In Honor of Yu Gwan Sun and the March 1st 1919 Korean Independence Movement

Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

Army Times editorial on May 28, 1979. In “Special Forces: No More Hot-Dogging,” Fry’s message was simple: Special Forces must support conventional forces, “helping them prepare for and win the big one by quiet professionalism, not by being aggressive and brash.” “We still tell it like it is but we do it in a constructive manner, get the message across … We believe we are going to exist as Special Forces and if our Army is going to be prepared to defend our nation, we need each other. Quiet Professionalism really works.”

– Learn more about COL Fry at https://arsof-history.org/icons/fry.html

“Happy people can zoom out to see, and fully enjoy the world around them. But that means standing up to the lie that you are the center of things. That is the essence of humility and a great secret to happiness.”

– Arthur C. Brooks.

"Don't explain your philosophy. Embody it."

– Epictetus

1. UN Command is investigating North Korean balloons that carried bags of filth over border

2. Microsoft identifies new N. Korean hacker group 'Moonstone Sleet'

3. US Intel says North Korean missile debris identified in Russian attack on Kharkiv: report

4. DPRK (North Korea): Open Briefing (UN)

5. Ukraine War rips veil off of US weapons superiority

6. US military conducts tunnel warfare exercise in Morocco

7. N. Korean leader guides firing drill involving super-large multiple rocket launchers

8. N. Korea conducts GPS jamming attack for 3rd day

9. N. Korea warns of 'unpredictable disaster' over U.S. spy plane's latest flyover

10. 2 Koreas see no cross-border trade last year amid frozen ties: unification ministry

11. U.S. has no plans to forward-deploy nuclear arms to Korean Peninsula: State Dept.

12. Analysts see signs of strain in North Korea-China ties

13. International Forum on One Korea - Capitol Policy Forum - “U.S. Support to a Free and Unified Korea” June 6th, 2024

14. Kim Jong-un's Fears Could Be Exploited

15. After 7-year hiatus, US groups resume humanitarian aid to North Korea

16. Why Is the North Korea Problem So Hard to Solve?

17. Kim a mortal menace or playing mind games?

1. UN Command is investigating North Korean balloons that carried bags of filth over border

For those who practice whataboutism and compare nK actions to escapee's balloon launches from the South I offer this: The deliberate isolation of the Korean people in the north and their lack of access to information is one of the many major human rights abuses documented in the UN COI of 2014. The UN called on responsible members of the international community to provide information. And the work that escapees from the north are doing is important, contributes to the call from the UN COI, and should be admired and supported. Information is the existential threat to KJU.

The ROK and the ROK/US alliance need to respond to this (and all non-kinetic and less than lethal "provocations") with a superior information campaign (something President Yoon said he would do in a December 2022 press conference - use information to respond to provocations). This is especially necessary if, as Kim Yo Jong has said, is an attempt to cause South Korea to stop the escapees from sending information into the north.

UN Command is investigating North Korean balloons that carried bags of filth over border

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · May 30, 2024

Trash carried over the border by a North Korean balloon is seen in this undated photo taken in Seoul, South Korea. (South Korean Ministry of National Defense)

PYEONGTAEK, South Korea — The multinational command tasked with enforcing the armistice agreement between North and South Korea is investigating hundreds of filth-carrying balloons Pyongyang sent across the Demilitarized Zone on Tuesday.

Roughly 260 balloons with plastic bags tethered to them have been discovered this week in provinces across the peninsula, the South Korean military said in a statement Wednesday. Some contained manure.

The bags also held cigarette butts, batteries, used clothes and other household trash, Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesman Col. Lee Sung-jun told reporters at a news conference Thursday.

North Korean balloons with bags tethered to them are seen in this undated photo taken in South Chungcheong province, South Korea. (South Korean Ministry of National Defense)

U.N. Command — composed of 22 member states and led by Army Gen. Paul LaCamera out of Camp Humphreys — announced late Wednesday it has launched a formal investigation in the matter.

“The military action of deploying mass numbers of balloons with substances (e.g. fecal matter and other contaminants) that can cause harm to local populations is not only offensive and unsanitary but constitutes a violation of the armistice agreement,” the statement said.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee will observe the investigation to provide third-party oversight, the command said.

“We condemn any violations of international law that disrupt efforts to preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula, and we encourage [North Korea] to return to dialogue to deliberate these matters and other issues that present potential sources of conflict or tension,” a U.N. Command spokesperson, Army Maj. Mayra Nañez, said in the statement.

The command’s purpose is to uphold the armistice agreement between the two Koreas and to investigate suspected violations. In one such probe last year, it concluded that both sides violated the agreement by flying drones into each other’s airspaces on Dec. 26, 2022.

South Korean firefighters and explosive ordnance disposal teams were dispatched to investigate the balloons, some of which may have landed on homes, airports, highways and vehicles, the South’s military said in a news release Wednesday.

None of the balloons were in the air as of Thursday, Lee, the Joint Chief’s spokesman, told reporters at the news conference. He described Pyongyang’s campaign as a “petty act.”

Tuesday’s incident comes two days after North Korean Vice Defense Minister Kim Kang-il warned of “tit-for-tat action” in response to balloons sent north of the border by South Korean human rights activists, according to a statement published Sunday by the state-run Korean Central News Agency.

South Korean activists and North Korean defectors living in the South regularly send balloons carrying food, money and household essentials to the North.

“Mounds of wastepaper and filth will soon be scattered over the border …,” Kim said.

Kim Yo Jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and a senior ruling party official, mocked the South in a KCNA statement Wednesday, calling the balloons a form of “freedom of expression.”

David Choi

David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · May 30, 2024

2. Microsoft identifies new N. Korean hacker group 'Moonstone Sleet'

Just as an aside, this article is based on RFA reporting. RFA and VOA, although focused on north Korea, also provide news that South Korean journalists use,

Microsoft identifies new N. Korean hacker group 'Moonstone Sleet'

https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/05/30/NJMUGNQDKNBATNVSPYOWN5LRXI/

By Kim Myeong-jin,

Kim Seo-young

Published 2024.05.30. 14:40

Illustrated by Jung Da-woon

Microsoft (MS) has discovered a North Korean hacker group called “Moonstone Sleet,” which distributed malware through fake online games, reported Radio Free Asia (RFA) on May 30.

According to RFA, MS announced via its Threat Intelligence blog on May 28 that they had “identified a new North Korean threat actor, now tracked as Moonstone Sleet.”

The hacker group focused its hacking activities on preparing for more extensive attacks, including fake job exams and the distribution of malicious games.

Moonstone Sleet disguised itself as a legitimate blockchain company or used fake companies, contacting educational institutions via email and presenting itself as seeking investors and developers.

It used methods such as deploying a malicious npm (server management program) package disguised as a technical skills assessment for fake companies and distributing a malicious online tank game called “DeTankWar.”

To gain the trust of users who quickly search for information, it also demonstrated meticulous movements, such as creating fake company websites and even establishing X (former Twitter) accounts.

MS has continuously warned of the dangers of North Korean cyber activities, including last year’s revelation that North Korean hacking groups attempted to steal personal information by creating fake websites to evaluate the skills of IT developers.

3. US Intel says North Korean missile debris identified in Russian attack on Kharkiv: report

Thanks to Fox News for reporting this. There has not been enough reporting on this. Also thank you to General Keane for highlighting the collaboration (or collusion) among China, Russia, Iran AND north Korea.

US Intel says North Korean missile debris identified in Russian attack on Kharkiv: report

foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken , Liz Friden Fox News

Video

Jack Keane warns Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are all 'collaborating'

Fox News senior strategic analyst Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.) discusses China's support for Russia.

Analysis of Russian ballistic missiles has confirmed North Korean-produced debris throughout Ukraine, according to an unclassified report released by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

The DIA has used open-source imagery to confirm debris found after the Jan. 2 attack on Kharkiv, the second-biggest city in Ukraine and the biggest city near the border with Russia, derived from a DPRK short-range missile.

The report demonstrates how the relationship between North Korea and Russia continues to evolve and strengthen as it seeks to improve public understanding of this vital national security issue. Russia has fired as many as 50 North Korean-made short range ballistic missiles, but as many as half of the missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air, according to Reuters.

Russia and North Korea continue to deny any arms deal has occurred, as it would violate an arms embargo on North Korea.

NORTH KOREAN ROCKET CARRYING MILITARY SATELLITE EXPLODES AFTER LAUNCH, CRASHES INTO SEA

President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during their meeting in Russia on Sept. 13, 2023. (Mikhail Metzel/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)

The DIA report used photos that indicate the missile debris in Ukraine has the same forward motor section and aft motor sections as those shown in images by the North Korean press agency of its leader Kim Jong Un touring a missile factory and reviewing recently-completed missiles.

The analysis also compared the cable tray – used to run wires from the front of the missile to the tail section – and the handling ring connectors, which are used to lift and move the missile.

RARE DISPUTE REVEALS CHINA AND NORTH KOREA'S ONGOING DISCORD OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The forward motor section from a North Korean system, left, matches the physical characteristics shown in two images of missile debris on the right. (Defense Intelligence Agency)

The report’s publication coincides with another North Korean missile salvo demonstration, which fired at least 10 short-range ballistic missiles off the country’s east coast on Thursday, according South Korea’s military. The missiles appeared to land outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

(Defense Intelligence Agency)

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said all missiles fired in the recent salvo appeared to be the same type and were likely destined for export to Russia.

NORTH KOREA FLIES BALLOONS CARRYING GARBAGE OVER SOUTH KOREA FOLLOWING FAILED SATELLITE LAUNCH

The cable tray and handling ring connectors’ proportions from the North Korean state media image, left, are identical to the cable tray and handling ring connectors shown in the missile debris from the Jan. 2 Kharkiv attack on the right. (Defense Intelligence Agency)

North Korea started negotiating with Russia to sell millions of rounds of shells and rockets to Russia in September 2022, as supplies started to dwindle and Russian President Vladimir Putin realized the conflict would go on for far longer than he had planned or hoped. The first shipments of North Korean weapons reportedly arrived in November 2022, with the mercenary Wagner forces taking the supplies.

From there, North Korean support for Russia extended into the United Nations, recognizing Moscow’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which Russia had used as a pretense to invade the rest of Ukraine.

CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

North Korea allegedly provided ammunition to Russia in late summer of 2023, and by the end of the year Russia started using North Korean ballistic missiles, attacking targets where dozens of civilians have been killed or wounded, according to Kyodo News.

In return, Russia in March this year vetoed the renewal of a U.N. committee panel that investigates North Korean violations of Security Council resolutions.

Peter Aitken is a Fox News Digital reporter with a focus on national and global news.

foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken , Liz Friden Fox News

4. DPRK (North Korea): Open Briefing (UN)

Today at the UN Security Council.

The result will be China and Russia protecting north Korea so it is an opportunity to call them out for their complicity in north Korean malign activities.

DPRK (North Korea): Open Briefing

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/05/dprk-north-korea-open-briefing-8.php?utm

Tomorrow morning (31 May), the Security Council will convene for an open briefing on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific Mohamed Khaled Khiari is expected to brief. France, Japan, Malta, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the UK, and the US requested the meeting following the DPRK’s unsuccessful satellite launch earlier this week.

On Monday (27 May), the DPRK announced that its latest attempt to launch a military reconnaissance satellite had failed. DPRK state media is said to have reported that “the launch of the new satellite carrier rocket failed when it exploded in mid-air during the flight of the first stage” and that the rocket used in the launch had utilised a new “liquid oxygen and petroleum engine”. Japan and the ROK confirmed that the attempt had been unsuccessful, with ROK officials noting that debris from the rocket had been detected in the sea soon after the launch.

The DPRK has now attempted to launch a reconnaissance satellite on four occasions during the last year. The first two attempts, which took place on 29 May 2023 and 24 August 2023, were also unsuccessful, while the third attempt on 24 November 2023 succeeded in sending a satellite into orbit. The Security Council convened for an open briefing following each of these launches.

Monday’s launch came shortly after the conclusion of the first trilateral meeting among leaders of China, Japan, and the ROK since 2019. In a joint declaration issued following the summit, the three countries noted that they had “reaffirmed that maintaining peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia serves our common interest and is our common responsibility” and reiterated their positions “on regional peace and stability, denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, and the abductions issue”. The DPRK subsequently condemned the joint declaration, describing it as “grave political provocation” and a violation of its sovereignty.

Yesterday (29 May), the DPRK fired a barrage of short-range ballistic missiles towards the Sea of Japan. According to ROK officials, approximately ten missiles travelled for 350 kilometres before landing in the ocean. Council members are likely to condemn these launches in their statements tomorrow.

Tomorrow’s meeting will take place just over a month after the expiration of the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. On 28 March, Russia vetoed a draft resolution that would have extended the Panel’s mandate for another year, until 30 April 2025. (For more information, see our 22 March What’s in Blue story.) Council members are still considering how to respond to the expiration of the Panel’s mandate. It appears that several options are being considered, including the possibility of establishing an alternative mechanism through the General Assembly.

The Council is deeply divided over the DPRK. The P3 (France, the UK, and the US) and other like-minded countries, including Japan and the ROK, support using sanctions to manage the threat posed by the DPRK and often call on member states to comply with existing Council resolutions. Many of these members have accused the DPRK of escalating tensions, while urging it to engage in dialogue and abandon its weapons programmes. Some of these members also call for the Council to show unity and respond to the DPRK’s weapons tests and argue that China and Russia have emboldened it by blocking Council action on the file.

China and Russia, on the other hand, blame the US for heightening tensions and accuse it of not doing enough to incentivise the DPRK to participate in denuclearisation talks. These two members have also contended that sanctions should be eased because of their impact on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK.

The divisions between Council members were evident during the negotiations on the US draft resolution on the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. In a statement delivered before the vote on this draft, Russia claimed that the Panel has ceased to carry out its obligations and said that the sanctions regime no longer reflects realities on the ground, imposes a heavy burden on the population of the DPRK, and has failed to achieve the international community’s stated aims. It further argued that a provision requiring an annual review of the regime was needed to address these issues. China expressed support for an annual review of the regime and called on the Council to consider the draft resolution it circulated in October 2021 on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK, which would provide sanctions relief to the DPRK if adopted.

Other Council members strongly criticised Russia’s veto, arguing that it undermines the global non-proliferation regime and emboldens the DPRK in its attempts to evade sanctions. Several members—including France, Japan, the ROK, the UK, and the US—linked the veto to Russia’s alleged purchase of arms from the DPRK. Some of these members emphasised that the 1718 regime remained in place and that they would continue efforts to monitor and enforce its provisions. These positions are likely to be reflected in Council members’ statements tomorrow.

Members that have expressed concern about the growing cooperation between Russia and the DPRK may also point to analysis suggesting that Russia may have assisted the DPRK with preparations for the 27 May satellite launch. On 26 May, Yonhap News Agency, a media outlet based in Seoul, reported that Russian experts had entered the DPRK to support its satellite programmes. This report followed DPRK leader Kim Jong-un’s September 2023 tour of a Russian space launch facility, during which Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly responded to a media question regarding possible Russian assistance to the DPRK’s satellite programmes by saying “that’s why we came here. The leader of the DPRK shows great interest in rocket engineering; they are also trying to develop space”.

Tags: DPRK (North Korea), Insights on Asia

5. Ukraine War rips veil off of US weapons superiority

Note that for the past three days north Korea has jammed GPS systems in Korea. Is the north learning from Putin's War in Ukraine? Is it jamming GPS to prevent a precision strike against the north?

Ukraine War rips veil off of US weapons superiority

Many of the failures, including the HIMARS, have been due to their reliance on GPS

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-us-weapons/?utm

ANALYSIS | MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

ANDREW COCKBURN

MAY 29, 2024

As Russian forces steadily advance in the Kharkiv region, it is becoming ever more clear that the Ukraine war has been a disaster for the U.S. defense machine, and not just because our aid has failed to save Ukraine from retreat and possible defeat. More importantly, the war has pitilessly exposed our defense system’s deep, underlying, faults.

(read the entire article at the link: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-us-weapons/?utm )

6. US military conducts tunnel warfare exercise in Morocco

Where are the most tunnels that will be part of a military conflict? (two letter hint: nK). Just saying. It is good to know that part of the National Guard 19th Special Forces Group is apportioned to Korea (or at least it used to be). And my real point is that we need to ensure we are passing lessons learned across theater boundaries (which I think we have been doing well in recent years at least based on my conversations with theater special operations commands - I see good sharing of lessons and information).

US military conducts tunnel warfare exercise in Morocco

defence-blog.com · May 30, 2024

News Army

May 30, 2024

Modified date: May 30, 2024

Photo by Jake SeaWolf

The US military recently concluded a tunnel warfare exercise in Tifnit, Morocco, as part of African Lion 2024 (AL24), a premier joint exercise led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF).

The exercise, held from April 19 to May 31, featured over 8,100 participants from 27 nations, including NATO contingents.

Tunnel warfare involves the use of tunnels and underground cavities for military operations, both for offensive and defensive purposes. It can include creating underground facilities to attack or defend, using existing natural caves, and constructing artificial underground structures. Tunnels can be used to undermine fortifications, launch surprise attacks, facilitate ambushes, conduct counterattacks, and move troops covertly. They can also serve as shelters from enemy attacks.

- ADVERTISEMENT - CONTINUE READING BELOW -

The AL24 exercise included a range of scenarios, such as subterranean warfare, psychological operations, building clearing, combined assaults, fast-rope insertion, rappelling, and hostage rescue. These exercises are essential for preparing forces to operate in diverse and challenging environments.

Photo by Jake Seawolf

During the training, a remotely controlled Micro Tactical Ground Robot navigated a subterranean passage. Green Berets from the 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Utah National Guard, trained alongside partner forces near Tifnit, Morocco.

The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas in 2023 highlighted the significance of tunnel warfare, with reports indicating that Hamas had constructed extensive tunnel networks under Gaza. Capturing and destroying these tunnels was a priority for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

If you would like to show your support for what we are doing, here's where to do it.

If you wish to report grammatical or factual errors within our news articles, you can let us know by using the online feedback form.

Executive Editor

About author:

Dylan Malyasov

Dylan Malyasov is the editor-in-chief of Defence Blog. He is a journalist, an accredited defense advisor, and a consultant. His background as a defense advisor and consultant adds a unique perspective to his journalistic endeavors, ensuring that his reporting is well-informed and authoritative. read more

defence-blog.com · May 30, 2024

7. N. Korean leader guides firing drill involving super-large multiple rocket launchers

I thought perhaps north Korea run out of missiles and had shifted to "filth balloons" but I guess I was wrong.

(2nd LD) N. Korean leader guides firing drill involving super-large multiple rocket launchers | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 31, 2024

(ATTN: TRIMS headline; RECASTS throughout with more info; ADDS photo)

By Kim Soo-yeon

SEOUL, May 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Friday it has conducted a firing drill involving super-large multiple rocket launchers in a bid to demonstrate its resolve to stage a preemptive strike against South Korea, if provoked.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un supervised the "power demonstration firing" drill involving 600 mm multiple rocket launchers Thursday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The South Korean military said Thursday it detected the North's launch of around 10 short-range ballistic missiles toward the East Sea. It was unusual for Pyongyang to fire a salvo of some 10 missiles at one time.

The KCNA said the drill was aimed at showing North Korea's "corresponding will not to hesitate to carry out a preemptive attack by invoking the right to self-defense at any time when the enemies attempt to use military force against it."

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on May 31, 2024, shows the North staging a firing drill involving 600 mm super-large multiple rocket launchers the previous day, guided by leader Kim Jong-un. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The North's super-large multiple rocket launch system is classified as a short-range missile that could put the entire South Korean territory within range. Pyongyang has claimed a tactical nuclear warhead could be mounted on such a weapon.

The firing "will serve as an occasion in clearly showing what consequences our rivals will face if they provoke us," Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA.

He stressed North Korea's nuclear forces should be more "thoroughly" prepared in a bid to promptly and correctly carry out a mission of deterring a war.

Photos carried by state media showed 18 artillery shots being fired from multiple rocket launchers on transporter erector launchers (TELs).

The provocation came as North Korea made a botched attempt to launch a spy satellite Monday. The North also sent hundreds of balloons carrying trash and manure into the South earlier this week in a "tit-for-tat" action against Seoul activists' campaign of sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on May 31, 2024, shows at least 18 rockets being fired from super-large multiple rocket launchers during the North's "power demonstration firing" drill held the previous day, guided by leader Kim Jong-un. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The KCNA said South Korea staged a "clumsy counteraction of dangerous armed demonstration" against the North's legitimate exercise of the sovereign right in an apparent reference to the South's latest aerial drills.

South Korea's military staged an air exercise involving around 20 fighter jets Monday near the border with North Korea, hours after North Korea informed Japan of a plan to launch a satellite by June 4.

North Korea has claimed that the development of a spy satellite is the exercise of its sovereign right to pursue a space development program. But any launch using ballistic missile technology by the North is a violation of United Nations Security Council's multiple resolutions against North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

"We strongly denounce North Korea for issuing menacing rhetoric and staging illegal provocations while repeatedly violating the UNSC resolutions and threatening to conduct a preemptive attack against us," Kim In-ae, deputy spokesperson at Seoul's unification ministry, told a press briefing.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on May 31, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (C) overseeing the country's "power demonstration firing" of 600 mm super-large multiple rocket launchers the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 31, 2024

8. N. Korea conducts GPS jamming attack for 3rd day

This is the real hostile act that concerns me. Is north Korea testing its electronic warfare capabilities in preparation for something?

Is this the regime's attempt at defending against a response from the South and/or the ROK/US alliance using precision guided munitions that require GPS? Again, are they learning lessons from Putin's War in Ukraine?

(LEAD) N. Korea conducts GPS jamming attack for 3rd day | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · May 31, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS more details on N.K. balloons from para 5, photo)

SEOUL, May 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea staged GPS jamming attacks in waters near South Korea's northwestern border islands for a third straight day on Friday, the South's military said, in the latest in a series of provocative acts this week.

The military detected the jamming signals from about 8 a.m. directed toward the islands near the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea, the de facto western maritime boundary between the two Koreas, according to a South Korean military official.

The latest attempt has not hindered the military's operations, the official said, although similar attempts the previous day led to glitches in the navigation systems of fishing boats and passenger ships in the waters.

The military detected the Thursday jamming attack shortly after the North launched 18 rounds of multiple rocket launchers toward the East Sea.

A ship departs from Incheon Coastal Passenger Terminal in Incheon, just west of Seoul, to the northwestern border island of Yeonpyeong on May 30, 2024. (Yonhap)

The North's GPS jamming attempts this week first took place Wednesday as it was sending hundreds of balloons carrying trash and apparent fecal matter to the South after it vowed to scatter "mounds of wastepaper and filth" in retaliation against anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent by activists in the South.

Another military official said the North could send more of such unpowered balloons Saturday when the wind is forecast to blow in a southward direction, although the military has yet to detect preparations of such launches.

On Wednesday night, Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of the North's leader, called the balloons "sincere presents" and said her country will send rubbish "dozens of times" more than those being scattered in the North.

"We are closely monitoring the North Korean military's activities," the South Korean official told reporters. "If the filth balloons are flown, we plan to notify the media."

The official advised the public not to touch such balloons that have fallen and report them to the authorities.

The military has decided against shooting down the balloons, the official said, noting that collecting them when they have fallen is currently the safest and most efficient way to respond to them.

"We are considering necessary measures, and are prepared and have the capabilities for stronger action," the official said, without elaborating.

The North's series of provocative moves came after its botched attempt to launch its second military spy satellite into orbit Monday night. The launch failed as the rocket exploded shortly after liftoff.

This composite image, provided by an individual in Paju, 37 kilometers north of Seoul, on May 29, 2024, shows a balloon carrying trash presumed to have been sent from North Korea in the border city. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · May 31, 2024

9. N. Korea warns of 'unpredictable disaster' over U.S. spy plane's latest flyover

Does the north think that GPS jamming will prevent our reconnaissance flights?

N. Korea warns of 'unpredictable disaster' over U.S. spy plane's latest flyover | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 31, 2024

SEOUL, May 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Friday denounced a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft's latest flight over South Korea, warning that its enemies could face an "unpredictable disaster" if they continue reckless military moves.

The U.S. Air Force's RC-135U Combat Sent was seen flying over the Korean Peninsula on Tuesday after taking off from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, according to multiple flight trackers.

In a commentary carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the North claimed the U.S. spy aircraft conducted air surveillance close to the country's southern border.

"(The U.S.) has been making a routine of doing monitoring and reconnaissance activity against us for almost 24 hours," the KCNA said.

North Korea also took issue with a planned joint military exercise between South Korea and the U.S. set for August, calling it an "extremely provocative and reckless" war drill against North Korea.

"The latest development shows that it is inevitable for us to strengthen our self-defense measures to take aim at, quell and crush the U.S. and its followers in a bid to safeguard the sovereign right and security interest," the KCNA said.

North Korea sent hundreds of big balloons carrying trash and manure to South Korea earlier this week, and it also made a botched attempt to launch a spy satellite Monday.

A U.S. RC-135U reconnaissance aircraft is seen in this photo captured from the U.S. Air Force's website. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 31, 2024

10. 2 Koreas see no cross-border trade last year amid frozen ties: unification ministry

2 Koreas see no cross-border trade last year amid frozen ties: unification ministry | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 31, 2024

SEOUL, May 31 (Yonhap) -- South and North Korea had no cross-border trade last year and Seoul's humanitarian aid to Pyongyang hit an all-time low amid frozen inter-Korean ties, the unification ministry said Friday.

It marked the first time that the two Koreas logged no cross-border trade since 1989, when they began trading, according to the 2024 Unification White Paper issued by the ministry.

The cumulative value of inter-Korean transactions reached US$24.86 billion between 1989 and 2022.

South Korea's nutrition aid for North Korean children and other humanitarian assistance to North Korea amounted to 900 million won ($653,000) last year, down from 2.6 billion won the previous year. Of the amount, civic groups provided aid worth 700 million won.

The 2023 figure marked the smallest amount since 1995, when the ministry began compiling related data.

The ministry also said the two Koreas saw no exchange of personnel for the third straight year in 2023.

This file photo, taken May 10, 2023, shows a road in Paju, just north of Seoul, that leads to the now-shuttered joint industrial complex in North Korea's border city of Kaesong. (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · May 31, 2024

11. U.S. has no plans to forward-deploy nuclear arms to Korean Peninsula: State Dept.

Is this a message that we are coordinating with our overall information strategy? Does this support our information strategy or is this simply in support of our desire to support non-proliferation.

(LEAD) U.S. has no plans to forward-deploy nuclear arms to Korean Peninsula: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 31, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS more remarks, details in paras 8-11)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, May 30 (Yonhap) -- The United States has no plans to forward-deploy nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, a State Department spokesperson said Thursday, amid a resurgent debate over the idea of Washington redeploying tactical nuclear arms to Korea for deterrence against North Korean threats.

Vedant Patel, the department's deputy spokesperson, made the remarks in response to a question about Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's recent remarks that Moscow may consider additional nuclear deterrence steps in the event of the U.S. deploying ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) to the Indo-Pacific.

"Let me just say that the U.S. does not assess returning nuclear weapons to the Indo-Pacific as necessary at this time," Patel told a press briefing. "The U.S. has no plans to forward-deploy nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula."

State Department deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel is seen answering questions during a daily press briefing at the department in Washington on Aug. 14, 2023 in this captured image. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

He pointed out that it was Russia that has engaged in "nuclear saber-rattling."

"Let's not forget that it is the Russian Federation that time and time again dating back to the early days of its aggression into Ukraine that it has recklessly participated in a nuclear saber-rattling, talking about the use and deployment of nuclear weapons," Patel said.

In a recent interview with Rossiya Segodnya, a Russian media group, Lavrov said that Moscow may consider taking additional steps to strengthen its nuclear deterrence should Washington deploy IRBMs to the region, according to a transcript on the website of Russia's foreign ministry.

A debate over the idea of the U.S. redeploying nuclear weapons to Korea has resurfaced as U.S. Republican senators floated the redeployment idea for stronger deterrence against evolving North Korean threats.

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula in 1991. South Korea has since adhered to its non-nuclear status while relying on America's security commitment, including its pledge to use its nuclear assets to defend its ally in a contingency.

At the briefing, Patel condemned North Korea's ballistic missile launches this week and took note of China's role in helping address the security challenge from the North.

"We continue to believe that there are countries who have a relationship with the DPRK and have influence with the DPRK, and (countries) that have a responsibility to rein in and influence some of the malign and bad behavior that we are seeing, especially a country like the People's Republic of China which sits on the U.N. Security Council," he said.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Patel also commented on the North having sent balloons carrying trash and fecal matter to the South this week. calling the move "malign" and "destabilizing."

"Any kind of aerial object ... certainly, we would find (it) destabilizing and provocative," he said. "We continue to consult closely with the Republic of Korea and Japan against these kinds of malign and destabilizing behaviors."

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · May 31, 2024

12. Analysts see signs of strain in North Korea-China ties

A transactional relationship. north Korea has always tried to exploit China and Russia and play them off against each other.

Analysts see signs of strain in North Korea-China ties

May 30, 2024 9:17 AM

By William Gallo

voanews.com · May 30, 2024

Seoul, South Korea —

Tensions between North Korea and China surfaced publicly this week for the first time in years, after Pyongyang lashed out at a joint statement signed by Beijing mentioning the possibility of denuclearization.

The apparent rift between the two allies emerged as North Korea’s latest attempt to launch a military spy satellite interrupted a major diplomatic initiative by China.

North Korea announced that it would conduct the launch as China’s premier, Li Qiang, was in Seoul preparing to meet the top leaders of Japan and South Korea as part of a trilateral dialogue that had not occurred in almost five years.

The launch, which ended in a fiery explosion just after liftoff, occurred several hours after the trilateral dialogue wrapped up late Monday.

A news program broadcasts file images of a rocket launch by North Korea, at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea, May 28, 2024. A rocket launched by North Korea to deploy the country's second spy satellite exploded shortly after liftoff on May 27, state media reported.

Although not unprecedented, it was a rare North Korean disruption of a major political event involving China, which has long been the main ally and economic lifeline for the isolated North.

The developments suggest fissures in a relationship that both sides have long insisted is “as close as lips and teeth,” according to Jean Lee, a Korea specialist at the East-West Center in Hawaii.

“I think what we’re seeing is that those fissures can break wide open with just a little bit of pressure,” she said.

Embed share

The code has been copied to your clipboard.

width px height px

The URL has been copied to your clipboard

No media source currently available

0:00 0:02:42 0:00

Uncomfortable spot

North Korea’s actions left China's Li in an awkward position, standing alongside Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, who both condemned the impending launch.

Things got more uncomfortable from there. After the three men released a joint statement calling, among other things, for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea erupted.

In a statement posted in the state-run Korean Central News Agency, North Korea's foreign ministry accused the three countries of “mockery and trickery,” denouncing what it described as a “blatant challenge” to its sovereignty and “wanton interference” in its internal affairs.

Though the North Korean statement was primarily directed at summit host South Korea, it was also a “veiled but undeniable swipe” at China, said Rachel Minyoung Lee, a North Korea watcher and senior fellow at the Washington-based Stimson Center.

“The North’s relations with China have looked to be cooling over the last year, but this is the first time in recent years any signs of trouble have broken into the open,” she wrote in a blog post on 38 North, a North Korea-focused website.

China has long called for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula – a formulation often embraced by other countries, including the United States and its allies.

North Korea has also accepted the idea of denuclearization in some settings, including perhaps most notably the joint statement signed by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and former U.S. president Donald Trump following their first summit in 2018.

However, North Korea last year enshrined nuclear weapons in its constitution – a status Kim now calls “irreversible.”

North Korea's moves have sparked major concerns among the U.S. and its allies, which have responded by ramping up their own displays of military strength.

In public settings, Chinese officials have called for all sides to show restraint, even while pressing the United States to make concessions in order to advance the denuclearization process.

Ups and downs

North Korea has not criticized China so blatantly since 2017, when Beijing backed United Nations Security Council sanctions over the North’s nuclear and missile tests.

Since then, North Korea-China ties have improved. China now opposes new sanctions, even as North Korea dramatically expanded its ballistic missile tests that are banned by the U.N. resolutions it once supported.

But there have been signs of trouble beneath the surface. For instance, Chinese leader Xi Jinping hasn’t met with Kim in over five years.

Meanwhile, Kim in September traveled to Russia's far east, where he agreed to expand military cooperation with President Vladimir Putin. According to Kremlin officials, plans are underway for Putin to soon visit North Korea.

Putin now uses North Korean missiles and other weapons to wage war in Ukraine. In return, Putin may be aiding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, according to some U.S. officials, who have not provided evidence.

Kim Jong-un's Fears Could Be Exploited

Kim Jong-un's regime poses a significant threat to South Korea and global stability, but understanding his fears could benefit the ROK-U.S. alliance.

by Ri Jong Ho David Maxwell

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/kim-jong-uns-fears-could-be-exploited-211224

The National Interest · by David Maxwell · May 30, 2024

Summary: Kim Jong-un's regime poses a significant threat to South Korea and global stability, but understanding his fears could benefit the ROK-U.S. alliance. Kim's primary fears include assassination or coup by close aides, preemptive strikes on his nuclear capabilities, the influx of outside information, exposure of his and his family's faults, the impact of reform and opening up, and the ultimate collapse of his regime.

-These fears can be exploited through psychological warfare to instill doubt among North Korean elites and military officers, spread information highlighting the disparity between North and South Korea, and emphasize the disgraceful ends of other dictators.

-A concerted information campaign could weaken Kim's grip on power, ultimately leading to regime change and a unified Korea.

Exploiting Kim Jong-un's Fears: A Strategy for ROK-U.S. Alliance

The Kim family regime and its military are an existential threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK). The regional powers fear the actions of North Korea. Many in the United States fear a North Korean nuclear attack. Whatever happens on the Korean peninsula, whether war or internal instability and regime collapse, will have global effects. However, rarely, if ever, do researchers consider what makes Kim Jong-un afraid. What keeps him awake at night? If that can be identified and understood, can those fears be exploited to the benefit of the ROK-U.S. alliance? The following are Kim Jong-un’s six major fears.

First, Kim Jong-un fears assassination and a coup executed by his close aides and the military. He is an absolute ruler but is always anxious that his aides and military officers could undermine his authority and later harm him. That’s why he continues the frequent execution and purging of officials and officers. The Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers’ Party keeps high-ranking officials under strict control by monitoring them on an hourly basis every day. However, this reign of terror is causing resentment among the elites.

Second, Kim Jong-un greatly fears a preemptive strike against his nuclear capabilities and himself and the use of words such as assassination and decapitation. If he continues his human rights atrocities against the Korean people and threatens regional stability and world peace with nuclear weapons, he knows he will be at risk. As the marshal of the North Korean People’s Army, he will always be a legitimate military target.

Third, Kim fears the influx of outside information that reveals the highly developed reality of South Korea and the free, prosperous daily lives of its people. This is especially dangerous because South Korea uses the same language, and the people are ethnic brethren who have lived together for thousands of years. Kim fears that if Koreans in the North come to admire the South Korean system, his power will collapse. That’s why he has designated South Korea as the principal enemy, banned words like “ethnic brethren” and “reunification,” and completely blocked outside information. This is also the reason he sent 260 balloons carrying trash to South Korea. He believes the implied aerial threat would create friction within the South and make the government demand that escapees halt sending information into the North. Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, nearly admitted this in her May 29 KCNA statement while saying these balloons are a form of freedom of expression. Information is an existential threat to the regime.

Fourth, Kim Jong-un fears his subjects learning about his own faults and those of his family. In the current North Korean system, Kim and his family are deified as perfect beings, with their personal lives shrouded in secrecy. If it were revealed that Kim’s mother, Ko Young-hee, was an ethnic Korean born in Japan and that his father, Kim Jong-il, had four wives, North Koreans would be outraged at being deceived. The North Korean system doesn’t even allow ethnic Koreans born in Japan to join the Workers’ Party. That’s why Kim fears the revelation of his and his family’s faults as much as a nuclear attack. This is precisely why he still hasn’t publicly acknowledged his mother, Ko Young-hee.

Fifth, Kim Jong-un fears reform and opening up. He believes this will bring down the personality cult and deification of his family that is built on lies and deception, making it impossible to maintain his hereditary absolute power. He also fears that if opened, the Kim regime’s seventy years of crimes against humanity will be exposed, landing him at the International Criminal Court. If Koreans in the north experience the freedom of an open society, they will compare it to their impoverished system, and their power will inevitably collapse.

Sixth, Kim fears the collapse of the regime most of all. The collapse could result from two conditions. First is the loss of the ability of the Korean Workers Party to govern the entire territory in the North from Pyongyang. The second is the loss of support from the military and security services. All the situations and circumstances described above could contribute to these conditions. When both occur simultaneously, it would be a most precarious position for Kim Jong-un, especially if there has been an effective information campaign that has targeted potential emerging leaders.

In 2020, Kim enacted the “Rejection of Reactionary Thought and Culture Act” (and amended it in 2022) to completely block outside information from South Korea, the United States, etc., blinding and deafening the people. The act prohibited all TV and radio channels from broadcasting South Korean and foreign programming. Anyone caught watching, listening to, keeping, or distributing South Korean or American movies, recordings, publications, songs, pictures, or photos faces five to ten years of labor re-education, an indefinite prison term, or even execution.

So how can Kim’s greatest fears be employed against him to liberate the oppressed Korean people in the North and achieve denuclearization? The fundamental solution to the North Korean problem must focus on Kim Jong-un, the ultimate decisionmaker within the regime.

First, the ROK-U.S. alliance must wage psychological warfare to give North Korean elites and military officers a firm belief in their future security if they break away from the brutal dictator. This could lead to forces emerging from the Workers’ Party, guard command, and state security agencies to remove the oppressive dictator and drive systemic change.

Second, the alliance could wage psychological warfare by continuously dropping leaflets and USB drives and using all communications channels into the North with information about the miserable ends of long-ruling brutal dictators like Romania’s Ceausescu, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, and Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. This will show North Korean officials and military elites the disgraceful fate of dictators, making them realize that they, too, could meet the same end by staying close to Kim Jong-un, driving them to lead the regime transition.

Third, the alliance could send video footage comparing the development of North and South Korea to make Koreans in the North realize they are poor and unfree because of Kim Jong-un. This could be accompanied by videos showing the gap in weapons systems between the North Korean military and ROK and U.S. forces, which could change the perceptions of North Korean officers and soldiers and break their will to attack the South. K-dramas are already having some effect, but much more could be done in this area.

Fourth, based on the universal human rights of North Koreans trapped in an enclosed space to access information, the U.S. Congress should pass a “North Korea Information Enhancement Act” to strengthen psychological warfare against the North. Our most powerful weapon to win without bloodshed is psychological warfare against North Korea (leafleting, radio broadcasts, mobile phone access, etc.). If Kim Jong-un continues his provocations with nuclear threats, we must counter with an offensive through an information campaign. This is the best defense and offense we can take against the North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, who tramples on international peace and human rights and commits crimes against humanity. The U.S. forces in South Korea and the South Korean military itself must also strengthen psychological warfare to drive the Korean people in the North to change Kim Jong-un’s system.

There is only one way to put an end to the nuclear and military threats, as well as the human rights abuses. That way is through the unification and establishment of a free and unified Korea based on the principles of individual freedom, the rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people.

About the Authors

Ri Jong Ho is a former senior North Korean economic official who served under all three leaders of the Kim family regime. His most recent role was based in Dalian, China, where he headed the Korea Daehung Trading Corporation, overseen by the clandestine Office 39 under the direct control of the ruling Kim family. Before his assignment in Dalian, Jong Ho held pivotal positions, including President of the Daehung Shipping Company and Executive Director of the Daehung General Bureau of the North Korean Workers’ Party, a role equivalent to Vice-Minister rank in the North Korean party state. Subsequently, he was appointed Chairman of the Korea Kumgang Economic Development Group (KKG) under the North Korean Defense Committee by Kim Jong-il. Jong Ho is a recipient of the Hero of Labor Award, the highest civilian honor in North Korea. Following a series of brutal purges by Kim Jong-un, he defected with his family to South Korea in late 2014. Currently, Jong Ho resides in the greater Washington D.C. area.

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent over thirty years in Asia, specializing in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation (where he focuses on a free and unified Korea). He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the editor of Small Wars Journal.

Image: Shutterstock/YouTube Screengrab.

The National Interest · by David Maxwell · May 30, 2024

What Makes Kim Jong Un Afraid?

How can this be Exploited?

By Ri Jong Ho and David Maxwell

The Kim family regime and its military is an existential threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK). The regional powers fear the actions of North Korea. Many in the U.S. fear a north Korean nuclear attack. Whatever happens on the Korea peninsula, whether war or internal instability and regime collapse, will have global effects. Rarely, if ever do researchers consider what make Kim Jong Un afraid. What keeps him awake at night? If that can be identified and understood, can those fears be exploited to the benefit of the ROK/U.S. alliance? The following are Kim Jong Un’s six major fears.

First, what Kim Jong Un fears most is assassination and a coup by his close aides and the military. He is an absolute ruler but is always anxious that his aides and military officers could harm him. That’s why he continues the frequent execution and purging officials and officers. He also has their homes, offices, and cars tapped for surveillance, with 24-hour tracking and monitoring. The Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers' Party keeps high-ranking officials under strict control by monitoring them on an hourly basis every day. However, this reign of terror is causing resentment among the elites.

Second, Kim Jong Un greatly fears a preemptive strike against his nuclear capabilities and himself, and the use of words such as assassination and decapitation. If he continues his human rights atrocities against the Korean people and threatening regional stability and world peace with nuclear weapons while oppressing the Korean people in the north, he knows he will be at risk. As the Marshall of the North Korean People’s Army, he will always be a legitimate military target.

Third, what Kim fears most is greater than a nuclear attack is the influx of outside information that reveals the highly developed reality of South Korea and the free, prosperous daily lives of its people. This is especially dangerous because South Korea uses the same language, and the people are ethnic brethren who have lived together for thousands of years. Kim fears that if Koreans in the north come to admire the South Korean system, his power will collapse. That’s why he has designated South Korea as the principle enemy, banned words like “ethnic brethren” and “reunification”, and completely blocked outside information. This is the reason he sent 260 balloons carrying trash to South Korea. He believes this will create friction within the South due to the implied threat which would be intended to make the people demand that escapees halt sending information into the north. Kim Yo Jong has nearly admitted this in her May 29th KCNA statement while saying these balloons are a form of freedom of expression. Information is an existential threat to the regime.

Fourth, Kim Jong-un's critical weakness is if Koreans on the north learn about the faults of him and his family. In the current North Korean system, Kim and his family are deified as perfect beings shrouded in secrecy. If it's revealed that Kim's mother Ko Young-hee was an ethnic Korean born in Japan, and that his father Kim Jong-il had four wives, North Koreans will be outraged at being deceived. The North Korean system doesn't even allow ethnic Koreans born in Japan to join the Workers' Party. That's why Kim fears the revelation of his and his family's faults as much as a nuclear attack. This is precisely why he still hasn't publicly acknowledged his mother Ko Young-hee.

Fifth, Kim Jong-un fears reform and opening up. He believes this will bring down the personality cult and deification of his family that is built on lies and deception, making it impossible to maintain his hereditary absolute power. He also fears that if opened, the Kim regime’s 70 years of crimes against humanity through the gulag prison system will be exposed, landing him at the International Criminal Court. And if Koreans in the north experience the freedom of an open society, they will compare It to their impoverished system and his power will inevitably collapse. Kim has kept Koreans in the north isolated from the outside world in a primitive slave-like state to preserve his power.

Sixth, Kim fears regime collapse most of all. Collapse will result from two conditions. First is the loss of the ability of the Korean Workers Party to govern the entire territory in the north from Pyongyang, in short, loss of central governing effectiveness. The second is the loss of coherency and support of the military and security services. All the situations and circumstances described above contribute to these conditions. When both occur simultaneous it is most dangerous to Kim Jong Un especially if there has been an effective information campaign that has targeted potential emerging leaders.

In 2020, Kim enacted the "Rejection of Reactionary Thought and Culture Act" (and amended it in 2022) to completely block outside information from South Korea, the U.S. etc., blinding and deafening the people. He fixed all TV and radio channels so people cannot watch or listen to South Korean and foreign broadcasts. Anyone caught watching, listening to, keeping or distributing South Korean or American movies, recordings, publications, songs, pictures or photos faces 5-10 years of labor re-education, or an indefinite prison term or even execution if deemed serious.

So how can Kim's greatest fears be employed against him to liberate the oppressed Korean people in the north and achieve denuclearization? The fundamental solution to the North Korea problem must focus on Kim Jong-un, the decision-maker behind all the evil acts that threaten the Korean peninsula and world peace with nuclear weapons while destroying the freedom and human rights of Koreans in the north. They need and deserve a regime transition to new enlightened leadership.

First, the ROK/U.S. alliance must wage psychological warfare to give North Korean elites and military officers a firm belief in future security and incentives, so they break away from the brutal dictator. This could lead to forces emerging from the Workers' Party, guard command, state security agencies etc. to remove the oppressive dictator and drive systemic change.

Second, the alliance wage psychological warfare by continuously dropping leaflets and USBs and using all communications channels into the north with information about the miserable ends of long-ruling brutal dictators like Romania's Ceausescu being executed by his people in 1989, Iraq's Saddam Hussein being captured by U.S. forces in 2003 and executed in 2006, Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden being killed by U.S. forces in 2011 for the 9/11 attacks, Egypt's Mubarak, and Iran's Soleimani being assassinated in 2020. This will show North Korean officials and military elites the disgraceful fate of dictators, making them realize they too could meet the same end by staying close to Kim Jong-un, driving them to lead regime transition.

Third, we must send video footage comparing the development of North and South Korea to make Koreans in the north realize "we are poor and unfree because of Kim Jong Un" and seek regime transition. We must also send videos showing the gap in weapons systems between the North Korean military and ROK/U.S. forces to change the perception of North Korean officers and soldiers, breaking their will to attack the South. K-dramas are already having some effect but much more could be done in this area.

Fourth, based on the universal human right of North Koreans trapped in an enclosed space to access information, the U.S. Congress should pass a "North Korea Information Enhancement Act" to strengthen psychological warfare against the North. Our most powerful weapon to win without bloodshed is psychological warfare against North Korea (leafleting, radio broadcasts, mobile phone access etc.). If Kim Jong Un continues his provocations with nuclear threats, we must counter with an offensive through information campaign. This is the best defense and offense we can take against the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, who tramples on international peace and human rights and commits crimes against humanity. The U.S. forces in South Korea and the South Korean military itself must also strengthen psychological warfare to drive the Korean people in the north to change Kim Jong Un's system.

In conclusion, there is only one way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime. That way is through the achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

Ri Jong Ho is a former senior North Korean economic official who served under all three leaders of the Kim family regime. His most recent role was based in Dalian, China, where he headed the Korea Daehung Trading Corporation, overseen by the clandestine Office 39 under the direct control of the ruling Kim family. Before his assignment in Dalian, Jong Ho held pivotal positions, including President of the Daehung Shipping Company and Executive Director of the Daehung General Bureau of the North Korean Workers’ Party, a role equivalent to Vice-Minister rank in the North Korean party-state. Subsequently, he was appointed Chairman of the Korea Kumgang Economic Development Group (KKG) under the North Korean Defense Committee by Kim Jong-il. Jong Ho is a recipient of the Hero of Labor Award, the highest civilian honor in North Korea. Following a series of brutal purges by Kim Jong-un, he defected with his family to South Korea in late 2014. Currently, Jong Ho resides in the greater Washington D.C. area.

15. After 7-year hiatus, US groups resume humanitarian aid to North Korea

What organizations?

After 7-year hiatus, US groups resume humanitarian aid to North Korea

The shipments were mostly medical and lab equipment, US Commerce Department data shows.

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/humanitarian-shipments-north-united-states-05302024142912.html

By Cho Jinwoo for RFA Korean

2024.05.30

North Korean dock workers unload sacks of donated wheat onto a truck at Nampo port March 14, 2003.

Gerald Bourke/WFP/AFP

After a seven-year hiatus, U.S. organizations began exporting humanitarian aid to North Korea last year – much of it medical and laboratory equipment and supplies, according to data from U.S. Department of Commerce’s Census Bureau.

Since November, more than US$200,000 in aid has been sent to the reclusive country, the data shows.

The U.S. government’s sanctions policy prohibits all trade with North Korea except for humanitarian goods such as food and medicine, which require approval from the Department of Commerce.

After Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test in 2016, a new round of sanctions made it virtually impossible for for organizations to pass strict scrutiny even for humanitarian exports. Certain medical devices, for example, were banned because they could be used in applications other than their primary purpose.

It wasn’t immediately clear why humanitarian shipments from organizations in the U.S. resumed, or which organizations provided the aid.

A truck driver walks on a truck carrying sacks of flour to North Korea at a parking lot of Imjingak pavilion near the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas in Paju, about 34 miles north of Seoul, July 26, 2011. (Jo Yong-Hak/Reuters)

An American government official who requested anonymity told RFA that the shipments were humanitarian aid from U.S.-based organizations and weren’t products purchased by North Korea.

Most of the shipments appear to be medical and laboratory equipment and supplies, said Jason Jindrich, director of the U.S. Census Bureau’s International Trade Indicator MacroAnalysis Branch and Economic Indicators Division.

“Because the census only has access to the statistical information, I cannot say under what provision these supplies were sent,” he said.

The resumption of the humanitarian aid comes at a time when international organizations that left North Korea during the COVID-19 pandemic are discussing a possible return.

The resumption of exports is “meaningful,” said Joung Eunlee, a research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification.

“I think this means that the U.S. government is also taking the stance that we will support North Korea from a humanitarian perspective,” she said.

The U.S. State Department has previously told RFA several times that it does support humanitarian aid to North Korea.

In November, US$120,000 worth of goods were shipped to the country, about $55,000 of which was classified as “immunological products.” In December, about $68,000 was sent, 90% of which were classified as “diagnostic or laboratory reagents kits.”

Nothing was sent in January, but in February exports totaled around $26,000 and $3,500 in March.

Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

16. Why Is the North Korea Problem So Hard to Solve?

north Korea and the Korea question is a wicked hard problem.

Excerpts;

Over time, North Korea will come to understand that Washington and Seoul’s strategy is a reflection of its own. When Pyongyang turns down the temperature, stops provocations, and engages in reciprocal trust-building, it will find ready and willing partners. When it insists on proliferation, weapons testing, and provocations, the United States and South Korea will improve their deterrence posture and lead an international pressure coalition. Washington can hold out hope that North Korea comes around, but if it relies on this, it passes up the opportunity for more modest and pragmatic achievements. At the very least, Washington can take proactive measures to prevent the worst possible outcome, no matter what path the Kim regime decides to take.

Why Is the North Korea Problem So Hard to Solve? - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Jonathan Corrado · May 31, 2024

The North Korea problem is set to get worse before it gets better. North Korea continues to perfect the reentry technology, targeting capability, and solid-fuel missiles that will dramatically increase the potency and reach of its nuclear weapons, overwhelm missile defenses on the Korean Peninsula, and threaten America’s homeland and allies in Asia. There are even renewed expectations of a seventh nuclear test or some other provocationtimed to make a splash before the U.S. presidential election.

In January, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un publicly designated South Korea as his country’s “primary enemy” and renounced peaceful unification, essentially rolling back a decades-long unification policy supported by his forefathers. These moves take on extra significance when viewed against the backdrop of Pyongyang’s geopolitical shift toward embracing autocracies and the Kim regime’s consistent calls for “war preparations” since early 2023. Meanwhile, Pyongyang is bear-hugging Moscow, sending it artillery and missiles in return for much-needed supplies like food and oil and possibly even military technology.

The result is an approaching crisis that calls for a recalibrated approach. As in years past, the North Korea policy debate has hardened into competing camps. One side wants to double down on deterrence and complete denuclearization, and the other wants engagement and arms control. If nothing else, the two camps agree that the status quo is unsustainable. And neither side is advocating for a modern incarnation of the “strategic patience” policy practiced during the Obama administration. And yet, without another plan, Washington will be stuck with a policy of not-so-strategic patience.

Today’s challenges stem from North Korea’s complex history, U.S.-North Korean system incompatibility, path dependency, decades of mistrust, and North Korea’s evolving strategic priorities. To overcome these challenges, we recommend forgoing a grand bargain in favor of a more incremental approach. This should combine deterrence, assurance, and engagement to build incentives for progress that can succeed whether or not Kim Jong Un comes to the table.

Become a Member

Histor of Complexity

The origins of the North Korea problem stem from Japanese colonialism, America’s broken promise to come to Korea’s aid in 1882, and a post–World War II trusteeship that set the stage for the peninsula’s ongoing ideological rivalry. The North Korean invasion that followed, green-lit by the Soviet Union and rescued from the jaws of defeat by Communist China, triggered a civil war that evolved into a regional war and a satellite war. The conflict threatened to escalate into a nuclear superpower showdown. While that thankfully never happened, the Korean War nonetheless initiated the pattern of Cold War proxy confrontation that continues to this day. At the end of the war, two years of difficult talks culminated in an uneasy armistice that remains in force, so the belligerents are stuck in a technical state of war until a political solution is reached.

North Korea’s decision making has always been affected by the wider geopolitical context. Kim Il Sung boldly ignored Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s direct guidance to dial down his cult of personality and embrace pluralistic governance. Over the years, Moscow and Beijing have both struggled to control their junior partner. As former Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong told a Soviet diplomat in 1956, North Korea ignores China’s advice “100 percent” of the time, while it “listens to you” 70 percent of the time. During the Sino-Soviet split, the animosity between Beijing and Moscow was the crucial factor Kim needed to secure defense pacts from both countries, working each against the other.

The mistrust cuts both ways. Although the Soviets helped North Korea establish a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in the 1950s, Pyongyang’s leaders didn’t fully commit to developing nuclear weapons until the 1970s, as they grew concerned about the credibility of their patrons and warily witnessed South Korea’s economic ascendance. The lesson for North Korea? Perhaps that when it courts multiple patrons, it can minimize their influence while maximizing benefits. We may be seeing echoes of this approach today as Kim courts Russian President Vladimir Putin while keeping China at arm’s length.

The same context has informed North Korea’s guns-versus-butter thinking. From the early postwar years, the Kim regime engaged in an economic policy debate over accumulation (investment) versus consumption, sometimes leading to dueling narratives on national defense and the civilian economy. This debate began as early as the mid-1950s and continues to this day.

After the armistice, different factions within the North Korean leadership waged a tug-of-war over whether to give priority to heavy industry (accumulation) or light industry and agriculture (consumption). Though Kim was pressured by the Soviets to find a balanced approach — giving priority to heavy industry while developing light industry and agriculture at the same time — his preference was always to improve the economy by prioritizing heavy industry. The turning point came in 1961 and 1962, when the Soviet Union instilled a “fear of abandonment” in North Korea. Moscow parted ways with the Chinese and Albanian communist parties, and during the Cuban missile crisis, it reached a deal with the United States, which Kim Il Sung viewed as a betrayal of its Cuban ally. These events prompted North Korea to adopt a policy of simultaneous economic and defense development (the country’s original byungjin policy) in December 1962, in effect giving priority to national defense.

Contemporary North Korea is the consequence of those unsolved legacy problems compounded over time. The Kim family regime continually chooses guns over butter, so while the domestic economy languishes, the military has made major strides in developing advanced weapons systems. Today, North Korea presents a conventional, nuclear, chemical, and biological threat, which is also a global proliferation problem and a dangerous precedent eroding the sustainability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. North Korea’s example is now a veritable roadmap for rogue states seeking nuclear weapons: Just grit your teeth and suffer sanctions for a while, and you too can own your own nukes and threaten your neighbors.

Policy Shift Meets Policy Inertia

There is a political cost in both Washington and Pyongyang for the compromises needed to move the ball forward. Both the United States and North Korea have thus become loss-averse, prioritizing the avoidance of setbacks over the prospect of making gains. Stubbornness has further become part and parcel of the strategic approach.

For the United States, it’s about path dependency, the process whereby policymaking becomes hardened and resistant to change, even as it no longer serves America’s interests. Although most U.S. analysts will concede that complete denuclearization is not feasible (or never was), no U.S. president wants to go down in history as having given up on that goal. Washington is unwilling to abandon denuclearization and also unwilling to confront the possibility that America may not be able to convince North Korea to denuclearize no matter what incentives are offered. That’s because North Korea’s nuclear weapons are not simply for defensive purposes: They are also intended to achieve a coercive effect, mobilize regime support, and hedge against overreliance on China and Russia.

North Korea also has its own calculus and unique and difficult to interpret ways of communicating its bargaining position. Some analysts forget that, amid the pageantry and fanfare of a sit-down summit, Kim Jong Un lost face when the prospects for a deal disintegrated during his second summit with Donald Trump in Hanoi. Although Kim is the undisputed leader of a unitary autocratic system, he nonetheless has a constituency of elites to answer to. Pyongyang complains of America’s “hostile policy” and has previously made denuclearization contingent on its removal. But when pushed by American diplomats to define what this means, the North Korean interlocutors won’t (or can’t). Although North Korea does not have a formal definition of “hostile policy,” a review of the country’s official statements and media commentary shows that it covers a broad range of issues that Pyongyang views as tarnishing its image or posing a threat to its regime security — from discussions of North Korea’s human rights conditions to sanctions and U.S.-South Korean combined military drills. A maximum and ambiguous definition is useful for creating negotiating space, and the trumped-up existential security threat is a handy pretext for the regime’s totalitarian control.

Further complicating the North Korea conundrum for U.S. policymakers are the apparent strategic policy shiftsthat Pyongyang has undertaken in recent years. The root of these shifts can be traced back to the collapse of the Hanoi summit and the lack of a diplomatic breakthrough between the two countries by the end of 2019. Kim Jong Un’s warning at the end of 2019 of a “long confrontation” with the United States accurately predicted where the North would be headed. Over the next five years, it would take a number of provocative steps. First, Pyongyang announced a five-year defense development plan centered on advancing nuclear capabilities. It also resumed intercontinental ballistic missile testing that it had suspended in April 2018 and declared that “there will be no longer any bargaining over” the North’s nuclear weapons. This essentially scrapped a three-decade policy of normalizing relations with the United States through denuclearization, started by Kim Il Sung and upheld by Kim Jong Il. Finally, Kim Jong Un designated South Korea as the “primary enemy” and shut the door to peaceful unification, which again was a reversal of his predecessors’ national unification policy. As North Korea shifted away from the United States and South Korea, it pivoted back to China and Russia, which marked a reversal of another three-decade policy: nonalignment with these two great power neighbors. Kim Jong Un’s understanding of the changing global order, which he described as being “multipolar” and in a “neo–Cold War,” coupled with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, appears to have spurred Pyongyang’s pivot away from Washington.

Limitations

The historical enmity between the United States and North Korea is multigenerational and baked into the culture. North Koreans are taught that the United States and South Korea started the Korean War (called “the Great Fatherland Liberation War”) and remain an urgent threat to this day. Given the paucity of rival narratives, most of the country’s 25 million people accept this fact. In America as well, most people view North Korea as backward, pesky, irrational, and even evil. The country is a problem to deal with or an obstacle to surmount rather than a place filled mostly with ordinary people who are merely trying to get through the day. The vast majority of Americans (87 percent) view North Korea as mostly or very unfavorable, and the only foreign policy item that American Democrats and Republicans can seem to agree upon is the importance of limiting the power and influence of North Korea.

Both sides have justifiable reasons to think the other has done them wrong in prior agreements. One needs look no further than the 1994 Agreed Framework, the first major nuclear deal. North Korea complains that the United States failed to deliver on promised fuel oil and dragged its feet on the construction of light water reactors. The United States claims that North Korea broke the spirit if not the letter of the agreement by secretly pursuing a uranium path to the bomb. Several stalled attempts later, both sides have accumulated a laundry list of complaints about the infidelities of the other. Neither is in the mood to leap first to break the impasse, although precedent suggests this may be necessary.

Historically, diplomatic progress has been undercut by system incompatibility, multilateral misalignment, and geopolitics. American domestic politics have complicated the ability of the U.S. president to follow up on commitments. For example, Republicans in Congress opposed the transfer of heavy fuel oil to North Korea during the Agreed Framework. North Korea’s top-down system has made it difficult for diplomats at the working level to make serious headway in the nuclear issue. American negotiators came prepared for detailed talks in the run-up to the Hanoi summit, but their North Korean interlocutors simply did not have permission to discuss nuclear weapons.

The sheer number and variety of attempts to make a deal work have led to a state of learned helplessness. At this point, we’ve tried bilateral and multilateral negotiations. We’ve tried talks that start with working group–level negotiations and talks that are catalyzed by early leader-level summits. We’ve tried economic incentives and negative security assurances. We’ve tried having South Korea and China serve core roles in the process and otherwise. Both sides have given up trying to improve the very bad situation because we’ve become conditioned that it’s not within their power. This is of course understandable but wrong.

Looking Forward

Long-time North Korea watchers tend to believe that North Korea may make tactical adjustments along the way, but its strategic goals remain unchanged. An offshoot of this thinking is that the North Korean leadership continues to view the United States as indispensable for regime security. That is certainly what prompted Kim Il Sung to improve relations with Washington in the 1990s and Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un to continue this policy. But are we confident that this remains Kim Jong Un’s priority? As explained above, the signaling from North Korea indicates otherwise. There is a real threat of failing to recognize that North Korea is changing and thus failing to recalibrate U.S. policy accordingly.

Additionally, it’s crucial to acknowledge that the offer at the core of former strategies — the lifting of sanctions or provision of economic aid packages in return for North Korea’s steps toward denuclearization — do not have the same allure for Pyongyang as they once did. For one, the strides North Korea has made in its weapons programs since the collapse of the Hanoi summit mean the terms of negotiations will not be the same as they were in 2018 or 2019. Let’s not forget that Kim has effectively drawn the line: no denuclearization. Next, North Korea’s calculus vis-á-vis the United States, China, and Russia has changed. Additionally, the growing rift between the United States and both China and Russia, combined with North Korea’s improved relations with Beijing and Moscow, have facilitated Pyongyang’s illicit economy. Notably, Russia recently vetoed a U.N. group tasked with monitoring North Korea’s sanctions evasions. The horse has truly left the barn.

The current state of the policy debate pits deterrence against engagement and assurance, ignoring the fact that all three will be needed to solve the problem. One dilemma is that it’s counter-productive to reward or incentivize bad behavior, but it’s also necessary to provide an off-ramp from this negative cycle the United States and North Korea are stuck in. The challenge is to pursue a policy that moves the ball in the right direction whether or not Pyongyang is in the mood to work on the relationship. The current debate also fails to address the reality that North Korea’s intransigence stems from regional division and global competition between rival blocs. So long as China and Russia continue to be at odds with the United States and even benefit from North Korea’s confrontation with Washington, it’s foolhardy to expect them to abandon their ally of convenience.

A great deal of intellectual and political capital has been expended on showy summits and grand bargains that simply don’t pan out. Victor Cha has written that “all the past denuclearization policies have arguably left the United States worse off than before.” To surmount the dilemmas inherent to North Korea policy, Washington should first break through the limitations in its own thinking. Policymakers should follow William Perry’s adviceto “deal with the North Korean government as it is, not as we might wish it to be.”

Given the nature of the problem — one so firmly rooted in wider regional rivalries — it is necessary to take the long view. That means preparing for sudden change while also girding for stasis or deterioration and proactively working to create conditions for favorable improvement. Sudden change could come in the form of an unanticipated two-front war in Asia involving the United States, both Koreas, China, Japan, and Taiwan. It could begin with a North Korean provocation or miscalculation that spirals out of control. It could be triggered by famine, regime instability, a coup, or a nuclear accident. Preventing and preparing for these eventualities involve painstaking planning, cooperation with our allies, and crisis management with our adversaries.

All too often, in stalemates, only a crisis can convince policymakers to invest the political capital needed for change. To that end, deterrence, assurance, and engagement will all be needed — as well as a healthy dose of pragmatism. When it comes to tough cases like North Korea, incremental progress doesn’t get the fanfare it deserves.

Modest Measures

Given the paucity of progress and the fait accompli that denuclearization is virtually impossible, some are calling for the United States and South Korea to make concessions to kick-start a peace process with an arms control deal or an end-of-war declaration. But without the proper verification measures and mutual trust-building, an arms control deal that stops short of full denuclearization could actually make the peninsula a more dangerous and unstable place. While an end-of-war declaration would be politically symbolic, it could lead to increased calls by Pyongyang to halt U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises or pull out U.S. military personnel and assets from South Korea, which could be more destabilizing for the region. Both objectives are worth pursuing in the long term, but only as part of a holistic and parallel process with reciprocity and snapbacks.

Both the United States and North Korea will need to demonstrate good faith. That’s worth working toward but shouldn’t be expected overnight, especially so long as China and Russia continue to bankroll the Kim regime’s intransigence. On the diplomatic front, rather than the unrealistic fantasy of a sweeping solution through a grand bargain, efforts should be focused on building out overlapping and supporting layers of initiatives that stave off disaster and precipitate positive outcomes.

First, Washington should invest serious political capital in crisis communications and confidence-building measures in Northeast Asia. It’s ideal if Pyongyang participates but nonetheless meaningful if similar dialogues can take place with the other regional players, especially China, the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The door will remain open for North Korea’s subsequent participation.

Next, the United States and South Korea have nothing to lose by trying to rekindle trust through humanitarian assistance, academic exchange, and people-to-people ties.

Simultaneously, the U.S.-Korean alliance should improve its deterrence posture by enhancing ballistic missile defenses, increasing trilateral cooperation with Japan, and developing and deploying assets and doctrines to meet the advancing threat. However, instead of emphasizing deterrence by punishment, which tends to be louder than it is effective, the alliance can focus on deterrence by denial “to undermine North Korea’s confidence in escalatory options without further threatening the regime.”

Over time, North Korea will come to understand that Washington and Seoul’s strategy is a reflection of its own. When Pyongyang turns down the temperature, stops provocations, and engages in reciprocal trust-building, it will find ready and willing partners. When it insists on proliferation, weapons testing, and provocations, the United States and South Korea will improve their deterrence posture and lead an international pressure coalition. Washington can hold out hope that North Korea comes around, but if it relies on this, it passes up the opportunity for more modest and pragmatic achievements. At the very least, Washington can take proactive measures to prevent the worst possible outcome, no matter what path the Kim regime decides to take.

Become a Member

Jonathan Corrado is director of policy for The Korea Society, where he produces programming and conducts research on the U.S.-Korea alliance and the Korean Peninsula. He teaches a class on North Korea at the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University and the State University of New York Stony Brook University. He was previously a Korean-English translator for Daily NK, a South Korean news service collecting information from North Korean sources.

Rachel Minyoung Lee is a senior fellow with the 38 North Program at the Stimson Center. She was a North Korea collection expert and analyst with the Open Source Enterprise of the U.S. government from 2000 to 2019.

Image: Wikimedia

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Jonathan Corrado · May 31, 2024

17. Kim a mortal menace or playing mind games?

How about he is a mortal (and immoral) menace who plays mind games?

Aidan Foster-Carter does an academic-like take down of Kim's "writings." Kim I think gets an "F."

One example (I remember being criticized by professors for writing all over the map and mixing metaphors etc, but I have never seen a critique like the second excerpt below - it is masterful):

Who or what exactly does Kim think “South Korea” is? He switches from government to territory to that peculiar “clan,” which prompts several questions.

...

Paragraph 3 gives another version of what South Korea is, and it ain’t pretty – nor remotely true. The distasteful disablist imagery that Kim bandies around here suggests an implicit political eugenics. Such a malformed, tainted, dependent entity is clearly unfit to be a dialogue partner.

I look forward to Part 2.

Kim a mortal menace or playing mind games? - Asia Times

Dictator’s radical new line on Seoul ultimately lacks coherence, raising questions of who or what he thinks the South really is

asiatimes.com · by Aidan Foster-Carter · May 31, 2024

This is part one in a two-part series on the implications of North Korea’s recent official change of stance toward South Korea, and is adapted from the author’s recent chapter in Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-journal of Bilateral Relations in the Indo-Pacific.

Kim Jong Un elaborated on his radical new line on South Korea to the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) in January. It sounded just as nasty as when he first expounded it in December, but no more coherent.

While awaiting further specification in a promised constitutional amendment, our provisional assessment is that this is more bark than bite. While vigilance and deterrence remain crucial, this does not look like a peninsula on the brink of war.

Kim’s new stance on South Korea

On its face, the new stand toward South Korea announced by Kim Jong Un at the end of 2023, and further adumbrated by him later in mid-January, upends Pyongyang’s entire past policy – which means repudiating the legacies of his grandfather and father.

Following a review of how party and state policies were implemented in the old year, Kim turned to the new one. Earlier Kim had laid out the usual DPRK perspective.

He spoke of “the dangerous security environment in the Korean peninsula on the brink of a nuclear war,” saying that “the US and its vassal forces have still perpetrated vicious anti-DPRK confrontational moves [and are] openly talking about ‘end of regime’ in the DPRK.”

Beyond such generalities, a wealth of detail on specific US and alliance developments showed how Pyongyang pays close attention to the moves of its foes. Kim’s conclusion: “The word ‘war’ is already approaching us as a realistic entity, not as an abstract concept.”

Naturally, Kim also blasted “the anti-DPRK confrontation behavior” in which “traitor” ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol recently was getting ever more”offensive.” This was why, in his view, the September 19 North-South Military Agreement “was scrapped.”

‘A decisive policy change‘

So far, so boilerplate.

But then Kim moved on to posit “gigantic geopolitical changes in [the] international geo-political situation … and the external environment of the Korean peninsula.” Here came a first mention of “the need to newly formulate the stands on the north-south relations and reunification policy and make a decisive policy change in the work against the enemy.”

Beyond the peninsula, Kim confirmed in doctrine what had already become evident in practice. “The field of external affairs [aka diplomacy] should “concentrat[e] the main efforts on the development of relations with the ruling parties of socialist countries.”

That too is a major change, though he did not spin it as such. Gone are the days when Pyongyang pivoted nimbly between powers: Kim Il Sung balancing between Moscow and Beijing, never fully in either’s pocket while pocketing aid from both; or Kim Jong Il playing off China and South Korea.

What of the peninsula? Kim called for “a fundamental turnabout in … work toward the south, on the basis of a cool analysis of the bitter history of the north-south relations, which has repeatedly suffered only distrust and confrontation.” This “abnormal situation is not a random phenomenon,” and, of course, it is all the South’s fault.

For 50 years the North has pursued “most just, reasonable and fair” policies on national reunification. By contrast, even though “the puppet regime has changed more than [10] times so far,” their constant theme is “the collapse of the DPRK’s regime” and “unification by absorption.”

Hold it there, comrade. What about Kim Dae-jung or Moon Jae-in?

“The puppet forces’ sinister ambition to destroy our social system and regime has remained unchanged even a bit whether they advocated ‘democracy’ or disguised themselves as ‘conservatism.’”

Hence the party has concluded that “reunification can never be achieved with the ROK authorities that defined the ‘unification by absorption’ and ‘unification under liberal democracy’ as their state policy, which is in sharp contradiction with our line of national reunification based on one nation and one state with two systems.”

But all this is a travesty. True, some – perhaps most – conservative ROK leaders thought in the way Kim describes. Not so the three liberals – “DJ” (1998-2003), Roh Moo-hyun (2003-08), and Roh’s protégé Moon (2017-22). Their vision was quite different and much closer to Pyongyang’s own.

Kim then adduces a further example, while also shifting his ground:

Even at this moment, the south Korean puppets are unhesitatingly contending that the DPRK and its people are territory and population of the ROK that should be reclaimed, and it is shamelessly specified in the constitution of the ROK that “the territory of the ROK contains the Korean peninsula and its attached islands.”

True, South Korea’s constitution does make that claim (in Article 3), whereas the North’s contains no such territorial definition. But this is specious of Kim. From the beginning, neither Korean state has recognized the other.

‘Hemiplegic malformation‘

Moving swiftly on, Kim draws drastic conclusions (numbers added for convenience):

“I think it is a mistake we should no longer make to regard the clan who publicly defined us as the ‘principal enemy’ and is seeking only the opportunity of ‘collapse of power’ and ‘unification by absorption’ in collusion with foreign forces as the partner of reconciliation and reunification.
“It is not suitable to the prestige and position of the DPRK to discuss the issue of reunification with the strange clan who is no more than a colonial stooge of the US, just because of the rhetorical word the fellow countrymen.
“South Korea at present is nothing but a hemiplegic malformation and colonial subordinate state whose politics is completely out of order, whole society tainted by Yankee culture, and [defense] and security totally dependent on the US.
“The north-south relations have been completely fixed into the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states, not the consanguineous or homogeneous ones any more.”

Who or what exactly does Kim think “South Korea” is? He switches from government to territory to that peculiar “clan,” which prompts several questions.

If the “clan” is unrepresentative – though freely elected, unlike north of the DMZ – then what of the Southern people? The implication is not only that Pyongyang has found no worthy interlocutors, but that it never will – and has stopped looking.

Paragraph 3 gives another version of what South Korea is, and it ain’t pretty – nor remotely true. The distasteful disablist imagery that Kim bandies around here suggests an implicit political eugenics. Such a malformed, tainted, dependent entity is clearly unfit to be a dialogue partner.

In what sense, if any, is Korea still one? Not at all, according to Kim. He reckons that “fellow countrymen” is merely a “rhetorical word.”

Paragraph 4 begs questions. Is it true that inter-Korean ties (at the level of states) are “fixed” into hostility? And regardless, what has that to do with either consanguinity or homogeneity?

Kim rounds off this farrago with two conclusions: bureaucratic, and then (more ominously) military. First, various organizations – not least, “the United Front Department of the Party Central Committee” – need “readjusting and reforming” to “fundamentally change the principle and orientation of the struggle.”

And on the very first day of 2024, Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui called a meeting “with officials concerned” to start implementing the organizational changes.

Evidently MOFA—not always a high-status ministry in Pyongyang – will gain power and expand its bailiwick, as the formerly separate bodies (mostly under the WPK) which hitherto handled South Korea are summarily axed.

And then finally a concluding growl:

“Solemnly declaring that if the US and south Korean puppets stubbornly attempt a military confrontation with the DPRK, the latter’s nuclear war deterrence will go over to a grave action without hesitation, [Kim] set forth the important tasks for the fields in charge of the affairs with enemies and foreign countries to make preparations in a foresighted way for keeping pace with the powerful military actions of the Korean People’s Army to subjugate the whole territory of the south on the basis of making it a fait accompli that a war may break out on the Korean peninsula any time due to the enemies’ reckless moves for invading the DPRK.”

Many questions arise. So the “territory” of the South can be subjugated – but only if the foe makes the first move? What about the Southern people: are they to be “subjugated” too?

And why is Kim, who ended his father’s military-first strategy (Songun) by restoring party control over the KPA, now in effect telling MOFA to spruce up and keep pace with the soldiers?

Aidan Foster-Carter (afostercarter@yahoo.com) is an honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds.

This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with permission.

Thank you for registering!

An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

asiatimes.com · by Aidan Foster-Carter · May 31, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website