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Quotes of the Day:
"Professional discourse will shape the direction the Army is headed, even if it is only a minor adjustment."
- Major Brennan Deveraux at The United States Army War College's Parameters Quarterly.
"The most formidable weapon against errors of every kind is reason."
– Thomas Paine
“It is foolish to think that you have to read all the books you buy, as it is foolish to criticize those who buy more books than they will ever be able to read. It would be like saying that you should use all the cutlery or glasses or screwdrivers or drill bits you bought before buying new ones. There are things in life that we need to always have plenty of supplies, even if we will only use a small portion. If, for example, we consider books as medicine, we understand that it is good to have many at home rather than a few: when you want to feel better, then you go to the 'medicine closet' and choose a book. Not a random one, but the right book for that moment. That's why you should always have a nutrition choice! Those who buy only one book, read only that one and then get rid of it. They simply apply the consumer mentality to books, that is, they consider them a consumer product, a good. Those who love books know that a book is anything but a commodity.”
– Umberto Eco
1. South Korean troops fired warning shots after North Korean soldiers briefly crossed land border
2. Third Meeting of Nuclear Consultative Group Enhances U.S., South Korea Alliance, Deterrence
3. S Korea, US complete review of joint guidelines to strengthen nuclear deterrence
4. Did Kim Jong-un Really Seek to Denuclearize?
5. Unification ministry mulls meeting with activists over anti-Pyongyang leaflet campaign
6. N. Korean soldiers briefly cross inter-Korean border, return after warning shots
7. N.K. leader sends message to Putin marking Russia's nat'l day
8. S. Korea welcomes U.N. Security Council's adoption of resolution for ceasefire in Gaza
9. S. Korean, U.S. defense officials visit key Army missile unit amid N.K. threats
10. Changes at North Korean Missile Operating Bases: Part 1
11. N. Korea's mass organizations lecture members about threats from abroad
12. North Korea restores train service to Russia, boosting hopes for tourists
13. North may be installing anti-South loudspeakers as balloon blitz continues
14. Chinese jets harassed Dutch warship on North Korea sanctions patrol: Netherlands
15. Sonic war: How propaganda loudspeakers have amplified inter-Korean strife
1. South Korean troops fired warning shots after North Korean soldiers briefly crossed land border
Nothing to see here. The war will not likely start with a clash on the DMZ. There have been many hundreds of these incidents over the years and they never escalate. (but of course we must never say never).
South Korean troops fired warning shots after North Korean soldiers briefly crossed land border
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · June 11, 2024
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korean soldiers fired warning shots after North Korean troops briefly violated the tense border earlier this week, South Korea’s military said Tuesday, as the rivals are embroiled in Cold War-style campaigns like balloon launches and propaganda broadcasts.
Bloodshed and violent confrontations have occasionally occurred at the Koreas’ heavily fortified border, called the Demilitarized Zone. While Sunday’s incident happened amid simmering tensions between the two Koreas, observers say it won’t likely develop into another source of animosity as South Korea believes the North Koreans didn’t deliberately commit the border intrusion and North Korea also didn’t return fire.
At 12:30 p.m. on Sunday, some North Korean soldiers who were engaged in unspecified work on the northern side of the border crossed the military demarcation line that bisects the two countries, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said.
Those North Korean soldiers carrying construction tools — some of them armed — immediately returned to their territory after South Korea’s military fired warning shots and issued warning broadcasts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said. It said North Korea had not conducted any other suspicious activities.
South Korea’s military has assessed that the North Korean soldiers didn’t appear to have intentionally crossed the border because the site is a wooded area and MDL signs there weren’t clearly visible, Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesperson Lee Sung Joon told reporters.
Lee gave no further details. But South Korean media reports said that about 20-30 North Korean soldiers had entered South Korean territory about 50 meters (165 feet) after they likely lost their way. The reports said most of the North Korean soldiers were carrying pickaxes and other construction tools.
The 248-kilometer (155-mile) -long, 4-kilometer (2.5-mile) -wide DMZ is the world’s most heavily armed border. An estimated 2 million mines are peppered inside and near the border, which is also guarded by barbed wire fences, tank traps and combat troops on both sides. It’s a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War, which ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty.
On Sunday, South Korea resumed anti-Pyongyang propaganda broadcasts from its border loudspeakers in response to the North’s recent launches of balloons carrying manure and rubbish across the border. South Korea said North Korea has installed its own border loudspeakers in response but hasn’t turned them on yet.
North Korea has said its balloon campaign was in response to South Korean activists’ launches of their own balloons to drop propaganda leaflets critical of leader Kim Jong Un’s authoritarian rule, USB sticks with K-pop songs and South Korean drama shows, and other items in North Korea.
North Korea is extremely sensitive to any outside criticism of its political system as most of its 26 million people have no official access to foreign news. On Sunday night, Kim’s sister and senior official, Kim Yo Jong, warned of “a new response” if South Korea continued its loudspeaker broadcasts and refused to stop civilian leafletting campaigns.
The tit-for-tat over speakers and balloons — both Cold War-style psychological warfare — have deepened tensions between the Koreas as talks over the North’s nuclear ambitions have remained stalled for years.
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · June 11, 2024
2. Third Meeting of Nuclear Consultative Group Enhances U.S., South Korea Alliance, Deterrence
Third Meeting of Nuclear Consultative Group Enhances U.S., South Korea Alliance, Deterrence
defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez
U.S. and South Korean officials today convened the third meeting of the Nuclear Consultative Group, where among other things, participants planned greater cooperation between the two nations and enhanced nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.
"Across the board, we're making progress in the Nuclear Consultative Group," said Richard C. Johnson, deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and countering weapons of mass destruction policy. "Just the establishment of that group, I think, was very important to demonstrate how we are elevating the discussion that we're having on nuclear deterrence issues, but the work that we're doing is really key. Whether that's from information sharing to joint planning and execution."
In Formation
Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Kentucky proceeds on the surface to Busan for a port visit while escorted by Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS John Finn and USS Ralph Johnson, July 18, 2023.
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Johnson spoke today at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
At this meeting of the NCG, Johnson said, a "big outcome" was the signing out of a set of shared guidelines for the U.S. and South Korean alliance.
"These guidelines really serve as kind of the principles and procedures upon which the alliance will serve to really look at nuclear deterrence issues in terms of policy and posture," Johnson said. "This will really be the foundation upon which we move forward in the NCG on U.S./[South Korea] cooperation."
According to a statement released today by the NCG, the guidelines provide principles and procedures for the U.S./South Korea alliance to maintain and strengthen a credible and effective nuclear deterrence policy and posture.
A key focus of this most recent meeting of the NCG, Johnson said, was planning and execution related to conventional nuclear integration, or CNI.
The NCG is interested in ensuring that, in the event of a nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, U.S nuclear capabilities are effectively integrated with Korea's own conventional capabilities. "[South Korea] ... is really advancing its conventional capabilities," he said. "And I think we're making real progress there."
The NCG statement today said participants in the meeting discussed the planning and execution of U.S/South Korea CNI options on the Korean Peninsula. The group reaffirmed that integration of South Korea's conventional capabilities with U.S. nuclear operations "substantively strengthens the allied deterrence and response capabilities against the [North Korea] nuclear and missile threat."
Also on the agenda, Johnson said, was a focus on increased tabletop exercises so that the U.S. and South Korea can practice the integration and deterrence the NCG seeks.
"The best way to understand how to operate in this ... world is to practice," he said. "We are doing more and more of what we call tabletop exercises, or TTXs. And we have at least, I believe, three coming up over the course of the next year, including a military-to-military exercise."
During today's meeting, NCG participants agreed to an interagency simulation, an NCG-led TTX and a military-to-military TTX.
A big part of deterrence efforts, Johnson said, also includes enhanced visibility of U.S. commitment to the alliance through the visibility of American strategic deterrent assets. In July 2023, for instance, the USS Kentucky, a nuclear ballistic missile submarine, visited the South Korean port of Busan. It was the first time in over 40 years such a visit occurred.
"I think we're in a very good place," Johnson said. "I don't think we've ever had this high of a level of collaboration, commitment and trust on extended deterrence than we've ever had with the United States and the Republic of Korea."
The NCG was created to implement what was agreed to in the April 2023 Washington Agreement. In that agreement, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to South Korea and the Korean people and also agreed that any nuclear attack by North Korea against South Korea "will be met with a swift, overwhelming and decisive response."
News Release: Washington Declaration
defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez
3. S Korea, US complete review of joint guidelines to strengthen nuclear deterrence
But has the NCG contributed to informing and educating the people in South Korea and the US about how we are going to employ nuclear weapons in order to instill confidence in US extended deterrence?
S Korea, US complete review of joint guidelines to strengthen nuclear deterrence
The Korea Times · June 10, 2024
Korea's deputy defense minister for policy Cho Chang-rae speaks during a press briefing at the Ministry of National Defense, Yongsan district, June 4. Yonhap
South Korea and the United States on Monday completed a review of a joint guideline document to strengthen the alliance's nuclear deterrence policy, a joint statement said, as they held key deterrence talks on countering growing North Korean threats.
Cho Chang-rae, deputy defense minister for policy, and Vipin Narang, principal U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, led the third meeting of the bilateral Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in Seoul.
"The two sides agreed that the joint guidelines will provide a solid foundation to strengthen cooperation for the unitary South Korea-U.S. extended deterrence (system)," the statement released by the defense ministry said.
The NCG was established under the Washington Declaration that President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden adopted during their summit in Washington in April last year as part of efforts to enhance the credibility of extended deterrence.
Extended deterrence refers to the U.S. commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, to defend an ally.
The first two meetings were led by the National Security Councils of the two countries, before the allies agreed for the body to be led by the defense ministry and the Pentagon.
The latest meeting took place after Pyongyang's continued provocative acts in recent weeks, such as the launches of trash-carrying balloons across the border and attempts to disrupt GPS signals around the South's northwestern border islands.
In response, Seoul fully suspended a 2018 inter-Korean tension reduction pact last week, and broadcast anti-Pyongyang propaganda through front-line loudspeakers on Sunday for the first time in six years.(Yonhap)
The Korea Times · June 10, 2024
4. Did Kim Jong-un Really Seek to Denuclearize?
Dr. Bennett calls out former President Moon.
Excerpts:
Moon should never have assumed that Kim sincerely wanted to denuclearize given North Korean policy on that issue. Even when Kim’s father led North Korea, the North had said on many occasions things like “it will never give up its nuclear weapons under any circumstance,” and “only fools will entertain the delusion that we will trade our nuclear deterrent for petty economic aid.” Not long before Kim supposedly promised Moon that the North would denuclearize, the North had said that “possessing nuclear arms is ‘irreversible’ and ‘inevitable’ to strengthen its ‘war deterrence.’”
...
In the end, memoirs often suggest much about what a leader hoped for. Clearly, Moon wanted peace with North Korea via its denuclearization, and chose to interpret events that were favorable to that possibility. But it would be a mistake to interpret Kim’s denuclearization promise as having been sincere.
Did Kim Jong-un Really Seek to Denuclearize?
Did North Korean leader Kim Jong-un really seek to denuclearize? Former South Korean President Moon Jae-in claims in his recent memoir that Kim was sincere in promising to denuclearize in 2018, and Moon believed him. Moon sees the failure to pursue Kim’s willingness as a major lost opportunity. Can we believe such a claim?
The National Interest · by Bruce W. Bennett · June 10, 2024
Did North Korean leader Kim Jong-un really seek to denuclearize?
Former South Korean President Moon Jae-in claims in his recent memoir that Kim was sincere in promising to denuclearize in 2018, and Moon believed him. Moon sees the failure to pursue Kim’s willingness as a major lost opportunity. Can we believe such a claim?
Of course, we will never know for sure, but evidence suggests Kim was hardly sincere.
Just one year after Kim’s supposed denuclearization offer, President Trump emerged from the 2019 Hanoi Summit to say the North Korean dictator was only willing to dismantle the Yongbyon complex for producing nuclear weapons in exchange for near complete removal of the economic sanctions on North Korea.
Trump later said that he had identified five key nuclear weapon production sites and Kim was only offering to dismantle one or two of them, apparently leaving Kim with substantial nuclear weapon production capability. There had been many U.S. criticisms of Trump’s 2018 Singapore Agreement because it heavily favored North Korea, and Kim’s Hanoi proposal was even more unbalanced.
Kim had apparently hoped that his other key production facilities were covert, and he was surprised when Trump identified some of them. Trump asked Kim to dismantle another nuclear weapon production site but Kim was reportedly unwilling to do so, so it is unlikely Kim was considering stopping his overall nuclear weapon production and freezing his nuclear weapon inventory.
And even a nuclear weapon production freeze is far from denuclearization, which would also require eliminating any existing North Korea nuclear weapons. So how could Kim claim that he wanted to denuclearize when he wasn’t even prepared for a nuclear weapon production freeze at the Hanoi Summit?
A North Korean document obtained after the Hanoi Summit says that Kim’s real objective at the Hanoi Summit was to get U.S. recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapon state. Had Trump made an agreement with Kim that ended most of the sanctions on North Korea while leaving the North with all of its nuclear weapons and a significant nuclear weapon production capability, he would have effectively done that.
Trump left the Hanoi Summit thinking that he had Kim’s agreement to build on the progress made at Hanoi and to continue negotiations. That was certainly not Kim’s perspective. Kim essentially shut-down the negotiation process for what has now been over five years. Kim apparently executed retribution on many of his personnel who had been involved in planning Hanoi, apparently blaming them for the embarrassment he suffered in failing to accomplish his objectives.
Moon should never have assumed that Kim sincerely wanted to denuclearize given North Korean policy on that issue. Even when Kim’s father led North Korea, the North had said on many occasions things like “it will never give up its nuclear weapons under any circumstance,” and “only fools will entertain the delusion that we will trade our nuclear deterrent for petty economic aid.” Not long before Kim supposedly promised Moon that the North would denuclearize, the North had said that “possessing nuclear arms is ‘irreversible’ and ‘inevitable’ to strengthen its ‘war deterrence.’”
By telling Moon that he wanted to denuclearize, Kim was able to buy time for his nuclear weapon development. Moon should have remembered that the Kim regime is prone to deception such as claiming that the South started the Korean War, the North does not violate human rights, or the North is a “utopia surrounded by a hellish outside world.” In 1992, the North agreed with the South to “not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.” Yet well before it voided that agreement in 2013 the North was doing most of these things.
Perhaps Moon felt that Kim did not need nuclear weapons for war deterrence and therefore thought that nuclear weapons were expendable to the North. Afterall, Moon was not interested in attacking the North in any way, and he knew that the United States had nothing to gain by attacking the North. But if that was what Moon thought, he neglected the real reasons for North Korea’s nuclear weapons: They create a powerful image of Kim inside the North that he needs for regime survival, and Kim wants nuclear weapons to coerce and compel South Korea.
In the end, memoirs often suggest much about what a leader hoped for. Clearly, Moon wanted peace with North Korea via its denuclearization, and chose to interpret events that were favorable to that possibility. But it would be a mistake to interpret Kim’s denuclearization promise as having been sincere.
About the Author: Dr. Bruce W. Bennett
Bruce W. Bennett is a senior international/defense researcher at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center.
The National Interest · by Bruce W. Bennett · June 10, 2024
5. Unification ministry mulls meeting with activists over anti-Pyongyang leaflet campaign
If the ROK government halts the work of the escapees/defectors it will be another victory for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy. Do not appease Kim Jong Un.
This should be one of the major themes and messages to really emphasize in messages to the north. The ROK Government cannot halt freedom of speech and freedom of expression because they are universal human rights. Despite the demands of Kim Jong Un to stop information from going to the north, the Korean people in the South (all people) have the right to express themselves and to send information to their brothers and sisters in the north.
Excerpts:
The ministry has said it will not officially ask defectors' groups to refrain from launching the leaflet campaigns, citing the Constitutional Court's related ruling last year.
In September, the court ruled that a clause banning leaflet launches in the law on the development of inter-Korean relations is unconstitutional, saying it excessively restricts the right to freedom of expression.
Unification ministry mulls meeting with activists over anti-Pyongyang leaflet campaign
The Korea Times · by 2024-06-11 15:55 | Politics · June 11, 2024
Members of the North Korean People's Liberation Front, a civic group, are seen in this photo taken from Gangwha Island off the west coast toward North Korea, June 7. Yonhap
The unification ministry is considering meeting with North Korean defectors' groups dedicated to sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the inter-Korean border amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul officials said Tuesday.
Tensions are running high as Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, warned Sunday that her country could take an unspecified "new counteraction" against South Korea if Seoul keeps sending such leaflets and blaring its loudspeaker broadcasts across the border.
South Korea resumed loudspeaker broadcasts Sunday for the first time in six years in response to North Korea's repeated sending of trash-carrying balloons to the South. But it did not turn on the loudspeakers the next day in an apparent bid to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control.
"The government is working on holding a meeting with related civic groups as swiftly as possible for close communication," a ministry official said.
Government's inaction on anti-NK leaflets draws criticism
The ministry has said it will not officially ask defectors' groups to refrain from launching the leaflet campaigns, citing the Constitutional Court's related ruling last year.
In September, the court ruled that a clause banning leaflet launches in the law on the development of inter-Korean relations is unconstitutional, saying it excessively restricts the right to freedom of expression.
The government said police could exercise their authority to deter activists' leaflet operations at the scene, if necessary, in cases that the move poses a serious threat to border residents.
For years, North Korean defectors in the South and conservative activists have sent big plastic balloons carrying leaflets critical of Kim Jong-un in what they say is aimed at freeing North Korean people from the tyrant regime with outside information. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · by 2024-06-11 15:55 | Politics · June 11, 2024
6. N. Korean soldiers briefly cross inter-Korean border, return after warning shots
For those who have never been to the DMZ it is actually quite easy to cross the border itself because it is only marked with signs. The line itself is marked off by a series of 1,292 identical signs which are placed at intervals across the peninsula. The north facing side of the signs are written in Korean and Chinese, and in Korean and English on the south facing side. The signs are now aging and rusting (thanks to wikipedia). The actual fences are along the north and South side of the DMZ
(LEAD) N. Korean soldiers briefly cross inter-Korean border, return after warning shots | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · June 11, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with details; ADDS photo)
SEOUL, June 11 (Yonhap) -- About 20 North Korean soldiers briefly crossed the inter-Korean land border earlier this week and went back to the North's side after the South's military fired warning shots, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said Tuesday.
The North Korean soldiers crossed the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas in the central section of the border at around 12:30 p.m. Sunday, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
The South Korean military conducted warning broadcasts and fired warning shots, prompting the North Koreans to return to their side of the border, the JCS said, adding that there was no unusual activity after the warning shots.
JCS spokesperson Col. Lee Sung-jun said the military assesses the soldiers, who were working on an unspecified task inside the DMZ, did not intend to cross the MDL, considering that they returned immediately after the warning shots.
Lee added that the DMZ is currently thick with grass and bushes, making the MDL sign difficult to see.
The incursion took place amid heightened cross-border tensions due to North Korea's recent launches of trash-carrying balloons.
It came just hours before South Korea resumed its border loudspeaker broadcasts toward the North for the first time in six years in response to the trash-balloon campaign.
This file photo, taken Nov. 28, 2023 from South Korea's Gyeonggi Province, shows a North Korean guard post within the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas. (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · June 11, 2024
7. N.K. leader sends message to Putin marking Russia's nat'l day
N.K. leader sends message to Putin marking Russia's nat'l day | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · June 11, 2024
SEOUL, June 11 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un sent a congratulatory message to Russian President Vladimir Putin on the occasion of its national day, the North's state media reported Tuesday, amid growing speculation that Putin would visit Pyongyang soon.
Kim sent "a message of greeting" to Putin, which was "courteously conveyed" by the North's Ambassador to Russia Sin Hong-chol to an official of the Russian foreign ministry, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The KCNA did not elaborate on details of the message.
Russia's national day, which falls on June 12, commemorates the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia in 1990.
The move came amid reports that preparations are under way for Putin's trip to Pyongyang and Vietnam as early as this month.
The envisioned visit, if realized, will mark his first visit to North Korea in 24 years, as Putin last visited the communist North in July 2000, when Kim Jong-un's late father, Kim Jong-il, was in power.
The two nations have been strengthening their military ties, as well as cooperation on a wide range of fields since last year's summit. Kim traveled to Russia's Far East for the meeting with Putin.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin ahead of their talks at the Vostochny Cosmodrome space launch center in the Russian Far East on Sept. 13, 2023, in this file photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
graceoh@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · June 11, 2024
8. S. Korea welcomes U.N. Security Council's adoption of resolution for ceasefire in Gaza
I believe South Korea is currently the president of the UNSC during the current term.
S. Korea welcomes U.N. Security Council's adoption of resolution for ceasefire in Gaza | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · June 11, 2024
SEOUL, June 11 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's foreign ministry on Tuesday welcomed the U.N. Security Council's (UNSC) adoption of a United States-led ceasefire plan for the war in Gaza.
On Monday (U.S. time), the council approved the first resolution endorsing a ceasefire proposal presented by U.S. President Joe Biden, which calls for ending the monthslong war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.
"South Korea expects all parties concerned to immediately accept the proposal and fully implement it upon the UNSC's adoption of the resolution," the ministry said in a message sent to reporters.
"The South Korean government, as a nonpermanent member of the council, will actively join the international community's efforts to resolve the Gaza conflict," it added.
The proposal presented conditions for a full and complete ceasefire, the release of hostages held by Hamas, the return of dead hostages' remains and the exchange of Palestinian prisoners.
The resolution was approved by 14 out of the 15 Security Council members, with Russia abstaining.
This file photo shows the U.N. General Assembly opening at the U.N. headquarters in New York on June 6, 2023. In a vote at the meeting, South Korea was elected as a nonpermanent member of the 15-member U.N. Security Council for a two-year term starting on Jan. 1, 2024. (Yonhap)
graceoh@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · June 11, 2024
9. S. Korean, U.S. defense officials visit key Army missile unit amid N.K. threats
S. Korean, U.S. defense officials visit key Army missile unit amid N.K. threats | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · June 11, 2024
SEOUL, June 11 (Yonhap) -- Senior South Korean and U.S. defense officials visited a key Army unit overseeing missile operations Tuesday, the defense ministry said, a day after holding nuclear deterrence talks against North Korean threats.
Cho Chang-rae, deputy defense minister for policy, and Vipin Narang, acting U.S. assistant secretary of defense for space policy, toured the Missile Strategic Command at an undisclosed location after leading the allies' third Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meeting in Seoul on Monday.
During the NCG session, the two sides discussed integrating the allies' conventional and nuclear capabilities to boost deterrence, and completed a review of joint guidelines over their response in the event of a North Korean nuclear crisis.
"This visit took place for the first time between South Korea and the United States to confirm the South's advanced conventional capabilities that can contribute to conventional-nuclear integration -- a key task of the NCG," the ministry said.
Cho Chang-rae (6th from L), deputy defense minister for policy, and Vipin Narang (5th from R), acting U.S. assistant secretary of defense for space policy, visit the Army Missile Strategic Command on June 11, 2024, in this photo released by the defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Narang said the visit presented a good opportunity to confirm the South's conventional capabilities that have made great progress, and expressed support for its plan to establish a strategic command, according to the ministry.
South Korea seeks to launch the command later this year, which will serve as an overarching organ of its key military assets, such as ballistic missiles, stealth fighters and 3,000-ton submarines.
He also reaffirmed that North Korea will face an overwhelming and decisive response if it undertakes a nuclear attack as outlined in the Washington Declaration adopted by President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden during their summit in April last year, it said.
A photo released by the defense ministry showed South Korean and U.S. officials standing in front of a transporter erector launcher of an unspecified missile at the unit.
The NCG was established under the Washington Declaration as part of efforts to enhance the credibility of extended deterrence amid the North's continued push to advance its weapons programs.
Extended deterrence refers to the U.S. commitment to using the full-range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend an ally.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · June 11, 2024
10. Changes at North Korean Missile Operating Bases: Part 1
Extensive imagery at the link: https://beyondparallel.csis.org/changes-at-north-korean-missile-operating-bases-part-1/
Changes at North Korean Missile Operating Bases: Part 1
June 10, 2024, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun
Overview of the Hoejung-ri Missile Operating Base, March 26, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Key Findings
- During the past five years, North Korea has undertaken numerous small and some significant changes at most of its ballistic missile operating bases.
- North Korea is not known to have ever made specific references to the existence of any of the ballistic missile operating bases identified in this report, which include the Hoejung-ni Missile Operating Base, the Kal-gol Missile Operating Base, and the Kumchon-ni Missile Operating Base.
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These bases are among approximately 15-20 known ballistic missile operating bases and ballistic missile support facilities that have never been declared by North Korea.
- Many of the observed changes have focused on replacing outdated housing and improving food availability, indicating a concerted effort to continue improving the quality of life and morale of the Strategic Force troops and their families.
- These developments are a component of Kim Jong-un’s ongoing efforts to elevate the Strategic Force’s status and improve readiness, as well as a concerted effort to continue improving the quality of life and morale of the troops and their families.
Introduction
During the past five years, North Korea has undertaken numerous small and some significant changes at many of its missile operating bases. While in isolation, many of these changes appear to be what would typically be expected to be seen at large North Korean military facilities. However, the timing and nature of these developments across multiple ballistic missile operating bases indicate that they are a component of Kim Jong-un’s ongoing efforts to elevate the Strategic Force’s status and improve its readiness. Many of the observed changes have focused on replacing outdated housing and improving food availability, indicating a concerted effort to continue improving the quality of life and morale of the Strategic Force troops and their families.
Hoejung-ni Missile Operating Base
The Hoejung-ni (회중리) Missile Operating Base is located approximately 338 kilometers north of the demilitarized zone and only 25 kilometers from the Chinese border in Chagang Province. It, along with several other northern missile operating bases, forms North Korea’s rear (or strategic) ballistic missile belt.1
Overview of the Hoejung-ri Missile Operating Base, March 26, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Hoejung-ni is one of the more recently completed missile operating bases, having begun construction in about 2003 and being essentially complete in about 2021. As such, significant changes during the two years since our previous report on the base were not anticipated. Satellite imagery collected during the intervening years has generally proven this to be correct—with one significant exception.
The headquarters area has seen some minor changes, including the addition of landscaping, razing of one building, and the addition of several monuments. The nearby hardened drive-through missile checkout facility (with two bunkers) and various support activities remain essentially unchanged. A minor change is noted in the narrow branch valley approximately 250 meters past the drive-through facility that heads southwest to the southern entrance of the first underground facility. Just past this entrance, three small buildings, previously assessed as a sawmill, were razed sometime in October 2023.
The headquarters area of the Hoejung-ni Missile Operating Base, March 26, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
The two bunkers of the hardened drive-through missile checkout facility, March 26, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Site of the razed sawmill and south entrance to the main underground facility, March 26, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
The one significant development at the base is that sometime around August 2023, construction began on a large, approximately 18 x 20-meter irregularly shaped building located directly across the river from the entrance to the second underground facility (UGF) and the access bridge to it. Although it remains to be confirmed, some additional work may have been undertaken on the portal to the UGF. As noted in our original report there are several unorthodox aspects to the construction of this UGF and its location across a river. These and other aspects are now associated with the new building. A final determination as to the intended function of both this UGF and the new building remains elusive.
New building across the stream from the portal to the second underground facility, March 26, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Notably, no pads like those observed at the Kal-gol Missile Operating Base and used for the training of missile crews with their TELs were observed at the Hoejung-ni Missile Operating Base.
Kal-gol Missile Operating Base
The Kal-gol (갈골) Missile Operating Base is located approximately 52 kilometers north of the demilitarized zone and 125 kilometers north of Seoul in South Hwanghae Province. It, along with the bases at Kumchon-ni and Sakkanmol, forms North Korea’s forward (or tactical) ballistic missile belt.
Overview of the Kal-gol Missile Operating Base, March 31, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
The rerouted road, new concrete deck bridge and new entrance and checkpoint, March 31, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
During the four years since our previous report on the base, a number of both significant and minor changes have taken place. The minor changes are typical of those observed at other large military facilities in rural areas (e.g., the razing of small structures, expansion of existing buildings, changes in agricultural support activities, etc.). Many of the more significant changes have focused on improving the troops’ and their families’ quality of life by replacing outdated housing and efforts to improve food availability. Adding training launch pads indicates an effort to improve training and operational readiness.
Moving east up the valley where the base is located, sometime in May 2023 the main entrance and checkpoint consisting of a guard post and a small building were razed. These were replaced by two larger buildings located slightly to the east with a partially walled-in parking area. Sometime between September and October 2023, the existing bridge 100 meters west of the new entrance and checkpoint was replaced by a more substantial concrete bridge capable of supporting heavier loads and traffic. No changes of significance were observed at the specialized drive-through TEL support building used for maintenance and training at Oya-dong. This structure measures approximately 31 meters by 11 meters with an arched clearstory and appears well maintained. This clearstory is high enough to elevate most short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles in the North Korean inventory.
A view of the specialized drive-through TEL support building at Oya-dong, March 31, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Beginning in late 2021 and continuing through 2024, a major project was undertaken to raze, rebuild, and consolidate almost all the housing units in the areas around the villages of Oya-dong and Kal-gol, northwest of the headquarters area. This project began in late 2021 with the three housing areas 1.4 to 2.0 kilometers northwest of the headquarters area. In stages, this would see the razing of all three housing areas (two south and one north of the main access road) and the construction of new, more modern housing. As of January 16, 2024, two of the housing areas have been rebuilt, and the third will likely be rebuilt this year. Between January and November 2022, a small housing area was razed 450 meters west of the main headquarters area. Concurrently, half of a second older housing area immediately west of the main headquarters area was razed, leaving only six renovated structures. Finally, beginning during fall 2022, what appears to be a livestock facility located 800 meters west of the main headquarters area began to be enlarged. This appears to have been completed by the fall of 2023.
Upgrades to the housing areas at Oya-dong, March 31, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Significantly, sometime between November 5 and November 26, 2022, five roughly semicircular 31-meter-by-20-meter graded areas were excavated along a 900-1,300-meter section of the main access road to the facility west of the headquarters area. Given their size, location, and timing of their appearance, it is believed that these clearings were pads used for training missile crews with their TELs during the winter training cycle. It should be noted that November 2022 was a remarkable month for North Korean missile testing, with one of the largest monthly number of missiles being launched.
Training missile launch pads built in November 2022, March 31, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
East of the headquarters area and within the hardened drive-through missile checkout facility (with two bunkers), a small structure was added sometime between November 25, 2022, and January 16, 2024. The purpose of this structure is unclear.
A view of the headquarters and administration area, March 31, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
An entrance to an underground facility and the two bunkers comprising the hardened drive-through missile checkout facility with the new structure (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Nothing of significance was observed at any of the UGF entrances in the base, including those at the east end up the valley.
Entrances to two of the underground facilities, March 31, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Entrances to the two final underground facilities at the base, March 31, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Kumchon-ni Missile Operating Base
The Kumchon-ni (금천리) Missile Operating Base is located approximately 1,100 kilometers west of Tokyo and 69 kilometers northeast of the demilitarized zone in Kangwon Province. It, along with the bases at Kal-gol and Sakkanmol, forms North Korea’s forward (or tactical) ballistic missile belt.
The Kumchon-ni is one of North Korea’s older missile operating bases with construction beginning sometime between 1991 and 1993. As a well-established facility, significant changes during the four-and-a-half years since our previous report on the base were not anticipated. Satellite imagery collected during the intervening years has proven this to be correct. The minor changes observed at Kumchon-ni follow the trend observed at other missile operating bases, focusing on improving the quality of life of troops and their families by replacing outdated housing and efforts to improve food availability. This, by extension, is viewed as an effort to improve morale and operational readiness among Strategic Force units.
An overview of the Kumchon-ni Missile Operating Base, March 14, 2024 (Copyright © Airbus DS 2024). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Moving east up the valley in which the base is located, several changes are observed. Between May 2022 and May 2023, the main access road was rerouted over a newly built concrete deck bridge and paved road between the main entrance and the security barracks approximately 300 meters to the east due to river flooding. A construction project to build nine new housing structures that began in 2022 was nearing completion. 200 to 500 meters to the east of these new housing structures were what appeared to be a new warehouse-type structure, and several housing units were built. Further east, in the center of the base in the headquarters and administration area, a single building was added between 2022 and 2024. Only very minor changes were observed elsewhere at the base.
A view of the entrance and checkpoint to the base, new deck bridge and security headquarters, March 14, 2024 (Copyright © Airbus DS 2024). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Rebuilt housing area and new warehouse building, March 14, 2024 (Copyright © Airbus DS 2024). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
The headquarters and administration area showing recently added building, March 14, 2024 (Copyright © Airbus DS 2024). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Notably, no pads like those observed at the Kal-gol Missile Operating Base that are used for training missile crews with their TELs were observed at Kumchon-ni. However, east of the headquarters area is a barracks area with two apparent small UGF entrances and a small, specialized TEL support building used for maintenance and training. This small high-bay structure, measuring 18 meters by 10 meters, with 5-meter-wide bay doors, a sloped roof, and no clearstory, is large enough to house a TEL and raise the launch rail to a vertical position. While similar to the one at Kal-gol, its size indicates that it is not as capable and is tall enough to only allow for the elevation of short-range ballistic missiles on a TEL. Although some larger systems could be serviced here, it is unlikely they could be elevated to full height.
A barracks area with a UGF entrance and the specialized TEL support building, March 14, 2024 (Copyright © Airbus DS 2024). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Closeup view of the specialized TEL support building, March 7, 2023 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar Technologies). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Nothing of significance was observed at any of the UGF entrances further up the valley to the east. While Kumchon-ni’s hardened drive-through missile checkout facility (with two bunkers) is partially obscured by the shadows of trees, it appears that nothing of significance has recently changed.
A view of the remaining UGF entrances and the hardened drive-through missile checkout facility with two bunkers, March 14, 2024 (Copyright © Airbus DS 2024). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Victor Cha is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair and the inaugural holder of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Jennifer Jun is project manager and research associate with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Headline image Copyright © CNES 2024, Distribution Airbus DS
Special thanks to Jisoo Kim and HanLim Ryu for research support.
References
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It is unknown how North Korea identifies the deployment layout of its ballistic missile operating bases. In open sources, however, there are two general descriptions. One describes forward (tactical), central (operational), and rear (strategic) missile belts. The second describes only forward (tactical) and rear (strategic) missile belts. ↩
11. N. Korea's mass organizations lecture members about threats from abroad
Another anecdotal measure of effectiveness is that information is getting to the Korean people in the north and it is having an effect on the regime.
Information is an existential threat to the regime.
N. Korea's mass organizations lecture members about threats from abroad - Daily NK English
More and more young people are facing self-criticism after being caught sneaking their phones into a lecture to play games or listen to music, a source told Daily NK
By Lee Chae Un - June 11, 2024
dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Un · June 11, 2024
On Apr. 2, 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un conducted an on-the-spot inspection of the first test launch of a new medium- to long-range solid-state ballistic missile, the Hwasongpo-16B, equipped with a newly developed hypersonic glide flight combat vehicle (warhead), according to Rodong Sinmun on Apr. 3. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
North Korean social organizations, including the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, the Socialist Women’s Union of Korea and the Socialist Patriotic Youth League, have been organizing lectures on the need to further strengthen North Korea’s independent defense capabilities.
“While the U.S. and its South Korean puppets are preparing a war of aggression against the DPRK, the leadership of the Marshal [North Korean leader Kim Jong Un] has turned the DPRK into a nuclear power that no one can hope to defeat. As long as the U.S. and its lackeys persist in their insane war provocations, we must continue to strengthen our independent national defense,” one of the lecturers reportedly said.
But the young people in attendance expressed irritation at the slogans about “strengthening national defense,” which they said they were “tired of hearing.
“Young people these days don’t even like to hear about strengthening national defense. They may have to listen to these lectures, but they don’t concentrate on them and think about other things. In fact, most of them can’t even tell you what the lecture was about if you ask them afterwards,” the source said.
The source said that even though participants are not allowed to bring their cell phones into the lecture hall, more and more young people are facing self-criticism after being caught sneaking their phones into a lecture to play games or listen to music.
Some people tired of constant criticism of South Korea, U.S.
That’s what happened to a thirty-something who was wearing earphones and listening to music at a lecture in Pyongsong on June 18. The young man had to undergo severe self-criticism at the review meeting held at the end of the month.
“Since they were children, young people have been listening ad nauseam to lectures stressing the need to strengthen the national defense because of the U.S.-South Korean military exercises. Nowadays, they can’t help but smile when they hear that national defense is being stressed for the same reasons as a decade ago, despite the constant bragging about how North Korea has become a nuclear power,” the source said.
The source said that after the lecture, one of the young people whispered to a friend, “I would rather we became an economic power than a military or nuclear power. Another muttered, “I wish I lived in a wealthy country.”
“Young people see little point in being a military or nuclear power and criticize the state for not caring how many people starve for lack of food. People are tired of the constant refrain about strengthening national defense because of the U.S. and South Korea, while people’s lives are getting harder and harder,” the source said.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Un · June 11, 2024
12. North Korea restores train service to Russia, boosting hopes for tourists
North Korea restores train service to Russia, boosting hopes for tourists
News comes as Russia’s Putin plans to visit North Korea in coming weeks.
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/passenger-rail-links-with-russia-restored-north-06102024170414.html
By Cho Jinwoo for RFA Korean
2024.06.10
Chinese railway police stand on the platform as a passenger train from North Korea pulls into Dandong station, April 24, 2004, in this border town in northeast Liaoning Province, China.
Frederic J. Brown/AFP
After a four-year hiatus due to the coronavirus pandemic, passenger rail service between Russia and North Korea has been restored, with 41 Russian tourists taking the train to North Korea last week, according to Moscow’s customs service.
The news comes amid a report Monday from the Russian daily Vedomosti that President Vladimir Putin will visit North Korea sometime in the next few weeks.
That would mark only the second time that Putin has visited the country, after a July 2000 trip – although Putin did meet with Kim Jong Un in September in the Russian far eastern city of Vladivostok.
The exact timing of the trip wasn’t clear, but Russia’s ambassador in Pyongyang, Alexander Matsegora, said the visit was being “actively prepared.”
Putin is also planning to visit Vietnam soon, the report said.
During their meeting, Putin and Kim Jong Un may discuss restarting trade, strengthening economic ties and bringing in North Korean workers to address Russian labor shortages, Alexander Zhebin, a researcher at the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told Vedomosti.
Russia's President Vladimir Putin and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un visit the Vostochny Сosmodrome in the far eastern Amur region, Russia, September 13, 2023. (Sputnik/Mikhail Metzel/Kremlin via Reuters)
The train bringing the Russian tourists to North Korea departed from Ussuriysk, a Russian city about 100 kilometers (60 miles) north of Vladivostok, the Federal Customs Service of Russia wrote on the Telegram social media platform on June 6.
“The first train with Russian tourists left for the DPRK through the Khasan checkpoint,” the service’s post said. “After a four-year break, Ussuri customs officers cleared the first passenger train for departure to North Korea.”
Last month, Primorski krai’s Gov. Oleg Kozhemyako announced at a meeting with a delegation from North Korea’s northeastern Rason region that passenger rail service between Vladivostok and Rason would soon resume, to the benefit of Russian travelers.
This announcement followed his statement in January that plans were in place to open passenger rail service within the year, and that he hoped any technical problems stalling the reopening would be resolved.
Russia and North Korea restarted tourism earlier this year, with 400 Russian tourists flying in by air between February and May, according to stats from the Primorsky krai government, which anticipates that tourist numbers will increase now that the passenger rail link has been restored.
Foreign workers
The restoration of service is expected to pave the way for North Korea to soon send large numbers of workers to Russia, Kang Dongwan, a professor at the South Korea-based Dong-A University in Busan, told Radio Free Asia.
Ethnic-Korean Chinese get back their passports as they board a Pyongyang bound train April 25, 2004, from Dandong station in China's northeast Liaoning Province, China. (Frederic J. Brown/AFP)
“Above all, Russia currently needs a large workforce for construction sites, and North Korea needs to send workers to Russia to earn foreign currency,” said Kang.
“Currently, with regular flight routes in operation, the addition of a train route to the Primorsky Krai region means that large-scale personnel and resources will be able to move back and forth.”
Should North Korea send workers to Russia, however, it would be yet another violation of international nuclear sanctions, which state that all North Korean workers abroad were to have returned home by the end of 2019 and no new work visas should be issued.
But North Korea maintains overseas workforces in China and Russia, and has been known to get around sanctions by sending new workers on vocational or education visas.
Translated by Leejin J. Chung. Edited by Eugene Whong.
13. North may be installing anti-South loudspeakers as balloon blitz continues
From 1986 through 1988 I was at Camp Greaves in Korea. It was positioned between loudspeakers from the north and South. The battle of the loudspeakers was ...well ...quite loud. I wonder if that is partly responsible for my hearing loss.
Monday
June 10, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 10 Jun. 2024, 18:38
Updated: 10 Jun. 2024, 19:49
North may be installing anti-South loudspeakers as balloon blitz continues
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-06-10/national/northKorea/North-may-be-installing-antiSouth-loudspeakers-as-balloon-blitz-continues/2065104
00:0006:12
South Korean soldiers conduct a drill on operating loudspeakers mounted on military vehicles in a file photo. Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said Sunday that such a drill for moving, installing and operating loudspeakers for anti-Pyongyang broadcasts took place for the first time since 2018. [JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF]
The South Korean military said Monday it observed moves by the North to install anti-South loudspeakers along the inter-Korean border, a day after Seoul resumed anti-North radio broadcasts through loudspeakers on Sunday.
Seoul's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said that anti-North loudspeakers along the inter-Korean border are being operated “flexibly” based on “strategic and tactical situations” after receiving hundreds of waste-laden balloons over the weekend.
The JCS said it would not operate the anti-Pyongyang loudspeakers on Monday. However, it told reporters that the military is "ready to resume the broadcasts immediately if North Korea engages in despicable behavior."
The South Korean military said Pyongyang flew more than 310 trash-laden balloons over the inter-Korean border between Sunday night and Monday morning in the fourth round of such launches.
The JCS reported that the balloons carried trash, such as plastic and waste paper. Analysis has yet to detect hazardous substances.
Related Article
The Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency said Monday that three balloons were discovered in Yongsan District, where the presidential office is located.
One of the three landed on the National Museum of Korea compound, 800 meters (0.49 miles) away from the presidential office. Two others were found at Yongsan District Office and near Itaewon Station.
The metropolitan police said 89 balloons were found inside the capital between Sunday and 5 a.m. Monday.
The balloons' reappearance surprised South Koreans in the greater Seoul area and regions along the border. The head of one village in Yeoncheon County, Gyeonggi, said residents "live in fear" and asked the two sides to ease the confrontation.
More than 1,600 balloons have arrived in South Korea in four launches since last month.
The third and fourth rounds of balloon intrusions happened after Seoul-based human rights advocacy groups sent anti-regime leaflets to the North on Friday.
North Korea flew around 330 balloons into the South in its third launch between Saturday night and early Sunday morning.
A military soldier inspects a loudspeaker-controlling machine last week in a photo released by the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff on Sunday. [JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF]
In response to the North’s balloon launches, the South Korean military resumed loudspeaker broadcasts on Sunday.
These were the first such broadcasts in six years since the speakers were disassembled in 2018.
“[The military] is conducting operations in a timely manner, taking as much time as needed, considering variables such as downtime for loudspeakers,” JCS spokesman Col. Lee Sung-jun told reporters at a regular press briefing on Monday.
The broadcasts carry messages denouncing the North for its militaristic behavior and authoritarian rule.
On Sunday, a two-hour radio program, "Voice of Freedom,” produced by a military psychological warfare unit, echoed through the loudspeakers from 4:55 p.m.
After opening with the South Korean national anthem, the broadcast covered the recent suspension of the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement approved by the South Korean Cabinet and President Yoon Suk Yeol.
It also said that North Korea has become a center of global criticism, citing joint condemnation by South Korea, the United States and Japan of the North's nuclear program, ballistic missile launches and military cooperation with Russia. The three countries criticized the North during the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors Meeting last Tuesday.
The broadcast also conveyed the South’s economic achievements. It mentioned Samsung Electronics' recent besting of global rivals in quarterly shipment volume in 38 countries.
Related Article
The broadcasts also included South Korean pop songs. The playlist included hit songs by boy band BTS, namely, “Butter” (2021), “Dynamite” (2020) and “Spring Day” (2017).
In particular, "Spring Day" includes metaphors and symbols of hope, with lyrics such as “The sun will rise again” and “No darkness, [and] no season can last forever.”
The large speakers facing the North can transmit up to 24 kilometers (14 miles) from their installation spots. This feature allows most North Korean soldiers stationed in border areas to hear the South’s messages.
However, the South Korean military said it "spotted moves by the North to install anti-South speakers" along the border. The authorities said such measures could be intended to interrupt the clear delivery of the South’s messages.
Firefighters respond to a balloon found on the roof of a residential complex in Incheon on Sunday. [INCHEON FIRE SERVICES]
On Sunday, Kim Yo-jong, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's sister, said that Seoul will “undoubtedly witness the new counteraction” from Pyongyang, adding that the South's moves, such as resuming loudspeaker broadcasts in border areas, have “changed the situation.”
In an English-language statement released by the state-run Korean Central News Agency, she “sternly warned” the South to halt the loudspeaker broadcasts, calling them a “dangerous act bringing further confrontation.”
While blaming Seoul, Kim defended the North’s balloon launches and claimed it committed no “political” aggression in sending waste paper to the South.
She said the North “scattered 7.5 tons of waste paper with more than 1,400 balloons” in the South from Saturday to Sunday evening.
She also said South Koreans would “suffer the bitter embarrassment of picking up waste paper without rest as daily work” if Seoul continues to send anti-regime materials and operate the loudspeakers.
On Monday, the South's government said it was working to pass a bill to help affected people recover from damages caused by the balloons.
The Seoul Metropolitan Government and Gyeonggi provincial government have said they will swiftly fund recovery efforts utilizing local budgets.
Eight cases of damage have been reported to the authorities so far. Interior Minister Lee Sang-min would announce a detailed support plan during a Tuesday cabinet meeting.
BY LEE SOO-JUNG, CHUNG YEONG-GYO, CHOI MO-RAN [lee.soojung1@joongang.co.kr]
14. Chinese jets harassed Dutch warship on North Korea sanctions patrol: Netherlands
Not often reported. There are international military forces attempting to enforce sanctions.
Chinese jets harassed Dutch warship on North Korea sanctions patrol: Netherlands
https://www.nknews.org/2024/06/chinese-jets-harassed-dutch-warship-on-north-korea-sanctions-patrol-netherlands/
Beijing disputes claim that jets created ‘unsafe situation,’ accusing ship of pretending to monitor UN sanctions
Ifang Bremer June 11, 2024
The Dutch frigate HNLMS Tromp | Image: Royal Netherlands Navy
Chinese fighter jets harassed a Dutch warship conducting patrols to enforce U.N. sanctions on North Korea, according to the Netherlands’ defense ministry.
“In the East China Sea, two Chinese fighter jets circled the naval ship HNLMS Tromp several times. Additionally, the ship’s NH90 maritime combat helicopter was approached by two Chinese fighter jets and a Chinese helicopter during a patrol,” the Dutch ministry stated in a press release on Friday.
The Chinese approach created a “potentially unsafe situation,” the ministry said, adding that the incident “took place in international airspace.”
China’s Ministry of National Defense on Tuesday disputed the Dutch ministry’s account, stating its military’s actions were “completely legal, reasonable, professional and standardized.”
“The creation of unsafe conditions was entirely the fault of the Dutch side, not China,” Beijing’s defense spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang said.
“The Dutch side falsely claimed to be carrying out a U.N. mission, displaying military force in the air and sea areas under another country’s jurisdiction, creating tension and damaging the friendly relations between the two countries,” the spokesperson said.
“We warn the Netherlands to strictly control their naval and air force actions, as any infringement and provocation will be met with a firm response from China.”
A Chinese fighter jet photographed from the HNLMS Tromp on Friday | Image: Royal Netherlands Navy
The incident took place a month after a Chinese fighter jet fired flares toward an Australian helicopter participating in a mission to monitor North Korea sanctions in the Yellow Sea.
Donald R. Rothwell, a professor of international law at the Australian National University, told NK News at the time that such incidents underscore the difficulties of monitoring sanctions “given China’s good relations with the DPRK” and the fact that “some vessels seeking to violate the U.N. sanctions may be Chinese flagged and operated.”
The Dutch vessel conducted its sanctions patrol “in coordination with the Pacific Security Maritime Exchange and the associated Enforcement Coordination Cell headquartered in Yokosuka, Japan,” according to the Dutch Embassy to Seoul.
Days before the incident with the Chinese jets, the Tromp docked in South Korea’s main port of Busan as part of its deployment to the Indo-Pacific.
Sanctions monitoring suffered a major setback earlier this year when Russia vetoed the mandate to renew the U.N. Security Council Panel of Experts tasked with investigating DPRK sanctions violations.
But all U.N. sanctions on North Korea remain in place, and since the end of the Panel, member states have continued to prosecute DPRK sanctions violators.
Security Council sanctions prohibit or limit trade with North Korea in a bid to prevent Pyongyang from further developing its nuclear program.
But the DPRK uses tactics such as false flag registrations of vessels, disabling ship-tracking systems, clandestine ship-to-ship transfers and shell companies to circumvent international sanctions and continue its maritime trade.
Meanwhile, New Zealand recently announced that a maritime patrol aircraft that it deployed on a DPRK sanctions monitoring mission observed “four ship-to-ship transfers” and “30 vessels of interest” from April to May.
The country subsequently reported “33 vessels suspected of violating United Nations Security Council sanctions” to the council, according to New Zealand’s military.
Edited by Bryan Betts
15. Sonic war: How propaganda loudspeakers have amplified inter-Korean strife
It is not the loudspeakers themselves. It is Kim Jong Un's fear of information and fear of knowledge about the South among the Korean people in the north as well as Kim's hostile policies toward the South. That is the cause of the tension.
Sonic war: How propaganda loudspeakers have amplified inter-Korean strife
https://www.nknews.org/2024/06/sonic-war-how-propaganda-loudspeakers-have-amplified-inter-korean-strife/
North and South Korea once traded artillery fire over loudspeakers, but they have also found ways to deescalate in past
Gabriela Bernal June 11, 2024
A collage of South Korean propaganda loudspeakers and troops setting up speakers near the inter-Korean border | Images: ROK JCS (June 9, 2024), ROK MND (Aug 12, 2015), edited by NK News
Inter-Korean tensions have been growing daily in recent weeks as North and South Korea have clashed over cross-border balloon launches. In response to the DPRK’s latest trash balloon barrage over the weekend, Seoul conducted a propaganda loudspeaker broadcast for the first time in six years, and Kim Jong Un’s powerful sister Kim Yo Jong swiftly warned of an unspecified “new counteraction.”
The situation hasn’t improved in the days since, with South Korea’s military stating that North Korea appears to be reinstalling its own loudspeakers near the border, while belatedly revealing that DPRK soldiers “encroached” on the Military Demarcation Line on Sunday.
Yet even as the two Koreas continue to escalate and prepare to blare propaganda across the border, similar events in the recent past show that an unstoppable spiral of tit-for-tat retaliation is not a given.
In 2015 and 2020, spats between the North and South led one or both sides to redeploy loudspeakers at the border and even to exchange artillery fire, putting the two Koreas on a collision course for a wider conflict.
But in both cases, Pyongyang backed down just as it appeared ready to ramp up to more aggressive military action, and a look back at these incidents can shed light on how the Koreas avoided a protracted period of dangerous hostility.
Still, with North Korea now declaring the South its main enemy, abandoning unification as a goal and boasting a much more advanced arsenal, a resolution to the current crisis may look different from the past.
Waste from a North Korean balloon that landed in Seoul’s Jungnang district | Image: ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (June 9, 2024)
2015: TRADING FIRE OVER LOUDSPEAKERS
In early Aug. 2015, a landmine explosion on South Korea’s side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) maimed two ROK soldiers, and Seoul soon concluded that North Korean special forces had planted the landmines.
In retaliation, South Korea reinstalled loudspeakers at the border for the first time since 2004 on Aug. 10. Steve Tharp, a retired U.S. Army infantry officer who served 26 years in Korea, told NK News that the loudspeakers broadcast for around 12 hours a day.
One week later, the North resumed its own loudspeaker broadcasts for the first time in 11 years.
Tensions sharply escalated again on Aug. 20 when the DPRK military fired on the South’s loudspeakers with artillery, which then prompted the ROK to fire dozens of shells back at the North. The DPRK claimed that the South fired 36 artillery shells across the border but reported no casualties.
Pyongyang announced the next day that it was placing “frontline large combined units” of its military into a state of “semi-war.” But just as hostilities appeared ready to boil over, the two sides backed down and agreed to talks.
Thirteen days after reinstalling its loudspeakers, Seoul stopped its propaganda broadcasts on Aug. 23, and the next day the two Koreas reached a deal under which North Korea expressed regret about the landmine explosion without taking responsibility, while the South agreed to halt further broadcasts.
It remains unclear why exactly the North toned down its actions so quickly.
One possibility is that the DPRK was surprised by South Korea’s rapid and disproportionately strong response that fired over 30 shells into the North. Pyongyang may have feared further South Korean military action and decided to take a step back to avoid unwanted escalation.
Another possibility is that the regime was concerned about the South’s loudspeaker broadcasts and their possible impact on DPRK troops’ morale, as well as how they might influence residents of border areas.
South Korean troops practice operating propaganda loudspeakers near the border. | Image: ROK JCS (June 9, 2024)
2020: INSTALLING AND REMOVING LOUDSPEAKERS
Loudspeakers were again at the center of a period of heightened tensions that gripped the peninsula from May 2020, when North Korea exploded in anger at anti-regime leafleting by South Korean defector activists.
Despite rosy ties between the two Koreas at the beginning of Moon Jae-in’s presidency, Kim Yo Jong was quick to rebuke the Moon government’s lack of action regarding the leafleting campaigns.
“I would like to ask the south Korean authorities if they are ready to take care of the consequences of evil conduct done by the rubbish-like mongrel dogs,” she said at the time, referring to the defectors sending the leaflets.
The DPRK followed through on Kim Yo Jong’s threats when it destroyed the inter-Korean liaison office on June 16. The situation further escalated on June 21, when the North reinstalled its propaganda loudspeakers at 20 locations along the DMZ.
But then, without warning, North Korea changed course. State media announced that leader Kim Jong Un had suspended plans for unspecified “military action,” and the DPRK military uninstalled half of the speakers at the border.
Like in 2015, the reason behind North Korea’s sudden change of heart remains unexplained. One possibility is that Pyongyang intended to wait to see how far Seoul would go in putting an end to the balloon launches and what concessions the South was willing to make.
Indeed, in July, Seoul began making unprecedented efforts to stop activists from sending leaflets North, including by preventing helium vendors from selling gas to well-known activists involved in sending leaflets.
The ruling party and the Moon government also pushed for a law to ban leafleting, which was eventually passed in Dec. 2020.
The destruction of the inter-Korean liaison office in 2020 | Image: KCNA
MORE VOLATILE TIMES?
While the 2015 and 2020 incidents share similarities with the current border situation, there are also some key differences that raise questions about how the present crisis will end.
For one, unlike in 2015, North Korea may not fear a South Korean retaliatory response as much given its vastly improved military capabilities.
Second, while the DPRK escalated and deescalated to extract concessions in the past, it appears unlikely to pursue such a strategy this time.
Pyongyang is well aware that the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol government won’t make concessions too easily or pursue engagement in the way his liberal predecessor did.
Another issue, Tharp said, is that South Korea does not see civilians’ balloon-launching activities as a violation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement and is thus unwilling to take action to stop the launches like the DPRK would want.
The unification ministry has said it will uphold the Constitutional Court’s ruling against the Moon-era anti-leaflet law as part of its efforts to “guarantee the freedom of expression.”
“Accordingly, this will continue to be a problem without an easy solution,” Tharp said.
Still, the former U.S. military officer said neither side wants the situation to escalate to uncontrollable levels. “Both sides will look for an exit ramp to ease the tension sooner than later.”
But with the two Koreas not communicating and each threatening to take further retaliatory actions, it remains unclear whether the current crisis involving loudspeakers will end as peacefully as in the past.
Edited by Bryan Betts
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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