Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The military institution is a mirror of its parent society, reflecting strengths and weaknesses....The highest service of the military to the state may well lie in the moral sphere."

– Sir John Hackett, to the cadet corps at the USAF Academy, circa. 1960

"As a nation, everything we say, everything we do, and everything we fail to say or do, will have its impact in other lands."

– President Eisenhower, 1952

"Fear of war is never helpful in preventing war. If we are firmly determined to brave any risks, we can fend off any emerging threats."

– South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak, Radio Address, 27 December, 2010

1. Top U.S. official for N. Korea policy recently resigned: sources

2. To counter China, NATO and its Asian partners are moving closer under US leadership

3. North Korea’s shifting satellite allegiance to Russia signals China’s waning influence.

4. Yoon to hold over 10 bilateral meetings on sidelines of NATO summit

5. N. Korea's military education delegation leaves for Russia amid deepening ties

6. Two Simultaneous Wars Scenario in Northeast Asia And Implications to South Korea’s Security

7. North Korea Neighbor Calls for Nuclear Weapons

8. North Korean leader’s sister denounces South’s border drills

9. N. Korea appears to have released border dam water without prior notice

10. Disability in N. Korea: Stigma persists despite official efforts

11. N. Korea mandates war film screenings to bolster patriotism

12. U.S. envoy for N. Korean human rights to visit S. Korea this week

13. Yoon to visit Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii

14. Yoon pledges to enhance combined readiness with U.S. against N. Korea

15. National Assembly launches forum for potential nuclear armament

16. U.S. renews 'great concern' over N. Korea-Russia cooperation ahead of NATO summit

1. Top U.S. official for N. Korea policy recently resigned: sources

I did not see this coming. I have no idea who will replace her.

(LEAD) Top U.S. official for N. Korea policy recently resigned: sources | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 9, 2024

By Song Sang-ho, Cho Joon-hyung and Kim Dong-hyun

WASHINGTON, July 9 (Yonhap) -- The top U.S. official for North Korea policy resigned last week, multiple sources said Tuesday, adding to uncertainty over Washington's diplomatic efforts to reengage with a recalcitrant Pyongyang.

Jung Pak left the post as the U.S. senior official for North Korea and a process is under way to select her replacement, according to the sources.

Pak, a scholar-turned-diplomat, took over the post for North Korea policy at the State Department after Sung Kim, a veteran diplomat, retired late last year. She also served as deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs.

Her departure came as the United States has repeatedly shown its desire to engage in diplomacy with the North -- an overture that has only been met with Pyongyang's dogged endeavor to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

She has led a series of efforts to strengthen cooperation between South Korea and the United States, and among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan over North Korea-related issues.

Pak previously served as a senior researcher at the Brookings Institution. She also worked at the Central Intelligence Agency.

This file photo, taken March 13, 2024, shows U.S. Senior Official for North Korea Jung Pak speaking during a retirement celebration for her predecessor, Sung Kim, in Washington. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 9, 2024

2. To counter China, NATO and its Asian partners are moving closer under US leadership

I am sure the propagandists with the axis of dictators will have a field day with the headline at least.

As an aside, this week in Mongolia I heard a Chinese scholar describe Northeast Asia as a Northern Triangle (China, Russia, and north Korea) and a Southern Triangle ( ROK, Japan, and US). And of course he went on to say that it is the Southern Triangle that is responsible for raising tensions in the region with all their exercises.

A question is what effect will the US election have on these alliances and security relationships?

Excerpts:

America’s top diplomat said the U.S. has been working to break down barriers between European alliances, Asian coalitions and other partners worldwide. “That’s part of the new landscape, the new geometry that we’ve put in place.”

Countries with shared security concerns are strengthening ties as competition escalates between the United States and China. Washington is trying to curb Beijing’s ambition to challenge the U.S.-led world order, which the Chinese government dismisses as a Cold War mentality aimed at containing China’s inevitable rise.

...

“The fact that the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific alliances are structured around a clear anchor — U.S. military power — makes them more cohesive and gives them a strategic edge as compared to the sort of interlocking partnerships that bind China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea,” Simon wrote in a commentary last week on War On the Rocks, a defense and foreign affairs website.

To counter China, NATO and its Asian partners are moving closer under US leadership

BY DIDI TANG

Updated 12:07 PM GMT+8, July 9, 2024

AP · July 9, 2024

WASHINGTON (AP) — In the third year of the war in Ukraine, NATO is set to deepen relations with its four Indo-Pacific partners, which, although not part of the military alliance, are gaining prominence as Russia and China forge closer ties to counter the United States and the two Koreas support opposing sides of the conflict in Europe.

The leaders of New Zealand, Japan and South Korea for the third year in a row will attend the NATO summit, which starts Tuesday in Washington, D.C., while Australia will send its deputy prime minister. China will be following the summit closely, worried by the alliance’s growing interest beyond Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

“Increasingly, partners in Europe see challenges halfway around the world in Asia as being relevant to them, just as partners in Asia see challenges halfway around the world in Europe as being relevant to them,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said last week at the Brookings Institution.

America’s top diplomat said the U.S. has been working to break down barriers between European alliances, Asian coalitions and other partners worldwide. “That’s part of the new landscape, the new geometry that we’ve put in place.”

Countries with shared security concerns are strengthening ties as competition escalates between the United States and China. Washington is trying to curb Beijing’s ambition to challenge the U.S.-led world order, which the Chinese government dismisses as a Cold War mentality aimed at containing China’s inevitable rise.

On Monday, Beijing responded angrily to unconfirmed reports that NATO and its four Indo-Pacific partners are expected to release a document laying out their relationship and ability to respond jointly to threats from cyberattacks and disinformation.

Lin Jian, a spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry, accused NATO of “breaching its boundary, expanding its mandate, reaching beyond its defense zone and stoking confrontation.”

The war in Ukraine, which has pitted the West against Russia and its friends, has bolstered the argument for closer cooperation between the U.S., Europe and their Asian allies. “Ukraine of today may be East Asia of tomorrow,” Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida told the U.S. Congress in April.

The U.S. and South Korea accused Pyongyang of supplying Russia with ammunition, while Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea last month and signed a pact with leader Kim Jong Un that envisions mutual military assistance.

South Korea and Japan, meanwhile, are sending military supplies and aid to Ukraine. The U.S. also says China is providing Russia with machine tools, microelectronics and other technology that allow it to make weapons to use against Ukraine.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol will bring to Washington “a strong message regarding the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea and discuss ways to enhance cooperation among NATO allies and Indo-Pacific partners,” his principal deputy national security adviser, Kim Tae-hyo, told reporters Friday.

New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said discussions would “focus on our collective efforts to support the rules-based system.”

The partnership does not make NATO a direct player in the Indo-Pacific but allows it to coordinate with the four partners on issues of mutual concern, said Mirna Galic, senior policy analyst on China and East Asia at the U.S. Institute of Peace. For example, she wrote in an analysis, they can share information and align on actions such as sanctions and aid delivery but do not intervene in military crises outside of their own regions.

The NATO summit will allow the United States and its European and Indo-Pacific allies to push back against China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, according to Luis Simon, director of the Centre for Security Diplomacy and Strategy at Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

“The fact that the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific alliances are structured around a clear anchor — U.S. military power — makes them more cohesive and gives them a strategic edge as compared to the sort of interlocking partnerships that bind China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea,” Simon wrote in a commentary last week on War On the Rocks, a defense and foreign affairs website.

Beijing is worried by NATO’s pivot to the east, said Zhu Feng, dean of the School of International Studies at Nanjing University in eastern China. Beijing has insisted that NATO not interfere in security affairs in the Indo-Pacific and that it should change its view of China as a strategic adversary.

“NATO should consider China as a positive force for the regional peace and stability and for global security,” Zhu said. “We also hope the Ukraine war can end as soon as possible ... and we have rejected a return to the triangular relation with Russia and North Korea.”

“In today’s volatile and fragile world, Europe, the U.S. and China should strengthen global and regional cooperation,” Zhu said.

NATO and China had little conflict until tensions grew between Beijing and Washington in 2019, the same year the NATO summit in London raised China as a “challenge” that “we need to address together as an alliance.” Two years later, NATO upgraded China to a “systemic challenge” and said Beijing was “cooperating militarily with Russia.”

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand attended a NATO summit for the first time, where statements noted the geopolitical challenges China poses. Beijing accused NATO of “cooperating with the U.S. government for an all-around suppression of China.”

Now, Beijing is worried that Washington is forming a NATO-like alliance in the Indo-Pacific.

Chinese Senior Col. Cao Yanzhong, a researcher at China’s Institute of War Studies, asked U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin last month whether the U.S. was trying to create an Asian version of NATO by emphasizing partnerships and alliances. They include a U.S. grouping with Britain and Australia; another with Australia, India and Japan; and one with Japan and South Korea.

“What implications do you think the strengthening of the U.S. alliance system in the Asia-Pacific will have on this region’s security and stability?” Cao asked at the Shangri-la Dialogue security summit in Singapore.

Austin replied that the U.S. was simply working with “like-minded countries with similar values and a common vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Beijing has its own conclusion.

“The real intent of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is to integrate all small circles into a big circle as the Asian version of NATO in order to maintain the hegemony as led by the United States,” Chinese Lt. Gen. Jing Jianfeng said at the forum.

___

AP researcher Chen Wanqing in Beijing contributed to this report.

AP · July 9, 2024

3. North Korea’s shifting satellite allegiance to Russia signals China’s waning influence

I told the journalist not to jump to concussion based on the satellite deal. But he did not use those remarks.

North Korea’s shifting satellite allegiance to Russia signals China’s waning influence

Appearing to lead ‘axis’ including Moscow, Pyongyang and Tehran does not appeal to Beijing, analysts say after Putin and Kim sign treaty

Topic | North Korea

Seong Hyeon Choi

Published: 12:00pm, 9 Jul, 2024

By Seong Hyeon Choi

https://amp-scmp-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/amp.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3269585/north-koreas-shifting-satellite-allegiance-russia-signals-chinas-waning-influence?utm

July 8, 2024

View Original

Pyongyang’s recent switch from a Chinese to a Russian satellite to broadcast its state television highlights Beijing’s weakening influence over North Korea, analysts say.

Closer ties between Pyongyang and Moscow could be a “burden” for Beijing, which does not want to be portrayed as the “leader of an axis,” they said.

Meanwhile North Korea and Russia have stepped up their diplomatic and military collaboration on the Ukraine war.

According to global TV and radio satellite data intelligence website LyngSat, North Korean state-run broadcasters, such as Korean Central Television, started transmitting its overseas broadcast through a Russian satellite, Ekspress 103, from June 20, leaving ChinaSat 12 satellite by July 1.

A South Korean ministry of unification official announced on Monday that North Korea had switched the transmission of its state TV broadcasts from a Chinese to Russian satellite, complicating the monitoring of Pyongyang’s broadcasts.

Government agencies and media in Seoul have monitored North Korean state media, which is one of the limited outbound sources of information from the reclusive state.

Kang Jun-young, a professor of Chinese studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, said the satellite switch meant science and technology cooperation between North Korea and Russia was intensifying.

“Pyongyang is also sending a message to China that it is inevitable for North Korea to strengthen cooperation with Russia because of Beijing’s lukewarm support of the country.”

Moscow and Pyongyang are both isolated by international sanctions. Their closer relationship has drawn accusations of dealing arms, including that ammunition from North Korea is supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in exchange for Russia providing aid and suspected technological aid for North Korea’s satellite development programme.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang in June, where he met North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and signed a “treaty on the comprehensive strategic partnership” that calls the other signatory to come to their aid if either is under attack.

Putin’s visit followed Kim’s trip to Russia’s far east in September last year when he visited Russian aerospace and weapons facilities.

Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said Russia and North Korea’s new treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership was “quite a burden” for China.

“Because, until now, North Korea’s only ally was China and, in fact, only China had been able to intervene in North Korea in times of emergency. However, after this treaty, which is evaluated as a paramilitary alliance treaty … Russia can now intervene,” Cho said.

“So, it is true that China’s exclusive influence over North Korea has been reduced. And given that North Korea’s dependence on China is almost 95 per cent in terms of trade volume, as North Korea-Russia trade and North Korea-Russia relations expand, North Korea will have more relative autonomy in terms of diplomacy and security from China.”

According to Cho, North Korea’s switching out satellite channels from entirely Chinese to Russian will weaken its dependence and “symbolically represents weakening dependence on China”.

Beijing has remained mostly silent over the Moscow-Pyongyang military ties. On the new treaty between the two countries, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian said the summit was a bilateral exchange between Russia and North Korea, but did not elaborate further.

While Chinese President Xi Jinping has met Putin several times since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Beijing has said it is not supplying arms and dual-use components to support the Russian military.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un walk during Xi’s visit to Pyongyang on June 21, 2019. Photo: KCNA via Reuters

Xi’s last meeting with Kim was in June 2019 when he visited North Korea.

Ramon Pacheco Pardo, an international relations professor at King’s College London, said North Korea had traditionally played the Soviet Union and China against each other, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, China had the “upper hand” over Russia in terms of influence over North Korea.

“But it seems that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed the situation, since for the first time Russia is in need of something that North Korea is willing to offer: munitions and weapons,” Pacheco Pardo said.

“Thus, I think that Kim Jong-un will play this to his country’s advantage, seeking to extract as much from Moscow as possible while showing to China that, at least for now, its relationship with Russia is stronger.”

Pacheco Pardo said while China would try to maintain a degree of influence over North Korea, Beijing will not “go overboard” in the face of closer ties between Moscow and Pyongyang.

“China doesn’t seem to be comfortable in being portrayed as the leader of an axis also including Russia, North Korea or Iran,” Pacheco Pardo said. “Beijing probably thinks that the relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang is based on mutual, short-term interests that will weaken once Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is over.”

Cho echoed the view that the close relations between North Korea and Russia could be “temporary” because of Russia’s war in Ukraine, which has become an unlimited war of attrition.

He said China would view the close ties between the two countries as “uncomfortable” but it would need Russia to contain Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Cho said Beijing would hope to recover its influence over Pyongyang after the Ukraine war ended.

“Because North Korea has been preparing for an all-out war for a long time, it has an ammunition inventory and production system in place. So, the reason Russia signed a de facto paramilitary alliance with North Korea is because of Russia’s urgency,” he said.

“China has the industrial potential that North Korea needs, not Russia. So, despite the close ties between North Korea and Russia, the need for North Korea-China relations still remains for North Korea. China also needs to manage North Korea as a strategic asset.”

David Maxwell, vice-president of the Centre for Asia-Pacific Strategy, said North Korea would continue to try to improve relations with Russia but the ties would remain “transactional” – and would result in strengthening another alliance.

“All of these activities have the opposite effect of what North Korea and Russia, and even China, are trying to do because their activities drive the US, the ROK [Republic of Korea] and Japan closer together,” said Maxwell, who is a retired US Special Forces colonel.

“And so I think that rather than weaken the alliances, it just makes them stronger.”

Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, said although North Korea and China were trying to avoid exposing each other’s disharmony to the outside world, their recent actions “clearly” exposed differences in their positions.

“China doesn’t want to directly intervene in the war in Ukraine, and in an intensifying strategic competition with the US, the relationship with European countries is important,” Park said. “For those European countries, the war in Ukraine poses an existential threat.

“China is trying to distance itself from North Korea and Russia, and so, China has [said it is] resolutely opposed to the so-called new cold-war structure.

“North Korea, on the other hand, disagrees. Kim Jong-un himself has said more than once that a new cold war has arrived in order to continue building a camp based on the solidarity between North Korea, China and Russia. In such a situation, China’s support is not at the desired level.”

4. Yoon to hold over 10 bilateral meetings on sidelines of NATO summit

I wonder if this NATO meeting will turn out to be one of the most consequential ones in its history. Will there be a major shift in focus to INDOPACOM?

(LEAD) Yoon to hold over 10 bilateral meetings on sidelines of NATO summit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 9, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with Yoon's remarks in paras 7-10; ADDS photo)

By Kim Eun-jung

HONOLULU, July 8 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol is set to hold over 10 bilateral meetings with his counterparts on the sidelines of the upcoming North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit, his office said Monday.

Yoon stopped in Hawaii to visit the Indo-Pacific Command ahead of his attendance to the NATO summit on Wednesday and Thursday as one of the Indo-Pacific partner nations, alongside Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks during a meeting with Korean nationals in Hawaii at a hotel in Honolulu on July 8, 2024. (Yonhap)

Yoon was initially scheduled to have a series of bilateral talks with the Czech Republic, Sweden, Finland and Norway, but the number of countries is expected to rise to over 10, a senior presidential official told reporters in Honolulu.

Talks are currently under way to have additional bilateral summits with Japan, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands and Britain, according to the official.

On Thursday, Yoon is scheduled to have a four-way meeting with three other Indo-Pacific nations and deliver a speech at the NATO public forum, an event jointly hosted by NATO and think tanks in Europe and the United States.

On the same day, he plans to meet NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg.

Principal Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Tae-hyo talks about President Yoon Suk Yeol's U.S. trip during a press briefing in Hawaii on July 8, 2024. (Yonhap)

At the upcoming summit, Yoon said he will express concerns over the deepening ties between Russia and North Korea and cooperate with NATO members and Indo-Pacific partners to end the ongoing war in Ukraine.

"Russia and North Korea are engaging in military and economic cooperation that directly violates U.N. Security Council resolutions, further raising concerns within the international community," Yoon said in a meeting with Korean residents in Hawaii.

Yoon said his third consecutive attendance at the NATO summit underscores the interlinked security between the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

"It shows the international community's growing expectations for South Korea's role at a time when the security of the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific cannot be separated," he said.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 9, 2024

5. N. Korea's military education delegation leaves for Russia amid deepening ties

Russian equivalent of IMET (international military education and training)?

N. Korea's military education delegation leaves for Russia amid deepening ties | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · July 9, 2024

SEOUL, July 9 (Yonhap) -- A delegation of North Korea's military school has departed for Russia, state media said Tuesday, amid deepening military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow.

The Korean People's Army military education delegation led by Kim Kum-chol, president of Kim Il Sung Military University, left for Russia on Monday, the Korean Central News Agency said in a one-sentence dispatch.

It did not provide further details, such as the delegation's itinerary and purpose of the visit.

The trip marks the first public visit by a North Korean military official to Russia since North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a pact that calls for providing military assistance without delay if either comes under attack.

Kim Il Sung Military University, named after North Korea's late founder, is a training institute for North Korean military officers. Leader Kim Jong-un is known to have taken courses at the school after returning to the North from Switzerland.

This illustration depicts a mutual defense pact signed by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin last month. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · July 9, 2024

6. Two Simultaneous Wars Scenario in Northeast Asia And Implications to South Korea’s Security

A lot to digest in the analysis.

If these forces are needed in Taiwan then we will be in rough shape but committing these forces will not likely change the outcome in Taiwan. It would make no sense to deploy a Styker Brigade for counter amphibious operations because according to the scenario described the PLA will have already landed. A Stryker Brigade would have to fight its way ashmore.

Excerpt:

Second, the U.S. might deem Taiwan its strategic priority due to its national interest. The U.S. might intensively deploy its combat forces from bases in Japan, Guam, and CONUS to a Taiwan War. If the Taiwan situation deteriorates rapidly, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) might deploy the F-16 Fighter Wing, Stryker Brigade for counter-amphibious forces, AH-64 Apache Helicopter Battalion, and OA-10C Fighter Wing to Taiwan.

ROK develops nuclear weapons and completes OPCON transition. Somehow I think if the ROK develops its own nuclear weapons there will likely be changes to the course of OPCON transition as well as the employment of US and UN forces.

Excerpt:

In particular, North Korea might attack with a tactical nuclear warhead delivered by an ultra-supersonic missile toward the Metropolitan within one minute. South Korea will not be able to cope with North Korea’s tactical nuclear preemptive strike. South Korea will have to respond to North Korea’s nuclear challenge to national survival with its own nuclear arsenal. Therefore, it is urgent for South Korea to pursue nuclear armament.

ROK-led warfighting systems should be established with the transition of wartime operational control. It will be very challenging for the U.S.-led Warfighting Combined Forces Command to wage war under the conditions of two simultaneous wars in the region. Relationships and roles of ROK JCS, Future Combined Forces Command (F-CFC), United Nations Command (UNC), and USFK should be defined. A Military Committee consisting of chairmen from ROK and U.S. JCS should provide strategic guidance and operational directives for the F-CFC.

The ROK JCS should be in charge of counter-provocation operations. UNC should take the responsibility for managing the armistice agreement and acting as a force provider in the event of a contingency. The F-CFC should develop operational plans and conduct combined exercises, including exercises of operational control over ROK-USFK, along with U.S. augmentation forces and tactical control over UN combat forces in the event of war (Jeon 6/22/2024).

The transition of wartime operational control needs to be implemented early by reorganizing the command structure by ROK four-star general serving as Commander of the CFC and a U.S. four-star general as Deputy Commander (Chung 2024c: 122-158).

There is a need for the ROK and the United States to agree on the terms of strategic flexibility so that when part of the U.S. forces stationed in Korea flow out to areas outside the Korean Peninsula, alternative forces can be deployed in advance or at the same time. Additionally, in the event of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. military forces stationed throughout the world will need to flow in to the Korean Peninsula theater to strengthen the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture (Jeon 2024).

Two Simultaneous Wars Scenario in Northeast Asia And Implications to South Korea’s Security

Commentary | July 08, 2024

Kyung-young CHUNG

Professor, Hanyang University

Zeljana ZMIRE

Lecturer, Hanyang University

Editor's Note

Kyung-young Chung (Professor, Hanyang University) and Zmire Zeljana (Lecturer, Hanyang University) predict a critical scenario involving simultaneous conflicts in Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. To prepare, they advocate for a more structured network and role division among South Korea, the United States, and Japan. They also recommend that South Korea bolster its defense posture through nuclear armament, transfer of Operational Control, and agreements on the strategic flexibility of United States Forces Korea (USFK).

This study examines possible war scenarios and elaborates on the conditions leading towards two simultaneous wars in Northeast Asia and its implications to South Korea (ROK)’s security.

An Imagined Scenario: "In 2027, on the one centennial anniversary of foundation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), China launched an invasion of Taiwan to seize maritime hegemony under the pretext of reunification. Taking advantage of this time, Kim Jong-un who defined South-North relations as a hostile state at war rather than a fratricidal relationship, kicked off large-scale attack along the Demilitarized Zone to occupy South Korea. This led to the outbreak of simultaneous wars in Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula. Under these circumstances, the U.S. massively committed its combat power, along with deployment of partial US Forces in Korea to the Taiwan War. Japan supports the Taiwan War, South Korea has to fight against North Korea by itself. North Korea’s tactical nuclear strike is killing thousands of South Korean civilians."

The study addresses offensive realism as a theoretical framework, elaborating on a possible confrontation between the established and rising hegemony powers. The study conducts an assessment of the regional security environment, reflecting South Korea-U.S.-Japan military cooperation and North Korea-China-Russia collaboration.

The study contends that there are three possible war scenarios: the Taiwan War, the Korean War, and Simultaneous Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula Wars. The study identifies the worst likely scenario, examines it thoroughly, and explores strategic implications and options. Any of these scenarios would cause an unprecedented scale of destruction and irrevocable disaster. Deterring those wars and strategic communication are an imperative for the region, along with the necessity of preparing for a potential war. Korea must solve the problem of national existence with diplomacy craft and strong military power. Diplomacy and defense are inextricably linked like two sides of the same coin, and they form the two pillars supporting national security.

The study proposes the ROK-U.S.-Japan Military Cooperation Task Force, establishment of ROK-led warfighting systems, and Northeast Asian foreign affairs-defense ministerial strategic talks.

I. Predictions of Offensive Realism:Inevitable War Between U.S.-China Hegemony

Chinese diplomats and politicians have described China’s rise as peaceful. Academics have explained this through Kenneth Waltz’s paradigm of defensive realism (Waltz 1979). The acceptance of this paradigm started to change during the Obama administration when he announced the “Pivot to Asia,” and it increased further during the Trump administration when China was highlighted as a strategic competitor (Liberthal 2011; Sevastopulo 2017). This paradigm shift was once more revisited with the worries that China might invade Taiwan (Kuo 2019).

This made many academics to turn their attention to John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism. Mearsheimer’s theory shares essential assumptions with Waltz’s defensive realism: states persist in a condition of anarchy, with no agency capable of protecting them from each other. Therefore, they are bound to augment their power to ensure future survival. Mearsheimer departs from Waltz in viewing how much power is necessary to achieve it. He deems that states’ final goal is to achieve hegemony in the international system. The second assumption of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism is that great powers possess some offensive military capabilities, giving them the possibility to cause significant damages to rivalry states. The third assumption says that states cannot trust each other’s intentions. Mearsheimer’s theory implies that China is bound to become a hegemon, signifying that it cannot rise peacefully. This further implies that Beijing might become inclined to solve its regional security challenges, which primarily include the issue of reunification with Taiwan. For these reasons, Mearsheimer stipulates that confrontations between Beijing and Washington are inevitable, including military confrontations as well (Mearsheimer 2001: 21, 30-31, 373-377).

II. Unprecedented Instability in the Regional Security Environment

If we re-examine the regional security order from the perspective of offensive realism, we can see that the rivalry between the U.S. and China intensifies. They compete across all global domains including ideology, military, economy, trade, technology, and cyber security. A new Cold War structure between China-Russia-North Korea versus South Korea-U.S.-Japan is emerging. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, Israel-Hamas Conflict, Taiwan Strait tensions, and North Korea’s increasing nuclear capabilities and incessant missiles tests led South Korea, U.S., and Japan to strengthen their military cooperation, along with U.S.-Japan-Philippines collaboration.

President Xi Jinping said, “China will never renounce the right to use force over Taiwan for a unified China” at the opening of a major party meeting on October 16, 2022 (Lun Tian and Blanchard 10/16/2022). President Joe Biden said at the meeting with President Xi Jinping in Bali, Indonesia, on November 14, 2022, “The United States opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side.” He clearly raised U.S. objections to the PRC’s coercive and increasingly aggressive actions toward Taiwan (The White House 2022).

North Korea adopted its Nuclear Forces Policy Law in September 2022. They also conducted the Korea People’s Army (KPA) command maneuver exercise by employing tactical nuclear warheads unit simulating the occupation of South Korea in September through October 2022. Kim Jong-un declared that inter-Korean relations had become a relationship between two hostile countries and two belligerents at war in December 2023 (KCNA 12/31/2023). Kim encourages his people to prepare for a civil war.

III. Actualization of ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Relations: The Spirit of Camp David

The leaders of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States convened at Camp David to inaugurate a new era of trilateral partnership in August 2023 (The White House 2023). They agreed to hold consultations to coordinate their responses to challenges, provocations, and threats in the region. The trilateral governments pledged to expand cooperation among the three countries and elevate their common goals to new horizons across all domains, the Indo-Pacific region, and beyond. The three parties agreed to collaborate closely on broad range of issues, from security, economy, technology to countering disinformation and cyber security. This includes regular diplomatic meetings, annual joint military exercises, intelligence sharing mechanisms, trilateral cooperation in missile defense systems, contingency planning, cooperation in emerging technologies, ensuring economic security, and providing developmental assistance.

They support a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace. The summit concluded with a resolution to build a peaceful and prosperous future not only for the people of Korea, the United States, and Japan, but also for all people in the Indo-Pacific region. Korea, the United States, and Japan are firmly committed to meeting any challenges together now and in the future.

IV. Reinforcement of North Korea-Russia-China Collaboration

In the period before the Camp David summit, Beijing and Moscow expressed their discontent about the U.S. strengthening its alliances in Northeast Asia and potentially creating new ones. This was particularly evident when both sides expressed that their priority had shifted from North Korean denuclearization to preventing the U.S. from altering regional security infrastructure. This, combined with the sanctions against Russia for its illegal invasion of Ukraine, led Moscow closer to Pyongyang, which has been under severe sanctions due to its nuclear and missile development. North Korea supplies arms to Russian military in Ukraine, while Russia shares its space satellite and missile technology. This military technology transfer reinforces offensive warfighting capabilities and intensifies the worries of Japan, South Korea and the U.S. on how those technologies will be developed and utilized (Rozman 2023).

Furthermore, Moscow proposed trilateral military exercises including North Korea, China and Russia as a move to counterbalance U.S.-led trilateral cooperation. On March 28, 2024, Russia vetoed and China abstained from a UN resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts, which monitors UN member states’ enforcement of UN sanctions against North Korea (Cha and Kim 2024). President Putin visited Pyongyang on June 19, 2024, and the two leaders agreed on mutual assistance in the event of contingency (Chosun Ilbo 6/20/2024). North Korea-Soviet Union military alliance treaty, which was signed in 1961 at the height of the Cold War and scrapped in 1996 during the post-Cold War has been revived. Against this backdrop, the close ties between North Korea and Russia are further complicating the security environment in Northeast Asia.

In the meantime, Beijing supports Moscow’s military campaign in Ukraine by supplying tools and technology used for the production of weaponry (AFP in Washington 4/12/2024). The significance of strategic cooperative relations between Beijing and Moscow is also visible in their trade ties. Trade between the two counties reached $240 billion in 2023, marking an increase of more than 64% since 2021, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, in 2023, Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia as China’s top crude oil supplier (Ng and Ma 5/15/2024).

China, North Korea, and Russia expressed discontent about the U.S. formalizing its alliances across the Indo-Pacific including Quad (U.S. Japan, India, and Australia), AUKUS (Australia, UK, and U.S.), and NATO+4 (South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand), as well as latticework security cooperation such as ROK-U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Japan-Philippines. Beijing interpreted these military cooperation as Washington’s strategy to contain China’s power and influence on the Indo-Pacific (Sayo 2024).

Trilateral cooperation institutionalized by the Spirit of Camp David is a logical strategic move led by the U.S. to ensure the safety of its allies, Japan and South Korea, as well as the broader Indo-Pacific region. Russian-North Korean military collaboration, North Korea’s provocations including drone and trash-carrying balloon infiltrations, and China’s increasingly aggressive actions toward Taiwan have increased the concerns of the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral parties.

In the context of the Taiwan Strait crisis and North Korea’s military adventurism, the three parties cannot predict with certainty what kind of provocations might occur, whether China and/or North Korea would wage a war against Taiwan or South Korea, or when such invasion might happen. The ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral military cooperation is essential for monitoring North Korea-China-Russia’s military activities and for taking counteractions.

Finally, the project and its recommendations need some caveats. Modeling an invasion does not imply that it is inevitable or even probable. The risk of invasion is real enough and potentially so destructive that analysis is worthwhile.

V. War Scenarios in Northeast Asia

Based on the comprehensive regional security assessment and North Korea-China-Russia’s military activities, this section draws on previous literature elaborating on possible war scenarios and related war game analyses. The study estimates the most unfavorable war scenario for South Korea and considers the conditions for war games.

Scenario 1: Taiwan War

Unlike the invasion of Ukraine that started relatively suddenly and caught the world by surprise, military experts elaborate that China’s attack on Taiwan would happen gradually in several key phases. This potentially includes a cognitive perception campaign against Taiwan, cyber warfare, partial blockade of trade routes, and more (Carugati 2022; Cancian et al. 2023). China’s decision to attack would have to be initiated by some kind of trigger, often referred to as crossing the red lines. According to the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, a Taiwanese proclamation of independence, strong rhetoric supporting it, or diplomatic or security moves from Washington showing a formal recognition of Taiwan could be seen by Beijing as crossing the red lines. However, even in the absence of such events, Beijing might choose to invade if the prospects of peaceful unification seem completely unlikely.

China’s attack on Taiwan could take several forms (Colby 2021: 110-146). First, the campaign could start by invading Taiwan’s small islands nearby China’s coast, Jinmendao and Mazudao. This would be accompanied by military action under the banner of the One-China Policy. Beijing might opt to attack Taiwan directly from the start, causing damage to key military and government infrastructure, along with a naval blockade. The second option includes combining aerial bombing and missile attack against U.S. aircraft carriers and American and Japanese bases in Japan and Guam to interdict external intervention. The third scenario further includes the amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

Scenario 2: The Korean Peninsula War

North Korea is estimated to be capable of a conventional attack by nuclear threats or a preemptive nuclear strike. This scenario assumed by North Korea may include the following phases. Phase 1 includes political and psychological warfare against South Korea’s discontented and marginalized populations, along with cyber-attacks against South Korean infrastructure such as command and control, communication, finance, and transportation networks. Furthermore, in this stage, they might strike South Korea’s war guidance headquarters, military operation command systems, and U.S. bases in Korea with long-range artillery and massive missile attacks. Phase 2 includes interdicting U.S. augmentation capability by launching long ballistic missile attack against U.S. bases in Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and possibly even Continental U.S. (CONUS) by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Phase 3 includes breaking through the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with mechanized forces to encircle Seoul with maneuver warfare, and demanding surrender by threatening the use of tactical nuclear force. Finally, advance southward to conduct a link-up operation between amphibious forces from East and West Coasts along the Yeongdong Highway to intercept personnel and logistic support from the south. Finally, they could continue southward and encircle Busan with a double envelopment strategy using the Seoul-Busan Expressway as the main effort and the East and South Sea Expressways as secondary efforts. This plan aims to take control of the entire Korean Peninsula within 5-7 days before the deployment of U.S. augmentation (Chung 2022a: 167-168).

If North Korea carries out a nuclear threat attack, it is estimated that it will move according to four scenarios: (1) the use of nuclear weapons for the purposes of intimidation, coercion, and deterrence; (2) limited use of nuclear weapons; (3) large-scale use of nuclear weapons; and (4) breakdown of the United States’ extended deterrence pledge (Bennet, Choi, Go, Bechtol, Park, Klingner, and Cha 2021: 43-52).

First, the use of nuclear weapons for the purpose of blackmail, coercion, and deterrence: This involves provocations such as infiltrating the Northern Limit Line (NLL) or occupying five islands in the West Sea and threatening to use nuclear weapons if ROK and the United States respond.

Second, limited nuclear employment: North Korea may attempt to break the ROK-U.S. will to respond by making Seoul a nuclear hostage and launching nuclear attacks on several cities. Additionally, if the war situation does not go as intended, they may use tactical nuclear weapons against ROK-U.S. counter-offensive forces. If South Korea does not stop its counteroffensive, North Korea is expected to threaten to strike U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region and even attack the U.S. mainland.

Third, major warfare with nuclear arsenal: North Korea may use 40 to 60 nuclear warheads in the early stages of the war to strike key political high-payoff targets and naval and air force command and control facilities in South Korea to force its surrender.

Fourth, attempting to divide the relationship between Korea and the U.S.: Undermining the U.S. pledge for extended deterrence by threatening to attack U.S. mainland with a nuclear arsenal (Chung 2022b: 73).

Scenario 3: Simultaneous Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula Wars

China and North Korea might collaborate to wage two wars in Northeast Asia. The PLA may attack Taiwan, along with missile strikes against U.S. bases in Japan to prevent their deployment to Taiwan War as well as the Korean theater. China could deploy two aircraft carriers into the Yellow Sea or West Sea to seize maritime supremacy in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategy. North Korea may launch a large-scale attack by breaching the DMZ, together with missile strikes against U.S. bases in Korea and Japan, to prevent U.S. redeployment to the Taiwan Conflict, thereby helping the PLA win the war.

If China’s PLA invades Taiwan under the pretext of reunification while seizing maritime hegemony, we should assume that North Korea might take advantage of this situation and launch an all-out war against the South. The U.S. would be forced to fight two wars, or even to choose one. In the worst scenario for South Korea, we should consider that the U.S. might choose Taiwan as strategically more important. This action would leave South Korea to defend itself by its own means.

This scenario is less highlighted in the academia as well as the military because we are trapped in a mindset where we cannot think strategically. Considering the increasing tensions in the Cross-Strait and on the Korean Peninsula, the simultaneous two warfare scenario should be considered. Since it is possible to wage interlocking wars rather than two separate wars, it is necessary to comprehensively analyze and assess the military activities of China and North Korea to develop strategic implications and alternatives.

VI. Simultaneous Wars as the Worst Scenario for South Korea

The simultaneous Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula War, rather than just the Taiwan War or the Korean Peninsula War, should be considered possible. China and North Korea may collaborate in deliberate coordinated attacks to increase their chances of winning. The reasons are as follows:

First, such simultaneous wars waged by China and North Korea might force the United States to engage in two wars in the region at the same time. The U.S. may not be able to win any of the two wars due to the split of its combat assets.

Second, the U.S. might deem Taiwan its strategic priority due to its national interest. The U.S. might intensively deploy its combat forces from bases in Japan, Guam, and CONUS to a Taiwan War. If the Taiwan situation deteriorates rapidly, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) might deploy the F-16 Fighter Wing, Stryker Brigade for counter-amphibious forces, AH-64 Apache Helicopter Battalion, and OA-10C Fighter Wing to Taiwan.

Assuming that North Korea wages a sequential war in deliberate coordination with China and the Chinese PLA launches an amphibious operation against Taiwan to gain maritime supremacy along the first island chain, the U.S. might request the ROK to deploy its Marine Corps, which has conducted amphibious exercises with the U.S. marine corps, and warships from Jeju Naval Base. This would be a dangerous situation for the ROK, because North Korea could exploit weakened ROK-U.S. combined warfighting capability to launch a large-scale attack to the south, resulting in a catastrophic war.

Third, it is highly likely that Russia would provide military support to North Korea in accordance with the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership recently signed by the two parties. The Vladivostok Pacific Fleet could be deployed to the East and South Seas, including the intervention of the Eastern Military District’s ground Force in Khabarovsk. Furthermore, the Northern Theater Command and the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese PLA might intervene in the Korean Peninsula War, along with two Chinese aircraft carriers aiming to seize maritime supremacy in West Sea. In this situation, North Korea could successfully conduct short, decisive high-maneuver warfare. Historically, countries that have occupied maritime superiority in West Sea have always won their wars, including the 1592-1598 Japanese Invasion, 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War, the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, and even the 1950-1953 Korean War.

Fourth, if North Korea launches an attack on U.S. forces in Japan and Guam with various long-range missiles and potentially targets the U.S. mainland with ICBMs, China would be able to attack Taiwan in the absence of intervention by external forces. Also, the redeployment of U.S. military forces and ROK military to Taiwan could trigger North Korea to invade the South.

In this worst-case scenario, South Korea would have to defend itself without military support from the U.S. and Japan. This could result in a situation where South Korea fights North Korean-Chinese-Russian trilateral forces.

Of course, the South Korean military is not weak like the ROK forces during the Korean War. The South Korean military holds the 5th place in the world military ranking, with overwhelming conventional warfighting capability over the North and the determination of fifty-two million people to defend a free and prosperous Republic of Korea. South Korea would fight North Korea, which holds the 37th military ranking and has a population of twenty-five million people (Global Firepower 2024).

VII. Strategic Communication and Total War Readiness Posture Imperative for Crisis Management

Recent tensions in the Taiwan Strait as well as on the Korean Peninsula are more serious than ever before. If these challenges are not well managed, the two wars might erupt simultaneously in the region. In case the deterrence strategy fails, South Korea, the United States, and Japan will have to prepare to win the war.

This study proposes establishment of ROK-U.S.-Japan Military Cooperation Task Forces (ROK-U.S.-Japan MCTF), consisting of strategic planners from ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Japan Joint Staff, and trilateral security experts. ROK-U.S.-Japan MCTF should conduct consultations to coordinate their responses to challenges, provocations, and threats in the region, periodic intelligence estimates, and simulation games. It will be possible to develop the missions and responsibilities of the three member states in accordance with the three scenarios.

ROK-led war readiness systems should be established. It is essential for South Korea to build comprehensive war guidance systems by Military Commander-in-Chief, a ROK-led Combined Forces Command, and conduct realistic field maneuver exercises with strategy, operational art, and tactics, reserve forces combat mobilization training, and civil defense exercise. This total war readiness posture can prevent war. In the event of actual war, the ROK may win the war with minimum casualties and achieve a free, unified Korea.

In particular, North Korea might attack with a tactical nuclear warhead delivered by an ultra-supersonic missile toward the Metropolitan within one minute. South Korea will not be able to cope with North Korea’s tactical nuclear preemptive strike. South Korea will have to respond to North Korea’s nuclear challenge to national survival with its own nuclear arsenal. Therefore, it is urgent for South Korea to pursue nuclear armament.

ROK-led warfighting systems should be established with the transition of wartime operational control. It will be very challenging for the U.S.-led Warfighting Combined Forces Command to wage war under the conditions of two simultaneous wars in the region. Relationships and roles of ROK JCS, Future Combined Forces Command (F-CFC), United Nations Command (UNC), and USFK should be defined. A Military Committee consisting of chairmen from ROK and U.S. JCS should provide strategic guidance and operational directives for the F-CFC.

The ROK JCS should be in charge of counter-provocation operations. UNC should take the responsibility for managing the armistice agreement and acting as a force provider in the event of a contingency. The F-CFC should develop operational plans and conduct combined exercises, including exercises of operational control over ROK-USFK, along with U.S. augmentation forces and tactical control over UN combat forces in the event of war (Jeon 6/22/2024).

The transition of wartime operational control needs to be implemented early by reorganizing the command structure by ROK four-star general serving as Commander of the CFC and a U.S. four-star general as Deputy Commander (Chung 2024c: 122-158).

There is a need for the ROK and the United States to agree on the terms of strategic flexibility so that when part of the U.S. forces stationed in Korea flow out to areas outside the Korean Peninsula, alternative forces can be deployed in advance or at the same time. Additionally, in the event of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. military forces stationed throughout the world will need to flow in to the Korean Peninsula theater to strengthen the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture (Jeon 2024).

Finally, along with strategic communication between South and North Korea, annual South Korea-China-Japan summit talks, Northeast Asian Foreign-Defense Ministerial Strategic Talks need to be held to consult on security issues. A Northeast Asia security regime should be institutionalized to manage peace and stability in the region. This security cooperation regime could make contributions to preventing war. We could establish Northeast Asia Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operation Task Forces to cope with transnational threats such as natural disasters.

Amid the huge loss of life in the Russo-Ukraine War and the Israel-Hamas Conflict, a powerful message appears: “Be willing to join peace talks and be prepared to wage war, if you really want peace.”

References

AFP in Washington. 2024. “China Supporting Russia in Massive Military Expansion, US says.” The Guardian. April 12. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/12/china-supporting-russia-in-massive-military-expansion-us-says

Atlantic Council Experts. 2024. “Experts React: What will Putin and Xi’s ‘New Era’ of Cooperation mean for the World?” Atlantic Council. May 16. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-what-will-putin-and-xis-new-era-of-cooperation-mean-for-the-world/

Bennet, Bruce W., Kang Choi, Myung-hyun Go, Bruce E Bechtol Jr., Ji-young Park, Bruce Klingner, and Du-hyun Cha. 2021. Countering the Risks of North Korean Nuclear Weapons. RAND Corporation. April. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA1000/PEA1015-1/RAND_PEA1015-1.pdf

Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. 2023. The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS). January 9. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan

Carugati, Remy. 2022. “Ukraine and Taiwan: Not the Same Fight.” Network for Strategic Analysis. March 14. https://ras-nsa.ca/ukraine-and-taiwan-not-the-same-fight/

Cha, Victor and Ellen Kim. 2024. “Russia’s Veto: Dismembering the UN Sanctions Regime on North Korea.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. March 29. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-veto-dismembering-un-sanctions-regime-north-korea

Chung, Kyung-young. 2022a. The Transition of Wartime Operational Control [in Korean]. Seoul: Maebong Publisher.

________. 2022b. “North Korea’s Nuclear Challenge and South Korea’s Response Strategy [in Korean].” The Journal of Military Affairs. Vol. 112: 63-94.

________. 2024c. “Security Policy Prospects and the ROK’s Preparation Direction in the event of Reelected President Trump [in Korean].” The Journal of Military Affairs. Vol. 117: 122-158.

Colby, Elbridge A. 2021. The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Global Firepower. 2024. “Military Ranking in the World.” https://www.globalfirepower.com/

Jeon, Jei-guk. 2024. “Strategic Flexibility of the USFK.” Author’s Interview with Jeon Jei-guk, Former Deputy Minister for Defense Policy. June 22.

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). 2023. “Report on 9th Enlarged Plenum of 8th WPK Central Committee.” December 31.

Chosun Ilbo. 2024. “North Korea and Russia ‘provide military aid without delay in the event of a state of war’... Release of the Treaty [Full Text][in Korean],” June 20. https://www.chosun.com/international/international_general/2024/06/20/QXEYNKQV7RFFVHP6QUHNF6SV6M/

Kuo, Lily. 2019. “All Necessary Means: Xi Jinping Reserves Right to Use Force against Taiwan.” The Guardian. January 2. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/02/all-necessary-means-xi-jinping-reserves-right-to-use-force-against-taiwan

Liberthal, Kenneth G. 2011. “The American Pivot to Asia.” Brookings. December 21. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/

Lun Tian, Yew and Ben Blanchard. 2022. “China will Never Renounce Right to Use Force over Taiwan, Xi says.” Reuters. October 16. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xi-china-will-never-renounce-right-use-force-over-taiwan-2022-10-16/

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Ng, Kelly and Yi Ma. 2024. “How is China Supporting Russia after it was Sanctioned for Ukraine War?” BBC News. May 15. https://www.bbc.com/news/60571253

Rozman, Gilbert. 2023. “A Perspective from China and Russia.” The Asan Forum. September 4. https://theasanforum.org/a-perspective-from-china-and-russia/

Sayo, Saruta. 2024. “What the Russia-DPRK Relationship Reflects About the West’s Security Strategy.” Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN). January 18. https://www.apln.network/analysis/commentaries/what-the-russia-dprk-relationship-reflects-about-the-wests-security-strategy

Sevastopulo, Demetri. 2017. “Trump Labels China a Strategic ‘Competitor.’” Financial Times. December 19. https://www.ft.com/content/215cf8fa-e3cb-11e7-8b99-0191e45377ec

The White House. 2022. “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China.” November 14.

_________. 2023. “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States.” August 18.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub.

■ Kyung-young CHUNG is an adjunct professor at the Graduate School of International Studies at Hanyang University.

■ Zeljana ZMIRE is a lecturer at the Graduate School of International Studies at Hanyang University.

■ Typeset by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate

For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

globalnk.org · by Professor of Korean Unification, Diplomacy and Security at Korea University

7. North Korea Neighbor Calls for Nuclear Weapons

Odd headline. South Korea is of course a "neighbor" of north Korea but it is an odd way to describe the "relationship."

North Korea Neighbor Calls for Nuclear Weapons

Newsweek · by Hugh Cameron · July 8, 2024

ByLive News Reporter

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A prominent South Korean politician is calling for the country to arm itself with nuclear weapons amid increasing tensions with their northern neighbor.

Na Kyung-won, a Korean politician and touted as a frontrunner to lead the country's official opposition, proposed that her country "make preparations to develop nuclear weapons in a short period of time right now".

In a Facebook post Kyung-won outlined why she believes the country should abandon its historic policy of non-proliferation.

"The history of international society shows that only 'countries with the power' to suppress external threats have survived," Na's post read. "This is why we should think about nuclear weapons with all possibilities open now."

Na went on to outline her proposal, which she said would be driven by "international sanity," and rely on "cooperation between Korea and the U.S."

"We will make preparations to develop nuclear weapons in a short period of time right now," Na said. "I will not just stop with words, but with actions."

Na will stand for election as the leader of the People Power Party at the party convention on July 23.

Na Kyung-won delivers a speech at the National Assembly in Seoul, South Korea. Na has called for the country to develop its own nuclear arsenal to counter the threat from North Korea. Na Kyung-won delivers a speech at the National Assembly in Seoul, South Korea. Na has called for the country to develop its own nuclear arsenal to counter the threat from North Korea. Kim Hyun-tai/Yonhap via AP

In 1975, South Korea joined the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which prohibits signatory states from developing nuclear weapons.

While it has continued to engage in nuclear research programs since that time, the country has maintained an official policy of non-proliferation.

However, Kim Jong Un has continually tried to develop an offensive nuclear capability in the face of international condemnation, prompting a reconsideration of South Korea's position.

In 2023, incumbent President Yoon Suk-Yeol suggested that the country could acquire its own nuclear arsenal if the situation with North Korea did not improve.

In April 2023, the U.S. agreed to deploy nuclear-armed submarines to South Korea, in exchange for the country abandoning plans to develop its own nuclear weapons.

People watch a television screen showing a news broadcast with file footage of a North Korean missile test, at a train station in Seoul on July 1. North Korea launched two ballistic missiles, South Korea's... People watch a television screen showing a news broadcast with file footage of a North Korean missile test, at a train station in Seoul on July 1. North Korea launched two ballistic missiles, South Korea's military confirmed—the latest in a series of weapons tests by Pyongyang that have soured relations with Seoul. JUNG YEON-JE/AFP via Getty Images

The latest threats by the opposition come during a period heightened tensions between the two states, as well as several altercations along their border.

Last week, North Korean state media reported that the regime had "successfully" launched an advanced ballistic missile armed with a "super-large warhead."

According to the South Korean military, one of the missiles flew "abnormally," and likely landed near the nation's capital of Pyongyang.

In late June, similarly, a hypersonic missile fired by North Korea exploded mid-flight over the sea of Japan.

In mid-June, satellite imagery showed several zones in the demilitarized zone along the Korean border where North Korea has cleared large strips of land to construct what appears to be a wall.

North Korean soldiers have also been crossing the inter-Korean border over the past few weeks, prompting warning shots to be fired by South Korean troops.

About the writer

Hugh Cameron

Hugh Cameron is Newsweek Live News Reporter based in London, U.K. His focus is reporting on international politics, conflict, and crime. Hugh joined Newsweek in 2024, having worked at Alliance News Ltd where he specialised in covering global and regional business developments, economic news, and market trends. He graduated from the University of Warwick with a bachelor's degree in politics in 2022, and from the University of Cambridge with a master's degree in international relations in 2023.

Languages: English.

You can get in touch with Hugh by emailing h.cameron@newsweek.com

Hugh Cameron is Newsweek Live News Reporter based in London, U.K. His focus is reporting on international politics, conflict, and ...

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Newsweek · by Hugh Cameron · July 8, 2024

8. North Korean leader’s sister denounces South’s border drills

North Korean leader’s sister denounces South’s border drills

Seoul resumed live-fire artillery exercises after suspending the inter-Korean tension reduction pact.

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/north-korea-denouces-south-drills-07082024003716.html

By Taejun Kang for RFA

2024.07.08

Taipei, Taiwan

Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un, attends a wreath laying ceremony at the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum in Hanoi, Vietnam March 2, 2019.

Jorge Silva/Pool/Reuters

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s powerful sister on Monday denounced South Korea’s resumption of live-fire artillery drills near the border as “suicidal hysteria” and warned of possible military action.

The South has conducted live-fire artillery drills near the land and sea borders in recent weeks after its suspension last month of an inter-Korean military tension reduction agreement. The 2018 pact included setting up a land buffer zone, where artillery drills and regiment-level field maneuvers were suspended, and maritime buffer zones, where artillery firing and naval drills were banned.

N. Korea appears to have released border dam water without prior notice | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 9, 2024

SEOUL, July 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korea appears to have begun releasing water from a dam near the inter-Korean border without giving prior notice to the South, the environment ministry said Tuesday.

The Imjin River downstream of the North's Hwanggang Dam had swelled based on analysis of satellite imagery, the ministry said, noting that it had shared the relevant information with the military and local municipalities.

The released water, however, is presumed to not be a significant amount.

If the North discharges 500 tons of water per second from the dam, it is expected to take nine hours for the water to reach the South's northernmost Pilseung Bridge on the Imjin River.

The water level and flow rate at the bridge currently remain stable at 0.48 meters and 30 cubic meters per second, respectively.

North Korea is said to not have given prior notice to the South over the latest discharge. It last notified the South of a release from Hwanggang Dam in 2013.

South Korea has repeatedly called on the North to give prior notice of such releases to prevent possible damage, but Pyongyang has not responded amid growing cross-border tensions stemming from the North's continued weapons testing and provocative acts.

This file photo, taken Aug. 22, 2023, shows South Korea's Gunnam Dam near the inter-Korean border in Yeoncheon County, 61 kilometers north of Seoul. (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 9, 2024

10. Disability in N. Korea: Stigma persists despite official efforts

This was north Korea's big response to the UN Commission of Inquiry. I heard a pundit this week tout this as one of the ways north Korea showed it was changing. It passed this law to show the world it was protecting human rights. But now to protect those with disabilities some are suggesting they should ship off to the gulag those who call disabled people bad names.

Disability in N. Korea: Stigma persists despite official efforts - Daily NK English

"It’s not right to drag somebody off to a forced labor camp for calling your boyfriend oppa, but I think we need to apply this punishment to improve views of the disabled,” a source argued

By Eun Seol -

July 9, 2024

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · July 9, 2024

Image: Adobe Firefly

North Korean media is attempting to improve perceptions of people with disabilities, including introducing a commemorative event for disabled children on International Children’s Day (June 1). However, these efforts have had little impact, with derogatory terms for the disabled still commonly used.

A source in Yanggang Province, speaking anonymously for security reasons, told Daily NK on June 14 that “almost nobody calls cripples ‘disabled'” and that negative perceptions remain widespread in North Korean society. Derogatory terms like “aeggu” for blind people and “ppiggo” for those with mobility impairments are still prevalent.

“Families often mistreat those with disabilities, telling them to stay hidden at home,” the source explained, adding: “Because of the general negative view, people with disabilities feel uncomfortable in public.”

North Korean authorities began efforts to change terminology in 2003 with the Law on the Protection of Disabled People. Since 2018, the Rodong Sinmun has run articles promoting non-discriminatory practices for people with disabilities. The government has also established facilities such as sports associations and vocational training schools. These include the Vocational Training School for Persons with Disabilities run by the Korean Federation for the Protection of the Disabled and a reading room for people with disabilities in the Sci-Tech Complex.

Despite these efforts, social prejudice and discrimination persist 20 years later. Critics within North Korea urge authorities to focus more on improving disability-related terminology rather than cracking down on South Korean speech patterns through the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act of January 2023.

“It’s not right to drag somebody off to a forced labor camp for calling your boyfriend oppa, but I think we need to apply this punishment to improve views of the disabled,” the source said. “If the authorities order that people be sent to a forced labor camp for using the word ‘cripple,’ more people will use the term ‘disabled,’ and perceptions of the disabled will change over time.”

North Korea’s first disability-related survey in 1998 reported 3.41% of its population as disabled. The country enacted the Law on the Protection of Disabled People in 2003 and conducted follow-up surveys in 2011 and 2014. In 2013, North Korea signed the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, amending its domestic law accordingly. The 2018 implementation report for this Convention stated that disabled individuals comprised 5.5% of the population, approximately 1.41 million out of 25.73 million people.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

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dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · July 9, 2024

11. N. Korea mandates war film screenings to bolster patriotism

Another indicator of how unsure KJU is of internal loyalty. He is threatened from within.

N. Korea mandates war film screenings to bolster patriotism - Daily NK English

Well-known films like "An Unattached Unit" and "Nation and Destiny" were designated for viewing

By Jeong Seo-yeong - July 9, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · July 9, 2024

A scene from the North Korean film "An Unattached Unit." (YouTube capture)

South Pyongan Province’s party committee recently organized screenings of Korean War-era films, requiring viewers to submit written impressions afterward.

A source in South Pyongan Province, speaking anonymously for security reasons, reported Tuesday that the provincial party committee ordered all local areas to screen films set during the “Fatherland Liberation War” (North Korea’s term for the Korean War). Viewers were instructed to watch three films daily, each about 90 minutes long, and submit written impressions.

Sunchon’s party committee implemented this order from June 26 to 29, mandating all local organizations and residents to participate. Well-known films like “An Unattached Unit” and “Nation and Destiny” were designated for viewing.

The committee emphasized focusing on how the films portrayed “enemies’ vile means to weaken us internally” and “how our wartime heroes defended our fatherland.” They also urged viewers to “learn from the indomitable will and spirit” of these heroes and to resist “South Korea’s plots” involving leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts.

Specific guidelines were provided for the written impressions, including pledges of ideological determination such as: “I will actively follow the passionate love and patriotism for the party, leader, fatherland and people,” and “I will never fall for the enemies’ contrivances and believe only in the party, fatherland and leader.”

The elementary party unit of Sunchon Catfish Farm conveyed these directions, stating that “the more people write, the clearer their ideology becomes.” Employees submitted statements pledging to “protect the fatherland in any situation” and “not be fooled by the enemies’ base propaganda schemes.”

The source added that South Pyongan Province’s party committee intends to provide more such “study opportunities” to strengthen public ideological education.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · July 9, 2024

- Daily NK English

Well-known films like "An Unattached Unit" and "Nation and Destiny" were designated for viewing

By Jeong Seo-yeong - July 9, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · July 9, 2024

A scene from the North Korean film "An Unattached Unit." (YouTube capture)

South Pyongan Province’s party committee recently organized screenings of Korean War-era films, requiring viewers to submit written impressions afterward.

The source added that South Pyongan Province’s party committee intends to provide more such “study opportunities” to strengthen public ideological education.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · July 9, 2024

12. U.S. envoy for N. Korean human rights to visit S. Korea this week

(LEAD) U.S. envoy for N. Korean human rights to visit S. Korea this week | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 9, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with State Department's statement on N. Korea Freedom Week)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, July 8 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights will visit South Korea this week to highlight Washington's commitment to supporting North Korean defectors and escapees, the State Department said Monday.

Ahead of North Korean Defectors' Day that falls on Sunday, Ambassador Julie Turner is scheduled to visit Seoul from Wednesday to Saturday to join a forum and meet Seoul officials, civil society organizations and industry groups to discuss supply chain due diligence and forced labor.

"She will highlight the United States' commitment to support the North Korean defector and escapee community, advance a survivor-centered approach to accountability for North Korea's human rights violations and abuses, and underscore the unique role escapees play in exposing the regime's human rights violations and abuses," it said in a release.

"North Korean escapees are a living testament to what is achievable for North Koreans living in freedom. The United States will continue to work with our allies, including the Republic of Korea, to amplify their voices," it added.

The department reiterated that Washington will continue to work with its allies to "amplify their voices."

This week, civic advocacy groups and others mark the annual North Korea Freedom Week, which culminates in North Korean Defectors' Day.

This file photo, taken Oct. 18, 2023, shows U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Julie Turner attending a press meeting in Seoul. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

In a separate statement, Matthew Miller, the department's spokesperson, said that the U.S. recognizes the "tenacity and courage" of North Korean escapees and human rights advocates, as well as the continued suffering of millions of North Koreans "at the hands of the DPRK government."

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"The regime continues to exploit its citizens, including through forced labor, and divert resources from the country's people to advance its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs," he said.

"Ruthless crackdowns on foreign media and the continuing rise in the number of public executions, including of youth, have heightened an environment of fear and repression."

Miller also reiterated calls for "all" countries to uphold non-refoulement obligations and to protect North Korean asylum seekers.

"We remain committed to highlighting the egregious human rights violations and abuses happening in the DPRK and to working with allies and partners to promote human rights, accountability and access to information."

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 9, 2024

13. Yoon to visit Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii

Yoon to visit Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 10, 2024

By Kim Eun-jung

HONOLULU, July 9 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol is set to visit U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii on Tuesday as part of his trip to the United States focused on bolstering South Korea's security against North Korea's military threats.

Yoon will receive a security briefing from Adm. Samuel Paparo, commander of Indo-Pacific Command, Gen. Paul LaCamera, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, and other U.S. military leaders.

The U.S. military's largest combatant command oversees U.S. Forces Korea, which maintains about 28,500 troops in South Korea as a deterrent against North Korea.

It marks the first such visit to the command by a South Korean president in 29 years and the first since it was renamed to USINDOPACOM in 2018.

Currently, the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), a U.S.-led joint maritime exercise, is under way around the Hawaiian Islands. The drills, involving South Korea and 28 other countries, began June 26 and will continue until Aug. 29.

Later in the day, Yoon will head to Washington to attend a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit on Wednesday and Thursday.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (R) shakes hands with Adm. Samuel Paparo (2nd from L), commander of Indo-Pacific Command, during his visit to the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific in Hawaii on July 8, 2024. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 10, 2024

14. Yoon pledges to enhance combined readiness with U.S. against N. Korea

At some point readiness cannot be enhanced anymore. We have been continuously enhancing readiness since we resumed an aggressive exercise program after we had naively cancelled, postponed, and scaled back exercises while we were "negotiating" with Kim Jong Un and then during the COVID era. In the past few years we have rasiedreadiness to a new level and it is time we start talking about how ready we are and that we are doing everything that is necessary to sustain a high level of readiness that deters war (and has done so successfully for seven decades).

(LEAD) Yoon pledges to enhance combined readiness with U.S. against N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 10, 2024

(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; UPDATES throughout with latest details; CHANGES photos)

By Kim Eun-jung

HONOLULU, July 9 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol vowed to bolster South Korea's combined defense readiness with the United States to deter North Korea's growing threats during his visit to the Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii on Tuesday.

Yoon made the remark during his meeting with Adm. Samuel Paparo, commander of Indo-Pacific Command, and Gen. Paul LaCamera, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, and other U.S. military leaders.

"North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile capabilities and continued provocations are threatening security on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. A steadfast combined defense readiness is more critical than ever," Yoon said, emphasizing the command's role in regional security.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) and Adm. Samuel Paparo, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, salute their countries' national flags during Yoon's visit to Camp Smith, the command's headquarters in Hawaii, on July 9, 2024. (Yonhap)

Yoon underscored the importance of cooperation among allies and partners to address the growing security threats posed by North Korea after its signing of a mutual defense treaty with Russia last month.

"Strong power and solidarity among countries that share values are essential to protecting our liberal democracy and economic prosperity from these reckless forces," Yoon said.

The U.S. military's largest combatant command oversees U.S. Forces Korea, which maintains about 28,500 troops in South Korea as a deterrent against North Korea.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (4th from L) poses for a photo with U.S. commanders during his visit to Camp Smith, Indo-Pacific Command's headquarters in Hawaii, on July 9, 2024. (From L to R) Commander of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific William Jurney, Commander of Pacific Air Forces Kevin Schneider, Commander of U.S. Army Pacific Charles Flynn, Commander of Indo-Pacific Command Samuel Paparo, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Philip Goldberg, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea Paul LaCamera and Commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet Stephen Koehler. (Yonhap)

It marks the first such visit to the command by a South Korean president in 29 years and the first since it was renamed to the Indo-Pacific Command in 2018.

During the visit, Yoon met about 200 military personnel at the command and thanked them for their service.

"I visited the Indo-Pacific Command to further strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance and the combined defense posture under the grave security situation on the Korean Peninsula," he told the soldiers in a speech.

South Korea has sent some 840 personnel and naval assets for the drills, including the 7,600-ton ROKS Yulgok Yi I Aegis-equipped destroyer and the 1,800-ton ROKS Lee Beom-seok submarine.

Later in the day, Yoon will head to Washington to attend a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit on Wednesday and Thursday.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · July 10, 2024

15. National Assembly launches forum for potential nuclear armament

Counterintuitively this is exactly what Kim Jong Un has been hoping for. This supports regime political warfare. This is an issue that will potentially divide the ROK/US alliance which of course is a major strategic objective of the regime.

National Assembly launches forum for potential nuclear armament

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · July 9, 2024

By Kim Arin

Published : July 9, 2024 - 18:19

Rep. Yu Yong-weon of People Power Party (The Korea Herald)

The National Assembly forum for potentially arming South Korea with nuclear weapons, the Mugunghwa Forum, kicked off Tuesday.

The ruling People Power Party Rep. Yu Yong-weon, the Mugunghwa Forum’s founding president, said in remarks delivered at the inaugural ceremony that the forum will discuss policies and strategies for cultivating what he has termed the country’s “nuclear potential.”

“I am pleased that the forum is taking off on this day at the National Assembly, which represents the voice of the South Korean people,” Yu said. “I hope that this forum can contribute to developing strategies and building consensus for securing South Korea’s potential for nuclear armament.”

Faced with growing nuclear threats from North Korea, the first-time lawmaker said that the “realistic alternative” to becoming a nuclear-armed country was for South Korea to be cleared of limitations in uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.

The ceremony, attended by the ruling party leadership, was held under the theme of “Preventing a North Korean nuclear catastrophe: Why South Korea can no longer put off securing a nuclear potential.”

Speaking at the ceremony, ruling party floor leader Rep. Choo Kyung-ho “vowed full support” so that the suggestions and ideas being put forth at the forum could translate into policies.

Rep. Kim Gi-hyeon, the ruling party’s former chair, said at the forum that when he raised the possibility of South Korea possibly having to arm itself two years ago, it was considered a moot point.

“Two years later, the tide in public opinion has completely shifted. According to one poll, about 80 percent of South Koreans support the country acquiring nuclear weapons,” he said.

“I think this reflects a sense of urgency in security. The importance of having greater independence in national defense capabilities cannot be emphasized enough.”

The forum is joined by 21 lawmakers, including Rep. Na Kyung-won, one of the front-runners for the next ruling party chair; Rep. Ahn Cheol-soo, a former presidential candidate; Rep. Sung Il-jong, the chair of the Assembly’s national defense committee; Rep. Kim Gunn, a former nuclear envoy; and Rep. Lee Jun-seok of the minor Reform Party.

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · July 9, 2024

16. U.S. renews 'great concern' over N. Korea-Russia cooperation ahead of NATO summit

Desperation, weakness, fear, and envy are what are driving Russia and north Korea. We should not forget that and we should be telling their story. Putin's comments today with Modi from India illustrate that. He is trying to show he can cultivate friends (to include a US friend) because he both fears and envies US alliances and of course he is separate for support because he is so weak.

Yes we should be concerned but we should not be afraid and we especially should not be afraid to call out Putin and Kim for their weakness as well as the malign activities (and brutality in Ukraine and throughout north Korea).

U.S. renews 'great concern' over N. Korea-Russia cooperation ahead of NATO summit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 9, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, July 8 (Yonhap) -- A State Department spokesperson reiterated "great concerns" Monday over growing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, as the United States is set to host a summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Washington this week.

Matthew Miller, the spokesperson, made the remarks as NATO allies are expected to highlight their solidarity against Russia's war operations in Ukraine during their summit set to take place in the U.S. capital from Tuesday through Thursday.

"I think we have made quite clear our great concern about increased collaboration between the DPRK and Russia ... the DPRK supporting Russia's war machine that is targeting, killing innocent civilians in Ukraine and violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of another U.N. member in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions," he said during a press briefing.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

"We will continue to work with our allies and partners to counter that relationship," he added.

The NATO summit comes after Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership" treaty entailing a mutual defense clause during their summit in Pyongyang last month.

Burgeoning security cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang has fueled concerns about its security implications on the Korean Peninsula and in Europe.

This photo, taken on June 6, 2024, shows State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller speaking during a press briefing at the department in Washington. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 9, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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