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Quotes of the Day:
"If you write, fix pipes, grade papers, lay bricks or drive a taxi - do it with a sense of pride. And do it the best you know how. Be cognizant and sympathetic to the guy alongside, because he wants a place in the sun, too. And always...always look past his color, his creed, his religion and the shape of his ears. Look for the whole person. Judge him as the whole person."
– Rod Serling, AS I KNEW HIM: My Dad Rod Serling
"You can never have a revolution in order to establish a democracy. You must have a democracy in order to have a revolution."
– G. K. Chesterton
"There is no cure for birth and death save to enjoy the interval."
– George Santayana
1. Tae Yong-ho on North Korea’s Purposeful Aggression
2. Blinken, senior Chinese official discuss N. Korea, Taiwan, Russia's war in Ukraine
3. N. Korea reportedly trades arms in Russian luxury goods
4. N. Korea halts radio station known for sending coded messages to spies in Seoul
5. [INTERVIEW] Philippines seeks to forge strategic partnership with Korea this year
6. Why 2024 is the Voldemort of years
7. Condemning China, rejecting refugees
8. North Korea to welcome Russian tourists, the country's first since the pandemic, report says
9. N. Korean grain prices continue upward trend into the New Year
10. Prices of rice sold in N. Korea’s state-run food shops similar to market prices
11. Is the US prepared for war in the Far East?
12. Veteran sculptor appointed special adviser for envisioned N.K. human rights center
1. Tae Yong-ho on North Korea’s Purposeful Aggression
Interesting analysis and a key point here. Unfortunately he does not get into sufficient depth about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime to put the latest rhetoric into a better perspective.
Will North Korea scale up its military aggression before the two elections?
Not to a significant degree. Events like the Battles of Yeonpyeong (1999 and 2002) or the sinking of the Cheonan naval warship (2010) are highly unlikely today. South Korea’s military structure and chain of command have vastly changed. South Korea now has military capabilities and a command structure that would allow a prompt and overwhelming response.
That said, a murkier “grey zone” encroachment, say a cyberspace attack, cannot be excluded.
Tae Yong-ho on North Korea’s Purposeful Aggression
thediplomat.com
The North Korean diplomat-turned-South Korean lawmaker discusses Pyongyang’s stepped-up artillery shelling and its foreign policy strategy.
By Kenji Yoshida
January 13, 2024
Credit: Kenji Yoshida
Tensions remain high on the western coast of the Korean Peninsula. Over three days, starting on January 5, North Korea engaged in an artillery barrage, firing some 350 rounds near a disputed maritime border in the West Sea.
The incident led civilians on the border islands of Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeong to evacuate, as the South Korean military staged live-fire drills in response. For the islanders, it jogged memories of the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, which resulted in the death of four South Koreans: two civilians and two soldiers.
Reacting to the onslaught, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 8 nullified maritime buffer zones in the West Sea, which had been created under a 2018 military pact signed between Seoul and Pyongyang.
North Korea’s menacing maneuvers come after its leader, Kim Jong Un, opened the new year vowing to annihilate South Korea and the United States if provoked. Concerns are brewing in the peninsula, as Kim may escalate aggression heading into South Korea’s general election in April.
In an interview with The Diplomat, Tae Yong-ho (sometimes spelled Thae Yong-ho), a lawmaker from the ruling People Power Party and ex-North Korean diplomat who defected to the South in 2016, deciphered Pyongyang’s intentions and what Washington and its allies should expect.
North Korea’s military activity is intensifying. Last December, they successfully launched a reconnaissance satellite and a Hwasong-18 ICBM. Their military maneuvers have become more direct in 2024. What is Kim Jong Un’s motive?
The recent artillery drills are Kim’s attempt to induce more palatable results in the upcoming general election in South Korea and the U.S. presidential election.
Kim is signaling to the U.S. presidential candidates that it’s time to renegotiate one-on-one with Pyongyang as it now possesses missiles capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Simultaneously, Kim is laying the groundwork for Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House.
Turning to South Korea, Pyongyang is aware that its government no longer responds to tactical maneuvers such as launching ICBMs. So the recent artillery blast should be viewed as a shift in their strategy from utilizing advanced weapons to conventional weapons. The latter, most certainly, will garner an immediate and swift reaction as it could seriously endanger South’s citizens and infrastructures.
Kim is trying to craft a “war vs. peace” narrative leading up to South Korea’s April election to tilt the results in favor of the opposition Democratic Party – a party traditionally more dovish and cooperative toward the North. Simply put, Kim is conveying the message: If you back the ruling People Party Party, a conflict will be unavoidable.
Will North Korea scale up its military aggression before the two elections?
Not to a significant degree. Events like the Battles of Yeonpyeong (1999 and 2002) or the sinking of the Cheonan naval warship (2010) are highly unlikely today. South Korea’s military structure and chain of command have vastly changed. South Korea now has military capabilities and a command structure that would allow a prompt and overwhelming response.
That said, a murkier “grey zone” encroachment, say a cyberspace attack, cannot be excluded.
How will this affect the trilateral military partnership between the United States, South Korea, and Japan?
Pyongyang’s ultimate aim will be to undermine and rupture the “Camp David Framework” announced in August 2023.
The stark contrast between how Kim approaches Seoul and Tokyo is noteworthy. While Kim continues to take a scathing attitude vis-à-vis its neighbor to the South, he remains rather charitable to Japan.
Take, for instance, the condolence letter Kim sent to Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio on January 5 over the recent earthquake. He referred to Kishida as “Your Excellency.” This is as rare an event as a North Korean leader sending a comfort message to its sworn enemy. Remember also, this happened the same day that North Korea open-fired some 200 artillery shells in the West Sea.
Pyongyang sees Japan as the weakest link in the trilateral pact. It also recognizes that Kishida is increasingly willing to negotiate over the abductee issue. Kim will likely capitalize on this situation to arrange a summit with the Japanese leader and attempt to isolate the archipelago from Washington and Seoul.
How will the U.S. presidential election in November play into this whole situation?
For Pyongyang, Trump’s reelection is more desirable than the incumbent Joe Biden administration, which carries on the Obama-era policy of strategic patience. While the 2019 Hanoi Summit ended fruitlessly, Kim believes he maintains a certain level of bond with the former president.
A recent Politico piece argued that Trump might shift America’s long-standing North Korea policy if reelected. Instead of a complete denuclearization, the article wrote that Trump may allow North Korea to retain its nuclear warheads with oversight but provide financial incentives to cease making new bombs.
Under the assumption of Trump’s return, Kim would likely seek bilateral negotiations with the U.S., offering to ease its military threat against the country.
If Trump, during his second term, desires to repivot America’s focus to China, the offer should be an entertaining one. But for South Korea, it’s an undesirable scenario.
Pyongyang recently repositioned its stance toward South Korea. What is your assessment?
There has indeed been a critical shift in Pyongyang’s policy vis-à-vis South Korea. Kim’s regime recently declared South Korea a “principal enemy” and abandoned all possibility of reunification or reconciliation. For North Korea, the South is now a belligerent state.
The restructuring of the policy should be interpreted as Kim paving the way for Pyongyang’s potential use of nuclear weapons against South Korea, a combative state in their view, in the event of an armed conflict.
Authors
Guest Author
Kenji Yoshida
Kenji Yoshida is an associate correspondent at JAPAN Forward.
thediplomat.com
2. Blinken, senior Chinese official discuss N. Korea, Taiwan, Russia's war in Ukraine
Unfortunately there will be no agreement on north Korea let alone on Taiwan and RUssia.
Blinken, senior Chinese official discuss N. Korea, Taiwan, Russia's war in Ukraine | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 13, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Jan. 12 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and a visiting senior Chinese official held talks in Washington on Friday over a range of issues concerning North Korea, Taiwan, Russia's war in Ukraine and the Middle East, a State Department spokesperson said.
The talks between Blinken and Liu Jianchao, minister of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, came just before Taiwan's presidential election on Saturday.
"The secretary reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea," Matthew Miller, the spokesperson, said in a statement.
"The two sides exchanged views on regional and global issues, including Russia's war against Ukraine, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Middle East," he added, referring to North Korea by its official name.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken holds talks with Chinese Communist Party International Liaison Department Minister Liu Jianchao at the State Department in Washington on Jan. 12, 2024, in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)
Among the topics, the Taiwan issue has been a source of tension between Washington and Beijing as China has expressed its hope for reunification with the self-governing island democracy with the U.S. opposing any unilateral change to the status quo despite its One China policy.
Blinken also noted the importance of defending navigational rights and freedoms in the Red Sea, the crucial waterway where tensions have spiked due to Iran-backed Houthi rebels' repeated attacks on commercial vessels.
The two officials reaffirmed the importance of continuing the progress made on key issues at the summit between President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping in California in November, Miller said. The issues include counter-narcotics cooperation and military-to-military communications.
"Both sides recognized the importance of continuing to maintain open channels of communication between the U.S. and the PRC," the spokesperson said, referring to China by its official name, the People's Republic of China.
Separately, Blinken also held talks with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa at the State Department.
In his opening remarks, Blinken stressed that the U.S.-Japan alliance is "truly the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific."
"I think what we've seen in recent years, but especially over the last couple of years, is an alliance that has reached new heights where we are working together not only on a bilateral basis, not only on a regional basis, but genuinely on a global basis," he said.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken holds talks with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa at the State Department in Washington on Jan. 12, 2024, in this photo released by AFP. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 13, 2024
3. N. Korea reportedly trades arms in Russian luxury goods
Have to keep the vodka flowing to north Korea.
Excerpts:
"There are signs of high-end liquor such as vodka, watches, and cosmetics being imported,” another source revealed. “The total value of these imports could reach millions of dollars." Earlier in December last year, it was observed that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had recently upgraded his vehicle to a new Mercedes-Maybach, worth at least 300 million won. Mercedes vehicles, categorized as luxury items, are among the goods banned from being exported to North Korea by the UN Security Council.
Reports also indicated an increase in food, including flour, that North Korea imported from Russia last year. North Korea faced severe food shortages, with over 240 reported starvation cases until July of last year. In a September meeting with Kim last September, Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed agricultural development, hinting, "Russia has something to offer to North Korea." This suggested Russia's readiness to actively engage in food support, being the leading global wheat exporter.
N. Korea reportedly trades arms in Russian luxury goods
donga.com
Posted January. 13, 2024 08:05,
Updated January. 13, 2024 08:05
N. Korea reportedly trades arms in Russian luxury goods. January. 13, 2024 08:05. by Jin-Woo Shin niceshin@donga.com.
The South Korean government authorities believe that North Korea imported millions of dollars worth of luxury goods from Russia last year. These imports are likely part of a deal to provide artillery shells and ballistic missiles to Russia, a move that breaches UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea.
The South Korean government sources reported on Friday that there was a significant increase in North Korea's luxury goods imports last year. These imports, mainly through China and Russia, particularly saw a notable rise from Russia compared to previous years. "The import of luxury goods by North Korea began to increase in the latter half of 2022 as the COVID-19 lockdown started to ease,” a government source said. “We understand that these imports became more frequently caught the attention (of South Korea and U.S. authorities) in the latter half of the year when the lockdown was effectively lifted. While most imports come from China, the rise in luxury goods from Russia is attracting attention."
"There are signs of high-end liquor such as vodka, watches, and cosmetics being imported,” another source revealed. “The total value of these imports could reach millions of dollars." Earlier in December last year, it was observed that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had recently upgraded his vehicle to a new Mercedes-Maybach, worth at least 300 million won. Mercedes vehicles, categorized as luxury items, are among the goods banned from being exported to North Korea by the UN Security Council.
Reports also indicated an increase in food, including flour, that North Korea imported from Russia last year. North Korea faced severe food shortages, with over 240 reported starvation cases until July of last year. In a September meeting with Kim last September, Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed agricultural development, hinting, "Russia has something to offer to North Korea." This suggested Russia's readiness to actively engage in food support, being the leading global wheat exporter.
Notably, North Korea's import of luxury goods could be seen as compensation for weapon provision, prompting vigilant monitoring by South Korean and U.S. authorities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated on Thursday (local time) that Russia had received over a million rounds of ammunition from North Korea. The White House also recently revealed that North Korea had supplied Russia with several ballistic missile launchers and missiles.
As evidence of the deepening ties between North Korea and Russia, there was also an increase last year in the operation of trains between the North Korean Tumen River station and the Russian Primorsky Krai Hassan station in border areas. “In the second half of last year, the frequency of train trips increased to several times a week," a source mentioned. This might be for arms trading, but it also likely serves the purpose of smuggling energy resources such as coal and oil, as well as luxury goods.
한국어
donga.com
4. N. Korea halts radio station known for sending coded messages to spies in Seoul
All warfare is based on deception. But we must not be deceived because there is no way the regime is halting its political warfare and subversion against the South (as well as its espionage efforts).
The regime probably knows it can communicate more effectively via the internet and open source communications that can either be encrypted or that can still use code words for encryption.
(LEAD) N. Korea halts radio station known for sending coded messages to spies in Seoul | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · January 13, 2024
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; ADDS more info in paras 1-6, photo)
SEOUL, Jan. 13 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is pressing ahead with measures to disband its inter-Korean organizations, apparently stopping a radio station previously used to send encrypted messages to its spies in South Korea.
As of Saturday, the North appears to have stopped broadcasting the state-run Pyongyang Radio and cut off access to its website.
The latest move comes after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered "readjusting and reforming" its organizations in charge of inter-Korean affairs during a key Workers' Party meeting last month amid growing cross-border tensions.
Pyongyang Radio is known for broadcasting a series of mysterious numbers, presumed to be coded messages, giving directions to its agents operating in South Korea.
The North resumed such broadcasts in 2016 after suspending them in 2000, when the two Koreas held their first historic summit.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) inspects a munitions factory, in this undated photo captured from the North's Korean Central Television on Jan. 10, 2024. During his visits to major munitions factories in unspecified locations on Jan. 8-9, Kim called South Korea the country's "principal enemy" and said he has "no intention of avoiding war." (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
On Saturday, North Korea said it also held a meeting the previous day to decide to dissolve organizations in charge of civilian exchanges with the South, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
All relevant organizations, including the North Side Committee for Implementing June 15 Joint Declaration, the North Headquarters of the Pan-national Alliance for Korea's Reunification, the Consultative Council for National Reconciliation and the Council for the Reunification of Tangun's Nation, will be readjusted, the KCNA said.
The meeting also called for a new reunification policy based on the view that the "South Korean puppets" who have pursued only the collapse of the North's power and unification by absorption are the "main enemy of the DPRK to be completely wiped out."
DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
North Korea has stepped up provocations after Kim defined inter-Korean ties as relations "between two states hostile to each other" and called for stepped-up preparations to "suppress the whole territory of South Korea" at the year-end ruling party meeting.
Kim also for a "fundamental change" in dealing with South Korea and instructed the disbandment of organizations in charge of inter-Korean affairs.
As a follow-up measure, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui led discussions early this month to dismantle the United Front Department in charge of relations with the South, according to state media.
Relations between South and North Korea remain strained, with tensions sharply escalating last week after Pyongyang fired around 350 rounds of artillery shells in waters off its west coast between Jan. 5 and 7, the first live-fire drills near the sea border since December 2022.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · January 13, 2024
5. [INTERVIEW] Philippines seeks to forge strategic partnership with Korea this year
[INTERVIEW] Philippines seeks to forge strategic partnership with Korea this year
The Korea Times · January 13, 2024
Philippine Ambassador to Korea Maria Theresa B. Dizon-De Vega speaks of burgeoning Korea-Philippines relations during an interview with The Korea Times at the Philippine Embassy in Seoul, Monday. Korea Times photo by Choi Won-suk
Korea, Philippines mark 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties
By Kim Hyun-bin
Following the historic signing of the Philippines-Korea free trade agreement (FTA) last year, the Philippines is actively seeking to establish a strategic partnership with Korea this year that marks the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Manila to enhance collaboration in diverse areas, according to the country’s ambassador to Seoul.
During an interview with The Korea Times, Monday, Philippine Ambassador to Korea Maria Theresa B. Dizon-De Vega envisioned more than just a deeper economic ties, aiming for a multifaceted collaboration that extends into emerging sectors, technological advancements and the overall well-being of both nations.
She highlighted the robust trade relations between the two nations and expressed optimism over the continued growth of the Korea-Philippines economic relationship, emphasizing the anticipated benefits of the recently signed FTA, set to take effect shortly. The agreement, signed in Jakarta on Sept. 7, 2023, during the ASEAN Summit, marks a historic milestone in economic relations.
"Korea, for the Philippines, is a valued trade and investment partner ranking fourth in terms of total bilateral trade volume for the Philippines valued at about $15.45 billion and sixth in terms of approved investments at $90.62 million," she said.
"This FTA is forward-looking, addressing not only traditional components but also recognizing emerging sectors crucial for both our economies."
The FTA with the Philippines is the fifth trade deal Korea signed with ASEAN members after Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia and Indonesia. The five countries together account for 91 percent of the ASEAN market.
Under the agreement, the five-percent tariff on Korean cars will be removed as soon as the FTA takes effect, while the tariff of up to 30 percent placed on car parts will be lifted within five years. Tariffs on electric and hybrid vehicles will also be removed within five years.
Describing the FTA as a "next-generation FTA," the ambassador outlined its distinctive features, including the incorporation of emerging industries such as green technology, creative and knowledge industries and advancements in health sectors, particularly in vaccine development and bioengineering.
"The next-generation FTA signifies a commitment to fostering a strong and mutually beneficial partnership in the years to come," she said.
Beyond trade and investment, Dizon-De Vega shed light on the economic cooperation component of the FTA, designed to foster collaboration beyond the business realm, including opportunities for research and development (R&D) in specific fields. Such initiatives are expected to benefit manufacturing sectors and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs).
Ongoing efforts were also highlighted, with collaboration between the Philippine Department of Trade and Industry and Korean counterparts in developing an origin system for tracking new investments under the FTA. This initiative aims to document the benefits and promote the growth of the private sector.
A resort in Cebu, Philippines / Korea Times photo by Kim Hyun-bin
Cultural exchanges, tourism
Highlighting people-to-people relations, Dizon-De Vega emphasized their strength rooted in shared sacrifices during the Korean War.
"We brought in the 4th largest contingent of fighting troops to help preserve democracy in this part of the world," the ambassador said.
She pointed out the significant role of Filipinos and Koreans residing in each other's countries, contributing to cultural exchanges and forming the bedrock of relations.
"Over the years, we've witnessed a constant flow of people-to-people exchanges between the Philippines and Korea," Dizon-De Vega said. “Currently, approximately 67,000 Filipinos reside in Korea, while over 80,000 Koreans have found a second home in the Philippines.”
The ambassador affectionately refers to them as the "real ambassadors," emphasizing their role in staying in touch with both societies, forming a solid foundation for bilateral relations.
Formal introductions to each other's cultures are facilitated by a cultural agreement signed in 1973, marking its 50th anniversary this year.
"It's still in place and serves as the basis for many decades of various cultural exchanges," she said.
The ambassador underscored the vital role of tourism in growing people-to-people relations. Korea has become a favorite destination for many Filipinos, driven by the popularity of Korean content, including K-pop, the Korean Wave, K-products, K-beauty, K-food, K-drama and films. Korea remains the number one source of international visitors to the Philippines, symbolizing the strong cultural ties.
Despite the challenges posed by the pandemic, the ambassador noted that Korea has regained its spot as the number one tourism market for the Philippines. She also emphasized the warm welcome extended to Koreans in the Philippines.
"There's this feeling that they're part of the Philippine family," she said.
75th-anniversary of bilateral ties
She also discussed the upcoming 75th-anniversary celebrations of diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Korea, set to commence in March 2024.
"As the 75th anniversary of relations approaches, we start commemorating in March, so it'll be a year-long commemoration from March of 2024 to March of 2025," the ambassador said.
She articulated the commemorative vision, emphasizing a forward-looking thematic approach.
"The thematic for the commemoration is not just to pay homage or to recognize the history but also looking forward," she said. The celebration aims to encompass both the shared history and sacrifices of the two nations, as well as the future strategic relations that both countries hope to establish.
Addressing major events planned for the commemoration, Dizon-De Vega mentioned a launching event in early March, designed to inform partners, friends, and the media about major activities.
She detailed a range of initiatives, including "book projects, sports diplomacy programs, artistic exchanges, and cultural events." The Philippine Embassy in Seoul collaborates with institutions like the Korea Foundation, ASEAN Culture House, universities, think tanks, business groups, and defense and security partners.
Characterizing the current state of diplomatic relations, Dizon-De Vega asserted, "I always say that the relationship between the Philippines and Korea is really issue-free. We don't really have any outstanding major irritants or issues in our relationship."
Regarding challenges, the ambassador stressed the importance of "working very, very closely together" to identify priorities and areas of cooperation. Ongoing
The Korea Times · January 13, 2024
6. Why 2024 is the Voldemort of years
You can download the 35 page repto at this link: https://www.eurasiagroup.net/pardot_download.cfm?filehash=565771E5477E245DC59560150306E2004F94E0B72D0A936D3A7252B7CD27CC77&download=1. You will have to register and opt-in to receive from the Eurasia Group.
Kim Jong Un will be upset that he did not make it into the article below but he is listed as part of number 5 in Axis of Rogues within the report.
Excerpt from the report (see page 18 for a graphic of north Korea and Iran aiding and abetting Russia):
5
Axis of rogues
Russia, North Korea, and Iran are the world’s most powerful rogue states. And they have been working to strengthen their cooperation since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, united by the draconian sanctions levied against them, their shared hatred of the US, and their willingness to violate international law to disrupt a global status quo they believe serves Western interests at their expense. They are agents of chaos in today’s geopolitical order, bent on undermining existing institutions and the governments and principles that uphold them.
Once seen by Russia as a nuisance at best and a liability at worst, North Korea has become an essential resource for Vladimir Putin’s war effort in Ukraine thanks to its pariah status, militarized economy, and large stocks of Soviet-standard artillery ammunition. Meeting in Russia’s Far East in September 2023, Kim Jong-un and Putin struck a deal that sends North Korean artillery shells, rockets, and ballistic missiles to Russia in exchange for Russian food, energy, and—most importantly—technological assistance, especially on satellite development and deployment.
Russia and Iran, longtime partners in a bid to protect Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria, have also upgraded their relationship from a limited tactical alliance to a more comprehensive and strategic military and economic partnership. Tehran has supplied Moscow with kamikaze drones to terrorize Ukrainian cities—now also being built in Russia—and drawn on its decades of experience to help Moscow evade Western sanctions. For its part, Russia has become Iran’s chief external weapons supplier, its top source of foreign investment, and a key trading partner. Moscow also provides diplomatic cover for Tehran’s nuclear program at the UN Security Council and has developed warm relations with Iranian proxies at war
with the US and Israel in the Middle East.
"While less prominent than Russia’s bilateral ties within the axis, North Korea and Iran have a decades-long history of cooperation on nuclear and ballistic missile development. This cooperation has reportedly extended to North Korea supplying weapons and missile designs to Hamas, the Houthis, and other Iranian-backed militant groups.
In 2024, deeper alignment and mutual support among these rogue states will pose a growing threat to global stability as they boost one another’s capabilities and act in increasingly coordinated and disruptive ways on the global stage.
Russia will be the primary driver of risk as it seeks to bolster its warfighting capabilities in Ukraine while working to deflect Western attention elsewhere. In exchange for North Korean artillery shells and rockets to sustain its war of attrition, Moscow will provide Pyongyang with technologies and know-how to advance its missile, submarine, and satellite programs, with major repercussions for Northeast Asian security. And in exchange for stepped-up provision of Iranian drones, munitions, sanctions relief, and ballistic missiles with which to strike Ukrainian cities, Moscow is poised to "supply Tehran with fighter jets and advanced weapons technology. Along with growing Russian support for Iran’s proxies, this will alter the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor at a time when Tehran and its proxies represent a much more direct security challenge to the West (please see Top Risk #2). Both bilateral deals would strengthen Russia’s hand in Ukraine and increase the war’s damage and costs (please see Top Risk #3).
The severity of existing Western sanctions against all three rogue states and the close cooperation among them means they will not be deterred by fear of further sanctions and isolation. This will unleash them to wage asymmetric warfare short of direct military attacks on the US and Europe, including via cyberattacks, support for terrorism, and disinformation campaigns designed to disrupt elections and sow chaos. More generally, the axis’s coordinated sanctions-busting and rule-breaking will undermine the compellent and deterrent power of Western sanctions, emboldening other would-be rogues.
It bears noting that China is not a member of the axis of rogues. Beijing did not openly condemn Russian aggression in Ukraine, but neither did it endorse the invasion or do much to help Putin’s war effort beyond purchasing discounted oil and allowing flows of dual-use goods to continue. (If India and the UAE were less friendly to the United States, analysts would be likening their Russia policies to China’s.) Beijing has looked on warily at the deepening security cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang—indeed, Chinese officials didn’t know Kim was going to Russia until after it was publicly announced … and they were piqued by it. And while it has ramped up oil imports from and diplomatic support for Tehran, Beijing has no desire to jeopardize its more strategically important interests in the Gulf (particularly its ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) by helping Iran make regional trouble.
That said, China is often well-served by the three rogues’ anti-Western operations and maintains a de facto policy of pro-axis neutrality. Indeed, without active acquiescence from China, the axis’s rogue activities would be less impactful. Short of violating international sanctions or jeopardizing its own interests, expect Beijing to continue to do business with and legitimize the axis as it undermines the US and its allies this year."
"Three caveats are in order. First, Russia, Iran, and North Korea leaning on each other is a sign of their desperation and weakness on the global stage. When your best (and near only) friends are two rogue states, you’re in trouble. Second, all of them seek to avoid an active shooting war with the West, which means continued caution when escalating direct attacks on the United States or its core allies. And third, despite their common interest in sowing chaos, dictators have trouble trusting each other, "making the entente a fragile one. This axis is a marriage of convenience and opportunity; its members are neither strategic nor ideological bedfellows—they are focused primarily on regime survival and geopolitical gain. As such, their relationships will remain largely transactional.
Still, the disruptive potential of their growing cooperation— especially with a boost or at the very least a blind eye from Beijing—should not be underestimated."
Why 2024 is the Voldemort of years
gzeromedia.com · by Ian Bremmer · January 10, 2024
January 10, 2024
Annie Gugliotta
2024. Politically it’s the Voldemort of years. The annus horribilis. The year that must not be named. I’d love to sugarcoat it, but I can’t: From a global political risk perspective, this is the most dangerous and uncertain year I’ve covered in my lifetime.
As we write in Eurasia Group’s 2024 Top Risks report, three wars will dominate world affairs: Russia vs. Ukraine, now in its third year; Israel vs. Hamas, now in its third month; and the United States vs. itself, ready to kick off at any moment.
Russia vs. Ukraine … is getting worse. Russia now has the battlefield initiative and a material advantage, while Ukraine stands to lose significant international interest and support. For the United States, in particular, it’s become a distant second (and increasingly third or lower) policy priority, despite hundreds of thousands of casualties and millions of displaced Ukrainians.
Battlefield difficulties, diminishing Western support, and domestic political infighting will leave Ukrainians feeling increasingly desperate, making Kyiv more risk-tolerant and the conflict more likely to escalate. While Russia has no way to “win,” Ukraine will be de facto partitioned this year and could “lose” the war as early as 2025.
Israel vs. Hamas … is getting worse. Hamas’ Oct. 7 terrorist attacks jolted the Middle East out of its complacency, and there’s no obvious way to end the fighting that has ensued. While no country wants a regional war to erupt, the powder is dry, and the number of players carrying matches – Israel’s war cabinet, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iran-backed militias in Syria and Iraq – makes the risk of escalation high. The current fighting in Gaza is accordingly likely to be only the first phase in an expanding conflict this year.
Whatever the military outcome, a dramatic increase in radicalization is guaranteed. Of Israeli Jews, feeling themselves globally isolated and even hated after facing the worst violence against them since the Holocaust. Of Palestinians, facing what they consider a genocide, with no opportunities for peace and no prospects of escape. Deep political divisions over the conflict run throughout the Middle East and across over one billion people in the broader Muslim world, not to mention in the United States and Europe.
And then there’s the biggest challenge in 2024 … the United States vs. itself. While America’s military and economy remain exceptionally strong, its political system is more dysfunctional than that of any other advanced industrial democracy. The 2024 election will exacerbate this problem no matter who wins, worsening the country’s political division, testing American democracy to a degree the nation hasn’t experienced in 150 years, and undermining US credibility on the global stage.
Fully one-third of the global population will go to the polls this year, but an unprecedentedly dysfunctional US election will be by far the most consequential for the world’s security, stability, and economic outlook. The outcome will affect the fate of 8 billion people, and only 160 million Americans will have a say in it, with the winner to be decided by just tens of thousands of voters in a handful of swing states. The losing side – whether Democrats or Republicans – will consider the outcome illegitimate and be unprepared to accept it. The world’s most powerful country faces critical challenges to its core political institutions: free and fair elections, the peaceful transfer of power, and the checks and balances provided by the separation of powers. With the outcome of the vote essentially a coin toss (at least for now), the only certainty is continued damage to America’s social fabric and international standing. The political state of the union … is troubled indeed.
********
None of these three conflicts have adequate guardrails preventing them from getting worse. None have responsible leaders willing and able to fix, or at least clean up, the mess. Indeed, these leaders see their opponents (and their opponents’ supporters) as principal adversaries – “enemies of the people.” Most problematically, none of the belligerents agree on what they’re fighting over.
By contrast, climate change has long been considered by many our greatest global challenge, but the world is on the road to responding – collectively, even though too slowly – because everyone understands the nature of the problem. There is too much carbon dioxide (and methane) in the atmosphere, with a lot more coming because it’s necessary for economic growth, leading to long-term damage to biodiversity and affecting everyone but mostly the poorest. None of this remains controversial; it’s just a question of who compromises how much – and who pays what and when. We have a pretty good sense of where we are heading accordingly.
Not so for any of the major conflicts driving geopolitical risk this year. The terms of confrontation are not shared: not the narratives, not the history, not even the basic facts of the ongoing fighting. And in all three cases, we are creating generations of incensed people prepared to dig in and battle for as long as it takes. Maybe an end to the fighting can come when one or both sides are exhausted … but the prospects of a sustainable peace? In Ukraine, in the Middle East, and in America, we’re not remotely close.
I call this a G-Zero world, a world without global leadership. Where the United States, the world’s sole remaining superpower, doesn’t want to be the world’s policeman, the architect of global trade, or the cheerleader of global values. And no other country is prepared to take that role for itself. We now see three major confrontations – and many more risks, from ungoverned artificial intelligence and an axis of rogue states to a fragile global economy and a politically disruptive El Nino climate pattern – that are the direct result of our G-Zero world.
By its nature, the G-Zero will cause more unsolvable conflicts and uncontainable risks in the years ahead – the only questions are where, when, and how destabilizing they will be. And whether the resulting crises spur enough action to fix the underlying problem with our “geopolitical recession” or only serve to make it worse.
Paraphrasing the Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky, we may not want crisis, but in a G-Zero world, crisis certainly wants us.
_________
Check out Eurasia Group’s 2024 Top Risks report. And be sure to subscribe to GZERO Daily to get the world's best global politics newsletter every day on top of my weekly email. Did I mention it's free?
January 09, 2024
7. Condemning China, rejecting refugees
Unfortunately our refugees from the north are mere pawns in the political fight over immigration in the US. There is no strategic vision and understanding of the importance of taking care of Koreans from the north.
Excerpt:
No single approach can comprehensively tackle all issues. Some Western leaders may highlight the legal and security challenges they face when processing asylum claims. China and North Korea may emphasize their unique challenges, although their excuses wouldn’t justify violating the human rights of North Korean refugees.
Instead of imposing conventional immigration policies on North Korean exiles, a grace period of six months to a year following their escape should be granted, providing them with adequate time to make informed decisions.
Hollow applause for North Korean refugees and tough talk directed at China and North Korea are not enough. Asylum, immigration and visa exceptions should be made for North Korean exiles so they can make informed decisions about where they will live once they are free.
Condemning China, rejecting refugees
The Korea Times · January 11, 2024
By Casey Lartigue Jr.
If ever there were a case illustrating the need to "think global, act local," it would be the problem of China repatriating North Koreans and the strong but mostly misdirected Western response.
On the global stage, Western leaders and international organizations have eloquently condemned China for repatriating North Korean refugees and they did so again late last year when China forcibly returned about 600 North Koreans. Back home, however, Western countries make it difficult for North Koreans to immigrate to freedom. They offer hollow applause, but not asylum, for North Koreans.
Having personally participated in protests in front of Chinese embassies as early as 2012, I share in the condemnation of China and North Korea. Could more North Koreans have reached freedom if Western countries had adopted more welcoming policies towards those who reached China?
Some Western leaders have tried to do something besides just talking. Nearly two decades ago, former U.S. President George W. Bush labeled North Korea an "axis of evil" and paved the way for North Koreans to be granted refugee status when he signed the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. Since 2006, around 220 or so North Korean exiles have legally found refuge in the USA.
Even that modest momentum has slowed down considerably. The year before the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States reportedly admitted only one North Korean refugee. As early as 2011, Roberta Cohen of the Brookings Institution reported that 107 out of 238 North Korean applicants from 2004 to 2010 abandoned their asylum applications to the USA because of paperwork and delays.
Canada’s 2016 census recorded that 970 North Koreans were residing in the country. However, five years later, that number had plummeted to 775. By 2018, Canadian authorities initiated the deportation of 242 North Koreans and were in the process of deporting an additional 512 after discovering many had already obtained South Korean citizenship before moving to Canada.
Canada has deported more North Korean refugees than the USA has accepted. Advocacy groups estimate that many North Korean refugees voluntarily left Canada to evade formal deportation.
In Europe, the U.K.'s All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea advocates for the rights of North Korean refugees, but more than one-third of the 1,300 asylum applications by North Korean refugees to the U.K. government were rejected between 2003 and 2018. The Diplomat reported in 2015 that Belgium rejected 99 out of 126 asylum claims. The Netherlands and France were even more stringent, rejecting all the applications they processed (128 and 19, respectively) from North Korean exiles.
I found those statistics and many others from newspaper articles and the websites of various countries. My organization, Freedom Speakers International, is now researching information from original sources to learn more deeply about the ways free countries block the immigration choices of North Korean refugees.
There are tears and strong statements about North Koreans being repatriated. If Western countries had been more welcoming before COVID-19 then China might have fewer North Koreans to repatriate back to North Korea.
The U.N.'s Commission of Inquiry on North Korea in 2013 documented shocking human rights abuses, accusing North Korea of "systematic, widespread, and grave violations of human rights." But the United Nations passed Resolution 2397 in 2017, ordering member nations to repatriate (yes, repatriate) North Korean workers.
Some countries deferring to South Korea as the default option may inadvertently limit the choices of North Korean refugees. South Korea has accepted approximately 34,000 North Koreans in the last quarter-century. Upon arrival, North Koreans are automatically granted citizenship under Article 3 of South Korea's Constitution.
Securing South Korean citizenship renders North Korean refugees ineligible to apply for asylum in other countries. Obtaining asylum in a different country makes them forever ineligible for services and support offered by the South Korean government to North Korean refugees.
After growing up isolated in North Korea and escaping into the unknown, North Koreans are expected to make snap decisions about where to go next in a mysterious world, probably without understanding the long-term consequences of their initial choice for asylum.
No single approach can comprehensively tackle all issues. Some Western leaders may highlight the legal and security challenges they face when processing asylum claims. China and North Korea may emphasize their unique challenges, although their excuses wouldn’t justify violating the human rights of North Korean refugees.
Instead of imposing conventional immigration policies on North Korean exiles, a grace period of six months to a year following their escape should be granted, providing them with adequate time to make informed decisions.
Hollow applause for North Korean refugees and tough talk directed at China and North Korea are not enough. Asylum, immigration and visa exceptions should be made for North Korean exiles so they can make informed decisions about where they will live once they are free.
Casey Lartigue Jr. (CJL@alumni.harvard.edu) is chairman and co-founder with Lee Eun-koo of Freedom Speakers International in Seoul, co-country representative of Giving Tuesday Korea, and a Seoul Honorary Citizen.
The Korea Times · January 11, 2024
8. North Korea to welcome Russian tourists, the country's first since the pandemic, report says
Risk of COVID versus need for cash.
North Korea to welcome Russian tourists, the country's first since the pandemic, report says
koreaherald.com · by AP · January 12, 2024
By AP
Published : Jan. 12, 2024 - 20:12
The flags of North Korea (left) and Russia (123rf)
Russian tourists reportedly going on a ski trip to North Korea will be the first international travelers to visit the country since its borders closed in 2020 amid the global pandemic lockdown.
The report, published Wednesday by the Russian state-run Tass news agency, underscores deepening cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang . It also follows the meeting last September between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a cosmodrome in Russia’s Far East.
Tass did not specify a timeframe but the report brough some surprise to Asia observers who had expected the first post-pandemic tourists to North Korea to come from China, the North’s biggest diplomatic ally and economic pipeline.
According to Tass, an unspecified number of tourists from Russia's far eastern region of Primorye will first fly to the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, where they will visit monuments such as the “Tower of Juche Idea,” named after the North’s guiding philosophy of “juche” or self-reliance.
The tourists will then travel on to the North’s Masik Pass on the east coast, where the country’s most modern ski resort is located, Tass said. It said the trip was arranged under an agreement reached between Oleg Kozhemyako, governor of the Primorye region, and North Korean authorities.
Kozhemyako traveled to Pyongyang in December for talks on boosting economic ties as part of a flurry of bilateral exchanges since the Kim-Putin summit. Ahead of the trip, he told Russian media he expected to discuss tourism, agriculture and trade cooperation.
The Kim-Putin summit deepened outside belief that North Korea is supplying conventional arms to Russia for its war in Ukraine , in return for high-tech Russian weapons technologies.
The White House said last week that it has evidence Russia fired additional North Korea-provided missiles at Ukraine. The United States, South Korea, Japan and others issued a joint statement condemning the missiles transfer.
North Korea and Russia are locked in separate confrontations with the United States and its allies — North Korea for its advancing nuclear program and Russia for its protracted war with Ukraine.
North Korea has been slowly easing pandemic-era curbs and opening its international borders as part of its efforts to revive its economy devastated by the lockdown and persistent US-led sanctions. Its reputation also suffered a blow in August 2022, when Pyongyang made a highly dubious claim that it had beaten a domestic COVID-19 outbreak.
“For North Korea, tourism is the easiest way to earn foreign currency under the international sanctions regime,” said Koh Yu-hwan, former president of Seoul’s Korea Institute for National Unification.
Koh said he expects Pyongyang to eventually also open North Korea to Chinese tourists.
Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul, said "visitors from Russia are unlikely to be as financially lucrative for North Korea as the return of more numerous visitors from China.”
“But the domestic political risk is relatively low while providing symbolism of revitalized relations with Moscow in line with Pyongyang’s current geopolitical narrative,” he added.
koreaherald.com · by AP · January 12, 2024
9. N. Korean grain prices continue upward trend into the New Year
N. Korean grain prices continue upward trend into the New Year
Daily NK's regular survey of market grain prices found that corn prices have risen more than rice
By Seulkee Jang - 2024.01.12 5:00pm
dailynk.com
N. Korean grain prices continue upward trend into the New Year | Daily NK English
FILE PHOTO: North Koreans are seen peddling goods at a street market in Hyesan, Yanggang Province. (© Daily NK)
The upward trend in North Korean grain prices that began in December has continued into the New Year. The country’s economic difficulties have led to a sharp rise in corn prices, as demand for corn is higher than that for rice.
According to Daily NK’s regular survey of North Korean market prices, a kilogram of rice sold for KPW 4,820 in a Pyongyang market on Jan. 7. By comparison, the price of rice at a Pyongyang market on Dec. 24 was KPW 4,800.
In other parts of the country, however, such as Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province, and Hyesan, Yanggang Province, the price of rice rose slightly more than in Pyongyang.
On July 7, the price of a kilogram of rice at a market in Sinuiju was KPW 4,910, up 1.9% from KPW 4,820 two weeks earlier.
In Hyesan, rice prices rose by a similar amount as in Sinuiju. On the same day, the price of a kilogram of rice at a market in Hyesan was KPW 5,100, up 2% from Dec. 24.
After rising to KPW 6,600 in mid-September, when the rice harvest began in North Korea, prices in Hyesan fell to KPW 4,830 in early December, when the harvest ended. However, prices soon recovered and have been above KPW 5,000 per kilogram since the end of last month.
North Korean rice prices are usually low in December after the harvest and begin to rise in late December or January. This year, however, rice prices began to rise in mid-December.
The survey also found that North Korean corn prices have risen more than rice.
On January 7, a kilogram of corn was sold for KPW 2,270 at a market in Sinuiju. This is up 11.4% from KPW 2,030 on Dec. 24.
Corn prices dropped sharply in early to mid-December, with a kilogram selling for KPW 1,900 at a market in Sinuiju, but soon recovered to the KPW 2,000 to 2,500 range.
At a market in Hyesan, the price of corn exceeded KPW 2,500 on Jan. 7, an increase of 8.7% from the price two weeks ago (KPW 2,300).
Corn prices are rising faster than rice because North Koreans, whose purchasing power has declined due to economic hardship, are increasingly turning to corn as a staple food.
Meanwhile, North Korean authorities claimed at a year-end Workers’ Party meeting that “surpassing the target for the production of grain, a dominant staple food that is crucial to the overall economic development and people’s livelihood security, is the most valuable and splendid achievement of our economic efforts in 2023.”
However, even after the harvest, grain sales have been limited to five kilograms per person due to a shortage of grains. While state-run food stores originally sold grain at about 20% below market prices, the gap between grain prices and market prices has recently narrowed significantly.
Translated by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
Seulkee Jang
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynk@uni-media.net.
dailynk.com
10. Prices of rice sold in N. Korea’s state-run food shops similar to market prices
The party cannot compete with the market - the market ensures quality (as best it can) and manages prices.
Prices of rice sold in N. Korea’s state-run food shops similar to market prices
The quality of the grain sold at the shops was so bad that many people say purchasing grain at markets is cheaper, a source told Daily NK
By Seulkee Jang - 2024.01.12 1:26pm
dailynk.com
Prices of rice sold in N. Korea’s state-run food shops similar to market prices | Daily NK English
This photo, published in state media in February 2023, shows people at a collective farm in Anak County. (Rodong Sinmun - News1)
Since the end of last year’s fall harvest, the price of rice in state-run grain stores has been little different from that sold in markets, Daily NK has learned. Moreover, the shops are unable to stock enough grain to sell to consumers.
Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a Daily NK source in South Pyongan Province said Wednesday that provincial authorities allowed teachers, doctors, and workers – in that order – to buy rice and corn from local state-run grain stores in late December.
In North Korea, people with military backgrounds, such as disabled veterans, discharged army officers, and military families, usually get priority in buying food at grain stores.
This time, however, the authorities sold grain to people of other professions first, as discharged army officers and other military personnel were given food to mark the Dec. 30 anniversary of Kim Jong Un’s appointment as supreme commander of North Korea’s armed forces.
Food shortages cause headaches for consumers
During recent food sales, state-run grain stores limited purchases to just five kilograms per person, the source said.
Given the country’s food shortages, North Korea limits the amount of grain people can buy to allow as many people as possible to purchase food and to prevent hoarding.
However, because the amount of grain sold by state-run grain stores could only meet the needs of about 70% of local residents, many people were unable to purchase grain after being pushed down the priority list.
In response, some state-run grain stores told people who could not buy grain that food would be sold again at the end of January when the shortages were made up.
People who had hoped that grain prices would drop after the harvest were also disappointed by the higher-than-expected prices.
State-run grain stores near Pyongsong sold a kilogram of rice for an average of KPW 4,000, and corn for KPW 2,000.
According to Daily NK’s regular survey of market prices in North Korea, a kilogram of rice at one market in Pyongyang – near Pyongsong – cost KPW 4,800 on Dec. 24, while corn cost KPW 2,100. In particular, the market price of corn was not much different from the price at the state-run grain stores.
The state-run grain stores in Pyongsong are sold rice at 16.7% below the market price and corn at 4.7% below the market price. When they first opened, state-run grain shops sold food at prices 20 to 30% below market prices, but recently the price gap seems to have narrowed significantly.
Shops sell low-quality food
Many people also complained about the low quality of the grain sold in the shops.
“The rice and corn had a lot of pebbles and dried grass and was quite wet, so there really wasn’t five kilograms of food being sold. There wasn’t much you could eat,” the source said.
“It’s so bad that people say buying grain in the markets is cheaper in the end.”
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
Seulkee Jang
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynk@uni-media.net.
dailynk.com
11. Is the US prepared for war in the Far East?
You can always expect Don Kirk to include the Korean threat, unlike many others in the press and among the pundits.
But the question is who is really threatening Xi, Putin, and Kim?
Excerpt:
Just as fighting has broken out suddenly, unexpectedly, elsewhere, so war could erupt in Northeast Asia if any of the actors — Xi, or Putin, or Kim — feel unduly threatened or need a war as an antidote to unrest at home. The U.S., riding high economically, may have the resources to pour into the struggle with any or even all of them, but does it have the will?
Is the US prepared for war in the Far East?
BY DONALD KIRK, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 01/12/24 10:00 AM ET
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4403903-is-the-us-prepared-for-war-in-the-far-east/
War is breaking out where most of us had not expected it.
By now we are accustomed to daily headlines on the Russian invasion of Ukraine and on the Israelis fighting to destroy Hamas terrorists in Gaza. What’s next, and how capable is America of standing by still more countries under siege and under attack?
The question assumes special relevance when you consider U.S. troops are not fighting on the ground in Ukraine or Gaza. These are proxy wars. America is sending arms and funds, but it is not Americans who are fighting and dying.
What’s going to happen, then, if the U.S. is called on to send its own troops?
We must face that possibility, with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un escalating his threats against South Korea, not to mention Japan and the U.S. The United States is bound by separate treaties with both South Korea and Japan to defend them. Washington maintains huge bases in both countries. The fear, though, is that of a war involving hundreds of thousands of troops against the two other major powers, China and Russia, in contention for the region.
At the moment, that concern seems abstract. China’s President Xi Jinping may talk big when it comes to taking over the independent island province of Taiwan, but he does not appear to be quite willing to go to war. That was clear from his recent meeting with President Biden in San Francisco.
Sure, he’s asserting Chinese influence from the Korean peninsula to the South China Sea, and in Southeast Asia and beyond, but he’s not interested in anything much more serious than skirmishes with Indian troops along the Himalayan frontier.
The Taiwan presidential election Jan. 13 may test the degree of Xi’s warlike intentions.
The outgoing Taiwan president, Tsai Ing-wen, has resolutely refused to upset China by declaring Taiwan’s independence; her vice president, Michael Lai Ching-te, running to succeed her, now favors the “status quo” after having infuriated Xi by advocating Taiwan’s “sovereignty” as an independent entity. He’s up against the candidate of the Kuomintang (KMT), the old “Nationalist” party whose forces fled across the Formosa Straits to Taipei before Mao’s victorious Red Army in 1949. The KMT now is all for placating Beijing, by far Taiwan’s biggest business partner.
Lately, Chinese coast guard vessels have been spraying Philippine fishing boats with water cannons in the South China Sea, which China claims as its own. That’s a far cry from firing real live bullets.
The Americans completely sympathize with their Philippine ally, to whom Biden is promising much support after years of sometimes bumpy relations. Washington occasionally orders its warships and planes to show the flag over the South China Sea, but Biden will not risk an armed clash in those disputed waters.
We’ve been surprised, however, by the outbreak of wars in Ukraine and Israel, and we have to be ready for shocks in Asia too. North Korea’s relationship with Russia is disturbing. There is no doubt the Russians are providing much-needed technological support for North Korean satellites and missiles.
Russian expertise is seen in Kim’s plans to send more spy satellites on orbits around the Earth. The first satellite was probably not too helpful technically, but the North Koreans are sure to get better under Russian tutelage. Similarly, Russian expertise is seen in the launching of the North’s latest Hwasong-18 missile, an intercontinental model capable, theoretically, of carrying a nuclear warhead to targets in the U.S.
The common denominator between satellites and missiles is they’re launched the same way. North Korean satellite technology has as much to do with perfecting the launching phase as with picking up photographic images of U.S., South Korean and Japanese facilities, many of which can be found via Google Earth. It’s because of its potential military ramifications that the United Nations theoretically bans North Korea from launching satellites and long-range missiles and has sanctioned the North repeatedly.
North Korea’s relations with China and Russia mean that it can easily avoid sanctions while remaining confident those two great powers will offer the ultimate defense in a showdown.
China is North Korea’s greatest trading partner, the source of almost all its oil and half its food, and Russia has been a terrific market for North Korean artillery shells and other arms since Kim’s historic mission in September to the Russian far east, where he met President Vladimir Putin at a cosmodrome near the Amur River.
Putin, fighting in Ukraine suffering from worse economic difficulties than China, is even less interested than Xi in waging a war in the Far East, including the Korean peninsula.
It’s not China or Russia but political divisions within the U.S. that may be America’s worst enemy. Americans are in no mood for sending troops overseas when they are fighting one another politically and socially at home. Anti-war sentiment is intense. It was for that reason that the U.S. had to withdraw its troops from Vietnam, leaving the South Vietnamese government to go down in defeat in 1975.
Similarly, the U.S. withdrew precipitously from Afghanistan in 2021.
Biden has sounded determined in asking Congress to authorize extra funding for Israel and Ukraine, but he may not be so tough about deploying hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops to engage in wars for countries about which Americans know very little. Unlike Harry Truman, who staked his presidency on turning back the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, Biden does not give the impression of being such a fighter. It’s one thing to assure the leaders of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, as well as the Philippines, of America’s “commitment” to defend them; it’s quite another to risk putting America on a real war footing.
Nor should we expect former President Trump, if he returns to the White House after this year’s presidential election, to be any better. In fact, he might be far worse. He bonded with Putin during his presidency and professed to “love” Kim after their summit in Singapore in June 2018. Despite the failure of their summit in Hanoi in February 2019, he would want to keep up the relationship. Amazingly, Trump also talked about withdrawing U.S. troops from Korea and Japan while asking Korea to pay an excessively huge amount for the privilege of having them on vital bases in the South.
It took the election of Biden in the U.S. and then of Yoon Suk Yeol as president of South Korea in 2002 to bring the longstanding alliance back to combat effectiveness.
Just as fighting has broken out suddenly, unexpectedly, elsewhere, so war could erupt in Northeast Asia if any of the actors — Xi, or Putin, or Kim — feel unduly threatened or need a war as an antidote to unrest at home. The U.S., riding high economically, may have the resources to pour into the struggle with any or even all of them, but does it have the will?
Donald Kirk has been a journalist for more than 60 years, focusing much of his career on conflict in Asia and the Middle East, including as a correspondent for the Washington Star and Chicago Tribune. He is currently a freelance correspondent covering North and South Korea, and is the author of several books about Asian affairs.
12. Veteran sculptor appointed special adviser for envisioned N.K. human rights center
Veteran sculptor appointed special adviser for envisioned N.K. human rights center | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 12, 2024
SEOUL, Jan. 12 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's unification minister on Friday appointed renowned sculptor Yoo Keun-sang as a special adviser for an envisioned center designed to shed light on North Korea's dire human rights situation.
Under the 26 billion won (US$19.8 million) project, the ministry aims to build the National North Korean Human Rights Center in western Seoul by the second half of 2026 to raise public awareness on the human rights issue.
Yoo, known for his unique use of light and color, said he hopes to bring such positive energy to raise global awareness on the grim reality of North Korea's human rights violations.
Artist Yoo Keun-sang speaks to reporters on Jan. 12, 2024, following his appointment as a special adviser for the unification ministry's project to build the National North Korean Human Rights Center in western Seoul. (Yonhap)
"Rather than perceiving human rights in a dismal light, I had the notion of bringing that out into a brighter world," Yoo, president of the Central Institute for Restoration in Italy, told reporters following his appointment.
"I would like to change it into a message of hope."
In addition to creating a space to shed light on North Korea's human rights situations, Yoo said he would like to feature works of surviving North Korean artists and exhibit North Korean cultural artifacts at the center in the long term.
Yoo also suggested delivering a message on North Korean human rights through the Vatican to help resolve the issue.
Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho voiced hope that the envisioned center will become a "hub" to inform the world of the North's dire human rights situation and said he will use Yoo's advice to turn the center into a symbolic venue.
Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho (R) shakes hands with artist Yoo Keun-sang as he appoints Yoo as a special adviser for a project to build the National North Korean Human Rights Center in western Seoul on Jan. 12, 2024. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 12, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
