Quotes of the Day:

"There are stars whose radiance is visible on Earth though they have long been extinct. There are people whose brilliance continues to light the world even though they are no longer among the living. These lights are particularly bright when the night is dark. They light the way for humankind." 

– Hannah Szenes

"None of us is as smart as all of us." 

– Phil Condit

"People, even more than things, have to be restored, renewed, revived, reclaimed, and redeemed; never throw out anyone." 

– Audrey Hepburn

1. What the Return of Trump Would Mean for South Korea

2. U.S. seeking trilateral summit with S. Korea, Japan in July: report

3. N. Korea's Kim inspects construction site of ruling party's training school

4. N. Korean delegation visits Laos: KCNA

5. Daily Review: Russia’s U.N. Veto Could Signal New Era for North Korea

6. Tug of war over North Korea-Japan summit

7. North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts

8. The vile murder methods Kim Jong-un uses to spread fear in North Korea

9. Man who flew drone into North Korea from China to capture incredible footage responds after everyone shares same concern

10. Kim Jong Un and the liberation of Palestine

1. What the Return of Trump Would Mean for South Korea

To reduce or adjust or increase the size of the US military in Korea should require answers to the following questions.

1.Why are we in Korea? 

2. What are the US national interests in Korea? (security, economic, and political)

3. Assuming the answers to the above call for a US troop presence these are the key questions:

• What is the optimal force presence in Korea to serve, protect, and advance US interests in Korea, Northeast Asia, and the INDOPACIFIC? (for example this is not simply a single number of say 28,500 but what are the military capabilities? - e.g., the units and forces, regardless of the number of troops - could be more or could be less than 28.500). (This is especially important to assist in the narrative about the number of troops whether the number is below or above 28,5000 - if we can articulate the optimal force presence by type units and capabilities we may be able to overcome the the crisis who simply argue about the number of boots on the ground as being the most important metric.)
• What is the optimal force presence when considering the ROK military capabilities within the ROK/US Combined Forces Command?
• What is the optimal force presence when considering the UN Command and the member state contributions?

​4. Once those questions are answered the following questions must be answered:

• ​What are the US political constrist that will impact on the optimal force presence required?
• What are the ROK political constraints that will impact on the optimal force presence?
• What are the cometiging national security requirements and priorities that will affect the optimal force presence

5. Once the constraints are assessed as applied to the force size we must ask what is the risk we are accepting by having less than the optimal force presence and how can our allies (ROK and the UN member states) offset that risk?

Excerpts:

When I broached the possibility of removing the last ground-maneuver, infantry formation with former South Korean officials in early 2020 – moving toward a more flexible air- and naval-centric U.S. posture – they categorically rejected the idea. It was not so much about the mechanics of warfighting as the shadow of history. The SCBT’s withdrawal – or it and other units’ flexible use for off-peninsula contingencies – would reawaken a longstanding, if contradictory mix of abandonment and entrapment fears. More recently, in response to Miller’s comment, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik insisted the current size of U.S. troops stationed in the country was “absolutely necessary.”

Still, just because changes in the U.S. force structure may cause tremors in South Korea or opposition in Congress is not sufficient reason to avoid contemplating them. The 28,500 number was a floor, set in 2008 and reflexively repeated since. Truculently adhering to that number is neither sound policy nor does it allow for constructive, forward-thinking planning; not to mention the fact that the number is never actually at 28,500 but fluctuates above and below it at any given time. The uncertainty of just how exactly Trump will approach U.S. forces in South Korea if reelected, coupled with his well-recorded skepticism, is both cause for concern and reason to constructively explore alternative futures.

What the Return of Trump Would Mean for South Korea

thediplomat.com · by Clint Work

The former president called into question the U.S. force presence in Korea – the foundation for the alliance.

By

March 30, 2024

Then-U.S. President Donald J. Trump addresses a crowd of joint service members stationed across the Korean Peninsula during his visit to Osan Air Base, South Korea, June 30, 2019.

Credit: U.S. Air Force photo by 1st Lt. Daniel de La Fé

Nowadays conversations with South Korean counterparts begin and end with concerns about former U.S. President Donald Trump’s possible return to the White House. Questions abound regarding tariffs and trade, industrial policies and export controls, unilateral attempts at accommodation with North Korea, and the issue of cost-sharing and U.S. forces in South Korea. This array of issues demonstrates an incredibly multifaceted South Korea-U.S. alliance. Yet, if so many aspects of the relationship simultaneously could be open to question under a second Trump administration, it raises broader concerns about the alliance’s longevity.

Among them, no other issue cuts to the core of the alliance more than the question of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. For all the pronouncements about the broadening and deepening of the alliance beyond its traditional military and defense components – into a strategic economic and technology partnership and global comprehensive strategic alliance – the U.S. force presence is the keystone in the arch upon which all else was built. Shift the stone and the arch teeters.

Trump’s past behavior and statements presage such shifts in the future.

Historical Context

Since the 1960s, Democratic and Republican presidents alike have pushed for greater cost-sharing (and burden-sharing) from Seoul and reassessed U.S. forces in South Korea. And the two issues were, to a degree, interconnected. Seoul’s remarkable economic growth not only provided the wherewithal to contribute more to the stationing of U.S. forces but also modernize the Republic of Korea (ROK) military. The latter resulted in South Korea gradually taking over various missions from U.S. forces and establishment of a combined alliance structure, within which U.S. and ROK forces divided labor in a more balanced manner. These developments, alongside shifting strategic contexts and U.S. foreign policy priorities, drove U.S. policymakers to gradually reduce and realign the U.S. presence.

The early post-Cold War period is a key example. Propelled by calls for a peace dividend at home and for allies to do more abroad, coupled with reduced tensions globally and around the Korean Peninsula, the George H.W. Bush administration structured a 10-year, three-phase plan for force reductions and realignments in South Korea and the wider region known as the East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI). As part of the policy, South Korea would eventually take the lead role in its own defense and the alliance’s command structure.

In this context, the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) framework was first established and codified. Under the SMA, South Korea provided financial support for a percentage of the total non-personnel costs of the U.S. military presence in South Korea, broken down into three categories: labor costs (i.e. salaries for the Koreans who work on U.S. bases); logistics and supply costs; and military construction costs. Although EASI was paused after its first phase – due to the first North Korean nuclear crisis and U.S. need to maintain primacy in the region – Seoul gradually continued increasing contributions under successive SMAs.

However, U.S. policymakers did not adjust the U.S. force presence based upon Seoul’s level of contribution. For them, it went without question the presence was critical to maintaining stability and deterrence on the peninsula and bolstering strategic imperatives beyond it. Trump rejected such assumptions.

Enter Trump

During the 2016 campaign, Trump lambasted all U.S. allies for free riding. Unfortunately for South Korea, its cost-sharing deal was the first to come up for renegotiation. Trump directly liked the issue of cost-sharing with the U.S. presence. He saw U.S. forces as there solely to defend South Korea and rejected (or seemed not to understand) their broader strategic logic. The United States got “practically nothing compared to the cost,” Trump said.

Never mind that by the time Trump entered office in 2017, Seoul was covering over $800 million, nearly 50 percent of the non-personnel costs, and had handled roughly 90 percent of the nearly $11 billion in construction costs for Camp Humphreys, the United States’ largest overseas military base. When the SMA renegotiation began in 2018, Trump demanded Seoul double its contribution to cover 100 percent of the non-personnel costs. Seoul refused, and a one-year stopgap deal was signed whereby South Korea boosted its contribution by 8.2 percent to about $920 million, covering roughly half the non-personnel costs.

Soon thereafter, Trump upped the ante, demanding South Korea increase its contribution by 400 percent or $5 billion, which would have meant South Korea would cover the entire $3 billion in direct basing costs while also paying a 66 percent premium. The Moon administration refused Trump’s demand, and, amid a global pandemic, talks stalemated. Korean laborers on U.S. bases were furloughed as budget funds ran out.

Until he left office, Trump refused to accept the Moon administration’s offer to boost its contribution by upwards of 13 percent, instead demanding Seoul pony up $5 billion (with some reports indicating a reduced ask of $4 billion, albeit a still outlandish number). Intent on stabilizing alliance relations, one of the first steps the Biden administration took was to finalize a new SMA, accepting South Korea’s offer to increase its contribution by 13.9 percent.

Notwithstanding the effort by the Biden and Yoon administrations to negotiate a new cost-sharing deal before the 2024 election (despite it not being due for renegotiation until 2025), there is reason to believe Trump would challenge it if elected. The issue could once again metastasize, accelerating Trump’s longstanding skepticism about U.S. troops in South Korea, and resulting in potentially precipitous changes in the U.S. force posture. Such dynamics arose in his first term and, according to various sources and Trump’s statements, would have worsened in a second term.

Presaging the Future?

In a February 21, 2023, post on Truth Social, Trump noted that he got to know and got along well with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and that Kim was not happy with and felt threatened by South Korea-U.S. military exercises. Such exercises are “extremely expensive and provocative drills,” and South Korea “pays us very little” for them, he claimed. Inaccurately stating that 35,000 U.S. troops were stationed in South Korea, Trump finished: “I had a deal for full payment to us, $Billions, and Biden gave it away. Such a shame!!!”

Would this sentiment be assuaged by another deal under Biden? Additional sources indicate not.

Describing a 2021 interview with Trump in their book, “The Divider,” Peter Baker and Susan Glass wrote: “The only regrets Trump expressed to us were that he was not able to push through all the tough policies he hoped to against America’s allies, whether imposing tariffs on German cars or sticking up South Korea for $5 billion in payment for American troops stationed there – both preoccupations of his he told us he planned to pursue in a second term.”

Covering similar ground recently, Baker reiterated that in addition to trying to reduce troops in Germany (a move rescinded by Biden), Trump “contemplated pulling American troops out of South Korea as well, only to be talked out of it, but has said since leaving office that such a move would be a priority in a second term unless South Korea paid more in compensation.” Other accounts point to more worrisome inclinations.

According to Secretary of Defense Mark Esper’s book, “A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of State During Extraordinary Times,” Trump proposed the “complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea.” Also, based on conversations with Esper for their book, “I Alone Can Fix It: Donald J. Trump’s Catastrophic Final Year,” Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker wrote that:

Trump had privately indicated he would seek to withdraw from NATO and to blow up the U.S. alliance with South Korea, should he win reelection. When those alliances had come up in meetings with Esper and other top aides, some advisers warned Trump that shredding them before the election would be politically dangerous. “Yeah, the second term,” Trump had said. ‘We’ll do it in the second term.”

To be sure, it is unclear whether Trump’s proposals to remove all troops or blow up the alliance reflected genuine intent or were merely a function of his hardline bargaining.

Alternatively, Trump may have adopted such an outsized position knowing it would be rebuffed, thus justifying removing some or all the troops. National Security Advisor John Bolton’s account indicates mixed motivations. Amid SMA negotiations in 2019, Trump said a way to get $5 billion was to threaten to withdraw all U.S. forces. “That puts you in a very strong bargaining position,” Trump said. This occurred in a context of increasing North Korean short-range missile tests, which were restarted following the failure of the Hanoi Summit. Trump observed to Bolton, “This is a good time to be asking for the money,” using growing tensions as leverage.

Later, Trump impetuously expressed frustration with ongoing if scaled down alliance military exercises, saying: “Get out of there if we don’t get the five-billion-dollar deal [for South Korean support of US bases]. We lose $38 billion in trade in Korea. Let’s get out.” Whether or not pure bombast, the message had begun to make its way through the inter-agency process.

According to a high-level former defense official, early in the administration the Pentagon fielded questions from the White House about why U.S. forces in South Korea were necessary. Such questions were normal insofar as new administrations conduct policy reviews, including force posture reassessments. However, despite the Pentagon providing detailed feedback, similar questions persisted. That was out of the ordinary. Although many suspected such discussions were occurring given Trump’s open distaste for alliances and foreign commitments, it was not until that 2020 reports emerged indicating the Pentagon had presented the White House with options for reducing U.S. forces in Korea.

One the one hand, the effort could have been a way for establishment types to mollify Trump by presenting him with concrete options. On the other hand, leaking to the press such options were being prepared may have fit Trump’s bargaining strategy. Nonetheless, administration officials declined to offer details about the specific options for reducing forces below the oft-cited 28,500 troop level, saying no decision had been made to reduce them. In any event, at that stage, the pandemic and reelection campaign took center stage, the SMA talks remained stalemated, and Trump went on to lose the 2020 election.

Trump’s views on the issue likely have not changed. The above (and other) sources provide insight into how Trump might approach the SMA and the broader question of U.S. forces in South Korea were he to be elected in November, including potential demands he might make, what he might do if those demands are not met, and various challenges and opportunities this may present.

Trump’s Possible Demands and Questions Raised

It appears plausible that even if the Biden and Yoon administrations sign a new agreement before the November election, Trump will not accept it. He may even target it during the campaign. Moreover, if elected, Trump likely intends to shake up the Department of Defense (DoD) and other executive branch departments and agencies far more than in his first term. His approach would potentially combine pushing out large numbers of civil servants by demoralizing or defunding them while targeting specific appointees and placing loyalists in their place, hammering the inter-agency into a more plaint operation. Foreign policy establishment types may either be barred at the door or be specifically selected to carry out his preferences.

Additionally, based on current trends, Trump would enter office at a time when North Korea is advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities in unabated fashion, inter-Korean tensions are at a high, and the alliance has ramped up and regularized military exercises alongside U.S. strategic asset deployments and efforts to institutionalize the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). In this context. Trump not only could demand Seoul cover 100 percent of non-personnel costs in the three categories under the SMA framework but also the costs of strategic asset deployments or other rotational units that make up important parts of the U.S. force structure. In other words, he would demand cost-sharing expanded beyond the existing SMA framework, consistent with demands during his first term.

Trump may see a worsening North Korea threat – and well-known South Korean insecurities – as the leverage he needs, again consistent with his comments during his first term. Although the conservative Yoon administration is more inclined to lean toward the U.S. position than its progressive predecessor, it could hardly accept these demands. Trump may then be predisposed to downgrade or call off continued exercises and strategic deployments, thus accelerating extant conversations regarding U.S. credibility and an indigenous South Korean nuclear capability (an idea he supported in 2016).

Alternatively, if Seoul does offer to cover some of the U.S. strategic asset or rotational deployments, does that mean the Trump administration would provide its Korean counterparts greater visibility and say about how and when such deployments operate? Such demands already increased under Biden, despite the Washington Declaration and gradual implantation of the NCG. It seems most likely, however, that Trump would push Seoul to give more, while expecting it to see and say less regarding U.S. operations. If America First logic predominates in cost-sharing discussion, will it disappear when it comes to highly sensitive areas like U.S. nuclear policy and planning?

Furthermore, since Trump is inclined to make demands that no ally would be willing or able to meet – given their own substantial domestic political barriers – he will potentially do what he was unable to do in his first term, namely, remove at least some U.S. forces. During Trump’s first term, Congress passed bipartisan language in successive National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) precluding the Pentagon from reducing troops in South Korea (below 22,000 in the 2019 NDAA and and 28,500 in the 2020 NDAA) without the defense secretary certifying the North Korean threat had eased, and the reduction would not hurt U.S. national security. Congress removed such language under Biden.

Yet, even if Congress reintroduces such legislative language under Trump, what’s to stop a unilateral push to improve relations with Kim Jong Un and a plaint secretary of defense from certifying such conditions? Besides, Trump would be the commander-in-chief, able to dispose of U.S. forces how he chose. Congressional opposition would complicate the process but not necessarily stop it.

Searching for Clues

Christopher C. Miller, the former acting secretary of defense at the tail end of the Trump administration, wrote the section on defense issues in the Heritage Foundation’s “Mandate for Leadership,” a comprehensive policy guide for the next conservative U.S. president many have examined for potential insights into a second Trump administration. In it, he called for U.S. allies to take far greater responsibility for their conventional defense and for Washington to “Enable South Korea to take the lead in its conventional defense against North Korea.” More recently, Miller said in an interview it was time to discuss whether South Korea still needs 28,500 American troops or if change was needed.

One potential step Trump might take would be to cancel the next deployment of the 4,400-person Stryker Combat Brigade Team (SCBT), which deploy to South Korea on a nine-month rotational basis from different U.S.-based locations. In other words, once the existing SCBT deployment leaves, Trump might bar the next from going. In 2020, congressional staffers expressed this exact concern. Notwithstanding the fact that South Korea already handles the overwhelming conventional burden on the Korean Peninsula, removing the SCBT would surely force the issue.

The SCBT – transformed from a U.S. Army Armored Brigade Combat Team (ACBT) in the fall of 2022 – provides additional firepower capability and mobility. It is the last remaining U.S. ground-maneuver, infantry formation in South Korea and a critical element of the 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-US Combined Division, itself the last remaining permanently forward-stationed division in the U.S. Army.

Were the SCBT removed from South Korea, the U.S. footprint would still be well over 20,000 troops, made up of (among other units) an aviation brigade and field artillery brigade, considerable air force, space, and intelligence capabilities, and a division headquarters capable of handling the logistics of folding in additional off-peninsula forces deployed to South Korea in the event of a contingency. Still, such a reduction would compel Seoul to take on an even greater burden while it increasingly grappled with its own military manpower shortages given its demographic decline.

Additionally, might a second Trump administration try to push Seoul to accept the more regular and flexible use of U.S. forces in South Korea, including elements of the SCBT or 7th Air Force, to deal with broader regional operations? This would also be consistent with the “Mandate for Leadership’s” recommendation for U.S. allies to play their part in dealing with China as well as statements from defense officials late in Trump’s first term that future force posture decisions would be less about bases and more about places. Furthermore, it would build on the fact that elements of the 7th Air Force already participate in wider regional exercises, including this month’s Cobra Gold exercises in Thailand (which also included personnel from South Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia) and aerial refueling operations over Okinawa in January.

Maybe the tradeoff would be a lower cost-sharing demand in exchange for acceptance of a more networked alliance system wherein U.S. forces moved more flexibly and freely to, through, and from the Korean Peninsula. This is what U.S. policymakers conceptualized in the early-to-mid-2000s during debates about strategic flexibility. South Korean officials have pushed back against the idea then and since.

Reflexive Opposition Won’t Suffice

For many South Koreans in defense and national security circles, when it comes to the SCBT, its symbolic importance exceeds its potential warfighting role. Despite the notable evolution and reduction of the so-called U.S. tripwire in South Korea, elements of the SCBT remain north of Seoul (others are south at Camp Humphreys). Indeed, South Korea’s entire national existence has been defined by some form of U.S. ground combat presence north of the capital city. The only time when this was not the case was from June 1949 to the outbreak of the Korean War a year later.

That history is deeply embedded in the Korean national security psychology. It helps explain the profound opposition to President Jimmy Carter’s policy to remove all remaining ground combat troops in the late 1970s and partly why he failed to implement it. The history persists in the present.

When I broached the possibility of removing the last ground-maneuver, infantry formation with former South Korean officials in early 2020 – moving toward a more flexible air- and naval-centric U.S. posture – they categorically rejected the idea. It was not so much about the mechanics of warfighting as the shadow of history. The SCBT’s withdrawal – or it and other units’ flexible use for off-peninsula contingencies – would reawaken a longstanding, if contradictory mix of abandonment and entrapment fears. More recently, in response to Miller’s comment, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik insisted the current size of U.S. troops stationed in the country was “absolutely necessary.”

Still, just because changes in the U.S. force structure may cause tremors in South Korea or opposition in Congress is not sufficient reason to avoid contemplating them. The 28,500 number was a floor, set in 2008 and reflexively repeated since. Truculently adhering to that number is neither sound policy nor does it allow for constructive, forward-thinking planning; not to mention the fact that the number is never actually at 28,500 but fluctuates above and below it at any given time. The uncertainty of just how exactly Trump will approach U.S. forces in South Korea if reelected, coupled with his well-recorded skepticism, is both cause for concern and reason to constructively explore alternative futures.

As I’ve explored elsewhere, there may be creative ways to reduce the U.S. footprint, enhance alliance integration, and enable Seoul to take on greater responsibility and authority while simultaneously taking on greater defense burdens in the alliance. It is better to ask hard questions and explore creative solutions now rather than wait for potentially impetuous demands from Trump. Doing such work ahead of time will help in the event that he is elected.

As my colleague Mark Tokola rightly notes, Trump’s demands should be read as opening bids, not final positions, and his policy pronouncements as first drafts rather than final products. Trump’s lack of convention, though certainly concerning, opens space for Seoul’s own creativity in making counter-demands. That requires it move away from knee-jerk opposition to change. Instead, it should lead the charge.

Authors

Contributing Author

Clint Work

Dr. Clint Work is fellow and director of Academic Affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). KEI is registered under the FARA as an agent of the KIEP, a public corporation established by the government of the Republic of Korea. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

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thediplomat.com · by Clint Work

3. U.S. seeking trilateral summit with S. Korea, Japan in July: report

Sustaining the highest level of trilateral diplomacy.

U.S. seeking trilateral summit with S. Korea, Japan in July: report | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · March 31, 2024

SEOUL, March 31 (Yonhap) -- The United States is in talks with South Korea and Japan to arrange a trilateral summit on the sidelines of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit to be held in Washington in July, a report said Sunday.

According to Japan's Kyodo News, which quoted diplomatic sources, U.S. President Joe Biden is considering inviting South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to the NATO event and holding the trilateral summit on the margins.

The three leaders have held multiple trilateral meetings, including during a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in San Francisco in November.

Their first standalone trilateral summit was held at the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland last August.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L), U.S. President Joe Biden (C) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pose for a photo as they meet during a summit of the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum at the Moscone Center in San Francisco in this file photo taken Nov. 16, 2023. (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · March 31, 2024

3. N. Korea's Kim inspects construction site of ruling party's training school

To contribute to the more thorough indcontribation of young people:

Excerpt:

The report said Kim "clearly set forth the immortal guidelines and fighting strategies for strengthening the WPK with his outstanding ideological and theoretical wisdom and extraordinary leadership and has led it to victory."

N. Korea's Kim inspects construction site of ruling party's training school | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Deok-Hyun Kim · March 31, 2024

SEOUL, March 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspected a construction site of the North's ruling party training school, the North's state media reported Sunday.

"The training school with a total floor space of over 133,000 square meters will be equipped with advanced educational systems and have the high level of educational conditions and environment," the North's Korean Central News Agency reported.

The construction of the school for cadets of the North's ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) will be completed in May, according to the report.

The report said Kim "clearly set forth the immortal guidelines and fighting strategies for strengthening the WPK with his outstanding ideological and theoretical wisdom and extraordinary leadership and has led it to victory."

The report did not specify when Kim gave the "field guidance," but he "personally chose the site of construction and meticulously indicated the principal tasks concerning the design while energetically guiding the work to turn the training school into a better university than others."

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on March 31, 2024, shows Kim Jong-un inspecting a construction site of the North's ruling party training school. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

kdh@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Deok-Hyun Kim · March 31, 2024

4. N. Korean delegation visits Laos: KCNA

Yes I am sounding like a broken record (e.g., another stone placed on the Go/Baduk board) but it does seem like the regime is being more aggressive in its diplomacy recently.

(2nd LD) N. Korean delegation visits Laos: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Deok-Hyun Kim · March 31, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS KCNA's English-language report)

SEOUL, March 31 (Yonhap) -- A North Korean delegation led by a senior official visited Laos and stressed the North's policy of bolstering defense capabilities, the North's state media reported Sunday.

Kim Song-nam, director of the international department at the North's ruling Workers' Party of Korea, met Thongsavanh Phomvihane, head of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party's external relations committee, last Friday, according to the report.

Laos is the final leg of Kim's three-nation trip that also took him to China and Vietnam.

Kim also paid a courtesy visit to Thongloun Sisoulith, the secretary general of the Communist Party of Laos.

In an English-language dispatch, the KCNA said the North Korean official conveyed a "verbal letter" from North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to Sisoulith.

The North Korean official said Pyongyang would "hasten the victory of the socialist cause and ramp up the comradely and strategic cooperation" with Laos, according to the report.

Kim's trip appears to be aimed at strengthening North Korea's ties with countries sharing the socialist ideology after South Korea established diplomatic relations with Cuba last month. Pyongyang has long boasted brotherly ties with Cuba.

Laos is scheduled to host an annual regional security meeting, the ASEAN Regional Forum, later this year.

North Korea has not sent its foreign minister to the forum since 2019, and the North's delegation's visit to Laos raised speculation on whether the North's top diplomat, Choi Son-hui, would attend the security gathering this year.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on March 31, 2024, shows Kim Song-nam (L), director of the international department at the North's ruling Workers' Party of Korea, shaking hands with Thongloun Sisoulith, the secretary general of the Communist Party of Laos. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

kdh@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Deok-Hyun Kim · March 31, 2024

5. Daily Review: Russia’s U.N. Veto Could Signal New Era for North Korea

Daily Review: Russia’s U.N. Veto Could Signal New Era for North Korea

worldpoliticsreview.com · by The Editors · March 29, 2024

Today’s Top Story

Russia vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution yesterday that would have extended the mandate of a panel of experts monitoring U.N. sanctions on North Korea over its nuclear program. The mandate had been extended annually for 14 years. (AP)

Our Take

For the past decade, opposition to North Korea’s nuclear program was one of the last remaining consensus issues to survive growing geopolitical tensions between the West, on one side, and Russia and China, on the other. Of course, Moscow and especially Beijing have been accused of being lax when it comes to the enforcement of sanctions against Pyongyang. But both had at least paid lip service to the issue on the international stage.

Now, Russia’s veto has brought an end to even that, with Moscow accusing the West of seeking to “strangle” North Korea with the sanctions.

The main factor driving this shift is Russia’s growing security ties with North Korea. Amid the war in Ukraine, Pyongyang has reportedly sold millions of munitions, including short-range ballistic missiles, to Moscow, in violation of the U.N. sanctions. Now, although the sanctions remain in place, the lack of any watchdog to monitor them will make it much easier for Russia to continue and even expand these purchases.

Russia’s veto also highlights how much North Korea has disappeared from the international radar since the early days of the Trump administration in 2017. At the time, former U.S. President Donald Trump launched a campaign of inflammatory brinksmanship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un before suddenly reversing course and engaging in a series of summits with Kim.

For a number of reasons, Trump failed in his goal of striking a deal with Pyongyang to curb its nuclear program, or at the very least placing it in the context of more stable relations. Instead, after a brief thaw, relations worsened and North Korea continued to nuclearize, while expanding and improving its missile arsenal. The Biden administration then essentially parked the issue, adopting what it called “a calibrated practical approach” that in practice has meant not engaging with Pyongyang and ignoring its saber-rattling.

That leaves North Korea as a de facto nuclear-armed state without any attempts by the West to stabilize relations via diplomacy. Until recently, the threat that represented was mitigated by North Korea’s diplomatic and economic isolation. Russia’s veto could be the first step in formally bringing Pyongyang back in from the cold.

On Our Radar

The first generation of rural-to-urban migrant workers in China is aging rapidly, but most of them don’t have access to pensions or health insurance and are increasingly struggling to find jobs, AP reports. Because of China’s system of household registration, migrant workers only have access to social insurance in their hometowns.

China’s decentralized welfare system is exacerbating one of the country’s broader challenges: a rapidly aging population. These policies have not only contributed to China’s high inequality but endanger the country’s economic growth. As columnist Mary Gallagher wrote in January, fixing the issue would require fiscal reforms that President Xi Jinping refuses to implement.

Population Decline Could Sink More Than China’s Economy

Jan. 23, 2024 | The challenges facing China’s decentralized welfare system are only going to get worse as the population rapidly ages. Read more.

A rift between Italian PM Giorgia Meloni and Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s National Rally party, makes it unlikely that Europe’s far-right movements will unite on the EU level, despite gaining momentum ahead of European Parliament elections in June, Reuters reports.

The rivalry is just one of many fault lines within Europe’s far right, with the most noticeable divide emerging between those with a more pragmatic stance about European integration, like Meloni, and those taking a more overtly anti-EU stance, like Le Pen. Alexander Clarkson broke down the divide in this column from September:

Europe’s Far-Right ‘Movement’ Is Full of Internal Fault Lines

Sep. 27, 2023 | A closer look at Europe’s far-right movements shows differences that can provide a more effective basis for containing the threat they pose. Read more.

The Palestinian Authority’s new PM named the members of his Cabinet yesterday, amid U.S. and international pressure to reform ahead of potentially taking administrative control over the Gaza Strip following the end of the Israel-Hamas war. The PA continues to face growing questions about its long-term viability, an issue that stretches back years, as Anas Iqtait and Tristan Dunning wrote in October.

The son and potential successor of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni vowed to fight corruption in the country’s military yesterday as he took over as its top commander. The announcement comes after a recent online campaign in Uganda sought to expose corruption in parliament, a reflection of growing discontent with Museveni’s government, as Michael Mutyaba wrote last week.

More from WPR

• Paul Poast on U.S. aid to Ukraine.
• Robert Looney on Jamaica’s economic success.
• Andrew Gawthorpe on Biden’s trade policy.
• Frida Ghitis on European Parliament elections.

worldpoliticsreview.com · by The Editors · March 29, 2024

6. Tug of war over North Korea-Japan summit

Every time Japan tugs on the rope, Kim releases it on his side and Japan falls flat on its back.

Tug of war over North Korea-Japan summit

The Korea Times · March 31, 2024

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his sister Kim Yo-jong attend a meeting with then South Korean President Moon Jae-in at Peace House in the truce village of Panmunjom inside the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas, in this April 27, 2018, file photo. Reuters-Yonhap

Proactively address moves by Pyongyang, Tokyo

North Korea and Japan are in a tug of war over a possible summit.

North Korea keeps brushing Japan off, ruling out any possibility of a summit talk to be held with Japan. Despite this, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida keeps trying to court North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to make the highest-level meeting happen sometime soon.

Their differing positions on the issue of the abduction of Japanese nationals stand as a key obstacle. Worse still, neither of the sides are ready to make concessions.

Japan claims that Japanese nationals who were abducted by North Korea over 40 years ago are still being held in the North, and demands a discussion on their return. But North Korea refutes this, insisting the abductees issue was resolved completely in the early 2000s during the summits between then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, father of the current leader, and thus there’s nothing left to discuss on the matter.

The North Korean leader’s sister Kim Yo-jong criticized Japan for raising the abduction issue, claiming that though Kishida expressed his willingness to meet her brother directly, the summit won’t happen.

“There is one thing the Japanese prime minister must understand: Our supreme leader is not a person he can meet whenever he wants,” she said in a statement released on March 26.

North Korea’s foreign ministry officials reiterated a similar view.

Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui dismissed the possibility of a summit. In a statement released on March 29, Choe said she finds it difficult to understand Japan’s “obsession” with the abduction issue which, according to her, has already been settled. Prior to her statement, Ri Ryong-nam, North Korea’s ambassador to China, said his embassy received an email about the summit from an official at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, adding the North has no plans to meet the Japanese prime minister.

Kishida, however, didn’t give up. He said that the Japan-North Korea summit, if held, would benefit both countries. He added that he firmly believes the summit would contribute to regional peace and stability.

It remains uncertain whether North Korea's denials of the summit reflect Kim Jong-un’s personal position.

The three who denied the summit are North Korean leader’s deputies, not Kim himself. Kim’s rare silence about the summit raises a key question: Why would a head of state remain silent on such an important foreign policy issue that could have enormous impact on his and his nation’s fate, while letting his deputies speak for him?

One possible answer to this question may be that he is still calculating potential gains and losses stemming from such a summit.

If this is true, Kim will want more time to think about the utility of the summit and therefore will intentionally try to leave room for a last-minute reversal by remaining silent for now. He would know better than anyone else that the summit will include economic incentives in return for North Korea’s possible suspension of provocations, an option he will find hard to resist. But Kim may not be sure about whether the gains he is calculating will be realized.

As his sister pointed out in her March 26 statement, Kim knows Kishida needs the summit to boost his lackluster approval ratings at home. Kim’s worst fear will be that if the North Korea-Japan summit is held, it can end up only benefiting Kishida. Kim himself had a similar bitter experience back in 2018 when he met then-U.S. President Donald Trump in Hanoi, Vietnam and the summit was cut short after the two sides failed to narrow their differences regarding denuclearization. The specter of the Hanoi summit may haunt Kim.

History tells us that diplomatic breakthroughs could happen. A North Korea-Japan summit could take place, despite their deep differences on the abduction issue.

Most vulnerable to North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, South Korea needs to closely watch the developments in Pyongyang-Tokyo relations and be fully prepared to address any possible shift in the situation.

If Kishida and Kim agree to meet for a summit against all odds, it would help de-escalate the tensions that have been mounting in the region. The U.S. presidential election in November is another key factor that can greatly affect regional security in East Asia.

The back-to-back political events and activities in Japan and the U.S. will likely impact North Korea’s possible courses of action and this will require South Korea to come up with effective policy responses to turn the tide in its favor. Depending on the results, Seoul may need to change its hard-line policy toward the North.

The Korea Times · March 31, 2024

7. North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts

Missing a couple of key dates from the 1950s (when the regime sent some 250 scientists and techniques to Moscow to get PhDs in nuclear related disciplines) and 1960s (when the north received its first experimental nuclear reactor from the USSR.  The regime has had its eye on the nuclear prize almost since its inception.

North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts

keyt.com · by CNN Newsource · March 29, 2024

CNN Editorial Research

(CNN) — Here is a look at North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and the history of its weapons program.

1985

North Korea signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demands that inspectors be given access to two nuclear waste storage sites. In response, North Korea threatens to quit the NPT but eventually opts to continue participating in the treaty.

1994

North Korea and the United States sign an agreement. North Korea pledges to freeze and eventually dismantle its old, graphite-moderated nuclear reactors in exchange for international aid to build two new light-water nuclear reactors.

2002

January 29 – US President George W. Bush labels North Korea, Iran and Iraq an “axis of evil” in his State of the Union address. “By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger,” he says.

October – The Bush Administration reveals that North Korea has admitted operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of the 1994 agreement.

2003

January 10 – North Korea withdraws from the NPT.

February – The United States confirms North Korea has reactivated a five-megawatt nuclear reactor at its Yongbyon facility, capable of producing plutonium for weapons.

April – Declares it has nuclear weapons.

2005

North Korea tentatively agrees to give up its entire nuclear program, including weapons. In exchange, the United States, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea say they will provide energy assistance to North Korea, as well as promote economic cooperation.

2006

July – After North Korea test fires long range missiles, the UN Security Council passes a resolution demanding that North Korea suspend the program.

October – North Korea claims to have successfully tested its first nuclear weapon. The test prompts the UN Security Council to impose a broad array of sanctions.

2007

February 13 – North Korea agrees to close its main nuclear reactor in exchange for an aid package worth $400 million.

September 30 – At six-party talks in Beijing, North Korea signs an agreement stating it will begin disabling its nuclear weapons facilities.

December 31 – North Korea misses the deadline to disable its weapons facilities.

2008

December – Six-party talks are held in Beijing. The talks break down over North Korea’s refusal to allow international inspectors unfettered access to suspected nuclear sites.

2009

June 12 – The UN Security Council condemns the nuclear test and imposes new sanctions.

2010

2011

October 24-25 – US officials meet with a North Korean delegation in Geneva, Switzerland, in an effort to restart the six-party nuclear arms talks that broke down in 2008.

2012

2013

January 24 – North Korea’s National Defense Commission says it will continue nuclear testing and long-range rocket launches in defiance of the United States. The tests and launches will feed into an “upcoming all-out action” targeting the United States, “the sworn enemy of the Korean people,” the commission says.

February 12 – Conducts third nuclear test. This is the first nuclear test carried out under Kim Jong Un. Three weeks later, the United Nations orders additional sanctions in protest.

2014

March 30-31 – North Korea warns that it is prepping another nuclear test. The following day, the hostility escalates when the country fires hundreds of shells across the sea border with South Korea. In response, South Korea fires about 300 shells into North Korean waters and sends fighter jets to the border.

2015

May 6 – In an exclusive interview with CNN, the deputy director of a North Korean think tank says the country has the missile capability to strike mainland United States and would do so if the United States “forced their hand.”

May 20 – North Korea says that it has the ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons, a key step toward building nuclear missiles. A US National Security Council spokesman responds that the United States does not think the North Koreans have that capability.

2016

September 9 – North Korea claims to have detonated a nuclear warhead. According to South Korea’s Meteorological Administration, the blast is estimated to have the explosive power of 10 kilotons.

2017

January 8 – During an interview on “Meet the Press,” Defense Secretary Ash Carter says that the military will shoot down any North Korean missile fired at the United States or any of its allies.

July 4 – North Korea claims it has conducted its first successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, that can “reach anywhere in the world.”

July 25 – North Korea threatens a nuclear strike on “the heart of the US” if it attempts to remove Kim as Supreme Leader, according to Pyongyang’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

August 7 – North Korea accuses the United States of “trying to drive the situation of the Korean peninsula to the brink of nuclear war” after the UN Security Council unanimously adopts new sanctions in response to Pyongyang’s long-range ballistic missile tests last month.

August 9 – North Korea’s military is “examining the operational plan” to strike areas around the US territory of Guam with medium-to-long-range strategic ballistic missiles, state-run news agency KCNA says. The North Korea comments are published one day after President Donald Trump warns Pyongyang that if it continues to threaten the United States, it would face “fire and fury like the world has never seen.”

September 3 – North Korea carries out its sixth test of a nuclear weapon, causing a 6.3 magnitude seismic event, as measured by the United States Geological Survey. Pyongyang claims the device is a hydrogen bomb that could be mounted on an intercontinental missile. A nuclear weapon monitoring group describes the weapon as up to eight times stronger than the bomb dropped in Hiroshima in 1945. In response to the test, Trump tweets that North Korea continues to be “very hostile and dangerous to the United States.” He goes on to criticize South Korea, claiming that the country is engaging in “talk of appeasement” with its neighbor to the north. He also says that North Korea is “an embarrassment to China,” claiming Beijing is having little success reining in the Kim regime.

2018

January 2 – Trump ridicules Kim in a tweet. The president says that he has a larger and more functional nuclear button than the North Korean leader in a post on Twitter, responding to Kim’s claim that he has a nuclear button on his desk.

March 6 – South Korea’s national security chief Chung Eui-yong says that North Korea has agreed to refrain from nuclear and missile testing while engaging in peace talks. North Korea has also expressed an openness to talk to the United States about abandoning its nuclear program, according to Chung.

June 12 – The final outcome of a landmark summit, and nearly five hours of talks between Trump and Kim in Singapore, culminates with declarations of a new friendship but only vague pledges of nuclear disarmament.

December 5 – New satellite images obtained exclusively by CNN reveal North Korea has significantly expanded a key long-range missile base, offering a reminder that Kim is still pursuing his promise to mass produce and deploy the existing types of nuclear warheads in his arsenal.

2019

January 18 – Trump meets with Kim Yong Chol, North Korea’s lead negotiator on nuclear talks, and they discuss denuclearization and the second summit scheduled for February.

February 27-28 – A second round of US-North Korean nuclear diplomacy talks ends abruptly with no joint agreement after Kim insists all US sanctions be lifted on his country. Trump states that Kim offered to take some steps toward dismantling his nuclear arsenal, but not enough to warrant ending sanctions imposed on the country.

March 8 – Analysts say that satellite images indicate possible activity at a launch facility, suggesting that the country may be preparing to shoot a missile or a rocket.

March 15 – North Korea’s foreign minister tells reporters that the country has no intention to “yield to the US demands.” In the wake of the comment, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insists that negotiations will continue.

May 4 – South Korea’s Defense Ministry states that North Korea test-fired 240 mm and 300 mm multiple rocket launchers, including a new model of a tactical guide weapon on May 3. According to the defense ministry’s assessment, the launchers’ range is about 70 to 240 kilometers (43 to 149 miles). The test is understood to be the first missile launch from North Korea since late 2017 – and the first since Trump began meeting with Kim.

October 2 – North Korea says it test fired a new type of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), a day after Pyongyang and Washington agreed to resume nuclear talks. The launch marks a departure from the tests of shorter range missiles North Korea has carried out in recent months.

December 3 – In a statement, Ri Thae Song, a first vice minister at the North Korean Foreign Ministry working on US affairs, warns the United States to prepare for a “Christmas gift,” which some interpret as the resumption of long-distance missile testing. December 25 passes without a “gift” from the North Korean regime, but US officials remain watchful.

2020

October 10 – North Korea unveils what analysts believe to be one of the world’s largest ballistic missiles at a military parade celebrating the 75th anniversary of the Workers’ Party broadcast on state-run television.

2021

August 27 – In an annual report on Pyongyang’s nuclear program, the IAEA says North Korea appears to have restarted operations at a power plant capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. The IAEA says that clues, such as the discharge of cooling water, observed in early July, indicated the plant is active. No such evidence had been observed since December 2018.

September 13 – North Korea claims it successfully test-fired new long-range cruise missiles on September 11 and 12, according to the country’s state-run KCNA. According to KCNA, the missiles traveled for 7,580 seconds along oval and figure-eight flight orbits in the air above the territorial land and waters of North Korea and hit targets 1,500 kilometers (930 miles) away. The US and neighboring South Korea are looking into the launch claims, officials in both countries tell CNN.

October 14 – An academic study finds that North Korea can get all the uranium it needs for nuclear weapons through its existing Pyongsan mill, and, based on satellite imagery, may be able to increase production above its current rate.

2022

January 12 – The United States announces sanctions on eight North Korean and Russian individuals and entities for supporting North Korea’s ballistic missile programs.

January 20 – North Korea says it will reconsider its moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests, according to state media.

March 24 – North Korea fires what is believed to be its first intercontinental ballistic missile since 2017. Analysts say the test could be the longest-range missile yet fired by North Korea, possibly representing a new type of ICBM.

September 9 – North Korean state media reports that North Korea has passed a new law declaring itself a nuclear weapons state. Leader Kim Jong Un vows the country will “never give up” its nuclear weapons and says there will be no negotiations on denuclearization.

October 4 – North Korea fires a ballistic missile without warning over Japan for the first time in five years, a highly provocative and reckless act that marks a significant escalation in its weapons testing program.

October 10 – North Korea performs a series of seven practice drills, intended to demonstrate its readiness to fire tactical nuclear warheads at potential targets in South Korea. Quoting leader Kim Jong Un, who oversaw the drills, KCNA says the tests, which coincided with nearby military drills between the United States, South Korea and Japan, showed Pyongyang was ready to respond to regional tensions by involving its “huge armed forces.”

2023

January 1 – Pyongyang’s state media reports that Kim Jong Un is calling for an “exponential increase” in his country’s nuclear weapons arsenal in response to what he claims are threats from South Korea and the United States.

July 18 – South Korea’s Defense Ministry announces the presence of a nuclear capable US Navy ballistic missile submarine in the South Korean port city of Busan. The arrival of the submarine follows a period of heightened tensions on the peninsula, during which North Korea has both tested what it said was an advanced long range missile and threatened to shoot down US military reconnaissance aircraft.

September 28 – The state-run Korean Central News Agency reports North Korea has amended its constitution to bolster and expand its nuclear force, with leader Kim Jong Un pointing to the growing cooperation between the United States, South Korea and Japan. The law added into North Korea’s constitution reinforces North Korea’s view that it is a forever nuclear power and that the idea of denuclearizing or giving up its weapons is not up for discussion.

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keyt.com · by CNN Newsource · March 29, 2024

8. The vile murder methods Kim Jong-un uses to spread fear in North Korea

Numerous photos at the link. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13223695/Blasted-anti-aircraft-guns-torched-flamethrowers-choked-pebbles-horrific-execution-methods-Kim-Jong-uses-spread-fear-North-Koreans.html

The number one security priority for Kim is the suppression of resistance. It is too bad Kim cannot defeat resistance with nuclear weapons.

So what good are nuclear weapons? Kim cannot use them to prevent resistance and the people cannot eat them. (note tongue in cheek).

The vile murder methods Kim Jong-un uses to spread fear in North Korea

Blasted with anti-aircraft guns, torched with flamethrowers and choked with pebbles: The horrific execution methods Kim Jong-un uses to spread fear among North Koreans

• Tyrant's regime is known for its brutal executions and Kim once had his own uncle killed by firing squad

By TARYN PEDLER

PUBLISHED: 04:27 EDT, 30 March 2024 | UPDATED: 05:05 EDT, 30 March 2024

Daily Mail · by Taryn Pedler · March 30, 2024

North Korea leader Kim Jong-un is known for his notoriously gruesome methods of execution that often resemble scenes from horror films.

Ranging from public death by firing squad to execution via anti-aircraft guns, the blood-thirsty madman has been previously criticised by human rights organisations for ordering the death penalty for 'crimes' such as watching foreign films or violating Covid restrictions.

North Korea has been ruled by one of the world's longest running dynastic dictatorships since 1948 - and in October 1993 the North Korean Government told Amnesty International that the death penalty is imposed rarely in 'extremely serious cases'.

But several savage reports from the repressive country would suggest otherwise, with a recent 2023 report from the Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU) providing eyewitness testimony that the Kim regime publicly executed violators of Pyongyang's draconian Covid19 quarantine measures.

Reports of shoot-to-kill orders for anyone attempting to cross the North Korean border during the pandemic were covered locally in October 2020, as Kim strengthened his grip over national governance.

Kim Jong-un is known for his notoriously violent methods of execution across North Korea

Researchers from a human right's group heard testimonies of 27 state-sanctioned executions in the decade since Kim Jong-un (pictured in an image released by North Korean news agency in November) took power after the sudden death of his father on December 17, 2011

Of the seven executions carried out for watching or distributing K-pop, all but one took place in Hyesan (pictured, file photo) between 2012 and 2014, the study found

The North Korean citizen was subject to a public execution by authorities for violating 'emergency quarantine measures' in November of the same year.

The firing squad shooting of the man accused of smuggling with his Chinese business partners was ordered to scare other citizens into strict compliance with the totalitarian nation's lockdown measures.

But the shocking testimony in the KINU report grants further credence to these horrific realities.

Public executions have long been part of the tyrant president's brutal regime policies - ranging from the public hangings and children being shot with assault rifles.

In 2021, a South Korean human rights organisation documented 23 public executions in the rogue state and featured testimony from North Korean defectors who were forced to watched the executions alongside the family members of the condemned.

All 23 of the public killings documented by the Transitional Justice Working Group had taken placed since Kim, 40, came to power in December 2011 after the sudden death of his father.

One witness told the the Seoul-based Transitional Justice Working Group, the organisation behind the report, that the executions were used as a warning from the state, with students and workers being ordered to watch.

'Even when there was fluid leaking from the condemned person's brain,' they told researchers, 'people were made to stand in line and look at the executed person in the face as a warning message.'

According to the chilling report, seven executions were punishments for watching or distributing South Korean media, such as K-pop - more than any other reason.

Kim has previously described the genre as a 'vivacious cancer' with the executions coming as part of a continual crackdown on the music.

The death penalty punishment was also dished out for crimes relating to drugs, prostitution, human trafficking and sex crimes.

CHILDREN SHOT DEAD

Teenage school students in North Korea were executed as recently as last year after watching TV shows from the South, a report stated.

Seoul's unification ministry drew from testimonies by more than 500 North Korean defectors in a report on abuses by Pyongyang.

It included a report of six teenagers aged 16 and 17 who faced the death penalty for watching illicit footage of South Korean TV shows and smoking opium.

The teenagers were sentenced to death in public and were immediately gunned down by authorities at an airfield in Hyesan, while residents were made to watch forcibly.

In order to escape fines, imprisonment, or worse, death, South Korean shows are smuggled on flash drives and watched behind closed doors in North Korea.

Two boys aged between 16 and 17 were marched on to an airfield in the city of Hyesan back in October and shot in front of locals for selling thumb drives containing South Korean films

The regime members called the 'crimes' committed by the minors 'evil'.

In a horrific 2012 case also in Hyesan, a child was executed with Kalashnikov rifles.

Describing the killing, a defector said: 'Blood was splattered and flesh was tattered.

'The authorities folded the body of the executed in half by stepping on it, and put it in a sack.

'I heard that they threw the sack away.'

The interviewees also described the inhumane treatment of prisoners before they were publicly executed.

'The condemned person was dragged out of the car like a dog before the public execution,' another witness said of a separate execution in Hyesan in 2012.

Children have also been sentenced to life in prison - where they are unlikely to survive due to the poor conditions.

North Korea sentenced a two-year-old to life in a prison camp after the toddler's parents were found with a Bible.

The plight of the child, whose entire family was also jailed, was revealed in the International Religious Freedom Report from the US State Department last year.

The publication also exposed multiple cases of North Koreans being killed for their Christianity, such as the execution by firing squad of a Christian woman and her grandchild in 2011.

FIRING SQUAD

One of the most popular methods of execution is death by firing squad, according to civilians fleeing the despot's murky regime.

A recent Radio Free Asia report from November 2023 brought a shocking incident to light involving 25,000 viewers, nine victims, and a vengeful firing squad.

According to the report, a crowd of 25,000 people were forced to gather at the airport in Hyesan and watch the grisly spectacle take place.

The nine people left in the hands of the authorities had allegedly commit the crime of 'beef smuggling' - and were handed the death penalty because of it.

A North Korean defector reacts next to a picture depicting a public execution of a North Korean soldier

Over 300 sites in North Korea have been identified as locations of public executions carried out by the hermit kingdom, sometimes drawing hundreds of forced spectators as the part of a campaign to intimidate citizens

A North Korean defector, left, wears a mask playing the role of North leader Kim Jong Il is "executed" by his fellows playing firing squad during a rally held against pro-North Korean groups in Seoul, in 2010

The victims had been reportedly operating an illegal beef distribution ring that bought and sold around 2,100 government-owned cows, slaughtered them, and distributed the meat to markets and businesses, including a restaurant in Pyongyang, residents told the outlet.

'There were enough people witnessing the shooting scene to fill the whole mountain range,' a resident of Hyesan's surrounding Ryanggang province told RFA Korean.

Before the execution took place, army representatives conducted an hour-long special military tribunal and disclosed details about each person's crime, he revealed.

'After [that], the seven men and two women who were tied to wooden stakes were executed by military marksmen,' he added.

'They were shot to death for killing and selling more than 2,100 state-owned cows from 2017 to February [2023].'

The horrified crowd was surrounded by police, soldiers, and other security personnel who ensured the onlookers stayed the entire duration of the event

'I kept thinking of the horrific scene of yesterday's shooting, so I couldn't sleep all night and trembled with fear,' the resident said.

According to local reports, whenever there is a public execution, the government usually requires every able-bodied person in the surrounding area to attend.

Another horrific human rights violation was committed by the country after reports emerged that a a six-month pregnant woman was publicly executed by the regime.

The woman had allegedly been caught in footage from 2017 dancing while pointing her finger at a portrait of the country's late founder Kim Il-sung.

This was deemed criminal enough to sentence her and her developing baby to death.

In 2013, Kim executed his own uncle Jang Song-thaek by firing squad after he was accused of being a traitor.

Jong Song Thaek, Kim's uncle who was thought to have taken temporary control of North Korea after Kim Jong Il died, was publicly arrested (right), declared a 'traitor for the ages', hauled in front of anti-aircraft guns and blown to pieces

North Korea's official news agency said Jang had sought to 'destabilise the country' to take charge through a coup.

Before his death, Jang was considered one of the most powerful figures in North Korea and he had served as a mentor to Kim Jong-un.

In a statement Pyongyang called Jang Song Thaek a 'traitor to the nation for all ages,' 'worse than a dog' and 'despicable human scum' who planned a military coup.

O Sang Hon, North Korea's deputy public security minister and a close ally of Jong, was killed around the same time for supporting him - allegedly burned to death using a flamethrower.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS

Defector Hee Yeon Lim reportedly claimed she saw 11 musicians accused of making a pornographic film 'blown to bits' by anti-aircraft guns.

'What I saw that day made me sick in my stomach,' she said.

Hee Yeon said she and her classmates were taken to a stadium at the city's Military Academy where the hooded victims were tied to the end of anti-aircraft guns in front of 10,000 spectators.

'A gun was fired, the noise was deafening, absolutely terrifying. And the guns were fired one after the other,' she recalled.

'The musicians just disappeared each time the guns were fired into them. Their bodies were blown to bits, totally destroyed, blood and bits flying everywhere… and then, after that, military tanks moved in and they ran over the bits on the ground where the remains lay.'

In 2015, reports surfaced from South Korean intelligence that its neighbour had publicly executed its Defence Minister Hyong Yong Chol with an anti-aircraft gun for falling asleep during an event and not carrying out instructions.

Satellite image showing a firing range in North Korea set up with a viewing area, targets, and a line of what appear to be anti-aircraft guns which Kim used to blast some of his rivals to pieces

A ZPU-4 AA gun like those reportedly used in North Korea to kill criminals

Hyon Yong Chol, North Korea's former defence minister (left), was also blown to pieces by anti-aircraft guns after he was caught on camera napping at a meeting chaired by Kim (right)

A rights group in North Korea later shared disturbing satellite footage appearing to show a group of people lined up in a military training area opposite six ZPU-4 AA-guns near a public viewing area.

A year later, a former agriculture minister and a senior education official were reportedly killed in a similar manner, 'executed by anti-aircraft gun at a military academy in Pyongyang' - the latter also alleged to have dozed off during a meeting.

CHOKED WITH PEBBLES

Harrowing testimonies within the Transitional Justice Working Group report described how prison inmates would be given just 20 ounces of corn each while toiling at mines, farms and factories form 13 to 15 hours a day.

Many died of hunger and diseases brought on by malnutrition, a witness said, while others managed to catch vermin and insects to eat.

'People eat rats and snakes. They were the best food to recover our health,' said one 46-year-old man, adding he still suffers from ulcers, headaches and back pain.

And in a shocking recollection, one inmate told of how an inmate sneaked away from his work for 15 minutes to pick fruit and was executed with his mouth stuffed with pebbles and gravel, to silence any protesting.

The victim was also tied to a wooden post and had his head covered with a hood as inmates were forced to watch the horrific scenes unfold in the Sariwon prison in 2015.

'I still can't forget his emotionless face,' the witness said.

A South Korean soldier, left, experiences what it is like to be held in a North Korean cell at the Korean War exhibition in Seoul in 2010

The same witness said the people organising the execution were heard violently cursing the accused and describing them as the 'epitome of social evil'.

Corpse desecration of the executed was also described by other witnesses.

POISONING

Kim Jong-un's estranged half-brother, Kim Jong-nam was killed in 2017 after the tyrant leader engineered the assassination of the 45-year-old.

In a report by South Korean intelligence analysts at the time, it was claimed Kim wanted the death to be so 'gruesome' it would 'horrify the rest of the world'.

Kim Jong-nam was killed by two women who smeared him with what turned out to be poisonous VX nerve agent in Kuala Lampur International Airport in Malaysia.

The two women were clearly visible on surveillance footage that captured the moment they targeted Jong Nam.

They also became identifiable after neglecting to cover their faces in the moments leading up to the assassination, and after the deed had been committed.

Nam Sung-wook, a former member of South Korea’s spy service who investigated the killing, says that Pyongyang wanted the assassination to be viewed in public.

‘Pyongyang wanted to send a worldwide message by murdering Kim Jong-nam in this gruesome, public way,’ Nam said at the time.

‘Pyongyang wanted to horrify the rest of the world by releasing a chemical weapon at an airport.

‘Jong-un wants to reign a long time and negotiate as a superpower.

‘The only way to do that is to keep the world in fear of his weapons. He has a grand design, and this is part of it.’

This screengrab made from CCTV footage obtained by Fuji TV and taken on February 13, 2017 shows Kim Jong-Nam (C in grey suit), half-brother of North Korea's leader Kim Jong-Un, speaking to airport authorities at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Kuala Lumpur

Malaysian police said the two women allegedly involved in the assassination - Siti Aisyah (left) and Huong (right) - knew the poisoning wasn't a 'TV prank'

Initially, it was thought that the assassination was a display of sloppiness by the North Koreans. Analysts noted that the two women who smeared the poison on Kim Jong-nam were clearly visible on surveillance footage

The two women, Indonesian Siti Aisyah, 25, and Doan Thi Huong, 28, from Vietnam, were allegedly hired by the blood-thirsty despot to fulfil the public poising.

But both told diplomats from their countries that they believed they were participating in a reality television show prank when they assaulted Kim Jong-nam.

But this is not the only case of poisoning that has been linked to the leader.

According to reports, Jang Song-thaek's wife and Kim Jong-un's aunt, Kim Kyong Hui, died in November 2014, aged 68, from a stroke during an argument about her husband's public execution in May of the same year.

But a defector claimed that Kim had ordered his aunt to be poisoned after she complained about the method of her husband's murder.

Kim then ordered the remaining seven members of Song-thaek's family to be executed.

Since succeeding his father Kim Jong-il as dictator of North Korea, Kim is thought to have killed 16 senior aides.

Capital punishment remains a divisive tool in the totalitarian state and proponents argue the brutality of methods used act as a deterrent for would-be offenders, and provide the only proportionate response to the most horrific crimes.

Opponents argue the death penalty has never put desperate criminals off from acting out, that wrongful executions cannot be compensated, and that it is beyond the purview of the state to take the life of its citizens.

As well as the death sentence reports have also exposed several abuses, such as torture, sexual violence and other inhumane treatment given to citizens in the country.

The North has even conducted medical experiments on the bodies of people with mental problems without their consent.

The death penalty remains a widely used penalty around the world in all its many forms, an insight into the many means humans have created to end life.

Daily Mail · by Taryn Pedler · March 30, 2024

9.  Man who flew drone into North Korea from China to capture incredible footage responds after everyone shares same concern

Man who flew drone into North Korea from China to capture incredible footage responds after everyone shares same concern

People expressed concerns about the videographer who took the drone footage

Niamh Shackleton

Published Mar 28, 2024, 19:46:46 GMT

Last updated Mar 28, 2024, 19:46:26 GMT

unilad.com

A man who managed to fly a drone over China's border with North Korea has spoken out.

On Tuesday (March 26), Redditor XiaoHao2 took to the social media platform to share the outcome of his dangerous drone mission.

It's thought the footage was taken during lockdown in 2020.

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While he was still in China, he flew his device over the border and managed to snap some images of the famously private country to give some insight into what it's like to live there.

"Drone pics of North Korea, I was in China, my drone flew across the border," he captioned the Reddit post that has been upvoted 138,000 times in just 48 hours.

There were a handful of images, with some showing North Korean residents appearing to spot the drone.

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Other photographs were of buildings, including a government one.

In light of North Korea's extremely strict rules in the country - especially as it closed its borders to outsiders in 2020 - fellow social media users penned their concerns about the man who took the drone footage.

"I wish you the best, hope you're safe. Thank you for the video," one person wrote.

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"That seems like a dangerous game," wrote another, as a third questioned: "Are you alive?"

XiaoHao2 has since confirmed that he's okay, telling those concerned: "I am still alive and free..."

While the streets of North Korea look notably empty in the Redditor's photos, recent snaps of the country showed more signs of life.

Photographer Pedro Pardo managed to take some images that portray life on the other side of the Chinese and North Korean border in recent weeks.

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Padro was able to get access to a remote part of North Korea's border with China in the latter's Jilin province to take the snaps, which date between February 26 and March 1 of this year.

The snaps were taken shortly before Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a damning report about North Korea. It was titled 'A Sense of Terror, Stronger than a Bullet: The Closing of North Korea 2018–2023'.

PEDRO PARDO/AFP via Getty Images

Part of the summary of the report, which was published on March 7, read: "North Korea is one of the most repressive countries in the world. Ruled by third-generation hereditary totalitarian leader Kim Jong Un, the North Korean government for decades has controlled its population with violence and fear, using arbitrary detention, torture, executions after unfair trials, enforced disappearance, and other serious violations of human rights, to obtain unquestioned obedience."

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Since King Jong-un took power of the country in 2011, North Korea's annual trade values in terms of exports have drastically decreased from almost $4 billion a year, as per HRW's report, to just $248 million a year in 2022.

Topics: North Korea, Photography, Reddit, Viral, World News

Niamh Shackleton

Niamh Shackleton is an experienced journalist for UNILAD, specialising in topics including mental health and showbiz, as well as anything Henry Cavill and cat related. She has previously worked for OK! Magazine, Caters and Kennedy.

@niamhshackleton

unilad.com

10. Kim Jong Un and the liberation of Palestine

A comparison between Iran and north Korea.  

We should not allow the axis of dictators/totalitarians to steal the word resistance.  

Excerpts:

North Korea’s situation parallels Iran’s ongoing diplomatic maneuvers as it tries to pressure the Biden administration into brokering a peaceful settlement between Israel and Hezbollah, aiming to avert the potential destruction of Iran’s most valued proxy. Since the October 7 Hamas offensive, Iran has maintained an ostensibly neutral stance, advocated “restraint” and simultaneously directed its network of proxy militias across the Middle East to sow instability, all under the guise of supporting Hamas’s endeavor to annihilate the Zionist entity. 

Iran’s approach to diplomacy, which vastly differs from North Korea’s strategy of apocalyptic threats, involves portraying itself as an ally to non-state actors like Hezbollah or the Houthis. These groups, supposedly acting independently, engage in attacks against Israel or disrupt global logistics through piracy in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

...

The case of Cuba distancing itself from the so-called axis of resistance illustrates that countries like North Korea and Iran are gradually losing allies willing to support the prioritization of military arsenals over economic stability and the well-being of their citizens.

Kim Jong Un and the liberation of Palestine

https://english.alarabiya.net/views/2024/03/27/Kim-Jong-Un-and-the-liberation-of-Palestine

Makram Rabah

Published: 27 March ,2024: 03:12 PM GST

Updated: 27 March ,2024: 03:43 PM GST

Amid the intense focus on the events in Gaza and the aftermath of the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, a significant development unfolded: Cuba and the Republic of South Korea announced the establishment of formal diplomatic relations on February 14. This historic event ended Cuba’s self-imposed isolation as the last Caribbean and Latin American country to establish such relations with South Korea. The development not only heralds a potentially prosperous future for both nations but also highlights North Korea’s failure to retain one of its most staunch allies, Cuba, within its anti-Western front.

Over the past year, North Korea has shuttered several of its leading embassies in countries including Libya, Uganda, Congo, Nepal, Bangladesh and Senegal, further isolating itself. The increasing isolation of North Korea, even from its traditional and authoritarian allies, reflects its failure to adhere to basic diplomatic norms. It underscores the reality that such Cold War relics are struggling to transition into the 21st century, and if they manage to, they are likely to find themselves obsolete.

North Korea’s situation parallels Iran’s ongoing diplomatic maneuvers as it tries to pressure the Biden administration into brokering a peaceful settlement between Israel and Hezbollah, aiming to avert the potential destruction of Iran’s most valued proxy. Since the October 7 Hamas offensive, Iran has maintained an ostensibly neutral stance, advocated “restraint” and simultaneously directed its network of proxy militias across the Middle East to sow instability, all under the guise of supporting Hamas’s endeavor to annihilate the Zionist entity.

Iran’s approach to diplomacy, which vastly differs from North Korea’s strategy of apocalyptic threats, involves portraying itself as an ally to non-state actors like Hezbollah or the Houthis. These groups, supposedly acting independently, engage in attacks against Israel or disrupt global logistics through piracy in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

Earlier in March, Amos Hochstein, Deputy Assistant to the US President and Senior Adviser for Energy and Investment, made a brief visit to Beirut where he met with Lebanese officials to convey that the chances of Israel ceasing its targeted operations against Hezbollah across Lebanon are minimal. Although Hochstein successfully demarcated the maritime border between Lebanon and Israel over a year ago, his current mission to halt hostilities and persuade Hezbollah to withdraw from southern Lebanon has proven challenging. This is particularly true after Hezbollah’s unprovoked attack on Israel the day following October 7, a fact proudly proclaimed by Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, in his latest televised speech.

Hochstein emphasized during his trip that discussions on a Lebanese-Israeli land border would only proceed once Hezbollah’s withdrawal is secured. Until then, Israel has no intention of stopping its targeted strikes against valuable assets across Lebanon.

The delusional mindset of North Korea is mirrored by its Iranian counterparts, who boast of their capability to destroy Israel and “liberate” Palestine, particularly Jerusalem. However, recent events suggest that this objective is low on the IRGC’s list of priorities. Kim Jong Un, in his typical bluster, has declared his “lawful right” to annihilate South Korea. Ironically, both North Korea and the Iranian regime believe their ailing economies and outdated technology are superior to those of their adversaries.

In reality, South Korea’s GDP is significantly higher than that of North Korea as South Koreas gross domestic product (GDP) amounts to “2,080 trillion South Korean won, while that of North Korea was approximately 36.2 trillion South Korean won, 57 times greater than that of North Korea.”

Recently, Hassan Nasrallah, in a televised speech, claimed that Israel is losing the war in both Gaza and southern Lebanon. He spent an hour extolling the virtues of the “axis of resistance,” without acknowledging the dire situation of Gaza’s civilians or the devastation in southern Lebanon, which has likely displaced its inhabitants permanently. Nasrallah’s refusal to recognize that his actions have put Lebanon on a collision course with a full-scale Israeli war exacerbates Lebanon’s ongoing economic and political crises.

The case of Cuba distancing itself from the so-called axis of resistance illustrates that countries like North Korea and Iran are gradually losing allies willing to support the prioritization of military arsenals over economic stability and the well-being of their citizens.

Read more:

US, South Korea set up task force to block North Korea oil shipments

North Korea’s Kim Jong oversees ‘super-large’ rocket launcher drills

North Korea’s leader Kim visits tank unit, calls for stepping combat readiness

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com