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On 12 November 2024, suspected Islamic State (IS) militants reportedly established a fake checkpoint along the M42 highway between ar-Rusafah and Athriya. This event highlights a potentially significant shift in IS tactics and territorial priorities. While no confirmation has been received from IS central command or insider sources, reports indicate that the group has been conducting operations in the ar-Rusafah desert. The creation of such a checkpoint suggests a deliberate attempt by IS to exert influence over strategic transit routes, enabling the movement of personnel and resources despite facing significant military pressure.
The ar-Rusafah desert's vast and rugged terrain offers a tactical advantage for IS, allowing them to evade coalition forces' scrutiny while maintaining operational capacity. This recent activity is likely a response to the intensified strikes by US coalition forces targeting IS strongholds in the Syrian Desert, specifically in Homs and Western Deir Ezzor. These operations have pressured IS to adapt, shifting their focus to areas such as ar-Rusafah that provide relative security and fewer immediate threats from aerial and ground campaigns. This development does not necessarily signify the establishment of a new hub but rather illustrates IS’s ability to reposition and exploit less-targeted regions as temporary bases for regrouping and launching new attacks.
IS Security in Syria and Its Ability to Set Up Roadblocks
IS’s ability to set up a fake checkpoint along a major highway demonstrates a concerning level of security and control within certain pockets of Syria. Despite ongoing military campaigns, IS appears to retain a level of territorial knowledge and operational freedom in remote areas like the ar-Rusafah desert. These regions, characterised by sparse populations and rugged terrain, provide IS with natural cover and allow them to establish transient operational zones.
IS’s security in the region is bolstered by its deep understanding of local geography and its capacity to exploit gaps in coalition and Syrian government oversight. Roadblocks or fake checkpoints, such as the one on the M42, serve multiple purposes: controlling local populations, disrupting rival movements, gathering intelligence, and projecting power. While such actions indicate a strategic attempt to undermine regional stability, they also expose IS’s ability to operate openly in regions where counterinsurgency efforts may be overstretched or insufficiently coordinated.
Operational Significance of the ar-Rusafah Region
TRAC has documented recent IS assaults in areas like Ja`din within the broader ar-Rusafah desert, further confirming IS's sustained activity. These incidents demonstrate IS's continued capacity to launch targeted attacks, even under intense pressure. The group's operations in ar-Rusafah do not signal a complete withdrawal from previously active regions, such as Homs or Deir Ezzor. Instead, IS frequently employs tactical retreats to divert attention, consolidate resources, and prepare for renewed offensives elsewhere.
While the ar-Rusafah desert may still need to constitute a new central hub for IS, its strategic importance is growing. The ability to conduct operations, maintain checkpoints, and evade detection highlights the enduring threat IS poses despite the significant blows dealt to its leadership and infrastructure.
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(Video/ Right-Wing Extremism): Satanic/Neo-Nazi/ Order of the Nine Angles (ONA/O9A) Circulate Video ‘Blow Up The West’ | |
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On 16 November 2024, an Order of the Nine Angles (ONA) Satanic neo-Nazi Telegram channel circulated a propaganda video names ‘Blow up the West’. The video displayed the ONA Septagon, symbolising its Seven-Fold Way ideology, and featured a montage of al-Qaeda leaders such as Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri alongside footage of the 9/11 attacks and the hijackers. Accompanied by extremist music, the video glorified mass-casualty terrorism and served as an example of stochastic terrorism designed to incite lone-wolf violence among its followers. By incorporating these elements, ONA explicitly linked its agenda with the tactics of jihadist groups, emphasising a shared vision of societal collapse.
TRAC highlights that ONA’s ideology revolves around murder, culling, and lone-wolf attacks aimed at dismantling society to create a Satanic empire. A distinctive aspect of ONA’s strategy is its encouragement of infiltration into militant groups across the spectrum, including Neo-Nazi groups to Islamist extremist organisations, to gain operational expertise and foster collaboration. With this, ONA aims to build an ideological alliance against shared targets, such as Western democratic systems, morality, and marginalised communities. This strategy highlights ONA’s willingness to blur ideological lines to pursue its apocalyptic goals.
TRAC has also observed that ONA and other Satanic groups are increasingly imitating the propaganda styles and rhetoric of jihadist groups. The video serves as a prime example, borrowing heavily from jihadist aesthetics by glorifying 9/11, using themes of rebellion and societal collapse, and featuring prominent Islamist leaders. By adopting these tactics, ONA seeks to elevate its appeal and align its agenda with the operational success and global notoriety of jihadist groups. This convergence of methods highlights the adaptability of contemporary extremist groups in co-opting one another’s narratives to amplify their reach.
The growing overlap between right-wing extremism, satanism, and jihadist propaganda creates a dangerous hybrid threat. ONA’s calls for cross-ideological collaboration, combined with its advocacy for infiltration and shared violent goals, represent a significant evolution in extremist strategy. This fusion of Satanic, far-right, and jihadist ideologies not only complicates counterterrorism efforts but also signals an alarming trend of increasingly unified and adaptive forms of extremism.
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TRAC Incident Report: Baloch Raaji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS) Claims Responsibility for Carrying out 45 Attacks across Balochistan with the Motive of “Baloch Martyr’s Day” in Balochistan, Pakistan | |
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With the motive of November 13, Baloch Martyrs’ Day, the Baloch Raaji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS) conducted an unprecedented wave of attacks, launching 45 coordinated strikes across 42 different locations in Balochistan over a span of four days, from November 11 to 14. The operation targeted the Pakistani Army, military installations, and critical infrastructure such as gas pipelines, mineral transport vehicles, and highways. The scale and precision of these attacks underline the operational sophistication of Baloch militant groups and their ability to strike a wide range of strategic targets simultaneously. Notably, the coastal highway and major transport routes in Rakshan, Khuzdar, and Harnai were blockaded, demonstrating the militants’ capacity to disrupt critical supply lines. Among the casualties were 20 Pakistani soldiers, including a senior officer, Major Haseeb, further highlighting the impact of the operation.
The scope and coordination of these attacks suggest months of planning, likely involving ZIRAB, BRAS’s intelligence unit, which would have played a critical role in identifying and reconnoitring high-value targets. By leveraging guerrilla tactics and capitalising on the symbolic importance of Baloch Martyrs’ Day, BRAS maximised the psychological and operational effects of the attacks. The operation’s decentralised nature, with militants from across Balochistan targeting different zones, stretched Pakistani forces thin, making it difficult for them to mount an effective, centralised response. This strategy caused significant material and financial losses and underscored the region’s persistent vulnerability of state forces.
The involvement of local supporters is also a plausible factor in the success of such a large-scale operation. November 13 is a rallying point for Baloch militant groups, who use the date to mobilise support for the cause of Baloch independence. Propaganda efforts likely encouraged locals to contribute to the operation, either directly or indirectly, further amplifying its reach and impact. The timing also allowed militants from various groups, including the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), to carry out parallel operations, creating a synchronised show of force across the province.
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TRAC Incident Report: Detonation of a Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) Targets a Police Truck, Injuring Five Officers, Tanyong Dalo, Yaring District, Pattani Province, Thailand | |
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On 14 November 2024, at approximately 2:40 PM local time, unidentified assailants remotely detonated an explosive device attached to a motorcycle (Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device / VBIED), targeting a passing police truck near the Tanyong Dalo Bridge in Yaring District, Pattani Province, Southern Thailand. The explosion injured five police officers, while the police truck, despite sustaining damage, was driven away from the site by its injured driver to prevent a possible follow-up attack. Authorities quickly cleared the area, fearing the presence of a second improvised explosive device (IED).
This bombing occurred just one day after heavily armed assailants attacked a paramilitary ranger unit in Ubae Village, Bannang Sata District, Yala Province, approximately 40 kilometres southwest of the Pattani bombing site. TRAC assesses that the same cell of militants was likely responsible for both incidents, given the proximity and timing of the attacks. Notably, photos of the damaged police truck suggest it was not only impacted by the blast but also struck by gunfire from weapons of different calibres, indicating a coordinated ambush involving firearms.
Southern Thailand has long been plagued by insurgent violence, with such attacks typically attributed to local insurgent groups seeking to instil fear and disrupt governance in the region. However, TRAC highlights the possibility that this particular attack may have been carried out by militants associated with Islamic State East Asia (ISEA)-Pattani. The group has demonstrated a pattern of orchestrating high-profile attacks in the region as part of broader efforts to destabilise Southern Thailand and establish an extremist foothold.
The tactics used in this incident—including the use of a VBIED, the potential ambush with gunfire, and the targeting of police—are consistent with the escalating sophistication and operational capabilities of insurgent or extremist cells in Southern Thailand. Whether conducted by local insurgents or ISEA-affiliated militants, these attacks underline the persistent volatility in the region, where overlapping insurgencies and jihadist influences continue to threaten regional security.
ISEA-Pattani: Emerging Threat in Southern Thailand's Insurgency since 2021
ISEA has been suspected of cross-border operations from Malaysia since 2016, with its fighters, likely based in the southern Philippines, urging Thai militants to continue their insurgency. Some Thai separatists embraced IS’s global radical Islamic ideology, as evidenced by a 2021 video in which Pattani insurgents pledged allegiance to IS.
ISEA-Pattani likely emerged from disaffected members of the dominant Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), and there are indications of crossover between the two groups. However, it remains unclear if they actively cooperate or simply avoid conflict with each other. Since 2021, ISEA-Pattani has carried out regular attacks, primarily bombings, while maintaining a low profile to evade detection by Thai security forces.
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(Poster) Al Isabah Media House on Behalf of Islamic State Hind Province (ISHP) Call for Arms & Endorse Violence | |
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This stochastic poster was published by Al-Isabah, an Islamic State (IS) media house. It is a clear piece of violent propaganda targeting individuals and groups perceived as hostile to IS’s ideology, explicitly focusing on India.
The visual elements of the poster include a handgun, bullets, and a grenade, signalling a call to arms and an endorsement of violence. A map of India alongside these items implies that this message’s intended focus or target is within Indian borders. A photograph of people holding orange flags with a crosshair overlay indicates an aggressive stance against Hindu nationalist groups, reflecting IS’s framing of its fight as not only anti-state but also against specific religious or cultural groups they consider adversarial.
In the background, there is a text block in Tamil, indicating that this message is mainly directed at Tamil-speaking audiences, possibly targeting radicalised individuals or those susceptible to extremist ideology within India’s Tamil population or the Tamil diaspora.
Through this poster, Al-Isabah attempts to promote the (re)establishment of a foothold in South Asia, presenting itself as a protector and avenger of Muslims against local nationalist groups while also exploiting regional tensions to further its agenda.
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TRAC Incident Report: Bandits Conduct Two Simultaneous Armed Assault, Killing Two & Abducting Over 30, in Dan-alhaji & Maidoriya, Batsari LGA, Katsina, Nigeria | |
TRAC Incident Report: Haitian Gang Armed Assault Target Spirit & American & JetBlue Airline Flights in Port-au-Prince, Quest Department, Haiti | |
TRAC Incident Report: Neo-Nazi Hate Club 1488 Members March Through Several Neighborhoods in Columbus, Ohio, United States | | | | |
