korean political turmoil as well as the north Korean internal situation I do not expect a very aggressive policy toward north Korea initially.
Trump's N. Korea policy may shake up security landscape on Korean Peninsula: think tank
The Korea Times · December 27, 2024
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, and U.S. President-elect Donald Trump move to shake hands at the border village of Panmunjeom in the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas, June 30, 2019. AP-Yonhap
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump's policy toward North Korea could shake up the security landscape on the Korean Peninsula, leaving South Korea with the daunting challenge of formulating a strategy to coordinate with Washington, a state think tank said Friday.
The foreign ministry-affiliated Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) made the projection as South Korea braces for uncertainties in foreign policy under Trump's second term, set to begin in late January next year.
Trump's team has yet to present its North Korea policy, amid speculation that he could seek to resume the stalled nuclear dialogue with the North's leader Kim Jong-un. The nuclear talks between Washington and Pyongyang collapsed with the no-deal summit in Hanoi in early 2019.
"Depending on President Trump's policy direction toward North Korea, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is expected to become increasingly volatile, likely fueling debates over the intentions behind U.S. policy and South Korea's response strategies," the IFANS said in its regular outlook report for 2025.
The report predicted that the possibility of a Trump-Kim summit next year is low, as the Trump administration is expected to focus on ending Russia's war in Ukraine, and because Kim may be unwilling to return to dialogue given his lesson from the failed Hanoi talks.
North Korea is also unlikely to preemptively carry out military provocations, such as long-range missile launches, to avoid additional U.S. sanctions and backlash from China, the report said.
Tensions are likely to remain high in inter-Korean relations, as the North is expected to maintain its hostile policy toward the South and continue seeking opportunities to provoke Seoul.
The report also said the North's troop deployment to Russia in support of the war against Ukraine could emerge as a flashpoint in the regime internally.
While Pyongyang will seek to improve its crippled economy through what it may gain from its military alignment with Moscow, the market instability will continue unless its trade with China recovers, the report noted.
South Korea's alliance with the U.S. will largely remain solid under the second Trump administration, but the risk of Trump demanding a raise in the defense burden sharing and his tougher trade policy will remain key tasks for Seoul in its relations with the ally, the report said. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · December 27, 2024
11. Navigating political crises in Korea and Germany
Excerpts:
Korea and Germany’s leadership change mechanisms reflect their distinct approaches to navigating the balance between stability, accountability and flexibility in governance. Korea’s impeachment process underscores its vigilance against executive overreach, shaped by its struggle against authoritarianism, while its rigid electoral framework leaves limited room for dynamic crisis resolution. Germany’s parliamentary tools, such as the constructive vote of no confidence and the Vertrauensfrage, reflect a commitment to stability and continuity born from the lessons of its troubled Weimar past, but they rely heavily on the complex interplay of coalition politics.
To strengthen their systems, Korea could consider adopting mechanisms for parliamentary dissolution to address political impasses, while Germany might benefit from greater safeguards against executive overreach. Yet, these adaptations must honor the unique histories and political realities of each nation. As the political theorist Karl Loewenstein noted, “A constitution that does not withstand crises is not worth the paper it is written on.” Ultimately, constitutional mechanisms alone are not enough. A democracy thrives when its leaders and citizens engage with these systems responsibly, resisting the temptation to exploit crises for personal or political gain. This enduring commitment to democratic values, more than any single institutional design, is the foundation of lasting governance.
Navigating political crises in Korea and Germany
The Korea Times · December 26, 2024
By Neele Henry Seifert
Neele Henry Seifert
Korea and Germany, two nations with vastly different political histories, exemplify contrasting approaches to leadership changes and political crisis management. As both countries face pivotal political moments, their constitutional frameworks demonstrate how each navigates power transitions and maintains democratic legitimacy.
In Korea, the impeachment motion against President Yoon Suk Yeol has reignited debates about the constraints of the power of the National Assembly. Meanwhile, in Germany, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s recent invocation of the Vertrauensfrage (vote of confidence) to trigger snap elections in February 2025 has drawn attention to parliamentary cohesion in a multiparty democracy. These events underscore how each country employs its constitutional tools to address crises and ensure stability.
Korea’s Constitution, shaped by its history of authoritarian rule, emphasizes curbing executive overreach through impeachment. An impeachment motion can be initiated by one-third of National Assembly members and requires a two-thirds majority for passage. Grounds for impeachment include constitutional or legal violations, and upon approval, the president’s powers are immediately suspended. The Constitutional Court then has 180 days to decide whether to uphold the motion. If confirmed, a new presidential election is held within 60 days.
This mechanism has been used effectively, as seen in the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2016 and potentially in the case of Yoon. During this suspension, the prime minister temporarily assumes presidential duties, providing continuity in governance. The impeachment process, however, is not exclusive to the presidency. The National Assembly can also impeach the prime minister, members of the State Council, heads of executive ministries, judges, justices of the Constitutional Court and other key public officials. This makes the Korean parliament a powerful entity with broad authority to scrutinize and suspend public officials.
However, this strong parliamentary authority is not mirrored by mechanisms for dismissing members of the National Assembly. Neither the president nor the Constitutional Court can dissolve the legislature, ensuring its immunity from external interference. Only the National Assembly itself can vote to dismiss a lawmaker. This dynamic raises concerns about a potential power imbalance, as impeachment motions — regardless of their outcomes — can wield significant political influence. Korea’s rigid electoral framework further compounds this, as presidential terms are fixed at five years and parliamentary terms at four years, with no constitutional provisions for early parliamentary elections.
Germany’s political framework revolves around the chancellor, the head of government and the nation’s most powerful political figure. Unlike Korea, the German chancellor is not directly elected by the people but typically emerges from the leading party in parliamentary elections. The chancellor can be removed through a constructive vote of no confidence, which requires the Bundestag to elect a successor with the majority of its statutory members. This mechanism does not require judicial approval and ensures continuity in governance by avoiding a leadership vacuum. While similar to impeachment in its aim of leadership change, the constructive vote does not necessitate constitutional or legal violations, making it a more flexible tool. However, it has only succeeded once, in 1982, when Helmut Kohl replaced Helmut Schmidt, reflecting the complexity of securing parliamentary agreement on a new leader in Germany’s multiparty system.
Another key mechanism in Germany is the Vertrauensfrage (vote of confidence), which allows the chancellor to test parliamentary support by formally asking the Bundestag for its confidence. If the chancellor loses this vote by not securing the majority of its statutory members, he can, within 21 days, request the president to dissolve parliament and call for snap elections within 60 days. This tool, recently invoked by Scholz and only used five times so far, provides a dynamic method to address political crises while preserving democratic legitimacy. This mechanism allows the Bundestag to initiate new parliamentary elections if deemed necessary, a flexibility not available within Korea’s constitutional framework.
Germany’s president, in contrast to Korea’s executive system, holds a largely ceremonial role and cannot dissolve parliament or dismiss state actors unilaterally. Although technically feasible, impeachment of Germany’s largely ceremonial president is rarely invoked due to the office’s limited authority. This institutional design reflects lessons from the Weimar Republic, where a powerful president with sweeping emergency powers contributed to political instability and the rise of authoritarianism.
Korea and Germany’s leadership change mechanisms reflect their distinct approaches to navigating the balance between stability, accountability and flexibility in governance. Korea’s impeachment process underscores its vigilance against executive overreach, shaped by its struggle against authoritarianism, while its rigid electoral framework leaves limited room for dynamic crisis resolution. Germany’s parliamentary tools, such as the constructive vote of no confidence and the Vertrauensfrage, reflect a commitment to stability and continuity born from the lessons of its troubled Weimar past, but they rely heavily on the complex interplay of coalition politics.
To strengthen their systems, Korea could consider adopting mechanisms for parliamentary dissolution to address political impasses, while Germany might benefit from greater safeguards against executive overreach. Yet, these adaptations must honor the unique histories and political realities of each nation. As the political theorist Karl Loewenstein noted, “A constitution that does not withstand crises is not worth the paper it is written on.” Ultimately, constitutional mechanisms alone are not enough. A democracy thrives when its leaders and citizens engage with these systems responsibly, resisting the temptation to exploit crises for personal or political gain. This enduring commitment to democratic values, more than any single institutional design, is the foundation of lasting governance.
Neele Henry Seifert is a student majoring in law at the University of Bielefeld.
The Korea Times · December 26, 2024
12. Martial law and ‘K-defense’
Martial law and ‘K-defense’
The Korea Times · December 25, 2024
By Kang Seung-woo
The abbreviation "K" for Korea is now a globally recognized symbol, and when attached, it signifies fame and trends.
"K-culture," encompassing films, dramas, and pop music, has captivated global audiences, with notable successes such as the global reach of K-pop and award-winning films. Novelist Han Kang's Nobel Prize in Literature has taken "K-literature" to new heights. These achievements have not only enhanced Korea's global prominence but also fostered a deep sense of national pride.
However, the popularity of K has hit a snag due to the political uncertainties prompted by President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Dec. 3 declaration of martial law and his subsequent impeachment. This has raised concerns that the promising prospects of the recently surging Korean defense industry and its arms exports could be undermined.
The situation is particularly regrettable as the return of Donald Trump as U.S. president is expected to bolster the Korean defense sector, amid expectations that his administration will likely introduce a larger defense budget, potentially facilitating exports from Korean defense companies to the United States.
According to the local defense industry, the government's role is crucial in securing contracts with other countries, so Korea's leadership vacuum is feared to negatively impact exports and cause delays in large-scale state projects.
The fallout has already begun to surface.
Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov had planned to visit Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) in Sacheon, South Gyeongsang Province earlier this month to observe a test flight and the production site of the KUH-1 Surion, a twin-engine transport utility helicopter. However, he canceled the visit following Yoon’s abrupt declaration of a short-lived martial law.
Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, who was scheduled to visit Seoul from Dec. 5 to 7, also canceled his trip, citing the current situation in Korea.
During his visit, Kristersson was expected to have closed-door meetings with businesses, raising hopes of possible talks about cooperation between the two countries in the defense industry. During Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo’s visit to Sweden in May last year, Kristersson had expressed his interest in exploring defense industry cooperation with Korea.
In the defense industry, visits and talks by foreign state leaders carry strategic significance, extending beyond typical commercial promotion.
Furthermore, the martial law debacle is expected to hinder local defense companies' efforts to secure large overseas orders.
Currently, Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries have set their respective sights on the $60 billion Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) and Poland’s $2.4 billion Orka submarine program. The CPSP aims to procure up to 12 conventionally-powered, under-ice capable submarines, while the Orka project seeks to acquire three submarines.
Additionally, concerns are escalating that the leadership vacuum may lead to delaying the 7.8 trillion won ($5.34 billion) KDDX project, a program aiming to construct six 7,100-ton class destroyers by 2036.
The government plans to introduce next-generation warships starting in 2026. However, disruptions in the operation of the Defense Project Promotion Committee, which approves defense project plans, have fueled speculation about delays. The committee is chaired by the defense minister, a position left vacant after former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun resigned and was subsequently arrested for his involvement in the martial law debacle.
Although the committee maintains that the project can proceed under the acting defense minister, large-scale projects like the KDDX require coordination not only within the committee but also with the presidential office, the defense ministry and the trade ministry, all of which are grappling with the fallout from the impeachment. In that regard, some suggest that the project may struggle to make meaningful progress until a new government is fully in place.
To address the fallout, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) has reached out to key defense partners, with DAPA Minister Seok Jong-gun actively working to bolster defense cooperation. This includes sending letters to key nations and undertaking a business trip to Poland, a pivotal partner in the K-defense sector.
Korea had been on track to achieve an unprecedented $20 billion in annual defense exports, driven by the strong performance of local firms, but this momentum has been disrupted by the martial law saga, according to DAPA.
There is broad consensus that government ministries must enhance cooperation to navigate the current turmoil. Given that defense procurement involves national security alongside political, diplomatic, and industrial considerations, securing active support from DAPA, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other relevant agencies is critical.
The Korea Times · December 25, 2024
13. Fallen Crypto Tycoon Do Kwon to Be Extradited to U.S.
Fallen Crypto Tycoon Do Kwon to Be Extradited to U.S.
Montenegro justice minister orders Kwon sent to U.S. rather than South Korea
https://www.wsj.com/finance/currencies/fallen-crypto-tycoon-do-kwon-to-be-extradited-to-u-s-7e931a7d?mod=Searchresults_pos6&page=1
By Alexander Osipovich
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in New York, Jiyoung Sohn
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in Seoul and Marko Vešović in Podgorica, Montenegro
Dec. 27, 2024 10:51 am ET
South Korean crypto mogul Do Kwon being escorted by police in Montenegro in March. Photo: boris pejovic/Shutterstock
One of the most notorious figures in crypto is set to face criminal charges in New York after the Balkan country of Montenegro ruled that he should be handed over to U.S. authorities.
Do Kwon, whose TerraUSD and Luna cryptocurrencies collapsed in a $40 billion crash in 2022, should be extradited to the U.S. rather than his native South Korea, according to a decision announced Friday by Montenegro’s justice ministry.
The decision by Montenegrin Justice Minister Bojan Božović ends more than a year and a half of legal wrangling over Kwon’s extradition. Both the U.S. and South Korea have sought to put the disgraced crypto entrepreneur on trial in their justice systems since his arrest in Montenegro last year. Kwon’s local lawyers filed a series of appeals in an effort to get him sent to South Korea, saying he wished to be closer to his family.
“It appears that the rule of law in Montenegro has been systematically subverted because federal prosecutors in New York don’t like the outcome reached repeatedly by Montenegrin courts, applying Montenegrin extradition law,” said Sean Hecker, a U.S. lawyer for Kwon.
“It makes little sense that a Korean citizen, charged first by Korean prosecutors in an indictment that encompasses the same charges brought by federal prosecutors in New York, would not be sent to his home country to face these charges,” Hecker added.
If he is convicted, the U.S. justice system is likely to impose a tougher prison sentence on Kwon than he would receive in South Korea, according to legal experts in both countries. The Manhattan U.S. attorney’s office prosecuting Kwon is the same office that recently won a conviction and 25-year prison sentence for FTX founder Sam Bankman-Fried.
Once a brash entrepreneur whose swagger and social-media omnipresence made him a crypto celebrity, Kwon went into hiding in the Balkans after the TerraUSD-Luna crash, hit with multiple lawsuits and investigations. Now, the 33-year-old faces eight criminal counts of fraud brought by federal prosecutors in New York. He has denied committing fraud.
Do Kwon in the office of Terraform Labs in 2022. Photo: Woohae Cho/Bloomberg News
Kwon already has been defeated in a New York courtroom, in a case that offers a preview of how the criminal case against him could proceed. In April, a New York jury found Kwon and his company, Terraform Labs, liable for securities fraud in a civil lawsuit brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission. After the verdict, Terraform and Kwon agreed to pay $4.5 billion in penalties, and the firm said it would wind down operations.
The SEC had accused Kwon and Terraform of lying about the stability of TerraUSD, a so-called stablecoin designed to maintain a value of $1. The criminal case against Kwon covers some of the same underlying accusations. But federal prosecutors must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a higher standard than the SEC faced.
Kwon has been held in Montenegro since March 2023, when he was arrested at the airport in the country’s capital of Podgorica, ending a monthslong international manhunt. He was caught while attempting to board a private jet to Dubai using a fake Costa Rican passport.
A Stanford University graduate, Kwon was among the biggest cheerleaders for crypto during the previous bull market in digital currencies in 2021 and early 2022.
He touted TerraUSD as the future of money, and dismissed its critics as “idiots” on Twitter, now called X. Investors poured billions of dollars into the token. Many were drawn by promised yields of nearly 20% on deposits of TerraUSD with Anchor Protocol, a sort of pseudo-bank created by Terraform Labs.
But TerraUSD was an “algorithmic” stablecoin, backed by financial engineering rather than actual dollars in a bank. Over several days in May 2022, it wobbled and then plummeted in value, also bringing down Luna, a related digital currency.
Countless investors around the world lost money. The ensuing domino effect caused other crypto firms to topple into bankruptcy. Bankman-Fried’s FTX and Alameda Research were among the companies damaged by fallout from the TerraUSD-Luna crash.
In September 2022, South Korean prosecutors obtained a warrant for Kwon’s arrest. Kwon, who had been living in a luxurious high-rise in Singapore, disappeared from public view around the same time. Still posting on social media and giving the occasional media interview, he denied being a fugitive but refused to disclose his location. Officials say he was hiding in Serbia.
Write to Alexander Osipovich at alexo@wsj.com and Jiyoung Sohn at jiyoung.sohn@wsj.com
14. North Korean defectors report highest-ever life satisfaction in 2024: Survey
Good news and bad news.
North Korean defectors report highest-ever life satisfaction in 2024: Survey
But ROK government also finds rising unemployment among female escapees, underscoring persistent economic challenges
https://www.nknews.org/2024/12/north-korean-defectors-report-highest-ever-life-satisfaction-in-2024-survey/?t=1735404127
Ifang Bremer December 27, 2024
A North Korean family in Pyongyang | Image: NK News (Oct. 2016)
North Korean escapees living in South Korea reported their highest-ever life satisfaction rate in 2024, according to an annual government survey released Friday, even as the rising unemployment rate among female defectors underlined persistent economic challenges.
Data gathered by the Hana Foundation found that 79.6% of escapees are satisfied with life in the ROK this year, up from 79.3% last year, 77.4% in 2022 and 75.1% in 2021.
The Hana Foundation, a government organization that facilitates the resettlement of North Korean defectors, conducted the survey among 2,500 escapees aged 15 and above who arrived in South Korea between Jan. 1997 and Dec. 2023.
The survey did not explain what is behind the rising satisfaction rate, though it showed some improvements in defectors’ economic status.
The average monthly wage for North Korean defectors rose to 2.62 million won ($1,770) in 2024, up 159,000 won (6.5%) from last year. This is still well below the South Korean average of 3.13 million won ($2,119) per month, though the wage gap decreased from 550,000 won ($373) last year to 512,000 won ($347) in 2024.
Even so, female escapees faced increased economic difficulties this year, according to the survey. While men saw their employment rate rise to 74.3%, women saw their employment rate drop to 55.4% and their unemployment rate jump to 7.7%, up from 5.1% in 2023.
Hanna Song of the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights previously told NK News that economic gaps between men and women are larger among defectors than the general public.
“In South Korea in general, it’s quite difficult to be a working woman, especially if you have children, but it’s possible if you have a support network” to help look after kids, she said. “But a lot of North Korean women don’t have any family in South Korea.”
The survey also provided other indicators of the difficulties that escapees experience.
For instance, 56.8% of North Korean defectors said they “feel stressed in their daily lives in general,” compared to 38.4% of the general population. 12.8% of respondents reported having suicidal thoughts, citing mental distress and economic difficulties as main reasons, up from the last available figure of 11.9% in 2022.
This year’s survey included questions about child care for the first time, asking parents about their children’s school enrollment status and educational challenges.
The survey found that 72% of respondents reported the “burden of child-rearing and education costs” was their biggest educational challenge, followed by “difficulty balancing child-rearing and economic activities” (66.6%) and “difficulty with academic guidance” (64.4%).
Asked what families need to improve their children’s education, most answered “financial support” (55.3%), followed by “child development and education support” (17.4%) and “emergency child care service support” (10.9%).
Cho Min-ho, head of the Korea Hana Foundation, said in a press release that the addition of these questions will “provide crucial insights into the needs of defector families, particularly regarding child care support.”
Improving access to education for children of escapees has been a key policy of the Yoon administration.
Over the summer, the unification ministry sought to allocate some $480,000 (640 million won) to support the education of children born to North Korean defectors in third countries, stating that it aims to address a gap in legal protection measures for this group.
At the time, the ministry also announced a 50% increase in the initial settlement support fund for North Korean escapees, rising from 10 million won ($7,633) to 15 million won ($11,450) per person.
However, President Yoon Suk-yeol’s recent impeachment has cast a shadow over the future of such policies.
Earlier this month, the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) reportedly moved to cut funding for an array of Yoon initiatives in response to the president’s declaration of martial law, including North Korean human rights programs.
The cuts were put on hold after Acting President Han Duk-soo called on the DP to help prevent more government chaos, but the proposal is likely a harbinger for how the DP will look to overhaul DPRK human rights policy if it wins the presidency.
Edited by Bryan Betts
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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