Quotes of the Day:

"Of every One-Hundred men, Ten shouldn't even be there, Eighty are nothing but targets, Nine are real fighters...We are lucky to have them...They make the battle, Ah, but the One, One of them is a Warrior...and He will bring the others back."

 –  Heraclitus (circa 500 BC)

"Never regret. If it's good, it's wonderful. If it's bad, it's experience."

– Eleanor Hibbert

"As masters of the art of resistance, Army Special Operations Forces work with partners to anticipate, prepare for, and defeat threats ranging from insurgencies to occupying foreign powers. To accomplish this, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Forces conduct activities to support or defeat resistance movements. ARSOF formations conduct Foreign Internal Defense to improve partner-government capacity to defeat internal stability threats. They further conduct Security Force Assistance, enabling partner nations to resist both internal and external threats. In competition and conflict, ARSOF conduct information warfare to prepare target audiences to support friendly efforts and resist adversaries. ARSOF also conduct Civil Network Development and Engagement to understand, empower, and potentially mobilize civil networks to resist adversaries. In crisis and conflict, ARSOF and JIIM partners conduct Unconventional Warfare and Counter-Unconventional Warfare to enable resistance against governments, occupying powers, and revanchist states."

– 1st Special Forces Command (https://www.soc.mil/USASFC/Documents/1sfc-vision-2021-beyond.pdf)

1. U.S. Special Operations Officials Underscore Continued Role in Deterring Conflict

2.  Full Committee Hearing: U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region

3. Building upon McRaven’s Foundation: Operational and Strategic Principles of Special Air Operations

4. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 20, 2024

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 20, 2024

6. A Suspicious Pattern Alarming the Ukrainian Military

7. U.S. vs Russian "Hybrid Warfare" Doctrine: A Comparative Glance

8. The War in Ukraine After The Russian Election by Mick Ryan

9. US TikTok Ban a Flashpoint in US-China Cyberwar

10. America Is Sliding Toward Chinese-Style Capitalism

11. Innocents and War: Contemporary Reflections, Permanent Dilemmas

12. Taiwan and US are playing dangerous game off Quemoy

13. A Mexican Drug Cartel’s New Target? Seniors and Their Timeshares

14. The One Idea That Could Save American Democracy

15. Senior leaders worry DOD pay models don’t reflect demands on troops

16. BE ALL WE CAN BE: RECLAIMING THE ARMY IDENTITY

17. ‘Ghost Army’ that fooled Hitler will receive Congress’s highest honor

18. Risch on SFRC Passage of Unqualified State Department Nominees

19. Russian Electronic Warfare: From History to Modern Battlefield

20. Special operations face growing demand amid potential cuts, top commander says

21. Naval Special Warfare 8 commodore relieved due to ‘loss of confidence’

22. China's grey-zone provocations: Time to reciprocate

23. The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine

24. The fallacy of soft power

25. A More European NATO

26.Learning from the War on Terror

27. U.S. to review Israeli assurances it is not violating international law

28. Delay, Disrupt, Degrade: Mine Warfare in Taiwan’s Porcupine Defense

29. How the US Neoliberal Shift Fed China’s Rise

1. U.S. Special Operations Officials Underscore Continued Role in Deterring Conflict

The combined statement of the ASD SO/LIC and he CDR USSOCOM is at this link: https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/03.20.24%20Maier-Fenton%20Joint%20Statement.pdf

Excerpts:

Irregular warfare is a critical tool for campaigning across the spectrum of conflict, enhancing interoperability and access, and disrupting competitor warfighting advantages while reinforcing our own. To further institutionalize irregular warfare across the Joint Force, SO/LIC is updating policy, informing doctrine, and modernizing irregular warfare education and training. As part of this effort, in close coordination with the Joint Staff, SO/LIC recently updated DoD’s definition of irregular warfare to better reflect the role of the Joint Force. Irregular warfare activities impose costs on our adversaries, strengthen our network of allies and partners, and interrupt our adversaries’ decision cycle. \

Irregular warfare is a fundamental component of the DoD’s contributions to a larger whole-of-government approach to strategic competition. Through the conduct of irregular warfare education and training, along with joint and combined activities and operations, our allies and partners are better equipped to deter and resist aggression from the PRC, Russia, Iran, and other malign actors. Irregular warfare enhances posture and options to counter an adversary’s gray zone activities and their counter-intervention strategies. Consequently, an enhanced understanding of irregular warfare will bolster deterrence and make large scale conflict less likely. While SOF may perform the preponderance of the DoD’s irregular warfare operations and activities, it remains the responsibility of the entire Joint Force. Shared investments in irregular warfare across the DoD will enhance interoperability and

disrupt our competitors’ advantage.

...

Your SOF stand ready to meet the complex challenges of this decisive decade with specially assessed and selected personnel, enabled by cutting-edge capabilities and training. Decades of problem-solving, courage, and relentless determination, attest to SOF’s ability to prepare the global operating environment, contributing to integrated deterrence. SOF’s unique capabilities generate options that enable the Joint Force to prevail while preserving the Nation’s strategic focus. Whether creating dilemmas for our competitors, countering coercion, reassuring allies and partners, disrupting VEOs or responding to crises, SOF provide a decisive advantage for the Nation. SO/LIC and USSOCOM will continue to provide the leadership and advocacy necessary to ensure that your SOF remain the world’s most highly skilled and capable special operations force. The men and women of Special Operations are grateful for your continued support.

The testing can be viewed on YouTube at this link:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=klV8_a3KVPI&t=1s. Note the testimony does not begin until the 31 minute mark so scroll ahead or you will be watching "will begin. shortly" sign for 30 minutes. 

A fascinating opening statement by Rep Bergman. I cannot recall a statement as strong in support of USSOCOM.

Congressman Jackson hit the 3000 person Army SOF cut very hard. General Fenton had to walk a tightrope in his answer. 

Rep Bergman closing remark: SOCOM cannot be used as a billpayer.

U.S. Special Operations Officials Underscore Continued Role in Deterring Conflict

defense.gov · by Joseph Clark

U.S. special operations forces continue to deliver critical advantages as the Defense Department confronts a changing national security landscape, top officials said today.

Army Gen. Bryan P. Fenton, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command said that in addition to honing key counterterrorism capabilities throughout the Global War on Terror, the special operations community has maintained its roots in deterring and defeating strategic threats.

Bryan P. Fenton

Army Gen. Bryan P. Fenton, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, speaks with U.S. Special Operations Command Africa troops in Manda Bay, Kenya, July 25, 2023

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He said the joint special operations communities' experience in strategic competition and integrated deterrence will pay dividends as the U.S. faces increasing competition with China, Russia's increasing aggression and Iran's malign activities throughout the Middle East.

Spotlight: Support for Ukraine

"To be clear, DOD's main effort, integrated deterrence, is Socom's main effort," Fenton said in testimony to the House Armed Services Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee.

"Since 1942, your SOF has accumulated six decades of strategic competition experience, now combined with over two decades of hard-earned combat experience in the Global War on Terror," he said. "These eight decades make your special operations tailormade for this era."

Special operations forces provide the U.S. with strategic options to prevent great power conflict and ensure the joint force prevails should conflict occur, he said, adding that "integrated deterrence and strategic competition are in our DNA."

Fenton testified alongside Christopher P. Maier, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, who outlined before lawmakers the impacts special operations forces were having in the changing national security environment.

Hovering Hues

East coast based Naval Special Warfare operators fast-rope onto a training vessel during a maritime interdiction operation exercise in Virginia Beach, Va., Nov. 7, 2023.

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In the Pacific, special operations forces' presence and engagement have produced tangible impacts aligned with U.S. efforts to prevent competition with China veering into conflict, Maier said.Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific

He added that special operations forces remained aligned with partners from U.S. Space Command, U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Strategic Command and are well positioned to "operationalize" integrated deterrence against China.

In Europe, Maier noted U.S. special operations forces' ability to draw on "generational relationships with Ukraine in aiding its fight against Russian aggression."

He added special operations forces are deepening integration with NATO's newest member, Sweden, as well as with Norway, a founding member of the alliance.

Spotlight: NATO

"With these partners and others, SOF is ready for operations in the Arctic," Maier said.

Troop Talk

Christopher P. Maier, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, speaks with U.S. Special Operations Command Africa troops at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, July 23, 2023.

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Fenton said to combat the range of threats the U.S. faces, Socom delivers "asymmetric and asynchronous advantage for DOD."

Those advantages are enabled by the special operations community's focus on its people.

"Your special operations attract the most talented men and women driven to solve the most complex problems and politically sensitive and contested environments," he said. "And with them, we win by asymmetrically deterring our adversaries, tearing apart violent extremist organizations and rapidly responding to crisis."

Spotlight: Value of Service Spotlight: Value of Service: https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/Value-of-Service/

defense.gov · by Joseph Clark

2. Full Committee Hearing: U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region

The hearing can be viewed on YouTube at his link. (note that the testimony begins at the 19 minute mark). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D1odQ_RP_hE

The statements are at these links: 

Ely Ratner: https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/20240320_Assistant%20Secretary%20Ratner%20Statement%20for%20the%20Record_HASC_FINAL.pdf

Adm Aquilino: https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/INDOPACOM%20Posture%20Testimony%20ADM%20Aquilino%20HASC.pdf

Gen LaCamera: https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/FY25%20Posture%20Statement%20USFK%20-%20HASC%20-%2020%20Mar%2024.pdf

Full Committee Hearing: U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region

armedservices.house.gov · March 20, 2024

Date:

Wednesday, March 20, 2024 - 11:15am

Location:

Rayburn 2118

Purpose: The purpose of the hearing is to examine Department of Defense policies, programs, and activities in the Indo-Pacific region in preparation for the committee’s consideration of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025. The hearing provides an opportunity to assess the threats to U.S. national security in the region and to evaluate the effectiveness of the department’s use of the resources provided by Congress to accomplish its objectives.

Witnesses:

The Honorable Ely Ratner

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs

Department of Defense

Admiral John Aquilino

Commander

US Indo-Pacific Command

General Paul LaCamera

Commander

United Nations Command, ROK/US Combined Forces Command, and US Forces Korea

The Honorable Ely Ratner Opening Statement

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs

Department of Defense

Admiral John Aquilino Opening Statement

Commander

US Indo-Pacific Command

General Paul LaCamera Opening Statement

Commander

United Nations Command, ROK/US Combined Forces Command, and US Forces Korea

118th Congress

armedservices.house.gov · March 20, 2024

3. Building upon McRaven’s Foundation: Operational and Strategic Principles of Special Air Operations

The graphic from Admiral McRaven's book is at the link.  

The focus of this article is on "special air operations." But we should remember that the Admiral's book on the theory of special operations is a theory for only one part of special operations - those that conduct direct action, counter terrorism, and hyper conventional raid operations. It is an excellent theory but it is not an all encompassing theory of special operations.

It does not cover the SOF that operates in this way:

–If there is an indigenous solution or an indigenous contribution to the solution for a complex political military problem conduct special warfare – the essence of which is “through, with, and by” as developed by COL (R) Mark Boyatt

Building upon McRaven’s Foundation: Operational and Strategic Principles of Special Air Operations

https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/building-upon-mcravens-foundation-operational-and-strategic-principles-of-special-air-operations/?utm

March 19, 2024 by Jan-Joost Ackermans Leave a Comment

In 1995, the future commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, William McRaven, published what has become a seminal work for understanding special operations: Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory & Practice. Using a series of case studies to demonstrate key principles, McRaven offered a theory of special operations that has served as essential guidelines for a generation. In essence, his theory states that “Special operations forces gain relative superiority over superior forces when they have a simple plan, carefully concealed, realistically rehearsed, and executed with surprise, speed, and purpose.”

Building on the groundwork laid by McRaven, this article aims to delve deeper into the strategic and operational layers that complement McRaven’s foundational principles. These additional principles serve to enhance the effectiveness of special air operations and ensure that they not only succeed tactically but also align with overarching military and political objectives. Through an exploration of these principles, readers will gain a more nuanced understanding of the approach required for the successful orchestration of special air operations.

The necessity for clear and comprehensive principles that guide special air operations is paramount. Principles that transcend traditional tactics ensure that operations are not only effective in immediate terms, but are also aligned with broader strategic objectives by creating a unified framework that enables decision-makers at all levels to act with a clear understanding of their role within the larger strategic context. As we look to the future of special air operations, the development of a set of principles that embraces the larger strategic context is not just beneficial; it is essential. Such principles provide the clarity and direction needed to operate effectively in today’s global security environment and ensure that actions at every level contribute to a cohesive and strategically sound operation.

When discussing principles of special air operations, evaluating the applicability of McRaven’s theory of special operations is essential. While McRaven’s theory has been influential in shaping principles for direct action missions primarily from a ground operations perspective, the theory requires expansion and adaptation to fully address the unique challenges and dynamics of modern special air operations.

The increasing reliance on technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles, advanced aircraft, and sophisticated communication systems in modern air operations is a critical aspect that McRaven’s principles, in their original form, did not comprehensively address. These technologies simply did not exist to their current extent when McRaven wrote his theory. Technologies integral to surveillance, intelligence gathering, precision strikes, and long-range missions in contemporary conflicts necessitate their inclusion in principles of contemporary special air operations.

Additionally, special air operations face distinct operational hurdles, such as conducting aerial refueling and managing long-range insertion and extraction in high-threat environments. These operations are further complicated by the need to navigate environments equipped with both advanced, high-tech devices and basic massed equipment. These operational and technological challenges require specific strategies and tactics that are distinct from ground operations. Moreover, these challenges have historically acted as catalysts for innovation and the development of unconventional solutions by airmen. For instance, the challenge of breaching the Ruhr Valley dams during Operation Chastise led to the invention of Wallis’s bouncing bombs. Yet, it was the ingenuity of the airmen who perfected the skipping technique and devised the lighting system necessary for maintaining the bombers at the precise height for bomb release. Similarly, the technical dilemma of launching medium bombers from an aircraft carrier for the Doolittle Raid necessitated mechanical modifications to the B-25s. However, it was the human creativity and determination that figured out the logistics of safely executing such a daring launch. These instances exemplify how, when faced with operational and technical hurdles, the human element plays a pivotal role in overcoming obstacles and achieving operational success in special air operations.

The current landscape of military operations often necessitates involving various branches of the government and military. Principles focusing on the coordination between (non) governmental agencies and air, ground, naval, space, and cyber forces are crucial for the success of modern multi-domain operations.

Furthermore, the legal and political considerations in special air operations, especially when operating in sovereign territories without explicit consent, require careful navigation. McRaven’s theory, while effective in a tactical sense, does not sufficiently cover these aspects for special air operations. Modern conflicts often involve a mix of conventional, unconventional, overt, covert, and clandestine tactics by states and also illegal and malicious actions by non-state actors. Particularly in a special air operations context it is essential to address the complexities of modern battlefields. Lastly, the psychological impact and the role of information operations in modern warfare is critical. While McRaven’s principles intentionally limited their focus to the tactical execution of direct-action missions, from the strategic and operational levels special operations also require an increasing focus on the psychological and informational dimensions of warfare.

Operational and strategic principles of special air operations

While McRaven’s theory of special operations lays a significant foundational framework, its adaptation and expansion are imperative to fully address the operational and strategic level challenges in modern special air operations. Warfare demands a comprehensive approach that encompasses not only tactical execution but also advanced technology integration, inter-service coordination, legal and political considerations, and psychological and information warfare strategies. This necessitates a forward-thinking and multifaceted approach integrated into strategic planning. To ensure strategic and operational coherence, it is beneficial to design principles of special air operations that can be used across the full spectrum of warfare, from the tactical to the strategic level.

The figure below presents a layered approach to the newly designed principles of special air operations, building upon the foundational principles laid out by McRaven and extending them to address the complexities of special air operations at the operational and strategic level.

Figure 1: Principles of special air operations. Source: Author.

At the base, we have McRaven’s principles of special operations that provide fundamental tactical principles: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose. Building upon this, the operational level introduces the principles of flexibility, coordination, and intelligence, which are essential for executing complex missions with precision and skill. At the top of the pyramid, we find the strategic principles of adaptability, innovation, and integration, signifying the highest-order principles necessary for dynamic and successful special air operations in a rapidly changing environment.

Principles Explained

Adaptability

Adaptability is the strategic ability of command structures to respond quickly to changing circumstances. It requires mental agility within command structures for decisive action. This includes the ability to alter strategies and operations based on new intelligence or unexpected challenges supported by agile command and control and logistics systems. From a special air warfare perspective, it is about special operations command structures preparing for various scenarios, ensuring operations can swiftly adjust to diverse and unpredicted threats, maintaining operational tempo and achieving strategic objectives in rapidly evolving environments.

Innovation

The strategic principle of innovation is critical for maintaining a strategic advantage, going beyond high-tech adoption to include creative strategies and the unconventional and unexpected use of both advanced and basic technologies. An example of this approach is Operation Thunderbolt, the Israelis’ hostage rescue from Uganda in 1976. There, innovative planning and execution underscored the importance of strategic innovation and operational flexibility.

Innovative airmen across all levels advocate for a culture of experimentation, blending high-tech precision with low-tech reliability to enhance operational flexibility, much like the Israeli Defense Forces utilized a mix of intelligence, surprise, and audacity to rescue hostages from Entebbe Airport in Uganda. This operation showcased not only the effective use of military craft and commando tactics but also the strategic deployment of deception and psychological warfare, with the use of a disguised vehicle to mimic Ugandan dictator Idi Amin’s convoy. Innovation is not simply implementing new technology. It requires rethinking operational concepts, fostering a mindset that embraces risk-taking, and learning from outcomes to ensure operations across all domains are effective against complex warfare challenges. Operation Thunderbolt stands as a testament to the effectiveness of embracing such innovative approaches, highlighting how blending diverse technological and tactical solutions can achieve decisive outcomes in the face of daunting challenges.

Integration

Integration involves a combination of air power with overall military strategy, ensuring air and space operations enhance other forces’ capabilities. It also includes seamlessly incorporating air strategies into national security and diplomatic objectives. Effective integration results in a unified force capable of efficient action across the full range of competition-to-conflict scenarios, crucial for coordinated efforts in the multi-dimensional landscape of modern warfare.

Flexibility

When highlighting the importance of flexibility in special air warfare, it becomes imperative to acknowledge the impact of the human factor within these operations. Embracing the SOF truth that “Humans are more important than hardware” we highlight the essence of what truly propels special air operations beyond conventional warfare. History is filled with examples of this truth, such as Eben Emael, Doolittle’s Raid, Operation Chastise, Operation Kingpin, and Operation Thursday, where the ingenuity and adaptability of airmen turned the tide. These examples serve as a testament to the ability of human creativity and unconventional thinking to leverage existing and, at times outdated, technologies in unexpected ways, thereby catching adversaries off guard. This distinct blend of flexibility and innovation, driven by the human spirit, underscores the argument that the strategic advantage in air warfare does not rest on the shoulders of technology but rather on the capability of individuals to think beyond the confines of conventional strategies and tools. The integration of such a human-centric approach into the discourse on air warfare not only enriches our understanding of its dynamic nature but also highlights the invaluable role of human resourcefulness in shaping the outcome of critical operations.

Coordination

Operation Neptune Spear exemplifies the essence of effective coordination in special air operations, showcasing how unified efforts across military branches, government agencies, and international partners are pivotal. The principle of coordination, founded on clear command, control and communication lines, shared objectives, and collaborative planning, was crucial in navigating the logistical, intelligence, and command challenges of the operation. The seamless integration of air operations, from stealth insertion to real-time intelligence, underscores the importance of such coordination in managing the complexities of operations involving state and non-state actors. This operation aligned efforts with broader goals, demonstrating that effective coordination is key to the success of joint operations and multi-domain engagements, achieving strategic political, social, and ideological objectives.

Intelligence

Intelligence emphasizes the operational use of information for planning and executing missions involving robust processes for intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination. It’s about understanding the operational environment, identifying threats, and exploiting opportunities to integrate various intelligence sources for a comprehensive mission area overview. Effective intelligence is crucial for enhancing mission success rates, reducing risks, and navigating the complexities of warfare to ensure decisions are well-informed and operations can effectively counter diverse tactics and goals of adversaries.

Now what?

Embracing these additional principles is crucial for harnessing technological advancements, ensuring swift adaptability, and gathering comprehensive intelligence – all of which are indispensable for the sustained success of special air warfare. It is imperative that airmen and leaders involved in future special air operations thoroughly integrate these strategic and operational principles, fostering a strong and adaptable approach to special operations that is ready to meet current and future challenges. This ongoing commitment to evolving strategically and operationally is key to staying effective and relevant in a complex global security environment.

As we venture deeper into the 21st century, the success of special air operations will hinge on the military’s ability to synthesize these principles into a coherent and agile framework. This framework must not only anticipate change, adapt to the unforeseen, and innovate amidst constraints but also prioritize the development, training, and empowerment of its special airmen above the sole acquisition of advanced technology. The ability to coordinate across spectrums, understand and navigate the fog of war and make critical decisions in complex environments underscores the irreplaceable value of skilled, adaptable, and resilient individuals. The future of special air operations is not a distant horizon but an immediate challenge, and readiness to meet this challenge begins with embracing principles that emphasize the importance of human talent and ingenuity. By acknowledging that the effectiveness of special air operations is primarily driven by the capabilities and decision-making of its people, the military ensures that its operations are as versatile and resilient as the individuals it relies upon and the operations it aims to guide.

Jan-Joost Ackermans is a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Royal Netherlands Air Force. He graduated from the Royal Netherlands Military Academy and Helicopter Weapons Instructor Course, and holds a Master of Science in Air and Space Operations from Staffordshire University. Jan-Joost served as a CH47F helicopter weapons instructor and flight lead, was an air advisor at the NATO Special Operations Headquarters and headed the Defence Helicopter Command’s weapons school, tactics, and standardization department. He currently serves as a strategic policy advisor at the Ministry of Defence in The Hague. 

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Royal Netherlands Air Force or Ministry of Defense, the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

U.S. Air Force Special Tactics operators, assigned to the 352d Special Operations Wing, prepare to conduct a simulated medevac mission on March 2, 2020, near Constanta, Romania, using the 352 SOW’s CV-22B Osprey. (Staff Sgt. Elizabeth Pena via DVIDS)

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4. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 20, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-20-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said during a meeting with unspecified leaders in Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” in Tehran that the current pause in attacks on US forces does not mark the end of efforts to expel US forces from Iraq.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City.
• Negotiations: Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan said on March 20 that Israel responded negatively to Hamas’ ceasefire proposal.
• West Bank: The IDF Air Force killed four Palestinian fighters, including two low-level PIJ leaders, in a drone strike in the Jenin refugee camp.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF said that it has degraded Hezbollah’s ability to transfer weapons since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.
• Yemen: The Houthi supreme leader said on March 15 that the Houthis intend to target international shipping transiting the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope. This statement is likely aspirational given the current maximum range of Houthi weapon systems, which is roughly 2,200km.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged the Iranian government’s shortcomings in “controlling inflation” and economic production during his Nowruz speech.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 20, 2024

Mar 20, 2024 - ISW Press

Iran Update, March 20, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said during a meeting with unspecified leaders in Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” in Tehran on March 20 that the current pause in attacks on US forces does not mark the end of efforts to expel US forces from Iraq. [1] Hamidawi said that he and the unspecified leaders discussed challenges and the timing of “resistance” activity.[2] He argued that “the politicized and the weak” must be prevented from interfering in this effort.[3] Hamidawi was likely referring to Iraqi Sunni political parties that Iranian-affiliated Iraqi Shia parties have accused of blocking attempts to remove US forces from Iraq.[4]

Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 20. Israeli special operations forces and the Israel Defense Forces 401st Brigade (162nd Division) killed approximately 90 Palestinian fighters and located weapons in the hospital area on March 20.[5] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF has apprehended about 350 suspected Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters in the hospital since the operation began.[6] Israeli forces detained PIJ Political Bureau member Khaled al Batsh during the operation.[7] The IDF noted that several Hamas battalion commanders were at the hospital but added that Gaza City Brigade Commander Izz al Din al Haddad was not present and is still at-large. Haddad is responsible for some of Hamas’ reconstitution efforts.[8]

The Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF assessed that Hamas may have tried in recent months to rebuild the underground tunnel system under al Shifa Hospital.[9] The report clarified that Hamas could not hide weapons in the rebuilt tunnels and its fighters were unable to use the tunnels to exfiltrate from the hospital area. Israeli forces initially expanded clearing operations to al Shifa Hospital in November 2023.[10] An Israeli think tank analyst told the RAND Corporation in 2016 that during previous operations the IDF found that the Gaza Strip’s sandy soil means that tunnels are difficult to rebuild.[11] Hamas and PIJ’s decision to use al Shifa to launch and direct operations after Israel’s initial clearing operations illustrates that Hamas will resume operations in areas without an Israeli presence, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said during a meeting with unspecified leaders in Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” in Tehran that the current pause in attacks on US forces does not mark the end of efforts to expel US forces from Iraq.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City.
• Negotiations: Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan said on March 20 that Israel responded negatively to Hamas’ ceasefire proposal.
• West Bank: The IDF Air Force killed four Palestinian fighters, including two low-level PIJ leaders, in a drone strike in the Jenin refugee camp.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF said that it has degraded Hezbollah’s ability to transfer weapons since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.
• Yemen: The Houthi supreme leader said on March 15 that the Houthis intend to target international shipping transiting the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope. This statement is likely aspirational given the current maximum range of Houthi weapon systems, which is roughly 2,200km.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged the Iranian government’s shortcomings in “controlling inflation” and economic production during his Nowruz speech.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) directed an airstrike targeting six Palestinian fighters in Jabalia on March 20.[12] Israeli forces previously struck Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) infrastructure in Jabalia on March 6 after Palestinian fighters launched rockets into Israel from Jabalia.[13]

Palestinian militias continued attempts to disrupt Israeli ground operations in Gaza City on March 20. Several militias reported that their fighters engaged Israeli forces near al Shifa Hospital with small arms.[14] Hamas published footage of its fighters targeting Israeli armor south of al Shifa Hospital with RPGs.[15] Palestinian sources reported engagements between Palestinian fighters and Israeli forces west of al Shifa Hospital.[16]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 20. The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) killed two Palestinian fighters in the area and attacked military infrastructure.[17] Hamas fighters targeted Israeli infantrymen breaching a tunnel in Qarara by rigging the tunnel entrance to explode.[18] PIJ fighters also mortared Israeli forces in Qarara.[19] Israeli forces have been operating in Qarara since March 3.[20]

The IDF Air Force killed five senior members of Hamas’ Emergency Committees in Rafah.[21] Israeli media reported that the Emergency Committees are Hamas organizations that are responsible for maintaining public order and civil control.[22] The IDF reported that the five members killed in this strike helped Hamas maintain Hamas control on the ground.[23] They worked to preserve Hamas’ organizational structure in humanitarian areas and were responsible for all Hamas activities including contact with Hamas fighters. The IDF killed the chair of the committees in Rafah last week.[24]

The White House requested that an Israeli delegation visit Washington next week to discuss alternatives to an Israeli ground operation in Rafah.[25] Two unspecified US officials told Axios on March 20 that one alternative is to delay a military operation in Rafah and instead focus on stabilizing the humanitarian situation in the northern Gaza Strip.[26] Another alternative is to focus first on securing the Egyptian side of the Egypt-Gaza Strip border as part of a combined US-Egyptian-Israeli plan. Israel confirmed that it will send a delegation to Washington.[27] The New York Times reported on March 19 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that an Israeli ground operation into Rafah is necessary because there is “no way” to destroy Hamas’ local battalions without one.[28]

The Associated Press reported on March 20 the new Palestinian prime minister would appoint a “non-partisan, technocratic government” supported by the international community and the Palestinian people. The Associated Press cited a mission statement written by incoming Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa.[29] Mustafa added that the Palestinian Authority (PA) aims to hold presidential and parliamentary elections. He did not give a timetable and added that the timetable would depend on “realities on the ground” in Gaza, the West Bank, and east Jerusalem. PA President Mahmoud Abbas appointed Mustafa as the new prime minister on March 14.[30]

Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan said on March 20 that Israel responded negatively to Hamas’ ceasefire proposal.[31] Hamas submitted a ceasefire proposal and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange to international mediators on March 14.[32] The proposal includes a ceasefire, calls for Israel to release Palestinian prisoners, an increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, a return of displaced Palestinians, and a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Strip.

Israeli media reported on March 14 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant disagreed over the issue of humanitarian aid distribution in the Gaza Strip.[33] Gallant said that Fatah must be involved in distribution while Netanyahu said he is “not ready to hear about the PA.”[34] Israeli media reported on March 15 that Gallant said that the best option Israel has for the future leader in the Gaza Strip will be local Palestinians who are affiliated with the PA.[35]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh said on March 20 that Israeli attacks targeting police officers in the Gaza Strip are harming Israel's ability to achieve a ceasefire.[36] Hamas controls several internal security forces, including the Civil Police.[37]

Israel detected Palestinian indirect fire targeting Sderot, southern Israel, on March 19.[38] No Palestinian militia has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing. Israeli forces responded to the attack by conducting an airstrike targeting a Hamas tunnel shaft near the fire‘s point of origin.[39]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact. 

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 19.[40]  Hamas reported on March 20 that its fighters conducted additional small arms attacks targeting Israeli forces and settlements in unspecified areas of the West Bank during an unspecified time frame.[41] Hamas called for Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem to escalate against Israel.[42]

The IDF Air Force killed four Palestinian fighters, including two low-level PIJ leaders, in a drone strike in the Jenin refugee camp on March 20.[43]  The IDF said that one of the PIJ fighters was a senior PIJ member who killed an Israeli civilian in a small arms attack targeting an Israeli settlement in May 2023. The strike also killed a local PIJ commander in Jenin.[44] The IDF said that the two other unspecified fighters killed in the strike directed an attempted suicide vest attack into Israel on March 11. The two fighters also directed an attack in which Palestinian fighters detonated an improvised explosive device targeting Israeli forces in Homesh, near Jerusalem, on March 8.[45] Palestinians in Jenin held a funeral service for the fighters on March 20.[46]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 19.[47]

The IDF said on March 20 that it has degraded Hezbollah’s ability to transfer weapons since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[48] The IDF added that it has targeted Hezbollah’s weapons production facilities since the beginning of the war. The IDF noted that these facilities are in civilian areas in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and in Lebanese cities.

An Israeli airstrike killed an Amal Movement leader in al Ghandouriya in southern Lebanon on March 20.[49] The Amal Movement released a statement mourning the official on the same day.[50]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport near Tel Aviv, Israel, on March 19.[51] Israel has not commented on the attack at the time of writing. Ben Gurion Airport did not report any significant flight delays on March 19, suggesting that the drone attack either did not pose a threat to the airport or did not occur.[52] The Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General said on March 20 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias must continue their support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[53] Kataib Hezbollah is part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which began a ”second phase of operations” in March 2024 that is defined by drone and missile attacks targeting Israeli airports and seaports. The Israeli government does not acknowledge many of these attacks claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and some of these attacks likely did not occur.

A French military helicopter operating in the Red Sea under European-led Operation Aspides intercepted a Houthi drone over the Red Sea on March 20.[54] European Council coalition members have shot down eight drones and ”repelled“ three other drones since they launched Operation Aspides on February 19.[55] Aspides is the European defensive naval coalition operating in the Red Sea.[56] The French military said that the drone was “threatening civilian maritime traffic.”[57]  The European coalition said that its vessels have ”closely protected” 35 merchant vessels in Red Sea.[58]

The Houthi supreme leader said on March 15 that the Houthis intend to target international shipping transiting the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope.[59] This statement is likely aspirational given the current maximum range of Houthi weapon systems, which is roughly 2,200km.[60] Houthi military spokesperson Yahye Saree said that the expanded operation would target all Israel-associated commercial vessels traveling around the Cape of Good Hope.[61] The Houthi’s maximum weapon range is 2,200km, which encompasses only some parts of the shipping routes toward the Cape of Good Hope and Indian Ocean, suggesting that the supreme leader's statement is largely aspirational.[62] Vessel traffic through the Red Sea has declined by approximately 50% since January 2024 due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[63] The Cape of Good Hope has seen a 74% increase in traffic compared to 2023 after Houthi attacks forced ships to re-route from the Red Sea and Suez Canal.[64] The Houthis have not conducted an attack outside the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since the announcement on March 15. Iran did target a vessel 200km off the Indian coast in the Indian Ocean on December 23.[65]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged the Iranian government’s shortcomings in “controlling inflation” and economic production during his Nowruz speech on March 20.[66] Khamenei announced “controlling inflation and” economic production as Iran’s new year’s slogan at the beginning of the last Persian calendar year in March 2023.[67] Khamenei stated on March 20, 2024 that the state of inflation and economic production in Iran is “relatively far from what we wanted.”[68] Khamenei said in a separate Nowruz message on March 20, 2024 that Iranians should not expect the regime to address “big issues” such as inflation and production growth “within a year.”[69] Khamenei also described the economy as Iran’s “main weakness” and announced a new slogan, “a leap in [economic] production with [the] people’s participation,” for the upcoming Persian calendar year.[70]

Iran’s inflation rate is approximately 44 percent, according to Iranian media.[71] The actual inflation rate is likely higher given Iranian officials and media’s tendency to fabricate economic statistics, however. Western and diaspora media recently reported that many Iranians refrained this year from buying goods that they normally would for Nowruz, such as new clothes and sweets, due to high prices.[72]

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 20, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Several Russian financial, economic, and military indicators suggest that Russia is preparing for a large-scale conventional conflict with NATO, not imminently but likely on a shorter timeline than what some Western analysts have initially posited.
• The Russian military continues to undertake structural reforms to simultaneously support the war in Ukraine while expanding Russia’s conventional capabilities in the long term in preparation for a potential future large-scale conflict with NATO.
• GUR reportedly conducted a drone strike against a Russian air base in Saratov Oblast on March 20 amid further indications that Ukrainian drone strikes within Russia are achieving limited asymmetric effects against Russian military assets and economic output.
• Kremlin-affiliated actors in the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia are invoking narratives that mirror previous Russian claims about Ukraine in the years leading up to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, likely as part of the Kremlin’s wider hybrid efforts to destabilize Moldova.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna and Donetsk City on March 20.
• The Russian military continues to train drone operators for operations in Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 20, 2024

Mar 20, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 20, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 20, 2024, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on March 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Several Russian financial, economic, and military indicators suggest that Russia is preparing for a large-scale conventional conflict with NATO, not imminently but likely on a shorter timeline than what some Western analysts have initially posited. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the leaders of Russian State Duma factions on March 19 and outlined priorities for his fifth presidential term.[1] Putin emphasized the importance of developing the Russian economy and expanding the social programs announced in his February 29 address to the Federation Council.[2] Putin claimed on March 19 that he personally witnessed how corporate interests fueled appointments to legislative bodies while he was working in Leningrad and later St Petersburg, although he himself likely made substantial commissions from illegally endorsed contracts and licenses while serving as St. Petersburg Deputy Mayor and Head of Committee.[3] Putin urged the Russian State Duma faction leaders to act in the interest of the state instead of corporations or parties and emphasized the importance of appointing people based on skill and competence. Putin similarly criticized the Russian “elite” in his February 29 Federation Council address by claiming that the individuals who “lined their pockets” in the 1990s are not the elite, but that the “real elite” are workers and military servicemen who proved their loyalty to Russia.[4]

Putin is likely attempting to set conditions to stabilize Russia’s long-term financial position at a higher level of government expenditure and is signaling that Russia’s long-term financial stability will require imposing at least some pain on some wealthy industrialist siloviki (Russian strongmen with political influence). Putin likely understands that financial crackdowns against industrialist siloviki could risk the political rapport Putin has built with them and is trying to mitigate those consequences. Russia does not appear to be facing imminent financial crisis, and increased military spending has been the most significant change in Russian budgetary policy, so efforts to secure Russia’s financial future are much more likely intended to set long-term conditions than to address immediate financial concerns.[5] Russia continues efforts to circumvent international sanctions, and the International Monetary Fund assessed that Russia’s GDP will grow by 2.6 percent in 2024 and reported that Russia’s GDP grew faster than all Group of Seven (G7) countries’ economies in 2023.[6]

Polish President Andrzej Duda emphasized in a March 20 interview with CNBC that Putin is intensifying efforts to shift Russia to a war economy with the intention of being able to attack NATO as early as 2026 or 2027, citing unspecified German research.[7] Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen stated on February 9 that new intelligence indicates that Russia may attempt to attack a NATO country within three to five years, an accelerated timeline from NATO’s reported assessment in 2023.[8] The timeline for the reconstitution of a significant Russian conventional military threat depends heavily on the financial resources Putin is willing to put against military efforts. In the absence of other explanations for Putin’s apparent preparations to risk damaging his relationship with wealthy Russian clients and in the context of continuing announcements of plans to expand the Russian military considered below, Putin’s attempts to set conditions to stabilize Russia’s economy and finances are most likely part of Russian financial and domestic preparations for a potential future large-scale conflict with NATO and not just for a protracted war in Ukraine.

The Russian military continues to undertake structural reforms to simultaneously support the war in Ukraine while expanding Russia’s conventional capabilities in the long term in preparation for a potential future large-scale conflict with NATO. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu addressed the Russian MoD board on March 20 and discussed ongoing Russian military reforms intended to increase the Russian military’s combat capabilities.[9] Shoigu reported that Russia has formed the “Dnepr River Flotilla” and a “brigade” of boats as part of the flotilla. The Dnepr River Flotilla is the historical name of various special military river units that were active during the Russo-Turkish wars in 1735-1739 and 1787-1792, the Russian Civil War, and World War II, but this is the first time that Russian military officials have confirmed the formation of the Dnepr River Flotilla in relation to the ongoing war in Ukraine.[10] The Dnepr River Flotilla would most likely be deployed along with the Dnepr Grouping of Forces in Kherson Oblast and will likely defend against Ukrainian cross-river raids and counteract Ukrainian efforts to sustain a limited presence in left (east) bank Kherson Oblast. The size and level of equipment of the Dnepr River Flotilla remains unclear, but the Russian military command may also intend to use it to support Russian cross-river raids and attempts to land in Ukrainian-controlled west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. Russian and Ukrainian sources confirmed that Russian forces were able to conduct a limited raid and temporarily land in west bank Kherson Oblast on March 13, and the Dnepr River Flotilla could feasibly support further such cross-river attempts.[11] It is unlikely that the Dnepr River Flotilla has the manpower and equipment necessary to establish an enduring large-scale Russian presence in west bank Kherson Oblast or credibly threaten to re-occupy significant territory in Kherson Oblast at this time, but the presence of a new formation in this area may force Ukraine to commit manpower and scarce materiel to an axis that has been relatively inactive since November 2022. The deployment of the Dnepr River Flotilla may force the Ukrainian command to make challenging decisions about resource attribution as it husbands limited stores of artillery ammunition and other critical military equipment.

Shoigu outlined several ongoing efforts to bolster Russia’s conventional military capabilities, more likely as part of Russia’s long-term effort to prepare for a potential conventional war with NATO than as part of the war against Ukraine. Shoigu stated that Russia has formed an army corps (AC) (likely either in reference to the AC currently forming in Karelia or to the 40th AC, which has deployed to Kherson Oblast) and a motorized rifle division (potentially in reference to the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, which is committed to the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast line as part of the new 25th Combined Arms Army).[12] Shoigu also claimed that the Russian military plans to form two combined arms armies (CAAs) and 14 divisions, and 16 brigades by the end of 2024. Russia formed two new CAAs — the 25th and the 18th — in 2023, and it is unclear if Shoigu is suggesting that Russia intends to stand up two additional CAAs over the course of 2024.[13] Shoigu initially announced in January 2023 that Russia would also create three new motorized rifle divisions, two new air assault divisions, and reorganize seven motorized rifle brigades into motorized rifle divisions, and Shoigu’s March 20 speech did not differentiate between air assault and motorized rifle divisions, so it is likely that Shoigu is suggesting that Russia will stand up two new divisions in 2024 in addition to the 12 divisions (air assault and motorized rifle, inclusive) he announced in January 2023. ISW continues to assess that Russia currently lacks the manpower, military infrastructure, and training capacity to properly staff several entirely new divisions to army-level formations to full end strength in the immediate to medium term.[14] Such reforms, however, are more likely intended to build out Russia’s long-term military capabilities vis-a-vis NATO, as opposed to immediately creating and staffing new formations up to the army level.

Ongoing personnel changes within the Russian MoD may be further indicators of Russia’s preparations for a conflict in the long term. Shoigu introduced Lieutenant General Andrei Bulyga as the Deputy Defense Minister for logistics support during the MoD address on March 20, confirming the Russian MoD’s initial announcement of Bulyga’s appointment on March 11.[15] The Russian Armed Forces Headquarters of Logistics Support, which Bulyga now heads, is intended to organize and coordinate logistical support for Russian troops in both peacetime and wartime.[16] Bulyga’s appointment is unlikely to remedy logistics and support issues faced by Russian troops in Ukraine in the immediate term, but Bulyga may spearhead reforms to the logistics headquarters that will have more noticeable impacts in the medium to long term. Bulyga will likely task his department with addressing logistical issues to support the ongoing conventional military reforms, setting conditions for longer-term efforts to build out Russia’s conventional capabilities.

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a drone strike against a Russian air base in Saratov Oblast on March 20 amid further indications that Ukrainian drone strikes within Russia are achieving limited asymmetric effects against Russian military assets and economic output. Ukrainian and Western media reported that the GUR struck unspecified targets at the Engels air base in Saratov Oblast with Ukrainian-produced drones.[17] Satellite imagery indicates that there were 11 Russian aircraft present at the air base on March 19, although ISW has yet to observe any visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces struck Russian aircraft at Engels-2 Air Base.[18] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed four Ukrainian drones over Saratov Oblast, and Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that the strikes did not cause any damage.[19] Geolocated footage from Engels includes the sound of loud explosions from nearby but is unclear if the footage depicts strikes against targets in Engels or the sound of Russian air defense striking aerial targets.[20]

Recent Ukrainian drone strikes against oil refineries within Russia may have significantly disrupted Russia’s refining capacity. Bloomberg reported on March 20 that Ukrainian drone strikes may have disabled up to 11 percent of Russia’s total refining capacity.[21] Torbjorn Tornqvist, Chief Executive Officer of multinational energy commodities trading company Guvnor, estimated on March 18 that Ukrainian strikes have taken 600,000 barrels of daily Russian oil refining capacity offline, and American multinational financial institution JPMorgan Chase and Co. estimated that the strikes have taken 900,000 barrels of daily refining capacity offline.[22] The decline in Russia’s refining capacity appears to have prompted a surge in gasoline and diesel prices on the St. Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange, but only a marginal increase in the cost of domestic fuel prices within Russia.[23] Russian Energy Minister Nikolai Shulginov stated on March 20 that the Russian Energy Ministry expects refining volumes to remain roughly the same in 2024 as in 2023, although Russian Deputy Energy Minister Pavel Sorokin stated on March 14 that a possible reduction in primary oil refining in 2024 would likely lead to increases in Russian crude oil exports (since Russia would not be able to refine as much as it usually does).[24] Tornqvist estimated that offline Russian refining capacity will likely immediately impact Russian distillate exports (petroleum products produced in conventional distillation operations).[25] ISW has yet to observe reports of decreased Russian crude oil and petroleum product exports following Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries in recent weeks. Russia relied on oil revenues to buoy federal budgets amid increased spending on its war in Ukraine in 2023, and significant constraints on Russian oil exports could have substantial impacts on Russia’s ability to balance a record level of defense spending in 2024 with its commitments on social spending.[26]

Ukrainian drone strikes against targets within Russia are also likely increasing pressures on available Russian air defense assets. Director of the Russian Energy Ministry’s Department for the Development of the Gas Industry Artem Verkhov stated on March 19 that the Russian Energy Ministry is working with Rosgvardia on proposals to deploy Pantsir-S1 air defense systems to strategic energy facilities within Russia.[27] GUR spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated that Russia has already deployed Pantsir air defense systems at energy facilities, however, and that Russian claims about the planned deployments are meant to reassure the Russian public.[28] Previous Ukrainian drone strikes against strategic targets in Moscow and Leningrad oblasts may have fixed Russian short-range air defenses along expected flight routes, and Russian ultranationalists have recently complained about a lack of available air defense assets in other Russian federal subjects in deep rear areas.[29] The Ukrainian ability to target Russian military infrastructure within Russia, threaten Russian oil refining and exports, and increase pressure on Russia’s air defense umbrella demonstrates that Ukraine can achieve asymmetrical impacts through strikes with limited numbers of mostly domestically produced drones.

Kremlin-affiliated actors in the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia are invoking narratives that mirror previous Russian claims about Ukraine in the years leading up to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, likely as part of the Kremlin’s wider hybrid efforts to destabilize Moldova. Yevgenia Gutsul, the governor of Gagauzia, stated in an interview with Russian outlet Izvestia published on March 20 that she would like Gagauzia to receive “zashchita” (a word that means both “defense” and “protection”) from Russia so that Gagauzian residents can have the right to a prosperous life, Gagauzian farmers can export their products to Russia, and Gagauzia can receive gas at a lower price — points Gutsul recently claimed she spoke about with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[30] Gutsul also claimed that Gagauzia is not considering leaving Moldova but wants the Moldovan government to observe the 1994 law on Gagauzia’s “special legal status” and implied that Gagauzia would consider leaving if this condition was not met.[31] Gutsul has recently drawn increased attention to the fact that Moldovan President Maia Sandu has not signed the decree to confirm Gutsul as a member of the Moldovan government, as required by the 1994 law.[32] Sandu stated in September 2023, however, that she would not sign the decree until the Moldovan Prosecution Service completed its investigation regarding corruption and bribery in the Gagauzia gubernatorial elections that brought Gutsul to power.[33]

Gutsul’s claims that the Moldovan government is not adhering to the law on Gagauzia’s special status parallel the Kremlin’s previous accusations that Ukraine did not adhere to the Minsk Agreements’ stipulations on the “special status” for the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR).[34] Kremlin officials and mouthpieces and Transnistrian authorities have also similarly claimed that Moldova abandoned the 5+2 negotiating process that aimed to resolve the decades-long conflict in Moldova’s other pro-Russian region, the breakaway republic of Transnistria.[35] The Kremlin has notably claimed that Ukraine’s alleged violations of the Minsk Agreements “forced” Russia to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[36] The Seventh Congress of Transnistrian Deputies on February 28 formally requested unspecified “zashchita” from Russia in response to alleged increasing pressures from Moldova.[37] ISW previously assessed that the use of a word that means both “defense” and “protection” was likely intended to set conditions for the Kremlin to interpret “defense” in a military sense if it so chooses.[38] Gutsul’s use of “zashchita” and the fact that both Transnistrian and Gagauzian authorities have invoked narratives that mirror those surrounding the Minsk Agreements in a major Russian publication suggest that the Kremlin is orchestrating a wider effort between pro-Russian actors in Gagauzia and Transnistria as part of the Kremlin’s ongoing hybrid operations to destabilize Moldova from within.[39]

Moldovan Interior Minister Adrian Efros stated on March 20 that the recent footage of a single drone allegedly flying from the direction of Odesa Oblast and striking a helicopter on the territory of a military unit in Transnistria is a video “montage” meant to cause panic and fear and that there was actually no explosion.[40] The Transnistrian Ministry of State Security (MGB), which is reportedly a “department” of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), responded to Efros’ statement and stated that it will present all available “evidence” of the incident to Interpol for assistance in an investigation.[41] ISW previously assessed that Russia or Russian-linked actors would likely be the beneficiaries of the alleged drone strike in Transnistria.[42] Russia or Russian-linked actors would also likely benefit from the dissemination of fake footage of a drone strike in Transnistria that heightens tensions between Transnistrian and Moldovan authorities and that the Kremlin could use to justify any future Russian activity in Transnistria. ISW cannot independently verify the details of the singular drone strike in Transnistria, but it is consistent with the way that Russia staged provocations in Donbas leading up to the 2022 full-scale invasion.

Key Takeaways:

• Several Russian financial, economic, and military indicators suggest that Russia is preparing for a large-scale conventional conflict with NATO, not imminently but likely on a shorter timeline than what some Western analysts have initially posited.
• The Russian military continues to undertake structural reforms to simultaneously support the war in Ukraine while expanding Russia’s conventional capabilities in the long term in preparation for a potential future large-scale conflict with NATO.
• GUR reportedly conducted a drone strike against a Russian air base in Saratov Oblast on March 20 amid further indications that Ukrainian drone strikes within Russia are achieving limited asymmetric effects against Russian military assets and economic output.
• Kremlin-affiliated actors in the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia are invoking narratives that mirror previous Russian claims about Ukraine in the years leading up to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, likely as part of the Kremlin’s wider hybrid efforts to destabilize Moldova.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna and Donetsk City on March 20.
• The Russian military continues to train drone operators for operations in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that the intensity of limited all-Russian pro-Ukrainian cross-border raids into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts decreased on March 20. The Russian MoD and a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces completely pushed the Russian volunteers out of Kozinka, Belgorod Oblast, and are now clearing the settlement.[43] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that pro-Ukrainian forces continued attacks in and around Kozinka.[44]

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances west and south of Kreminna on March 20. Ukraine’s Ground Forces reported on March 20 that Ukrainian forces repelled a “massive” Russian assault in the Lyman direction (west of Kreminna) and published geolocated footage from the assault showing that Russian forces advanced towards Terny (west of Kreminna).[45] The footage shows Ukrainian strikes damaging or destroying several Russian armored vehicles in this area, but the full extent of Russian losses and the size of this assault remains unclear. Additional geolocated footage published on March 19 shows that Russian forces recently advanced north of Zolotarivka (about 17km south of Kreminna).[46] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; west of Kreminna near Terny; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka and Zolotarivka.[47] Elements of the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA, Western Military District [WMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[48]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on March 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka, Vesele, and Spirne; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; and southwest of Bakhmut near Predtechnye, Klishchiivka, and Bila Hora.[49] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating west of Bakhmut near Chasiv Yar.[50]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Oleksandropil (southwest of Horlivka) as part of an effort to gain access to Kostyantynivka (west of Bakhmut) from further southwest along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway and to move the frontline further away from the Horlivka-Donetsk City line.[51]

Positional engagements continued near Avdiivka on March 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi, Semenivka, and Orlivka; west of Avdiivka near Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, Netaylove, and Nevelske.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces completely cleared Orlivka and that fighting is ongoing north of the settlement, but ISW has yet to observe visual confirmation of claims that Russian forces seized the settlement on March 19.[53] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Pervomaiske and Tonenke, but ISW has also not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[54] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have established fire control over the Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Berdychi and Orlivka to Umanske (west of Orlivka and southwest of Berdychi).[55]

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances west and southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements in the area on March 20. Geolocated footage published on March 20 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of the dam in Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City).[56] Additional geolocated footage published on March 20 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[57] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian counterattacks have greatly reduced Russian forces’ presence in Krasnohorivka but that Russian forces retain positions on the southern outskirts of the settlement.[59] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Marinka (west of Donetsk City), and elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[60]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked northwest of Vuhledar near Vodyane and south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine.[61] Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating north of Vuhledar; elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Pavlivka (southwest of Vuhledar); and elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka direction.[62]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have a shortage of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities along the entire frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast.[64] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue operating near Robotyne, and elements of the Russian “Russkiye Yastreby” (Russian Hawks) detachment of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[65]

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on March 20.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in dacha areas near the Antonivsky roadway bridge (north of Oleshky).[67]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City with an unspecified number of unidentified missiles and Kozacha Lopan, Kharkiv Oblast with two S-300/S-400 missiles on March 20.[68]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian military continues to train drone operators for operations in Ukraine. The Russian MoD stated that drone instructors in the Russian Central Military District (CMD) have trained more than 100 first person view (FPV) drone operators since the start of 2024.[69] The reported number of new drone operators within the CMD is relatively small in the context of heavy Russian and Ukrainian FPV drone use in Ukraine and suggests that there may be training constraints on the Russian military’s ability to generate new drone operators.[70]

The Russian MoD is reportedly systematizing the apparatus for issuing benefits to Russian veterans. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated on March 20 that the MoD will issue electronic identification cards for Russian veterans and that the Russian government signed a corresponding order on March 16.[71] Shoigu stated that the electronic identification cards will allow Russian combat veterans to receive MoD, federal, and regional payments and special privileges at banks.[72] Shoigu stated that the MoD has already received 70,000 applications for the electronic identification cards.[73]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Kremlin newswire TASS reported on March 20 that Russian company HiderX delivered “invisibility suits” to Russian units operating in Ukraine that camouflage and shield Russian military personnel from Ukrainian thermal imaging equipment.[74] HiderX told TASS in January that the suit is coated in an unspecified chemical composition, weighs roughly 350 grams, can fit in a pocket, and is based completely on Russian technology.[75]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on March 20 that Russia is intensifying an information campaign aimed at discrediting Ukraine and the West in the Middle East.[76] GUR stated that the Kremlin is leveraging its intelligence networks, propaganda tools, and diplomatic missions to conduct this hybrid operation in the Middle East and noted that the Kremlin has tasked the Russian Embassy in Cairo, Egypt with carrying out anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western disinformation operations.[77] Russia is likely using such information operations to manage its reputation in the Middle East against the backdrop of the war in Gaza and its increased cooperation with Iran.

Russian officials continue to threaten escalation over French proposals to send military personnel to Ukraine in order to constrain Western discussions about support for Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened that a French deployment to Ukraine would result in significant French deaths and that this would generate domestic upheaval within France “tantamount to the guillotine.”[78] Medvedev also posted his threat in French on his X (formerly twitter) account, likely hoping that French actors will use it to argue against the French proposal.[79] French President Emmanuel Macron has recently discussed proposals to send Western troops to Ukraine but has stressed that the current situation does not require it, and these proposals are part of Macron’s wider calls for the West to expand the level and types of security assistance it sends to Ukraine.[80] Russia has not significantly responded to Western security assistance to Ukraine that Russia has previously labeled as significant escalations.[81]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

6. A Suspicious Pattern Alarming the Ukrainian Military

If true, what can be done?

Excerpts:

Sometimes a coincidence is just a coincidence. But the suspicious cases have added up, and because many satellite-imagery companies offer a backlist of archived images, marked with dates and coordinates, it’s possible to browse tens of thousands of images taken of Ukraine and notice suggestive patterns. In the week before April 2, 2022, about a month after Russia’s initial invasion, images of a remote airfield outside Myrhorod, Ukraine, were requested from American companies at least nine times. Myrhorod is not a particularly interesting place, apart from that airfield. On April 2, missiles landed there. In the week that followed, someone asked for images of the airfield again. Satellite imaging has preceded strikes in urban areas as well: In Lviv, just before March 26, 2022, someone tasked a satellite with looking at a factory used for military-armor production. It, too, was struck. In late January of this year, someone commissioned a commercial-satellite company to take fresh images of Kyiv, just before the city was hit by a missile barrage.

...

The power to regulate these satellites already belongs to the Department of Commerce’s Office of Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs (CRSRA), which specifies conditions whereby any U.S. company with advanced satellites can be forced to “limit data collection and/or dissemination during periods of increased concerns for national security and … foreign policy interests.” CRSRA told me it had issued licenses to Planet and Maxar, but the terms of those licenses—which might impose limits on what images their satellites can produce—are not public information.

The companies that produce imagery sometimes act as if they are neutral, just as Amazon sells books without asking customers why they want to read them. The companies should, under this theory, preserve their credibility by staying independent, rather than offering Ukraine or anyone else veto power over their imagery. This stance sounds awfully pious to Ukrainians worried that the last thing they will ever hear is a Russian missile screaming across the sky. And the companies have, after all, already taken a side. They are American, subject to regulations that force their cooperation with American interests. Some of them have huge Department of Defense contracts. The principal backer of Ukraine is already paying them.

“By no means am I trying to cast a shadow on any of the [imagery] vendors,” the executive told me. He said he supports Ukraine in the war and knows that the Ukrainian military has used satellite imagery from the same companies. (Planet cited customer confidentiality and would not say whether it had given imagery to Ukraine. Maxar did not reply.) “All of them have been very helpful to Ukraine overall. I want there to be a reasonable explanation” for the imagery they have produced, he said—an explanation that shows “no malice or negligence.” But, he added: “With the information that I have access to, I cannot find that explanation.”

A Suspicious Pattern Alarming the Ukrainian Military

A Ukrainian military source believes that Russia’s long-range strikes are aimed using satellite imagery provided by U.S. companies.

By Graeme Wood

The Atlantic · by Graeme Wood · March 18, 2024

Earlier this month, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky got unusually testy over the failure of the United States to deliver anti-missile and anti-drone systems. On March 2, a strike in Odesa had killed 12 people, five of them children. “The world has enough missile-defense systems,” he said. Debates over funding have kept those systems from being delivered. “Delaying the supply of weapons to Ukraine, missile-defense systems to protect our people, leads, unfortunately, to such losses.”

Others in Ukraine’s government, however, have expressed an even deeper frustration. What if Americans, in addition to not sending defensive assistance to Ukraine, are sending offensive assistance to Russia? A Ukrainian military source told me he believes that Russia’s long-range strikes, by cruise missiles that are among the most costly weapons in its nonnuclear arsenal, are aimed using satellite imagery provided by U.S. companies. He says the sequence is clear: A satellite snaps pictures of a site, then some days or weeks later a missile lands. Sometimes another satellite is sent to capture additional images afterward, perhaps to check the extent of the damage. “The number of coincidences, where the images are followed by strikes, is too high to be random,” the source told me. (I agreed not to name him because he is not authorized to speak publicly.)

Sometimes a coincidence is just a coincidence. But the suspicious cases have added up, and because many satellite-imagery companies offer a backlist of archived images, marked with dates and coordinates, it’s possible to browse tens of thousands of images taken of Ukraine and notice suggestive patterns. In the week before April 2, 2022, about a month after Russia’s initial invasion, images of a remote airfield outside Myrhorod, Ukraine, were requested from American companies at least nine times. Myrhorod is not a particularly interesting place, apart from that airfield. On April 2, missiles landed there. In the week that followed, someone asked for images of the airfield again. Satellite imaging has preceded strikes in urban areas as well: In Lviv, just before March 26, 2022, someone tasked a satellite with looking at a factory used for military-armor production. It, too, was struck. In late January of this year, someone commissioned a commercial-satellite company to take fresh images of Kyiv, just before the city was hit by a missile barrage.

Steven Feldstein: The answer to Starlink is more Starlinks

There are hundreds of such cases. The Ukrainians say they monitor flyovers by Russia’s own satellites. But until recently, they assumed that the satellites of allies would not be available for Russia’s advantage. “Before about six months ago, we couldn’t imagine that private companies would be selling satellite imagery in sensitive areas,” the Ukrainian military official told me. But “it has become hard to believe that [these coincidences] are random.” Russian satellite capabilities are limited, and Ukraine’s are too. Anyone who has seen the social-media footage of ragtag infantrymen huddled in trenches is aware that this war is being fought by two poor countries. But with subterfuge, even poor countries can try to rent the services of rich ones—or, more precisely, the services of the private companies that operate within the rich ones’ borders.

Ukraine’s deputy defense minister, Kateryna Chernohorenko, sent me a statement noting that U.S. satellite companies have supported Ukraine. But she said that her ministry’s experts suspect that Russia “purchases satellite imagery through third-party companies” that do business with Western satellite-imagery companies, and that these images “could be used in armed aggression against Ukraine.”

Ordering imagery from these companies is simpler than you might think. Stale, blurry images are free on Google Maps. Fresh, crisp imagery of something you may or may not wish to blow to smithereens costs a little more. A site called spymesat.com tracks various companies’ satellites and will give a cost estimate for a brand-new image taken the next time one of them passes over the location you choose. In the business, ordering a satellite to take an image is called “tasking.” The companies offer astonishingly fast turnaround times, at costs in the low thousands of dollars. Faster turnaround and higher resolution raise the cost. I zoomed in on the apartment where I stayed in Odesa early in the war, and the site told me that a U.S. company would let me task its satellite for $1,200 when it passed in just a few hours. If I went there now and painted BOMB ME in huge letters on the roof, the paint would still be wet for its close-up.

For even less, one can order archival imagery from Ukraine—some of it very recent, and of militarily significant areas. The city of Zaporizhzhia is about an hour’s drive from the front line. An Atlantic staffer requested a recent satellite photo of that city from a reseller that works with Planet, a San Francisco-based commercial satellite company. The staffer gave the reseller a credit-card number and a name, and received a high-resolution image just minutes later.

Some targets are stationary: You can’t move an air base. But even those are worth monitoring persistently, sometimes weeks or even months before an intended attack. A cruise missile costs about $1 million, so a kopeck-pinching government would happily pay just a few thousand dollars for recent evidence of how a target is being used, what’s there, and what time of day is optimal for maximum damage. Watching a parking lot outside a factory or barracks can tell you when the building is full and when it is empty. A strike on a full building kills more than a strike on an empty one, so these images can theoretically multiply the Ukrainian body count, at minimal extra cost. Many of the images tasked in Ukraine—including many of sites of future strikes—show only cloud cover. These very expensive images of clouds are still much cheaper than another cruise missile.

Two of the largest commercial-satellite-imaging companies in the United States are Maxar and Planet. Both have produced imagery of Ukrainian sites later struck by Russian missiles. Both stressed that they vet their customers diligently, and that they have observed the U.S. regulation that has forbidden transactions with Russia since the beginning of the war. Maxar declined to comment on specific cases of suspicious imagery orders in Ukraine but said it “ceased all business with Russian entities, including resellers, in early March 2022.” Planet said it was dedicated to providing imagery to “responsible actors such as governments, aid and relief organizations, and media,” with “diligent operations to avoid the potential for misuse and abuse.” A spokesperson from Planet told me that after a review of more than a dozen cases of prestrike tasking, the company “did not find evidence of misuse or abuse.” The spokesperson declined to comment further or explain how Planet had exonerated itself in these cases.

Neither company was willing to say whether it had ever detected instances when it suspected that Russia had used its satellites, nor was either willing to describe how it ensured that its customers were not in fact Russian front companies. Maxar and Planet would not say how they would respond if they noticed a suspicious pattern—image tasking, missile strike on a Ukrainian airfield, follow-up tasking. “We regularly conduct thorough reviews” of security, a Maxar spokesperson told me, and have implemented “more stringent controls” for Ukraine imagery.

Sometimes the tasking is benign. If you deal in commodities, you might peek at Odesa’s port to see whether ships are loaded with grain, and whether the world’s grain supply is about to rise. You might also order an image of a wheat field 150 miles north, in Kropyvnytskyi, to see whether the crop is harvested early or late. Even sites of military significance can be of interest to neutral or friendly entities—including the Ukrainian government itself, media organizations, and humanitarian groups that need accurate pictures of the conflict to do their work.

An executive of a firm that analyzes satellite imagery told me that the firm noticed a pattern dating back to 2022, by cross-referencing tasked images against actual attacks. (The executive requested anonymity because the firm does business with the same satellite companies whose images it reviewed, and does not want its relationships to sour over bad publicity.) The executive identified more than 350 Russian missile strikes in the first year of the war, all deep within Ukrainian territory. I showed a selection of cases to Jack O’Connor, who teaches geospatial intelligence at Johns Hopkins University, and he wrote back, “The data suggests that the Russians are doing what the Ukrainians suspect.” He was, however, cautious about what one can infer with certainty, no matter what patterns one sees. “There is no direct causal relation that can be proven from this data.”

In any particular case, it’s impossible to be sure whether the tasking was done with malign intent. That is especially true when the imagery captures a large area. (Maxar, for example, produces very-high-resolution images of whole neighborhoods or even towns.) But the correlations are there. On February 27, 2022, days after the outbreak of war, Maxar was tasked with taking an image near the Belarusian border. On March 6, 2022, a Russian missile hit buildings in Ovruch—which happened to be dead in the middle of the previous week’s tasked image. (Maxar declined to say whether it had taken these images, but a source with access to the company’s catalog confirmed that the images were in it.) On May 18, 2022, with the war in full swing, someone asked Maxar to look at a large square in the town of Lubny. Two days later, a missile struck Lubny, and soon after, someone asked Maxar to take another look, in the area of the original image where the missile had just hit.

The Ukrainian military official acknowledged the possibility that the tasking was just a benevolent citizen or group with curiosity about obscure Ukrainian military assets and armor factories. And he said he had no reason to believe that the companies themselves favor Russia in the war. Planet and Maxar both do a great deal of business with the U.S. government, and intentionally helping Russia would jeopardize contracts and invite regulation.

But the executive I spoke with said that to keep the imagery out of Russian hands, the satellite companies would have to control not just which customers they accept tasking from but also the resale of those images. The executive said the U.S. companies’ process of vetting their customers was “detailed.” Industry experts stressed that the companies have contracts with the U.S. government, and would not gain from doing business with Russia under the table. Although Maxar insists that it no longer does business with Russian entities, including resellers, it did not reply when I asked whether its resellers’ customers also stopped doing business with Russian entities.

The U.S. companies’ desire to avoid doing business with Russia, directly or indirectly, is not in serious doubt. A former U.S. official who worked on commercial-satellite regulation told me that, early in the war, the companies regularly approached the government seeking help to determine whether their customers might be working for the Russians. “It was a confusing time,” he said, “and then companies got better at vetting their customers.” He said the companies had implemented stronger procedures since then. Skies over Ukraine have become crowded with image-capturing satellites. “There are many cooks in the kitchen,” he said—“sometimes five U.S. government agencies at once,” all seeking imagery from commercial and government satellites. And it is very hard to figure out who wants images, and for what purpose. “It wouldn’t surprise me at all that some of those images coincide in space and time with Russian military activities.”

The Ukrainian official told me he would just “like to see these images moderated,” possibly by giving the Ukrainian military a chance to see what images are tasked before they’re taken. He added that “the companies should look very carefully at the records of who has been buying these images,” and probably involve local spy agencies in tracking companies suspected of funneling the images to Moscow. Other Ukrainians I spoke with suggested that instead of blacklisting certain customers, the companies should develop a limited white list of approved taskers, and add to it only when someone is clearly not a Russian agent. (Planet and Maxar did not directly reply when I asked if they had a blacklist or white list, and if so, what one had to do to get on it.)

Andrey Liscovich, a former Silicon Valley executive who now runs a U.S.–based nonprofit funneling nonlethal aid to Ukraine, was skeptical of the companies’ claims that they can control the ultimate destination of their images. “They lack the necessary resources to adequately screen the final recipients of their products,” Liscovitch texted me. He said the answer is regulation, along the lines of statutes in place to blur out satellite imagery of Israel. “Western governments should impose restrictions on the distribution of satellite imagery over Ukraine, ensuring access is granted only to thoroughly vetted recipients.” Chernohorenko, the deputy defense minister, wrote to me that her government “will propose a mechanism to address this issue.”

Anne Applebaum: What Russia got by scaring Elon Musk

The power to regulate these satellites already belongs to the Department of Commerce’s Office of Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs (CRSRA), which specifies conditions whereby any U.S. company with advanced satellites can be forced to “limit data collection and/or dissemination during periods of increased concerns for national security and … foreign policy interests.” CRSRA told me it had issued licenses to Planet and Maxar, but the terms of those licenses—which might impose limits on what images their satellites can produce—are not public information.

The companies that produce imagery sometimes act as if they are neutral, just as Amazon sells books without asking customers why they want to read them. The companies should, under this theory, preserve their credibility by staying independent, rather than offering Ukraine or anyone else veto power over their imagery. This stance sounds awfully pious to Ukrainians worried that the last thing they will ever hear is a Russian missile screaming across the sky. And the companies have, after all, already taken a side. They are American, subject to regulations that force their cooperation with American interests. Some of them have huge Department of Defense contracts. The principal backer of Ukraine is already paying them.

“By no means am I trying to cast a shadow on any of the [imagery] vendors,” the executive told me. He said he supports Ukraine in the war and knows that the Ukrainian military has used satellite imagery from the same companies. (Planet cited customer confidentiality and would not say whether it had given imagery to Ukraine. Maxar did not reply.) “All of them have been very helpful to Ukraine overall. I want there to be a reasonable explanation” for the imagery they have produced, he said—an explanation that shows “no malice or negligence.” But, he added: “With the information that I have access to, I cannot find that explanation.”

The Atlantic · by Graeme Wood · March 18, 2024

7. U.S. vs Russian "Hybrid Warfare" Doctrine: A Comparative Glance

A very interesting comparison.

While the author provided the 7 phases of a US sponsored insurgency he did not provide the 8 phases of Russian nonlinear warfare.

So here is the comparison.

Russian New Generation Warfare and the Future of War overview:

As a result, it follows that the main guidelines for developing Russian military capabilities by 2020 are:

i. From direct destruction to direct influence;

ii. from direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay;

iii. from a war with weapons and technology to a culture war;

iv. from a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings;

v. from the traditional (3D) battleground to information/psychological warfare and war of perceptions;

vi. from direct clash to contactless war;

vii. from a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy’s internal side and base;

viii. from war in the physical environment to a war in the human consciousness and in cyberspace;

ix. from symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns;

x. From war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life.

http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx

New Generation Warfare

FIRST PHASE: non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic, and military setup).

SECOND PHASE: special operations to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions.

THIRD PHASE: intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their service duties.

FOURTH PHASE: destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among the population, boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion.

FIFTH PHASE: establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.

SIXTH PHASE: commencement of military action, immediately preceded by large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions. All types, forms, methods, and forces, including special operations forces, space, radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic, and secret service intelligence, and industrial espionage.

SEVENTH PHASE: combination of targeted information operation, electronic warfare operation, aerospace operation, continuous air force harassment, combined with the use of high precision weapons launched from various platforms (long-range artillery, and weapons based on new physical principles, including microwaves, radiation, non-lethal biological weapons).

EIGHTH PHASE: roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units by special operations conducted by reconnaissance units to spot which enemy units have survived and transmit their coordinates to the attacker's missile and artillery units; fire barrages to annihilate the defender's resisting army units by effective advanced weapons; airdrop operations to surround points of resistance; and territory mopping-up operations by ground troops.

US Sponsored Insurgency

PHASE I: PREPARATION

The preparation phase for unconventional warfare begins with the approval of the President and/or Secretary of Defense to execute an unconventional warfare campaign.

Intelligence and psychological preparation continues throughout.

PHASE II: INITIAL CONTACT

Ideally, a pilot team should make initial contact with an established or potential irregular element. A pilot team is typically an ad hoc element composed of individuals possessing the specialized skills appropriate to the particular mission.

PHASE III: INFILTRATION

During this phase, special operations forces infiltrate the unconventional warfare operating area. Infiltration may be as overt as using a chartered civilian flight or as discreet as a clandestine insertion.

PHASE IV: ORGANIZATION

Once U.S. advisors link up with resistance leadership, the objective is to determine and agree upon a plan to organize the resistance for expanded operations. In addition to physical preparations, this entails a confirmation of mutual objectives and prior agreements. This requires a period of rapport-building to develop trust and confidence, as well as a period of discussion of expectations from both sides.

PHASE V: BUILDUP

Plans agreed to in Phase IV are implemented in Phase V. The amount of effort required to conduct organization building will be based on the insurgent/resistance organization that may already exist. Organization could be time consuming and painstaking or friendly forces could fall in on well-established and robust organizations.

PHASE VI: EMPLOYMENT

 This will be a series of many events, both lethal and nonlethal, throughout Phases IV through VII. In other words, Phase V does not come to a complete stop when Phase VI begins. Nevertheless, this may represent a planned surge or maximum growth of organization effectiveness synchronized with planned future operations.

PHASE VII: TRANSITION

When unconventional warfare ends in overthrow of a state or liberation of occupied territory and leads to a new government, Phase VII will include those activities contributing to the promotion of the new government’s legitimacy. In such cases, the unconventional warfare effort transitions to foreign internal defense at some point.

Russia versus US Unconventional Warfare

•US UW is very tactical, narrow, and limited

–SOF focused

•Russian UW is joint and interagency and employs conventional as well as special operations forces

–SOF and Conventional and Diplomatic and Economic focus

–Broader tasks – e.g., no fly zones, blockades, EW, deception, propaganda

•US 7 phases – “How to” for SF/SOF

•Russian 8 phases – an outline for strategic employment and more than SOF

U.S. vs Russian "Hybrid Warfare" Doctrine: A Comparative Glance

greydynamics.com · by Curtis Fox · March 20, 2024

1.0 Introduction

In my recently released book, Hybrid Warfare: the Russian Approach to Strategic Competition and Conventional Military Conflict, I analyze Moscow’s employment of hybrid warfare as an asymmetric means of shaping its security environment. U.S. and Russian doctrine can look very different at times. At the operational level, the Russians employ a whole-of-government approach to combat operations without an official declaration of war. This includes non-military and non-kinetic influence campaigns that use:

1. Targeted propaganda
2. Political subversion
3. Diplomatic coercion
4. Economic leverage
5. Financial sanctions

All of these factors move the needle in Moscow’s favour. However, at the tactical level, the Russians employ a series of preparatory activities and covert actions, utilizing intelligence operatives, the Spetsnaz, and other elite forces to tailor the battlespace ahead of heavy ground forces.

Russia’s tactical-level preparatory activities should look familiar to students of American military doctrine. Preparing the battlefield for combat operations is doctrinally captured under Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) employs numerous doctrinal missions beneath this campaign-level activity to maximize prospects for victory. (Source)

1.1 Russian Approach

Russia is not unique: There is very little in the tactical and kinetic execution of Russian hybrid warfare that Western militaries are not functionally capable of doing themselves. The difference lies in how the Russians conceptualize and execute interventions in contrast to their American counterparts.

Russia’s relative weakness to NATO forces makes the grey zone vital to its vision of the strategic competition. The Russian economy is smaller than that of the state of Texas, but Moscow envisions itself as a counterbalance to the entire NATO alliance. NATO collectively constitutes 45% of global GDP. For Russia to credibly compete with adversaries far above its weight class, Moscow must use tactical-level preparatory activities to facilitate the rapid introduction of heavy ground forces.

2.0 Where Does the Grey Zone Fit in U.S. Law? Peacetime vs. Wartime Authorities

The American process for authorizing military force is much more complex than Russia’s. It has many more checks against unimpeded executive overreach that create downstream effects on how Americans prepare for and execute combat operations. Under Article II Section 2 of the Constitution, the President of the United States is the head of the executive branch and Commander in Chief of the Armed Services. The President has total authority over the management of the Armed Services, intelligence services, and national security, but he is subject to Congressional oversight and Congress retains the exclusive power to declare war.

In contrast, the President of Russia has total authority over the actions of the intelligence apparatus and Armed Services. The Prime Minister is the Head of Government and leader of the ruling coalition in the Duma (Russia’s lower legislative chamber). He oversees the day-to-day operations of government, particularly regarding internal affairs, but the Russian President is the Head of State. The President has the final say on policy and authority over foreign affairs and the security apparatus, and the Russian military and intelligence services operate under the President’s authority.

The Federation Assembly (Russian parliament), which consists of the Duma (lower house) and Federation Council (upper house), retains the power to declare war. But President Putin does not require their assent to initiate a military intervention. Putin’s United Russia party has controlled the Duma (lower chamber) and Federation Council (upper chamber) of the legislative branch with super-majorities since he rose to power.

Consequently, the President of Russia has enormous latitude in military actions outside of Russia’s borders. President Putin does not suffer any unwanted oversight and does not have to deal with tedious legal or doctrinal distinctions to wield his authority.

2.1 Title 50 Authorities—Peacetime Authorities

Title 50 of the U.S. Code defines the left and right limits of the executive branch’s “Peacetime” abilities to:

• Collect intelligence
• Conduct counterintelligence
• Conduct covert action

All American intelligence activities fall under the constitutional prerogative of the President as Commander in Chief, dating back to rulings by the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Jay.

All activities conducted under Title 50 “Peacetime” authorities fall under the oversight of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The President is required by Title 50 Section 413 to keep Congress informed of all intelligence activities that do not constitute covert action. The National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA and gave it peacetime authority to collect intelligence, conduct counterintelligence, and execute covert action under the President’s Article II Section 2 constitutional authority.

Covert action is defined as:

…an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.

2.1.1 Covert Action

Activities falling under the modern definition of covert action have been ordered by every U.S. President dating back to George Washington and are a distinct prerogative of the president as the Commander in Chief. Moreover, the President is entitled to withhold especially sensitive national security information from Congress at his discretion. Information the President typically withholds from the Committees may pertain to OPSEC for ongoing operations or to protect the identities of those individuals who may be cooperating with the U.S. Government abroad.

To prevent these broad authorities from being abused, Congress imposes on the President a requirement that the appropriate Congressional committee chairs and ranking members be notified if a covert action has been authorized in the form of a Presidential Finding.

The Presidential Finding must state who is authorized to fund the covert action and clarify that the action does not violate the Constitution. This system imposes on the President, and subordinate executive branch agencies, a requirement for a strict internal review, instituting a check on abuses of authority without instituting direct Congressional Oversight, which would infringe on the Constitutional prerogatives of the President as Commander in Chief.

The Russian Duma and Federation Council do not have any such oversight over President Putin or the Prime Minister. The Russian President discloses to the legislative chambers only what he wants them to know, so the only real check on executive authorities in peacetime intelligence activities comes from potentially fragmenting the Prime Minister’s voting majority.

2.2 Title 10 Authorities—Wartime Authorities

The management, organization, and mission of the United States Armed Services, the conduct of war, and all activities preparing for war fall under Title 10 of the U.S. Code. As Commander in Chief, the President has sole authority over the Armed Services and the conduct of war.

The House Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee share oversight of the U.S. Armed Services, but here again, the President retains his prerogative to withhold information from Congress for national security reasons. Once Congress declares war, and via Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution (commonly referred to as the War Powers Clause), only the Congress can declare war, the President and executive branch operate under Title 10 authorities with nearly carte blanche authority in the conduct of war.

All the capabilities of the United States Armed Services and Intelligence Community are at the disposal of the President and his subordinate generals to achieve victory. There are two provisions: Title 10 authorities only apply to traditional military activities, and Congress always retains accountability through its control of the military budget.

2.2.1 Traditional Military Activities

1. They are conducted by military personnel;
2. They fall under the direction and control of a United States military commander;
3. They are preceding or related to hostilities that are either anticipated (meaning approval has been given by the National Command Authorities for the activities and operational planning for hostilities) to involve U.S. military forces or where such hostilities involving United States military forces are ongoing and the U.S. role in the overall operation is apparent or to be acknowledged publicly.

If U.S. military and intelligence activities abroad do not fall under the umbrella of traditional military activities, then they cannot fall under Title 10 authorities and therefore default to Title 50 “Peacetime” authorities, under which the President is subject to stricter congressional oversight (and where the President must issue a Presidential Finding to conduct covert action).

However, there is a wrinkle in the American architecture of accountability. Title 10 authorities for “traditional military activities” apply to activities to prepare for war. Under modern interpretation, war does not have to be imminent to fall under Title 10. War can merely be possible, opening the door for Title 10 authorities to apply to long-term planning and shaping activities such as Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) and Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE).

In the case of OPE especially, this creates a seam between Title 10 and Title 50 authorities that might allow a President to circumvent Congressional oversight. Operational Preparation of the Environment is the American doctrinal mission conducted prior to and during Phase 0 to prepare for the introduction of military forces. This may include deploying intelligence officers or SOF, and these operatives may conduct numerous sensitive activities, all in support of OPE.

The activities conducted under OPE would otherwise require a Presidential Finding for covert action if they were executed during peacetime. These grey areas cause Senate committees to ask pointed questions of Department of Defense appointees during confirmation hearings to ensure they are not exploited.

3.0 Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE)

The Department of Defense (DoD) has not published a precise definition of OPE, but military planners and theorists generally agree that OPE consists of Title 10 activities that prepare the battlefield for introducing larger ground forces and/or additional SOF (Source). In general, Administrations (both Democrat and Republican) avoid precisely defining OPE as it may constrain the President’s options in responding to a potential crisis. OPE needs to be considered from a multi-layered perspective for its full function to be understood.

3.1 Layer 1: OPE’s High-Level Taskings

• Orientation activities
• Target development
• Preliminary engagement

3.1.1 Orientation Activities (falling under the SOF mission of special reconnaissance)

1. Mapping the physical and human terrain
2. Understanding routes and avenues of travel
3. Creating situational awareness for incoming forces
4. Target development (another task that falls within special reconnaissance)

• Finds and fixes enemy units
• Critical infrastructure (airfields, bridges, water resources, etc.)
• Key individuals (political leaders, weapons specialists, military officers, etc.)
• High-level threats

3.1.2 Target Development

Target Development makes use of both the SOF units’ organic ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) assets and local knowledge to establish persistent surveillance and build target packages.

3.1.3 Preliminary Engagement

• Establishing points of contact with local allies and conducting small-scale direct action
• Sabotage
• Terminal guidance (ground-level targeting assistance for air strikes)
• Against soft targets Dormant enemy forces Obstacles to the introduction of heavier forces

3.2 Layer 2: Sequentially Executed Missions

The second layer of OPE consists of three missions that are sequentially executed by both SOF and/or intelligence operatives:

1. Pre-crisis activities;
2. Pilot team operations;
3. Advanced force operations (AFO).

Each of these activities builds on the others to pave the way for the introduction of larger/heavier forces.

3.2.1 Pre-Crisis Activities

U.S. SOF perform pre-crisis activities during peacetime by deploying to host nation countries. During pre-crisis activities, American SOF train host nation units in tactics, conduct joint training exercises, or advise them in regional peacekeeping missions. Army Civil Affairs conduct area assessments and infrastructure surveys.

Pre-crisis activities also include security force assistance missions where American officers train host nation field-grade officers in managing battalion and brigade level units.

Pre-crisis activities simply constitute making friends, building relationships, and learning about the area. Host nation countries receive valuable foreign assistance in the form of tactical training, military equipment and supplies, infrastructure investment, and closer diplomatic ties. These activities prove their worth during a regional crisis. When SOF units insert into a destabilized or hostile region, they usually rely on prior knowledge, partnerships, and local allies for support.

The objective of American pre-crisis activities is very much in keeping with the practices of the FSB and GRU in the Russian periphery, but in contrast U.S. SOF relies on relationships that were negotiated at the diplomatic level (by the U.S. Ambassador and/or Defense Attaché) and then constructed at the level of soldier-to-soldier/unit-to-unit engagement.

3.2.1.1 A Comparative Glance at Russian Pre-Crisis Activities

This is sharply different from the GRU and FSB approach. Joint training and relationship building are mostly window dressing in the Eastern Bloc. Russia relies primarily on penetrating the ranks of target nations (Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, etc.) with informers, sympathizers, and mutineers, and then offering direct financial support to the political class. However, when Russia responds to a regional crisis, they rely on local friends and allies to facilitate the introduction of Russian operatives. The difference between American and Russian approaches lies in methods and TTPs, not in objectives.

3.2.2 Pilot Team Operations

Conceptually, Pre-Crisis Activities are followed by pilot team operations (Phase 0). Pilot teams (either from U.S. interagency, Army Special Forces, Marine Raiders, etc.) are a boots-on-the ground compliment to the joint planning process that allows leaders to confirm initial assessments and verify “what we think we know”. Pilot teams are also the first introduction of U.S. forces to the battlefield, and they are tasked with contacting allies, establishing a U.S. presence, and setting up communications to higher command.

In the fall of 2001, two Army Special Forces Teams (SFOD-As) infiltrated Afghanistan to organize elements of the Northern Alliance for a campaign against the Taliban. The only American presence in Afghanistan prior to these two teams were pilot team officers of the CIA who made first contact with the warlords of the Northern Alliance and brokered a partnership. These two SFOD-As were tasked with waging Unconventional Warfare in Northern Afghanistan, with specific orders to organize the Northern Alliance into a fighting force and capture the Afghan city Mazar-I-Sharif.

Mazar-I-Sharif is a strategically located northern transit hub. For these SFOD-As to plan and execute the campaign that would capture Mazar-I-Sharif on 10 November 2001, they needed intimate knowledge of Northern Afghanistan and working relations with the Northern Alliance. So, before the SFOD-As infiltrated the country, CIA pilot teams were sent first to map the human and physical terrain.

3.2.3 Advanced Force Operations (AFO)

Advanced force operations (AFO) are approved by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and are only conducted when war is imminent. AFO includes:

• Clandestine operations
• Source operations (HUMINT)
• Deployment of enabling forces and capabilities

These are essentially target-specific preparations prior to an actual operation against a specific adversary.

First, AFO shapes the battlespace by developing targets that are key operational objectives. This may include key infrastructure, enemy depots and supply points, areas of high enemy activity, high-value individuals, main thoroughfares of travel, and enemy strong points.

This may also include high-level threats to incoming friendly forces like A2/AD systems, CBRN capabilities (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear), or IED (improvised explosive device) manufacturers. AFO allows follow-on forces to immediately begin kinetic operations once they have boots-on-the-ground, and supports the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces as they arrive to the battlespace.

After developing targets for key objectives, the AFO mission then shapes the battlespace through “clandestine operations”. Under AFO, clandestine operations are best defined as direct action missions where the enemy is unaware that a mission took place at all. They are low-profile, low-intensity missions that are designed to shape the operational environment.

Generally, they are conducted against critical obstacles to the introduction of heavier ground forces, but they may include:

• Cyber-attacks
• Assassinations
• Sabotage

3.2.3.1 A Comparative Glance at Russian Advanced Force Operations

Russian intelligence operatives and Spetsnaz detachments have worked hard to perfect their approach to Pilot Team Operations and AFO. This was the secret sauce that the Russians executed so well during the Crimea Annexation. Pilot Teams verified objectives and set the table, and then Russian operative’s adept execution of AFO allowed the available firepower of elite units, like the Spetsnaz or the VDV, to be concentrated on a few limited but vital objectives.

Complex targets and strong-points were isolated, by-passed, and left for heavier ground forces to mop up later. Sophisticated AFO practices allow for speedy advances and rapid seizures, and they allow Russian units to maintain the initiative, constantly maneuvering to points that have the greatest impact in support of theater operations.

3.3 Layer 3: Military Information Support Operations and Unconventional Warfare

The third layer of OPE consists of military information support operations (MISO) and Unconventional Warfare (UW). The UW mission organizes and employs irregular proxy forces (guerrillas) against a hostile government or military occupation.

Special Forces train and lead the main guerrilla force (kinetic forces), while the MISO mission develops the underground and erodes public confidence in enemy capabilities and governance. These activities shape the operational environment and support OPE’s first and second layer taskings by facilitating an introduction of conventional forces.

3.3.1 Military Information Support Operations (MISO)

In support of OPE, military information support operations (MISO), sometimes referred to as psychological operations (PSYOPS) [1], influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of target audiences in support of operational objectives in the battlespace.

In American doctrine, MISO is a subset of information operations (IO) and complements other IO subsets such as Operational Security (OPSEC), military deception (MILDEC), electronic warfare (EW), and computer network operations.

Target audiences include not just potential adversaries, but also friendly and neutral populations. This is a means of winning “hearts and minds” for both U.S. conventional forces and SOF. An IO cell chief, subordinate to the Joint Force Commander, is responsible for creating a cohesive information plan that integrates the deployment of MISO into the Joint Operation Planning Process.

3.3.1.1 MISO Activities

U.S. Army MISO activities generally fall under three categories (though there are significant nuances between and within them).

1. White information operations are statements that are attributable to the U.S. Government. They are often (but not necessarily) official statements and have government sanction and authority. Political leaders use official messaging not merely to communicate policy to the public, but to convey intent to friends and adversaries alike.
2. Grey information operations employ targeted messaging to specific audiences and are non-attributable to the U.S. Government.
3. Black information operations employ targeted messaging to specific audiences with the appearance of being attributable to third parties.

3.3.1.2 A Comparative Glance at Russian Propaganda

In American doctrine, MISO is only a component of the Joint Operational Planning Process, whereas Russian propaganda operations are foundational to a successful campaign. Russia learned a hard lesson in Chechnya. Failure to dominate the narrative results in international backlash and domestic dissent. In the conduct of Hybrid Warfare, Russian propaganda permeates the operational environment to legitimize Russian activities, sway public opinion, and break the enemy’s will to resist.

3.3.2 Unconventional Warfare (UW)

The U.S. Army defines unconventional warfare (UW) as an activity on the spectrum of irregular conflict that involves infiltrating a hostile nation and enabling an insurgency to overthrow the existing government. It can be conducted either under OPE to support the eventual introduction of conventional forces or independently to wage war through local proxies (hidden-hand approach).

In 2001, Army SFOD-As were deployed to assist the Northern Alliance, waging UW to destabilize the Taliban regime. Conventional forces deployed into Afghanistan after the capture of Mazar-I-Sharif.

Alternatively, during the Soviet Afghan War (1979-1989) CIA paramilitary officers and supporting U.S. SOF were tasked by a Presidential Finding for covert action to conduct UW in Afghanistan. This covert action undermined the Soviet occupation and puppet government by training and organizing Mujahideen partisans in the employment of weapons systems like the Stinger missile. USSOCOM defines UW as:

…activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

3.3.2.1 U.S. Army Doctrinal Elements of an Insurgency

A resistance movement or insurgency must have three elements to be considered viable by American standards:

1. The guerrilla force is the kinetic action element of the movement. Army SFOD-As deploy to train and organize, advise, and lead guerrillas, enabling them to conduct offensive operations.
2. The underground is the information-gathering apparatus. It informs resistance leaders on the activities of government forces, changes in the political climate, targets of opportunity, etc. The underground may also include a shadow government, with several prominent leaders ready to immediately take power if the existing regime collapses or abdicates.

Both the guerrilla force and the underground are supported by a network of auxiliaries to provide safe-havens, logistics, supply, and transportation. The guerrilla force is equivalent to the tip of an iceberg, which can be seen protruding above water. The auxiliary is the remaining 90% of the iceberg that is invisible below the surface.

3.3.2.2 U.S. Army Doctrinal Phases of Unconventional Warfare

U.S. Army Special Forces views UW through the lens of seven phases:

1. Preparation—U.S. PSYOP elements coordinate with the resistance movement’s underground to lay the groundwork for an information campaign that seeks to unify opposition to the current regime and prepare the public for U.S. support.
2. Initial Contact—U.S. intelligence operatives, or a SFOD-A pilot team, make contact with the allied resistance movement and negotiate the conditions of U.S. support, preparing for the introduction of additional SFOD-As.
3. Infiltration—SFOD-As infiltrate the country, contact the resistance movement directly, establish a presence in-country, and set in place communications to higher command.
4. Organization—SFOD-As organize and train the insurgency’s guerrilla forces, underground, and auxiliaries.
5. Build-Up—SFOD-As continue to train and organize guerrilla forces in order to build critical mass, while leading select guerrilla proxies in limited kinetic operations (sabotage, raids to support logistics, and targets of opportunity). Guerrilla forces avoid decisive engagements and maneuver to control key terrain. As conventional forces steer clear of unruly localities, the auxiliary and underground can increasingly take advantage of safe spaces for politicking, training, intelligence activities, planning, logistics, and public affairs campaigns.
6. Employment—SFOD-As lead guerrilla partners in combat operations, increasingly developing the autonomy and self-sustainment of the guerrilla forces as the resistance movement reaches sufficient mass to wage open conflict with the current regime.
7. Transition—U.S. conventional forces join the conflict and conduct combined operations with the guerrilla force, and the hostile regime is overthrown. Guerrilla forces and elements of the auxiliary transition into conventional forces or disband in peacetime. The shadow government and underground both grow to fill the power vacuum left by the old regime. Civil Affairs units are infiltrated into the battlespace to assess infrastructure and facilitate economic development.

3.3.2.3 A Comparative Glance of Russian Unconventional Warfare

The Russians, and the Soviets before them, put UW into practice with alarming frequency, but the Russian approach relies on standing up conventional motorized infantry and artillery battalions manned by guerrillas from the very beginning. As potential officers are identified, they are often sent to Russia for formal training apart from the conflict.

The problem with the Russian approach is that militia rarely stand up to conventional forces in a no-holds-barred fight. Militias are too individualistic, and they lack formal training or faith in their officers. Irregular troops also lack social pressures from their peers to fully commit to combat as a team. Militias also usually suffer from a lack of military discipline.

4.0 In Closing:

American and Russian, grey zone tactics are not so different. While sensitive missions are not spelled out so precisely in Russian military lexicon, most of the tactical level activities that Russia employs under the rubric of hybrid warfare are captured in American doctrine and considered best practice by modern military theorists. Russian military planners use them to create asymmetric advantages prior to the introduction of heavy ground forces.

Unlike his Moscow counterpart, the U.S. President does not have carte blanche to conduct a military intervention. The U.S. President must issue a Presidential Finding to conduct covert action during peacetime, and a Presidential Finding is insufficient justification for the President to marshal the resources necessary to support a full campaign (as Russia did in Crimea and Donbas).

Russia’s smaller economy and military means that they need to move faster. Russia’s tactical preparatory activities benefit from whole-of-government support for the campaign at the operational level, including: targeted propaganda, political subversion, diplomatic coercion, economic leverage, and financial sanctions. That is really where Russian military practices deviate from Western orthodoxy.

If the United States, NATO, and their allies are to effectively respond to Russian aggression, then they must recognize the underlying tactics and understand why Russia is employing an asymmetric approach.

[1] U.S. Army doctrine refers to MISO as a mission, whereas PSYOPS are the forces that conduct the mission.

Disclaimer:

The views expressed in this article are strictly those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

References:

Bibb, Andrew. “Making the Most of Spontaneous Civil Engagement: An Introduction to the Engaged Awareness Cycle”. Small Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/making-most-spontaneous-civil-engagement-introduction-engaged-awareness-cycle.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. ”ADRP 3-05 Special Operations”. January 2018. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/adrp3_05.pdf.

Joint Publication 2-01.3. “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment”. 21 May 2014. Joint Staff. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp2-01-3.pdf.

Joint Publication 3-05. “Special Operations”. 16 July 2014. Joint Staff. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_05.pdf.

Joint Publication 3-05.1. “Joint Special Operations Task Force”. 26 April 2007. Joint Staff. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_05_01.pdf.

Kuyers, Joshua. “’Operational Preparation of the Environment’: ‘Intelligence Activity’ or ‘Covert Action’ by Any Other Name?”. Winter 2013. 4 American University Washington College of Law. National Security Law Brief 21. https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=nslb

MG Linder, James; Meredith, Spencer & Johnson, Jason. “The Battlefield of Tomorrow Fought Today: Winning in the Human Domain”. The Small Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-battlefield-of-tomorrow-fought-today-winning-in-the-human-domain.

National Security Law Brief. “’Operational Preparation of the Environment’: ‘Covert Action’ By Any Other Name?”. 24 April 2020. American University. https://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/2012/12/15/operational-preparation-of-the-environment-covert-action-by-any-other-name.

Stanton, Doug. “Horse Soldiers”. 2009. Scribner: A Division of Simon and Schuster Inc.

“The U.S. Constitution and other Writings.” 2017. Compiled, edited, and published by Canterbury Classics: An imprint of Printers Row Publishing Group.

U.S. Code Title 50

U.S. Code Title 10

[1] Phase 0 is an umbrella term used to describe a phase of war prior to active engagement of kinetic hostilities, whereas Phase 1 is understood to be the first move/manoeuvre in an overt declared war. Phase 0 is often used synonymously with “grey-zone” activities to describe covert manoeuvres by nations to understand or prepare the domains of military competition prior to the initiation of hostilities.

[2] U.S. Army doctrine refers to MISO as a mission, whereas PSYOPS are the forces that conduct the mission.

greydynamics.com · by Curtis Fox · March 20, 2024

8. The War in Ukraine After The Russian Election by Mick Ryan

The War in Ukraine After The Russian Election

Stepping It Up or Dragging It Out?

MICK RYAN

MAR 21, 2024

mickryan.substack.com · by Mick Ryan

Image: Kyiv Independent

The Putin re-election campaign is now complete. And, as predicted, Putin won in a landslide. Putin received 87.28% of votes cast, with a turnout of 77.44%. AP News notes that:

After the harshest crackdown on dissent since Soviet times, it was clear from the earliest returns that Putin’s nearly quarter-century rule would continue with a fifth term that grants him six more years.

With his re-election campaign in the rear view mirror, what might this mean for Putin’s military strategy as we approach the northern spring and summer? This article provides assumptions and a worst case scenario on how the Russian strategy for 2024 in Ukraine might play out.

Clearly, the main effort for the Russian military will remain its campaign to subjugate Ukraine by degrading and destroying its tactical forces, conducting strike operations against operational, strategic and civilian targets, and its ongoing diplomatic and strategic influence operations.

Supporting efforts in this overall strategy will include air, cyber, ground and maritime military operations elsewhere along its border with NATO countries including Finland and the Baltics, restructuring of the Russian military districts, formation of two new armies and 30 other formations and continued collaboration with China, Iran and North Korea.

Putin’s Post-Election Options

Putin has three obvious options for the war after the Russian election.

First, he might decide to continue the war at its current tempo, dragging it out with lots of smaller operations across multiple areas of a very long frontline in Ukraine, as well as periodic missile and drone strikes.

Second, Putin might decide to step up operations once the climatic, logistic and manpower conditions are set for a larger scale offensive sometime in the northern spring or summer.

Finally, he can decide to call it quits and return all his military forces and return to pre-2014 borders. The likelihood of this is zero, but it had to be mentioned as an option.

While the first option might at first appear attractive to Putin, even he can appreciate how the Europeans are slowly but inevitably stepping up their defence production capabilities. The longer he continues the war, the more capable the European defence industry - and their military forces - will become. While Putin understands that western polities are impatient, he will probably give greater weight to the fact that the longer the war continues, the more powerful European military capacity will become. With aspirations of regional dominance, this would not be an outcome preferred by Putin.

The third option is probably off the table. Putin’s rhetoric before and during the war, through to his victory speech this week, indicates total commitment of his nation to the defeat of Ukraine. While this may not include the takeover of all Ukrainian territory in the short term, it probably includes at least advancing to more defensible terrain in western and southern Ukraine in 2024.

As such, Putin most likely sees 2024 as an opportunity when U.S. support is lacking, European defence capacity is not yet at a point where it can provide decisive support to Ukraine, and the Ukrainian military capacity is in a reconstitution and institutional transformation stage. A decisive blow against Ukraine this year, which results in seizing significant portions of territory, might see U.S. support for the war decline even further and result in greater pressure on the Ukrainian government to negotiate some kind of ceasefire or armistice.

While this would be a disaster for Ukraine and Europe, it would be very advantageous for Putin and Russia. Therefore, Putin’s most likely course of action - and the most dangerous for Ukraine - is another larger offensive some time this year.

The Road to a Larger Russian Offensive

For several months, the Russians have been conducting tactical actions to advance in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine. Some are opportunistic, which take advantage of Ukrainian force and artillery shortfalls and the local terrain to make small gains in territory.

Other Russian attacks are deliberate attempts to retake ground lost in Ukrainian offensives in 2022 and 2023. The overall effect however is a large-scale operational level collection effort to ascertain Ukrainian physical force dispositions, unit and formation strengths, the evolving capabilities of Ukrainian drone and electronic warfare complexes, as well as reserve force locations, composition and deployment processes.

None of the current Russian operations are at the scale, or appear designed, to achieve a significant breakthrough of Ukrainian defenses. Military organisations must ‘fight for information’ in order to ‘fight with information’.

Recent Russian gains in eastern and southern Ukraine. Images: @War_Mapper on Twitter / X

Coupled with extensive aerial, ground and satellite surveillance (which according to reports may now include the use of U.S. satellite imagery), Russian offensive operations will also be developing for the Russians a broader picture of Ukraine’s current efforts to construct defensive lines across the front line.

The Russians will correlate their understanding of the new Ukrainian defensive lines with how their own defensive lines worked, and where they didn’t, in the south. They will be seeking to understand secondary and tertiary defensive lines, as well as Ukrainian counter attack and coutner penetration routes.

In this complex undertaking, the Russians may also be adapting their tactical doctrine and training for ground forces so that they have a better chance of success in two key elements of any large-scale offensive. The first is the ‘break in’ battle, which is the combined arms attack into a defended areas and the fight through of that defensive zone. This includes use of artillery, electronic warfare (EW) and drones for suppression, destruction, obscuration and deception, as well as the combined arms close combat inherent in such operations.

Ukrainian defences under construction. Images: @MilitaryLandnet at Twitter / X

The second element of doctrinal and training innovation required by the Russians is ‘break through’ operations, for which a precursor is a successful ‘break in’ and fight through successive defensive lines as well as the interdiction of reserve foces and counter battery and drone fight. No one has achieved this since 2022 in this war, and just as both sides on the western front in World War spent several years experimenting with ideas for an operational breakthrough, so too will the Ukrainians and Russians need to rethink their doctrine, organisations, training and concepts of operations to achieve it in Ukraine.

It is prudent to make theses assumptions about Russian preparations for a larger scale offensive in 2024. Russia has shown the ability to learn and adapt, even if it is often slower than Ukraine in doing so, and that adaptation is uneven across their forces. But we can be assured that the Russians will have watched the failure of Cold War NATO doctrine (and inability to coordinate higher level combined arms) in the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive and will have learned from it.

Concurrent with this learning and adaptation, the Russians are likely to be building up munitions stockpiles, and continue using its glide bombs and UAV/FPV operations to support current and future ground operations. Any targetable concentrations of such stocks should be a priority target for Ukrainian operational targeteers.

Russian Enablers for a Larger Scale 2024 Offensive

There are some strategic enablers which Russia will need to get right before any larger ground offensive in 2024 however.

First, it needs to probably undertake another large scale mobilization to provide a pool of replacements. Any large offensive will inevitably result in large casualties given the Russian style of fighting. And Ukraine’s excellence at killing Russians. It may not call such an effort ‘mobilisation’, but it must almost certainly expand the size of its army, in accordance with announced plans and possibly beyond, in order to conduct a larger scale offensive in 2024 and undertake missions in other areas bordering NATO countries.

Second, Russia will need to build up munitions through indigenous production and imports from countries like North Korea. Big offensives are big consumers of munitions. Russia has already recieved thousands of containers of munitions from North Korea, but it is uncertain how much more North Korea has to give. At the same time, Russia has stepped up domestic production of munitions and drones. It now produces about 250,000 rounds of artillery each month according to this report, which places it significantly ahead of U.S. and European production (at present). The war of industrial systems, which I explored here, will continue and will provide a foundation for Russian preparations for any 2024 general offensive.

Third, it will need to somehow address its problem with armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) production and supply. Russian has lost thousands of these vehicles over the past two years. While it has thousands of old vehicles in storage, the more it draws on this, the older the vehicles are and harder to recondition for combat. And, it will need to continue adapting its employment of armoured vehicles - main battle tanks, IFVs, APCs and other armoured support vehicles - to ensure they are survivable in an environment where drones are ubiquitous and can rapidly detect, swarm around and destroy tanks and other AFVs.

As an aside, the Kyiv Independent recently ran an article that explored just how many tanks Russia has left. You can read it here.

Russian tank storage depots. Image: RALee85 on Twitter / X

Fourth, Russia will need to address Ukraine’s integrated air, missile and drone defence network which continues to improve. This network has proven remarkably resillient and has constantly adpated to Russian threats. However, a key targetable Ukrainian weakness is expensive interceptors provided by the West. As such, the Russians are likely to continue to probe the Ukrainian air defence network, attack radar and launcher sites if possible, and induce the Ukrainians to launch expensive missiles at aerial targets.

The arrival of F16s for the Ukrainian Air Force this year will complicate Russia’s challenge in this regard. And they will need to continue to adapt to Ukrainian drone operations.

Fifth, Russia must degrade Ukrainian tactical and operational collection efforts. The aim of this would be to generate uncertainty and hopefully (for Russia), surprise against the Ukrainians. It can’t do much about European and US surveillance satellites however and the sharing of intelligence gleaned from foreign intelligence agencies.

Russia’s strategic and operational deception in the lead up to any large-scale offensive would be vital. This was missing from the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive. Surprise is much harder to achieve with contemporary integrated civil-military sensor networks that both the Ukrainians and Russian operate. But, it is not impossible.

Sixth, the Russians may be thinking about ‘what happens if a major offensive is successful’? For example, might a large scale Russian victory in a 2024 offensive prompt a greater NATO intervention including, as Macron has hinted, the deployment of NATO troops? Or, alternatively, might a successful Russian offensive in the coming months lead to a crisis of confidence in western capitals they can exploit? Russian planners and strategic leaders will almost certainly be wargaming such possible outcomes among a range of others.

Finally, an inevitable part of Russia’s approach to its 2024 operations, including any step up on offensive operations, will be nuclear threats. Putin has done this throughout the war. Most recently he issued the following warning:

Everything that the west comes up with creates the real threat of a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, and thus the destruction of civilisation.

It is almost instinctive for Russia to apply the nuclear ‘escalate to de-escalate’ method to deter greater NATO involvement. It is very likely to be used again in 2024.

The Months Ahead

Putin’s speeches and comments this year indicate he is willing to double down on his subjugation of Ukraine. Now his ‘election’ is out of the way, he can dedicate more time and resources to that end.

It is likely that the current Russian aerial and ground operations are a prelude to Russia undertaking a larger scale offensive operation at some time in 2024. They will seek to maximise territorial gain while also creating as many Ukrainian casualties as possible. This would create a difficult, two-sided military and political problem for the Ukrainians and would potentiall see increased diplomatic pressure on them for some kind of negotiated outcome in the short term.

This would be catastrophic for Ukraine.

It is now up to Western countries to ensure they provides all necessary support to defend Ukraine in 2024 as it reconstitutes forces, and as the West rebuilds its industrial capacity to match the current production of the ‘arsenal of authoritarians’.

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mickryan.substack.com · by Mick Ryan

9. US TikTok Ban a Flashpoint in US-China Cyberwar

POLITICS

US TikTok Ban a Flashpoint in US-China Cyberwar

Maneuvers to escape ban serve to entrench US political animosity

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/tiktok-ban-flashpoint-usa-china-cyberwar?utm=

MAR 21, 2024

By: Andy Wong Ming Jun

Not everybody thinks this is a good idea. Photo from AP

The passage by the US House of Representatives on March 13 of the popularly dubbed “Ban TikTok Bill” with rare bipartisan support represents the brightest line drawn to date by the US political establishment against China in the realm of cyberspace and information warfare competition.

Whatever the pleadings of TikTok’s Singaporean CEO Chew Shouzi during his January 31 US Congressional grilling regarding both his own and the company’s independence from Beijing and its Chinese parent company ByteDance, US politicians haven’t bought into the argument that the phenomenally popular social media app isn’t a threat to US national security or its innocent nature of entertainment instead of a propaganda and data accumulation outlet for the Chinese Communist Party.

A February 6 Asia Sentinel article described US Sen. Josh Hawley’s questioning TikTok’s ability to keep its US user data private and siloed from access by ByteDance, despite it being headquartered in Singapore and claiming cooperation with US regulators on such concerns with “Project Texas” back in June 2022. “Project Texas” is a US$1.5 billion plan which saw TikTok route all US user data to be stored in the cloud infrastructure of a US software company, Oracle. A January 30 Wall Street Journal article reported that internal reports from TikTok employees revealed that US user data was still accessible to ByteDance staff. Chew’s inability to adequately address this issue arguably contributed significantly towards the House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s decision to support a full US ban.

(See related story: Singapore Begins To Pay The Price for ‘China Cuckooing’)

Public maneuvers by TikTok, its CEO, its parent company, and the Chinese government leading up to and following the passing of the ban have merely served to entrench US political animosity. Days before the bill’s passage through the House Of Representatives, TikTok, and Chew put out direct video messages to its US user base exhorting them to lobby their Congressional representatives to “stop a TikTok shutdown,” providing direct links to contact details for their specific congressional representatives. This led in some cases to American teenagers threatening self-harm or suicide in videos and phone calls, though in most cases US TikTok users simply stated that they were following instructions sent directly to their phones via the app. When this last-ditch effort to mobilize the American public backfired with the first-stage passage of the bill through Congress, TikTok doubled down in justifying its lobbying effort by asking “Why are members of Congress complaining about hearing from their constituents? Respectfully, isn't that their job?”

With a third of US adults under the age of 30 using TikTok not just for entertainment but as a news source, the behavior of Tiktok’s 170 million-strong US user base provided grist for the “national security risk” narrative being pushed by US politicians to justify banning the app. Any possibility of a ban is certain to result a plethora of lawsuits.

Nor is the US alone in its national security fears. TikTok shut down its India service in June 2020 after India became the first country to enact a nationwide block. Other governments enacting bans on the popular app include the EU, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, New Zealand, the UK, and Afghanistan. Estonia’s 2024 intelligence threat report described TikTok as an avenue for Bytedance and China by extension to hoover up massive amounts of visual and behavioral data from diverse non-Chinese human demographics around the world to develop “globally competent artificial intelligence” which could be potentially weaponized in conjunction with another Douyin-owned digital newsfeed named Toutiao that relies on AI-processed user behavior patterns to push personalized news feeds for individual users. The report concluded with the declaration that “using TikTok means assisting a company with ties to an authoritarian state, which aims to reshape Western security architecture, in developing artificial intelligence."

Worse was to come. Subsequent public responses from Bytedance and China in the following days blew away any notion of TikTok being an independent company free from Chinese control and direct influence. The Chinese foreign ministry put out a statement on March 14 decrying what it described as US lawmakers unjustly suppressing foreign companies out of a “bandit mentality.” The irony of China’s outcry was not lost on American ears, with the US ambassador to China retorting that China was in no position to criticize the US given its own heavy-handed censorship and exclusion of Western social media platforms and news websites behind its infamous “Great Firewall,” even applied to TikTok itself, an internationalized version of Bytedance’s Douyin social media app.

Beijing later doubled down in its backing of TikTok by signaling to Bytedance company executives in Beijing that they would not allow TikTok’s US operations or even the Singapore-based company itself to be forcibly sold out of Chinese ownership to avoid a US ban. This is despite the fact that China has had a history of gatekeeping foreign business access to its domestic market by requiring them to set up mainland operations as joint ventures with local Chinese companies. In some cases, these joint ventures would later be deliberately handicapped through various means to produce sandbagged financial performance. The intention was to induce foreign partners in said joint ventures to sell out to their Chinese counterparts and cut their losses. Once fully Chinese-owned, such businesses would suddenly be able to turn a profit.

Viewed from this historical perspective, it can be said that the current US bill targeting TikTok with the option of either divesting fully from Bytedance and Chinese ownership in a “shotgun divorce” or being banned from the US market is a clear offer that can’t be accepted in the first serious information warfare counterattack by the US against China amid rapidly chilling ties.

Even if China and Bytedance were to acquiesce to this US challenge over TikTok’s ultimate control and ownership, a shotgun divorce of TikTok from full Bytedance ownership and control would be something relatively easier to legislate for than to practically implement with multiple potential business pitfalls and loss in company value.

10. America Is Sliding Toward Chinese-Style Capitalism

Excerpt:

Either irony is dead, or the Chinese Communist Party has a subversive sense of humor. Its entire economic model revolves around selectively flouting principles of the market economy and fair competition, including by systematically discriminating against foreign enterprises. China’s state capitalism has so effectively tilted the international playing field in its own favor that it has forced others, including the U.S., to adopt their own versions of state capitalism.

America Is Sliding Toward Chinese-Style Capitalism

In the name of national security, politics take priority over profits

https://www.wsj.com/economy/america-is-sliding-toward-chinese-style-capitalism-fff67df4?mod=hp_lead_pos5

By Greg Ip

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March 21, 2024 5:30 am ET

TikTok supporters marched from the U.S. Capitol to the White House last week. PHOTO: LENIN NOLLY/ZUMA PRESS

Who decides whether TikTok stays Chinese, is banned or sold? Washington. Who determines whether an American or Japanese company gets to buy 

United States Steel? Washington. Who is giving Intel $8.5 billion to make semiconductors in the U.S.? You get the picture.Across the U.S., business decisions once made in boardrooms or shareholder meetings increasingly depend on politics. The U.S. isn’t sliding toward socialism, in which the government controls the means of production. It may, however, be slouching toward state capitalism, in which government regularly intervenes in business to ensure it serves the national interest.

The problem, as both the TikTok and U.S. Steel affairs show, is that the national interest is constantly being redefined to fit the political priorities of the day.

While the U.S. has never been a laissez-faire paradise, more than other countries it believed in free-market capitalism and let efficiency and profits determine the allocation of capital.

Neither Donald Trump nor President Biden believe in that. Both are happy to use all the levers of the federal government, whether taxes, subsidies, regulations or the bully pulpit, to tilt business decisions toward their own vision of the national interest.

When the House of Representatives voted to force the sale or ban of TikTok, the short-video app owned by Beijing-based ByteDance, China’s Ministry of Commerce demanded, according to Xinhua, that the U.S. “earnestly respect the market economy and the principle of fair competition, and provide an open, fair, just and nondiscriminatory environment for enterprises from all countries.”

Either irony is dead, or the Chinese Communist Party has a subversive sense of humor. Its entire economic model revolves around selectively flouting principles of the market economy and fair competition, including by systematically discriminating against foreign enterprises. China’s state capitalism has so effectively tilted the international playing field in its own favor that it has forced others, including the U.S., to adopt their own versions of state capitalism.

Trump was an early convert to state capitalism, albeit a somewhat personal, ad hoc kind. He browbeat one company into keeping a factory open instead of moving it to Mexico. He used trade policy to punish foreign competitors and favor American companies.

At the request of Boeing, Trump’s Commerce Department hit Canada’s Bombardier with crippling tariffs. This forced it to sell control of a new regional jet, whose production soon moved to Alabama from Canada.

Claiming the U.S. military needed a domestic source of steel, Trump imposed tariffs on imports of the metal—from military allies. In 2020, he tried, and failed, to force the sale of TikTok to American investors.

Trump has now decided that Chinese ownership of TikTok is less of a threat to the public than 

Facebook, which suspended Trump’s account after the Jan. 6, 2021, Capitol riot. Earlier this month, he came out against banning TikTok, before demurring—instantly weakening Republican support for a sale or ban.Biden has pursued a less personal, more refined version of state capitalism with two stated aims: promoting domestic manufacturing and green energy, and safeguarding national security by restricting the export of sensitive technology and knowledge.

In practice, these have become the same thing. When every microchip has a military and civilian application and any database can become a channel of foreign influence, then even cargo cranes are fair game.

And when Biden last week declared his opposition to Japanese steel giant 

Nippon Steel’s proposed purchase of Pittsburgh-based United States Steel, he showed that his version of state capitalism can be as personal, political and ultimately counterproductive as Trump’s.Biden said U.S. Steel should stay in U.S. hands. But why?

Nippon’s deep pockets, close relationship with Japanese automakers and expertise making the specialized thin steel for electric-vehicle motors would make U.S. Steel stronger. A Japanese American counterweight to Chinese behemoths would embody Biden’s vision of cooperation among market democracies.

But the United Steelworkers doubted Nippon Steel’s commitment to its unionized plants and came out against it. So, too, did senators from the swing states of Ohio and Pennsylvania, as well as Trump. Fearful of losing Pennsylvania voters, Biden joined them. On Wednesday, he got the United Steelworkers’ endorsement.

A U.S. Steel facility in Clairton, Pa., this month. PHOTO: JUSTIN MERRIMAN/BLOOMBERG NEWS

Biden’s opposition makes it more likely U.S. Steel will be bought on the cheap by Ohio-based steelmaker 

Cleveland-Cliffs, which was outbid last year by Nippon Steel. That would undermine another Biden priority, preventing corporation concentration, since the combined entity would dominate some markets.This isn’t China, and neither Trump nor Biden can simply dictate their preferred outcome to companies. But the expectation that they will try changes how business behaves.

Investment isn’t crafted for maximum return but political expedience. Executives avoid saying anything that might offend people in power. The line between state capitalism and crony capitalism blurs as companies seek to defeat their competitors in the corridors of power rather than the market.

Having lost in the boardroom, Cleveland-Cliffs set out to kill Nippon Steel’s bid by working with unions and politicians. It also added Ron Bloom, who had previously worked for the United Steelworkers and in the Obama administration, to its board.

Any buyer of TikTok will presumably have to be acceptable to a future Trump administration. So it isn’t surprising that Trump’s former Treasury secretary, Steven Mnuchin, said last week that he was organizing a bid.

As Bill Bishop, who writes a newsletter about China, wrote, “You could not write a better storyline for the Ministry of Propaganda if you tried.”

Write to Greg Ip at greg.ip@wsj.com

11. Innocents and War: Contemporary Reflections, Permanent Dilemmas

Excerpt:

Thus far I have emphasized civilian and noncombatant deaths and injuries or other suffering in war. However, there are some words to be said for a contrarian viewpoint that asks about the costs and lingering effects of war on soldiers. After all, soldiers were once civilians and will return to civilian status after having served under arms. They also have families, friends and others who are personally affected by the soldiers’ wartime experiences and postwar struggles. It can be argued that professional soldiers knowingly accept the dangers and risks of combat, including serious wounds or death. On the other hand, even soldiers who undergo combat without being killed or severely wounded often have to deal with postwar lasting effects on their psyches. The physical risks are clear enough: the lasting psychological effects are difficult to comprehend unless and until the war experience has become embedded in the memories of battle. In this sense, soldiers, too, are innocents: their prewar expectations about the immediate or lasting effects of combat are almost certainly different from their experiences under fire. Veterans who have fought in battles in the domains of land, sea or air have been documented with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other psychological disorders, in addition to lasting wounds and physical disabilities.[ix] Even those who were not recognized by an official medical diagnosis of post-conflict damage to their psyches were imbued with memories of combat and its attendant horrors, creating what some have called moral injury.[x] Perhaps related to the previous points is the contradiction noted by military historian John Keegan, between the norms and expectations of modern Western societies for the treatment of their own civilians, on one hand, and their willingness to embrace ever more lethal weapons of war that have unprecedented collateral damage to noncombatants, on the other.[xi]

Innocents and War: Contemporary Reflections, Permanent Dilemmas - Military Strategy Magazine

Stephen J. Cimbala - Penn State Brandywine, Pennsylvania State University

March 19, 2024

To cite this article:

Cimbala, Stephen J., “Innocents and War: Contemporary Reflections, Permanent Dilemmas,” Military Strategy Magazine, Exclusive Article, March 2024.

militarystrategymagazine.com · March 19, 2024

Preface

The costs and risks of war for civilians and other noncombatants are not a new subject. But in the aftermath of ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza, I found myself confronted by anxious students seeking more clarity than I could provide. In the following discussion, I offer a summary of some of my “thinking in progress” about aspects of these and other human rights issues, not pretending that any observations are definitive or even original. But try we must: a broken peace in Europe and a simultaneous hybrid war in the Middle East challenge our understandings of human predicaments in wartime and, as the pot boils, push political leaders and military planners into what Sun Tzu called deadlands.[i]

I. Who Are The Innocents?

The killing of civilians in wartime is described in various ways by writers of history, in fiction, and in personal accounts of wartime experience. Phrases such as “collateral damage” are used to mitigate the essential horror and existential dread of war for noncombatants. War is a violent phenomenon experienced by combatant soldiers and by civilians, albeit in different ways. The soldier has some military experience and training, but most civilians caught up in a war zone have neither. Their sense of anomie is as profound as is the danger of actual physical harm that may befall them. They are “victims” of carnage directed at some political or military objective, but this term too seems insufficient to capture the essence of their situation. Perhaps the term “martyr” better captures the death of civilians caught up in a war zone, as well as the hostages or prisoners of combatant forces who are used as human shields or bargaining chips prior to their demise.

II. “Precision” Weapons and Civilians in War

A great deal of writing about modern war emphasizes the development of precision weapons, enabling the pinpoint targeting of opponents and the reduction of incidental damage to bystanders and innocents. On the other hand, the “precision” of modern weapons can be overstated. Precision weapons, so-called, are not necessarily less destructive per se: but their destructive capacity is more focused in order to limit collateral damage. Drone strikes against terrorist cells are certainly “precise” compared to massive artillery bombardments, but nevertheless, many kill innocents who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Under some conditions, precision weapons are available to both sides but not dominant in the conduct of battle. If you are a civilian noncombatant in Israel, in Gaza, in Ukraine, in Russia, or in any conflict zone where mass fires are routine, you are experiencing the hell of innocence traduced by the rupture of civilization. Nevertheless, it makes sense for states capable of imposing restrictions on the scope of destruction, and who wish to enable a reputation for discriminate targeting, to avail themselves of up-to-date munitions with the appropriate characteristics. Sometimes a takedown of one or more key leaders of a country or military faction can accomplish as much, or more, than mass destruction undisciplined by restraint. The issue is whether decisions about the elimination of individuals or groups who are not members of fighting forces or other military formations are part of a disciplined process of review and strategy making or, on the other hand, represent impulsively motivated or feral attacks against “enemies” broadly and vaguely defined.

III. Just and Unjust Wars

Historians and philosophers have distinguished “just” from “unjust” wars according to the purposes for which wars are fought and the means by which combat operations are conducted.[ii] A just war is a war fought for a good cause, and by appropriate means. Appropriate means imply serious efforts to distinguish civilians from combatants and to avoid gratuitous loss of life and property among the former. However, the distinction between just and unjust wars is often marinated in the propaganda put out by all sides in a war zone. States at war tend to assume that their causes are righteous and those of their opponents are invidious. Sometimes a purportedly just cause excuses the use of any means to subdue the opponent, however excessive the costs to noncombatants.

It is also the case that, as wars become more prolonged and costly, the guardrails separating inexcusable and unacceptable means of fighting from more ethical and restrained methods tend to come down. Conquering armies, whose societies have undergone earlier massive hardships imposed by ruthless invaders, are often driven by revenge that takes its toll against helpless civilians in countless numbers. The Soviet army that took its revenge against German civilians in 1945 was following in the footsteps of the Roman legions that destroyed Carthage in its entirety.[iii] Sieges are often the scenes of mass atrocities. The German siege of Leningrad in World War II witnessed the death of millions of civilians by starvation and other means. Russia’s siege of Mariupol in 2022 reminded us of the devastating battles over Sebastopol during that same earlier war.

IV. War and Politics

The great Prussian theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz, averred that wars are fought for a political purpose: policy must be the governing agent that exercises control over military operations.[iv] Yet in practice, the relationship between policy and warfare is fluid. Success in battle encourages more ambitious policy objectives; military setbacks can impose constraints on political aspirations. The reciprocal relationship between war and policy, or politics, also helps to define what is considered legitimate in the way of military tactics, including attacks on noncombatants. As the late Professor Colin Gray noted, with respect to the relationship between war and policy, or politics:

“In principle, there is no question as to the proper relationship between politics and war, but historically, in practice, politics is often more an instrument of war than vice versa, at least temporarily.”[v]

For example, Hitler’s insistence on conducting a race war against Jews and other communities was responsible for war crimes and mass murder. The “final solution” also consumed many resources that might otherwise have been devoted to support of combat arms and delegitimized Germany’s entire war effort in the eyes of the civilized world.

Authoritarian leaders are given to absolutist aims in order to justify their grip on power and to create a myth that will enable followers to erase their own doubts about a leader’s atrocities. Joseph Stalin justified the starvation of millions of Ukrainians and others in the 1930s by calling for a campaign against “kulaks” (relatively more successful and productive farmers) and other presumably bourgeois enemies of the state. Soviet gulags were filled with political prisoners throughout the duration of Stalin’s dictatorship. These prisoners included erstwhile disgraced military commanders who were later released from prison in order to provide the leadership needed on the Eastern front in World War II. Orwellian doublethink marked the “show trials” of the 1930s in which prisoners’ coerced confessions were followed by their execution as victims shouted: “Long Live Stalin.”

V. Putin’s War

Vladimir Putin, another in a long line of autocratic Russian rulers, has set a tone in domestic politics that presaged his approach to the conduct of war. Putin’s war against Ukraine beginning in February 2022 has been conducted with little or no discrimination between “military” and “civilian” targets. The unexpectedly strong resistance by Ukrainian regulars and partisans against Russian invaders has prompted the latter toward brutal artillery barrages and air strikes against hospitals, residences, and other social infrastructure. The terroristic intimidation of civilians is clearly an established part of the Russian playbook in Ukraine: much as Germany’s aerial “blitz” against London in World War II was intended to discourage British citizens and melt their support for Britain’s war effort. In Putin’s case, the mass murder of civilians has undermined international support for Russia and, in the longer run, perhaps delegitimized Putin’s regime in the eyes of many. On the other hand, for Putin this is a war about civilizations, not state borders, and civilization wars do not lend themselves easily to moderation in ends and means. His willingness to rebuild Russian power has included a medieval ruthlessness against his domestic political opponents. He would prefer, following Machiavelli, to be feared rather than loved.

Notwithstanding Putin’s proclivities, some argue that, compared to Russia’s war against Ukraine, Israel’s campaign against Hamas in Gaza has actually caused comparatively more (proportionate) deaths among children. According to one former officer of the Swedish Armed Forces/Air Defense and former defense politician:

“I have seen figures of 500 – 1000 dead children in Ukraine during two years of war. Compare that with nearly 15,000 killed children in Gaza in five months. The reason for this is that the Russian forces see civilians in eastern Ukraine as Russians and of course try to minimize the losses among “their” civilians. If Russians would have killed children in the same level as Israel and in comparison to the population and the duration of the war, 500,000 children would have been killed in Ukraine, not 500 – 1,000.”[vi]

This analysis does not take into account that children represent a much higher percentage of the population in Gaza than they do in Ukraine. In addition, children and others in Gaza are trapped in a very limited area of land relative to the large size of the population. Escape corridors for those civilians who wish to leave have been closed off. Then, too, the quality of medical services in Gaza is deficient relative to the needs of the general population, and the fighting has destroyed much of the prewar available medical infrastructure. Finally, many figures given for injuries or deaths to the general population in Gaza are unverified by objective sources. Nevertheless, the point is that, regardless of the relative comparisons between Ukraine and Gaza, large numbers of civilian deaths and injuries have taken place in both.

VI. Terrorism and Civilians

Terrorism is, in the largest sense, the deliberate murder of civilians in order to affect the policies set by authorities. Terrorists seek to demonstrate their commitment to some important cause, or their fearlessness in opposing what they regard as illegitimate regimes, or their ability to hide within the larger civilian population in one or more countries – or all of these. The “audiences” for terrorists are not only the governments of hostile countries, but also their non-governmental elites (media, corporate, academic) and citizens at large.[vii] Terrorist groups like Hamas, ISIS and al-Qaeda have used modern technology for recruitment and messaging, giving global reach to their ideology and appeal. As many cities in developing societies have grown into larger conglomerations with numerous young and frustrated people, terrorist activities have found fertile soil there. In some respects, insurgents share with terrorists the deliberate blurring of lines between “civilian” and “military” personnel. On the other hand, insurgents’ or guerrillas’ goals usually include the displacement of a regime and its replacement with one commanded by former revolutionaries.[viii]

The goals of insurgents, terrorists or other unconventional fighters who resort to violence are important in determining their willingness to tolerate atrocity. In some instances, atrocity is a deliberate form of communication of unmitigated hatred for targeted enemies as well as a message of absolute determination to persevere in a cause regardless of the consequences to third parties. Both ISIS and Hamas have in modern times combined demonstrative acts of cruelty against civilians with video messaging in support of their respective causes. For example, Hamas attackers against Israeli civilians on October 7, 2023 videotaped and broadcast their atrocities in real time, shocking public conscience and dominating the global news cycle. For Hamas and other terrorists, the taking of hostages provides a bargaining chip for future negotiations as well as a potential instrument of influence over policy debates in enemy countries. In responding to Hamas, Israel has found itself simultaneously seeking to eliminate the Hamas organization as an effective military fighting force while, at the same time, avoiding gratuitous death and destruction to civilians in Gaza. Iran and Hamas made Israel’s attempt to walk this fine line as difficult as possible by using civilians in Gaza as human shields and by concealing weapons and command centers in hospitals, schools and other civilian infrastructure. As well, Hamas and Iran devised a global campaign of anti-war demonstrations, against Israel’s response to Hamas’ attacks, that received widespread media coverage and increased American and other governments’ pressures on Israel for more discriminant military operations, for cease fires, and for humanitarian relief for civilians trapped in Gaza.

VII. Soldiers, Atrocity and War

Thus far I have emphasized civilian and noncombatant deaths and injuries or other suffering in war. However, there are some words to be said for a contrarian viewpoint that asks about the costs and lingering effects of war on soldiers. After all, soldiers were once civilians and will return to civilian status after having served under arms. They also have families, friends and others who are personally affected by the soldiers’ wartime experiences and postwar struggles. It can be argued that professional soldiers knowingly accept the dangers and risks of combat, including serious wounds or death. On the other hand, even soldiers who undergo combat without being killed or severely wounded often have to deal with postwar lasting effects on their psyches. The physical risks are clear enough: the lasting psychological effects are difficult to comprehend unless and until the war experience has become embedded in the memories of battle. In this sense, soldiers, too, are innocents: their prewar expectations about the immediate or lasting effects of combat are almost certainly different from their experiences under fire. Veterans who have fought in battles in the domains of land, sea or air have been documented with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other psychological disorders, in addition to lasting wounds and physical disabilities.[ix] Even those who were not recognized by an official medical diagnosis of post-conflict damage to their psyches were imbued with memories of combat and its attendant horrors, creating what some have called moral injury.[x] Perhaps related to the previous points is the contradiction noted by military historian John Keegan, between the norms and expectations of modern Western societies for the treatment of their own civilians, on one hand, and their willingness to embrace ever more lethal weapons of war that have unprecedented collateral damage to noncombatants, on the other.[xi]

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and is the author of numerous works in the fields of international security and defense policy.

References

[i] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, edited and translated by Michael Nylan (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2022), p. 22.

[ii] For pertinent cases, see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

[iii] Antony Beevor, The Second World War ( New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2012), p. 719 and passim.

[iv]Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 87-89.

[v] Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p. 28).

[vi] Mikael Valtersson, “Comment: Russian Soldiers Go to Ukraine to Kill Civilians,” X/Twitter, March 10, 2024, in Johnson’s Russia List 2024 - #60 – March 11, 2024, davidjohnson@starpower.net

[vii] A useful compendium appears in James J. F. Forest and Russell D. Howard, eds., Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, Second Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2013).

[viii] For additional discussion on this point, see: Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (New York: Liveright – W.W. Norton, 2013, xxi-xxiii.

[ix] For example, see: Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New York: Scribner, 1994); and Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Costs of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New York: Little, Brown, Revised Edition. 2009).

[x] Moral injury implies the battering of conscience that takes place when an individual observes or participates in an event that is morally ambivalent according to his or her prior expectations of right and wrong. See the special issue of Aether: A Journal of Strategic Airpower and Spacepower, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall 2023), Department of the Air Force, which is entirely devoted to the topic of moral injury.

[xi] John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 321-331.

militarystrategymagazine.com · March 19, 2024

12. Taiwan and US are playing dangerous game off Quemoy

Some "whataboutism." 

Green Berets as a provocation.

Excerpts:

Now imagine how Washington would react if China had permanently stationed some of its most elite troops a couple of kilometres from Hawaii, Guam or worse, the continental United States. The Pentagon would probably deploy more than a few coastguard vessels as a response.

The Green Berets’ presence only recently came to light, at least to the public. When asked about it, Taiwanese Defence Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng gave an indirect answer this month at the Legislative Yuan’s foreign and national defence committee.

“[There] may have some blind spots and shortcomings and therefore it is important to communicate with others who are friendly to us, whether they are teams, groups, or countries,” said Chiu, who once claimed that the mainland could invade by next year.

Speaking to reporters on the sidelines of the committee meeting, he described those “military exchanges” as taking place on “a regular basis” and involving “mutual observation, learning strengths, and addressing weaknesses.” They go, he said, beyond the scope of weapon sales and purchases between Taiwan and the US.

Taiwan and US are playing dangerous game off Quemoy

• Stationing elite US troops like Green Berets barely 5km from southeastern coast of mainland China is direct provocation, not an attempt to preserve status quo in Taiwan Strait
• 
  

By Alex Lo South China Morning Post3 min

March 19, 2024

View Original

Taiwan-controlled Quemoy islands have become politically explosive recently. And so, on Sunday, to add fuel to the flame, Taiwan’s official Central News Agency ran a story claiming mainland China was trying to expand its sovereignty claims by establishing “de facto control” over the maritime area.

“China is repeatedly trespassing in the waters surrounding Taiwan-held Quemoy in a bid to establish ‘de facto’ jurisdictional control of the area and bolster its sovereignty claims,” it said.

That has been pretty much the consensus narrative for Taiwan and its Western friends about recent confrontations around the outlying islands within spitting distance from the mainland shores. The latest brush involved several Chinese mainland coastguard ships reportedly entering the area at the weekend.

Tensions flared last month after two mainland fishermen drowned while their boat was being pursued by Taiwanese coastguard vessels. A more amiable incident came last week when the two sides launched a joint rescue mission after a Chinese fishing vessel capsized near Quemoy, also known as Kinmen.

The area is always going to be politically and militarily sensitive as Quemoy is less than 5km off the mainland’s southeast coast.

Taiwan’s concerns grow over Quemoy waters as Beijing steps up patrols

But why all these mutually provocative activities now?

What is almost always left unreported is that US Army special forces called the Green Berets are now stationed in amphibious command centres on outlying islands such as Quemoy and Penghu, and that they train and conduct joint exercises with their Taiwanese military counterparts. This, according to Taiwan media reports.

Now imagine how Washington would react if China had permanently stationed some of its most elite troops a couple of kilometres from Hawaii, Guam or worse, the continental United States. The Pentagon would probably deploy more than a few coastguard vessels as a response.

The Green Berets’ presence only recently came to light, at least to the public. When asked about it, Taiwanese Defence Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng gave an indirect answer this month at the Legislative Yuan’s foreign and national defence committee.

“[There] may have some blind spots and shortcomings and therefore it is important to communicate with others who are friendly to us, whether they are teams, groups, or countries,” said Chiu, who once claimed that the mainland could invade by next year.

Speaking to reporters on the sidelines of the committee meeting, he described those “military exchanges” as taking place on “a regular basis” and involving “mutual observation, learning strengths, and addressing weaknesses.” They go, he said, beyond the scope of weapon sales and purchases between Taiwan and the US.

The joint military programme, while not specifically mentioned, may be tied to the 2023 National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) passed in the US. It also includes weapons training such as the operation of drones and developing operational and instructional manuals for military personnel. In the section titled “Support for Taiwan and Pacific Allies”, the 2023 Act “reaffirms US support to the defence of Taiwan, reaffirms Indo-Pacific Command’s authority to conduct joint exercises with Taiwan, no matter what the Chinese say, and invites Taiwan to join the Rim of the Pacific Exercise in 2024 to improve the readiness of their forces and send a message to Beijing”.

KMT deputy chief Andrew Hsia starts mainland China trip with call for dialogue

In response to the weekend incident, a US State Department spokesman said Washington was urging all parties to exercise restraint and refrain from unilaterally changing the “status quo”.

“Maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is in line with our [the US’] consistent interests and is crucial to regional and global security and prosperity,” the spokesman said.

The statement is just laughable. So, after stationing special forces just off the coast of Fujian, apparently for good, the US claims it wants to preserve the status quo!

In one of her many deliberately provocative acts during her eight-year-long tenure, retiring President Tsai Ing-wen was the first island leader to acknowledge the presence of US troops. The Green Berets add to the provocation now not only because they are among the US military’s most elite troops, but also because they are said to be stationed in Taiwan permanently, rather than on a rotational or contingent basis. Seen in this light, Beijing has been remarkably restrained.

13. A Mexican Drug Cartel’s New Target? Seniors and Their Timeshares

Just another reason not to buy a timeshare. (or try to get rid of one).

But I guess this lucrative work is less risky than distributing drugs.

A Mexican Drug Cartel’s New Target? Seniors and Their Timeshares

One of Mexico’s most powerful criminal groups, Jalisco New Generation, runs call centers that offer to buy retirees’ vacation properties. Then, they empty their victims’ bank accounts.

• https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/21/world/americas/mexico-timeshare-fraud-cartel.html

Tourists in Puerto Vallarta, a popular beach town in Mexico, in February. Over the last five years, American timeshare owners were bilked out of $288 million, according to the F.B.I.Credit...Alejandro Cegarra for The New York Times

By Maria Abi-Habib

Reporting from Guadalajara and Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, cities in Jalisco state that are cartel strongholds.

March 21, 2024, 

12:00 a.m. ET

Leer en español

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First the cartel cut its teeth with drug trafficking. Then avocados, real estate and construction companies. Now, a Mexican criminal group known for its brutality is moving in on seniors and their timeshares.

The operation is relatively simple. Cartel employees posing as sales representatives call up timeshare owners, offering to buy their investments back for generous sums. They then demand upfront fees for anything from listing advertisements to paying government fines. The representatives persuade their victims to wire large amounts of money to Mexico — sometimes as much as hundreds of thousands of dollars — and then they disappear.

The scheme has netted the cartel, Jalisco New Generation, hundreds of millions of dollars over the past decade, according to U.S. officials who were not authorized to speak publicly, via dozens of call centers in Mexico that relentlessly target American and Canadian timeshare owners. They even bribe employees at Mexican resorts to leak guest information, the U.S. officials say.

The scam represents the latest evolution of the Jalisco New Generation, which is entrenched in both illegal and legal sectors of the economy. With little more than a phone and a convincing script, cartel employees are victimizing people across multiple countries.

And even those employees are vulnerable to the cartel’s ruthlessness.

Last May, the remains of eight young Mexicans who worked at a call center owned by the cartel were discovered in dozens of plastic bags in a ravine on the outskirts of Guadalajara, a city in Jalisco state.

The cartel typically preys on older, retired people who want to leave as much money as they can to their family by selling off assets. Several victims interviewed by The New York Times said the money they had lost to scammers exceeded the value of their initial investment in timeshares in Jamaica, California and Mexico.

“I’m old, just like these clients,” said Michael Finn, founder of Finn Law Group in St. Petersburg, Fla., which has represented thousands of people facing various forms of timeshare fraud. “We tend to be trusting when someone calls chatting us up and selling us these dreams.”

Mr. Finn realized how serious this type of fraud was becoming four years ago, when he received a call from a desperate woman whose mother had wired $1.2 million, her entire life savings, to Mexico to sell her timeshare.

The timeshare industry is booming, with $10.5 billion in sales in 2022, a 30 percent jump from the year before, according to the American Resort Development Association. Nearly 10 million American households own timeshares, the association said, spending an average of about $22,000 for their investment on top of annual fees of around $2,000. Most timeshares are beach resorts.

The sector’s growth coincides with a 79 percent rise over the past four years of timeshare fraud complaints received by the F.B.I. But for scams that originate in Mexico, the F.B.I. can investigate only if it gets the local authorities’ cooperation. And American law firms cannot file civil lawsuits because they do not have jurisdiction in Mexico.

More on Mexico

• Tackling Fentanyl Abuse: The U.S. government brought Mexican coroners to a “body farm” in Colorado to learn how to detect fatal opioid overdoses, hoping to show that fentanyl kills in Mexico, too.
• A New Frontier: For the first time, women professional softball players in Latin America have a league of their own, another gain for women seeking more opportunities.
• A New Inquiry: Mexico’s freedom of information institute, a government agency, said that it would start an investigation into President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s disclosure on national TV of the personal phone number of a New York Times journalist.
• Presidential Election: Two women will face off for Mexico’s highest office in what is set to be a historic election in May, and for the first time Mexicans living abroad will be able to vote in person. Here’s what to know.

Over the past five years, American timeshare owners were bilked out of $288 million, according to the F.B.I., through various types of scams, including those run by the cartel. The real number is most likely about $350 million, as about 20 percent of those defrauded never register a complaint.

“The victims don’t want to come forward because they are embarrassed and hide it from their families,” Mr. Finn said.

Image

James and Nicki, who asked that their last name and identities not be revealed, have lost roughly $900,000 on a scam to help them sell their timeshare.Credit...Max Whittaker for The New York Times

In October 2022, a retired couple — James, 76, and his wife, Nicki, 72 — said they received a call from a supposed real estate agent at Worry Free Vacations in Atlanta, offering to broker the sale of their timeshare in Lake Tahoe, Calif., to a wealthy Mexican businessman. They asked not to publish their last name as they were “very embarrassed” about being defrauded.

As their daughters grew older, the family had stopped using the vacation spot that it bought in the 1990s for some $8,000, so the couple jumped at the opportunity to sell.

The scam started with smaller fees, James said — a few thousand dollars here and there meant to settle Mexican government registration costs for “cross-border transactions.” The fees grew heftier as he was told he was being fined by the Mexican authorities for various violations and could be extradited for breaking the law unless he paid. At one point, James said, the scammers even persuaded him to invest in a new commercial property in Mexico.

About two dozen payments later, the couple have wired nearly $900,000 to various bank accounts in Mexico, according to bank records reviewed by The Times.

Scams that go as far as this are not that uncommon, according to the F.B.I. The agency says that, typically, victims like James and Nicki are wiring the money to bank accounts held by associates of the Jalisco New Generation cartel.

The couple said they had depleted their life savings and were now in debt. They said they even borrowed about $150,000 from one of their daughters and sold James’s childhood home, but have not seen a single cent in return.

“I’m sure that if I were asking them, they’d say, ‘How could you be so stupid?’” James said of his daughters. “And I asked myself that same thing. I used to think I was fairly intelligent.”

The scammers identified themselves as sales representatives and an official at Mexico’s Central Bank, emails reviewed by The Times show, and kept promising that if he paid only “one more fee,” everything would be cleared and his money released.

What you should know. The Times makes a careful decision any time it uses an anonymous source. The information the source supplies must be newsworthy and give readers genuine insight.

Learn more about our process.

Yet after every payment, a new fee was piled on.

In a statement, the Mexican Central Bank said it was aware that timeshare fraud was being committed in its name and warned people away from falling for the scam.

Late last year, James started to receive desperate messages from alleged representatives who claimed their colleague was jailed in Mexico after trying to settle James’s case, according to recorded calls and emails reviewed by The Times.

“Please, do everything that you can, to get my friend/boss back home. He misses his family so much and hearing him feels awful, you’re the only hope for this to be resolved,” a recent email read. “The pending amount to be paid is: $157,786.61.”

James said he was considering taking out a second mortgage to pay the amount, until his daughters stopped him.

Image

A call center in Guadalajara, Mexico, in February. Eight employees of the center were later found murdered.Credit...Alejandro Cegarra for The New York Times

While the scam targeting timeshare owners is financial, in Mexico it can be deadly.

The eight Mexicans found dead on the outskirts of Guadalajara last year all worked at a call center in the heart of Guadalajara run by the Jalisco New Generation cartel, American officials said. Local prosecutors said when they searched the center, they found a mop with red stains, blackboards with foreign names and details of timeshare memberships.

When New York Times reporters recently visited the call center, they found it was closed, with a police vehicle parked outside. The building was in an upscale neighborhood, across the street from a park. Parents walked by, taking their children to school.

Héctor Flores, the founder of the Light and Hope Collective, which combs through Jalisco state looking for the bodies of the disappeared, said he knew of about 30 people who had disappeared from call centers since 2017. But there are most likely more, he said, as many families do not come forward out of fear.

Image

Héctor Flores, who tracks murder victims in Jalisco state, said he knew of about 30 people who disappeared from call centers since 2017.Credit...Alejandro Cegarra for The New York Times

The state prosecutors’ office did not respond to requests for comment.

The Jalisco New Generation cartel, which was founded about 15 years ago, has grown into one of the most powerful cartels in Mexico. In recent years, it has expanded into the legal sectors of the economy, including selling avocados to the United States.

In Puerto Vallarta, a cartel stronghold and popular beach town, Mexican hotel workers are routinely pressured by the criminal group to leak guest information, according to James Barnacle, the F.B.I. deputy assistant director overseeing financial crimes.

Mr. Barnacle said that hotels and timeshare companies in Mexico were aware of the leaks and that the U.S. government had warned them to start clamping down.

Of particular concern to U.S. officials is the Vidanta Group, one of the world’s largest timeshare resort companies based in Mexico. Its owner, Daniel Chávez Morán, is a friend and an adviser to Mexico’s president. Many of Vidanta’s clients have been victims of timeshare fraud, according to a U.S. official who was not authorized to speak publicly.

Vidanta did not respond to requests for comment.

Pete Willard said he bought his Vidanta timeshare in 2015. Six years later, he received a call from a supposed New York real estate company offering him about a half-million dollars for it. After sending various wire payments to Mexico, he has lost $100,000 with nothing in return, Mr. Willard said.

Once he realized he was never going to see his money again, Mr. Willard contacted the F.B.I.

“They said there wasn’t much they could do as the money was all in Mexico,” he said.

Mr. Willard said he tried to file complaints with the Better Business Bureau and the district attorney in New York against the companies that scammed him. “I never got a response from anyone other than ‘I’m sorry, you should have been more diligent.’”

Image

Vidanta World in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. Many of Vidanta’s clients have been victims of timeshare fraud.Credit...Alejandro Cegarra for The New York Times

Mr. Barnacle admits that U.S. law enforcement agencies are basically powerless to counter these frauds beyond public messaging.

“People exploit your data all the time,” said Mr. Barnacle. The cartel doesn’t “have to invest in a product that they have; they just got to pick up the phone or send an email to people, and, you know, trick them into giving up their money.”

So far, the U.S. Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on 40 Mexican companies and about a dozen people for timeshare fraud, but few arrests have been made. And as soon as a front company or bank account is shut down, new ones are created.

Mexican “banks are to blame,” said Spencer McMullen, an American who practices law in Chapala, Mexico, adding that they often do not check whether the accounts the cartel runs are using valid addresses and are legitimate business. “They could be freezing these accounts for suspicious activity.”

During the two weeks that James, the timeshare owner who lost nearly $900,000, was speaking to The Times, he slowly realized he was never going to see his money again. His wife, Nicki, is livid, having warned him from the very beginning.

“You know, when you work for so many years and save so you can enjoy your senior years, and then have it just ripped away from you,” Nicki said, “it’s just not right.”

They went from starting their retirement very comfortably to now wondering if they need to apply for part-time jobs. Nicki is recovering from cancer, and their expenses are piling up.

“Am I going to have to go work at Walmart now?” Nicki said.

Emiliano Rodríguez Mega contributed reporting from Mexico City.

Maria Abi-Habib is a Times investigative reporter based in Mexico City, covering Latin America. She previously reported from Afghanistan, across the Middle East and in India, where she covered South Asia. More about Maria Abi-Habib

14. The One Idea That Could Save American Democracy

Spoiler alert: The word is "solidarity.

Sounds like a very nice concept. Unfortunately the author's want solidarity with their vision. And that vision is that the government is the solution to problems. They offer nothing to those who believe that the government cannot solve all our problems. It is their way or the highway. So their call for solidarity rings hollow.

If you what solidarity you are going to have to have a concept that can embrace both views of government (which of course is why we have our Constitution so that through checks and balances and separation of powers we can work to find the sweep spot between those who believe in big government and those who think limited government is the answer, e,g,. our Constitution forces compromise which must be the how we build solidarity). But authors like these are only interested in advancing their agenda and not in damovating that it is our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, and the Federalist papers which should provide the foundation for "solidarity."

OPINION

GUEST ESSAY

The One Idea That Could Save American Democracy

March 21, 2024, 

5:03 a.m. ET

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/21/opinion/democracy-solidarity-trump.html

CreditCredit...By Bráulio Amado

• Share full article
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By Astra Taylor and Leah Hunt-Hendrix

Ms. Taylor and Ms. Hunt-Hendrix are political organizers and the authors of the book “Solidarity: The Past, Present, and Future of a World-Changing Idea.”

These days, we often hear that democracy is on the ballot. And there’s a truth to that: Winning elections is critical, especially as liberal and progressive forces try to fend off radical right-wing movements. But the democratic crisis that our society faces will not be solved by voting alone. We need to do more than defeat Donald Trump and his allies — we need to make cultivating solidarity a national priority.

For years, solidarity’s strongest associations have been with the left and the labor movement — a term invoked at protests and on picket lines. But its roots are much deeper, and its potential implications far more profound, than we typically assume. Though we rarely speak about it as such, solidarity is a concept as fundamental to democracy as its better-known cousins: equality, freedom and justice. Solidarity is simultaneously a bond that holds society together and a force that propels it forward. After all, when people feel connected, they are more willing to work together, to share resources and to have one another’s backs. Solidarity weaves us into a larger and more resilient “we” through the precious and powerful sense that even though we are different, our lives and our fates are connected.

We have both spent years working as organizers and activists. If our experience has taught us anything, it is that a sense of connection and mutualism is rarely spontaneous. It must be nurtured and sustained. Without robust and effective organizations and institutions to cultivate and maintain solidarity, it weakens and democracy falters. We become more atomized and isolated, suspicious and susceptible to misinformation, more disengaged and cynical, and easily pitted against one another.

Democracy’s opponents know this. That’s why they invest huge amounts of energy and resources to sabotage transformative, democratic solidarity and to nurture exclusionary and reactionary forms of group identity. Enraged at a decade of social movements and the long-overdue revival of organized labor, right-wing strategists and their corporate backers have redoubled their efforts to divide and conquer the American public, inflaming group resentments in order to restore traditional social hierarchies and ensure that plutocrats maintain their hold on wealth and power. In white papers, stump speeches and podcasts, conservative ideologues have laid out their vision for capturing the state and using it as a tool to remake our country in their image.

If we do not prioritize solidarity, this dangerous and anti-democratic project will succeed. Far more than just a slogan or hashtag, solidarity can orient us toward a future worth fighting for, providing the basis of a credible and galvanizing plan for democratic renewal. Instead of the 20th-century ideal of a welfare state, we should try to imagine a solidarity state.

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We urgently need a countervision of what government can and should be, and how public resources and infrastructure can be deployed to foster social connection and repair the social fabric so that democracy can have a chance not just to limp along, but to flourish. Solidarity, here, is both a goal worth reaching toward and the method of building the power to achieve it. It is both means and ends, the forging of social bonds so that we can become strong enough to shift policy together.

Historically, the question of solidarity has been raised during volatile junctures like the one we are living through. Contemporary conceptions of solidarity first took form after the democratic revolutions of the 18th century and over the course of the Industrial Revolution. As kings were deposed and the church’s role as a moral authority waned, philosophers and citizens wondered how society could cohere without a monarch or god. What could bind people in a secular, pluralistic age?

The 19th-century thinkers who began seriously contemplating and writing about the idea of solidarity often used the image of the human body, where different parts work in tandem. Most famously, the French sociologist Émile Durkheim put solidarity at the center of his inquiry, arguing that as society increased in complexity, social bonds between people would strengthen, each person playing a specialized role while connected to a larger whole. Solidarity and social cohesion, he argued, would be the natural result of increasing social and economic interdependence. But as Durkheim himself would eventually recognize, the industrial economy that he initially imagined would generate solidarity would actually serve to weaken its fragile ties, fostering what he called anomie, the corrosive hopelessness that accompanied growing inequality.

In the United States, solidarity never achieved the same intellectual cachet as in Europe. Since this nation’s founding, the concept has generally been neglected, and the practice actively suppressed and even criminalized. Attempts to forge cross-racial solidarity have met with violent suppression time and again, and labor organizing, effectively outlawed until the New Deal era, still occupies hostile legal ground. Decades of market-friendly policies, promoted by Republicans and Democrats alike, have undermined solidarity in ways both subtle and overt, from encouraging us to see ourselves as individual consumers rather than citizens to fostering individualism and competition over collectivity and cooperation.

As our profit-driven economy has made us more insecure and atomized — and more susceptible to authoritarian appeals — the far right has seized its opportunity. A furious backlash now rises to cut down the shoots of solidarity that sprung up as a result of recent movements pushing for economic, racial, environmental and gender justice. In response, programs that encourage diversity and inclusion are being targeted by billionaire investors, while small acts of solidarity — like helping someone get an abortion or bailing protesters out of jail — have been criminalized.

Awaiting the return of Mr. Trump, the Heritage Foundation has mapped out a plan to remake government and society, using the full power of the state to roll back what it calls “the Great Awokening” and restore a Judeo-Christian, capitalist “culture of life” and “blessedness.” “Woke” has been turned into a pejorative so that the word can be wielded to tarnish and break the solidarity that people have only just begun to experience.

Our vision of a solidarity state offers a pointed rejoinder to this project. Social democrats and socialists have been right to emphasize the need for redistribution and robust public investment in goods and services. We must restructure our economy so that it works for the many and not the few. But unlike conservatives — think, for example, of Margaret Thatcher, the prime minister of Britain who in 1981 said, “Economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul” — liberals and leftists have tended to downplay the role of policy in shaping public sensibilities. This is a mistake.

Laws and social programs not only shape material outcomes; they also shape us, informing public perceptions and preferences, and generating what scholars call policy feedback loops. There is no neutral state to aspire to. Policies can either foster solidarity and help repair the divides that separate us or deepen the fissures.

Today, the American welfare state too often does the latter. As sociologists including Suzanne Mettler and Matthew Desmond have detailed, lower-income people tend to be stigmatized for needing assistance, while more-affluent citizens reap a range of benefits that are comparatively invisible, mainly through tax credits and tax breaks. Both arrangements — the highly visible and stigmatized aid to the poor and the more invisible and socially acceptable aid to the affluent — serve to foster resentment and obscure how we are all dependent on the state in various ways.

Instead of treating citizens as passive and isolated recipients of services delivered from on high, a solidarity state would experiment with creative ways of fostering connection and participation at every opportunity for more Americans. What if we had basic guarantees that were universal rather than means-tested programs that distinguish the deserving and undeserving, stigmatizing some and setting groups apart? What if, following the model of a widely admired program in Canada, the government aided groups of private citizens who want to sponsor and subsidize migrants and refugees? What if public schools, post offices, transit systems, parks, public utilities and jobs programs were explicitly designed to facilitate social connection and solidarity in addition to providing essential support and services?

We’ll get there only if we take up the challenge of building solidarity from wherever we happen to sit. Both means and end, solidarity can be a source of power, built through the day-to-day work of organizing, and our shared purpose. Solidarity is the essential and too often missing ingredient of today’s most important political project: not just saving democracy but creating an egalitarian, multiracial society that can guarantee each of us a dignified life.

More from Astra Taylor

Opinion | Astra Taylor

Why Does Everyone Feel So Insecure All the Time?

Aug. 18, 2023

Opinion | Astra Taylor

Debtors, Unite! You Have Nothing to Lose but Your Shame.

Sept. 6, 2022

Opinion

Out With the Old, In With the Young

Astra Taylor and Leah Hunt-Hendrix are political organizers and the authors of the book “Solidarity: The Past, Present, and Future of a World-Changing Idea.”

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15. Senior leaders worry DOD pay models don’t reflect demands on troops

I served with a Sergeant Major who argued that we should receive no special pays. Rather our base pay should be increased to include these special pays. His argument was that none of those special pays are included in retirement pay, only the base pay is used to compute retirement pay. Therefore if we really want to compensate military personnel based on their hazardous duty and the special pays to incentivize their service in certain MOSs,  the special pays should be added to the base pay and therefore servicemembers would have different pays scales depending on their MOS. Obviously this raises the personnel funding account significantly which is why we would never do it (it would be a gift that would keep on giving though the retirement lifecycle.) 

Senior leaders worry DOD pay models don’t reflect demands on troops

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · March 20, 2024

Lawmakers and senior enlisted leaders cast doubt over whether current military models for troops’ pay really reflect the roles and responsibilities of their jobs, and said more overhauls may be needed to make sure service member compensation is fair.

“We should be looking for a comparison model that isn’t about someone’s age and education. It should be more about the level of responsibility, and the expectations of the work in the service,” Master Chief Petty Officer James Honea told members of the House Appropriations Committee on Wednesday.

“If a 19-year-old is working at Starbucks, that’s not the same thing as being in the military. We’re asking our 19-year-olds to serve in harm’s way.”

Honea’s comments during a committee hearing on military quality of life issues come as Defense Department leaders are conducting a comprehensive review of military pay and benefits issues, with an eye towards potential major changes in the future.

RELATED

Senators eye pay boost for junior troops, more funds for housing fixes

Both House and Senate lawmakers want to pass targeted pay raises for junior enlisted troops, but budget caps may complicate those plans.

Members of the appropriations committee have already proposed targeted pay raises for junior enlisted troops in coming years as a way to combat low basic pay and food insecurity for some of the youngest military members and families.

Under current military pay tables, the newest enlisted troops can earn as little as $23,000 in annual base pay, not including housing allowances and free medical coverage. House plans could raise all service member base pay to $31,000 annually, and are expected to be included in lawmakers’ annual defense authorization bill proposals later this spring.

Senate lawmakers have voiced support for the idea, but the White House has opposed any dramatic pay table overhauls until after the Defense Department completes its quadrennial military compensation review sometime next year.

Senior enlisted officials from each of the services told lawmakers that pay issues remain key for recruiting and retention efforts.

But Honea said he is not sure if historic models for salary comparisons fully reflect the demands of military service. He suggested that future models focus more on jobs like first responders, who can receive higher pay for more dangerous work.

Rep. John Rutherford, R-Fla., expressed similar concerns and backed Honea’s remarks.

“As a former Navy dependent and enlisted man, I can tell you I’ve heard all these discussions at the kitchen table,” he said. “So, I’m glad to hear that you are concerned about what to do with this.”

Whether those concerns will translate into concrete changes for troops remains unclear. Rep. Don Bacon, R-Neb., and head of a special congressional panel on military quality of life issues, said that defense budget limits adopted by Congress last summer could limit planned reforms for military pay.

The White House has proposed a 4.5% pay raise for all troops in 2025 as part of their federal budget request for next year.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

16. BE ALL WE CAN BE: RECLAIMING THE ARMY IDENTITY

Excerpts:

In order to captivate these types of candidates, the Army must also reflect strong values in its media presence. While social media is an effective tool to reach a large audience, Army media managers should safeguard our identity as a professional, standards-driven organization to attract high quality, intrinsically motivated candidates. Satirical or comedic social media content that appeals to the majority of GenZ might in fact drive off the exact type of recruit we need and redirect them toward a branch that still produces traditional advertisements, like “the Few, the Proud, the Marines.”

The Army should instead release a rolling series of ads featuring its most unique aspects, including time-honored units, training opportunities, and multinational exercises. The series would not only highlight the wide array of opportunities that the Army has to offer, but provide potential enlistees with goals and a sense of mythos for storied units. Lastly, the vignettes would instill a sense of pride and increase morale for the soldiers currently serving in the featured organizations or roles. This series would serve as an evolution of the successful “Warriors Wanted” campaign launched in 2019 after the Army fell short of its recruiting goal in 2018. The “Warriors Wanted” effort enabled recovery from a failed string of advertisements that senior leaders felt portrayed too many “guys in lab coats.” Refocusing on more traditional messaging drastically shifted the tone toward showcasing the most compelling and unique aspects of Army life, and resulted in an achieved recruiting goal the same year. 

In the same way, the Army should change the way it presents its economic benefits: Instead of emphasizing immediate payouts or overlaying the text “50K” on a photo of an Abrams tank, the Army should show how serving our country can increase recruits’ social mobility, open the door to better opportunities, and give a better life to their families. Many large employers such as Buc-ee’s offer strikingly similar benefits packages and bonuses as the Army, without the immense personal sacrifices required of military service members. But few private-sector jobs offer the Army’s opportunity to simultaneously support a family while serving your fellow citizens, performing meaningful work, and developing into a respected leader. These intangible, principle-based benefits are far more compelling than monetary prizes and will recruit the type of Soldier that we would be proud to serve alongside.

Tactical and technological advancements render the future of warfare deadlier and more catastrophic than recent historical conflicts. Modernization will not make the next war quick and short, nor will it replace the need for soldiers on the ground. In order to maintain our global image, build institutional trust, and provide a combat capable force, the Army must broadcast standards of excellence, strong values, and patriotic unity. A re-commitment to these traditional Army values will attract soldiers of all backgrounds and demographics unified by a common goal: the desire to be extraordinary for their nation.

BE ALL WE CAN BE: RECLAIMING THE ARMY IDENTITY

 LEAH FOODMAN  MARCH 21, 2024 6 MIN READ

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/all-we-can-be/

In order to solve its recruiting crisis—and safeguard national security—the Army must reclaim its identity in the eyes of the American public

Americans are still joining the military, just not the Army. Although obesity and substance abuse rates disqualify 77% of young Americans from service (a six-percentage point increase since 2017), the other services are still meeting their recruitment goals. In Fiscal Year 2022, the Marine Corps, Air Force, Space Force, and Navy each met 100% of their active-duty recruiting goal. Meanwhile, the Army fell short by a staggering 25% in both 2022 and 2023. The Army’s failure is therefore not an issue of ineligibility, but of identity: By advertising soldiering as a nine-to-five job with benefits, the Army has distanced itself from traditional calls to service, adventure, and growth.

  In order to solve its recruiting crisis—and safeguard national security—the Army must reclaim its identity in the eyes of the American public by (1) maintaining a high standard of excellence in recruiting and operations to attract qualified candidates, and (2) gearing advertisements toward those intrinsically inspired by service, camaraderie, and challenge. The Army must not lose sight of its mission: to fight and win our nation’s wars. Rather than brand the Army as a common path for anyone to follow, we must market— and embody—the uncommon path for those striving to be extraordinary.

High Standards Proliferate, Even Among GenZ

Conventional wisdom might suggest that the Army should “get with the times,” but rather than sway with the cultural winds, the Army must remain vigilant in protecting and projecting the traditional image of the American soldier. The Army must breed disciplined, capable, and intelligent servant leaders. Calls to lower standards to appeal to GenZ might bring in more recruits in the short term, but would also signal desperation, degrade the overall quality of the force, and turn motivated citizens towards other branches. The Army must safeguard against and deter preventable, premature separations from the service by maintaining and upholding fitness standards among new recruits. Basic trainees who are incapable of completing their training place undue strain on units, occupy resources unnecessarily, and render enlistment bonuses wasteful.

               Older generations and social media often characterize GenZ as individualistic, self-absorbed, emotionally fragile, and hesitant to assume adult responsibilities—traits counterproductive to the military profession. However, members of GenZ are still joining and succeeding in the Army, albeit in smaller numbers. Rather than granting waivers and adjusting prerequisites for enlistment, the Army should focus on attracting the 23% of GenZ who are eligible to serve by emphasizing their qualities and motivations in the recruiting process. What separates those from GenZ who volunteer and those who don’t? What can the Army do to better resonate with those who are fit to serve but choose not to? 

To best assess these qualities and tailor recruiting efforts, the Army Enterprise Marketing Office (AEMO) should conduct research that follows recruits from initial enlistment to their first assignment. This effort should strive to understand personal attributes in the context of enlistment decision-making and performance evaluations. Are high-performing soldiers motivated by similar goals? Do they possess similar qualities? These data points would allow the Army to identify the subset of GenZ joining the Army, and further discern the smaller subset of those succeeding. This information would provide valuable insight for recruiters striving to target the top-notch prospects.

The Army must also bear in mind that the best recruiter is the American soldier. Disciplined, professional soldiers serve as excellent examples and spokespeople for the Army without even trying. High-caliber soldiers surrounded by equally capable peers will be fulfilled, and more likely to convince other strong candidates to join. Likewise, less-than-impressive soldiers are not likely to inspire high-achieving young Americans to join the Army. Quality must not be compromised in favor of quantity, and quality breeds quantity in the long run. These principles must be reinforced in advertising campaigns. 

While social media is an effective tool to reach a large audience, Army media managers should safeguard our identity as a professional, standards-driven organization to attract high quality, intrinsically motivated candidates.

Mission-Focused, Values-Driven Advertising

The Army must attract individuals who are passionate about the mission and inclined to use their skillset to contribute to it. A recent Army advertisement included testimony from soldiers in various career fields, including aviators, canine handlers, and unmanned aerial systems operators, but failed to explicitly show how these personnel enable warfighting. Meanwhile, a recent Marine Corps ad featured a compelling call to service and many of the same career specialties in action, highlighting values like service and patriotism and demonstrating a story of national defense. For example, rather than film a soldier standing next to a military working dog, the Army should depict a story of the handler and canine identifying a roadside bomb, alerting the team, and saving countless lives. This type of teamwork in the context of a critical, life-or-death mission is central to the military profession, and conveys a far more compelling narrative to attract strong prospective Army recruits.

In order to captivate these types of candidates, the Army must also reflect strong values in its media presence. While social media is an effective tool to reach a large audience, Army media managers should safeguard our identity as a professional, standards-driven organization to attract high quality, intrinsically motivated candidates. Satirical or comedic social media content that appeals to the majority of GenZ might in fact drive off the exact type of recruit we need and redirect them toward a branch that still produces traditional advertisements, like “the Few, the Proud, the Marines.”

The Army should instead release a rolling series of ads featuring its most unique aspects, including time-honored units, training opportunities, and multinational exercises. The series would not only highlight the wide array of opportunities that the Army has to offer, but provide potential enlistees with goals and a sense of mythos for storied units. Lastly, the vignettes would instill a sense of pride and increase morale for the soldiers currently serving in the featured organizations or roles. This series would serve as an evolution of the successful “Warriors Wanted” campaign launched in 2019 after the Army fell short of its recruiting goal in 2018. The “Warriors Wanted” effort enabled recovery from a failed string of advertisements that senior leaders felt portrayed too many “guys in lab coats.” Refocusing on more traditional messaging drastically shifted the tone toward showcasing the most compelling and unique aspects of Army life, and resulted in an achieved recruiting goal the same year. 

In the same way, the Army should change the way it presents its economic benefits: Instead of emphasizing immediate payouts or overlaying the text “50K” on a photo of an Abrams tank, the Army should show how serving our country can increase recruits’ social mobility, open the door to better opportunities, and give a better life to their families. Many large employers such as Buc-ee’s offer strikingly similar benefits packages and bonuses as the Army, without the immense personal sacrifices required of military service members. But few private-sector jobs offer the Army’s opportunity to simultaneously support a family while serving your fellow citizens, performing meaningful work, and developing into a respected leader. These intangible, principle-based benefits are far more compelling than monetary prizes and will recruit the type of Soldier that we would be proud to serve alongside.

Tactical and technological advancements render the future of warfare deadlier and more catastrophic than recent historical conflicts. Modernization will not make the next war quick and short, nor will it replace the need for soldiers on the ground. In order to maintain our global image, build institutional trust, and provide a combat capable force, the Army must broadcast standards of excellence, strong values, and patriotic unity. A re-commitment to these traditional Army values will attract soldiers of all backgrounds and demographics unified by a common goal: the desire to be extraordinary for their nation.

Leah Foodman is an active-duty Armor officer and a United States Military Academy graduate. Her work has previously been published in the Journal of Strategic Security and Modern War Institute.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Armor School, the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: Basic Combat Training, also known as “boot camp,” is the process in transforming civilian volunteers into Soldiers. Over 10 weeks, trainees will go through four phases that cover Army core values, physical training, first aid, hand grenades, obstacle course, basic rifle marksmanship, navigation, and three separate field exercises. Basic training produces Soldiers that are disciplined, resilient, physically fit and competent in their basic skills who can successfully contribute as members of a team when they arrive at their first unit of assignment.

Photo Credit: U.S. Army photo by Robin Hicks

17. ‘Ghost Army’ that fooled Hitler will receive Congress’s highest honor

"All warfare is based on deception." About time these soldiers are recognized and are no longer "ghosted" by Congress and America!

‘Ghost Army’ that fooled Hitler will receive Congress’s highest honor

The Washington Post · by Christopher Klein · March 18, 2024

Weeks after the Allies stormed the beaches of Normandy, the young men of the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops encountered D-Day’s lingering carnage as they waded ashore. Bloated bodies churned in the surf. Tree branches cradled the carcass of a cow blown skyward by explosives.

Fear and adrenaline coursed through the GIs, along with hope that they wouldn’t have to fire their rifles. Their mission, after all, wasn’t to kill Nazis but to perform for them.

Armed with sound effects, costumes, scripts and props, the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops and its sister unit, the 3133rd Signal Company Special, brandished Hollywood-worthy stagecraft in European theaters of war to dupe the German army about the location and size of Allied forces. The 1,100 sound engineers, radio broadcasters, fashion designers, ad men, artists, actors and theater set designers unofficially known as the “Ghost Army” masqueraded as a combat force more than 30 times its actual size.

Operating as close as a quarter mile from the front lines, the Ghost Army is credited with saving the lives of tens of thousands of American soldiers by luring away the enemy during more than 20 full-scale deception campaigns.

Subterfuge has been an integral part of warfare from the time the Greeks wheeled a wooden horse to the gates of Troy. Even during World War II, Operation Fortitude’s elaborate ruse convinced German forces that the D-Day invasion would strike Calais, not Normandy.

Yet the Ghost Army — nicknamed the “Cecil B. DeMille Warriors” by one member — is unique in the annals of warfare, according to Rick Beyer, co-author of “The Ghost Army of World War II” and producer and director of a 2013 documentary on the force.

“It’s the first mobile, multimedia, tactical deception unit in the history of warfare,” he said. “They are capable of projecting their deception — visual, sound, radio, special effects — through all these different means, and they are essentially another arrow in the quiver of a battlefield commander to maneuver the enemy.”

Although a U.S. Army report credited the Ghost Army with saving the lives of between 15,000 and 30,000 servicemen, its story remained untold for decades as information about the force stayed classified until 1996. On Wednesday, the top-secret unit will finally get its just due when it receives one of the country’s highest awards, the Congressional Gold Medal.

Recruited from advertising agencies, communications companies and art schools — through vaguely worded notices seeking creative candidates for noncombat camouflage battalions — the Ghost Army hoodwinked the Germans about the location of Gen. George S. Patton Jr.’s Third Army as it swept eastward across France during the summer of 1944. The Americans fooled Nazis’ eyes by deploying fleets of inflatable rubber tanks, trucks and airplanes and tricked their ears by broadcasting phony radio chatter and playing prerecorded soundtracks of troop exercises from 500-pound loudspeakers.

Despite initial successes, Lt. Fred Fox believed the Ghost Army needed even more theatrics. “There is too much MILITARY and not enough SHOWMANSHIP,” he wrote in a memo to the unit’s leaders. “We must remember that we are playing to a very critical and attentive radio, ground and aerial audience. They must all be convinced.

At Fox’s behest, the Ghost Army added a fourth dimension — physical deceptions referred to as “special effects” — to its visual, sonic and radio initiatives. Operations grew more sophisticated as actors donned uniforms with insignia of other units to impersonate officers and recited choreographed scripts in phony command posts. When Patton found his line dangerously thin along the Moselle River in September 1944, the Ghost Army rushed from Paris and kept the Germans at bay for a week by posing as the 6th Armored Division.

In its final blockbuster performance, the Ghost Army mimicked two 9th Army divisions — a 40,000-man force — set to make the difficult crossing of the Rhine River in March 1945. Moving like phantoms under the cloak of darkness, the tricksters set up operations 10 miles south of the intended attack location. They inflated 200 decoy trucks and tanks. They blared sounds of rumbling vehicles, hammering and even soldiers swearing. They radioed false orders to simulate movement to the front and posed as loose-lipped colonels and generals while planting disinformation for German spies to overhear in local bars and cafes.

“I guess we were successful because the Germans fired upon us,” 100-year-old Ghost Army veteran Bernie Bluestein of Hoffman Estates, Ill., who specialized in fake signs and vehicle stencils, recalled in an interview. “We convinced them that we were the real thing.” As the Germans moved their defenses and shelled the faux force, the 9th Army encountered token resistance as it forded the Rhine with minimal casualties.

After the curtain fell on World War II, the military’s greatest showmen, which included artist Ellsworth Kelly and fashion designer Bill Blass, returned home to resume their creative lives. For decades, though, they were sworn to secrecy about their exploits in case the Cold War required similar subterfuge. “Some of these guys went to their graves without telling anybody in their families what this unit was involved in,” Beyer said.

“I didn’t even tell my wife until the 1990s, when the secrecy came off,” said 100-year-old veteran Seymour Nussenbaum of Monroe Township, N.J., who was part of a team that crafted fake patches. “I couldn’t potentially risk the lives of any soldiers who might be involved because of what I said.” The Pratt Institute graduate and retired package designer joked that because of his decoy-inflating experience, whenever family members asked him what he did in the war, he could answer truthfully: “I blew up tanks!”

While Beyer’s book and documentary raised awareness of the Ghost Army, he believed the unlikely World War II heroes deserved even greater attention and honor. “I’ve been surprised at how this story has escaped the history books and Hollywood,” he said. “I had been blown away by their deceptions, blown away by the fact that they came back and kept quiet about it for 50 years, and I thought they needed some official recognition.”

Following a grass-roots lobbying effort launched by Beyer and other Ghost Army Legacy Project volunteers in 2015, President Biden signed a bill in 2022 authorizing the awarding of the Congressional Gold Medal — Congress’s highest honor — to the master illusionists. Of the unit’s seven known surviving members, Bluestein, Nussenbaum and 99-year-old John Christman of Leesburg, N.J., plan to attend Wednesday’s medal ceremony at the U.S. Capitol.

“I’m certainly happy that it’s happening and they’re giving us a little recognition,” said Bluestein, who joined the Ghost Army while a scholarship student at the Cleveland Institute of Art and had a long, successful industrial design career after the war. “But I’m very disappointed that it couldn’t have been a lot earlier when many of these soldiers were still living so they could have accepted and had some recognition the same as I am.”

“Probably thousands of people weren’t killed because of the Ghost Army,” Beyer said. “Life would have been different for a lot of people if this unit hadn’t been there. Now they’re getting their due, and I think that’s pretty incredible.”

The Washington Post · by Christopher Klein · March 18, 2024

18. Risch on SFRC Passage of Unqualified State Department Nominees

I do not recall ever seeing a piece like this that outlines why a nominee was not supported and the specific objections. I have probably missed this since I do not follow congress that closely but this is an interesting way to publicly express disagreement and objectives on nominees.

Risch on SFRC Passage of Unqualified State Department Nominees | United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

foreign.senate.gov

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Jim Risch (R-Idaho), ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, today released the following statements following the committee’s passage of four unqualified State Department nominees:

“I am disappointed the chairman decided to move four nominees today that have significant vetting concerns. For months I have made my objections to these nominees known, as well as my desire for the president to nominate other, well-vetted nominees. That did not happen, so I will continue to object to these nominees moving forward.”

On the nomination of Robert Forden to be ambassador to Cambodia:

“On Mr. Forden, this is a clear case of negligence – he did not uphold the most basic and important responsibilities of a senior leader in the Department. He was entrusted with defending the rights of U.S. diplomats in China, but he failed.

“The initial waiver of inviolability the Department agreed to in September 2020 was extremely limited, allowing only: 1) testing before arrival in China; 2) testing upon arrival and at day 13 in China; and 3) quarantine for up to 14 days. Mr. Forden says Washington made all the decisions, yet was the one who asked State to sign off on this waiver.

“China started to violate this waiver immediately, and Mr. Forden did not stop it. China subjected our diplomats to fever hospitals and hotel quarantines with abhorrent conditions, separated children from their families, performed blood tests and other invasive medical testing on U.S. diplomats, denied non-COVID medical care, and conducted round-the-clock surveillance. We know this because multiple whistleblowers provided evidence that directly refutes key parts of Mr. Forden’s testimony. Whistleblowers attended our hearing and we could have heard from them, but the chairman denied the committee this opportunity.

“Instead of drawing lines to stop Chinese overreach, Mr. Forden fostered a culture of compliance with China’s violations. U.S. diplomats did not know their privileges and immunities had been waived or violated. Embassy guidance was to comply and they felt they had no choice.

“This is part of a broader pattern: the U.S. government is tolerating increased mistreatment and harassment of U.S. diplomats by the Chinese government and security apparatus. That is unacceptable.

“The majority said it was unaware of these allegations until the hearing. However, whistleblowers approached both sides of the committee in January 2022. The majority has had this information for years – they chose not to investigate it.”

On the nomination of Margaret Taylor to be legal advisor at the State Department:

“While I have concerns about Ms. Taylor’s performance as general counsel at USAID, including how on her watch, some USAID contractors and partners repeatedly promoted abortion overseas in violation of U.S. law, my objection to her nomination is simple – this is about State’s refusal to share information about Mr. Malley’s suspended security clearance.

“For eight months, I asked for information on the suspension. What are the underlying allegations? Are the allegations related to his work on Iran? Was any information he provided to this committee compromised? During the hearing, we were told State doesn’t have this information. However, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Mr. Smith briefed me and the chairman that he indeed does have it, he is just not allowed to share it.

“Instead, State has failed to provide any legal basis for withholding this information. It hides behind the Privacy Act, despite a clear exception for requests from congressional committees – an exception the nominee herself has acknowledged.”

On the nomination of Dr. Michael Sfraga to be ambassador at large for Arctic affairs:

“The position of ambassador at large for Arctic affairs must be focused on national security challenges, economic opportunities, and the implications of U.S. foreign policy in the Arctic. Due to its importance, this position is a target for malign influence, especially from Russia and China. Our Arctic Ambassador must be able to counter foreign malign influence – not facilitate it.

“Dr. Sfraga has traveled extensively to Russia and China, negotiated agreements with Chinese institutions tied to the Chinese defense and intelligence services, spoke at a Russian government-sponsored conference headlined by Vladimir Putin, and, just a couple months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, spoke on a panel sponsored by a sanctioned state-owned Russian energy company. He failed to disclose any of this, and had to update his file three times after being confronted with this information.

“He has consistently advocated for a ‘competition-free’ Arctic despite Russia and China’s ongoing efforts to undermine U.S. and allied interests in the region. All of this shows a concerning lack of judgment, which could make Dr. Sfraga a liability our adversaries could exploit if confirmed. The Senate should not confirm – and the administration never should have nominated – such a poorly vetted candidate for such an important role.”

On the nomination of Erik Woodhouse to be head of the Office of Sanctions Coordination at the State Department:

“The head of the Office of Sanctions Coordination is a role I care deeply about. I wrote the legislation to create it, and I want it to succeed. This job requires someone who will voice opposition when the law and the political will of an administration don’t align.

“Unfortunately, Mr. Woodhouse has not robustly defended the law in key sanctions issues. He played a pivotal role in the administration’s protection of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from mandatory, bipartisan sanctions before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. While he was not the only administration official responsible for this blatant violation of the law, in conversations he has had with my team, it is clear he intentionally misled the committee and ignored facts that contradicted Biden policy. Based on my experience with him, I lack confidence in Mr. Woodhouse.”

###

foreign.senate.gov

19. Russian Electronic Warfare: From History to Modern Battlefield

Excerpt:

Conclusion

Russia’s military places a higher priority on EW, employing these capabilities across all levels of war. Moscow’s military deployments to Syria and Ukraine illustrate that EW is intrinsic to Russian force disposition. Worryingly, Russia’s use of EW, particularly counter-GPS systems, extends beyond the battlefield, adversely affecting non-combatants in places like the Black Sea region. Three aspects warrant more attention from US and allied defense analysts: 1) the ubiquity of Russian EW across all levels of war 2) the superior integration of Russian EW within maneuver units compared to NATO counterparts; and 3) the extensive and effective application of EW by Russia in conflict zones like Syria and Ukraine. These three factors are closely linked to irregular warfare within the broader context of Russo-American strategic rivalry in Europe and elsewhere. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine underscores the extent to which Russian EW capabilities can challenge existing expectations of electromagnetic spectrum dominance. Physics is at the heart of EW, and as Isaac Newton’s third law of motion states, every action has an equal and opposite reaction.

Russian Electronic Warfare: From History to Modern Battlefield - Irregular Warfare Initiative

March 21, 2024 by Olga R. Chiriac, Thomas Withington

irregularwarfare.org · by Olga R. Chiriac, Thomas Withington · March 21, 2024

Every April 15, the Russian Federation celebrates Electronic Warfare Specialist Day, marking the first combat use of electronic warfare. On this day in 1904, during the Japanese shelling of the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, the battleship Pobeda and a coastal radio post jammed Japanese radio communications, preventing over 60 cannon shells from hitting their targets. This operation, which severely disrupted the Imperial Japanese Navy’s command and control, is considered the birth of what we now know as Electronic Warfare (EW). Today, Russia continues to prioritize EW, employing it to notable effect in Syria, Ukraine, and now the Black Sea. This article seeks to understand EW and its relationship to irregular warfare, focusing on Russian practices and capabilities.

What is electronic warfare?

EW involves using radio and electromagnetic signals to protect or disrupt communications and equipment. It has three distinct branches: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic support (ES). EA targets enemy radars, communications radios, and navigation systems using radio waves for jamming purposes, aiming to degrade or neutralize their effectiveness. In contrast, EP is dedicated to shielding against such jamming attempts, ensuring communications and systems remain functional despite enemy interference. Lastly, ES deals with detecting and locating electromagnetic emissions, often leading to confusion with Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), as both involve activities relating to intercepting electromagnetic usage by adversaries.

The distinction between ES and SIGINT within US doctrine is significant, hinging on the purpose, scope, and entity controlling the operation. In the US, ES primarily serves the tactical needs of operational commanders, while SIGINT operates as an intelligence-gathering function, subject to distinct authorities and policies. SIGINT is further categorized into Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), and Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT), each focusing on different aspects of intelligence collection. COMINT zeroes in on intercepting and analyzing enemy radio communications to pinpoint the location and intentions of adversaries. ELINT focuses on collecting data from enemy radar systems and other non-communicative electronic signals to identify threats and support mission planning. FISINT gathers information from foreign electronic equipment, such as missiles or satellites, to learn about their capabilities and operational patterns.

How does Russia use EW?

Russian sources define electronic warfare (EW) as a form of armed struggle in which radio emissions (radio interference) affect the electronic means of enemy control, communication and intelligence systems to change the quality of military information circulating in them, protect their systems from similar influences, and change the conditions (properties of the environment) of radio wave propagation. In Russian sources, EW is referred to as Radio-Electronic Warfare (радиоэлектронная борьба).

In contrast to the approach taken by NATO countries, where EW has arguably been kept somewhat separate from other military operations, Russia integrates EW closely with all branches of its military. EW capabilities are embedded across Russia’s land, sea, and air forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Militaries use radio waves on the battlefield for communications, radar and navigation. Ships, vehicles, aircraft, weapons, sensors, bases, and personnel depend on these capabilities to communicate, navigate, and for situational awareness.

This integration is likely due to the less restrictive classification of EW operations within Russian forces compared to the highly sensitive nature of EW activities in NATO militaries. It is also likely due to the Russian approach to modern warfare:a continuum versus a clearly delineated conventional versus unconventional battlefield. Russian doctrine treats EW as an integral part of operational art, essential for disrupting, degrading, and ultimately destroying enemy command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. This more comprehensive view positions EW as a cornerstone of Russia’s broader information warfare doctrine.

Russian EW capabilities

Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities encompass diverse systems that neutralize threats across different domains. The Krasukha Electronic Warfare Complex, including the “Krasukha-S4” and “Krasukha-2,” targets low-Earth orbit spy satellites, airborne radars, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and enemy radar stations with the intent to disrupt navigation and communications. The “Moscow-1” complex excels in passive electronic reconnaissance and coordination of EW systems over a vast area. The “Murmansk-BN” specializes in jamming short-wave radio communications, boasting a remarkable operational range that could disable NATO aerospace and radar complexes. The “Saphir” complex represents the latest advancement in EW, designed to counter unmanned vehicles through automatic classification and suppression, while the Orlan-10 UAV performs dual roles in reconnaissance and EW. Russia’s anti-drone technologies, including electromagnetic guns like the Harpoon-3 and Silok systems, focus on severing control links to protect against UAV attacks. Underpinning these technological advancements is the Military Research Institute of Electronic Warfare (MIEW), which spearheads training, research, and development in EW disciplines, showcasing Russia’s commitment to maintaining a leading edge in electronic warfare capabilities.

Russian EW in Syria and the Black Sea

Russian EW capabilities have been on full display in Syria and the Black Sea region. Speaking at the 2018 GEOINT Symposium, General Raymond A. Thomas III, the then-commander of US Special Operations Command, characterized Russia’s actions in Syria as “the most aggressive electronic warfare on the planet.” He highlighted Syria, much like Ukraine today, as a proving ground: “They are testing us every day, knocking our communications down, disabling our EC-130s, etc.” Despite the Russian military’s aggressive EW posture in Syria, Western and allied responses have been relatively slow in recognizing and countering the threat.

In the Black Sea, EW has been used to jam precision-guided munitions that depend on satellite navigation signals. Leaked documents from the US Department of Defense in 2022 revealed that some American-supplied weapons, which rely on these satellite signals for accuracy, are susceptible to Russian jamming efforts. This includes weapons like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), both of which use satellite navigation to enhance their targeting precision. Russian EW efforts have been successful in degrading the performance of the satellite receivers in these weapons, degrading their accuracy. Worryingly, the power of Russian counter-satellite systems has been enough to degrade the encrypted ‘M-Code signals’ from the US GPS constellation, overwhelming these signals with more powerful jamming emissions. Russian media has exploited these vulnerabilities in information campaigns to undermine confidence in the success of Ukrainian forces and the reliability of US and allied weaponry.

Russian military analysts tend to regard the operations in Ukraine as a testing ground, particularly highlighting the use of electronic warfare (EW) against Turkish Bayraktar drones, a topic that has been extensively written about. During the early months of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Bayraktar TB2 drones were considered a potent weapon for Ukraine. This is no longer the case. According to prominent Russian military supplier ROSTEC quoted in Gazeta: “A variety of electronic warfare systems are now successfully being tested in combat: they jam the enemy’s communication channels, guidance systems, leaving them without eyes and ears.” According to the same source, EW is employed as an effective means to deal with drones; it suppresses control and data transmission channels between the operator and the drone, as well as satellite navigation.

Russian GPS jamming also impacts commercial activities. A snapshot taken on January 27, 2024, illustrates the widespread GPS interference observed in the Black Sea. As depicted above, it primarily aims to shield Russian vessels from precision-guided munitions. However, a secondary consequence of this jamming may disrupt civilian maritime navigation for Ukrainian and other international ships. This situation underscores the complexities of EW within Information Warfare: Russian ships might suffer from jamming similar to Ukrainian and international vessels. Yet, it is important to note that GPS and GLONASS (the Russian satellite navigation system) operate on distinct frequency bands, suggesting Russian vessels could potentially navigate with less disruption.

Conclusion

Russia’s military places a higher priority on EW, employing these capabilities across all levels of war. Moscow’s military deployments to Syria and Ukraine illustrate that EW is intrinsic to Russian force disposition. Worryingly, Russia’s use of EW, particularly counter-GPS systems, extends beyond the battlefield, adversely affecting non-combatants in places like the Black Sea region. Three aspects warrant more attention from US and allied defense analysts: 1) the ubiquity of Russian EW across all levels of war 2) the superior integration of Russian EW within maneuver units compared to NATO counterparts; and 3) the extensive and effective application of EW by Russia in conflict zones like Syria and Ukraine. These three factors are closely linked to irregular warfare within the broader context of Russo-American strategic rivalry in Europe and elsewhere. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine underscores the extent to which Russian EW capabilities can challenge existing expectations of electromagnetic spectrum dominance. Physics is at the heart of EW, and as Isaac Newton’s third law of motion states, every action has an equal and opposite reaction.

Dr. Olga R. Chiriac is the Project Europe Director at the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work of the University of Bucharest, and a Fellow at the Research Institute of the University of Bucharest, where she co-directs the Black Sea Program. She is a 2022 US State Department Title VIII Black Sea Fellow. Her book “Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: Implications for Black Sea Security” was published by Palgrave Macmillan in February 2024.

Dr. Thomas Withington is an analyst and writer specializing in electronic warfare, radar, and military communications. He has written widely on these subjects for a range of specialist and general publications. He also works as a consultant and adviser in these areas for several leading government and private-sector clients. Furthermore, Dr. Withington provides regular commentary on security and defense aspects of electromagnetic spectrum use for major media organizations around the world.

Main Photo: U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to “Wild Bill” Platoon, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment and 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment conduct electronic warfare training during Combined Resolve XV, Feb. 23, 2021 at the Hohenfels Training Area. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Julian Padua)

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

20. Special operations face growing demand amid potential cuts, top commander says

Excerpts:

“The challenge is that that's against the backdrop of ever-increasing demands from our combatant commands—a 150% increase or more in our crisis response missions over the last three years—and this ever changing, more challenging character and environment of war,” Fenton said.

Now, the special operations community must analyze how to do more with less, a process that will take years, Fenton said. "Against the backdrop of what I'm seeing, I certainly wouldn't support thinking that way as we go forward the next couple of years,” he said of the proposed cuts.

Special operations face growing demand amid potential cuts, top commander says

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

U.S. Special Operations Commander Gen. Bryan Fenton testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 7, 2023. Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images

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Faced with a more active China, “I certainly wouldn't support” reducing the size of the force, said special operations leader.

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

March 20, 2024 07:31 PM ET

• Special Operations
• Army
• Personnel

Even as the U.S. Army makes plans to cut up to 3,000 special operations soldiers, the demand for such forces is growing around the world, the head of U.S. Special Operations Command told lawmakers Wednesday.

Consistently poor recruitment numbers and other factors have forced the Army to consider a variety of cuts, including special operations forces, Gen. Bryan Fenton, the commander of SOCOM, told the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations. But the timing couldn’t be worse, he said. The Army makes up the largest portion of SOCOM by service.

“The challenge is that that's against the backdrop of ever-increasing demands from our combatant commands—a 150% increase or more in our crisis response missions over the last three years—and this ever changing, more challenging character and environment of war,” Fenton said.

Now, the special operations community must analyze how to do more with less, a process that will take years, Fenton said. "Against the backdrop of what I'm seeing, I certainly wouldn't support thinking that way as we go forward the next couple of years,” he said of the proposed cuts.

Special operations forces are no longer called on to perform as many close-range tactical missions as they were during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But they remain very engaged in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, as well as in Africa and South America—where Russia, Iran and China are seeking greater influence.

Fenton described Chinese activities in these regions as “diplomatic coercion and predatory behavior,” and said China also uses private security “that we're really calling parasitic sham corporations, because we know what they mean: They mean nothing good for SOUTHCOM or CENTCOM, or AFRICOM.”

Evidence of the global nature of that competition for influence was demonstrated again this week, when Niger cut ties with the U.S. military. That followed a July coup, which saw Russian military actors in the country near key dates.

“In general, any time we detach from or lose a partner in that region, it's a challenge…It gives us less insights, indications, and warnings into what any of the groups that are there, terrorists…potentially Russia and the PRC, are doing or thinking about towards the U.S. and towards partners and allies.” But, Fenton said, “There's still a lot to watch vis-à-vis Niger.”

To counter those trends, Fenton said, the U.S. must continue to train partner militaries, in the mold of the successful training of Ukrainian special operations troops. “We are a teammate of choice in the SOUTHCOM,” he said.

21. Naval Special Warfare 8 commodore relieved due to ‘loss of confidence’

Naval Special Warfare 8 commodore relieved due to ‘loss of confidence’

Stars and Stripes · by Brian McElhiney · March 20, 2024

Military members from Naval Special Warfare Group 8 display the national ensign as they perform dive operations while underway on a Virginia Class fast-attack submarine USS New Mexico (SSN 778) in June 2022. The commodore of Naval Special Warfare Group 8 was relieved of his command Wednesday, the service announced. (Christopher Perez/U.S. Navy)

The commodore of Naval Special Warfare Group 8 was relieved of his command Wednesday, the service announced.

Capt. Richard A. Zaszewski was relieved by Rear Adm. Keith Davids, commander of Naval Special Warfare Command, “due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command,” the service announced in a news release. Deputy commodore Capt. Stig Sanness assumed the duties of commodore, with no impact to mission readiness, the Navy said.

Under federal privacy law, military officials are not required to disclose the reasons for removing or reassigning personnel. Military officials often cite “a loss of confidence” when commanders are removed from their posts without providing any specifics that led to the decision.

Zaszewski commissioned in 1997, according to his service record provided by the Navy, and he has received many military awards, including a Silver Star, three Bronze Stars, a Legion of Merit and five Defense Meritorious Service Medals.

Naval Special Warfare Group 8 was established in August 2021 and assumed responsibility for all units in Naval Special Warfare Groups 3 and 10, which were disestablished at the same time, according to a Navy news release at the time. The group was established to converge “undersea operational capabilities and advanced intelligence and communications capabilities.”

Zaszewski is the fifth commanding officer to be relieved by the Navy this year.

In January, the commander of the blue crew of the Ohio-class guided missile submarine USS Georgia was relieved. The commander of the Japan-based USS Howard and the commanding officer of Destroyer Squadron 2 were fired in February.

Earlier this month, Capt. Kurt Balagna, the commander of the gold crew of the USS Ohio, was relieved of duty.

Brian McElhiney

Brian McElhiney is a digital editor and occasional reporter for Stars and Stripes. He has worked as a music reporter and editor for publications in New Hampshire, Vermont, New York and Oregon. One of his earliest journalistic inspirations came from reading Stars and Stripes as a kid growing up in Okinawa, Japan.

Stars and Stripes · by Brian McElhiney · March 20, 2024

22. China's grey-zone provocations: Time to reciprocate

Excerpts:

Inaction by others has led Beijing towards a strategy that steadily heightens tensions. Now is the time to send a message to China’s to change course before it’s too late.

China’s grey zone strategy aims to impress and influence others through fear of the consequences if China escalates to using violence. It is a form of carefully scripted brinkmanship designed to gradually accumulate successes while avoiding military escalation. China has carefully controlled its grey zone actions to avoid accidently starting a war it clearly doesn't want.

Inherent in China’s grey zone approach is continually ratcheting up its actions. The nations targeted will be less attentive and less fearful if China’s activities become normalised.

...

Reciprocation would hopefully send a strong message to China to wind down its grey zone activities. However, it may not work. China may continue with its current grey zone actions. If so, no one is worse off. Having tried the reciprocation approach, other options might then be considered.

An advantage of reciprocating is that Chinese complaints would appear hypocritical. If an action is good enough for China, surely others can follow in its footsteps? Moreover, Chinese escalation through the use of violence would be hard to justify, since the other nations aren’t escalating, they are simply reciprocating. There would be an argument for publicly warning China that its grey zone actions might be reciprocated. Such uncertainty may in itself induce caution.

Inaction by others has led Beijing towards a strategy that steadily heightens tensions. Now is the time to send a message to China’s to change course before it’s too late. In doing so, China doesn't have to lose face. It’s not apologising for its past aggressiveness or admitting fault. It is simply no longer doing what it has done in the past and might have continued doing in the future.

China's grey-zone provocations: Time to reciprocate | Lowy Institute

Those subject to China’s actions have responded

cautiously. They now need to consider a change in tactics.

lowyinstitute.org · by Peter Layton

It’s time to send a signal to Beijing that a crisis is approaching. China’s use of grey zone tactics is intensifying. This worsening trend line has been evident for several years and seems headed towards an unintended violent incident, a crisis and possibly armed conflict. Attempts need to be made now to persuade China to desist.

Inaction by others has led Beijing towards a strategy that steadily heightens tensions. Now is the time to send a message to China’s to change course before it’s too late.

China’s grey zone strategy aims to impress and influence others through fear of the consequences if China escalates to using violence. It is a form of carefully scripted brinkmanship designed to gradually accumulate successes while avoiding military escalation. China has carefully controlled its grey zone actions to avoid accidently starting a war it clearly doesn't want.

Inherent in China’s grey zone approach is continually ratcheting up its actions. The nations targeted will be less attentive and less fearful if China’s activities become normalised.

At sea, China and the Philippines have been in a deepening crisis for the last year over ownership of an island group within the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). China’s latest escalation involves deliberately damaging a Philippine Coast Guard vessel and injuring crew members. China’s previous actions suggest such violence may worsen. For example, China killed some 20 Indian soldiers in its action on the India-China border in 2020.

In the skies, China now daily sends its military aircraft, sometimes armed, into Taiwanese and Japanese Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ). Responding to these incursions is taxing for both. China further ratcheted up tensions in late 2022 by firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan into the sea beyond; five impacted in Japan’s EEZ.

China’s grey zone strategy aims to impress and influence others through fear of the consequences if China escalates to using violence.

Late last year, China started sending balloons over Taiwan; by mid-February 2024, some 26 had overflown at similar altitudes to airliners. In January, China announced it would unilaterally move eastward a mutually agreed civil aircraft flight corridor in the Taiwan Strait. This means Chinese civil aircraft making even minor diversions for weather conditions are now likely to intrude into Taiwan’s ADIZ.

To the north, China is heightening tensions by stationing four warships on the boundaries of an ADIZ which China declared in the East China Sea in 2013. These ships request all non-Chinese civilian aircraft in the ADIZ to immediately leave, threatening “defensive emergency measures” if an aircraft fails to do so. It's another step in turning this international airspace into China’s territorial airspace, with PLA fighter interceptions of transiting civil aircraft possible in the future.

On land, China and India remain at odds over Chinese border incursions. Sensing an opportunity, China is now building housing and roads on territory claimed by Bhutan.

Those subject to, or concerned by, Chinese grey zone actions have in the main been cautious, tried to relax tensions and not respond in kind. While admirable in the abstract, this approach has clearly not been effective. The time is right for a change in tactics.

Grey zone actions are inherently theatrical and consequently, responses should be designed to concern, confuse, or deceive China’s political and military leadership. These responses might be tried first at sea rather than in the air, since ships move slowly and situations develop gradually.

Such responses should involve reciprocating Chinese actions. For example, just as Chinese Coast Guard ships use water cannons against fishing vessels and coast guard ships, nations subject to such actions could do the same. Large vessels might be leased and used to crowd out and block Chinese coast guard or armed militia vessels, just as China regularly does to smaller navies and commercial fishing boats. Sealight, a maritime transparency project at Stanford University, has published a useful Chinese grey zone playbook that sets out numerous Chinese actions that could be reciprocated.

Reciprocation raises concerns over military escalation, but escalation to armed violence would represent a significant Chinese failure. China has not fought a war for more than 40 years; generations of Chinese military personnel have come and gone, and remained deskbound. Nevertheless, any pushback carries risk and needs prudent management.

Reciprocation would hopefully send a strong message to China to wind down its grey zone activities. However, it may not work. China may continue with its current grey zone actions. If so, no one is worse off. Having tried the reciprocation approach, other options might then be considered.

An advantage of reciprocating is that Chinese complaints would appear hypocritical. If an action is good enough for China, surely others can follow in its footsteps? Moreover, Chinese escalation through the use of violence would be hard to justify, since the other nations aren’t escalating, they are simply reciprocating. There would be an argument for publicly warning China that its grey zone actions might be reciprocated. Such uncertainty may in itself induce caution.

Inaction by others has led Beijing towards a strategy that steadily heightens tensions. Now is the time to send a message to China’s to change course before it’s too late. In doing so, China doesn't have to lose face. It’s not apologising for its past aggressiveness or admitting fault. It is simply no longer doing what it has done in the past and might have continued doing in the future.

lowyinstitute.org · by Peter Layton

23. The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine

Excerpt:

Conclusion

The conduct of attritional wars is vastly different from wars of manoeuvre. They last longer and end up testing a country’s industrial capacity. Victory is assured by careful planning, industrial base development and development of mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and even more careful management of resources in wartime.

Victory is attainable by carefully analysing one’s own and the enemy’s political objectives. The key is recognising the strengths and weaknesses of competing economic models and identifying the economic strategies that are most likely to generate maximum resources. These resources can then be utilised to build a massive army using the high/low force and weapons mixture. The military conduct of war is driven by overall political strategic objectives, military realities and economic limitations. Combat operations are shallow and focus on destroying enemy resources, not on gaining terrain. Propaganda is used to support military operations, not the other way around. With patience and careful planning, a war can be won.

Unfortunately, many in the West have a very cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons outlined above. Even middling global powers have both the geography and the population and industrial resources needed to conduct an attritional war. The thought that any major power would back down in the case of an initial military defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict between great powers would be viewed by adversary elites as existential and pursued with the full resources available to the state. The resulting war will become attritional and will favour the state which has the economy, doctrine and military structure that is better suited towards this form of conflict.

If the West is serious about a possible great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and means of waging a protracted war, rather than conducting wargames covering a single month of conflict and hoping that the war will end afterwards. As the Iraq War taught us, hope is not a method.

The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine

Alex Vershinin18 March 2024 Long Read

rusi.org

Attritional wars require their own ‘Art of War’ and are fought with a ‘force-centric’ approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are ‘terrain-focused’. They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses, geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, military operations are shaped by a state’s ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win.

The West is not prepared for this kind of war. To most Western experts, attritional strategy is counterintuitive. Historically, the West preferred the short ‘winner takes all’ clash of professional armies. Recent war games such as CSIS’s war over Taiwan covered one month of fighting. The possibility that the war would go on never entered the discussion. This is a reflection of a common Western attitude. Wars of attrition are treated as exceptions, something to be avoided at all costs and generally products of leaders’ ineptitude. Unfortunately, wars between near-peer powers are likely to be attritional, thanks to a large pool of resources available to replace initial losses. The attritional nature of combat, including the erosion of professionalism due to casualties, levels the battlefield no matter which army started with better trained forces. As conflict drags on, the war is won by economies, not armies. States that grasp this and fight such a war via an attritional strategy aimed at exhausting enemy resources while preserving their own are more likely to win. The fastest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on manoeuvre, expending valuable resources on near-term territorial objectives. Recognising that wars of attrition have their own art is vital to winning them without sustaining crippling losses.

The Economic Dimension

Wars of attrition are won by economies enabling mass mobilisation of militaries via their industrial sectors. Armies expand rapidly during such a conflict, requiring massive quantities of armoured vehicles, drones, electronic products, and other combat equipment. Because high-end weaponry is very complex to manufacture and consumes vast resources, a high-low mixture of forces and weapons is imperative in order to win.

High-end weapons have exceptional performance but are difficult to manufacture, especially when needed to arm a rapidly mobilised army subjected to a high rate of attrition. For example, during the Second World War German Panzers were superb tanks, but using approximately the same production resources, the Soviets rolled out eight T-34s for every German Panzer. The difference in performance did not justify the numerical disparity in production. High-end weapons also require high-end troops. These take significant time to train – time which is unavailable in a war with high attrition rates.

It is easier and faster to produce large numbers of cheap weapons and munitions, especially if their subcomponents are interchangeable with civilian goods, ensuring mass quantity without the expansion of production lines. New recruits also absorb simpler weapons faster, allowing rapid generation of new formations or the reconstitution of existing ones.

Achieving mass is difficult for higher-end Western economies. To achieve hyper-efficiency, they shed excess capacity and struggle to rapidly expand, especially since lower-tier industries have been transferred abroad for economic reasons. During war, global supply chains are disrupted and subcomponents can no longer be secured. Added to this conundrum is the lack of a skilled workforce with experience in a particular industry. These skills are acquired over decades, and once an industry is shuttered it takes decades to rebuild. The 2018 US government interagency report on US industrial capacity highlighted these problems. The bottom line is that the West must take a hard look at ensuring peacetime excess capacity in its military industrial complex, or risk losing the next war.

Force Generation

Industrial output exists so it can be channelled into replacing losses and generating new formations. This requires appropriate doctrine and command and control structures. There are two main models; NATO (most Western armies) and the old Soviet model, with most states fielding something in between.

NATO armies are highly professional, backed by a strong non-commissioned officer (NCO) Corps, with extensive peacetime military education and experience. They build upon this professionalism for their military doctrine (fundamentals, tactics and techniques) to stress individual initiative, delegating a great deal of leeway to junior officers and NCOs. NATO formations enjoy tremendous agility and flexibility to exploit opportunities on a dynamic battlefield.

In attritional war, this method has a downside. The officers and NCOs required to execute this doctrine require extensive training and, above all, experience. A US Army NCO takes years to develop. A squad leader generally has at least three years in service and a platoon sergeant has at least seven. In an attritional war characterised by heavy casualties, there simply isn’t time to replace lost NCOs or generate them for new units. The idea that civilians can be given three-month training courses, sergeant’s chevrons and then expected to perform in the same manner as a seven-year veteran is a recipe for disaster. Only time can generate leaders capable of executing NATO doctrine, and time is one thing that the massive demands of attritional war do not give.

The Soviet Union built its army for large-scale conflict with NATO. It was intended to be able to rapidly expand by calling up massed reserves. Every male in the Soviet Union underwent two years of basic training right out of high school. The constant turnover of enlisted personnel precluded creation of a Western-style NCO corps but generated a massive pool of semi-trained reserves available in times of war. The absence of reliable NCOs created an officer-centric command model, less flexible than NATO’s but more adaptable to the large-scale expansion required by attritional warfare.

However, as a war progresses past a one-year mark, front-line units will gain experience and an improved NCO corps is likely to emerge, giving the Soviet model greater flexibility. By 1943, the Red Army had developed a robust NCO corps, which then disappeared after the Second World War as combat formations were demobilised. A key difference between the models is that NATO doctrine cannot function without high-performing NCOs. The Soviet doctrine was enhanced by experienced NCOs but did not require them.

Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving one’s own

The most effective model is a mixture of the two, in which a state maintains a medium-sized professional army, together with a mass of draftees available for mobilisation. This leads directly to a high/low mixture. Professional pre-war forces form the high end of this army, becoming fire brigades – moving from sector to sector in battle to stabilise the situation and conduct decisive attacks. Low-end formations hold the line and gain experience slowly, increasing their quality until they gain the capability to conduct offensive operations. Victory is attained by creating the highest quality low-end formations possible.

Forging new units into combat-capable soldiers instead of civilian mobs is done through training and combat experience. A new formation should train for at least six months, and only if manned by reservists with previous individual training. Conscripts take longer. These units should also have professional soldiers and NCOs brought in from the pre-war army to add professionalism. Once initial training is complete, they should only be fed into the battle in secondary sectors. No formation should be allowed to fall below 70% strength. Withdrawing formations early allows experience to proliferate among the new replacements as veterans pass on their skills. Otherwise, valuable experience is lost, causing the process to start all over. Another implication is that resources should prioritise replacements over new formations, preserving combat edge in both the pre-war army (high) and newly raised (low) formations. It’s advisable to disband several pre-war (high-end) formations to spread professional soldiers among newly created low-end formations in order to raise initial quality.

The Military Dimension

Military operations in an attritional conflict are very distinct from those in a war of manoeuvre. Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving one’s own. In this context, a successful strategy accepts that the war will last at least two years and be broken into two distinct phases. The first phase ranges from initiation of hostilities to the point where sufficient combat power has been mobilised to allow decisive action. It will see little positional shifting on the ground, focusing on favourable exchange of losses and building up combat power in the rear. The dominant form of combat is fires rather than manoeuvre, complemented by extensive fortifications and camouflage. The peacetime army starts the war and conducts holding actions, providing time to mobilise resources and train the new army.

The second phase can commence after one side has met the following conditions.

• Newly mobilised forces have completed their training and gained sufficient experience to make them combat-effective formations, capable of rapidly integrating all their assets in a cohesive manner.
• The enemy’s strategic reserve is exhausted, leaving it unable to reinforce the threatened sector.
• Fires and reconnaissance superiority are achieved, allowing the attacker to effectively mass fires on a key sector while denying the enemy the same.
• The enemy’s industrial sector is degraded to the point where it is unable to replace battlefield losses. In the case of fighting against a coalition of countries, their industrial resources must also be exhausted or at least accounted for.

Only after meeting these criteria should offensive operations commence. They should be launched across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points with shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside a layered bubble of friendly protective systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. Only then should the offensive extend towards objectives deeper in the enemy rear. Concentration of forces on one main effort should be avoided as this gives an indication of the offensive’s location and an opportunity for the enemy to concentrate their reserves against this key point. The Brusilov Offensive of 1916, which resulted in the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army, is a good example of a successful attritional offensive at the tactical and operational level. By attacking along a broad front, the Russian army prevented the Austro-Hungarians from concentrating their reserves, resulting in a collapse all along the front. At the strategic level, however, the Brusilov Offensive is an example of failure. Russian forces failed to set conditions against the whole enemy coalition, focusing only on the Austro-Hungarian Empire and neglecting German capacity. The Russians expended crucial resources which they could not replace, without defeating the strongest coalition member. To reemphasise the key point, an offensive will only succeed once key criteria are met. Attempting to launch an offensive earlier will result in losses without any strategic gains, playing directly into enemy hands.

Modern War

The modern battlefield is an integrated system of systems which includes various types of electronic warfare (EW), three basic types of air defences, four different types of artillery, countless aircraft types, strike and reconnaissance drones, construction and sapper engineers, traditional infantry, armour formations and, above all, logistics. Artillery has become more dangerous thanks to increased ranges and advanced targeting, stretching the depth of the battlefield.

In practice, this means it is easier to mass fires than forces. Deep manoeuvre, which requires the massing of combat power, is no longer possible because any massed force will be destroyed by indirect fires before it can achieve success in depth. Instead, a ground offensive requires a tight protective bubble to ward off enemy strike systems. This bubble is generated through layering friendly counter-fire, air defence and EW assets. Moving numerous interdependent systems is highly complicated and unlikely to be successful. Shallow attacks along the forward line of troops are most likely to be successful at an acceptable cost ratio; attempts at deep penetration will be exposed to massed fires the moment they exit the protection of the defensive bubble.

Integration of these overlapping assets requires centralised planning and exceptionally well-trained staff officers, capable of integrating multiple capabilities on the fly. It takes years to train such officers, and even combat experience does not generate such skills in a short time. Checklists and mandatory procedures can alleviate these deficiencies, but only on a less-complicated, static front. Dynamic offensive operations require fast reaction times, which semi-trained officers are incapable of performing.

An example of this complexity is an attack by a platoon of 30 soldiers. This would require EW systems to jam enemy drones; another EW system to jam enemy communications preventing adjustment of enemy fires; and a third EW system to jam space navigation systems denying use of precision guided munitions. In addition, fires require counterbattery radars to defeat enemy artillery. Further complicating planning is the fact that enemy EW will locate and destroy any friendly radar or EW emitter that is emitting for too long. Engineers will have to clear paths through minefields, while friendly drones provide time-sensitive ISR and fire support if needed. (This task requires a great deal of training with the supporting units to avoid dropping munitions on friendly attacking troops.) Finally, artillery needs to provide support both on the objective and enemy rear, targeting reserves and suppressing artillery. All these systems need to work as an integrated team just to support 30 men in several vehicles attacking another 30 men or less. A lack of coordination between these assets will result in failed attacks and horrific losses without ever seeing the enemy. As the size of formation conducting operations increases, so do the number and complexity of assets that need to be integrated.

Implications for Combat Operations

Deep fires – further than 100–150 km (the average range of tactical rockets) behind the front line – target an enemy’s ability to generate combat power. This includes production facilities, munitions dumps, repair depots, and energy and transportation infrastructure. Of particular importance are targets that require significant production capabilities and that are difficult to replace/repair, as their destruction will inflict long term damage. As with all aspects of attritional war, such strikes will take significant time to have an effect, with timelines running into years. The low global production volumes of long-range precision-guided munitions, effective deception and concealment actions, large stockpiles of anti-aircraft missiles and the sheer repair capacities of strong, determined states all combine to prolong conflicts. Effective layering of air defences must include high-end systems at all altitudes coupled with cheaper systems to counter the enemy’s massed low-end attack platforms. Combined with mass-scale manufacturing and effective EW, this is the only way to defeat enemy deep fires.

Victory in an attritional war is assured by careful planning, industrial base development and development of mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and even more careful management of resources in wartime

Successful attritional war focuses on the preservation of one’s own combat power. This usually translates into a relatively static front interrupted by limited local attacks to improve positions, using artillery for most of the fighting. Fortification and concealment of all forces including logistics is the key to minimising losses. The long time required to construct fortifications prevents significant ground movement. An attacking force which cannot rapidly entrench will suffer significant losses from enemy artillery fires.

Defensive operations buy time to develop low-end combat formations, allowing newly mobilised troops to gain combat experience without suffering heavy losses in large-scale attacks. Building up experienced low-tier combat formations generates the capability for future offensive operations.

The early stages of attritional war range from initiation of hostilities to the point where mobilised resources are available in large numbers and are ready for combat operations. In the case of a surprise attack, a rapid offensive by one side may be possible until the defender can form a solid front. After that, combat solidifies. This period lasts at least a year-and-a-half to two years. During this period, major offensive operations should be avoided. Even if large attacks are successful, they will result in significant casualties, often for meaningless territorial gains. An army should never accept a battle on unfavourable terms. In attritional war, any terrain that does not have a vital industrial centre is irrelevant. It is always better to retreat and preserve forces, regardless of the political consequences. Fighting on disadvantageous terrain burns up units, losing experienced soldiers who are key to victory. The German obsession with Stalingrad in 1942 is a prime example of fighting on unfavourable terrain for political reasons. Germany burned up vital units that it could not afford to lose, simply to capture a city bearing Stalin’s name. It is also wise to push the enemy into fighting on disadvantageous terrain through information operations, exploiting politically sensitive enemy objectives. The goal is to force the enemy to expend vital material and strategic reserves on strategically meaningless operations. A key pitfall to avoid is being dragged into the very same trap that has been set for the enemy. In the First World War, Germans did just that at Verdun, where it planned to use surprise to capture key, politically sensitive terrain, provoking costly French counterattacks. Unfortunately for the Germans, they fell into their own trap. They failed to gain key, defendable terrain early on, and the battle devolved instead into a series of costly infantry assaults by both sides, with artillery fires devastating attacking infantry.

When the second phase begins, the offensive should be launched across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points using shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside the layered bubble of friendly protective systems, while stretching depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses. There is a cascading effect in which a crisis in one sector forces the defenders to shift reserves from a second sector, only to generate a crisis there in turn. As forces start falling back and leaving prepared fortifications, morale plummets, with the obvious question: ‘If we can’t hold the mega-fortress, how can we hold these new trenches?’ Retreat then turns into rout. Only then should the offensive extend towards objectives deeper in the enemy rear. The Allies’ Offensive in 1918 is an example. The Allies attacked along a broad front, while the Germans lacked sufficient resources to defend the entire line. Once the German Army began to retreat it proved impossible to stop.

The attritional strategy, centred on defence, is counterintuitive to most Western military officers. Western military thought views the offensive as the only means of achieving the decisive strategic goal of forcing the enemy to come to the negotiating table on unfavourable terms. The strategic patience required to set the conditions for an offensive runs against their combat experience acquired in overseas counterinsurgency operations.

Conclusion

The conduct of attritional wars is vastly different from wars of manoeuvre. They last longer and end up testing a country’s industrial capacity. Victory is assured by careful planning, industrial base development and development of mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and even more careful management of resources in wartime.

Victory is attainable by carefully analysing one’s own and the enemy’s political objectives. The key is recognising the strengths and weaknesses of competing economic models and identifying the economic strategies that are most likely to generate maximum resources. These resources can then be utilised to build a massive army using the high/low force and weapons mixture. The military conduct of war is driven by overall political strategic objectives, military realities and economic limitations. Combat operations are shallow and focus on destroying enemy resources, not on gaining terrain. Propaganda is used to support military operations, not the other way around. With patience and careful planning, a war can be won.

Unfortunately, many in the West have a very cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons outlined above. Even middling global powers have both the geography and the population and industrial resources needed to conduct an attritional war. The thought that any major power would back down in the case of an initial military defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict between great powers would be viewed by adversary elites as existential and pursued with the full resources available to the state. The resulting war will become attritional and will favour the state which has the economy, doctrine and military structure that is better suited towards this form of conflict.

If the West is serious about a possible great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and means of waging a protracted war, rather than conducting wargames covering a single month of conflict and hoping that the war will end afterwards. As the Iraq War taught us, hope is not a method.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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24. The fallacy of soft power

Excerpts:

History does not support the notion that cultural attraction generates behavioural deference. If anything, there is a disconnect. In our time, Saddam Hussein defied the United States for 13 years even while consuming Frank Sinatra and Jack Daniels. Islamists from Egypt or Saudi Arabia crave the pleasures and technological wonders of the Western societies that they want to burn.

And recall wishful visions two decades ago, that Western offers of prosperity could make a rising China into an equity stakeholder, deferring to American primacy. In more distant times, even invading predators liked the civilisations they looted. Recall the invaders that sacked Rome yet minted coins in the likeness of emperors, or the crusaders who diverted their expedition to plunder Constantinople.

Without hard foundations, appeals to authority carry little weight. In 1945, Stalin notoriously dismissed papal disapproval: “The Pope? How many divisions has he got?” This may not capture the full complexity of diplomacy. But it is a better “first cut” guide to the world than the Soft Power Index, or mandarins who mistake popularity for strength.

The fallacy of soft power | Patrick Porter | The Critic Magazine

The world runs on cold national self interest, not cultural capital

FEATURES

By

Patrick Porter

March 2024

thecritic.co.uk · 

This article is taken from the March 2024 issue of The Critic. To get the full magazine why not subscribe? Right now we’re offering five issues for just £10.

You may have missed it, but British statecraft recently scored a triumph. The United Kingdom ranked second in Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Index, trailing only the United States.

For the Senior Communications Officer of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO), these were glad tidings that affirm Britain’s stature in the competition for prestige and regard. It followed an “historic 2022, as the world celebrated the Platinum Jubilee and mourned the loss of Her late Majesty Queen Elizabeth II”.

This recognition follows the UK government’s own claim in the Integrated Review of 2021 that Britain is a “soft power superpower”, an aspiration that surely drives terror into our foes. Yet puzzlingly, Houthi militants persistently fire on British and American ships. Haven’t they read the league table?

Does Britain feel like a superpower to you, of any kind? It’s easy to like the thought that Britain exerts strength internationally through its celebrated heritage, from TV studios to the Premier League, from medieval churches to the City. It serves as a psychological balm when our material existence is under strain.

Often asserted, rarely observed, it is evidently something people want to believe without really looking

The nation’s infrastructure may creak and crumble, its debt may soar, its borders may be in chaos, its energy infrastructure run down, its hospitals overburdened, its steel industry decimated, its property unaffordable, its army and navy depleted, with the navy struggling to crew the surface fleet. But rest assured, Britain’s cultural cachet makes it a colossus abroad. Huge, if true.

Like most dodgy concepts, “soft power” is a moving target. It can be lazy shorthand for anything non-military, for “diplomacy”, a lever policymakers pull or the velvet glove on the iron first. But if it’s just the “glove”, it is merely supplementary.

In a more ambitious version, a polity’s culture and values, its institutions, language, art, literature and iconography, will cause others to pre-align their interests with that polity. Yet it works not so much as a hypothesis as a creed. People who should know better, in Whitehall, industry and civil society, revere the image of British “soft power” as axiomatically true. Often asserted, rarely observed, it is evidently something people want to believe without really looking. Let’s look.

Britain’s relative prestige in the world, like its material position, was stronger in 1956 than in 2024. Europe was shattered by the world war and the future Asian giants, India and China, were not yet great industrialising powers. British institutions were internationally respected. Yet in 1956 when national interests clashed over Suez, none of this mattered a jot to the new, actual superpower, the United States.

In that crisis, despite Britain’s eminence and the Anglophilia of American elites, President Dwight Eisenhower coerced Britain out of its campaign against Egypt, with military pressure — fouling the sonar of the British ships in the Mediterranean — and with economic leverage — threatening to sink the pound. Suez was an easy test of soft power theory, and it flunked. And all the cultural treasures in the world could not extinguish anti-colonial revolt.

Aircraft carrier HMS Theseus leaves Portsmouth for the Mediterranean and Egypt during the Suez Crisis, August 5th 1956. (Evening Standard/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Any decent conception of power must be partly relational. That is, it must deal with the interaction between moving parts. For soft power to count, it must get others to do things they otherwise might not do. Which brings us back to the Soft Power Index. How does the Index measure and track soft power? Over two glossy pages, its “methodology” hardly deals with behaviour. Rather, it establishes the scale of countries’ soft power by opinion polling, asking people how far other countries bear influence, familiarity and reputation.

This is little more than pub talk, writ large. It supplements this question-begging data with faith statements from luminaries. Even the incisive journalist Andrew Neil claims, “More and more films and TV series seem to require a London location for at least part of the shoot … [on the show You], Americans dress up in Victorian garb and try to speak with British accents. Series four is entirely based in London. That is Soft Power for you.”

Is it? Thus formulated, “soft power” becomes circular and unfalsifiable. The input of cultural appeal is indistinguishable from its output. We get others to know, like and respect us in order … that they know, like and respect us. Without an account of cause and effect, there is no theory of power here at all.

In a Twitter exchange, I suggested to the FCDO Senior Communications Officer that lovely cultural assets (the jubilee and the national mourning for the late monarch) aren’t effects or proof of soft power. They are inputs. Did these events get others to alter their behaviour in ways that accord with British interests? Did such events help induce a favourable US-UK trade agreement? Or a UK-Canadian one? Apparently not. And these are countries that eagerly consume British cultural fare.

When challenged, defenders of the concept typically withdraw into generalities

How reliable has British soft power ever been in Washington, for that matter? The irony of the Anglo-American special relationship is the disconnect between cross-cultural affection and unsentimental policymaking. From recognition of Sinn Fein to steel tariffs, not signing up to the International Criminal Court or the treaty on land mines, from disbanding the Iraqi B’aath party to invading Grenada, America — like all leading states — does what it likes. As for the BBC and its World Service, so often touted not just as a good thing but as a delivery system for British influence and a guard against disinformation, did its outreach get India not to raid the BBC offices in Mumbai and New Delhi?

In other words, where’s the beef? when challenged, defenders of the concept typically withdraw into generalities. The FCDO officer replied that soft power could not have such a “deterrent effect”, but that “culture, education, monarchy are important to the brand, add to tourism + economy, warm people to the UK in the long term”. Again, the circularity, plus the troubling use of the term “brand”.

Britain in this picture is not so much a country pursuing a way of life in a hostile world as a corporation with a “brand”, existing to attract customers and enjoy “warm” feelings. Under the slightest scrutiny, the “soft power index” turns out to be little more than a tourism index. On that measure, Spain and Mexico are superpowers, while in the ranks of regional heavyweights, Thailand outranks Japan.

The whole “soft power” proposition is not just cloyingly self-congratulatory. By making people feel good about their country’s place in the international pecking order, it deflects from the harder means-ends decisions that a serious country must face. Worse, it encourages the dangerous conceit that soft things — from diplomatic gestures to popular culture — can offset or replace hard capabilities.

Consider the advice of Simon McDonald, former permanent secretary at the Foreign Office and head of the Diplomatic Service. McDonald’s manifesto, Beyond Britannia, denounces the nostalgic pursuit of great power status embodied in Brexit and argues for a fresh statecraft built around “soft power”.

For him, Britain’s soft power is more latent than manifest, awaiting an enlightened government to unlock it. Since Britain can no longer play the hard power game, it should barter away its nuclear arsenal, downgrade the Royal Navy into a local fleet and give up its permanent seat on the UN Security Council to the European Union.

This programme is a gamble. Exchanging a survivable, continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent for greater worldwide repute? Winning hearts and minds by trading away veto power at the UN for an organisation Britain isn’t part of? This grand bargain is staked on the bet that international life is about getting other countries to admire your moral authority and enlightened gestures. Events, however, suggest otherwise.

Britain and its allies checked Putin’s aggressive expansionism not primarily by tweets

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the “global south” nations from South Africa to Kenya to India to Brazil responded not with virtuous internationalism, but by hedging and trading with Moscow. They did so even though Russia shows no signs of nuclear disarmament. To the contrary, it issues veiled nuclear threats.

The international arena is not an audience of moralists aching to be “led”, but one of calculating regimes pursuing cold self-interest. McDonald denounces the swaggering, backward-looking nationalism of the Brexiteers. But by suggesting that Britain can revive its influence via the soft stuff, he offers the image of a global audience waiting for the guidance of British leadership. Who is the “great power” nostalgic and sentimentalist in this story?

We have been here before. Liberal denunciations of the Iraq war of 2003 charge that by invading illegally and unleashing bloody chaos and committing torture, the United States and Britain squandered their “moral authority”. The war was a disastrous blunder, but the “moral authority” complaint runs up against the facts.

Despite public protestations against the military adventure, the French government gave intelligence assistance behind the scenes and soon afterwards integrated its military command into NATO, while Germany provided intelligence assistance in Baghdad and allowed extraordinary rendition flights from its soil. In 2015, after discovering that the NSA had tapped Chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone, as Jeremy Shapiro recalls, “German officials messaged in backroom seminars that the alliance could never be the same. A few months later it was the same.”

To suggest, as McDonald does, that we should turn to “soft power” is not a daring, fresh challenge, but a tired routine. As Perry Anderson said of Francis Fukuyama when he made similar arguments after Iraq went wrong, “The miscellaneous proposals with which [the book] ends — greater reliance on soft power, more consultation with allies, respect for international institutions — are of a desolating predictability, the truisms of every bien-pensant editorial or periodical in the land.”

The violence in Ukraine and Gaza has once again revealed to us that the world revolves around harder currencies, of blood and iron. With a vengeance, today’s battlefields force public debate to reckon with material things: the defence industrial base, energy supplies, mass and logistics, manpower and shipyard capacity.

Saddam Hussein defied the United States while consuming Frank Sinatra and Jack Daniels

Britain and its allies checked Putin’s aggressive expansionism not primarily by tweets and summits. They did so with money, training, military intelligence and guns.

These are the hard capabilities McDonald claims Britain is no longer capable of wielding. That seaborne trade has resumed through the Black Sea is only possible because Ukraine militarily holds Russia’s fleet at risk. Yet asked about Britain’s support to Ukraine, McDonald plays the definition game: “These all to me feel in the soft power side of life: to draw other people’s attention to something, to galvanise activity.” If “soft power” can be reformulated to include arming and training Ukrainians to kill Russian soldiers, the term is meaningless.

History does not support the notion that cultural attraction generates behavioural deference. If anything, there is a disconnect. In our time, Saddam Hussein defied the United States for 13 years even while consuming Frank Sinatra and Jack Daniels. Islamists from Egypt or Saudi Arabia crave the pleasures and technological wonders of the Western societies that they want to burn.

And recall wishful visions two decades ago, that Western offers of prosperity could make a rising China into an equity stakeholder, deferring to American primacy. In more distant times, even invading predators liked the civilisations they looted. Recall the invaders that sacked Rome yet minted coins in the likeness of emperors, or the crusaders who diverted their expedition to plunder Constantinople.

Without hard foundations, appeals to authority carry little weight. In 1945, Stalin notoriously dismissed papal disapproval: “The Pope? How many divisions has he got?” This may not capture the full complexity of diplomacy. But it is a better “first cut” guide to the world than the Soft Power Index, or mandarins who mistake popularity for strength.

thecritic.co.uk · 

25. A More European NATO

Conclusion:

The best option is for NATO leaders to push for a greater European role when the alliance convenes in Washington this summer. The United States should use its influence to advocate for European integration, and it should throw its support behind the kinds of EU defense efforts that Washington has historically opposed. A stronger, less dependent Europe would meet the United States as a genuine partner, giving Washington new reason to commit to the relationship. NATO, after all, will be more valuable as an alliance between two military powers than it is as a team led by just one.

A More European NATO

Defense Spending Alone Cannot Fix the Alliance’s Overdependence on the United States

By Max Bergmann

March 21, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Max Bergmann · March 21, 2024

When NATO leaders meet at a summit in Washington this summer, the alliance’s 75th birthday should be cause for celebration. NATO is stronger than ever, having welcomed two new members, Finland and Sweden, within the past year. After decades of drift, the alliance has found new purpose in deterring Russian aggression, its original raison d’etre. At last, European countries are ramping up their defense spending. Together, these trends paint a bright future for NATO—but there is also peril ahead.

The effort to repel Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is stuttering, and a revisionist Putin is threatening its European neighbors. This, however, is not NATO’s fundamental problem. NATO knows how to deter Russia. The main problem, the one that makes solving the others more difficult, lies with NATO’s overdependence on the United States.

For decades, the United States has sat at the center of NATO, leading and managing, and occasionally micromanaging, Europe’s defense. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander is always an American, and NATO’s ultimate security guarantee is the U.S. nuclear deterrent. When Europe fights, it relies on U.S. aircraft and U.S. military transport and intelligence. If a NATO country were attacked, U.S. forces would take the combat lead. In NATO’s early days, as Europe rebuilt after World War II, the United States played this role out of necessity. But Washington became accustomed to calling the shots, and European leaders largely accepted a secondary role. Europe’s dependence on the United States has become a feature, not a bug, of NATO’s operations.

But now, with the rise of China and the beginning of a generational shift in leadership in Washington, the United States is unlikely to provide the level of support that Europe needs. No matter who sits in the White House, U.S. engagement with NATO is almost certain to weaken in the coming years.

Consensus is emerging on both sides of the Atlantic that Europeans must take charge of their own security—an attitude that has solidified in Europe since former U.S. President Donald Trump declared in February that Washington should not come to the defense of NATO allies that “don’t pay up.” But many American and European leaders have mistakenly concluded that all it will take to replace the United States’ contribution is to spend a lot more on security. In fact, even if all European NATO members were to meet the alliance’s goal of contributing two percent of GDP toward defense, their efforts would not significantly reduce Europe’s military dependence on Washington.

Europe does not just have a spending problem; it has a collective action problem. European countries treat defense policy as a national responsibility. Because most individual countries face few direct security threats, their governments, quite rationally, invest little in defense. Yet Europe as a whole does require protection from the grave threat of a revanchist Russia, and it must address the security risks that stem from a volatile periphery stretching from the Sahel to the South Caucasus.

Given how deeply the United States, through NATO, is involved in Europe’s defense system, no quick fix can ensure Europe’s security if the United States were to pull back. But it is still possible for Europe to shore up its defense. European countries will need to integrate their efforts, a process that will be difficult and slow and will require greater coordination both within the European Union and between the EU and NATO. Policy leaders should use the upcoming NATO summit to introduce a new strategy, one that will ensure that Europe has not only the equipment and personnel but also the organizational capacity it needs to stand and fight when confronted with a threat, with or without the support of the United States. Far from undermining NATO, this is an opportunity to make the alliance stronger and European countries more secure—as long as the United States gives Europe the time it needs to transform.

NO MORE GUARANTEES

The United States has long stood in the way of Europe claiming a larger security role. The end of the Cold War brought opportunities to both reassess NATO’s direction and remake Europe, and ambitious plans for European defense were circulating inside the newly formed EU. In 1998, France and the United Kingdom reached what seemed like a historic breakthrough in the Saint-Malo declaration, which included an agreement for the EU to build an army of 60,000 troops. But Washington balked at the plan. Days after the declaration was announced, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright outlined a new U.S. position, known as “the three Ds”: any EU defense policy should not decouple European defense from the NATO structure, duplicate NATO capabilities, or discriminate against non-EU members of NATO. The United States made clear it would maintain its central role in European security, and its decision to box out the EU would stunt European defense integration in the decades that followed.

Resistance to changing this dynamic at NATO is still prevalent in Washington, at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and in many European capitals. The current bargain, after all, has served both Europe and the United States well for decades. By locking European countries into an alliance and guaranteeing their protection, NATO removed the security problems that once plagued the continent, and paved the way for the economic and political integration of Europe—a truly extraordinary achievement.

In exchange for the United States providing security for Europe, European capitals largely support American objectives elsewhere in the world. The U.S. military has been able to rely on built-in European coalitions during the wars in Afghanistan and even Iraq, as well as in more recent joint U.S.-European efforts to secure the Red Sea. European governments dutifully buy American weapons and are accustomed to having to make concessions on thorny policy issues, such as export controls on technology sales to China. With NATO alleviating the need for heavy investment in defense, European countries have also enjoyed the rewards of greater investment in social programs.

If Trump wins in November, NATO will be in grave peril.

Policymakers who work at or with NATO understandably have deep affection for the alliance as it is and are averse to altering the status quo. They want to believe that the U.S. commitment to NATO will not change. Many in Europe hope that by meeting Trump’s ransom demands—by spending two percent of GDP on defense and buying U.S. arms—they can also buy Washington’s perpetual support. They could be proved right, but sticking to this approach is an increasingly dangerous gamble.

If Trump wins the U.S. presidential election in November, NATO will be in grave peril. Trump sees NATO as a protection racket rather than as an institution that benefits the United States. And unlike his first administration, his second would likely include high-level officials who share the president’s skepticism. Plans are already circulating within Trump-aligned think tanks, such as the Center for Renewing America and the Heritage Foundation, that outline a significant U.S. retreat from NATO, including shrinking the size of NATO staff and pulling U.S. forces out of Europe.

Regardless of the U.S. election outcome, however, Trump has already broken the traditional bipartisan consensus in favor of NATO. Misgivings about the alliance are now widespread. Jamie Dimon, the CEO of Goldman Sachs, remarked at this year’s Davos summit that Trump “was kind of right about NATO.” And Republican politicians are divided over the United States’ obligations to contribute to Europe’s defense. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, who supports a more traditional U.S. security role, has struggled to get younger Republican senators, such as Josh Hawley and J. D. Vance, on board with providing additional military aid to Ukraine.

Trump’s attacks on NATO also tap into a deeper American dissatisfaction with European military dependence that reflects a fading Cold War–era attachment to European security. When Americans travel to Europe, they see sophisticated infrastructure and citizens who enjoy high standards of living and robust social safety nets, and they cannot understand why their tax dollars and soldiers are needed to defend a well-off continent whose total population far outstrips that of the United States. Bipartisan disparagement of NATO allies’ low defense spending has also tarnished the alliance’s image. And even when European armies fight alongside the U.S. military, their comparatively small contributions earn them little praise. U.S. troops joked that the acronym for NATO’s ISAF operations in Afghanistan stood for “I saw Americans fight.”

The United States can no longer guarantee that its military will be able to come to Europe’s defense.

Most policymakers in Washington today have forged their careers in a post-9/11 world in which conflict in Europe seems less relevant. Because European allies brought so little to the table militarily, engaging them on issues such as security in the Middle East turned into a box-checking exercise condescendingly called “alliance management.” President Barack Obama, for instance, dutifully went through the diplomatic motions, but Europeans generally saw him as disinterested in European affairs. Even President Joe Biden, whose time on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began during the Cold War and who maintains a deep attachment to NATO, seemed to treat Europe as an afterthought during his first year in office. His administration barely coordinated with Europe on the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and it signed the AUKUS submarine deal with Australia and the United Kingdom without considering the repercussions for U.S. relations with France, which felt blindsided when the deal superseded its own submarine agreement with Canberra. The war in Ukraine drew U.S. attention back to Europe, but that attention is already beginning to wane.

Most important, the United States can no longer guarantee that its military will be able to come to Europe’s defense. Pentagon planners are laser-focused on a potential conflict with China, and should such a war break out, the United States would undoubtedly redeploy key capabilities, such as air defense systems and aircraft designed for transport and refueling, to the Indo-Pacific. Europe’s dependence on an overstretched U.S. defense industry would be a major vulnerability, as U.S. production would prioritize resupplying munitions and replacement equipment for U.S. forces in active combat. If the United States were to engage in hostilities with China, a revisionist Russia could also seize the opportunity to challenge NATO’s eastern flank. Deprived of the means to defend themselves, European countries could end up in the position Ukraine is in now, their war efforts undermined by a shortfall of U.S. supplies. That NATO is not already planning frantically for this scenario and European countries are not ramping up production and preparing to backfill systems that could be sent to the Indo-Pacific reveals that both are in a state of denial about where they rank on Washington’s list of priorities.

TIME TO INTEGRATE

The EU and the United Kingdom together have a military force that is roughly two million strong. But it is a Potemkin force: its readiness and capabilities vary by country but are generally low, and separate national militaries cannot coalesce into a unified fighting force without the direction and material support of the United States. If Europe is to truly take responsibility for its own security, it needs to integrate its defense efforts.

This is a task for NATO and the EU to share. NATO would continue to act as Europe’s combatant command, in charge of military planning and warfighting, as well as providing a political-military forum for Europe to coordinate with the United States, Canada, and Turkey. NATO planners should draw up a blueprint showing how European forces can acquire the capabilities they will need to reduce their dependence on the United States.

The EU, meanwhile, should act as NATO’s investment and procurement arm, using its ability to mobilize resources on behalf of Europe. Where NATO sets standards and procurement targets, the EU would provide the resources. The EU should develop its own defense budget, funded by some combination of joint EU borrowing, member state contributions, or increasing revenue sources through tariffs, pan-European taxation, or other means. Member states would still be responsible for developing their own military forces, but the EU could take the lead in procuring expensive aircraft fleets or building a common stockpile of munitions. The EU can also integrate national bureaucracies’ efforts to strengthen Europe’s fledgling defense industrial base. It would not be duplicating NATO’s functions, because NATO has never brought European members together in this way.

A more integrated European defense is overwhelmingly popular among Europeans.

Euroskeptic defense analysts often dismiss proposals to integrate European defense as foolhardy efforts to create a European army. But this assessment misconstrues how European integration would work. The first stage would address tangible problems and gaps, such as making up for munitions shortfalls, which requires significant but straightforward investments. Only later would knottier defense integration issues that entail structural reforms—such as whether Europe needs its own nuclear deterrent and, if the answer is yes, who would control it—be put on the table.

Some analysts fear that expanding the EU’s security role would invite a populist backlash. But polling consistently shows that a more integrated European defense is overwhelmingly popular among Europeans. A recent pan-European survey by Bertelsmann Stiftung, a German research institute, found that 87 percent of Europeans supported a common EU defense policy. Scholars have found that this strong support has been remarkably stable over time, and there is no reason to think that people’s attitudes would change when they learn the details of European defense integration plans. Another study, conducted in five European countries by scholars at the University of Amsterdam, found that EU citizens favor big ideas on European defense, including those that transfer responsibilities for military expenditure and even fielding troops from national governments to the EU, over less ambitious projects.

European politicians thus enjoy a generally permissive environment for advancing transformative policies. Some of them are recognizing the opportunity: ahead of EU parliamentary elections in June, leaders of the center-right European People’s Party, the largest party in the European Parliament and the one to which European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen belongs, have called for a dedicated EU defense budget of 0.5 percent of the bloc’s total GDP, on top of national defense spending.

European countries’ bureaucracies, not their publics, represent the biggest challenge. Today, 30 European defense ministries each bring their own vested bureaucratic and industrial interests to NATO. The ministries contribute to Europe’s shocking inefficiency in defense by applying idiosyncratic requirements, which often favor national defense companies, to weapons purchases. In practice, it makes little sense for each country to have its own processes. Most European defense forces, realistically, would be used only when NATO members act collectively. Yet European countries field a hodgepodge of equipment that makes it difficult for their militaries to deploy and fight together. For instance, after Russia’s invasion, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia bought armored vehicles from Sweden to replace the old Soviet systems they sent to Ukraine. But they ended up outfitting their vehicles with different caliber guns. The new systems are thus not fully interchangeable—a problem that could easily have been avoided had the two countries chosen to fully coordinate their procurement.

THE CLOCK IS TICKING

The EU has been able to integrate entrenched, protected state sectors before; successes such as its common agricultural policy provide proof of concept. Today, its work on the defense sector is already underway. Von der Leyen, who is running for a second five-year term as European Commission president this year, has proposed creating a new EU position, commissioner for defense, that would manage the EU’s expanding portfolio of defense initiatives and represent the EU both to member states and to third parties. The EU also has a new defense industrial strategy that encourages member states to buy the same defense systems—to address the interoperability problem—but its efforts need money to succeed. Estonia has proposed a scheme to create a 100-billion-euro fund for military aid to Ukraine and EU defense investment, which would serve as a starting point not just for further European support for Kyiv but also to expand the EU’s own defense activities.

Proper resources would allow the EU to procure and stockpile ammunition and buy new aircraft fleets—all without needing to formally change the Lisbon Treaty, which essentially serves as the union’s constitution. European NATO countries that are not members of the EU, such as Norway and the United Kingdom, could also be incorporated into EU efforts. Norway, by contributing to the EU budget, in some ways is already treated as a de facto member. The United Kingdom is a critical part of the European defense industrial base and its military forces are central to European security. The Labour Party, which is favored in the next British elections, has indicated its intention to bolster defense ties with the EU. Defense industrial cooperation could also help entice Turkey to stop blocking EU-NATO engagement because of its long-standing dispute with Cyprus (an EU member), which for years has impeded even basic coordination between the two institutions.

Integration does not mean replacing national defense forces with a single European army. France and Poland, for instance, will keep their own armies, but those armies should be able to operate together seamlessly, drawing on EU-funded forces and equipment.

Yet Europe may not have the time to integrate gradually. An abrupt withdrawal of U.S. forces from NATO might compel Europe to take dramatic action, but it could also leave the continent exposed militarily if it happens before Europe has built the capacity to guarantee its security. The shock could throw the continent into disarray. It would force Europe to face the most difficult aspects of integration immediately. On the issue of a nuclear deterrent, for example, some European states might rush to build their own stockpiles or make bilateral deals with Russia, creating deep splits within the EU and enabling wider nuclear proliferation.

The best option is for NATO leaders to push for a greater European role when the alliance convenes in Washington this summer. The United States should use its influence to advocate for European integration, and it should throw its support behind the kinds of EU defense efforts that Washington has historically opposed. A stronger, less dependent Europe would meet the United States as a genuine partner, giving Washington new reason to commit to the relationship. NATO, after all, will be more valuable as an alliance between two military powers than it is as a team led by just one.

• MAX BERGMANN is Director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Foreign Affairs · by Max Bergmann · March 21, 2024

26. Learning from the War on Terror

This Is quite an indictment.

Excerpts:

Frank Sobchak recently pointed out in these pages how Israel’s war echoes the U.S. failure to plan how to manage Iraq after the fall of president Saddam Hussein. My perspective is similar, but I might go further: What’s been happening in Gaza suggests none of the lessons from 20 years of global counter-terrorism conflicts were implemented.

...

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, warnings by veteran soldiers, intelligence officers, diplomats, and humanitarian workers about these and other issues with the war in Gaza would have been heeded. Their calls for a ceasefire would have been answered. These experts — including myself — have 20 years of experience trying to keep the world secure. In addition to the needless destruction and tragic loss of life in Gaza, from a military and intelligence perspective, all the hard-gained lessons from the Global War on Terror have been wasted.

Learning from the War on Terror - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Karen M. Sudkamp · March 21, 2024

At the height of the “Global War on Terror,” I spent over 10 years as an intelligence analyst. My work informed military counter-terrorism operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and supported the development and implementation of counter-terrorism policy at the Pentagon.

As I watched Israel’s operations in Gaza against Hamas — designated as a terrorist organization by not just Israel, but also the United States, the European Union, Britain, and NATO — I couldn’t help but be stunned. The invasion of Gaza proceeded as if combatting a terrorist group in an urban environment was a novel experience. Frank Sobchak recently pointed out in these pages how Israel’s war echoes the U.S. failure to plan how to manage Iraq after the fall of president Saddam Hussein. My perspective is similar, but I might go further: What’s been happening in Gaza suggests none of the lessons from 20 years of global counter-terrorism conflicts were implemented.

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After almost six months of military operations in Gaza, the lessons below are relevant whether a ceasefire is eventually reached between Hamas and Israel or not. (The latest reporting indicates negotiations are stalled.) In the event of a pause in fighting and hostage release, Israeli forces can review operations in Gaza and revise military strategy and doctrine using the lessons learned in two decades of the Global War on Terror. If hostilities continue, Israeli forces should learn from these same lessons and prioritize reducing civilian harm — which includes limiting civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure — in their operations.

Lessons Learned from the Global War on Terror

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, Israel wouldn’t have commenced military operations in Gaza without a firm strategy and clear objective. “Destroy Hamas” was not, and is not, a sound military objective.

“Destroying” a terrorist organization through military force alone is impossible. The most common way for a terrorist group to be defeated, according to research, is through a transition to the political process. In 43 percent of the cases between 1968 and 2008 where terrorist groups were brought into the political process, political goals were achieved and the groups ended. Another 40 percent of the time, the arrest or killing of key leaders by law enforcement or intelligence agencies led to the end of terrorist groups. The self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant was territorially defeated in Syria in 2019 using military force, but its members are still carrying out attacks in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, Israel conducted four major military operations in Gaza in the last 15 years but never eliminated Hamas or even permanently reduced its military capabilities. Religiously motivated terrorist organizations are particularly persistent; only 32 percent of religiously motivated groups ended between 1968 and 2008, a rate half that of secularly motivated groups.

Hamas is a designated foreign terrorist organization, but it has also governed the Gaza Strip for over a decade. It is intertwined in the local economy, governance, and society. Thus, the group’s defeat calls for a military campaign with multiple, complementary lines of effort. One line is a direct targeting effort focusing on the capture or killing of Hamas leadership, such as the one conducted against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State throughout the Middle East and East Africa. While this can certainly cause splintering and decentralization of groups, the deaths of charismatic leaders such as Osama bin Ladin and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi also precipitated the overall decline in effectiveness for their groups. However, fully eradicating Hamas’ influence and presence will require a multifaceted effort, more akin to a counter-insurgency operation — Hamas is integrated into society in Gaza as many insurgent groups like the Taliban and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka were. This effort would place a higher emphasis on reducing civilian harm and preserving and protecting local societies and economies, while also looking beyond the immediate stage of fighting.

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, operations in Gaza would be precise, supported by detailed intelligence and precision weapons.

Instead, in just the first week following Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel, the Israel Defense Forces said it dropped 6,000 bombs on Gaza. (For comparison, the U.S.-led coalition fighting the Islamic State dropped 10,000 bombs in Raqqa, Syria, over a four-month period. Even that, using precision weaponry and targeting, left 60 to 80 percent of the city uninhabitable.) Despite the Israel Defense Forces’ public insistence that it was using precision weapons, 40 to 45 percent of the munitions it fired in the first two months of the war had no guidance system. Fighting in a densely populated urban environment against an adversary that uses civilians and their infrastructure as shields demands accuracy, as seen in Mosul and Raqqa against the Islamic State. This is the only way to limit civilian harm to humans and infrastructure and is required by international law, as previously noted by Amos Fox.

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, the Israel Defense Forces also would take the time necessary to precisely target Hamas’ senior leadership. Establishing a pattern of life for such targets requires significant time and intelligence, but it is also the best way to correctly identify locations and targets and to limit civilian harm, including hostages.

The Israel Defense Forces’ continued use of the AI-enabled target-creation platform called “the Gospel” led to an unprecedented number of bombings in a short period of time. During the first month of operations, the Israel Defense Forces hit more than 12,000 targets. In a quickly changing environment, in which civilians, aid workers, and Hamas fighters and leadership are all on the move, it is difficult for humans to spend enough time verifying AI-recommended targets to ensure accuracy. Moreover, excessive reliance on AI removes what little human culpability and morality currently remains in the execution of war. In contrast to the widespread violence carried out in Gaza in the first weeks after Oct. 7 is the Jan. 2 targeted killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri in Beirut. Israeli officials refused to confirm or deny responsibility for the attack, but damage to civilians and infrastructure was minimal and proven to be within presumed Israeli military capabilities.

Israeli military and intelligence forces should review targeting processes and procedures to ensure they are allowing ample time to develop a pattern of life and prioritizing reducing civilian harm. Ryan Evans previously discussed how the Israel Defense Forces are not doing this in Gaza. During operations against the Islamic State, the U.S.-led coalition typically had a threshold for acceptable number of non-combatant deaths of zero or one. If any civilian could potentially die as a result of a military strike, the local commander was required to seek higher approval to conduct the operation. After U.S.-led coalition operations in Raqqa, military officials highlighted that they prioritized unplanned, dynamic airstrikes to support ongoing military operation. This placed primacy on the protection of the coalition-supported ground forces and reducing Islamic State capabilities, which reduced the amount of time to properly and effectively establish a pattern of life to reduce civilian harm.

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, maintaining public accountability for military operations would be seen as a critical foundation and building block for long-term security in Gaza.

At several junctures during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military launched investigations into allegations of misconduct and civilian casualties. Following events such as the detainee mistreatment at Abu Ghraib in Iraq or the accidental bombing of a civilian hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, the United States investigated the incident, prosecuted perpetrators as appropriate, and updated training or processes as required. Demonstrating a culture of adherence to the rule of law and rules of armed conflict was a critical step in rebuilding trust with Afghan and Iraqi partners. In early February, the Israel Defense Forces began to investigate claims of possible violations of international law concerning civilian casualties. This is a tentative first step toward demonstrating accountability, which may begin to ease global concerns over Israeli operations, including the case brought to the International Criminal Court by South Africa. Behaving in accordance with international laws and norms would also reduce the potential for retaliatory violence within Israel or the Gaza Strip by Hamas or other Palestinian terrorist groups.

Israel can and should do more to increase transparency. International press should be allowed to independently document military operations and communicate with Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip, in real time. To supplement Israel Defense Forces investigations, Israel should provide unimpeded access to Gaza by international human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch, Airwars, and Amnesty International so that they can investigate allegations of civilian harm and publish the results. Cooperation between the U.S. military and international human rights organizations during operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria pushed the United States to reduce civilian harm, to improve U.S. military investigations into civilian casualties, and to acknowledge higher numbers of civilian deaths.

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, Israel would have recognized that protecting civilians is the only way to ensure its long-term security and counter support for Hamas.

The Gaza Ministry of Health data indicates that over 100,000 residents of Gaza have been killed or injured — about 4 in 100 Palestinians in the territory. The United Nations estimated in December that 60 percent of homes have been destroyed; others suggest that the war has destroyed more than 80 percent of all structures in northern Gaza. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, drawing on his experience as a four-star general overseeing the battle against terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Iraq, summed up the risk that this kind of violence toward civilians presents on Dec. 12: “In this kind of a fight, the center of gravity is the civilian population. And if you drive them into the arms of the enemy, you replace a tactical victory with a strategic defeat.”

Polling indicates that more Palestinians now support Hamas than did before the Oct. 7 attack on Israel. But support for the terrorist organization still remains below 50 percent in both Gaza and the West Bank. To decrease support for terrorist and insurgent organizations, civilians should be given effective political and social options. They need homes, businesses, educational facilities, and communities to rebuild. Uneven and insufficient reconstruction efforts in northeastern Syria since 2017, coupled with the ongoing Syrian civil war, have provided the Islamic State an opportunity to maintain insurgent activities and pressure against civilians and local governing authorities.

Instead, 85 percent of Palestinians, almost 2 million people, have been displaced since Oct. 7. Many have moved multiple times. They have been pushed into areas of southern Gaza that have no humanitarian infrastructure. Evacuation routes are not safe and secure. Aid organizations say continued fighting and slow border crossings are producing a severe hunger and public health crisis. Over 90 percent of children under the age of 24 months as well as pregnant and breastfeeding women eat food of the “lowest nutritional value and from only two or fewer food groups,” a result of severe food insecurity. According to the same United Nations Children’s Fund report, 90 percent of children are suffering from one or more infectious diseases.

The current and next generations of Palestinians are at risk of disease, starvation and malnutrition, under-education, and generational trauma. The Gaza Strip is facing an imminent famine. Despite warnings that it would cause long-term environmental damage to local agriculture and the water table, Israel began pumping seawater to flood some of the tunnels under Gaza in early February. This will limit Gazans’ ability to restart the economy and maintain public health.

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, Israel and its Western partners and allies would work with trusted and vetted aid organizations to create safe zones for civilians. These areas would remain as demilitarized humanitarian evacuation zones so Palestinians would not have to move again until they can return home. The safe zones would contain adequate housing, water and food supplies, sanitation and hygiene, and medical resources. Israel should also provide international aid organizations consistent and secure daily access to the Gaza Strip to support humanitarian aid deliveries. Humanitarian aid to Gaza prior to Oct. 7 was already insufficient, and now the situation is even more dire. Instead, the Israel Defense Forces plan to conduct military operations in Rafah, where almost half of Gaza’s population has sought refuge, having been told by Israeli authorities to evacuate there from northern and central Gaza.

If lessons from the Global War on Terrorism were learned, Israel would already be working with international and local partners to prepare for future governance, stabilization, and reconstruction in Gaza.

Planning for what happens after the end of hostilities should begin now. Reconstruction of Gaza is critical for the future stability and safety not only of Palestinians, but also of Israel. Ensuring that Gaza has a viable economy, government, and civil society respects the humanity of Palestinians, will provide them a future, and will help ensure the security of Israel. Both Israelis and Palestinians should be involved in any post-conflict stabilization planning, but this planning should not occur along separate paths. The United States and European partners, regional Arab countries, and trusted nongovernmental organizations and commercial partners should also be included in the planning to ensure success. Provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and Iraq could provide a template for integrating multiple stakeholders into stabilization and reconstruction processes, especially local leaders. Plans for the reconstruction of Ukraine, Yemen, and Mosul could also provide roadmaps for Gaza.

Unfortunately, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s latest plan for post-conflict Gaza does not provide for stabilization or reconstruction. It prioritizes Israeli security control, access, and demilitarization — at the expense of Palestinians — of the Gaza Strip. It does not give Palestinians agency or a voice in their own future, which will likely undercut long-term security in Israel, the Gaza Strip, and possibly the West Bank. Credible Palestinian political representatives, identified by Palestinians themselves, should also be involved in crafting a reconstruction and governance structure following the end of hostilities. In Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S.-led coalitions appointed interim, mostly formerly expatriate, leaders, prior to national elections, which did not provide accurate or effective representation. There should be free and fair elections in Gaza — the first since 2006 — which would provide Palestinians a voice in their leadership.

In Syria, local partners to the U.S.-led coalition prioritized protecting civilians and pushed the military to do the same during counter–Islamic State operations. This partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces brought together local Arab and Kurdish leaders and fighting forces. While combatting the Islamic State was the priority, these coalition forces also were concerned about stabilization and reconstruction upon the territorial defeat of the terrorist organization. Unfortunately, in Gaza, Israel has few local partners of the same stature. Palestinians in the Gaza Strip also lack a government that prioritizes their interests, welfare, and security. And yet, local support is the only way to achieve long-lasting security. After the end of fighting and during the reconstruction of Gaza, the establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee could help achieve peace and identify local partners committed to stability. These have been successful globally, such as in South Africa, Canada, and throughout Latin America.

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, warnings by veteran soldiers, intelligence officers, diplomats, and humanitarian workers about these and other issues with the war in Gaza would have been heeded. Their calls for a ceasefire would have been answered. These experts — including myself — have 20 years of experience trying to keep the world secure. In addition to the needless destruction and tragic loss of life in Gaza, from a military and intelligence perspective, all the hard-gained lessons from the Global War on Terror have been wasted.

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Karen M. Sudkamp is a national security researcher at RAND, a nonprofit, non-partisan policy think tank, with a focus on how to limit the impacts of conflict on civilian populations. She spent over a decade in the U.S. intelligence community supporting political-military and counter-terrorism analysis, operations, and policy focused on the Middle East.

Image: Fars News

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Karen M. Sudkamp · March 21, 2024

27. U.S. to review Israeli assurances it is not violating international law

U.S. to review Israeli assurances it is not violating international law

Israel has been accused of violating the laws of war in Gaza. Now it has to prove innocence to the State Department, at the risk of losing critical U.S. arms supplies.

By Karen DeYoung and John Hudson

March 20, 2024 at 8:10 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoung · March 21, 2024

The State Department has received Israel’s required written assurances, ahead of a Sunday deadline, that its use of U.S-supplied defense equipment does not violate international humanitarian or U.S. human rights law, according to U.S. and Israeli officials.

The Department now has until early May to formally assess whether those assurances are “credible and reliable” and report to Congress under a national security memorandum issued by President Biden in February. If Israel’s pledges are found wanting, Biden has the option at any point of suspending any further U.S. arms transfers.

The delivery last Friday of the assurance letter signed by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant comes as Israel and the Biden administration are locked in a contentious debate over Israel’s plan for a major military offensive in the southern Gaza city of Rafah. Biden has warned that the operation risks a humanitarian catastrophe and called it a “mistake,” according to national security adviser Jake Sullivan. Delivery of the letter was first reported by Axios.

Officials who confirmed receipt of the Israeli letter spoke on the condition of anonymity about private diplomatic exchanges.

A team of senior Israeli officials is due in Washington early next week, at Biden’s request, to discuss the ongoing offensive. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a video address to the nation Wednesday, said he told Biden in a Monday phone call that it was “impossible” for Israel to prevail in its war against Hamas without entering Rafah, and he has already approved the military’s operational plan.

“We are determined to achieve total victory and we will achieve it,” Netanyahu said.

Israel has long been the largest recipient of U.S. military aid, eclipsed only by Ukraine in the past two years. Since the war in Gaza began with Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack, killing about 1,200 Israelis and taking at least 250 hostages, the Biden administration has expedited the shipment of thousands of bombs and munitions for use in more than five months of Israeli air and ground strikes inside Gaza.

According to local health authorities, nearly 32,000 Palestinians — the majority women and children — have died in attacks Biden has called “indiscriminate.” At the same time, Israeli restrictions on humanitarian aid entering the besieged enclave have led the United Nations and other international aid groups to warn of imminent famine and rampant disease. More than half of Gaza’s 2.2 million prewar population is now crammed into squalid conditions in and around Rafah, most of them sheltering there after fleeing from fighting farther north.

Netanyahu has said that the Israel Defense Forces are developing a plan to evacuate civilians from Rafah, although the United Nations — by far the largest distributor of aid in Gaza — has said that nowhere is safe and that it will not be party to forced relocation, itself a violation of international law.

This week, Human Rights Watch and Oxfam called on the Biden administration to rule that any Israeli assurances are “not credible” and to impose the “immediate suspension” of arms transfers. They issued a joint report documenting what they said were clear “violations of international humanitarian law, deprivation of services critical to the survival of the civilian population and arbitrary denial and restrictions of humanitarian aid.”

In January, the International Court of Justice, ruling on an action brought by South Africa, ordered Israel to take action to prevent the possibility of genocide in its war against Hamas inside Gaza, stopping short of saying genocide was already occurring. It also ordered Israel to take action to improve the situation for Palestinian civilians there.

In recent weeks, members of Congress including Sens. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) and Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) have called on the administration to withhold military assistance if Israel does not allow more assistance to civilians in Gaza.

U.S. officials have said privately that they have considered restricting arms shipments. But concerns about losing influence with the Netanyahu government have so far carried the day, even as the administration has become more outspoken in its disagreement with what it calls Israel’s lack of a coherent, sustainable strategy in the war.

On Monday, Sullivan was asked if the apparent failure of the White House’s public and private entreaties to Israel meant that conditions on arms were needed.

“Obviously, words aren’t enough,” Sullivan said. “It’s action that matters. And the action that matters is flowing trucks’ and ships’ worth of humanitarian assistance — particularly food, water, and medicine — to people who are gravely in need of it.” He did not mention potential restrictions on arms sales.

The national security memorandum signed by Biden on Feb. 8 was clearly a response to rising concerns about Israel’s conduct of the war. It repeated many of the arms transfer rules in place in U.S. and international law, but included new assessment, transparency and reporting requirements.

While the memorandum applies to more than 70 countries receiving U.S. weaponry, more restrictive reporting requirements are placed on seven countries currently involved in armed conflict, including both Israel and Ukraine. Each was given an initial 45 days for a senior official to provide “credible and reliable written assurances” that it will use U.S. defense material in accordance with international humanitarian and other laws.

The law of war imposes specific requirements on targeting, protection of civilians and treatment of prisoners. The memo also requires recipient countries to “facilitate and not arbitrarily deny, restrict or otherwise impede, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance” or U.S.-supported international efforts to provide aid.

Israel has repeatedly said it is not impeding aid and charged the United Nations with incompetence in distributing assistance and Hamas with looting aid trucks. The administration has disputed those assertions. In his State of the Union speech earlier this month, Biden ordered the U.S. military to build a temporary pier for delivery of aid to Gaza by sea.

But, he said, “Israel must also do its part. Israel must allow more aid into Gaza and ensure that humanitarian workers aren’t caught in the crossfire. ... Humanitarian assistance cannot be a secondary consideration or a bargaining chip.”

If assurances provided on the use of U.S. weapons are “called into question” by the Secretary of State or Defense, the memo says, they must report that initial assessment to the president and within 45 days indicate “appropriate next steps,” ranging from seeking additional assurances “to suspending any further transfers of defense articles or, as appropriate, defense services.” Any such report to the president must also be notified to Congress within seven days.

The memo does not require any specific action by the president.

Any potential restriction on supplying weapons does not apply to air defense systems or other articles intended for purely defensive or nonlethal purposes. The U.S. government has spent billions on Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system, which shoots down incoming projectiles.

During the 45 days after receiving the country assurances, the two secretaries must conduct a detailed assessment of its reliability, including consideration of “any credible reports or allegations” of actions violating international law, or those “inconsistent” with “best practices” adopted by the U.S. military.

At the end of that period — a deadline that falls on May 8 — they must present Congress with an unclassified written report, along with applicable in-person briefings by senior officials, of their assessment and actions.

Similar assurances and assessments will be required each fiscal year and thereafter. But the initial report this year, the memo says, must include any available information beginning in January 2023 on the use of U.S. defense articles and services by any country engaged in armed conflict.

The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoung · March 21, 2024

28. Delay, Disrupt, Degrade: Mine Warfare in Taiwan’s Porcupine Defense

Excerpt:

Conclusion

On the shore of the Tamsui River today, a sculpture with a “dove of love and peace” sits perched atop yellow naval mines, commemorating the historic location where sea mines halted France’s invasion fleet from sailing into Taipei. The lessons the French learned at this site 140 years ago are no less true today: The naval mine remains an effective sea denial weapon to wield against an amphibious invader.

Delay, Disrupt, Degrade: Mine Warfare in Taiwan’s Porcupine Defense - War on the Rocks

JONATHAN DORSEY, KELLY A. GRIECO, AND JENNIFER KAVANAGH

warontherocks.com · by Jonathan Dorsey · March 21, 2024

In October 1884, as part of the wider Sino-French War, a contingent of heavily armed French warships sailed toward the harbor of Tamsui, in northern Taiwan. When the fleet approached the estuary of the Tamsui River, nine naval mines and boats loaded with stones blocked its path. Prevented from sailing into Taipei, French commanders dispatched their marines, but they fared little better. After several hours of fighting on land they were driven back into the sea.

Today, Taiwan again faces the threat of invasion — this time from China. As Taiwan’s leaders consider their defensive options, the Battle of Tamsui may also hold answers.

U.S. officials and Taiwanese strategists have argued that Taiwan’s best defense is to become a “porcupine,” bristling with “a large number of small things.” Military analysts have proposed denying air superiority to China via mobile surface-to-air missiles and drones and creating a “prickly fortress of sea denial” with road-mobile anti-ship missiles. What is largely missing is a similarly detailed discussion of the concepts and tactics for mine warfare. The naval mine, however, as RAND’s Scott Savitz has argued, is one of the most potent and cost-effective denial weapons available to Taiwan.

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Strategically placed naval mines would allow Taiwan to leverage its natural geographic advantages to strengthen deterrence by denial and build a formidable defense in depth. Exploiting Taiwan’s shallow waters and treacherous coastline, mines employed at different water depths and locations would offer Taiwan a low-cost and effective means to delay, disrupt, and degrade Chinese forces. Taiwan could integrate these concepts, slowing down a Chinese invasion and interfering with its timing and tempo by channeling Chinese movements into corridors for Taiwan’s anti-ship missiles, gun batteries, and drones, inflicting significant attrition.

Sea mines are, of course, not a panacea to solve all the security threats facing Taiwan, which include gray-zone activities and a blockade of the island. Protective mining would likely be less useful to defend Taiwan against these other forms of Chinese coercion, but to the extent that China might employ such means to weaken Taiwan in advance of an amphibious invasion, mining would still offer Taiwan a valuable line of defense. To exploit mine warfare in this way, however, Taiwan would need to make it an investment priority, expanding the size and diversity of its mine stockpile and minelaying capabilities and improving its readiness to execute such a campaign.

Taiwan’s Deterrence Challenge

The credibility of Taiwan’s deterrence depends on convincing China it cannot accomplish a fait accompli, rapidly seizing the island before coalition forces have time to intervene. Given that Taiwan cannot match China ship for ship, or missile for missile, strategists have called on Taipei to adopt an “asymmetric” approach. Lee Hsi-min, a retired admiral and former chief of staff of Taiwan’s armed forces, for example, has developed an overall defense concept, which envisions employing numerous small and low-cost systems in a distributed way that can survive an initial bombardment and then conduct a protracted and effective resistance.

Taiwan has two critical advantages — it only needs to contest sea control to deny China a victory, and it would be fighting from its home territory. The British naval theorist Julian Corbett distinguished between sea control, aimed at securing freedom of action and maneuver at a specific time and place, and sea denial, which seeks to prevent an adversary from gaining such control. Taiwan only needs to achieve sea denial, which is much easier than the sea control required for a successful amphibious attack. Given that the People’s Liberation Army would need sea control to support amphibious operations, Taiwan’s strategy should aim to convince Beijing it cannot obtain it. Employed in a way consistent with international law, naval mines placed on Taiwan’s western coast and within its own waters can contribute directly to sea denial, restricting the invasion fleet’s access to the littorals and limiting its freedom of movement.

Taiwan’s geography is especially favorable to a sea denial campaign and to the use of mines. The waters off the island’s west coast, including those to the north and south of its largest ports, are shallow, making them ideally suited for mining. With a limited number of beaches suitable for an amphibious landing and many of these quite narrow and steep, Taiwan would be able to concentrate its mining efforts in a discrete number of locations. The shallow depths and mudflats surrounding Taiwan would enhance the effects of naval mines laid near its shores, making it easier to channel Chinese forces into areas where they are most vulnerable to Taiwan’s other defenses.

Three Concepts of Sea Denial

Protective mining operations would allow Taiwan to deny a Chinese fait accompli through three primary mechanisms: delaying the amphibious assault, disrupting the attacker’s plans, and degrading the advancing forces.

Operations to Delay: For Taiwan, delaying the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army on its shores with the use of naval mines would give its forces additional time to organize a defense and require China to divert significant resources to costly and personnel-intensive minesweeping operations.

Taiwanese mines — or suspected mines — would provide one of the “outer layers” of a defense in depth, requiring the People’s Liberation Army to fight its way past each layer. By combining different types of mines, employed at different water depths and varied distances from shore, Taiwan could create a multifaceted and hard-to-solve problem for China. The People’s Liberation Army Navy would have to deploy assets to neutralize the mines or find alternate routes, both time-consuming processes. With many types of mines, China’s minesweepers would need to employ different types of countermeasures, multiplying the time required to clear or neutralize the threat. For example, Taiwan could employ bottom mines and a series of moored influence and moored contact mines to create a vertical “curtain” — varying both threat types and depths of placement to make it especially difficult for China to sweep the area.

Minefield density could also be leveraged as a tool to protract timelines. China has about 60 mine countermeasures ships, but not all vessels are able to clear all types of mines. Estimating based on historical averages and assuming that a third are not operationally ready due to maintenance, each of China’s 40 available minesweepers might clear 0.8 to 2 mines per day, for a total of 32 to 80 mines. Creating a Q-route, or cleared passageway, typically requires removing 10 percent of a minefield. Doing so through even a small minefield of 600 mines, therefore, could delay Chinese forces at least 0.75 to 1.8 days, and possibly longer if mines are laid close together. Large numbers of decoy mines, intermixed with real ones, could also be a cheap way for Taiwan to increase the time and effort required for Chinese mine clearance operations. Taiwan could cause further delays by targeting the minesweepers, which work in predictable patterns, with anti-ship missiles and loitering munitions.

North Korea’s mining of Wonsan Harbor in 1950 offers a model. After landing at Inchon on Sept. 15, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the commander-in-chief of U.N. forces, ordered an amphibious assault on Wonsan to encircle enemy forces retreating from the south. With “mines too numerous to count” blocking the assault path to the beach, the U.S. Navy began a complex sweeping operation, resulting in the loss of four ships and a delayed start to the amphibious attack. “Those damn mines cost us eight days’ delay in getting troops ashore,” Adm. Forrest Sherman concluded, warning, “I can all too-easy think of circumstances when eight days’ delay offshore could mean losing a war.”

Operations to Disrupt: Mine warfare also offers Taiwan a low-cost way to interfere with China’s military plans, increasing the risk of operational failure. Any military operation — and especially one as complex as an amphibious invasion — is meticulously planned and choreographed ahead of time, but the People’s Liberation Army’s preference for highly scripted operations leaves it particularly vulnerable to disruptions and inhibits the battlefield adaptationneeded for success.

First, protective mining would deny China one of the attacker’s main operational advantages — the element of surprise. Chinese mine-clearing efforts would be easily detected. China likely lacks sufficient minesweeping capabilities to conduct multiple feints, making the location of Chinese clearing efforts one of the most reliable indicators of Chinese operational intentions. This early warning would allow Taiwan’s defenders to reinforce the one or two beaches where Chinese forces are sweeping the waters for mines.

Second, mines will impede the movement of advancing forces and upset even the best-laid plans. Mines provide a concealed threat, lurking below the surface, ready to strike. A ship damaged by an uncleared mine creates a collision risk for advancing ships, forcing the formation to redirect its route — a challenge exacerbated by the narrowness of Taiwan’s beaches and the approaches to them — and diverting other assets to support rescue efforts. Remote mines that can be activated at a time of Taiwan’s choosing could be especially effective for disruption operations, targeting vessels at key places within the invasion fleet’s formation. As other ships work to clear the obstruction and address the threat, the attention of the fleet is distracted from its primary mission. It can also trigger a cascading effect, leaving ships out of sync with the pre-planned movements of the amphibious assault.

The threat of sea mines can even be enough to halt an entire operation — the ultimate disruption. During the Great Retreat of the Russian army in World War I, Russian sea mines, supported by artillery and a naval squadron, were sufficiently dangerous to cause the Germans to end a naval operation threatening the Russian army’s seaward flank. “Operation against Gulf of Riga broken off in view of the presence of very powerful minefields, one following another,” the German commander reported. His minesweepers later managed to clear a passage through the mines and enter the gulf, but after spotting a floating mine he ordered the fleet to retire for the night. When the German ships returned the next day, they discovered the Russians had used that time to seed new minefields. The Germans called off the attack and withdrew.

Operations to Degrade: Finally, naval mines can degrade China’s capabilities to invade Taiwan, damaging or sinking Chinese ships, inflicting significant physical and psychological attrition to its invasion forces, and helping to offset an unfavorable balance of forces.

Mines can contribute to the degradation of Chinese forces in two main ways. First, they can inflict direct damage on Chinese vessels and landing forces approaching Taiwan’s beaches. Since World War II, for example, 15 U.S. Navy ships have been sunk or damaged by mines, amounting to about four times the losses of all other threats combined. Second, mines can indirectly contribute to damage by leading adversary forces into shallow and rocky waters and shaping the littoral environment. Taiwanese minefields arranged in strategic locations or patterns — for example staggered in tiers or overlapping bunches — could create barriers that, together with Taiwan’s inhospitable geography, channel the People’s Liberation Army into kill zones, allowing Taiwan’s anti-ship missiles, torpedoes, gun batteries, and drones to multiply their destructive effects and attrit China’s invasion forces.

The French and British learned this lesson during World War I when they attacked the Dardanelles in 1915, aiming to open the straits and seize Constantinople. The campaign was a disaster from the start. With the waters heavily mined, Allied ships were forced into narrow areas covered by the enemy’s coastal forts and heavy gun batteries. Commanders then attempted to take Constantinople by amphibious assault. Here too, mines were the Allies’ undoing. Enemy minefields channelized the Allied landing, restricting the size of the landing areas and limiting fire support and resupply. The result was a costly and failed campaign.

Building a Protective Mining Capability

Though mines would significantly strengthen Taiwan’s deterrence and defense, Taipei has not made the necessary preparations. Taiwan’s navy continues to prioritize small numbers of large surface combatants over acquiring the “large number of small things,” including sea mines, needed to implement an asymmetric strategy. Investing in the necessary capabilities and improving readiness to carry out mining operations, however, should be top priorities for Taiwan.

Materiel Gaps: Taiwan would need to address materiel gaps, both in mines and minelayers. Taiwan’s current stock of mines is relatively small and old. For a robust mine campaign, however, Taiwan would need large and diverse stocks of sea mines for creating layered minefields of many sizes and densities. Taiwan’s top priority should be acquiring numerous cheap and easy-to-produce mines, such as simple air- or surface-delivered moored contact mines or even homemade “MacGyver mines” made from waterproof landmines. Simple mines such as these can cost as little as $2,000 each but still cause much damage, especially if placed in water depths of less than 30 feet close to a landing beach, where they would cause casualties and subsequent delays.

In addition, Taiwan could acquire smaller numbers of more advanced influence and remote-controlled mines. Influence mines activate when they sense a ship’s acoustic or magnetic signature above them or are activated by the pressure created as a ship moves past and would be especially useful in the shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait. They can also be set with “ship counters” to activate when the second or n-th ship passes — letting minesweepers pass before targeting higher-value vessels. Remote mines would allow Taiwan to mine ports and beaches well in advance of any invasion attempt.

To lay these mines quickly, Taiwan would need to expand its minelaying capabilities. Taiwan could use aircraft or surface vessels to deliver the bulk of these mines. Civilian militia trained to push homemade mines off the back of small boats could also contribute. Taiwan has four new indigenously produced minelayers, but some advanced mines would require sub-surface delivery. Given Taiwan’s submarine fleet is small, it could acquire uncrewed subsurface vessels designed for minelaying, such as the U.S.-developed Orca system or explore cheaper options — similar to the underwater drones used in the Red Sea.

Readiness Gaps: A successful mine warfare campaign would also require training and staging to ensure Taiwan can quickly and effectively lay a large and diverse array of mines. Taiwan has conducted some small-scale minelaying drills, but most of its training on mines seems to focus on countermeasures. Taiwan should make minelaying a much more intensive part of its military training programs and a visible one — signaling to China that it has this capability.

A more robust training regime should focus on preparing Taiwan to quickly lay mines at scale. Relying mainly on inert mines (or even similarly sized balls or barrels) for these trainings, Taiwan could practice seeding ports and beaches. Taiwan should prioritize training its air, naval, and coast guard forces, but should eventually expand training to a civilian militia, working to integrate the island’s fishing fleet into minelaying operations.

More generally, Taiwan will need to develop operational plans that address questions of staging, timing, sequencing, and logistics of a protective mining campaign ahead of time. Given China’s missile threat to Taiwan’s surface or airborne minelayers, Taipei would want to have its minefields in place before the shooting war begins, creating several challenges for the island’s political and military leaders. For instance, Taiwan will need to decide at what point in a crisis — should a Chinese invasion appear impending — it would begin protective mining, including which ports and beaches to prioritize and how to distribute its stocks across locations. The stakes would be high, as protective mining could trigger public or economic panic and even offer Beijing a convenient casus belli to confuse international public opinion over who started the conflict, given both claim those territorial waters as their own.

To lay thousands of mines, Taiwan will need at least several days, if not more than a week, while taking care not to impede commercial traffic through the Taiwan Strait — a move that could prompt international backlash and cost Taiwan some of its international sympathy. To be ready, Taiwan should adopt procedures to allow for a rapid mining campaign, including distributing its mine stockpiles to numerous locations with easy access for use. It should also invest more in sub-surface delivered mines, especially remote mines that can be activated in the future, and simple mines that can be laid quickly in bulk. Finally, Taipei might consider socializing its plan for mining with international partners to consolidate their support.

Conclusion

On the shore of the Tamsui River today, a sculpture with a “dove of love and peace” sits perched atop yellow naval mines, commemorating the historic location where sea mines halted France’s invasion fleet from sailing into Taipei. The lessons the French learned at this site 140 years ago are no less true today: The naval mine remains an effective sea denial weapon to wield against an amphibious invader.

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Jonathan Dorsey is a Naval Aviator, recently commanded a FDNF squadron, and is now a U.S. Navy fellow at the Stimson Center. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, or the US Government.

Kelly A. Grieco is a senior fellow in the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center, a nonresident fellow with the Marine Corps University’s Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfare, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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warontherocks.com · by Jonathan Dorsey · March 21, 2024

29. How the US Neoliberal Shift Fed China’s Rise

Excerpt:

The continued focus in Washington today on the threat of “Made in China” peddles the myth that the United States is no longer a manufacturing nation and, in the process, it removes accountability from corporate decisions that pursue low wages over all else. The problem at the heart of U.S. industrial policy today, then, isn’t China. It’s a politics that enables these actions by prioritizing capital over labor.

How the US Neoliberal Shift Fed China’s Rise

thediplomat.com · by Shannon Tiezzi

Elizabeth O’Brien Ingleson discusses the intersecting economic interests in China and the U.S. that transformed global trade starting in the 1970s.

By

March 19, 2024

Credit: Depositphotos

The great rapprochement between China and the United States in the 1970s was driven by geopolitical calculations: The Nixon administration’s gambit to form a united front with Mao’s China against the Soviet Union. But in the long run, the biggest outcome may have been economic. The reopening of China-U.S. trade lines would eventually rewire the entire global economy, turning China into the “world’s factory” while hollowing out manufacturing employment in the United States.

Elizabeth O’Brien Ingleson delves into this seismic transformation in her new book, “Made in China: When US-China Interests Converged to Transform Global Trade.” In this interview with The Diplomat, Ingleson, an assistant professor of international history at the London School of Economics, explores how the shift toward neoliberal capitalism in the 1970s and 1980s rewrote the dynamics of China-U.S. trade – and ultimately China-U.S. relations.

“In order for China to converge with global capitalism, the United States – the largest and most powerful player in the capitalist system – needed to accommodate China’s needs,” she explained. And that is story that unfolded in boardrooms and factory floors on both sides of the Pacific Ocean.

Overviews of the China-U.S. trade relationship often focus on the shifts in China’s economic policy, particularly the “reform and opening” approach introduced in 1978. But you argue that “transformation in the U.S. economy was critical to China’s eventual convergence with global capitalism.” How did the economic changes happening in both countries reinforce each other?

One of the big questions scholars of modern China are grappling with is how and why the country converged with the global capitalist system. An earlier debate among scholars sought to understand what Kenneth Pomeranz memorably described as the “great divergence” in industrialization between Northwest Europe and East Asia since the mid-18th century. More recently, a group of economists have put forward the notion of “convergence” as a means of understanding China’s relationship to global capitalism in the latter part of the 20th century.

I think this is a useful framework for understanding China’s transformation; what might be best be labelled the “great convergence” with global capitalism. The reform and opening Deng announced in late 1978 looms large in these accounts – and for good reason. The post-1978 changes were indeed crucial to this process. But scholars whose main focus is on China have tended to pay less attention to the capitalist system with which China began to engage. In order for China to converge with global capitalism, the United States – the largest and most powerful player in the capitalist system – needed to accommodate China’s needs.

So, my interest was in bringing these two dynamics together: the changes happening within China as well as those happening within U.S. capitalism. And I found that even before Deng’s reforms, Chinese reformers began to experiment with ways of integrating China’s own development goals with processes that were underway within the United States and accelerating in the 1970s: the internationalization of manufacturing through cheap offshore labor and emerging supply chains.

American businesspeople had already begun slowly internationalizing their manufacturing before trade with China reopened. In the 1950s and 1960s, they turned to noncommunist sources like Japan and Taiwan. In the 1970s, China’s leaders began to adapt to these emerging dynamics, and in the process they slowly transcended the Cold War divisions that had so long divided China and the United States.

In most parts of the world, the Cold War ended in the late 1980s when the Soviet Union began to collapse and the U.S.-led vision of neoliberal capitalism became the key organizing principle for social development. But in the case of U.S.-China relations, the Cold War ended without systemic collapse in either nation. Instead, Cold War divisions between these two nations fizzled out during the 1970s through a gradual convergence of interests between U.S. capitalism and Chinese communism.

The history I tell can’t be told without exploring the decisions and actions happening in both countries. I wasn’t able to make sense of the changes happening amongst U.S. business community trading with China without looking deeply and with proper consideration of what was happening in China. And the reverse is also true too. The ways that Chinese pragmatists started to integrate with the capitalist system necessitated an understanding of changes happening in the post-Bretton Woods United States. In that sense it’s very much a transnational story – one that had a wide-reaching impact on global capitalism and trade.

One of the central themes of your book is the importance of the shift in how China was imagined by U.S. businesses and economists: from a potential market for U.S. goods to a source of cheap labor. How did that change in U.S. business perceptions mesh with the goals of the Chinese state at the time?

Yes, for centuries, businesspeople had seen in China the promise of a huge consumer market, what one U.S. businessman famously described in the 1930s as “400 million customers.” To them, China trade meant expanding exports. In the 1970s, U.S. and Chinese traders together reframed the meaning of the China market. They began to nurture a new promise of outsourced manufacturing – a proverbial 800 million workers.

As Chinese pragmatists debated ways of accelerating China’s industrialization, they increasingly experimented with using the cash generated from sales of exports to fund their development efforts. By selling textiles and raw materials they hoped to buy factories, airplanes, and so on. China’s huge workforce offered the potential to create cheap manufactured goods that could be sold to the United States and elsewhere, in turn generating the money needed to buy the infrastructure to accelerate China’s industrialization.

The “mesh” happened in manufacturing. As American corporations internationalized manufacturing operations to other parts of the world, they began to see China as offering the potential to join – and assist – in this process. For most of the decade China did not permit foreign direct investment, but it did offer cheap labor. So the interests of Chinese pragmatists and U.S. capitalists began to align. The consequence of this alignment was a fundamental reconfiguration of what it meant to speak of “U.S.-China trade” – no longer a China market of 400 million customers, but one of workers instead.

It’s important to underscore, however, that these efforts were met with fierce opposition. The 1970s was a period immense social and political upheaval in China, overshadowed by Mao’s illness and eventual death in 1976. There was no certainty that these halting efforts in the 1970s would continue. It’s easy, I think, from today’s perspective to consider China’s convergence with global capitalism to be a natural or inevitable process of economic growth and development. But the opposition to the trade relationship and problems underpinning it are precisely why it was not inevitable: trade was difficult, and profit was far from certain.

You note that in the early days of China-U.S. re-engagement, “Leaders in both nations understood and used trade as a tool of diplomacy, but in very different ways.” What were the major differences in their approaches, and does this still hold true today?

The first years of U.S.-China trade developed in the strange limbo period of rapprochement. Despite the dramatic meeting between President Nixon and Chairman Mao in Beijing in 1972, it took until two new leaders came to power – Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping – for the two countries to finally reestablish diplomatic relations, which they announced in December 1978. Throughout this period, leaders in both the United States and China treated trade as an incentive – but one to be offered at different points of the negotiation process. The United States used it as an incentive prior to full diplomatic normalization, as an indication of its commitment to the rapprochement process. China used trade as an incentive to be provided after improvements in geopolitical negotiations.

These diverging attitudes came to complement one another in a surprising way: Chinese exports to the United States took on diplomatic importance. One of the major economic problems that emerged in the 1970s was a trade imbalance in the United States’ favor. The total value of China’s imports was greater than its exports to the United States and, especially as diplomacy began to stall in the middle of the decade, Chinese officials wanted this redressed. In response, American diplomatic and business leaders worked to increase U.S. imports of Chinese goods. They did so precisely because of their own assumptions that good trade relations were important for assisting the parallel diplomatic efforts. But this aligned with – and helped develop – the mesh between U.S. capitalists and the Chinese state.

Today, the dynamic is more complicated, precisely because of the changes that occurred throughout the 1970s. The internationalization of manufacturing has fundamentally changed the relationship between trade and the nation state. In our post-COVID era we’re all familiar with the centrality of supply chains to global manufacturing and trade. But the politics of trade remains remarkably bound by the nation state. If “Made in China” represents a threat to American manufacturing, then “Made in America” suggests its effects can be countered, too, by the nation state.

The long history of “yellow peril” fears combined with the national pride engendered by the ameliorative “Made in America” have long been a winning combination in American politics. This is why the very first executive order President Biden passed in early 2021 was dubbed “Made in America.” It called for more federal agencies to use products produced within the United States. However, the fine-print of Biden’s executive order reveals the messiness behind country-of-origin labels today. The standard for his Made in America plan would be met if only 55 percent of components were manufactured within the United States.

So, the 1970s approach of using trade as a political tool – in today’s context that often means applying tariffs – doesn’t impact China in the way that it would have 50 years ago. Despite today’s tariffs, China-made semiconductors are entering the United States in increasing number via Mexico, for example. What this history reveals is that in order to redress the very real problems that American workers are facing, we need to focus on the factors that led us to where we are today. Most particularly: a politics that prioritized the interests of capital over labor.

Trade has been central to China-U.S. relations since the process of normalization began. Today, however, trade is increasingly viewed through a national security lens in Washington; “de-risking” is the order of the day. Were there similar concerns in the 1970s, when the pillars of China-U.S. trade relations were being built?

In the 1970s, national security concerns certainly remained in certain pockets of Washington, particularly in the Pentagon regarding sales of technology that might have military application. But these were concerns that became more and more of a minority voice rather than the rising fears we hear today. In that sense, we can see how the Cold War ended for U.S.-China relations in the 1970s: as a slow fade out of tensions.

Viewed from 2024, this history of converging interests between the United States and China reads more and more like a story of the distant past. But when I first started this research, in the early 2010s, there were still hopes that the interdependent trade relationship might help bring about positive geopolitical relations. In the space of a decade a lot has changed. But living through this period as I researched and wrote about a different decade really brought home to me how much can change in a relatively short period of time due to decisions – and shared visions – of those with more political and economic power than others.

Labor groups were among the few to accurately foresee the impact of China-U.S. economic engagement on the American economy. To what extent were labor groups specifically worried about China, versus more generally concerned about the trend of manufacturing moving overseas, regardless of destination?

China held specific concern in the sense that the size of its population dramatically amplified the broader trends happening in the U.S. manufacturing sector. There was no way of knowing in the 1970s that China would indeed become such a significant source of labor. China was extremely poor with a weak industrial base – another key reason its convergence with global capitalism was not inevitable. But signs were certainly emerging that things might be changing in China. And this came at precisely the moment U.S. manufacturing was turning towards overseas sources of cheap labor.

It was the U.S. textile industry that voiced fears about China the loudest. This was an industry whose workforce was almost entirely women of color, an important reason why they were not given the attention they were pushing for. They weren’t the hard-hat-wearing men of the auto and steel industries that played a prominent role in U.S. politics of the 1970s. But even more importantly, many of the white male leaders of the textile industry who were pursuing – on behalf of these women of color – restrictions on trade with China were calling for market order rather than fundamental reforms that would protect working Americans.

The idea of moving to cheap labor overseas was not a problem per se for many within the textile industry. Instead, they were looking for a transition toward outsourced manufacturing that would unfold steadily, giving managers time to adjust their production lines to overseas cheap labor. Their concern was with China specifically because its communist state structures made it easier for China to undercut labor costs and dump cheap goods. Dumping was disruptive; it made it harder for U.S. textile managers to slowly and steadily move to overseas labor.

Ultimately, Chinese leaders’ ability to lift their population out of poverty came at the expense of ununionized minimum-wage textile workers in the United States and later other industries as well. But that impact on U.S. workers was fundamentally enabled by the decisions of industry leaders and executives at U.S. corporations, aided by legislation in Washington. U.S. corporations and businesspeople were therefore crucial linchpins in both China’s industrialization and the United States’ deindustrialization.

In the United States this was a deindustrialization of labor. Between the late 1940s and early 2020s, manufacturing in the United States remained relatively stable as a proportion of real GDP. The United States continues to make goods. In fact, until 2010 it was the world’s largest manufacturing country, after which it remained second only to China. It was not manufacturing that went into decline in the United States in the 1970s, but its employment: a result, largely, of new technologies used in the manufacturing process, new kinds of high-tech goods being made, and the movement of labor-intensive industries to factories overseas.

The continued focus in Washington today on the threat of “Made in China” peddles the myth that the United States is no longer a manufacturing nation and, in the process, it removes accountability from corporate decisions that pursue low wages over all else. The problem at the heart of U.S. industrial policy today, then, isn’t China. It’s a politics that enables these actions by prioritizing capital over labor.

Authors

Staff Author

Shannon Tiezzi

Shannon Tiezzi is Editor-in-Chief at The Diplomat.

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thediplomat.com · by Shannon Tiezzi

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com