Quotes of the Day:

"Restriction of free thought and free speech is the most dangerous of all subversions. It is the one un-American act that could most easily defeat us."

–​ William O. Douglas

"Great thoughts speak only to the thoughtful mind, but great actions speak to all mankind."

– Theodore Roosevelt

"The most shocking fact about war is that its victims and its instruments are individual human beings, and that these individual beings are condemned by the monstrous conventions of politics to murder or be murdered in quarrels not their own."

– Aldous Huxley

​1. N. Korean leader calls for nurturing more military commanders on key military anniv.

2. Unification minister, U.S. envoy to visit site of N.K. abduction next month

3. S. Korea to acquire SM-3 shipborne missiles by 2030

4. S. Korea, Japan could consider simplified entry agreement amid warming ties: Seoul official

5. Exclusive: Kim Jong-un’s annual expenditures are enough to feed people for 3 years

6. Upcoming UN report will shed new light on North Korea’s human rights abuses, experts say

7. Stronger Alliance or Nuclear Weapons? North Korea’s Military Might Means Tough Choices for South Korea

8. China, North Korea denounce Japan’s involvement with AUKUS

9. Japanese firm says its part found on North Korean missile is fake: report

10. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Recruitment for the world's longest military service(1) This year 8 years for men, 5 years for women

1. N. Korean leader calls for nurturing more military commanders on key military anniv.

Re-education programs for officers? Sounds like a political prison camp.

But I'm curious as to what "nurturing" is like in the north Korean People's Army.

Excerpt:

From 2002-2007, the incumbent leader Kim is known to have studied at the military university that provides re-education programs for commissioned officers.

N. Korean leader calls for nurturing more military commanders on key military anniv. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 26, 2024

SEOUL, April 26 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called for fostering more military commanders to bolster the country's combat capabilities and help stoke fears among its enemies, state media reported Friday.

Kim made the remark during his visit to Kim Il Sung Military University in Pyongyang on Thursday, the 92nd founding anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPRA), according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The KPRA is the anti-Japanese guerilla force known to have been created by late national founder Kim Il-sung in 1932.

In a speech, the North's leader stressed that the main task of the military academy is to nurture more capable military commanders.

"The more (the school) faithfully fulfills its duty, the more the combat power of our military will be strengthened. Then, in direct proportion to the move, our enemies' anxiety and fears will further increase," Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA.

At the height of the 1950-53 Korean War, North Korea founded an elite military school under the support of the former Soviet Union's armed forces and changed the name to Kim Il Sung Military University in 1956.

From 2002-2007, the incumbent leader Kim is known to have studied at the military university that provides re-education programs for commissioned officers.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 26, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (front, L) visiting Kim Il Sung Military University the previous day to mark the 92nd founding anniversary of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 26, 2024

2. Unification minister, U.S. envoy to visit site of N.K. abduction next month

It is important to include all the human rights issues such as abductees in both Japan and Korea.

Unification minister, U.S. envoy to visit site of N.K. abduction next month | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 26, 2024

SEOUL, April 26 (Yonhap) -- Kim Yung-ho, South Korea's point man on North Korea, and Julie Turner, the U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights, plan to make a visit next month to areas where then South Korean teens were abducted by the North in the 1970s, a Seoul official said Friday.

Kim and Turner will visit the Seonyu and Hong islands in the country's southwestern region in late May, a plan organized at the request of the families of the victims, according to South Korea's envoy for North Korean human rights, Lee Shin-wha.

The five victims, who were high school students at the time of the incident, were kidnapped between 1977 and 1978.

Among them, Kim Young-nam was married in North Korea with Megumi Yokota, a Japanese kidnapped by North Korean agents in the 1970s when she was 13. Kim is believed to have been abducted by the North in 1978 in areas near Seonyu Island and Megumi is a symbol of Japanese people abducted by North Korea.

Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho speaks at a forum in Seoul on April 26, 2024, to discuss updating a landmark 2014 report compiled by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights, in this photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Lee made the remark in a forum organized by the unification ministry to discuss updating a 2014 report compiled by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI) on North Korea's human rights situation. The landmark report accused Pyongyang of committing "systemic, widespread and gross human rights violations."

During the forum, Kim called for continued efforts by the international community to resolve the issue of detainees, abductees and prisoners of war in the North.

Of an estimated 3,835 South Koreans who were kidnapped by North Korea after the 1950-53 Korean War, 3,310 people were sent back home and nine escaped the repressive regime, with the other 516 South Koreans having yet to return home, according to government data.

Six South Koreans, including three missionaries, have been held in North Korea for years, with their whereabouts and fates unknown.

Participants pose for a photo during a forum in Seoul on April 26, 2024, to discuss updating a landmark 2014 report compiled by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights, in this photo provided by the unification ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 26, 2024

3. S. Korea to acquire SM-3 shipborne missiles by 2030

Why so long?

S. Korea to acquire SM-3 shipborne missiles by 2030 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · April 26, 2024

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, April 26 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will buy Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) shipborne interceptors from the United States to bolster the missile shield against North Korean threats, the state procurement agency said Friday.

The SM-3, a ship-based surface-to-air missile system used by the U.S. Navy, is capable of intercepting incoming ballistic missiles at altitudes above 100 kilometers.

The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said its weapons program review committee approved the plan to acquire the SM-3s through government-to-government foreign military sales by 2030 at an estimated cost of 803.9 billion won (US$583.4 million).

The anti-ballistic missile system is expected to be fitted on the South Korean Navy's Aegis destroyers.

DAPA also approved a 3.25 trillion-won program to build Ulsan-class Batch-IV frigates by 2032 to replace the aging warship fleet.

In addition, it confirmed a 1.57 trillion-won project to develop long-range air-to-air missiles for the homegrown fighter jet KF-21 from 2025 to 2038.

Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd. has constructed six prototype KF-21s. The first production model is scheduled to be delivered to the Air Force in the latter half of 2026.

A Standard Missile-3 is launched from a U.S. Navy Aegis destroyer in this file photo captured from Wikimedia. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · April 26, 2024

4. S. Korea, Japan could consider simplified entry agreement amid warming ties: Seoul official

Get this done.

Excerpts:

"Simplifying the entry procedure is among those, and there is a considerable shared understanding in Japan (about this). I believe we need to make various efforts to find the common ground between South Korea and Japan," the official said.

The foreign ministry said, however, no discussions are under way at the government level regarding a potential easing of entry procedures.

The official noted that South Korea and Japan now share strategic interests in many areas, such as in the Indo-Pacific region and advanced technologies, highlighting the need for follow-up steps to move the relationship forward.

S. Korea, Japan could consider simplified entry agreement amid warming ties: Seoul official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · April 26, 2024

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, April 26 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and Japan could consider adopting a simplified entry procedure for people traveling between the two countries, as an effort to keep the momentum going in the dramatic improvement in bilateral relations, a Seoul official said Friday.

The official made the suggestion as one of the possibilities that the two neighbors could explore, likening the idea to the Schengen Agreement in Europe that allows nationals of the signatory countries and eligible members to travel freely without border checks.

Next year could serve as an occasion for such discussions, as Seoul and Tokyo are to mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations, the official said in a session with reporters.

"The 60th anniversary can be another very important momentum. We should institutionalize the overall exchanges, economic cooperation in a way that they won't be damaged, while we continue to sternly address the historical issues," the official said on the condition of anonymity.

This undated file photo shows Japan's Haneda International Airport in Tokyo. (Yonhap)

"Simplifying the entry procedure is among those, and there is a considerable shared understanding in Japan (about this). I believe we need to make various efforts to find the common ground between South Korea and Japan," the official said.

The foreign ministry said, however, no discussions are under way at the government level regarding a potential easing of entry procedures.

The official noted that South Korea and Japan now share strategic interests in many areas, such as in the Indo-Pacific region and advanced technologies, highlighting the need for follow-up steps to move the relationship forward.

The official expected that the bilateral partnership fund, established between the countries' two largest business lobbies, should see a significant increase in contributions from Japanese companies.

The Federation of Korean Industries and the Japan Business Federation launched the fund in May last year to promote private exchanges, as a follow-up to the leaders' March summit that came after Seoul's announcement that it will compensate the Korean victims of Japan's wartime forced labor on its own without involving Japanese firms.

The decision by the Yoon Suk Yeol government has led to a dramatic warming of bilateral relations, resuming the "shuttle diplomacy" between leaders and the removal of Japan's export controls on South Korean industries.

elly@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · April 26, 2024

5. Exclusive: Kim Jong-un’s annual expenditures are enough to feed people for 3 years

This needs to be a key element in our information campaign. The Korean people in the north are suffering because of Kim Jong Un's deliberate policy decisions to prioritize nuclear weapons, missiles, and HIMSELF over the welfare of the people.

Exclusive: Kim Jong-un’s annual expenditures are enough to feed people for 3 years

https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/04/26/4MEIB4BF6VGX7IM3AXAPO4PHRY/

By Yang Ji-ho,

Kim Mi-geon

Published 2024.04.26. 11:38

Kim Jong-un was seen wearing a Balenciaga coat estimated to cost around 20 million won during a visit to a munitions factory on Jan. 8-9./Rodong Sinmun· News1

North Korea’s annual expenditure on missile provocations and Kim Jong-un and his family’s luxurious living could provide enough funding to feed its citizens for three years, according to estimates.

“Last year alone, North Korea spent up to $5 million (about 6.8 billion won) for the country to launch a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) and up to $30 million (about 41 billion won) for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM),” a military intelligence source said on Apr. 25. Pyonyang spent between 830 million (about $638 million) and 1.3 billion (about $946 million) won on missile launches. They turned their eye on short-range ballistic missile provocations, estimated to have cost about 117 billion won (about $85,103,287) as of Apr. 25.

The Kim family reportedly spent 830 billion won on luxury goods in the same period, according to the Ministry of National Defense and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

During his visit to a munitions factory, Kim Jong-un was seen wearing a coat from the Italian luxury brand Balenciaga, which was priced at around 20 million won (about $14,545). His daughter, Kim Ju-ae, also appeared in a Dior jacket valued at 2.5 million won (about $1,818) in March. In December of the previous year, Kim was spotted exiting a Mercedes-Benz Maybach car valued at more than 300 million won ($220,000). “The annual living expenses of the Kim family will be enough to cover the food shortage of North Koreans for a year through imports,” a Defense Ministry official said.

6. Upcoming UN report will shed new light on North Korea’s human rights abuses, experts say

An international community human rights upfront approach toward north Korea is necessary.

Upcoming UN report will shed new light on North Korea’s human rights abuses, experts say

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · April 26, 2024

Panelists discuss North Korean human rights abuses at the Ministry of Unification in Seoul, South Korea, April 26, 2024. From left to right: Kim Tae-Hoon, president of the People for Successful Corean Reunification; Lee Keumsoon, senior research fellow at the Korean Institute for National Unification; and Yoon Sanguk, director general for human rights policy at the Ministry of Unification. (David Choi/Stars and Stripes)

SEOUL, South Korea — An upcoming report will revise the United Nation’s decade-old review of North Korea’s record of human rights abuses, according to experts on the humanitarian crisis at a panel discussion hosted Friday by the South Korea Ministry of Unification.

The last comprehensive report on human rights in North Korea was published by the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2014. It included testimonials from over 240 victims and witnesses and stated “systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed by [North Korea], its institutions and officials.”

The council is scheduled to release an updated version in 2025, a Ministry of Unification spokeswoman said by phone Friday. South Korean officials customarily speak to the media on condition of anonymity.

The council’s 2014 findings included state-sponsored punishment for watching and listening to foreign media and an “absolute ban on ordinary citizens traveling abroad.” It also reported that North Korea stems the practice of any religion.

“The gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world,” the report said.

The report accounts for only the first three years of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s reign and the country may have undergone societal shifts in the past decade, said Yoon Sanguk, director general for human rights policy at the Ministry of Unification.

“We need to think about how many changes there are compared to his father or grandfather,” Yoon told an audience of roughly 250 people.

Kim’s regime “took no credible steps to prosecute officials who committed human rights abuses or corruption” since his father’s death in 2011, according to a U.S. State Department report on North Korea’s human rights abuses published in 2021.

Human rights concerns have since been overshadowed by other issues, such as North Korea’s weapons program, according to Kim Tae-Hoon, president of the Seoul-based People for Successful Corean Reunification non-governmental organization.

Kim said public executions in North Korea may have dropped since 2014 and recommended the upcoming review should “name and shame China” for being complicit in Pyongyang’s human rights abuses.

Over 2,000 North Korean escapees, 70% of them women, are believed to be detained in China, the Human Rights Council reported in July 2023.

The Human Rights Watch accused China of facilitating human rights abuses in North Korea, including forcibly repatriating at least 120 defectors in 2023, according to the non-governmental organization’s website.

The updated report is “urgently needed now, more than ever” and should include the voices of “those who are most affected,” said Hanna Song, executive director of the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights.

“The [report] would not have been possible if the victims, family members and the North Korean people themselves had not spoken out,” she said. “The report is for them. The report is to show that the international community is listening.”

David Choi

David Choi

David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · April 26, 2024

7.Stronger Alliance or Nuclear Weapons? North Korea’s Military Might Means Tough Choices for South Korea

Stronger alliance gets my vote.

A key element of the north's political warfare strategy was to break the alliance to drive US forces from the peninsula. we should not play into the regime's hands.

Excerpts:

And this, of course, would have immense implications for the future of America’s entire strategic posture in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Here is the key underlying significance of North Korea’s newly bellicose language towards the South. By deepening South Korea’s fear of North Korean nuclear blackmail, Pyongyang has sharpened Seoul’s doubts about U.S. extended deterrence, pushed Seoul towards building its own nuclear weapons, and arguably nudged Japan in the same direction. All this exposes and increases the fragility of the two key alliances on which America’s entire strategic position in East Asia and the Western Pacific depends.

And that, perhaps, is exactly what Pyongyang intends. At first glance, it might seem that its interests would not be served by encouraging Seoul to go nuclear. But look closer. On the Peninsula itself, facing a choice between a nuclear-armed South Korea or a nuclear-armed United States across the DMZ, it makes sense for them to choose the former. Looking beyond the Peninsula, it surely serves North Korea’s interests to undermine America’s strategic position in the wider region. It certainly serves the interests of North Korea’s most important neighbors, partners, and supporters, China and Russia, whose principal ambition is to reduce and, if possible, eliminate America’s strategic weight and influence in regions close to their borders. And that may ultimately be what Pyongyang’s new brand of tough talk towards South Korea is really all about.

Stronger Alliance or Nuclear Weapons? North Korea’s Military Might Means Tough Choices for South Korea

North Korea’s recent escalation in rhetoric, declaring South Korea as its “principal enemy,” may not signal an imminent military threat. Still, it does indicate a strategic shift with significant implications for regional stability.

The National Interest · by Hugh White · April 25, 2024

Summary: North Korea's recent escalation in rhetoric, declaring South Korea as its "principal enemy," may not signal an imminent military threat but does indicate a strategic shift with significant implications for regional stability. This change comes as North Korea's advancing nuclear capabilities, including ICBMs that can reach the U.S., complicate the strategic calculus for South Korea and its allies.

North Korea's Harsh Rhetoric Shifts Regional Power Dynamics

In January of this year, Pyongyang’s language towards South Korea took on a new and much more bellicose tone. North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, described the South as his country’s “principal enemy,” and announced that its citizens should no longer be regarded as “fellow countrymen,” foreshadowing the removal of the commitment to reunification from North Korea’s constitution. Some highly respected analysts have argued that this rhetorical shift indicates a sharply increased risk of North Korean military aggression across the DMZ. Others argue that nothing has really changed and that the new rhetoric simply reflects political maneuverings within North Korea rather than a substantial change in the threat it poses to the South.

I’d like to suggest a third interpretation: while the risk of a large-scale North Korean military assault on the South remains very low, Pyongyang’s newly hostile tone portends a very significant shift in the strategic balance on the Korean Peninsula, with important implications for America’s position in East Asia more broadly.

This interpretation reflects the profound but often underestimated consequences of North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities for the strategic situation in the Western Pacific. In recent years, Washington’s attention has shifted away from the North Korean problem, but it has not gone away. Pyongyang is now believed to have at least twenty nuclear weapons and perhaps the material to build seventy. It has also developed a range of increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles to deliver them, including intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can reach the United States itself.

North Korea’s ICBMs fundamentally change the strategic calculations of all the key players and immensely increase the significance of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. That is not because Pyongyang might mount an unprovoked nuclear attack on America itself—the certainty of massive U.S. retaliation makes sure of that. But it intensifies North Korean nuclear threats to U.S. allies by undermining the credibility of extended deterrence. Hitherto, it has been relatively easy for America to neutralize Pyongyang’s nuclear threat to South Korea and Japan. Its promises to mount devastating nuclear strikes on North Korea in retaliation for any North Korean nuclear attacks on U.S. allies or partners have been highly credible as long as North Korea could not hit America back.

Now, Pyongyang can respond to a U.S. retaliatory attack on North Korea with a counter-retaliatory nuclear strike on the United States. Washington would try to minimize this threat with preemptive strikes on North Korea’s ICBMs, but big risks would remain. The potential cost to America of fulfilling its extended deterrence promises to its allies is, therefore, much higher than it was before, so the risks of America reneging on them in a crisis are much higher, too.

That has enormous implications for strategic calculations in Seoul, Tokyo, and Pyongyang. Let’s start with Seoul. Pyongyang’s ability to strike the United States will radically undermine Seoul’s confidence in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. South Korean decision-makers must now recognize the real danger that the North Koreans will convince themselves that they can launch a nuclear attack on South Korea without incurring a U.S. retaliatory strike on themselves because they believe that the threat of North Korean counter-retaliation against the United States itself would deter Washington.

This confronts Seoul with a real problem. The danger is not so much that Pyongyang would actually launch a nuclear attack on the South. It is that North Korea could use the threat of nuclear attack to compel the South to do its bidding. The more uncertain a U.S. retaliatory response becomes, the more credible a North Korean threat of this kind would be, and the more likely it becomes that Seoul would have no choice but to comply with whatever demands Pyongyang might make. Moreover, the harsh new tone of Pyongyang’s rhetoric towards the South makes it seem less unlikely that the North might try to use nuclear blackmail this way. By repudiating the idea of peaceful reunification and instead declaring South Korea to be an enemy that must be subdued by force, Kim Jong-un might be setting the scene for just this kind of confrontation.

What can Seoul do in the face of this new and grave danger? It has only two options. One is to try to strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. The other is to cease depending on Washington and instead build its own nuclear forces to counter and neutralize North Korean nuclear threats. The second option must be taken very seriously. In January last year, President Yoon openly canvassed the idea that South Korea might need to build its own nuclear weapons to counter North Korea’s. Polling suggests that 60 to 70 percent of South Koreans would support this move. South Korea is well-placed technically to develop nuclear weapons and has already built ballistic-missile firing submarines to deliver them.

Although President Yoon quickly stepped back from his comments, Washington plainly took them seriously. A few months after he made them, Yoon was invited to the White House, where he and President Biden issued the “Washington Declaration,” in which ringing reaffirmations of America’s extended-deterrence commitment to defend South Korea were matched by equally plangent affirmations South Korea’s confidence in U.S. commitments and promises not to develop its own nuclear forces. The declaration announced new forums for closer consultation between Washington and Seoul on nuclear questions, including the establishment of a Nuclear Consultative Group modeled on NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, and contained a U.S. promise to “further enhance the regular visibility of strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula” by more frequent visits by nuclear-capable U.S. forces.

However, the Biden Administration stopped short of taking two steps that would have more materially addressed Seoul’s concerns. It did not agree to the kind of “nuclear-sharing” arrangements that exist between the United States and some NATO allies. Nor did it agree to redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea, which again contrasts with its continued basing of nuclear weapons in Europe. It seems Seoul asked for both, and Washington declined. It is worth reflecting on this.

In the face of the growing uncertainties about America’s resolve created by Pyongyang’s growing ICBM capability, Washington has refused to offer Seoul the same mechanisms of reassurance that it extended to its European allies since the Cold War. That is hardly reassuring. Indeed, it risks the Washington Declaration having an effect that is opposite to that intended. By setting such clear limits on what America is willing to do, it weakens rather than strengthens South Korean confidence in U.S. resolve. So, it is hardly surprising that the Washington Declaration has not assuaged South Korean concerns about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.

So what should the Biden Administration do instead? What would be required to fully convince both Seoul and Pyongyang of America’s resolve to defend South Korea, even at the risk of North Korean nuclear attacks on U.S. cities? When thinking about this, it is worth looking back at the Cold War.

For several decades, successive U.S. administrations successfully convinced both the Soviet Union and its NATO allies that it would fight a nuclear war and accept massive Soviet nuclear attacks on the United States itself in order to defend Western Europe. That worked because friend and foe alike believed that Washington saw the security of Western Europe as literally vital to America’s own survival in the face of the Soviet Union’s seemingly formidable power. As Thomas Schelling memorably put it in his 1966 book Arms and Influence, extended deterrence was credible in that era because all parties believed that for America, defending its allies in Europe was “defending California.” Only that made it credible that America would accept a nuclear attack on its own cities in order to defend its allies.

This clarifies the question at the heart of U.S. extended deterrence towards South Korea today in light of Pyongyang’s ability to launch a nuclear strike on the United States. Is America’s stake in the security of South Korea today comparable to its stake in the security of Western European allies during the Cold War? In other words, is South Korea’s security from the North literally vital to America’s own security in the Western Hemisphere? Could a North Korean victory over South Korea credibly lead to a looming direct threat to the United States itself—the way a Soviet victory in Western Europe could well have done?

This is a significant and complex question. What made the Soviet threat to Western Europe a truly existential question for America was the very real prospect, especially in the Cold War’s early decades, that if the Soviets took over Western Europe, they could go on to dominate the whole of Eurasia, and thereby put itself in a position to overpower America itself and dominate the world. Clearly, North Korea simply could not pose that kind of threat, with or without South Korea’s resources. But that is not the end of the matter. Failing to fulfill its extended deterrence commitments to Seoul would arguably destroy U.S. leadership throughout East Asia and beyond and fatally undermine the post-Cold War international order that that leadership underpins.

Would this create a credible looming existential threat to America’s own security? That depends on what might take the old order’s place. The answer would be “yes” if there were a serious danger that, in the absence of U.S. leadership, a single authoritarian hegemonic power could come to dominate Eurasia the way the Soviet Union threatened to do in the late 1940s and 1950s. Though some see this outcome foreshadowed by today’s “no limits” partnership between Russia and China, the underlying realities of the distribution of wealth and power in the world today argue against it.

Much more likely is a multipolar global order in which a number of great powers—including China, India, Russia, Europe, and, of course, the United States—would balance and constrain one another. That would be much less congenial to Washington than the U.S.-led order of the post-Cold War era. Still, America would remain secure as the unchallengeable primary power in the Western Hemisphere. It is hard to see that it would make sense for America to fight a nuclear war to avoid this outcome—even assuming that such a war could be “won” and the old U.S.-led order preserved. To put it simply, but not inaccurately, America has a truly vital interest in maintaining its Monroe Doctrine primacy in the Western Hemisphere. In an era of strategic rivalry among multiple nuclear-armed great powers, it does not have a truly vital interest in perpetuating the U.S.-led global order of the post-Cold War era nor in sustaining the alliances that supported that order.

These complex questions must trouble many U.S. allies as they consider how far they can rely on U.S. strategic commitments in the decades ahead. Still, they are especially urgent for policymakers in Seoul. Without a clear and compelling existential U.S. imperative to contain North Korea, there is arguably nothing Washington can do to assure South Koreans that they can depend on America to deter a nuclear attack from the north or neutralize North Korean nuclear blackmail. That would be so even if the very real prospect of a second Trump presidency did not raise questions about whether America will even try to provide that assurance or will instead abandon strategic commitments to allies like South Korea.

This brings us back to the question of what South Korea can do, given that there is no clear way to strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. It faces a stark choice between developing a nuclear deterrent or living with the ever-increasing risk of North Korean nuclear blackmail—a risk made all the more salient by Pyongyang’s newly hostile rhetoric. This is why President Yoon spoke out about the nuclear option and why so many South Koreans support it. The seemingly inescapable conclusion is that it is possible—even probable—that Seoul will build its own nuclear weapons within the next few years. Of course, that would endanger its U.S. alliance, but Seoul might well decide that a nuclear deterrent is more important to its security. Indeed, once South Korea develops a nuclear weapons program, the costs of the alliance might well outweigh the benefits.

This would, of course, have consequences beyond the Korean Peninsula. It would be a major blow to the non-proliferation efforts around the world, but the most significant effect would be just across the Straits of Tsushima. A decision by Seoul to go nuclear would amplify Japanese doubts about the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and greatly increase pressure on Tokyo to go nuclear, too. That would then raise questions about the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and not just from the U.S. side. Like Seoul, Tokyo would have to ask whether the benefits of the alliance still outweigh the costs when Japan no longer needs to depend on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. It is far from clear that the answer would be “yes.”

And this, of course, would have immense implications for the future of America’s entire strategic posture in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Here is the key underlying significance of North Korea’s newly bellicose language towards the South. By deepening South Korea’s fear of North Korean nuclear blackmail, Pyongyang has sharpened Seoul’s doubts about U.S. extended deterrence, pushed Seoul towards building its own nuclear weapons, and arguably nudged Japan in the same direction. All this exposes and increases the fragility of the two key alliances on which America’s entire strategic position in East Asia and the Western Pacific depends.

And that, perhaps, is exactly what Pyongyang intends. At first glance, it might seem that its interests would not be served by encouraging Seoul to go nuclear. But look closer. On the Peninsula itself, facing a choice between a nuclear-armed South Korea or a nuclear-armed United States across the DMZ, it makes sense for them to choose the former. Looking beyond the Peninsula, it surely serves North Korea’s interests to undermine America’s strategic position in the wider region. It certainly serves the interests of North Korea’s most important neighbors, partners, and supporters, China and Russia, whose principal ambition is to reduce and, if possible, eliminate America’s strategic weight and influence in regions close to their borders. And that may ultimately be what Pyongyang’s new brand of tough talk towards South Korea is really all about.

About the Author: Dr. Hugh White

Hugh White is an Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra.

Main Image is from U.S. Air Force. All Other Images: KCNA/Screenshot.

The National Interest · by Hugh White · April 25, 2024

​8. China, North Korea denounce Japan’s involvement with AUKUS

Because they fear AUKUS.

China, North Korea denounce Japan’s involvement with AUKUS

China says it firmly opposes foreign military alliances targeting it and stoking bloc confrontation.

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/chinank-japan-aukus-04262024042042.html

By RFA Staff

2024.04.26

U.S. President Joe Biden, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak deliver remarks on the Australia- United Kingdom- U.S. (AUKUS) partnership, after a trilateral meeting, at Naval Base Point Loma in San Diego, California U.S. on March 13, 2023.

 Leah Millis/Reuters

China has expressed “grave concern” about the possibility of Japan joining the AUKUS security pact, saying it would undermine peace and stability in the region and the world.

A spokesperson at China’s defense ministry said on Thursday that China was open to normal military cooperation between countries but “we firmly oppose relevant countries cobbling together exclusive groupings.” 

North Korea, meanwhile, said the United States has made “reckless moves” to involve Japan to “frantically expand its alliance sphere without limits.”

Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. formed the AUKUS defense and security partnership in 2021 in an effort to stand up to China’s growing power in the region. 

China has repeatedly criticized AUKUS as stoking “bloc-to-bloc confrontation”.

The United States has also sought to step up partnerships with allies in Asia, including Japan and the Philippines, in the face of China’s military build-up and its growing territorial assertiveness.

Japan has yet to explicitly announce its participation in AUKUS but a joint statement released after U.S. President Joe Biden met Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida this month said that the AUKUS partners “are considering cooperation with Japan” in certain projects.

U.S. President Joe Biden speaks to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida during a state visit at the White House in Washington, U.S. on April 10, 2024. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)

Chinese defense ministry spokesperson Wu Qian told a press briefing in Beijing that the Asia-Pacific was “not a wrestling ground for geopolitical competition.”

“Japan needs to draw lessons from history, both speak and act prudently on military and security issues,” Wu said, warning some “other countries” to avoid fueling confrontation, too.

North Korea also criticized the plan, saying that “the danger of Japan’s participation in AUKUS is making the whole international community tense.”

“It is the sinister intention of the US to make Japan ... obsessed by nationalism, a crewmember of a confrontation ship called AUKUS and put it at the outpost line of the anti-China pressure and push the nuclear minefield in the Asia-Pacific region closer to China,” analyst Kang Jin Song said in an editorial published by North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency on Thrusday.

Japan’s involvement

“Recognizing Japan’s strengths and its close bilateral defense partnerships with all three countries, we are considering cooperation with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects,” AUKUS defense ministers said in a joint statement.

The first main program, or Pillar I, of the trilateral partnership, is “the sharing of nuclear powered submarines between the U.S., U.K, and Australia,” said Stephen Nagy, a professor of politics and international studies at the International Christian University in Tokyo.

“Japan will not join Pillar I but it could join Pillar II, which is the cooperation in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cyber, hypersonics and more,” said the political scientist.

Japan’s participation would enhance its technology and coordination with AUKUS members as well as its security but “ensure that emerging technology domination will be by like-minded countries that respect the rule of law,” Nagy added.

Tokyo is one of Washington’s most trusted partners in the Indo-Pacific. There are 54,000 American troops in Japan and the U.S.’s only forward-deployed aircraft carrier strike group is based in Yokosuka. 

Japan is increasing military spending to deal with challenges and taking a regional leadership role, moving away from its post-war pacifist defense strategy.

Edited by Taejun Kang.

9. Japanese firm says its part found on North Korean missile is fake: report

Japanese firm says its part found on North Korean missile is fake: report

It came after a British arms watchdog found Japanese parts used in a missile launched by Russia against Ukraine.

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/japan-nkmissile-russia-04252024231958.html

By RFA Staff

2024.04.25

A representative from the prosecutor’s office shows parts of an unidentified missile, which Ukrainian authorities believe to be made in North Korea and was used in a strike in Kharkiv earlier this week, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kharkiv, Ukraine on Jan. 6, 2024.

 Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy/Reuters

A suspected Japanese-made component found in a North Korean missile fired by Russia forces towards Ukraine is likely fake, Japan’s Asahi Shimbun daily reported on Thursday. 

A journalist from the paper checked the wreckage of the North Korean missile in the custody of the Ukrainian government last month and found a fist-sized bearing on the missile engraved with the word “JAPAN”, the name of a Japanese conglomerate and identification numbers, the newspaper reported.

The missile was recovered in January in Kharkiv, in northeastern Ukraine.

A company representative checked the photos of the missile against the genuine item and confirmed it was “counterfeit,” the newspaper said, adding that the style of engraving was different from the genuine product. The official did not elaborate. 

The Asahi Shumbun’s report comes two months after the British arms watchdog Conflict Arms Research (CAR) said it had analyzed 290 parts used in the North Korean missile used by Russia against Ukraine and identified parts from companies based in the United States, China, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland and Taiwan.

The missile was believed to be a North Korean short-range ballistic missile, either the KN-23 or KN-24.

A CAR official told the Asahi Shimbun that several parts used in the missile were found to be counterfeit, and that several European-based companies were believed to have made the fake components. 

But the official did not disclose the parts or identify the companies.

The Asahi Shimbun cited Katsuhisa Furukawa, who served on an expert panel for the U.N. Security Council’s North Korea sanctions committee, as saying it was quite possible that North Korea was tricked by middlemen and bought fake components.

“North Korea has no choice but to rely on foreign-made parts to improve the accuracy of its short-range missiles,” Furukawa said, noting that fake or low-quality parts, including bearings, could reduce the accuracy of North Korea’s missiles. 

Furukawa said if the international community could not stop North Korea from dodging sanctions, it would be good to intentionally provide fake parts to them. 

Last month, Russia’s newly appointed ambassador to Japan warned it of serious consequences and retaliatory steps if Patriot missile systems manufactured under U.S. license in Japan ended up in Ukraine.

At that time, Russia’s state-run RIA news agency cited the new envoy, Nikolai Nozdrev, as saying that Russia would be watching closely to see where Japanese arms exports ended up after Japan eased its export rules at the end of last year.

He said, in particular, Russia would be watching to see if and when any Patriot missile systems and missiles made in Japan under U.S. license were exported to the U.S. and then to Ukraine.

Edited by RFA Staff.

10. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Recruitment for the world's longest military service(1) This year 8 years for men, 5 years for women

＜Inside N. Korea＞Recruitment for the world's longest military service(1) This year 8 years for men, 5 years for women

asiapress.org

(FILE PHOTO) A female soldier wanders through a market alley. She appears to be at the end of her military service. Photographed by Mindeullae in Ryanggang Province, June 2013 (ASIAPRESS)

North Korean authorities have set the length of service for military recruits this year at eight years for men and five years for women, according to a reporting partner inside the country. In this two-part series, ASIAPRESS uses information from multiple reporting partners to take a look at the changes in North Korea's military recruitment and their significance in today’s North Korea. (JEON Sung-jun / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Soldiers in missile and mechanized units serve for 10 years

In April, several reporting partners in the northern part of the country reported that the length of service for new recruits joining the Korean People's Army this year is the same as last year: eight years for men and five years for women.

"There are some differences depending on the type of soldier, such as 10 years for special soldiers such as missile and mechanized units, but it is said to be eight years for men and five years for women."

ASIAPRESS continues to investigate the North Korean military's recruitment efforts every March and April. The investigations are conducted by North Korean reporting partners in contact with officials at the Military Mobilization Department in their regions and parents whose children are scheduled to enlist.

※ Military Mobilization Departments: Located in each province, city and county, the agencies are under the Ministry of Defense’s Reserve Forces Division and handle affairs related to the recruitment of new soldiers.

(FILE PHOTO) People seen sending off new soldiers. Every April, new recruit enlistment ceremonies are held across the country. Photographed by Ri Jun in Cheongjin in 2006 (ASIAPRESS)

◆ North Korea’s military has frequently changed service times for soldiers

The length of military service in North Korea has changed frequently, beginning with a famine in the mid-1990s called the "Arduous March." Many children died or suffered from malnutrition, and a severe recruitment shortage emerged around 2010, when this generation was entering the military.

The military has tried to make up for the shortage by extending the age of military service for men to 11 years in 2014 and 13 years in 2019, up from around 10 years previously, and by actively encouraging women to join the military as well.

The large number of young men tied to the military has led to a labor shortage in rural areas, factories, coal mines, and other production sectors. In 2021, Kim Jong Un's regime decided to drastically reduce the length of military service from 13 years to eight years for men and eight years to five years for women. They did that by discharging large numbers of soldiers who had served beyond that period and placing them in the workforce, a trend that has continued to this day.

◆ An increasing number of women join the military

According to one reporting partner, the percentage of female graduates selected this year was significantly higher than in the past.

"Among the school's graduates, except for those who were recommended to universities and vocational schools, basically all men went to the army, and many women were also selected to serve."

The reporting partner went on to say that while it is still difficult to determine exact numbers, he has heard that 60 percent of girls graduating from high schools enlist in the military. It's clear that more women are joining the military than ever before, as the country seeks to fill a chronic shortage of recruits. (To be continued in the next installment)

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com