​Quotes of the Day:

A quote from a Judge and Veteran who tells his jurors that jury service is as important as military service to the support and defense of our federal and state Constitutions:

“I would like to add one final thought. When you go home and turn on the news tonight, I don't care what channel you watch, someone is going to want to influence you in a certain way. You may be left thinking that your fellow citizens, or half of them, are not equal to you because they don't believe in things that you do. I say that that is hogwash, and those commentators are laughing all the way to the bank. No one here, from what I can tell, knows who is liberal or who is conservative, who is a republican or who is a democrat. But we all agreed, as far as I can tell, that we would show up and perform our constitutional duty with our fellow citizens and do the right thing. And I want you to think about that when you leave. Don't let people tell you that we're a divided nation. Decide that we are not, as you did today, and just do your duty. Thank you very much.”

– Tom Murphy

“Don’t worry about siding for or against the majority. Worry about taking up any of their irrational beliefs. “ 

– Marcus Aurelius

“The truth is like a lion; you don’t have to defend it. Let it loose; it will defend itself.” 

– Augustine 

Happy Birthday, Devil Dogs.

10 November 2024

A MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

https://www.cmc.marines.mil/Birthday/

1. How the Gray Zone Challenges Western Norms of Conventional Warfare: A Paradigm Shift in Military Strategy11/10/24 Korean News and Commentary

2. Biden administration to allow American military contractors to deploy to Ukraine for first time since Russia’s invasion

3. Qatar Tells Hamas Leaders to Leave

4. Grading Goldwater-Nichols at Forty Years; Has it Worked?​

5. Deals and Deterrence: Trump’s Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World

6. A Recommendation for the Incoming Administration

7. The end of Pax Americana by Ivo Daalder

8. China Courts U.S. Allies as Defense Against Trump’s Protectionism

9. Western leader blurts out what was once taboo on Ukraine

10. The Meaning of an Election Night U.S. Missile Test

11. Russian Ammo Depot Hit by Ukrainian Forces in Bryansk Region

12. Taiwan Sees a Higher Price for U.S. Support as Trump Returns to Power

13.  With Trump’s win, Australia worries AUKUS may come under new scrutiny

14. ‘America First’ and Threading the Needle on Tech Sovereignty

15. Trump on Day 1: Begin deportation push, pardon Jan. 6 rioters and make his criminal cases vanish

16. A guide to key figures in Donald Trump's orbit

17. 50,000 Russian and North Korean Troops Mass Ahead of Attack, U.S. Says

1. How the Gray Zone Challenges Western Norms of Conventional Warfare: A Paradigm Shift in Military Strategy

​

More thought provocation from Jeremiah Monk at Strategy Central.

I like his analogy:  “relationship below the threshold of divorce.”

It is useful and important to think (and rethink) about the gray zone since it is a term tossed out so easily and so much. What is the intelligence foundation behind it?

Here are some of the Gray Zone thinkers and their writings when the Gray Zone concept was first (re-)introduced by Phil Kapusta (The 2010 QDR and going back decades before as some form of gray zone/area has been in and out of fashion). Below the article are summaries of the major Gray Zone articles listed here.

•      2010 QDR, page 73 – “gray area phenomena”

–     http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf

•      Gen Votel March 2015 Congressional testimony

–     http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20150318/103157/HMTG-114-AS26-Wstate-VotelUSAJ-20150318.pdf

•      DEPSECDEF Robert Work April 2015 Army War College

–     http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606661/army-war-college-strategy-conference

•      USSOCOM White Paper September 2015 (Phil Kapusta)

–     https://army.com/sites/army.com/files/Gray%20Zones%20-%20USSOCOM%20White%20Paper%209%20Sep%202015.pdf

•      Mike Mazarr December 2015 7 Hypotheses of the Gray Zone

–     http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1303.pdf

•      Hal Brands February 2016 Paradoxes of the Gray Zone

–     http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/

•      Frank Hoffman 2016 The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict

–     http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/essays/contemporary-spectrum-of-conflict/

•      Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin January 2016 UW in the Gray Zone

–     http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/643108/unconventional-warfare-in-the-gray-zone/

•      Autilio Echevarrio April 2016 Operating in the Gray Zone

–     https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1318

•      Nathan Freier, et el, Army War College, June 2016, Outplayed Regaining the Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone

–     http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1325

•      Adam Elkus December 2015 You Cannot Save the Gray Zone Concept

–     http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/abandon-all-hope-ye-who-enter-here-you-cannot-save-the-gray-zone-concept/

How the Gray Zone Challenges Western Norms of Conventional Warfare: A Paradigm Shift in Military Strategy

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/how-the-gray-zone-challenges-western-norms-of-conventional-warfare-a-paradigm-shift-in-military-str?postId=b26ffdc7-10df-47cd-b60e-dd151efbb98c&utm

By Jeremiah Monk

Introduction

The concept of the “Gray Zone” has reshaped discussions about contemporary conflict within Western military frameworks. The concept was introduced in 2015 by US Special Operations Command strategist Philip Kapusta, who defined it as "competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality." Kapusta framed the Gray Zone as conflicts that do not meet the traditional expectations of warfare or peace, noting that of all the conflicts the U.S. has engaged in over the past century, only five can be classified as conventional wars, while 57 were non-traditional actions. This staggering discrepancy underscores that non-conventional, “Gray Zone” actions are not exceptions but rather the persistent norm in modern warfare.

Kapusta is correct in his theory that conventional war is itself an outlier from the norm. Likewise, the extreme state of “peace” is also rare. Kapusta’s intent was to highlight the regularity of presence in the Gray Zone in order to refocus the strategic conversation away from these two extreme bookends. But by defining the Gray Zone as an intermediate space “below the threshold of war,” Kapusta’s framing unintentionally reinforces the notion of “worst case” conventional warfare as a normative standard, instead of as the divergent condition it actually is.

As an analogy, imagine if you were to define marriage as a “relationship below the threshold of divorce.” Doing so would significantly change the nature of your relationship with your spouse, as you put efforts and resources into preparing for that eventual worst-case scenario. An obviously better approach is to minimize the chances of getting to that “most dangerous” scenario by putting effort and resources into your here-and-now relationship. Regrettably, the Western defense complex does not approach the world this way. There is much less profit in peace, after all.

This article will examine the historical formation of the Western norm of conventional war, the international perspectives that challenge this framework, and the argument that what Western militaries see as “normal” warfare is actually an outlier. This framing enables a rationale for the defense enterprise to develop and posture to meet the outlier threat, often at the expense of the much more likely operating environment of the Gray Zone. We at Strategy Central believe this persistent framing is a strategic error grounded in false logic that inhibits Western militaries in their ability to safeguard national interests in the more common operating environment. We believe Kapusta’s Gray Zone model should be embraced at the default, but doing so will require a fundamental rethinking of Western military strategy.

The Western Norm of Conventional Warfare: Origins and Assumptions

The Western concept of conventional warfare has deep roots in the historical evolution of state-based conflicts, marked by clear battle lines, codified rules, and decisive engagements. This approach stems from centuries of military practice in the West that emphasized formalized, state-led confrontations as the primary means of resolving disputes.

• The Legacy of Total War in the West: Western military doctrine was profoundly shaped by conflicts such as the Napoleonic Wars, the two World Wars, and the Cold War. These events established a precedent for thinking about conflict as decisive, large-scale engagements involving state actors. Western societies became accustomed to viewing war as an intense but temporary disruption, a departure from peace that could be declared and resolved through treaties. Such wars conformed to a “total war” model, which involved extensive mobilization and industrial production, further embedding this conventional model into Western defense systems.
• The Influence of Industrialization and Technology: The Industrial Revolution introduced military technologies that shifted the nature of warfare from small-scale skirmishes to vast, industrialized conflicts. The development of a defense industry centered around tanks, aircraft, artillery, and heavy weaponry institutionalized the conventional warfare paradigm. This reliance on industrial production for conventional military tools was further solidified during the Cold War, as massive budgets went into preparing for a potential large-scale confrontation with the Soviet Union.
• The Binary of War and Peace: Western legal and diplomatic systems traditionally view war and peace as distinct states, with each carrying a specific set of norms. Treaties, declarations of war, and peace agreements have long allowed Western societies to categorize relationships as either hostile or non-hostile, with warfare seen as an “extraordinary” state that requires formal authorization. This binary perspective not only influenced public perception but also simplified military planning, as war and peace were seen as distinct, mutually exclusive states.

International Perspectives on Warfare: Fluidity over Formality

While the Western concept of war and peace as separate states may be deeply entrenched, it is not a universally shared perspective. Other cultures and military traditions often view conflict as a fluid continuum, where direct, conventional warfare is but one of many strategies.

• Chinese Military Strategy and the Concept of “Unrestricted Warfare”: Chinese military philosophy, especially as articulated in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, advocates for strategies that prioritize flexibility, deception, and the achievement of goals without open confrontation. Sun Tzu’s ideas suggest that war is not bound by a binary state of war and peace but is instead a continuous process of strategic positioning. This view persists in China’s modern concept of “unrestricted warfare,” which combines all elements of power—cyber, economic, psychological, and informational—to gain advantage without conventional military engagements. The Chinese model highlights an understanding of warfare that is far removed from the West’s focus on conventional confrontation.
• Russian Hybrid Warfare: Russia has long practiced what is now termed “hybrid warfare,” a blend of conventional and unconventional methods aimed at achieving strategic objectives without open confrontation. Russian actions in Ukraine and other areas, such as the use of cyber operations and disinformation, fall into the Gray Zone as they avoid direct, declared warfare. For Russia, hybrid tactics are not exceptions but foundational components of military strategy, designed to exploit the ambiguity of the Gray Zone and achieve objectives without facing Western conventional forces head-on.
• Irregular Warfare in Colonial and Post-Colonial Struggles: Many post-colonial nations have used irregular warfare to resist larger conventional forces, as seen in conflicts across Vietnam, Afghanistan, and parts of Africa. Guerrilla tactics and insurgencies allow smaller forces to effectively challenge conventionally superior powers. For these actors, war and peace are not distinct; rather, conflict is a constant element, fought on multiple fronts—political, social, and military. This perspective challenges the notion that war must be formalized or declared to be legitimate and impactful.

Kapusta’s Gray Zone: Reinforcing Western Norms of Conventional Warfare

Kapusta’s Gray Zone concept was developed as a response to the gap between Western military expectations and the irregular, ambiguous forms of conflict that increasingly define global power struggles. He observes that the United States has engaged in only five conventional wars over the last century, with a staggering 57 instances of non-traditional conflict. This data suggests that non-conventional actions are, in fact, the dominant form of conflict, underscoring that conventional warfare is the exception rather than the rule.

Yet, by framing the Gray Zone as a space that exists between war and peace, Kapusta’s definition is based on the notion that conventional warfare is the measurable standard. This framing implies that there exists an established norm of state-on-state, open conflict, as sets that norm as the “worst-case” that other conditions should be measured against, giving it primacy on the spectrum. Thus, while Kapusta intended to establish the Gray Zone as the actual norm, this framing inadvertently validates conventional war as a central condition that looms over the lesser Gray Zone actions, instead of as a state of disruption that occurs when governments fail at their primary stated task of deterring conflict.

Reversing the Definition: Gray Zone as the Norm, Conventional Warfare as the Outlier

Shifting our perspective to be more in line with Kapusta's core argument has profound implications for Western military strategies and force structures:

• Conventional Warfare as the Outlier: If the Gray Zone represents the norm, then large-scale, state-based warfare should be seen as an exception. As Kapusta’s data suggests, conventional wars are few and far between, while non-traditional conflicts occur with far greater frequency. Wars like the two World Wars or even the Gulf War are not representative of the majority of conflicts in recent history; rather, small-scale, hybrid, and ambiguous conflicts dominate the landscape.
• Gray Zone Activities as the Default State: Most conflicts today fall outside the traditional scope of warfare, manifesting in economic coercion, cyber attacks, disinformation, and other forms of influence that never escalate into open warfare. These Gray Zone tactics are not merely “in-between” states; they constitute the primary arena in which international competition unfolds. This continuous, low-level state of tension and influence mirrors the strategic philosophy of Sun Tzu, who argued for the supremacy of victory without direct battle.
• Implications for Western Military Strategy: Recognizing the Gray Zone as the norm calls for a recalibration of Western military priorities. Forces structured primarily for large-scale, conventional battles may be misaligned with the true nature of modern conflict, which increasingly requires unconventional capabilities like cyber defense, information warfare, and economic resilience. By clinging to conventional frameworks, Western militaries risk under-preparing for the forms of conflict that dominate the global landscape.

Adapting to a Gray Zone Reality

This shift in perspective requires Western militaries to reframe their strategic priorities, emphasizing capabilities suited to the ambiguity and complexity of Gray Zone competition.

• Prioritizing Non-Conventional Capabilities: Western militaries must invest in cyber, psychological, and information warfare capabilities to effectively compete in the Gray Zone. This shift would enable them to counter modern threats with agile, non-traditional responses.
• Adopting Hybrid Warfare Doctrine: Rather than focusing solely on conventional forces, Western militaries should adopt a hybrid approach that integrates unconventional and cyber capabilities. This model would draw upon the strategic insights of Sun Tzu, viewing victory as the result of influence and positioning rather than direct combat.
• Redefining Success and Victory: In the Gray Zone, success is often measured not by outright victory but by maintaining influence and preventing escalation. Western militaries must shift from a mindset focused on decisive battles to one that values influence, subtlety, and strategic positioning.

Conclusion: Embracing the Gray Zone as the New Norm

The Gray Zone highlights the limits of the conventional warfare model and challenges deeply held Western assumptions about the nature of conflict. By reframing the Gray Zone as the default state of global competition, we see that what Western militaries consider “normal” warfare is actually the exception. In this context, conventional war becomes the outlier, a rare and extraordinary state that disrupts the underlying continuum of political and economic conflict.

As Sun Tzu argued, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Embracing this philosophy, Western militaries can shift their focus from preparing for large-scale, conventional wars to developing capabilities that enable influence, adaptability, and resilience in the face of persistent, non-traditional threats. Recognizing the Gray Zone as the reality of modern warfare allows Western militaries to align their strategies, resources, and goals with the true nature of 21st-century conflict.

Sun Tzu might also agree that investing in flowers rather than lawyers is a more effective - and much less costly – strategy to mitigate the threat of divorce.

References

Kapusta, Philip. "The Gray Zone." Special Warfare, October-December 2015, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, p 19-25. https://www.swcs.mil/Portals/111/October%202015%20Special%20Warfare.pdf

•      Gen Votel March 2015 Congressional Testimony:

–     Actors taking a “gray zone” approach seek to secure their objectives while minimizing the scope and scale of actual fighting. In this “gray zone” we are confronted with ambiguity on the nature of conflict, the parties involved and the validity of the legal and political claims at stake. These conflicts defy our traditional views of war and require us to invest time and effort in ensuring we prepare ourselves with the proper capabilities, capacities, and authorities to safeguard US interests.

–     http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20150318/103157/HMTG-114-AS26-Wstate-VotelUSAJ-20150318.pdf

•      DEPSECDEF Robert Work at the Army War College, April 2015:

–     Argued that adversaries are increasingly using “Agents, paramilitaries, deception, infiltration, and persistent denial to make those avenues of approach very hard to detect, operating in what some people have called ‘the gray zone.’ Now, that’s the one in which our ground forces have not traditionally had to operate, but one in which they must now become more proficient.”

–     http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606661/army-war-college-strategy-conference

•      USSOCOM White Paper September 2015:

–     Gray zone challenges are defined as competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality. 

–     They are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.

–     Gray zone challenges are not new

–     https://army.com/sites/army.com/files/Gray%20Zones%20-%20USSOCOM%20White%20Paper%209%20Sep%202015.pdf

•      Mike Mazarr’s gray zone hypothesis:

–     Argues that three elements – rising revisionist intent, a form of strategic gradualism, and unconventional tools – are creating a new approach to the pursuit of aggressive aims, a new form of conflict.

–     Evidence from a number of ongoing campaigns by China and Russia, suggests that gradual gray zone strategies may be becoming the tool of choice for states wanting to reframe the global order in the 21^st century.

–     The idea of competing below the threshold of war is hardly new: States and non-state actors have employed gray zone approaches for thousands of years most ambitiously during WWII and the Cold War.

–     Nonetheless, this analysis finds reason to believe that gray zone conflict represents an identifiable and intentional strategy for several states, and a phenomenon of growing importance.

–     If this hypothesis is valid, then the US needs to become more adept at operating in the environment.

•      (I could not agree more)

•      http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1303.pdf

–  

Mike Mazarr’s Seven Hypotheses:

1. Gray Zone campaigns will constitute the default mode of conflict in coming decades.
2. Gray Zone Strategies require a new theory of conflict
3. Gray Zone campaigns generate a sense of persistent warfare
4. Gray Zone conflict increases the potential for inadvertent war
5. Gray Zone campaigns undermine deterrence
6. Gray Zone Conflict depends upon larger social, political and economic factors for success of failure
7. Gray Zone Campaigns have powerful limitations

•      Hal Brands’ paradoxes of the gray zone:

1.       “Gray zone” cannot mean everything if it is to mean anything

2.       Gray zone challenges are the wave of the future—and a blast from the past

3.       Gray zone conflict reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the international order

4.       Gray zone strategies are weapons of the weak against the strong—and of the strong against the weak

5.       Confronting gray zone challenges requires both embracing and dispelling ambiguity

6.       Gray zone conflict is aggression, but military tools are only part of the response

7.       America is not poorly equipped for the gray zone—but it may not be fully prepared

8.       Gray zone challenges can be productive and counterproductive at the same time

http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/

•      Frank Hoffman illustrates the spectrum of conflict

The larger problem is that the U.S. has a strategic culture that does not appreciate history or strategy, nor does it devote sufficient attention to the breadth of adversaries facing it and the many different forms that human conflict can take.

At least three consequences can be expected from a flawed grasp of contemporary conflict:

•      Unreasonable political and public expectations for quick wins at low cost,

•      An overly simplistic grasp of the application of blunt military power and what it will supposedly achieve, and

•      Naïve views of both adversaries and the context for conflict.

   http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/essays/contemporary-spectrum-of-conflict/

•      Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone By Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin

–     The Gray Zone is characterized by intense political, economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war. It is hardly new, however. The Cold War was a 45-year-long Gray Zone struggle in which the West succeeded in checking the spread of communism and ultimately witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. To avoid superpower confrontations that might escalate to all-out nuclear war, the Cold War was largely a proxy war, with the United States and Soviet Union backing various state or nonstate actors in small regional conflicts and executing discrete superpower intervention and counter-intervention around the globe. Even the Korean and Vietnam conflicts were fought under political constraints that made complete U.S. or allied victory virtually impossible for fear of escalation.

–     http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/643108/unconventional-warfare-in-the-gray-zone/

•      Autulio Echevarria:

–     Coercive Strategies and a New Campaign Construct needed.

–     Recent events in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, and the South China Sea continue to take interesting, if not surprising, turns. As a result, many security experts are calling for revolutionary measures to address what they wrongly perceive to be a new form of warfare, called “hybrid” or “gray zone” wars, but which is, in fact, an application of classic coercive strategies. These strategies, enhanced by evolving technologies, have exploited a number of weaknesses in the West’s security structures.

–     To remedy one of those weaknesses, namely, the lack of an appropriate planning framework, this monograph suggests a way to re-center the current U.S. campaign-planning paradigm to make it more relevant to contemporary uses of coercive strategies.

–     https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1318

•      Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, A Report Sponsored by the Army Capabilities Integration Center in Coordination with Joint Staff J-39/Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Branch

•      Joint ground force commanders—but especially the U.S. Army—will benefit from a thorough reimagining of the potential of expeditionary forces and operations. As it applies to the gray zone, U.S. ground forces need the capability to deploy in large numbers to perform a wide range of missions: enable and support allies, partners, and sister U.S. joint forces; build foreign partner capacity; counter adversary unconventional warfare (UW) campaigns; and perform more traditional offensive and defensive operations (often against hybrid opponents). This requires examining and developing capabilities to defeat A2AD and rapidly delivering ground capabilities on short notice and limited advanced planning.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1325

•      This study found UW to be a final area of unique ground force vulnerability for the United States and its partners as they assess and contend with gray zone challenges. As currently defined by American Joint military doctrine, UW is the collection of activities that enable the overthrow of a government through proxy actors in overtly denied areas. U.S. UW vulnerability emerges in both an offensive and defense context. Offensively, UW provides U.S. decision-makers with a baseline capability for covert degradation of an adversary’s control over contested territory. Defensively, Russian and Iranian UW efforts are currently presenting U.S./partners thorny challenges in Europe and the Middle East. In both instances, U.S. forces are increasingly unfamiliar with the associated ground force demands that might result.

•      For example, SOF UW competency has atrophied with the substantial counterinsurgency and counterterrorism demands of the last decade and a half. For their part, GPF have never been required to understand UW as a concept. Improvement is essential on both counts.

•       A sharper offensive UW instrument will be an important tool for pressuring active gray zone revisionist powers who themselves employ UW to aggressively undermine U.S. partners. Likewise, deep understanding of UW on the part of GPF forces will enable them to engage in defensive UW activities to generate greater resilience among the same at risk partners. Finally, a more robust ground force UW capability that can understand, prosecute, and defend against it, employing the widest set of military and non-military tools, may require a new military competency in “political warfare.” This specific focus would enable both conventional and SOF to grasp the underpinnings and requirements necessary for prosecuting offensive and defensive UW activities against sophisticated gray zone actors.

•      Adam Elkus debunks the gray zone concept:

–     In Fifty Shades of Gray in WOTR:

•      There’s only one problem: The “gray wars” concept lacks even the most basic strategic sense. Like the book and movie 50 Shades of Grey, the gray wars concept grossly over-exaggerates its own transgressions from the norm.

•      First, it should be observed that this definition, which is applied to both wars with Vladimir Putin’s deniable “little green men” and Middle Eastern wars in Iraq and Syria featuring mobile combined arms maneuver, is incoherent.

•      http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/50-shades-of-gray-why-the-gray-wars-concept-lacks-strategic-sense/

–     You Cannot Save the Gray Zone Concept in WOTR:

•      He has have argued, in part, that the gray zone concept merely puts a new spin on older and more well-understood ideas from political science, military history, and strategic theory about how actors pursue strategic objectives under constraint.

•      http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/abandon-all-hope-ye-who-enter-here-you-cannot-save-the-gray-zone-concep

​My response to Adam:

• Bottom line I think for Adam is that since the gray zone provides nothing new from the existing norm it is; therefore, unhelpful.​ That may be the case or perhaps not. 
• Most importantly if policymakers and strategists are embracing it and it helps them to understand and articulate strategic challenges then it may be of value.
• We need to decide whether to embrace it – it may not be perfect but to help us think strategically with a common frame of reference then we need to “make a decision and then make the decision right.” – making the decision right is the equivalent of “doing strategy.”

2. Biden administration to allow American military contractors to deploy to Ukraine for first time since Russia’s invasion

​I am reminded of a lame duck president deploying troops to Somalia for humanitarian assistance in 1992. Is there a parallel here? (though this should have been authorized a long time ago).

Biden administration to allow American military contractors to deploy to Ukraine for first time since Russia’s invasion | CNN Politics

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand, Haley Britzky, Oren Liebermann · November 8, 2024

Two Ukrainian army mechanics repair a broken MT-LB (light armored multi-purpose towing vehicle) in the Donetsk region in Kharkiv, Ukraine on October 25, 2024.

Fermin Torrano/Anadolu/Getty Images

CNN —

The Biden administration has lifted a de facto ban on American military contractors deploying to Ukraine to help the country’s military maintain and repair US-provided weapons systems, particularly F16 fighter jets and Patriot air defense systems, an official with direct knowledge of the plan told CNN.

The new policy, approved earlier this month before the election, would allow the Pentagon to provide contracts to American companies for work inside Ukraine for the first time since Russia invaded in 2022. Officials said they hope it will speed up the maintenance and repairs of weapons systems being used by the Ukrainian military.

It is not clear whether Donald Trump will keep the policy in place when he takes office in January. Trump has said he hopes to end the war between Ukraine and Russia “within 24 hours” of returning to power.

“In order to help Ukraine repair and maintain military equipment provided by the US and its allies, DoD (Department of Defense) is soliciting bids for a small number of contractors who will help Ukraine maintain the assistance we’ve already provided,” a defense official said.

“These contractors will be located far from the front lines and they will not be fighting Russian forces. They will help Ukrainian Armed Forces rapidly repair and maintain US provided equipment as needed so it can be quickly returned to the front lines.”

The defense official confirmed that the US is moving forward with the plan because several of the systems the US has provided Ukraine, particularly F-16s and Patriots, “require specific technical expertise to maintain.”

The shift marks another significant change in the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy, as the US looks for ways to give Ukraine’s military an upper hand against Russia. The Pentagon is expected to start listing the contracts online soon, the official said.

Over the last two years, Biden has insisted that all Americans, and particularly US troops, stay far away from the Ukrainian frontlines. The White House has been determined to limit both the danger to Americans and the perception, particularly by Russia, that the US military is engaged in combat there. The State Department has explicitly warned Americans against traveling to Ukraine since 2022.

As a result, US-provided military equipment that has sustained significant damage in combat has had to be transported out of the country to Poland, Romania, or other NATO countries for repairs, a process which takes time. US troops have also been available to help the Ukrainians with more routine maintenance and logistics, but only from afar via video chat or secure phone—an arrangement that has come with inherent limitations, since US troops and contractors are not able to work directly on the systems.

Allowing experienced, US government-funded American contractors to maintain a presence in Ukraine means they will be able to help fix damaged, high-value equipment much faster, officials have told CNN. One advanced system that officials say will likely require regular maintenance is the F-16 fighter jet, which Ukraine received earlier this year.

Companies bidding for the contracts would be required to develop robust risk mitigation plans to reduce threats to their employees, officials told CNN.

“The Department made this decision after careful risk assessment and in coordination with interagency stakeholders,” the defense official said. “Each US contractor, organization or company will be responsible for the safety and security of their employees and will be required to include risk mitigation plans as part of their bids.”

Current and former officials familiar said the policy change will not result in the kind of major American contractor presence that existed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, it would likely result in anywhere from a few dozen to a couple hundred contractors working in Ukraine at a time.

“It is worth noting that there already are a wide array of American companies who have personnel in Ukraine fulfilling contracts for the Ukrainian government, so this will not lead to a substantial increase of employees of US companies working on the ground in Ukraine,” the defense official said.

This story has been updated with additional details.

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand, Haley Britzky, Oren Liebermann · November 8, 2024

3. Qatar Tells Hamas Leaders to Leave

​Will this significantly alter the political landscape?

Excerpts:

Qatari officials have previously threatened the group with expulsion, including as recently as August, in an attempt to force progress in negotiations. Such efforts have failed to push Hamas to do a deal. Some regional officials said the recent ultimatum to Hamas could be a similar pressure tactic designed to extract concessions from the group.

A spokesperson for Qatar’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement that reports about the Hamas office in Doha were “inaccurate” and added that Qatar’s efforts to mediate between the parties are “currently stalled.”

The Foreign Ministry said Qatar notified the U.S., Israel and Hamas 10 days ago that if an agreement weren’t reached during the latest round of cease-fire talks, then Doha would stall its efforts to mediate. Qatar would resume its role as a mediator only when “the parties show their willingness and seriousness to end the brutal war,” the ministry said.

If the suspension of talks brings Hamas and Israel’s positions on the cease-fire talks closer together, then Doha could reconsider the pause, a person briefed on the decision said.

Qatar Tells Hamas Leaders to Leave

Move reflects frustration with lack of progress in Gaza cease-fire talks

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/qatar-tells-hamas-leaders-to-leave-7d9b1a1e?mod=hp_lead_pos5

By Jared Malsin

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, Summer Said

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and Alexander Ward

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Updated Nov. 9, 2024 4:40 pm ET

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived in Doha last month. PHOTO: NATHAN HOWARD/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Qatar has asked Hamas’s political leaders to leave the Gulf country, after more than a year of trying to leverage their presence to broker a cease-fire with Israel that would halt the war in Gaza and free the hostages held by the group.

In a move coordinated with the U.S., Qatar told the Hamas leadership to leave about 10 days ago, according to officials familiar with the matter.

The decision is a dark sign for the Biden administration’s long effort to broker a cease-fire in Gaza, in which it has worked closely with both Egypt and Qatar to communicate with Hamas. Qatar’s government has grown increasingly frustrated with both Hamas and Israel in recent months. Its move reflects a conclusion that there isn’t enough willingness on either side to cut a deal, one of the people said.

The U.S. regards Hamas as a terrorist organization and therefore has no direct relations with the group, relying instead on intermediaries during months of painstaking diplomacy over Gaza. The effort to impose a cease-fire in Gaza fell apart in recent months largely due to intransigence by both Hamas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who says he opposes any deal that leaves the group intact. 

“After rejecting repeated proposals to release hostages, its leaders should no longer be welcome in the capitals of any American partner,” a senior Biden administration official said. “We made that clear to Qatar following Hamas’s rejection weeks ago of another hostage release proposal.”

Senior Hamas officials denied that they had been asked to leave the country.

Qatari officials have previously threatened the group with expulsion, including as recently as August, in an attempt to force progress in negotiations. Such efforts have failed to push Hamas to do a deal. Some regional officials said the recent ultimatum to Hamas could be a similar pressure tactic designed to extract concessions from the group.

A spokesperson for Qatar’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement that reports about the Hamas office in Doha were “inaccurate” and added that Qatar’s efforts to mediate between the parties are “currently stalled.”

The Foreign Ministry said Qatar notified the U.S., Israel and Hamas 10 days ago that if an agreement weren’t reached during the latest round of cease-fire talks, then Doha would stall its efforts to mediate. Qatar would resume its role as a mediator only when “the parties show their willingness and seriousness to end the brutal war,” the ministry said.

If the suspension of talks brings Hamas and Israel’s positions on the cease-fire talks closer together, then Doha could reconsider the pause, a person briefed on the decision said.

A wall of posters in Tel Aviv depicting the hostages kidnapped in the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel. PHOTO: FLORION GOGA/REUTERS

Tiny, hydrocarbon-rich Qatar, a U.S. ally that hosts a major air base that can accommodate thousands of American troops, has also hosted leaders of the Taliban and other extremist groups in an effort to promote itself as a diplomatic power broker.

The presence of the exiled Hamas leadership in Qatar has come under increasing scrutiny in recent months, as efforts to achieve a cease-fire ran into obstacles. As early as April, Hamas’s leaders contacted other regional countries looking for a new base.

Expulsion from Qatar is likely to have little impact on Hamas’s overall leadership structure, which includes officials spread across the Middle East including in Lebanon, Turkey, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Under the leadership of Yahya Sinwar, the group’s top leader in Gaza and the mastermind of the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Southern Israel, power within Hamas became concentrated in the hands of the leadership inside Gaza, with Sinwar taking overall control of the group after former leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran over the summer. 

Sinwar was himself killed by Israeli forces in Gaza in October, leaving the group without its top strategist.

Sinwar, who had been jailed in Israel, planned and authorized the Oct. 7 attack that left 1,200 dead and 250 taken as hostages. Israel launched an offensive in Gaza which has reduced much of the coastal enclave to rubble and killed more than 43,000 people, according to local health officials.

Stephen Kalin contributed to this article.

Write to Jared Malsin at jared.malsin@wsj.com, Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com and Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com

4. Grading Goldwater-Nichols at Forty Years; Has it Worked?​

​Some naval gazing from a Navalist? (Apologies, I could not resist an attempt at humor).

Seriously I think it is useful to really examine the effects of Godlwater Nichols to determine if and how it should evolve (or be revolutionarily changed).

One point not made is that the intent of the Nunn Cohen amendment and the establishment of ASD SO/LIC was to place responsibility for low intensity conflict in one organization. Has that happened? What were the results? How do we assess the last two decades of "low intensity conflict?" Should responsibility for low instantly conflict be placed in one organization? Or as per the Gray Zone article today from Jeremiah Monk at Strategy Central as well as many others, gray zone activities and irregular warfare (which would likely have been called low intensity conflict back in the 1980s) are the norm (e.g., they are regularly conducted and conventional warfare is conducted on an irregular basis) and require contributions from the entire military and whole of government so does that mean that one organization should not or cannot be responsible for all LIC?

There is some very succinct and useful analysis here. We need more of this with proposed changes (and then action).

Two critically important critiques in my opinion (though they are all important).

Increase Attention to Strategy Formulation and Contingency Planning: Operational level of war contingency planning has worked in some cases, but the 2024 Gaza pier operation, the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the failed mission to stop Houthi missile attacks in the Red Sea offer strong examples of failure. Earlier missteps in prosecuting counterinsurgency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that despite decades of joint professional military education, a combination of poor operational level of war planning and civilian interference produced poor military outcomes.

...

Enhance the Effectiveness of Joint Military Operations: Limited operations with short-term tactical success have been achieved due in part to the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Legislation. U.S. Cold War strategy, technology and tactics overcome Saddam Hussein in 1991, and U.S. weapon systems have been effective for periods of time against Russian forces in Ukraine since 2022. There has yet however been a corresponding test of U.S. joint operations theory against a peer opponent. 

Conclusion:

The positive changes in the U.S. military operational command structure begat by Goldwater-Nichols have proven effective and should remain, but the bloated civilian OSD structure that has been a growing parasite on military readiness and combat execution must be reduced. Such reforms are vital to preparing the U.S. military for potential combat against the People’s Republic of China. Come January there will be a new president in the White House. Now is a good time to start the reform process. 

Grading Goldwater-Nichols at Forty Years; Has it Worked?​

https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/grading-goldwater-nichols-at-forty-years-has-it-worked/

Dr. Steven Wills

Navalist

By Dr. Steven Wills

November 7, 2024

Figure 1: Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn; Primary Architects of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986

The Goldwater-Nichols Act (GWN) of 1986 is now nearly 40 years old. As such, it ought now to be a subject of historical evaluation. In the decade following its passage, GWN was credited with the successes of the First Gulf War and the implementation of “jointness” at both the operational and administrative levels. Opponents were cast as evil “service parochialists” who elevated their individual services over the nation’s national security.  

However, since 9/11, this “sunlit uplands” depiction of the U.S. joint force and its civilian leadership has become dark and clouded. Goldwater-Nichols promised to end conditions that were seen as the cause for the failed outcome of the Vietnam War, the capture of the USS Pueblo, and service communication failures seen in the 1983 terrorist bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, and the invasion of Grenada. The legislation was supposed to reinvigorate “civilian control of the military that was threatened” (by what at that time, was never really made clear) and stamp out service parochialism. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) became the President’s principal military advisor, and the other joint chiefs were distanced from direct interaction with the chief executive. The CJCS was also intended to get control of the individual service budgets and direct them toward the good of all as opposed to narrow, parochial interests.  

Have any of these reforms really occurred? Senate Armed Services Committee staffer and Goldwater-Nichols advocate James Locher employed a grading rubric of nine points to evaluate the effectiveness of the Goldwater Nichols legislation at ages 10, 20, and 30 years. How do the legislation’s key provisions hold up today? 

1. Strengthen Civilian Control of the Military: The Constitution clearly says that Congress provides civilian control of the armed forces. Civilian control of the military in that respect was never in doubt. GWN advocates sought to elevate the role of Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) civilian bureaucrats and analysts over the individual services. However, failure to successfully prosecute the Afghan and Iraq conflicts, massive defense budgets produce lagging numbers of ships, aircraft, armored vehicles, and weapons suggests that Congress should re-assert its control of these aspects of military administration.
2. Improve Military Advice to the President: At the time of Goldwater-Nichols, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger firmly stated that the advice he received from the Joint Chiefs was uniformly good. In 1986, CJCS, General John Vessey stated: “As in the case of all advisors who perform their duties well, the [Joint Chiefs of Staff] from time to time have to give Secretaries of Defense advice they may not like to hear. But to be honest to the oath that they have sworn to serve the country they must do so.” Since it is difficult to separate bad advice from unpopular advice, it remains unclear if and how GWN has improved the quality of military advice. Privileging the advice of a single principle military advisor also limits the President’s access to the full spectrum of perspectives offered by the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Place Clear Responsibilities on the Unified Combatant Commanders: Operational level of war command has arguably improved since GWN’s passage. However, the act did not empowered the United States to win non-traditional conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are now as arguably lost as was the Vietnam War.
4. Ensure that a Unified Commander’s Authority is Commensurate with Their Responsibilities: A focus on regional commanders makes sense to counter regional threats. However, great power rivalry crosses the Unified Command Plan boundaries, suggesting that the United States needs to return to a more centralized, Cold War-style command system. Unified Commanders can no longer be left to act as regional, Roman proconsular-like authorities and must better coordinate with their counterparts under national-level leadership.
5. Increase Attention to Strategy Formulation and Contingency Planning: Operational level of war contingency planning has worked in some cases, but the 2024 Gaza pier operation, the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the failed mission to stop Houthi missile attacks in the Red Sea offer strong examples of failure. Earlier missteps in prosecuting counterinsurgency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that despite decades of joint professional military education, a combination of poor operational level of war planning and civilian interference produced poor military outcomes.
6. Provide for the More Efficient Use of Resources: Ongoing problems with an ever-increasing defense budget with longer timelines to fielding new equipment in smaller numbers suggest real problems remain in the defense acquisition system that Goldwater-Nichols did not solve and may have made worse over the last four decades. 
7. Improve Joint Officer Management: While more officers have “joint” experience, there are arguably fewer opportunities in an officer’s career to lead at the company and field grade levels before the potential for making flag officer. That loss of experience has been judged by some experts as a loss of training and experience within the operational navy. 
8. Enhance the Effectiveness of Joint Military Operations: Limited operations with short-term tactical success have been achieved due in part to the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Legislation. U.S. Cold War strategy, technology and tactics overcome Saddam Hussein in 1991, and U.S. weapon systems have been effective for periods of time against Russian forces in Ukraine since 2022. There has yet however been a corresponding test of U.S. joint operations theory against a peer opponent. 
9. Improve Defense Management and Administration: Attempts to stamp out sole-service and even bilaterial efforts like Air-Sea Battle have made the joint force weaker and less flexible than its Cold War counterpart. The extensive joint bureaucratic superstructure added to the Pentagon since 1986 has not made defense acquisition any more affordable or easier to accomplish. The superlative weapon systems created during the Cold War were the product of intense service competition, and while messy and sometimes costly they generally produced effective combat platforms. Trying to force services into buying things they did not want—such as the F-111 as a Navy carrier aircraft—resulted in less capable equipment. 

The Department of Defense needs a massive overhaul to reduce the civilian bureaucracy in favor of a much smaller, military-led structure directly responsible to Congress that allows the services to compete before the legislature to determine what programs and policies are best for the nation. Civilian control of the military must rest with Congress, and not Pentagon bureaucrats as the Founders intended in the Constitution. Defense consolidation and reform since the Second World War has instantiated multiple layers of civilian bureaucrats between the military and the Congress and President. Civilian control of the military is fundamentally a question of political control which can only be exercised by the elected leaders of the country and not career bureaucrats.  

The positive changes in the U.S. military operational command structure begat by Goldwater-Nichols have proven effective and should remain, but the bloated civilian OSD structure that has been a growing parasite on military readiness and combat execution must be reduced. Such reforms are vital to preparing the U.S. military for potential combat against the People’s Republic of China. Come January there will be a new president in the White House. Now is a good time to start the reform process. 

Dr. Steve Wills is the Navalist at The Center for Maritime Strategy.

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.

5. Deals and Deterrence: Trump’s Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World

​Maybe that will be the tagline for the new administration's foreign policy: "D&D" – deals and deterrence.

This article covers most of the major challenges and threats..

But I just cannot get this quote out of my mind:

"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it." 

– George Orwell

Excerpts:

Trump has made clear that he wants to end the war in Ukraine, though he hasn’t said how. His advisers suggest freezing the war in place, confirming Russia’s de facto seizure of about 20% of Ukraine, and coercing Kyiv to abandon for decades its quest for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Putin, however, is interested in taking a much larger chunk of Ukraine, as well as gaining control over the future government in Kyiv, which Trump might find unpalatable.

Trump “is going to do what it takes to bring the war to an end and the killing to an end,” O’Brien said. “How he goes about that diplomatically, we will see how that plays out. But the president has been very clear that the killing should stop.”

Deals and Deterrence: Trump’s Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World

The president-elect is expected to showcase U.S. economic and military might, seeking to instill fear in adversaries and extract greater accommodation from allies

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trump-foreign-policy-china-russia-iran-ukraine-8c32cdf4?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow

, Lara SeligmanFollow

 and Alexander WardFollow

Nov. 9, 2024 9:00 pm ET

With the world a more dangerous place than when President-elect Donald Trump first took office, current and former advisers expect he will navigate widening conflicts by building deterrence against foreign rivals while favoring transactional policies with U.S. allies.

The U.S. hasn’t been feared enough overseas during the Biden administration, according to these advisers. By showcasing American economic and military might, the second Trump presidency should bring peace or, at minimum, prevent further escalation in Ukraine, the Middle East and beyond, they said.

“It’s going to be a return to peace through strength. Deterrence is going to be restored,” said Trump’s former national security adviser Robert O’Brien, who could play a senior role in the incoming administration. “American adversaries understand that the things they’ve gotten away with over the last four years will not be tolerated any further.”

Executing such policies is easier said than done, especially with Russia, Iran and North Korea coalescing into an informal military alliance that has the economic and diplomatic backing of a rapidly rearming China.

When Trump tried and failed in 2019 to negotiate a nuclear deal with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Hanoi, the problem of the Korean Peninsula could be tackled in relative isolation. That is no longer the case in many of the world’s toughest hot spots, a former Trump White House official said.

“With North Korean soldiers serving with the Russians to kill Ukrainians using Iranian missiles, who are selling their oil to the Chinese, just the interconnectedness of all of these different policy areas is something we didn’t have,” the former official said. “We could have a discrete North Korea policy. We could have a discrete Iran policy. Now it’s got to be done much more holistically.”

Then-President Trump meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Hanoi on Feb. 28, 2019. Photo: Evan Vucci/AP

Unlike Biden, who hasn’t spoken to Russian President Vladimir Putin since February 2022, Trump has signaled that he is aiming to negotiate a settlement of the war in Ukraine with Putin. Such personal diplomacy might be helpful in weakening the new anti-American axis, said retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, who served in top national-security positions in the Trump administration. 

“It all starts with personal relationships,” said Kellogg, who wasn’t speaking on behalf of the campaign but is being considered for a senior job in the new administration. “A President Trump will reach out to key leaders to try and find a way to work through a problem. You always have stronger options available, like sanctions or brute force, but it is not the option of first choice.”

America’s alliances are likely to come under new strain, if Trump raises trade tariffs on European and Asian allies, as he said in his presidential campaign. He has frequently complained that countries such as Germany, which runs a huge trade surplus with the U.S. while enjoying its military protection, are taking advantage of American largess.

“I don’t think Trump has a plan to destroy alliances, but he also doesn’t really care about them,” said Jeremy Shapiro, director of the U.S. program at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “He thinks they are rip-offs for the American public, and that allies are like relatives who come to your house to borrow money and then stay all day and use your pool.”

Bracing for a new U.S. relationship, French President Emmanuel Macron warned Thursday about “naive trans-atlanticism,” in an address to European leaders gathered in Budapest. Trump “has been elected by the American people, and he will defend American interests, which is a legitimate and good thing,” Macron said. “The question is whether we are ready to defend the interests of Europeans. This is the only question.”

From left, Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, Austria’s Chancellor Karl Nehammer, France’s President Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz during a meeting Friday in Budapest Photo: attila kisbenedek/AFP/Getty Images

During Trump’s first term, his team initially struggled to persuade Europeans to replace equipment from state-owned Chinese telecommunications suppliers such as Huawei, fearing their potential for espionage. Trump’s trade war against Europe made some leaders less willing to work with Washington.

If European governments feel the new Trump administration threatens their security by accommodating Russia over Ukraine, American allies might be tempted to improve ties with China, the world’s other great power, even if it means breaking ranks with Washington.

Hard line

The U.S.-China relationship is likely to dominate Trump’s second term. He is expected to double down on his hard-line approach, which the Biden administration by and large continued, former and current advisers said. Trump might return to the trade war that marked his first administration and invest more in U.S. military preparedness for a possible conflict in the Pacific.

The president-elect is more wary of Chinese leader Xi Jinping, whom he blames for the Covid-19 pandemic and, because of its disastrous consequences, his loss to Biden in 2020, two former Trump administration officials said. Trump also was angered by Chinese attempts to hack his 2024 campaign. 

Trump won’t have the same willingness to take Xi at face value, one of the former officials said.

Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.) warned that any Trump mishandling of relations with European allies could prove a geopolitical boon for Beijing. “The Chinese have been waiting for it and preparing for it, and we are better off challenging China’s technological advances and intended dominance in partnership with our allies,” he said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, left, speaking on Oct. 24 during a summit meeting in Kazan, Russia. Photo: maxim shemetov/PRESS POOL

Shrinking American military commitments overseas was a goal in Trump’s first administration. Current conflicts in Europe and the Middle East don’t involve U.S. troops directly, but that doesn’t mean Trump will stay on the sidelines. Instead, former and current advisers said, the incoming commander in chief will likely try to involve himself diplomatically, potentially more than Biden did. 

“He wants to insert the U.S. into every conflict in the world to meditate, to bring about diplomatic solutions,” the former Trump White House official said. “That’s going to be a major centerpiece for what he does, being kind of a broker for peace all over the world.”

Even lower-level disputes stir Trump’s penchant to place himself at the center of negotiations. One former White House official recalled arriving at work one day during the first administration and hearing Trump talk about mediating the longstanding—and politically far afield—dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile.

Trump’s key asset is his unpredictability, unlike Biden who often telegraphed his actions in advance, according to supporters and even some of his critics. In a January 2022 gaffe, Biden said that Western allies wouldn’t have a unified response if Putin carried out a “minor incursion” into Ukraine—remarks that Trump’s supporters say encouraged the full-scale invasion just over a month later.

With Trump, rival leaders can’t be certain how far America would go in reacting to their moves, allies say.

“Deterrence requires clearly communicating threats to your adversaries, and Trump did that, love it or hate it,” said Matthew Kroenig, vice president of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He served as a senior adviser at the Pentagon in the first Trump administration. 

Heavy price

Trump has made clear that he wants to end the war in Ukraine, though he hasn’t said how. His advisers suggest freezing the war in place, confirming Russia’s de facto seizure of about 20% of Ukraine, and coercing Kyiv to abandon for decades its quest for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Putin, however, is interested in taking a much larger chunk of Ukraine, as well as gaining control over the future government in Kyiv, which Trump might find unpalatable.

An honor guard carrying the coffin of a Ukrainian serviceman during a funeral service Friday in Kyiv. Photo: Evgeniy Maloletka/AP

Trump “is going to do what it takes to bring the war to an end and the killing to an end,” O’Brien said. “How he goes about that diplomatically, we will see how that plays out. But the president has been very clear that the killing should stop.”

Trump was determined to be tougher with Iran than Biden, reviving sanctions enforcement and returning to the “maximum pressure” campaign of his last administration, especially if Tehran edges closer to obtaining nuclear weapons, advisers said.

Then on Friday, the Justice Department disclosed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had foiled an Iranian plot to assassinate Trump before the election. In August, U.S. prosecutors charged a Pakistani man with ties to Iran in a plot to kill Trump.

Trump remains willing to talk with Iran, one of the former Trump administration officials said, but Tehran is going to pay a very heavy price at the negotiating table. “Maybe you shouldn’t have tried to kill him,” the former official said.

Neither Trump nor his running mate, JD Vance, want war with Tehran, people close to the president-elect said. But that doesn’t mean he would stand by if Iran decided to build nuclear weapons, the people said. 

Trump has long campaigned against what he called endless wars, and he might finally withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and Iraq, where they have repeatedly come under attack from Iranian proxy groups.

“We don’t know yet what it will be, but Trump’s approach will be much, much stronger, and that should be no surprise to anybody,” said Andrew Tabler, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who served in Trump’s White House. “He’s likely to use diplomacy, sanctions, as well as a credible threat of military force to try and affect an outcome.”

Trump will likely seek to include Saudi Arabia in the Abraham Accords, a series of bilateral agreements his administration negotiated between Israel and four Arab nations, former and current advisers said. He failed to accomplish that in his first administration.

Unlike the Biden administration, which dissuaded Israel from striking Iran’s nuclear sites and energy export facilities, Trump had told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to “do what you have to do,” regarding Iran and its proxies.

Children staring at building ruins following an Israeli strike Thursday at a refugee camp in central Gaza. Photo: eyad baba/AFP/Getty Images

Netanyahu isn’t likely to have unlimited U.S. backing to pursue military operations in Gaza and Lebanon, given the devastating toll on Palestinian and Lebanese civilians. Trump had a falling-out with Netanyahu over the Israeli prime minister’s refusal to challenge the legitimacy of Biden’s victory in 2020. Though the two men patched up ties this year, Trump’s resentment remains, according to current and former advisers.

Trump successfully campaigned to attract Muslim and Arab voters appalled by the carnage in Gaza, defeating Vice President Kamala Harris in heavily Arab-American towns, such as Dearborn, Mich. Unlike Biden, Trump would pay a limited political price in Congress for strong-arming Netanyahu to wind down the war, if he chooses to do so.

Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com, Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com and Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com

6. A Recommendation for the Incoming Administration

​Conclusion:

The struggle for power that Morgenthau identified as the essence of international politics continues into the 21^st century. "The incoming Trump administration would be well-advised to consult the timeless wisdom in Politics Among Nations."

A Recommendation for the Incoming Administration

By Francis P. Sempa

November 09, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/11/09/a_recommendation_for_the_incoming_administration_1071105.html

SPECIAL SERIES:

Best Defense

In 1948, the Cold War in Europe was heating up with the Soviets as their communist henchmen took control in Czechoslovakia and the Soviets imposed a land blockade of Berlin. In the Far East, Mao Zedong’s Communists were advancing in China’s civil war, while Ho Chi Minh’s communists challenged French rule in Indochina. It was also the year of the first Arab-Israeli War in the Middle East. And 1948 saw the first publication of Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, which eventually became the bible for foreign policy realists. It is a book worth consulting as we deal with shooting wars in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and a Cold War that could turn hot in the western Pacific.

In the Foreword to the first edition, Morgenthau, who emigrated to the United States from Germany in 1937 and later taught international politics at the University of Chicago, wrote that the book developed from his college lectures in which he sought to present a theory of international politics. He called that theory “realism,” and began the book by identifying six principles of political realism. First, “politics . . . is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature,” which he wrote, had not changed since ancient times. Second, “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power,” and foreign policy realists are less concerned with intentions, motives, and what is desirable than with what is possible “under the concrete circumstances of time and place.” Third, the “interests” of a nation should determine its foreign policy, and those interests can change over time. Fourth, “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but [instead] must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.” Prudence, not morality or ethics, is “the supreme virtue in politics.” Fifth, moral aspirations often distort judgment and can lead to “the blindness of crusading frenzy [that] destroys nations and civilizations.” Sixth, political realism eschews the “legalistic-moralistic approach,” in favor of an approach that asks how policies “affect the power of the nation.”

Although realism is a theory of international politics, it is based first and foremost on a study of history, which teaches that “the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible,” according to Morgenthau. While it is important to study the past, the statesman “cannot read the future from his knowledge of the past [or] from the signs of the present.” But some concepts in international politics are eternal, including the fact that “international politics . . . is a struggle for power.” Nations have broader goals, but their immediate aim is always power. And power is defined by Morgenthau as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men.” Power in international politics is based primarily, but not exclusively, on armed power and the threat it poses to other nations. History teaches that “the struggle for power is universal in time and space and an undeniable fact of experience.” Throughout history, Morgenthau wrote, some countries use power to maintain the status quo, others seek power to change the status quo in their favor, while still others use power as a means of establishing or enhancing “prestige” or what we call today “credibility.”

Morgenthau also attempted to put meat on the bones of the abstract term “power” by setting forth, as Alfred Thayer Mahan did in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, the elements of national power. Morgenthau identified the first element as geography, which he described as “the most stable factor upon which the power of a nation depends.” The second element is natural resources, including food, raw materials, industrial capacity, technology, and population. The third element is national character and national morale. Fourth is the quality of a nation’s diplomacy, and fifth is the quality of government. Underlying all of these elements are the nation’s military and economic power.

Morgenthau emphasizes, however, that power in international politics is not absolute, but relative to the power of other nations. The key realist concept here is the balance of power, which has always shifted throughout history. Realists understand that there is no magic formula to assess the balance of power. It depends on numerous factors, including geography, relative population, relative economic and military power, alliances and counter-alliances, and the courage and character of opposing forces.

Politics Among Nations includes many historical examples that lend an empirical quality to realist theory. Those examples include the wars of Napoleon and the coalitions of nations that ultimately brought him down; the statecraft and diplomacy of Bismarck, which unified Germany and for many years thereafter successfully established and maintained a stable balance of power in Europe; the flexible policy of Great Britain that enabled it to be the “holder” of the balance of power by supporting alliances against nations that threatened to upset that balance; the neutralist policies of the United States under Presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Andrew Jackson that exploited geographical advantages to avoid foreign wars and expand across the North American continent; and the 20^th century U.S. foreign policy that accepted overseas commitments to prevent the domination of Eurasia by a hostile power or coalition of powers.

Politics Among Nations went through seven editions. Morgenthau wrote other books, including Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (1946), In Defense of the National Interest (1951), and A New Foreign Policy for the United States (1969). He wrote articles and essays for Worldview Magazine, Commentary, The New Republic, Foreign Affairs, and other journals. Some of those essays and articles were collected in Truth and Power (1970), and others can be read on the web at https://russilwvong.com/future/morgenthau.html. Morgenthau opposed the Vietnam War--not on moral grounds, but on realist grounds. Our interests, he believed, were not proportionate to the investment we made in that war.

Morgenthau concluded Politics Among Nations with a warning to American statesmen to avoid the “crusading spirit”; conduct diplomacy and formulate policy based on concrete interests, not abstractions; be willing to compromise on issues and interests that are not vital to the nation; always consider the mind and motivations of other nations; never allow allies to determine your foreign policy; don’t let the nation’s armed forces dictate foreign policy; don’t surrender to “popular passions”; and base your foreign policy solely on the national interest. Prudence, stability, and a sense of limits are all aspects of Morgenthau’s realism.

Morgenthau, one senses, would have strenuously opposed the enlargement of NATO after the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. He would likely have balked at the notion that America should fight to make Afghanistan, Iraq, or any other country a democracy in our own image. He would probably have been astounded at our reaction to the so-called “Arab Spring,” and would surely not believe that an American president (Obama) would go on an apology tour at the outset of his administration. Morgenthau would likely recognize that what is needed today is a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine War, a lessening of tensions between Israel and Iran in the Middle East, and a greater U.S. deterrent posture in the western Pacific.

The struggle for power that Morgenthau identified as the essence of international politics continues into the 21^st century. "The incoming Trump administration would be well-advised to consult the timeless wisdom in Politics Among Nations."

Francis P. Sempa writes on foreign policy and geopolitics. His Best Defense columns appear at the beginning of each month. 

7. The end of Pax Americana by Ivo Daalder

Like Mark Twain's death? ​Is this being exaggerated as well?

I think we will want to keep this article on file to see if it stands the test of time or if it was exaggerated.

Excerpts;

The end of the Pax Americana will have profound consequences: For one, the transformation of Europe’s security environment will now be complete. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine already demonstrated the folly of relying on cheap Russian gas to power economies. China’s turn to increased economic self-sufficiency raised serious questions about relying on exports to its growing market for growth. And now, as the U.S. turns away from alliances, the Continent will be forced to become serious about its own defense.

Whether they do so will be up to them, of course, but Washington is unlikely to be of much help.

Meanwhile, in Asia, countries living in the shadow of a more assertive and ambitious China will have to decide whether they’ll find new ways to balance Beijing’s growing power or align more closely with it. And many nations in the global south will enjoy more freedom of maneuver in the short term — though they may also come to find a sudden increase in China’s and Russia’s demands on them.

The Pax America will officially end on Jan. 20, 2025, when the U.S. inaugurates Donald J. Trump as its 47th president. The country and world will be very different because of it.

The end of Pax Americana

Politico · by Ivo Daalder · November 8, 2024

When the U.S. inaugurates Donald J. Trump as its 47th president, the country and world will be very different because of it.

Donald Trump became the first U.S. president since Grover Cleveland in 1893 to be reelected after losing a previous reelection. | Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

From Across the Pond

November 8, 2024 4:00 am CET

By

Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, is CEO of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and host of the weekly podcast “World Review with Ivo Daalder.” He writes POLITICO’s Across the Pond column.

In the end, it wasn’t even close.

Donald Trump became the first U.S. president since Grover Cleveland in 1893 to be reelected after losing a previous reelection. And he’s only the second Republican to win the popular vote in 36 years.

Trump won in a landslide. He helped Republicans take control of the Senate and may well help them keep the House — ensuring single-party control across all three branches of government. He can rightly claim a mandate to implement all the policies he touted.

“I will govern by a simple motto,” he declared in his victory speech. “Promises made, promises kept.”

And he made many promises.

Trump will be “dictator” on Day 1. He’ll deport 15 million or more illegal immigrants. He’ll deploy the military against his critics. He’ll go after the media and the Justice Department, impose a loyalty test on civil servants and end federal prosecutions of his past conduct.

All the while, he’ll be shielded by a Supreme Court that’s already decided a president cannot be criminally prosecuted for his “official acts.”

It’s doubtful that most Americans actually voted for these promises. Rather, what drove a majority to vote for a man who has lied about losing an election, encouraged sedition and been convicted on 34 felony counts was the same anti-incumbent mood that felled many governments across the world this year. From Britain to South Africa, India to France, voters have punished their leaders at the polls.

And now, this anti-incumbent wave has crested in the U.S., fed — above all — by inflation and uncontrolled immigration.

More than half of today’s U.S. population was born after the last major bout of inflation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Until now, they’d never experienced spikes in prices for housing, groceries and more. Add to that a general sense that immigration has grown out of control, and many of them just voted to throw the bums out.

They don’t necessarily like Trump or even agree with his policies, but they want change.

However, elections have consequences. And Trump’s return to power will have major repercussions for the U.S. and the world at large. I’ve long worried about the impact his reelection would have on American democracy, and nothing about this result gives me any comfort. I, for one, believe Trump intends to keep his promises — all of them.

I also worry about what this means for the rest of the world. In his first term, Trump made clear he doesn’t buy into Washington’s global leadership role as his predecessors have done. He doesn’t believe in leading — he believes in winning.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine already demonstrated the folly of relying on cheap Russian gas to power economies. | AFP/Getty Imagea

Yet, since 1945, the world as we know it has largely been built on the idea of America leading — a Pax Americana that sought to deter enemies and reassure friends; build prosperity by opening markets and encouraging the free movement of goods, capital, people and ideas; and uphold the defense of liberty, democracy and rule of law. It was this global leadership that produced NATO and other alliances, helped rebuild post-war Europe and Asia, and opened trade with the General Agreements of Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization.

America’s enemies long resisted this singular global role — but the Soviet Union succumbed to its internal contradictions, and China eventually realized it had to integrate into the global economy in order to lift its citizens out of poverty. Even so, Moscow and Beijing have long chafed at Washington’s leadership, and for the past decade, they’ve sought to counter and undermine it.

They may now get their wish.

Trump isn’t interested in sustaining the Pax Americana in the ways his 14 predecessors were. He has long seen alliances as protection rackets, where a partnership’s value to the U.S. is how much it gets paid rather than the peace and security it provides. He doesn’t believe in trade or open markets, instead he favors imposing crushing tariffs on U.S. imports — up to levels last seen in the 1930s — even if all economists believe it will bring economic disaster.

And far from showing an interest in defending democracy and rule of law, he deeply admires and looks for common cause with the strongmen who oppose both.

The end of the Pax Americana will have profound consequences: For one, the transformation of Europe’s security environment will now be complete. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine already demonstrated the folly of relying on cheap Russian gas to power economies. China’s turn to increased economic self-sufficiency raised serious questions about relying on exports to its growing market for growth. And now, as the U.S. turns away from alliances, the Continent will be forced to become serious about its own defense.

Whether they do so will be up to them, of course, but Washington is unlikely to be of much help.

Meanwhile, in Asia, countries living in the shadow of a more assertive and ambitious China will have to decide whether they’ll find new ways to balance Beijing’s growing power or align more closely with it. And many nations in the global south will enjoy more freedom of maneuver in the short term — though they may also come to find a sudden increase in China’s and Russia’s demands on them.

The Pax America will officially end on Jan. 20, 2025, when the U.S. inaugurates Donald J. Trump as its 47th president. The country and world will be very different because of it.

Politico · by Ivo Daalder · November 8, 2024

8. China Courts U.S. Allies as Defense Against Trump’s Protectionism

China Courts U.S. Allies as Defense Against Trump’s Protectionism

Fearing a U.S. tariff barrage, Beijing hopes to use ‘proactive’ tariff cuts and investment offers to draw American partners in Europe and Asia

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-courts-u-s-allies-as-defense-against-trumps-protectionism-e574714e?mod=hp_lead_pos5

By Lingling Wei

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 and Kim Mackrael

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Updated Nov. 10, 2024 12:01 am ET

A screen showing coverage of the U.S. election in a restaurant in Hong Kong. Photo: Mladen Antonov/AFP/Getty Images

With President-elect Donald Trump promising to inflict pain on the Chinese economy by shutting out Chinese goods from the U.S. market, Beijing is looking at ways to peel American allies away from Washington in response.

Trump’s campaign pledge to impose tariffs of up to 60% on imports from China threatens the very growth model promoted by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, one that centers on ramping up manufacturing and exporting the country’s way out of a downturn. 

To offset the potential hit to the already wobbly Chinese economy, the Xi leadership is considering plans to shower American allies in Europe and Asia with tariff cuts, visa exemptions, Chinese investments and other incentives, according to people close to Beijing’s decision-making.

They say that while China is willing to engage in dialogue with Washington once the new Trump team is in place, it is also seizing on the opportunity to court America’s traditional partners to buy itself time and leverage in its intensifying competition with the U.S.

But Beijing is facing an uphill battle to make the strategy work. The European Union has hardened its stance on China in recent years and is angry with China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, which it sees as an existential security threat. U.S. allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, are also increasingly wary of their assertive neighbor.

In recent months, China has already removed visa requirements for travelers from some two dozen countries including Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, Finland and South Korea—without requiring that the moves be immediately reciprocated. 

The strategy, labeled “unilateral opening” in China’s policy circles, represents a tactical change for a leadership that has long favored quid-pro-quo economic and diplomatic deals.

He Lifeng, Xi’s economic czar, hinted in recent meetings with Western business leaders that Beijing is weighing “proactive” tariff cuts in various sectors to boost foreign investment and trade with Europe and other Asian countries, according to the people close to the decision-making.

The people say the sectors in focus include electrical and telecommunications equipment, as well as seafood and other agricultural products, depending on the countries Beijing is targeting.

In Beijing, the government is facing an uphill battle to make its strategy work. Photo: Na Bian/Bloomberg News

European leaders are likely to be wary about offers from China and reluctant to be boxed into any position that deepens the rifts that they already fear will arise with the Trump administration. European officials have long said Beijing hasn’t come through on previous trade pledges. They also worry that increased market access could be a cover for Chinese companies to steal European technology. 

At a big trade fair in Shanghai on Tuesday, Chinese Premier Li Qiang said China would pursue unilateral opening to offer opportunities for foreigners to access the Chinese market.

Beijing’s changing tack reflects the challenges it foresees in dealing with Trump, whose first four years in the White House reshaped Washington’s policy toward China by replacing decadeslong engagement with a more confrontational approach. A large-scale trade conflict during the first Trump term significantly strained bilateral ties.

Xi sent Trump a congratulatory message on Thursday but also gave a veiled warning to the incoming Trump administration about engaging in new economic fights with China. “History tells us that both countries stand to gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation,” Xi said.

With the new opening strategy, the people said, Beijing hopes to capitalize on fear in Europe and Asia that Trump will revive the often hostile rhetoric against U.S. allies he employed during his first term. During his campaign early this year, Trump said he would encourage Russia to attack North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries that don’t pay enough into the alliance—remarks that caused anxiety across Europe.

By taking the initiative, the people say, China intends to increase pressure on the U.S. and try to split its allies. China has an urgent need to diversify markets away from an America that may shut it out. It has made inroads in the developing world, but greater access to European or Asian markets could have a bigger impact.

Donald Trump during a visit to Beijing in 2017 during his first presidency. Photo: Thomas Peter/Reuters

Chinese leaders see an opening for China from Trump’s return to the White House. In their views, according to the people close to decision-making, Trump is an erratic dealmaker who could accelerate what Xi believes is the U.S.’s eventual decline as the singular world power, cause more political and social disarray in America and push away allies Biden has won over, potentially helping Beijing rebuild relations with the Europeans and others.

When Trump started setting tariffs on China in early 2018 to force Beijing to change its state-led economic practices, Beijing hit back in kind each time, figuring the businessman-turned-president would eventually back down.

Tit-for-tat escalation followed. The American levies on imports of Chinese goods ended up quadrupling from 3% to 12% on average during Trump’s first term. 

Still, Chinese exporters benefited from robust demand from the U.S. during the Covid-19 pandemic, when American consumers were handed cash directly from the government and when a sharply weaker Chinese currency also made Chinese products cheaper overseas.

Boosted by Xi’s manufacturing-driven agenda, Chinese exports are one of the few bright spots in China’s economy these days. That means that if Trump follows through on his tariff pledges, the impact on the Chinese economy would likely be a lot greater than during his first term.

Some Republican strategists say that, once sworn in, Trump likely will start to fulfill his tariff pledge by focusing on China’s failure to fully comply with the so-called Phase One trade deal signed between Washington and Beijing in 2020, which required China to increase purchases of American goods and services by $200 billion over two years. The U.S. is entitled to raise tariffs on China for noncompliance under the deal.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping is shown on a screen outside a shopping mall in Beijing. Photo: Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

A recent report by Gavekal Dragonomics, an economic-research firm, shows that Chinese exports are 60% higher and the country’s share of global exports is 2 percentage points higher than in 2017, before the tariffs were imposed by the first Trump administration.

Larry Hu, China economist at Macquarie, estimates that a 60% tariff increase by the U.S. could reduce China’s economic growth by 2 percentage points in the 12 months following the implementation. “Trade war 2.0 could end China’s ongoing growth model, in which exports and manufacturing have been the main growth driver,” Hu said.

Chinese trade officials earlier this year engaged in a last-ditch effort to get the EU to back off from imposing tariffs on made-in-China electric vehicles. Still, the bloc this fall raised those tariffs to up to 45.3%, its toughest recent trade measure.

Beijing offered a combination of carrots and sticks to the 27-nation bloc in an effort to stave off the tariffs, including the possibility of new investments and the threat of tariffs on EU goods.

Both Beijing and Brussels have indicated that they would continue to negotiate to attempt to find an alternative to tariffs.

Europe’s economic ties to the U.S. are vital, with exports worth more than double the value of its exports to China. However, Chinese offers of greater market access might give the bloc some leverage in what will likely be difficult trade talks with Trump’s team. 

To woo European leaders, China could offer some minor carrots, such as ending trade investigations launched in the past year into imports of European dairy and pork products, and recently imposed temporary tariffs on European brandy. Other steps could include easier access to Chinese procurement markets and a pledge to boost investment in European countries.

But any Chinese promises to increase investment in the bloc would risk creating division among European member states, said Abigaël Vasselier, head of the foreign-relations program at the Mercator Institute for China Studies.

The main things the EU wants from China, Vasselier said, are effective measures to curb the flow of low-cost products entering the European market and an end to China’s support for Russia. On both points, she said, “China does not have, at this stage, the capacity to respond.”

Laurence Norman contributed to this article.

Write to Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com and Kim Mackrael at kim.mackrael@wsj.com

9. Western leader blurts out what was once taboo on Ukraine

From the Quincy Institute.

Excerpts:

According to the report, his suggestion was mulled amid talk in Berlin of setting up a “contact group” together with China, India, and Brazil in search of a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine. This idea was not raised during the meeting with Rutte as it does not yet represent a consolidated position of the German government — an unwieldy coalition of Scholz’s war-weary Social Democrats, ardently pro-Ukraine Greens, and fiscal hawks in the liberal Free Democrats party (FDP).

The fact, however, that the Finlandization option is even discussed now shows how far the debate in Europe has shifted from the “whatever it takes for Ukraine’s victory” mantra to a more sober assessment of the realities on the ground: even The Economist, a staunch supporter of Ukraine’s cause from the outset, now accepts that it’s not a victory but mere survival as an independent state that is at stake for Ukraine.

Western leader blurts out what was once taboo on Ukraine

Some say ‘Finlandization’ is a peace option for Kyiv, one that Germany may be willing to sign on to

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/germany-ukraine-2669632533/

Analysis | Europe

1. regions europe ukraine war

Eldar Mamedov

Nov 08, 2024

This week, Politico scooped the news: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, before meeting NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Berlin, informally voiced opposition to Ukraine’s prospects for an alliance membership, suggesting instead a “Finlandization” option — a neutral status like Finland maintained between NATO and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and for the subsequent three decades between NATO and Russia.

According to the report, his suggestion was mulled amid talk in Berlin of setting up a “contact group” together with China, India, and Brazil in search of a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine. This idea was not raised during the meeting with Rutte as it does not yet represent a consolidated position of the German government — an unwieldy coalition of Scholz’s war-weary Social Democrats, ardently pro-Ukraine Greens, and fiscal hawks in the liberal Free Democrats party (FDP).

The fact, however, that the Finlandization option is even discussed now shows how far the debate in Europe has shifted from the “whatever it takes for Ukraine’s victory” mantra to a more sober assessment of the realities on the ground: even The Economist, a staunch supporter of Ukraine’s cause from the outset, now accepts that it’s not a victory but mere survival as an independent state that is at stake for Ukraine.

For Ukraine, “Finlandization” would mean giving up its NATO membership aspirations — something that Moscow claimed was such an intolerable threat to its national security that felt compelled to invade Ukraine to prevent it. The concept first acquired negative connotations during the debates on the Baltic states’ prospective NATO membership in 1990s — it was perceived then by supporters, both in the U.S. and the Baltics, as artificially creating zones of influence in Europe. By being left outside of NATO, the Baltics feared they would be relegated to Russia’s zone of influence, if not worse.

The Baltics, of course, joined NATO during the George W. Bush administration, and there is no point now in relitigating the debates that led up to the decision. It, however, was always odd to use “Finlandization” as a bogeyman considering that Finland managed to build a resilient democracy and a top-performing, innovative economy while remaining neutral.

But these days, even Finland seems to repudiate that remarkably successful legacy; its ambassador to Berlin dismissed the notion because “it is not in our interest to restore any artificial spheres of interest” and “we are obliged to respect the freedom of choice of Ukraine, as well as its territorial integrity.”

Finland, as well as Sweden, joined NATO after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, even though the ground for such a step had already been prepared for decades by hawkish Atlanticists in both countries, including Alexander Stubb, the current president of Finland, and Carl Bildt, a former prime minister and foreign minister of Sweden.

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There are, however, still examples of successful neutral countries in Europe, like Austria, where even now none of the mainstream political parties are pushing for NATO membership. That underscores the limited utility of using a NATO/Russia dichotomy as the exclusive lens for discussions on security and stability in eastern Europe.

The fact that Berlin seems to be willing to look beyond that artificial dichotomy and warm to the idea of Ukraine’s permanent neutrality reflects the shifting popular mood in Germany. Chancellor Scholz has for some months voiced ideas that were until recently considered taboo, such as direct talks with Russia at a next peace summit on Ukraine. The rise in a string of local elections of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the left-populist Sahra Wagenknecht party (BSW) at the expense of the ruling coalition’s parties is explained in part by their opposition to a further war in Ukraine. In June 2024, the AfD and BSW boycotted a Bundestag address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, for his “uncompromising views,” even though Wagenknecht condemned Putin’s invasion.

Of the two parties, the BSW in particular is poised to reap the political benefits from its anti-war stance. As a far-right party, AfD is subjected to a “cordon sanitaire,” or firewall, meaning that no other party has agreed to form a coalition with it, either at a local or national level. That gives BSW additional leverage to negotiate coalition deals. It already used it in Thuringia, a state in Germany’s east, forcing the two potential partners, the state’s center-right Christian-Democrats (CDU) and center-left Social Democrats (SPD) to issue a call for Germany to lead efforts for a diplomatic settlement of the war.

The BSW, which at 9% currently, far outperforms in the national polls the liberal FDP (which would not clear the 5% threshold if elections were held today) and runs neck and neck with the declining Greens (around 10%) emerges as a viable alternative for coalition-building with both the CDU and SPD -- the new legislative elections in Germany are currently scheduled for autumn 2025 but could take place much earlier if the current federal coalition collapses, as seems increasingly likely. – On November 6, the Chancellor Scholz sacked Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) over the latter’s calls for early elections due to disagreements over the budget. That sets the stage for a confidence vote on the government to be held on January 15, and then snap elections in March. In any early elections, both BSW and AfD are likely to perform well given the recent state election results, and BSW will almost certainly leverage its pro-peace stance in any potential negotiations.

The problem is that even if “Finlandization” of Ukraine becomes the official line of a hypothetical new German government, it may simply be too late to use it as an incentive for Russia to end the war. It was a realistic option in the still-born peace agreement negotiated in Istanbul in April 2022 but that collapsed over Russia’s overbearing demands and the West’s promises to escalate support for Ukraine on the battlefield.

Sensing that the tide has turned in his favor, Russian President Vladimir Putin may be tempted to press for greater advantage before he acquiesces to serious negotiations. Russian hardliners, such as the former president and current deputy chairman of the Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, are pushing further west and talking about the destruction of Ukrainian statehood as a war aim. Tragically, “Finlandization,” even if Ukraine and its Western backers like Germany, would agree to it, may no longer be enough to end the war.

Eldar Mamedov

Eldar Mamedov is a Brussels-based foreign policy expert

The views expressed by authors on Responsible Statecraft do not necessarily reflect those of the Quincy Institute or its associates.

10. The Meaning of an Election Night U.S. Missile Test

​Was the signal received and understood? Or what it lost in the clutter and noise of the election?

Excerpt:

Americans may have been too busy to notice, but let us hope the signal registered in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang.

The Meaning of an Election Night U.S. Missile Test​

Washington sent a signal to its adversaries with a Minuteman III ICBM test on Nov. 5.

Kroenig-Matthew-foreign-policy-columnist12

Matthew Kroenig

By Matthew Kroenig, a columnist at Foreign Policy and vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Foreign Policy · by Matthew Kroenig

• United States
• Matthew Kroenig

November 7, 2024, 10:29 AM

With a cautious lame-duck president in office, set to be replaced by an unpredictable successor who is more comfortable brandishing American power, will U.S. adversaries try to test Washington in the coming weeks?

Perhaps Iran will try to dash to a bomb before a new Trump administration puts a credible military option on the table and fully backs Israel’s right to defend itself. China might see this as a closing window of opportunity to coerce Taiwan. Russian President Vladimir Putin could try to escalate the war in Ukraine. Or maybe North Korea—which has already sent troops to assist Russia—will engage in provocations against the South.

In an attempt to show adversaries that now is not the right time to test the United States, the U.S. Department of Defense was hard at work on election night. While the rest of us were attending watch parties, calculating the returns, or doomscrolling, a joint team of service members from the Air Force Global Strike Command and Navy launched an unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile equipped with multiple targetable reentry vehicles from Vandenberg Space Force Base, California, at 11:01 p.m. Pacific time on Nov. 5.

The test was scheduled years in advance, but it was intended to send a message. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, the commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command, said: “These tests are demonstrative of what Striker Airmen bring to the fight if called by the president.” He went on to state that the United States’ nuclear weapons are “the strategic backstop of our nation’s defense and defense of allies and partners.”

In other words, the United States retains the capability to impose staggering costs on any potential aggressor.

Americans may have been too busy to notice, but let us hope the signal registered in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang.

This post is part of FP’s live coverage with global updates and analysis throughout the U.S. election. Follow along here.

Foreign Policy · by Matthew Kroenig

11. Russian Ammo Depot Hit by Ukrainian Forces in Bryansk Region

​Good work here.

Russian Ammo Depot Hit by Ukrainian Forces in Bryansk Region

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · November 10, 2024

As part of a coordinated attack on Russian territory, Ukrainian forces targeted an ammunition depot in Bryansk Oblast, less than 150 km from the Ukrainian border.

by Kyiv Post | November 10, 2024, 1:19 pm

• Russia
• Belgorod
• Kursk

The Ukrainian Defense Forces carried out a strike on the ammunition depots of the 1060th Material and Technical Support Center in Russia’s Bryansk Oblast, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) reported.

Overnight Nov. 9-10, AFU drone units, in coordination with other branches of the Defense Forces, struck the facility. The target appeared to be the former 120th arsenal of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate.

“At least eight explosions were recorded. Objective control results indicate at least two fire points at the military facility and signs of secondary detonations,” the General Staff reported.

Alexander Bogomaz, governor of the Bryansk Oblast, confirmed the attack and damage to the facilities.

“As a result of the drone attack in Bryansk, non-residential buildings caught fire,” the Russian governor reported.

As of 6:00 a.m. on Sunday, a fire continued to rage at the site in Russia’s Bryansk region. Efforts to clarify the results of the strike are ongoing.

“The successful joint combat work of all the components of the Defense Forces on important targets of the Russian Armed Forces will continue,” the General Staff added.

Earlier Russia’s defense ministry reported a drone attack on Moscow that had temporarily closed all three of the Russian capital’s airports.

OSTIN analysts from the Eye of Hor group concur that the drone strike could have targeted the arsenal of the 120th Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU).

Other Topics of Interest

‘Massive’ Ukrainian Drone Attack on Moscow, 34 UAVs Downed, Russia Says

The Russian Defense Ministry says it downs dozens of Ukrainian drones that targeted several regions in Russia, including the capital. Three Moscow airports were closed.

According to defense news outlet Militarnyi, in 2023, the head of the Russian government signed a decree according to which “120 Arsenal,” a new plant for the repair of artillery systems, was to be introduced in the structure of the Russian Ministry of Defense in the city of Bryansk.

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · November 10, 2024

12. Taiwan Sees a Higher Price for U.S. Support as Trump Returns to Power

​In addition to determining if Taiwan is a vital national interest to the US and that we should come to its defense, we should consider another question. What if Taiwan shifts politically with new leadership that does seek political unification with the PRC? What would be the US position if that were to happen? 

Taiwan Sees a Higher Price for U.S. Support as Trump Returns to Power

The president-elect’s call for Taiwan to spend more on its own defense and his complaints about its semiconductor dominance may herald a tenser relationship.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/10/world/asia/taiwan-sees-a-higher-price-for-us-support-as-trump-returns-to-power.html

Taiwanese soldiers during military exercises last year. Donald J. Trump has complained about Taiwan, saying: “They don’t pay us money for the protection, you know?” Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times

By Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien

Reporting from Taipei, Taiwan

Nov. 10, 2024

Updated 10:18 a.m. ET

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In 2016, Taiwan’s president called Donald J. Trump to congratulate him after he won the presidential election. Mr. Trump took the call, becoming the first American president or president-elect to speak to a Taiwanese leader in decades.

This time, after Mr. Trump won a second term in the White House, Taiwan was quick to deny reports that its current leader, Lai Ching-te, was seeking a similar phone call with the president-elect.

The contrast was telling.

Taiwan appears to be preparing for a more delicate, possibly testy, relationship with Mr. Trump upon his return to the White House. On the campaign trail, Mr. Trump had suggested that Taiwan should pay the United States for helping defend the island from China, and complained that Taiwan had stolen America’s business in semiconductors.

“There is more anxiety this time” in Taiwan about Mr. Trump’s taking office, Chen Ming-chi, a former senior adviser on Taiwan’s National Security Council, said in an interview.

By “declaring that we are not going to seek a congratulatory phone call, that means we are more realistic,” said Professor Chen, who teaches at Taiwan’s National Tsing Hua University. Mr. Lai issued a congratulatory statement about Mr. Trump’s victory.

Tensions between Beijing and Taipei are high, with frequent Chinese military drills stoking fears of an accidental conflict. A call with Mr. Trump could prompt a forceful reaction from China, which claims the island as its territory and resents whenever Taiwan acts like, or is treated as, a sovereign nation.

For instance, that 2016 call between Mr. Trump and Tsai Ing-wen, who was then Taiwan’s president, drew condemnation from China. The United States had avoided leader-level contacts with Taiwan after it severed ties in 1979 to switch to recognition of China.

The call was only the first of several notable steps by Mr. Trump that bolstered U.S. support for Taiwan.

His administration later increased weapons sales to Taiwan and sent senior officials to visit, in defiance of Beijing’s complaints. Such moves gained Mr. Trump wide popularity in Taiwan even as much of the world soured on American leadership under him.

Image

A plane carrying Alex M. Azar II, then the secretary of health, landing in Taipei in 2020. He was the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit since 1979, the year the U.S. broke ties with Taiwan and officially established relations with China.Credit...Chiang Ying-ying/Associated Press

Now, Taiwan is also on the receiving end of Mr. Trump’s bluntly transactional diplomacy. And the lack of formal relations means Taiwan’s president, Mr. Lai, won’t get to make his case in a face-to-face meeting with the new U.S. leader.

Mr. Trump’s complaints about Taiwan’s military spending and semiconductor industry are adding to the pressure on Taiwan to buy more American weapons and increase investment in building chip plants in the United States.

“You know, Taiwan, they stole our chip business, OK?” he said on a recent episode of “The Joe Rogan Experience,” a popular podcast. “They don’t pay us money for the protection, you know? The mob makes you pay money, right?”

Professor Chen, the former security adviser, said Taiwan would have to adjust its approach to securing the support of the United States and its allies.

“In the past few years, we built our value on two things: democracy and chips,” he said. “But democracy is not a focus of the coming Trump administration, and the chips have turned from our advantage to a bit of a problem, because Trump says we are stealing jobs.”

Taiwan’s trade may also suffer if President-elect Trump acts on vows to steeply increase tariffs on goods imported into the United States. And some in Taiwan worry that Mr. Trump may lose sight of the island’s concerns as he focuses on his relationship — part pugilistic, part admiring — with China’s strongman leader, Xi Jinping.

Despite Taiwan’s lack of formal diplomatic relationship with Washington, it relies on U.S. support to counter China’s growing power and military pressure. The partnership deepened under President Trump in his first term and then under President Biden, while U.S. rivalry with China intensified.

Taiwanese officials have long sought to work closely with both Republicans and Democrats, and are sure to try to build bridges with Mr. Trump’s nominees for his next administration.

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President Lai Ching-te of Taiwan at a naval base in Taoyuan last month. Taiwan has been under pressure to spend more on its military.Credit...I-Hwa Cheng/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Taiwan has already been raising its military spending, partly under pressure from Washington. This year’s proposed budget would increase Taiwan’s outlays on defense to about 2.6 percent of the island’s total economic output. But Mr. Trump has said that Taiwan should raise military spending to 10 percent of its gross domestic product.

Sharply increasing military spending could be politically difficult for Taiwan’s president, Mr. Lai. His party does not have a majority in the legislature, and Mr. Lai also wants to spend more on domestic priorities, such as green energy.

Mr. Trump has signaled doubt as to how quickly and effectively the United States could help defend against a Chinese invasion. “Taiwan’s a tough situation,” Mr. Trump told The Washington Post. “Don’t forget, it’s 9,000 miles away” from the United States, he said.

Such comments are “a certain way to say, listen, you have to increase your defense budget. That means you buy more American weapons,” said Miles Yu, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute who was a China policy adviser to Mike Pompeo, a secretary of state in the Trump administration.

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, or TSMC, and the island’s other leading chip makers may face demands from the Trump administration to locate more production in the United States. (Industry experts have said that Mr. Trump’s accusation against Taiwan’s semiconductor makers is groundless, noting that the Taiwan companies merely provide manufacturing services to American chip giants.)

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A Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company building in Tainan. Chipmakers may face demands from Mr. Trump to shift more production to the United States. Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times

Last week, some Taiwanese officials played down the potential harm of the tariff plans, noting that Mr. Trump has threatened even higher tariffs on goods from China, which could open up opportunities for Taiwanese businesses.

“For Taiwan, there are actually more pros than cons,” Liu Chin-ching, the minister in charge of Taiwan’s National Development Council, told lawmakers on Tuesday. Mr. Trump’s tariff proposals could drive more orders from China to Taiwan, and encourage Taiwanese manufacturers to leave China, he said.

“The United States will impose technology restrictions to defend its own interests,” Mr. Liu said, “but Taiwan will basically go along with these restrictions, and we believe that we will have opportunities to benefit from them.”

Taiwan will also closely watch Mr. Trump’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Taiwan’s government has supported American aid to Ukraine, presenting it as proof of united resistance to authoritarian threats, whether from Moscow or possibly Beijing.

But Mr. Trump has said that he wants to quickly end that war. An abrupt reduction in help for Ukraine may shake Taiwanese confidence, several experts said.

“Taiwan’s leaders will view Trump’s handling of Ukraine as an early warning for whether and how Trump would stand up to Chinese pressure on Taiwan in the event of crisis,” said Ryan Hass, a former director for China at the National Security Council under President Barack Obama.

Beijing, for its part, appears poised to exploit any signs of discord between Washington and Taipei, pressing its message that Taiwanese people cannot rely on the United States — and should accept unification with China.

“Whether the United States wants to ‘protect Taiwan’ or ‘harm Taiwan,’ I believe that most Taiwanese compatriots have made their own rational judgments,” said Zhu Fenglian, a spokeswoman in Beijing for the Chinese government office that deals with Taiwan.

Taiwanese people, Ms. Zhu added, “clearly know that the United States always pursues ‘America First’ and Taiwan may change from a ‘pawn’ to a ‘sacrificed piece’ at any time.”

Chris Buckley, the chief China correspondent for The Times, reports on China and Taiwan from Taipei, focused on politics, social change and security and military issues. More about Chris Buckley

Amy Chang Chien is a reporter and researcher for The Times in Taipei, covering Taiwan and China. More about Amy Chang Chien

13. With Trump’s win, Australia worries AUKUS may come under new scrutiny

​Is AUKUS in the best interest of the US/ And is it a good deal for the US? I think the answer to both is yes. But how will the Trump administration view it?

With Trump’s win, Australia worries AUKUS may come under new scrutiny

Australia has already spent billions on the nuclear-powered submarine deal agreed with the Biden administration, and fears President-elect Trump might disrupt that.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/08/aukus-australia-donald-trump-concerns/

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese stands in front of the Parliament House in Canberra, Australia, in June. (Lukas Coch/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

By Michael E. Miller

Updated November 8, 2024 at 8:11 a.m. EST|Published November 8, 2024 at 3:47 a.m. EST

CANBERRA — Australian political leaders are extolling their alliance with the United States and its importance in maintaining the “stability and security of the Indo-Pacific” amid fears that Donald Trump could disrupt the AUKUS defense partnership after he takes office as president next year.

The imminent return of an American president known for needling allies and reneging on agreements has raised blood pressures in Australia, which has already spent billions to make good on a deal that could total as much as $250 billion to acquire at least eight nuclear-powered but conventionally armed submarines.

Australian officials call AUKUS — a trilateral defense partnership in which the United States and the United Kingdom are providing the submarines to Australia in a bid to push back on growing Chinese naval power in the region — the biggest industrial endeavor in their nation’s history.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese told Parliament this week that he had used his first phone call with Trump to talk about the security agreement.

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“We affirmed the strong relationship between our two nations and committed to working together for the benefit of our people, including through AUKUS,” he said.

The United States and Australia have been close allies since World War II but have deepened defense ties and interoperability in recent years in response to China’s growing military assertiveness. In addition to AUKUS, the United States is also expanding its military footprint in Australia to create what one American official has called “a central base of operations from which to project power.”

Even as the two countries increase military cooperation from the oceans to space, some defense analysts say Trump’s mercurial and transactional style of politics could disrupt that broader effort.

“Under Trump, there is a significant risk that he’ll scrap AUKUS, not because he’s advised to by his military but just because he doesn’t like allies,” said Hugh White, a defense analyst at the Australian National University and a prominent critic of AUKUS.

He’s not alone. John Bolton, who served as Trump’s national security adviser, said before the election that ­AUKUS “could be in jeopardy” if his former boss won because “all Trump looks at is the balance sheet.”

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, President Joe Biden and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak hold a news conference at the Naval Base Point Miramar in San Diego in March 2023. (Etienne Laurent/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

A more likely outcome is that Trump imposes new demands on Australia, other analysts said.

“Trump will inevitably want Australia to do more, to pump up its defense spending,” said Charles Edel, a senior adviser and the inaugural Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. But it is hard to say how Trump will treat AUKUS, he added, since the former president has been silent on the issue since it was announced in 2021 by President Joe Biden.

“Despite what supporters of AUKUS in Australia and the United States might say, I don’t think it’s a guarantee that Trump will be automatically supportive of AUKUS,” Edel said. “The reason for that is that Trump has never said anything publicly about AUKUS to date, and we know that he is transactional in his view of deals and agreements with other counties.”

Scott Morrison, the former Australian prime minister who struck the AUKUS deal with Biden, has said it received a “warm reception” when he discussed it with Trump in New York in May. Morrison told Australian media on Wednesday that he was “quite confident” the Trump administration would support the agreement.

“It is true that President Trump has a reputation for being transactional, but that doesn’t mean he likes bad deals. He likes good deals. AUKUS is a good deal,” Morrison told Sky News. “Australia carries its weight in that deal; you won’t find another defense agreement anywhere in the world where your ally is actually paying to support the industrial base in your own country, in the United States.”

Australian officials have said they expect to pay up to $250 billion for the submarines, the first of which will be new or used American Virginia-class submarines delivered early next decade, followed by a new design with the United Kingdom that will be built in Australia in the early 2040s.

Australia is already investing $3 billion in U.S. shipyards over the next few years as part of the deal, and it is building more than $5 billion worth of new infrastructure at a naval base in Perth in anticipation of a rotation of U.S. and U.K. submarines that will begin in 2027.

Officials from the U.S., U.K. and Australia visit the Osborne Naval Shipyard, where the AUKUS nuclear submarine will be built, in March in Adelaide, Australia. (MATT TURNER/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

Defense Minister Richard Marles told The Washington Post shortly before the election results came in that he was confident AUKUS would go ahead no matter who won given the strong bipartisan support for the defense partnership in all three countries.

“The three countries are trying to do a big thing, a very big thing,” he said. “In a sense it is biggest for us because we are the ones who are going through this transformation in terms of all that technology.”

Marles said the massive project was an “everyday sprint” for decades that would inevitably come under criticism.

“We are demanding of scrutiny from others, meaning our partners in the U.S. and the U.K.,” he said. “We’re not going to get this done unless there is constant scrutiny on every aspect of this.”

The inception of the AUKUS deal involved the jilting of another U.S. ally. The Biden administration’s surprise move to share sensitive nuclear-powered submarine technology with Australia effectively canceled a $66 billion agreement to buy submarines from France. The episode was a low point in relations between Biden and Europe, with French officials charging that the about-face was reminiscent of the way Trump approached international dealings.

While AUKUS was agreed under Morrison, a conservative, Albanese and his center-left Labor Party quickly adopted the idea and have embraced it since coming to power in 2022. But conservative opposition leader Peter Dutton has accused Albanese of underfunding defense. And on Wednesday, Dutton cited AUKUS in a series of congratulatory social media messages to Trump.

“May the years ahead be some of the most defining for our Alliance in which, driven by tests of our times, the necessity of deterrence, and the cause of securing peace through strength, we unleash the defense, industrial and economic opportunities of AUKUS at speed and scale,” he wrote.

Peter Jennings, a former senior defense official in conservative governments, welcomed the idea that Trump’s transactional approach could force Australia to increase its defense spending, now 2 percent of GDP.

Jennings, who has called on the government to increase defense spending to 3 percent of GDP, as it was during the Cold War, said Trump could demand more visible, short-term defense spending, adding that such a demand would be difficult to refuse for Albanese, who faces an election of his own next year.

Some in the Trump administration are likely to argue it doesn’t make sense for the United States to transfer submarines to Australia at a time of growing tension with China over Taiwan and the South China Sea, he said.

“It’s up to us make the case that AUKUS is a good deal for the United States,” Jennings said.

How well Australia makes that case may depend on the personal rapport between Trump and Albanese, Edel said.

Albanese has had a good relationship with Biden, which began on the Australian’s first full day in office in 2022 when he flew to Japan to meet the American president and other leaders.

His relationship with Trump got off to a rockier start, however, when a video emerged earlier this week of Albanese saying in 2017 that he would deal with Trump “with trepidation.”

“I think it’s of concern the leader of the Free World thinks that you can conduct politics through 140 characters on Twitter overnight,” Albanese said at the time.

On Thursday, it was Albanese who took to Twitter, now known as X, to say that he and Trump had spoken by phone “about the importance of the Alliance, and the strength of the Australia-US relationship in security, AUKUS, trade and investment.”

Albanese’s ambassador to the United States, former prime minister Kevin Rudd, has also been busy on X deleting past comments critical of Trump, including calling him “a traitor to the West” and the “most destructive president in history.” Albanese has resisted calls from some in the opposition to replace Rudd.

The election has shown that Trump can warm to those who’ve criticized him in the past, such as his soon-to-be vice president, Edel said.

“There is going to be more uncertainty associated with a Trump White House in general because it will be more personalistic,” said one former Pentagon official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to speak freely about the incoming president. “That’s just the reality of it.”

correction

A previous version of this article incorrectly said that John Bolton served as ambassador to the United Nations under President Donald Trump. He was U.N. ambassador under President George W. Bush and served as national security adviser for Trump. The article has been corrected.

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By Michael E. Miller

Michael E. Miller is The Washington Post's Sydney bureau chief. He was previously on the local enterprise team. He joined The Washington Post in 2015 and has also reported for the newspaper from Afghanistan and Mexico.follow on X @MikeMillerDC

14. ‘America First’ and Threading the Needle on Tech Sovereignty

​Excerpts:

All of these gains in trilateral cooperation could come under pressure should a second Trump administration pursue a “made in America” policy that places U.S. technological and industry sovereignty above a strategy of collective gain through collaboration.

Such a move could not only dismantle the gains of U.S. collaboration with two advanced tech industry leaders, it could more broadly weaken its relationship with the two East Asian nations whose strategic location, U.S. bases, and military capacity make them vital for Washington’s efforts to retain the regional balance of power.

With technological sovereignty drives also strengthening in Europe and several middle power nations, many of which are beginning to push back against China’s overproduction in EVs and other industries, a “made in America” policy that too aggressively erodes market space for “friendly” trade rivals could also threaten to have a broader impact on U.S. partnerships, especially in the case of emerging tech hubs with equidistant foreign policies such as Malaysia.

Given the increasingly complex research ecosystems and value chains necessary for fostering critical advanced technologies, collaboration and segmentation is no longer optional for attaining or retaining the cutting edge in the industries pivotal for economic and military success in the 21st century. A proportionate “made in America” tech sovereignty policy can, and should, seek to retain U.S. standing as a tech industry leading partner, and help reverse some of the hollowing out of U.S. industry that has had an adverse impact on the lives and communities of many working-class Americans. A disproportionately hardline policy could, conversely, see a more isolated U.S. lose the tech war, and a great deal more.

‘America First’ and Threading the Needle on Tech Sovereignty

thediplomat.com

A disproportionately hardline policy from the incoming Trump administration could ultimately see a more isolated U.S. lose the tech war, and a great deal more.

By Corey Lee Bell and Elena Collinson

November 09, 2024

Credit: Depositphotos

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Donald Trump’s return to the White House is expected to usher in a raft of changes to the United States’ foreign policy posture. But there is at least one area in which the Republican president-elect is in agreement with the Democratic incumbent, Joe Biden: Both believe that China constitutes the nation’s primary great power rival.

For both the Biden administration and the first Trump administration (2017-2021), one of the pivotal tasks for meeting this challenge has been to retain or extend U.S. supremacy in relation to the design and production of certain critical technologies including, but not limited to, those that have dual military and non-military applications. However, how the United States should go about this has been the subject of markedly differing strategies.

Key among them, and the subject of considerable attention, has been the two leaders’ respective approaches to green energy technologies.

Biden’s approach has been to make the U.S. a more formidable challenger to China’s dominance in this sector through a mixture of import restrictions, such as the recent imposition of 100 percent tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, and subsidy programs aimed at advancing green energy technological sovereignty in areas including EV batteries – the most significant by far being those under the umbrella of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).

While agreeing on the application of tariffs, Trump, on the other hand, has proposed that the answer to the China challenge lies not so much in competing on the same parameters, but rather in reversing green policies and leveraging the United States’ competitive advantages in fossil fuels. Against this, he faces the reality that the IRA is supporting jobs in Republican states. Added to this is perhaps the biggest conundrum of Trump’s green policy: that while tariffs and bans may protect legacy technology like internal combustion automobiles from foreign competition in the U.S. market, it may have little impact on the trajectory of green policies in the rest of the world – potentially damaging U.S. carmakers by decoupling their domestic and export markets.

Biden’s Tech War

A related policy difference between Biden and Trump that looks to be no less consequential to the outcome of the China-U.S. tech war is their approach to negotiating an aggressive push for technological sovereignty and tech cooperation with advanced sector trade rivals that are U.S. allies.

Bolstering the U.S. advanced tech sector and its research ecology has been a top priority for Biden, who worked to de-risk supply chains and out-compete China in areas including green energy tech, artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductors. Key symbols of these efforts have been the 2022 passing of the IRA and the CHIPS and Science Act.

While strengthening U.S. technological sovereignty has been at the core of these programs, this priority has been balanced by friendshoring provisions and a commitment to advanced tech collaboration with major allies, such as with Australia and the U.K. through AUKUS, and Japan and South Korea through a reinvigorated trilateral partnership.

The Biden administration’s strategy, which has seen some measure of success, has been to incentivize solidarity for U.S. tech war policies by deepening and expanding a U.S.-led, multilateral tech sector symbiosis. In doing so Biden has sought to leverage an important advantage over Beijing, whose key partners are relatively tech poor, and whose industrial overcapacity and push for fuller spectrum tech sovereignty has made it a competitive threat to the advanced nations that had once participated in fostering its industrial rise.

Trump’s Approach

Trump, by comparison, has pushed a domestic tech industry sovereignty hardline, which has already stoked anxieties among U.S. tech partners. He has leveled accusations against Taiwan, for instance, of “tak[ing] about 100 percent of our chip business,” while criticizing U.S. financing of its semiconductor sector. He has not only committed to winding back the IRA, but also pledged to “stop Chinese and other countries (authors’ emphasis) producing automobiles and autonomous vehicles.”

On this front Trump’s “America first” policy agenda carries consequential risks. By emphasizing advanced tech industrial sovereignty not only at the expense of China, but also to the potential detriment of Washington’s partners and allies’ economic interests, “made in America” policies could fundamentally alter the calculus of technologically advanced nations hitherto willing to invest in U.S. partnerships and operations and absorb the opportunity costs of cooperating with U.S. policies aimed at constraining China’s technological rise.

It could even have a broader impact on the overall integrity of the U.S. alliance system – an increasingly pivotal factor as strengthening cooperation between authoritarian states, including Russia, North Korea, and Iran, poses growing threats to the global liberal order.

Competitive Threats From China and the Japan-South Korea Rapprochement

Changes in relation to the sources of competitive threats to advanced nations’ tech industries can impact foreign policy more broadly. That dynamic is the subject of a recent report by the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney.

Drawing on a case study on Japan and South Korea’s recent rapprochement, a core finding of the report was that in countries with economically vital tech industries and strong ideologies of techno-nationalism, efforts aimed at fending off challenges to tech-sovereignty may transcend beyond reforms to domestic industrial policies and enter in the realm of foreign affairs, even altering well-consolidated international relations’ postures.

In line with this, while Tokyo and Seoul’s long-running tensions prior to the rapprochement have often been associated with historical animosities and territorial tensions, it is just as instructional to understand them in relation to competing trade structures.

Japan and South Korea’s broadly similar techno-nationalist beliefs are seen to have manifested in the two nations pursuing largely parallel industry and trade policies. And the combination of these parallel ideologies and policies made the struggle for tech industry success in both countries not only seem economically and politically existential but, increasingly, a zero-sum game.

Yet the two nations have come to view China, shifting as it has from complementary trading partner to prime competitor to their cutting-edge industries, as the major threat to their status as advanced tech industry leaders, overshadowing the longstanding trade tensions between Japan and South Korea. This incentivized the two nations to set aside entrenched animosities to join forces to confront a common challenge. In line with this, the report found that closer cooperation between the two countries in the early rapprochement period was overwhelmingly focused on high-tech industries and their supply chains, particularly in semiconductors and EV technology.

The Japan-South Korea-U.S. Trilateral Partnership

China, however, was not the only shared threat for Japan and South Korea’s advanced tech industries. Also of concern were competitive challenges posed by the Biden administration’s tech subsidies. Such was the strength of mutual concern that an “American threat,” as opposed to a Chinese one, was even raised by Japanese and Korean industry figures as a core motivation for closer tech industry and supply chain cooperation.

Yet despite this, Japan and South Korea, with some caveats, leaned heavily toward the United States for tech collaboration – a trend confirmed by the “Spirit of Camp David” joint statement in August 2023, as well as this year’s inauguration of a U.S.-Japan-Korea Commerce and Industry Ministerial.

Aside from Washington’s importance as a security partner, there were several key economic reasons why this was so, despite the challenges posed by U.S. competition and the potential steep costs cooperation with the United States could potentially impose upon both nations’ still-important China trade profiles.

First, China’s shift from a complementary partner to a core industry competitor coincided with the U.S. overtaking China as both Japan’s and South Korea’s largest and most important export market.

Second, particularly in with the area of cutting-edge semiconductors, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea’s industries were both complementary and symbiotic.

Third, the U.S. displayed a sensitivity to the interests of its partners in their heavily weighted advanced tech sectors. Washington implemented friendshoring agreements, made reasonable concessions to South Korean semiconductor producers with economic interests in China, and, perhaps most importantly, opened up access to its subsidy programs to both South Korea and Japan. This provided enormous benefits to the former in particular, with South Korean firms having secured U.S. loans and tax breaks worth billions of dollars for investing in battery and solar production in the United States.

Risks of “America First”

All of these gains in trilateral cooperation could come under pressure should a second Trump administration pursue a “made in America” policy that places U.S. technological and industry sovereignty above a strategy of collective gain through collaboration.

Such a move could not only dismantle the gains of U.S. collaboration with two advanced tech industry leaders, it could more broadly weaken its relationship with the two East Asian nations whose strategic location, U.S. bases, and military capacity make them vital for Washington’s efforts to retain the regional balance of power.

With technological sovereignty drives also strengthening in Europe and several middle power nations, many of which are beginning to push back against China’s overproduction in EVs and other industries, a “made in America” policy that too aggressively erodes market space for “friendly” trade rivals could also threaten to have a broader impact on U.S. partnerships, especially in the case of emerging tech hubs with equidistant foreign policies such as Malaysia.

Given the increasingly complex research ecosystems and value chains necessary for fostering critical advanced technologies, collaboration and segmentation is no longer optional for attaining or retaining the cutting edge in the industries pivotal for economic and military success in the 21st century. A proportionate “made in America” tech sovereignty policy can, and should, seek to retain U.S. standing as a tech industry leading partner, and help reverse some of the hollowing out of U.S. industry that has had an adverse impact on the lives and communities of many working-class Americans. A disproportionately hardline policy could, conversely, see a more isolated U.S. lose the tech war, and a great deal more.

Authors

Guest Author

Corey Lee Bell

Dr. Corey Lee Bell is a researcher at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney.

Guest Author

Elena Collinson

Elena Collinson is head of analysis at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney.

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15. Trump on Day 1: Begin deportation push, pardon Jan. 6 rioters and make his criminal cases vanish

​Another "scorecard" to keep track. 

Trump on Day 1: Begin deportation push, pardon Jan. 6 rioters and make his criminal cases vanish

By  COLLEEN LONG and DAN MERICA

Updated 8:05 AM EST, November 10, 2024

AP · by COLLEEN LONG · November 10, 2024

1 of 9 |FILE - Republican presidential nominee former President Donald Trump listens to Paul Perez, president of the National Border Patrol Council, as he tours the southern border with Mexico, on Aug. 22, 2024, in Sierra Vista, Ariz. (AP Photo/Evan Vucci)

WASHINGTON (AP) — Donald Trump has said he wouldn’t be a dictator — “except for Day 1.” According to his own statements, he’s got a lot to do on that first day in the White House.

His list includes starting up the mass deportation of migrants, rolling back Biden administration policies on education, reshaping the federal government by firing potentially thousands of federal employees he believes are secretly working against him, and pardoning people who were arrested for their role in the riot at the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021.

“I want to close the border, and I want to drill, drill, drill,” he said of his Day 1 plans.

When he took office in 2017, he had a long list, too, including immediately renegotiating trade deals, deporting migrants and putting in place measures to root out government corruption. Those things didn’t happen all at once.

Here’s a look at what Trump has said he will do in his second term and whether he can do it the moment he steps into the White House:

Make most of his criminal cases go away, at least the federal ones

Trump has said that “within two seconds” of taking office that he would fire Jack Smith, the special counsel who has been prosecuting two federal cases against him. Smith is already evaluating how to wind down the cases because of long-standing Justice Department policy that says sitting presidents cannot be prosecuted.

Smith charged Trump last year with plotting to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election and illegally hoarding classified documents at his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida.

Trump cannot pardon himself when it comes to his state conviction in New York in a hush money case, but he could seek to leverage his status as president-elect in an effort to set aside or expunge his felony conviction and stave off a potential prison sentence.

A case in Georgia, where Trump was charged with election interference, will likely be the only criminal case left standing. It would probably be put on hold until at least 2029, at the end of his presidential term. The Georgia prosecutor on the case just won reelection.

Pardon supporters who attacked the Capitol

More than 1,500 people have been charged since a mob of Trump supporters spun up by the outgoing president attacked the Capitol almost nearly four years ago.

Trump launched his general election campaign in March by not merely trying to rewrite the history of that riot, but positioning the violent siege and failed attempt to overturn the 2020 election as a cornerstone of his bid to return to the White House. As part of that, he called the rioters “unbelievable patriots” and promised to help them “the first day we get into office.”

As president, Trump can pardon anyone convicted in federal court, District of Columbia Superior Court or in a military court-martial. He can stop the continued prosecution of rioters by telling his attorney general to stand down.

“I am inclined to pardon many of them,” Trump said on his social media platform in March when announcing the promise. “I can’t say for every single one, because a couple of them, probably they got out of control.”

Dismantle the ‘deep state’ of government workers

Trump could begin the process of stripping tens of thousands of career employees of their civil service protections, so they could be more easily fired.

He wants to do two things: drastically reduce the federal workforce, which he has long said is an unnecessary drain, and to “totally obliterate the deep state” — perceived enemies who, he believes, are hiding in government jobs.

Within the government, there are hundreds of politically appointed professionals who come and go with administrations. There also are tens of thousands of “career” officials, who work under Democratic and Republican presidents. They are considered apolitical workers whose expertise and experience help keep the government functioning, particularly through transitions.

Trump wants the ability to convert some of those career people into political jobs, making them easier to dismiss and replace with loyalists. He would try to accomplish that by reviving a 2020 executive order known as “Schedule F.” The idea behind the order was to strip job protections from federal workers and create a new class of political employees. It could affect roughly 50,000 of 2.2 million civilian federal employees.

Democratic President Joe Biden rescinded the order when he took office in January 2021. But Congress failed to pass a bill protecting federal employees. The Office of Personnel Management, the federal government’s chief human resources agency, finalized a rule last spring against reclassifying workers, so Trump might have to spend months — or even years — unwinding it.

Trump has said he has a particular focus on “corrupt bureaucrats who have weaponized our justice system” and “corrupt actors in our national security and intelligence apparatus.”

Beyond the firings, Trump wants to crack down on government officials who leak to reporters. He also wants to require that federal employees pass a new civil service test.

Impose tariffs on imported goods, especially those from China

Trump promised throughout the campaign to impose tariffs on imported goods, particularly those from China. He argued that such import taxes would keep manufacturing jobs in the United States, shrink the federal deficit and help lower food prices. He also cast them as central to his national security agenda.

“Tariffs are the greatest thing ever invented,” Trump said during a September rally in Flint, Michigan.

The size of his pledged tariffs varied. He proposed at least a 10% across-the-board tariff on imported goods, a 60% import tax on goods from China and a 25% tariff on all goods from Mexico — if not more.

Trump would likely not need Congress to impose these tariffs, as was clear in 2018, when he imposed them on steel and aluminum imports without going through lawmakers by citing Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. That law, according to the Congressional Research Service, gives a president the power to adjust tariffs on imports that could affect U.S. national security, an argument Trump has made.

“We’re being invaded by Mexico,” Trump said at a rally in North Carolina this month. Speaking about the new president of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum, Trump said: “I’m going to inform her on Day 1 or sooner that if they don’t stop this onslaught of criminals and drugs coming into our country, I’m going to immediately impose a 25% tariff on everything they send into the United States of America.”

Roll back protections for transgender students

Trump said during the campaign that he would roll back Biden administration action seeking to protect transgender students from discrimination in schools on the first day of his new administration.

Opposition to transgender rights was central to the Trump campaign’s closing argument. His campaign ran an ad in the final days of the race against Vice President Kamala Harris in which a narrator said: “Kamala is for they/them. President Trump is for you.”

The Biden administration announced new Title XI protections in April that made clear treating transgender students differently from their classmates is discrimination. Trump responded by saying he would roll back those changes, pledging to do some on the first day of his new administration and specifically noting he has the power to act without Congress.

“We’re going to end it on Day 1,” Trump said in May. “Don’t forget, that was done as an order from the president. That came down as an executive order. And we’re going to change it — on Day 1 it’s going to be changed.”

It is unlikely Trump will stop there.

Speaking at a Wisconsin rally in June, Trump said “on Day 1" he would “sign a new executive order” that would cut federal money for any school “pushing critical race theory, transgender insanity and other inappropriate racial, sexual or political content onto the lives of our children.”

While it is likely that any of these actions would end up in court, as Biden’s change to Title XI has. Trump does have considerable power through executive orders to implement these promises.

Drill, drill, drill

Trump is looking to reverse climate policies aimed at reducing planet-warming greenhouse gas emissions.

With an executive order on Day 1, he can roll back environmental protections, halt wind projects, scuttle the Biden administration’s targets that encourage the switch to electric cars and abolish standards for companies to become more environmentally friendly.

He has pledged to increase production of U.S. fossil fuels, promising to “drill, drill, drill,” when he gets into office on Day 1 and seeking to open the Arctic wilderness to oil drilling, which he claims would lower energy costs.

Settle the war between Russia and Ukraine

Trump has repeatedly said he could settle the war between Russia and Ukraine in one day.

When asked to respond to the claim, Russia’s U.N. ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, said “the Ukrainian crisis cannot be solved in one day.”

Trump’s national press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, told Fox News after Trump was declared the winner of the election that Trump would now be able to “negotiate a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine.” She later said, “It includes, on Day 1, bringing Ukraine and Russia to the negotiating table to end this war.”

Russia invaded Ukraine nearly three years ago. Trump, who makes no secret of his admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin, has criticized the Biden administration for giving money to Ukraine to fight the war.

At a CNN town hall in May 2023, Trump said: “They’re dying, Russians and Ukrainians. I want them to stop dying. And I’ll have that done — I’ll have that done in 24 hours.” He said that would happen after he met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Putin.

Begin mass deportations of migrants in the US

Speaking last month at his Madison Square Garden rally in New York, Trump said: “On Day 1, I will launch the largest deportation program in American history to get the criminals out. I will rescue every city and town that has been invaded and conquered, and we will put these vicious and bloodthirsty criminals in jail, then kick them the hell out of our country as fast as possible.”

Trump can direct his administration to begin the effort the minute he arrives in office, but it’s much more complicated to actually deport the nearly 11 million people who are believed to be in the United States illegally. That would require a huge, trained law enforcement force, massive detention facilities, airplanes to move people and nations willing to accept them.

Trump has said he would invoke the Alien Enemies Act. That rarely used 1798 law allows the president to deport anyone who is not an American citizen and is from a country with which there is a “declared war” or a threatened or attempted “invasion or predatory incursion.”

He has spoken about deploying the National Guard, which can be activated on orders from a governor. Stephen Miller, a top Trump adviser, said sympathetic Republican governors could send troops to nearby states that refuse to participate.

Asked about the cost of his plan, he told NBC News: “It’s not a question of a price tag. It’s not — really, we have no choice. When people have killed and murdered, when drug lords have destroyed countries, and now they’re going to go back to those countries because they’re not staying here. There is no price tag.”

COLLEEN LONG

Colleen covers the White House for The Associated Press, with a focus on domestic policy including immigration, law enforcement and legal affairs.

DAN MERICA

Merica is an investigative reporter in Washington, covering the intersection of politics and artificial intelligence.

twittermailto

AP · by COLLEEN LONG · November 10, 2024

​16. A guide to key figures in Donald Trump's orbit

A guide to key figures in Donald Trump's orbit

By  MICHELLE L. PRICE and ALEX CONNOR

Updated 2:12 PM EST, November 8, 2024

AP · by MICHELLE L. PRICE · November 8, 2024

A guide to key figures in Donald Trump’s orbit

1 of 6 |Republican Presidential nominee former President Donald Trump speaks at the Palm Beach County Convention Center during an election night watch party, Tuesday, Nov. 5, 2024, Wednesday, Nov. 6, 2024, in West Palm Beach, Fla. (AP Photo/Lynne Sladky)

MICHELLE L. PRICE

Price is a national political reporter for The Associated Press. She is based in New York.

twittermailto

AP · by MICHELLE L. PRICE · November 8, 2024

​17. 50,000 Russian and North Korean Troops Mass Ahead of Attack, U.S. Says

​Here it comes. Will this be a pig push, a major attack?

Excerpts:

The North Koreans will be fighting as light infantry, without the benefit of armored vehicles. And current Ukrainian tactics of artillery fire and drone attacks have proved devastating to unprotected Russian troops.

That said, if Russia gains momentum, it may not stop at its border but might try to drive Ukrainian forces back farther. It is not clear if the North Korean government will authorize its forces to conduct sustained operations in Ukraine or if they are intended only for the Kursk counteroffensive, according to U.S. defense officials. Some American officials believe that North Korea could order its troops to stop at the border while the Russian forces press deeper into Ukraine.

U.S. officials said they did not know how effective the North Koreans would be, considering their lack of ground combat experience.

George Barros, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, said that in spite of that inexperience, the North Korean forces are well organized. “The one thing that they might actually be better at than the Russians is cohesion and discipline,” he said.

Rob Lee, a Russian military specialist at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia who recently returned from a visit to Ukraine, added, “Thousands of additional infantry can make a difference in Kursk. These soldiers are younger and in better physical shape than many Russian contract soldiers.”

50,000 Russian and North Korean Troops Mass Ahead of Attack, U.S. Says

Ukrainian officials expect a counteroffensive in western Russia to begin in the coming days as North Korea’s troops train with Russian forces.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/10/us/politics/russia-north-korea-troops-ukraine.html

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A Ukrainian army vehicle passing through the destroyed Russian border post at the Sudzha crossing and into Russia in August.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

By Julian E. BarnesEric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz

The reporters have been covering Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Nov. 10, 2024, 5:04 a.m. ET

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in North Korea and Russia? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

The Russian military has assembled a force of 50,000 soldiers, including North Korean troops, as it prepares to begin an assault aimed at reclaiming territory seized by Ukraine in the Kursk region of Russia, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.

A new U.S. assessment concludes that Russia has massed the force without having to pull soldiers out of Ukraine’s east — its main battlefield priority — allowing Moscow to press on multiple fronts simultaneously.

Russian troops have been clawing back some of the territory that Ukraine captured in Kursk this year. They have been attacking Ukrainian positions with missile strikes and artillery fire, but they have not yet begun a major assault there, U.S. officials said.

Ukrainian officials say they expect such an attack involving the North Korean troops in the coming days.

For now, the North Koreans are training with Russian forces in the far western part of Kursk.

The Russian-North Korean offensive looms as President-elect Donald J. Trump prepares to re-enter office with a stated goal of ending the war quickly. Mr. Trump has said little about how he would settle the conflict, but Vice President-elect JD Vance has outlined a plan that would allow Russia to keep the territory it has seized in Ukraine.

Some U.S. military and intelligence officials have grown more pessimistic about Ukraine’s overall prospects, noting that Russia has steadily gained ground, both in Kursk and in eastern Ukraine. Officials say the setbacks are partly a result of Ukraine’s failure to solve critical shortfalls in troop strength.

President Biden has been deeply supportive of Ukraine, pushing Congress to approve billions of dollars in aid and having the U.S. military and spy agencies provide critical intelligence to help Kyiv fight the war.

One Western official said Ukraine’s surprise incursion into Kursk in August thinned out its forces across the battlefield in eastern Ukraine, leaving them vulnerable to Russian advances. But that official, and U.S. officials, said Ukraine still had a strong defense in Kursk and might be able to hold, at least for a time.

The officials interviewed for this article spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence assessments and offer a candid appraisal of Ukraine’s battlefield prospects.

Western and Ukrainian officials say the arrival of North Korean forces is a major escalation after more than two years of war.

North Korea has sent more than 10,000 troops to fight with Russia in Kursk, American officials say. The troops are wearing Russian uniforms and have been equipped by Moscow, but they will probably fight in their own discrete units, U.S. defense officials said.

Ukrainian officials said Moscow had supplied the North Korean forces with machine guns, sniper rifles, antitank missiles and rocket-propelled grenades.

Russia has been training the North Koreans in artillery fire, basic infantry tactics and, critically, trench clearing, American officials said. That training suggests that at least some of the North Korean forces will be involved in frontal assaults on Ukraine’s dug-in defensive positions.

“We fully expect that D.P.R.K. soldiers could be engaged in combat,” Sabrina Singh, the deputy Pentagon press secretary, said on Thursday, using the initials of North Korea’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

U.S. officials are not sure what constraints the government of President Kim Jong-un has put on the use of its forces. However, American officials expect them to be directly involved in the fighting.

A Ukrainian official said the North Korean forces had been divided into two groups, an assault unit and a support unit, which will help provide security inside the territory recaptured from Ukrainian forces.

North Korea has a large army but, unlike Russia, has not been involved in ground combat for decades. The troops North Korea is deploying, however, are considered its best, drawn from the 11th Corps, home to the country’s special operations soldiers.

The Ukrainians captured hundreds of square miles of territory with little opposition, but Russia has slowly chipped away at those gains — reclaiming roughly half the seized territory — and now appears ready to conduct a much larger-scale operation.

American officials believe that the Ukrainian troops will prove difficult to dislodge, and that the Russian and North Korean forces will probably take heavy losses, similar to what Russia has suffered in eastern Ukraine. U.S. and British military analysts put the current number of Russian troop deaths and injuries at an average of more than 1,200 a day.

Image

North Korean soldiers parading in Pyongyang, North Korea, in 2012. Soldiers from an elite unit of the North Korean army are believed to be joining Russian soldiers to try to recapture territory in the Kursk region of Russia.Credit...David Guttenfelder/Associated Press

The North Koreans will be fighting as light infantry, without the benefit of armored vehicles. And current Ukrainian tactics of artillery fire and drone attacks have proved devastating to unprotected Russian troops.

That said, if Russia gains momentum, it may not stop at its border but might try to drive Ukrainian forces back farther. It is not clear if the North Korean government will authorize its forces to conduct sustained operations in Ukraine or if they are intended only for the Kursk counteroffensive, according to U.S. defense officials. Some American officials believe that North Korea could order its troops to stop at the border while the Russian forces press deeper into Ukraine.

U.S. officials said they did not know how effective the North Koreans would be, considering their lack of ground combat experience.

George Barros, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, said that in spite of that inexperience, the North Korean forces are well organized. “The one thing that they might actually be better at than the Russians is cohesion and discipline,” he said.

Rob Lee, a Russian military specialist at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia who recently returned from a visit to Ukraine, added, “Thousands of additional infantry can make a difference in Kursk. These soldiers are younger and in better physical shape than many Russian contract soldiers.”

In exchange for supplying troops, U.S. officials believe North Korea expects to receive rocket and missile technology from Russia as well as diplomatic support. But Ukrainian officials said North Korea may also be hoping to battle-harden its troops and learn from the tactics being developed in the war.

U.S. defense officials said they did not know if North Korea would send additional reinforcements. A senior Ukrainian official said Ukrainian intelligence officials had predicted that North Korea could send as many as 100,000 troops.

Russia is struggling to meet its monthly recruiting goal of roughly 25,000 troops as its casualties mount, meaning the North Korean soldiers are critical.

Mr. Barros called the North Korean deployment an “alternative pipeline.”

“It is likely not going to be a one-time shipment of 10,000 soldiers,” he said. “It is more likely going to be a way to regularly pull in thousands, perhaps up to 15,000 men a month.”

Andrew E. Kramer contributed reporting from Kyiv.

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt

Michael Schwirtz is an investigative reporter with the International desk. With The Times since 2006, he previously covered the countries of the former Soviet Union from Moscow and was a lead reporter on a team that won the 2020 Pulitzer Prize for articles about Russian intelligence operations. More about Michael Schwirtz

See more on: Russia-Ukraine War, President Joe Biden, Kim Jong-un , Donald Trump

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David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com