Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication."

– Leonardo da Vinci

“In keeping silent about evil, and burying it so deep within us, that no sign of it appears on the surface, we are implanting it, and it will rise up a thousand fold in the future. When we neither punish nor reproach, evildoers, we are not simply protecting their trivial old age, we are thereby ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new generations.”

– Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

"Beware the fury of a patient man."

– John Dryden

1. The Rising Threat of Kim Jong Un's North Korea

2. Analysts: North Korea Seeks to Dominate South Korea Through Nuclear Coercion

3. Unification minister slams N.K. war rhetoric backers as 'anti-state'

4. S Korea labels Kim regime irrational, calls for an end to provocation

5. Bolton warns Trump could seek 'reckless' deal on N.K. nuclear program if reelected

6. N. Korea says it conducted launch of 'Hwasal-2' strategic cruise missile

7. Vice unification minister highlights role of UNC amid heightened inter-Korean tensions

8. South Korea's Yoon warns North Korea may try to disrupt April poll

9. South Korea’s Nuclear Education

10. DO OR DIE Sold as ‘sex chat’ slaves and hunted like dogs through the jungle… the treacherous reality of escaping from North Korea

11. Explained | Kim Jong Un reportedly tears down father’s reunification monument. Why is it a big deal?

12. How North Korea Deterred an American Invasion in 2002

13. Could reports of a North Korea workers’ riot in China ‘pose threats’ to regime?

1. The Rising Threat of Kim Jong Un's North Korea

A warning from a former NIO.

As always, I remain more concerned with the effects of internal instability. But the conditions that lead to threats to the regime and the potential for regime collapse could lead to the saem actions as Markus describes as Kim seeks to "externalize" the threat.

Excerpt:

With all this in mind, the conditions are aligning for North Korea to conduct a localized attack with its improved capabilities while relying on threats of nuclear escalation and the potential for Chinese intervention to prevent regime-ending consequences.

North Korea has many options for such a limited attack, such as striking South Korean military units on sparsely populated islands near disputed Yellow Sea waters. This area has long been a venue for North Korean provocations, and just this month the North conducted artillery demonstrations nearby. These isolated islands are close to North Korea and right on China's doorstep. North Korea might seize a temporary military advantage there, expecting Washington and Seoul to accept a settlement rather than strongly escalate in response—out of fear of triggering Chinese intervention or a North Korean nuclear response. Even a temporary North Korean military victory would be a political win for the regime and shake allies' confidence in the United States. If a limited North Korean attack spiraled into a nuclear exchange or a larger war with China, this would admittedly be an even worse outcome.

These dangers are real and growing. North Korea is testing new missiles, expanding its nuclear arsenal, and trading weapons with Russia. The risk of North Korean escalation beyond the scale of anything we have seen since the armistice of 1953 is rising. Meanwhile, if China and the U.S. end up in a military confrontation—over Taiwan, for example—this is likely to lead to a two-front war with North Korea as well. North Korea is unlikely to sit on the sidelines as its Chinese patron and its sworn U.S. enemy face off to determine the fate of the region. North Korea has huge stakes in the outcome—perhaps a chance to see the U.S. ejected from the region—and what better time to attack U.S. bases than when China is already fighting the U.S.?

These are the dangers we should be focused on, rather than over-interpretation of Kim's rhetoric as meaning he would independently launch a suicidal war.

The Rising Threat of Kim Jong Un's North Korea

By Markus V. Garlauskas

Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council

Newsweek · · January 30, 2024

A recent shift in rhetoric from North Korea and its supreme leader Kim Jong Un has brought fears of war in Korea to the forefront, with two prominent Korea watchers even claiming that Kim has "made a strategic decision to go to war."

We should be concerned about the rising threat from North Korea, but not allow the North's latest propaganda line to distract us from the real, growing dangers that North Korea poses. These dangers include: North Korea's advancing weapons programs expanding its options and incentives for unprecedented, if limited, attacks on South Korea; its alignment with China and growing military relationship with Russia; and, its potential to widen a China-U.S. confrontation over Taiwan into a two-front war.

The new political line from North Korea that has some worried is more a recognition of reality than a signal of impending war. Since the armistice that halted the Korean War in 1953 left the Korean Peninsula divided, North Korea's ideology had held out hope of Korean unification under its leadership, by political means or force. In recent weeks, however, North Korea shifted to declaring South Korea a permanent adversary and started dismantling the organizational and symbolic manifestations of its hopes for reunification.

A South Korean marine patrols a beach on Yeonpyeong island, near the 'northern limit line' sea boundary with North Korea on Jan. 8. A South Korean marine patrols a beach on Yeonpyeong island, near the 'northern limit line' sea boundary with North Korea on Jan. 8. JUNG YEON-JE/AFP via Getty Images

This should be no surprise. Unification would be a disaster for Kim's regime. Kim and his elite, with access to outside information can see what they are up against. South Korea has more than twice the population and more than 50 times the economic power of North Korea, along with a vibrant society steeped in choice and the free flow of information. Indeed, isolating North Korea's people from the corrosive influence of South Korean lifestyles and culture is part of the regime's survival strategy. Reconciliation with or military occupation of the South would involve too much interaction with hard to control South Koreans and would therefore be far more dangerous to the regime than clinging to power in the North.

So, if this shift in rhetoric does not actually signal war, and if North Korea attempting a takeover of South Korea is not in the cards, what should we be most concerned about? The risk of major, if limited, aggression by North Korea is growing. Pyongyang has long used limited military provocations for many purposes, such as demonstrating its strength and to undermine South Korean confidence in the ability of the U.S.-South Korea alliance to deter North Korea.

But the next round of such aggression could be much, much worse than ever before. North Korea's military capabilities have improved and expanded in recent years, as has its backing from China and Russia, giving North Korea increasing options and incentives to escalate.

North Korea's military capabilities have been rapidly advancing in various important categories for years. Its weapons development has been making particularly great strides. Just in recent months, North Korea has test-fired new submarine-launched and land-based cruise missiles, new ballistic missiles designed to evade missile defenses, and new Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the continental United States. Last year, the North displayed a new, smaller nuclear warhead design that can apparently fit on a much wider variety of its missiles, and also be carried by an underwater drone that it claims to have tested again this month.

Meanwhile, the growing alignment of China and Russia with North Korea amplifies the danger. Beijing and Moscow are shielding North Korea from the effects of UN sanctions and giving it political cover. North Korea's recent shipments of ballistic missiles to Russia are a flagrant violation of UN sanctions resolutions that Russia and China both previously voted for. Russia firing these missiles into Ukraine allows North Korea to test their performance under operational conditions. As the White House has warned, Russian military capabilities could also flow to North Korea in return, such as "fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment or materials, and other advanced technologies."

With all this in mind, the conditions are aligning for North Korea to conduct a localized attack with its improved capabilities while relying on threats of nuclear escalation and the potential for Chinese intervention to prevent regime-ending consequences.

North Korea has many options for such a limited attack, such as striking South Korean military units on sparsely populated islands near disputed Yellow Sea waters. This area has long been a venue for North Korean provocations, and just this month the North conducted artillery demonstrations nearby. These isolated islands are close to North Korea and right on China's doorstep. North Korea might seize a temporary military advantage there, expecting Washington and Seoul to accept a settlement rather than strongly escalate in response—out of fear of triggering Chinese intervention or a North Korean nuclear response. Even a temporary North Korean military victory would be a political win for the regime and shake allies' confidence in the United States. If a limited North Korean attack spiraled into a nuclear exchange or a larger war with China, this would admittedly be an even worse outcome.

These dangers are real and growing. North Korea is testing new missiles, expanding its nuclear arsenal, and trading weapons with Russia. The risk of North Korean escalation beyond the scale of anything we have seen since the armistice of 1953 is rising. Meanwhile, if China and the U.S. end up in a military confrontation—over Taiwan, for example—this is likely to lead to a two-front war with North Korea as well. North Korea is unlikely to sit on the sidelines as its Chinese patron and its sworn U.S. enemy face off to determine the fate of the region. North Korea has huge stakes in the outcome—perhaps a chance to see the U.S. ejected from the region—and what better time to attack U.S. bases than when China is already fighting the U.S.?

These are the dangers we should be focused on, rather than over-interpretation of Kim's rhetoric as meaning he would independently launch a suicidal war.

Markus V. Garlauskas led the U.S. intelligence community's strategic analysis of North Korea as the national intelligence officer for North Korea from 2014 to 2020, after 12 years of service in U.S. Forces Korea. He now is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

Newsweek · · January 30, 2024

2. Analysts: North Korea Seeks to Dominate South Korea Through Nuclear Coercion

A number of us comment for VOA.

Analysts: North Korea Seeks to Dominate South Korea Through Nuclear Coercion

January 30, 2024 8:19 PM

By Christy Lee

voanews.com · January 30, 2024

WASHINGTON —

Several prominent analysts are voicing doubts about a widely cited article concluding that North Korea has decided to wage war against South Korea, suggesting that Pyongyang’s provocative military buildup is more likely intended to win control over the South through intimidation.

North Korea test-fired another round of cruise missiles off its west coast on Tuesday, according to South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was the third cruise missile launch since Jan. 14, when the regime tested a hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile.

Two days after the Jan. 14 launch, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared an end to his country's policy of seeking reunification with South Korea and ordered his nation to be ready to occupy South Korea if war breaks out.

Unification minister slams N.K. war rhetoric backers as 'anti-state' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 31, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho on Wednesday condemned some liberal South Koreans supportive of North Korea's war rhetoric for having an "anti-state" mindset that could undermine the foundation of the South.

The minister made the remark at the start of a screening session of "Beyond Utopia," a U.S. documentary film depicting North Korean defectors' desperate escape from their home country.

Citing a news report that some liberal experts said during a forum at the National Assembly last week that they can accept North Korea's perspective of war for the purpose of peace, Kim criticized them for following North Korea's propaganda.

"Their remarks made in the name of academic freedom carries an anti-state view that undermines the achievements and identity of the Republic of Korea. This cannot be tolerable," he said.

At the latest parliamentary meeting, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called for revising the country's constitution to define South Korea as its "primary foe" and to codify a commitment to "completely occupying" South Korean territory in the event of war.

This photo, taken Jan. 31, 2024, shows Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho (C) speaking in a meeting with around 200 young people after watching "Beyond Utopia," a U.S. documentary film depicting North Korean defectors' desperate escape from their home country. (Yonhap)

The minister also condemned North Korea's bellicose rhetoric and its latest weapons tests as an "act of political provocation" designed to drive a wedge in South Korean society.

"Our people and the government should be united in realizing North Korea's true nature and repelling the North's deception and propaganda tactics," Kim said.

Meanwhile, after watching the documentary, the minister said in a meeting with around 200 young people that North Korea has been squandering scarce resources on weapons development while turning a blind eye to its people's livelihoods.

The film, directed by Madeleine Gavin, features an arduous journey by North Korean defector families who risked their lives to escape the repressive regime before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and related rescue efforts by South Korean pastor Kim Sung-eun. It hit local cinemas Wednesday.

"The issue of North Korea's human rights cannot be separated from the country's nuclear and missile problem," he said.

Pastor Kim, a human rights advocate who has rescued more than 1,000 North Korean defectors over the past 23 years, called for attention to North Korea's grave human rights violations.

"North Korea has touted itself as the world's best country, but more than 34,000 North Koreans have risked their lives to escape that nation and defect to South Korea," he said.

"I hope this film could give you a chance to realize how precious our freedom is and why we need to protect it. Also I want you to share the pain of North Korean defectors," the pastor added.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 31, 2024

4. S Korea labels Kim regime irrational, calls for an end to provocation

While the regime certainly seems irrational from our view point and it may feel good to call it so. But I think we need to understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the regime as well as its 7 decades old "playbook." From the perspective of the regime and the history of its actions, it appears to mehat it is acting rationally in accordance with its own strategic narrative. But again that appears irrational from our perspective.

S Korea labels Kim regime irrational, calls for an end to provocation

President Yoon accused Pyongyang of blatantly ignoring international law.

By Lee Jeong-Ho for RFA

2024.01.30

Seoul, South Korea

rfa.org

South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol issued a fresh warning to North Korea Wednesday, as Pyongyang continued its military provocation, with missile tests potentially placing the United States and its allies within the range of its nuclear capabilities.

“The North Korean regime stands alone globally in legalizing the preemptive use of nuclear weapons, marking it as an irrational entity,” Yoon said in a pan-governmental defense meeting in Seoul.

“A rational government would relinquish nuclear arms and find means for its people to thrive. However, the North Korean regime is recklessly dedicated to preserving its inherited totalitarian rule.

“Recently, by engaging in arms deals with Russia, North Korea is blatantly and flagrantly ignoring international law and UN Security Council resolutions. This too is a highly provocative act, posing a threat not only to global security but also to the security of the Korean Peninsula.”

The pan-governmental meeting “showcases the collective resolve of the people in issuing a warning to North Korea,” Yoon added.

“We need to enhance our readiness even more to guarantee that our citizens can engage in economic and social pursuits with a sense of security and tranquility.”

The conservative Yoon administration has been implementing a hardline policy towards Pyongyang, with his government openly vowing to respond to the North’s military provocation.

For instance, when North Korea launched some 200 artillery shells into waters off its western coast near South Korea’s Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong islands earlier this month, Seoul reciprocated by conducting “naval fire” drills.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends a submarine-launched cruise missile test with military officials at an undisclosed location in this picture released by the Korean Central News Agency on Jan. 28, 2024. (KCNA via Reuters)

Yoon’s latest comments come as North Korea on Wednesday confirmed a cruise missile test.

“The Korean People’s Army [KPA] staged a drill of launching strategic cruise missile ‘Hwasal-2’ in the West Sea of Korea on January 30,” North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency said.

“The drill made a contribution to checking the KPA’s rapid counterattack posture and improving its strategic striking capability and had no adverse effect on the security of a neighboring country,” it added, without further elaboration.

According to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Tuesday, the North fired multiple “unidentified cruise missiles” off its western coast at around 7 a.m. Although cruise missiles are not banned by the United Nations, the test increases the level of nuclear threat to South Korea and Japan due to their geographical proximity.

North Korea also test-fired submarine-launched cruise missiles Sunday, with leader Kim Jong Un ordering officials to expedite his country’s nuclear submarine development.

Earlier this month, Kim and his daughter Ju Ae visited an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, mobile launcher vehicle factory, signaling Pyongyang’s will to put the U.S. mainland on its nuclear radar.

Edited by Mike Firn and Taejun Kang.

rfa.org

5. Bolton warns Trump could seek 'reckless' deal on N.K. nuclear program if reelected

And so could a new ROK President depending on which political party is elected. For north Korea some of us thought the stars were aligned in 2018-2019 in the regime's favor and we thought they would never be so again. But perhaps the regime is trying to reprise the conditions that existed then by influencing the presidential elections in both countries (the General Assembly election first in the South) to help bring leaders to office whom it favors and who it believes will act favorably in future negotiations and give it the deal it wants (and needs to survive).

If this is the case we can assess that Kim is unlikely to go to war or create conditions for escalation before the next ROK presidential election if it believes it can create the conditions for a favorable deal in accordance with its objectives and strategy. Kim will be "self-deterring " until after those elections take place and he can see the results.

Bolton warns Trump could seek 'reckless' deal on N.K. nuclear program if reelected | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 31, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Jan. 30 (Yonhap) -- Former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton warned in his memoir published Tuesday that former President Donald Trump, if reelected, could attempt to reach a "reckless" deal on North Korea's nuclear program that would alienate South Korea.

Bolton, who served as national security advisor under Trump from 2018-2019, made the prediction in the new foreword of his book, "The Room Where It Happened," as Trump is expected to face President Joe Biden in the Nov. 5 presidential election.

"Imagine Trump's euphoria at resuming contact with North Korea's Kim Jong-un, about whom he famously boasted, 'We fell in love,'" he wrote in the 18-page foreword that entails his forecast for what would happen under a potential second-term Trump administration.

"Trump previously almost gave away the store to Pyongyang, and he could try again early in a second term. A reckless deal on the North's nuclear weapons program would further alienate Japan and South Korea, and extend China's influence," he added.

This file photo, taken on April 25, 2023, shows former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton speaking during a forum in Seoul. (Yonhap)

Bolton also forecast that burgeoning military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow would not keep Trump from reuniting with the North Korean leader.

"Pyongyang's emerging role in the Beijing-Moscow axis, including providing ammunition and weapons for Russia to use against Ukraine, will not deter Trump from getting back together with Kim," he claimed.

Moreover, Bolton predicted that Taiwan and others along China's Indo-Pacific periphery could face "real peril" in a second Trump term.

"He still shows no recognition of Taiwan's importance, as he earlier ignored Beijing's crushing of Hong Kong's autonomy. The near-term risks of China's manufacturing a crisis over Taiwan will rise dramatically," he said.

He went on to say that it is unlikely Beijing will "physically" invade Taiwan since crossing the Taiwan Strait's open ocean is a "formidable" task. "More likely, China's Navy will blockade the island, and perhaps seize Taiwanese islands near the mainland, just to show that it can," he said.

Bolton also expressed concerns that Trump may believe the "one-China" policy means the U.S. can accept Beijing's absorbing of Taiwan.

"But our Indo-Pacific allies would be justifiably appalled," he said. "The loss of Taiwan's independence, which would soon follow a U.S. failure to resist Beijing's blockade, could persuade most countries near China to follow a 'Finlandization' policy at best."

Finlandization refers to a process by which a powerful nation makes a smaller neighbor refrain from opposing the former's external policy while allowing the latter to keep its independence and political system.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 31, 2024

6. N. Korea says it conducted launch of 'Hwasal-2' strategic cruise missile

(2nd LD) N. Korea says it conducted launch of 'Hwasal-2' strategic cruise missile | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 31, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS details throughout )

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Wednesday it conducted a drill to launch the Hwasal-2 strategic cruise missile the previous day to check its rapid counterattack posture and improve its strategic striking capability.

The launch in the Yellow Sea had "no adverse effect on the security of a neighboring country," the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said without giving further details, including how many missiles were launched and how far they flew.

South Korea had said Tuesday the North fired several cruise missiles off the west coast.

Photos released by the KCNA showed a Hwasal-2 cruise missile flying at a low altitude.

Cruise missiles, powered by jet engines, fly low and maneuver, making them hard to detect and intercept.

White stripes were visible on the dark-colored body of the missile, resembling the appearance of a Hwasal-1 cruise missile that was previously launched.

The North first test-fired the Hwasal-1 and Hwasal-2 cruise missiles in September 2021 and January 2022, respectively, and has since launched several Hwasal-1 and Hwasal-2 missiles that are presumed to have a normal flight range of 1,500 kilometers and 2,000 kilometers, respectively.

While the launch of a cruise missile is not a violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions banning the North's use of ballistic missile technology, it could pose a serious threat to security as nuclear warheads can be mounted on such missiles.

This photo, released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Jan. 31, 2024, shows the North staging a drill to launch the Hwasal-2 strategic cruise missile off its west coast the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The latest launch marked the North's third cruise missile launch in a week.

On Sunday, North Korea test-fired a newly developed submarine-launched strategic cruise missile, named the "Pulhwasal-3-31," near Sinpo, a major shipyard for submarines, just days after the strategic cruise missile was tested for the first time last Wednesday.

Hwasal means "arrow" in Korean, and Pulhwasal means "fire arrow."

North Korea has dialed up tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the new year -- an election year for South Korea and the United States -- with weapons tests and hard-worded rhetoric.

The string of launches comes in what appears to be an effort to strengthen its capabilities to deliver nuclear warheads. Earlier this month, the North fired a solid-fuel hypersonic missile and launched what it claimed was an underwater nuclear attack drone.

During a year-end party meeting, Kim Jong-un defined inter-Korean ties as relations between "two states hostile to each other" and vowed to "suppress" South Korea's whole territory in the event of a contingency.

At the latest parliamentary meeting, Kim called for revising the country's constitution to define South Korea as the North's "primary foe" and announced the country will abandon its decadeslong policy of seeking reconciliation and unification with the South.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 31, 2024

7. Vice unification minister highlights role of UNC amid heightened inter-Korean tensions

These are highly unusual but welcome statements.

I cannot recall a time when the ROK government had such favorable views of the UNC command since 1950-53.

Vice unification minister highlights role of UNC amid heightened inter-Korean tensions | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 31, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- A senior official at South Korea's unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs emphasized the importance of the U.N. Command (UNC) on Wednesday as North Korea continues to dial up tensions on the Korean Peninsula after defining South Korea as its "primary foe."

Vice Unification Minister Moon Seoung-hyun made the remarks as he attended a roundtable session of ambassadors from UNC member countries to brief them on the government's unification policy, the ministry said.

Moon said the government takes the latest developments sternly and vowed to bolster cooperation with UNC member countries and the wider international community to contain the North's provocations and realize the vision of a free and peaceful Korean Peninsula, it added.

During the policy briefing, the ambassadors denounced the North for using its scarce resources for weapons development and agreed on the need for stronger cooperation within the international community to induce a change, according to the ministry.

This Sept. 1, 2023, file photo shows Vice Unification Minister Moon Seoung-hyun. (Yonhap)

The session came as North Korea has been ramping up tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the new year -- an election year for South Korea and the United States -- with weapons tests and harshly worded rhetoric.

During a year-end party meeting, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un defined inter-Korean ties as relations between "two states hostile to each other" and vowed to "suppress" South Korea's whole territory in the event of a contingency.

The UNC has jurisdiction over the area that separates the two Koreas.

As part of efforts to strengthen cooperation with the U.S.-led multinational command, Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho met with UNC chief Gen. Paul LaCamera at the command headquarters in November. It marked the first such trip by a unification minister.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 31, 2024

8. South Korea's Yoon warns North Korea may try to disrupt April poll

I think internal stresses on the regime and the intent to influence elections in the ROK (and later the US and then ROK presidential elections) are likely the drivers of the regime's stepped up rhetoric and threatening actions. Kim may only be trying to make us think he is going to war (which supports his political warfare strategy as he benefits from the increased perception of an external threat (which he himself is creating so the Propaganda and Agitation department can use it for domestic propaganda to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the Korean people in the north.

South Korea's Yoon warns North Korea may try to disrupt April poll

By Hyonhee Shin

January 31, 20248:17 PM GMT+9Updated 9 hours ago

[1/5]South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol salutes the national flag during the central integrated defence meeting in Seoul, South Korea, January 31, 2024. Yonhap via REUTERS Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

SEOUL, Jan 31 (Reuters) - South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol warned on Wednesday that North Korea could stage provocations such as armed actions near the shared border, drone intrusions, cyber attacks or spreading fake news to interfere in April's parliamentary elections.

Yoon made the remarks as he convened an annual meeting of the central integrated defence council that brings together the military, government and civil defence entities.

In recent weeks, Pyongyang has ramped up tensions on the Korean peninsula with missile tests and verbal threats against Seoul and Washington, while scrapping its decades-long goal of a peaceful reunification and redefining the South as a separate, enemy state.

Yoon warned that North Korea could stage "numerous provocations" to intervene in the upcoming election and called for a tighter security posture.

South Korea is set to elect new members of parliament on April 10, with 300 seats up for grab.

"The North Korean regime is going through fire and water solely for the sake of maintaining its hereditary totalitarian regime, while blatantly ignoring international law and U.N. Security Council resolutions by trading arms with Russia," Yoon told the meeting.

Russia and North Korea have overseen a series of high-level exchanges since last year amid growing criticism of Pyongyang's role in the Ukraine war by allegedly shipping artillery and missiles to Russia.

Both North Korea and Russia deny the accusation and also the charge that Pyongyang has been receiving advanced technology for developing strategic military capability from Moscow in return.

Yoon called for greater cooperation between his country's military, government, police and private actors, as well as additional measures to prevent possible cyber attacks on national infrastructure, and attempts to disseminate false propaganda.

"Cyber attacks can paralyse national functions and people's daily lives in an instant. Fake news and false propaganda may also cause great chaos in society," he said.

Seoul's defence council meeting this year was specifically designed to examine practical ways of responding under various scenarios to North Korean provocations, including long-range artillery and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, Yoon's office said.

Lee Jae-myung, leader of the main opposition Democratic Party, which has criticised what it called Yoon's hardline North Korea policy, expressed concerns over a possible armed clash near the border.

He called for restoring inter-Korean hotlines, which the North have not responded to since Yoon took office, and warned Yoon against staging "war games" for political gains.

Reporting by Hyonhee Shin; Editing by Ed Davies and Christian Schmollinger

9 South Korea’s Nuclear Education

Excerpts:

Over time, the alliance could explore expanding the pool of candidates to include additional civilian defense, foreign affairs, and other civilian officials. In addition to developing a dedicated and continuous cohort of staffers for a standing NCG body or office, the alliance might explore creating a senior advisory body for the NCG. To extend the European analogy, this would be akin to the NATO NPG High Level Group (HLG). NCG’s senior advisory body would be composed of national policymakers and other experts from both Washington and Seoul. Together, they would discuss aspects of the NCG’s nuclear policy and planning and issues concerning the effectiveness of U.S. extended deterrence. It seems most likely that this would have to fold into existing standing bodies, such as the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), Deterrence Strategy Committee, and Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD).

The point is that process matters but only insofar as it contributes to more tangible outcomes. For some, the Washington Declaration was a short-term solution to a fundamental dilemma of ROK insecurity and fear of abandonment by the United States. It bought some space and time, yet ultimately, it is too little, too late. According to this view, the ROK indigenous nuclear genie is coming out of the bottle, if gradually and fitfully for now. That view may be correct. If so, it makes pursuing more in-depth education and consultation even more important. These steps could buy more time, reduce the chances of a further untethering of the nuclear order, and help the alliance navigate the rough waters ahead.

South Korea’s Nuclear Education

If South Korea is inching toward a nuclear program, it becomes imperative for the U.S. to step up education and consultation to avoid the further untethering of the nuclear order

The National Interest · by Clint Work · January 30, 2024

The trends driving the U.S.-ROK alliance to enhance cooperation around extended deterrence and establish the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in 2023—advancing North Korean capabilities, increasingly virulent threats, and a worsening strategic environment—have only accelerated and, with greater North Korean-Russian cooperation, expanded. Such trends naturally motivate further strengthening of the NCG. So, too, does the shadow of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Given growing concerns that Trump’s return to the White House would undermine efforts to institutionalize the NCG, officials are moving to secure “substantive progress in an expedited manner” in the first half of 2024, according to the joint press statement following the second NCG meeting held in Washington in December.

Following that meeting, ROK Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Tae-hyo said that U.S. and ROK officials “agreed to complete guidelines regarding the planning and operation of a nuclear strategy by the middle of next year.” In his New Year’s Day address, President Yoon Suk-yeol remarked: “By the first half of this year, we will complete the enhanced South Korea-U.S. extended deterrence system to fundamentally deter any North Korean nuclear and missile threats.” Reinforcing the message, ROK Minister of Defense Shin Won-shik stated the commitments outlined in the Washington Declaration would be “cemented” this coming summer. Joint nuclear deterrence against North Korea will be “institutionalized” and “signed into measures of irreversibility.” Yet the insistence with which such statements are made reveals the fragility of the enterprise.

Although new bureaucratic processes (i.e., the NCG’s workstreams) take time and deliberation to set up, alliance managers must avoid allowing the process itself to take the place of concrete outcomes. Such a dynamic could undermine expectations and cause alliance fissures. Furthermore, this applies to ROK nuclear education and training, a potentially promising yet little-covered area that grew out of President Yoon’s April 2023 State Visit and the Washington Declaration.

Process Is Necessary But Not Sufficient

What exactly the completed guidelines will look like and how North Korea will be fundamentally deterred remains unclear. After all, deterrence is never a finished equation; it’s an iterative dynamic driven by allies’ and adversaries’ constantly evolving capabilities, postures, and signals. There’s no endpoint. Statements about making substantive progress and completing enhancements serve political purposes and may offer short-term reassurances. Yet, ultimately, the devil is in the details: what is really being done that is new and different and that can be sustained? And how is it communicated to the South Korean public and North Korea (and others) in a credible manner? Furthermore, saying alliance commitments and joint efforts will be cemented and made irreversible belies the history of the alliance’s consultative architecture.

To be fair, it’s understandable that the NCG’s various workstreams on bolstering nuclear deterrence and response capabilities are being established gradually, particularly if they will achieve new levels of alliance cooperation and consultation surrounding the planning and operation of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment to South Korea. It bears mention that during much of the Cold War, only the ROK president—with no other South Korean personnel present—spoke to American officials about U.S. nuclear weapons, and even those conversations were rudimentary. The alliance has progressed significantly since then.

Yet only in 2010 did the alliance formally establish a consultative body on extended deterrence. Even then, the U.S. provided relatively limited info from their side of the equation (i.e., nuclear) and put more effort into better understanding and shaping the ROK’s conventional capabilities and counter-provocation plans. Building greater trust and navigating institutional and psychological barriers to information sharing proved challenging, even as the alliance’s consultative architecture on extended deterrence evolved and expanded over the 2010s.

It didn’t help that electoral turnover in both countries—and the mismatched priorities and ideological differences between the Moon and Trump administrations—caused such consultative bodies to either cease meeting or operate in dysfunctional ways just as they were supposed to be moving toward deeper levels of cooperation. ROK officials had wondered about the adequacy of alliance consultative mechanisms during stable times in the mid-2010s. Such skepticism only worsened with an advancing North Korean threat and a more unstable and complex strategic environment. So, with a Biden administration committed to strengthening alliances, the Yoon team embraced reenergizing existing bodies and pushed for more robust arrangements.

The Yoon administration’s push for creating the NCG was partly political, to achieve a level of alliance consultation surpassing all previous ROK administrations’ efforts and communicate to a domestic audience. However, the effort was also driven by a worsening North Korean threat and the fact that the dysfunction and limits within the existing consultative architecture were linked to broader doubts about the credibility and nature of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. The NCG would hopefully result in a new level of ROK understanding and involvement in the operation of U.S. extended deterrence.

Following the Washington Declaration, the floodgates opened. Spurred by the public signaling about a new level of joint decision-making under the NCG, working-level officials throughout the U.S. interagency were beset by unrealistic notions that somehow the alliance was headed toward some sort of nuclear sharing and that the ROK would be made privy to and given agency surrounding U.S. nuclear targeting and employment. Yet, as often happens, topline pronouncements and the text of joint statements met the brass tacks of what was and what was not yet (and maybe never would be) possible.

The risk the alliance faces is having a new set of bureaucratic processes stand in for substantive outcomes. Surely, the process is critical. The frequent meetings of the NCG Working Group (WG) on NCG workstreams between the first and second NCG meetings—including guidelines; security and information sharing protocols; nuclear consultation processes in crises and contingencies; nuclear and strategic planning; U.S.- ROK conventional and nuclear integration (CNI); strategic communications; exercises, simulations, training, and investment activities; and risk reduction practices—points to an array of new or deeper areas of consultation.

But frequent meetings (i.e., process) do not necessarily indicate progress. Furthermore, overselling what can be achieved in a matter of months and talking in terms of irreversible steps risks creating unrealistic expectations. If the much-touted process produces less than substantive outcomes, such expectations could be dashed. It would be uncharitable to refer to the Washington Declaration as an empty scrap of paper, as did some ROK conservative critics immediately following its release. Still, dashed expectations could lead to displeasure that leaks out and breathes life into these critiques. Only so many times can the alliance upgrade its consultative architecture and have those efforts prove less than advertised before a growing number of ROK voices push for greater hedging and independence in the nuclear arena.

ROK Nuclear Education and Training

In addition to the workstreams above, ROK education and training on nuclear deterrence is another promising area for alliance cooperation that may help build a more sustainable and institutionalized structure underpinning the NCG. Yet, it’s potentially subject to the same risks above.

Originally featured in the Fact Sheet from the ROK State Visit to the United States in April 2023, ROK nuclear education has received little to no coverage since. The fact sheet stated that to enhance ROK preparedness for nuclear threat scenarios, the United States welcomed participation by ROK military personnel in Department of Defense courses and trainings, which would focus on how the alliance approaches nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, including through conventional-nuclear integration. According to those familiar with the drafting of the language on nuclear education in the fact sheet, much remained to be done.

There was no public mention of nuclear education and training during last July’s inaugural NCG meeting. Still, the second meeting’s joint press statement commended holding an “Extended Nuclear Deterrence Immersion Course…which was provided for officials from across the ROK interagency, and the substantive interagency cooperation being practiced through the NCG.” Reports noted fifteen ROK officials had received education on the U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and planning, and the United States had agreed at the second NCG meeting to provide further “in-depth” nuclear education to South Korean officials this year. “To put it simply,” Kim Tae-hyo said, “our side’s nuclear ‘IQ’ will continue to grow.”

One wonders, though, about the content of the education. If centered on CNI, is the education mostly about a U.S.-ROK alliance version of NATO’s Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics (SNOWCAT), whereby the ROK assists in nuclear missions through conventional air support? Recent alliance exercises indicate more such activities are afoot. However, the ROK’s conventional support for U.S. nuclear operations is not the same as joint decision-making about nuclear employment.

If the education goes beyond this, what is the level of detail involved? Is it more advanced than what could be found in open-source materials on U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and planning, about which much info is readily accessible even to a cursory internet search? If not, what is the value? Is the value merely the optics of official-level educational efforts around such issues rather than the substantive content? If so, that would seem to provide diminishing returns as it becomes clear that info-sharing continues to face stark limits.

Alternatively, if deeper levels of info-sharing are meant to be instituted, that raises other questions: What are the barriers to information-sharing to overcome? What vetting processes and security clearances are needed? Is the Department of Defense willing to grant those clearances and share information in new ways with ROK officials? Are these to be one-off courses, with a new group cycling in each time, or is a core group of ROK officials repeatedly returning to new and deeper iterations of the course, building knowledge and trust with their American counterparts over time? Assuming barriers can be overcome and sustained rather than a cursory approach is adopted, such education and training could help build successive cohorts of nuclear operators that could help staff a standing body or permanent office, something akin to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group’s Staff Group.

Over time, the alliance could explore expanding the pool of candidates to include additional civilian defense, foreign affairs, and other civilian officials. In addition to developing a dedicated and continuous cohort of staffers for a standing NCG body or office, the alliance might explore creating a senior advisory body for the NCG. To extend the European analogy, this would be akin to the NATO NPG High Level Group (HLG). NCG’s senior advisory body would be composed of national policymakers and other experts from both Washington and Seoul. Together, they would discuss aspects of the NCG’s nuclear policy and planning and issues concerning the effectiveness of U.S. extended deterrence. It seems most likely that this would have to fold into existing standing bodies, such as the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), Deterrence Strategy Committee, and Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD).

The point is that process matters but only insofar as it contributes to more tangible outcomes. For some, the Washington Declaration was a short-term solution to a fundamental dilemma of ROK insecurity and fear of abandonment by the United States. It bought some space and time, yet ultimately, it is too little, too late. According to this view, the ROK indigenous nuclear genie is coming out of the bottle, if gradually and fitfully for now. That view may be correct. If so, it makes pursuing more in-depth education and consultation even more important. These steps could buy more time, reduce the chances of a further untethering of the nuclear order, and help the alliance navigate the rough waters ahead.

About the Author: Clint Work

Clint Work is a fellow and the director of academic affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America.

Image Credit: Shuterstock.

The National Interest · by Clint Work · January 30, 2024

10. DO OR DIE Sold as ‘sex chat’ slaves and hunted like dogs through the jungle… the treacherous reality of escaping from North Korea

The sensational Sun newspaper. That said, it is contributing to the exposure of the brutality of the north- all problems and abuses can be traced back (directly and indirectly) solely to the existence of the Kim family regime.

Numerous photos at the link: https://www.the-sun.com/news/10235845/north-korea-life-escape-defectors-journey-documentary/

DO OR DIE Sold as ‘sex chat’ slaves and hunted like dogs through the jungle… the treacherous reality of escaping from North Korea

Shocking documentary also reveals the dark fate of boy who was captured as he tried to flee the oppressive state

James Liveris
Published: 11:07 ET, Jan 30 2024

AS military dogs howl behind them, a family-of-five stumble wearily in the pitch black through thick jungle undergrowth.

They know that failure risks imprisonment, torture, being sold into sex slavery or, at worst, even death.

The Roh family trek through the jungle in a daring escape from North KoreaCredit: BBC

A viewing platform looking into North Korea from China, divided by the Yalu River

On a desperate quest towards safety in Thailand, the Roh family are the latest in a long line of fugitives risking their very lives to escape North Korea.

Their gripping tale of survival is among those featured in the documentary Beyond Utopia: Escape from North Korea, which airs on BBC Four tonight.

Through secret footage, viewers get a rare inside view of Kim Jong-Un's despotic regime and the extraordinary lengths its desperate citizens will go to gain freedom.

To escape the oppressive hermit state, citizens must chart a path across the Yalu river, a snaking 800 mile-long waterway that draws a border with China to the north.

North Korea's other neighbours are Russia and South Korea. Defectors usually seek refuge in the latter, but its boundary is reportedly lined with two million landmines, making it impossible to cross directly.

If they do make it across the Yalu river undetected - evading military posts, spies and dodgy brokers - a perilous journey traversing through South East Asia awaits.

But from an office about 50 miles south of the South Korean capital, Seoul, Seungeun Kim, from from the Caleb Mission Church, keeps in close contact with the escapees.

Since establishing his 'underground railroad' ministry in 2000, the pastor has helped more than 1,000 people defect from North Korea, regularly braving the deadly path himself.

Daring escape

Defectors usually make the crossing into China during the dark of night to keep out of sight of the military guards that patrol the border.

Once there, they are accompanied by "brokers" who guide them to freedom - some of whom were equipped with cameras supplied by pastor Kim for the film.

However, Kim claims that in recent years some brokers have also proved untrustworthy, with their motivations easily skewed by higher rewards from the regime.

He said: "If the Chinese government is alerted of defectors by the North Korean Security Police, rewards that equal about six months' wages are offered for their capture.

"So if brokers see this as a one-off, it's much more lucrative to report on us.

In North Korea, they will go so far as to kill him. Eventually, my son will beg them to end his life

Defector Soyeon Lee On Her Captured Son

"Brokers don't care about the defectors, they see them as money.

"But everyone in our network knows if they report on us even once."

The decision to leave their homeland is fraught with danger - severe punishment or even execution awaits if they are caught, while family members who remain behind may also face retribution.

Even escape comes at a price, with young females often sold into video sex-chatting in China or prostitution.

And in recent years, the number of defectors entering South Korea has dropped sharply.

Around a decade ago, nearly 3,000 arrived each year. During the pandemic, when North Korea closed its borders, that figure dropped to less than 100.

'Hebegged the soldiers to end his life'

Defectors must make treacherous treks through the jungleCredit: IMBD

The chances of fleeing North Korea are slimCredit: Reuters

Most of the film's stories began in the months just before the coronavirus pandemic shut down the world, making them some of the last known attempts to escape North Korea.

One of the most harrowing involves defector Soyeon Lee, who is desperate to reunite with the son she was forced to leave behind.

A decade earlier she has told her boy, who was at that point a young child, that she was crossing the border to sell black market goods in China, but had in fact taken the opportunity to defect, with the hope of later bringing him across.

She tells the documentary: "It has been ten years since I've seen my son.

"I was in the army in North Korea and when I left, I was sent to a coal mine."

Horrified at the perilous conditions set out by the regime, she decided to leave her family to search for a better life.

However, she was later caught crossing the Yalu River by North Korean police and sent to a prison camp for two years.

Eventually she defected again, this time successfully, and was now encouraging her son to join.

We didn't know another life existed besides the one we had. We were captured in a huge, virtual prison

Author Hyeonseo Lee

In conjunction with brokers and the pastor, Lee attempted to send her son across the river so he could enjoy a new life in South Korea.

But during his escape, things went terribly wrong when the brokers turned him in to authorities.

After weeks of searching for information, Lee learns her son has been tortured, interrogated and sent to a political prison camp, where he now remains.

She hears he was severely beaten to the point where he was unable to breathe properly or digest food.

Heartbroken Lee added: "In North Korea, they will go so far as to kill him.

"Eventually, my son will beg them to end his life."

Family's triumph

Footage showing the Roh family making their trek through the jungleCredit: BBC

North Korea's borders can be extremely dangerous to cross - this fence divides the Korean Demilitarised Zone

Also aided by the pastor, the Rohs are the last family to be followed in the film.

They embark on a treacherous journey through Asia - first crossing into Shenyang, then to Qingdao, through the Vietnamese jungle, then on to Vientiane, Laos, and finally into Thailand.

However, their road to freedom is fraught with danger. In tense scenes, the family are so drained they can hardly walk as they push through dense jungle while military dogs bark in the background, trying to hunt them down.

Finally making it to safety, their mother recalled: "I thought a lot about our neighbours on that mountain, I wondered about the path to survival when the price is abandoning our hometowns.

"I miss our friends and our dog.

"We wouldn't have lived if it wasn't for the pastor."

After arriving in Thailand and proving their identity as North Koreans, the Roh family was sent to a resettlement facility in South Korea where they were taught about the world outside North Korea.

This is a process all defectors go through before receiving housing and other benefits as they enter South Korean society.

Brainwashed citizens

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has been in power since 2011Credit: AP

North Korean citizens are ruled by fear and have no contact with the outside world

A propaganda poster depicting the Kim dynastyCredit: Alamy

More than 20 years ago, Hyeonseo Lee defected from North Korea.

She has since gone on to author the New York Times Bestseller The Girl With Seven Names, a memoir of her time living in the hermit state and her subsequent escape.

In the documentary, she reveals she is still haunted by her years of being brainwashed by the oppressive regime.

The writer, who now lives in South Korea, said: "I had grown up thinking I was living in Utopia.

"I eventually found out that everyone around me was brainwashed and the heroes I worshipped were actually monstrous villains."

According to the film, North Korea only has one newspaper, one TV channel and one radio station.

There is also no cell service that allows contact with the outside world, and attempting to do so is highly illegal.

Through such rules, the Kim dynasty has been able to brainwash its citizens and warp their views with hateful propaganda towards the West.

We didn't know another life existed besides the one we had. We were captured in a huge, virtual prison

Hyeonseo Lee

Hyeonseo Lee added: "People live in a constant state of fear with public executions.

"Government officials come to houses with white gloves checking that pictures of the Supreme Leader past and present have no dust on them - and they are severely punished otherwise."

Hyeonseo Lee, now an activist and a human rights campaigner, said she was baffled by the propaganda North Koreans are fed.

She added: "We are literally told that Kim's dad is God, and Kim is son of God.

"We were taught at school that during the colonial period, Kim Il-Sung fought against Japanese enemies by crossing the rainbows from this mountain to another mountain.

"And during the Korean War, he made rice from sand.

"He also made bombs from pine cones and even crossed the Yalu River standing on tree leaves.

"We didn't know another life existed besides the one we had.

"We were captured in a huge, virtual prison."

'I just kept walking'

Now enjoying freedom as she lives in South Korea, Hyeonseo Lee can vividly remember the day she decided to leave.

She added: "I left in the middle of night and crossed the river, it was covered in snow because of the freezing conditions.

"When I was crossing the border I was staring at the sky and my legs were trembling.

"I didn't even know God existed.

"But somehow I just prayed, I don't know to who, but I said 'please, just help me'.

11. Explained | Kim Jong Un reportedly tears down father’s reunification monument. Why is it a big deal?

Explained | Kim Jong Un reportedly tears down father’s reunification monument. Why is it a big deal?

wionews.com

North Korea has reportedly demolished a major monument which symbolised the goal of reconciliation with South Korea following the orders of their leader Kim Jong Un who called the massive structure that his father constructed in the capital city Pyongyang, an “eyesore,” earlier this month.

While the move seems to be in line with the North Korean leader’s rhetoric and volatile temperament, and given the rise of tensions between Pyongyang and Seoul, it is important to know what the monument symbolised and why it’s reported razing is making the headlines.

About the Arch of Reunification

The Arch of Reunification, officially known as the Monument to the Three-Point Charter for National Reunification, is said to be one of the major monuments in the North Korean capital city and is located on the Pyongyang-Kaesong (reunification highway).

WATCH | North Korea says Arch of Reunification disappeared from Pyongyang

However, satellite imagery of Pyongyang, last week, showed that the 30 metre-tall and 61.5- metre wide symbol was no longer there, according to a report by NK News, an online outlet that monitors North Korea.

The American website in its report also stressed that the images are ‘hazy’ at best and one snapshot was taken Tuesday (Jan 23) by an inter-Korean rail crossing at Kaesong did not clearly show any construction crews. Therefore, a higher-definition picture is needed to be certain that the monument has in fact disappeared.

The arch was unveiled a year after the 2000 inter-Korea summit between Kim’s father North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, and former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. The summit resulted in a joint declaration, in which both countries agreed to pursue reunification through peaceful means.

The 30-metre-tall monument was symbolic of the three charters – self-reliance, peace and national cooperation, according to South Korean government records. The arch symbolised reunification plans through diplomacy put forward by Kim’s father.

Since Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, Kim Il-Sung took over the premiership of the newly formed Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea’s official name, in 1948, he had hoped to reunify with South Korea. However, he took a different approach.

Kim Il-Sung unlike his son tried to reunify Korea by force and launched an invasion of South Korea triggering the Korean War, which ended in a stalemate three years later.

Rise in tensions between the two Koreas

Earlier this month, in a speech at North Korea’s rubber-stamp parliament, Kim called for the country’s constitution to be changed to ensure that South Korea is defined as “the most hostile state,” reported the state media KCNA.

According to Kim, the constitution should be amended to educate North Koreans that South Korea is a “primary foe and invariable principal enemy”.

During the same speech, on January 15, he had also called the massive monument that his father constructed in Pyongyang an “eyesore” and vowed to get rid of it.

It was around the same time that North Korea had abolished agencies that oversaw cooperation and reunification, indicating that Kim was no longer interested in seeking reconciliation with South Korea.

Additionally, three organisations dealing with unification and inter-Korean tourism were also shut down, the state media had reported, earlier this month. On January 15, Kim said Pyongyang would not recognise the two countries’ de facto maritime border, the Northern Limit Line (NLL).

Last year, in April, the South Korean Unification Ministry said that North Korea had not responded to their regularly held calls, adding that this is the first time since October 2021 that all inter-Korean military lines or liaison calls have stopped for more than a day.

The communication lines were first opened in 2018 when the two countries set up hotlines after a series of summits aimed at decreasing tensions in the region. However, it was not the first time that North Korea unilaterally shut down the communications links in a display of anger.

The line was restored in July 2021 following North Korea’s shutdown for nearly a year after its anger over South Korean activists sending leaflets critical of Kim’s regime across the border by balloon.

The communication was cut off in 2023 also around the time when South Korea was holding drills with the United States, which North Korea has long viewed as an enemy. Pyongyang, which reportedly has nuclear weapons, also tested a record number of missiles last year.

It also seems like it is going to be more of the same in 2024, as within the first month of the year, North Korea has already tested a number of missiles, including a cruise missile dubbed Pulhwasal-3-3, on January 24 and again on January 28.

This was after North Korea had fired more than 200 artillery rounds near a disputed maritime border with South Korea prompting Seoul to take “corresponding” action with live fire drills. The exchange prompted the evacuation of nearly 2,000 residents of two remote South Korean islands to bomb shelters.

An ‘unachieved wish’

Kim Jong Un was 26 years old when he took over North Korea, days after his father’s death, and like his predecessors, he too has ruled the country with an iron fist ever since. However, unlike his father and grandfather, the incumbent leader does not seem to be interested in the idea of reunification.

Cho Han-bum, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification told AFP, earlier this month, that the North Korean system has long been grounded on the idea of reunification, an unachieved wish of the country’s founding leader and Kim’s grandfather Kim II Sung.

“Now he is denying everything that his predecessors have done,” said Cho.

Therefore, if confirmed, getting rid of his father’s monument would be a big step for Kim, who was known to be his favourite son and hence became his successor.

However, it seems as though since his grandfather’s invasion and his father’s diplomacy did not work, Kim is charting his own course, which involves ramping up military rhetoric and posturing.

While reunification has long been on the North Korean agenda, Kim, earlier this month said that he had concluded that unification with the South was no longer possible and accused Seoul of seeking the collapse of his regime and unification by absorption.

The Korea Institute for National Unification, a think-tank, said Kim has all but removed the ‘concept of unity’ from North Korean policy, reported Metro newspaper.

Therefore, by reportedly removing the Arch of Reunification ‘the history of inter-Korean relations was completely denied’ and the ‘geopolitical risks’ to South Korea will continue to rise, analysts added.

The US factor

Pyongyang’s hatred towards Washington can be traced back to the Korean War where then-US President Harry Truman’s declaration prompted nearly two dozen countries to send troops and medical units to back South Korea, during the war.

Meanwhile, North Korea was supported by both the Soviet Union and China. Therefore, the alliances over the years have not changed all that much. Even today, Pyongyang maintains good relations with Beijing and Moscow.

Except for Kim’s brief “bromance” with former US President Donald Trump when he was the commander-in-chief, not like the much-awaited meeting between the two leaders produced any tangible results.

Meanwhile, the US and South Korea have conducted a number of drills amid Kim’s increasing military rhetoric and posturing. Last year, Washington, for the first time since the 1980s also deployed a nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to a South Korean port.

(With inputs from agencies)

wionews.com

12. How North Korea Deterred an American Invasion in 2002

I remember this well. I was actually sent to have a one on one sit down with COL Wlikerson on the 7th floor of State as he wanted to know how we could use Special Forces to take down the regime's nuclear program. He told me that there were policy makers who were enamored with the success of US Special Forces (and the CIA and airpower) in the fall of 2001 and believed that they could do the same in north Korea against the nuclear program. He asked me to describe the feasibility of using the Afghan model and his chances of success. He was not advocating for this course of action but wanted an informed view to use in discussions with policy makers who were proposing it.

I did not give it any thought at the time (it was October 2002) but this article notes that it could have been north Korea rather than Iraq in 2003. We should think about that.

How North Korea Deterred an American Invasion in 2002

thediplomat.com

Colin Powell’s former chief of staff revealed that an invasion was considered but deemed too risky – well before North Korea’s nuclear deterrent was in place.

By A. B. Abrams

January 31, 2024

Third Armored Brigade Combat Team “Bulldog”, 1st Armored Division (Rotational), 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-US Combined Division, Soldiers drive an M88A2 Heavy Equipment Recovery Combat Utility Lifting Extraction System (HERCULES) across an improvised ribbon bridge on the Imjin-gang River during the Bulldog Bridging Exercise at Local Training Area 320, Republic of Korea, April 22, 2019.

American discourse regarding possible military options against North Korea has changed markedly since late 2017, after U.S. intelligence confirmed that the country had gained the capability to launch nuclear strikes against the American mainland using its then newly tested Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 intercontinental range ballistic missiles. Prior to that point, calls from both civilian and military leaders for an attack on North Korea had been considerable and growing, with examples from the Trump administration’s first year in office ranging from Senator Lindsey Graham to Army Colonel Ralph Peters.

Since 2018, Washington has increasingly drawn a softer line against North Korea’s testing of ballistic missiles. Previously, any modernization of the country’s missile deterrent was harshly condemned as unacceptable and frequently responded to with sanctions (though all these efforts, including some ambitious Obama-era electronic sabotage efforts, failed to prevent North Korea from making rapid progress).

The shift was best exemplified by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton’s assertions in 2019 that Washington had an understanding with Pyongyang that only testing of missiles capable of hitting the U.S. mainland would cease. On that basis, Trump administration officials downplayed and chose not to respond to multiple ballistic missile tests from other classes that year.

This continued into the Biden administration. North Korea’s continuously modernizing missile arsenal has become an accepted fact, where it previously sparked furor and calls to action in the Western world. This process mirrors the West’s gradual coming to terms with the Soviet and Chinese nuclear and missile deterrents during the Cold War.

Before 2018, U.S. military options were widely discussed and called for, either to set back Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs or to invade and occupy the entire country. However, North Korea’s significantly superior conventional capabilities relative to other potential targets for U.S. attacks have long provided a degree of deterrence. This was an important factor ensuring North Korea did not ensure the same fates as Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, and the other former Soviet security partners which the United States attacked during the height of its power. North Korean conventional capabilities were an important deterrent when the Bill Clinton and Barack Obama administrations both came close to launching attacks on its nuclear program in 1994 and 2016, respectively.

In 2002, while the George W. Bush administration was preparing for its invasion of Iraq, it was simultaneously considering an attack on North Korea. Providing important new insight into Washington’s decision not to take military action against North Korea, former U.S. Army colonel Lawrence Wilkerson specifically discussed the issue in a December interview.

Wilkerson is a veteran of the Navy’s Pacific Command based in South Korea, Japan, and Hawaii, and at the time served as chief of staff to State Secretary Colin Powell. In the interview, he recalled that during a at the Pentagon, “I was briefed we were going to war with North Korea, we were going to war with Iraq, that’d be followed by Syria, that’d be followed by Iran, although we wouldn’t have to do probably Syria and Iran because they’d quake in their boots after we did Iraq.”

Wilkerson further recalled that Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz had stated at the time: “We want to end all challenges, no matter how indistinct they might be, to American power,” with attacks on all these states considered a means of achieving this.

“These were war plans,” Wilkerson emphasized. “I went to a colonel and I said: ‘Are these concept plans or are these TPFDD – Time Phased Force Deployment Data, that means they’re probably going to be executed.” To which Wilkerson recalled the colonel replied: “Oh they’re fully TPFDD.”

Despite North Korea having been the priority target, however, the country’s significantly superior military capabilities compared to other targets led to plans for an attack being indefinitely postponed. Wilkerson stated to this effect:

Later I would come back and find out that the air force general who had briefed me on the North Korean plan had ‘seen the light,’ if you will, and said ‘100,000 casualties, 30,000 of them in the first 30 days, a lot of them Americans – a quarter of a million American non-combatants in the Seoul region – maybe we shouldn’t do this one. Maybe we should put this one on a burner and do the easy ones – he called it the ‘low hanging fruit’, in the Middle East. This is the authority in the Pentagon talking, at that time, to his State Department representative who was absolutely floored by what they were doing.

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was justified based on fabricated evidence of developing weapons of mass destruction. In that sense, North Korea was a more compelling target: Pyongyang not only already had a substantial chemical weapons arsenal, but had just two months prior, in January 2003, withdrawn from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To do so, representatives cited Article 5 which allowed withdrawal in response to “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty” which “jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”

One month before Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT, the United States had cut the oil supplies that it was obliged to provide under the 1994 Agreed Framework. The deal had limited activities at North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for U.S. support for a civilian “proliferation-proof” nuclear program and normalization of political and economic ties, including sanctions relief within three months of signing. This included removing the listing of North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act, which was a key step towards normalizing economic ties. Other than the often delayed interim energy supplies to compensate for the closure of Korean nuclear facilities, however, Washington had over the past eight years otherwise neglected to uphold the large majority of its commitments – a fact that was highlighted repeatedly in a U.S. Senate hearing in 1998 and by the agreement’s chief negotiator Robert Gallucci.

The final collapse of the Agreed Framework in December paved the way to North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003, removing the sole two treaties that had prohibited Pyongyang from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Estimates at the time indicated that it could have a nuclear arsenal that decade. Thus if Washington’s primary objective were to prevent countries outside its sphere of influence from acquiring nuclear capabilities, in early 2003 North Korea would have been the priority target for an attack – if all other factors were equal.

Even without nuclear weapons, however, North Korea was considered a particularly challenging target, with U.S. intelligence reports highlighting its continued investments “to improve and train its forward deployed forces” and “maintain current conventional force capabilities and military readiness” with an emphasis on “high impact” arms, which continued even in the aftermath of the Agreed Framework’s signing. Bush’s Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had himself particularly emphasized that North Korea’s tremendous network of underground fortifications, which included “underground emplacements of enormous numbers of weapons,” would make an invasion extremely difficult.

In 1994, when the Clinton administration was considering strikes on northern military facilities, Pentagon assessments projected that U.S. and South Korean forces would suffer over 540,000 military casualties in a war with the North. These estimates had only grown by the 2000s. And these projections consistently discounted the possibility of North Korea using unconventional weapons such as VX chemical agents.

By contrast, Iraq and Libya were by far weaker targets, with both having disarmed unilaterally and allowed deep inspections of their military facilities in exchange for promises of sanctions relief. Even Syria was a far tougher target. It fielded more chemical weapons than Iraq ever did, and from the 1990s Syria had significantly modernized its ballistic missile arsenal through acquisitions from North Korea. By the early 200s, Syria was fielding missile classes far longer ranged and more precise than any Iraq had ever had – more so when considering that Iraq had disarmed.

Wilkerson’s recollections indicate that, although North Korea was by far the most urgent target, and had initially been intended as the first to be invaded, its conventional military capabilities were sufficient to force the Bush administration to reassess its plans for an attack. This indicates a strong deterrent was in place long before North Korea had either tested nuclear weapons or demonstrated the ability to strike targets farther away than Japan.

While North Korean military capabilities were not sufficient to take U.S. military options totally off the table, as demonstrated by the widespread calls in the U.S. for an attack up to 2018, they were sufficient to divert attentions toward attacking other adversary states – the “low hanging fruit in the Middle East,” as Wilkerson recalled they were referred to.

This gave Pyongyang valuable time to strengthen its deterrent capabilities, with test nuclear detonations in 2006 and 2009 followed by accelerated modernization of both strategic and conventional arsenals in the 2010s. Nuclear weapons and ICBMs, which cost relatively little to develop, would gradually reduce the burden on the country’s then much more costly conventional forces, allowing for cuts to defense spending from around 2009 while providing a surer means of deterrence.

Had North Korea’s conventional capabilities not been what they were, however, the mid-2000s may have been characterized by a new Korean War after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, rather than a second war with Iraq, with very significant implications for the geopolitical landscape across the wider world.

Authors

Guest Author

A. B. Abrams

A. B. Abrams has published widely on international security and geopolitics with a focus on East Asia, and holds related Master's degrees from the University of London. Among his publications are the books “Immovable Object: North Korea’s 70 Years at War with American Power,” and “World War in Syria: Global Conflict on Middle Eastern Battlefields.” He speaks both Korean and Arabic.

thediplomat.com

13. Could reports of a North Korea workers’ riot in China ‘pose threats’ to regime?

We must be observing for the indicators of inability just as diligently as we observing for indicators of attack.

Could reports of a North Korea workers’ riot in China ‘pose threats’ to regime?

Workers at a North Korea-run factory in China were said to have staged a deadly protest after learning their back pay had been transferred to the regime’s arms programme
The apparent incident has sparked concern it could trigger a chain of protests among other disgruntled North Korean workers overseas, observers say

By Park Chan-Kyong South China Morning Post3 min

January 30, 2024

View Original

“A North Korean manager was killed, and three other executives were seriously injured,” Cho told This Week in Asia on Tuesday.

The workers were angered to find out earlier this month that their back payments had been transferred to Pyongyang as special contributions for the regime’s weapons programme, he said, citing unidentified sources in Jilin.

Their owed wages totalled an estimated US$10 million, according to Cho. “When they found out their wages were gone, they just exploded,” he said of the apparent riots.

North Koreans hired for jobs in China usually work for three years, earning some US$200 monthly. When they return home, the sums would be enough for them to buy a modest house in the suburbs of Pyongyang, Cho said.

But many of the workers have been held back in China for up to seven years because of the North’s pandemic lockdowns. Only selected workers were allowed to return, leaving most of the workers in limbo in China.

According to Cho, Pyongyang wants them to stay in China for as long as possible, as Beijing is wary that United Nations sanctions would prevent a fresh intake of workers from replacing those who have left.

US at UN condemns North Korean ICBM launch, as China and Russia defend ally

Alarmed by the rare upheaval, North Korean authorities are said to have quickly dispatched a local consul general to restore order, borrowing several months’ worth of back wages from another trading company to pay off the rioters.

But Cho warned the regime faced the threat of similar riots taking place elsewhere as other North Korean-run factories also owed salaries.

“Workers in China have been toiling for years, and their discontent is reaching a boiling point as they are selectively allowed to return home,” he said.

North Korean factory workers in Dandong, a Chinese border city. Under a UN sanctions resolution, countries using North Korean workers must repatriate them by the end of 2019. File photo: Kyodo

Separately, former North Korean diplomat Ko Young-hwan also broke the news to Japan’s Sankei daily last week, citing multiple North Korean sources in three northeastern Chinese provinces.

He said North Korean workers in one factory walked off the job on January 11, and the strike soon spread to other Pyongyang-run plants in Jilin province. After occupying the premises, the workers took North Korean executives hostage and vandalised factory equipment, according to Ko.

“This will remain a political time bomb and may well trigger actions by other workers in China and other foreign countries,” Cho said.

Workers are usually hired collectively in China through government-controlled North Korean trading companies.

They are unaware of their true salary amounts, as they receive their pay only after deductions of “loyal funds” to Pyongyang, and various fees and bribes.

Why North Korea rejects US talks: regime ‘never negotiates if it feels strong’

In contrast, North Korean workers in Russia are usually individually hired, mostly in housing projects, making them less prone to exploitation by the Pyongyang authorities, Cho said.

He estimated there were 100,000 North Koreans working overseas as of 2019, with 80,000 in China and 10,000 in Russia. Many work in labour-intensive roles, including at construction sites, factories and logging camps, Cho said.

Most North Korean workers sent overseas are from privileged families in Pyongyang who have expressed loyalty to the ruling Workers’ Party.

“But if the party brings them all back to North Korea at once, it would pose threats to the regime” because of the fear they might also protest back in North Korea”, Cho said.

“On the other hand, it cannot hold them back there for good for fear that they might act out together. It’s a tense time now,” he said.

People offer flowers to the statues of late North Korean leaders Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il on February 8, 2022. Photo: AFP/KCNA via KNS

A 2017 UN Security Council resolution required countries to repatriate North Koreans earning income abroad by the end of 2019.

But the North’s lockdown against the global pandemic has prevented the repatriation of its own citizens and left them in limbo.

Kim In-ae, a deputy spokeswoman for South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, said the agency had no official comment on the reported riot.

“In accordance with UN sanctions, North Korean workers should no longer be sent abroad, and we hope that the poor human rights situation of workers will improve,” she said.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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