Quotes of the Day:

“We have realized the wish of the great leaders who devoted their lives to building the strongest national defense capability to reliably safeguard our country’s sovereignty, and we have created a mighty sword for defending peace, as desired by all our people who had to tighten their belts for long years.” 

– Kim Jong-un, January 1, 2018

"Remember that not getting what you want is sometimes a wonderful stroke of luck." 

– Dalai Lama

"In foreign policy you have to wait twenty-five years to see how it comes out." 

– James Reston

1. US special ops teams must cut 5,000 troops over next 5 years amid push to recruit technical experts

2. Evaluating the Strategic Expansion of Pentagon Special Ops Training for Allies Amid Global Tensions

3.  The power of relationships and partnerships forged by special ops by Michael K. Nagata

4. US Commander Suggests UK Special Forces Are Active in Ukraine

5. The US is still falling behind on electronic warfare, special operators warn

6. UN Admits Hamas Lied on Casualty Numbers; But the Damage Is Done

7. Army Officer Resigns in Protest of ‘Unqualified’ U.S. Support to Israel

8. The arsenal of democracy is running low on gunpowder

9. How Cobra Gold Helps the US Strengthen Its Indo-Pacific Partnerships

10. Must-Pass Defense Bill Includes 4.5% Military Pay Raise on Top of 15% Increase for Junior Enlisted Troops

11. Putin begins defense ministry purge amid nuclear secrets leak rumor

12. Biden's Latest Policy Failure: West Africa

13. An Army drone branch? Idea advances in House subcommittee

14. GA-ASI and USSOCOM collaborate on ABAD Pod for MQ-9A resilience

15. Putin to meet Xi in Beijing as world convulses from global conflicts

16. America needs to lead in drone warfare

17. Should Taiwan Attempt to Replicate the Zelensky Playbook?

18. Why Iran and Israel Stepped Back From the Brink

19. A UN Trusteeship for Palestine

20. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2024

21. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 14, 2024

1. US special ops teams must cut 5,000 troops over next 5 years amid push to recruit technical experts

Excerpts:

The conflicting pressures are forcing a broader restructuring of the commando teams, which are often deployed for high-risk counterterrorism missions and other sensitive operations around the world. The changes under consideration are being influenced by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command, which bears the brunt of the personnel cuts, is eyeing plans to increase the size of its Green Beret teams — usually about 12 members — to bring in people with more specialized and technical abilities. One possibility would be the addition of computer software experts who could reprogram drones or other technical equipment on the fly.

...

Army Special Operations Command, which Fenton said is absorbing about 4,000 cuts ordered over the past year and a half, is looking at bringing in people with high-tech skills.

"I think one of the questions is how much can you teach a Green Beret versus some of these specialties are extremely technical," said Maj. Gen. Patrick Roberson, deputy commander of the command at Fort Liberty in North Carolina. "You can teach a person about how to use a drone. But then to say, I want to have a software engineer program that drone, that’s something different."

The cuts to Army special operations forces have triggered some congressional opposition, including during recent Capitol Hill hearings where lawmakers noted the impact at Fort Liberty. Fenton also spoke bluntly at the hearings about the growing demand for special operations forces.

​That which does not kill me makes me stronger. No one likes this but in five years SOF may be a better position than today.

US special ops teams must cut 5,000 troops over next 5 years amid push to recruit technical experts

foxnews.com · by Associated Press

Video

US Army launches new campaign among recruit shortage

Fox News chief national security correspondent Jennifer Griffin discusses how the Genesis health system is impacting recruiting on 'Special Report.'

Forced to do more with less and learning from the war in Ukraine, U.S. special operations commanders are juggling how to add more high-tech experts to their teams while still cutting their overall forces by about 5,000 troops over the next five years.

The conflicting pressures are forcing a broader restructuring of the commando teams, which are often deployed for high-risk counterterrorism missions and other sensitive operations around the world. The changes under consideration are being influenced by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command, which bears the brunt of the personnel cuts, is eyeing plans to increase the size of its Green Beret teams — usually about 12 members — to bring in people with more specialized and technical abilities. One possibility would be the addition of computer software experts who could reprogram drones or other technical equipment on the fly.

US MILITARY FORCES TO ESTABLISH 9 SITES ON PHILIPPINE BASES TO COUNTER CHINA THREATS

But similar changes could ripple across all the military services.

"A 12-person detachment might be upgunned," said Gen. Bryan Fenton, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. He said an Air Force pilot, Navy ship driver, cryptologist or cyber expert may be needed as battlefields become more challenging and high-tech.

He said in an interview that the U.S. is "taking a lot of lessons learned out of the experience in Ukraine," including by special operations forces working in the country. The U.S. has no troops on the ground there.

The bulk of the cuts stem from the Army's decision to reduce the size of its force by about 24,000 and restructure its troops as the U.S. shifts from counterterrorism and counterinsurgency to focus more on large-scale combat operations. The Army also has struggled to meet recruitment goals and had to reduce the overall size of its force.

U.S. special operations commanders are learning how to make fewer resources stretch further while cutting their overall forces by about 5,000 troops over the next five years. (Ken Kassens/U.S. Army via AP)

Army Special Operations Command, which Fenton said is absorbing about 4,000 cuts ordered over the past year and a half, is looking at bringing in people with high-tech skills.

"I think one of the questions is how much can you teach a Green Beret versus some of these specialties are extremely technical," said Maj. Gen. Patrick Roberson, deputy commander of the command at Fort Liberty in North Carolina. "You can teach a person about how to use a drone. But then to say, I want to have a software engineer program that drone, that’s something different."

The cuts to Army special operations forces have triggered some congressional opposition, including during recent Capitol Hill hearings where lawmakers noted the impact at Fort Liberty. Fenton also spoke bluntly at the hearings about the growing demand for special operations forces.

He said U.S. regional commanders around the world consistently want more and that cutting the forces means "we’ll be able to meet less of what they demand. And I think we owe the secretary of defense our assessment as we go forward."

For years, during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the number of special operations forces and support staff grew, particularly since they were often spread out in small, remote bases where they needed additional security and other logistical help. Now, Pentagon leaders say the numbers can shrink a bit.

Fenton said a cut of about 2,000 personnel in special operations was ordered by the department about a year and a half ago, including about 750 in the Army. That was followed this year by a cut of 3,000 in Army special operations. The cuts are to be spread out across five years.

"So the real Army reduction in totality is almost 4,000, and the remaining 1,000 will come from the joint force, SEALs, Marine raiders, other Army units," said Fenton.

For Roberson, the question is where to cut his Army troops. "Cuts have a way of crystallizing your focus and your view of, okay, what’s important to me? What’s the future? What do I really need to have," he said in an interview in his Fort Liberty office.

He and other Army leaders said a significant percentage of the special forces cuts are in slots that are already open so would not affect existing personnel. Roberson estimated that at least 30% of the cuts are in those open jobs.

For other reductions, he said he is looking for redundancies, including among trainers and instructors. Army leaders have also said that psychological operations and civil affairs, both part of the Army command, are facing cuts.

"At the end of 20 years of war, it’s always a good time to look back and say, OK, what did I have when this started? What did I learn? What did I do, what was important to me?" Roberson said.

CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

And even if all teams are not boosted in size, he said the Army needs to be able to quickly augment them with specialists. In some cases a mission might need just a couple technical support members, and other times could need six or seven, he said.

More broadly, as his forces absorb the cuts, their training must also be changed or increased to include more technology, robotics or sensors and signals intelligence information, Roberson added. Right now, he said, his troops are experimenting with the various options at the National Training Center in California and out in the field in Iraq and Syria.

Adaptability is the key, he said, and "we have to figure out how we're going to make the most of this."

foxnews.com · by Associated Press

2.  Evaluating the Strategic Expansion of Pentagon Special Ops Training for Allies Amid Global Tensions

Circular reporting but with an awkward headline.

But the amount of funding described here is budget dust. Although counterintuitive, lower numbers are easier to salami slice away. Being cost effective does not always mean that you will get the support for the initiative.

Excerpts:

The Pentagon estimates the cost of this proposed expansion of irregular warfare authorities at approximately $1.3 million per year through FY29, a relatively modest sum in the realm of defense spending. Nevertheless, this proposal’s strategic significance far outweighs its financial footprint. It represents a tangible shift in U.S. military policy, gearing towards a more proactive stance in strengthening the defensive and offensive capabilities of partner nations.

As the FY25 defense policy bill undergoes review by Congress in the weeks ahead, the implications of such a shift are considerable. If approved, this expansion could lead to a more empowered network of U.S. allies, enhanced readiness for irregular warfare scenarios, and a direct message to adversarial powers that the United States is actively fortifying its global partnerships against potential acts of aggression.

Evaluating the Strategic Expansion of Pentagon Special Ops Training for Allies Amid Global Tensions

PUBLISHED ON

MAY 13, 2024

BY

EMMA TAYLOR

trendydigests.com · May 13, 2024

The U.S. Department of Defense has recently proposed a legislative expansion of special operations authorities, a move that could significantly reshape the Pentagon’s approach to irregular warfare and the strengthening of U.S.-aligned countries. This proposition comes at a time when international tensions, notably with Russia, are on the rise, requiring a nuanced understanding of the strategic implications.

According to the Pentagon, the expansion would extend current authorities – typically associated with counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and border security – to include “resistance operations” and “foreign internal defense operations.” These definitions are pivotal in understanding the potential scope of action. Resistance operations are described as endeavors by national security forces, the government, and the populace of a country to withstand an invasion or occupation by an adversarial power. Foreign internal defense operations, meanwhile, are intended to shield a nation and its people from subversive acts sponsored by foreign entities that pose a significant threat to the governing body.

The rationale behind this proposal is multifaceted. In regions such as Scandinavia and the Baltic states, the looming threat of Russian influence and potential conflict has been acknowledged. The Pentagon contends that deliberate efforts to build partnership capacity for resistance operations are necessary to mitigate Russian threats and deter aggression. U.S. Special Operations Forces can already train and equip partner forces for certain missions under existing authorities.

The Pentagon has underscored the relative instability of some African national security infrastructures, using Kenya as a prime example. Despite growing capacities in conventional and Special Operations Forces, vulnerabilities to corruption, subversion, terrorism, and the risk of civil war are cited as areas of concern. In response, the Biden administration has committed $100 million to assist Kenyan forces in leading multinational efforts to restore stability in Haiti, albeit with delays in the construction of a base for these forces.

The Pentagon estimates the cost of this proposed expansion of irregular warfare authorities at approximately $1.3 million per year through FY29, a relatively modest sum in the realm of defense spending. Nevertheless, this proposal’s strategic significance far outweighs its financial footprint. It represents a tangible shift in U.S. military policy, gearing towards a more proactive stance in strengthening the defensive and offensive capabilities of partner nations.

As the FY25 defense policy bill undergoes review by Congress in the weeks ahead, the implications of such a shift are considerable. If approved, this expansion could lead to a more empowered network of U.S. allies, enhanced readiness for irregular warfare scenarios, and a direct message to adversarial powers that the United States is actively fortifying its global partnerships against potential acts of aggression.

Relevant articles:

– Pentagon seeks to expand special ops authorities for friendly nations, Defense News, 05/13/2024

Related

trendydigests.com · May 13, 2024

3.The power of relationships and partnerships forged by special ops by Michael K. Nagata

I missed this last week.

Excerpts:

Today, the entire U.S. military is a well-resourced and highly skilled enterprise. Amidst a world marked by escalating mistrust, instability and the proliferation of violence sponsored by both nation-states and extremists, all military branches are now urgently seeking new ways to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic advantages. Accordingly, the old saying that protecting America and her interests requires harnessing “all instruments of national power” is even more true than ever before.

U.S. special operations forces contribute to all these efforts in numerous ways. However, its enduring strength lies in its time-proven ability, skill, and enthusiasm for deliberately cultivating long-term and deep relationships. By intentionally nourishing these relationships, the special operations community aims to evolve them toward someday becoming genuine operational and strategic partnerships. In so doing, U.S. SOF enhances and enriches its contribution to all of America’s efforts to deter aggression, or should those efforts fail, to swiftly and decisively respond to threats, protect national interests and promote stability worldwide.

The power of relationships and partnerships forged by special ops

militarytimes.com · by Michael K. Nagata · May 8, 2024

In over three decades of being privileged to serve in U.S. special operations forces (SOF), I witnessed many forms of power in dozens of campaigns, battles, and other operations across four continents. These ranged from physical, kinetic power, to the use of technology, information, intelligence and others. Whether this power was tactically, operationally, or strategically employed, each form was often profoundly impressive.

And yet, I came to realize that one type of power often stood alone and, in many ways, was more important than all the rest. Ironically, it was also the least tangible or physical. Its dimensions cannot by measured by a micrometer, or its existence weighed on any scale. Indeed, its strength lies in the fact that it is deeply emotional, psychological, and highly personal.

This vital form of intangible power originates from the thoughtful, deliberate, and persistent creation of relationships that lead to partnerships, and this intentional effort is irreplaceable for advancing and protecting U.S. national security interests. The history of special operations in the U.S. is replete with examples that demonstrate how vital this can be, and I offer two specific examples that are illuminating and instructive.

As a very young Army Special Forces officer in the 1980′s oriented on the Pacific region, my colleagues and I frequently deployed to train with the Philippine Scout Rangers, the Philippine Marines, and other formations of their armed forces. This cultivated a broad network of strong friendships that flourished on both sides for decades. When relations between the U.S. and the Philippines significantly dwindled after 1991 because of the closure of Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base as U.S. installations, the American-Philippines relationship deteriorated even more sharply during the six years President Duterte was in office. And yet, the personal bonds of friendship and shared experiences between U.S. special operations forces and the Armed Forces of the Philippines endured, however informally. Subsequently, in 2014 when the Islamic State dramatically emerged to threaten the Philippines, this enduring informal network of American special operators and Philippine military personnel became indispensable in combating this threat by enabling a very rapid renewal of a strong and effective operational partnership. This was most vividly demonstrated during the battle for Marawi City in Mindanao, and ultimately enabled the Philippines to defeat ISIS. Strong relationships continue to pay dividends today to enable an ever-stronger strategic partnership between the U.S. and the Philippines in their combined efforts to contest China, which blasted water cannons at Philippine vessels and rammed one carrying Philippine Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Romeo Brawner in December 2023.

Another powerful example flows from the counter-ISIS fight in Iraq and Syria. After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, special operations personnel spent years in combat alongside both the Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi special operators combatting insurgents and Al-Qaeda networks. This led to deep personal bonds of trust and affection across these forces that endured for years and remained intact long after the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011. Then, in 2014 when ISIS suddenly emerged to seize the city of Mosul and begin marching toward Baghdad, the hasty redeployment of American special operations forces into Iraq quickly became operationally and strategically effective because of the enduring relationships between these forces, despite years of physical separation. Both the Peshmerga and Iraqi operators welcomed their American counterparts with open arms, and neither side had to waste time in developing trust or having to learn about what each side had to contribute to the fight. Instead, all were able to join forces rapidly and effectively in a committed partnership that endures to this day.

These examples illustrate how strategically irreplaceable these deeply committed relationships can be, and how they can blossom into strategic partnerships. The special operations community always appreciates that such relationships in another land require long-term investments of time, demonstrated reliability, and persistent presence whenever possible. Doing so, simply put, is part of SOF’s “DNA.”

Just as importantly, these SOF practices can provide invaluable advantages, opportunities, and outcomes for more than just U.S. military goals. For decades, U.S. SOF has deliberately invested in consistent integration and collaboration with many other U.S. agencies and departments, ranging from intelligence agencies to the State Department and its foreign service, and beyond. Today, a vast network of personal relationships persists between U.S. SOF and dozens of U.S. interagency partner organizations. In many cases, these relationships were initiated during deployments in combat environments over the past two decades. Most importantly, just as this practice enabled U.S. SOF to develop strategic partnerships with global actors, so has this practice with other agencies fostered genuine operational and strategic partnerships that directly enable both U.S. SOF, and these civilian agencies, to become far more effective.

Today, the entire U.S. military is a well-resourced and highly skilled enterprise. Amidst a world marked by escalating mistrust, instability and the proliferation of violence sponsored by both nation-states and extremists, all military branches are now urgently seeking new ways to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic advantages. Accordingly, the old saying that protecting America and her interests requires harnessing “all instruments of national power” is even more true than ever before.

U.S. special operations forces contribute to all these efforts in numerous ways. However, its enduring strength lies in its time-proven ability, skill, and enthusiasm for deliberately cultivating long-term and deep relationships. By intentionally nourishing these relationships, the special operations community aims to evolve them toward someday becoming genuine operational and strategic partnerships. In so doing, U.S. SOF enhances and enriches its contribution to all of America’s efforts to deter aggression, or should those efforts fail, to swiftly and decisively respond to threats, protect national interests and promote stability worldwide.

Retired Army Lt. Gen. Michael K. Nagata, enlisted in 1982, attended Army Officer Candidate School and later volunteered for U.S. Army Special Forces. Throughout his 38-year career, he served in many special operations and interagency roles, participating in dozens of contingency and combat operations abroad. His final assignment was Director of Strategic Operational Planning at the National Counterterrorism Center. Today, he works as the strategic advisor and senior vice president for CACI International, a defense and technology company that provides significant capabilities and assistance for U.S. SOF and other national security needs.

4. US Commander Suggests UK Special Forces Are Active in Ukraine

Excerpts:

The covert operations of Western military units in Ukraine have been long speculated, with increasing discussions about the possibility for Western countries to engage more openly militarily in Ukraine. French President Emmanuel Macron has even considered the possibility of deploying French troops.

A spokesperson for the Ministry of Defence stated, "It is a consistent policy not to discuss UK Special Forces operations."

The UK's special forces network includes elite units such as the Special Air Service, the Special Boat Service, the Special Reconnaissance Regiment, the Special Forces Support Group, the 18th Signal Regiment, and the Joint Special Forces Aviation Wing.

Reports from The Times of London in April 2022 indicated that UK special forces were in Ukraine to help train Ukrainian recruits on British-supplied anti-tank NLAW missiles. A senior European defense official confirmed to the Financial Times in February, "The presence of Western special forces in Ukraine is an open secret, although not officially acknowledged."

US Commander Suggests UK Special Forces Are Active in Ukraine

armyrecognition.com · by Vandenbosch

• Defense News Army 2024

A US commander has hinted that UK special forces are involved in Ukraine. In an interview with The Associated Press on May 12, 2024, General Bryan Fenton, head of US Special Operations Command, discussed the valuable lessons learned from the experience of UK special forces currently in Ukraine. The UK Ministry of Defence has chosen not to comment on these observations.

Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link

Soldiers of the British Army and Groupement des Commandos Parachutiste (GCP), the advance forces of 16 Air Assault Brigade and 11e Brigade Parachutiste train together on Exercise Falcon Amarante in France. (Picture source: UK MoD)

General Fenton discussed plans to adapt Green Beret teams based on strategies learned from their British counterparts in Ukraine, suggesting enhancements such as the inclusion of cyber experts, Air Force pilots, or cryptologists in these teams. He emphasized that these modifications are directly derived from lessons learned in Ukraine, primarily through the expertise of UK special operations partners. These partners have quickly integrated additional roles, realizing the need for broader joint force support.

General Fenton also mentioned that British commandos had consulted Royal Air Force pilots for drone operations and had sought guidance from naval personnel to better understand naval maneuvers in the Black Sea.

The covert operations of Western military units in Ukraine have been long speculated, with increasing discussions about the possibility for Western countries to engage more openly militarily in Ukraine. French President Emmanuel Macron has even considered the possibility of deploying French troops.

A spokesperson for the Ministry of Defence stated, "It is a consistent policy not to discuss UK Special Forces operations."

The UK's special forces network includes elite units such as the Special Air Service, the Special Boat Service, the Special Reconnaissance Regiment, the Special Forces Support Group, the 18th Signal Regiment, and the Joint Special Forces Aviation Wing.

Reports from The Times of London in April 2022 indicated that UK special forces were in Ukraine to help train Ukrainian recruits on British-supplied anti-tank NLAW missiles. A senior European defense official confirmed to the Financial Times in February, "The presence of Western special forces in Ukraine is an open secret, although not officially acknowledged."

President Macron, speaking to The Economist, expressed openness to deploying French troops under certain conditions, emphasizing the unpredictable nature of the conflict and the potential for increased involvement. Russia has responded strongly to such proposals, with former Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev threatening to use nuclear weapons against any NATO countries intervening militarily in Ukraine.

General Fenton also shared additional challenges faced by US special operations commanders, including the need to manage budget cuts while incorporating more high-tech experts into their teams. The US Army's special forces, which are facing a reduction of about 5,000 troops over the next five years, are considering increasing the size of their Green Beret teams to include more specialized and technical skills. These changes are occurring amidst conflicting pressures due to overall force reductions and the evolving requirements of modern military operations.

• Prev
• Next

armyrecognition.com · by Vandenbosch

5. The US is still falling behind on electronic warfare, special operators warn

Excerpts:

But SOCOM isn’t looking to use space for just communications. The command already has its own small satellite, called MISR, to collect signals intelligence, and it is looking to create more SOCOM-specific satellites.

“This is really a demonstration of SOF-unique payloads to look at taking some of the systems from all the other [program management] shops and looking at how you would migrate those to space,” said the second official.

Said Nagata, mastering low-earth-orbit satellite communications is crucial to U.S. military operations in the face of Russian electromagnetic interference. But perhaps the two most important things that the United States can do is simply innovate the way it acquires things and better incentivize the military to take more risks, he said.

“The U.S. government, particularly its leadership—from senior military officers all the way to civilian policymakers–we have to be willing to take more risk in experimenting with, adopting and employing new technologies. We will invite failure along the way. But if you're not willing to fail, you're not going to succeed.”

The US is still falling behind on electronic warfare, special operators warn

New space and low-power solutions are needed to operate against modern jamming.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

The U.S. military is “still falling behind” its potential adversaries in electronic warfare, one former three-star special operator said last week at SOF Week conference in Tampa, Florida—and he wasn’t the only one.

“The gap between where the United States should be and where we are, in my judgment, continues to expand not everywhere, but in far too many places,” said Mike Nagata, a retired Army lieutenant general who led special operations in the Middle East and is now a senior vice president for CACI International.

If the Pentagon is to regain its advantage in a warfare domain that is only growing in importance, Nagata said, it needs to get more creative in its use of radio technologies, particularly space-based communications.

Nagata is hardly the first to sound the alarm. In 2022, the National Defense Strategy Commission said that the United States is “losing its advantages in electronic warfare, hindering the nation’s ability to conduct military operations against capable adversaries.”

That sentiment was reinforced by two recently retired special-operations personnel who work in electronic warfare. One reason that Russia is so far ahead, they said, is simply that Moscow chooses to ignore international law against jamming civilian telecommunications. But the Kremlin has also consistently invested and experimented in electromagnetic innovation in decades when U.S. EW efforts were focused on gathering intelligence in the relatively permissive environments of wars in the Middle East.

The war in Ukraine is revealing just how good modern Russian EW gear is—against American weapons. Russian jamming has decreased the “efficiency rate” of GPS-guided Excalibur 155mm artillery from 70 percent to 6 percent, Daniel Patt, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, told lawmakers this month. Drones, small-diameter bombs, and some communications systems have proven similarly vulnerable.

At SOF Week, U.S. special operators walked the floors in search of answers. Officials with U.S. Special Operations Command’s Tactical Information Systems told industry representatives they want help for two key programs. The first, the Satellite Deployable Node program, helps connect troops on the battlefield to space-based datalinks.

The second, the Tactical Local Area Network program, aims to put the computing power of entire server racks into a more portable form, which could help operators in the field find unjammed frequencies to use.

“Both these programs are largely dependent on commercial-off-the-shelf equipment. Therefore, we're at the mercy of you guys to make things smaller, lighter and faster,” said the first official.

He might also have said “cooler and less power-hungry,” to hide them from enemy sensors.

One company already working with the broader international special operations community (but declined to say SOCOM specifically) is GoTenna, a mobile mesh network that uses radio to allow short, low-energy communications bursts for chat, messaging, and location.

“One of the problems that we realized from discussions with this community was that those are high-energy signatures, particularly [satellite communications.] Starlink and Starshield [the military version of Starlink] are all high-energy systems,” said Chris Boyd, GoTenna’s Vice President of Product.

The GoTenna unit, about the size of a sunglasses case, can connect satellite or cellular networks, allowing communications at vast distances at low power (at least from the perspective of the operator trying to remain invisible). Company officials offered a demonstration in which two users, some 532 miles apart, connected over a 7-kilohertz, 100-watt channel. The operator can also select or move around the spectrum to find empty channels and unused wavelengths.

Creative workarounds like that will be key to using high-energy satellite communications in a way that won’t get troops targeted. And SOCOM is eager to acquire more satellite communications.

“We're looking at many variants, looking for redundancy,” a second official said, adding that such satellites might fly in geostationary, medium-Earth, or low-Earth orbits. “You'll see some offerings in the next few months coming out...Gone are the days that we used to operate SATCOM from a fixed location. We are now extending that to a moving platform on the way to the objective, which is really changing the landscape of how we do communications.”

But SOCOM isn’t looking to use space for just communications. The command already has its own small satellite, called MISR, to collect signals intelligence, and it is looking to create more SOCOM-specific satellites.

“This is really a demonstration of SOF-unique payloads to look at taking some of the systems from all the other [program management] shops and looking at how you would migrate those to space,” said the second official.

Said Nagata, mastering low-earth-orbit satellite communications is crucial to U.S. military operations in the face of Russian electromagnetic interference. But perhaps the two most important things that the United States can do is simply innovate the way it acquires things and better incentivize the military to take more risks, he said.

“The U.S. government, particularly its leadership—from senior military officers all the way to civilian policymakers–we have to be willing to take more risk in experimenting with, adopting and employing new technologies. We will invite failure along the way. But if you're not willing to fail, you're not going to succeed.”

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

6. UN Admits Hamas Lied on Casualty Numbers; But the Damage Is Done

A lie travels around the world before the truth can get its pants on. Let's see how many media outlets report on this story.

That said, even the accurate numbers are still a terrible tragedy.

UN Admits Hamas Lied on Casualty Numbers; But the Damage Is Done

algemeiner.com

UN Admits Hamas Lied on Casualty Numbers; But the Damage Is Done - Algemeiner.com

May 14, 2024 10:48 am

× [contact-form-7 404 “Not Found”]

by Shoshana Bryen

Opinion

An Israeli tank maneuvers, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, near the Israel-Gaza Border, in southern Israel, May 7, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen

Numbers are funny things.

After shouting about Israel and “genocide” — and touting Hamas’ casualty numbers with no verification and obvious flaws — the UN changed its mind this weekend. The old numbers (up to May 6, 2024) looked like this:

• 34,735 dead, including over 9,500 women and over 14,500 children. [You could, if you wished, extrapolate the number of men/terrorists, but the UN wasn’t going to help you.]

The new numbers (May 8, 2024) are:

• 24,686 people, including 10,006 men, 4,959 women, and 7,797 children

The UN blames “the fog of war.” Baloney.

There is always fog, but the UN acceptance of Hamas casualty figures led directly to South Africa’s complaint to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing Israel of genocide. The ICJ declined to say there was genocide, but Israel was still smeared again across the international media.

The UN and others ignored the work of John Spencer, Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at West Point, and a follower of the nuances and statistics of Israel’s war in Gaza. He has given a master class over the past six month on evaluating military to civilian casualties in urban warfare, and the unprecedented steps that Israel took to minimize those casualties.

His numbers boil down to this:

The current (March 31) Hamas-supplied estimate of over 31,000 does not acknowledge a single combatant death (nor any deaths due to the misfiring of its own rockets or other friendly fire). The IDF estimates it has killed about 13,000 Hamas operatives, which would mean some 18,000 civilians had died, a ratio of roughly 1 combatant to 1.5 civilians. Given Hamas’ likely inflation of the death count, the real figure could be closer to 1 to 1. Either way, the number would be historically low for modern urban warfare.

According to other sources, Spencer notes, civilians usually account for 80-90 percent of casualties, or a 1:9 ratio, in modern war (though this does mix all types of wars). In the 2016-2017 Battle of Mosul, the AP reported some 10,000 civilians were killed compared to roughly 4,000 ISIS terrorists.

How did it happen that theoretically neutral/reliable sources including the AP, Reuters, NPR, the UN itself swallowed those blatantly false Hamas numbers whole and ignored an actual expert in the field?

Oxfam reported that the death rate in Gaza was higher than any other major conflict in the 20th century.

On October 7, Hamas and its friends entered Israel and killed 1,163 people — a verified number. The victims included a baby who died 14 hours after birth, and a 94-year-old woman. The world was horrified by the numbers and the manner of their death, which included rape, torture, and the burning of people alive.

The world was similarly horrified to discover that 240 people, including Americans, had been dragged into Gaza — most living but some already dead.

Israel’s initial military response was met with a degree of understanding around the world.

Hamas had a dilemma — but also a war strategy to turn the tables.

Having built its military infrastructure under streets, houses, schools, mosques, and UNRWA facilities, Hamas was assured that Israeli action to clear those spaces of terrorist operatives would kill the human shields sitting above. (Especially after Hamas warned Gazans not to flee and fired on Palestinian civilians using the “safe passage” route.)

In fact, Hamas planned it that way. The more civilians that died, the more Israel would be seen as an out-of-control monster, killing the defenseless in retribution. Committing “genocide.”

And Hamas’ strategy worked.

The first big test was at the Al-Ahli Hospital, where an explosion killed people outside the building. The Gaza Health Ministry (run by Hamas) claimed 500 dead from an Israeli air strike on a protected site. Media around the world went with it. Later evidence showed it was caused by an errant Palestinian rocket aiming for Israel, and that the casualty figure was closer to 50 than 500.

At that point, the “narrative” changed: “I don’t think the question will ever get fully resolved using open source intelligence,” an assistant professor of political science opined. If actual evidence won’t let you blame Israel and politics won’t let you blame Hamas, best to call it foggy and move on.

That’s how it worked. And the numbers caused the flood.

In January, it was the ICJ.

In February, President Biden said Israel’s response was “over the top,” and began to institute sanctions on individual Israelis and Israeli companies that he intimated were only the beginning.

And, indeed, in May, as Israel geared up for the Rafah battle, the administration announced the withholding of weapons already approved for delivery by Congress. There was also the blackmail/bribe strategy of offering Israel intelligence information if it would limit its incursion. The UN vote elevating Palestinian status was likely a way member states could slap at Israel without repercussions.

Israel is likely to do what it has to do to defend its people. The UN through UNRWA has already shown itself to be an accessory to Hamas and a participant in Hamas war crimes — both in Israel and against its own people. Later, when the “fog of war” dissipates, and the outcomes are closer to the John Spencer model than the Hamas model, the UN should find itself in the dock.

The number change is an attempt to deflect its guilt.

Shoshana Bryen is Senior Director of The Jewish Policy Center and Editor of inFOCUS Quarterly.

algemeiner.com

7. Army Officer Resigns in Protest of ‘Unqualified’ U.S. Support to Israel

He was "enabling policies."

Army Officer Resigns in Protest of ‘Unqualified’ U.S. Support to Israel - The New York Times

nytimes.com · by John Ismay · May 14, 2024

Army Officer Resigns in Protest of ‘Unqualified’ U.S. Support to Israel

While assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency, Maj. Harrison Mann said he was enabling policies that violated his conscience.

As the death toll in Gaza has risen, the Biden administration has faced waves of internal dissent for supporting Israel in the war.

By John Ismay

Reporting from Washington

Published May 13, 2024Updated May 14, 2024, 2:52 p.m. ET

An Army officer assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency has resigned in protest over the United States’ support for Israel, which he said had “enabled and empowered” the killing of Palestinian civilians.

The officer, Maj. Harrison Mann, announced his resignation and explained his reasons for leaving the service in a post on the social media site LinkedIn on Monday. According to his biography on the site, he has specialized in the Middle East and Africa for about half of his 13-year career and previously served at the U.S. Embassy in Tunis.

“The policy that has never been far from my mind for the past six months is the nearly unqualified support for the government of Israel, which has enabled and empowered the killing and starvation of tens of thousands of innocent Palestinians,” Major Mann wrote in the post, which noted that he had emailed his comments to co-workers on April 16. “This unconditional support also encourages reckless escalation that risks wider war.”

Reached by phone on Monday, Major Mann confirmed that he was the author of the post but declined to comment further, referring questions to the D.I.A.’s office of corporate communications.

An image from Maj. Harrison Mann’s LinkedIn profile.

It is unclear whether other military officers have resigned in protest of U.S. foreign policy since the deadly Hamas-led attacks in Israel in October ignited the war, but the resignation of an active-duty officer in protest of U.S. foreign policy is most likely uncommon — especially one in which the officer makes public the reasons for doing so.

A spokeswoman for the Army was not immediately able to confirm whether other officers had resigned for similar reasons since the war began.

As the death toll in Gaza has risen, the Biden administration has faced waves of internal dissent for supporting Israel in the war. In October, Josh Paul, a State Department official in the bureau that oversees arms transfers, resigned in protest of the administration’s decision to continue sending weapons to Israel.

Major Mann said that he had planned to leave the Army “at some point” but that the Gaza war led him to submit his resignation in November and leave his assignment at the D.I.A. early.

Lt. Col. Ruth Castro, an Army spokeswoman, said his request was approved on Jan. 8 and would become effective on June 3.

According to his LinkedIn profile, Major Mann became an infantry officer after receiving his commission in 2011, then studied at the Army’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center in North Carolina and qualified as a civil affairs officer in 2016. About three years later, his biography states, he became a foreign area officer specializing in the Middle East.

Regional specialists are often posted at American embassies and may serve as defense attachés, who act as high-level liaisons between the Pentagon and the host nation’s military. Attachés also are trained to evaluate requests for weapons and training from foreign powers and make recommendations to State Department officials as to whether providing such aid is necessary and in line with federal laws on protecting human rights.

In his note, Major Mann said he had continued to carry out his duties at the Defense Intelligence Agency without voicing his concerns, hoping that the war would soon be over.

“I told myself my individual contribution was minimal, and that if I didn’t do my job, someone else would, so why cause a stir for nothing?” he wrote.

“My work here — however administrative or marginal it appeared — has unquestionably contributed to that support,” his post said. “The past months have presented us with the most horrific and heartbreaking images imaginable — sometimes playing on the news in our own spaces — and I have been unable to ignore the connection between those images and my duties here. This caused me incredible shame and guilt.”

“At some point — whatever the justification — you’re either advancing a policy that enables the mass starvation of children, or you’re not,” he added.

“I know that I did, in my small way, wittingly advance that policy,” the major wrote. “And I want to clarify that as the descendant of European Jews, I was raised in a particularly unforgiving moral environment when it came to the topic of bearing responsibility for ethnic cleansing.”

is a reporter covering the Pentagon for The Times. He served as an explosive ordnance disposal officer in the U.S. Navy.

A version of this article appears in print on  , Section A, Page 8 of the New York edition with the headline: Army Officer Resigns Post Over Israel. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

See more on: Israel-Hamas War News

nytimes.com · by John Ismay · May 14, 2024

8. The arsenal of democracy is running low on gunpowder

Excerpt:

While we can’t know for sure what future conflicts lie ahead, we do know what gaps exist in our supply chain capabilities today — and we can address them. Congress must back the commonsense approach of the Ammunition Supply Chain Act and enable American manufacturers to replenish our gunpowder supply to counter a growing Chinese advantage.

The arsenal of democracy is running low on gunpowder - Washington Examiner

ByRobert Pittenger

Washington Examiner · May 14, 2024

While the fallout from the war in Ukraine maintains its standing among our national headlines, there’s a critical issue that hasn’t yet reached the nightly news: in the middle of the largest land war since World War II and a substantial conflict in the Middle East, the United States is running low on modern gunpowder.

The United States has long held on to air, sea, and land superiority over our adversaries because of our arsenal, technological advancements, and the incredible achievements of our service members. However, the war in Ukraine and supply-sourcing complications have placed a significant strain on our ability to produce modern gunpowder. As a result, nitrocellulose, or “guncotton,” a key production material for modern gunpowder, is becoming increasingly scarce here at home.

Just how concerned should we be? Amid growing conflicts abroad, the lag in supply is an alarming national security concern. Even at levels six times current production, it would take years to replenish U.S. ammunition arsenals, according to researchers. That creates real vulnerabilities in our military capabilities.

Even more concerning, China is emerging as the foremost producer of guncotton. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has led to a depletion of global supplies, furthering China’s production dominance. This position enables China to bolster the Russian military and ultimately advance the CCP’s long-term objectives.

According to a recent Financial Times article, Russia’s imports of nitrocellulose from China saw a substantial increase last year, jumping from $3.4 million in 2022 to $7.18 million within just the first 10 months of 2023 — a move that has undoubtedly extended Russia’s capabilities and foreshadows China’s ability to exert influence amid a conflict.

Weaponizing economic fault lines is nothing new for China. In fact, during my time in Congress, I led the charge to expose and counter malign Chinese investments here in the United States, and for years have raised concerns about Chinese investments and influence on critical supply chains.

To address the growing threat of the supply shortage, Congress must prioritize nitrocellulose production. Thankfully, Sen. Jim Risch (R-ID) and Rep. Tom Emmer (R-MN) had the diligence to do just that. Their now-introduced legislation, the Ammunition Supply Chain Act, is designed to identify and address faults in the gunpowder supply chain. In turn, this would enable ammo manufacturers to resolve a national issue before it becomes a national security crisis. The commonsense approach of the bill has led to broad support from across the industry, with backing from Vista Outdoor and the National Shooting Sports Foundation.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM RESTORING AMERICA

An old military maxim attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte holds, “One can remain 24 or, if necessary, 36 hours without eating, but one cannot remain three minutes without gunpowder.” In the age of the French empire, just as in our modern age, success on the battlefield can depend on the strength and consistency of supply lines.

While we can’t know for sure what future conflicts lie ahead, we do know what gaps exist in our supply chain capabilities today — and we can address them. Congress must back the commonsense approach of the Ammunition Supply Chain Act and enable American manufacturers to replenish our gunpowder supply to counter a growing Chinese advantage.

Robert Pittenger is a former U.S. representative for North Carolina and the founder and chairman of the Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum (PI-SF). He served as chairman of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, and as vice chairman of the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Terrorism and Illicit Finance.

Washington Examiner · May 14, 2024

9. How Cobra Gold Helps the US Strengthen Its Indo-Pacific Partnerships

As an aside I heard a rumor that LTG Brunson is being considered as the next commander of the ROK/US CFC. I think it would be unusual for a Corps commander to take over Korea so I rate the information as relatively low probability.  The only other rumors I have heard are LTG Braga at USASOC and the General LaCamera will remain in command for another year. Seeing as how we have not heard any credible rumors of a replacement, it seems reasonable given the strategic situation in Korea that general LaCamera remains in command for another year.

How Cobra Gold Helps the US Strengthen Its Indo-Pacific Partnerships

thediplomat.com

Through combined exercises and enduring engagements, the United States is building “deterrence through assurance.”

By Xavier Brunson and Cody Chick

May 14, 2024

Thai, South Korean, and U.S. Marines conduct a combined joint amphibious exercise during COBRA GOLD.

Credit: Cody Chick

Contested waters in the South China Sea, the war in Ukraine, and escalating tensions between great power rivals have all created opportunities for the United States to strengthen its alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. Since 2022, the National Defense Strategy has established integrated deterrence as the framework for strengthening alliances, providing an adversary-focused approach to comprehensive security. Integral to the success of deterrence is providing “integrated assurance,” a campaign to “assure” partners and allies through security cooperation to reinforce joint, multinational partnerships that can credibly deter rivals.

As Gen. Charles Flynn and Lt.-Col. Tim Devine wrote in a recent piece for Proceedings on land-naval integration, “The Army is consequently fostering unity of effort by welcoming others with skin in the game and helping them build more credible means to support shared national interests on land and at sea. Campaigning as a combined joint force allows the United States and its allies to apply unity of effort to achieve common objectives.”

Exercise Cobra Gold stands out as a case study that can illustrate the importance of campaigning to build integrated assurance, and takes place within a network of enduring engagements that are critical to understanding regional challenges and supporting military-to-military relations. As the risk of conflict may increase within the Indo-Pacific, it becomes more critical than ever to communicate U.S. commitment to regional partners to build a shared investment for security cooperation.

Integrated Assurance

Integrated assurance is the other side of the coin from integrated deterrence. Deterrence tends to be threat-based, focused on denial and then on inflicting punishment or other costs if an aggressive action is taken. Integrated assurance, meanwhile, is partner-focused, physically posturing, protecting, and sustaining U.S. people and resources alongside those of friendly nations. This builds tangible trust and mutual responsibility to provide security for shared interests. Integrated assurance deepens diplomatic, military, economic, information, and technological cooperation and in turn can feed the capabilities for punishment or denial through deterrence.

Integrated assurance translates the integrated deterrence approach articulated in national strategy into an actionable, ground-level framework. It deters adversaries at the strategic level by materially focusing on partners and allies at the tactical and operational levels, building mutual understanding and human interoperability. Within military campaigning, joint exercises and security cooperation provide integrated assurance through training and relationship building while supporting strategic ends with a combat credible force.

This assurance can only be done through showing commitment — the commitment of time, resources, and service members to support allies and partners in response to shared opportunities and threats. Integrated assurance provides the connective tissue that ties the strategic framework to purposeful understanding at the tactical level.

Moreover, integrated assurance is the linchpin to effective campaigning. It is one of the distinctions that would make an infantry platoon training with NATO allies during the Cold War understand their overarching purpose, while units elsewhere during the relatively peaceful 1990s may have struggled to understand how their combined training made a tangible difference. While the United States military has participated in multinational exercises for years, the focus on campaigning has concentrated efforts to have purposeful, incremental engagements that are mutually supporting and have a clear shared end-state.

This type of assurance moves horizontally between nations and forms of national power, and vertically by providing meaningful interactions, from cooperation between senior leaders down to join training between service-members at the tactical level. The foreign academy exchange program at West Point is one example of how key military leader relations can be first developed and consistently fostered in an officer’s career through annual exercises like Cobra Gold to provide integrated assurance. These continual engagements build friendships and personal connections that can be instrumental in shaping pro-U.S. military policies for senior leaders and trust between units in time of conflict. During steady state operations, the U.S. military primarily competes through combined exercises and enduring engagements with partners to build integrated assurance.

Key Security Cooperation partnerships

Exercise Cobra Gold, most recently held during February 27-March 8 in Thailand, serves as a tactical platform for facilitating military-to-military interactions and creating greater integrated assurance. In the most recent iteration, there were 10 participating nations: Thailand, the United States, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, China, India, and Australia. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, joint multinational exercises have only grown and provide additional opportunities for militaries to work together.

On a tactical level, exercises are necessary to demonstrate commitment, building interoperability and readiness. On a strategic level, it signals a positive trend in coalitions and international affairs within the region. At Cobra Gold, each member of the Quad (the United States, Australia, India and Japan) were present, as well as the Republic of Korea (ROK) which has gradually warmed relations with Japan as demonstrated in the trilateral security pact summit at Camp David in August 2023. One measure of cooperation is identifying how many interactions certain countries have (or not) at the tactical level.

Cobra Gold focuses on a multinational force command post exercise (MNF-CPX), combined joint field training exercises, senior leader seminars, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). During the most recent iteration of Cobra Gold, India, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Australia limited their participation to the humanitarian and civic assistance portion. Yet, several key Cobra Gold events highlighted growing cooperation between countries.

The largest training portion in Cobra Gold is the MNF-CPX, in which each of the major contributing countries participated. Within the MNF-CPX, seven nations participated in solving a notional regional crisis with the intent of broadening mutual understanding of capabilities and limitations, developing interoperability, and building relationships. This exercise emphasized large-scale combat operations and maritime security within a multi-domain environment. Command post exercises are not superfluous to the U.S. Army Pacific’s approach to campaigning. Rather, “collectively, Operation Pathways combines individual and tactical actions to solve operational and strategic problems.” The MNF-CPX offered a chance to observe interactions between each country’s staffs, as well as providing first-hand accounts from service members about today’s security challenges and insights into growing partnerships.

During the Cyber Exercise of Cobra Gold, U.S., Japanese, and South Korean service-members integrated operating practices to conduct a combined digital defense. Photo provided by Cody Chick.

Japan-ROK Relations

Relations between Japan and South Korea continue to stabilize in response to growing regional threats. During Cobra Gold, both countries participated in civic assistance projects, the ROK conducted a combined amphibious exercise with the Thai and U.S. Marines, and all three members of the trilateral security pact shared a table for the cyber exercise.

Outside of Cobra Gold, Japan and South Korea have traditionally conducted some form of tactical hedging due to economic coupling with the PRC, but both have also made various public commitments to increasing security cooperation with the United States. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted Japan to normalize its military, increasing its capability and scope to deter aggression.

Likewise, an unprecedented amount of newly sophisticated North Korean missile tests and a growing hostility by the PRC in the region have signaled the need for Japan and South Korea to present a unified front. Unlike anything in the past decade, Japan, South Korea, and the United States held 30 trilateral meetings between August and December 2023. Mechanisms put in place at the Camp David Summit in August 2023 were finalized, as countries established a multi-year military exercise plan and a joint alert system for any potential threats. In response to a missile launch by North Korea in December 2023, the United States held trilateral military drills with South Korea and Japan that included U.S. long-range bombers and fighter jets from both allies.

By all accounts, Japan and South Korea have made exceptional strides as leaders have aligned security interests, enabling integrated assurance that develops the human and military domain at the tactical and operational level.

Competitors, Together

Unlike many other multinational exercises, the Thai-led Cobra Gold exercise brings competitors together for civic assistance and HA/DR. During the civic assistance project, American, Thai, Malaysian, and Chinese engineers worked together to erect a new multi-purpose facility at a local school in Prachinburi province. Service members spent the bulk of their days constructing the facility and engaged in cultural events at night to build understanding and comradery. In military units that are often insular, these exchanges provided the soldiers with an appreciation for the complexity of cultural differences and commonalities.

The U.S. component was led by First Lt. Tyler Clarke, an Army Reserve officer from 871st Engineer Company in Hawaii. Clarke has been a carpenter for years and was grateful for the experience. Reflecting on the project, Clarke said “There was an eagerness or excitement from everyone that I wasn’t expecting, to get to know each other and work together, especially among the junior enlisted. I think there was an unspoken awareness of how rare of an opportunity it was for these soldiers to work side by side, and they genuinely wanted to get to know one another.”

Isolated as they were to a small village in Thailand, service members from all four countries built bonds through shared experience, away from the weight of political tensions that burden the strategic level and hinder collaboration.

For Thailand, a security ally of the United States that has a close economic relationship with China, such events underscore the value of engaging in collaboration, wherever possible. Unlike during the Cold War, which had clear lines of distinction between adversaries and allies, the great power competition of today operates in a more ambiguous environment where partners often hedge their interests between competitors. At the construction site, the interactions between Chinese soldiers and U.S. allies highlighted the dynamics of balancing relationships and extending opportunities to work together.

While Cobra Gold is coordinated by Thailand, it represents an increased opening in the lines of communications between the U.S. and PRC. Communication between competitors is critical to de-escalate conflict and coordinate in a crisis or HA/DR environment within the region.

Enduring Engagements by SOF, SFABs, and SPPs

Beyond and behind these large multinational exercises are enduring bilateral engagements by special operations forces, Security Force Assistance Brigades, and the State Partnership Program, which pairs individual U.S. state national guards with foreign partners.

Special operations forces (SOFs) have contributed a significant amount to security cooperation through their dedicated focus on foreign internal defense (FID). They have maintained the lead in conducting the military portion of FID and conduct engagements worldwide. Within Cobra Gold, U.S. special operations forces conducted combined training with Thai special forces and the Japanese Special Operations Group.

In Thailand, the First Special Forces Group works closely with the Royal Thai Army Special Warfare Schoolhouse to advise and assist. Enduring engagements by units like SOFs demonstrate trust and commitment to integrated assurance.

Likewise, Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) maintain a persistent presence with partner forces that transcends annual exercises and events. The 5th SFAB has been assisting Royal Thai Army Stryker units after receiving new vehicles at the Non-Commissioned Officer’s Academy and the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy.

Integration at key development schools and with operational units builds generational assurance to U.S. military support. Maintaining continuous touchpoints with counterparts enables large military exercises. Lessons learned in one year can be re-trained and emphasized through enduring engagements, so units are better prepared and operating at a higher level by the next year.

Multinational civilian and military groups prepare for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Photo provided by Cody Chick.

Working in tandem with Cobra Gold, the State Partnership Program (SPP) increases security cooperation by regional emphasis. During Cobra Gold, the Washington State National Guard took the lead as the U.S. representatives in the HA/DR demonstration. Unlike conventional military units whose leaders change every one to three years, National Guard units allow for long-term relations between military leaders, adding another layer to integrated assurance. Col. Michael Ake, the chief of staff for the Washington State National Guard Joint Force Headquarters, has interfaced with his Thai partners in Cobra Gold for the past 14 years.

In response to the SPP’s unique role, Ake said “Our [Nation Guard] service members have a broad level of expertise and experience from their civilian occupations that is value added to any mission- particularly in the HA/DR lines of effort.”

One clear demonstration of the SPP’s potential can be drawn from Europe. Like SOFs, the National Guard had a consistent role through SPP in training with Ukrainian forces prior to the Russian invasion in 2022.

Enduring engagements are critical to understanding regional challenges and supporting military-to-military relations. In Thailand, U.S. Special Forces have close ties with SOF partners through more than 50 years of engagements; meanwhile, the 5th SFAB and the SPP have provided means for conventional units to establish consistency towards integrated assurance. Improving interoperability is done at the technical, operational, and human levels but must be in conjunction with integrated assurance and a shared understanding. Increased engagements can also lead to foreign military sales, ultimately feeding increased interoperability and diversified placement for certain equipment in the circumstance of denied logistics.

Conclusion

Exercise Cobra Gold provides a platform for regional partners to build military cooperation and interoperability to foster integrated assurance. The United States utilizes combined exercises and enduring engagements as key components to campaigning within the Indo-Pacific. Integrated assurance provides credibility, commitment and resolve to partners and allies, directly tying into the ability to build cohesive coalitions that effectively deter. Constant campaigning through the Indo-Pacific at joint and multinational levels facilitates constant partner touchpoints along with units that maintain a persistent presence with host nations. While tactical in nature, each engagement over time builds generational trust and equity, and brings regional partners to the table that share larger strategic aims.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Naval Postgraduate School, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Authors

Guest Author

Xavier Brunson

Lt.-Gen. Xavier Brunson is the commanding general of I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. Previously, he commanded the 7th Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord. He entered active duty in 1990 and has commanded at multiple levels in both conventional and special operations forces in combat. He holds two master’s degrees, one in human resources development and the other in national security and policy.

Guest Author

Cody Chick

Maj. Cody Chick is a Major in the United States Army and a graduate from The Citadel with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science. He is currently a candidate for a MS degree in Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

thediplomat.com

10. Must-Pass Defense Bill Includes 4.5% Military Pay Raise on Top of 15% Increase for Junior Enlisted Troops

It is not only a SOF truth that people are more important than hardware. It applies to our most junior military personnel. I hope this helps with recruiting too.

At the risk of embarrassing myself with public math but what will be the increase in pay from going from E-4 to E-5 (specialist/corporal to Sergeant)? With the 15% increase for E1-E4 the increase in pay from E-4 to E-5 would seem to be reduced by 15%.

Must-Pass Defense Bill Includes 4.5% Military Pay Raise on Top of 15% Increase for Junior Enlisted Troops

military.com · by Rebecca Kheel · May 13, 2024

A key House panel is endorsing a 4.5% across-the-board pay raise for service members on top of a 15% raise for junior enlisted troops in a must-pass defense policy bill that was released Monday.

The recommendation from the House Armed Services Committee in its draft version of the National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA, means the military's lowest-ranking forces could see a 19.5% pay hike next year if the plan becomes law.

There are still several hurdles before the bill becomes law, including negotiations with the Senate, which has not yet revealed its plans for a military pay raise next year. But inclusion in the base text of the House NDAA signals that House members will prioritize increasing junior enlisted pay as the defense bill works its way through Congress.

Members of the House Armed Services Committee previously said they wanted to give E-1s through E-4s a 15% pay raise after a bipartisan group of lawmakers empaneled to study military quality-of-life issues found military pay has lagged behind inflation and private-sector pay.

The committee introduced a bill last month to enact the 15% pay raise. Committee leaders said they planned to include the bill in their NDAA.

Meanwhile, by law, all service members are entitled to an annual raise. The raise they are entitled to next year is 4.5%, which is also the rate the Biden administration requested in its annual budget proposal to Congress.

The proposed House NDAA that was released Monday includes both the across-the-board raise and the targeted raise for junior enlisted members, meaning E-1s through E-4s would get a 19.5% raise next year, according to the bill text and committee staffers who briefed reporters on condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the committee.

"Members were seeing that some kids are making more money at Walmart or Home Depot," a senior staffer for committee Republicans said at the briefing. "If we're asking young kids to launch multimillion-dollar planes off billion-dollar aircraft [carriers], we should pay them a little more than your greeter at Walmart."

While top senators have also indicated they are interested in re-examining junior enlisted pay this year, they have not fully endorsed the House plan yet. The Senate Armed Services Committee is expected to work on its version of the NDAA next month.

Also unclear is where the Biden administration will fall on the targeted raise for junior enlisted troops.

Last year, when some House members tried to give junior enlisted troops a 30% pay bump, administration officials opposed the proposal on the ground that they believed it was premature amid a comprehensive review of military pay. The administration's review is not expected to be done until the end of the year, and defense officials have continued to defer to the review when asked about increasing junior enlisted pay.

But House committee staffers argued their proposal should not be a "big surprise" to the administration since the House got close to hiking junior enlisted pay last year and the 15% rate the House Armed Services Committee chose this year is aligned with one of the options the administration's review is considering.

The House committee is scheduled to debate its NDAA next week.

military.com · by Rebecca Kheel · May 13, 2024

11. Putin begins defense ministry purge amid nuclear secrets leak rumor

Excerpts:

At least five people have been arrested in the scandal. These include deputy minister Timur Ivanov who has been in pre-trial detention on bribery charges since April 23, after he was accused of receiving bribes worth $11 million in the form of property services from a construction company in return for contracts. Ivanov denies the charges.

Meanwhile, two weeks before Shoigu's sacking, Igor Sushko, the executive director of the Wind of Change Research Group, claimed that the former defense minister and his deputies, Ivanov and Tsalikov, had been accused of leaking nuclear secrets and could be facing state treason charges.

"Raids on Ivanov & accomplices yielded data on classified military projects including nuclear installations," Sushko wrote in a post on X, formerly known as Twitter, on April 28.

Osechkin also made the same allegations in a video posted to YouTube the day before. "In contravention of all top secret protocols, Tsalikov and Ivanov provided access to secret documents about Russia's nuclear shelf, among other things, to persons who did not have any level of security clearance," he alleged.

Putin begins defense ministry purge amid nuclear secrets leak rumor

Newsweek · by Martha McHardy · May 14, 2024

The firing of Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu and members of his team may be linked to a leak of nuclear secrets, an expert has claimed, as Vladimir Putin's Defense Ministry purge continues.

In a post on Telegram, Russian dissident exile Vladimir Osechkin said Putin's purge of his Defense Ministry had deepened on Tuesday, with three of Shoigu's deputies revealed to have resigned at least a week before their boss.

"Shoigu's deputies [Alexey] Krivoruchko and [Rusland] Tsalikov submitted their resignations a week before [Shoigu]'s resignation," he wrote.

Krivoruchko and Tsalikov, who were deputy defense ministers, backdated their resignations to May 9, according to Igor Sushko, the executive director of the Wind of Change Research Group, despite signing their letters of resignation on May 13.

Pro-war "Z" bloggers also said two more deputy defense ministers had resigned before Shoigu's departure.

Meanwhile, Osechkin claimed that deputy finance minister Tatyana Shevtsova had also resigned. However, the date of her resignation was not revealed.

It comes after Shoigu, who had been one of Putin's closest allies, was unexpectedly removed from his job on Sunday and assigned to a new role as secretary of Russia's Security Council. He is to be replaced by Andrei Belousov, an economist and former deputy prime minister.

While the exact reason for Shoigu's sacking is unknown, it is thought by analysts that the appointment of Belousov, who has no military background, is part of Putin's strategy to improve the efficiency of Russia's war economy as its army seeks to push further into Ukraine in the third year of the war.

But it also came after one of the biggest government corruption scandals in years in Russia—of which the Defense Ministry is at the center.

Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) talks to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (R) on February 23, 2024, in Moscow, Russia. Shoigu was unexpectedly sacked from his role over the weekend. Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) talks to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (R) on February 23, 2024, in Moscow, Russia. Shoigu was unexpectedly sacked from his role over the weekend. Contributor/Getty Images

The head of personnel at Russia's Defense Ministry, Yuri Kuznetsov, was arrested on suspicion of bribery last week after more than $1 million in cash and valuables were discovered at his properties.

Kuznetsov was suspected of "receiving a bribe on an especially large scale," according to the state investigative committee.

"According to the investigation, in 2021–2023, as the head of the 8th Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Kuznetsov received a bribe from representatives of commercial structures for performing certain actions in their favor," the committee said.

​At least five people have been arrested in the scandal. These include deputy minister Timur Ivanov who has been in pre-trial detention on bribery charges since April 23, after he was accused of receiving bribes worth $11 million in the form of property services from a construction company in return for contracts. Ivanov denies the charges.

Meanwhile, two weeks before Shoigu's sacking, Igor Sushko, the executive director of the Wind of Change Research Group, claimed that the former defense minister and his deputies, Ivanov and Tsalikov, had been accused of leaking nuclear secrets and could be facing state treason charges.

"Raids on Ivanov & accomplices yielded data on classified military projects including nuclear installations," Sushko wrote in a post on X, formerly known as Twitter, on April 28.

Osechkin also made the same allegations in a video posted to YouTube the day before. "In contravention of all top secret protocols, Tsalikov and Ivanov provided access to secret documents about Russia's nuclear shelf, among other things, to persons who did not have any level of security clearance," he alleged.

Newsweek · by Martha McHardy · May 14, 2024

12. Biden's Latest Policy Failure: West Africa

Excerpts:

Even before the departure of U.S. troops from Chad and Niger, the governments of those countries began inviting the Russians in—"taking advantage," as former U.S. special envoy to the Sahel J. Peter Pham told me, "of an opening creating by the Biden administration's ham-fisted approach."

According to Chadian media, 130 Wagner mercenaries arrived in that country in late April. Last week, an unspecified number of Russian troops arrived in Niger, ostensibly for "training" purposes. In a bizarre changing of the guard, they are being housed alongside, but separately from, American servicemen at a soon-to-be-former U.S. airbase adjacent to Niamey's airport.

Worrying reports also hold that Iranian agents are in the country seeking uranium rights in exchange for military exports. Predictably in the current climate, U.S. efforts to stymie the deal have reportedly failed.

U.S. Marine Corps General Michael E. Langley, who commands AFRICOM—headquartered in faraway Stuttgart, Germany—told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March that Russia is "trying to take over central Africa as well as the Sahel" at an "accelerated pace." That's hard to deny, but the acceleration comes courtesy of Joseph R. Biden and his execrable foreign policy team.

Biden's Latest Policy Failure: West Africa

Newsweek · by Paul du Quenoy · May 14, 2024

While the Biden administration's feckless foreign policy team continues to flounder in the Middle East, in sub-Saharan Africa it has invited humiliations of historic proportions. In March, the government of Niger, a military junta that overthrew that country's democratic government in July 2023, demanded that the United States remove its troop presence, which consists of 1,100 Army and Air Force personnel mostly stationed at a $110 million base built just six years ago.

Last-minute diplomatic attempts to reverse Niger's decision failed. On April 19, Biden's State Department acknowledged that the decision was final and that the withdrawal will be faithfully carried out. Just before the final agreement was reached, neighboring Chad demanded that a smaller but significant deployment of U.S. forces in that country leave, and threatened to cancel a standing agreement governing U.S. deployments there.

Until Niger changed governments last year, American military personnel in the country had engaged in successful anti-terrorism operations via drone deployments and joint patrols with the Nigerien armed forces. After the July revolt, however, the Biden administration suspended much of the U.S. military cooperation, citing Niger's lack of democratic government. Last October, the State Department provocatively declared the change in government a "coup." Under U.S. policy, this measure required the full suspension of all U.S. military operations in the country, except for self-defense, and resulted in a $500 million reduction in non-humanitarian foreign aid. The State Department also affirmed that its highest objective is the restoration of Niger's democratic government, presumably over counterterrorism operations.

That sat poorly with the junta, which responded by declaring the U.S. military presence "illegal" and demanding its withdrawal. Its decision has been supported by popular protests in Niger's capital, Niamey. Earlier, the junta had expelled a French deployment of about 1,500 troops, as well as the French ambassador, citing France's colonial past in the country. French forces and diplomatic representatives in Mali and Burkina Faso have also been expelled in recent years.

The 1,100 U.S. personnel in Niger have idled for months, even as the country and the larger Sahel region—where six other national governments have been overthrown in the last three and a half years—have become increasingly destabilized and dangerous. Niger has rejected or not responded to requests for military overflights that would allow U.S. personnel in the country to leave or new personnel to arrive. Attacks by ISIS and al Qaeda affiliates in Niger increased fourfold in the month after the July coup alone, in the absence of the joint U.S.-Nigerien military efforts.

"The Americans deployed here have not been able to perform their primary mission and have been told to 'sit and hold,'" wrote an anonymous serviceman stationed in Niger in a whistleblower letter to Congress published by the Washington Post last month. Referring to the prolonged diplomacy and lack of flight clearances, the whistleblower added that U.S. servicemen "are essentially being held hostage from returning home to their families while the State Department continues with failed diplomacy." The author specifically blamed U.S. Ambassador Kathleen FitzGibbon and her defense attaché, Colonel Nora J. Nelson-Richter, for having allegedly "suppressed intelligence information" and "failed to be transparent" with U.S. personnel in Niger, potentially leaving them exposed to serious danger.

The rot goes much higher, however. "The administration's distracted, sputtering performance in Africa is having painful consequences for our priorities," says Alberto Fernandez, a retired U.S. diplomat who served as ambassador to Equatorial Guinea and is currently vice president of the Middle East Media Research Institute.

Protesters react as a man holds up a sign demanding that soldiers from the United States Army leave Niger without negotiation during a demonstration in Niamey, on April 13, 2024. Thousands of people demonstrated on... Protesters react as a man holds up a sign demanding that soldiers from the United States Army leave Niger without negotiation during a demonstration in Niamey, on April 13, 2024. Thousands of people demonstrated on April 13, 2024 in Niger's capital Niamey to demand the immediate departure of American soldiers based in northern Niger, after the military regime said it was withdrawing from a 2012 cooperation deal with Washington. AFP/Getty Images

As terrorist forces revive, national governments in West Africa are looking to Russia to fill the gap. Unlike Washington under Biden, Moscow takes no position on the nature of national governments and does not predicate military cooperation on democracy.

While Russia's paramilitary Wagner Group has operated in Africa since 2017, its deployments to the Sahel have increased since Biden entered office, recently replacing the French in Mali and Burkina Faso.

Even before the departure of U.S. troops from Chad and Niger, the governments of those countries began inviting the Russians in—"taking advantage," as former U.S. special envoy to the Sahel J. Peter Pham told me, "of an opening creating by the Biden administration's ham-fisted approach."

According to Chadian media, 130 Wagner mercenaries arrived in that country in late April. Last week, an unspecified number of Russian troops arrived in Niger, ostensibly for "training" purposes. In a bizarre changing of the guard, they are being housed alongside, but separately from, American servicemen at a soon-to-be-former U.S. airbase adjacent to Niamey's airport.

Worrying reports also hold that Iranian agents are in the country seeking uranium rights in exchange for military exports. Predictably in the current climate, U.S. efforts to stymie the deal have reportedly failed.

U.S. Marine Corps General Michael E. Langley, who commands AFRICOM—headquartered in faraway Stuttgart, Germany—told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March that Russia is "trying to take over central Africa as well as the Sahel" at an "accelerated pace." That's hard to deny, but the acceleration comes courtesy of Joseph R. Biden and his execrable foreign policy team.

Paul du Quenoy is President of the Palm Beach Freedom Institute.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

Newsweek · by Paul du Quenoy · May 14, 2024

13. An Army drone branch? Idea advances in House subcommittee

An Army drone branch? Idea advances in House subcommittee

Tactical and Land Forces panel’s NDAA proposal would also fund 3 “unfunded priorities.”

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

U.S. Army Sgt. Claudia Kinney, assigned to the 6th Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment, retrieves a drone during Allied Spirit 24 at the Hohenfels Training Area, Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Germany, March 6, 2024. U.S. Army / Spc. Micah Wilson

Get all our news and commentary in your inbox at 6 a.m. ET.

Stay Connected

Policy

Tactical and Land Forces panel’s NDAA proposal would also fund 3 “unfunded priorities.”

|

May 13, 2024 02:15 PM ET

• Army
• Congress
• Drones

By Sam Skove

Staff Writer

May 13, 2024 02:15 PM ET

• Army
• Congress
• Drones

The Army would gain a drone branch under proposed language in the 2025 defense authorization bill, a move intended to further professionalize the field and put it on par with the service’s other disciplines.

The Army currently fields 22 branches, from air defense artillery to transportation. The branches are the building blocks of the Army, with each job, or military occupational specialty, organized under a branch.

The change is proposed in the version of the 2025 policy bill advanced by the tactical and land forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

In addition to drone operation, the branch would also handle counter-drone work, said a congressional staffer, speaking on background. The branch would address “not only small UASs”—unmanned aerial systems—“but also counter-small-UAS capabilities,” the staffer said.

The move is “reflective of the lessons learned in Ukraine and also reflective of what our international partners are doing,” the staffer said. Ukraine in February established a drone branch.

Designating drones as a separate branch within the Army could increase specialized training and innovation, as well as enable more targeted recruitment of drone operators, according to an op-ed published by an Army aviator.

Branches are also led by senior officers, who lead training and assist with the force modernization of their branch. The staffer said Congress had not identified a general to lead the new drone branch.

While the provision is not guaranteed to take effect, the staffer said the chances were “pretty high” it would be adopted.

The Army currently trains drone operation and counter-drone skills in a variety of locations, including the Maneuver Center of Excellence and the Joint Counter Small Unmanned Aerial Systems University. Units also conduct drone training within their own brigades.

The subcommittee’s NDAA proposal would also fund the Army’s top three requirements from its unfunded priority list, all related to counter-drone equipment, for a total of $350 million, the staffer said.

Separate language in the proposal calls for the Army to “establish and operate an Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence within the Army Training and Doctrine Command.” Electronic warfare has similarly taken on increased importance thanks to the Russian-Ukrainian war, with U.S. precision weapons frequently falling prey to Russian electronic warfare.

14. GA-ASI and USSOCOM collaborate on ABAD Pod for MQ-9A resilience

GA-ASI and USSOCOM collaborate on ABAD Pod for MQ-9A resilience - Airforce Technology

airforce-technology.com · by Harry McNeil · May 13, 2024

GA-ASI has partnered with USSOCOM to reveal its plans for the development of an ABAD pod that can enhance the MQ-9A’s survival against new threats in the battlefield. Source: GA-ASI

San Diego-based General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI) partners with the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), unveiling plans for an Airborne Battlespace Awareness and Defense (ABAD) pod designed to fortify the MQ-9A’s survivability against emerging threats.

Free Buyers Guide

Leading Guide to Military UAV Suppliers for the Air Defense Industry

The document includes detailed information on the manufacturers and suppliers and their products, along with contact details, to inform your purchasing decision.

Thank you.

Go deeper with GlobalData

• 
  
• Reports
• Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) - Thematic Intelligence
• 
  
• Reports
• Robotics in Defense and Homeland Security - Thematic Research

Premium Insights

The gold standard of business intelligence.

Find out more

Related Company Profiles

BAE Systems Plc

BAE Systems Inc

Leonardo DRS Inc

View all

Your download email will arrive shortly.Please check your mail inbox to download buyer's guide

By downloading this case study, you acknowledge that GlobalData UK Limited may share your information with our white paper partners/sponsors who may contact you directly with information on their products and services.

Tick here to opt out of curated industry news, reports, and event updates

Visit our Privacy Policy for more information about our services, how GlobalData may use, process and share your personal data, including information on your rights in respect of your personal data and how you can unsubscribe from future marketing communications. Our services are intended for corporate subscribers and you warrant that the email address submitted is your corporate email address.

How well do you really know your competitors?

Access the most comprehensive Company Profiles on the market, powered by GlobalData. Save hours of research. Gain competitive edge.

Company Profile – free sample

Thank you!

Your download email will arrive shortly

Not ready to buy yet? Download a free sample

We are confident about the unique quality of our Company Profiles. However, we want you to make the most beneficial decision for your business, so we offer a free sample that you can download by submitting the below form

By GlobalData

Tick here to opt out of curated industry news, reports, and event updates from Airforce Technology.

Visit our Privacy Policy for more information about our services, how we may use, process and share your personal data, including information of your rights in respect of your personal data and how you can unsubscribe from future marketing communications. Our services are intended for corporate subscribers and you warrant that the email address submitted is your corporate email address.

In a bid to improve battlefield resilience and bolster the protective capabilities of the MQ-9A Block 5 Medium-Altitude, Long-Endurance Tactical (MALET) Extended Range Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), GA-ASI and USSOCOM have embarked on a collaboration. The focus is developing an Airborne Battlespace Awareness and Defense (ABAD) pod.

This ABAD pod is poised to improve threat detection and protection, particularly against the spectres of Radio Frequency (RF) and Infrared (IR) threats. By leveraging technology, the ABAD pod aims to enhance the MQ-9A’s threat awareness capabilities and empower it to navigate contested environments with agility and resilience.

In 2022, GA-ASI conducted a successful flight test of the Nato pod, specially designed for the MQ-9A remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). The Nato pod meets stringent Nato airworthiness standards and offers additional payload options and configurations for the MQ-9A and MQ-9B SkyGuardian RPAs.

“Threat awareness and survivability are critical for MQ-9A to operate in contested environments,” emphasized GA-ASI President David R. Alexander. “ABAD will enable the tracking of RF and IR missile threats, enable defensive measures, and real-time threat awareness for MQ-9A.”

The genesis of this project involved an evaluation of RF Electronic Warfare (EW) and IR countermeasures systems. Following a selection process, GA-ASI zeroed in on a next-generation software-defined radio-based EW system from BAE Systems and the AN/AAQ-45 Distributed Aperture Infrared Countermeasure System (DAIRCM) from Leonardo DRS.

“BAE Systems’ advancements in small form factor EW technologies will provide affordable multifunction capabilities for the MQ-9A, enabling it to operate in previously inaccessible airspace,” affirmed Joshua Niedzwiecki, vice president and general manager of Electronic Combat Solutions at BAE Systems.

Echoing this sentiment, David Snodgrass, Vice President of the DAIRCM Program at Leonardo DRS, expressed enthusiasm about the collaboration, stating, “Leonardo DRS is delighted to team with GA-ASI to provide our industry-leading and proven AN/AAQ-45 DAIRCM aircraft protection system to enhance MQ-9A survivability in support of this mission for USSOCOM.”

Work is underway on an engineering and testing effort to mature the ABAD capability into a podded payload capable of integration and operation on the MQ-9A aircraft by 2025.

GA-ASI has made strides in advancing unmanned aviation capabilities in recent years, with achievements across various partnerships and contracts. GA-ASI has collaborated with the US Marine Corps (USMC), Spain’s MQ-9A fleet, the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) and the UK Royal Air Force (RAF).

Free Buyers Guide

Leading Guide to Military UAV Suppliers for the Air Defense Industry

The document includes detailed information on the manufacturers and suppliers and their products, along with contact details, to inform your purchasing decision.

Thank you.

Your download email will arrive shortly.Please check your mail inbox to download buyer's guide

By Airforce Buyers Guide

By downloading this case study, you acknowledge that GlobalData UK Limited may share your information with our white paper partners/sponsors who may contact you directly with information on their products and services.

Tick here to opt out of curated industry news, reports, and event updates

Visit our Privacy Policy for more information about our services, how GlobalData may use, process and share your personal data, including information on your rights in respect of your personal data and how you can unsubscribe from future marketing communications. Our services are intended for corporate subscribers and you warrant that the email address submitted is your corporate email address.

Sign up for our daily news round-up!

Give your business an edge with our leading industry insights.

Sign up

Share

airforce-technology.com · by Harry McNeil · May 13, 2024

​15. Putin to meet Xi in Beijing as world convulses from global conflicts

The coordination, collaboration, and collusion of the axis of dictators. The danger is not just China. The danger is the collusion among the 4 revision and rogue powers and violent extremist organizations.

Putin to meet Xi in Beijing as world convulses from global conflicts | CNN

CNN · by Simone McCarthy · May 14, 2024

Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin attend the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing last October.

Pedro Pardo/AFP/Getty Images

Hong Kong CNN —

Chinese leader Xi Jinping will welcome Vladimir Putin to China on Thursday for the Russian president’s second visit in less than a year – the latest sign of their growing alignment amid hardening global fault lines as conflict devastates Gaza and Russia makes advances in Ukraine.

Putin will arrive in China just over a week since entering a new term in office, extending his autocratic rule until 2030 – the result of an election without any true opposition.

His visit, set to take place May 16-17, according to Chinese state media, mirrors Xi’s own state visit to Moscow just over a year ago, where he marked the norm-shattering start of a new term as president – like Putin, after rewriting rules around how long leaders can serve.

Their meeting comes months ahead of the American presidential elections and as Washington faces mounting international backlash over its support for Israel’s war on Gaza. It’s set to provide a platform for the leaders to discuss how all this can advance their shared ambition to degrade and offer an alternative to American power.

The visit also comes as the two leaders operate within what observers say is a loose but growing coordination of interests between avowedly anti-American countries Iran and North Korea. Pyongyang – which has an economy almost entirely dependent of China – is believed by Western governments to be aiding Russia with war supplies. So too, the US says, is Tehran, which is being bolstered economically by Russia and China and is a powerful player in the conflict in the Middle East.

Putin will arrive for the two-day state visit emboldened by the survival of his wartime economy and amid a major new offensive along key points of the front line in Ukraine. For Xi, freshly returned from a European tour, the visit is an opportunity to showcase that his allegiance to Putin has not broken his ability to engage with the West.

In an interview with Chinese state news agency Xinhua published Wednesday ahead of his travel, Putin hailed the “great prospects” of the countries’ partnership and their joint efforts to “strengthen the sovereignty, protect the territorial integrity and security of our countries.”

The leaders aimed to deepen cooperation in “industry and high-tech, outer space and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, renewable energy and other innovative sectors,” Putin added.

But the optics of the strident allegiance belie a more challenging picture.

Pressure is mounting on Beijing from Washington over its alleged support for Russia’s defense industry. In Europe, Xi had to navigate sharp tensions in France – only welcomed with fanfare in Serbia and Hungary, while China’s key partner, Russia, remains isolated on the world stage.

Xi has ramped up his calls for Europe and other countries to help the world avoid a “Cold War,” suggesting they resist what Beijing sees as US efforts to contain China.

But the leader himself – including as he hosts Putin this week – is seen to be tightening relationships to underscore a growing global split that could deepen divisions with the West, whose technology and investment, experts say, China needs.

“We live in a more dangerous world, authoritarian powers are increasingly aligned. Russia is receiving support for its war of aggression from China, Iran and North Korea,” NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg warned last month.

“This reminds us that security is not regional, security is global. And we must work with our like-minded partners around the world to preserve and protect transatlantic security.”

Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for a photo prior to their talks on the sidelines of the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, China, on Wednesday, Oct. 18, 2023.

Sergei Guneyev/AP

‘Grand strategy’

Looming over Xi’s meeting with Putin this week are Western threats of more sweeping actions against his country if it continues sending certain goods to Russia. The US government says dual-use exports are enabling Russia to build up its defense industry.

“The pressures are arguably bigger than they were in the past two years,” said Li Mingjiang, an associate professor of international relations at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, pointing to a new raft of sanctions from the US earlier this month targeting Chinese firms – and the potential for more, including from the EU.

China has said it closely monitors exports of dual-use goods and denies its trade with Russia is anything outside of normal bilateral exchange. Bilateral trade between the two countries reached a record $240 billion last year.

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky (L) greets US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Kyiv on May 14, 2024.

Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

Related article Blinken arrives in Kyiv to reassure Ukraine of US support

Even close observers of Xi’s opaque decision-making are divided on whether all this means the Chinese leader will seek to use his time with Putin this week to advocate for a settlement in the conflict soon.

But China’s official trade data from March and April both show declines in exports to Russia compared with the same periods the previous year – indicating Beijing may be taking steps to protect against Western sanctions hitting deeper into its commercial and financial sectors.

Any recalibration there, however, is unlikely to stem deepening of cooperation across a range of areas between the two countries, who hold regular military drills and diplomatic exchanges. It’s also unlikely to change Beijing’s bottom line when it comes to Russia’s war, analysts say.

“Russia is fundamental to China’s grand strategy,” said Manoj Kewalramani, who heads Indo-Pacific studies at the Takshashila Institution research center in Bangalore. While Beijing doesn’t want escalation, “there is a deep interest in making sure that Russia doesn’t lose the war,” he said.

Boys watch smoke billowing during Israeli strikes east of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on May 13, 2024.

Stringer/AFP/Getty Images

‘Force multipliers’

The war in Gaza — also expected to be a touchpoint in Xi and Putin’s discussions — has opened opportunity for the two countries’ shared goals, analysts say.

Those goals, broadly speaking, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov put it during a joint presser with his counterpart Wang Yi in Beijing last month, include establishing a “fair multipolar world order” free from American “hegemony and neo-colonial” practices, as well as working together to “consolidate the nations of the Global South.”

When it comes to Gaza, both powers have declined to condemn Hamas for its October 7 terror attack on Israel. They have also criticized Israel and the United States – converging with mounting global backlash, especially across the Global South against Israel’s war. More than 35,000 have died in Gaza during the war, according to the health ministry there, and a mass humanitarian worsens with every week.

China has limited hard influence in the region, while Russia has had some level of presence, but “they see each other as force multipliers,” said Kewalramani in Bangalore, referring to the overlap in their response to this conflict.

The conflict has also impacted how China and Russia view their relations with countries there, he added. That includes with Iran, which in the past year joined two Beijing and Moscow-founded international groups, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

“They see Iran as part of the new order (they are working to create), whereas they see Israel as a proxy for the United States … that has become much sharper since October 7,” he said.

‘Privately and quietly’

But as Xi continues to strengthen his relationship with Putin and Russia in an increasingly fractured world, this also raises questions – including from within China’s policy circles and the public sphere – about where that leads the world’s second largest economy.

Unlike internationally isolated Russia or Iran, China is still viewed throughout the West as an important player and potential partner on global issues like climate change, despite concerns about its human rights record and aggression in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.

“Chinese like me feel shameful to receive Vladimir Putin, because his country defies the UN charter … (and is viewed by) 141 countries as an aggressor,” said Shanghai-based international scholar Shen Dingli. China “wants to use Russia” for its aims, but Russia is making China weak, he said.

Popular suspicions and concerns about Russia were on show in China earlier this month, when an account on Chinese social media platform Weibo was set up in the name of prominent Russian ultranationalist thinker Alexander Dugin.

French President Emmanuel Macron and Chinese leader Xi Jinping shake hands after a meeting of the Franco-Chinese Business Council in Paris on May 6.

Mohammed Badra/AFP/Getty Images

Related article In Europe, Xi looks to counter claims China is aiding Russia in Ukraine

Social media users flocked to the unverified page, where some voices called for Ukrainian victory and others pointed to the two countries’ historical frictions, with one user comment that received hundreds of likes calling for Moscow to return lands in the Russian Far East ceded to the Russian empire in the 19th century.

CNN was unable to confirm if the account, which garnered more than 100,000 followers, was authentic.

Some observers argue that historical mistrust – linked to border tensions only formally resolved in the early 2000s and China’s Cold War realignment with the US – mean even Xi and Putin’s close relations are transactional in the face of shared tensions with the West – or at least lacking trust within their broader government ranks.

All this comes into great focus ahead of the upcoming US elections, where the outcome could have a sweeping impact on the future of the war in Ukraine and US engagement with China – with the re-election of former president Donald Trump perhaps playing to Russia’s benefit.

“We know some Chinese policy analysts would quietly, privately make the argument that is despite American pressures on China and geopolitical contestations in the past few years … China could have maintained slightly better relations with the US and the West, at the same time, could have avoided developing relationship with Russia to the extent that is so close today,” said Li in Singapore.

But in Xi’s China there appears to be little space for such questions.

Instead, the summit this week is poised to underline the strength of the partnership – and an opportunity for both to check in on an aspiration Xi voiced to Putin during his state visit to Moscow just over a year ago.

There, he proclaimed that “changes that have not happened for 100 years” were afoot. “Together, we should push (these changes) forward,” he said.

This story has been updated with additional information.

CNN · by Simone McCarthy · May 14, 2024

16. America needs to lead in drone warfare

America needs to lead in drone warfare

c4isrnet.com · by Mark Montgomery · May 13, 2024

When Russian tanks invaded and cruise missiles and drones rained down, Ukrainians responded with grit, a highly motivated fighting force, and their own waves of drones. This nation of 38 million people has stood firm against one of the world’s largest militaries, in part by using drones as an invaluable force multiplier. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) play an instrumental role in modern asymmetric warfare, but if the U.S. does not step up, our partners and allies will continue turning to China and Iran to purchase this technology.

Both Moscow and Kyiv use drones for intelligence gathering, target acquisition, and airstrikes for devastating effects. Drones have evolved from mere intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tools to lethal weapons capable of carrying up to 500-pound munitions, striking targets with incredible accuracy. With their ample processing capability, drones can rapidly identify, track, and attack targets.

Drones have also become key to extending communications lines, collecting intelligence for law enforcement officials, and delivering supplies to contested areas. With UAVs, Ukraine has successfully mounted wide-ranging attacks inside Russia, causing significant damage to Russian energy infrastructure sites, destroying naval bases and shipyards, and damaging several Russian military aircraft. Yet without sustained supplies of drones, electronic warfare equipment and other defense support, Ukraine’s efforts will be constrained by the sheer scale and superiority of Russia’s forces.

Early in the war, Ukraine heavily utilized cheap Chinese commercial drones for tactical missions. Just a few months in, however, Kyiv began noticing problems: Chinese drone maker DJI appeared to be leaking data on Ukrainian military positions to Russia. Chinese drones also proved susceptible to powerful Russian jamming and electronic warfare attacks. Then, in July 2023, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began restricting drones sales to Ukraine while continuing to supply Russia. Facing challenges replacing the small drones that form the cornerstone of its kill chain, Kyiv began looking elsewhere.

Now, hundreds of American-produced drones are in use across Ukraine to disrupt Russian supply lines and help document Russian war crimes, including Russian barrages against civilians, hospitals, schools and infrastructure. These drones are easy to use and operate securely offline. They are powered by next generation artificial intelligence and autonomous capabilities. And their rapid, iterative software updates can stay ahead of Russian countermeasures, greatly enhancing Ukraine’s ability to resist Russian forces and helping Ukraine regain operational control over the battlefield.

America’s partners and allies are taking note. Leveraging rapid software modernization and technological advances levels the playing field for smaller, less capable countries facing a larger adversary. Even Taipei, facing an adversary whose defense budget is the size of the entire Taiwanese GDP, could maintain its ISR over the island and surrounding waters in a crisis, inject resiliency into its communications systems, and target advancing PRC forces with asymmetric capabilities, like masses of smaller, multi-functional UAVs.

The problem for Taiwan and other nations in the Indo-Pacific is that China has flooded the global markets with cheap drones from DJI and Autel, capturing 90 percent of the global market for small drones. Indeed, the PRC has increased its investment in advanced drone technology, working to make Chinese drones more cost-effective and capable – all the while developing new military capabilities like drone swarms and stealth drones and supplying hundreds of millions of dollars of support and a steady supply of drones to Russia.

Our allies and partners need American-made drones, not Chinese or Iranian ones. Our own military needs cutting-edge, secure drones with reliable supply chains even in a crisis. Thousands of new American drones in the hands of the warfighter scales battlefield insights and accelerates the speed of decisions and actions.

As the Biden administration seeks to restore American manufacturing, the drone market is a prime industry to invest in. Beyond creating American jobs, these drones would fuel commercial, industrial, and first responder markets with drones “Made in the USA”. American drone manufacturers can (and do) work closely with military personnel to rapidly iterate on the designs based on users, missions, and environments. And so the Department of Defense (DoD) has taken the first step toward investing in this industry by championing rapid development of drones and AI-enabled autonomous vehicles. DoD can also use a portion of the newly secured supplemental funding for Ukraine to provide U.S. drones to Ukraine – either as new purchases or as a draw from existing U.S. military stock

The U.S. State Department should also fund UAV usage for international law enforcement and promote U.S. drone capabilities amongst allies and partners. As the primary touchpoint with foreign countries, embassy officials should warn other countries of the risks of using PRC-made UAVs, and our commercial service officers should work in tandem with the State Department to promote U.S.-made alternatives. Congress should also bolster funding for State Department programs that have successfully utilized drone technology to support their missions, such as the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau’s efforts in countering transnational crime with help from ISR drones.

There is a clear global demand for more drone technology. According to industry analysis, the global drone market will double from 2022 to 2026 and then triple, to reach over $160 billion, by 2030. Without U.S. support and clear alternatives, Ukraine, Taiwan and other countries with a high demand for UAVs will be forced to turn to U.S. adversaries for cheaper options and accept the accompanying national security risks.

Today, America’s strategic competitors dominate global commercial drone markets. To support our allies and ensure military superiority in future conflicts, the United States must reassert a leadership role in rapid, iterative drone development and production at scale. U.S. companies must put in significant resources and scale production, and Washington help American manufacturers outpace Chinese competitors as well as maintain support for allies like Ukraine whose battlefield experience further confirm the criticality of American efforts.

Mark Montgomery is a senior director and senior fellow at Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He served for 32 years in the U.S. Navy as a nuclear-trained surface warfare officer, retiring as a rear admiral in 2017. He also served as Policy Director for the Senate Armed Services Committee under the leadership of Senator John S. McCain.️

17.Should Taiwan Attempt to Replicate the Zelensky Playbook?

A cautionary note: "don't overlearn the lessons of Ukraine." And of course the playbook is more than information operations though that is an important element. And I am not sure leaving open the possibility of fleeing in the face of a Chinese attack and publicly discussing it is the right move as it will likely undercut the legitimacy of the leadership. 

This essay illustrates why thorough and continuous assessment is required. This is a helpful article from three professors. But what about professional assessments from those who have been on the ground in both places? I know one retired G.O. who has extensive experience with the resistance operating concept in Ukraine who has been on the ground in both Ukraine and Taiwan who is qualified to make the assessment to answer the question (he contributed to Zelensky's playbook and has Asian experience so he can add to the professors' assessment here.

This is why I heavily emphasize assessments (among others) in the Eight Points of Irregular Warfare:

4. Assessment - must conduct continuous assessment to gain understanding - tactical, operational, and strategic.  Assessments are key to developing strategy and campaign plans and anticipating potential conflict. Assessments allow you to challenge assumptions and determine if a rebalance of ways and means with the acceptable, durable, political arrangement  is required. Understand the indigenous way of war and adapt to it.   Do not force the US way of war upon indigenous forces if it is counter to their history, customs, traditions, and abilities.

5.  Ensure US and indigenous interests are sufficiently aligned.  If indigenous and US interests are not sufficiently aligned the mission will fail.  If the US has stronger interest than the indigenous force we can create an “assistance paradox” - if indigenous forces believe the US mission is "no fail” and the US forces will not allow them to fail and therefore they do not need to try too hard.  They may very well benefit from long term US aid and support which may be their objective for accepting support in the first place.

 6. Employ the right forces for the right mission. US SOF, conventional, civilian agency, indigenous forces.  Always based on assessment and thorough understanding of the problem and available resources and capabilities.  Cannot over rely on one force to do everything.  

https://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2018/07/eight-points-of-special-warfare.html

​Excerpts:

Conclusion

First and foremost, policymakers in Taiwan and the United States should take caution not to overlearn the lessons of Ukraine. Information campaigns can be a huge enabler but can be challenging to implement, particularly since Beijing has also witnessed Moscow’s shortcomings and will likely take steps to ensure its own narratives remain dominant throughout a potential conflict. Second, improving one’s infrastructure resilience against cyberattacks and physical disruptions is always a positive, but it could have limited utility in Taiwan if China decides to prioritize a digital denial campaign on the island. As such, Taiwan needs to ensure the foundations of its information strategy are laid well in advance of conflict.

Lastly, Taiwan, the United States, and its other allies need to prepare for contingencies in which messaging campaigns fall flat or the complete digital isolation of the island is realized. As with Zelensky, Taiwan’s leaders will need the fortitude to stare down a potential onslaught on their nation, but they should leave open the possibility of fleeing the island if the situation dictates. It should not be forgotten that keeping the legitimate, democratically elected government of Taiwan both alive and free is itself a burning symbol of resistance, one that the Chinese Communist Party will be all too eager to extinguish.

Should Taiwan Attempt to Replicate the Zelensky Playbook? - War on the Rocks

JASON VOGT, NINA KOLLARS, AND MICHAEL POZNANSKY

warontherocks.com · by Jason Vogt · May 15, 2024

On the eve of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, most of the world could not imagine President Volodymyr Zelensky emerging as a potent symbol of Ukrainian resistance. When he was elected in 2019, Zelensky came to office with no prior political experience. Despite initial enthusiasm, the former television star’s popularity was in decline, with many voters disillusioned by continued corruption, disruption from the COVID-19 pandemic, and the growing threat of a Russian invasion. Early in the war, U.S. officials attempted to persuade Zelensky that he should leave the capital and move to the western part of Ukraine so he would be better protected. Zelensky’s now-famous refusal —”I need ammunition, not a ride”— proved to be an initial indicator that he could use his background in entertainment to rally support to Ukraine’s cause.

The conflict in Ukraine has underscored the importance of a properly executed information campaign; the country has received an estimated $233 billion in foreign aid and military assistance. Ukraine’s success was underpinned by its ability to keep its government and population digitally connected to the rest of the world. As the United States and its allies prepare for a potential conflict in Taiwan, questions arise about whether Taiwan, if attacked, could replicate Ukraine’s success.

On the surface, Taiwan’s and Ukraine’s geopolitical situations share several features. Both are vibrant democracies next to large autocratic neighbors that have designs on their territory. But a war over Taiwan would occur under very different conditions. A country less than 5 percent the size of Ukraine and surrounded by water, Taiwan’s geography makes its communications infrastructure — a vital component of any information campaign — vulnerable to disruption. For example, using cyber or physical attacks, China could target Taiwan’s onshore cable landing stations, data centers, and electrical power infrastructure, all of which are needed to maintain digital connectivity.

Furthermore, because of Taiwan’s ambiguous political status and considerably weaker military position and the absence of a NATO-like alliance in the Pacific, its messaging will look different than Ukraine’s. Whereas Ukraine was focused on acquiring military aid, Taiwan will almost certainly be asking potential allies to engage in a direct military intervention. Given the risk of digital isolation, Taiwan needs to lay the groundwork for its information campaign well in advance of a confrontation and should focus its messaging on convincing potential allies that protecting Taiwan is vital to their security interests.

Become a Member

The Zelensky Playbook

To be successful, information campaigns require both a compelling message that resonates with international audiences and the technical means to deliver it globally, ideally through more than one medium. Ukraine did this through the “Zelensky playbook,” a wartime engagement strategy that relies on digital communications to take a message directly to foreign audiences, governments, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations. Robust access to digital communications technology was a critical enabler of this strategy, as it allowed both the government and the civilian population to flood social media with content demonstrating Ukraine’s resolve. Through this content, Ukrainian leaders were able to project a narrative that highlighted Ukraine’s willingness to fight, while simultaneously seeking to frame the conflict as a broader struggle between democratic societies and autocratic regimes.

Taiwan’s government has taken notice of the strategy and is seeking to emulate parts of it in preparation for a Chinese invasion. Outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen has made several speeches comparing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to Taiwan’s potential plight, stating that “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call to us all, and served as a reminder that authoritarianism does not cease in its belligerence against democracy.” Meanwhile, Taiwan’s digital ministry has taken steps to improve Taiwan’s digital telecommunications resiliency, including entering into an agreement with a British satellite communications provider to serve as a backup.

The People’s Republic of China is also watching the conflict in Ukraine and has witnessed Russia’s shortcomings in the information environment. China’s military, which dwarfs Taiwan’s in term of both numbers and capabilities, places information superiority at the pinnacle of its military doctrine and will likely take steps to ensure its own narratives remain dominant throughout the conflict. It might also anticipate Taiwan’s actions and prioritize plans to disrupt them. This could take the form of digital denial operations, which include kinetic and nonkinetic attacks aimed at degrading or destroying civilian and government digital communications infrastructure. For Taiwan to be successful against China, they will need to understand which lessons from Ukraine are applicable to their situation and which are not.

More Vulnerable Digital Infrastructure

Maintaining access to reliable communications is critical for information campaigns. At the start of the invasion, Russia attempted to cripple Ukrainian government networks through destructive cyberattacks, but these effects were blunted with the help of Microsoft, Google, and other firms, which would come to provide unprecedented levels of support for Ukraine during the conflict. Russia also conducted physical attacks on Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure, but these were mitigated in areas outside direct Russian control through the introduction of SpaceX’s Starlink satellite communications terminals, whose use has become widespread among Ukrainian military forces and the civilian population. Overall, Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s communications infrastructure represented only a limited digital denial campaign, one primarily focused on disrupting the communications of the central government in the early stages of the conflict. Implementing a total digital blackout would likely have exceeded Russia’s conventional and cyber capabilities.

Taiwan’s situation is different. China is much better positioned to implement the near-complete digital isolation of the island. With 90 percent of its population online, Taiwan hosts one of the most open, diverse, and affordable online environments in the world. However, its current connectivity is almost completely dependent on undersea cables that could be surreptitiously severed during a conflict. Taiwan is currently connected to ten undersea cable systems, which include 16 individual cables, with three additional systems planned in the coming years. Together, these cables carry approximately 97 percent of Taiwan’s global internet traffic. Three of these systems route directly through China, making them highly vulnerable to exploitation during a potential conflict. Inadvertently or not, Taiwan’s undersea cables have been severed at least 27 times, demonstrating their vulnerability to disruption during conflict.

The majority of Taiwan’s on-island digital communications architecture is concentrated in the northern portion of the island — an area roughly the size of Connecticut — well within range of China’s substantial inventory of short-range ballistic missiles. This architecture includes the most critical submarine cable landing stations, which route international internet traffic to and from the island, along with a handful of data centers, which store everything from email servers managed by major telecommunications companies to civil records vital to the functioning of Taiwan’s government. As an alternative to striking these targets directly, Beijing may attempt to use its substantial cyber capabilities, allowing it to focus its kinetic attacks on other high-priority targets.

China could also indirectly target Taiwan’s communications infrastructure by crippling the electrical grid. Roughly 80 percent of Taiwan’s power is generated by coal and liquified natural gas, most of which must be imported via maritime routes. While the bulk of this is sourced from the United States, Canada, and Australia, ensuring delivery of these resources during a conflict would be extremely challenging. A recent wargame conducted by the think tank Taiwan Center for Security Studies concluded that Taiwan’s energy storage and electrical grid would fail to meet even basic power needs in the event of blockade or invasion by China.

Learning from the conflict in Ukraine, Taiwan’s leaders recognize the need to harden the island’s digital infrastructure and have embarked upon a campaign to defend against communications isolation. Taiwan’s largest telecommunications company formally signed an agreement with EutelSat/OneWeb, which operates a satellite constellation similar to Starlink, in an effort to make its mobile network more resilient. These satellite communications are difficult to jam and have proven effective at enabling Ukrainian military operations, along with keeping otherwise isolated regions of Ukraine connected during the conflict. However, these systems still require power to operate and provide only a fraction of the bandwidth of undersea cables. If Taiwan were left with only satellite communications, they would be forced to make tradeoffs regarding which military, government or civilian networks would remain connected and for how long.

Additionally, Taiwan’s power company is planning to invest U.S. $17.5 billion in strengthening its energy grid over the next ten years, much of which will be dedicated to renewable power sources, reducing but not eliminating Taiwan’s dependence on foreign fuel supplies. The U.S. government is also looking to expand cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan, and Congress has authorized the Defense Department to partner with Taipei to help protect its military networks and critical infrastructure. Given these developments, China might find it difficult to completely sever Taiwan’s digital communications prior to the start of kinetic conflict. However, the grim reality of Taiwan’s infrastructure vulnerabilities should not be understated, and it is likely that substantial portions of the island will become digitally isolated during a conflict.

Finding the Right Message for the Right Audience

Having the capability to deliver a message is a prerequisite for any successful information campaign, but there are at least two other components behind the Zelensky Playbook: an effective messenger and an effective message. As Russian forces around Kyiv stalled, then retreated, Zelensky conducted dozens of interviews with major news organizations and staged televised virtual addresses with governments across the world during which he persuaded foreign and domestic audiences that Ukraine was militarily capable of resisting Russian aggression. His calls for military aid and harsher sanctions on Russia far exceeded expectations.

Finding an effective communicator is an important component of any information campaign, and Zelensky deserves a good deal of credit. However, his success did not occur in a vacuum; certain geopolitical and geographic factors helped make it possible. Ukraine is a sovereign state recognized by the United Nations, and although it is part of Europe, it is a member of neither the European Union nor NATO. Additionally, the United States and its European allies made it clear they would not intervene militarily unless a NATO country was directly threatened or attacked.

The lack of ambiguity as to Ukraine’s sovereignty and NATO’s clear position on direct involvement allowed the Zelensky government to craft an engagement strategy that appealed to the West’s ideals about self-determination and democracy while simultaneously exploiting their collective guilt that the burden of fighting would be left to Ukraine alone. This situation created a strong desire within Western nations to provide military and humanitarian aid, but also helped to establish boundaries in terms of the types of support they were willing to provide (artillery shells), the types they would not endorse (no-fly zones), and where there was room for negotiation (tanks). Russian attempts to influence these decisions by threatening to widen the confrontation ultimately proved hollow, as Russia was equally motivated to keep the conflict from spilling into NATO territory.

During a conflict over Taiwan, having an effective communicator could prove equally as important. However, it’s difficult to predict both who will be in a leadership position during a time of crisis and whether that individual will resonate with international audiences. Moreover, Zelensky’s decision to remain in the Ukrainian capital proved to be a brilliant move, but if he had been captured, killed, or otherwise rendered unable to communicate with the outside world, Ukraine could have been left without its most successful communicator to rally support to its cause.

Taiwan’s geopolitical situation is also very different, and given the risk of digital isolation, it must lay the groundwork for an information campaign well ahead of any conflict. Even though it has existed as an independent political entity for over half a century, Taiwan is not recognized as a sovereign state by the international community, leaving potential allies unsure of how they should respond to violations of its territory. Additionally, the U.S. position on Taiwan is one of “strategic ambiguity,” deliberately creating a degree of uncertainty as to whether it will intervene. While alliances in the Pacific exist, most are bilateral, and with the exception of Australia and New Zealand, most nations are unaccustomed to acting in unison to combat potential threats. The unclear status of its statehood, the potential uncertainty surrounding America’s military commitment, and the lack of a collective defense agreement among Asian democracies mean that developing a strategy that convinces multiple allies to come to Taiwan’s aid could be difficult. China will also be trying to drive wedges between these potential allies, possibly through the use of economic incentives or coercion.

In addition, Taiwan will be asking potential allies to conduct a direct military intervention, a prospect that carries a far greater risk of retaliation than delivering military aid. As such, Taiwan’s engagement strategy will need to be focused first and foremost on gaining a military commitment from the United States, without which none of the countries in the region will likely to be willing to engage in hostilities against China. While the Biden administration has framed the current state of international relations as a global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, this mode of thinking may not be the dominant theme for future administrations. Instead of focusing on ideology, Taiwan might be better served by appealing to the core security interests of the United States and its regional partners. This does not mean that Taiwan should focus its engagement efforts solely on the United States, for convincing regional partners that military intervention is warranted could help generate collective momentum toward intervening on Taiwan’s behalf.

Chief among these are America’s closest allies in the region: Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. The capture of Taiwan would potentially embolden China to seize disputed territories in Japanese territory and the South China Sea. It would also provide China’s navy with a base of operations in the center of the first island chain, enabling it to project power farther into the region. China would likely deploy long-range radars and missile batteries to the island, substantially increasing the threat radius of its already formidable missile forces. These countries already perceive China as a major threat to their territories, increasing the likelihood that they can be persuaded that collective action against China in a Taiwan contingency is a far better prospect then facing it alone in the future.

Conclusion

First and foremost, policymakers in Taiwan and the United States should take caution not to overlearn the lessons of Ukraine. Information campaigns can be a huge enabler but can be challenging to implement, particularly since Beijing has also witnessed Moscow’s shortcomings and will likely take steps to ensure its own narratives remain dominant throughout a potential conflict. Second, improving one’s infrastructure resilience against cyberattacks and physical disruptions is always a positive, but it could have limited utility in Taiwan if China decides to prioritize a digital denial campaign on the island. As such, Taiwan needs to ensure the foundations of its information strategy are laid well in advance of conflict.

Lastly, Taiwan, the United States, and its other allies need to prepare for contingencies in which messaging campaigns fall flat or the complete digital isolation of the island is realized. As with Zelensky, Taiwan’s leaders will need the fortitude to stare down a potential onslaught on their nation, but they should leave open the possibility of fleeing the island if the situation dictates. It should not be forgotten that keeping the legitimate, democratically elected government of Taiwan both alive and free is itself a burning symbol of resistance, one that the Chinese Communist Party will be all too eager to extinguish.

Become a Member

Jason Vogt is an assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College. Vogt previously worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency and served on active duty as an Army officer. He specializes in cyber and wargaming.

Nina Kollars is an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College. Kollars formerly served as advisor to Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu. Her primary areas of research are in emerging technologies, cybersecurity, and military innovation.

Michael Poznansky is an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College. He is the author of In the Shadow of International Law: Secrecy and Regime Change in the Postwar World (Oxford University Press, 2020).

The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent those of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Image: Wikimedia

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Jason Vogt · May 15, 2024

18. Why Iran and Israel Stepped Back From the Brink

​Excerpts:

The end of one war must not be the beginning of another in Lebanon. Israel and Hezbollah will need to restore the cold peace they had maintained between their war in 2006 and October 7 last year. Success on this front, combined with steps toward a political resolution of the Palestinian issue, is critical to meaningful normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as between Israel and the rest of the Arab world.

The final piece of the puzzle is Iran itself. Managing the threat Iran now poses to Israel must go beyond arming Israel and instilling fear of U.S. retaliation in Tehran. The United States must also consider a diplomatic push, similar to its efforts to mediate between Israel and Hezbollah over the past six months, to establish redlines between Israel and Iran. Each side would clarify the kinds of provocations they would view as cause for escalation and make a tacit agreement to avoid crossing those thresholds. For such a process to begin, though, the United States and Iran must reduce their own tensions by renewing the discussions about Iran’s nuclear program and regional issues that they started in Oman last year but abandoned after October 7. It is in the United States’ interest to resume these talks, which could lower the temperature between Iran and Israel. Such de-escalation is necessary before any diplomatic breakthrough regarding Iran’s nuclear program—an urgent issue made more so by the Iranian-Israeli rivalry—is possible.

The silver lining to the crisis in April was that Washington and Tehran talked behind the scenes throughout the two weeks. Their communication was key to averting catastrophe. As it charts its next diplomatic course, the United States should take advantage of that opening to lower the risk of a larger war. It should engage Iran on a host of regional issues, such as the Houthi threat to international shipping in the Red Sea, and build on its previous diplomatic efforts to bring calm to the Israeli-Lebanese border. This is not a time for the United States to fall back on military options as the solution of first resort. The region’s perilous security conditions instead demand that Washington realize the potential of American statecraft.

Why Iran and Israel Stepped Back From the Brink

U.S. Diplomacy Remains the Key to Regional Stability

By Vali Nasr

May 14, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare · May 14, 2024

The volley of attacks and counterattacks between Iran and Israel in the first two weeks of April drastically changed the strategic landscape in the Middle East. On April 1, an Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus killed seven Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders, including two generals. Two weeks later, Iran retaliated with a barrage of drones and missiles, almost all of which were intercepted. Israel swiftly responded with its own drone and missile attack on an airbase in Iran. The exchange brought the shadow war the two countries have been fighting for more than a decade into the open.

It is now clear that the spiraling rivalry between Iran and Israel will shape regional security and drive Middle East politics for the foreseeable future. Each views the other as an arch enemy that it must defeat by military means. Left unchecked, their dangerous competition will destabilize the region, and it could ultimately trigger a conflict that drags the United States into a costly war. It now falls on Washington to craft a diplomatic strategy to calm the escalatory forces that precipitated a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel in April—and could do so again.

THE SPECTER OF A LARGER WAR

Hamas’s October 7 attack dented Israel’s aura of invincibility and diminished its sense of security. Israel has launched a ferocious response, seeking to destroy Hamas, free the Israeli hostages that remain in Gaza, and restore confidence in its ability to deter outside attacks and protect its population. All three goals have thus far eluded Israel.

Israel’s strike on the Iranian consulate, like its campaign in Gaza, was in part motivated by the desire to ensure an attack on the scale of October 7 can never be repeated. The strike killed Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the Revolutionary Guard commander who coordinated the military operations of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and other armed groups in the region that Tehran has mobilized in support of Hamas in the past six months. By targeting Zahedi, Israel made clear that it considers Iran to be ultimately responsible for the current crisis. And by killing him in a diplomatic compound, it demonstrated its willingness and ability to assassinate senior Iranian officials anywhere and at any time.

This was not the first time Israel had struck Iranian bases in Syria or killed senior Revolutionary Guard officers and commanders there. Even before October 7, Israel had attacked Iranian industrial infrastructure and military installations, killed nuclear scientists inside Iran, struck bases used by Iraqi Shiite militias close to the Iraqi-Syrian border, and routinely targeted convoys of trucks traveling from Iran to Syria through Iraq. Israeli attacks in Syria became more brazen beginning in early 2022, when Russia, having reduced its footprint there to focus on Ukraine, no longer served as a check on where and when Israeli jets and drones could strike.

Left unchecked, the dangerous competition between Iran and Israel will destabilize the region.

Iran generally refrained from responding directly. The last time Iran engaged in a tit for tat with Israel was in February 2018, when Israel replied to an Iranian-operated drone entering its airspace (an accusation Tehran denied) with a strike on Iranian positions in Syria. A skirmish followed in which Syrian forces shot down an Israeli F-16 fighter jet. Iran had since avoided direct confrontation in favor of what it calls “strategic patience,” focusing on building its military capabilities in Syria and abstaining from measures that could result in escalation with Israel.

But when Israel attacked its consulate, Iran changed its strategy. It interpreted the move as a significant provocation that called for a direct response. Iran’s leaders saw little reason to assume that Israel would not escalate further—not just in Syria, but in Lebanon and even in Iran—if they failed to restore deterrence.

The scale of Iran’s reaction, however, was both surprising and worrisome. Tehran did give notice of its intentions, communicating its planned response to the United States through European and Arab intermediaries. Then, by launching hundreds of drones and missiles at Israel, Iran made clear that it would no longer practice strategic patience and henceforth would respond when attacked.

Israel repelled most of Iran’s drones and missiles with help from Jordan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Tehran likely expected such an outcome. Iran’s intent was not to provoke a war, only to demonstrate its willingness to attack Israel. Still, Israel retaliated, launching a missile strike on a major military airbase in central Iran. That strike seems to have ended this round of reciprocal attacks, but it also confirmed that the rules that guided Iran and Israel’s shadow war for years no longer apply. Now, an attack by either side will invite a direct response by the other, raising the specter of a larger war.

LOWER THE TEMPERATURE

Washington and its allies want to avoid such escalation—and Tehran knows this. Immediately after the Damascus consulate attack, the United States and its partners across Europe and the Middle East acted quickly to prevent the crisis from spiraling into war. The United States assured Iran that it did not know of Israel’s plans for the strike in advance and then signaled its concerns about the dangers of a larger war both in public statements and via intermediaries. Arab and European diplomats, carrying messages from Washington, spoke to Iranian officials directly. They urged Tehran not to respond at all but also emphasized that if a response were to happen, it should be measured, with a limited scope and range of targets, so as not to provoke further escalation. After Iran retaliated, Washington and its allies redirected their efforts, this time leaning on Israel to temper its response.

The diplomatic surge succeeded in keeping the crisis contained. It also made clear that the United States’ highest priority is to prevent the war in Gaza from igniting a regional conflagration and dragging the United States into another costly war in the Middle East. A fact working in Washington’s favor is that neither Iran nor Israel is keen on direct conflict, their recent show of force notwithstanding. Iran understands that Israel is a nuclear state with superior conventional capabilities and that war with Israel would ultimately mean war with the United States. Israel, for its part, knows that a larger conflict with Iran would compel Hezbollah to fire many more missiles at Israeli cities and military facilities. Still, if the tenuous truce between Iran and Israel is to hold, Washington must remain deeply engaged. It must work closely with Israel to address the country’s security concerns, and it should build on the diplomatic progress it has made with Iran in recent weeks.

Meanwhile, the prospect of another dangerous escalation looms over the region. An Israeli incursion into Rafah could precipitate another confrontation if Iran and its allies feel compelled to take action as the humanitarian crisis there worsens or to prevent the annihilation of Hamas. A long-term cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, too, could set the stage for further conflict, as it would free Israel to focus on Hezbollah—as it has hinted it intends to do—or once again target Iran in Syria. Iran and Israel are not ready to fight now, but if they continue to see each other as a mortal threat that can only be confronted militarily, then a future conflict is all but certain.

MOUNTING RISKS

Both countries’ preparations for that conflict will alter the region’s security balance in several ways. The first is through an arms race—after their recent military exchange, Iran and Israel will accelerate their pursuits of more advanced offensive and defensive capabilities. Because Iran and Israel do not share a common border, a war between them is less likely to require tanks, artillery, and soldiers than it is to be fought with missiles and drones—and, on the Israeli side, fighter jets. Amassing these weapons will not only make a war between the two enemies more likely and more devastating, it will also spur a destabilizing military buildup across the region. And Tehran, knowing that it will not likely be able to keep up with a conventional arms race, may redouble its efforts to secure nuclear weapons.

Both countries will also be looking to gain a geographical advantage. In the recent round of attacks, the relative effectiveness of Iranian and Israeli strikes depended not only on technological capabilities but also on their launch positions. Iran’s drones and missiles had to traverse Iraq and Jordan to reach Israel, reducing the element of surprise and providing Jordan, the United Kingdom, and the United States the opportunity to intercept a significant number before they reached their targets. Israel, by contrast, likely launched its attack from Iraqi airspace right across the Iranian border.

Iran has long pursued a strategy of arming Hezbollah with missiles on Israel’s borders while trying to deny Israel a similar perch in countries surrounding Iran. Tehran did not call on Hezbollah in the latest back-and-forth, but it could next time. Iran may also seek to augment its missile and drone capabilities in Syria, which shares a border with Israel. This would present a significant threat to Israel, which would likely respond by stepping up attacks on Iran’s and Hezbollah’s positions in Lebanon and Syria. U.S. troops that remain in Syria to fight the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) could thus be drawn into another mission: preventing an Iranian military buildup that could trigger an Iranian-Israeli war.

As Iran strengthens its military capacity on Israel’s borders, Israel may reciprocate by entrenching its intelligence and military presence on Iran’s borders. Azerbaijan and the Kurdish region of northern Iraq are already staging grounds for Israeli operations. Israel will likely expand that footprint, which will invite Iranian diplomatic and military pressure on both Azerbaijan and Iraqi Kurdistan. Iran recently conducted large-scale military maneuvers on its border with Azerbaijan and has launched missiles at alleged Israeli intelligence bases in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. Such pressures could grow more intense. Azerbaijan and the Kurdistan Regional Government may then look to Turkey and the United States for diplomatic support and air defense. Turkey might be able to mediate between Iran and Azerbaijan, but only the United States can provide protection to the KRG—and such protection would likely require a strengthened U.S. military presence.

Tehran did not call on Hezbollah in the recent volley of attacks and counterattacks between Iran and Israel, but it could next time.

The potential expansion of Israel’s partnerships in the Persian Gulf could be even more consequential. Israel has close formal ties with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, and those countries, along with Saudi Arabia, collaborate with Israel on intelligence and security issues. But Israel does not yet have a base of operations in this region from which it could target Iran directly. Even before October 7, Iran feared a U.S.-brokered deal in which Israel would attain a base in Saudi Arabia that would be protected by an American defense pact with Riyadh. As Saudi public opinion has turned sharply against Israel since the onset of the war in Gaza, that prospect is not imminent. But stalled Israeli-Saudi normalization talks will not stop the United States and Saudi Arabia from deepening their strategic partnership. That partnership would inevitably become entangled in the Iranian-Israeli conflict, jeopardizing the Gulf States’ security and undermining their economic ambitions.

For these countries, the possibility of a defense pact with Washington presents a conundrum. They crave such an assurance, but it would also make them targets in any conflict involving Iran. Iranian missiles can reach their shores in seconds; a diplomatic agreement does not change that fact. Ironically, a defense pact is more attractive in a scenario where the United States and Iran have lowered the tensions among them.

The Gulf States are therefore likely to try to stay in the gray zone between Iran and Israel, at least for now. But maintaining a balance will become more difficult as they face pressure from each side to deny the other access to their territory and airspace. Israel will press Washington to use its influence in Gulf capitals to secure cooperation, whereas Iran will threaten consequences for those who cooperate. Arab populations incensed by the war in Gaza will also pressure their governments not to help Israel. Jordan, for one, has discovered the difficulty of navigating these hardening battle lines. It followed the United States’ lead to shoot down Iranian drones heading for Israel, but popular criticism for that decision has pushed the government to step up its criticism of Israel’s conduct in Gaza.

Iraq will suffer more than any other country in the tug of war between Iran and Israel. Already, Iran has used Iraqi territory and militias to support its own operations in Syria and to attack U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria, and Israeli intelligence has carried out operations inside Iran from the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. During the recent confrontation, Iranian drones and missiles flew over Iraq to reach Israel, and Israel likely launched its attack on Iran from Iraqi skies. Iraq will only become more important as a first line of defense against Iranian missile attacks, which could encourage the United States to retain and even expand its military footprint in the country. For its part, Iran will intensify pressure on the Iraqi government to push the United States out. Shiite militias, for example, may increase their attacks on U.S. military installations and personnel in Iraq. Tehran will also want the KRG to cease cooperation with Israel and the United States. Iran has already carried out missile attacks on targets in northern Iraq it claims are linked to the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, and the KRG has asked for U.S. air-defense protection against Iran. All these proxy battles will put Iraq’s tenuous stability at risk.

A RETURN TO STATECRAFT

Escalation between Iran and Israel could compel the United States to abandon its plans to reduce its military footprint in the Middle East. If Washington’s goal is to avoid entanglement in a regional war, then it must ensure regional stability. Washington’s instinct may be to rely on its military muscle to deter Iran, but in truth it needs a primarily nonmilitary strategy to contain and manage the conflict. To start, it should deploy the full force of its diplomatic power to work toward an end to the war in Gaza, followed by a serious and sustained pursuit of a viable Palestinian state. This outcome is necessary to build a broader regional order that constrains the escalatory impulses that now drive both Iranian and Israeli decision-making. The war in Gaza has intensified those impulses, and only by ending it can the tensions simmer down.

The end of one war must not be the beginning of another in Lebanon. Israel and Hezbollah will need to restore the cold peace they had maintained between their war in 2006 and October 7 last year. Success on this front, combined with steps toward a political resolution of the Palestinian issue, is critical to meaningful normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as between Israel and the rest of the Arab world.

The final piece of the puzzle is Iran itself. Managing the threat Iran now poses to Israel must go beyond arming Israel and instilling fear of U.S. retaliation in Tehran. The United States must also consider a diplomatic push, similar to its efforts to mediate between Israel and Hezbollah over the past six months, to establish redlines between Israel and Iran. Each side would clarify the kinds of provocations they would view as cause for escalation and make a tacit agreement to avoid crossing those thresholds. For such a process to begin, though, the United States and Iran must reduce their own tensions by renewing the discussions about Iran’s nuclear program and regional issues that they started in Oman last year but abandoned after October 7. It is in the United States’ interest to resume these talks, which could lower the temperature between Iran and Israel. Such de-escalation is necessary before any diplomatic breakthrough regarding Iran’s nuclear program—an urgent issue made more so by the Iranian-Israeli rivalry—is possible.

The silver lining to the crisis in April was that Washington and Tehran talked behind the scenes throughout the two weeks. Their communication was key to averting catastrophe. As it charts its next diplomatic course, the United States should take advantage of that opening to lower the risk of a larger war. It should engage Iran on a host of regional issues, such as the Houthi threat to international shipping in the Red Sea, and build on its previous diplomatic efforts to bring calm to the Israeli-Lebanese border. This is not a time for the United States to fall back on military options as the solution of first resort. The region’s perilous security conditions instead demand that Washington realize the potential of American statecraft.

• VALI NASR is Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is a co-author of How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare.

Foreign Affairs · by How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare · May 14, 2024

19. A UN Trusteeship for Palestine

Excepts:

Although the initiative would not be simple to negotiate, it is probably less complicated than the alternatives and could open the way to the wider regional deal centered on Saudi-Israeli normalization. Although the PA is currently in no position to govern, a temporary trusteeship would offer the international administrative and supervisory support required to aid its transition to government. The Trusteeship Council has proved it can do this sort of work. With Saudi Arabia leading the administering authority, alongside one or two other regional partners, Hamas could be disbanded, Israeli security could be guaranteed, and Palestine’s pathway to statehood clarified. Troops would be provided, chiefly by administering states, though with contributions from other UN member states. All this would be done within a UN framework and with the support of the UN membership.

UN trusteeship thus offers a path to progress on an intractable problem. The Palestinian question has remained an open wound, triggering resentment and accusations of Western hypocrisy for decades. It has also proved highly divisive domestically in many countries, as seen recently on U.S. university campuses. A temporary trusteeship also sidesteps a fractured Security Council, offering the hope of resolving a conflict in the midst of great-power competition.

Although the notion of trusteeship may seem anachronistic, it could offer a useful tool for UN-led state building beyond Palestine. As civil wars rage with renewed ferocity around the world, a reinvigorated Trusteeship Council might serve as a useful means of fostering the transition to statehood for other non-self-governing regions, such as the Western Sahara and 15 others, that may require support to transition to independence. Ending these conflicts would mark an important achievement for a UN system in need of a victory. And in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it offers the best chance of peace.

A UN Trusteeship for Palestine

A Temporary Fix That Can Lead to an Enduring Peace

By Lloyd Axworthy, Michael W. Manulak, and Allan Rock

May 15, 2024

Foreign Affairs · May 15, 2024

The current crisis in the Middle East, sparked seven months ago by Hamas’s attack on Israel, shows worrying signs of worsening. Tit-for-tat strikes between Israel and Iran in April, unprecedented in their directness, threaten to turn the long-standing shadow war between the two countries into outright military confrontation. Now, as Israel begins its ground assault in Rafah, the situation inside Gaza is deteriorating swiftly. With more than 34,000 civilian deaths already, accusations of genocide, and indications of a manmade famine, the humanitarian imperative is enormous and urgent. Outside of Gaza, new Jewish settlements and incursions by the Israel Defense Forces in the West Bank stoke further tensions.

The elements of a wider regional deal, built around the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations and a pathway for Palestinian statehood, have been circulating for months and would be welcomed by the United States and many other countries. A key obstacle to realizing such an agreement, however, is Israel’s reluctance to end the war, with the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seemingly unwilling to bring the military campaign to an end. Another obstacle is a refusal on the Palestinian side to recognize that Hamas can play no role in postconflict governance.

Basic questions must also be answered for both sides to move toward this future. How would Gaza be administered? By whom? How could Israeli security be guaranteed? So far, few answers have emerged. Israel lacks a political vision for the war’s end. An Israeli occupation of Gaza, perhaps the most likely outcome currently, will come at enormous cost to Israel, in terms of blood, treasure, and international reputation. But neither is the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas in a position to govern Gaza. The PA needs reform and fresh leadership to regain credibility among Palestinians. And a return to rule by Hamas, which thrives on violence and the suffering of those it governs, is even less viable.

The situation cries out for an international arrangement to help all sides realize their self-interest in a durable peace for Gaza and, ultimately, a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To last, any such arrangement will have to be backed by regional leaders, have the clear goal of strengthening Palestinian institutions as a prelude to statehood, and guarantee Israel’s security. Fortunately, there is an established, long-dormant mechanism that can do just that: a UN trusteeship.

WORK YOURSELF OUT OF A JOB

The administration of UN trusteeships is supervised by the UN Trusteeship Council, a forum that was set up shortly after the creation of the United Nations in 1945. Trusteeships were established for remaining League of Nations mandates, the colonies of the Axis powers in World War II, and any other territories placed under the system. Trust territories included Western Samoa, Cameroon, Togoland, New Guinea, Italian Somaliland, among others.

One of six organs of the UN system—alongside the Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice—the Trusteeship Council suspended operations in November 1994 when its final trust territory, Palau, achieved independence. In total, the Trusteeship Council oversaw 11 trust territories. The Trusteeship Council, a rare example of an international institution that unambiguously fulfilled its agenda, provided a vital mechanism for facilitating decolonization in Africa and the Pacific. It exceeded even the most optimistic expectations of governments.

It could continue this legacy with a trusteeship for Palestine, putting Palestinians on a pathway toward statehood. As made clear under Article 76 of the UN Charter, trusteeships have the express purpose of fostering “progressive development towards self-government and independence” based on the “expressed wishes of the people concerned,” alongside respect for human rights and the furtherance of international peace and security.

The trusteeship should establish a time frame for full Palestinian statehood.

UN trusteeships are a product of what are known as administrative agreements, pacts negotiated by UN member states and approved by the General Assembly. These agreements are devised by one or more states that assume a duty under the UN Charter to aid the trust territory in strengthening its institutions of governance as it moves toward independence. This includes the provision of force, as necessary, to maintain peace and security. Supervision by the Trusteeship Council ensures the support and oversight of the international community. With these layers of oversight, trusteeships are designed to benefit the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories. They work with the consent of the governed, accompanying them as they develop their institutions and capacity.

Though suspended, the current membership of the Trusteeship Council includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. It could be reconvened by request of the Security Council or the General Assembly, or by a decision of current Trusteeship Council members. Upon convening, members of the Trusteeship Council would duly elect a president and vice president.

A trusteeship for Palestine has been considered before. In 2003, former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk made the case for a U.S.-led and UN-endorsed trusteeship for Palestine in Foreign Affairs. “Without some form of effective international intervention, Israelis and Palestinians will continue to die and their circumstances will continue to deteriorate, fueling vast discontent and anger at the United States in the Muslim world and placing Israel’s future well-being in jeopardy,” he wrote. In 2007, he renewed his proposal for a UN-mandated international force to replace Israeli forces in the Palestinian territories. Although similar in spirit, what’s needed now is something different. Although firm U.S. backing is necessary, the trusteeship should be under the aegis of the UN and led by regional actors.

GOVERNING GAZA

A temporary trusteeship in Palestine should include both Gaza and the West Bank. If the objective is to forge a unified Palestinian state, as it must be, both territories should be included. Negotiation of an administrative agreement might also consider the future of the UN agency serving Palestinian refugees (known as UNRWA), the status of East Jerusalem, and Jewish settlements in the West Bank. As specified in the UN Charter, provision must be made to ensure that the expressed wishes of the Palestinian people will be the overriding consideration in state building throughout the trusteeship, including political, economic, social, and educational advancement.

The trusteeship should establish a time frame for full Palestinian statehood. A timeline would help focus state-building efforts and guard against the risk that this temporary measure becomes more enduring than initially intended, which is what happened to the UNRWA. UN trusteeships are designed to come to an end. Many UN trusteeships were concluded within 15 years, with some complete in less than ten. Conceivably, a Palestinian trusteeship could lead to statehood even more swiftly.

Like most other former mandates established under the League of Nations after World War I, Palestine very nearly became a UN trust in 1948. Indeed, senior U.S. officials believed strongly that this was the most suitable option and circulated a draft agreement at the UN to achieve this. The plan was scuppered at the last moment—with not a little embarrassment at the State Department—by objections from U.S. President Harry Truman, some say for domestic political reasons, as well as by hesitations on the part of Jewish and Palestinian groups.

UN trusteeship offers a path to progress on an intractable problem.

Using the Trusteeship Council to pave the way to a two-state solution would require no amendment to the UN Charter, since the organ would be used for its intended purpose. Indeed, it would arguably rectify the error made in 1948. Moreover, agreement on a trusteeship would not be subject to a UN Security Council veto. Trusteeships fall under the responsibility of the General Assembly, and so the administrative agreement to establish the trusteeship would need merely a majority vote of all members. This was a hard-earned win for states that are not permanent members of the Security Council at the San Francisco conference in 1945. This arrangement avoids veto-power-induced wrangling over a Security Council resolution that, in all likelihood, would result in the same type of fractured, ambiguous mandate that has bedeviled other UN missions. It might also save the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) from excessive politicization, moving discussions from a security-focused venue to a more technical forum.

Negotiations over an administrative agreement would be complex. All sides would need to feel that their interests would be safeguarded. The support of Israel, the PA, moderate forces in Gaza, and the United States would be necessary. The agreement would need to support the wider regional deal on Saudi-Israeli normalization, offering value to all sides. The trusteeship should be administered by a small group of regional states, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which would assume primary responsibility for the trusteeship. Active Israeli collaboration in some form would be essential on the ground, especially—if it were not itself elected to the Trusteeship Council—as a nonvoting participant in discussions. Israel, often skeptical of UN solutions, would likely need some convincing to back a trusteeship, up to and including the type of U.S. arm-twisting seen recently over weapons shipments. Although key regional players have in the past voiced concern about assuming responsibility for postconflict Gaza, they have a strong interest in Palestinian statehood and might welcome the more formal institutional backing of the UN in any solution. The staggering costs of rebuilding Gaza will be a key consideration for these regional actors in embarking on any administrative agreement, making the broad international support of the UN system especially appealing.

Once an administrative agreement for the trusteeship has been finalized and approved by a majority vote at the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council could be reconstituted. With only one trust territory, the revived organ could be small, limited in number to the administrative authorities—in this case Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and any other actors in the region that assume the responsibility— and, as stipulated in Article 86 of the UN Charter, an equal number of nonadministrative members elected by the General Assembly for three-year terms. Members of the Trusteeship Council would convene in New York to review progress toward Palestinian statehood, issuing by majority vote decisions or recommendations in support of this process. Any abstaining governments are not counted in votes. The permanent members of the UN Security Council would be included among the membership of the Trusteeship Council. Any additional nonadministrative members should be elected on a geographically representative basis, taking into account the experience of candidate countries with state building. The small size of the Trusteeship Council would be a virtue, bringing coherence and, with luck, depoliticizing the endeavor.

BUYING TIME

Although the initiative would not be simple to negotiate, it is probably less complicated than the alternatives and could open the way to the wider regional deal centered on Saudi-Israeli normalization. Although the PA is currently in no position to govern, a temporary trusteeship would offer the international administrative and supervisory support required to aid its transition to government. The Trusteeship Council has proved it can do this sort of work. With Saudi Arabia leading the administering authority, alongside one or two other regional partners, Hamas could be disbanded, Israeli security could be guaranteed, and Palestine’s pathway to statehood clarified. Troops would be provided, chiefly by administering states, though with contributions from other UN member states. All this would be done within a UN framework and with the support of the UN membership.

UN trusteeship thus offers a path to progress on an intractable problem. The Palestinian question has remained an open wound, triggering resentment and accusations of Western hypocrisy for decades. It has also proved highly divisive domestically in many countries, as seen recently on U.S. university campuses. A temporary trusteeship also sidesteps a fractured Security Council, offering the hope of resolving a conflict in the midst of great-power competition.

Although the notion of trusteeship may seem anachronistic, it could offer a useful tool for UN-led state building beyond Palestine. As civil wars rage with renewed ferocity around the world, a reinvigorated Trusteeship Council might serve as a useful means of fostering the transition to statehood for other non-self-governing regions, such as the Western Sahara and 15 others, that may require support to transition to independence. Ending these conflicts would mark an important achievement for a UN system in need of a victory. And in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it offers the best chance of peace.

• LLOYD AXWORTHY is Chair of the World Refugee and Migration Council. He was Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 2000.
• MICHAEL W. MANULAK is an Assistant Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University and the author of Change in Global Environmental Politics: Temporal Focal Points and the Reform of International Institutions.
• ALLAN ROCK is President Emeritus of the University of Ottawa. He was Canadian Minister of Justice from 1993 to 1997 and Canadian Ambassador to the UN from 2003 to 2006.

Foreign Affairs · May 15, 2024

20. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2024

Key Takeaways:

• The pace of Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast appears to have slowed over the past 24 hours, and the pattern of Russian offensive activity in this area is consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian forces are prioritizing the creation of a "buffer zone" in the international border area over a deeper penetration of Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's candidate for Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov outlined his and Putin's intended priorities for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) during a speech to the Russian Federation Council on May 14.
• Russian authorities detained Russian Deputy Defense Minister and Russian MoD Main Personnel Directorate Head Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov on May 13 on charges of accepting large-scale bribes.
• Putin appointed former Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev as his presidential assistants on May 14, further re-balancing his ministerial cabinet for his fifth term.
• The Georgian parliament passed Georgia's Russian-style "foreign agents" bill in its third and final reading on May 14, amid continued protests against the bill in Tbilisi.
• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that the US is interested in a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv on May 14.
• Likely Ukrainian actors conducted a strike against a Russian railway line in Volgograd Oblast on May 14.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Lyptsi, Vovchansk, Svatove, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Krynky.
• The Russian MoD is reportedly coercing Russian citizens and migrants into Russian military service through false job opportunities, likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.
• Ukrainian officials continue efforts to return forcibly deported Ukrainian children to Ukrainian-controlled territory from Russia.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 14, 2024

May 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2024

Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 14, 2024, 8:35pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3:15pm ET on May 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The pace of Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast appears to have slowed over the past 24 hours, and the pattern of Russian offensive activity in this area is consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian forces are prioritizing the creation of a "buffer zone" in the international border area over a deeper penetration of Kharkiv Oblast. Several Ukrainian military officials reported on May 14 that they believe the situation in Kharkiv Oblast is slowly stabilizing — Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on May 14 that the situation in Kharkiv Oblast began stabilizing on the night of May 13 into May 14 as additional Ukrainian units deployed to the area and began defending against Russian advances.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn noted that Ukrainian forces have begun to "clear" Vovchansk by targeting visible Russian assault groups in the settlement.[2] Several Russian and Ukrainian sources also reported that Russian forces are using new tactics in this direction — using smaller assault groups of no more than five people to penetrate Ukrainian positions before merging with other small assault groups to unite into a larger strike group.[3] Drone footage purportedly from Vovchansk shows Russian foot mobile infantry operating within the settlement in small squad-sized assault groups, consistent with Ukrainian reports.[4]

The use of small assault groups, however, may be contributing to higher Russian manpower and materiel losses and slowing the overall pace of the Russian offensive in this direction. One Russian military commentator, who previously served as a "Storm-Z" unit instructor, complained that footage of small Russian assault groups is indicative of poor training and preparation, not an effective new tactic.[5] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that growing Russian losses in this direction are leading to a decrease in the overall pace of offensive operations.[6] Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff Major General Anatoliy Barhylevych suggested that Russian forces have lost up to 1,740 soldiers in this direction over just the past day, which would be a very high rate of losses.[7] ISW cannot independently confirm this number, but the purported loss rate may be consistent with the generally slower rate of offensive operations observed on May 14. If the pace of Russian operations remains relatively lower, Russian forces will likely focus on consolidating new positions and building out a lateral salient in Kharkiv Oblast by merging the Lyptsi and Vovchansk efforts and creating a "buffer zone" in the border area, as opposed to pushing further into the oblast, as ISW has previously assessed.[8]

Russian President Vladimir Putin's candidate for Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov outlined his and Putin's intended priorities for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) during a speech to the Russian Federation Council on May 14. Belousov stated that Putin has set two tasks for a Belousov-led Russian MoD – ensuring the full integration of the Russian military's economy into the general Russian economy and making the Russian MoD as open to innovation as possible.[9] Belousov stated that the Russian MoD's "most pressing issue" is equipping and supplying the Russian military with modern equipment, ammunition, missiles, communications equipment, drones, and electronic warfare (EW) systems. Belousov stated that his other top priorities are the implementation of the 2025 state defense order, the Russian MoD's annual request for new weapons and equipment from the Russian defense industry, and recruitment efforts, but noted that there is no need to discuss "emergency measures" such as a partial or general mobilization of Russian citizens. Belousov noted that the Russian MoD must optimize its spending and gain greater control over the Russian defense industry. Belousov's identified priorities are largely consistent with ISW's assessment that Belousov's appointment indicates that Putin is taking significant steps towards mobilizing the Russian economy and defense industry to support a protracted war effort in Ukraine and possibly prepare for a future confrontation with NATO.[10]

Russian authorities detained Russian Deputy Defense Minister and Russian MoD Main Personnel Directorate Head Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov on May 13 on charges of accepting large-scale bribes. The Russian Investigative Committee and Russian media reported on May 14 that the Russian 235th Garrison Military Court detained Kuznetsov on suspicion of accepting a large bribe in the period 2021-2023 while serving as the head of the Russian General Staff's 8th Directorate, which is in charge of the protection of state secrets.[11] The Russian Investigative Committee reported that authorities raided Kuznetsov's home and discovered over 100 million rubles (about $1 million) worth of cash, including foreign currency, and luxury items. Moscow's Basmanny Raion Court also detained Russian businessman Lev Martirosyan as part of Kuznetsov's case.[12] Russian outlet Kommersant reported that Martirosyan bribed Kuznetsov with a total of 30.5 million rubles ($333,935) to help Martirosyan's hotel companies win government contracts.[13] Kommersant reported that the same Investigative Committee department is investigating Kuznetsov's and detained Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov's cases and that the Investigative Committee is forming a special team to investigate similar cases involving high-ranking military personnel. Russian authorities detained Ivanov on April 24 on charges of accepting bribes.[14] Ongoing speculation about further changes within the Russian military and political leadership prompted Russian sources to speculate about the possible return of disgraced Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin to Russian President Vladimir Putin's favor, but Russian sources concluded that insider reports that Surovikin is in Moscow are inaccurate.[15]

Putin appointed former Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev as his presidential assistants on May 14, further re-balancing his ministerial cabinet for his fifth term.[16] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that Dyumin will oversee issues regarding the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), State Council, and sports policy, while Patrushev will oversee the strategic development of the Russian shipbuilding industry as well as "other areas, perhaps."[17] Russian presidential assistants typically help the Russian president in the execution of their powers, including by preparing proposals for presidential work and by participating in official meetings alongside the president.[18] Presidential assistants may perform other tasks as the president orders. Dyumin's appointment as Putin's assistant on DIB issues is consistent with Putin's apparent effort to restructure the Russian economy for a protracted war — Dyumin generally has a positive reputation amongst Russian commentators and is seen as a solid and effective professional, and Putin likely is hoping to leverage Dyumin's good reputation to manage his own.[19]

Russian commentators received the news of Patrushev's new position less certainly, however. Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing sources close to the Kremlin, stated that its sources were "stunned" when they saw that Putin had removed Patrushev from the Security Council, and even more "shocked" that his new position is to be Putin's assistant on shipbuilding.[20] Putin may have moved Patrushev to this new position in order to rebalance the siloviki-run power vertical that exists within the Russian security services, as ISW previously reported Putin tends to do with powerful siloviki.[21] Patrushev is reportedly a close Putin ally, the individual personally responsible for the assassination of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Putin's personal diplomat who frequently conducted diplomatic trips on Putin's behalf, according to Western reporting.[22] Putin can continue to use Patrushev's connections and experience even if Patrushev is nominally acting as an expert on "shipbuilding" strategy. The new position is nevertheless an obvious demotion.

The Georgian parliament passed Georgia's Russian-style "foreign agents" bill in its third and final reading on May 14, amid continued protests against the bill in Tbilisi. The Georgian parliament passed the bill in an 84 to 30 vote, after which it will go to Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili to for final signature.[23] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Georgian service reported that members of the European Socialist party and the People's Force party, a breakaway party from the ruling Georgian Dream, supported the bill alongside Georgian Dream members.[24] Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili previously stated that she intended to veto the bill, although RFE/RL's Georgian service noted that Georgian Dream has enough votes to override her veto.[25] Zurabishvili also proposed postponing the law's entry into force until November 1, after the October 26 Georgian parliamentary elections.[26] Georgian opposition figures and Western officials have expressed concern that the Georgian government could also utilize the bill to target and justify domestic repression and that its passage could block Georgia’s path to joining the European Union (EU).[27] US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O'Brien previously met with senior Georgian officials and opposition members in Tbilisi on April 14. O'Brien stated that Georgian Dream party founder and former Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili refused to meet with him because Ivanishvili claimed that the US had "de facto" sanctioned him, which O'Brien stated was false.[28] ISW has recently observed Ivanishvili and the Georgian State Security Service (SUS) intensifying their use of established Kremlin information operations and increasing rhetorical alignment with Russia against the West.[29] Georgian Dream actors likely intend to purposefully derail long-term Georgian efforts for Euro-Atlantic integration, which plays into continued Russian hybrid operations to divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia.[30]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that the United States is interested in a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv on May 14. Blinken stated during a speech in Kyiv that more than 32 NATO states are negotiating 10-year bilateral security commitments with Ukraine, including nine states with completed agreements.[31] Blinken also reiterated the US commitment to supporting Ukraine's military and industrial efforts. Blinken met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on May 14 and is expected to meet with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on May 15.[32] Zelensky and Blinken discussed the importance of newly arrived US security assistance in helping Ukrainian forces repel Russian attacks along the frontline and long-term security and economic support for Ukraine.

Likely Ukrainian actors conducted a strike against a Russian railway line in Volgograd Oblast on May 14. Geolocated footage published on May 14 purportedly shows the aftermath of a likely Ukrainian drone strike against a train in Samofalovka.[33] The train was allegedly transporting fuel.[34] Volga Railway's Press Service stated that "unauthorized persons" derailed several cars of a freight train, and unspecified Russian operational services reported that the derailment and subsequent fire damaged almost 300 meters of railway tracks.[35]

Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur clarified that Estonia is not currently considering sending its forces to deep rear areas in Ukraine for non-combat roles.[36] Pevkur stated on May 14 that previous discussions about possibly sending troops to deep rear areas of Ukraine have not gained traction in either Estonia or the European Union (EU) and noted that Estonia would not take such a measure alone. Breaking Defense reported on May 13 that National Security Advisor to the Estonian President, Madis Roll, stated that the Estonian government is "seriously" considering sending Estonian troops to western Ukraine to take over non-combat roles in the rear from Ukrainian troops, allowing Ukrainian forces to deploy to frontline areas.[37] Roll clarified to Breaking Defense on May 14 that the discussion of sending Estonian forces to Ukraine in non-combat roles is "not dead" and "ongoing in Estonia in general."[38]

Key Takeaways:

• The pace of Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast appears to have slowed over the past 24 hours, and the pattern of Russian offensive activity in this area is consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian forces are prioritizing the creation of a "buffer zone" in the international border area over a deeper penetration of Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's candidate for Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov outlined his and Putin's intended priorities for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) during a speech to the Russian Federation Council on May 14.
• Russian authorities detained Russian Deputy Defense Minister and Russian MoD Main Personnel Directorate Head Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov on May 13 on charges of accepting large-scale bribes.
• Putin appointed former Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev as his presidential assistants on May 14, further re-balancing his ministerial cabinet for his fifth term.
• The Georgian parliament passed Georgia's Russian-style "foreign agents" bill in its third and final reading on May 14, amid continued protests against the bill in Tbilisi.
• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that the US is interested in a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv on May 14.
• Likely Ukrainian actors conducted a strike against a Russian railway line in Volgograd Oblast on May 14.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Lyptsi, Vovchansk, Svatove, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Krynky.
• The Russian MoD is reportedly coercing Russian citizens and migrants into Russian military service through false job opportunities, likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.
• Ukrainian officials continue efforts to return forcibly deported Ukrainian children to Ukrainian-controlled territory from Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

NOTE: ISW is adding a section to cover Russian offensive operations along the Belgorod-Kharkiv axis as these offensive operations comprise an operational effort separate from Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. ISW may enlarge the scope of this section should Russian forces expand offensive operations along the Russian-Ukrainian international border in northeastern Ukraine.

Russian forces continued to make marginal tactical advances in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City). Geolocated footage published on May 13 shows that Russian forces advanced southward to the intersection of Skhilna Road and Chervonyi Lane in eastern Lukyantsi (northeast of Lyptsi).[39] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have seized the entirety of Lukyantsi and are operating in the fields southeast of Lukyantsi.[40] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating in southern Lukyantsi or southeast of the settlement, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces "repositioned" near Lukyantsi to save the lives of Ukrainian personnel, likely a tacit acknowledgment of Russian advances into the settlement.[41] Ukrainian sources and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue efforts to reach the outskirts of Lyptsi from the Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi) and Lukyantsi directions.[42] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that elements of the 79th and 280th motorized rifle regiments (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps, Baltic Sea Fleet) and the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (directly subordinate to the 11th Army Corps) are operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that an assault group of the former Wagner Group has also deployed to northern Kharkiv Oblast as part of the Russian Northern Group of Forces, although ISW has not yet independently confirmed the presence of former Wagner fighters in this area.[44]

Russian forces also continued to make tactical advances in and around Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City). Geolocated footage published on May 14 shows that Russian forces have advanced along Slobozhanska Street in northwestern Vovchansk.[45] Additional geolocated footage published on May 14 shows that Russian forces have advanced in northeastern Vovchansk near Zarichna Street.[46] Russian sources reported that Russian forces have advanced in northwestern and northeastern Vovchansk, consistent with the available geolocated footage.[47] ISW has notably not yet observed any confirmation of Russian forces operating on the southern (left) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk thus far. Geolocated footage published on May 14 also confirms that Russian forces have advanced into central Buhruvatka (southwest of Vovchansk) and in forest areas north of Buhruvatka.[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Buhruvatka, which is consistent with geolocated evidence and reports from other Russian sources.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are attacking towards Vovchansk from the direction of Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast and that there is fighting on the outskirts of the settlement.[50] Mashovets noted that elements of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 6th Combined Arms Army (MMD) are operating in the Vovchansk direction.[51] Mashovets also reported that there are already about 5-6 Russian motorized rifle battalions, reinforced with tank units, committed to the Vovchansk direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance northwest of Svatove amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on May 14. Geolocated footage published on May 14 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Stelmakhivka (northwest of Svatove), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near the settlement.[52] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, Vilshana, Lyman Pershyi, and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Krokhmalne and Berestove; west of Svatove near Myasozharivka; southwest of Svatove near Kovalivka, Novoyehorivka, Ploshchanka, Makiivka, and Chervonopopivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Ivanivka; southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Siversk (northeast of Bakhmut) near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Spirne; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka and Vyimka on May 14.[54]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast and east of Chasiv Yar amid continued ground attacks in the area on May 14. Geolocated footage published on May 12 and 13 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced on the eastern outskirts of Kalynivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) and in the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar), respectively.[55] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also marginally advanced in the dacha area north of Kanal Microraion and near Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[56] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces "changed" unspecified positions in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction to preserve Ukrainian personnel.[57] Russian forces also continued ground attacks near Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar), east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Bila Hora.[58] The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces are assaulting the area with smaller forces and are primarily using "Storm V" and "Storm B" units staffed with penal recruits for infantry-led attacks in the area.[59] ISW has not observed previous mentions of "Storm-B" units before, and they are likely a different iteration of the "Storm-Z" assault group built on convict recruits. The commander also stated that Russian forces have an unspecified number of mechanized units in reserve. Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) continue operating in the Chasiv Yar direction, and elements of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz and the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly fighting near Ivanivske.[60]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Avdiivka and continued ground attacks in the area on May 14. Geolocated footage published on May 14 shows that Russian forces advanced south of Umanske (west of Avdiivka) and reached the S-051801 Novoselivka Persha-Umanske-Yasnobrodivka road.[61] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka) and further within Netaylove (southwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[62] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces "changed" positions in some unspecified areas and that Russian forces achieved unspecified tactical successes in the Pokrovsk (Avdiivka) direction.[63] Russian forces also continued ground attacks northwest of Avdiivka near Ocheretyne, Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Kalynove, Arkhanhelske, Solovyove, and Sokil; and west of Avdiivka near Umanske, Semenivka, and Yasnobrodivka.[64]

Russian forces reportedly marginally advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued ground assaults west and southwest of Donetsk City on May 14. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to marginally advance in Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[65] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces achieved an unspecified marginal success in the Kurakhove direction (west of Donetsk City).[66] Russian forces also continued ground attacks west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Vodyane.[67] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC ), 238th Motorized Rifle Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), and 68th AC (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly fighting near Krasnohorivka.[68]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on May 14.[69]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milbloger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[70] Russian forces continued assaults near Robotyne from the direction of Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne).[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently intensified their drone operations in the Zaporizhia direction.[72] Elements of the Russian 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reformed Soviet-era unit) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[73]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Krynky amid continued positional fighting in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on May 14. Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced up to a section of Ostapa Vyshni Street within Krynky.[74] Russian forces continued assaults near Krynky from the Oleshkivsky Pisky nature reserve southwest of Krynky and near Kozachi Laheri (just southwest of Krynky).[75] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command and Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported that Russian forces have not attacked Nestryha Island in the past two days and are focusing their attacks on Krynky.[76]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 13 to 14. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Mykola Oleschuk reported that Russian forces launched 18 Shahed-136/131 drones and an Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea.[77] Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed all 18 Shahed drones over Kyiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkassy, Kirovohrad, Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.

The New York Times (NYT), citing data from the Ukrainian Air Force's daily reports, reported on May 14 that constrained Ukrainian air defenses are increasingly failing to destroy Russian missiles.[78] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash told NYT that Ukrainian forces cannot afford to unnecessarily deplete their limited stockpiles of air defense missiles and are employing "non-standard" methods, likely referring to Ukraine's mobile fire groups, to destroy Russian drones and missiles. Yevlash noted that Ukraine is constantly moving its air defense systems in response to Russia's changing tactics and target set and to protect Ukraine's limited air defense systems.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian MoD is reportedly coercing Russian citizens and migrants into Russian military service through false job opportunities, likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Systema project reported on May 14 that the Russian MoD is recruiting Russian citizens and migrants to Russian MoD-controlled companies through false contracts with the promise of a one-time payment of 405,000 rubles (about $4,400).[79] Systema reported that legitimate Russian companies participate in this scheme to show their loyalty to the Russian government and retain their current employees, likely to protect them from crypto-mobilization. The Russian MoD reportedly immediately sends individuals recruited under false job contracts to fight in Ukraine. Systema reported that these false job opportunity schemes target Russian, Belarusian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Indian, and Congolese citizens.

Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov confirmed on May 14 that elements of Rosgvardia are using heavy weaponry in Ukraine. Zolotov claimed that Rosgvardia's 116th Special Purpose Brigade has 36 tanks, 15 mortars, and an unspecified number of artillery systems and is currently operating in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[80] Zolotov announced on June 27, 2023, that Rosgvardia would receive heavy weapons and tanks.[81]

The Russian government is likely continuing attempts to nationalize Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises. Russian outlet RBK reported on May 14 that Yaroslavl Oblast's Arbitration Court seized the assets of the Yaroslavl Shipyard company that produces vessels for the Russian Navy.[82] One of RBK's sources assessed that the Russian government will likely nationalize Yaroslavl Shipyard.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD and Tula Oblast government are supporting a project to build unmanned naval drones. The milblogger posted footage purportedly showing Russian forces testing a naval drone with a 250-kilometer range and a 250-kilogram warhead in Tula Oblast.[83]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian officials continue efforts to return forcibly deported Ukrainian children to Ukrainian-controlled territory from Russia. The Ukrainian Ministry for Reintegration reported on May 14 that the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers approved a new procedure for identifying, returning, and providing social support for deported Ukrainian children, including orphans and children without parental care.[84] The procedure will develop an individual return plan for each child.

Occupation officials continue to forcibly transport and detain Ukrainian citizens within Russian controlled territory. The Crimean Human Rights Group published a report on May 12 confirming that Russian authorities abducted at least 72 Ukrainian civilians from occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and transferred them to occupied Simferopol, Crimea to stand trial for alleged crimes between January and March 2024.[85] The Crimean Human Rights Group reported that Russian authorities have detained at least 201 Ukrainian citizens for political and religious reasons. Ukraine's Presidential Representation in Crimea reported on May 13 that Russia has illegally imprisoned 218 people in occupied Crimea, including 133 Crimean Tatars.[86]

Russian officials continue efforts to Russify and indoctrinate Ukrainian citizens and children using Russian cultural and historical legacies, including forcibly deporting Ukrainian students to Russia. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on May 12 that occupation officials taught Ukrainian children history lessons about the Soviet Union's contributions during the Great Patriotic War (Second World War) in honor of Russia's May 9th Victory Day holiday.[87] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported that the Skadovsk Museum of Local History held a public event to teach Ukrainian children about the war using known Kremlin narratives.[88] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration also stated on May 13 that occupation officials will send 1,200 Ukrainian teenagers from occupied Kherson Oblast to Kabardino-Balkaria State University in Russia for a program aimed at indoctrinating the students into Russian historical and cultural narratives.[89] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that occupation authorities sent 100 college students from Donetsk State University to Moscow for a patriotic youth program intended to convince Ukrainian students that Ukraine does not exist and belongs to Russia.[90]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials and pro-Kremlin actors continue a number of information operations aimed at discrediting the Ukrainian government and undermining Ukrainians' morale and trust in the military. Russian actors made a number of claims accusing the Ukrainian military of being unprepared to defend against the Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast, inflating the degree of Russian successes in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and accusing the Ukrainian government of corruption and unethical practices regarding the war.[91]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

21. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, May 14, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-14-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias are sustaining a very high daily rate of attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia. The IDF is currently conducting two re-clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli operations continued in eastern Rafah and around the Rafah border crossing.
• Iran: Iranian media identified former Iranian Ambassador to Iraq and IRGC Quds Force Brig. Gen. Eraj Masjedi as the IRGC Quds Force coordination deputy for the first time on May 14. The coordination deputy is the third highest-ranking officer in the IRGC Quds Force.
• West Bank: Israeli civilians set fire to two humanitarian aid trucks bound for the Gaza Strip at a checkpoint between Israel and the West Bank.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah fired several anti-tank guided missiles targeting an Israeli surveillance balloon and equipment associated with it in successive attacks.

IRAN UPDATE, MAY 14, 2024

May 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, May 14, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Israeli forces expanded clearing operations on May 14 into areas of the Jabalia refugee camp that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had not previously cleared. Two IDF brigades advanced into the center of the Jabalia refugee camp.[1] Israeli forces initially conducted clearing operations in Jabalia city and refugee camp in November 2023, but the IDF had not advanced into center of the camp before this operation.[2]

Palestinian militias have sustained the highest number of claimed attacks per day around Jabalia since the war began. Palestinian militias have claimed 86 attacks (an average of roughly 28 attacks per day) targeting Israeli forces since the IDF advanced into eastern Jabalia on May 11.[3] This rate of attack exceeds the level seen during a similar operation in Zaytoun, when the militias claimed 92 attacks (an average of roughly 10 attacks per day) over a nine-day period during the IDF’s first re-clearing operation in Zaytoun.[4] The militias have preserved or rebuilt the personnel and material required to contest Israeli raids in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas will likely be able to compensate for any losses it takes during this Israeli operation by rebuilding its units in the Jabalia refugee camp after the IDF withdraws, given the IDF’s clear-leave-repeat strategy.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias are sustaining a very high daily rate of attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia. The IDF is currently conducting two re-clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli operations continued in eastern Rafah and around the Rafah border crossing.
• Iran: Iranian media identified former Iranian Ambassador to Iraq and IRGC Quds Force Brig. Gen. Eraj Masjedi as the IRGC Quds Force coordination deputy for the first time on May 14. The coordination deputy is the third highest-ranking officer in the IRGC Quds Force.
• West Bank: Israeli civilians set fire to two humanitarian aid trucks bound for the Gaza Strip at a checkpoint between Israel and the West Bank.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah fired several anti-tank guided missiles targeting an Israeli surveillance balloon and equipment associated with it in successive attacks.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces continued a re-clearing operation in Zaytoun, southern Gaza City, on May 14. Two IDF brigades located and destroyed military infrastructure, including rocket launchers and a weapons depot.[5] Tanks in the IDF 679th Armored Brigade killed several Palestinian fighters who were approaching Israeli ground forces.[6] Three Palestinian militias separately engaged Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[7]

The IDF issued evacuation orders for civilians in areas west of Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on May 14.[8] The IDF said that it would operate in Atatra, an area west of Jabalia, to clear Palestinian militias operating in and launching rockets from the area. Israeli forces initially conducted clearing operations in Atatra in November 2023.[9] The IDF issued evacuation orders on May 11 that covered areas of Jabalia refugee camp and eastern Jabalia.[10]

The IDF Air Force struck a Hamas operations room inside a UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) school in Nuseirat, central Gaza Strip, on May 14.[11] The IDF said that Palestinian fighters, including Hamas ‘Nukhba fighters, recently used the room to coordinate attacks targeting Israeli forces in the area. A UNRWA official said that the agency is not able to confirm the IDF's report.[12] The IDF said that the attack killed about 15 Palestinian fighters, including 10 Hamas fighters.[13] Local Palestinians reported that airstrikes in the area killed a total of 40 people.[14] The United States and Israel have repeatedly said throughout the war that Hamas uses hospitals and schools and other civilian facilities for military purposes.[15]

The IDF 162nd Division continued its clearing operation in eastern Rafah and near the Rafah border crossing with Egypt on May 14. The IDF Givati Brigade located weapons, killed Palestinian fighters, and directed Israeli airstrikes in eastern Rafah.[16] The IDF 401st Armored Brigade engaged several Palestinian cells near the Rafah border crossing.[17] Local Palestinians reported that Israeli forces are operating in several neighborhoods west of the Salah al Din Road in eastern Rafah.[18] Several Palestinian militias rigged tunnels to explode to target Israeli forces and attacked Israeli forces in Rafah with small arms, improvised explosive devices, and mortars[19]

Two unspecified senior Biden administration officials told CNN that the Biden administration assesses that Israel has amassed enough forces on the edge of Rafah city to conduct a full-scale military operation in the "coming days."[20] Senior US officials are unsure if Israel has made the final decision to conduct such an operation. US President Joe Biden warned Israel on May 8 that the United States would withhold additional arms shipments if Israel proceeded with a major operation.[21]  

The Qatari prime minister said on May 12 that ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas “are almost at a stalemate.”[22] He claimed that Israeli operations in Rafah have delayed talks. Hamas contributed to the standstill in negotiations when it introduced a ceasefire counterproposal on May 6 with two key changes that Israel had not accepted.[23]

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said on May 13 that the world must demand Hamas to return to the negotiating table with Israel.[24] Hamas claimed in a rebuttal to Sullivan’s statement that it has not neglected any round of negotiations and that it agreed to the latest proposal.[25] Hamas introduced a counterproposal, ”accepted” its own counterproposal, then framed the counterproposal as if Hamas had accepted the original agreement.

Sullivan said that military pressure is necessary but not sufficient to fully defeat Hamas.[26] He warned that Hamas will return to power without a viable political plan for the Gaza Strip. Sullivan said Hamas has already returned in Gaza City. Hamas has begun reasserting its political power in the northern Gaza Strip by suppressing opposition, policing, and governing trade.[27] Other US officials have similarly expressed concern that Hamas will survive in the Gaza Strip. Blinken warned on May 12 that without an alternative to Hamas, Israel will achieve tactical successes but ultimately Hamas would return to power.[28] US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told CNN that the United States doesn’t believe that Israel’s goal of a total victory over Hamas is ”likely or possible.”[29]

Unspecified people fired at a United Nations vehicle in Rafah on May 13, killing a UN employee and injuring another.[30] The UN said that the vehicle was clearly marked and that Israeli forces were aware of the car’s route to a hospital in Khan Younis.[31] The IDF said that the two workers were hit in an active combat zone but the IDF did not specify who was responsible for the fire.[32] The IDF also said that it was not aware of the vehicle's movement.[33] The UN has opened a fact-finding panel to investigate the attack.[34]

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on May 13 that more than 1,000 Hamas members were being treated in hospitals across Turkey.[35] An anonymous Turkish official told Reuters that Erdogan “misspoke” and meant to say that Turkish hospitals are treating Gazans.[36] The Turkish government announced plans in November 2023 to evacuate some wounded or sick Gazans, Turkish nationals, and Turkish Cypriots from the Gaza Strip to Turkey.[37] Turkey reportedly used the Al Arish International Airport in Egypt to transfer the Gazans to Turkey.[38]

Palestinian militias conducted four indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on May 14.[39] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired rockets from the northern Gaza Strip targeting Sderot.[40]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cut off on May 13.[41]

Palestinians organized demonstrations on May 14 in Jenin, Ramallah, and Tulkarm to protest the treatment of Palestinians in Israeli prisons.[42]

Israeli civilians set fire to two humanitarian aid trucks bound for the Gaza Strip at a checkpoint between Israel and the West Bank on May 13.[43] CTP-ISW reported on May 13 that the Israeli Tsav 9 group—a right-wing activist group that seeks to disrupt the delivery of aid into the Gaza Strip as long as Hamas and its militia allies continue to hold Israeli hostages—organized protests to block a humanitarian aid convoy west of Hebron.[44] Israeli media reported that right-wing protesters returned to the site after Israeli police departed and set fire to two aid trucks from the convoy that the protesters had been blocking.[45] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan called the assaults on the aid convoy “utterly unacceptable behavior” on May 14. Sullivan said that the United States raised concerns with the Israeli government and that the United States is considering a response to the incident.[46]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 13.[47] Hezbollah fired anti-tank missiles targeting an Israeli surveillance balloon and equipment associated with the balloon near Adamit on May 14.[48] The IDF said that the attack shot down the balloon and wounded five IDF soldiers.[49]

Israeli demonstrators blocked roads in northern Israel on May 14 to protest the Israeli government's inability to return displaced Israeli civilians to northern Israel.[50] Regional officials in northern Israel announced plans on May 10 for protests on Israel’s Independence Day on May 14.[51] Residents began planning protests after Israeli media reports on May 10 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had dismissed concerns during a cabinet meeting that civilians may not be able to return to northern Israel before the start of the school year in early September.[52]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei greeted a Houthi delegation attending the Tehran International Book Fair on May 13.[53] Khamenei asked the Houthi delegation to extend his “warm greetings” to Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi. Houthi Ambassador to Iran Ibrahim al Daylami, Houthi Deputy Cultural Minister Mohammad Haidareh and Head of the Houthi Book Organization Abdulrahman Muard were part of the Houthi delegation.[54]

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brig. Gen. Eraj Masjedi said on May 14 that Iran’s enmity with Israel will not end until Israel is completely destroyed.[55] Masjedi claimed that Iran can fight Israel and the United States simultaneously. Masjedi stated that it is difficult to use the element of surprise when conducting a direct attack on Israel due to the distance between the two countries.

Iranian media first identified Masjedi as the IRGC Quds Force coordination deputy on May 14.[56] The IRGC Quds Force coordination deputy is the third most senior position within the IRGC Quds Force. Masjedi replaced the former IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brig. Gen. Mohammad-Hadi Haji-Rahimi who was killed in the April 1 Israeli airstrike in Damascus, Syria.[57] Masjedi served as the Iranian Ambassador to Iraq from 2017-2022. He was also an advisor to IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani.[58] Masjedi played a "formative role” in the IRGC Quds Force's Iraq policy during his time as the Iranian ambassador to Iraq, according to the US Treasury Department.[59] Masjedi oversaw a program to train and support Iraqi militia groups and "directed" Iraqi groups that were responsible for attacks against US forces. The United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Masjedi in October 2020. Masjedi‘s predecessor as IRGC Quds Force coordination deputy, Rahimi, also functioned as the IRGC Quds Force commander for the Palestinian territories.[60]

Iran and India signed a 10-year contract to allow India to develop and operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal at the Chabahar Port on May 13.[61]  India will invest $370 million in the port as part of the contract.[62] India took over the port’s operations at the end of 2018.[63] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that Iran is ready to increase cooperation with India via BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) during a meeting with Indian Ports, Shipping, and Waterways Minister Sarbananda Sonowal on May 14.[64]

US State Department Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel warned India that conducting business with Iran may expose India to pre-existing US sanctions.[65] US sanctions on Iran have deterred foreign investment in the Chabahar Port in the past.[66]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed on May 13 that it conducted an attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat using two “Arfad” drones.[67] The IDF reported on May 13 that its fighter jets intercepted an unmanned aircraft that approached Israeli airspace from the east.[68] This attack marked the first time the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed an attack using Arfad drones since the Israel-Hamas War began in October 2023. The Arfad drone bears visual resemblance to the Houthi Samad drone system. The Samad-3 has a range of around 1,500 kilometers. CTP-ISW cannot confirm if the Arfad is a Samad-3 or an earlier model. Iranian-backed Bahraini militia Saraya al Ashtar also used a drone resembling the Houthi Samad drones in an attack targeting Eilat on May 2.[69]

Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq Secretary General Mohammad al Tamimi said on May 9 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will resume attacks targeting US forces if US forces do not leave Iraq voluntarily.[70] Tamimi made this statement in an interview with Russian state-controlled media. Tamimi claimed that the United States has shown no intention of removing its forces from Iraq. Tamimi previously stated that the United States “only understands the language of force” during an interview with Russian state-controlled media in early April 2024.[71] Tamimi separately claimed in his interview on May 9 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq will continue to attack Israel until Israel ends its operations targeting Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip.[72] Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq reportedly has ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[73] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not resumed their attack campaign targeting US forces since they suspended the campaign in late January 2024.

US CENTCOM intercepted one Houthi drone and one Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile over the Red Sea on May 13.[74] CENTCOM also conducted a preemptive strike targeting a drone in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen. CENTCOM reported that the attacks posed an immediate threat to US, coalition forces, and merchant vessels in the area.[75]

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com