NEVER FORGET

Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The belief that there is only one truth and that oneself is in possession of it seems to me the deepest root of all evil that is in the world."

– Max Born

“Competition is the law of the jungle, but cooperation is the law of civilization.”

– Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921)

“The highest result of education is tolerance.”

– Helen Keller

1. Tracking a Year of Dangerous Tit for Tat on the Korean Border

2. The North Korea Watcher ego trap: Flaunting credentials from failed policies

3. Do North Korean refugees really want to be human rights advocates?

4. N.K. leader meets Russia's defense chief, vows continued support for Moscow's war efforts

5. S. Korea, US to hold tabletop exercise on nuclear deterrence next week

6. NK hangs Yoon photo, military motto in exhibit about 'the enemy'

7. North Korea bans 2 South Korean dishes

8. ‘Korean THAAD’ L-SAM successfully developed in 10 years

9. North Korea Expanding KN-23 Missile Production for Use by Russia

10. South Korea’s Secret Female Commandos Shine on ‘Steel Troops W’

11. Russia will likely send North Korean troops to the most dangerous spots to fight, says South Korea

12. North Korea’s Struggles to Deliver on Its Plans

13. 60 Years of Japan-South Korea Relations: A Moment for Reflection and Progress

14. Why the North Korea-Russia Alliance Is a Grave Threat

15. '12.12: The Day' wins Best Film at Blue Dragon Film Awards

1. Tracking a Year of Dangerous Tit for Tat on the Korean Border

Please go to this link to view this article on the interactive web site with all the map/graphics/photos.

While most look at the situation with fear and trepidation, we should also see the opportunities that Kim Jong Un's miscalculations are providing the ROK/US alliance.

Excerpts:

“Provoking South Korea to act in ways that puts stress on the U.S. alliance is to North Korea’s benefit,” said Toby Dalton, senior fellow and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Here are some of North Korea’s biggest border moves this year:

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/tracking-a-year-of-dangerous-tit-for-tat-on-the-korean-border-c667983c?st=oK2iVC&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Tracking a Year of Dangerous Tit for Tat on the Korean Border

See how a series of actions by Kim Jong Un’s regime has shaken up the world’s most militarized border

By Timothy W. MartinFollow, Dasl YoonFollow, Carl ChurchillFollow and Taylor UmlaufFollow

Updated Nov. 30, 2024 12:01 am ET

The border between North and South Korea is one of the most fortified places on Earth. Now, with relations between the two countries plumbing new lows, a show of force on both sides is raising the risk of deadly miscalculation.

In recent months, North and South Korea, still technically at war, have ramped up their presence of armed forces, border defenses and provocations on land, at sea and in the air. The catalyst was a decision in January by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to drop the country’s decades-old policy of peaceful reunification—and declare his southern neighbors as the country’s new No. 1 enemy.

Kim’s audacity has escalated since he forged a tighter bond with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Pyongyang and Moscow have signed a new mutual defense pact, and the Kim regime has recently sent troops to the Russian front lines to fight against Ukraine. With their interests and enemies aligned, Putin could lean on Kim to cause havoc on the Korean Peninsula through military moves that would distract the U.S. and its close allies.

The North’s border behavior is such a top concern that South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol raised the matter during his postelection call with President-elect Donald Trump.

“Provoking South Korea to act in ways that puts stress on the U.S. alliance is to North Korea’s benefit,” said Toby Dalton, senior fellow and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Here are some of North Korea’s biggest border moves this year:

The heightened friction follows a sharp deterioration in Pyongyang-Seoul ties that accelerated after Yoon took office in 2022. A conservative who backs a tougher line against the North, Yoon argues peace is achieved through power.

The two Koreas have walked away from a 2018 joint accord that sought to tone down military hostilities by disarming border guards, establishing no-fly zones and creating buffer zones on land and at sea.

Kim wants to seal off his border to ward off outside information that could undermine his claims of North Korea’s prosperity and therefore threaten his legitimacy. As a result, the Kim regime views cross-border travel with China or South Korean music or dramas smuggled in from elsewhere as national-security threats. Kim has lashed out at his nation’s youth for using South Korean slang.

“The major driver for this border behavior is Kim Jong Un’s feeling of insecurity,” said Kuyoun Chung, a policy adviser for South Korea’s defense ministry, navy and presidential national security council.

North Korea has long wanted to see a reduction—then ultimate elimination—of joint drills between Washington and Seoul, deployments of American warships and nuclear-equipped bombers to the region, and U.S. troop presence in South Korea, said Sydney A. Seiler, a former U.S. envoy for nuclear talks with North Korea in 2014 and 2015, which also included China, Japan, Russia and South Korea.

Meanwhile the skies over the two countries have been unusually active—and draped in mystery.

South Korean officials cleaning up the contents of a trash-carrying balloon sent by North Korea after it landed on a street in Seoul this year. Photo: Yonhap/AFP/Getty Images

In recent weeks, North Korea accused South Korea of having sent drones over Pyongyang several times, claiming to have found one on its territory. Seoul initially denied sending drones. It later said it saw no value in verifying or responding to the Kim regime’s unilateral claims. Meanwhile, Kim recently oversaw a fiery exhibition of North Korea’s latest drones.

One aerial incursion has grabbed global headlines: trash-filled balloons. Since May, North Korea has floated a total of more than 4,000 balloons into the South across more than 30 occasions.

Only about 15% of the floated balloons landed on South Korean territory in the early launches. Now, more than 90% do.

North Korea’s trash-filled balloons that have landed in South Korea since May 28

Trash balloons

North Korea

Demilitarized Zone

Kaesong

Seoul

South korea

Daejeon

Daegu

Busan

Korea Strait

Note: As of Oct. 24 local time

Sources: Center for Strategic and International Studies (trash balloons); European Space Agency (land cover); OpenStreetMap (demilitarized zone)

Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com, Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com, Carl Churchill at carl.churchill@wsj.com and Taylor Umlauf at taylor.umlauf@wsj.com

2. The North Korea Watcher ego trap: Flaunting credentials from failed policies

Wow. So much bitterness from Professor Robertson. Perhaps a Korea watcher kicked sand in his face once.

That said, I agree with his point here on "true expertise" being a willingness to learn from failure and that we must have intellectual humility..

Here are my caveats that I often use when I give lectures on Korea.

Caveat Up Front

I support peace on the Korean peninsula
I support a diplomatic solution to the north Korean nuclear threat
I support ROK engagement with the north
I do not support a weakening of the ROK and ROK/US defensive capabilities
I believe there cannot be success for US, ROK, and Japanese interests without strong ROK/US and Japan/US alliances
Despite the above I think we have to accept that north Korea may have a continued hostile strategy and therefore while we prioritize diplomacy we have to remain prepared for the worst cases. I hope I am wrong here and that Kim Jong-un will dismantle his nuclear weapons and seek peaceful co-existence. But I do not think that is likely so we need a superior political warfare and military strategy to achieve peace by settling the "Korea question" once and for all.
There are no ”experts” on north Korea – it is the most difficult intelligence target – the proverbial “hard target”
At best we are students trying to understand the nature of the regime and the security problem on the Korean peninsula
Anything I say can and should be challenged
However, now that I am retired I am no longer constrained by doctrine, funding, or a chain of command so I can tell you how I really feel

Excerpts:

Intellectual humility

The obsession with credentials and connections reflects a deeper insecurity within the North Korea Watcher community. Faced with a track record of ineffectiveness, they grasp at their résumés to shield themselves from criticism. But the public—and policymakers—should demand more.

True expertise requires not just experience but the willingness to learn from failure. It demands humility, a readiness to question assumptions, and an openness to new ideas—even from those outside the insular expert class. It requires the ability to say “I don’t know”.

Instead of celebrating their former roles, North Korea Watchers should approach them as cautionary tales. They should grapple publicly with the implications of failures and interrogate why their strategies fell short. Only then can they build credibility and contribute meaningfully to one of the most intractable geopolitical challenges of our time.

Until that reckoning occurs, we would do well to treat the boastful proclamations of former positions with the skepticism they deserve. For in a field defined by failure, being connected to power is not a qualification—it’s a red flag.

Commentary

The North Korea Watcher ego trap: Flaunting credentials from failed policies

The North Korea Watcher “expert” ecosystem is a tight-knit, often self-congratulatory circle...

https://www.junotane.com/p/the-north-korea-watcher-ego-trap?utm_

Nov 30, 2024

In the peculiar realm of the North Korea Watcher, a curious phenomenon unfolds: a seemingly insatiable desire among watchers, commentators, and analysts to remind us, repeatedly, of their former positions in government, think tanks, and academia. It's as if proximity to power—even when that power produced failure—is a badge of honor. This ostentatious display of credentials is not just unseemly; it’s counterproductive, undermining the credibility of the very insights they purport to offer.

The North Korea Watcher “expert” ecosystem is a tight-knit, often self-congratulatory circle (most would add another word to this). On social media platforms and in think-tank panel discussions, résumés are wielded like cudgels. The message is clear: "I was in the room where it happened." They flaunt their attendance at high-level meetings, advisory roles during summits, or contributions to sanctions strategies. The classic line comes in big wig conferences at plush hotels in Seoul.

The older, nearly retired hunchback with a free flow of dandruff around the neck leans forward and says “when I met with the Secretary of State on our return to Washington from Pyongyang…” It doesn’t inspire confidence. This chest-thumping raises a critical question: If you were so deeply embedded in shaping policy, why are we still talking about the same problems decades later?

The credentials paradox

At its core, the North Korea issue is one of repeated failure. Since the collapse of the Agreed Framework in the early 2000s, successive administrations—whether in Washington, Seoul, or Tokyo—have failed to halt Pyongyang’s march toward becoming a bona fide nuclear weapons state. North Korea Watcher “experts”, often recruited into these policymaking circles, have presided over a legacy of misjudgments, miscalculations, and missed opportunities.

And yet, they emerge from these chapters not chastened but emboldened, touting their proximity to the gears of power. "I was in the XXXX administration during the XXXX talks," they’ll declare, as if this proximity lends them unique insight. It does not. What it demonstrates is their complicity in a long arc of ineffectual policies. Instead of viewing their past roles as a liability—a grim reminder that even experts can get it catastrophically wrong—they spin their CVs as proof of credibility.

This is not unique to North Korea Watchers, of course. Former officials across many policy spheres like to leverage their past titles. But in the case of North Korea, the stakes are higher, the failures starker, and the self-aggrandizement more grating.

Connection as a substitute for competence

This credential-waving often obscures the absence of substantive solutions. Analysts with a rolodex of "key contacts" in government and academia are often elevated over those offering fresh perspectives. The allure of connections—of insider knowledge—becomes the currency of credibility.

Yet, what have these connections achieved? Did they prevent North Korea from building its nuclear arsenal? Did they ensure human rights were meaningfully addressed? Did they facilitate peace on the Korean Peninsula? No. North Korea’s nuclear capability has expanded, its missile tests have grown bolder, and the regime remains as entrenched as ever.

The dirty secret of the North Korea watcher world is that their connections often serve more as a performative flourish than a functional tool. Knowing who’s who in Pyongyang’s opaque hierarchy or having attended a Track II dialogue doesn’t necessarily translate into actionable insight. It’s theater—a way to maintain relevance in a competitive field where outcomes rarely change.

What’s worse, these obscenities are repeated at lower levels as well. It’s as if we all think real life is a LinkedIn metasphere where everything you do is about showing what you’ve done and who you know. You’ll see it at most conferences nowadays - young people swarming about to secure photos with recognized public officials for that LinkedIn fan shot “I met XXXX XXXX!!!”. Then five or so years later the same shot will appear again on their LinkedIn page with more gravity “I’d like to congratulate XXXX XXXX on their promotion to Deputy Secretary of State” or some such guff. It makes me wanna puke.

A leisure lounge in the echo chamber

The North Korea Watcher community thrives on insularity. Its members publish op-eds in the same outlets, speak on the same panels, and praise each other’s books. This mutual back-patting reinforces their collective narratives, making it easier to ignore their shared culpability in repeated policy failures.

Challengers to the orthodoxy are often dismissed as outsiders, unserious, or lacking the necessary connections to "understand" the problem. This exclusionary culture stifles innovation and perpetuates a cycle of stale ideas.

Worse, it rewards those who toe the line. Analysts who once advocated hardline policies (like "strategic patience") now seamlessly pivot to softer stances without acknowledging their previous positions’ futility. The field thus becomes less about accountability and more about branding.

If the past 30 years of North Korea policy have taught us anything, it’s that no one has the answers. Engagement strategies, sanctions regimes, and military deterrence have all fallen short. Analysts who cling to their credentials as proof of their expertise should be met with skepticism. Their records suggest not omniscience but fallibility.

Instead of acknowledging this reality, many double down on their insider status. They repackage old ideas with new buzzwords, oblivious to the warning their résumés should present.

For instance, the same individuals who championed sanctions as a cornerstone of policy are now arguing for their relaxation, claiming a newfound enlightenment about humanitarian impacts. Conveniently, they omit their role in crafting the original sanctions architecture. These abrupt shifts betray an opportunism more concerned with career longevity than intellectual honesty.

Intellectual humility

The obsession with credentials and connections reflects a deeper insecurity within the North Korea Watcher community. Faced with a track record of ineffectiveness, they grasp at their résumés to shield themselves from criticism. But the public—and policymakers—should demand more.

True expertise requires not just experience but the willingness to learn from failure. It demands humility, a readiness to question assumptions, and an openness to new ideas—even from those outside the insular expert class. It requires the ability to say “I don’t know”.

Instead of celebrating their former roles, North Korea Watchers should approach them as cautionary tales. They should grapple publicly with the implications of failures and interrogate why their strategies fell short. Only then can they build credibility and contribute meaningfully to one of the most intractable geopolitical challenges of our time.

Until that reckoning occurs, we would do well to treat the boastful proclamations of former positions with the skepticism they deserve. For in a field defined by failure, being connected to power is not a qualification—it’s a red flag.

3. Do North Korean refugees really want to be human rights advocates?

Yes, Don't assume.

But in my experience most of the members of the north Korean diaspora (old and new) are pretty passionate about human rights. Yes some desire to be more active than others but they all understand the importance of human rights to the future of the Korean peninsula. But like self-determination of government they have the right to determine their own level of involvement in advocacy, if at all. After all that is what it is to be free. On the other hand, other members of the north Korean diaspora have the freedom to try to recruit advocates for human rights from among their ranks.

Excerpts:

At FSI, we have conducted 20 English speech contests with about 150 speeches by North Korean refugees in English. They can choose their topics freely. Few speeches have focused on human rights, unification, or North Korea’s leadership. Most North Korean refugees prefer to discuss their personal journeys, struggles, and adjustments to life in freedom. This freedom to choose ensures that their voices remain genuine and authentic.

The papers presented at the Hana Foundation seminar were by my colleagues concerned about North Korean refugees. My point of disagreement is with the rush to recruit newcomers and to present most North Korean refugees as potential human rights advocates. Advocacy should be an option, not an expectation, to create space for authentic voices to emerge naturally.

Do North Korean refugees really want to be human rights advocates?

The Korea Times · November 30, 2024

Casey Lartigue Jr., right, addresses the 2024 Korea Hana Foundation International Seminar, Nov. 19. Courtesy of Casey Lartigue Jr.

By Casey Lartigue Jr.

Should North Korean refugees be recruited to become human rights advocates? Why do most North Korean refugees avoid public advocacy? How can we empower their voices without imposing external agendas? And what does it take for a North Korean refugee to naturally transition into advocacy?

These were the questions I wrestled with while reading the papers presented by Park So-keel and Shin Hyo-sook at the Korea Hana Foundation’s 2024 International Seminar on November 19. Both papers were well-researched, logical, and rooted in valuable insights. They highlighted the potential of North Korean refugees to make a global impact, and for the past 12 years, I have been involved with making that happen. Yet, I found myself disagreeing with the premise that North Korean refugees should be actively recruited to become human rights advocates.

In my response, I focused on three main points. First, I questioned whether most North Korean refugees even want to be advocates. Second, I emphasized the importance of balancing advocacy with autonomy and authenticity. Third, I reflected on the limitations of advocacy as a broader strategy.

The assumption that North Korean refugees are eager to become human rights advocates doesn’t align with my experience. Since 2013, over 600 North Korean refugees located in various countries — including South Korea, the United States, Canada, Italy, France and the UK — have studied English and public speaking at Freedom Speakers International (FSI), the organization I co-founded with Lee Eun-koo. Their reasons for learning English are diverse and deeply personal. Many refugees prioritize education, aiming to succeed in South Korean universities or gain professional skills. Others see English as a tool to advance their careers, improve their independence, or build confidence. Only a small number express a desire to engage in public speaking or advocacy.

When refugees do engage in public speaking, their motivations vary. Some aim to raise awareness about North Korea, while others focus on personal storytelling, which allows them to share the experiences of loved ones. For many, public speaking serves as a form of therapy, helping them process trauma and heal. It is also a way to build self-confidence and find a sense of identity. Advocacy against the North Korean regime is just one of many possible outcomes, and it is far from the most common.

While advocacy has its place, it must not overshadow the personal goals and autonomy of North Korean refugees. Many North Koreans who escape begin their journeys as refugees, focused on survival rather than activism. Over time, some transition into defector-advocates. In freedom, free to read any book, watch videos, meet and talk with people, they learn more about North Korea’s systemic oppression. However, this transformation is deeply personal and should not be rushed.

One of the most remarkable examples I’ve witnessed is my co-author, Han Song-mi. For her first nine years in South Korea, she was largely invisible. Today, she is a public speaker who has addressed audiences at Harvard University and the Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy. Whereas she was once silent, she now encourages other refugees to share their stories. Song-mi’s journey illustrates the importance of patience. When North Korean refugees are given time and space to grow, many naturally become effective advocates. Conversely, when pressured into advocacy roles prematurely, they risk losing their authenticity and credibility.

On average, it takes North Korean refugees, after they are living in freedom, 11 years to publish a memoir in English. This timeline reflects the time they need to process their experiences, adjust to life in freedom, and develop the skills and confidence required to share their stories publicly. There are many more North Korean refugees who haven’t published their memoirs, for a variety of reasons.

Despite the long timeline for North Korean refugees to speak out, there is a constant demand by media, academics, and NGOs for “new” stories. The ultimate dream is for a reporter to interview Kim Jung-un, after he escapes, about the DMZ. This obsession with novelty overlooks the contributions of refugees who have already stepped forward as speakers, authors, and advocates, but who may have escaped a decade ago or longer. One thing that has baffled me is the constant search for new stories instead of supporting the handful that have already told their stories and may be ready for activism.

While advocacy is a powerful tool, it has limitations. Advocacy alone cannot address the structural challenges facing North Korean refugees or dismantle the Kim regime’s control. Moreover, advocacy efforts are often shaped by external agenda. Governments, NGOs, and academics frequently ask refugees to speak on topics they may not be comfortable with or have no personal connection to. This can dilute the authenticity of their voices and make them appear as “paid propagandists.”

At FSI, we have conducted 20 English speech contests with about 150 speeches by North Korean refugees in English. They can choose their topics freely. Few speeches have focused on human rights, unification, or North Korea’s leadership. Most North Korean refugees prefer to discuss their personal journeys, struggles, and adjustments to life in freedom. This freedom to choose ensures that their voices remain genuine and authentic.

The papers presented at the Hana Foundation seminar were by my colleagues concerned about North Korean refugees. My point of disagreement is with the rush to recruit newcomers and to present most North Korean refugees as potential human rights advocates. Advocacy should be an option, not an expectation, to create space for authentic voices to emerge naturally.

Casey Lartigue Jr. (CJL@alumni.harvard.edu) is the co-founder of Freedom Speakers International with Lee Eun-koo and co-author with Han Song-mi of her memoir "Greenlight to Freedom: A North Korean Daughter’s Search for Her Mother and Herself.”

The Korea Times · November 30, 2024

4. N.K. leader meets Russia's defense chief, vows continued support for Moscow's war efforts

Think opportunities, not fear.

(2nd LD) N.K. leader meets Russia's defense chief, vows continued support for Moscow's war efforts | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · November 30, 2024

(ATTN: RECASTS lead; ADDS more details in paras 6-7, 16)

By Kim Soo-yeon

SEOUL, Nov. 30 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has met Russia's visiting defense minister and expressed his support for Russia's war against Ukraine, state media reported Saturday, amid deepening military cooperation between the two nations.

Kim had a "friendly and trustworthy" meeting with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Pyongyang on Friday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Belousov arrived in North Korea the previous day for a visit that came as North Korea has sent thousands of its troops to Russia in support of Moscow's war against Ukraine.

In the meeting, the North's leader condemned the United States and the West for permitting Ukraine to use supplied long-range missiles for strikes against Russia, calling the move a "direct" military intervention, the KCNA said.

"It is an exercise of the right to self-defense for Russia to take resolute action to make the hostile forces pay the price," Kim said.

Kim's remark was seen as expressing support for Russia's recent firing of a hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile into the Ukrainian city of Dnipro.

The strike was seen as a response to the U.S. and Britain's allowing of Kyiv to strike Russian territory with advanced Western missiles.

The KCNA report did not mention whether Kim and Belousov discussed North Korea's troop deployment to Russia.

He affirmed that "the DPRK government, army and people will invariably support the policy of the Russian Federation to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity from the imperialists' moves for hegemony," the KCNA said, using the acronym of North Korea's official name.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Nov. 30, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (L) meeting with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

North Korea and Russia have been bolstering military cooperation under a major defense treaty signed in June that calls for providing military assistance "without delay" if either side comes under attack.

Earlier this month, North Korea ratified the comprehensive strategic partnership treaty through a decree signed by Kim. Russian President Vladimir Putin also signed the treaty into law after Russia's upper and lower houses ratified it.

North Korea has not publicly confirmed its troop deployment to Russia. But South Korea and the U.S. have said some of the North's deployed soldiers have already entered combat in Russia's western Kursk region.

Seoul officials are concerned that North Korea may receive advanced weapons technology from Russia in return for its troop dispatch to Moscow.

North Korea's troop deployment has raised concerns about an expansion of Russia's protracted war against Ukraine. Pyongyang has provided artillery and conventional weapons to Russia to support its war.

In regard to Belousov's visit to North Korea, experts raised the possibility of Russia asking for North Korea to further provide weapons or send troops to help bring the war to its advantage.

Ukrainian and Russian forces have intensively engaged in combat in recent weeks ahead of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump taking office in January. During the campaign, Trump said, if elected, he can end the war "in one day."

Meanwhile, Belousov held talks with his North Korean counterpart, No Kwang-chol, the previous day to discuss strengthening "strategic and tactical cooperation" between the two countries' armies by thoroughly implementing the strategic partnership, the KCNA said in a separate dispatch.

Russia's defense minister "expressed the willingness to further expand the mutually beneficial cooperation in the complicated international situation," it said.

Belousov was quoted as saying by Russia's news media Friday that Russia's cooperation with North Korea is "expanding" in various areas, including in the military field.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Nov. 30, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (R) meeting with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · November 30, 2024

5. S. Korea, US to hold tabletop exercise on nuclear deterrence next week

Good. This is important. I hope they will also include discussions on how to better inform and educate the Korean and US publics on the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence. That needs to be a key line of effort for the NCG.

S. Korea, US to hold tabletop exercise on nuclear deterrence next week

The Korea Times · November 28, 2024

South Korea's Deputy Minister for National Defense Policy Cho Chang-rae, center, U.S. Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Cara Abercrombie, left, and Japanese Director General for Defense Policy Taro Yamato shakes hands during the 15th Defense Trilateral Talks held in Seoul, in this photo provided by the defense ministry, Sept. 10. Yonhap

South Korea and the United States will hold a discussion-based exercise simulating North Korea's use of a nuclear weapon next week, Seoul's defense ministry said Thursday, as part of ongoing efforts to strengthen joint deterrence against the North's nuclear threats.

Cho Chang-rae, South Korea's deputy defense minister for policy, and Cara Abercrombie, the U.S. acting deputy under secretary of defense for policy, will lead the tabletop exercise during a two-day meeting slated for Wednesday next week in Washington, D.C., the ministry said.

The exercise, the first such military tabletop exercise to take place as part of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), will "enable a more advanced and cooperative policy coordination between the allies on nuclear and strategic planning in the event of a crisis or contingencies on the Korean Peninsula," it added.

The NCG was established under the Washington Declaration that President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden adopted during their summit in Washington in April last year as part of efforts to enhance the credibility of extended deterrence in the face of the North's continued push to advance its weapons programs.

Prior to the NCG launch, the allies held similar discussion-based drills, known as the Deterrence Strategy Committee tabletop exercise.

Next week Cho and Abercrombie will also lead the fourth session of the NCG meeting, joined by security, defense and foreign policy officials from both sides, the ministry said.

Both sides plan to review progress made through the NCG, in the areas of the security and intelligence-sharing process, nuclear consultations and strategic communications in the event of contingencies, conventional nuclear integration, and exercises and simulated drills, it added.

The upcoming NGC session is expected to be the last such meeting to be held under the Biden administration. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · November 28, 2024

6. NK hangs Yoon photo, military motto in exhibit about 'the enemy'

I don't think this will have an effect on President Yoon or the South that the Propaganda and Agitation Department thinks it will. It will not have the effect in the South in the same way such a photo of Kim Jong Un would have if used in a similar way .

NK hangs Yoon photo, military motto in exhibit about 'the enemy'

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · November 29, 2024

By Ji Da-gyum

Published : Nov. 29, 2024 - 16:21

People walk along Mirae Scientists Street in Pyongyang, North Korea on Monday. AP

North Korea’s indoctrination center in Pyongyang now displays a photo of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol alongside the South Korean military’s motto for countering provocations from Pyongyang -- “immediately, strongly and to the end" -- according to an image published by North Korean state media.

North Korea's Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the ruling Workers’ Party and the nation’s most widely circulated publication, featured a photo of students at the Central Class Education House in Pyongyang -- which is dedicated to fostering hostility toward South Korea, the United States and Japan -- on the sixth page of its Nov. 27 edition.

One exhibit showcased a photo of Yoon visiting a military unit, accompanied by the caption: “The venomous remarks of scoundrel Yoon Suk Yeol causing destruction,” paired with the phrase, “immediately, strongly and to the end,” the South Korean military’s slogan for responding to provocations from North Korea.

Yoon's photo was displayed under the title, "The vicious main culprit of the confrontation mentality against the Republic," a reference to North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Another section of the display targeted the South Korea-US alliance, featuring the 45th South Korea-US Security Consultative Meeting -- an annual defense dialogue between the two countries -- described as a "platform of discussion strategy of nuclear war provocations." The exhibit also labeled the South Korea-US alliance as an "aggressive treaty."

The Rodong Sinmun published the photo under the headline, “As generations change and the revolution advances, maintain a more resolute anti-imperialist class consciousness,” with the subtitle, “(North Korean people) cannot suppress their growing anger toward the South Korean puppet regime’s plots and schemes against the Republic."

The Central Class Education House, inaugurated in 2016 to commemorate the 66th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, serves as a key hub for fostering hostility toward South Korea, the United States and Japan while reinforcing ideological indoctrination.

The Unification Ministry in Seoul confirmed Friday that the exhibits related to South Korea at the Central Class Education House have been revised.

“These changes seem to be one of North Korea's attempts to dismantle the idea of unification and intensify class indoctrination aimed at fostering hostility toward South Korea,” an unnamed ministry official said.

These actions followed Kim's public assertion that the two Koreas now exist as "two hostile states" in a "belligerent relationship." This stance, first articulated at the 2023 year-end plenary session, has since been reiterated on multiple occasions, including at the Supreme People’s Assembly on Jan. 15, where Kim declared unification with South Korea no longer possible.

The Kim regime has also actively worked to eliminate unification symbols and references while severing physical links with South Korea, such as inter-Korean roads and railways.

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · November 29, 2024

7. North Korea bans 2 South Korean dishes

The regime is doubling down on its anti-South efforts.

It is ironic that it bans symbols of Korean resilience.

We enjoyed Budae-jjigae at the ROK Special Warfare Command HQ when I visited last week.

Excerpt:

All three of the dishes appeared in South Korea after the division of the country at the end of World War II and the 1950-53 Korean War that effectively made the division permanent.

Budae-jjigae literally means “army base stew,” and was borne out of a time of scarcity in the South.

It was made from packaged food items that were past their expiration date, but still edible, such as hot dogs and SPAM, that were discarded by U.S. Army bases and reclaimed by hungry South Koreans out of necessity.

These days in the South, the ingredients are procured by more conventional means, at the grocery store or from a wholesaler.

North Korea bans 2 South Korean dishes

Authorities shut down shops selling budae-jjigae and tteokbokki, leaving residents scratching their heads.

https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2024/11/30/north-south-korea-food-ban/

By Moon Sung Whui for RFA Korean

2024.11.29

Budae-jjigae served in a heated bowl. (Storyblocks)

Read a version of this story in Korean

North Korea has banned two popular dishes from being sold in restaurants because they are South Korean in origin, residents in the country told Radio Free Asia.

It’s the latest example of Pyongyang cracking down on the “invasion” of South Korean culture -- viewed as decadent and capitalist -- into the reclusive communist country.

Both dishes -- budae-jjigae, a spicy stew that sometimes includes instant ramen noodles, hot dogs and whatever happens to be on hand, and tteokbokki, steamed rice cakes covered in a spicy sauce -- have been very popular in South Korea for decades.

They did not surface in North Korea until 2017, brought over by a restaurateurs attached to a department store operated jointly with Chinese companies, the residents said.

Another food popular in the South that recently spread to the North, samgyeopsal, or barbecued pork belly slices, is not yet subject to the ban, they said.

In recent years, South Korean culture -- movies and TV shows, clothing and hairstyles, slang, humor and even dance moves -- have been seeping into the North. South Korean TV shows and other media are smuggled into the country on thumb drives and watched widely -- though in secret.

In 2020, North Korea passed a law called the Rejection of Reactionary Thought and Culture Act to keep these things from spreading.

Now it appears to have its sights on these foods.

“Sales of tteokbokki and budae-jjigae at the marketplace have completely stopped since the 15th,” a merchant from the northern province of Ryanggang told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for personal safety.

“The city police and the market management office have declared that if anyone is caught secretly selling those foods, their store will be shut down.”

She said that restaurant managers who sold the dishes were under investigation, and that police took measures to prevent their sale in a food court at a local department store.

“This is not simply a measure taken only in Ryanggang Province, but also to all restaurant networks and market food stands across the country, including Pyongyang,” the merchant said. “People are well aware that the sale of tteokbokki and budae-jjigae is prohibited because they are South Korean foods.”

Created by division

All three of the dishes appeared in South Korea after the division of the country at the end of World War II and the 1950-53 Korean War that effectively made the division permanent.

Budae-jjigae literally means “army base stew,” and was borne out of a time of scarcity in the South.

It was made from packaged food items that were past their expiration date, but still edible, such as hot dogs and SPAM, that were discarded by U.S. Army bases and reclaimed by hungry South Koreans out of necessity.

These days in the South, the ingredients are procured by more conventional means, at the grocery store or from a wholesaler.

Tteokbokki is served at a Korean street food stall. (Storyblocks)

Tteokbokki, meanwhile, is a street food that can be found in roadside carts in Seoul or any other South Korean city. It combines steamed rice cake with a sweet-spicy gooey sauce, and is often sold with boiled eggs, odeng fish sausage, and often paired with soju, the distilled alcoholic drink.

Literally translated as “three-layer meat,” samgyeopsal is pork belly. It’s the same cut used for bacon and is named for the three layers of fat that separate the meatier parts of the cut. Meat is extremely rare in the diet of typical North Koreans, but is readily available in the South.

Samgyeopsal is typically cooked on a heated griddle or over an open flame, then sliced and enjoyed with a variety of condiments. It’s often wrapped in lettuce with rice, raw or roasted garlic, chili pepper and other ingredients.

All of these dishes appeared recently in restaurants run by Chinese-citizen residents, the merchant said.

“They began to be sold in restaurants in the Yangsun Department Store, which has operated as a joint venture with China, since around 2017,” she said. “Until now, there were no restrictions on selling these foods.

No explanation given

According to the merchant, the authorities have not explained why they are banning tteokbokki and budae-jjigae. Samgyeopsal remains available because it is not quite as popular as the other two.

“Samgyeopsal is a popular food in high-end restaurants in Pyongyang and other regions, so it will likely be subject to crackdowns in the future,” she said.

‘Korean THAAD’ L-SAM successfully developed in 10 years

donga.com

Posted November. 30, 2024 07:28,

Updated November. 30, 2024 07:28

‘Korean THAAD’ L-SAM successfully developed in 10 years. November. 30, 2024 07:28. by Hyo-Ju Son hjson@donga.com.

South Korea has completed the development of the long-range surface-to-air guided weapon (L-SAM), often referred to as the "Korean version of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense)," after a decade of development. The L-SAM intercepts missiles at altitudes of 40-70 kilometers and plays a crucial role in the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, part of the three-axis strategy designed to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

On Friday, the Ministry of National Defense hosted a commemorative event to mark the achievement at the Agency for Defense Development's (ADD) Daejeon office. Attendees included Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun, Air Force Chief of Staff Lee Young-soo, and Defense Acquisition Program Administration Director Seok Jong-gun. President Yoon Suk Yeol congratulated, stating, “With the development of the L-SAM, Korea now possesses world-class missile defense capabilities capable of precisely intercepting high-altitude missiles at high speeds. This marks a groundbreaking advancement in the Korean missile defense system.”

The L-SAM project began exploratory development in 2015 with a total investment of 1.2 trillion won. In May 2024, it was rated combat-ready, meeting all operational performance requirements of the military. Mass production of the system is set to begin early next year.

한국어

donga.com

9. North Korea Expanding KN-23 Missile Production for Use by Russia

A money-maker for the regime.

North Korea Expanding KN-23 Missile Production for Use by Russia

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · November 27, 2024

Recent satellite images have shown the “February 11” missile manufacturing plant near Hamhung, North Korea’s second-most populous city, is being enlarged.

by Kyiv Post | November 27, 2024, 2:43 pm

Satellite imagery taken on Oct. 2, of the February 11 missile manufacturing plant near Hamhung, North Korea shows an expansion of the weapons-manufacturing complex. Image by Planet Labs PBC via “X.”

North Korea is expanding a weapons plant that manufactures missiles being used by Russia against Ukraine, according to analysts from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), who had examined recent satellite imagery produced by Planet Labs PBC.

North Korea’s state news agency KCNA confirmed earlier in November that construction was underway at the plant but categorized it as a modernization program that had been planned for implementation in 2024.

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The “February 11” plant, part of the Ryongsong Machine Complex, is located near the country’s second-largest city, Hamhung, and is known to produce the Hwasong 11A and 11B short range ballistic missiles, known in the West as the KN-23 and KN-24.

Reuters was told by Sam Lair, a research associate at CNS, that the Hamhung facility is the only plant in North Korea capable of producing the Hwasong-11 (KN-23/24) solid-fuel ballistic missiles.

The development on the site seems to include machine buildings, a second building, probably for the final assembly of missiles, along with a new housing facility, likely intended for the additional workers needed for the assembly of missiles.

The think-tank’s assessment comes only days after South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) said that Pyongyang had supplied additional artillery systems to Russia after photos appeared on social media showing flatbed rail cars carrying North Korean M-1978 Koksan 170mm self-propelled artillery howitzers near Krasnoyarsk, Russia, on Nov.15. The NIS said that Pyongyang had sent 50 Koksan along with 240mm multiple launch rocket systems to Russia in recent weeks.

Ukraine Sees Influx of Western War Tourists

The visits generally centre around Kyiv and its suburbs that saw alleged massacres from Russian troops in the early 2022.

In October, the NIS said that Russia had received more than 13,000 containers carrying artillery, missiles and other conventional ammunition from North Korea since August 2023.

Both Moscow and Pyongyang have denied allegations that North Korea has supplied weapons and munitions to aid Russia’s war effort, despite the growing mountain of evidence to the contrary.

Ukraine has been hit by a recent increase in Russian missile and drone attacks including by ballistic missiles, about a third of which were the North Korean KN-23 type, according to Ukrainian military officials.

According to Ukraine’s Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) many of the components used in the North Korean missiles are produced by Western manufacturers, including companies based in the US, the Netherlands and the UK, that have probably been acquired through third parties.

As part of the mutual defense pact signed by Moscow and Pyongyang in June this year, which calls on each other to “immediately provide military and other assistance using all available means” in the event of war. It is apparent that military cooperation between the two nations is deepening as a result. Along with the supply of ammunition, missiles and weapons, several thousand North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia’s Kursk region to support the Kremlin in its fight against Ukraine according to Western and South Korean officials.

Deputy Pentagon press secretary Sabrina Singh told journalists on Nov. 18 that around 11,000 North Korean troops had arrived in Russia's Kursk region which were expected to reinforce Russia’s frontline troops in the near future.

South Korea’s national security adviser Shin Won-sik said during a television interview on Nov. 22 that Russia had provided North Korea with advanced military technology including air defense missiles with which Kim Jong-un’s regime was deploying to protect the capital, Pyongyang.

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · November 27, 2024

10. South Korea’s Secret Female Commandos Shine on ‘Steel Troops W’

:-)

Excerpts:

So what exactly does the Dokgumi Unit, now in the spotlight, do? Renamed the Taeho Unit in May 2022, this all-female special operations company plays a unique role within the South Korean military.

The South Korean armed forces boast numerous special operations units, each with distinct missions. The Taeho Unit is comprised of about ten highly trained female non-commissioned officers who were selected for their physical prowess and leadership skills. They specialize in urban warfare and rapid counterterrorism response. While specific mission details remain classified, it’s known that the unit maintains exceptionally high standards, accepting only two new members annually.

The Taeho Unit is one of the most sought-after assignments among female soldiers, with application rates varying from 10:1 to as high as 60:1. Only elite non-commissioned officers who have completed training at the Army NCO Academy are selected, giving the Taeho Unit its status as the only all-female special forces unit in the South Korean military.

All unit members are martial arts experts in disciplines like Taekwondo, Hapkido, and Judo—essential skills for rapid and effective counterterrorism strikes. Given their rigorous training, they rank among the highest in shooting, martial arts, and physical fitness across the Army. The average martial arts ranking in the unit is 6th dan, and some members collectively hold over ten martial arts dan certificates.

South Korea’s Secret Female Commandos Shine on ‘Steel Troops W’

Story by Mobilitytv • 3d • 3 min read

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/south-korea-s-secret-female-commandos-shine-on-steel-troops-w/ar-AA1uR1V3

outh Korea’s only all-female special forces unit, known as the Dokgumi Unit (now renamed Taeho Unit), has drawn public interest after being featured on television. This elite unit, whose members’ faces, names, and ranks are classified, recently gained attention when a former member appeared on Channel A’s survival program, Steel Troops W.

Steel Troops W is a military survival show in which top female soldiers form teams to compete for their unit’s honor. The show features elite female units, including the Dokgumi Unit, Army Special Forces, Marine Corps, and the 707th Special Mission Battalion, enhancing its intensity. This season marks the latest installment of Steel Troops, which began in 2021 and has previously showcased fierce battles between former special forces members.

Steel Troops W

Steel Troops W has become the first entertainment show to focus on a top-tier female unit, capturing viewers’ interest with its unique theme. Previous seasons of Steel Troops have created a strong fanbase, contributing to the show’s guaranteed popularity.

A fan of survival shows in their 30s, A shared that after finishing the Netflix series Chef in Black and White, they started watching Steel Troops W. A said, “It’s fascinating to see a side of female soldiers we don’t usually get to see,” adding that they enjoy getting energized by survival programs.

Steel Troops W

So what exactly does the Dokgumi Unit, now in the spotlight, do? Renamed the Taeho Unit in May 2022, this all-female special operations company plays a unique role within the South Korean military.

The South Korean armed forces boast numerous special operations units, each with distinct missions. The Taeho Unit is comprised of about ten highly trained female non-commissioned officers who were selected for their physical prowess and leadership skills. They specialize in urban warfare and rapid counterterrorism response. While specific mission details remain classified, it’s known that the unit maintains exceptionally high standards, accepting only two new members annually.

Defense Daily

The Taeho Unit is one of the most sought-after assignments among female soldiers, with application rates varying from 10:1 to as high as 60:1. Only elite non-commissioned officers who have completed training at the Army NCO Academy are selected, giving the Taeho Unit its status as the only all-female special forces unit in the South Korean military.

All unit members are martial arts experts in disciplines like Taekwondo, Hapkido, and Judo—essential skills for rapid and effective counterterrorism strikes. Given their rigorous training, they rank among the highest in shooting, martial arts, and physical fitness across the Army. The average martial arts ranking in the unit is 6th dan, and some members collectively hold over ten martial arts dan certificates.

News1

Before the Taeho Unit, South Korea’s first female special forces unit was the Female Special Forces Company under the Army Special Warfare Command’s 707th Special Mission Battalion. The history of female special forces in South Korea dates back to September 1969, when Master Sergeant Jeong Hyo Dan and seven others completed airborne training.” Later, on September 1, 1975, the Special Warfare Command established a female company with 34 members who carried out various missions.

Although the Female Special Forces Company was disbanded in 2014 and its members were reassigned to different brigades, the Taeho Unit and the Female Special Forces Company have remained iconic parts of South Korean female special forces. The popularity of the show Steel Troops W has brought renewed attention to these female units.

11. Russia will likely send North Korean troops to the most dangerous spots to fight, says South Korea

Really? How do we know? I still have not seen credible reporting on how the nKPA forces are actually being employed.

Russia will likely send North Korean troops to the most dangerous spots to fight, says South Korea

Business Insider · by Thibault Spirlet

Military & Defense

Thibault Spirlet

2024-11-28T15:49:41Z

Ukrainian forces hit North Korean troops with Storm Shadow missiles in Kursk last week, an official told the Financial Times. Ed Ram/For The Washington Post via Getty Images

This story is available exclusively to Business Insider subscribers. Become an Insider and start reading now. Have an account? .

North Korean troops sent to aid Russia will likely be deployed to the most dangerous fighting spots.
That's according to South Korea's defense minister, who said they'd likely be used as "cannon fodder."
North Korean forces have already taken casualties, per reports.

North Korean troops fighting alongside Russian forces will likely be sent to some of the most dangerous spots in the war, Kim Yong-Hyun, South Korea's defense minister, said on Thursday.

Speaking during a parliamentary defense committee session, Kim said that "the war is led by Russia, and from the stance of unit heads of the Russian military, they are likely to send the North Korean platoons to the most dangerous and difficult areas."

He added that North Korean troops will likely be used as "cannon fodder," according to Yonhap News Agency, echoing comments made by Joonkook Hwang, South Korea's ambassador to the UN.

North Korea has sent thousands of troops to aid Russia in its war efforts, according to officials from South Korea, Ukraine, and the US.

On Tuesday, the Financial Times, citing a Ukrainian official, reported that a North Korean general had been injured and several officers killed last week by UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles that Ukraine launched against a Russian command center in Kursk.

The Wall Street Journal first reported the general's injury, citing Western officials.

In the attack, Ukraine fired a volley of at least 10 Storm Shadow missiles, the Journal reported, citing Ukrainian and Western officials.

Earlier this month, Andrii Kovalenko, the head of Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation, told BI that North Korean troops were being given just "a few weeks" of training, including in using reconnaissance and strike drones, before being sent to live combat positions.

Around the same time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that North Korean soldiers had suffered their first losses in the war.

Dmytro Ponomarenko, Ukraine's ambassador to South Korea, told Voice of America earlier this month that the number of North Korean soldiers deployed to help Russia could rise to 15,000, which would mean about 100,000 soldiers serving in rotation within a year, he said.

Sources familiar with the assessments of several G20 countries also cited the 100,000 figure when speaking to Bloomberg.

During a UN Security Council meeting on Wednesday, Kim Song, North Korea's permanent representative to the UN, avoided answering a direct question from his US counterpart about whether North Korea had sent troops to Russia.

Instead, he said the treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership between North Korea and Russia "fully conforms to international law and the UN Charter" and that his country would "remain faithful" to its treaty obligations.

Russia North Korea Ukraine

More...

Business Insider · by Thibault Spirlet

12. North Korea’s Struggles to Deliver on Its Plans

The Kim family regime is a living contradiction. And this provides such an opportunity for an information campaign to undermine the legitimacy of the regime and to give the tools to the Korean people in the north to seek transformation.

North Korea’s Struggles to Deliver on Its Plans

thediplomat.com

The yawning gap between Pyongyang’s pledges and reality.

By ISOZAKI Atsuhito

November 26, 2024

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There is often a significant disparity between North Korea’s stated policies and their implementation. In fact, looking back on its history, one could persuasively argue that Pyongyang has frequently failed to fulfill its public promises.

For instance, North-South reunification was Kim Il Sung’s stated goal since the founding of the country in 1948. The Korean War was an attempt to forcibly reunify North and South, and when that became unachievable following the U.S. intervention, Pyongyang resorted to terrorism. However, that too was unsuccessful in bringing about South Korea’s collapse. North Korean-led unification is unimaginable today, and Kim’s grandson, Kim Jong Un has turned to his own form of realism, outright rejecting the targets of his country from its founding.

For decades since the Cold War, North Korea referred to itself as “Paradise on Earth.” Even today, schools display the slogan, “We have nothing to envy in the world.” This might have functioned as effective propaganda until the 1960s, when South Korea was also poor, but the economic disparity between the two countries has widened drastically, with conditions in North Korea tending to be extremely harsh, especially since the end of the Cold War. There have been some improvements since the 1990s, but even so, rural areas are still suffering food shortages.

Kim Il Sung made “For the Complete Victory of Socialism” a target in the constitution of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). At the time this was adopted, it was assumed that the entire Korean Peninsula, including the southern half, would experience a socialist revolution. His son Kim Jong Il preferred the term “Construction of a Strong and Prosperous Socialist Nation (Gangseongdaeguk).” This “Strong and Prosperous Nation” was to be formed of three pillars: one political and ideological, one military, and the third economic. North Korea itself determined that the first two pillars had been achieved at sufficient standards and set economic construction as a central national issue.

Although no specific, numerical targets were declared, Kim Jong Il boasted of an “open gate for a Strong and Prosperous Nation” by 2012, marking the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth. This was meant to be a slogan instilling hopes for economic development among the people, but Kim Jong Il died suddenly at the end of 2011. In the end, this “Strong and Prosperous Nation” was quietly retired.

Kim Jong Un, who assumed the role of supreme leader while still in his 20s, spent his middle and high school years in Switzerland and is part of the internet generation. So, it is thought that he has a better understanding of the situation in his own country than his father and grandfather, who tended to seek out ideals.

However, Kim appears to have his own struggles with ideals and reality. In addition to directly recognizing the harsh economic conditions in North Korea, he also clarified his support for the people as he teared up while summing up the previous year. “My desires were burning all the time, but I spent the past year feeling anxious and remorseful for the lack of my ability,” he said in his New Year’s Address on January 1, 2017. In the party constitution, the basic political system of “military first (Songun)” was also replaced with “People-first politics.”

The COVID-19 pandemic was an economic crisis for the entire world, but for North Korea, the timing couldn’t have been worse. In 2018, three inter-Korean summits were held, as well as the North Korea-United States Singapore Summit with then-U.S. President Donald Trump. The following year, however, as a result of failed negotiations with the U.S., North Korea was unable to achieve security guarantees or even a partial lifting of sanctions. The pandemic began immediately after that, and the closing of the borders inevitably led to an increasingly difficult economic situation in North Korea.

Kim Jong Un lamented the weakness of the country’s healthcare system and ordered the construction of the Pyongyang General Hospital in a prime location within the capital. However, the North Korean media stopped reporting on this highly touted project at some point. Satellite photos show that construction of the large building was completed quickly, but there is likely a decisive shortage of crucial medical equipment and medicine. With no talk of the hospital’s opening, the pandemic began to wind down anyway.

The failure to implement public promises is not limited to anti-South Korean and unification issues or economic challenges. In August of last year, election laws were revised, and the principle of competition was introduced, albeit in a limited way. These revisions allow for the partial introduction of a screening stage, with pre-election candidates selected by ballot. It is thought that this measure was aimed at relieving pressure from the public, but to date, an election for delegates to the Supreme People’s Assembly has not happened, though it was supposed to happen in March of this year.

Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un stated that North Korea would launch three additional reconnaissance satellites this year, but only one was launched in May, and it was a failure. Additionally, next year marks the last year of the “Five-year plan for the development of national defense science and weapons systems” announced in 2021. North Korea also appears to be a long way from owning nuclear submarines, a stated goal of the plan. While neighboring countries prefer that North Korea does not fulfill its public promises of weapons development, they still worry that it might make good on them in the future.

Authors

Guest Author

ISOZAKI Atsuhito

ISOZAKI Atsuhito is a professor at Keio University.

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thediplomat.com

13. 60 Years of Japan-South Korea Relations: A Moment for Reflection and Progress

Excerpts:

This steadfast commitment to dialogue and reconciliation is particularly meaningful as Japan and South Korea prepare to commemorate significant anniversaries in their bilateral relationship next year. Iwaya’s approach reflects a constructive vision for the future, one that prioritizes mutual understanding and collaboration over divisive rhetoric. Despite the challenges, this stance offers a promising foundation for improving Japan-South Korea relations, and it deserves recognition and support.

The 60th anniversary of Japan-South Korea relations presents both a moment of reflection and a chance for progress. While there are undeniable challenges, particularly surrounding historical issues, both nations have an opportunity to build on the momentum of the past few years. Ishiba’s vision for a more cooperative and forward-looking relationship is commendable, but it must be accompanied by actions that match this rhetoric. To ensure a lasting and positive future for Japan-South Korea relations, both governments must demonstrate sincerity, consistency, and a shared commitment to overcoming the legacies of the past in favor of a more harmonious and prosperous future.

60 Years of Japan-South Korea Relations: A Moment for Reflection and Progress

thediplomat.com

Under the leadership of Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, there is hope that recent momentum will continue.

By Haruka Satake

November 27, 2024

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The year 2025 marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea, a significant milestone in the history of both nations. Despite the long-standing tensions and complex history between the two countries, this anniversary provides a significant opportunity to reflect on the progress made and to reaffirm the potential for future collaboration. Under the leadership of Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, there is hope that this momentum will continue, with both countries taking steps to address shared challenges and enhance bilateral cooperation.

In recent years, the strategic importance of Japan-South Korea relations has become more pronounced, especially in the face of evolving threats from North Korea and growing geopolitical shifts in the region. During a meeting in Peru on November 16, Ishiba and Yoon agreed on the importance of cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and the United States in addressing North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments and its increasing military ties with Russia. Ishiba and Yoon were also joined by U.S. President Joe Biden for a trilateral summit on November 15. This alignment on regional security issues is a clear indication that both Japan and South Korea recognize the necessity of working together to ensure peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

Also, in anticipation of the 60th anniversary, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a special office in August 2024 to manage the commemoration and strengthen bilateral ties. The upcoming events in 2025, including the Osaka-Kansai Expo and the APEC CEO Summit in Gyeongju, offer tangible platforms to celebrate the successes of the past six decades and to set the stage for deeper cooperation in the future.

As we approach the 60th anniversary, however, there have already been some bumps on the road. For example, Japan-South Korea relations recently became a hot topic once again over the issue of visits to Yasukuni Shrine. On November 24, the Korean side – both bereaved family members and government participants – canceled their participation at the last minute in a memorial ceremony held in Niigata Prefecture for the gold mine workers on Sado Island. The South Korean side claimed that Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikuina Akiko, who participated in the ceremony, had visited Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 2022 – the anniversary of the end of World War II – after her election to the House of Councilors in July that same year. This was seen as the reason for the Korean side’s absence. The Japanese government, on the other hand, maintains that there is no evidence Ikuina has visited Yasukuni Shrine since her election.

Ishiba has also faced criticism from South Korea over the controversial Yasukuni Shrine issue. He is regarded as a pro-Korea figure, and the Korean side hoped for improving Japan-South Korea relations after his inauguration. The Korean Times reported this September that Ishiba had expressed somewhat critical views regarding visits to Yasukuni Shrine. However, in October, Ishiba sent an offering to the shrine, prompting South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to express deep disappointment and regret. While it is said Ishiba’s actions align with precedents set by former leaders such as Suga Yoshihide and Kishida Fumio, his offering to Yasukuni Shrine has been perceived as an attempt to maintain the support of Japan’s conservative base, despite his reputation as a pro-Korea politician.

Although Ishiba’s image as a figure of reconciliation is welcomed, actions like this risk undermining trust in his commitment to fostering better ties with South Korea. His apparent balancing act – catering to conservative factions while presenting himself as a reformer – can erode his credibility, particularly in South Korea. To ensure lasting progress in Japan-South Korea relations, consistent and clear actions are vital, as wavering decisions like the recent Yasukuni offering may only deepen skepticism across the region.

On the one hand, Ishiba’s administration notably includes Foreign Minister Iwaya Tsuyoshi, who has demonstrated a firm commitment to improving Japan-South Korea relations despite political tensions. He served as Japan’s defense minister during the radar-locking incident in 2018 involving a South Korean naval vessel and a Japanese patrol plane, and Iwaya advocated for forward-looking bilateral relations even amid the controversy. In 2019, he emphasized the importance of future-oriented Japan-South Korea defense cooperation, stating that mutual trust was fundamental to the relationship. Even today, despite facing criticism from within the Liberal Democratic Party for his pro-engagement stance, Iwaya stated that “Japanese diplomacy would not be possible if we were averse to China and Korea” at a press conference on November 2.

This steadfast commitment to dialogue and reconciliation is particularly meaningful as Japan and South Korea prepare to commemorate significant anniversaries in their bilateral relationship next year. Iwaya’s approach reflects a constructive vision for the future, one that prioritizes mutual understanding and collaboration over divisive rhetoric. Despite the challenges, this stance offers a promising foundation for improving Japan-South Korea relations, and it deserves recognition and support.

The 60th anniversary of Japan-South Korea relations presents both a moment of reflection and a chance for progress. While there are undeniable challenges, particularly surrounding historical issues, both nations have an opportunity to build on the momentum of the past few years. Ishiba’s vision for a more cooperative and forward-looking relationship is commendable, but it must be accompanied by actions that match this rhetoric. To ensure a lasting and positive future for Japan-South Korea relations, both governments must demonstrate sincerity, consistency, and a shared commitment to overcoming the legacies of the past in favor of a more harmonious and prosperous future.

Authors

Guest Author

Haruka Satake

Haruka Satake is a policy research fellow of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins University. She specializes in East Asia and U.S. security policy.

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thediplomat.com

14. Why the North Korea-Russia Alliance Is a Grave Threat

We must not look at things strictly through the nuclear lens as it blinds us to the other aspects of the Kim family regime strategies. That said, this makes sense.

Why the North Korea-Russia Alliance Is a Grave Threat

In this volatile and extremely uncertain landscape, South Korea has little to gain and much to lose by taking premature action that might harm its national interests.

The National Interest · by Byong-Chul Lee · November 28, 2024

The deployment of North Korean troops to support Russia in the war with Ukraine, once speculative, is now confirmed. Russia has stopped short of outright denial that North Korean soldiers are already on Russian soil, positioned to aid the Kremlin’s efforts on the Ukrainian front.

On October 25, President Vladimir Putin revealed that under a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty signed with North Korea this past June, discussions are underway to determine if, and to what extent, Pyongyang might further assist Moscow. North Korea’s foreign ministry also commented on this possibility, stating that if North Korean forces are deployed, their actions would align with “international legal norms.”

This convergence between Russia and North Korea is unsurprising, but it is also deeply troubling.

Since the onset of Russia’s invasion in February 2022, North Korea has remained one of Moscow’s staunchest supporters. During a UN General Assembly emergency special session on March 2, 2022, North Korea joined a small group of countries opposing a resolution condemning Russia’s aggression. In early 2023, Kim Yo-jong, sister to Kim Jong-un, went further, mocking the Ukrainian government, suggesting that they were “no match for Russia” and warning that their nuclear “delusions” could make them a target for Russian nuclear strikes.

After the failed 2019 Hanoi summit with then-President Trump, Kim Jong-un abandoned the United States as a central player in his strategic calculus.

In the meantime, South Korea’s response has been unusually proactive. On October 22, Deputy National Security Advisor Kim Tae-hyo announced that South Korea would take “phased response measures” in reaction to this deepening North Korea-Russia military cooperation. While the specifics remain undisclosed, the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol government of South Korea seems ready to expand its support for Ukraine, potentially even considering military aid.

Any notion of a quick end to this conflict is, however, unrealistic. The situation feels disturbingly reminiscent of the interwar period (1919–1939) between the world wars. The outlook for Ukraine remains unclear, with President Biden unlikely to achieve a resolution before his term ends. Meanwhile, Russia continues to launch relentless missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, further destabilizing the region.

When U.S. President-elect Donald Trump returns to the White House in 2025, Ukraine may face an even more uncertain future. The soon-to-be forty-seventh president has claimed he could end the war “in twenty-four hours,” a promise many assume implies the withdrawal of American aid for Ukraine if re-elected, but has offered no further details. Not surprisingly, his unpredictable approach and apparent rapport with President Putin could result in a peace deal favoring Russia.

At the same time, we see early signs that Western nations, including the United States, are exploring more direct actions against Russia. This is a testament to the breakdown of the post-Cold War, U.S.-led unipolar order, and the emergence of a multipolar world marked by heightened instability.

In this volatile and extremely uncertain landscape, South Korea has little to gain and much to lose by taking premature action that might harm its national interests. Shattering over three decades of diplomatic relations with Russia to support Ukraine’s uncertain future is an imprudent gamble. Even during tough economic times in the 1970s, South Korea avoided such reckless moves.

History offers a cautionary tale. During the Vietnam War, Seoul sent some of its most elite units to aid the defense of South Vietnam, a decision driven by national interests and economic needs.

Today, South Korea’s national strength is considerably greater, and North Korea is a nuclear-armed state with considerable conventional forces. Therefore, South Korea’s foreign policy should be based on strategic calculation, not knee-jerk responses to shifting global pressures.

There is also a real risk that the Seoul government may resort to reactive, short-term measures in response to what can only be described as the “absurdity of diplomacy” between Kim Jong-un and Putin. Instead, South Korea must prioritize de-escalation and careful management of inter-Korean tensions. South Korean decision-makers, most of whom are relatively hawkish, should exercise particular caution, as missteps could destabilize an already precarious situation.

Reckless foreign policy actions that prioritize values over national interests may sound noble, but they are the stuff of second-rate strategies. In a sense, North Korea likely views this conflict as an opportunity to advance its military capabilities and potentially deceive international watchdogs like the IAEA. As part of its growing alliance with Moscow, the communist regime in North Korea may be poised to receive advanced military technology, including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology and satellite reconnaissance capabilities. These developments could dramatically boost its nuclear program. If North Korea-Russia cooperation solidifies into a full-fledged military alliance, akin to the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, it could seriously destabilize Northeast Asia.

For Pyongyang, which appears to be determined to pull up the drawbridge between the two Koreas, the Ukraine war presents a strategic opportunity. The chances of voluntary denuclearization are now effectively zero. In this climate of deepening “adversarial duality” between North Korea and the rest of the world, we cannot ignore the “inconvenient truths” we now face: the end of unipolarity, the hardening of geopolitical blocs, and North Korea’s relentless nuclear advancements. These realities make the growing North Korea-Russia alliance a serious and immediate threat.

In a rapidly changing global structure, it is no coincidence that Mr. Kim has set his survival strategy on the “two hostile states” doctrine, shifting his diplomatic pendulum from President Xi Jinping to Putin. However, this doesn’t mean that North Korea can entirely replace China with Russia. While it’s not a mechanical equidistant diplomacy akin to the Sino-Soviet split, Kim’s choice of Russia over China appears aimed at advancing nuclear capabilities. The essence of nuclear weapons has evolved from being contained within U.S.-led nonproliferation norms to a kind of chess game involving major powers like the United States, Russia, and China.

All in all, the North Korean nuclear equation has grown more complex, making it harder to untangle. The UN Security Council’s role has also become ineffective.

The North Korean nuclear issue is a dependent variable within the competitive dynamics of great powers. The war in Ukraine vividly illustrates this shift toward a multipolar world. Both denuclearization and unification, which are the starting points for strengthening the peace and stability in the region, have ultimately become challenges that our generation is unlikely to resolve.

Byong-Chul Lee is an Assistant Professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) in Seoul, South Korea. His research interests include North Korean denuclearization, nuclear non-proliferation, and policies on ROK-US relations. Before joining the IFES, Dr. Lee worked as an aide to the Presidential Senior Secretary for Foreign and National Security Affairs and served as a foreign and national security policy planning staff member at the Presidential Office of South Korea from 1993 to 1999. He also served as a special aide and policy planning secretary to the Speaker of the National Assembly from 2015 to 2016. His op-eds and comments have appeared in The New York Times, 38North, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, YaleGlobal, Project Syndicate, and The South China Morning Post, among other publications.

Image: Juliya Shangarey / Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest · by Byong-Chul Lee · November 28, 2024

15. '12.12: The Day' wins Best Film at Blue Dragon Film Awards

'12.12: The Day' wins Best Film at Blue Dragon Film Awards | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Woo Jae-yeon · November 29, 2024

By Woo Jae-yeon

SEOUL, Nov. 29 (Yonhap) -- The historical drama "12.12: The Day" won Best film at the 45th Blue Dragon Film Awards on Friday, with its lead actor, Hwang Jung-min, taking home the Best Actor award.

Directed by Kim Sung-su, the film depicts the gripping nine-hour standoff on Dec. 12, 1979, between Chun Doo-kwang (portrayed by Hwang), the mastermind behind a military coup as head of the Defense Security Command, and Lee Tae-shin (Jung Woo-sung), the Capital Defense Commander who bravely opposes the coup at great personal risk.

This photo provided by Plus M Entertainment shows a scene from "12.12: The Day." (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Kim Go-eun was awarded Best Actress for her performance in the supernatural thriller "Exhuma" while director Jang Jae-hyun received the Best Director award.

"Exhuma" follows two shamans, a feng shui expert and a mortician as they team up to investigate a series of mysterious events plaguing a wealthy family living in the United States. Their investigation leads them to a remote Korean village, where they uncover secrets by exhuming the grave of the family's ancestor.

A still from "Exhuma" is shown in this image provided by Showbox. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Jung Hae-in won Best Supporting Actor for his role as the villain in Ryoo Seung-wan's crime action "I, the Executioner," while Lee Sang-hee took home Best Supporting Actress for her portrayal of Seon-joo, an ethnic Korean character living in China, in Netflix's original Korean film "My Name is Loh Kiwan."

The Best New Actor award went to Noh Sang-hyun for his portray of a gay man in the coming-of-age drama "Love in the Big City" and Park Joo-hyun earned Best New Actress for her role in the thriller "Drive."

The Blue Dragon Film Awards is one of the country's most prestigious film honors. Established in 1963 the awards were discontinued in 1973 but resumed in 1990 and have been held annually ever since.

jaeyeon.woo@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Woo Jae-yeon · November 29, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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