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Quotes of the Day:
"Anyone who conducts an argument by appealing to authority is not using his intelligence; he is just using his memory."
– Leonardo da Vinci
"A belief which leaves no place for doubt is not a belief; it is a superstition."
– Jose Bergamin
"He that wrestles with us strengthens our nerves, and sharpens our skill. Our antagonist is our helper."
– Edmund Burke
1. North Korea images spark nuclear fears
2. Satellite Images Show North Korea’s Increasing Isolation
3. Living with an anti-reunification North Korea
4. U.N. sanctions on North Korea have been losing their bite
5. Human Rights NGO Files Federal Petition to Block Seafood Tied to North Korean Workers
6. S. Korea, U.S. launch task force to block N. Korea's nuclear, missile programs
7. N. Korean, Vietnamese party officials call for boosting bilateral ties
8. Yoon receives JFK Profile in Courage Award from late president's daughter
9. The Shame Weapon: Condemning a Country’s Human Rights Violations Rarely Works—but That Doesn’t Make It Pointless
10. Japan And U.S. Will Deepen Military Ties As Tensions With China Rise
11. Unification minister slams N. Korea's abduction, detention of S. Koreans as inhumane
12. US, ROK launch new task force to counter North Korean oil smuggling
13. Exclusive: Heart of South Korea’s satellite operations breached in cyberattack
14. Why did North Korea walk away from talks with Japan abruptly?
15. Reducing war and nuclear risks on the Korean Peninsula
16. Russia supplies oil to N. Korea in violence of UN sanctions
17. Kangwon Province military unit tests officers’ ideological loyalty
1. North Korea images spark nuclear fears
There is no one more afraid of nuclear weapons than us.
North Korea images spark nuclear fears
Newsweek · by Ellie Cook · March 26, 2024
BySecurity & Defense Reporter
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North Korea has again started work to expand a site believed to be a nuclear facility close to the country's capital city, according to new analysis, as the secretive nation's leadership becomes bolder in its nuclear rhetoric and tensions with its southern neighbor skyrocket.
A "new annex" is under construction at the Kangson site near Pyongyang, believed by some analysts to be a North Korean uranium enrichment site, according to NKPro, a project run by the U.S.-based NK News website.
The new area, which the outlet said was identified from satellite imagery, is just over a fifth of the size of the current main building, according to their analysis, adding it was built in the past month. Newsweek reached out to the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations Office in Geneva via email for comment.
The Kangson site was identified as a likely uranium enrichment compound in 2018. The Diplomat reported at the time that U.S. intelligence had been monitoring this site for more than 10 years.
But a report published by North Korean analysts with 38 North in late 2020 suggested Kangson may not be a uranium enrichment site, but a facility manufacturing parts centrifuges. Centrifuges, however, can be used to enrich uranium and then used as nuclear fuel.
NEW: North Korea expanding suspected uranium enrichment site, satellite imagery shows https://t.co/4c13yywWBd
— NK NEWS (@nknewsorg) March 26, 2024
Satellite imagery previously suggested in 2021 that North Korea was expanding its uranium enrichment plant at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Facility complex, north of Pyongyang. This could be laying the groundwork to "increase production of nuclear materials for weapons production," Jeffrey Lewis, a weapons expert and professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, told CNN in September 2021.
Recent months have seen Pyongyang and its leader, Kim Jong Un, become more daring in nuclear saber-rattling as relations with South Korea frayed to their worst point in decades.
North Korea has shifted from an official policy of reconciliation with South Korea, declaring Seoul to be a sworn enemy. South Korea and Japan have expressed grave concerns about North Korea's military activity, calling Pyongyang's actions a severe threat to their national security and turning to the U.S. for support—something that has angered North Korea.
North Korea has said it is upping weapons production and test-fired a host of new weapons capable of carrying nuclear weapons, from an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to an "underwater nuclear weapons system" supposedly capable of unleashing a nuclear tsunami on North Korea's adversaries. In September, North Korea said it had debuted its first "tactical nuclear attack submarine" able to carry and launch nuclear weapons.
There is some doubt among Western analysts about the submarine's true capabilities, but North Korea has also launched a spy satellite and committed to putting several more into orbit this year.
North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un on April 25, 2019, in Vladivostok, Russia. North Korea has started work to expand a site believed to be a nuclear facility close to the country's capital city, according... North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un on April 25, 2019, in Vladivostok, Russia. North Korea has started work to expand a site believed to be a nuclear facility close to the country's capital city, according to new analysis. Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images
About the writer
Ellie Cook
Ellie Cook is a Newsweek security and defense reporter based in London, U.K. Her work focuses largely on the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S. military, weapons systems and emerging technology. She joined Newsweek in January 2023, having previously worked as a reporter at the Daily Express, and is a graduate of International Journalism at City, University of London.
Languages: English, Spanish.
You can reach Ellie via email at e.cook@newsweek.com.
Ellie Cook is a Newsweek security and defense reporter based in London, U.K. Her work focuses largely on the Russia-Ukraine ...
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Newsweek · by Ellie Cook · March 26, 2024
2. Satellite Images Show North Korea’s Increasing Isolation
Images at the link.
One question is whether the international community can pry open north Korea?
And of course we need to assess why Kim is doing this: He is deathly afraid of contact with the people through information (and face to face as well) because of the potential resistance he believes will result from such contact. Understanding this should guide our strategy and campaign planning for north Korea and its threats. But instead we are myopically focused on nuclear weapons due to our overwhelming fear of them and this self deters us - and creates success for the regime's political warfare strategy in Kim's mind. But Kim's actions and rhetoric are providing us with opportunities that should be exploited in an information campaign with a human rights upfront approach and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.
Satellite Images Show North Korea’s Increasing Isolation
The country was the first to close its border in the pandemic. It still hasn’t fully emerged.
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/satellite-images-show-north-koreas-increasing-isolation-7d591778?mod=googlenewsfeed&utm_medium=social
By Liyan QiFollow
and Ming LiFollow
Updated March 27, 2024 12:05 am ET
North Korea, already one of the world’s most isolated countries, has walled itself off further over the past years, data and satellite images show, with devastating effects for its population.
Satellite images and trade data analyzed by Human Rights Watch document how when Covid-19 hit, North Korea sealed its borders and erected new barriers. International sanctions had already cut into trade, including with China, its primary ally and trading partner. In 2020, commerce with China effectively ceased, worsening food shortages.
Liaoyuan
RUS.
CHINA
RUS.
Yanbian
Area of
detail
CHINA
N. KOREA
Baishan
S. KOREA
JAPAN
Dandong
NORTH KOREA
Sea of Japan
Location of analyzed fences and border-security sites built between 2019 and 2023
Korea Bay
Pyongyang
50 miles
50 km
Sources: Human Rights Watch (analyzed fence locations); Google Earth (satellite image)
Roque Ruiz/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
In analyzing satellite images of roughly one-quarter of the country’s northern border, the rights organization found authorities built layers of fencing in border areas that had served as trade routes, including where smugglers had brought food into North Korea and where North Koreans had escaped into China before Covid-19. Much of the terrain along North Korea’s northern border, which largely follows the vast Yalu River, is so treacherous that no fencing is needed.
The new fences North Korea built since 2020 included a far-north section of its border with China, according to Human Rights Watch’s analysis of North Korea’s satellite images.
CHINA
Hoeryong city
Hoeryong city
CHINA
CHINA
NORTH KOREA
Hoeryong stream
Tumen River
BEFORE
Fences and border–security sites built between February 2020 and April 2022
Fences
CHINA
NORTH KOREA
Bridge
NORTH KOREA
AFTER
CHINA
RUSSIA
Detail
NORTH
KOREA
Sea of Japan
5 miles
Fences
5 km
Note: Fence locations are approximate.
Sources: Human Rights Watch (fence locations); Google Earth (satellite images)
The areas surrounding the North Korean city of Hoeryong, separated from China’s Jilin province by the Tumen River, had been a hot spot for informal trade. That was largely because an existing fence left an opening in a stream leading to the Tumen that had allowed North Koreans to reach crossing points when the water was low.
Since 2020, North Korea has built a bridge across the stream that closed that loophole, and added guard posts to the existing fence. The images show they also added a secondary fence further inland from the river.
Due to the fortified border with China and a “shoot-on-sight” order on North Korea’s northern border, the number of North Korean defectors eventually ending up in South Korea has dwindled since 2020.
Number of North Korean defectors
entering South Korea
Men
2500
Women
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2011
’15
’20
’23
Source: South Korean Ministry of Unification
Apart from a small number of North Koreans who flee to Russia, virtually all North Korean defectors escape via China, which has long made defectors’ passage difficult. During the pandemic, China’s own Covid restrictions made escapes even harder. China built its own daunting walls along its northern and southern borders to fend off illegal crossings.
After Beijing reopened its border in January 2023, the number of defectors picked up slightly, allowing some defectors stuck in China to flee to South Korea.
Economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations to force Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear ambitions had already hurt North Korea’s imports before Covid, including from China. During the pandemic, commerce with China slowed almost to a standstill.
North Korea’s annual imports
$6 billion
5
4
CHINA
3
2
1
REST OF WORLD
0
2011
’15
’20
’22
Note: Inflation-adjusted
Source: Human Rights Watch analysis
of United Nations data
Imports picked up in 2022. Chinese customs data show they improved further in 2023. Still, imports remain well below levels before the pandemic.
In addition, now, almost all North Korea’s imports are from China, suggesting a further distancing from the rest of the world.
With the sharp drop in trade, food shortages worsened as North Korea’s imports of staple foods and proteins plunged. According to Human Rights Watch, the regime feared imported goods would carry the Covid-19 virus
In early 2020, North Korea halted train service with China and Russia, which had been how much of its food imports entered. Only the occasional cargo train was let in.
International sanctions had already thrown a large number of North Koreans into food insecurity, defined by the U.N. as consumption insufficient to maintain an active and healthy life.
Between 2020 and 2022, the portion of North Korea’s population without enough food increased to 46%, in the U.N.’s estimates, from around 41% in the previous years.
Informal food trade with China, a lifeline for many North Koreans, was almost entirely wiped out.
North Korea’s food imports, change since 2018
DAIRY AND EGGS
FLOUR
FRUITS AND NUTS
VEGETABLES
20%
0
–20
–40
–60
–80
–100
2018
’19
’20
’21
’22
Note: Import volume measured in kilograms; select food items
Source: Human Rights Watch analysis of United Nations data
“With the pandemic, smuggling from China was blocked. The food situation in North Korea became worse quickly,” a North Korean man who escaped to South Korea with his family by boat in 2023 testified at the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva on March 15.
“If someone sells food in North Korea today, they are a traitor,” he said.
In August 2023, North Korea restarted air travel with China, breaking 3½ years of isolation.
The meager contacts Pyongyang has resumed have been restricted to China and Russia. Some Chinese diplomats have returned to North Korea, but humanitarian organizations and most diplomats remain unable to return, according to Human Rights Watch.
Some Russian tourists visited Pyongyang in February, the first foreign tourists to the country since the Kim Jong Un regime slammed its borders closed in early 2020.
While more North Koreans go hungry, the one thing that has thrived in North Korea during the pandemic is Kim Jong Un’s nuclear arsenal. The country has even provided short-range missiles for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Much of the terrain along North Korea’s northern border, which largely follows the vast Yalu River, is so treacherous that no fencing is needed PHOTO: CHANDAN KHANNA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Write to Liyan Qi at Liyan.qi@wsj.com and Ming Li at ming.li@wsj.com
3. Living with an anti-reunification North Korea
Some useful analysis from Denny Roy. But what I think is important to understand is that there has been no change in the nature of the regime (of course) or its objectives and strategy. Kim is continuing his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies (gray zone strategies) while continuing to develop advanced military capabilities that support his "gray zone strategies" while simultaneously preparing to use force when the conditions are right to achieve domination of the Korean peninsula under his rule as they only way to ensure long terms survival of the regime.
Thus, the recent pronouncements by Kim and this regime indicate no change to policy.
I also agree that we are likely to see future pronouncements reverse the rhetoric when Kim finds it useful to do so in support of his gray zone strategies.
Excerpts:
Although not a sure harbinger of war, Pyongyang’s renunciation of reunification does nothing to improve inter-Korean relations, and it seemingly undermines the basis for modest peace-building activities such as family reunions humanitarian aid.
It reaffirms that the regime currently governing North Korea is irreconcilable with South Korea as we now know it. Nevertheless, this being North Korea, no policy is irreversible.
Living with an anti-reunification North Korea - Asia Times
Did Kim really decide to go to war in the near future – or is this a symbolic and attitudinal policy change?
asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · March 26, 2024
Along with its deployment of new types and larger numbers of vehicles that can deliver nuclear weapons, the government of North Korea presented its neighbor the Republic of Korea (ROK) with a new worry this year.
Paramount leader Kim Jong-un made official a revised view of North Korea’s relationship with the South, one that Pyongyang had gravitated toward over the previous several months.
Kim renounced minjok, the idea of Koreans as a single nation or ethnic group inhabiting both halves of the Peninsula. Rather, he said, South Korea is now a foreign state and the chief enemy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Although liberal and conservative governments in Seoul have implemented policies toward North Korea that varied from hardline to relatively sympathetic, Kim said he is disappointed with both varieties.
He complained that the ROK seeks to overthrow the DPRK government. Nevertheless, he added, “We will never unilaterally unleash a war if the enemies do not provoke us.”
The change is jarring. One DPRK watcher compared it to the Pope telling Catholic Church members to stop believing in a Second Coming of Jesus Christ.
Nevertheless, the policy change is symbolic and attitudinal rather than substantive.
For many years already, a scenario in which Pyongyang under the Kim dynasty rules over South Korea has been almost inconceivable. This would require that either
- a) the South Koreans decide they would prefer to junk their current socio-political system and standard of living and live like North Koreans, or
- b) the US abandons its responsibility to defend the ROK and Seoul decides not to deploy nuclear weapons of its own to counter the DPRK’s.
What really matters is what the new non-reunification policy portends for North Korea’s future behavior toward South Korea. Two experienced and reputable analysts, for example, quickly concluded Pyongyang has decided to go to war against the ROK in the near future.
Evaluating the impact of the new policy on regional peace requires trying to uncover what drove Kim to renounce reunification. Among the explanations offered by outside observers, four are plausible. They are not mutually exclusive.
Soft power
The first plausible explanation is that Kim fears South Korea’s soft power.
Repudiating reunification sends an unambiguous message to DPRK citizens that friendly relations with South Korea are no longer politically correct.
Popular interest in South Korean culture is rising in North Korea as elsewhere. While the global popularity of BTS, “Gangnam style” or K-dramas has economic and prestige benefits for the ROK, the impact of Korean soft power upon the DPRK has strategic consequences.
“Korean Wave” culture is epitomized by K-Pop. Image: Jiyeun Kang / Allure
The DPRK government has demonstrated extraordinary sensitivity to the “Korean Wave,” called in North Korea Nam Choson Baram (“South Choson wind” – Choson is the preferred North Korean name for Korea as a whole).
In December 2020 the DPRK enacted the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act, which prescribes harsh punishment for North Korean citizens found imitating South Korean cultural practices or consuming South Korean media.
There are multiple reports since the pandemic of the DPRK executing North Koreans for distributing movies and television programs from South Korea. In January the BBC publicized a video from 2022 showing the public sentencing of two teenage boys to 12 years of hard labor for the crime of watching South Korean TV shows.
Exposure to depictions of life in South Korea, which is vastly wealthier, erodes respect among North Koreans for their government’s claimed accomplishments. Admiration for South Korea’s opulence and culture can only increase the hope of some North Koreans that the ROK “absorbs” the DPRK, something Kim has repeatedly said he fears.
Seeing affinity for things South Korean as a threat to regime security, designating the ROK a foreign enemy is a logical step for a government that wants to signal to its people they should forget about ever being able to enjoy the South Korean lifestyle.
Election year in the US and South Korea
The second explanation is a desire to gain US and ROK attention during what is an election year in both countries.
Recently the DPRK has deepened its strategic cooperation with Russia, which puts pressure on Beijing to court the DPRK as well to avoid falling behind Russia’s level of influence over a country that borders China. Pyongyang seemingly gave up on reaching an agreement with Washington after the collapse of the Trump-Kim talks in Hanoi in 2019.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and US President Donald Trump, shown walking together at the Sofitel Legend Metropole hotel in Hanoi, failed to reach agreement on a nuclear deal in which Kim proposed to dismantle part of the Yongbyon reactor complex. The United States and North Korea on March 1, 2019, put forward starkly different accounts of the breakdown of their high-stakes second summit. Photo: KCNA VIA KNS
But Kim’s stronger relations with the China-Russia Bloc do not mean he is no longer interested in gaining concessions from Washington and Seoul.
The DPRK government wants the USA to lift economic sanctions, recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, halt joint military exercises with the ROK, and discontinue the routine visits of nuclear-capable US ships and aircraft to South Korea.
Georgetown University Professor Victor Cha says empirical data demonstrate that “North Korea has increased its level of provocations during US election years.”
This year will see not only elections for the US president and most congressional seats in November, but also elections for South Korea’s National Assembly in which President Yoon Suk Yeol’s People Power Party hopes to gain a legislative majority.
South Korea is a source of possible economic handouts, and Pyongyang wants to intimidate the Yoon Administration into backing away from its hawkish posture toward North Korea.
Since DPRK missile tests have become so frequent they have lost much of their political shock value, Kim might see the renunciation of reunification as an alternative means of making North Korea a higher priority issue for Washington and Seoul.
Rally ’round the flag
The third explanation is based on what international relations scholars term a diversionary foreign policy: national leaders talking up an external crisis to divert public attention from failures of government at home and to mobilize popular patriotic support through a “rally ’round the flag” effect.
Economic hardship is generating public discontent with the DPRK government. An already-weak North Korean economy declined for three consecutive years during the COVID-19 pandemic.
A February 2023 report by Radio Free Asia said ordinary North Koreans resent seeing that Kim’s 9-year-old daughter is well-fed and well-dressed while most North Korean children are under-nourished – and are punished if they show interest in “capitalist” fashion.
North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un and his daughter observing a warhead missile launch exercise simulating a tactical nuclear attack. Photo: KCNA
Kim warned his people in late 2023 that economic problems will worsen in 2024. The country continues to suffer chronic food shortages. In January, Kim acknowledged his government’s “inability to provide even basic necessities such as basic foodstuffs, groceries and consumer goods to the local people.”
Recasting neighbor South Korea from a temporarily estranged cousin to a permanent enemy makes the DPRK’s national security situation appear more dangerous, inviting North Koreans to bond with the Kim regime in a struggle for survival against their common outside enemies. This may have been at least part of Kim’s intention.
Dehumanizing adversaries
The fourth possible explanation is that Pyongyang wants to reduce sympathy for the enemy.
The policy of striving for reunification rested on the notion that the southern half of the Korean Peninsula is part of the homeland of North Koreans and that its inhabitants are members of the larger Korean family. At the same time, Pyongyang spoke of “mercilessly” slaughtering South Koreans and contaminating their land with nuclear strikes.
Analysts such as Hong Min, a senior fellow at the Korea Institute of National Unification, argue that Pyongyang’s ideology presented the North Korean people with a contradiction. “The logic of ideology fell apart,” Hong says. But “abandoning the unification discourse and defining the ROK as a hostile foreign state at war without diplomatic relations resolves that contradiction.”
The first three possible explanations do not support the conclusion that Kim has decided to start a war against the South.
Desiring to insulate itself against South Korean cultural influence reflects a fundamentally defensive mindset rather than a desire to annex the South, even if that was possible.
Seoul street scene. Photo: codexperutrade.com
Perhaps Kim realizes that his regime would likely be unable to govern South Koreans, who are competitive, enterprising and twice as numerous as North Koreans – and many of whom remember throwing off their own dictatorship late last century.
The DPRK has many times told Seoul and Washington that the peninsula has moved closer to war, not as a prelude to attack but as a tactic to bring about negotiations.
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Similarly, when the intended audience is the North Korean public, cultivating a sense of external crisis as a distraction does not require actually going to war against the hyped-up enemy. Pyongyang routinely claims that war is imminent, for example, when the US and the ROK hold joint military exercises. The message for DPRK citizens is sufficiently clear: Powerful enemies are bent on destroying us, so respect your government for holding them at bay.
Number 4 is scary …
The fourth possible explanation – dehumanizing adversaries to make it psychologically easier to kill them – is indeed frightening.
There are, however, three good reasons to believe the non-reunification policy does not indicate Kim has decided to launch a war against the ROK.
First, the North Korean government was comfortable for decades with the apparent contradiction of telling its people they should look forward to reunifying with South Koreans but should also be prepared to kill them. Pyongyang started threatening to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” 30 years ago.
This is the same contradiction citizens of the People’s Republic of China live with in regard to Taiwan. The contradiction was never an obstacle to the DPRK going to war against the South. Dropping reunification, therefore, is not convincing evidence that Pyongyang plans to attack.
Second, statements from DPRK leaders and media consistently reaffirm that any North Korean use of force will be in response to an aggression against the DPRK. Pyongyang doesn’t want war, so it is careful to avoid inviting a pre-emptive war by its adversaries.
Third, the idea that Kim plans to start a war with South Korea faces the problem of explaining how Kim could expect himself and his country to survive such a war, in which he would be fighting against a combined force that far outclasses the DPRK’s conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Although not a sure harbinger of war, Pyongyang’s renunciation of reunification does nothing to improve inter-Korean relations, and it seemingly undermines the basis for modest peace-building activities such as family reunions humanitarian aid.
It reaffirms that the regime currently governing North Korea is irreconcilable with South Korea as we now know it. Nevertheless, this being North Korea, no policy is irreversible.
Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu.
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asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · March 26, 2024
4. U.N. sanctions on North Korea have been losing their bite
And of course the Russians (and probably Chinese behind the scenes) are working to shut down the Panel of Experts who assess the efficacy of UN sanctions.
And the discord it is causing in the international community is likely a desired effect of the regime's gray zone strategies (political warfare and blackmail diplomacy). And those effects are also desired by Russia and China as well.
U.N. sanctions on North Korea have been losing their bite
Pyongyang has been boosting trade amid discord in the international community
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Datawatch/U.N.-sanctions-on-North-Korea-have-been-losing-their-bite?utm
JUNNOSUKE KOBARA, Nikkei staff writer
MARCH 24, 2024 16:11 JST
SEOUL -- Economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations on North Korea have been losing their impact.
Despite a series of ballistic missile launches by Pyongyang, the U.N. Security Council has been unable to pass any new resolutions against the country for more than six years due to discord in the international community. North Korea has also been exploiting this disarray to evade existing sanctions by strengthening ties with Russia and using cyberattacks to secure funds and supplies.
In recent years, the North has openly engaged in practices clearly at odds with international sanctions. The sanctions ban the export of automobiles to North Korea, but the nation's leader, Kim Jong Un, this month publicly used a limousine given to him by Russian President Vladimir Putin, the North's Korean Central News Agency reported on March 16, quoting his sister Kim Yo Jong.
Both the supply of military technologies to the North and the purchase of weapons from the country would violate U.N. sanctions. Still, during his trip to Russia last September, Kim Jong Un visited military facilities accompanied by North Korea's leading missile expert. Russia also reportedly used North Korean ballistic missiles in its invasion of Ukraine.
International sanctions ban coal imports from North Korea, but SIA, a South Korean startup with expertise in artificial intelligence-based satellite image analysis, detected "evidence" of coal exports from the North last year. On Sept. 8, the company confirmed the entry of 10 railroad vehicles onto a coal pier at the port of Nampo in North Korea. It again found 21 rail cars in the same place on Oct. 22.
"Pyongyang brazenly violates the sanctions in an effort to show their ineffectiveness," said Maiko Takeuchi, a consulting fellow at Japan's Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
It was reported last year that North Korea, seen facing serious food shortages, had begun to push wheat-based meals. Pundits speculate that North Korea and Russia -- both facing worsening ties with the U.S. and Europe -- may have reached a deal: The former would supply weapons to the latter in exchange for technologies and wheat, an item not covered by international sanctions.
Trade between North Korea and China is also rebounding from the doldrums seen during the COVID-19 pandemic, making it harder for economic sanctions to be effective.
North Korea has resumed the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles in earnest since 2022. Following the launch of a military reconnaissance satellite in November, Pyongyang is planning another three such launches this year.
The international community has been unable to stop those moves. The U.N. Security Council last adopted a resolution against Pyongyang in December 2017. A U.S. proposal for additional sanctions in 2022 was opposed by Russia and China amid a deepening global divide.
Until 2017, the Security Council toughened sanctions every time Pyongyang stepped up its development of nuclear weapons and missiles. It adopted strict measures in 2017, such as a ban on coal imports from North Korea and a cap of 500,000 barrels a year on refined petroleum exports to the country. The sanctions had a major impact on North Korean trade, which shrank markedly through 2018.
But the sanctions have become less effective as the international community has grown more split. Roughly 30% of the U.N. member states, including many in Africa and Oceania, have not presented any reports of compliance. From 2021 to 2023, no new countries submitted reports regarding the December 2017 resolution.
"Uncooperative countries may become new loopholes for sanctions," said Kim Minkwan, head of the Northeast Asia team at South Korea's Korea Development Bank.
North Korea has also been busy nurturing new sources of money, including stealing cryptocurrencies through cyberattacks.
In 2022, North Korea's cryptocurrency theft reached $1.65 billion, a 56-fold increase from 2017, according to an estimate by U.S. blockchain analysis company Chainalysis. North Korea-linked crypto hacks are increasing in Japan and the U.S. Pyongyang has started to send information technology experts overseas to help its illicit activities, according to a U.N. expert panel.
If Pyongyang increases its financial power, it will likely use it to advance its military development. But current sanctions are woefully inadequate to meet the challenge of curbing that, and there is little prospect that effective action can be taken to close loopholes any time soon.
5. Human Rights NGO Files Federal Petition to Block Seafood Tied to North Korean Workers
The HRNK letter is at the link: https://cdn.theoutlawocean.com/investigations/china/pdf/coverage/us-customs-and-border-patrol--hrnk-letter-to-cbp-on-north-korean-labor-in-the-chinese-seafood-sector.pdf
(For transparency, I am a member of the HRNK Board of Directors).
Human Rights NGO Files Federal Petition to Block Seafood Tied to North Korean Workers
By Austin Brush theoutlawocean.substack.com4 min
March 21, 2024
View Original
The impact of our recent investigation into China’s role in the world’s seafood supply and specifically the series’ third story revealing the broad use of captive North Korean workers in Chinese plants that export to the U.S. and E.U is beginning to gather force.
Last week the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, a human rights and advocacy organization, submitted a formal letter to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, calling for immediate halt of shipments of seafood from nearly a dozen Chinese companies that were found to be using North Korean labor, in violation of U.S. law and U.N. sanctions.
investigation published by the Outlaw Ocean Project that was released in partnership with the New Yorker magazine in February. The letter calls on the agency to strengthen the enforcement of existing laws, including Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which specifically bans the import to the U.S. of products tied to North Korean labor. The letter also calls for the agency to implement stricter monitoring mechanisms to prevent the importation of goods produced through forced labor, among other tangible actions that could be taken by the U.S. government.
The letter from the NGO is a recent development in a series of ongoing actions globally, which are being tracked on the Outlaw Ocean’s Impact page for this particular investigation.
North Korean laborers are often sent to various countries across the world, working under conditions often described as forced labor to earn foreign currency for the regime. These laborers are employed in diverse sectors, including hospitality, construction, agriculture, and manufacturing, and their wages are largely appropriated by the North Korean government, contributing to its nuclear and missile programs. The seafood processing sector in the Chinese province of Liaoning, is a prime example.
The story about the use of North Korean labor was the third part of a series that ran in the New Yorker. It focused on human-rights and environmental abuses in the global seafood industry. The story about North Korean workers revealed that over a thousand such workers spread across at least ten processing plants were held captive and often sexually abused, having been dispatched to China by the North Korean government. The investigation also found that much of the seafood coming from these plants supply major American companies.
The exportation of goods produced through such exploitative labor practices to the U.S. raises serious concerns regarding compliance with CAATSA, which was enacted on August 2, 2017. This law is meant to empower sanctions such as those imposed on Iran, Russia, and North Korea. These sanctions are meant to curb their aggressive actions and policies. Regarding North Korea, CAATSA particularly addresses concerns over labor practices, nuclear proliferation, and economic activities that support the regime's military capabilities.
The ten companies cited in the investigation and letter include:
-
Dalian Haiqing Food (bait-to-plate, discussion);
-
Dandong Galicia Seafood (bait-to-plate, discussion);
-
Dandong Hailong Foodstuff (bait-to-plate, discussion);
-
Dandong Omeca Food (bait-to-plate, discussion);
-
Dandong Taifeng Foodstuff (bait-to-plate, discussion);
-
Dandong Taihua Foodstuff (bait-to-plate, discussion);
-
Dandong Yuanyi Refined Seafoods (bait-to-plate, discussion);
-
Donggang Haimeng Foodstuff (bait-to-plate, discussion);
-
Donggang Jinhui Foodstuff (bait-to-plate, discussion); and
-
Donggang Luyuan Food (bait-to-plate, discussion).
This letter is only the most recent development in a series of measures taken by NGOs, lawmakers, and the private sector to call upon governments to increase scrutiny of global seafood supply chains.
Various legal petitions have been filed in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom since October 2023. This includes sanctions petitions filed in the U.K., Canada, and the United States, calling on their respective governments to implement sanctions against seven Chinese companies that the OO investigation found to be complicit in serious human rights abuses committed against Uyghurs workers in China’s seafood industry. Additionally, in November 2023, two other legal filings were submitted by NGOs calling on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to to stop squid tied to Chinese distant water fishing vessels identified in an investigation from entering the country.
American lawmakers have also directed their attention at companies, having written, for example, letters to Sysco and Costco inquiring how they plan to ensure that future audits will adequately prevent seafood tied to Xinjiang and North Korean forced labor from entering the United States. A bipartisan commission created by the White House and Congress held a hearing in October 2023 to discuss the presence of seafood made with forced labor on Chinese ships and in China’s processing factories throughout the U.S. supply chain.
In Europe, on March 1, 2024, Members of European Parliament Caroline Roose and Mounir Satouri, both representing France, sent a letter to the European Commission and the President of the European Parliament following up on Le Monde's publication of The Outlaw Ocean Project investigation. The letter asked about E.U. Parliament ties to the Compass Group, a company that the investigation tied to North Korean labor and supplying catering services to the European Parliament. This came shortly before negotiators from the E.U. Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement on new rules to ban products made with forced labor from the E.U. market. See additional reporting on that here and here.
For more information about the Outlaw Ocean Project’s investigation into North Korean forced labor in the Chinese seafood sector, please see the story and video about the use of North Korean forced labor in the Chinese seafood processing sector; the Discussion page tied to the companies in the formal letter; and the Bait-to-Plate page tracing seafood from these companies to grocers in North America and Europe.
If you have any questions about this matter, please email us. (media@theoutlawocean.com). Or reach out to Greg Scarlatoiu, the Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (executive.director@hrnk.org).
For routine updates on further reporting, please subscribe.
6. S. Korea, U.S. launch task force to block N. Korea's nuclear, missile programs
(LEAD) S. Korea, U.S. launch task force to block N. Korea's nuclear, missile programs | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 27, 2024
(ATTN: ADDS State Department's release in paras 6-7; RECASTS dateline)
By Yi Wonju and Song Sang-ho
SEOUL/WASHINGTON, March 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States have launched a task force to effectively block North Korea from financing its unlawful nuclear and missile programs, the foreign ministry said Wednesday.
The inaugural meeting of the South Korea-U.S. bilateral Enhanced Disruption Task Force was held in Washington, D.C., on Tuesday (local time) with over 30 officials in areas of diplomacy, intelligence, sanctions and maritime interdiction, according to the ministry.
During the meeting, the two sides discussed ways to counter illicit efforts by North Korea to circumvent sanctions concerning the procurement of refined petroleum, stressing that importing refined oil in excess of the U.N.-mandated cap violates U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.
They also highlighted the need for close cooperation to counter the North's ability to procure petroleum, including from Russia, saying it directly contributes to the reclusive country's military readiness and its weapons development.
The two sides also agreed to consider slapping independent sanctions on individuals and companies involved in smuggling refined oil to North Korea.
In a separate release, the State Department said that through the task force, Seoul and Washington are pursuing a wide range of joint actions to disrupt the North's refined oil procurement networks, including by exposing its sanction evasion activities, reviewing options for autonomous sanction designations and engaging regional actors that facilitate the North's oil procurement either knowingly or unwittingly.
The two sides also discussed future areas of focus, including disrupting the North's illicit overseas coal sales, it added.
Under UNSC sanctions, the North is banned from importing more than 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum per year.
In a report released early Thursday, the panel under the U.N. Security Council sanctions committee on the North estimated North Korean-flagged tankers would have delivered 1,523,381 barrels between Jan. 1 and Sept. 15 last year.
This image, provided by Yonhap News TV, shows a North Korea missile launch. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Lee Jun-il (R), South Korea's deputy nuclear envoy, and U.S. Deputy Special Representative for North Korea Lyn Debevoise poses for a photo before the inaugural meeting of the South Korea-U.S. bilateral Enhanced Disruption Task Force on March 26, 2024. (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 27, 2024
7. N. Korean, Vietnamese party officials call for boosting bilateral ties
The regime is placing more stones on the Go/Baduk board.
N. Korean, Vietnamese party officials call for boosting bilateral ties | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · March 27, 2024
SEOUL, March 27 (Yonhap) -- A senior North Korean official has reached a consensus with his Vietnamese counterpart on boosting cooperation and advancing their bilateral ties to a new level, Pyongyang's state media said Wednesday.
The move came during a meeting between Kim Song-nam, director of the international department at the Workers' Party, and Le Hoai Trung, secretary of the central committee and head of the central committee for foreign affairs at Vietnam's Communist Party, in Hanoi on Monday, according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
Kim arrived in the Southeast Asian country from China for the second leg of his three-nation trip that will also take him to Laos.
The trip came as North Korea appears to be resuming diplomatic activity with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), following years of Pyongyang's COVID-19 border shutdowns.
Laos plans to host the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other ASEAN-related meetings as this year's chair country. The annual ARF is the sole regional forum joined by North Korea.
ASEAN comprises Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam.
Separately, a North Korean delegation led by External Economic Relations Minister Yun Jong-ho left for Russia on Tuesday, the KCNA said, without providing further details on the purpose of the trip.
North Korea and Russia have been strengthening cooperation following a rare summit between their leaders in September.
This photo, released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency, shows a North Korean delegation, led by Kim Song-nam (R), director in charge of international affairs at the Workers' Party, departing Pyongyang on March 21, 2024, for visits to China, Vietnam and Laos. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · March 27, 2024
8. Yoon receives JFK Profile in Courage Award from late president's daughter
Yoon receives JFK Profile in Courage Award from late president's daughter | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · March 27, 2024
SEOUL, March 27 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol met U.S. Ambassador to Australia Caroline Kennedy on Wednesday and received the John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award, five months after being honored by the U.S. foundation, the presidential office said.
The ambassador, honorary president of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation and the daughter of the late U.S. president, handed over a sterling silver lantern symbolizing the award to Yoon during their meeting at the presidential office.
President Yoon Suk Yeol (R) receives the John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award from U.S. Ambassador to Australia Caroline Kennedy, the honorary president of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, during their meeting at the presidential office on March 27, 2024, in this photo provided by Yoon's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The delivery comes after the foundation in October presented Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida with the special International Profile in Courage Award for their contribution to improving bilateral relations despite domestic opposition stemming from historical issues.
Yoon said he was honored to receive the award from the late president's family member.
"I will continue to contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region based on relations between South Korea and Japan and the trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan," Yoon was quoted as saying.
The award symbolizing a beacon of hope is modeled after the lantern on the USS Constitution, the oldest commissioned ship in the U.S. Navy.
President Yoon Suk Yeol receives the John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award from Caroline Kennedy, the honorary president of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, during their meeting at the presidential office on March 27, 2024. This photo provided by the presidential office shows the award, a sterling silver lantern designed by Edwin Schlossberg, Kennedy's husband. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · March 27, 2024
9. The Shame Weapon: Condemning a Country’s Human Rights Violations Rarely Works—but That Doesn’t Make It Pointless
We should also not forget the example of Ronald Reagan who told Gorbachov to "tear down this wall" even as they were conducting arms control negotiations.
Often, leaders of totalitarian regimes believe the denial of human rights is necessary to remain in power. Therefore, human rights are not only a moral imperative but also a national security issue. It is a line of effort in support of the diplomatic and informmational instruments of national power
Excerpts:
Enforcing international norms requires political leverage; it demands that states harness their material and strategic influence for the benefit of innocent civilians in far-off places, which itself requires an enormous amount of political will. In this sense, U.S. policymakers can learn from another time in history when the United States was one of the last holdouts protecting an ally facing worldwide condemnation: apartheid-era South Africa. After decades of resistance, the United States finally yielded in 1986 to global and domestic pressure and issued sanctions against South Africa, despite Washington’s close economic and strategic partnership with the apartheid government. The sanctions helped speed the end of apartheid precisely because the United States had a strong relationship with the country it was targeting. If international pressure is to have any chance of curtailing the unfathomable suffering in Gaza and elsewhere, it will have to be led by the actors that have done the most to enable and protect the perpetrators.
This understanding should inform the United States’ approach to advancing human rights through foreign policy more generally. Governments are in a better position to influence states with which they share political or economic ties. When it comes to trying to change the behavior of adversaries, engagement—not isolation—offers the best chance for promoting human rights in the long term. As for partners, leaders will need to summon the political will required to overcome the costs of shaming a friend. In the service of protecting human rights, the United States must be willing to put strategic interests on the line.
The Shame Weapon
Condemning a Country’s Human Rights Violations Rarely Works—but That Doesn’t Make It Pointless
March 27, 2024
Foreign Affairs · March 27, 2024
In its December 2023 filing to the International Court of Justice, South Africa accused Israel of violating its obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention in a case that prompted strong reactions. Some touted the investigation as a significant step toward the fair application of international law. Others deemed it a cynical exercise, infused with double standards and political bias.
Amid the controversy, it was easy to lose sight of the fact that any ruling from the ICJ is effectively unenforceable. The court has no independent mechanism to ensure compliance. Israel could easily ignore any decision it dislikes, and the United States would almost certainly veto any attempt to coerce Israel through the UN Security Council.
But even without the material powers to enforce its judgements, the ICJ can still have a considerable effect by marshaling the moral powers of global condemnation. In this sense, it joins other forms of international rebuke in attempting to enforce human rights and humanitarian norms through shaming. International shaming, whether through formal legal mechanisms (such as the censure of the ICJ) or informal denunciations in diplomatic rhetoric, can hurt countries alleged to have violated international norms, embarrassing their leaders and tarnishing their reputations. It can also mobilize domestic opposition within the targeted countries, encouraging publics to demand change from their own leaders.
And yet, when it comes to Israel, the ICJ does not appear to be swaying Israeli leaders or citizens to implement a cease-fire or change the way Israel is fighting so that fewer Palestinian civilians will be killed. If anything, the investigation has only inflamed long-standing suspicions of international institutions. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu captured the pique of Israeli public opinion when, in remarks in January, he pithily dismissed South Africa’s case as an act of “brazen gall.”
Israel is not unique in defying international pressure. Global shaming often fails to produce any meaningful change in the targeted country, and in some cases can backfire by provoking outright resistance. For example, after Western countries condemned Uganda and Nigeria for criminalizing homosexuality in 2014, rights groups reported a spike in human rights violations against LGBTQ people in those two countries. In China, international shaming about human rights issues has sparked defensive nationalist backlashes among citizens, increasing support for the regime. Rulings by international courts have provoked similar “rally ’round the flag” responses in other countries, shifting public opinion and government policies in a counterproductive direction.
Shaming rarely works to convince rivals or adversaries to change their behavior because a targeted country has little to gain from acquiescing to the demands of its opponents. Governments understand this dynamic, and yet they insist on shaming others anyway. That is because the point of shaming is not just to try to change a state’s behavior but also to stake the moral high ground, earning credit with the public and winning the favor of other countries. In truth, shaming works to change behavior only in particular contexts, namely when friendly countries exert pressure on one another using existing leverage. But those states rarely want to throw their allies or partners under the bus and risk damaging valuable relationships. The irony of shaming is that it is used most often when it is almost destined to fail and not enough when it is most likely to succeed.
FOR SHAME
Shaming a state is much like shaming an individual: in both cases, shaming works to place social pressure on actors that violate shared norms. When world leaders denounced violence in Syria during its decade-long civil war, or when Gambia accused Myanmar of genocide in the ICJ in 2019, or when the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution in 2022 condemning human rights violations in Iran, the goal was to put a country in the spotlight, decry violations, and urge reform. Although these situations differed in important respects, all of these actions attempted to enforce widely accepted norms by applying some kind of social sanction.
Like shaming people, shaming governments is an inherently social process, occurring through preexisting relationships and risking damaging them. Even when it is purely rhetorical, criticizing other countries can endanger valuable ties. For example, many of China’s partners—including many Muslim countries—have refused to condemn its abuse of Uyghurs because they fear undermining a profitable relationship.
And yet leaders still try to shame other countries quite often, even when there appear to be few direct benefits of doing so. That’s because there are other benefits. By publicly shaming other countries for violating human rights, leaders can be rewarded by third-party audiences, such as their own voters, who genuinely believe in human rights and wish to see their government take action to protect them, or their allies, which want to see norms enforced on the world stage but may not want to bear that responsibility themselves. South African policymakers won tremendous domestic and international credit, for instance, by prosecuting Israel for genocide, reaping political gains at home while enhancing their country’s reputation abroad.
Shaming a state is much like shaming an individual.
Shamers can benefit from stigmatizing a target. In the international realm, leaders often denounce human rights violations not because they genuinely care about human rights but because they want to inflict political damage on foreign adversaries, thus bolstering their own relative power. As a result, states shame their rivals in particularly sensationalist and inflammatory ways.
Compare, for example, Western reactions to human rights violations in Saudi Arabia and Iran. The two Middle Eastern countries are similar in many respects: both are run by authoritarian regimes and both rank among the worst human rights violators. But they enjoy very different sorts of geopolitical ties. The United States and its Western allies routinely condemn Iran—an adversary—in the harshest terms. Many policymakers are rightly horrified by Iran’s record of abuse, but it is also clear that geopolitical motives underly their rhetoric. “Allies should be treated differently—and better—than adversaries,” wrote Brian Hook, a State Department aide in the Trump administration, in a 2017 memo. He elaborated that Washington should press China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia on human rights not only out of moral concern but also because doing so “is one way to impose costs, apply counter-pressure, and regain the initiative from them strategically.”
Saudi Arabia and the United States have sustained a close partnership for nearly 80 years, cooperating on a range of security, economic, and diplomatic issues. As a result, U.S. policymakers have hesitated to condemn the kingdom’s abysmal human rights record. When Saudi operatives killed the Saudi journalist (and U.S. resident) Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in 2018, the United States decided against denouncing or sanctioning Riyadh after the Saudis threatened to retaliate economically to any such measure. Even after the Biden administration released a report in 2021 that claimed that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman approved the murder, little changed. In the eyes of Washington, the cost of endangering an important relationship eclipsed the moral imperative of punishing Saudi violations.
The point here is not that Washington is guilty of hypocrisy—it is hardly unique in this regard—but rather that countries tend to shame their rivals and adversaries more often, and more harshly, than they do their friends and allies. It can be rational for leaders to continue to shame another country even if their efforts fail to reform the target’s behavior and even if those efforts backfire and exacerbate violations. Simply put, compliance is not always the primary goal of shaming.
SHAMELESS
Even when pressure is applied, it doesn’t always succeed in improving human rights conditions or deterring abuse. The shaming of adversaries is rarely effective. Because there is no valued relationship to protect, target countries have little reason to acquiesce to the shamer’s demands. Tehran, for example, takes U.S. criticism less seriously because it has no incentive to maintain good relations with Washington. Such accusations are also less credible; policymakers and the public see them as a cynical attempt to attack the target for political reasons, a perception that allows governments to safely reject and deny such accusations.
Shaming can even backfire by stimulating a defensive nationalist reaction in the target country. When domestic audiences perceive foreign pressure as hostile, paternalistic, or threatening, leaders can conclude that flouting that pressure will better serve their interests. In an earlier incident in Uganda, for example, Western condemnation of an anti-gay bill in 2009 provoked a defiant reaction from the public, transforming a local policy issue into a symbol of national sovereignty and self-determination. President Yoweri Museveni—who had reservations about the legislation—was backed into a corner. When he signed a different version of the bill in 2014, he did so, in the words of his spokesman, “with the full witness of the international media to demonstrate Uganda’s independence in the face of Western pressure and provocation.”
A similar reaction is evident in Israel, where a large portion of the public views the ICJ case as yet another iteration of unceasing international hostility toward the Jewish state. Such sentiments are not entirely unreasonable, considering that UN organs condemn Israel far more than any other country. Research has shown that even Israelis who are otherwise sympathetic to the Palestinian cause can find themselves supporting hard-line policies as part of a defensive reaction to international pressure. Such shifts in public opinion have bolstered the most hawkish segments of Israeli society while dampening internal calls for restraint.
Human rights enforcement is more likely to succeed when countries pressure their friends.
Israel and its defenders have decried South Africa’s role as cynical and theatrical. But it is certainly true that South Africa chose to lead the case against Israel for reasons beyond shaming the Jewish state. In prosecuting the crime of genocide, South Africa has not only earned credit among those who wish to see Israel held accountable—a contingent that spans much of the world—but also among other countries in the global South that resent what they see as Western hypocrisy in the enforcement of global morality.
Sometimes shaming really does change the behavior of targeted states. Human rights enforcement is more likely to succeed when countries pressure their friends and allies. When it comes to Israel, that responsibility falls squarely on the United States, which has the deepest alliance with Israel and thus the greatest leverage to help contain the destruction in Gaza.
But despite being the most effective kind of pressure, it is also the most difficult to pull off: leaders are reluctant to criticize friends and allies because they value these relationships and do not want to risk endangering them. For decades, the United States has shielded Israel from legitimate human rights criticism in large part because it views the alliance as critical to its security interests in the Middle East. “It’s not only a long-standing moral commitment,” then Vice President Joe Biden explained to an American Israel Public Affairs Committee conference in 2013. “It’s a strategic commitment.” Even as U.S. domestic opinion is gradually turning against Israel, Washington remains reluctant to use the leverage it has to constrain Israeli behavior.
THE STAKES OF SHAME
When it comes to human rights, adversaries are quick to condemn but often provoke a counterproductive response. Allies are the most effective enforcers but also the most reluctant to push friends to change their behavior. As a result, shaming is most common in situations where it is least likely to be effective and most effective in situations where it is least likely to occur.
Enforcing international norms requires political leverage; it demands that states harness their material and strategic influence for the benefit of innocent civilians in far-off places, which itself requires an enormous amount of political will. In this sense, U.S. policymakers can learn from another time in history when the United States was one of the last holdouts protecting an ally facing worldwide condemnation: apartheid-era South Africa. After decades of resistance, the United States finally yielded in 1986 to global and domestic pressure and issued sanctions against South Africa, despite Washington’s close economic and strategic partnership with the apartheid government. The sanctions helped speed the end of apartheid precisely because the United States had a strong relationship with the country it was targeting. If international pressure is to have any chance of curtailing the unfathomable suffering in Gaza and elsewhere, it will have to be led by the actors that have done the most to enable and protect the perpetrators.
This understanding should inform the United States’ approach to advancing human rights through foreign policy more generally. Governments are in a better position to influence states with which they share political or economic ties. When it comes to trying to change the behavior of adversaries, engagement—not isolation—offers the best chance for promoting human rights in the long term. As for partners, leaders will need to summon the political will required to overcome the costs of shaming a friend. In the service of protecting human rights, the United States must be willing to put strategic interests on the line.
Foreign Affairs · March 27, 2024
10. Japan And U.S. Will Deepen Military Ties As Tensions With China Rise
Japan And U.S. Will Deepen Military Ties As Tensions With China Rise
Forbes · by Zachary Folk · March 26, 2024
Topline
The U.S. and Japan will sign a new security agreement next month, the Financial Times first reported, marking the first time the two nations have restructured their alliance since 1960 as tensions rise between China and Taiwan, and North Korea continues military exercises and missile tests in waters bordering Japan and South Korea.
Japan has steadily increased its military spending after maintaining only a small self-defense force … [+] for decades after World War II.
AFP via Getty Images
Key Facts
President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida plan to announce the new agreement while the Japanese leader visits the White House for a state dinner on April 10, according to the report.
The new defense agreement will likely give the three-star commander of the U.S. Forces in Japan more operational authority—now the commander must coordinate operations with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, located in Hawaii.
Japan remains one of the largest foreign deployments for the U.S. military, hosting an estimated 54,000 servicemembers, 45,000 dependents and 8,000 civilian contractors.
The U.S. and Japanese governments have not commented on the reported treaty yet.
It’s unclear what else this new security agreement would include, and how much it would depend on Japan growing its own defense.
Key Background
After World War II, the Japanese Constitution, with prodding from the U.S., embraced pacifism as a national ideal, stating “Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation,” adding that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” However, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe signed a landmark bill in 2015 that allowed the country’s military to participate in “collective self-defense.” Since 2015, Japan has steadily increased its military spending, and in 2023 pledged to double its military spending to account for 2% of the nation’s GDP by 2027—a move praised by Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
Contra
China has consistently condemned Japan’s military buildup, calling Abe’s 2015 bill “unprecedented” and urging the Japanese government to “learn the lessons of history.” China has a tumultuous history with Japan—the National World War II Museum estimates about 4 million Chinese soldiers died during its war with Japan (which began in 1937 and ended with Japan’s surrender to allied forces in 1945), while anywhere between 20 million to 50 million civilians were killed. Japan’s relations with China have strained considerably over the last year as Japan pursues closer relations with Taiwan. Japan does not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which China considers part of its territory, but Japan appointed a government minister to serve as a de facto defense attache in September, Reuters reported. In January, Japan’s foreign congratulated Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te on his election, further angering the Chinese government. The official statement called Taiwan a “crucial partner and an important friend.”
What Security Threats Are Japan And The U.s. Concerned About?
The news of the new security treaty comes days after Admiral John Aquilino, the head of Indo-Pacific Command said he believed China will be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Over the last few years, China has continuously flown fighter jets through Taiwanese airspace, even conducting “aggressive maneuvers” near U.S. planes above the island. Both countries are also concerned about military drills and missile tests in North Korea, who recently fired hundreds of artillery shells near a South Korean island, forcing the residents to evacuate.
Forbes · by Zachary Folk · March 26, 2024
11. Unification minister slams N. Korea's abduction, detention of S. Koreans as inhumane
(LEAD) Unification minister slams N. Korea's abduction, detention of S. Koreans as inhumane | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · March 27, 2024
(ATTN: ADDS photo, details in paras 5, 10-11)
SEOUL, March 27 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho on Wednesday condemned North Korea's abduction and detention of South Korean nationals as an "inhumane" act, vowing the government's utmost efforts to resolve the urgent issue.
Kim made the remarks during a meeting with family members of the South Korean victims and chiefs of related advocacy groups, as the unification ministry has created a symbol of South Korean abductees, detainees and prisoners of the 1950-53 Korean War with an image of three forget-me-nots.
Earlier in the day, the minister placed the pin featuring the three forget-me-nots on the clothes of eight participants in an event held at the ministry.
Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho (R) places a pin on the clothing of the chief of an advocacy group for prisoners of war on March 27, 2024. The pin features three forget-me-nots, a symbol representing South Korean abductees, detainees and prisoners of the 1950-53 Korean War,. (Yonhap)
"This special event was arranged to voice regret over North Korea's inhumane act while not losing the thread of hope that they will come back home someday," Kim said.
He said resolving the issue is the nation's responsibility in terms of the protection of the people and requires urgency, noting that President Yoon Suk Yeol, along with other members of the Cabinet, wore the symbolic pin in a Cabinet meeting the previous day and vowed to make the utmost efforts.
Currently, six South Koreans are being detained in North Korea, including three missionaries -- Kim Jung-wook, Choi Chun-gil and Kim Kook-kie -- whose whereabouts and fates are unknown.
Separately, 516 South Koreans have yet to return home among an estimated 3,835 people who were kidnapped by North Korea after the 1950-53 Korean War, according to government data. At least 60,000 prisoners of war are also estimated to have not come back home after being detained in North Korea.
President Yoon Suk Yeol wears a forget-me-not pin on his lapel during a Cabinet meeting at the presidential office in Seoul on March 26, 2024. (Yonhap)
The unification ministry voiced regret that North Korea has maintained an "irresponsible" attitude toward the issue without providing minimum information, such as the fates of the South Korean nationals.
"We once again denounce North Korea's illegal and inhumane act and strongly call on the North to clearly understand that the issue is a grave matter for the protection of our people's lives and actively resolve it," ministry spokesperson Koo Byoung-sam said in a statement.
In Britain, a group of cross-party parliamentarians on North Korea joined the move to wear the forget-me-not pins in a sign of solidarity with the South Korean government on resolving the issue.
"We urge North Korean authorities to immediately release the current South Korean detainees so they can reunite with their beloved family members," the All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea said in a statement issued Tuesday (local time).
This photo, taken March 27, 2024, shows a pin of three forget-me-nots, a symbol representing South Korean abductees, detainees and prisoners of the 1950-53 Korean War. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · March 27, 2024
12. US, ROK launch new task force to counter North Korean oil smuggling
US, ROK launch new task force to counter North Korean oil smuggling
Allies seek to crack down on sanctions evasion supporting DPRK nuclear program amid dysfunction in UN sanctions regime
Anton Sokolin March 27, 2024
https://www.nknews.org/2024/03/us-rok-launch-new-task-force-to-counter-north-korean-oil-smuggling/
A photo of an oil tanker at sea |Image: Kuntum Kuro via Pexels
The U.S. and South Korea have launched a new task force to counter North Korea’s illicit efforts to procure fuel in support of its nuclear weapons program, the allies announced this week, in what one expert described as an attempt to compensate for the failing DPRK sanctions regime.
The Enhanced Disruption Task Force will aim to expose DPRK sanctions evasion, review options for autonomous sanctions designations and engage private sector and third-party actors who aid the regime’s smuggling operations, according to the U.S. State Department and ROK foreign ministry.
U.S. Deputy Special Representative for the DPRK Lyn Debevoise and the ROK’s Director-General for North Korean Nuclear Affairs Lee Jun-il presided over the inaugural meeting on Tuesday.
Oil remains an “essential resource” contributing to “North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and military preparedness,” the ROK foreign ministry said, pointing to Pyongyang’s continuous efforts to illicitly procure oil and skirt international sanctions.
U.N. sanctions limited the DPRK to importing 4 million barrels of crude oil and 500,000 barrels of refined oil per year in an effort to constrain the country’s nuclear and missile programs.
The ROK foreign ministry cited an assessment in the latest report by the U.N. Panel of Experts that found North Korea likely smuggled up to 1.5 million barrels of refined petroleum into the country between Jan.-Sept. 2023, triple the annual oil cap.
In Tuesday’s meeting, the allies also “discussed ways to block illegal cooperation between Russia and North Korea,” the ministry said, adding that Seoul and Washington are concerned over the possibility of Russia providing refined oil to the DPRK.
The allies urged Russia to “thoroughly implement the Security Council resolutions” and act like a responsible member of the UNSC, the ministry added.
The task force is set to reconvene sometime this year in Seoul, the ROK ministry said, adding that the two sides will also discuss ways to disrupt the DPRK’s coal smuggling activities.
The launch of the new monitoring body notably comes as the U.N. Panel of Experts overseeing North Korea sanctions implementation faces an uncertain future and the possibility of being disbanded.
NK News reported last week that the U.N. delayed a Security Council vote on renewing the Panel’s mandate due to the possibility that Russia would veto the measure.
Yang Uk, an analyst at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, pointed to the “dysfunctionality of the current DPRK sanctions regime” as a reason for the U.S. and ROK to launch the new task force and assert their leadership to safeguard U.N. sanctions.
“Implementing DPRK sanctions is up for individual states but only the U.S. and South Korea think of it as a priority,” he said. “No other country would care.”
The expert said both China and Russia have sabotaged the DPRK sanctions regime and the U.N. Panel’s work by violating sanctions that they once supported.
But Seoul and Washington will have a better chance to get Beijing to comply with U.N. restrictions as China may fear reputational and economic risks from failing to do so, he said, while Russia has shown complete disregard for international law.
The launch of the task force came as the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) assessed on Tuesday that a small flotilla of North Korean oil tankers — including two under U.N. sanctions — have likely been shuttling oil products between Port Vostochny in Russia’s Far East and the DPRK port of Chongjin since early March.
Vostochny is known to be a key node in a suspected arms shipping operation between the DPRK and Russia.
RUSI estimated that the deliveries may have amounted to 125,000 barrels of refined petroleum products, a quarter of the established cap.
It remains unclear what type of fuel the ships loaded at Vostochny and whether Russia is going to report these shipments to the U.N.
UNSC Resolution 2397 mandates that all member states notify the 1718 U.N. Sanctions Committee of their petroleum product and crude oil deliveries to the DPRK every 30 days and 90 days, respectively.
Russia has reported only one official delivery of refined petroleum to North Korea this year, stating that it supplied 15,280 barrels in January.
Edited by Bryan Betts
13. Exclusive: Heart of South Korea’s satellite operations breached in cyberattack
The all purpose sword strikes again.
Exclusive: Heart of South Korea’s satellite operations breached in cyberattack
The Korea Satellite Operations Center was hacked in December of last year
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2024/03/27/4GEZDNF5F5DVBDGG7LOLWV4DJ4/
By Song Bok-gyu,
Yeom Hyun-a
Published 2024.03.27. 11:33
The Korea Satellite Operations Center in Gujwa-eup, Jeju, South Korea./Korea Satellite Operations Center
The Korea Satellite Operations Center, tasked with managing Multipurpose Satellites for reconnaissance satellites, and the Compact Advanced Satellite 500, a public satellite, has fallen victim to a hacking incident. The full extent of the breach remains uncertain, highlighting significant vulnerabilities in South Korea’s space infrastructure. This comes at a critical time, just before the inauguration of the Korea Aerospace Administration, a significant initiative under President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration.
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) has confirmed a recent cyber intrusion at the Korea Satellite Operations Center in Jeju. It is actively investigating the breach’s scope and impact, as reported by sources within the science and technology community on Mar. 26.
Officials have revealed that the hacking efforts began around December of the previous year. The Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information (KISTI), a government-supported cybersecurity entity, identified the breach during a routine security audit.
Established by the Ministry of Science and ICT along with the NIS in 2022, the Jeju-based Korea Satellite Operations Center is operated by the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). Its primary duties include managing the Arirang 3 and 3A satellites and overseeing satellite imagery. By 2030, the center aims to oversee 70 low-orbit satellites, encompassing Multipurpose Satellites, the Compact Advanced Satellite 500, and small satellites. It is a key research facility in the aerospace field that will become part of the new Korea Aerospace Administration, launched on May 27.
KARI oversees critical Earth observation satellites, such as the Multipurpose Satellites and Compact Advanced Satellite 500, with the NIS being its principal client. The Arirang 3 satellite has an optical camera capable of detailed ground observations (to 70 centimeters), whereas the Arirang 3A features a 55-centimeter resolution camera and an infrared camera for nighttime surveillance.
The NIS is currently working to identify the perpetrators, the methods employed in the hack, and the nature of the compromised data. An NIS official emphasized the agency’s crucial collaborative efforts with the Ministry of Science and ICT.
A security control specialist suggested the likelihood of North Korea’s involvement, saying, “The hack likely originated from North Korea.” Given the history of cyber-attacks on governmental bodies, often traced back to North Korea, and the similarities in the hacking techniques observed, there is a strong suspicion that North Korea could be behind this incident. A breach of the Korean Satellite Operations Center by North Korean operatives could endanger a wide range of sensitive data, including security, economic, and environmental information, gathered by South Korea’s Multipurpose Satellites. These satellites have monitored South Korea and other global regions for over two decades, holding potentially sensitive data about crucial allies.
14. Why did North Korea walk away from talks with Japan abruptly?
We must understand the regime's gray zone strategies (political warfare and blackmail diplomacy).
Why did North Korea walk away from talks with Japan abruptly?
The Korea Times · March 27, 2024
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his sister Kim Yo-jong attend a meeting with then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in, not pictured, at the Peace House in the truce village of Panmunjeom inside the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas, in this April 27, 2018, file photo. Reuters-Yonhap
By Kwak Yeon-soo
North Korea's decision to walk abruptly away from talks with Japan is due to a failure in reaching an agreement on the agenda for a possible summit between the two countries, experts said Wednesday.
Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, said Tuesday the North has no interest in a summit with Japan and would reject any further negotiations.
This came just a day after she said that Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida had proposed a meeting with the reclusive leader.
"North Korea will pay no attention to and reject any contact and negotiations with Japan," Kim was quoted as saying by the North's official Korean Central News Agency.
She accused Japan of remaining "stuck in the past" by continuing to raise the issue of Japanese abductees and North Korea's banned nuclear weapons programs.
Experts said that Pyongyang's sudden shift in stance on Tokyo came after Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa held a press conference on Monday, saying that the abduction issue has yet to be settled.
"For Japan, the resolution of the abduction issue is the most important point," Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, said. "Kishida won't give up the issue easily because he is facing increasing public pressure ahead of the September election."
"Kishida had expressed his intention to meet 'unconditionally' with Kim, but there are more downsides to it if he returns emptyhanded from talks with the North Korean leader," Park said.
Japan has said that North Korea abducted 17 Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. It has insisted that 12 of them are still in the North, excluding five the North let return home, following then-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's trip to Pyongyang in 2002.
Park said that North Korea is trying to embarrass Japan, which is a tactic Kim uses frequently.
"Details about the possible bilateral talk should have been kept under wraps until the two counterparts make an agreement," he added. "But North Korea has revealed them, which is intended to embarrass his Japanese counterpart."
Cheong Seong-chang, director of the Center for Korean Peninsula Strategy at the Sejong Institute, said a Kim-Kishida summit seems unlikely unless Japan's top leader takes a creative approach toward the North that would satisfy both countries.
"The two failed to narrow down and produce an agreement on the agenda," he said. "North Korea recognized that Japan was trying to use the summit as a tool to earn domestic political interests."
"Given his low approval rating, Kishida seems unlikely to keep his grip on power. North Korea doesn't have much to lose even if a Kim-Kishida summit doesn't take place."
The Korea Times · March 27, 2024
15. Reducing war and nuclear risks on the Korean Peninsula
But the ball is in Kim's court to agree to talks.
Reducing war and nuclear risks on the Korean Peninsula
The Korea Times · March 27, 2024
By Jun Bong-geun
Jun Bong-geun
The Korean Peninsula has always stood as one of the most dangerous flashpoints for conflict throughout the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. Today, in what some term the post-post-Cold War era, the specter of war looms even larger. This is primarily due to the entrenched dynamics of zero-sum security competition, namely the "unification competition," wherein the two Koreas vie for dominance, each seeking to eliminate the other.
Across the military demarcation line, the South maintains a standing force of 480,000 troops, while the North boasts 1.2 million, underscoring the intense militarization and readiness for conflict on both sides. Moreover, the presence of 28,000 U.S. soldiers in the South as part of the South Korea-U.S. alliance guarantees U.S. involvement in any conflict as a party to the war. Additionally, China and Russia stand ready to intervene in support of North Korea, potentially escalating any confrontation into an extended regional war with a possible exchange of nuclear weapons. Though the chances of such a scenario remain low for now, the risk will rise in the absence of proactive measures to address the ongoing war and nuclear crises in the region.
The chances of accidental military collision and limited warfare remain a constant concern due to the following reasons: a very high level of hostility between the two Koreas, frequent large-scale military exercises and military provocations, heightened military preparedness and tensions and preemptive strike doctrines, among others. Moreover, North Korea, chronically suffering from economic, food and regime crises, has a strong political incentive to pursue limited conflict, as most theories on the root causes of war predict.
Then, how do we solve this Korea problem? As Tim Marshall's best-selling book "The Power of Geography" (2016) aptly puts it, "No, we cannot. We just manage it." However, it is debatable whether effective management of this problem has been achieved thus far. Denuclearization diplomacy over the past 30 years has failed, and the risks of war and nuclear use are higher than ever. In light of this pressing reality, what measures can be taken to prevent the imminent danger of war and nuclear use, as well as to contain North Korea's freewheeling nuclear and missile buildup?
First, the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue is essential. Despite the U.S. government's proposal for "unconditional dialogue," North Korea has persistently refused to engage since the breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi U.S.-North Korea summit. While the best way to resume U.S.-North Korea dialogue would be through a summit, there is little chance that current U.S. President Joe Biden will meet Chairman Kim Jung-un. The next best option is for Biden to send a letter to Kim. If necessary, China or a neutral European state could facilitate the exchange of such correspondence.
Second, it is crucial to reaffirm the 2018 U.S.-North Korea Singapore Joint Statement by both leaders. This statement outlines key objectives, including achieving a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, normalizing diplomatic relations, building a peace regime and repatriating American war remains. If the two leaders could reaffirm these goals through an exchange of letters or a high-level meeting, working-level negotiations to implement the agreement will follow. Subsequently, North Korea is expected to suspend further nuclear and missile tests.
Third, both U.S.-North Korea and South-North Korea politico-military talks should be held for crisis management and communication to prevent military collisions and their potential escalation. A notable precedent occurred in late 2023 when the U.S. and China agreed to resume high-level military dialogue to prevent military collisions in East Asia despite fierce strategic competition between the two. Similarly, engaging in military dialogue with North Korea is essential to prevent a military collision and possible nuclear use. Future politico-military talks will need to prioritize crisis management and communication, as well as initiatives aimed at reducing military tensions and nuclear risks.
Lastly, given that peace on the Korean Peninsula hinges on North Korea's denuclearization, diplomatic efforts toward this end must be resumed as soon as possible, despite its challenges. Central to this effort is the development and adoption of a sustainable and effective denuclearization strategy. In addition, consensus must be reached on key principles guiding denuclearization diplomacy, such as mutual threat reduction with North Korea, a step-by-step approach, reciprocal exchanges of denuclearization steps and corresponding measures and simultaneous progress of denuclearization and peace regime-building. These principles would help make the denuclearization process implementable and sustainable.
Dr. Jun Bong-geun is professor emeritus at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy and visiting advisor at United States Institute of Peace. He is a member of Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN). This article is published in cooperation with APLN (www.apln.network).
The Korea Times · March 27, 2024
16. Russia supplies oil to N. Korea in violence of UN sanctions
No surprise.
Russia supplies oil to N. Korea in violence of UN sanctions
donga.com
Posted March. 27, 2024 07:45,
Updated March. 27, 2024 07:45
Russia supplies oil to N. Korea in violence of UN sanctions. March. 27, 2024 07:45. by 이기욱기자 71wook@donga.com.
North Korean oil tankers have been confirmed to have visited the Russian port of Vostochny at least five times recently to receive refined oil, reported The Financial Times on Tuesday (local time). This marks the first instance of oil transportation from Russia to North Korea since the United Nations Security Council adopted sanctions limiting oil exports to North Korea in 2017.
According to satellite images shared by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), as reported by The Financial Times, North Korean oil tankers visited the Vostochny port on March 7, before making multiple visits on the 10th, 13th, 14th, and 22nd of the same month. Subsequently, these tankers were also spotted at the Chongjin port in North Korea. The Financial Times analyzed that these ships all appeared to be loading cargo at berths operated by Russian oil companies.
Notably, one of the tankers that docked at the Vostochny port was the "Paekyangsan 1," which North Korea purchased last December. It had already been revealed that this vessel was involved in illegal oil transfers between ships to evade UN restrictions on oil imports. "North Korean vessels are not even allowed to enter foreign ports," said Joseph Byrne, a research fellow at RUSI. “North Korea and Russia are openly violating UN sanctions.
Earlier, the UN Security Council adopted sanctions limiting annual refined oil exports to North Korea to 500,000 barrels (with crude oil capped at 4 million barrels). Transporting oil to North Korea is only permissible in cases pre-reported to the UN. RUSI disclosed that the volume of oil transported this time could reach 125,000 barrels, a quarter of the annual allowance.
This oil transportation occurred after North Korea transported weapons to Russia. Previously, RUSI revealed that in August last year, a Russian ship carrying what was suspected to be containers of ammunition returned to Russia's Dunaj port from North Korea's Najin port. The Financial Times criticized this exchange of North Korean weapons for Russian oil as a clear example of "quid pro quo" and labeled Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, as an "outlaw state" for failing to uphold UN sanctions.
한국어
donga.com
17. Kangwon Province military unit tests officers’ ideological loyalty
Control then command versus command and control.
When there is a loss of the ability of the regime to convert from Pyongyang combined with a loss of coherency and support of the military, we are likely to see internal instability and potential regime collapse.
Kim must ensure control of the military and demand its loyalty.
Kangwon Province military unit tests officers’ ideological loyalty
Agents disguised as civilians took note of their economic circumstances, what kind of music they heard, and the ideological tone of the family members' ordinary conversations
By Jong So Yong - March 27, 2024
dailynk.com
Kangwon Province military unit tests officers’ ideological loyalty - Daily NK English
FILE PHOTO: North Korean soldiers in North Pyongan Province. (Daily NK)
The political department of an army unit based in Chorwon County, Kangwon Province, has been sending agents disguised as civilians to the homes of the unit’s officers to determine their ideological loyalty, Daily NK has learned.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source in Kangwon Province told Daily NK on Monday that the political department of the unit in question “sent fake civilians to the homes of officers serving in various positions earlier this month to determine their economic circumstances and political leanings, leading to intense ideological struggle sessions.”
These “fake civilians,” assigned by the political department of the unit, visited the officers’ homes and made requests such as asking for food because “they had nothing to eat,” pleading for cement or wood “because the mud wall of their house was about to collapse,” or begging for some shabby clothes the family no longer wore “because they had nothing to wear.”
Most of the officials and their relatives felt sorry for the visitors and tried to meet their requests by inviting them into their homes and giving them food.
Once inside, however, the visitors took note of the families’ economic circumstances and reported to the political department what kind of music they heard and the ideological tone of the family members’ ordinary conversations. This raised eyebrows among the officers.
In fact, according to the source, the visitors reported everything: that the homes were “like palaces,”; that the families lived in well-appointed houses that “exuded a foreign aura” like “houses in foreign movies,”; or that they received leftover food and side dishes that were like a feast “that ordinary people could never imagine.”
They reported hearing “music with a strange accompaniment” at one officer’s house, complaining that it “clearly wasn’t North Korean music.” At another officer’s house, they reported seeing a lot of foreign-made clothing and smelling “unusual smells” from cosmetics and perfumes.
After receiving the reports, the unit’s political department ordered that anyone found guilty of anti-socialist or non-socialist behavior in their homes be subjected to intensive struggle sessions and forced to write letters of self-criticism.
One member of unit found to have “impeccable” loyalty
Only the head of the unit’s infirmary was found to be impeccable in his behavior, the source said. “He will be promoted soon, as the latest affair proved him incorruptible,” he added.
According to the source, a shabby-looking “fake civilian” went to the infirmary chief’s home with a bag of corn and begged to trade it for some of the unit’s medicine, saying his child “was dying because he had no medicine.” The chief, however, refused to listen and curtly sent him away. The political department deemed the man “unblemished” as a result.
However, the source said the infirmary chief has since been the target of envy and ostracism by other officers for being the only man left standing at the end.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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