Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“If we are to have another contest… Of national significance, I predict that the dividing line will not be Mason and Dixon’s, but between patriotism and intelligence on the one side, and superstition, ambition and ignorance on the other.”

– Ulysses, S Grant, 1875

"The less talent they have, the more pride, vanity and arrogance they have. All these fools, however, find other fools who applaud them."

– Erasmus, 1509

“And how we burned in the camps later, thinking: What would things have been like if every Security operative, when he went out at night to make an arrest, had been uncertain whether he would return alive and had to say good-bye to his family? Or if, during periods of mass arrests, as for example in Leningrad, when they arrested a quarter of the entire city, people had not simply sat there in their lairs, paling with terror at every bang of the downstairs door and at every step on the staircase, but had understood they had nothing left to lose and had boldly set up in the downstairs hall an ambush of half a dozen people with axes, hammers, pokers, or whatever else was at hand?... The Organs would very quickly have suffered a shortage of officers and transport and, notwithstanding all of Stalin's thirst, the cursed machine would have ground to a halt! If...if...We didn't love freedom enough. And even more – we had no awareness of the real situation.... We purely and simply deserved everything that happened afterward.”

– Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn , The Gulag Archipelago 1918–1956

1. Justice Sotomayor dangerously misunderstands our military

2. President Joe Biden Launches the Ukraine Compact

3. Remarks by President Biden on the Ukraine Compact

4. Back to the Basics: How Many People Are in the People’s Liberation Army?

5. The Ukraine War Proves Europe Must Spend More on Defense Now

6. Far from a “Burden,” NATO Has Delivered a High Return on Investment

7. The West Is Misreading China in the South China Sea

8. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 11, 2024

9. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, July 11, 2024

10. Exclusive: US and Germany foiled Russian plot to assassinate CEO of arms manufacturer sending weapons to Ukraine

11. The Gray Zone Darkens: Russian Assassination Plot Foiled in Germany

12. Russian influence ops are the ‘preeminent threat’ to November's elections, US officials say

13. Army graduates its first cohort of new warrant officer recruiters

14. NATO de facto fueling Indo-Pacific's re-militarization

15. 3rd Plenum will treat economy with Chinese medicine

16. At NATO summit, a question of what the alliance wants from the Pacific

17. ‘America’s Cold Warrior’ Review: The Legacy of Paul Nitze

18. .Fish Wars: How to Prevent Conflict Over an Increasingly Scarce Resource

19. What the Lebanese People Really Think of Hezbollah

20. US plan to boost Pacific air power seen as counterbalance to China

21. The Roots of World War III

22. Okinawa protests parachute training while US works on alternative site

23. Operational Misconceptions: A Response to Operational Incompetence 2030

24. China's newest military base is up and running, and US officials see more of them on the horizon

25. Addressing the Root Cause of Our Veterans’ Suicide Epidemic

26. You might have just missed Earth-shattering economic news

1. Justice Sotomayor dangerously misunderstands our military

Excerpts:

If a coup plot were brewing, it would not remain a secret — and once revealed, the plotters would be swiftly caught.

A rogue president who “fires” generals in an attempt to compel compliance would only succeed in providing Congress the exact evidence needed to impeach. Our legislators enjoy strong and direct ties with the military, which they fund and oversee.

The idea that hypothetical assassins would be shielded by presidential pardons is also nonsense. A chief executive who boldly orders such killings and then frees the assassins would be impeached and removed from office. Sotomayor’s tortured scenario reads more like a bad movie script than a realistic appraisal of the American political dynamic.

Our troops are not trigger-men for a tyrant, but the bulwark of democracy. In these difficult times, when trust is strained between citizens and their government, the majority of Americans continue to express “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. military. Sotomayor’s misinformed Hail Mary of a dissent was inappropriate and harmful to this trust. It ignored the principled behavior of our military and inaccurately politicized its members.

Sotomayor fears for our democracy, but she should look elsewhere for true threats to our republic.

Justice Sotomayor dangerously misunderstands our military

BY ELIZABETH ROBBINS, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 07/09/24 7:45 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/4760751-justice-sotomayor-executive-power/?utm

Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor may be a constitutional law expert, but she apparently is unaware of a key limitation on executive power: our American troops.

In her dissent to the Supreme Court’s July 1 ruling in Trump v. United States, Sotomayor raised a hypothetical scenario regarding presidential immunity. Specifically, she warned that the decision meant that a commander-in-chief could order U.S. troops to murder an opponent, then sidestep criminal prosecution.

She wrote: “[The president] orders the Navy’s Seal Team 6 to assassinate a political rival? Immune. Organizes a military coup to hold onto power? Immune.”

Someone needs to explain to her that’s not how it works.

Sotomayor wrote, “In every use of official power, the president is now a king above the law” who in her view can simply execute opponents. But where are the willing executioners?

I served for more than 20 years as an Army officer. I can tell you that they are not in uniform. Our armed forces are comprised of bright and principled fellow citizens who understand their duty to follow only lawful orders. An assassination order against an American citizen would not be lawful — in fact, it would be an impeachable offense.

Each service member swears an oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” Further, enlistees vow to “obey the orders of the president of the United States” and other officers “according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.”

The Uniform Code of Military Justice was established by Congress under its Constitutional powers to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, and establish rules and regulations for these forces. Accordingly, U.S. service members receive legal and ethical training to fulfill Congress’s directives as codified and implemented and enforced by commanders and the Judge Advocate General’s Corps. This is deadly serious — the U.S. government provides its military a license to kill and the means to do so on its behalf, but with deep and meaningful constraints upon that power.

Beyond these legal boundaries, another reason that Sotomayor’s contention is nonsense is the diverse composition of our military. The ranks are filled with individuals from across the social, ethnic and political spectrum. No common military perspective exists on domestic politics. Multiple studies reveal that the troops do not predominantly support one party or another.

Accordingly, if a president were to give an illegal order to murder or enact a coup, the troops would not simply fall into line. As I have written previously, it is laughable to think that service members could agree on taking an unlawful course of action; mobilize sympathetic service members across various branches and locations to provide illicit combat and service support; and keep the planning and execution of these criminal schemes from other troops, civilian law enforcement personnel, their families and their neighbors.

If a coup plot were brewing, it would not remain a secret — and once revealed, the plotters would be swiftly caught.

A rogue president who “fires” generals in an attempt to compel compliance would only succeed in providing Congress the exact evidence needed to impeach. Our legislators enjoy strong and direct ties with the military, which they fund and oversee.

The idea that hypothetical assassins would be shielded by presidential pardons is also nonsense. A chief executive who boldly orders such killings and then frees the assassins would be impeached and removed from office. Sotomayor’s tortured scenario reads more like a bad movie script than a realistic appraisal of the American political dynamic.

Our troops are not trigger-men for a tyrant, but the bulwark of democracy. In these difficult times, when trust is strained between citizens and their government, the majority of Americans continue to express “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. military. Sotomayor’s misinformed Hail Mary of a dissent was inappropriate and harmful to this trust. It ignored the principled behavior of our military and inaccurately politicized its members.

Sotomayor fears for our democracy, but she should look elsewhere for true threats to our republic.

Elizabeth Robbins, a retired Army officer, is vice president for communications at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

2. President Joe Biden Launches the Ukraine Compact

Excerpt:

Leveraging each of our agreements, this historic Compact creates a unified and comprehensive security architecture to support Ukraine today and in the future, in war and in peace. Together, will achieve our collective goal: a Ukraine that is free, sovereign, democratic, independent, and prosperous, and able to defend itself and deter future aggression

JULY 11, 2024

President Joe Biden Launches the Ukraine Compact

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/07/11/president-joe-biden-launches-the-ukraine-compact/

Today, President Biden launched the Ukraine Compact at an event with 32 allies and partners as part of our commitment to Ukraine’s long term security. This Compact fulfills the promise President Biden and these countries made in Vilnius in 2023 to negotiate long-term bilateral security agreements with Ukraine to support Ukraine as it defends itself now, and to deter aggression against Ukraine in the future as part of its bridge to NATO membership. Leveraging each of our agreements, this historic Compact creates a unified and comprehensive security architecture to support Ukraine today and in the future, in war and in peace. Together, will achieve our collective goal: a Ukraine that is free, sovereign, democratic, independent, and prosperous, and able to defend itself and deter future aggression

We the leaders of the United States of America, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, together with the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the President of Ukraine:

Commend the security agreements and arrangements finalized with Ukraine by 20 countries and the European Union (EU) under the framework of the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine (Joint Declaration) released on the margins of the 2023 Vilnius North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit, and welcome all the remaining Joint Declaration signatories finalizing their respective security agreements and arrangements with Ukraine in the near future;

Affirm that the security of Ukraine is integral to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, and that we intend to support Ukraine until it prevails against Russia’s aggression;

Emphasize our unwavering commitment to a free, independent, democratic, and sovereign Ukraine capable of defending itself and deterring future aggression, and reaffirm Ukraine’s sovereign right to choose its own security arrangements as well as political, social, economic, and cultural systems;

Underscore that Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine is a threat to international peace and security; a flagrant violation of international law, including the United Nations (UN) Charter; and incompatible with our security interests; and

Recognize Ukraine’s commitment to reforms strengthening democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and media freedoms, as needed to advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and emphasize our shared values and interests, including respect for the principles of the UN Charter such as sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Today, we announce the Ukraine Compact (Compact) with a view towards coordinating and accelerating our collective efforts to meet Ukraine’s comprehensive security needs, as outlined in the Joint Declaration and in the security agreements and arrangements each of the signatories (Compact Signatories) has completed with Ukraine. Through this Compact, we declare our enduring intent and commitment to ensure Ukraine can successfully defend its freedom, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity today and deter acts of aggression in the future. To meet these vital objectives, as outlined in our respective bilateral security agreements and arrangements and consistent with all applicable laws and our respective legal systems, Compact Signatories pledge to:

(1) Support Ukraine’s immediate defense and security needs, including through the continued provision of security assistance and training, modern military equipment, and defense industrial and necessary economic support, working bilaterally and through existing multilateral mechanisms, including the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) and its Capability Coalitions, NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), and the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine);

(2) Accelerate efforts to build a Ukrainian future force that maintains a credible defense and deterrence capability, including by convening within 6 months at the level of Defense Ministers through the UDCG to review and approve roadmaps prepared by the leaders of the Capability Coalitions — each a Compact Signatory — on future force development through 2027, in coordination with and EUMAM Ukraine, with a view to continue strengthening the force into the 2030s; and

(3) In the event of future Russian armed attack against Ukraine following the conclusion of current hostilities, convene swiftly and collectively at the most senior levels to determine appropriate next steps in supporting Ukraine as it exercises its right of self-defense as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, including the provision of swift and sustained security assistance and the imposition of economic and other costs on Russia.

We intend to uphold these commitments with unwavering determination by leveraging the multilateral security architecture that supports Ukraine, consistent with our respective national laws and security and defense policies. Compact Signatories plan to take these commitments forward while Ukraine pursues its pathway towards future membership in the EU, NATO, and the broader Euro-Atlantic community. Other countries that wish to contribute to this effort to ensure a free, democratic, independent, and sovereign Ukraine may join this Compact upon completion of a bilateral security agreement or arrangement with Ukraine.

Endorsed at Washington, this 11th day of July, 2024, by the leaders of:

The United States of America Latvia

Belgium Lithuania

Canada Luxembourg

Czechia The Netherlands

Denmark Norway

Estonia Poland

The European Union Portugal

Finland Romania

France Slovenia

Germany Spain

Iceland Sweden

Italy Ukraine

Japan The United Kingdom

###

3. Remarks by President Biden on the Ukraine Compact

Remarks by President Biden on the Ukraine Compact

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/07/11/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-ukraine-compact/

Walter E. Washington Convention Center

Washington, D.C.

5:40 P.M. EDT

PRESIDENT BIDEN: Well, I’m sure my fellow leaders are tired of hearing from all of us, but we had an important thing to do today, and it’s a way to close this conference.

Good afternoon, everyone.

When Putin launched his brutal war over two years ago, I promised President Zelenskyy the United States and our allies and our partners would stand with him for the people of Ukraine as they defended their country.

Since then, all of you — all my fellow leaders — we built a global coalition to support Ukraine, supplied economic and humanitarian support, supplied weapons that Ukraine needs to defend itself.

And two days ago, I announced a historic donation of air defense equipment to protect Ukrainian cities, troops, and — from Russian missiles.

And here today, with all these important people behind me, we take another important step in our collective support for Ukraine. We refer to it as the “Ukraine Compact,” and here’s how it works.

Last year, the G7 nations signed into a decl- — signed on to a declaration to protect Ukraine long term, not just for the duration of this war but beyond, after they win. Twenty-five additional countries quickly joined them and pledged to negotiate and sign a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine.

Now, one year later, more than 20 companies pl- — coun- –countries plus the European Union have completed and signed these agreements. And more countries are finalizing theirs as we speak.

This compact brings all those countries together in a unified, coordinated, and comprehensive architecture to support Ukraine not just for now but for years in the future.

In the short term, we’ll continue to supply Ukraine with the weapons and munitions and training they need to repel Russian forces.

In the medium term, we’ll help build a future force that has the strength and the capabilities both to defend Ukraine and deter further aggression.

In the long term, after this war is over, if Putin ever tries it again, all the countries that endorsed the compact have pledged to have Ukraine’s back just like we have it now.

You heard me say it before: We’re building a bridge to NATO for Ukraine, a pathway leading to an — an eventual membership as they continue to implement important domestic reforms.

This compact, which is on the stage here, is a central piece of that bridge.

What happens to Ukraine matters. It matters to all of Europe. It matters to NATO. Quite frankly, it matters to the whole world.

We’re united against Putin’s senseless and brutal war. We are united behind Ukraine as it fights to defend its freedom and its future. We’re united behind a vision of the world where free countries like Ukraine do not have to fear aggression from a brutal tyrant next door.

I want to commend Ukrainian fr- — armed forces, as their defense secretary and leaders are here as well, and the Ukrainian people. You’re incredible. And through all of your country, you’re incredible — their courage, the determination, the sacrifices they’ve made.

And I commend all the nations that stepped up when it counted to stand with Ukraine.

As I’ve said before, Russia will not prevail in this war. Ukraine will prevail in this war. And we will stand with them every single step of the way.

That’s what the compact says loudly and clearly.

And now I want to hand it over to the president of Ukraine, who has as much courage as he has determination.

Ladies and gentlemen, President Putin — (applause) — President Putin — he’s going to beat President Putin — President Zelenskyy.

I’m so focused on beating Putin, we got to worry about it. Anyway, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY: I’m better than that.

PRESIDENT BIDEN: You are a hell of a lot better. (Laughter.)

PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY: Thank you so much, Mr. President. (Applause.) Thank you very much.

Thank you so much, Mr. President.

Dear — dear our friends, friends of Ukraine, last year at the NATO Summit in Vilnius, we took a very strong step with a G7 declaration on security for Ukraine — for Ukrainian people. And we did not waste time, and now we have a solid architecture of security guarantees.

I thank President Biden for his leadership and all the efforts to make our security cooperation full of strong actions. There are 23 strong agreements, and there will be agreements with other countries. And we have a historically significant security agreement with the United States.

All of these helped us obtain the necessary air defense systems. Thanks to — to America and to all the partners; to all the leaders and your societies, your people, of course. And thanks to all partners for the Patriots and other air defense systems, provision of F-16s, and assistance so that our pe- — our people and our country could withstand Russian attacks on our energy sector as well as training, cybersecurity, intelligence cooperation, and the development of the defense industry.

This Ukraine Compact we are forming takes our relations to a new level — a significant achievement for Ukraine and all of us.

Slava Ukraini. (Applause.)

5:46 P.M. EDT

4. Back to the Basics: How Many People Are in the People’s Liberation Army?

Excerpts:

Why Does This Matter?

The Chinese military system has been adapted to suit its own unique and changing national circumstances. As the United States and its friends and allies seek to compete militarily with China, it is critical for U.S. policymakers and planners to reduce mirror-imaging and misunderstanding. In order to fill in the many gaps in our knowledge about the Chinese armed forces, Western analysts and planners should not assume that Chinese solutions to personnel, organizational, and doctrinal challenges are the same that Western (or other) nations have adopted. The deeper one digs, the less the People’s Liberation Army looks like other militaries — opening the door for the Chinese to leverage these differences to their advantage and surprise us with their actions. For example, some relatively unexplored components of the Chinese armed forces could contribute unanticipated capabilities in a crisis or, at a minimum, add confusion to the situation.

For the Chinese side, it has been five years since the last defense white paper was issued, the longest gap since the Chinese government published its first white paper in 1998. Nonetheless, many changes continue, such as the break-up of the strategic support force into three smaller forces. White papers can provide data that reduces the need for foreign speculation and misunderstandings about basic information such as the sizes of individual services and forces or the types and distribution of personnel in all the elements of the Chinese armed forces.

The Chinese saying “Towering buildings are built from the ground up” (万丈高楼平地起) applies to both the American and Chinese sides. As the U.S. military, intelligence, and policy communities expand their capabilities to craft effective competitive strategies directed at China and its armed forces, the U.S. side requires a solid foundational knowledge of Chinese force structure and organizational culture, beyond weapons systems and maximum capabilities. Getting the basic software issues right has direct implications on how we assess the capabilities and training quality of the Chinese armed forces. Modifications to People’s Liberation Army personnel policies deserve analytical attention similar to that afforded equipment and technological developments, as it will be those people who operate and maintain new weapons and plan for their employment to maximize effectiveness.

Back to the Basics: How Many People Are in the People’s Liberation Army? - War on the Rocks

SHANSHAN MEI AND DENNIS J. BLASKO

warontherocks.com · by Shanshan Mei · July 12, 2024

The People’s Liberation Army is often described as “the largest military in the world.” But depending on who you ask and what you count, the details are murky and confusing. The deeper one dives into the numbers, the more complicated the picture gets, and the greater the differences between the Chinese and U.S. systems become. Though many recent reforms have surface aspects that appear to reflect U.S. structures, the new-look People’s Liberation Army does not mirror-image its American (or Russian) counterpart. Nor have its new organizations been tempered by combat.

It is critical for defense planners, military researchers, intelligence analysts, and policymakers to take the basics of the Chinese armed forces seriously. The types of people who work for the Chinese armed forces are fundamental to understanding how their systems function. Their force structure and organizational culture determine how they plan to fight and win wars. Misunderstanding the known or misinterpreting the unknown and unknowable can have adverse effects on long-range U.S. strategic planning. Little-understood forces may contribute unexpectedly to Chinese campaigns. Or, the inertia of such a large armed force may inhibit its flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances.

But how big is this force?

Become a Member

Different Estimates of the Size of the Force

Since 2019, the government of the People’s Republic of China has provided only the bottom line number: after a 300,000-personnel reduction, the total active force is 2 million. The army was “significantly” reduced, the air force “maintained” in size, while the navy and rocket force “moderately increased,” but no specific numbers were given. The sizes of the newly formed Strategic Support Force (reorganized to become the Information Support force, Military Aerospace Force, and Cyberspace Force in April 2024) and Joint Logistic Support Force were not announced. Concurrently, the reserve force (not active-duty troops) was restructured, but no details were provided. In 2017, the Army was reported to be less than 50 percent of total military personnel. Left unsaid, however, was that the majority of personnel assigned to the new joint forces wear army uniforms but are not counted as Army personnel. In comparison, the U.S. Department of Defense personnel reporting system supplies similar and more information updated quarterly. The paucity of official Chinese data can result in misunderstanding and misinterpretations.

An objective, long-running source of statistics on the People’s Liberation Army (and all the world’s militaries) is the International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance. It filled in the gaps in Chinese numbers with the following educated guesses (as of 2024): total active-duty personnel, 2,035,000; Army, 965,000; Navy, 252,000; Air Force, 403,000; Rocket Force, 120,000; Strategic Support Force, 145,000; Joint Logistic Support Force, 150,000; paramilitary People’s Armed Police, 500,000; and People’s Liberation Army reserves, estimated 510,000. Because of the institute’s longtime attention to the subject, and lacking specifics from Beijing, many foreign observers use these estimates when addressing the size of the Chinese military. Fun fact number one: The estimated number of personnel in the world’s “largest navy” (by overall battle force, including its Marine Corps) is about 52 percent of the active-duty U.S. Navy and Marine Corps total.

The Department of Defense used the Chinese number for the People’s Liberation Army’s active-duty component in the 2020 and 2021 editions of its annual report to Congress, the Chinese Military Power Report, actually improving its accuracy by adding the word “approximately” in front of the two million figure. (The specific number of personnel in any force fluctuates slightly over time according to how and when new officers and enlisted personnel are inducted and separated and other factors such as deaths and unforeseen discharges.) However, the 2022 report said China had “approximately 2.2 million active duty military service members” — a 10 percent increase in China’s figures of active-duty numbers in one year’s time, when recruiting was difficult for most militaries. The report did not explain why this significant surge allegedly occurred.

A year later, the 2023 report modified the numbers again: “The [People’s Liberation Army] is the world’s largest active-duty military force and comprised of approximately 2.185 million active, 1.17 million reserve, and 660,000 paramilitary personnel for a total force of 4 million.” No explanation was specified for the 15,000-person reduction in active-duty personnel from the previous year. At the same time, the Pentagon’s website carried a graphic that depicted U.S. total numbers as “3.4 million Service Members & Civilians.” Those figures include U.S. active-duty and reserve components plus Defense Department civilians, a distant second to the People’s Liberation Army. Another section of the 2023 report stated: “As of 2020, [People’s Liberation Army] officers and civilian personnel probably numbered approximately 450,000 personnel (23 percent), [noncommissioned officers] roughly 850,000 (42 percent), and conscripted recruits about 700,000 (35 percent).” There’s a lot to unpack in these numbers.

The Chinese Armed Forces

Article 22 of the 1997 People’s Republic of China National Defense Law says the Chinese armed forces consist of the active-duty and reserve forces of the People’s Liberation Army, the People’s Armed Police, and the militia. Article 27 of the 2020 revision to the law added that the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police “shall implement the civilian personnel (文职人员) system for prescribed positions.” The law codified a new category of non-active-duty, uniformed civilian personnel. This contingent had been created in 2005 to work on contract to the Chinese armed forces. For the first decade of its existence, their numbers were reported to be about 20,000 personnel. They augmented active-duty officers, noncommissioned officers, and conscripts in non-combatant jobs in education, medical, research, engineering, and other fields — and often performed tasks assigned to active-duty, uniformed People’s Liberation Army civil (or civilian) cadre (文职干部), who held the status of officers. For many years, China’s Madame Peng Liyuan (Mrs. Xi Jinping) was the most famous civil cadre. We assess she likely has retired from her military duties to perform her full-time role of first lady.

Simultaneous with the 300,000-man active-duty reduction, the non-active-duty civilian force was professionalized, greatly expanded, and issued their own “peacock blue” (孔雀蓝) uniforms and insignia to differentiate them from other elements of the Chinese armed forces. In recent years, the civilian personnel system has also been used as a recruitment vehicle to attract Western-educated young people with advanced degrees to join the service. While the exact number of People’s Liberation Army civilians has not been revealed, their total numbers apparently are many multiples of the 20,000 reported earlier. Their expansion somewhat offsets the impact of the active-duty cuts. These civilians have been assigned to augment undermanned headquarters staffs at all levels in the force, throughout the professional military education system as instructors and researchers, and in many operational units. At the same time, the unknown number of active-duty civil cadre has been nearly totally (if not completely) retired, transformed to officers, or transformed to civilian status.

A separate, minor category of non-active-duty, non-uniformed civilian personnel, called workers and staff (职工), provides administrative and custodian services in shops and canteens on military facilities and existed long before the introduction of uniformed civilians.

The growth of the number of civilian personnel has at least two major implications. First, these non-active-duty uniformed personnel are the Chinese military equivalent to the much larger 780,000-plus cadre of non-active-duty Department of Defense civilians found on every U.S. military installation throughout the world. (That number does not include the tens of thousands of civilian commercial contractors who work for the Pentagon throughout the world, including in combat zones, whose contribution is measured in contract “full-time equivalents.”) But, they are not comparable to the network of Defense Department political appointees who change with every administration.

Second, as active-duty People’s Liberation Army civil cadre have disappeared, the percentage of officers on the rolls has diminished an unknown amount, down from about 23 percent (what we estimated on these pages in 2020) to what is now likely under 20 percent. This would allow for the continued enlargement of the noncommissioned officer corps above our previous guess of 42 percent. Furthermore, it is possible the percentage of conscripts has dropped a few points below our previous assessment of 35 percent.

The Pentagon’s 2023 report accounting for active-duty officers, noncommissioned officers, and conscripts mentioned above reflected the exact same numbers we did in 2020, but in the category of officers, it also included “civilian personnel.” However, our classification listed “officers and civil cadres.” This mistake — unlike officers and civil cadres, civilian personnel are non-active-duty — might have led to the report’s 2.185 million number for total personnel, if active-duty and projections for non-active civilians inadvertently were mixed together.

In addition to the active-duty People’s Liberation Army, the first category of the Chinese armed forces also includes the reserve force. As seen earlier, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates 510,000 reserve personnel. As best we know, that number comes from official Chinese sources in 2009 and hasn’t been updated since. The 2019 white paper, China’s National Defense in New Era, acknowledged this element was being reformed. Indeed, over the past 15 years, the reserve unit structure changed drastically. The number of Army reserve units was reduced, with some of their personnel/units being transferred to the Air Force reserve. At the same time, reserve units in the other services and forces were expanded to some degree. The 2023 Pentagon report notes that Army reserve units have begun restructuring into a “reserve base system.” At least five such bases have been identified, one per theater, numbered 1 through 5 — for example, the Eastern Theater’s Army Reserve 1st Base (陆军预备役第一基地). Details of these changes remain unclear. A new Reserve Law has been issued. Reserve ranks have been adjusted to parallel the active-duty rank structure from private to senior colonel. Unfortunately, the 2023 Pentagon report confused the issue of reserve numbers by reporting both the 510,000 number on one page and 1.17 million on an earlier page.

With all the changes under way, the best that can be said is that the current number of personnel in the reserve force has not been announced publicly by the Chinese government. We assess Chinese reserve units likely remain significantly smaller than the active force. Though they share a similar name, the level of operational readiness of many People’s Liberation Army reserve units and their interoperability/inter-changeability with active forces likely does not match their U.S. counterpart organizations. Fun fact number two: Today, the end-strength of the U.S. Army Reserves and National Guard surpasses the active force by nearly 60,000 personnel.

Similar uncertainty exists about the size of the active-duty, paramilitary People’s Armed Police.

Its primary mission is to work with the civilian police force to maintain domestic security by assisting in law enforcement operations. It also provides the country’s primary antiterrorist reaction forces, though both the police and the People’s Liberation Army also have antiterrorist capabilities. The People’s Armed Police has a secondary mission of assisting the People’s Liberation Army in external defense, similar to the military’s secondary mission of assisting in domestic security operations, when authorized. The People’s Armed Police also has undergone a major reorganization since 2015. This includes the addition of the Chinese Coast Guard into its structure and the transfer of its former gold mine, forest, and hydroelectric units to the control of other government organizations. The 660,000 personnel number cited by the Pentagon report comes from the 2006 Chinese defense white paper and is unlikely to reflect the current force strength. The People’s Armed Police has no analogue in the U.S. military.

The third component of the Chinese armed forces, the militia, has been reported as being reduced to, or at, eight million personnel since the 2008 white paper. The 2019 white paper stated, “China is streamlining the number of primary militia (基干民兵) nationwide,” but added no details. The most infamous element of the militia is the maritime militia. This component’s exact size is unknown but is only a small fraction of a much larger force that has units in every county in China. With no equivalent in the U.S. armed forces, the Chinese militia probably numbers in the multiple millions (on paper) and has varying degrees of training and effectiveness. New units frequently are added to its roster to take advantage of maturing commercial technologies.

An important element of the militia is its leadership: the large body of full-time, non-active-duty, uniformed local government workers known as People’s Armed Forces Department cadre (人民武装干部). These personnel work in grassroots government offices below county level, in neighborhoods, state-owned and commercial enterprises, and universities and colleges. People’s Armed Forces Department cadre have many responsibilities including commanding militia units (battalions and companies). Both they and the militia received similar new uniforms last year, indicating their close relationship. They also perform national defense mobilization duties, such as inventorying civilian assets that may be marshalled in times of emergency.

Moreover, People’s Armed Forces Department cadre serve as frontline recruiters to perform conscription and demobilization tasks for the active-duty force. They are the equivalent of active-duty U.S. military recruiters. The total number of People’s Armed Forces Department cadre has never been disclosed by the Chinese government, but could amount to a few hundred thousand. Recently, People’s Liberation Army civilians have been assigned to grassroots People’s Armed Forces Departments to assist their over-worked cadre with their duties. Innovative measures have also been introduced to raise the profile of these cadre to help improve the overall quality of the recruiters and smooth over civil-military relationships throughout the conscription processes.

Efforts Under Way to Maintain the Size of the Force

With such a large enlisted force, the Chinese military is undertaking several methods to attract and retain qualified young citizens. In 2021 (after a year delay due to COVID-19), twice-a-year conscription and demobilization (两征两退) were implemented, replacing the once-a-year process of previous decades. Recruitment in both the spring and fall is aimed at making service for college students and graduates more convenient and includes incentives for tuition compensation and loan repayment.

Demobilized soldiers are encouraged to reenlist on a second enlistment (二次入伍) as a conscript or noncommissioned officer, if qualified. They also may become a People’s Liberation Army civilian or People’s Armed Forces Department cadre. Otherwise, they may join the reserves or militia for part-time service. Operational units frequently communicate directly with the recruiting system to identify personnel requirements needed in their unit. Qualified conscripts are now authorized to be promoted to junior noncommissioned officers after serving only one year. Intermediate and senior noncommissioned officers who were not selected for promotion in the allotted time period have been allowed to extend their periods of service. If required to complete important unit training or operational missions, soldiers may have their demobilization dates extended to complete these tasks with the units.

Why Does This Matter?

The Chinese military system has been adapted to suit its own unique and changing national circumstances. As the United States and its friends and allies seek to compete militarily with China, it is critical for U.S. policymakers and planners to reduce mirror-imaging and misunderstanding. In order to fill in the many gaps in our knowledge about the Chinese armed forces, Western analysts and planners should not assume that Chinese solutions to personnel, organizational, and doctrinal challenges are the same that Western (or other) nations have adopted. The deeper one digs, the less the People’s Liberation Army looks like other militaries — opening the door for the Chinese to leverage these differences to their advantage and surprise us with their actions. For example, some relatively unexplored components of the Chinese armed forces could contribute unanticipated capabilities in a crisis or, at a minimum, add confusion to the situation.

For the Chinese side, it has been five years since the last defense white paper was issued, the longest gap since the Chinese government published its first white paper in 1998. Nonetheless, many changes continue, such as the break-up of the strategic support force into three smaller forces. White papers can provide data that reduces the need for foreign speculation and misunderstandings about basic information such as the sizes of individual services and forces or the types and distribution of personnel in all the elements of the Chinese armed forces.

The Chinese saying “Towering buildings are built from the ground up” (万丈高楼平地起) applies to both the American and Chinese sides. As the U.S. military, intelligence, and policy communities expand their capabilities to craft effective competitive strategies directed at China and its armed forces, the U.S. side requires a solid foundational knowledge of Chinese force structure and organizational culture, beyond weapons systems and maximum capabilities. Getting the basic software issues right has direct implications on how we assess the capabilities and training quality of the Chinese armed forces. Modifications to People’s Liberation Army personnel policies deserve analytical attention similar to that afforded equipment and technological developments, as it will be those people who operate and maintain new weapons and plan for their employment to maximize effectiveness.

Become a Member

Shanshan Mei, known by the pen name Marcus Clay, is a political scientist at RAND. She previously served as the special assistant to the 22nd chief of staff of the Air Force for China and Indo-Pacific issues.

Dennis J. Blasko is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel with 23 years of service as a military intelligence officer and foreign area officer specializing in China. From 1992 to 1996, he was an Army attaché in Beijing and Hong Kong. He has written numerous articles and chapters on the Chinese military, along with the book The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century.

The views in this article are those of the authors alone and not those of any institution they are or have been affiliated with.

Image: People’s Liberation Army

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Shanshan Mei · July 12, 2024

5. The Ukraine War Proves Europe Must Spend More on Defense Now

Excerpts:

The United States has been saying for almost 20 years that Europe needs to do more. In 2011, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned European leaders that “if current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders—those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me—may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.” A decade and a half later, less than two-thirds of NATO members have reached that mark.

This represents a deep unseriousness on the part of many Europeans when it comes to security issues. Europe can either accept to live with a Russia that is able to outgun and therefore threaten Europe, or it can choose to re-arm and deter further Russian aggression within Europe. As noted earlier, many nations in Europe are already moving to higher defense budgets, but more must be done—and urgently.

The good news is that Europe has the resources to easily deter Russia. It has the required manpower, the wealth, the technology, and the industry.

It simply has to make the choice to do so.

The Ukraine War Proves Europe Must Spend More on Defense Now

Jul 10, 2024 4 min read

https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/the-ukraine-war-proves-europe-must-spend-more-defense-now

Robert Peters

@realbobpeters

Research Fellow, Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense

Robert Peters is a Research Fellow for Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense in Heritage’s Allison Center for National Security.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine served as a wakeup call to NATO, reversing a decades’ long trend of European members disarming at the end of the Cold War.

2. Many of those nations in Western Europe chose to underinvest in their militaries in order to provide robust social welfare benefits for their people.

3. The good news is that Europe has the resources to easily deter Russia. It simply has to make the choice to do so.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine served as a wakeup call to NATO, reversing a decades’ long trend of European members disarming at the end of the Cold War.

To that end, many (but not all) have been increasing their defense budgets and restarting weapons production lines—not only to supply Ukraine, but to enable a longer-term rearming of the European continent to deter potential future Russian aggression.

This is a welcome development, but we should not forget that in many ways, Europe’s security challenges are a direct consequence of its past decisions.

At the height of the Cold War in 1970, NATO fielded a military force that included over 10 million people in the active and reserve military (out of a population over 500 billion), with a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of almost $2 trillion. This force included tens of thousands of aircraft, tanks, and artillery rounds, with nations such as Germany and the UK stationing hundreds of thousands of soldiers on the front lines of NATO, squaring off against the Warsaw Pact.

All of this was backed up by over 6,000 American tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe itself. In 1970, the United States committed 8% of its GDP on defense—more than twice the 3% the average European NATO member spent on defense. The end result: an effective—and, therefore, credible—military that deterred Soviet aggression.

>>> NATO in 2024—Can Its European Members Deter Further Russian Aggression?

By 2019, however, the situation in Europe was very different.

The totally military manpower had been cut in half, with NATO only fielding roughly five million people in NATO—and the United States provided almost all of these personnel. This was at a time when the population of NATO nations had almost doubled, to over 940 million.

And while the combined GDP of NATO in 2019 was over $40 trillion, European nations were spending only 1.5% of their GDP on defense—despite agreeing in 2006 to spend at least 2%. Perhaps most alarming of all, the United States maintained only about 100-150 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, while Russia maintained over 2,000.

Why the change, in which a larger, more prosperous, and more technologically advanced Europe is unable to field a credible military deterrent in the face of Russian aggression? It isn’t because Russia is richer or has more people than Europe. Indeed, NATO’s economy—and its population size—is roughly seven times that of Russia.

The answer lies in European decisions. Many of those nations in Western Europe—particularly in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom—chose to underinvest in their militaries in order to provide robust social welfare benefits for their people. The consequence is a German Army (once the backbone of NATO’s ground forces in Europe) that is less than half the size of what it was when the Berlin Wall fell—despite having a population that is larger by 20 million people. The once-vaunted British navy only has 16 surface combatants remaining. Similar stories can be found across Western Europe.

This military weakness invited Russian aggression. Vladimir Putin, by all indications, respects strength and holds weakness in contempt. A Europe that outsourced its security to the United States was, if not an inviting target for Putin, was at least an opponent not to be feared by him.

>>> The Russia-North Korea Military Pact Is a Big Problem

The United States has been saying for almost 20 years that Europe needs to do more. In 2011, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned European leaders that “if current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders—those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me—may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.” A decade and a half later, less than two-thirds of NATO members have reached that mark.

This represents a deep unseriousness on the part of many Europeans when it comes to security issues. Europe can either accept to live with a Russia that is able to outgun and therefore threaten Europe, or it can choose to re-arm and deter further Russian aggression within Europe. As noted earlier, many nations in Europe are already moving to higher defense budgets, but more must be done—and urgently.

The good news is that Europe has the resources to easily deter Russia. It has the required manpower, the wealth, the technology, and the industry.

It simply has to make the choice to do so.

This piece originally appeared in the National Security Journal

6. Far from a “Burden,” NATO Has Delivered a High Return on Investment

A view from Turkey.

"smart investment" and "government" are usually not words used in the same sentence.

Excerpts:

Lastly, there is the simple face value of deterrence from attack. A mutual defense treaty with such a large, geopolitically important bloc greatly improves US national security at a much lower cost than going at it alone.

But Trump and other Republicans are not wrong to criticize and call for reform and modernization of NATO. Europeans cannot be free-riders, and they now need to recognize that unexpected events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, can happen at any time. They need to comply, contribute, and make up for the losses during times of their under-delivery.

Working together, we can reform NATO according to the geopolitical realities of the 21st century. We need to work together on fair terms to address the threats not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific, which include not only military threats but also hybrid warfare, such as economic disruption and disinformation.

By not focusing solely on values but also on economic ties and self-sufficiency, the West can be better prepared to stand ready against the tyrants of the world who fear our freedoms. Indeed, NATO has been one of the smartest investments made by the US government in the past century.

Far from a “Burden,” NATO Has Delivered a High Return on Investment

OPINION - July 10, 2024

By Bilal Bilici

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/far-from-a-burden-nato-has-delivered-a-high-return-on-investment/

In recent years, US support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has rapidly waned from its post-Cold War peak. According to a poll by the Pew Research Center, just 58% of US respondents expressed support for NATO, which is a sharp drop of four points from 2023, despite the Russia’s ongoing war raging in Ukraine. Similarly, only 66% of Americans say that NATO membership benefits the country, down from 69% in 2022.

As NATO member nations gather to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the alliance at the July 9-11 Summit in Washington DC, it would give European allies a critical boost of confidence to see strong support from prominent members of both parties. But if the hostile, isolationist narrative takes over, we should be very concerned about the future of our national security structures.

It’s true that Western Europe has enjoyed a vacation from history since the end of the Cold War. Their economies thrived under the assumed guarantee of the US security umbrella, public spending was directed away from defense, while energy reliance on Russian gas was thought to disincentivize conflict. But Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine abruptly awoke Europe from that pleasant dream, and ushered in a new era in which Europe must play a much larger geopolitical role.

Former President Donald Trump and his supporters have sharply complained about NATO, arguing that allies have been taking advantage of the United States. During a speech at a rally earlier this year, Former President Trump shocked observers when he said he would “encourage” Russia or other enemies to “do whatever the hell they want” with NATO countries who aren’t paying enough.

Though we should always be careful to separate Trump’s campaign rhetoric from actual policy proposals, there is a concerning tendency among his supporters to view security alliances on a zero-sum transactional basis. According to their view, many countries “owe NATO billions of dollars” to compensate for past US spending.

This isn’t just deeply misleading, but flatly false. There are no unpaid dues, bills, or invoices among NATO members, no one owes any debt to any other member. There is the commitment of 2% of GDP to be spent on defense, which was agreed at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, and actually, we have seen the strongest growth of defense spending among members in the past several years. This year it is expected that twenty-two out of the thirty-two total member countries will meet or exceed the 2 percent target, including France and Germany.

However, if we must look at NATO from a transactional basis, then we should consider return on investment. Far from being a burden on the US taxpayer as argued by the isolationists, the United States has benefitted enormously from the alliance.

Firstly, in terms of raw defense spending, the United States has not expended budget on behalf of other nations. In fact, without NATO, US defense spending would in fact have to be much higher. Thanks to NATO, the United States is better prepared to defend itself and is able to apply its resources more effectively. The common funding mechanisms and joint military exercises on NATO ensure that member nations share the costs of defense, which helps mitigate the financial strain on a single nation. Additionally, the standardization of equipment and interoperability among NATO forces means that the U.S. can operate seamlessly with its allies, enhancing overall military readiness.

Secondly, the US benefits from the position of leadership in the global economy. By leading NATO, the United States maintains significant influence over global security policies and initiatives. This leadership role allows the U.S. to shape the strategic direction of the alliance, ensuring that its interests and values are represented on the global stage. In particular, we are seeing the emergence of coordinated defense industrial strategies among NATO allies, including the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS), which aims to lay out a framework not only to dramatically increase manufacture of munitions, but to compete globally in technology, innovation, agriculture, and energy.

Lastly, there is the simple face value of deterrence from attack. A mutual defense treaty with such a large, geopolitically important bloc greatly improves US national security at a much lower cost than going at it alone.

But Trump and other Republicans are not wrong to criticize and call for reform and modernization of NATO. Europeans cannot be free-riders, and they now need to recognize that unexpected events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, can happen at any time. They need to comply, contribute, and make up for the losses during times of their under-delivery.

Working together, we can reform NATO according to the geopolitical realities of the 21st century. We need to work together on fair terms to address the threats not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific, which include not only military threats but also hybrid warfare, such as economic disruption and disinformation.

By not focusing solely on values but also on economic ties and self-sufficiency, the West can be better prepared to stand ready against the tyrants of the world who fear our freedoms. Indeed, NATO has been one of the smartest investments made by the US government in the past century.

Bilal Bilici is a Member of Turkish Parliament and Foreign Affairs Committee Member.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

7. The West Is Misreading China in the South China Sea

Excerpts:

A Way Out

There remains a course of action to pursue, other than potential conflict, if the states in the region can distance themselves from the economic and political influence of the West. All states with an interest in a peaceful solution to the South China Sea disputes need to take China’s view of history seriously. In doing so, the following suggested actions by the interested parties should be considered at least as a preliminary course to avoid conflict:

First, there must be removed from the discourse regarding the South China Sea those states that have no valid territorial claim in or relating to the SCS (United States, UK, EU, etc.).

Second, all claimants to islands, reefs and waters within the South China Sea must have a specified period of time in which to determine their claims and file them with the appropriate international concern.

Third, a South China Sea summit-level organization should be convened to settle discrepancies in the claims, but essentially to develop a strategy whereby each country is accorded the right to participate in the development of natural resources of the SCS.

Fourth, the claimants to territory within the confines of the South China Sea must enter into an agreement (i.e. treaty) whereby each agrees to withdraw all military material (including personnel) from disputed territories.

Fifth, the signatories agree not to utilize any territorial possession for military purposes or deploy any material that could be used for military purposes.

Having suggested the above, there will be substantial pushback from the West regarding this approach to conflict resolution. Their economic and political interests are not advantaged by resolving the South China Sea dispute unless it is accomplished on terms favorable to the West, economically and politically. As long as there is tension in the region these external power brokers will foster a position that makes peaceful resolution to disputes cumbersome at best. Time and economics are on their side.

The West Is Misreading China in the South China Sea

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-west-is-misreading-china-in-the-south-china-sea/

OPINION - July 11, 2024

By F. Andrew Wolf, Jr.

In spite of the abundance of opinions voiced almost daily by foreign policy experts and international relations academics there is no consensus about China’s strategic and tactical motivations regarding the South China Sea (SCS). But if one considers China’s history, as well as its geography, resources, and economy clues emerge which give us some perspective about why China is so categorical in its resolve about the South China Sea.

Beijing claims roughly 90% of this sea, which lies in the Pacific Ocean, encompasses an area of around 3.5 million square kilometers (1.4 million square miles), and is shared by Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Several of these states, some of which are United States allies, are engaged in territorial and maritime disputes over a number of islands, reefs, and waterways.

Some like the Philippines have accused China of bullying and intimidation to force its sovereignty over the areas it claims as part of its mainland. They claim that China has constructed a number of artificial islands in the SCS and that its warships routinely patrol and harass the navies of other Southeast Asian countries.

The tension noticeably grew in 2023, prompting the 11-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to express concern that the disputes could “undermine peace, security, and stability in the region.” China is not a member of ASEAN but is the bloc’s largest trading partner.

The United States has weighed in on the South China Seas by supporting its allies in the region; in March of this year, it condemned Chinese naval action in the dispute with the Philippines: “The PRC’s actions are destabilizing to the region and show clear disregard for international law,” a US State Department statement said. The statement went on to reaffirm the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense treaty.

Washington’s read of the South China Seas, and its involvement in what China says is a regional issue, is further raising the mercury on tensions with Beijing.

US and Western strategists tend to focus on 3 concerns:

The maintenance of a rules-based order which requires
preoccupation on the safety of allies which necessitates
freedom of navigation in the seas.

Western journalists and scholars writing about the disputes inculcate these issues as the crux of the matter. The result is that presumptive motivations are projected onto Chinese behavior and actions are interpreted based on these assumptions.

Western analysis of Chinese actions in the South China Sea emphasizes to its detriment three aims which it views as Chinese priorities:

Securing China’s strategic lines of communication;
Precluding or defeating decisively any seaborne attack by foreigners;
Building sufficient strategic nuclear deterrence.

But if one examines the statements China has voiced (sometimes repeatedly) or its published documents–including correspondence between officials – a defining question emerges:

Why is China willing to risk conflict to protect its interests in the South China Sea?

A cogent response comes into specific relief as we consider China’s disclosures. Moreover, most of these documents are not subject to classified intelligence proscriptions.

Yet, the view from China – from the official documents available – reveals an assessment contrary to that of the West.

In May 2015 China issued a White Paper on Military Strategy in which 3 major concerns for China were delineated: hegemony issues, power politics, and neo-interventionist policies.

The document further discloses that top priorities for the military were to “safeguard [China’s] national unification, territorial integrity, and development interests.”

It is evident that the United States and China look at the same problem and emerge with distinctly different assessments. The central issue for the U.S. is transit through the South China Sea as part of the “international resource domains.” Chinese resolve amounts to defending the South China Sea as integral to its sovereign territory. US experts on the region must begin to treat this differing view from China with the import it deserves if they are to understand what is truly motivating the disputes there.

One thing is certain though, the Chinese leadership is focused on those difficulties and seems intent on resolving them in what can only be viewed as China’s best interest. In June 2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping asserted that China must place the “highest priority on building an impregnable wall for border and ocean defense.” Xi has repeatedly focused on “the need to firmly uphold China’s territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, and national unity, and properly handle territorial and island disputes.”

The Western assessment of Chinese priorities could be a misreading of the situation. The priority of issues is significant in that the following three tasks deal with the return of territory and resources under Chinese sovereign control: 1) reunifying Taiwan with the mainland; 2) the return of lost and disputed maritime territory; and 3) defending national maritime resources.

If one considers the comments previously noted by Xi since 2014, this hierarchy of goals indicates Chinese leadership’s obsession with ending the country’s “national humiliation” historically at the hands of the Western powers. The “Century of Humiliation” (1839-1949), refers to a period when China was dominated and occupied by colonial powers. Failure to understand the importance of this hierarchy of aims is to misunderstand the key motivations driving Chinese policy and the contentious issues in the South China Sea.

China behaves the way it does in the South China Sea based upon nationalist readings of regional history. Thus, China’s behavior is driven by the idea of sovereign entitlement to the islands and other natural structures in the waters of the SCS.

This sense of entitlement is robust. Moreover, it will likely lead China over the coming years to be even more assertive in the region. Continued encroachment into strategic and resource-rich areas along with possible confrontations are quite real.

Given the geography and increasing US and British political and military hegemony in the area, strategic considerations are important to China. China is a country dependent on trade; thus, access to the open ocean through the South China Sea is a matter of national survival. From China’s perspective there is a real possibility that at some point, US military war strategy would attempt to limit or impede maritime trade accessibility–to cut China off from what it needs to continue as a functioning, viable nation–economically and politically.

A few statistics illustrate why China acts the way it does with regard to that large body of water on its south eastern coast. In 2013 China surpassed the U.S. to become the world’s largest net oil importer; it had already been a net importer of food since 2008. Moreover, foreign trade constitutes about 37% of China’s GDP. Yet, the country has no clear access to the open sea. The South China Sea is its lifeline to the oceans of the world and its ability to survive should the worst happen.

China’s defensive policy is designed to develop strategies against US efforts to support Taiwan in the event of a conflict. China’s new island bases greatly improve its early warning systems. Furthermore, it would be much easier for China to construct a base for its new Jin-class ballistic missile submarines if it were able to control the deep-water areas like the Scarborough Shoal.

It should be noted further that there are many Chinese officials (i.e. bureaucrats) who support a more assertive policy. This illustrates interest among industry groups, including the fishing industry and state-owned energy companies, which stand to benefit from an assertive South China Sea policy. The power of these interest groups is immense when they work together to benefit China. One thing is certain, everyone in China (industry, military, civilian, government) agrees that whether for reasons of nationalism, security, profit or jobs, China must gain access to and resources from the South China Sea.

Historic Rights

Underpinning these defensive and bureaucratic motivations is a particular, nationalistic version of history.

The official Chinese view is that only Chinese ships ever used the South China Sea, therefore, China has historic rights to waters inside its “nine-dash line” claim. In July 2016, an International Arbitral Tribunal

in The Hague ruled there were no legitimate grounds for China to claim historic rights. Nonetheless, the argument of claims based on historic rights continues to be the predicate for the ongoing conflict between China and neighboring Southeast Asian states.

The United States, as noted previously, has tended to discount the territorial elements and focus only on issues regarding their view of China’s “comprehensive strategy.” Not only is this once more a misreading of Chinese strategy, it is a miscalculation which could be a harbinger of future conflict. Should the issue of entitlement not be taken seriously, it could predispose to conflict. And the latter cannot be resolved by any “display of Western military prowess.” The fundamental cause of China’s sense of historically-based entitlement needs to be understood as a reality for China–it won’t go away by itself.

China’s view is that it is essentially correcting mistreatments and wrongs that were historically perpetrated against it. A concern is that the other countries in the dispute do not appreciate the importance of this view held by China–for China it is a matter of principle. Moreover, from Beijing’s vantage point – they are essentially reclaiming “lost” territory.

China Remembers

Any behavior by a foreign power to obstruct the reunification of what is considered sovereign territory will be countered – including a verdict by an international arbitral tribunal. It is simply another chapter in a protracted story of foreign efforts to carve up Chinese territory–to take something from China. If policymakers in the US ignore the motivating power of China’s historical narrative, territorial imperative and sense of humiliation driving it, then Western leadership understands neither China’s objectives nor the Chinese mind.

Neither diplomacy (talk) nor confrontation (action) will diminish the motivation behind China’s actions in the South China Sea. Western military encroachment may impede Chinese movements in the short term, but it will also manifest great frustration and provoke calls for an even more assertive response. What will remain, unreservedly, is China’s commitment to and strong presence in the South China Sea – the defense of its coast, sea lanes, and nuclear deterrent. China’s strategic reasons for maintaining a strong presence in the SCS are not negotiable–they are predicated upon existential needs, driven by prior humiliation.

The status quo, however, is also deleterious to China’s interests. The recent encirclement of much smaller Philippine vessels and injuring of Filipino servicemen at the hands of Chinese maritime forces will reinforce international concerns over China’s rise as a major power. And China’s newly imposed regulations against “trespassing” foreigners across its claimed territories in the South China Sea only raise the risk of accidental clashes and casualties.

In an article for the South China Morning Post, Professor Richard Heydarian, Chairholder in Geopolitics at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, asserts: “As an aspiring leader in Asia, China can ill afford to be seen as a bully and, worse, risk an armed confrontation with the Philippines and potentially the United States, which has reiterated its commitment to help in an event of a contingency in the South China Sea.”

It is therefore incumbent on China, as the more powerful party, to re-examine its approach to the Philippines in favor of de-escalation and mutually beneficial agreements. On its part, the Marcos administration should ensure that it maintains robust communication channels with China, avoids getting dragged into a US-led “Asian NATO,” and engages with the rest of ASEAN to pursue an inclusive and stable regional order.

Yet, tensions in the region are also being fed and will continue to be exacerbated by the activities of the U.S. and its allies. Western naval vessels are routinely sent on so-called “freedom of navigation” missions through the area claimed by Beijing as its exclusive economic zone.

If there is ever to be mutually beneficial agreements (and some degree of trust) between the states proximate to the South China Sea, foreign powers must be distanced from any negotiations at an international forum to hear grievances, disputes, and “global commons” access to the South China Sea.

China will not allow her access to the commercial sea lanes be restricted – to do otherwise would be an existential threat to her

A Way Out

There remains a course of action to pursue, other than potential conflict, if the states in the region can distance themselves from the economic and political influence of the West. All states with an interest in a peaceful solution to the South China Sea disputes need to take China’s view of history seriously. In doing so, the following suggested actions by the interested parties should be considered at least as a preliminary course to avoid conflict:

First, there must be removed from the discourse regarding the South China Sea those states that have no valid territorial claim in or relating to the SCS (United States, UK, EU, etc.).

Second, all claimants to islands, reefs and waters within the South China Sea must have a specified period of time in which to determine their claims and file them with the appropriate international concern.

Third, a South China Sea summit-level organization should be convened to settle discrepancies in the claims, but essentially to develop a strategy whereby each country is accorded the right to participate in the development of natural resources of the SCS.

Fourth, the claimants to territory within the confines of the South China Sea must enter into an agreement (i.e. treaty) whereby each agrees to withdraw all military material (including personnel) from disputed territories.

Fifth, the signatories agree not to utilize any territorial possession for military purposes or deploy any material that could be used for military purposes.

Having suggested the above, there will be substantial pushback from the West regarding this approach to conflict resolution. Their economic and political interests are not advantaged by resolving the South China Sea dispute unless it is accomplished on terms favorable to the West, economically and politically. As long as there is tension in the region these external power brokers will foster a position that makes peaceful resolution to disputes cumbersome at best. Time and economics are on their side.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

8. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 11, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 11, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2024

Key Takeaways:

Russian authorities reportedly attempted to assassinate leading figures in the European defense industrial base (DIB), likely as part of Russian efforts to disrupt and deter Western aid to Ukraine and Russia's wider efforts to destabilize NATO members.
Finnish authorities reported an increase in GPS "malfunctions" in the past week and that most disruptions to aviation and maritime GPS and radar originate from within Russia.
Ukraine intends to hold a second meeting of the Global Peace Summit by the end of 2024 and reportedly plans to invite Russia to participate.
European Union (EU) leadership is reportedly considering restricting Hungary's power as EU Council president following Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Moscow and his efforts to present himself as a potential mediator between Russia and Ukraine.
The Russian government continued efforts to root out critical voices and consolidate control over the Russian information space.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that it prevented a terrorist attack against an Orthodox church in Maykop, Republic of Adygea on July 11.
Ukrainian forces advanced north of Kharkiv City; and Russian forces recently advanced south of Siversk, northwest of Avdiivka, and west of Donetsk City.
Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to use monetary incentives as part of Russia's crypto-mobilization recruitment efforts.

9. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, July 11, 2024

Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, July 11, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-11-2024

Key Takeaways:

Iran: IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani has traveled to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria in recent days to meet with unspecified Axis of Resistance leaders, according to Iraqi media
Some senior IRGC commanders have emphasized in recent days the need for the Iranian political establishment, particularly hardliners, to accept and support Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian in order to preserve political stability.
Gaza Strip: International mediators are reportedly considering using 2,500 US-trained PA supporters from the Gaza Strip as an interim governing force in the Gaza Strip.
Russia: Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf attended the BRICS parliamentary forum in St. Petersburg, Russia.

10. Exclusive: US and Germany foiled Russian plot to assassinate CEO of arms manufacturer sending weapons to Ukraine

Exclusive: US and Germany foiled Russian plot to assassinate CEO of arms manufacturer sending weapons to Ukraine | CNN Politics

CNN · by Katie Bo Lillis, Natasha Bertrand, Frederik Pleitgen · July 11, 2024

Germany's biggest arms maker is helping Ukraine with 'lack of ammunition.' Here's how

03:06 - Source: CNN

CNN —

US intelligence discovered earlier this year that the Russian government planned to assassinate the chief executive of a powerful German arms manufacturer that has been producing artillery shells and military vehicles for Ukraine, according to five US and western officials familiar with the episode.

The plot was one of a series of Russian plans to assassinate defense industry executives across Europe who were supporting Ukraine’s war effort, these sources said. The plan to kill Armin Papperger, a white-haired goliath who has led the German manufacturing charge in support of Kyiv, was the most mature.

When the Americans learned of the effort, they informed Germany, whose security services were then able to protect Papperger and foil the plot. A high-level German government official confirmed that Berlin was warned about the plot by the US.

For more than six months, Russia has been carrying out a sabotage campaign across Europe, largely by proxy. It has recruited local amateurs for everything from arson attacks on warehouses linked to arms for Ukraine to petty acts of vandalism — all designed to stymie the flow of weapons from the West to Ukraine and blunt public support for Kyiv.

But the intelligence suggesting that Russia was willing to assassinate private citizens underlined to Western officials just how far Moscow was willing to go in a parallel shadow war it is waging across the west.

Papperger was an obvious target: His company, Rheinmetall, is the largest and most successful German manufacturer of the vital 155mm artillery shells that have become the make-or-break weapon in Ukraine’s grinding war of attrition. The company is opening an armored vehicle plant inside of Ukraine in the coming weeks, an effort that one source familiar with the intelligence said was deeply concerning to Russia. After a series of gains earlier this year, Moscow’s war effort has once again stalled amid redoubled Ukrainian defenses and punishing losses in personnel.

Employees work at a production line as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Defence Minister Boris Pistorius attend the groundbreaking ceremony for a new munitions factory of German defense contractor Rheinmetall on February 12 in Unterluess, Germany.

Fabian Bimmer/Pool/Getty Images

The series of plots, not previously reported, helps explain the increasingly strident warnings from NATO officials about the seriousness of the sabotage campaign — one that some senior officials believe risks crossing the threshold into armed conflict in eastern Europe.

“We’re seeing sabotage, we’re seeing assassination plots, we’re seeing arson. We’re seeing things that have a cost in human lives,” a senior NATO official told reporters on Tuesday. “I believe very much that we’re seeing a campaign of covert sabotage activities from Russia that have strategic consequences.”

The National Security Council declined to comment on the existence of the Russian plot and the US warning to Germany. But, NSC spokesperson Adrienne Watson said in a statement, “Russia’s intensifying campaign of subversion is something that we are taking extremely seriously and have been intently focused on over the past few months.

“The United States has been discussing this issue with our NATO Allies, and we are actively working together to expose and disrupt these activities,” she said. “We have also been clear that Russia’s actions will not deter Allies from continuing to support Ukraine.”

German officials declined to comment on the specifics of CNN’s reporting. But speaking on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington on Thursday, Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said it shows how Russia is “waging a hybrid war of aggression” on European allies.

“We have seen that there have been attacks on factories. And this underlines once again that we as Europeans must protect ourselves as best we can and not be naive,” Baerbock said.

In a separate statement sent to CNN, the German Interior Ministry said that Berlin “will not be intimidated by the Russian threats,” emphasizing that they are fundamentally aimed at “undermining the support of Germany and our partners for Ukraine in its defense against the Russian war of aggression.”

A spokesman for Rheinmetall, Oliver Hoffman, declined to comment.

“The necessary measures are always taken in regular consultation with the security authorities,” Hoffman said.

CNN has asked the Russian embassy in Washington for comment.

NATO members seeking to strengthen intel sharing

Russia’s sabotage campaign has been a major point of discussion among NATO officials gathered in Washington for the bloc’s 75th anniversary summit. NATO has sought to improve intelligence sharing across the alliance so that the nations will be able to connect the dots between what otherwise might appear to be disparate criminal activities unique to their own country.

But the campaign — and in particular Russia’s willingness to take lethal action against European citizens on foreign soil — has raised difficult questions about how the alliance should respond. In theory under Article 5, an armed attack on a NATO member state is an attack on all.

Russia’s sabotage campaign has, at times, smacked of a shotgun approach carried out by amateurs. Some of the crimes linked to the campaign have not had obvious links to the conflict in Ukraine; Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk publicly suggested that a fire at an IKEA in Lithuania could have been the work of Russia, for example. In Poland, CNN has reported, a Ukrainian man was recruited over Telegram by a Russian handler he never met in person and was paid just $7 to spray anti-war graffiti. Later, he was asked to plant surveillance cameras and burn down the fence of a Ukrainian-owned transportation company.

Some analysts have referred to the effort as a “hybrid” campaign, one that uses non-military tools like propaganda, deception and sabotage. But US and European officials are gradually hardening against defining Russia’s sabotage efforts that way.

“I fundamentally reject the idea that what we’re seeing is a hybrid campaign from Russia. There are hybrid elements of it. When I think of ‘hybrid’, I think of … defacing monuments,” the senior NATO official said. “Things that meet that traditional definition of ‘below the threshold of armed conflict.’”

Because Russia is recruiting operatives to carry out arson and plotting assassinations — lethal action — “I’m not as confident that those all fall below this threshold that ‘hybrid’ implies,” the official said.

It was not clear whether the intelligence related to Rheinmetall suggested Russia intended to kill Papperger directly or hire a local proxy.

Other Russian efforts have been far more serious than spraying a little graffiti or vandalizing a diplomat’s car: US military bases across Europe were placed on a heightened state of alert last week for the first time in a decade after the US received intelligence that Russian-backed actors were considering carrying out sabotage attacks against US military personnel and facilities, multiple sources familiar with the matter told CNN.

In April, two German-Russian nationals were arrested for allegedly plotting bomb and arson attacks on targets including US military facilities on behalf of Russia.

In London in March, several men were charged with working with Russian intelligence services to set fire to a Ukrainian-linked warehouse. Poland is investigating whether an arson attack that destroyed Warsaw’s largest mall in May was connected to Russia and has arrested nine people in connection with Russia-linked acts of sabotage, the prime minister said in May. And French authorities last month detained a Russian-Ukrainian man who was allegedly building bombs as part of a sabotage campaign orchestrated by Moscow.

Drone view of the Marywilska 44 shopping centre burning during a massive fire in Warsaw, Poland, on May 12, 2024.

Dariusz Borowicz/Agencja Wyborcza.pl/Reuters

“They’re doing it now because they believe that as there are a number of elections happening throughout the west, that this is a prime opportunity to try to undermine public support for Ukraine,” the senior NATO official said.

The official also said that Russia sees a window of opportunity before additional weapons and ammunition promised by the west arrive on the battlefield in Ukraine.

For Russia, this “is a prime time to target the west in these types of operations to try to undermine support and prevent the flow of weapons there.”

CNN’s Zachary Cohen, Nadine Schmidt and Chris Stern contributed to this report.

CNN · by Katie Bo Lillis, Natasha Bertrand, Frederik Pleitgen · July 11, 2024

11. The Gray Zone Darkens: Russian Assassination Plot Foiled in Germany

The Gray Zone Darkens: Russian Assassination Plot Foiled in Germany

https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/the-gray-zone-darkens-russian-assassination-plot-foiled-in-germany/

A Ukrainian serviceman from an anti-drone mobile air defense unit stands near a ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannon as he waits for Russian kamikaze drones in Kherson Region, Ukraine, June 11, 2024.(Ivan Antypenko/Reuters)

By ANDREW STUTTAFORD

July 11, 2024 2:01 PM

73 CommentsListen

As the level of tension between the West and Russia continues to ratchet up, expect to see more and more hostile activity in the “gray zone.” There have been plenty of instances of sabotage credibly linked to Russia in recent months.

CNN:

Arson at warehouses linked to arms for Ukraine. Surveillance cameras where NATO trains Ukrainian troops. Blunt vandalism of ministerial cars. Even an apparent, failed bomb plot.

Russia has been engaged in a “bold” sabotage operation across NATO’s member states for more than six months, targeting the supply lines of weapons for Ukraine and the decision-makers behind it, according to a senior NATO official.

Multiple security officials across Europe describe a threat that is metastasizing as Russian agents, increasingly under scrutiny by security services and frustrated in their own operations, hire local amateurs to undertake high-risk, and often deniable, crimes on their behalf.

And now (also via CNN):

The gray zone?

Clementine G. Starling, the deputy director of the Forward Defense program and a resident fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative, has described it as follows:

The gray zone describes a set of activities that occur between peace (or cooperation) and war (or armed conflict). A multitude of activities fall into this murky in-between—from nefarious economic activities, influence operations, and cyberattacks to mercenary operations, assassinations, and disinformation campaigns. Generally, gray-zone activities are considered gradualist campaigns by state and non-state actors that combine non-military and quasi-military tools and fall below the threshold of armed conflict. They aim to thwart, destabilize, weaken, or attack an adversary, and they are often tailored toward the vulnerabilities of the target state. While gray-zone activities are nothing new, the onset of new technologies has provided states with more tools to operate and avoid clear categorization, attribution, and detection—all of which complicates the United States’ and its allies’ ability to respond.

Two key reasons why waging a war in the gray zone is so effective for the aggressor are contained in the last part of that last sentence. The first is the question of proof, and the second, which applies even if there is proof of who was responsible, is how to respond. NATO is not (nor should it) go to war over an arson attack or even an assassination of, say, a business executive. But how does it hit back?

ANDREW STUTTAFORD is the editor of National Review's Capital Matters.

12. Russian influence ops are the ‘preeminent threat’ to November's elections, US officials say

What is sad is that the Russians will get a free pass from many because of the 2016 dossier and the Hunter laptop scandals

People will continue to refuse to heed the advice of Trump's 2017 NSS (apologies for being a broken record):

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Russian influence ops are the ‘preeminent threat’ to November's elections, US officials say

defenseone.com · by David DiMolfetta

Then-President Donald Trump and Russia's President Vladimir Putin attend a joint press conference after a meeting at the Presidential Palace in Helsinki, on July 16, 2018. A recent assessment by the U.S. intelligence community names Russia as the "preeminent threat" to election in in the runup to the 2024 vote. BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP via Getty Images

Get all our news and commentary in your inbox at 6 a.m. ET.

Stay Connected

Threats

Moscow appears to still favor Donald Trump as it promotes divisive narratives and denigrates other politicians, IC and FBI officials said.

July 9, 2024

Election Security

By David DiMolfetta

Cybersecurity Reporter, Nextgov/FCW

July 9, 2024

Election Security

In the months leading into this November’s presidential election, Russian influence operatives have already begun targeting specific voter demographics, promoting divisive narratives and denigrating specific politicians in an effort to undermine the integrity of the election process and sow further domestic divisions, intelligence officials say.

It means Moscow is now seen as the “preeminent threat” to U.S. election security in 2024, an official in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence told reporters Tuesday in a briefing that included staff from the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

Former president Donald Trump — returning as the expected Republican presidential candidate — was not explicitly named by officials, but they noted that Russia has not changed its stances since its past 2016 and 2020 election interference attempts.

“We have not observed a shift in Russia’s preferences for the presidential race from past elections, given the role the U.S. is playing with regard to Ukraine and broader policy toward Russia,” the official said.

ODNI officials said Russian spin doctors plan to covertly use social media to amplify narratives that could sway public opinion in election swing states and diminish U.S. support for Ukraine. Pro-Russian messaging and influence attempts have also been made through encrypted direct messaging channels, they added.

Russia’s war on Ukraine is one such flash point. Some GOP lawmakers have echoed Russian propaganda in criticizing the Biden administration’s hefty financial support for Kyiv. Donald Trump was impeached for withholding congressionally authorized military aid to coerce Ukrainian officials to make politically damaging statements about Joe Biden in the runup to the 2020 presidential election.

Officials said China and Iran are also threats, though they said the former may not be seeking to influence this coming presidential election directly because both Democratic and Republican party leaders run on platforms critical of Beijing.

Iran will serve as a “chaos agent” in the election space, and has “demonstrated a longstanding interest in exploiting U.S. political and social tensions” that have since accelerated since Israel declared war on Hamas in October, the ODNI official said. Just Tuesday, ODNI director Avril Haines said an Iran-backed influence campaign is taking advantage of U.S. protests over Israel’s war in Gaza.

Russia and China are the top adversaries using AI tools to carry out their missions, the ODNI official said, with the caveat that China is turning to AI more for broad exploration of U.S. political themes that can be used to Beijing’s advantage later.

13. Army graduates its first cohort of new warrant officer recruiters

Hopefully this will make a difference and they will make an important contribution to the recruiting effort.

But I can also foresee the Warrant Officer memes that are likely being developed.

Army graduates its first cohort of new warrant officer recruiters

militarytimes.com · by Jonathan Lehrfeld · July 11, 2024

The Army held a graduation ceremony Thursday morning at Fort Knox, Kentucky, for its first group of warrant officers to possess a specific military occupational specialty for recruiting.

The 25 talent acquisition technicians will aid in the service’s overall recruiting operations, data analytics and marketing techniques, Col. Christine Rice, the lead officer in charge of the Army’s workforce redesign initiative, said during a media event Wednesday. She added that the soldiers, known as 420Ts, who started their training in March, will arrive at their assignments in August and September.

Following past lackluster recruiting seasons, the Army begins to move away from its former structure with the addition of permanent recruiters. But the service aims to not just tread water in a difficult recruiting environment but to use key data points to target new talent and close demographic gaps in the force.

“The biggest thing about recruiting is its an ever-evolving, changing mission,” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Sasha Adams Gibson, one of the 420T graduates. Originally from Fort Worth, Texas, she chose to transition from her role as a legal administrator in the Army JAG Corps to the new recruiter position and will be assigned to Fort Knox.

“Being able to analyze the data, improve it, enhance it so that we can get after meeting our mission of filling the ranks of the Army is the ultimate goal,” she said.

After it opened applications for the positions in January, the Army kicked off a selection process to choose the roughly two dozen soldiers for its first cohort. From there, the soldiers participated in a course that included various data analytics and technical training. They’ll soon be stationed throughout the country at the battalion and brigade levels for their assignments.

Using a variety of internal and external reports with information on the demographics of potential recruits — for example their gender or age — the warrant officers said they plan to better identify who should be reached, and how to best tailor their message. They’ll also work with regional academic and industry partners to strategize on successful talent acquisition procedures.

“I get asked by peers, ‘How will we measure the success of the 420Ts,’” said Col. Rick Frank, commandant of the Army Recruiting and Retention College.

“I would offer that we already achieve a victory by providing continuity to our units through these warrant officers,” he said, noting that as opposed to the previous model that required soldiers to temporarily fill recruiting billets, these warrant officers will stay in their roles for four to five years.

Exclusive: The inside story of how the Army rethought recruiting

Ahead of the 2023 Association of the U.S. Army conference, the Army's top official talked in-depth about her recruiting reform plans.

The Army has incrementally been implementing reforms to its recruiting plan and intends to bring on two other cohorts into the new career field, slightly different than the first, consisting of noncommissioned officers who must first attend warrant officer candidate school.

One group is expected to participate in training later this year with another expected to begin early next year, Rice said, leading to approximately half of the MOS being fulfilled within a year of standing up the occupation.

Rice said the Army also conducted a virtual panel in the past month for enlisted talent acquisition technicians, known as 42Ts, and in the coming months those soldiers will attend training with industry personnel before heading to their units in the second quarter of fiscal year 2025.

“Understanding some of the weaknesses and strengths of your battalion, and understanding what assets you have and being able to apply them to basically have an advantage in the market, is critical. Especially as difficult as recruiting has been, we’ve got to be able to do that, and capitalize on that,” Frank said.

About Jonathan Lehrfeld

Jonathan is a staff writer and editor of the Early Bird Brief newsletter for Military Times. Follow him on Twitter @lehrfeld_media

14. NATO de facto fueling Indo-Pacific's re-militarization

NATO de facto fueling Indo-Pacific's re-militarization - Asia Times

NATO Summit adds to surging patchwork of Indo-Pacific defense cooperation as Ukraine’s war effort flounders

asiatimes.com · by Bob Savic, Michael Lloyd · July 11, 2024

The Indo-Pacific is being rapidly re-militarized as bilateral defense agreements spring up across much of the region.

That contrasts markedly with most of the post-Cold War period, when the region’s priority shifted toward economic prosperity and a degree of de-militarization, including in the case of the Philippines, seen in the closure of major Cold War-era American military bases.

In recent weeks and months, on the other hand, a complex web of inter-regional and intra-regional linkages has been forged or re-enforced across this vast land and maritime area.

This is happening in the context of intensifying great power rivalry between the US, its NATO allies and Western-oriented regional partners jostling for control and influence against the rising powers of China, Russia and other regional states seen variously by the West as strategic or dangerous competitors.

The latest iteration of re-militarization arises in the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the region. Although NATO does not, as yet, have a physical presence anywhere in the Indo-Pacific, the transatlantic organization is forging ties in new spheres with its principal partners there, including Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand.

Several new initiatives were agreed at its annual summit in Washington DC involving the development of cybersecurity, tackling hybrid threats, promoting interoperability and beefing up general defense cooperation.

It’s not just the Indo-Pacific’s most advanced economies that are forming military partnerships: The Philippines is foremost among the region’s developing economies to launch a series of new defense deals.

The most recent and notable has been its security pact with Japan, which was symbolically signed on the eve of the NATO summit.

The agreement, which was partly driven by growing concerns over Manila’s recent clashes with China in the South China Sea, facilitates the deployment of each other’s forces on their respective territories for joint drills.

It is the first defense agreement between Japan and another Asian country since the end of World War II and the former’s brutal occupation of many regional countries, including the Philippines. Manila had earlier concluded a similar Visiting Forces Agreement with Australia, as indeed has Japan.

Perhaps the most controversial military pact launched by the Philippines has been with the US in the form of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).

EDCA was set up by former late-president Benigno Aquino a decade earlier. Its expansion this year by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has elicited some disquiet among certain Filipino media and sections of the general public.

Marcos has expanded from the original five bases that have hosted “rotational” US forces to an additional four on coastal regions facing Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Their announced purpose has been to “address a range of shared challenges in the Indo-Pacific region,” according to the US Department of Defense.

Other recent notable military cooperation agreements include Japan’s ten-year mutual security arrangement with Ukraine, which was signed in June 2024. While non-binding, it provides for the supply of non-lethal assistance to Ukraine.

South Korea is considering a similar cooperation deal. However, last month, President Yoon Suk Yeol said he would reconsider supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine after declining to do so the previous month.

Putin hits back with new defense agreements

Yoon may have reconsidered after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s defense treaty with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, agreed on his visit to Pyongyang in June 2024.

The agreement sets out mutual military assistance in the event of either state being subject to an armed invasion from a third country.

In June, in another regional trip that irked Washington, Putin traveled to Vietnam. Russia has long been Vietnam’s principal weapons supplier dating back to the Cold War. Both sides agreed to upgrade their mutual defense and security cooperation subject to a joint communique, with the caveat it is “not directed against any third country.”

Nonetheless, the big regional elephant in the room was Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Moscow, his first since the Ukraine conflict began. The trip was subject to negative scrutiny in Washington given it occurred during the opening days of the NATO Summit in Washington, although the Indian government downplayed the timing.

Aside from the notable Putin-Modi bonhomie on display during their meeting, both leaders agreed to expand their military cooperation with an emphasis on the joint production of advanced technology and systems.

These include setting up new joint ventures to produce military parts and defense equipment under the “Make in India” program to be enabled by technology transfers from Russia and subsequent exports to “friendly” third countries.

Ukraine’s weakening positions

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky heavily criticized Modi’s Moscow visit, calling it a “huge disappointment and devastating blow to peace efforts.”

Zelensky’s reaction may also be reflective of the visit coming at a sensitive time for Ukraine as its war effort flounders with diminishing prospects for ejecting Russia from its territorial gains.

Yet NATO support for Ukraine is largely confined to rhetoric with limited military and economic support. There are no official NATO “boots on the ground”

The military weakness of the current Ukrainian position is clear. The potential manpower available for the military is substantially hindered by its paucity of available young men in their 20s; the average age of Ukraine’s frontline soldiers is 43.

Ukraine’s economy is weak, though growth has been higher than anticipated in 2023. Nonetheless, under recent scenarios, it is unlikely to recover its GDP level until the late 2020s. The damaging and relentless Russian missile attacks on Ukraine’s power grid and rail infrastructure are further debilitating the economy.

NATO and Ukrainian rhetoric about recapturing all the territory currently occupied by Russia since the invasion – and Russian occupation of Crimea that predates the invasion – is plainly unrealistic.

What is emerging from the NATO summit is more of the same rhetoric and limited commitments of further support in kind. Whether these commitments will actually be delivered will depend on the conflict’s progress on the battlefield.

Despite NATO assertions to the contrary, Russia does not appear to be weakening in military or economic terms. What is sometimes ignored is that Russia, in purchasing power parity terms, is the fourth largest economy in the world, according to the World Bank’s revised measurements this year.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

The US has suggested that Ukraine should be provided with a clear “bridge to NATO membership.” What this would entail in practice is meaningless. Moreover, it cannot guarantee membership. All current members of NATO have to agree on membership. Additionally, until the conflict is resolved, entry into NATO cannot happen.

Overdue Ukraine armistice

Resolution of the conflict is most likely to occur, at some point, via an armistice. An armistice, it should be noted, allows both parties to agree to cease hostilities on current border positions – with Russia retaining the four oblasts it effectively holds, plus Crimea – without either side conceding defeat.

The conflict then becomes frozen, with a military-free zone at the border. The Korean war ended in this manner. It is to be hoped, if only to end the suffering of the Ukrainian people, that an armistice comes later this year, before another winter sets in.

Ironically, such a situation might allow the accession of Ukraine to NATO, with a guarantee that NATO troops or military installations would not be stationed within several hundred miles of the armistice border.

A similar situation exists in Norway, a long-standing member of NATO, where no NATO installations or troops are stationed north of Trondelag, which is far south of the border with Russia.

Finally, it is worth adding that any final resolution of the conflict should involve China. It is the one country that could guarantee that an armistice would hold, given its influence on Russia.

While hosting Hungary’s Prime Minister Victor Orban, Chinese President Xi Jinping called on Russia and Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire and on other major powers to create an environment conducive to talks. Only when all major powers project “positive energy rather than negative energy” can a ceasefire occur, Xi said on CCTV.

asiatimes.com · by Bob Savic, Michael Lloyd · July 11, 2024

15. 3rd Plenum will treat economy with Chinese medicine

Excerpts:

All in all, expectations for China’s long-awaited conclave for reform, the Third Plenum, should be managed carefully. The announcements will look more similar to Chinese medicine than to a shock therapy, even if China’s health issues are increasingly serious.

This has important consequences for the global economy, namely that China’s demand for foreign products will remain subdued and that Chinese companies will continue to rely on foreign markets to survive. This points to trade wars continuing to hit the headlines and perhaps moving beyond.

3rd Plenum will treat economy with Chinese medicine - Asia Times

Not even on the mix of demand policies can we expect the shock therapy of radical change

asiatimes.com · by Alicia Garcia Herrero · July 12, 2024

The market is closely watching the long-awaited Third Plenum in China, which will take place in Beijing from July 15-18. Historically, this event has been pivotal in signaling key policy shifts and economic reforms in China. This time around, market participants and China watchers have a very specific question that they hope the Third Plenum can answer, namely whether enough growth-enhancing measures will be announced to revive the Chinese economy after years of underwhelming performance.

So far, there does not seem to be much hope that path-breaking reforms will be announced at the Third Plenum, based on how officials and Chinese academics have been preparing the ground for this event. The problems that have been piling up during the last few years are, however, increasingly serious, from real estate stagnancy to the difficult financial situation of local governments as well as the rapidly declining return on assets, due to over-investment, and the deflationary pressures in the economy.

The recipe to all these woos, as aired by the Chinese leadership during the past few months comes from strengthening China’s manufacturing capacity further, under the mantra of the “New Production Forces.” There is, however, little sign of demand measures, particularly those supporting private consumption. At most some more consumption vouchers are to be expected but certainly not the establishment of a welfare state. Xi Jinping has repeatedly denied any interest in such a model.

More supply without increasing domestic demand will need to end somewhere, possibly in an even bigger trade surplus but this looks increasingly difficult as the West and some key emerging economies have started to impose barriers on Chinese imports. The consequence, thus, will be more deflationary pressures.

The same very gradual approach to solve China’s key imbalance (the stubbornly low domestic consumption) will probably be applied to other pressing issues, such as the deterioration of the fiscal situation – particularly that of local governments, which had long financed their expenses by land sales that have plummeted since 2020.

The financial pressure on local governments is, by now, well known. It affects local civil servants’ salaries and also public services. Given the lack of alternative fiscal revenue and the increasing interest rate burden that local governments need to face, one should expect measures to improve the local government finances at the Third Plenum.

The one that seems most likely at this moment is the transfer of consumption taxes to the local governments. In addition to the revenue, managing government spending will also be key. The government will need to balance the increase in pension and medical costs carefully, given the shrinking working-age population. This will probably include postponing the retirement age, that was already announced in the previous Plenum, but now with real implementation.

A longer-term issue is obviously aging, which has been tackled in the previous plenum with announcements on the easing of China’s system to control domestic migration, the hukou. Such measures should accelerate urbanization but the reality is that China does not have a huge chunk of its population willing to migrate any more (with 63% of the population in urban areas as compared to less than 30% before entry into the WTO) and, most importantly, the job opportunities in the cities are also dwindling

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

Finally, on the immediate issue of the policy mix, China would benefit from more lax monetary and fiscal policies but the reality is that the space is not really there. Public debt is at 100% of GDP and interest rates are already very low, especially when compared with the US, pushing the RMB to record weak levels. This is why, not even on the mix of demand policies, can we expect any radical change from the Third Plenum.

All in all, expectations for China’s long-awaited conclave for reform, the Third Plenum, should be managed carefully. The announcements will look more similar to Chinese medicine than to a shock therapy, even if China’s health issues are increasingly serious.

This has important consequences for the global economy, namely that China’s demand for foreign products will remain subdued and that Chinese companies will continue to rely on foreign markets to survive. This points to trade wars continuing to hit the headlines and perhaps moving beyond.

asiatimes.com · by Alicia Garcia Herrero · July 12, 2024

16. At NATO summit, a question of what the alliance wants from the Pacific

Excerpts:

“The United States should clarify to NATO allies the impact an Indo-Pacific contingency would have on the European theater,” reads Bergmann’s report.

And if European countries are to become more involved in Asian security, they should weigh carefully whether they do so under the label of NATO, multiple analysts and officials told Defense News. Because the alliance is so reflexively threatening to China, the earlier European official said, using it could be “counterproductive” toward maintaining peace.

Still, the official supports lower-level cooperation like that seen in the Washington Summit’s final plan. This kind of work is what the two regions will likely focus on in the near future, said Bonnie Glaser, an expert at the German Marshall Fund: countering terrorism and disinformation, protecting against climate change and work on cybersecurity.

Even getting the two regions to see each other as security partners has been a win for this White House, she argued.

“When [U.S. President Joe] Biden came to power, Europe’s attention to possible war in the Taiwan Strait was negligible at best,” said Glaser.

At NATO summit, a question of what the alliance wants from the Pacific

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · July 11, 2024

It’s been a busy two months of travel for Lithuania’s defense minister.

In June, Laurynas Kasčiūnas traveled to Singapore for the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s largest defense conference — and one, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, that’s seen far more Europeans in attendance.

And this month he was in Washington for the NATO Summit. This time, he didn’t have to go do the Indo-Pacific. It came to him.

For the third straight year, a group of countries with ties to the alliance, called the Indo-Pacific Four, have sent officials to attend the summit in person. Members of NATO say this is a sign that the two regions increasingly see their security as shared.

“It’s interlinked,” Kasčiūnas said in an interview.

That point was obvious in the Washington summit’s communique — a plan for the alliance over the next year. Alongside critiques of North Korea, it featured the harshest-ever criticism of China, urging an end to support for Russia’s defense industry.

“The [People’s Republic of China] continues to pose systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security,” the document reads.

And yet, it’s still hard to see how those interests become action.

The Washington Declaration includes a list of “flagship projects” on cyber, disinformation, technology and Ukraine-related issues for the two regions. Members of the alliance point to these as signs of real commitment.

“It’s not just about political messaging,” a senior NATO official told reporters before the summit. “It’s about practical cooperation.”

Others in the alliance, though, are more ambivalent about the new partnerships, or skeptical that they amount to much yet. And the side projects, while beneficial, only matter on the margins compared to what America and Indo-Pacific partners may really want from Europe, said Max Bergmann, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“The biggest thing Europe can do for the Indo-Pacific right now is take more responsibility for Europe,” he said.

‘East Asia tomorrow’

Only weeks before the NATO summit, Bergmann published a report on Europe’s role in Indo-Pacific security.

It tracked a rise in European countries sending their forces to the region, even temporarily. Beside the longtime players of Britain and France, countries such as Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have sent military vessels around Asia. Other European states are joining large military exercises hosted in the region as well.

Driving this increase is mainly Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago. Countries in Europe have seen how key China has been to Russia’s war effort, sustaining Moscow’s defense industry through a huge rise in trade. And countries in the Indo-Pacific started to take the threat China may pose to Taiwan or the Philippines more seriously.

“Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio earlier this year. European officials have since echoed his quote.

At the summit, officials from the four Indo-Pacific countries — Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan — met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. And Australia pledged its largest-ever package of military aid to Kyiv shortly after: $250 million of air defense interceptors, munitions and other supplies.

“We’re breaking down the traditional silos that have been around defense alliances,” said Matt Thistlethwaite, Canberra’s assistant minister of defense, in an interview.

He mentioned military exercises as an example. The week of the NATO summit, 20 nations participated in Pitch Black, a military drill in Australia’s Northern Territory. The list included NATO nations as well, including Italy and Spain joining for the first time.

Thistlethwaite said there was even a revived push this year to open a NATO office in Japan. The plans were never ambitious — only a few junior officers to be stationed in Tokyo to avoid long flights between there and Brussels. But they collapsed last year after some in the alliance, in particular France, said the new office would provoke China. Bejing chafes at any sign that countries are forming an alliance against it and regularly accuses the U.S. of building an Asian version of NATO.

Despite the new talks, opposition to the office within the alliance hadn’t ended. Speaking before the summit, a European official told reporters that his country didn’t support the office and didn’t feel pressured to anymore.

“This issue was not discussed at all for the Washington Summit,” the official said.

Theaters

The same official made the traditional counterarguments for NATO becoming involved so far from its borders: it lacks the expertise and the capacity to do so, and the risks may outweigh the benefits.

European countries have been trying to surge their defense industries since Russia’s full-scale invasion. But more than two years later, the results have been slow.

The incremental progress means that America is still somewhat tied down in Europe. Most in Washington say it’s in America’s interest to support Ukraine’s self-defense, and the administration has spent more than $51 billion on security aid for Kyiv since 2022.

But the last two presidents have said their top challenge is China. And while the weapons going to Ukraine mostly wouldn’t matter for Taiwan or the Philippines, some of America’s forces are in a zero-sum game.

“The United States should clarify to NATO allies the impact an Indo-Pacific contingency would have on the European theater,” reads Bergmann’s report.

And if European countries are to become more involved in Asian security, they should weigh carefully whether they do so under the label of NATO, multiple analysts and officials told Defense News. Because the alliance is so reflexively threatening to China, the earlier European official said, using it could be “counterproductive” toward maintaining peace.

Still, the official supports lower-level cooperation like that seen in the Washington Summit’s final plan. This kind of work is what the two regions will likely focus on in the near future, said Bonnie Glaser, an expert at the German Marshall Fund: countering terrorism and disinformation, protecting against climate change and work on cybersecurity.

Even getting the two regions to see each other as security partners has been a win for this White House, she argued.

“When [U.S. President Joe] Biden came to power, Europe’s attention to possible war in the Taiwan Strait was negligible at best,” said Glaser.

About Noah Robertson and Bryant Harris

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

17. ‘America’s Cold Warrior’ Review: The Legacy of Paul Nitze

This book review provides a summary of Cold War history.

Perhaps Nitze lived up to the informal SAMS motto, be more than you appear.

But who is today's Nitze?

Excerpt:

Nitze was the embodiment of the nonpartisan expert who knew something about everything. Above all, says Mr. Wilson, he knew “how to get things done.” Nitze believed that the skills he possessed were teachable, which is why he established, with Christian Herter (secretary of state in 1959-61), the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington.

‘America’s Cold Warrior’ Review: The Legacy of Paul Nitze

Though overshadowed by better-known statesmen of his era, Nitze was instrumental in shaping U.S. nuclear policy toward the Soviet Union.

https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/books/americas-cold-warrior-review-the-legacy-of-paul-nitze-aa72120c?mod=latest_headlines

By Richard Aldous

July 12, 2024 10:59 am ET

Paul Nitze (left) and John F. Kennedy (right) at a press conference in 1960. PHOTO: BETTMANN/GETTY IMAGES

On Jan. 17, 1950, a midlevel staffer at the State Department, in charge of its policy-planning team, wrote to Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposing a study on the implications of moving toward an era of thermonuclear war. Acheson approved the idea, and the study became NSC-68—a foundational text of the Cold War arguing for a major buildup of America’s nuclear arsenal. Its lead author, Paul Nitze—the staffer who had proposed the study—would go on to know as much about nuclear-weapons strategy as anyone in the world.

GRAB A COPY

America's Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze and National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan

By James Graham Wilson

Cornell University Press

336 pages

We may earn a commission when you buy products through the links on our site.

BUY BOOK

Yet despite his knowledge and his service to several presidents—from FDR to Ronald Reagan—Nitze (1907-2004) never enjoyed the public fame or esteem of contemporaries that George Kennan or Henry Kissinger did. That fact irked him, as did the idea that he was a mere “intellectual middleman” rather than an original thinker.

James Graham Wilson, a historian at the State Department, believes that Nitze had a point. In “America’s Cold Warrior”—a brilliant political biography, elegantly written, rich in archival material—Mr. Wilson sets out to remind us of Nitze’s critical role in a period of dangerous international rivalry. “No other American in the twentieth century contributed to high policy as much as he did for as long as he did,” Mr. Wilson writes.

Nitze’s essential creed throughout the Cold War was that the U.S. needed to achieve and maintain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Deterrence in peacetime, he thought, required the means to prevail in wartime. It was a principle that he advanced with a sharp tongue and a somewhat frosty demeanor.

As Mr. Wilson shows, Nitze’s worldview was rooted in an unexpectedly emotional perspective. As a child, he had been hiking in the Austrian Alps with his vacationing family when World War I began. Over time he came to believe that, even more than World War II, World War I had had a decisive impact “on the structure of civilization, the disillusionment and brutalization of man and his humanity,” as he would write. “The civilized world was never again the same.” The fear that civilization and order might collapse at any moment never left him.

Like his contemporary Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Nitze was the son of a distinguished academic. (William Nitze was a professor of Romance languages at the University of Chicago.) And, like Schlesinger, Nitze yearned to be taken seriously both as an intellectual and as a man of action. His model for the active life was the Wall Street banker Clarence Dillon, who gave him his first proper job just weeks before the stock market crash of 1929.

Nitze was awestruck by Dillon, whose “keen, analytical mind,” he would recall, “combined with a radical and brutal decisiveness in taking the course of action from his analysts.” Objective analysis followed by decisive action: This aspect of Dillon’s character Nitze sought to emulate throughout his career.

In 1940 Nitze got a telegram from James Forrestal, another Dillon protégé, newly installed by FDR as undersecretary of the Navy. It read: “Be in Washington Monday morning.” And so he was. Nitze would stay in Washington for the next 60 years.

Mr. Wilson tells Nitze’s story with an impressive command of detail and sources, no mean feat given the span of Nitze’s career. After coordinating the writing of NSC-68, Nitze drafted the pivotal Gaither Report (1957), which warned of the catastrophic consequences of a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland. In the 1960s he served in the Kennedy administration, including as a “hawk” during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and then in the Johnson administration during the worst days of the Vietnam War.

Nitze advised a distrustful Nixon on nuclear-arms talks in the early 1970s and then in 1976 participated in the controversial “Team B” National Intelligence Estimate that blasted the CIA for underestimating Soviet capability. He also devised the “Nitze scenario,” a description of what might happen in the event of a Soviet first strike. In Mr. Wilson’s summary: “The Soviets might preemptively take out US land-based nuclear forces while leaving US cities intact.” The purpose was to underline the importance of the U.S. having the capability not only to survive a nuclear strike but also to retaliate effectively.

After exile under Jimmy Carter, Nitze returned to government service, with an emphasis on arms control. Notably, he took a “walk in the woods’’ with his Soviet counterpart at arms-control talks in Geneva in 1982, during the Reagan administration. This famous episode in diplomacy aimed to lay the groundwork for a grand bargain, between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and indeed Nitze was instrumental in drafting the final form of the INF treaty that was signed by Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev five years later. Nitze also set the framework for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that would be signed by George H.W. Bush and Gorbachev in 1991.

The painstaking work of these later years, Mr. Wilson argues, was Nitze’s “most significant contribution to US peace and security.” James Baker, the new secretary of state in 1989, didn’t exactly reward all this effort, however. He wanted to distinguish himself from his predecessors, Mr. Wilson says, and thus had no place for Nitze—worse, he offered to make him “Ambassador at Large Emeritus for Arms Control Matters.” Still, Nitze remained active in public life, becoming in his final years an éminence grise to the administration of George W. Bush. Indeed, Mr. Bush’s advisers consciously looked to NSC-68—especially its claim that the strength of a country comes from the character of its society and the values on which it is built—for guidance in the wake of 9/11.

All told, Nitze’s career was exemplary, yet he fell short by his own standards. In the realms of diplomacy and statecraft, he never held the highest office, as Kissinger had; nor did he leave an indelible mark through his writing, as Kennan did with the Long Telegram and the “X” article proposing America’s containment policy. “Tension Between Opposites” (1993), the book Nitze had hoped would achieve his lifelong ambition to articulate a unifying theory of international politics, “has not found a place in the political science canon,” Mr. Wilson deadpans.

Those at the very top clearly valued Nitze’s expertise and the assuredness with which he gave advice. But they often did so without a full measure of confidence. For someone like Kissinger, Nitze lacked scholarly prestige or, alternatively, political clout. There was also a sense that Nitze was a little too sure of himself and therefore lacked subtlety. We know from the transcripts of White House tapes that, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy was exasperated by Nitze’s insistence on observing standard protocols, which might have given local commanders the authority to launch missiles and thus risk thermonuclear war. He could not see that the usual rules of the game didn’t apply in such circumstances.

But such reservations miss the point, Mr. Wilson believes. Aside from his achievements in Cold War policymaking, Nitze did more than anyone to craft a new type of career—that of the national-security professional. “The Cold War demanded generalists with competence in multiple areas—economics, military strategy, intelligence, diplomacy—and the know-how to achieve results, whether in the private sector, academia, or government bureaucracies,” Mr. Wilson writes. “Nitze met that demand.”

Nitze was the embodiment of the nonpartisan expert who knew something about everything. Above all, says Mr. Wilson, he knew “how to get things done.” Nitze believed that the skills he possessed were teachable, which is why he established, with Christian Herter (secretary of state in 1959-61), the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington.

Mr. Wilson brings Nitze’s story alive in clear and arresting prose. The nuances and complexities of strategic policymaking might have made for dreary stuff, but not here. We see the human emotions involved alongside the hardheaded analysis. When, for example, the wily Acheson watches Defense Secretary Louis A. Johnson storm out of a meeting rather than let Nitze present NSC-68, we feel the drama of the moment. Johnson was an advocate of limiting the Pentagon’s budget and keeping costs down. He was right to recognize the paper as a turning point in American foreign policy—effectively the militarization of the Cold War and an explicit commitment to containing the Soviet Union.

NSC-68 is suffused with the language of the Founders, setting out a vision of the Cold War that underlined “the integrity and the vitality of our free society,” founded on “the dignity and worth of the individual.” Those phrases, from a passage drafted by Nitze, express the philosophical and moral foundation of his thinking. But he was also a pragmatist. He willingly served both Republican and Democrats. Sometimes he admired the political figures he was advising, sometimes he despised them, but he never turned his back on proximity to power.

Such an approach to government service does raise an intriguing hypothetical for national-security professionals today: Were he alive now, and in the event of Donald Trump winning the election in November, would Paul Nitze have worked for him? The answer surely has to be yes. Nitze always sought the chance to push for policies he believed in, knowing that the closer he got to the president, the more likely his ideas were to prevail. Such an answer will bother a lot of his successors and admirers in Washington today. But that, as the saying goes, is their problem, not Paul Nitze’s.

Mr. Aldous, a professor of history at Bard, is the author of biographies of Douglas Dillon and Arthur Schlesinger Jr.

18. Fish Wars: How to Prevent Conflict Over an Increasingly Scarce Resource

We do not give this issue enough thought.

Excerpts:

Stronger global governance is necessary, too. The existing network of regional fishery management organizations is consensus-based and relies on members’ voluntary commitments. So far, these organizations have had varying success at reaching multilateral agreements on fish catch allocation and other fishery management measures that take the effects of climate change into account. But they do bring to the table a diverse set of actors, from government representatives of small-scale fisheries in coastal nations to those of the world’s distant-water fishing fleets, including policymakers from China and the EU. By scheduling supplemental meetings when a dispute emerges—keeping scientific or policy meetings free of such issues—these platforms can foster constructive dialogue to address potential conflicts before they escalate.

Finally, small-scale and artisanal fisheries need data-driven, climate-responsive management. In many of these fisheries today, regulations apply to one species at a time, without accounting for environmental change or interactions with other species; scientists lack sufficient data to predict the potential effects of warming waters; or the fishers, managers, and policymakers cannot agree on new catch quotas. Ultimately, fishers need to reduce the number of fish they kill each year if fisheries are to remain viable sources of sustenance. There are many tools available to make this happen, and they can be adapted to suit each fishery. Regulators can allow fewer boats in the fishery; with sufficient funds or private sector investment, fishers can adopt practices that reduce spoilage and waste; governments can invest in scientific research to improve modeling of fishery ecosystems; and policymakers can eliminate harmful fuel subsidies and address labor abuse in the fishing sector, thus making the price of seafood reflect the true cost of catching fish. There is no one-size-fits-all solution, but the good news is that there are many possible paths forward.

Ocean health, human health, and peace and security can all hinge on fisheries, and it is time that policymakers value these assets for what they are worth. Fish stocks are an increasingly scarce and unpredictable resource, and the resulting disputes over fisheries could escalate and feed into regional or even global conflicts. The violence that ensues would not only take human lives. By disrupting a critical industry and releasing pollutants into the ocean, war at sea would also destroy habitats, degrade ecosystems, imperil food security, cost jobs, weaken economies, and set back climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. The total price of waging fish wars dwarfs the investment in natural resource protection and global governance that states would need to make to keep conflict from happening in the first place. The scientific and conservation communities have reached clear conclusions about how to manage this challenge. The onus is now on policymakers to take preventive action while they still have the chance.

Fish Wars

How to Prevent Conflict Over an Increasingly Scarce Resource

By Sarah Glaser and Tim Gallaudet

July 12, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Sarah Glaser and Tim Gallaudet · July 12, 2024

In 2012, British and French scallop fishers clashed in a series of violent encounters, dubbed the “great scallop war” in the press. The conflict did not escalate beyond rammed boats and thrown rocks, but it heightened tensions between the two governments, and when Brexit went into effect in 2020 a majority of French fishers were banned from operating in British territorial waters. This year, after the United Kingdom banned bottom trawling to protect fragile marine habitats, the French government protested vehemently and threatened to respond with punitive trade measures. Clashes are happening in other parts of the world, too. In 2022, when a U.S. Coast Guard cutter approached to inspect a Chinese squid vessel near Ecuador—following established legal protocols—the Chinese ship used aggressive maneuvers to avoid being boarded. In the meantime, dozens of other vessels fled without being inspected.

In a world consumed with wars in Ukraine and the Middle East—and a potential conflict over Taiwan—these incidents may seem insignificant. But although they may fly under the radar, disputes over fisheries have the potential to turn into larger conflicts and to exacerbate existing ones, just as disputes over oil, water, and grain have done in the past. Fisheries are finite natural resources that provide sustenance to billions of people; seafood constitutes nearly one-fifth of global consumption of animal protein. Its products are among the world’s most highly traded food commodities. The fisheries sector employs hundreds of millions of people and fuels the economies of many developing countries and small island states. And the industry already faces growing pressure as overfishing, poor management, and climate change degrade fish stocks across the planet. Rising ocean temperatures alone are expected to push nearly one in four local fish populations to cross an international boundary in the coming decade, reshuffling access to this critical resource and incentivizing risky illegal fishing and labor abuse in the sector. It is not hard to imagine how, in this context, a fish-related fight could spiral.

In fact, skirmishes are already happening with alarming frequency. Fights over fish are not new: during the Cold War, for instance, countries that were otherwise aligned clashed frequently over fisheries. In 1979, Canada seized U.S. fishing boats in a dispute about albacore tuna, and the Cod Wars of the 1970s saw Iceland and the United Kingdom clash over fishing rights in the North Atlantic. But the frequency of confrontation over fishery resources has increased 20-fold since 1970, and the rapid growth of fishing fleets able travel to distant waters has further raised the risk of serious clashes.

Still, it is possible to avoid escalating conflicts over access to this increasingly scarce resource. When they have sufficient data and resources, scientists know how to rebuild stocks and manage fisheries sustainably, and their ability to predict the effects of new environmental stressors on fish populations is rapidly improving. When it comes to funding this work and applying its findings to governance, most countries fall short. But with strong institutions, conservation programs, and better real-time information about what is happening in national waters, national and international fishery bodies can make fishing grounds zones of peace rather than sources of conflict. Now is the time to muster the political will to do just that—and to thereby prevent tragedy at sea.

CONSIDER THE FISH

U.S. policymakers and the American public are aware that fishing is a fraught industry. Recent reporting, including an October 2023 investigation in The New Yorker, has revealed widespread abuse of laborers aboard squid fishing vessels in the Pacific. Other reports have shown that the poor working conditions and other crimes that run rampant in the sector—from illegal fishing and piracy to the smuggling of wildlife, drugs, arms, and people—make the seas less secure by increasing the risk of armed robbery against fishers, militarizing conservation zones, and facilitating corruption. Since these issues have come to light, members of the U.S. Congress have held hearings, proposed changes to government procurement policies, and called on the Biden administration to strengthen existing regulations that prevent the import of seafood produced using forced labor and through illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, as well as applying sanctions against companies that use forced labor.

Laudable as such measures may be, however, they do not address the economic and environmental factors that feed interstate conflict over fisheries. Narrow, country-specific policies are necessary but are not sufficient to address problems that are regional or global in scale. The United States, with its capable bureaucracy and ability to enforce maritime law, has a strong record of implementing measures to promote sustainable fishing. But many other countries lack the resources for effective fisheries management, and nearly 40 percent of global stocks are overfished as a result.

Localized efforts have made progress in some cases, such as the cooperative management measures that eight Pacific Island nations have implemented under the Parties to the Nauru Agreement. But there is no global mechanism to settle disputes. The primary vehicle for multilateral governance of fisheries is the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which established the legal tools and mechanisms now used by an overlapping set of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). But these bodies address only the issues that their founding members agreed to address, and not all fishery conflicts are under their purview. Conflict can occur when RFMO members do not comply with the organizations’ rules, when a fish stock is spread across more than one organization’s jurisdiction, or when rule-breaking fleets belong to a country that is not a member of the relevant RFMO. These regional organizations have settled disputes among their members. But existing governance mechanisms must be more flexible and proactive, taking steps to prevent the conflicts that could arise from climate-change-induced movement of fisheries.

Nearly 40 percent of global stocks are overfished.

In part, the problem is one of mindset. Governments have long treated fisheries either as tradable commodities, with a focus on maximizing yields, or as subjects for environmental conservation and resources to be maintained like a national park. Their potential to become sites of conflict—and the need to manage them in a way that preserves peace—has been overlooked by all but a handful of researchers. As a result, access to fisheries is often seen as a zero-sum game, while opportunities for diplomacy are overlooked. On some occasions, such as when Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe adopted a Joint Development Agreement, in 2001, maritime negotiations led to additional cooperation on resource management. But these instances are rare. Where economic interests drive governments to maximize the yield of a single species, too, fishing practices are typically not designed to realize the full potential of fisheries to support human well-being.

It is not just fisheries whose geopolitical value is underappreciated. More than 75 percent of the earth’s oceans remain unexplored, despite the role that these waters play in food supply, economic development, energy sustainability, public health, climate change, and security. When asked by researchers at the College of William and Mary to rank the United Nations’ 17 Sustainable Development Goals, leaders from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors listed number 14, “life below water,” as the least important. Ocean issues, including fisheries, protected areas, and marine science, have received less than one percent of global philanthropic funding since 2009, and government investments in ocean science have been declining for decades. Most government funds come in the form of conservation projects worked into development budgets—which themselves represent a miniscule fraction of what governments spend annually on defense.

Even though the resources available for ocean- and fisheries-related work have been limited, they have been enough for researchers to demonstrate that governments need to pay more attention. The circumstances in which fisheries conflict is more likely to occur are well established: unequal or contested access to fishing grounds; the presence of foreign fishing vessels, whether they are fishing legally or illegally, in domestic waters; low government capacity to enforce maritime law; and real or perceived declines in sizes of fish stocks. Recent analysis by World Wildlife Fund highlights 20 potential conflict hotspots across the world. Some, such as the South China Sea, the Horn of Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea, come as no surprise, given the ongoing clashes between military vessels and fishing boats, and between foreign and domestic fishing boats, in those regions. Others, including the Arctic, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Melanesia, are likely to heat up if fish stocks migrate in expected directions in response to climate change. Armed with this knowledge, policymakers can turn their focus to conflict prevention.

GOOD GOVERNANCE

International momentum is building around expanding maritime regulations. Government and civil society delegations at COP28, the UN’s most recent climate summit, recognized the ocean’s critical contribution to climate mitigation and adaptation. Since 2016, when the UN’s Port State Measures Agreement entered into force, 78 signatories have agreed to fight illegal fishing with inspections and other security and compliance measures for vessels entering their ports. Last year, the UN also adopted the agreement on Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (also known as the High Seas Treaty), a historic step for conservation efforts in international waters. The World Trade Organization, too, has begun to address government-sponsored fisheries subsidies. The first part of a multilateral agreement is in place, but more governments need to ratify it before it enters into force. Next, WTO negotiators need to expedite the final text of a second, more powerful agreement to end subsidies that that lead to overfishing.

The challenge now is to build on progress toward ocean governance with policies that specifically mitigate the risk of conflict over fisheries. Governments should start by devoting more resources to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; adopting practices that build resilience to climate change; and expanding the role of civil society and indigenous communities in fishery management. In the United States, there are already mechanisms in place and tools available to crack down on illegal fishing and boost maritime security, but the agencies involved need adequate funding. The U.S. Maritime SAFE Interagency Working Group on Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported Fishing, established in 2020 under the Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement Act, was tasked with coordinating the U.S. government’s approach to ending illegal fishing. But the group still lacks sufficient resources to fulfill the objectives outlined in its ambitious five-year strategy.

The U.S. government should make the security of fisheries an explicit part of the mandates of the agencies—including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy, the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—that protect U.S. and international waters and engage with foreign counterparts to strengthen fishery management. In a positive step, Representative Garret Graves, Republican from Louisiana, and Representative Jared Huffman, Democrat from California, successfully attached an amendment to the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act that adds illegal fishing to the portfolio of the Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency. But more can be done. Preventing fish wars in the eastern Pacific in particular is in the United States’ national security interest, and U.S. military services can help deter conflicts by conducting more joint exercises and training with regional partners in areas where illegal fishing takes place.

Ocean health, human health, and peace and security can all hinge on fisheries.

The United States should also help foreign governments to monitor the movement and activities of ocean vessels, train and support judges and prosecutors to ensure existing maritime rules are enforced, and raise the penalties for illegal fishing. U.S. and foreign enforcement agencies should work together to disrupt other organized criminal activities, including the smuggling of arms, drugs, and wildlife by fishing vessels, to lower the overall risk of conflict at sea.

Stronger global governance is necessary, too. The existing network of regional fishery management organizations is consensus-based and relies on members’ voluntary commitments. So far, these organizations have had varying success at reaching multilateral agreements on fish catch allocation and other fishery management measures that take the effects of climate change into account. But they do bring to the table a diverse set of actors, from government representatives of small-scale fisheries in coastal nations to those of the world’s distant-water fishing fleets, including policymakers from China and the EU. By scheduling supplemental meetings when a dispute emerges—keeping scientific or policy meetings free of such issues—these platforms can foster constructive dialogue to address potential conflicts before they escalate.

Finally, small-scale and artisanal fisheries need data-driven, climate-responsive management. In many of these fisheries today, regulations apply to one species at a time, without accounting for environmental change or interactions with other species; scientists lack sufficient data to predict the potential effects of warming waters; or the fishers, managers, and policymakers cannot agree on new catch quotas. Ultimately, fishers need to reduce the number of fish they kill each year if fisheries are to remain viable sources of sustenance. There are many tools available to make this happen, and they can be adapted to suit each fishery. Regulators can allow fewer boats in the fishery; with sufficient funds or private sector investment, fishers can adopt practices that reduce spoilage and waste; governments can invest in scientific research to improve modeling of fishery ecosystems; and policymakers can eliminate harmful fuel subsidies and address labor abuse in the fishing sector, thus making the price of seafood reflect the true cost of catching fish. There is no one-size-fits-all solution, but the good news is that there are many possible paths forward.

Ocean health, human health, and peace and security can all hinge on fisheries, and it is time that policymakers value these assets for what they are worth. Fish stocks are an increasingly scarce and unpredictable resource, and the resulting disputes over fisheries could escalate and feed into regional or even global conflicts. The violence that ensues would not only take human lives. By disrupting a critical industry and releasing pollutants into the ocean, war at sea would also destroy habitats, degrade ecosystems, imperil food security, cost jobs, weaken economies, and set back climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. The total price of waging fish wars dwarfs the investment in natural resource protection and global governance that states would need to make to keep conflict from happening in the first place. The scientific and conservation communities have reached clear conclusions about how to manage this challenge. The onus is now on policymakers to take preventive action while they still have the chance.

SARAH GLASER is Senior Director of Oceans Futures at World Wildlife Fund, U.S.
TIM GALLAUDET is a retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral, former Undersecretary of Commerce and Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and a member of World Wildlife Fund’s Oceans Futures Advisory Board.

Foreign Affairs · by Sarah Glaser and Tim Gallaudet · July 12, 2024

19. What the Lebanese People Really Think of Hezbollah

Excerpts:

As both Israel and Hezbollah contemplate the prospect of escalating their conflict, they should take into account the context in which a new war would take place: a period of intense precarity in Lebanon. Lebanese citizens in large part remain wary of Hezbollah (and Iran), but almost all have been horrified by Israel’s war in Gaza, and some have become increasingly approving of Hezbollah’s fight against Israel. That basic logic—my enemy’s enemy is my friend—would likely take firmer hold if Israel chose to launch a larger war against the group, and especially if Israeli forces invaded Lebanon. An Israeli military campaign in Lebanon would significantly magnify all the difficulties ordinary citizens already face, and many would come to see supporting Hezbollah as a pragmatic way to defend their homeland, making it become harder for Israel to achieve its goals.

At the same time, if Hezbollah were to be seen as the party that caused the war to expand to Lebanon, it could lose the limited support it has gained since October 7 from Lebanon’s non-Shiite population. Ordinary Lebanese do not want a war in their homeland. If one broke out and they blamed Hezbollah, its popularity may drop. Given the extremely negative views the Lebanese have of Israel’s actions in Gaza, it seems unlikely a decline in the limited support for Hezbollah would result in any positive change in views of Israel. That would leave many Lebanese opposed to both main actors in a war that would make their already difficult circumstances even harder to bear.

What the Lebanese People Really Think of Hezbollah

And How Their Views Might Shape the Next Phase of Conflict in the Middle East

By MaryClare Roche and Michael Robbins

July 12, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by MaryClare Roche and Michael Robbins · July 12, 2024

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently declared that as his country’s military operations in Gaza wind down, Israel will turn its attention to its foe to the north: the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah. The two parties have a long history of conflict rooted in Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, its occupation of the southern portion of the country from 1985 to 2000, and a full-scale war the two sides fought in 2006. In recent years, Israel and Hezbollah have been carrying out low-scale cross-border attacks, but the frequency and scale of these increased following Hamas’s horrific attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent Israeli military campaign in Gaza. In recent weeks, concerns have grown that another major war between the two parties could break out.

If it did, such a war would take place in a country that is already on the brink. Ever since experiencing a near-total collapse of Lebanon’s economy in 2019, ordinary Lebanese have faced immense challenges. The depth of their despair is clear from the result of a nationally representative survey that our organization, Arab Barometer, carried out between February and April 2024, which encompassed all areas of the country, including both urban and rural locations, and covered all the major sectarian communities.

Historically, Lebanon was one of the Arab region’s more affluent and developed non-oil producing countries. But conditions there have deteriorated considerably, especially in recent years, fueling intense frustration and anger among ordinary Lebanese of all sects. Around 80 percent of citizens say the availability and the affordability of food is currently a problem. Sixty-eight percent reported sometimes or often running out of food before they could afford to buy more in the last month. Among the seven predominantly Arab countries where we have conducted surveys since September 2023, Lebanese respondents reported by far the lowest satisfaction in the region with the provision of water, electricity, internet access, and healthcare. Lebanese respondents were also the most likely to say they have experienced weekly electricity outages: 92 percent did so, which is 43 points above the next-worst performer, the Palestinian territories, which were surveyed just prior to October 7. The same was true of weekly water shortages, which 65 percent of Lebanese respondents reported—17 points above the next-worst performer (again the Palestinian territories).

There is also very little hope for the future. Only 13 percent of citizens think the situation will improve in the next two to three years. Among the Arab populations we surveyed, Lebanese respondents were the most likely to say that they are worse off than their parents (over 50 percent), and only 28 percent think their children will have a better quality of life than they do.

Even before October 7, Lebanon was a deeply factious country. It experienced a horrendous civil war, fought largely along sectarian lines, from 1975 to 1990, which ended with a tenuous peace accord guaranteeing the main confessional groups specific political rights. For example, the president of Lebanon is designated to be Christian, the prime minister Sunni, and the speaker of parliament Shiite.

But Hezbollah’s rise in the last three decades has fundamentally altered this balance of power. As the most heavily armed nonstate actor in the world, Hezbollah has been designated as a terrorist organization by most Western countries. Within Lebanon, however, it operates as a legal political party and as a security force: the group effectively governs much of the country, particularly in the south and east. Hezbollah also provides basic services to those living in its areas it controls, which would normally be provided by the national government. In effect, the group operates as a state within a state. Neither the national government nor the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have the capacity to counter Hezbollah, meaning the group could effectively drag Lebanon into a war with Israel on its own.

The Arab Barometer survey makes clear that, despite being a driving force in Lebanese politics and enjoying high levels of support among the country’s Shiite population, which is concentrated in the south and east, Hezbollah does not command widespread support across the country. And yet many Lebanese favor some of Hezbollah’s basic positions. Lebanese overwhelmingly support the rights of Palestinians and condemn Israel for its actions in Gaza. Tellingly, the findings make clear that support for Hezbollah’s role in regional affairs has risen among non-Shiite Lebanese, almost assuredly because of the group’s resistance to Israel in the wake of the war in Gaza. And if Israel invades Lebanon to attack Hezbollah, support for the organization would likely rise further.

A MATTER OF TRUST

The Arab Barometer survey reveals that, despite Hezbollah’s significant influence in Lebanon, relatively few Lebanese support it. Just 30 percent say they have quite a lot or a great deal of trust in Hezbollah, whereas 55 percent say they have no trust at all. Levels of trust vary widely by sect. Among the Shiite population, 85 percent say they have a great deal or quite a lot of trust in Hezbollah. By comparison, just nine percent of Sunnis and Druze, respectively, and six percent of Christians say the same. Since Arab Barometer last surveyed Lebanon in 2022, trust in Hezbollah has risen among Shiite by seven points but has remained unchanged among Christians, Sunnis, and Druze.

There is also not broad support among Lebanese for Hezbollah’s role in regional politics. Only a third say that they agree or strongly agree that it is good for the Arab world that Hezbollah is involved in regional politics, whereas a plurality of 42 percent strongly disagree. Unsurprisingly, Lebanese Shiites are most likely to rate Hezbollah’s role in regional affairs as positive (78 percent), compared with only 13 percent of Sunnis, 12 percent of Christians, and 16 percent of Druze.

Nevertheless, the perception that Hezbollah’s role in regional politics is positive has increased by nine points since 2022—and, notably, this increase in support is not coming from Shiites, whose views on this question have remained unchanged over the last two years. Instead, the heightened support comes from members of other sects, with a 10-point increase among Druze, an eight-point increase among Sunnis, and a seven-point increase among Christians.

This increase likely points to sympathy for Hezbollah’s stance toward Israel rather than deep support for the group itself. Lebanese citizens of all sects are horrified by Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. From a list of seven terms ranging from “conflict” to “genocide,” the most common terms they use to describe the Israeli operations there are “genocide” (36 percent of respondents chose that term) and “massacre” (25 percent). Meanwhile, 78 percent of Lebanese say that Israel’s bombing of Gaza represents “a terrorist act” compared with only 11 percent who view Hezbollah’s attacks in Northern Israel as “terrorism.”

Hezbollah’s primary patron is Iran, so it is unsurprising that Lebanese views of Iran mirror their attitudes of Hezbollah’s role in regional politics. Thirty-six percent of Lebanese hold a very favorable or somewhat favorable view of Iran, with the sectarian divide once again visible: 80 percent of Shiites do so, compared with only 26 percent of Druze, 15 percent of Sunnis, and 15 percent of Christians. Despite this low overall level of support, such positive views towards Iran have increased by eight percentage points since 2022, and the increase was driven primarily by changing views among non-Shiites. Iran’s image improved the most among Druze (nine points) followed by Christians (five points) and Sunnis (four points).

The shift toward Iran, particularly among non-Shiite sects in Lebanon, has been coupled with a collapse in support for the United States. In 2024, just 27 percent of Lebanese have a favorable view of the U.S., down from 42 percent in 2022. Christians are the most positive toward America (49 percent), followed by Druze (32 percent), and Sunnis (25 percent). Among Shiites, the figure is extremely low: five percent. The change was most dramatic among the Druze population, where favorable views of the United States fell by 31 percentage points. Favorability fell by 13 points among Christians, 11 points among Sunni, and eight points among Shiite.

There is little question that Hezbollah’s standing is shaped by how Lebanese view the situation in Gaza. Despite the group’s gains, however, its policies and actions have not resulted in much cross-sectarian support. At the national level, only 12 percent of citizens feel closest to Hezbollah as a political party. Shiites are the only Lebanese sect in which more than one percent of members say that, among all the country’s parties, they feel closest to Hezbollah. And even among Shiites, only 39 percent say they feel closest to Hezbollah, roughly the same percentage (37 percent) who say they do not feel close to any political party.

MY ENEMY’S ENEMY

Given the importance of the war in Gaza, one result from the survey is somewhat surprising. Alone among Arab populations in the seven countries Arab Barometer has surveyed since September 2023, Lebanese say the Biden administration should prioritize economic development in the Middle East over the Palestinian issue. This is striking, since most Lebanese feel a tremendous amount of empathy for Palestinians and harbor deep skepticism about Washington; the finding underscores just how desperate circumstances in Lebanon have become. Indeed, Lebanese respondents were generally receptive to the idea of help from foreign actors; 62 percent supported the deal the Lebanese government made with the International Monetary Fund in 2022 to bail out the country, even though some of its terms might prove unpopular.

Lebanese are turning to foreign actors because the ongoing political and financial crisis has destroyed citizens’ trust in their own government and faith in their religious leaders. Lebanese citizens express the lowest level of trust in political leaders and institutions of any country surveyed by Arab Barometer. Nine out of ten Lebanese respondents said they have not a lot or no trust in their government, the parliament, president, or the prime minister. Ninety-four percent of Lebanese citizens say they are dissatisfied with the government’s performance. What is more, three out of four said they do not trust religious leaders; 65 percent say religious leaders are just as likely to be corrupt as nonreligious ones.

Tellingly, the one public institution that is seen as having any significant credibility is the Lebanese Armed Forces, which enjoys the trust of 85 percent of respondents—far higher than the level for Hezbollah or any other actor. Members of all sects express similar levels of trust in the LAF. This may have something to do with the fact that the LAF includes members of all of Lebanon’s sects and is the largest employer in the country, providing a crucial safety net to service members and their families.

As both Israel and Hezbollah contemplate the prospect of escalating their conflict, they should take into account the context in which a new war would take place: a period of intense precarity in Lebanon. Lebanese citizens in large part remain wary of Hezbollah (and Iran), but almost all have been horrified by Israel’s war in Gaza, and some have become increasingly approving of Hezbollah’s fight against Israel. That basic logic—my enemy’s enemy is my friend—would likely take firmer hold if Israel chose to launch a larger war against the group, and especially if Israeli forces invaded Lebanon. An Israeli military campaign in Lebanon would significantly magnify all the difficulties ordinary citizens already face, and many would come to see supporting Hezbollah as a pragmatic way to defend their homeland, making it become harder for Israel to achieve its goals.

At the same time, if Hezbollah were to be seen as the party that caused the war to expand to Lebanon, it could lose the limited support it has gained since October 7 from Lebanon’s non-Shiite population. Ordinary Lebanese do not want a war in their homeland. If one broke out and they blamed Hezbollah, its popularity may drop. Given the extremely negative views the Lebanese have of Israel’s actions in Gaza, it seems unlikely a decline in the limited support for Hezbollah would result in any positive change in views of Israel. That would leave many Lebanese opposed to both main actors in a war that would make their already difficult circumstances even harder to bear.

MARYCLARE ROCHE is Director of Technology and Innovation at Arab Barometer.
MICHAEL ROBBINS is Director and Co-Principal Investigator at Arab Barometer.

Foreign Affairs · by MaryClare Roche and Michael Robbins · July 12, 2024

20. US plan to boost Pacific air power seen as counterbalance to China

US plan to boost Pacific air power seen as counterbalance to China

July 10, 2024 9:02 PM

By Christy Lee

voanews.com · July 10, 2024

washington —

A U.S. plan to boost its Pacific air power is seen by analysts as an effort to reinforce deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and counterbalance China's attempt to gain dominance in the region.

The U.S. Air Force plans to upgrade more than 80 fighter jets stationed at Japanese bases over the next several years as part of a $10 billion program to modernize its forces there.

The Defense Department announced the plan last week, saying it aims to enhance the U.S.-Japan alliance and bolster deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

"This is a necessary upgrade that has been planned for some time. And combined with Japan's own investments, it will help maintain some degree of air power balance between the allies and China's progress in air force modernization," said James Schoff, senior director of the U.S.-Japan NEXT Alliance Initiative at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA.

"Without it, the credibility of U.S. deterrent capacity would be much weaker, which could cause Beijing to doubt U.S. seriousness about protecting the status quo across the Taiwan Strait and prompt more aggressive Chinese behavior," Schoff said.

The Taiwanese Defense Ministry said it spotted 37 Chinese aircraft near Taiwan on Wednesday as they headed to the Western Pacific for drills with the Shandong aircraft carrier.

Chinese jets and warships have frequently made dangerous maneuvers around the self-ruled island of Taiwan, which Beijing claims as a part of its own territory.

Okinawa protests parachute training while US works on alternative site

Stars and Stripes · by Brian McElhiney and Keishi Koja · July 10, 2024

The U.S. military began work to fix the runway at Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield, Okinawa prefecure, Japan, according to Defense Minister Minoru Kihara on July 9, 2024. (Okinawa Prefecture)

CAMP FOSTER, Okinawa — The U.S. military has reportedly started preliminary work to repair an auxiliary airfield runway that figures in a dispute between the U.S. military and Okinawa prefecture over parachute training at Kadena Air Base.

The U.S. is procuring materials to repair the runway on Ie Shima, an island just off the northwest shore of Okinawa, and is “investigating geological features such as cavities under the runway,” Defense Minister Minoru Kihara said at a news conference Tuesday.

The U.S. Marine Corps and Air Force use the airfield on Ie Shima, a 9-square-mile island a few miles off the Motobu Peninsula, for training operations, including parachute drops.

Since December, the Air Force 18th Wing has conducted that training about once a month at the Ridout drop zone on Kadena Air Base over the prefecture’s objections. A training drop on Monday drew further protests from Okinawa Gov. Denny Tamaki.

The Okinawa Defense Bureau visually confirmed parachute training that day at Kadena, Kihara said.

Ridout is an alternative to Ie Shima, due to exceptional conditions on the island, including “weather, winds, sea state, airfield conditions and other potential factors,” the wing said in an unsigned email in May.

Marine Corps Installations Pacific, which manages the Ie Shima airfield, would not confirm or deny repairs are underway at the runway, citing operational security, spokesman Capt. Brett Dornhege-Lazaroff told Stars and Stripes by phone and email Wednesday.

The Marines dropped 400 jumpers onto Ie Shima in April and 70 in May; no Marine drops took place in June, Dornhege-Lazaroff said by email Wednesday.

Kihara said U.S. authorities planned to quickly finish the repairs.

“We were told that they will quickly complete the construction plan considering the results of these investigations and will show it to us,” Kihara said. “We’d like to release detailed information, including construction schedule, after concluding bilateral arrangements.”

The Monday drops were the sixth since December and the first since April, a spokesman for the prefecture’s Military Base Affairs Division said by phone Wednesday. Some Japanese government officials may speak to the press only on condition of anonymity.

The 18th Wing at Kadena received emailed questions about Monday’s training from Stars and Stripes but had not responded by Wednesday afternoon.

“Relying solely on Ie Shima for jump training is insufficient for meeting our team’s requirements, which impacts our readiness to meet our treaty obligation to support the defense of Japan,” the 18th Wing stated in May.

The training Monday was an “exceptional circumstance,” and no damage to the local community or landings outside the base were reported, Kihara said.

“We have been told by the U.S. side that it is still difficult to land and fly big, fixed-wing aircraft at the runway in Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield,” Kihara said.

The prefecture on Tuesday protested with Manabu Miyagawa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, and Okinawa Defense Bureau director Shinya Ito asking for a halt to parachute training at Kadena and to move that training out of the prefecture or the country.

“We think that this is not an exceptional circumstance,” Tamaki said in a post on the Base Affairs Division’s X account.

Tamaki in the post referred to a case of sexual assault of a minor pending in Okinawa courts against an Air Force member. The delayed release of information by the Okinawa Prefectural Police and Naha Public Prosecutors Office in June drew official protests from the prefecture.

“They [the U.S. Air Force] carried out this parachute training under this situation,” Tamaki wrote. “I think there is a lack of understanding regarding the sentiments of the prefecture’s citizens.”

Stars and Stripes · by Brian McElhiney and Keishi Koja · July 10, 2024

23. Operational Misconceptions: A Response to Operational Incompetence 2030

Excerpts:

The Generals who critique Force Design all think these new capabilities are something outside of the Marne Corps traditional missions. They are not. Before the establishment of the Fleet Marine Force and development of amphibious doctrine in the 1930’s, the Marine Corps invested much of its structure as an Advanced Base Force. The original orders for this force were signed by General Lejeune in 1921.[v] Bottom line: The stand-in force’s mission is relevant, it’s critical and it’s in line with Marine Corps traditions. The Marine Corps continues to have forces for power projection. We can all agree that there are never enough of these forces to satisfy requirements. Hard choices are being made. And, yes, mistakes are being made too. Change is never perfect on the first try. But for those who are watching, those errors are being reviewed and addressed in real time.

Until recently, every Commandant had the explicit trust of his predecessors for stewardship of our Corps. They had confidence that a sitting Commandant had the best understanding of what the Nation needed from her Marines. Every Commandant has enough on his plate already with the challenges of organizing, training, and equipping the Corps to meet current needs and future threats. Let this one do his job.

Operational Misconceptions: A Response to Operational Incompetence 2030

By Mark J. Desens

July 12, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/07/12/operational_misconceptions_a_response_to_operational_incompetence_2030_1044012.html

Generals Boomer and Conway’s June 15, 2024, article critiquing the Marine Corps Force Design plans was a step forward in the dialogue. While the title was unfortunate (but catchy), the tone was less shrill than what we’ve seen from some of our retired generals.

Like the other three and four-star generals who have offered critiques, these are legendary men from my time on active duty. General Boomer led a two-division breach of Saddam’s defenses and a rout of Iraqi forces in the retaking of Kuwait in 1991. General Conway led the Corps next attack eleven years later to finish Saddam’s evil rule and served as our 34^th Commandant. I had the pleasure of serving in General Conway’s command in early 2003 as a planner with the 3^rd Marine Air Wing and again from 2006-2008 in the Operations Division for the Marine Corps in the Pentagon. Both are men whom I greatly admire. However, I could not disagree more with their assessments.

The root of the problem is that their experiences are from a different era. The character of warfare has shifted. Their generation appears unable to comprehend the nature of today’s fight. First, that the deadliest and most important fight may be getting to the fight and, second, that modern technology has greatly diminished the value of legacy formations and equipment. To be clear, these are smart men. But individual experiences can make for stubborn anchors to change. The paradigm of warfare has shifted while they haven’t.

When Marine Expeditionary Forces fought Iraq in 1991 and 2003, Marines had the luxury of moving their forces to the theater – primarily by sea over a period of several months – in virtually uncontested waters. An amphibious assault was not a real factor in either contest. The threat of simple floating mines – one of which damaged the USS Tripoli - was enough to keep an entire Marine Expeditionary Brigade (5^th MEB) from ever reaching landfall in 1991. An amphibious assault in the 2003 invasion was never seriously considered.[i] Despite the warnings, these men never questioned the value of amphibious power projection or our ability to move force across the globe. In their view, getting to the fight was the Navy’s problem. How they were able to all but ignore Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) threats remains a mystery.

Throughout the 1990s, the Navy voiced their concerns with the proliferation of sophisticated A2AD systems and pressured the Marine Corps to evolve its approaches to projecting power ashore. As their hopes in the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (a high water-speed craft that was ultimately canceled) floundered, Marines tried launching their ancient amphibious assault vehicles from farther out than the traditional 5,000 yards. An hour of bobbing ashore in a fume-filled aluminum container turned into hours. The Marines couldn’t survive the trip and be combat-effective once ashore.[ii] When that didn’t work, the Marines tried to cajole the Navy into remaining close to shore, exposing an entire ship and contents to lethal attack by anti-ship missiles. These unproductive interactions were obscured by the concurrent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan with which the Marine Corps was absorbed.

Underlying their preoccupation and sometimes acrimonious resistance was a reality that the previous generation refused to face. The days of uncontested sailing were over. U.S. Forces, Marines in particular, must be prepared to fight their way to the objective area and onto the objective. Our enemies now all have modern, lethal, inexpensive weapons that can hurt us well before we get to the objective area. Imagine the impact of a $2B amphibious landing dock (LPD) going down with several hundred Marines, sailors, and equipment. The psychological cost alone could put the mission at risk and cause a national apoplexy.

The reality is that the massive power projection capabilities that the generals reminisce of were always supported by a foundation of sea control. The U.S. Navy’s first priority must, and will always be, to control the seas. Sea Control requires attack submarines and surface combatants, as well as aircraft carriers and patrol aircraft. In context, having thirty-one amphibious ships seems a good deal. General Conway asserted that, “the previous Commandant (Gen Berger) arbitrarily reduced the requirement to 31 ships.” This was not arbitrary at all. In fact, on General Conway’s watch, he set the requirement at 38, with tacit agreement for 31 operational ships at a given time. The Navy (obviously) took the number as 31. Marines have been struggling ever since to get enough of those 31 ships to be operational enough to support basic commitments, let alone go to war. This sad situation is not the fault of General Conway or any one Commandant. It is part of a broad decline in naval capabilities, to include maritime prepositioning.[iii]

As for those 31 ships. They are exquisite. Too exquisite. An allocation of fewer ships over time induced the Marine Corps to demand bigger, more expensive ships to pack with people and equipment. With minimal defensive capabilities, these ships are $2-5B sitting ducks. Conversely, the Landing Ship Medium that the Generals impugn for its slow speed and lack of armament (which mirrors current amphibs), distributes capabilities across several platforms, can operate in more restricted waters, costs far less, and is a less lucrative target than an LHA/D (General Purpose Amphibious Assault Ship) or LPD. Marines should be open to an amphibious task force that combines legacy and new platforms to offer more options and better survivability.

The Operational Incompetence article attacked the competence of recent Marine leaders; that their operational experiences were in counterinsurgency, thus making them incapable of understanding the need for combined arms and fixated on operating from fixed bases. A counteraccusation would ask who taught these Marines to live in “fixed bases” (i.e., forward operating bases, or FOBs) and to view warfare through a narrow land warfare lens? Personal biases and ad hominem attacks aside, a simple review of the equipment modernization that the Corps is fielding, especially in infantry battalions and in unmanned systems, demonstrates the hollowness of their argument. Their fixed bases affront equates Iraqi FOBs with the newly conceptualized Expeditionary Advanced Bases (EAB). This analogy is incorrect. FOBs were designed not to move while a central tenet of EABs is their ability to rapidly emplace, operate and displace to new locations.

The authors and their colleagues all take umbrage that the Corps has shifted (even if only partially) from a capabilities-based force to a threat-based one. What they are really saying is that they prefer to be a second land army that merely rides ships as opposed to a truly naval force.[iv] What they fail to see is that the stand-in forces and capabilities they disparage are designed to offset threats that are far more capable of disrupting maritime operations than anything we have ever faced. Prevention through a viable stand-in force is preferrable to battling to take land and restricted waters back. This is especially important if you happen to be a U.S. ally.

The Generals who critique Force Design all think these new capabilities are something outside of the Marne Corps traditional missions. They are not. Before the establishment of the Fleet Marine Force and development of amphibious doctrine in the 1930’s, the Marine Corps invested much of its structure as an Advanced Base Force. The original orders for this force were signed by General Lejeune in 1921.[v] Bottom line: The stand-in force’s mission is relevant, it’s critical and it’s in line with Marine Corps traditions. The Marine Corps continues to have forces for power projection. We can all agree that there are never enough of these forces to satisfy requirements. Hard choices are being made. And, yes, mistakes are being made too. Change is never perfect on the first try. But for those who are watching, those errors are being reviewed and addressed in real time.

Until recently, every Commandant had the explicit trust of his predecessors for stewardship of our Corps. They had confidence that a sitting Commandant had the best understanding of what the Nation needed from her Marines. Every Commandant has enough on his plate already with the challenges of organizing, training, and equipping the Corps to meet current needs and future threats. Let this one do his job.

Col. Mark J. Desens (USMC, ret.) served thirty years on active duty in the Marine Corps (1984-2014), serving in a variety of billets, to include commander of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit from 2008-2011. I currently teach at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Distance Education Program.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and not the U.S. Marine Corps or Department of Defense.

Notes:

[i] UK Ministry of Defence, “Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future” (London: UK Ministry of Defence, 2003), 12. British forces, supported by U.S. Navy SEALS and the 15^th Marine Expeditionary Unit did conduct an assault from the sea on the Al Faw Peninsula in March 2003. This attack was conducted almost exclusively using helicopters, supported by fixed and rotary wing fire support. However, UK armor was diverted through Kuwait due to extensive mining on the landing beaches.

[ii] Our ship-to-shore technology has not changed much. The Corps’ new amphibious combat vehicle has the same 4-5 knot water speed as its predecessor.

[iii] The latter started with the deactivation of Maritime Prepositioning Squadron One (MPSRON-1) in 2012. General Berger arguably committed a major error by expressing doubt as to the efficacy of maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) in his 2018 planning guidance. The Navy was quick to reallocate resources from MPS to other priorities.

[iv] Every Commandant faces this institutionally strategic dilemma. In times of war, the Marine Corps will always fight alongside the U.S. Army; often at (temporary) expense to its naval character. Outside of war, the Marine Corps justifies its existence as a Naval force.

[v] https://www.usmcu.edu/Research/Marine-Corps-History-Division/Frequently-Requested-Topics/Historical-Documents-Orders-and-Speeches/Establishing-the-Advanced-Base-Force/. “Marine Corps organizations available for overseas service with the fleet shall be known as “The Advanced Base Force, U.S. Marine Corps.””

24. China's newest military base is up and running, and US officials see more of them on the horizon

China's newest military base is up and running, and US officials see more of them on the horizon - Breaking Defense

US officials have tracked China’s engagement with dozens of countries in recent years to determine where the PLA’s next overseas base will appear.

breakingdefense.com · by Christopher Woody · July 12, 2024

Cambodian naval personnel are seen on boats berthed at a jetty at the Ream naval base in Preah Sihanouk province on July 26, 2019 during a government organised media tour. (Photo: TANG CHHIN SOTHY/AFP via Getty Images)

BANGKOK — With the months-long presence of Chinese warships at Cambodia’s Ream naval base and a major bilateral military exercise there in May, China’s newest overseas military facility appears to be up and running, confirming years of suspicions about China’s presence in the Southeast Asian country.

While the extent of China’s access to Ream remains unclear, it would be China’s second overseas military base, and few who have watched those bases emerge expect it to be the last. US defense and intelligence officials and other analysts are already tracking dozens of countries that could host them in the future.

US concerns about Ream have been building for years but became serious in 2019, when Cambodia unexpectedly declined US assistance with repairs there. Since then, US media reports have described a secret deal granting China’s People’s Liberation Army exclusive access to the base, and satellite images have shown rapid and extensive construction, including the demolition of a US-funded building in late 2020.

When Cambodia officially broke ground on Ream’s “modernization” in June 2022 — at a ceremony where a sign said it was funded by “grant aid from the People’s Republic of China” — officials said upgrades would include a dry dock, an extended pier, and dredging so ships up to 5,000 tons displacement could use the port. The extended pier, nearly 1,000 feet long, was built in the first half of 2023, and in December, two Chinese corvettes tied up alongside it. Those vessels used the pier for several months — and appeared to be the only ships using it, analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies said in April — and were joined by three more Chinese navy ships in May, when the countries held the largest iteration yet of their annual Golden Dragon bilateral exercise.

The PLA “is already clearly getting some use out of the facility, even if construction is nowhere near complete,” said Thomas Shugart, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. A Cambodian defense official said on July 2 that the Chinese warships at Ream “have only recently arrived,” a sign Chinese vessels will have what Shugart called “at least a rotational presence there.”

When additional logistical facilities, such as fuel tanks and wharves, are built, Shugart said, “I imagine that presence will be become more robust, perhaps with permanently stationed forces.”

Cambodian officials have repeatedly denied that China will have a permanent base at Ream, citing constitutional prohibitions on foreign basing, and offered shifting explanations for China’s presence there. (A Chinese official said in 2022 that the PLA would have access to “a portion” of the base.) Phnom Penh has said the warships’ extended stay at Ream was to train Cambodian sailors and test the new pier, and officials from both countries have said China will not have exclusive access.

Based on what has been built, China’s outpost at Ream is “looking like a medium-size naval base with facilities to support training, maintenance, personnel support, supply,” and other functions, Shugart, a retired US Navy captain, said. “I’d expect those to facilitate missions like unit training, near- and far-seas patrols, and in wartime sea-control operations supporting the defense of China’s southern sea lines of communication (SLOCs).”

US officials have been vocal about their concerns over the intent, nature, and scope of the work at Ream and the PLA’s role there and have sought to counter deepening Sino-Cambodian ties, most visibly with high-level visits to Cambodia. For the US military, the concern is that the PLA could eventually use Ream to project and sustain operations across the southern end of the South China Sea, the Gulf of Thailand, and into the eastern Indian Ocean — including air power if a nearby airport is converted for military use — and to extend intelligence-gathering over those areas. China already has bases on islands in the South China Sea, but Ream is closer to the Strait of Malacca, a vital corridor for goods and ships between the Indian and Pacific oceans.

SLOC Options

The work at Ream reflects the expanding overseas footprint of Chinese security forces. They operate satellite tracking stations and intelligence-gathering facilities in several countries, including in the Western Hemisphere, and have a paramilitary outpost in Tajikistan. Chinese firms have invested heavily in port facilities around the world, raising concerns about Beijing’s access to “dual-use installations” designed for commercial activity but capable of supporting military operations.

But formal military bases — which Chinese officials often describe as logistical support facilities — provide greater access for more units to conduct more complex operations. Beijing announced plans to build its first overseas base in Djibouti in late 2015. It was officially opened in 2017 and has hosted forces conducting anti-piracy patrols and similar operations. While those two bases, both modest in size, are a far cry from the US’s globe-spanning base network, the speed with which Beijing has set them up has rattled Washington. US officials and outside experts have spent recent years monitoring China’s diplomatic and economic activity to see where its next bases might be.

Since 2020, the US Defense Department’s annual report on China’s military has named multiple countries where China is “likely considering” or “pursuing” military facilities. The most recent report, published in October, listed Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the UAE, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. The US intelligence community’s most recent annual threat assessment, published in February, also said that in addition to Djibouti and Cambodia, “Beijing reportedly is considering pursuing military facilities in multiple locations, including — but not limited to — Burma, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tanzania, and the UAE.”

Experts have tried to narrow that list by analyzing China’s foreign investments and official statements. A RAND Corporation report released in late 2022 ranked 108 countries based on their desirability to China for military operations and the feasibility of China obtaining basing or access, with a focus on the 2030-2040 timeframe. Four countries scored in the top quartile across both dimensions: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Cambodia, which all have ports and other infrastructure that China is helping develop.

Of the 24 countries that scored in the top 50 percent in the RAND report, 10 were in the US Central Command area of responsibility and seven each in the US Africa Command and US Indo-Pacific Command areas. Middle Eastern countries generally scored higher given their proximity to important sea lanes, terrorism concerns, energy exports, and potential willingness to increase investment and security ties with China, the report said, adding that “relatively developed coastal countries” also ranked favorably across both dimensions.

A 2023 report by AidData, a research group at William & Mary university, examined ports and infrastructure financed by Chinese state-owned firms in low- and middle-income countries between 2000 and 2021, assessing the scale of the financing, the strategic value of the ports, and the country’s relationship with Beijing in order to assess where China was likely to set up bases for its maritime forces. Alongside Ream, the report listed seven locations “where China might establish naval bases in the next two to five years”: Hambantota, Sri Lanka; Bata, Equatorial Guinea; Gwadar, Pakistan; Kribi, Cameroon; Loganville, Vanuatu; Nacala, Mozambique; and Nouakchott, Mauritania.

The reports reflect what experts say is China’s focus on being able to secure access to the SLOCs connecting it to export markets and sources of energy imports. Many of those routes run through the Indian Ocean, where Chinese port projects have been concentrated over the past decade. The recent Pentagon report also said China “is most interested in military access along the SLOCs” to the Strait of Hormuz and Africa as well as to the Pacific Islands, where China has for years sought a military presence that could help it sustain operations beyond the limits of the first island chain.

US intelligence has highlighted places where China’s efforts are advancing. Media reports in late 2021 indicated that US officials had learned of Chinese plans to set up bases in Equatorial Guinea and the UAE. US officials cautioned both countries against hosting the PLA, but a classified US map leaked on Discord in spring 2023 said construction on a base in the UAE was continuing and that Equatorial Guinea and China had “likely approved [a] facility agreement.” The map also said negotiations had been “observed” between China and Gabon, Tanzania, and Mozambique.

‘A Work In Progress’

Determining where Chinese bases will appear is complicated by sparse information about Chinese thinking. Chinese sources rarely list specific countries of interest, and official statements and writings often show evolving views of what the PLA will need to do overseas and where. The list of potential hosts may also grow or shrink as domestic events shape those countries’ relations with China.

The leaked map referred to “Project 141” under which the PLA “seeks to establish at least 5 overseas bases and 10 logistic support sites by 2030 to fulfill Beijing’s national security objectives,” including protecting its economic interests. But even if Beijing reaches that goal, those bases may still be limited in what they can support.

According to a RAND report published in June, PLA researchers acknowledge deficiencies, such as inadequate command-and-control and lack of experience among troops, in their ability to use overseas bases. While the PLA is building an expeditionary force that would use of such bases, the report said, “its capability and capacity to sustain overseas operations are likely to be limited through at least 2030” and that PLA writings suggest it “has neither the intent nor capability” to use its overseas bases “to launch preemptive attacks or other offensive operations” against the US in a conflict “through at least 2030.”

China’s pursuit of formal bases may also be tempered by political considerations. Pushing host countries to allow them may tarnish Beijing’s narrative about its “peaceful rise” as a great power, and matters closer to home, such as unification with Taiwan — an imperative for the Chinese Communist Party — may limit the resources devoted to bases and operations farther afield. “Until Taiwan and other territorial disputes are resolved, it will be be difficult for the PLA to focus on developing the core competencies necessary for an expeditionary force,” Michael Dahm, a senior resident fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said in an interview in December.

China “can and probably will develop a limited expeditionary capability in the near future,” said Dahm, a retired US Navy intelligence officer who served as assistant naval attaché in Beijing, but the PLA “is a long way from being on par with the US military, able to use military power to shape events and set geostrategic conditions halfway around the world.”

China’s port investments have raised concerns about those facilities being used to support Chinese military operations and to monitor and potentially interfere with US operations. Chinese leaders do see those ports as a way to support the PLA’s logistical and lower-end maintenance needs, but the technical limitations of those facilities and the concerns of the host country likely rule out their use for higher-end operations or combat. The PLA may view “a mixture of military logistics models,” including co-location at commercial facilities as well as formal bases, as what “most closely aligns” with its logistics needs, the recent Pentagon report said.

Despite the uncertainty about what China’s bases will look like and where they will be, few in Washington doubt there will be more of them. “I would just characterize it as a work in progress,” a senior US defense official said in October when asked about China’s progress on foreign basing. “I think they’re continuing to try to expand the access in the locations that are available to the PLA globally, and I would expect to see continued effort and continued developments on that front in the coming years.”

Christopher Woody is a defense journalist based in Bangkok. You can follow him on Twitter and read more of his work here.

breakingdefense.com · by Christopher Woody · July 12, 2024

25. Addressing the Root Cause of Our Veterans’ Suicide Epidemic

Excerpts:

Unfortunately, MDMA-AT has recently encountered an obstacle on its way to healing Veterans. Despite extraordinary clinical outcomes, MDMA-AT faced unfounded criticism from an FDA Advisory Committee that voted against recommending it for FDA approval. It was later discovered that the committee was influenced by a carefully coordinated campaign to stop MDMA-AT from ever being used to treat Veterans. This campaign was led by activists who labeled Veterans “murderers” and “imperialists,” and claimed that treating Veterans for PTSD “perpetuates the logic of white supremacism, capitalism and imperialism.” Their perspective influenced the Committee to question the efficacy and safety of MDMA-AT, in spite of overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary.

As an American who is privileged to be the highest-ranking combat Veteran to ever serve in the U.S. Congress, I cannot sit by silently while our Veteran suicide epidemic continues to ravage my brothers and sisters. PTSD is a matter of life and death to those of us who’ve bravely served our Nation – not a political issue to be questioned or debated. The evidence in favor of MDMA-AT is overwhelming – and it’s high time we stop playing politics with this deadly disorder and start giving Veterans the tools they need to bring our suicide epidemic to an end.

Please join me in urging the FDA to help change our collective Veteran story from one of despair to one of triumph. Like so many others, I am eager to turn the page on the PTSD narrative that has been dominated by dysfunction, disorder, and debilitation. It’s time to shine a light, instead, on the possibility of growth in the aftermath of trauma. FDA approval of MDMA-AT is a significant and necessary step in that direction, and there’s no better time to do it than now. Fighting for those who’ve fought for us is the most patriotic thing we can do, as we have just celebrated our freedom on July 4th.

Addressing the Root Cause of Our Veterans’ Suicide Epidemic

By Jack Bergman

July 12, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/07/12/addressing_the_root_cause_of_our_veterans_suicide_epidemic_1044024.html

On June 27th, I hosted a Special Order speech on the House floor to raise awareness of veteran Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). I chose this date for a reason: June was National PTSD awareness month, and June 27th was National PTSD Awareness Day.

According to the National Center for PTSD, ten percent of all Veterans suffer from PTSD. PTSD is the leading cause of the Veteran suicide epidemic, claiming between 17 and 44 Veteran lives each and every DAY – a cumulative loss of nearly 150,000 Veteran lives since 9/11. This figure is 21 times greater than the 7,000 servicemembers we lost in post-9/11 warzones, making PTSD exponentially more lethal than combat.

To keep my fellow Veterans’ plight at the forefront of American minds, I have made it my mission every day to raise awareness of PTSD. However, it also begs the question of what is being done to help those who suffer. Despite billions of federal dollars spent on addressing PTSD, the number of Veteran lives lost to suicide has not decreased. This is due in part to the fact that the FDA has not approved any new treatments for PTSD in nearly 25 years. This astounding lack of innovation has undoubtedly contributed to our rising Veteran suicide rates over the past two decades.

Fortunately, hope is on the horizon. Psychedelic-assisted therapies like MDMA-assisted therapy (MDMA-AT) have the clinically proven potential to bring Veterans who have long suffered with PTSD a treatment that works. MDMA-AT has shown enormous promise in privately funded research for decades and was officially designated “Breakthrough Therapy” by the FDA in 2017. The FDA has since worked with the drug’s sponsor to design clinical trials, which ultimately proved MDMA-AT’s remarkable efficacy. In Phase three confirmatory trials, 71.2% of participants, who suffered from PTSD an average of 14 years, no longer qualified for a PTSD diagnosis after three eight-hour sessions of MDMA-AT. Moreover, 86.5% of participants experienced “clinically significant” improvements in their PTSD symptoms. These results are nearly double those of existing PTSD treatments, rendering MDMA-AT the most effective PTSD treatment ever developed.

The science supporting MDMA-AT has helped me garner significant bipartisan support for this remarkable “Breakthrough Therapy” in Congress; so much so that my colleagues and I unanimously approved federal funding in both FY24 and FY25, to implement MDMA-AT throughout the VA health care system as soon as it is FDA-approved. Recently, the VA issued its first-ever Request for Applications (RFA) for clinicians and researchers to study MDMA-AT’s impact on veteran patients. The VA also announced the creation of a new implementation team, that has already begun working through the logistics of implementing MDMA-AT in VA clinics nationwide. Given its political support, and the science and data, supporting MDMA-AT’s efficacy, MDMA-AT’s fast-track approval was all but expected this August.

Unfortunately, MDMA-AT has recently encountered an obstacle on its way to healing Veterans. Despite extraordinary clinical outcomes, MDMA-AT faced unfounded criticism from an FDA Advisory Committee that voted against recommending it for FDA approval. It was later discovered that the committee was influenced by a carefully coordinated campaign to stop MDMA-AT from ever being used to treat Veterans. This campaign was led by activists who labeled Veterans “murderers” and “imperialists,” and claimed that treating Veterans for PTSD “perpetuates the logic of white supremacism, capitalism and imperialism.” Their perspective influenced the Committee to question the efficacy and safety of MDMA-AT, in spite of overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary.

As an American who is privileged to be the highest-ranking combat Veteran to ever serve in the U.S. Congress, I cannot sit by silently while our Veteran suicide epidemic continues to ravage my brothers and sisters. PTSD is a matter of life and death to those of us who’ve bravely served our Nation – not a political issue to be questioned or debated. The evidence in favor of MDMA-AT is overwhelming – and it’s high time we stop playing politics with this deadly disorder and start giving Veterans the tools they need to bring our suicide epidemic to an end.

Please join me in urging the FDA to help change our collective Veteran story from one of despair to one of triumph. Like so many others, I am eager to turn the page on the PTSD narrative that has been dominated by dysfunction, disorder, and debilitation. It’s time to shine a light, instead, on the possibility of growth in the aftermath of trauma. FDA approval of MDMA-AT is a significant and necessary step in that direction, and there’s no better time to do it than now. Fighting for those who’ve fought for us is the most patriotic thing we can do, as we have just celebrated our freedom on July 4^th.

Lt. Gen. Jack Bergman (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) serves as U.S. Congressman representing Michigan’s First District.

26. You might have just missed Earth-shattering economic news

It is "the economy stupid" but this will not likely have any impact on the election.

You might have just missed Earth-shattering economic news | CNN Business

CNN · by Allison Morrow · July 12, 2024

In June, prices on everyday goods and services actually fell. That hasn't happened in four years.

Eric Thayer/Bloomberg/Getty Images

A version of this story appeared in CNN Business’ Nightcap newsletter. To get it in your inbox, sign up for free, here.

New York CNN —

We did it, y’all! Get the Champagne on ice and gather the townsfolk because America hath slain the beast known as inflation. (Or, at least, it’s hit a turning point.)

ICYMI: Last month, for the first time in four years, prices on everyday goods and services actually fell. In other words, this June was the first time since the pandemic started that we paid less for stuff compared with the previous month.

The surprise price decline is seismic news, at least among econ wonks and a narrow strata of reporters who follow this stuff with the fervor of a tween Swiftie.

American consumers have been battling high prices for the past three years, with many now starting to pull back on their spending.

David Paul Morris/Bloomberg/Getty Images

“Inflation is dead, and jobs are alive,” labor economist Aaron Sojourner tells me. “We have a very good chance right now of sticking the soft landing.”

Huzzah! Maximum employment and price stability? Let’s party.

But wait — what’s that I hear? Not the riotous cheers of American consumers dancing in the streets. Not a chorus of workers singing about the strongest labor market of their lifetimes, and no — I can’t even pick up on the sound of what I’m sure is an army of economists demanding sainthood for Jay Powell.

Instead, the single best economic news of the past decade is but a murmur of chit-chat, barely audible against a clamor of politicos shouting about President Joe Biden’s age.

And that has got to drive the Biden campaign absolutely nuts.

Bidenomics worked and no one cares

For the past three years, President Biden’s biggest political liabilities have been painfully obvious: his age and inflation.

One those problems has more or less evaporated — inflation has been steadily cooling, from 9% to 3% on annualized basis, for the past two years. Consumers are finally expressing some optimism, if not for the economy as a whole then at least for their own personal financial situations, the stock market and cooling inflation.

President Joe Biden during the CNN Presidential Debate on Thursday, June 27, in Atlanta.

Austin Steele/CNN

Of course, everyone knows intellectually that the president doesn’t control the economy. But that’s never stopped voters from blaming whoever’s in office for, well, just about anything, and similarly no party would miss an opportunity to claim credit for an economic boom.

To be sure, American households aren’t suddenly going to forget the whiplash of inflation that has strained their finances. It remains true, as my colleague Alicia Wallace notes, that overall prices are a good 20% higher than they were in February 2020. (In recent history, the index would typically rise about 10% over a 54-month period, Labor Department data shows.)

And nothing in economics goes in a straight line. Just 24 hours after the jaw-dropping consumer price report, Friday brought some unexpected bad news around producer prices, which rose 0.2% in June after holding flat in May.

Still, Thursday should have been a day for the White House to spike the football and double down on a message that has, historically, fallen flat — that Bidenomics is working.

Unfortunately, if you’re in the Biden camp, age — unlike inflation — only goes one direction.

Rather than doing a victory lap, Biden on Thursday was preparing for a high-stakes news conference in front of a ravenous White House press corps that focused their questions almost entirely on his fitness to lead. During the press conference, he touted the inflation numbers repeatedly, comparing the positive economic situation now to the pandemic mess he inherited when he started the job. But the press’ questions focused mostly on his verbal slipups and chances of beating former President Donald Trump.

Bottom line: Thursday’s inflation report is an indisputably positive development that could put some wind in the sails of a Democratic campaign — a powerful blow against the fictional Republican narrative about a US economy in the gutter. The White House can finally cross out “inflation” on its list of presidential liabilities. But as long as Biden’s age dominates the conversation, it’ll just be the econ nerds sipping Champagne alone.

CNN · by Allison Morrow · July 12, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website