Quotes of the Day:

"If you write, fix pipes, grade papers, lay bricks or drive a taxi - do it with a sense of pride. And do it the best you know how. Be cognizant and sympathetic to the guy alongside, because he wants a place in the sun, too. And always...always look past his color, his creed, his religion and the shape of his ears. Look for the whole person. Judge him as the whole person."

– Rod Serling, AS I KNEW HIM: My Dad Rod Serling

"You can never have a revolution in order to establish a democracy. You must have a democracy in order to have a revolution." 

– G. K. Chesterton

"There is no cure for birth and death save to enjoy the interval."

– George Santayana

1. Analytical material on the security situation in Ukraine as of January 2024, with a forecast of the development of events for the spring campaign.

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 12, 2024

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 12, 2024

4. Data as Ammunition: Hyper-Personalized Warfare in the Digital Age

5. Taiwan’s January 2024 Elections: What You Need to Know

6. Ukraine’s Fifth Column Shoots, Burns, and Poisons Deep Inside Russia

7. ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ Review: Dreams of Empire

8. Taiwan Voters Defy Beijing in Electing New President

9. AI Disinformation – We Need New Defenses

10. U.S. Strikes Give Yemen’s Houthis the Enemy They Long Sought

11. Yemen is a war worth fighting

12.  Why 2024 is the Voldemort of years

13. American Universities Are Post Truth

14. A Rebellion in Yale’s Secret Societies

15. Scandalous Indoctrination: Inside a Kings College Counter-Terrorism Course for UK Civil Servants

16. Myanmar insurgents virtue signaling to China

17. A Top Biden Official Is Pushing An Alarming Plan For Gaza After The War

18. Is the US prepared for war in the Far East?

19. SOF Pic of the Day: Bringing SFC Chapman Home, 2002

1. Analytical material on the security situation in Ukraine as of January 2024, with a forecast of the development of events for the spring campaign.

From a serving officer in Ukraine. 

Notice he follows the same naming conventionI I use for north Korea (I always use a lower case "n" for north to recognize its illegitimacy - until editors make me change it). He chooses to use a lower case "r" for russia. Since I am the editor I am respecting his naming convention and keeping his paper in his true voice.

I am hoping he will again be attending a senior PME institution in the US in the coming months.

Graphics and charts at the link: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/analytical-material-security-situation-ukraine-january-2024-forecast-development-events

Analytical material on the security situation in Ukraine as of January 2024, with a forecast of the development of events for the spring campaign. | Small Wars Journal

Small Wars Journal

Analytical material on the security situation in Ukraine as of January 2024, with a forecast of the development of events for the spring campaign."

By Vlad Dut

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

Sun Tzu's "The Art of War"

The objective of this study is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the security situation in Ukraine across various domains: in the air (ACC), on land (LCC), at sea (MCC), in cyberspace (Cyber), and in space (Space). The aim is to fully understand the current situation and predict its medium-term development within the framework of applying NATO principles.

An additional task involves identifying the 'Centre of Gravity (COG),' a crucial aspect that often receives insufficient attention in contemporary operational planning and combat strategies.

The aim of this study is to conduct a critical evaluation of the current security situation in the most threatening areas of the front to achieve a realistic understanding and to propose measures for its improvement. Acquiring a thorough awareness of the situation during the period of russian aggression is crucial for identifying correct priorities in neutralizing the enemy's offensive potential by the military-political leadership of Ukraine. This approach also allows for consideration of the genuine challenges faced by the civilian population.

Plan

1. The security situation in the regions of Ukraine in the air(ACC), on land(LCC), at sea(MCC), in cyber(Cyber) and outer space(Space).

2. Center of gravity (COG) according to Carl von Clausewitz. The current COG of the russian occupation forces.

3. Current critical gaps in the Defense Forces of Ukraine and their likely solutions.

4. Conclusion.

The security situation in Ukraine is marked by a high degree of complexity, leading to an inaccurate assessment of medium and long-term risks. This miscalculation reached a critical juncture by the end of December 2023.

Reflecting on Ukraine's defensive and offensive actions throughout 2023, it is evident that the anticipated outcomes, established as objectives the previous year, were not fully realized. Unwarranted expectations resulted from a combination of consequences and miscalculations at both the political and military levels within Ukraine and, to a significant extent, among our allies, notably the USA

.The unsuccessful campaign on the Orihiv front served as a sobering moment for all participants in the so-called counter-offensive. This setback, occurring during the autumn-winter period, compelled a more realistic assessment of the Russian-Ukrainian war, particularly for Ukraine's political leadership and civilian population.

Ukraine is fighting against the powerful russian military machine, which holds superiority in various aspects. Hence, there is no need to seek out betrayal, particularly at this moment, as the war is ongoing, and the final results will only be evident after the cessation of hostilities.

As noted earlier, the ongoing war represents the world's largest armed confrontation since the Second World War. It involves a range of tactics, from mass infantry and armored vehicle attacks to highly precise cyber assaults capable of paralyzing a state for several days. Consequently, not everything can be meticulously planned and executed, given the absence of a template or standard for the correct conduct of the present war. The russian Federation poses a unique challenge, distinct from countries like Afghanistan or Iraq, where securing a specific border might be achieved solely with infantry—an approach that does not align with the complex realities faced by Ukraine.

1. The security situation in Ukraine as of December-January 2023/2024 is challenging, marked by the offensive of Russian troops in the northeast and east of Ukraine, with initial actions unfolding in the southeast. This offensive involves a potent strike group that was assembled during the covert mobilization of the Russian Federation in the spring-summer period of the current year. Notably, Russian units are adhering to previously defined strategic and operational goals established in 2022/2023, with only minimal adjustments depending on the situation.

The strategic goals of the Russian Federation in Ukraine have remained consistent since the onset of the invasion and are as follows:

1. 'Denazification,' which aims to eradicate Ukrainian identity in all its manifestations.
2. A shift in Ukraine's political course involves halting the western trajectory of the country's development and redirecting its political and economic orientation towards Moscow.

As the full-scale invasion unfolded, additional objectives came to light:

1. The reduction of Western support for Ukraine through non-kinetic actions aimed at altering the political situations of partner countries such as Slovakia, Poland, the Netherlands, and others. In our view, this newly crystallized goal takes precedence for the russian Federation, directing the maximum allowable resources to achieve the utmost result.
2. The goal of reducing the economic functioning of Ukraine involves both kinetic and non-kinetic influence by the special services of the russian Federation on key sectors. This includes missile strikes targeting the fuel and energy complex, attacks on sea/land trade infrastructure, and the use of proxy groups to block borders, all contributing to the destabilization of socio-political processes in Ukraine and beyond.

These strategic goals of russia remain permanent, experiencing only minimal changes as certain effects are achieved. Yet, it is precisely from these strategic goals that the operational goals emerge, determining the most relevant plan of action in Ukraine.

Operational goals of the russian Federation in Ukraine:

Military:

1. Full occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk regions to confirm their intentions to protect the so-called terrorist states and the zone of interest

.2. To counteract the offensive maneuvers of the Defense Forces of Ukraine in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, aiming to safeguard the integrity of communication lines (LOC - line of communication) in the South

.3. To reestablish full control (Sea Control) in the western part of the Black Sea, enabling the russian side to obstruct the actions of the Naval Forces of Ukraine (FOM/FON) and control trade routes.

Social and political:

4. Undermining the reputational and ideological trust of Ukrainian society in the top political and military leadership of Ukraine through informational and psychological operations, employing non-kinetic actions that involve discrediting and manipulation.

International:

5. Employ non-kinetic and kinetic methods to delay the construction and deployment of Ukraine's Military-Industrial Complex, taking advantage of a 90% reduction in Western aid. For instance, impede the delivery of essential components and parts from China required for the production of FPV drones and other critical resources.

The execution of strategic and operational goals during the 2022-2023 campaign in Moscow showcased the high professionalism and expertise of the strategic and operational-strategic headquarters. In our assessment, they adeptly leverage their capabilities, conducting operations at a level that proves detrimental to the Ukrainian side. The higher headquarters of the russian military demonstrate a commendable proficiency in military management, effectively orchestrating a dynamic combination of forces and resources across various domains—land, air, sea, cybernetic, and space—to fulfill multi-level objectives. It is the adept coordination, management, and synchronization of these headquarters on both vertical and horizontal axes that, in our view, contribute significantly to their effectiveness.

For instance, the russian Federation's offensive operation near the city of Avdiivka exemplifies a meticulously organized and coordinated effort by the headquarters element. This operation witnessed the engagement of approximately 40-50 thousand troops with effective battlefield management

. Over a span of two months, russia incurred losses of around 13,000 personnel and 200-250 units of heavy armored vehicles in the Avdiivka direction, yet without diminishing the momentum and scope of the offensive. An additional factor contributing to effectiveness is the judicious utilization of the russian Air Force (ACC). This includes guided missile strikes, kamikaze drones of various types, and missile strikes targeting critical elements of the Ukrainian side, specifically the 2-3 echelons of defense. This illustrates the operational/strategic headquarters and commands' proficiency in creating a synergistic utilization of diverse weaponry across different domains to achieve desired outcomes. In essence, airspace complements land space (and vice versa), combining various methods for inflicting damage.The present security situation in Ukraine, in contrast to the enemy's summer campaign, has witnessed several changes. As a consequence, the offensive initiative shifted to the russian side in the autumn of 2023. Although the utilization format of the russian Federation's forces and resources did not undergo significant alterations from previous attempts, it was notably adapted to the prevailing circumstances.

I will delve into a more detailed security analysis across five areas, each governed by the combat statutes of NATO alliance member countries, regulating their operations. It's crucial to note that each application of a specific effect by the russian forces and resources is complementary and may partially overlap.

Land Component Command (LLC or land component). The situation on the conflict lines is challenging, primarily because of the engagement of pre-positioned russian reserves in the area of hostilities. Further exacerbating the scenario is the limitation of assistance from Western countries, encompassing a comprehensive range of ammunition. This restriction has led to a significant decline in the Ukrainian firing rate across various calibers, such as 155 mm, 152 mm, 122 mm, 120 mm, and others, by approximately 5-6 times.

In 2023, the primary objective for russian troops was to impede the advancement of Ukrainian offensive operations in the southeast. Simultaneously, by diverting the most combat-ready units of the Ukrainian army to the focal point of the attack, russia bolstered its armed forces through enticing financial incentives and effective propaganda

. Exactly, while specific units were occupied with restraining and neutralizing Ukrainian attacks, russia was concurrently engaged in the active establishment of new units. Furthermore, the most proficient and combat-ready units experienced an organizational advancement, exemplified by the deployment of a majority of russian Air Force regiments to the divisional level.Hence, in September-October 2023, the new waves of attacks by russian units shifted their focus from a defensive posture to an offensive one, targeting the following directions:

1. Kupyansk Direction:

Russian units are attempting to compel the Defense Forces of Ukraine toward the city of Kupyansk, intending to cover a crucial transport hub with fire. This maneuver aims to neutralize potential Ukrainian offensive actions towards the western side of the Luhansk region. An additional objective for russia is to entirely restrict or limit maneuverability in the eastern part of the Oskil River. This direction is advantageous for the russian side, given the short logistics route from russian territory. The use of the Kupyansk freight-Valuyki railway branch facilitates maintaining the offensive pace. This is primarily achieved through the implementation of wave tactics in russian infantry attacks, following the algorithm:

1. Group No. 1 "Assault":

• Comprising 15-25 individuals, supported by 1-2 tanks or BMP and concentrated artillery fire, captures the Ukrainian position.

1. Group No. 2 "Diggers":

• Also consisting of a similar number of personnel, immediately moves to the freshly captured position. Here, the group focuses on swift engineering improvements. Group No. 1 retreats to restore combat capability, incurring losses of 50-60% of the initial number.

1. Group No. 3 "Defensive Infantry":

• Takes over the already improved position and initiates assigned duties.

Upon restoring combat capability (which may take 1-2 days, at times due to the russian HQ's reluctance to allow for extended reformation), Group No. 1 resumes the offensive following the outlined algorithm.

These offensive operations predominantly occur in the vicinity of the settlements of Lyman First and Synkivka, aiming to penetrate the defense of Ukraine's forward positions. This poses additional challenges for the Ukrainian side, particularly along the Oskil River, constraining actions and limiting the expansive use of the territory.

Simultaneously with the offensive operation, the forces and resources of russia significantly increased the use of the air component compared to the summer. They employed air defense systems to target the logistics routes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and potentially locate Ukrainian headquarters and UAV "Lancet" for artillery strikes and other purposes. As a result, in the future, the russian Federation's forces will aim to sustain their offensive pace while experiencing a considerable loss of human resources. The Defense Forces of Ukraine, leveraging a substantial number of UAVs across various platforms and FPV drones, will adopt a static strategy to entangle and deplete the opponent.

1. Donetsk Direction:

Encompassing Avdiyivka, Krasnohorivka, and Mariinka, this direction signifies the second main vector of russian offensive actions. The objective is to secure the northern side of the city of Avdiyivka, compelling the withdrawal of the Defense Forces of Ukraine from the city and occupying strategically unfavorable defense lines to further advance their success.

The russian Federation concentrated approximately 40-50 thousand units in an attempt to capture Avdiyivka. However, they encountered a well-prepared Ukrainian defense line, prompting attempts to advance using heavily armored vehicles

.

After nearly three months of the offensive, the russian achievements are deemed unsuccessful, considering the significant personnel losses (13 thousand) and the loss of approximately 220 units of equipment. These losses indicate a setback with elements of failure and the potential for further degradation of combat capabilities in the coming 1-2 months

.By penetrating the Ukrainian defense line at the beginning of October, the russian forces were initially successful in partially advancing and creating a wedge to expand their presence north of the city of Avdiyivka. While this tactic proved effective in the initial phase, the stoppage of movement and stabilization of the situation allowed the Ukrainian side to inflict significant fire damage using group weapons such as grenade launchers, mortars, and large-caliber machine guns, rendering the russian units vulnerable within the wedge.

Currently, to ensure their survival, russian units need to move forward. However, this is hindered by the Ukrainian control of the Avdiyivka Coke chemical plant and its adjacent infrastructure. Consequently, Ukrainian Defense Forces have shifted their focus from flanking Avdiyivka to launching an offensive in the northern direction towards Novobakhmutivka and Rozhivka, where the terrain is more favorable for the Ukrainian side.

In the future, it is anticipated that the russian offensive in the Avdiivka direction will slow down due to significant manpower losses, an unfavorable tactical position, a shortage of artillery means, and shells, which is increasing daily.

1. Zaporizhia Direction:

Currently, the Zaporizhia direction is marked by a relatively unstable area of hostilities, but future developments suggest a potential escalation.

Following the Ukrainian offensive campaign in the Orihiv and Staromayor areas, it is anticipated that russian Federation units will attempt to reclaim previously lost positions in the medium term, thereby nullifying Ukrainian successes in 2023.

Along the Orihiv defense line, the russian side has concentrated combat-ready units of infantry and mechanized units. At the height of the Ukrainian offensive, these units are already attempting to seize the initiative and counterattack. Increased russian activity in this direction is expected in February-March 2024, involving the deployment of additional units.

In the Staromayor tactical area, the situation mirrors the previous one. However, as of December 2023, the russian forces are demonstrating more active offensive actions to reclaim previously captured positions. The primary focus of the enemy is on capturing (or at least bringing under fire control) the section of the Staromayorsk-Rivnopillya road, a strategically significant logistical route for the Ukrainian Defense Forces. The russian side initiated this intention as early as November 2023.

Overall, the main objective for the russians in the southern direction is to maintain static defense and, under favorable conditions, launch counterattacks. This strategy aims to draw additional Ukrainian units and assets away from the Kupyansk and Donetsk directions, leading to their weakening

.

• In general, Land Component Commands (LCCs) of the russian side, during offensive actions, adhere to the following principles of Clausewitzian war:Mass: This involves the extensive use of russian troops characterized by mass attacks and assaults, often resulting in significant personnel losses, reaching up to 50%. This strategy entails engaging superior forces relative to the opponent.
• Objective: The russian side is known for a clear definition of its ultimate goal and the implementation of strategic plans to achieve it.
• Maneuver: The russian forces exhibit the ability to swiftly transfer their units across substantial distances, utilizing railways, air transport, or road infrastructure. Tactically, maneuverability contributes to unexpected directions of attack, exemplified by the unexpected move in Avdiivka on October 6, 2023.

Air Component Command (ACC or Air Forces): The russian Air Component Command is distinguished by the active utilization of aviation, missiles, or unmanned platforms to target critical infrastructure elements within Ukraine. To conduct a more detailed analysis of the russian air element, it can be divided into the following subgroups, each with its specific purpose and expected final result.

1. Missile Attacks:

• A diverse array of missiles is utilized in missile attacks, primarily targeting essential nodes within the energy industry, logistics, or operational-strategic and political-level headquarters. Given the costly nature of missile strikes, they are strategically deployed to neutralize Ukrainian high-value targets (HVTs) within the infrastructure.

1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Strikes:

• UAV strikes focus on disrupting elements of medium-level critical infrastructure, characterized by a mass application approach owing to their cost-effectiveness, being more economical than missiles. The ongoing production of Shahed-type UAVs contributes to their widespread use. A recent observed tactic involves the initial launch of 2-3 units, followed by a mass launch of 10-20 units in the subsequent days, contingent upon the success of the initial strikes. It is imperative to wait for a few days for a detailed analysis before initiating the mass launch.

1. Military Aviation Employment:

• Tactical, operational, and strategic aviation play crucial roles in the military strategies of the russian Federation. These aircraft are utilized to conduct strikes, including the deployment of missile platforms, aimed at diminishing the effectiveness of the Ukrainian military. The predominant use of russian aviation involves the deployment of the KAB-500 series of munitions, enhanced with a retrofitted GPS guidance system, effectively targeting military and logistical objectives. This approach was notably prominent during the attacks on the city of Avdiyivka, taking advantage of favorable front line conditions and rapid movement along the route from russian territory.

As of today, the functionality of the russian ACC is limited due to the saturation of air defense equipment by the Ukrainian side, supported by partner countries. Ukrainian air defense systems are particularly concentrated in the cities such as Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipro, as well as along the southern regions of Ukraine. However, this limitation does not extend to the use of Shahed-type kamikaze drones, the production of which has significantly increased compared to 2022 in russia. For example, russia has announced its intention to produce 6,000 drones by the summer of 2025, evidenced by the construction of a new plant in Tatarstan

. In September-October alone, russia managed to launch 151 drones on the territory of Ukraine. An added threat to Ukraine is the substantial quantity of S-300 missiles in the russian Federation, amounting to approximately 7,000 missiles. These missiles possess formidable destructive capabilities and are challenging to intercept. As a result, the russian ACC maintains a pivotal role in terms of its functionality and capacity to conduct subsequent strikes. This ensures the potential for adaptability and a combination of strategies to counter ongoing Ukrainian defensive measures.The Maritime Component Command (MCC) of russia remains unaltered, with a diminished presence in the Black Sea attributed to the abundant deployment of unmanned naval platforms (USVs) by the Ukrainian side.

Ukraine's novel military concept, encompassing Sea Deny (disrupting enemy actions), Sea Control (water area control), and even Sea Command (preventing the construction or repair of enemy assets), has demonstrated that restraining enemy actions doesn't necessitate an expensive fleet or any fleet at all. This effect can be achieved through numerous relatively inexpensive unmanned platforms (priced at 500-700 thousand dollars). Even in the event of an attack by 10 units, 7-8 units are expected to be destroyed, leaving the remaining 2 to inflict significant damage. However, the sustainability of Sea Control established by Ukraine in the western part of the Black Sea may be subject to change in the future, considering russia's potential to devise proportional countermeasures. Although unconfirmed in reality and possibly initiated for propaganda purposes, russia is reportedly constructing and developing unmanned sea platforms that could disrupt the security situation in the region

.Hence, in the foreseeable future, the Ukrainian side will uphold control in the Black Sea waters through the deployment of Sea Baby and Magura sea drones, along with Vilkha, Neptune, Storm Shadow, and SCALP missiles. Nonetheless, the long-term scenario could witness alterations with the introduction of russian countermeasures, currently in the design phase.

The cybersphere (Cyber) in the russo-Ukrainian war is progressively assuming a novel role, exerting non-kinetic influence on the stable functioning of the state apparatus, indirectly impacting the military domain.

A prominent instance is the cyber attack on the Ukrainian communications monopolist "Kyivstar" on December 12, 2023. This incident marked the most extensive assault on Ukraine's telecommunications infrastructure, rendering 24 million subscribers without communication

. It wasn't until December 21 that the company fully restored its functionality, highlighting the adversary's effective operation in cyberspace.Henceforth, it is likely that the russians will incorporate cyber attacks into military scenarios, informed by a meticulous analysis of past applications. Considering potential challenges in the medium and long term, the following measures should be instituted:

• Duplicate all networks, particularly in the public sector, with alternative communication channels.
• Amidst the era of total digitalization, reserve space for the operation of analog management.
• Establish dedicated military IT units within the structural subdivisions of the Commands of the branches, consisting of non-military personnel (due to their non-stereotypical thinking). These units will be responsible for developing and ensuring the functionality of cyberspace. An IT specialist can disrupt the functionality of 2-3 attack aircraft positions, inflicting losses on the russian side in cyberspace.

Considering the repercussions of the "Kyivstar" attack, the significance of cyberspace is poised to increase in the future. Hacker attacks orchestrated under the direction of the russian GRU are likely to recur and escalate in their impact on the overall functioning of Ukraine's state apparatus

.Space - As of now, russian space capabilities are not sufficiently advanced to pose a large-scale threat to the Defense Forces of Ukraine. However, in collaboration with partner countries, particularly China, there exists a theoretical possibility for such a threat to materialize.

The focus of the russian Federation's sphere is primarily manifested through the activities of the Soyuz series satellites, primarily tasked with:

1. Aerial photography of the territory of Ukraine and its allies to document and monitor changes and the concentration of forces.
2. Ensuring the functionality of the Glonass navigation system, which serves as the primary navigation system for the russian army and weapon systems.

As of April 2023, russia possesses approximately 100 satellites responsible for space operations

. However, upon closer analysis, we posit that the actual number of satellites capable of active functionality is no more than 5-7 units, apart from russian propaganda.Even though russia launched new satellites of the Soyuz-2 series from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome on November 25, August 7, May 23, and March 23, in 2023

, this development is not expected to significantly impact the course of the russo-Ukrainian war due to the absence of Western technologies, which remain inaccessible due to sanctions.Therefore, the role of outer space for the russian Federation is expected to have a limited character, primarily serving a propaganda purpose to cater to the domestic audience. This role is not anticipated to exert a significant impact on the Ukrainian Defence Forces.

II. Center of Gravity (COG) is a military term referring to the source of strength, balance, or stability required by military forces to maintain function. Centres of gravity exist for all belligerents and at all tactical, strategic, and operational levels of war simultaneously. The concept was initially developed by Karl von Clausewitz and detailed in his work "On War"

. COG represents a robust physical element at the operational or tactical level of the opponent, enabling them to achieve successful results and dominate on the battlefield.In our assessment, concerning the operational and tactical aspects within the forces and means of the russian Federation during the russo-Ukrainian war, the dominant factor in the current period is radio-electronic warfare. This element, in the systemic context, prevails over Ukrainian analogues.

The Center of Gravity in Electronic Warfare (COG EW) exhibits a variable nature, given the proactive efforts of the Ukrainian side to enhance its systems and devise solutions to diminish russian electronic influence across all levels of systems. The most pertinent application of russian Federation's EW is observed in the realm of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). As the utilization of UAVs has significantly increased from both sides, the significance of safeguarding counterparts from the opponent's UAVs has proportionally escalated.

The existing russian means at the operational level of Electronic Warfare (EW) are directed towards diminishing the effectiveness of high-precision munitions (HIMARS, for instance, struggles to accurately hit the target due to active shifting of programmed GPS coordinates by the russian forces). Additionally, these means are employed to counter the use of Ukrainian UAVs such as Leka, PD-2, Valkyrie, Bayraktar, among others, in their rear areas. Furthermore, they are utilized for the detection of zones with unusual frequency amplitudes (Harris) and their subsequent disruption.

Consequently, the role of the russian Federation in Electronic Radio-frequency Combat (ERB) demonstrates high efficiency and exhibits a trend towards continuous improvement and development

.III. In December 2023 and January 2024, Ukraine confronted a multitude of challenges that directly impacted the military strategy on the battlefronts. The primary concern revolves around international support from allies, upon whom there is a substantial reliance for financial, humanitarian, and military assistance.

In the military-political sphere, several critical factors have emerged, exerting medium and long-term influence on combat operations for the Defense Forces of Ukraine.

The factors mentioned above have only a peripheral connection to the military aspects of Ukraine's security sector functioning. However, their resolution holds strategic importance, except for point 4. The following military factors are directly significant, as the outcome of the hostilities in 2024 hinges on their resolution.

1.Integration of multimedia at all levels of unit command. Currently, the conduct of hostilities has evolved following a structured algorithm:

Hence, the one who first employs this algorithm within reasonable limits swiftly gains control over the battlefield, nullifying any opponent's initiative. This algorithm is standard at the battalion-brigade level, where the entire horizontal and vertical chain of command resides within the same unit, fostering personal acquaintance among members.

In other scenarios, such as with quickly formed units or tactical groups in the theater of operations, there is diminished combat effectiveness and algorithm execution due to the low efficacy of command and control (C2) and weak horizontal-vertical communications.

Consequently, the prompt detection, exchange, and real-time indication of targets stand as contemporary imperatives for combat operations. Those who adeptly apply this formula gain a strategic advantage, contingent upon the available variety of types and classes of weapons capable of swiftly engaging and eliminating the target.

2.Saturation of technical means of intelligence and observation is a crucial aspect. The extensive front line with russia spans approximately 3,750 km, necessitating substantial resources and combat units to forestall any sudden attacks on Ukrainian territory

. The active front line, measuring 1,500 km, is a constant theater of combat clashes. Both sections of the front, despite varying amplitudes of warfare, demand continuous attention from units, creating a significant distraction. Therefore, to safeguard against enemy actions, maintaining round-the-clock surveillance is imperative. This can be achieved through technical means of intelligence, including stationary day/night/thermal cameras, motion sensors, and heavy UAVs that receive uninterrupted power through a wired connection from the ground.Unlike the adversary, Ukraine faces challenges related to a lower mobilization capacity. To mitigate the threat posed by these challenges, it is essential to adopt a nuanced approach. Partner countries with ample technical resources or experience in addressing similar challenges (such as the USA, Japan, Estonia, and others) could assist in enhancing border security and fortifying the contact line.

Furthermore, augmenting the arsenal of technical intelligence means will amplify combat effectiveness, facilitating more precise and rapid responses to emerging threats. Special attention should be given to unmanned combat modules capable of autonomously engaging the most critical areas of concern.

The decision to construct defensive positions for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd echelons, along with their engineering fortification, was officially endorsed by the top political leadership on November 17, 2023. This decision consolidates efforts to initiate the construction of defensive positions spanning the entire front line, with particular emphasis on regions experiencing active hostilities

.In the first half of 2022, the Defense Forces of Ukraine adopted a strategy of mobile and maneuverable defense, emphasizing decentralization of command and active engagement at the battalion and company tactical group levels. However, as the front line stabilized in the latter half of 2022 and into 2023, responsibility for actions transitioned to the brigade level. During the static defense in eastern Ukraine, brigade-level forces were primarily responsible for constructing the first-line defense, while the construction of the 2nd and 3rd front lines occurred at lower levels, handled by the Defense Forces of Ukraine themselves. This decentralization presented challenges due to limited resources and the need to fulfill multiple tasks effectively.

In 2015, the Cabinet of Ministers assigned a specific task to all regional state administrations: to secure designated sections of the front line and construct the 2nd and 3rd echelons of defense using civilian contractors. The Regional State Administrations took on the political responsibility of directing the region's maximum resources to their assigned zones and successfully fulfilled the task

. The effectiveness of this project was demonstrated by the successful defense of the Defense Forces of Ukraine in 2022-2023, which has maintained defense in these positions despite ongoing attacks from the russian side.Therefore, re-consolidating certain sections of the front/line of demarcation under the control of Regional State Administrations to create a multi-echelon front line spanning 1,500 km would be an effective solution to enhance the security of Ukraine's territory. This approach would relieve the military of construction tasks, enabling them to focus on other essential duties.

3.Establishment of a new command dedicated to unmanned platforms. Currently, unmanned platforms are intricately integrated into the system of combat operations, providing significant improvements in speed, efficiency, and synchronicity in achieving results. When discussing unmanned platforms, there is a common understanding, in most cases, of aerial vehicles, with less emphasis on marine drones.

As the year 2023 marked the emergence of FPV drones in the rus-Ukrainian war, the ongoing trend of improvement and development is expected to persist. To ensure that the Ukrainian side maintains technological and operational superiority on the modern battlefield, it is imperative to initiate the creation of a strategy, doctrine, and legal framework promptly. Managing and professionally developing this newly formed trend is crucial to channel its direction effectively.

Currently, Ukraine has a diverse range of UAVs at its disposal, spanning strategic (such as Bayraktar), operational (including Leleka, PD-2, Valkyrie, and others), and tactical (like FPV drones, Mavic, Autel, and others). These UAVs serve the interests of HQ at all levels, yet there is a notable absence of a comprehensive application strategy. Furthermore, the valuable experience and skills gained during combat operations in one unit have not been systematically organized and shared with other units.

The utilization of unmanned platforms not only enhances military capabilities but also presents a financial advantage. The cost-effectiveness of tactical-level UAVs, when compared to the expenses associated with compensating the families of fallen soldiers (amounting to 15 million per family), highlights the economic benefits. The efficiency of a UAV at the tactical level can replace the activities of 8-10 servicemen, making it a cost-effective alternative, even when factoring in potential combat losses.

The advancement of unmanned platforms is intricately connected to the enhancement of countermeasures, particularly in the realm of electronic warfare (EW). Ukrainian EW systems, in collaboration with unmanned systems, are undergoing pertinent development after a comprehensive analysis and identification of the Center of Gravity (COG) of the russian Federation. This strategic approach is directly targeted at diminishing the efficiency of Ukrainian operations.

Hence, crafting a fresh concept for employing unmanned systems in terrestrial, aerial, and maritime domains (with potential future considerations in the space domain) mandates the initiation of proactive measures to stay ahead of the opposing force.

These points possess these characteristics, and if necessary, they can be further scrutinized and elaborated by the scientific institutes of the educational institutions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. These institutions should examine the present and the past, and predict potential future development options. In a period of change and development, success belongs to those who can quickly learn, adapt, and evolve. For instance, a decisive factor in the victory of the Entente coalition in the First World War was the innovative use of tanks by the British at the Battle of the Somme in 1916. Despite initial critics and opponents during the implementation of tank usage, the psychological impact they created significantly contributed to the victory of the Entente alliance. Therefore, technology is always evolving, and development leads to victory.

The advancement of unmanned platforms is intricately tied to the evolution of their countermeasures, specifically electronic warfare (EW). Given the analysis and identification of the Center of Gravity (COG) of the russian Federation, focused on diminishing Ukrainian efficiency, there is a pressing need for the concurrent development of Ukrainian EW capabilities alongside unmanned systems. Consequently, the establishment of a novel concept for the utilization of unmanned systems across land, air, and sea domains (with potential future considerations in the space sphere) necessitates proactive initiatives to stay ahead of the opposing party.

IV. The security situation in Ukraine as of December 2023 is challenging but not critical, as it currently permeates all facets of the information space. This was primarily attributable to a series of steps which were not professionally implemented by the military-political leadership at the beginning of 2023, subsequently leading to further russian actions. These missteps include:

• Failure to accurately assess the real state and position of russian occupying forces along the main offensive line during the summer campaign.
• Displaying excessive optimism and expectations in the open information space concerning russian units, shifting focus from recognizing the professional and specialized nature of the russian Federation's army towards disdain and underestimation of their professionalism.
• Insufficient communication between the operational and strategic headquarters of the Defense Forces of Ukraine and partner countries. The Ukrainian side failed to convey the actual state of affairs (attributed to the constant emphasis on adopting NATO standards without synchronized joint military actions) during offensive operations. Simultaneously, the side of the partner countries, primarily the USA, failed to comprehend the current trends in the russo-Ukrainian war.
• A minimal number of training sessions by instructors from partner countries for operational and operational-strategic level Ukrainian headquarters. Due to time constraints, there was a failure to grasp the concept of the 5-dimensional battle and a lack of adequate resources.
• The russian side's rapid adaptation to counter the use of Western weapons and the accelerated construction of defensively fortified positions with engineering enhancements, among other factors.

These steps resulted in the russian side seizing the initiative and launching offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Donetsk directions in the fall of 2023. These offensives persisted for 2-3 months, yielding only tactical achievements without significant strategic or operational gains. They are nearing a critical point of culmination and the loss of further capabilities. This situation is attributed to the substantial losses suffered by the russian Federation in terms of manpower, equipment, and the utilization of low-quality ammunition purchased from North Korea and other sources

.Despite the nearing culmination of offensive actions and the depletion of offensive potential, the russian side shows no strategic intention to de-escalate and is actively building up its combat capabilities. In the coming year, the budget of the Ministry of Defense of the russian Federation is set to reach a record level in its entire history, amounting to 40% of the entire country's budget, specifically 72.1 billion US dollars

. This substantial allocation from the state budget doesn't include federal (regional) funding for the power sector of the russian Federation. This extensive financial allocation indicates a determination to continue the invasion of Ukraine in the long term.The following intentions characterize approximate russian plans for 2024:

1. The russian Federation continues the formation of new military units and conducts a broad recruitment campaign to popularize military service through a multiple increase in monetary support;

2. The accumulation of stocks of missile platforms, which in 2023 will be used less for strikes on Ukrainian territory, however, increasing their production in the city of Yekaterinburg. For example, stocks of quantitative missiles in August 2023 amounted to 585 units, and in November they already amounted to 875, producing 70-80 units per month

. A similar situation can be seen in the 2-3 times increased manufactured UAVs of various application levels.3. Transferring the work of all factories of the military-industrial complex to 3 shifts, increasing the production of weapons accordingly. It is reasonable to assume that there is an ability to manufacture 200 pieces of equipment from scratch, to restore much more.

4. The civilian population of the russian Federation maintains a high level of trust in its political leadership, providing full support in armed aggression against Ukraine. According to social polls, 74% of respondents in the russian Federation support the war, while only 18% are against it which does not demonstrate a contradiction against war

.The security forecast for the spring of 2024 indicates intentions to intensify offensive actions in the eastern region of Ukraine, with the goal of fully occupying the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The heightened offensive actions will be accompanied by numerous psychological operations and information measures by the russian side against the Ukrainian population, aiming to instill distrust and encourage them to sign a peace treaty that is unfavorable for Kyiv.

Despite the security challenges and problems, Ukraine is resisting any manifestations of russian aggression by employing increased non-traditional and hybrid methods of war. There is already a significant boost in the production of unmanned platforms of various application levels, which is expected to have a substantial impact on the battlefield.

While the decision to provide military support is pending in the US Congress, it is anticipated to materialize no later than January 2024, with efforts to systematize and synchronize actions with all partner states. The temporary pause in US aid is being partially supplemented by Germany, covering a portion of the current deficit

.Historically, wars have witnessed varying degrees of success and failure. However, the key to victory lies in the ability to thoroughly assess miscalculations, introduce corrections to existing processes, and prevent their recurrence. Therefore, for a Ukrainian victory, the algorithm of "awareness-assessment-analysis-making changes-re-analysis" should become a dogma across all spheres and structures, a process that is already actively underway.

Most importantly, the mere existence of Ukraine as a nation and a state is a significant victory, despite facing deficits in various aspects, we keep fighting and we will be victorious.

Glory to Ukraine.

Sincerely, Vlad Dut.

ANY COPYING OR DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND WILL BE SUBJECT TO PENALTIES.

About the Author(s)

Vlad Dut

Vlad Dut (pseudonym for obvious security reasons) is a Ukrainian active duty officer who has participated in combat since 2014. In July 2014 he was wounded in Lugansk region. He has studied in USA and Estonia as a military student.

Ukrainian military portal: https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/ssha-provodyat-vijskovi-igry-dlya-ukrayinskyh-komandyriv-nyt/

Modern war institute: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/what-is-russias-strategy-in-ukraine/

Apostrophe International https://apostrophe.ua/en/news/society/2023-12-06/torchat-ushi-moskvyi-kak-polskie-zabastovschiki-rabotayut-na-vraga-ukrainyi/309825

BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60938544

Ukrainska Pravda: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/12/15/7433166/

Zaxid.Net https://zaxid.net/rozvidka_ssha_nazvala_vtrati_rosiyskoyi_armiyi_pid_avdiyivkoyu_n1576260

Associated Press: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-shipping-black-sea-6e7721886bb2b1d98af2e49cf6f67aaf

Ukr.Net: https://ua.news/ua/war-vs-rf/rosiya-perekinula-na-hersonshhinu-novu-diviziyu-desantu-britanska-rozvidka

The new voice of Ukraine: https://english.nv.ua/nation/russian-soldiers-pretend-to-be-dead-near-avdiivka-50376785.html

Forbes: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/12/15/complete-annihilation-five-russian-battalions-went-up-in-smoke-and-flames-trying-to-surround-avdiivka/

Unian: https://www.unian.ua/war/okupanti-sunut-na-robotine-verbove-ale-ci-sprobi-nevdali-genshta12409737.html

ClausevitaStudies https://clausewitzstudies.org/mobile/principlesofwar.htm

Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2023/08/17/russia-iran-drone-shahed-alabuga/

Defense Express: https://defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/rf_maje_tisjachi_raket_do_s_300 _ale_dlja_vijni_v_ukrajini_virishila_vzjati_menshe_sotni_v_bilorusi-9638.html

.Defense Express: https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/russia_showcases_own_naval_drone_to_hunt_down_ukrainian_explosive_boats-7944.html

Atlantic Council: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukrainian-telecoms-hack-highlights-cyber-dangers-of-russias-invasion/

Forbes Ukraine: https://forbes.ua/innovations/ataku-na-kiivstar-zdiysnilo-khakerske-ugrupuvannya-rosiyskogo-gru-sandworm-13122023-17890

Radio Liberty: https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/rosiya-suputnyky-viyna-ukrayina/31798551.html

Janes: https: https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/russia-successfully-launches-military-satellite

Major Mark P. Krieger Jr., U.S. Army: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20070831_art012.pdf

The Economist: https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/23/russia-is-starting-to-make-its-superiority-in-electronic-warfare-count?utm_medium=cpc.adword .pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=18151738051&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gad_source=1&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI3cifq7itgwMVopWDBx28SACbEAAYASAAEgKu8PD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.

Government Portal: https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/uriad-vydilyv-koshty-na-dodatkove-zmitsnennia-oborony-na-pivdenno-skhidnomu-napriamku

Politico: https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-kim-jong-un-russia-pyongyang-beats-brussels-to-a-million-ammunition-rounds/

ISW: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2023

ISW: https://www-understandingwar-org.translate.goog/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2023?_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=uk&_x_tr_hl=uk&_x_tr_pto=sc

Glavkom: https://glavcom.ua/world/observe/skilki-rosijan-pidtrimujut-vijnu-v-ukrajini-rezultati-opituvannja-973492.html

Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-set-double-its-ukraine-military-aid-under-scholz-plan-bloomberg-news-2023-11-12/

Small Wars Journal

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 12, 2024

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine and the United Kingdom (UK) signed an agreement on bilateral security guarantees pursuant to the G7’s July 2023 joint declaration of support for Ukraine.
• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 11 that the US has suspended security assistance to Ukraine and will not resume sending aid to Ukraine until the US Congress approves funding.
• Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov expressed confidence in Ukraine’s ability to produce one million first-person view (FPV) drones in 2024.
• Pentagon Spokesperson Brigadier General Patrick Ryder stated on January 11 that there is no credible evidence of the illegal diversion of US-provided advanced conventional weapons to Ukraine.
• The US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) announced on January 11 sanctions against several Russian entities reportedly involved in the transfer of North Korean ballistic missiles to Russia.
• Actors in the Russia-backed breakaway republic of Transnistria may be setting information conditions for a possible false-flag operation in Transnistria as part of wider Kremlin efforts to destabilize Moldova.
• Russian occupation officials appear to be deliberately censoring information about Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have illegally removed to occupied Crimea.
• Imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin accused the Kremlin of hesitating to conduct operationally significant offensive operations in Ukraine or a new wave of mobilization in Russia as Ukraine “build[s] up [its] strength” for a future counteroffensive effort.
• Russian forces made confirmed marginal advances northeast of Bakhmut, northwest of Avdiivka, southwest of Donetsk City, west of Verbove, and in (east) left bank Kherson Oblast amid continued positional fighting along the entire front.
• The Russian State Duma will consider a draft law allowing foreigners with a criminal record to serve in the Russian Armed Forces.
• Russian Health Minister Mikhail Murashko confirmed that Russian authorities have deported over 2,100 Ukrainians, including 500 children, to Russia for medical reasons in 2023.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 12, 2024

Jan 12, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 12, 2024

Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 12, 2024, 5:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. 

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on January 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. 

Ukraine and the United Kingdom (UK) signed an agreement on bilateral security guarantees pursuant to the G7’s July 2023 joint declaration of support for Ukraine. UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 12 and signed the UK-Ukraine Agreement on Security Cooperation.[1] The agreement covers joint efforts supporting Ukraine’s future accession to NATO, including comprehensive assistance to Ukraine to protect and restore its territorial integrity, preventing new Russian aggression against Ukraine, and supporting Ukraine’s integration into certain Western institutions.[2] The agreement also states that the UK government will work with its domestic defense industrial base (DIB) to help develop Ukraine’s own DIB. The UK is the first country to sign a final agreement with Ukraine on the basis of the G7’s July 2023 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, and at least 24 non-G7 countries have joined the declaration.[3]

Sunak also announced a military assistance package valued at 2.5 billion GBP (roughly $3.19 billion), which includes long-range missiles, air defense components, artillery ammunition, and maritime security provisions, and at least 200 million GBP of this package is specifically allocated to producing and procuring drones, most of which the UK expects to produce.[4] Sunak also announced an additional 18 million GBP to support frontline humanitarian efforts and fortify Ukraine’s energy infrastructure against Russian strikes. Sunak reiterated the UK’s commitment to long-term support for Ukraine and stated that the new UK-Ukraine security pact will last ”100 years or more.”[5]

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 11 that the US has suspended security assistance to Ukraine and will not resume sending aid to Ukraine until the US Congress approves funding.[6] Kirby stated that the US provided the last package of aid to Ukraine that the US had enough funding for, which was a $250 million security assistance package announced on December 27, 2023.[7]

Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov expressed confidence in Ukraine’s ability to produce one million first-person view (FPV) drones in 2024.[8] Fedorov stated on January 12 that the number of Ukrainian enterprises producing drones increased to from seven to 200 between 2022 and the end of 2023.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 19, 2023, that Ukraine plans to produce one million drones and expand artillery production in 2024.[10] Production of a million drones per year requires a monthly average production of more than 83,000 FPV drones per month, and Ukraine already produced 50,000 FPV drones per month as of December 2023.[11]

Pentagon Spokesperson Brigadier General Patrick Ryder stated on January 11 that there is no credible evidence of the illegal diversion of US-provided advanced conventional weapons to Ukraine.[12] Ryder stated that the US has given Ukraine unprecedented access to information regarding US-provided equipment and that Ukraine fully understands and supports the US need to report on defense articles that are accountable to Department of Defense (DoD) standards.[13] The US DoD Office of the Inspector General published a report earlier on January 11 that stated that DoD limitations were largely responsible for a failure to properly document certain US-provided military assistance to Ukraine.[14] The DoD Office of the Inspector General report stated that it was not responsible for determining whether US defense articles allocated to Ukraine have been misappropriated and did not attempt to do so.[15]

The US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) announced on January 11 sanctions against several Russian entities reportedly involved in the transfer of North Korean ballistic missiles to Russia.[16] OFAC announced sanctions against one (1) employee of the Russian state-owned cargo transport service 224th Flight Unit State Airlines, a weapons testing facility called Ashuluk Firing Range in Astrakhan Oblast, and Russian defense manufacturer Vladimirovka Advanced Weapons and Research Complex in Astrakhan Oblast.[17] Western and Ukrainian officials have previously reported that Russian forces have launched at least one ballistic missile acquired from North Korea at Ukraine.[18]

Actors in the Russia-backed breakaway republic of Transnistria may be setting information conditions for a possible false-flag operation in Transnistria as part of wider Kremlin efforts to destabilize Moldova. The Transnistrian Ministry of State Security (MGB) issued a press release on January 12 claiming that Moldovan special forces are training “special combat groups” of more than 60 people to destroy critical facilities, sabotage military installations, and capture or destroy senior Transnistrian officials and law enforcement officers.[19] ISW previously reported that the MGB is a Russian-dominated organization that is commonly understood to be a ”department of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)” that likely takes orders directly from Moscow.[20] The MGB and Transnistrian officials have previously made similar, less escalatory claims likely also as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to set informational conditions aimed at destabilizing Moldova and justifying any future Russian campaigns in the region by framing Russia as a protector of allegedly threatened Russian-language speakers in Moldova.[21]

Russian occupation officials appear to be deliberately censoring information about Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have illegally removed to occupied Crimea. A Reuters special report published on January 11 details how Russian occupation officials and Russian authorities facilitate the removal and deportation of Ukrainian children from orphanages and children's homes under the direct guidance of Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova.[22] Reuters found that Lvova-Belova personally visited a children's home in occupied Henichesk, Kherson Oblast, in early 2023 and encouraged Ukrainian children, many of whom were separated from their parents due to the war or other circumstances but are not officially orphans, to obtain Russian passports so that Russian families can adopt the children.[23] Reuters also identified Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov as directly involved in removing Ukrainian children from Kherson Oblast to children's homes in Crimea, consistent with ISW's assessment about the involvement of Russian occupation authorities in the removal and deportation process.[24] According to Reuters, an unspecified Crimean occupation official stated that all information about Ukrainian orphans in Crimea is "strictly confidential" on Aksyonov’s direct order and that all requests about children are immediately reported to the occupation administration. The suggestion that Russian occupation authorities are deliberately trying to hide information about Ukrainian children from the public is notable—it indicates that Russian authorities are uninterested in repatriating these children, which undermines the Russian information operations that the removal and deportation of children is a temporary humanitarian endeavor and that Russia's ultimate interest is in returning these children to their homes and families.[25]

Imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin accused the Kremlin of hesitating to conduct operationally significant offensive operations in Ukraine or a new wave of mobilization in Russia as Ukraine “build[s] up [its] strength” for a future counteroffensive effort. Russian milblogger and serviceman Mikhail Polynkov published a letter reportedly written by Girkin on December 8, 2023 to his Telegram channel on January 11 wherein Girkin claimed that Russia currently has “no plans” for a broad offensive in Ukraine and that Russia’s war in Ukraine is developing according to a “very bad” scenario.[26] Girkin writes that the Kremlin’s unwillingness to conduct a new wave of mobilization in Russia is prompting the Russian military to fill “holes” in its units with convicts and contract servicemen (kontraktniki). Girkin claimed that most of the reported 452,000 servicemen who enrolled in the Russian military in 2023 are already serving in Ukraine or “will not get there at all,” meaning that without a new wave of mobilization in spring 2024, Russia will not have the manpower required to conduct operationally significant offensive operations later this year. Girkin claimed that the Russian military and the Kremlin are choosing to “wait” until Ukraine ”falls apart” or agrees to peace negotiations, while the Ukrainian military is receiving foreign aid and building up strength for future counteroffensive efforts. Girkin warned that Ukraine’s ability to learn lessons on the battlefield may make its next counteroffensive operation more successful while the Russian military is still led by “the same morons” who insist on conducting costly frontal infantry assaults to capture settlements.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine and the United Kingdom (UK) signed an agreement on bilateral security guarantees pursuant to the G7’s July 2023 joint declaration of support for Ukraine.
• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 11 that the US has suspended security assistance to Ukraine and will not resume sending aid to Ukraine until the US Congress approves funding.
• Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov expressed confidence in Ukraine’s ability to produce one million first-person view (FPV) drones in 2024.
• Pentagon Spokesperson Brigadier General Patrick Ryder stated on January 11 that there is no credible evidence of the illegal diversion of US-provided advanced conventional weapons to Ukraine.
• The US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) announced on January 11 sanctions against several Russian entities reportedly involved in the transfer of North Korean ballistic missiles to Russia.
• Actors in the Russia-backed breakaway republic of Transnistria may be setting information conditions for a possible false-flag operation in Transnistria as part of wider Kremlin efforts to destabilize Moldova.
• Russian occupation officials appear to be deliberately censoring information about Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have illegally removed to occupied Crimea.
• Imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin accused the Kremlin of hesitating to conduct operationally significant offensive operations in Ukraine or a new wave of mobilization in Russia as Ukraine “build[s] up [its] strength” for a future counteroffensive effort.
• Russian forces made confirmed marginal advances northeast of Bakhmut, northwest of Avdiivka, southwest of Donetsk City, west of Verbove, and in (east) left bank Kherson Oblast amid continued positional fighting along the entire front.
• The Russian State Duma will consider a draft law allowing foreigners with a criminal record to serve in the Russian Armed Forces.
• Russian Health Minister Mikhail Murashko confirmed that Russian authorities have deported over 2,100 Ukrainians, including 500 children, to Russia for medical reasons in 2023.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on January 12 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov responded to a question about a recent reported 1.5km Ukrainian advance in the Kupyansk direction and stated that these reports are likely associated with Ukrainian forces recapturing previously lost positions.[27] ISW has not observed confirmation of recent Ukrainian advances in the Kupyansk direction. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Ivanivka, Pishchane, and Berestove; southwest of Svatove near Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka.[28] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that 150 to 300 Russian personnel serving in irregular Russian formations in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions conduct active actions each day and that these units primarily focus on breaking through Ukrainian defenses.[29] Synehubov stated that Russian forces are preparing for another offensive effort near Synkivka, where they renewed assaults in the past week and continue to accumulate forces, conduct rotations, and train units for future actions.[30] Elements of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and elements of the LNR 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Berestove, Donetsk Oblast.[31]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger expressed concerns about the Russian Western Grouping of Forces’ ability to conduct effective offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction.[32] The milblogger claimed that Russian infantry with armored vehicle support conducted assaults in columns in open areas near Synkivka in December 2023 and that Ukrainian artillery units and drone operators easily repelled these assaults by targeting advancing Russian columns.[33] The milblogger claimed that the elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces in the Kupyansk direction conduct only infantry-led frontal assaults and lack sufficient artillery support.[34] The milblogger claimed that such ”incompetence” is systematic throughout the Russian Western Grouping of Forces and compared the grouping to the Russian ”Dnepr” Grouping of Forces, which Russian sources have routinely maligned as having serious command and coordination issues.[35] The Russian milblogger’s description of poorly designed and ineffective mechanized assaults across terrain with high visibility suggests that the Russian command has yet to internalize and disseminate lessons learned from failed mass mechanized assaults near Avdiivka in October 2023 to Russian forces throughout Ukraine, particularly across different military district and grouping of forces commands.[36] ISW previously assessed as of January 2024 that the Western Grouping of Forces appears to be relatively less degraded and better-rested than other Russian force groupings and may therefore be better able to conduct an offensive effort than Russian forces elsewhere in Ukraine.[37] It remains unclear if the Russian Western Grouping of Forces will be able to conduct large-scale assaults to achieve operationally significant gains in a way that would be significantly more effective than the disorganized and costly Russian offensive operations that have been underway around Avdiivka since October 2023, however.[38] The Russian milblogger’s description of the grouping suggests that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction may face similar difficulties during a possible intensified effort to capture Kupyansk.

Synehubov stated on January 12 that there is no concentration of Russian forces in Belgorod Oblast sufficient to conduct offensive actions along the international border with Ukraine.[39] Synehubov stated that several Russian Storm-Z units recently transferred to Belgorod Oblast and conducted demonstrative actions along the border with Kharkiv Oblast.[40] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military is likely currently able to conduct only tactical-level actions into Kharkiv Oblast from Belgorod Oblast, which at most would serve as feints to draw and fix Ukrainian forces away from a possible Russian operational effort in the Kupyansk direction.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced east of Vesele (northeast of Bakhmut).[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 12 that Russian forces are trying to improve their tactical positions near Vesele, where Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian assaults.[43]

Positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on January 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported positional fighting northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka, west of Bakhmut near Khromove and towards Ivanivske, and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[44] A Russian milblogger continued to characterize Russian offensive operations west of Bakhmut as a ”creeping offensive” towards Chasiv Yar.[45] Other Russian sources discussed the challenges that Russian forces are facing northwest of Bakhmut, particularly in attacks on Vasyukivka, Mynkivka, and Bohdanivka.[46] One Russian source noted that Vasyukivka is located at low elevation and is surrounded by Ukrainian positions on tactical heights, and claimed that mobilized assault units refused to conduct assaults after entering Bohdanivka, forcing an unspecified Spetsnaz brigade to attack Ukrainian positions instead.[47] Elements of the 106th Guards Airborne Assault (VDV) Division are reportedly operating northeast of Bakhmut in the Soledar direction.[48]

Russian forces recently made a marginal gain northwest of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on January 12 shows that Russian forces recently advanced just east of the Avdiivka Coke Plant in northwestern Avdiivka.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near the water treatment facilities of the Coke Plant area, a claim that is generally consistent with the available geolocated footage.[50] Milboggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced on the eastern outskirts of Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka) between the Izmaylovsky Pond area and Pershotravneva Street, but ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[51] Russian and Ukrainian forces reported continued fighting northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne, Stepove, and Ocheretyne; near the Coke Plant area; in southeastern Avdiivka in the industrial zone area; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[52] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that there are high losses among foreigners and migrants fighting in the ranks of Russian forces fighting in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka, the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and western Zaporizhia Oblast) due to poor training.[53]

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on January 9 shows that Russian forces recently made marginal gains south of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[54] Positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Marinka, Heorhiivka, and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[55] A milblogger noted that Russian forces are trying to advance west of Marinka towards Kurakhove via Heorhiivka and south of Marinka towards Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[56] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that Russian forces are attacking Novomykhailivka in order to interdict the O0532 Marinka-Vuhledar road.[57] Elements of the 255th and 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiments (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [8th CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]); an unspecified battalion of the 155th Naval Infantry Battalion (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]); and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, EMD) are all reportedly operating east and south of Novomykhailivka.[58]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Limited positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on January 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[59] Elements of the Russian 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division [MRD], 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryyutne, and elements of the 392nd Motorized Rifle Division (127th MRD, 5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske.[60]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on January 10 and 12 shows Russian forces capturing Ukrainian trench positions along a road west of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[61] Positional fighting continued near Robotyne, Verbove, and Nesteryanka (northwest of Robotyne).[62]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Krynky on the Dnipro River’s east (left) bank in Kherson Oblast. Geolocated footage published on January 12 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced in eastern Krynky.[63] Positional fighting continued on the east bank.[64] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on January 12 that Russian forces significantly reduced their pace of attacks on the east bank in the past day.[65] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces are conducting drone strikes against west (right) bank Kherson Oblast to compensate for their inability to operate aviation in inclement weather.[66]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) 

The Russian State Duma will consider a draft law allowing foreigners with a criminal record to serve in the Russian Armed Forces.[67] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on January 12 that the Tula Oblast Duma submitted the bill to the Russian State Duma, arguing that foreign citizens with criminal records have the same right to enter into a military service contract as Russian citizens who have criminal records or have committed minor crimes.[68] The Tula Oblast Duma argued that the proposal would expand the Russian military’s recruiting capabilities.[69] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on January 4 strengthening provisions for granting foreign citizens Russian citizenship in exchange for military service in Ukraine.[70] Both Putin’s decree and this draft law are likely a part of ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into Russian military service.

Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian defense industrial base (DIB) production is struggling to produce the quality and quantity of weapons needed by Russian forces amid Russian reports that Russia has improved its production of precision machine tools. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on January 12 that Russia is producing more shells domestically but that Ukrainian officials have noticed a decrease in the quality of the shells.[71] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated that Russia is attempting to increase its production of various weapons and equipment but is unable to reconstitute the stockpile Russia had before February 24, 2022, as everything that Russia currently produces is immediately committed to the war effort.[72] Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec subsidiary Kalashnikov Concern claimed on January 12 that Kalashnikov increased its production of precision machine tools by 65 percent in 2023 compared to 2022.[73] Kalashnikov claimed that it produced 126 units of industrial precision machine tools, including 27 high-precision spindles for large Russian enterprises.[74] Kalashnikov noted that Russia previously imported high-precision spindles from Italy.[75] ISW previously assessed that Russia has been increasingly attempting to develop import substitution solutions for Western-made precision machine tools in 2023, likely in preparation for Western sanctions targeting Russia’s reliance on Western-made precision machine tools.[76]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu inspected the production and assembly workshops of the Russian Tactical Missiles Corporation on January 12.[77] Tactical Missile Corporation General Director Boris Obnosov told Shoigu that the company has increased its production of high-precision weapons by a factor of five since the beginning of the full-scale invasion due to an expansion and modernization of production workshops, an increased number of personnel, increased labor productivity, and the transition to a 24/7 work schedule.[78] Shoigu stated during the visit that glide bombs have ”proven themselves” during Russia’s war in Ukraine.[79] Russian milbloggers amplified photos on January 12 that indicates that the Russian Tactical Missiles Corporation is producing FAB-1500M54 glide bombs with a Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPC).[80]

A Russian insider source claimed on January 12 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is punishing Serbian nationals whom Russian officials have recruited to serve in Russian formations in Ukraine for complaining about poor treatment by Russian command.[81] The insider source claimed that the Russian MoD prevented the Serbian nationals from transferring to Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz units and instead sent the Serbians to fight with the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) in unspecified areas of heavy fighting (likely around Bakhmut, where the 106th VDV Division is currently deployed). The insider source claimed that the Russian MoD told the Serbians it was “impossible” to transfer them to Akhmat units after an affiliate of Russian President Vladimir Putin negotiated their transfer to Akhmat units with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov. The insider sources claimed that the Russian MoD ordered the military prosecutor to investigate the Serbians and charge them with refusing to follow orders. Serbian volunteers serving in the separate “Volk” unit of the Russian 119th VDV Regiment previously claimed that Russian commanders order Serbian fighters to conduct assaults under threat of violence and withhold provisions and ammunition from them.[82] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military may be assigning foreign volunteers to the 106th VDV Division to offset likely heavy personnel losses.[83]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

See Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian Health Minister Mikhail Murashko confirmed that Russian authorities deported over 2,100 Ukrainians, including 500 children, to Russia for medical reasons in 2023.[84] During a visit to occupied Mariupol, Murashko stated that over 2,100 individuals from occupied areas of Ukraine have been taken to Russian federal clinics for "high-tech medical care." Murashko did not clarify how or if these individuals returned to Ukraine following their treatment in federally controlled health clinics. ISW has previously observed cases of Russian authorities requiring individuals to receive Russian passports before traveling to Russia for medical treatment, and Russian authorities may be using medical care as a coercive device to encourage passportization, as well as to deport Ukrainians to Russia and collect their personal information.[85]

Russia continues efforts to economically integrate occupied areas of Ukraine into the Russian system. Chairperson of the Russian Duma Committee on Economic Policy Maxim Topilin claimed on January 11 that Russian authorities will abolish a mineral extraction tax in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as part of a free economic zone (FEZ) in occupied Donbas until 2050.[86] The Russian State Duma approved a law on the creation of the FEZ in occupied Ukraine in June 2023, which was meant to ease tax burdens and insurance rates to generate economic stability in occupied areas, guided by Russian economic standards.[87] The Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Ministry of Industry and Trade noted on January 12 that from March 1, the LNR will require metal producers to require Russian-style licenses, which means that the Russian state will have oversight into the procurement, storage, processing, and sale of scrap metals.[88]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned joint US and UK air and missile strikes against Houthi military targets in Yemen to maintain freedom of navigation in global maritime chokepoints on January 11.[89] The Russian MFA’s condemnation and request to hold an emergency United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting regarding the strikes are an attempt to falsely blame the US and UK for escalating tensions actually caused by Iranian-backed Houthi militants’ attacks on ships in the Red Sea.[90] Russia abstained from a UNSC vote on January 11 calling on the Houthis to stop all attacks on merchant and commercial vessels.[91] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev absurdly claimed that the US and UK conducted the Houthi strikes on January 11 to divert international attention from Ukraine.[92]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 12, 2024

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-12-2024

Key Takeaways:

1. The United States and the United Kingdom conducted joint strikes on January 11 that targeted Houthi military facilities to degrade the group’s capability to attack ships transiting the Red Sea.
2. The Houthis will likely continue to attempt attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea because the January 11 airstrikes do not sufficiently threaten the Houthis’ position within Yemen.
3. Palestinian militias in the northern Gaza Strip are disrupting Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations to destroy military infrastructure and secure areas bordering Israel.
4. The IDF is conducting clearing operations in Bureij and Maghazi in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
5. The IDF continued clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip.
6. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks targeting Israel on January 12.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 12, 2024

Jan 12, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, January 12, 2024

Peter Mills, Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, and Amin Soltani

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. The United States and the United Kingdom conducted joint strikes on January 11 that targeted Houthi military facilities to degrade the group’s capability to attack ships transiting the Red Sea.
2. The Houthis will likely continue to attempt attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea because the January 11 airstrikes do not sufficiently threaten the Houthis’ position within Yemen.
3. Palestinian militias in the northern Gaza Strip are disrupting Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations to destroy military infrastructure and secure areas bordering Israel.
4. The IDF is conducting clearing operations in Bureij and Maghazi in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
5. The IDF continued clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip.
6. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks targeting Israel on January 12.

The United States and the United Kingdom conducted joint strikes on January 11 that targeted Houthi military facilities to degrade the group’s capability to attack ships transiting the Red Sea. US aircraft, surface, and subsurface vessels launched over 100 precision-guided munitions that targeted more than 60 Houthi command and control, munitions depots, production facilities, air defense radar systems, and drone and missile launching systems in 16 locations across Yemen.[1] The UK Defense Ministry reported that four RAF Typhoons used precision-guided bombs to target Houthi drone and cruise missile launching positions in northwest Yemen.[2] The Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea said that US and UK forces carried out 73 raids across Yemen which killed five Houthi fighters and wounded six more.[3] The UK Defense Ministry reported that the Houthis’ ability to threaten international shipping "has taken a blow.”[4]

The Houthis will likely continue to attempt attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea because the January 11 airstrikes do not sufficiently threaten the Houthis’ position within Yemen. The Houthis said after the attacks that they would retaliate against the United States and the United Kingdom.[5] The Houthis aim to control all of Yemen. Houthi spokespersons said on January 12 that the airstrikes will not deter Houthi forces from supporting Palestine.[6] The Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting a Russian tanker south of Yemen on January 12.[7] The Houthis believe that attacks on international shipping help the group solidify its control in Yemen by demonstrating Houthi support to the Palestinian cause.[8]

The Houthis and their Iranian patrons continue to blame the United States for “escalating” in the region in response to the airstrikes.[9] Houthi spokespersons said on January 11 that the Houthis do not threaten international shipping in the Red Sea.[10] A former IRGC commander also warned that the strikes could escalate tensions in the region.[11] The United States and the United Kingdom did not escalate against the Houthis. The Houthis have conducted 27 piratical and terrorist attacks targeting international shipping in the Red Sea since October 17 without a response.[12] The United States and 11 partners warned the Houthis against further attacks on international shipping on January 3.[13] The Houthis conducted their largest and most complex attack to date on January 9 targeting HMS Diamond and US naval vessels after the warning.[14] The United States and the United Kingdom repeatedly called upon the Houthi movement to cease attacks prior to the strikes, including through a UN Security Council Resolution that called upon the Houthis to cease attacks in the Red Sea on January 10.[15]

Iranian officials and state media condemned the US-UK strikes on Houthi targets inside Yemen as a violation of international law and Yemen's sovereignty on January 12.[16] The Houthis are not the internationally recognized government of Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias in the northern Gaza Strip are disrupting Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations to destroy military infrastructure and secure areas bordering Israel. An Israeli Army Radio defense correspondent reported on January 6 that Israeli forces no longer permanently operate in the entire area of the northern strip and have moved to the border with Israel.[17] Israeli media began reporting in December that the IDF would transition to a third phase of operations that includes securing a buffer zone in the northern Gaza Strip and transitioning to targeted raids.[18] Palestinian militias are not destroyed in the northern Gaza Strip and maintain a limited presence in the northern Gaza Strip. The Economist reported on January 12 that Israeli forces recently found a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) underground tunnel network in Shujaiya neighborhood of Gaza City.[19] The Economist noted that Israeli forces were not previously aware of the network in the neighborhood, which is one kilometer from the border with Israel. An Israeli colonel said that the IDF has killed most of the local Hamas battalion commanders, but that dozens of fighters remain there and are now in “guerilla mode.”[20]

Other Palestinian militias threaten Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip. The military wing of the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, the Mujahideen Brigades, mortared Israeli forces west of Beit Lahia on January 12.[21] PIJ‘s military wing, the al Quds Brigades, claimed to conduct a multi-stage combined arms attack on an Israeli supply route south and east of Gaza.[22] The militia did not specify the exact location of the attack. The al Quds Brigades’ footage shows fighters observing Israeli armor, jeeps, and personnel and its fighters' firing mortars and rockets.[23] The militia claimed that it detonated a minefield targeting Israeli armor along the supply route. The military wing of Hamas, the al Qassem Brigades, has likely used a rear area in the central Gaza Strip to conduct several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip since mid-December.[24] Israeli forces are actively clearing in the central Gaza Strip to dismantle the four Hamas battalions there.

The IDF is conducting clearing operations in Bureij and Maghazi in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 12. The IDF 414th Reconnaissance Battalion conducted a drone strike targeting a Palestinian fighter who fired at them from a building in Bureij.[25] The IDF 36th Division killed 20 Palestinian fighters on January 11 and 12, including a commander of Hamas’ Nukhba (Elite) Forces, and captured many weapons during clearing operations in Maghazi.[26]

Palestinian militias are attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in the Central Governorate. The self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli infantry as they advanced in Maghazi.[27] Palestinian media reported that Israeli bulldozers and tanks operated north of Nuseirat on January 12.[28] The military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the National Resistance Brigades, fired an RPG at an advancing Israeli vehicle northeast of Nuseirat.[29] The Mujahideen Brigades claimed that it clashed with Israeli forces and targeted Israeli armor using unspecified weapons east of Nuseirat.[30]

The IDF continued clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on January 12. The IDF 98th Division directed airstrikes targeting a Hamas-controlled building and killed a commander in Hamas’ Nukhba Forces and six other Hamas fighters.[31] The IDF said that the Hamas Nukhba commander participated in attacks on Israeli towns near the Gaza Strip on October 7.[32] The 89th Commando Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) also killed three Hamas fighters in Khan Younis.[33] Israeli forces located weapons and RPGs in the area and destroyed a weapons cache.[34]

Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 12. The al Quds Brigades engaged Israeli forces in small arms clashes and fired an RPG targeting an Israeli bulldozer in Khan Younis City.[35] The al Quds Brigades also fired mortars targeting Israeli forces in central Khan Younis.[36] The al Quds Brigades said that it mortared Israeli forces in central Khan Younis in a combined operation with the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.[37]

The IDF said that Israeli forces have destroyed over 700 Hamas rockets and rocket launchers in the Gaza Strip since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[38] The IDF said on January 12 that the IDF Golani Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) destroyed rocket launchers in a cemetery in the Gaza Strip.[39] The IDF said that it aims to destroy Hamas’ rocket launching capabilities in the Gaza Strip and stop Hamas rocket attacks into Israel.[40] The al Qassem Brigades have only conducted five rocket attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip since December 21, indicating that Israeli operations have degraded Hamas’ rocket capability.[41]

The IDF said on January 11 that Israeli forces continue to locate and destroy Hamas tunnels in the Gaza Strip.[42] The IDF reported that Hamas has spent tens of millions of dollars constructing hundreds of kilometers of tunnels.[43] Unspecified senior Israeli officials told The Economist on January 11 that the IDF has yet to destroy half of Hamas’ tunnels in the Gaza Strip.[44]

The Gaza Strip is experiencing a large-scale internet blackout. A Palestine-based communication company announced a complete interruption of cellular, fixed, and internet services on January 12.[45] NetBlocks later confirmed that most residents are unlikely to have telecom services.[46]

The al Quds Brigades fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Ashdod in southern Israel on January 12.[47]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Several Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces conducting a raid in Nour Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm on January 12. The al Qassem Brigades said that its fighters, alongside other militias, clashed with Israeli forces in Nour Shams refugee camp.[48] The Tulkarm Battalion of the al Quds Brigades detonated two types of IEDs on Israeli armor and a bulldozer operating in the camp.[49] The al Quds Brigade also fired small arms at Israeli infantry during the multi-hour Israeli operation.[50] The Tulkarm Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades targeted Israeli forces in the camp with IEDs and small arms.[51] The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade said that it prepared to confront the Israeli operation after a raid killed three militants in Tulkarm on January 9.[52]

Palestinian fighters also attacked Israeli targets elsewhere in the West Bank on January 12. Unspecified Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces with IEDs and small arms in two towns in Jenin Governorate on January 12.[53] Three Palestinian fighters infiltrated into an Israeli settlement west of Hebron and fired small arms at an IDF force and a civilian there.[54] Israeli forces arrested four people in the overnight West Bank raids.[55]

Palestinians demonstrated in Ramallah in support of Gaza, Lebanon, and the Houthis on January 12.[56] Hamas called for the Ramallah demonstrations.[57]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) claimed five attacks into northern Israel targeting Israeli forces on January 12.[58]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks targeting Israel on January 12. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq stated that it attacked an unspecified Israeli military target in the Golan Heights and an unspecified target in Eilat.[59]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Bart Eide discussed the combined US-UK airstrikes targeting Houthi military positions in Yemen during a phone call on January 12.[60] Abdollahian emphasized that the Houthis are a permanent actor in the Middle East’s regional security and reiterated prior calls for providing humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip. The Houthis are not the internationally recognized government in Yemen.

Abdollahian and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan discussed the Israel-Hamas war during a phone call on January 11.[61] The two discussed the provision of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, the South Africa-led International Court of Justice case against Israel. The two also discussed efforts to bring about an end to the Israel-Hamas War.

4. Data as Ammunition: Hyper-Personalized Warfare in the Digital Age

We need strong "cyber civil defense" (everyone must contribute to protect their networks) and "personal cyber hygiene" (we need to protect our own personal data). We are all vulnerable.

Excerpts:

Analysis of this data by increasingly capable AI programs will be able to produce actionable intelligence on the military community writ large. This intelligence will likely contain not only factual data, but also increasingly accurate psychological profiles with corresponding vulnerabilities. Lower-ranking service members, their families, and by extension, their friends, may quickly find themselves in the digital crosshairs of a future conflict.

While intelligence files on these individuals may not necessarily lead to lethal outcomes, they could be used for disruptive attacks against the financial, social, and mental health of the military community. These types of attacks would impact the effectiveness of the military not just during a conflict, but prior to one as well.

The important distinction between individual attacks of the last century and this one is a matter of time and cost. The planning for both the Yamamoto and Soleimani attacks involved rigorous preparation, extended planning time, and thousands of hours of work before the strikes were launched.

Current capabilities can execute an automated digital attack in milliseconds and at virtually no cost, making it both easier and more lucrative to execute these types of attacks at scale. Although not yet widespread, imagine what these attacks might look like on service members, their families, and their friends.

Data as Ammunition: Hyper-Personalized Warfare in the Digital Age

By Brian Michelson

January 10, 2024

Rapid advances in artificial intelligence and vast amounts of personal data are enabling a new era of hyper-personalized warfare, where adversaries can conduct targeted digital attacks and psychological operations against individual service members, their families, and friends.

cepa.org · by Brian Michelson · January 10, 2024

This article is part of CEPA’s “Age of Autonomy” series, which looks at the growing use and implementation of autonomous technologies on the battlefield and its implications for transatlantic defense and security.

Weaponized data is the new ammunition in the coming era of hyper-personalized warfare. The ability to gather, process, and weaponize vast amounts of data on individuals is already a reality, and with every click, like, purchase, and online transaction, we have the potential to improve the information an adversary has on each of us. Fed by this vast amount of data, improving artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms will enable state and non-state adversaries to tailor large-scale digital operations to a level not previously seen.

While this phenomenon will have many unanticipated results, two trends bear especially close watching: the increasing ability of adversaries to use highly personalized digital attacks against servicemembers, their families, and their friends and the ability of adversaries to conduct large-scale psychological warfare at the individual level.

Targeting high-value military leaders has long been a common practice in war. From the 1943 precision strike on Admiral Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Combined Japanese Fleet, in Papua New Guinea to the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Force, at the Baghdad International Airport in 2020, deliberate attacks on individuals have had a significant effect on military conflicts. While past operations have taken considerable time, energy, and resources to conduct, the most significant limiting factor has often been accurate intelligence on the individuals themselves.

Yet, we now live in an age in which we have abundant information that can be quickly turned into intelligence. Cell phone data is ubiquitous, even in combat zones, as we have seen in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Less obvious is how enormous amounts of data is generated on, and by, service members during a peacetime environment.

Commercially available data, numerous and massive data breaches of government, commercial, and health care sites, social media, military discount registrations, facial recognition of publicly available photographs, Alexa, Siri, GPS tracking, and other sources all combine to offer a trove of data on servicemembers, and by extension, their families, and friends.

Analysis of this data by increasingly capable AI programs will be able to produce actionable intelligence on the military community writ large. This intelligence will likely contain not only factual data, but also increasingly accurate psychological profiles with corresponding vulnerabilities. Lower-ranking service members, their families, and by extension, their friends, may quickly find themselves in the digital crosshairs of a future conflict.

While intelligence files on these individuals may not necessarily lead to lethal outcomes, they could be used for disruptive attacks against the financial, social, and mental health of the military community. These types of attacks would impact the effectiveness of the military not just during a conflict, but prior to one as well.

The important distinction between individual attacks of the last century and this one is a matter of time and cost. The planning for both the Yamamoto and Soleimani attacks involved rigorous preparation, extended planning time, and thousands of hours of work before the strikes were launched.

Current capabilities can execute an automated digital attack in milliseconds and at virtually no cost, making it both easier and more lucrative to execute these types of attacks at scale. Although not yet widespread, imagine what these attacks might look like on service members, their families, and their friends.

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Personal disruptions would likely take the form of damage to a servicemember’s personal finances, social networks, career prospects, and other areas that will maximize their personal stress and pain levels and in so doing, reduce their effectiveness in their job. Losing access to financial accounts and seeing the resulting cascade of monetary issues, losing real and online “friends” due to implanted offensive posts and deep fake messaging, and having artificially created misconduct allegations brought against servicemembers will all have an operationally significant effect. The misconduct allegations can be especially dangerous as they can flag an individual as a security risk.

Attacks against family members could be the most devastating and take various forms mentioned above. During the past century, the US has had the luxury of fighting overseas with little risk to families. Most Western nations have all-volunteer forces, and knowing that families would be under attack would be a crippling moral blow to service members and their willingness to continue to serve. Attacks on friends would likely be either an effort to alienate them by manipulating social media and personal electronic correspondence, or an effort to have them express the futility of the operation.

Either way, the perceived loss of social status and friendship would have a negative impact on the service member during a period of high stress. Even if the issues described are all shown to be false and eventually resolved, all will take time and energy that will be in short supply. We must ask ourselves, why wouldn’t an adversary pursue this capability?

A second area that bears close watching pertains to how adversaries may use psychological warfare at the individual level to erode civil support for military operations. Western nations have been drifting towards postmodern worldviews and the corresponding relativistic approach to truth and morality.

This creates an easy path to arguments both about moral equivalency and demonization that can be used by both isolationist and interventionist factions respectively. Couple this with tailored messaging that is done both at scale and considers an individual’s psychological biases, and the result is an increasingly confused and polluted information environment.

In this environment, the isolationist faction of a country is of most use to an adversary. With sufficient and targeted efforts against selected individuals, it becomes easier for a society to ask, “Why are we in this conflict if our government is just as bad/evil/at fault as the other one? Why should we continue this conflict?”

While these are fair questions, what if a nation is in a justified conflict due to the necessity of defending its citizens, territory, or interests and is doing so within the bounds of the Western Jus in Bello (Just War) tradition? If an adversary can damage, break, or simply reduce civil support in their opponent by stoking isolationist sentiment to gain a strategic advantage, why wouldn’t they pursue this capability?

As we step into a future full of possibilities and risks, there are no easy solutions. A few initial steps are available to start. First, we must accept that future conflicts will be psychological knife fights in which truth will be hotly contested with increasingly capable and sophisticated digital tools.

Secondly, we can educate and inform military members and their families about the very real likelihood of them becoming primary targets in coming conflicts. We then owe them, and must develop, the tools and infrastructure they will need to quickly deal with these attacks.

Lastly, senior leaders will need to be proactive about explaining the moral nature of the conflicts we are facing and what to expect from our adversaries in terms of information warfare. While we are susceptible to the above issues, so are our future opponents. The question is, who will wield these capabilities best?

Colonel (Ret.) Brian M. Michelson is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with CEPA’s Transatlantic Defense Tech Initiative.

The views expressed in this article are the views of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Europe's Edge

CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.

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cepa.org · by Brian Michelson · January 10, 2024

5. Taiwan’s January 2024 Elections: What You Need to Know

Excerpts:

4 Factors Likely to Shape the Outcome

Factor 1: Managing Relations with China Properly

Factor 2: Party Affiliation

Factor 3: Dissatisfaction With Incumbents

Factor 4: Opposition United or Divided?

At this point, Lai must be regarded as the favorite to win a plurality in the election, although turnout and strategic voting may still give Hou the victory. The outcome of the legislative elections is less clear, with a significant chance that the DPP will not maintain a majority even if Lai wins the presidential election.

If Lai wins, he is unlikely to cross Beijing’s explicit red lines for the use of force by declaring independence or calling for a referendum on Taiwan’s status. His refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus or to negotiate substitute language suggests that cross-strait dialogue will remain suspended, that Beijing will increase pressure on Taiwan, and that cross-strait tensions will continue to rise.

Lai’s remarks in the presidential debate, when he questioned whether the Republic of China Constitution provides a basis for engaging China, suggest that he will continue the project of building a separate Taiwan cultural and political identity. These efforts are likely to eventually press the limits of Beijing’s tolerance, and perhaps Washington’s as well.

If Lai confronts a KMT majority legislature, he is likely to have difficulty following through on DPP pledges to increase defense spending and arms purchases, even though the KMT also supports those goals. DPP efforts to lengthen conscription service to one year and reorganize Taiwan’s reserve forces may also meet opposition.

A Hou victory would likely produce a resumption of cross-strait dialogue and a reduction in military tensions. However, a narrow election victory would not give Hou and the KMT much of a mandate to strengthen economic and political ties with Beijing. If Hou follows previous KMT President Ma Ying-jeou’s approach of seeking to postpone discussion of political issues, Beijing is likely to eventually lose patience and begin to apply more pressure on Taiwan. A KMT government under Hou would continue efforts to strengthen the Taiwan military and maintain good relations with the United States, but likely with less urgency.

Taiwan’s January 2024 Elections: What You Need to Know

thediplomat.com

Introducing the three presidential candidates and reviewing four factors likely to shape the outcome.

By Phillip C. Saunders

January 12, 2024

Supporters cheer for the Democratic Progressive Party during an elections rally in New Taipei City, Taiwan on Jan. 6, 2024.

Credit: AP Photo/Ng Han Guan

On January 13, Taiwan will hold presidential and legislative elections. Taiwan’s voters will cast one vote for president, one vote for a candidate running for the legislature in their home district, and one vote for their preferred party. The candidate with the most votes will win the presidency, even if they have a plurality rather than a majority. The 113-seat Legislative Yuan will be filled by winners of electoral districts (73 seats); indigenous constituencies (6 seats); and party list voting (34 seats).

Below, I introduce the three presidential candidates and review four factors likely to shape the outcome: 1) candidate positions on cross-strait relations; 2) party affiliation; 3) dissatisfaction with incumbents; and 4) whether the opposition is united or divided. The goal is to provide readers with a framework for interpreting the election results, which will be known the same day as the voting.

Final polling data suggests Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate William Lai holds a 3-6 point lead and is likely to win with a plurality of votes against a divided opposition, though Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih could still eke out a victory. Even if Lai wins, it is not clear that the DPP will maintain a majority in the Legislative Yuan.

Introducing the Presidential Candidates

William Lai, also known as Lai Ching-te, the current vice president, is the DPP presidential candidate. He has extensive political experience and has held a small lead in public opinion polls over the other candidates throughout the campaign.

Lai has called himself a “worker for Taiwan independence” in the past, but holds to the DPP position that a formal declaration of independence is unnecessary because Taiwan is already a sovereign independent state. Lai and the DPP have rejected Beijing’s “one country, two systems” model for unification and do not accept the “1992 Consensus,” which Beijing has made a condition for cross-strait dialogue. During the campaign, Lai has projected a moderate position on cross-strait relations and stated that he will continue current President Tsai Ing-wen’s policies toward the mainland.

Lai’s running mate is Hsiao Bi-khim, a DPP politician who previously served as Taiwan’s representative to the United States.

Hou Yu-ih, currently the mayor of New Taipei City (Taiwan’s largest city, with a population of 4 million), is the presidential candidate for the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan’s main opposition party. Hou has an extensive law enforcement background, including as head of the National Police Agency from 2006 to 2008. He lacks deep political ties within the KMT; he was chosen as the party’s presidential candidate based on his administrative skills, perceived electability, and moderate position on cross-strait issues.

Hou opposes Taiwan independence and supports the KMT’s interpretation of the 1992 Consensus (one China, separate interpretations) but has rejected Beijing’s unpopular “one country, two systems” formula. His campaign has emphasized his ability to stabilize cross-strait relations through active dialogue with Beijing.

Hou chose KMT stalwart and media personality Jaw Shaw-kong as his running mate.

Ko Wen-je, former mayor of Taipei, is the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) presidential candidate. Ko is an accomplished surgeon who specialized in organ transplants before turning to politics and winning the Taipei mayoral election as an independent candidate in 2014. Ko subsequently established the TPP as an alternative to the DPP and the KMT and as a vehicle for his presidential ambitions. He presents a populist argument of representing the people without being beholden to party ideology.

Ko has stated that “the two sides of the strait are part of one family” but sought to maintain ambiguity about what that means. He is viewed as seeking to maintain the cross-strait status quo and resume dialogue with China to maintain peace in the Taiwan strait.

Ko’s running mate is Cynthia Wu Hsin-ying, a Taiwanese business executive currently serving as a TPP legislator.

4 Factors Likely to Shape the Outcome

Factor 1: Managing Relations with China Properly

Candidates for the presidency must persuade the Taiwan electorate that they will manage relations with mainland China properly. “Properly” means in accordance with mainstream public opinion, which prefers to maintain the political status quo of de facto independence in order to avoid a military conflict with China.

For candidates that view Taiwan as part of China and who nominally support unification at some future point, this requires standing up to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and resisting pressure to accept its definition of Taiwan’s status (as a province of the People’s Republic of China) or to enter premature political talks on unification. For candidates who support Taiwan independence, this requires assuring the electorate that they will not take provocative actions that would lead to a Chinese attack on Taiwan or severely damage cross-strait trade and investment ties, which are critical to Taiwan’s economy.

Given the underlying positions of the pro-independence DPP and the pro-unification KMT, candidates from these parties need to send different messages to reassure the Taiwan electorate (and interested parties such as the United States and Japan) of their ability to manage relations with Beijing. DPP candidates need to convey that they will behave prudently and avoid provocations; KMT candidates need to convey that they will stand up for Taiwan and resist CCP pressure.

China has sought to raise doubts about the DPP’s ability to manage cross-strait relations. Since Tsai’s inauguration in 2016, PRC officials have refused to talk directly with her administration because Tsai has not accepted the 1992 Consensus. Although cross-strait economic relations tether Taiwan to the mainland and benefit the Chinese economy via imports of Taiwan electronic components and technology, PRC leaders have at times used restrictions on trade and tourism to pressure Taiwan leaders.

Beijing may eventually decide that its goal of peaceful unification requires a more substantial disruption of cross-strait economic ties to pressure Taiwan into political talks. Such an action would challenge the positions of all of Taiwan’s parties.

Factor 2: Party Affiliation

Taiwan has evolved from an authoritarian one-party state into a multi-party democracy. Party affiliation is a significant factor in Taiwan politics, though less important than in the United States.

Surveys by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University show about 30 percent of the electorate identifying with the DPP, about 20 percent identifying with the KMT, and about 12 percent identifying with the newer TPP (as of June 2023). About 40 percent consider themselves independent or did not respond to the question. Late 2023 polls show DPP support at 28-31 percent, KMT support at 22-26 percent support, and the TPP with 13-14 percent.

Neither the DPP nor the KMT has enough committed supporters to win national elections without appealing to independent voters and those willing to cross party lines.

Party affiliation matters most for the legislative elections, where voters will cast one vote for a candidate running for the legislature in their home district and one vote for their preferred party. This system rewards a party’s ability to run strong candidates and turn out their voters in districts across the country. It penalizes smaller parties like the TPP that cannot readily win individual districts (the TPP’s five current legislators were all elected via the party list).

Factor 3: Dissatisfaction With Incumbents

Taiwan faces a range of persistent governance challenges, including dealing with the military and political threat posed by mainland China, maintaining growth and creating jobs in a mature economy, and providing health care and pensions for its population of 23 million people. These challenges are exacerbated by a relatively low tax burden, which limits the government’s ability to spend to meet these societal demands.

These seemingly intractable challenges have produced a recurring pattern where dissatisfaction with the ruling party’s performance causes a drop in public support over time and provides a political opportunity for other parties. This dynamic partly explains the outcome of presidential elections in 2008 and 2016; in both cases, the incumbent president was ineligible to run again due to term limits, and voters elected a president from the opposition rather than choosing a successor from the ruling party. The same sentiments could be a negative factor for the ruling DPP in the presidential and legislative elections.

The polls have consistently shown more total support for opposition party presidential candidates than for Lai, the ruling DPP candidate. An October 2023 poll also indicated that more than half of those surveyed thought rotation of the presidency away from the DPP would be beneficial for Taiwan’s democracy.

Factor 4: Opposition United or Divided?

Given the DPP’s limited core support base and evidence that the Taiwan public supports change, much of the electoral campaign has been focused on whether the opposition can unite behind a single candidate, or whether multiple opposition candidates would allow the DPP candidate to win with a plurality of votes.

Hou and Ko discussed forming a KMT-TPP unity ticket, but talks stalled on the question of who would be the presidential candidate and who would be the vice-presidential candidate. An agreement to use a series of public opinion polls to decide who would head the ticket broke down over questions about how to interpret the polling results; both Hou and Ko ultimately registered as presidential candidates under their own party affiliations.

This split in the opposition gives Lai an excellent chance to win the presidential election with a plurality of the vote. The outcome will be determined partly by turnout, partly by appeal to independent and crossover voters, and partly by whether Ko’s supporters will decide to support the TPP leader (who is running third in most polls) even if that makes Lai more likely to win.

It is generally assumed that most of Ko’s voters would prefer Hou over Lai and might vote strategically for their second-choice candidate. However, given that Ko’s supporters tend to be younger and more independent, some will vote for Ko anyway to make a political statement, some might support Lai instead of Hou, and some may choose not to vote at all.

Given the structure of Taiwan’s legislative elections, there is also a chance that the DPP may lose its legislative majority even if Lai wins the presidential election. If the KMT wins an outright majority, it would be in a position to block DPP initiatives. If smaller parties (including the TPP) hold the balance in the legislature, the DPP would have to bid for their support, perhaps on an issue-by-issue basis.

Implications

In the final surveys before the polling blackout that began on January 3, Lai was in the lead with 36 percent support, followed by Hou at 31 percent, and Ko at 24 percent. Most other polls also showed Lai with a 3-6 point lead over Hou, with Ko running a distant third. These results have been fairly consistent since the candidates were officially registered.

At this point, Lai must be regarded as the favorite to win a plurality in the election, although turnout and strategic voting may still give Hou the victory. The outcome of the legislative elections is less clear, with a significant chance that the DPP will not maintain a majority even if Lai wins the presidential election.

If Lai wins, he is unlikely to cross Beijing’s explicit red lines for the use of force by declaring independence or calling for a referendum on Taiwan’s status. His refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus or to negotiate substitute language suggests that cross-strait dialogue will remain suspended, that Beijing will increase pressure on Taiwan, and that cross-strait tensions will continue to rise.

Lai’s remarks in the presidential debate, when he questioned whether the Republic of China Constitution provides a basis for engaging China, suggest that he will continue the project of building a separate Taiwan cultural and political identity. These efforts are likely to eventually press the limits of Beijing’s tolerance, and perhaps Washington’s as well.

If Lai confronts a KMT majority legislature, he is likely to have difficulty following through on DPP pledges to increase defense spending and arms purchases, even though the KMT also supports those goals. DPP efforts to lengthen conscription service to one year and reorganize Taiwan’s reserve forces may also meet opposition.

A Hou victory would likely produce a resumption of cross-strait dialogue and a reduction in military tensions. However, a narrow election victory would not give Hou and the KMT much of a mandate to strengthen economic and political ties with Beijing. If Hou follows previous KMT President Ma Ying-jeou’s approach of seeking to postpone discussion of political issues, Beijing is likely to eventually lose patience and begin to apply more pressure on Taiwan. A KMT government under Hou would continue efforts to strengthen the Taiwan military and maintain good relations with the United States, but likely with less urgency.

Authors

Guest Author

Phillip C. Saunders

Dr. Phillip Saunders is the director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

INSS Research Assistant Lauren Edson provided research support for this analysis.

thediplomat.com

6. Ukraine’s Fifth Column Shoots, Burns, and Poisons Deep Inside Russia

Excerpts:

Today, there are two “fifth column” groups operating in Russia and in Russia-occupied Ukraine. Rospartizan is an anti-Putin Russian group that conducts and reports on bombings, arson attacks, poisonings and train derailments across Russia. The Rospartizan Telegram channel features these attacks from the last week alone: destruction by arson of the headquarters building in Chechnya of the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, the largest Chechen unit fighting in Ukraine; an arson attack on the St. Petersburg apartment of Trofim Tatarenkov, a pro-war propagandist on Sputnik radio; and two attacks on militarily strategic rail lines.

The first of these, Rospartizan says, was the bombing of a fuel tanker rail car in Nizhny Tagil. This industrial city in the Urals is Russia’s largest producer of T-14, T-72, and T-90 battle tanks for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Separately, on Monday morning, Rospartizan reported about 20 freight cars derailed on a section of the Trans-Siberian Railway 150 miles north of China. Train traffic stopped on the railway, the main corridor for arms shipments from North Korea to Russia. Train sabotage has become so frequent in Russia and its satellite Belarus, that Belarus has instituted the death penalty for people convicted of planning them.

...

The other main “fifth columnist” group, Atesh, was set up in 2022 by a new Ukrainian military unit, the National Resistance Center. Meaning “fire” in Crimean Tatar, Atesh was originally centered in Crimea. In recent months, it has aggressively expanded across Russia and now claims it has over 1,000 collaborators. Imagine France’s World War II resistance movement with a national Telegram channel, eight regional Telegram channels, and three sign up email addresses.

“Atesh is expanding and creating a number of autonomous cells on the territory of the Russian Federation,” the group announces in its latest post on Telegram. “Regional centers were created in: Ichkeria [Chechnya] Kaliningrad, Buryatia, Tyva, Ingushetia. Dagestan. Cells also operate in Siberia and Tatarstan. We increasingly received messages about the desire to help from various regions of the Russian Federation.”

Ukraine’s Fifth Column Shoots, Burns, and Poisons Deep Inside Russia

A 16-year-old boy setting a $50 million war plane on fire is just the tip of a large iceberg.​

JAMES BROOKE

Friday, January 12, 2024

17:34:04 pm

nysun.com

The director of a Russian state propaganda TV channel was found poisoned in her home last weekend at Krasnodar, some 400 miles south of Ukraine. A bomb disrupted rail traffic Sunday at Nizhny Tagil, home to the world’s largest tank factory, 1,400 miles east of Ukraine.

A 16-year-old boy was arrested last week for torching a $50 million SU war jet, at Chelyabinsk, 1,100 miles east of Ukraine’s border. A TV announcer who said that Ukrainian children should be drowned is struggling to recover from near fatal poisoning at Moscow, 400 miles north of Ukraine.

Shortly after President Putin launched his attack on Ukraine, Mr. Putin went on national television to warn Russians to be on high alert for “fifth columnists.” He said: “The Russian people will always be able to distinguish true patriots from scum and traitors and will simply spit them out like a gnat that accidentally flew into their mouths — spit them out on the pavement.”

Fallen out of fashion among English-speakers, the phrase “fifth column” dates back to 1936, when Spain’s Francisco Franco said four of his rebel columns were approaching Madrid — and a fifth column would attack the capital from inside. Mr. Putin adapts the phrase to his own family history.

In 1944, the future president’s father, also Vladimir, was parachuted into Nazi-occupied Germany with a 28-member NKVD unit. Estonian farmers “betrayed” the Soviets. Mr. Putin’s father was one of only four survivors. Now, after almost two years of war, Mr. Putin’s prediction about “fifth columnists” is coming true.

Today, there are two “fifth column” groups operating in Russia and in Russia-occupied Ukraine. Rospartizan is an anti-Putin Russian group that conducts and reports on bombings, arson attacks, poisonings and train derailments across Russia. The Rospartizan Telegram channel features these attacks from the last week alone: destruction by arson of the headquarters building in Chechnya of the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, the largest Chechen unit fighting in Ukraine; an arson attack on the St. Petersburg apartment of Trofim Tatarenkov, a pro-war propagandist on Sputnik radio; and two attacks on militarily strategic rail lines.

The first of these, Rospartizan says, was the bombing of a fuel tanker rail car in Nizhny Tagil. This industrial city in the Urals is Russia’s largest producer of T-14, T-72, and T-90 battle tanks for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Separately, on Monday morning, Rospartizan reported about 20 freight cars derailed on a section of the Trans-Siberian Railway 150 miles north of China. Train traffic stopped on the railway, the main corridor for arms shipments from North Korea to Russia. Train sabotage has become so frequent in Russia and its satellite Belarus, that Belarus has instituted the death penalty for people convicted of planning them.

Inside Russia, many attacks are carried out by disgruntled “lone wolves” with no formal connection to a resistance organization. Last Sunday, a 16-year-old boy was detained on suspicion of breaking into an airfield in Chelyabinsk and setting fire to a Su-34 fighter bomber. Russia’s most modern war jet, the Su-34 has a NATO reporting name of ‘Fullback’ and a price tag of $50 million. Video clips posted online appear to show the cockpit in flames. Although the unnamed suspect has no criminal record, he is believed to have set fire to two railroad facilities in his native Dagestan, reports Chelyabinsk news site 74.ru.

In another unclaimed attack, a mysterious fire last Sunday destroyed the Ryazan house of Roman Putin, a 45-year-old son of a cousin of the president, according to video and texts posted on a Telegram channel in Ryazan, 125 miles southeast of Moscow. Last year, arsonists burned down his hotel in the Russian Arctic, causing $10 million in damages. He reportedly had offered to house 500 refugees from Russia-occupied Ukraine. Trading on the family name, Roman Putin set up Putin Consulting Ltd., and became a multi-millionaire by helping foreign investors enter Russia. In 2020, he was elected president of a pro-government party, Russia Without Corruption, according to Ria Novosti.

The other main “fifth columnist” group, Atesh, was set up in 2022 by a new Ukrainian military unit, the National Resistance Center. Meaning “fire” in Crimean Tatar, Atesh was originally centered in Crimea. In recent months, it has aggressively expanded across Russia and now claims it has over 1,000 collaborators. Imagine France’s World War II resistance movement with a national Telegram channel, eight regional Telegram channels, and three sign up email addresses.

“Atesh is expanding and creating a number of autonomous cells on the territory of the Russian Federation,” the group announces in its latest post on Telegram. “Regional centers were created in: Ichkeria [Chechnya] Kaliningrad, Buryatia, Tyva, Ingushetia. Dagestan. Cells also operate in Siberia and Tatarstan. We increasingly received messages about the desire to help from various regions of the Russian Federation.”

Atesh’s Telegram channels largely post reports of car bombings and streams of smartphone photographs of Russian military bases around Crimea and Western Russia. Atesh claims that this on the ground intelligence leads to concrete actions. Thursday saw the burial of the top commander in Crimea of radar and anti-missile units, Colonel Vadim Ismagilov of the Russian military. He was killed Jan. 4 in a daytime missile strike on a radar command post near Sevastopol. Last year, a Russian major general described Colonel Ismagilov’s unit as “the eyes and ears” of Russian air defense in Crimea.

Poisoning is a favorite tactic used by pro-Ukraine resisters. A group called “Crimea Combat Seagulls” claimed in a Telegram post last month to have poisoned and killed 46 Russian soldiers in Crimea. Two young women allegedly delivered to a Russian base food and drink adulterated with arsenic and rat poison.

“Two cute girls came to the checkpoint of the military unit and introduced themselves as local residents,” the post states. “They brought seven bottles of vodka and some snacks — fish, sausage, bread, cheese. They told the guards that they wanted to thank our boys for everything, for protecting them.”

In November at Melitopol, a Ukrainian occupied city, four FSB agents were poisoned by takeout food adulterated with rat poison and arsenic. Three died and the takeout food driver disappeared, Melitopol’s mayor-in-exile Ivan Fedorov told Ukrainian TV. In October, a Ukrainian driver in western Russia was arrested after delivering a poisoned cake and bottles of whisky to a 20th class reunion celebration for 77 Russian Air Force pilots, reported Russian a military blogger site, ‘Fighterbomber.’ On September 29, seven people died of poisoning after attending the funeral reception at Sevastopol for a Russian Navy officer, reports the Russia-based Telegram channel Kremlyevskaya Tabakerka.

State media propagandists are also targets for poisoning. Last weekend state television director Zoya Konovalova was found poisoned to death in her home. Ms. Konovalova, aged 48, was editor-in-chief of Russian state TV in Kuban, a region neighboring Ukraine. Last month, Anna Tsareva, deputy editor-in-chief of Komsomolskaya Pravda news site, was found dead in her Moscow apartment at age 35.

Late last month, leading Putin TV propagandist Anton Krasovsky was poisoned in his apartment in Moscow, he reported from a hospital bed in his Telegram channel. Krasovsky, age 48 was formerly broadcast director for RT, Russian international media arm. On air, Mr. Krasovky had called for a “final solution” to the Ukrainian problem. This would include beheading Ukrainian prisoners and drowning or burning Ukrainian children.

The challenge for the Kremlin is that most Russian-speaking Ukrainians can pass for Russians. In the North America context, most Canadians could pass for Americans.

In response, Putin once again takes a leaf out of World War II history. He has revived “Smersh,” Stalin’s counterintelligence organization, as the Sun has reported. The name means “Death to Spies.” On Monday, Britain’s Defense Intelligence reported that agents with “Smersh” patches had been spotted in Russia-occupied Ukraine. Smersh operated between 1942 and 1946, torturing and executing supposed spies and traitors. A decade later, Ian Fleming adopted the name for a fictional international criminal syndicate that matched wits with James Bond in Bond novels and movies.

In real life, much of the counter espionage in Russia-occupied Ukraine is carried about by Rosgvardiya, or the Russian National Guard, a military organization run by a former bodyguard of Mr. Putin, Viktor Zolotov. It has 35,000 troops assigned to occupied areas and charged with ‘filtration’ of the population and detection of partisans, according to Ukraine’s National Resistance Center.

“This is exactly how their ‘grandfathers’ [who served] in the ranks of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR acted when Soviet troops occupied Western Ukraine and the Baltic countries after 1945,” says the Resistance Center. “These units are responsible for the preservation of Putin’s ruling regime and his entourage on the territory of the Russian Federation itself, it can be argued that Putin’s Rosgvardia is the Russian analogue of the Gestapo from the times of the Third Reich.”

To pacify Western Ukraine in the late 1940s, the Soviets killed 153,000 Ukrainians, arrested 134,000 and deported 203,000. From the Ukrainian side, partisans killed 30,676 people. In 1975, when Mr. Putin joined the KGB, its upper ranks were filled with officers experienced with pacifying Ukraine two decades earlier.

nysun.com

7. ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ Review: Dreams of Empire

Another one for my "to read pile of books."

Excerpt:

Mr. Fiennes’s “Lawrence of Arabia: My Journey in Search of T.E. Lawrence” is a casually elegant biography and an expert reflection on the kind of irregular warfare that Lawrence pioneered and Mr. Fiennes experienced as a young officer fighting a Marxist insurgency in the mountains of Oman in the late 1960s. Lawrence’s example, Mr. Fiennes writes, preceded him and “often inspired me to victory in life-or-death situations.” But Lawrence was also his companion in facing “impossible military and political odds, as well as confronting personal scars.”

‘Lawrence of Arabia’ Review: Dreams of Empire

Ranulph Fiennes goes in search of T.E. Lawrence, a man who became famous fighting for a Middle East that would never be.

https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/books/lawrence-of-arabia-review-dreams-of-empire-7e8e64ca

By Dominic Green

Jan. 12, 2024 12:51 pm ET

Feisal, center, with T.E. Lawrence, middle row, second from right, at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919. PHOTO: PEGASUS

The British explorer Ranulph Fiennes is the first person to have crossed Antarctica on foot and the only living person to have circumnavigated the planet by its poles. In 2000 he fell through the ice while walking solo to the North Pole, leaving the fingertips of his left hand severely frostbitten. When he got home, Mr. Fiennes, a veteran of the elite Special Air Service, trimmed the fingertips with a saw, saving himself £6,000 in medical expenses and, he says, considerable pain.

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Lawrence of Arabia: My Journey in Search of T. E. Lawrence

By Ranulph Fiennes

Pegasus Books

352 pages

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In 2003 Mr. Fiennes had a heart attack and a bypass operation, then completed seven marathons on seven continents in seven days. In 2009 he reached the summit of Mount Everest on the third attempt. His other feats of endurance include writing more than 30 books, including biographies of the polar pioneers Ernest Shackleton and Robert Falcon Scott, handbooks for ultrarunners and travelers with weak hearts, and the perhaps inevitable family history “Mad Dogs and Englishmen.”

Mr. Fiennes (pronounced “Fines”) is a classic English type, the diffident hero and driven adventurer. He is the square peg who inspires irregular soldiers in inhospitable places. He crosses deserts, forests and frozen wastes, facing down danger and the limits of human endurance, death included.

The rarest such figure, combining all these characteristics of imperial legend with lasting historical significance, was T.E. Lawrence (1888-1935). Dubbed Lawrence of Arabia in his lifetime and immortalized twice over, once by himself in his 1926 memoir “Seven Pillars of Wisdom” and again by Peter O’Toole in the 1962 movie “Lawrence of Arabia,” Lawrence played a crucial but thwarted role in the shaping of the modern Middle East.

19 BOOKS WE READ THIS WEEK

A new biography of the adventurer T.E. Lawrence, Einstein’s complex genius, a political party’s transformation and more.

In 1916 Britain was at war with Germany’s Ottoman Turkish allies. Lawrence, an archaeologist turned intelligence officer, helped organize the Arab tribes of the Hejaz (today’s western Saudi Arabia) into a guerrilla army and led the Arab Revolt that, in October 1918, displaced the Turks from Damascus. The revolt raised hopes for a unified, self-determining Arab nation, but Lawrence’s political masters and their French allies connived at frustrating that ambition. After the war, the British and French took over from the Turks and created new borders and nations. The events of that era still complicate today’s local and global politics.

Mr. Fiennes’s “Lawrence of Arabia: My Journey in Search of T.E. Lawrence” is a casually elegant biography and an expert reflection on the kind of irregular warfare that Lawrence pioneered and Mr. Fiennes experienced as a young officer fighting a Marxist insurgency in the mountains of Oman in the late 1960s. Lawrence’s example, Mr. Fiennes writes, preceded him and “often inspired me to victory in life-or-death situations.” But Lawrence was also his companion in facing “impossible military and political odds, as well as confronting personal scars.”

The second of five sons, Lawrence grew up in a villa in Oxford. Fascinated by military history, especially the Crusades and Napoleon Bonaparte, he was pushed by his mother to achieve greatness. Lawrence’s motives in risking his life, Mr. Fiennes writes, were not just “his attachment to the Arabs and his hatred for the Ottomans.” He was not who he claimed to be or who he wanted to be. “Lawrence” was an assumed name. His father, an Irish baronet named Thomas Chapman, had eloped with the family maid. When Chapman’s wife refused to grant a divorce, he and his mistress adopted a new name and pretended to be married. Lawrence’s mother saddled him with the “burden that he was special” and a mission to “redeem the family.” Raised a strict Christian, Lawrence was 10 years old when he discovered his illegitimacy.

He became a feted student at Oxford, then cultivated the English romance with tribal life while digging at ancient Carchemish, north of Aleppo, Syria, from 1911 to 1914. “I am Arab in habits and slip in talking from English to French to Arabic unnoticing,” he wrote home. When war broke out in 1914, the British army needed Arabic speakers with local knowledge. Lawrence’s old Oxford tutor, now an intelligence officer, summoned him to Cairo as a mapmaker and adviser. But Lawrence already had a plan to redraw the map by unifying the Arab tribes against the Turks. “I want to pull them all together,” he wrote in 1915, “and roll up Syria by way of the Hedjaz” in the name of Hussein Ibn Ali, the Emir of Mecca.

Meanwhile Hussein and his four sons secretly planned their own revolt, but needed weapons and support. The British could not spare soldiers, but they sent Hussein money and antique rifles, as well as a promise from Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt, to recognize Hussein’s rule from Aleppo to Aden if the revolt succeeded.

In July 1916, Hussein’s followers expelled the Turkish garrison from Mecca but, lacking heavy weapons, they were repulsed at the ports of Jidda, Yenbo and Rabegh. In October, with the revolt stalled and British confidence faltering, Lawrence sailed from Egypt for Jidda. From there, he disguised himself in Arab robes, crossed roughly 100 miles of desert by camel through sandstorms, bearing the heat and weeping saddle sores, met Hussein’s son Feisal at the rebel camp and launched his legend.

Lawrence said he preferred “the Arab untouched” to the “perfectly hopeless vulgarity of the half-Europeanized Arab.” In Feisal he found his ideal partner, tall and white-robed, with a “strange still watchfulness” and an “almost regal” bearing that reminded Lawrence of Richard the Lionheart and the young Napoleon. Returning to Cairo, Lawrence secured explosives, the support of Royal Navy ships and British advisers “to train Arab bands,” and a supply of gold.

The Turks controlled the Red Sea ports of the Hejaz via their new Damascus-Medina railroad. Lawrence soon saw that the Arabs could not match well-drilled Turkish troops and their German-supplied artillery. Inland, however, Lawrence believed that the tribesmen’s mobility, small numbers and familiarity with “one of the most trying countries in the world for civilized warfare” made them “the most elusive enemy an army ever had.” Lawrence convinced Feisal to adopt an indirect strategy: disrupt and pin down the Turks by sabotaging the railroad line, then bypass and isolate the Turkish garrisons at Medina and the Red Sea ports and push northward to Syria.

In November 1917, Ottoman troops captured Lawrence, disguised as a peasant, as he spied out the railroad junction of Deraa. He was brutally beaten and raped by the Turkish governor and his men. The shame he felt after that episode was only multiplied at the end of the war: After he entered Damascus on Oct. 1, 1918, in a Rolls Royce, he had to watch as the British commander Edmund Allenby informed Feisal that Britain and France did not intend to honor McMahon’s promises of a unified Arab kingdom.

Damaged by his experiences in Arabia and disenchanted by the political aftermath, Lawrence became a celebrity when “Seven Pillars of Wisdom” appeared in 1926, then did his best to disappear, enlisting in the Royal Air Force under an assumed name. He died in a motorbike accident in 1935.

During the height of the Cold War, Mr. Fiennes was a tank commander in Germany. In 1967, bored with waiting for the Soviet invasion that never came, he volunteered for a posting in Oman, where Chinese- and Russian-funded tribesmen had rebelled against Said bin Taimur, an aging sultan who kept all the oil revenues to himself. At the beginning all Mr. Fiennes knew was that Oman was “somewhere in Arabia.” That prompted a vision of Lawrence “thrillingly leading the Arab tribes on his camel, his white robes flowing behind him”—an “exciting image,” Mr. Fiennes now realizes, of Peter O’Toole as Lawrence.

The reality of Oman also resembled Lawrence’s myth, albeit with air support. Mr. Fiennes’s recruits struggled with their drills but had an intuitive grasp of the mountainous terrain. Lawrence had difficulty executing a murderer in the ranks; Mr. Fiennes, a trained soldier, shot an enemy fighter point-blank but still found himself haunted by his “scared face.” Lawrence was raped; Mr. Fiennes tracked down Salim Amr, the communist torturer “renowned for lowering male villagers over a fire with their legs spread apart so that their most sensitive parts would be kippered slowly but surely.”

Lawrence’s commitment to his heroic dream led to what he called “the complete ruin of my plans and hopes.” Mr. Fiennes faced similar disillusion. The sultan, as he puts it, denied the Omani people “their rightful inheritance” and kept them in medieval poverty while the foreign managers of Petroleum Development Oman Ltd. reclined in a “luxurious air-conditioned” compound that “was like something out of St. Tropez.” Lawrence came to feel shame at his “daily posturing in alien dress.” Only when Mr. Fiennes returned to Oman in 1973, when a new sultan was sharing the profits with his people, could he “look back with pride” at the role he had played in clearing the way for such change.

“No man is unblemished, particularly those who reach for greatness,” writes Mr. Fiennes, a fine biographer and autobiographer. Lawrence’s strategy in the Hejaz, he argues, “saved many Arab lives” and “continues to inspire military operations and guerrilla rebellions throughout the world.” The empire that Lawrence served is gone, and the Arab states in whose birth he played a crucial role are in chaos, but his hold on the English imagination endures in the postimperial age. Mr. Fiennes has written a subtle and sympathetic account of a hero who did not want to be known.

Mr. Green is a Journal contributor and a fellow at the Royal Historical Society.

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the January 13, 2024, print edition.

8. Taiwan Voters Defy Beijing in Electing New President

PRC/CCP political warfare and subversion are not working. How will Beijing react?

Taiwan Voters Defy Beijing in Electing New President

Lai Ching-te’s victory will likely maintain the status quo—and the geopolitical tensions—around the island and between Washington and Beijing

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/taiwan-presidential-elections-2024-baa62e17?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Joyu Wang

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Updated Jan. 13, 2024 8:56 am ET

Lai Ching-te’s Democratic Progressive Party secured an unprecedented third straight term in the presidency. PHOTO: YASUYOSHI CHIBA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

TAIPEI—China’s least preferred candidate declared victory in Taiwan’s presidential vote on Saturday after his rivals conceded, extending the dominance of a ruling party that Beijing has denounced as a separatist force and raising the specter of four more years of geopolitical tensions around the island democracy.

Taiwanese Vice President Lai Ching-te was set to claim more than 40% of the vote in a rare and volatile three-way race, beating out second-place finisher Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, by roughly 7 percentage points.

The result gives the ruling Democratic Progressive Party an unprecedented third straight term in the presidency, and signals that self-ruled Taiwan will continue to travel along the political and economic trajectory away from Beijing established under outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen, who is stepping down due to term limits.

“In the global election year of 2024, in this most anticipated first election, Taiwan has scored the first victory for democracy, ” Lai said in his victory speech, referring to the roughly four dozen national elections scheduled to be held around the globe this year.

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In the run-up to Taiwan’s presidential election, government officials and NGOs say the island has been targeted by thousands of disinformation attacks, which authorities say is an attempt by China to influence the pivotal vote. China has denied it is trying to interfere. Photo Composite: Diana Chan

U.S. officials are bracing for China to increase the pressure on Taiwan after Saturday’s election, officials and foreign-policy scholars said. China’s Communist government, which claims Taiwan as its territory despite never ruling here, has painted Lai and his running mate—Hsiao Bi-khim, until late last year Taipei’s de facto ambassador in Washington—as proponents of Taiwan independence, a red line for Beijing.

“China has opinions about me and Bi-khim, and that’s because both of us are steadfast in upholding Taiwan’s sovereignty,” Lai said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal last month. He portrayed himself as a steadfast defender of peace.

On Friday, a spokesman for China’s Defense Ministry said the Chinese military would “take all necessary measures to resolutely crush any form of secessionist designs for ‘Taiwan independence.’” 

The Biden administration has urged Beijing not to raise the heat on Taiwan, concerned that an aggressive response could unravel a recent steadying of U.S.-China ties. The White House has also sought to reassure Chinese officials of their own carefulness in dealing with the island.

Supporters wave flags outside the Democratic Progressive Party’s headquarters. PHOTO: AN RONG XU/BLOOMBERG NEWS

Chinese academics outlined Beijing’s general plans for a pressure campaign in meetings and online discussions involving American foreign policy specialists and former Chinese officials, participants of those meetings said.

While the Chinese interlocutors didn’t specify what actions would be taken and how soon, the pressure is expected to take a range of forms, from stepped-up military drills to economic measures, the participants said. Incursions by Chinese naval vessels into Taiwan’s 12-nautical mile territorial limit or flyovers by drones across the island are among the possible tactics, they said.

China’s Commerce Ministry said ahead of the vote that it was considering expanding plans to suspend tariff reductions on a variety of Taiwanese imports, including farm products, seafood and auto parts.

“The expectation is that Beijing will go hard on Lai,” said Yun Sun, a China foreign policy watcher at the Stimson Center, a Washington think tank. 

Voters cast their ballots in the presidential election. PHOTO: ANNICE LYN/GETTY IMAGES

“Clearly, this result isn’t good news with regard to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” said Li Zhenguang, a professor at Beijing Union University’s Institute of Taiwan Studies.

The outlook on relations between the mainland and Taiwan is “extremely bleak,” and “confrontation and clashes may become the norm,” Li said. “This trend will cause an extremely negative impact on people-to-people exchanges across the strait.”

Lai won despite disillusionment with the DPP over issues such as inequality and housing prices among the island’s youth, many of whom threw their support behind third-party candidate Ko Wen-je. Ko came away with 26% of the vote.

The ruling party also overcame warnings from both the KMT and Beijing that a vote for Lai would push the island closer to war.

“People may have normalized PRC pressure such that it’s a constant and not a variable,” said Chong Ja Ian, who teaches political science at the National University of Singapore, using the acronym for the People’s Republic of China. 

Vincent Wu, 66, a retired stock market trader in New Taipei City, said he voted for Lai because he wanted to see Taiwan “making more new friends with all other democratic countries,” despite Beijing’s efforts to isolate it internationally.

Taiwan’s presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih, of the Nationalist Party, waves to supporters at a market in Taichung on Friday, the eve of the election. PHOTO: KYODONEWS/ZUMA PRESS

Lin Pao-ling, 61, a housewife in the same city, also cast her vote for Lai, seeing him as the continuation of the status quo. “We hope we can still enjoy our freedom and democracy,” she said, adding that she didn’t see a Lai presidency as increasing the risk of war.

Though domestic issues dominated on the campaign trail, China still loomed large in the elections, analysts said.

“Every election in Taiwan is to some degree about China,” said Nathan Batto, a longtime scholar of Taiwan’s politics at Academia Sinica’s Institute of Political Science in Taipei. “It’s always going to be about identity or are you Chinese or Taiwanese?” he said. “This is baked into the party system.”

The latest polls tracking Taiwanese identity show the proportion of people on the island who identify primarily as Chinese plummeting to below 3%.

Senior Taiwan government officials warned earlier this week that China would likely do as much as it can in the five months between the vote and the next president’s inauguration to pressure the next government into starting on a conciliatory footing. 

Charles Hutzler in Washington and Chun Han Wong in Taipei contributed to this article.

Write to Joyu Wang at joyu.wang@wsj.com

Corrections & Amplifications

The third-party candidate in Taiwan’s presidential election is Ko Wen-je. An earlier version of this article mistakenly rendered his name as Ke Wen-je. (Corrected on Jan. 13)

9. AI Disinformation – We Need New Defenses

Excerpts:

How can we combat the coming flood of AI-generated misinformation? Traditional fact-checking is too labor-intensive and is bound to fail. Yet some potential weapons offer a path forward. Algorithmic detection scanning hundreds of thousands of social media posts identifies AI patterns more quickly than human moderators, making it effective in combating coordinated disinformation campaigns. This technique helped flag Russia’s Glasvet network.

Several social media companies have begun embedding metadata in AI-generated images in order to allow for easy checking. The Content Authority Initiative creates tools that authenticate images through metadata and sets standards of evaluation that can weed out AI-generated photos. Even if generative AI creates images that pass as real to the human eye, metadata identifies them as fakes.

Unfortunately, no standard infrastructure exists yet for identifying and combating AI-generated text. Additional research is required, and governments should consider funding it. In the meantime, voters beware. As election year approaches, expect a significant increase in AI-powered disinformation.

AI Disinformation – We Need New Defenses

By Joshua Stein

January 8, 2024

Artificial intelligence generates new disinformation risks, smearing the line between fact and falsehood. It threatens 2024’s crucial elections.

cepa.org · by Joshua Stein · January 8, 2024

The photo is graphic and disturbing – showing an anguished young Israeli woman in pain. Another image depicts a deadly explosion in Gaza. In yet another, a Ukrainian boy and girl are stranded in a bombed-out cityscape.

All are powerful images – and fake, produced with AI.

AI generates a flood of text and images with minimal effort, providing munition for disinformation campaigns. By blurring fact and fiction, the technology threatens to undermine the credibility of genuine reporting. After the Washington Post revealed the fake AI war pictures from the Mideast and Ukraine, the software company Adobe hosting them vowed to crack down.

Unfortunately, the danger is mounting. Even with strong controls, AI systems make significant errors. The mistakes range from bias and hallucinating patterns to basic errors of common sense and mathematics. These problems are good reasons to avoid AI when writing articles for a term paper or for a reputable publication.

But for those producing large amounts of misinformation, the mistakes don’t matter. They may even represent an advantage. Disinformation campaigns don’t need to construct credible stories or provide sophisticated evidence. An effective and economical tactic is to publish fabricated images and text alongside real stories.

Even if individual stories are debunked, voters will accept a false pattern if enough stories repeat the same lies. Or they will begin to mistrust all information, adopting undue skepticism about well-sourced stories. “Alternative” facts spread. Healthy skepticism seeps into everyone having their own facts.

This danger isn’t theoretical, particularly as we enter a New Year full of consequential elections on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Governments and politicians in both democracies and autocracies are leveraging AI to generate texts, images, and videos to manipulate public opinion in their favor and to censor critical online content. In a recent Freedom House report, researchers documented the use of generative AI in 16 countries “to sow doubt, smear opponents, or influence public debate.”

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Russia is behind much dangerous disinformation. When the cybersecurity firm Symantec looked at the large number of bot accounts created by Russia’s Glasvet, it found that they attempted to fuel the extremes of both Democrats and Republicans. “The campaign directed propaganda at both sides of the liberal/conservative political divide in the US, in particular, the more disaffected elements of both camps” concludes researcher Gillian Cleary. “The main objective of the campaign instead appeared to be sowing discord by attempting to inflame opinions on both sides.”

European Commission Vice President Vera Jourova recently denounced Russia’s “multi-million euro weapon of mass manipulation” ahead of the upcoming June 2024 European parliamentary elections. “The Russian state has engaged in the war of ideas to pollute our information space with half-truths and lies to create a false image that democracy is no better than autocracy,” Jourova argued.

But our own politicians are also guilty. During the 2020 election, the Trump campaign pumped out fake or doctored images of a sleeping Joe Biden and the Covid 19 pandemic featured a flood of health misinformation.

The problem will worsen as AI-generated images and stories improve. In the future, AI will no longer draw individuals with hands at impossible-to-achieve angles or with too many fingers. AI-generated gibberish text will become rare.

How can we combat the coming flood of AI-generated misinformation? Traditional fact-checking is too labor-intensive and is bound to fail. Yet some potential weapons offer a path forward. Algorithmic detection scanning hundreds of thousands of social media posts identifies AI patterns more quickly than human moderators, making it effective in combating coordinated disinformation campaigns. This technique helped flag Russia’s Glasvet network.

Several social media companies have begun embedding metadata in AI-generated images in order to allow for easy checking. The Content Authority Initiative creates tools that authenticate images through metadata and sets standards of evaluation that can weed out AI-generated photos. Even if generative AI creates images that pass as real to the human eye, metadata identifies them as fakes.

Unfortunately, no standard infrastructure exists yet for identifying and combating AI-generated text. Additional research is required, and governments should consider funding it. In the meantime, voters beware. As election year approaches, expect a significant increase in AI-powered disinformation.

Joshua Stein recently completed a postdoctoral fellowship at the Georgetown Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics. His work focuses on ethics, technology, and economics.

Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

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cepa.org · by Joshua Stein · January 8, 2024

10. U.S. Strikes Give Yemen’s Houthis the Enemy They Long Sought

Excerpts:

Elisabeth Kendall, a Middle East expert and the head of the University of Cambridge’s Girton College, said the Houthis are used to sustaining heavy airstrikes and know the U.S. won’t escalate because it doesn’t want to put boots on the ground or further inflame regional tensions.

“This now makes them the victim-heroes, the heroic martyrs,” she said. “They have no real reason to stop and a high tolerance for casualties.”

Kendall predicted that a U.S. strike that produced high civilian casualties could be a tipping point in the conflict that the Houthis would use to inflame emotions.

“War has become a way of life,” she said. “Governance for the people to create prosperity is an alien concept.”

​The last sentence reminds me of Keegan:

War embraces much more than politics: it is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself. 

--John Keegan in A History of Warfare 

U.S. Strikes Give Yemen’s Houthis the Enemy They Long Sought

A religiously inspired militia that emerged from Yemen’s northern mountains 20 years ago is now more powerful than ever

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-strikes-give-yemens-houthis-the-enemy-they-long-sought-50415f4c?mod=hp_lead_pos2

By Stephen KalinFollow

 and Saleh al-Batati

Jan. 13, 2024 8:47 am ET

In disrupting international shipping and drawing U.S. military strikes, Yemen’s Houthi forces are trying to complete a two-decade-long transformation from a ragtag tribal insurgency into their country’s legitimate rulers.

Washington and its allies say they have attacked dozens of Houthi targets in the past two days, including on Saturday morning against a radar site. The Houthis’ deputy information minister, Nasr al-Din Amir, reported no material losses or casualties from the latest strikes and said the targeted site was already defunct.

The strikes are the latest signs that conflict stemming from the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza is widening across the Middle East, with the Red Sea as a new flashpoint between Washington and the various Iran-backed groups arrayed across the region.

Watch: Satellite Images Show Aftermath of U.S.-Led Yemen Strikes

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Watch: Satellite Images Show Aftermath of U.S.-Led Yemen Strikes

Play video: Watch: Satellite Images Show Aftermath of U.S.-Led Yemen Strikes

Houthi rebels said they remained undeterred after a U.S.-led coalition launched strikes intended to reduce the Iran-backed group’s attacks on ships in the Red Sea. WSJ’s Stephen Kalin explains how the strikes could threaten a broader conflict. Satellite Images: Maxar Technologies

The Houthis, aligned with Iran but with a looser connection than the likes of Lebanese Hezbollah, have proved a surprisingly resilient force. They emerged emboldened and well-armed from a long conflict with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, who intervened in Yemen’s civil war in 2015 after the rebels seized the capital, San’a, launching thousands of airstrikes and sending in ground troops. Iran ramped up its supply of arms and training to the Houthis during the war, bringing them into general alignment with the regime in Tehran.

Now, dozens of attacks on commercial ships transiting the Red Sea—and a defiant response to American-British airstrikes that began this week—have enabled the Houthis to show solidarity with the Palestinians during Israel’s war in Gaza and cast themselves as an international player. A road map aimed at a lasting peace in Yemen, which Saudi Arabia brokered with the Houthis last year in United Nations-backed talks, now appears in jeopardy.

More important, the latest confrontation has boosted the Houthis’ popularity in Yemen and the broader Middle East, while distracting from the challenge of actually governing the northern areas of the country the group controls.

Palestinians living in Lebanon prayed Friday before joining a protest in Beirut in solidarity with the Yemeni people. PHOTO: WAEL HAMZEH/SHUTTERSTOCK

“Who attacked your country?” Houthi leader Mohammed Ali al-Houthi asked Friday at a rally in San’a’s Sabeen Square. Tens of thousands of Yemenis who gathered there to protest the U.S. strikes replied: “America!”

“America is the devil. America is your enemy. America is terrorism,” the Houthi leader said. Confrontation with the U.S. has long been an ambition for the Houthis, whose slogan includes the lines “death to America, death to Israel.”

The Houthis, a political movement and militia inspired by the Zaidi offshoot of Shiite Islam, have been waging a prolonged fight for dominance with the internationally recognized Yemeni government. They initially launched attacks on Israel after the beginning of its Gaza offensive. After failing to penetrate Israel’s air-defense systems, they turned to other targets, primarily international shipping lanes, including those in and out of the Suez Canal.

While the Houthis have said they were targeting any Israeli-affiliated ship, many of the targeted ships have no clear connection to Israel or the war. Iran supports them with arms and intelligence but says it doesn’t control their actions.

Maged Al-Madhaji, chairman of the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, said that the opportunity to harass the U.S. and directly engage with the American military is the Houthis’ “most cherished aspiration.”

Israel’s bombardment of Gaza has coincided with a surge in Houthi attacks, but the connection isn’t always clear. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

He said that as peace talks with Saudi Arabia gain steam, the group is seeking a new justification to keep it on a war footing. “This conflict will turn into an eternal battle with the international community,” he said.

The U.S.-led strikes have been condemned by Yemeni political forces that are opposed to the Houthis but reject the violation of their country’s sovereignty.

Elisabeth Kendall, a Middle East expert and the head of the University of Cambridge’s Girton College, said the Houthis are used to sustaining heavy airstrikes and know the U.S. won’t escalate because it doesn’t want to put boots on the ground or further inflame regional tensions.

“This now makes them the victim-heroes, the heroic martyrs,” she said. “They have no real reason to stop and a high tolerance for casualties.”

Kendall predicted that a U.S. strike that produced high civilian casualties could be a tipping point in the conflict that the Houthis would use to inflame emotions.

“War has become a way of life,” she said. “Governance for the people to create prosperity is an alien concept.”

Write to Stephen Kalin at stephen.kalin@wsj.com

11. Yemen is a war worth fighting

Yemen is a war worth fighting

unherd.com · by Matt Feeney

by Tom McTague

Friday, 12

January 2024

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Britain and America are launching a new foreign policy era

by Tom McTague

‘The Houthis might be plucky little fuckers, but that’s also the point — they have proved remarkably resilient.’ (MOHAMMED HUWAIS/AFP via Getty Images)

Finally, we’ve found the kind of Middle Eastern war we should be fighting. Still, that doesn’t mean we’ll win.

Let’s start with the first proposition: that this is the right war. Strip away everything else and what do we have? A cheaply-armed, Iranian backed militia in control of one half of a very poor country imposing itself into our domestic affairs. By targeting container ships travelling through the Red Sea en route to the Suez Canal and Europe, the Houthis are destabilising Western economies at a time they can least afford it. As one senior Western figure put it to me: “We’ve got to stop the plucky little fuckers.”

There is, then, a refreshing simplicity to this military action. At heart we are asserting our power. We, the West, remain powerful and our interests are being affected by those with less power. And so we act. This is not naive neoconservatism, it’s hard-edged paleoconservatism — and the better for it. Lord Salisbury could be overseeing the policy.

For most of this century, Western foreign policy has been devoid of such clear, understandable logic, gripped by dreams of enlightened hegemony. We spent billions toppling regimes and trying to build new states and cultures in their place. And we failed. Then came the years of austerity, where we convinced ourselves that we could maintain global order on the cheap through the magic of development spending. In Britain, the apotheosis of this fallacious foreign policy was David Cameron’s austerity-era Strategic Defence and Security Review.

In hindsight, the first two decades of this century — bookended by President Putin’s rise to power on December 31, 1999, and Joe Biden’s hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 — mark a catastrophic failure. Two military defeats, the destabilisation of whole regions, the rise of Isis, the slashing of our military capacity. In its place a new but much older doctrine has arrived: do not spend billions of pounds we haven’t got nation-building in places where we have little material interest; do stand up to threats to international shipping and oil prices which affect our people at home.

But now let’s turn to the second proposition: it might not work. This is the reality we need to wrestle with, now. The Houthis might be plucky little fuckers, but that’s also the point — they have proved remarkably resilient. They have been fighting a civil war since 2014 against the assembled forces of the world’s richest powers: Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the West. And they have won. Today, they control more than half of the population of Yemen and now run a de facto country of their own. We should not assume that we can easily succeed where the far more ruthless Mohammed bin Salman failed.

If anyone should know the difficulty of projecting power in this part of the world, it’s Britain. It was in Yemen — or part of what is today’s Yemen — where British forces had to be withdrawn in 1967 following a sustained campaign by local guerrillas. Some things never change.

And, then as now, one central facet of this war is that our power and wealth is not necessarily the advantage we assume it is. The Houthis are armed with cheap drones which we seem only capable of fighting with extraordinarily expensive missiles. They might be poor, but their war is less expensive than ours. But it’s also simpler. They want chaos; we demand order. And if there is anything we have learned over the past quarter of a century, it is that order is hard and expensive.

unherd.com · by Matt Feeney

12. Why 2024 is the Voldemort of years

You can download the 35 page repto at this link:  https://www.eurasiagroup.net/pardot_download.cfm?filehash=565771E5477E245DC59560150306E2004F94E0B72D0A936D3A7252B7CD27CC77&download=1. You will have to register and opt-in to receive from the Eurasia Group.

Kim Jong Un will be upset that he did not make it into the article below but he is listed as part of number 5 in Axis of Rogues within the report.

Excerpt from the report (see page 18 for a graphic of north Korea and Iran aiding and abetting Russia):

5

Axis of rogues

Russia, North Korea, and Iran are the world’s most powerful rogue states. And they have been working to strengthen their cooperation since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, united by the draconian sanctions levied against them, their shared hatred of the US, and their willingness to violate international law to disrupt a global status quo they believe serves Western interests at their expense. They are agents of chaos in today’s geopolitical order, bent on undermining existing institutions and the governments and principles that uphold them.

Once seen by Russia as a nuisance at best and a liability at worst, North Korea has become an essential resource for Vladimir Putin’s war effort in Ukraine thanks to its pariah status, militarized economy, and large stocks of Soviet-standard artillery ammunition. Meeting in Russia’s Far East in September 2023, Kim Jong-un and Putin struck a deal that sends North Korean artillery shells, rockets, and ballistic missiles to Russia in exchange for Russian food, energy, and—most importantly—technological assistance, especially on satellite development and deployment.

Russia and Iran, longtime partners in a bid to protect Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria, have also upgraded their relationship from a limited tactical alliance to a more comprehensive and strategic military and economic partnership. Tehran has supplied Moscow with kamikaze drones to terrorize Ukrainian cities—now also being built in Russia—and drawn on its decades of experience to help Moscow evade Western sanctions. For its part, Russia has become Iran’s chief external weapons supplier, its top source of foreign investment, and a key trading partner. Moscow also provides diplomatic cover for Tehran’s nuclear program at the UN Security Council and has developed warm relations with Iranian proxies at war

with the US and Israel in the Middle East.

"While less prominent than Russia’s bilateral ties within the axis, North Korea and Iran have a decades-long history of cooperation on nuclear and ballistic missile development. This cooperation has reportedly extended to North Korea supplying weapons and missile designs to Hamas, the Houthis, and other Iranian-backed militant groups.

In 2024, deeper alignment and mutual support among these rogue states will pose a growing threat to global stability as they boost one another’s capabilities and act in increasingly coordinated and disruptive ways on the global stage.

Russia will be the primary driver of risk as it seeks to bolster its warfighting capabilities in Ukraine while working to deflect Western attention elsewhere. In exchange for North Korean artillery shells and rockets to sustain its war of attrition, Moscow will provide Pyongyang with technologies and know-how to advance its missile, submarine, and satellite programs, with major repercussions for Northeast Asian security. And in exchange for stepped-up provision of Iranian drones, munitions, sanctions relief, and ballistic missiles with which to strike Ukrainian cities, Moscow is poised to "supply Tehran with fighter jets and advanced weapons technology. Along with growing Russian support for Iran’s proxies, this will alter the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor at a time when Tehran and its proxies represent a much more direct security challenge to the West (please see Top Risk #2). Both bilateral deals would strengthen Russia’s hand in Ukraine and increase the war’s damage and costs (please see Top Risk #3).

​

The severity of existing Western sanctions against all three rogue states and the close cooperation among them means they will not be deterred by fear of further sanctions and isolation. This will unleash them to wage asymmetric warfare short of direct military attacks on the US and Europe, including via cyberattacks, support for terrorism, and disinformation campaigns designed to disrupt elections and sow chaos. More generally, the axis’s coordinated sanctions-busting and rule-breaking will undermine the compellent and deterrent power of Western sanctions, emboldening other would-be rogues.

It bears noting that China is not a member of the axis of rogues. Beijing did not openly condemn Russian aggression in Ukraine, but neither did it endorse the invasion or do much to help Putin’s war effort beyond purchasing discounted oil and allowing flows of dual-use goods to continue. (If India and the UAE were less friendly to the United States, analysts would be likening their Russia policies to China’s.) Beijing has looked on warily at the deepening security cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang—indeed, Chinese officials didn’t know Kim was going to Russia until after it was publicly announced … and they were piqued by it. And while it has ramped up oil imports from and diplomatic support for Tehran, Beijing has no desire to jeopardize its more strategically important interests in the Gulf (particularly its ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) by helping Iran make regional trouble.

That said, China is often well-served by the three rogues’ anti-Western operations and maintains a de facto policy of pro-axis neutrality. Indeed, without active acquiescence from China, the axis’s rogue activities would be less impactful. Short of violating international sanctions or jeopardizing its own interests, expect Beijing to continue to do business with and legitimize the axis as it undermines the US and its allies this year."

"Three caveats are in order. First, Russia, Iran, and North Korea leaning on each other is a sign of their desperation and weakness on the global stage. When your best (and near only) friends are two rogue states, you’re in trouble. Second, all of them seek to avoid an active shooting war with the West, which means continued caution when escalating direct attacks on the United States or its core allies. And third, despite their common interest in sowing chaos, dictators have trouble trusting each other, "making the entente a fragile one. This axis is a marriage of convenience and opportunity; its members are neither strategic nor ideological bedfellows—they are focused primarily on regime survival and geopolitical gain. As such, their relationships will remain largely transactional.

Still, the disruptive potential of their growing cooperation— especially with a boost or at the very least a blind eye from Beijing—should not be underestimated."

Why 2024 is the Voldemort of years

gzeromedia.com · by Ian Bremmer · January 10, 2024

January 10, 2024

Annie Gugliotta

2024. Politically it’s the Voldemort of years. The annus horribilis. The year that must not be named. I’d love to sugarcoat it, but I can’t: From a global political risk perspective, this is the most dangerous and uncertain year I’ve covered in my lifetime.

As we write in Eurasia Group’s 2024 Top Risks report, three wars will dominate world affairs: Russia vs. Ukraine, now in its third year; Israel vs. Hamas, now in its third month; and the United States vs. itself, ready to kick off at any moment.

Russia vs. Ukraine … is getting worse. Russia now has the battlefield initiative and a material advantage, while Ukraine stands to lose significant international interest and support. For the United States, in particular, it’s become a distant second (and increasingly third or lower) policy priority, despite hundreds of thousands of casualties and millions of displaced Ukrainians.

Battlefield difficulties, diminishing Western support, and domestic political infighting will leave Ukrainians feeling increasingly desperate, making Kyiv more risk-tolerant and the conflict more likely to escalate. While Russia has no way to “win,” Ukraine will be de facto partitioned this year and could “lose” the war as early as 2025.

Israel vs. Hamas … is getting worse. Hamas’ Oct. 7 terrorist attacks jolted the Middle East out of its complacency, and there’s no obvious way to end the fighting that has ensued. While no country wants a regional war to erupt, the powder is dry, and the number of players carrying matches – Israel’s war cabinet, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iran-backed militias in Syria and Iraq – makes the risk of escalation high. The current fighting in Gaza is accordingly likely to be only the first phase in an expanding conflict this year.

Whatever the military outcome, a dramatic increase in radicalization is guaranteed. Of Israeli Jews, feeling themselves globally isolated and even hated after facing the worst violence against them since the Holocaust. Of Palestinians, facing what they consider a genocide, with no opportunities for peace and no prospects of escape. Deep political divisions over the conflict run throughout the Middle East and across over one billion people in the broader Muslim world, not to mention in the United States and Europe.

And then there’s the biggest challenge in 2024 … the United States vs. itself. While America’s military and economy remain exceptionally strong, its political system is more dysfunctional than that of any other advanced industrial democracy. The 2024 election will exacerbate this problem no matter who wins, worsening the country’s political division, testing American democracy to a degree the nation hasn’t experienced in 150 years, and undermining US credibility on the global stage.

Fully one-third of the global population will go to the polls this year, but an unprecedentedly dysfunctional US election will be by far the most consequential for the world’s security, stability, and economic outlook. The outcome will affect the fate of 8 billion people, and only 160 million Americans will have a say in it, with the winner to be decided by just tens of thousands of voters in a handful of swing states. The losing side – whether Democrats or Republicans – will consider the outcome illegitimate and be unprepared to accept it. The world’s most powerful country faces critical challenges to its core political institutions: free and fair elections, the peaceful transfer of power, and the checks and balances provided by the separation of powers. With the outcome of the vote essentially a coin toss (at least for now), the only certainty is continued damage to America’s social fabric and international standing. The political state of the union … is troubled indeed.

********

None of these three conflicts have adequate guardrails preventing them from getting worse. None have responsible leaders willing and able to fix, or at least clean up, the mess. Indeed, these leaders see their opponents (and their opponents’ supporters) as principal adversaries – “enemies of the people.” Most problematically, none of the belligerents agree on what they’re fighting over.

By contrast, climate change has long been considered by many our greatest global challenge, but the world is on the road to responding – collectively, even though too slowly – because everyone understands the nature of the problem. There is too much carbon dioxide (and methane) in the atmosphere, with a lot more coming because it’s necessary for economic growth, leading to long-term damage to biodiversity and affecting everyone but mostly the poorest. None of this remains controversial; it’s just a question of who compromises how much – and who pays what and when. We have a pretty good sense of where we are heading accordingly.

Not so for any of the major conflicts driving geopolitical risk this year. The terms of confrontation are not shared: not the narratives, not the history, not even the basic facts of the ongoing fighting. And in all three cases, we are creating generations of incensed people prepared to dig in and battle for as long as it takes. Maybe an end to the fighting can come when one or both sides are exhausted … but the prospects of a sustainable peace? In Ukraine, in the Middle East, and in America, we’re not remotely close.

I call this a G-Zero world, a world without global leadership. Where the United States, the world’s sole remaining superpower, doesn’t want to be the world’s policeman, the architect of global trade, or the cheerleader of global values. And no other country is prepared to take that role for itself. We now see three major confrontations – and many more risks, from ungoverned artificial intelligence and an axis of rogue states to a fragile global economy and a politically disruptive El Nino climate pattern – that are the direct result of our G-Zero world.

By its nature, the G-Zero will cause more unsolvable conflicts and uncontainable risks in the years ahead – the only questions are where, when, and how destabilizing they will be. And whether the resulting crises spur enough action to fix the underlying problem with our “geopolitical recession” or only serve to make it worse.

Paraphrasing the Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky, we may not want crisis, but in a G-Zero world, crisis certainly wants us.

_________

 Check out Eurasia Group’s 2024 Top Risks report. And be sure to subscribe to GZERO Daily to get the world's best global politics newsletter every day on top of my weekly email. Did I mention it's free?

Walmart

January 09, 2024

13. American Universities Are Post Truth

This is one of the best analyses of the current academic controversies I have read in a long time. Fair and balanced as they say.

American Universities Are Post Truth

Neither conservatives nor liberals trust academic institutions, because they are dishonest.

The Atlantic · by Josh Barro · January 12, 2024

Over the past few years, conservatives have rapidly lost trust in higher education. From 2015 to 2023, Gallup found that the share of Republicans expressing “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in higher education fell by 37 points, from 56 to 19 percent. As conservatives have come to look negatively at these institutions, Republicans have engaged in political attacks on the sector, most recently in the fact-finding and pressure campaign that caused Claudine Gay to resign as president of Harvard.

This decline is something close to common knowledge. Less discussed is the fact that public confidence in colleges has fallen significantly across all ideological groups since 2015. Though Republicans’ confidence cratered the most, Gallup found that it fell by 16 points among independents (from 48 to 32 percent) and nine points among Democrats (from 68 to 59 percent, not far from where Republicans were nine years ago).

Often, when an issue becomes polarized, you’ll see thermostatic effects in public opinion, as when Democrats became more liberal on immigration in response to Donald Trump’s attacks on immigrants. But while liberal figures on campus like to talk about themselves as a vanguard in the fight against conservative know-nothings who would take down expertise, no pro-college backlash among liberals is apparent in the polls. So the champions of truth at our nation’s top-tier universities should probably be a little less entitled and whiny, and a little more introspective about why everyone seems to like them less than they used to. One explanation is that these institutions are dishonest.

I personally have also developed a more negative view of elite universities over the past decade, and my reason is simple: A lot of the research coming out of them does not seem to aim at truth, whether because it is politicized or for more venal reasons. The social-justice messaging they wrap themselves in is often insincere. Their public accountings of the reasons for their internal actions are often implausible. They deceive the public about the role that race plays in their admissions and hiring practices. And sometimes, especially at the graduate level, they confer degrees whose value they ought to know will not justify the time and money that students invest to get them.

Ben Sasse: The moral decline of elite universities

The most recent debacle at Harvard, in which large swaths of academia seem to have conveniently forgotten what the term plagiarism means so they don’t have to admit that Claudine Gay engaged in it, is only the latest example of the lying that is endemic on campus.

For me, the problem starts with the replication crisis. I was a psychology major at Harvard, and graduated in 2005. Most of my coursework was in social psychology. And something I keep seeing in the news since I graduated is that a decent amount of what I was taught in Harvard’s social-psychology courses was just wrong. When I was a student, there was a vogue for research about how “priming” and little behavioral nudges can materially affect attitudes and behavior, but the studies I learned about in class keep getting debunked: Replications have failed, and many of the studies were p-hacked or even based on fraudulent data. The widespread research dishonesty in psychology stemmed from poor incentives—interesting findings are published, and being published gets you funding and job security and notoriety and sometimes even corporate consulting contracts, and it’s easier to produce an interesting finding if you juke your data—and was made possible by lax practices that prevailed until recently, including researchers not being expected to share their raw data for review by others.

Universities’ level of interest in addressing widespread research dishonesty in behavioral science has been mixed. Dan Ariely, a professor of psychology and behavioral economics famous for studying dishonesty, of all things, has been accused of serial academic misconduct, but he remains at Duke. A lot of the work in cleaning up the field has been done as a side project by three professors who write Data Colada, a blog about data integrity. Harvard Business School, to its credit, aggressively investigated data-fraud allegations against Francesca Gino that Data Colada first raised, ultimately suspending her last year and thus enduring a lawsuit and the de rigueur allegation that taking action against her was sexist. But if the Data Colada team hadn’t done this sleuthing in its spare time, neither HBS nor the journals that published Gino’s research would ever have noticed a problem. And in a preview of the defenses we’ve seen in the Claudine Gay case, the Harvard Law School professor Lawrence Lessig looked past the ample evidence of data fraud to tell The New Yorker that he rejected the allegations against Gino because of who she is: “I’m convinced about her because I know her,” he said. “That’s the strongest reason why I can’t believe this has happened.”

I’m not under the impression that the replication crisis in the social sciences looms as large for others as it does for me. But research dishonesty in universities goes beyond the social sciences. In the humanities, it has taken a different form—postmodern research that aims at “my truth” instead of truth.

The commentator Matt Yglesias wrote a few weeks ago about a paper by Jenny Bulstrode, a historian of science at the University of London, who alleges that a moderately notable metallurgical technique patented in England in the late 1700s was in fact stolen from the Black Jamaican metallurgists who really developed it. The problem with Bulstrode’s paper is that it marshals no real evidence for its allegation—not only failing to show that the Englishman Henry Cort was aware of a Jamaican metallurgical technique similar to the one he patented but failing to show even that such a technique was ever used in Jamaica.

The paper, because it fit into the fashionable category of “historian finds yet another thing that is racist,” garnered credulous press coverage. And when people pointed out that the paper didn’t have the goods, the editors of the journal that published it came out with a “what is truth, anyway”–type word salad in defense of the article, including this:

We by no means hold that “fiction” is a meaningless category—dishonesty and fabrication in academic scholarship are ethically unacceptable. But we do believe that what counts as accountability to our historical subjects, our readers and our own communities is not singular or to be dictated prior to engaging in historical study. If we are to confront the anti-Blackness of EuroAmerican intellectual traditions, as those have been explicated over the last century by DuBois, Fanon, and scholars of the subsequent generations we must grasp that what is experienced by dominant actors in EuroAmerican cultures as ‘empiricism’ is deeply conditioned by the predicating logics of colonialism and racial capitalism. To do otherwise is to reinstate older forms of profoundly selective historicism that support white domination.

This ideology-first, activism-oriented, the-truth-depends-on-who’s-looking approach leads me to suspect that a lot of what’s happening at universities isn’t really research—it’s social activism dressed up as research, which need not be of good quality so long as it has the right ideological goals. Of course, this is not what all (or even necessarily most) professors in the humanities are up to. And I see arguments like this one in The Atlantic from Tyler Austin Harper, a professor at Bates College, that faculty in the humanities generally aren’t even pleased with these changes—that it’s administrators at the top of these institutions pushing departments in politicized directions. He writes:

The reigning assumption is that scholars of color are disproportionately represented in activism-oriented fields such as “decolonial theory,” which means that deans—always seeking more brown faces to put on university websites—are more likely to approve new tenure lines in ideologically supercharged, diversity-rich disciplines. It is often faculty who are trying to safeguard their fields from the progressive machinations of their bureaucratic overlords. But faced with a choice between watching their departments shrink or agreeing to hire in areas that help realize the personnel-engineering schemes of their bosses, departments tend to choose the latter.

So this is another form of dishonesty. Because using racial quotas in hiring is illegal, universities can’t explicitly admit to setting positions aside for candidates from underrepresented minorities. Instead they use ideological screens and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) statement reviews as a proxy for race. This approach has many drawbacks—in addition to involving a concealment of the university’s true objectives, it is of no use to Black and Hispanic candidates who are not interested in “ideologically supercharged” areas of study, and sometimes it leads to the hiring of white candidates anyway, if they know best how to include the magic trendy words in a DEI statement.

Yet another distortion of academic output is subject-matter specialists using the guise of expertise to impose their policy preferences on the public. This phenomenon exploded as a huge problem early in the coronavirus pandemic, and it wasn’t limited to universities—some of the public-health professionals who fought to turn transmission estimates into policies that closed schools, offices, and places of worship were on faculties, some were at hospitals, some worked for the government, and some just posted a lot on Twitter. But I’ll say that several years of hearing “science says” prior to claims that weren’t science as such but rather were applications of scientific claims through a specific value framework I didn’t share—part-communitarian, part-neurotic, part-left wing—made me feel more negatively about experts. I’m far from alone in that sentiment.

The dishonesty at elite universities extends beyond their research output to how they describe their admissions processes. Like many universities, Harvard has long used race as a factor in college admissions, producing a class that is less Asian and more Black and Hispanic than it would be if it did not consider race. Throughout the litigation over this practice, the university’s representatives didn’t just defend the appropriateness of race-conscious policies to promote diversity; they denied that they were discriminating at all. They played word games—similar to the “what even is plagiarism?” bit deployed by Gay’s defenders—arguing somehow that race could be used as a positive factor for admission without ever being a negative one, a mathematical impossibility when awarding a fixed number of admission slots.

Tyler Austin Harper: The real Harvard scandal

Affirmative-action policies prefer personnel of certain racial and ethnic backgrounds as part of an effort to alter the institution’s demographic balance—this is the point of affirmative action—but apparently it’s racist to admit this is what’s happening (or sometimes it would constitute an admission of illegal activity), so there’s a bunch of obfuscatory fudging of what the universities are really up to when they look at race. And since the Supreme Court’s ruling last year prohibiting race-conscious admissions practices, institutions across the country have been obvious about their search for ways to flout the law. It’s dishonest, and in the past few years, it’s been all over the news, which can’t have been good for public trust.

And so that takes me to where this current news kerfuffle started: the congressional hearing last month, where Representative Elise Stefanik bested the presidents of Harvard, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania. The presidents were right on one of the points that was officially at issue in their exchange: If a university’s policies on expression are designed to follow the First Amendment, then even a call for genocide will be prohibited only in certain specific circumstances. The problem, in my view, is that the university presidents weren’t straight about the if part of that statement: They do not, in practice, take a hands-off approach to all kinds of speech. Universities find ways to extend forbearance to speakers who break rules in the process of expressing favored ideas, and they impose sanctions on those who express disfavored ideas, often through process-as-punishment.

Gay herself was responsible for one such breach of neutrality discussed at the hearing: the firing of Ron Sullivan as a faculty dean at Harvard College over his legal representation of Harvey Weinstein. Officially, that’s not why Sullivan was fired—the university laundered students’ complaints about his legal activities through the notion that his behavior was disruptive to the “climate” inside Winthrop House, and Gay continued that laundering in her testimony. The case of the evolutionary biologist Carole Hooven also shows that a claim as banal as saying that there are only two human sexes (note sexes, not genders) is unprotected in practice at Harvard.

Gay’s detractors have correctly identified Harvard as hostile to certain kinds of speech, but they had a variety of other complaints too—they want restrictions of certain kinds of speech about Israel, and they have broader objections to DEI. But what they found, when searching for dirt on her, was unrelated to all of this: She plagiarized, repeatedly, in her academic work. She copied paragraphs of text nearly wholesale, without quoting the scholars whose text she used, and sometimes without even citing them. Anyone who went to college knows you’re not allowed to do that. It’s not just a rule—it’s a rule that universities beat into students’ heads. If I had copied like Gay did when I was a student, and if I got caught, I would have expected the university to require me to withdraw.

And that’s why it’s been so jarring over the past month to watch some academics and journalists announce a new, more lax standard for plagiarism that was unknown to us when we were students. What seems to be happening here is they are suffering from Christopher Rufo Derangement Syndrome. That is, they know conservative activist Christopher Rufo is a bad guy, and therefore the only way they can analyze a question on which he has opined is by assuming that the opposite of whatever he said was true. If Rufo says Gay plagiarized, then she must not have plagiarized, regardless of whatever near-duplicate paragraphs we can see with our own eyes. In addition to being a terrible approach to learning the truth, this mental model endows Rufo with tremendous power: If you have Christopher Rufo Derangement Syndrome, all Rufo has to do to make you look like a total idiot is be right about something, once.

So we got a lot of idiotic statements. Gay was merely guilty of “duplicative language,” the Harvard Corporation said, back when it was still defending her. We were told that everybody does it: “Claudine Gay has resigned on the basis of a plagiarism charge that could have been leveled at anyone we know via the power of text mining applied without sound standards of how to assess the results,” wrote Jo Gludi, a history professor at Emory. (Really? Anyone we know?) The columnist Charles Blow even wrote in The New York Times that the expectation that the president of Harvard should not plagiarize (or should not be the subject of “questions about missing citations and quotation marks,” as he more verbosely described plagiarism) constitutes a “Wonder Woman requirement” in which Black women in positions of power “are trapped in prisons of others’ demands for perfection.”

The demand that we should define academic honesty down in order to address the fact that Harvard’s first Black female president is a plagiarist is insulting to academics of all races who don’t copy other people’s works. And the insistence that this is how it’s always been, that actually this kind of copying is a standard industry practice, is just gaslighting. I went to college. I know that’s not true.

Eventually (belatedly), the Harvard Corporation realized that nobody was buying these defenses, and that Gay’s position was untenable—that it would not do to have a university president stay in place when she’d done things the university kicks ordinary students out for doing. But that Harvard’s first instinct was to lie and obfuscate—to say there was nothing to see here—is reflective of the university’s overall posture of dishonesty and nontransparency. In fairness to the members of the corporation, they usually do get away with it.

And all of this colors the conservative “war on higher ed.” Liberals in academia, including Gay herself, are very agitated about it. But it’s not clear to me exactly what one is supposed to be defending and why. I’d much rather see this industry do some introspection about why it’s losing public trust—not just among conservatives—and what it could do to be more deserving of it. After all, if the strategy is simply to polarize views about universities and turn them into a liberal cause célèbre, that strategy is failing.

This article was adapted from a post on Josh Barro’s Substack, Very Serious. ​​

The Atlantic · by Josh Barro · January 12, 2024

​14. A Rebellion in Yale’s Secret Societies

A fascinating look into the evolution of secret societies at Yale. There is a lot to reflect upon in this.

Has the ""diversification" of these secret societies had any effect? Are these secret societies as influential today as they were "back in the day?" Has the pendulum swung too far among these secret societies with some no longer "majority white?" Is that good or bad?

A Rebellion in Yale’s Secret Societies

They wanted to tear down Yale from the inside. Then they got into its most exclusive secret society.

The Atlantic · by Rose Horowitch · January 11, 2024

One evening in 2019, in a windowless building known as the “tomb” in the center of Yale’s campus, the members of Skull and Bones snapped. There they were, having been granted membership to the most elite secret society at one of the most elite universities in the world—part of a rare group that for generations included individuals from the most powerful families on the planet. Vanderbilts, Rockefellers, and Buckleys have all been in Skull and Bones. Three Bonesmen would go on to become president of the United States. Their traditions (including oaths of secrecy upon admission) and antics (stealing the gravestone of Yale’s founder), and the rumors about them (that the Bones tomb contains several human skulls), are legendary—and an intense source of campus gossip.

But there in the tomb, surrounded by oil portraits of former Bonesmen—all white, all chosen by the society’s alumni board—the current members felt overcome not by the achievements of those who had come before them, or by the possibilities that lay ahead, but instead by the organization’s long history of exclusion. So the students did what they felt had to be done: They pulled the portraits down, and replaced them with homemade signs criticizing the secret society’s record of keeping people of color out of its ranks. “Portraits is a relatively straightforward and easy ask,” one member who participated in the redecoration told me. “The way a space looks can have a large impact on a person’s psyche.”

This was not the only act of Skull and Bones rebellion in 2019. During an all-expenses-paid trip to meet with George W. Bush’s in Texas that year, one or more members confronted the ex-president— who wrote in his 1999 autobiography, “I joined Skull and Bones, a secret society, so secret I can’t say anything more”—and criticized him for leading America into the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to several people familiar with the trip. More recently, young graduates of Berzelius, another of the “Ancient Eight,” Yale’s most elite societies, pressed to change the name of the society’s nonprofit legal entity from the Colony Foundation, on the grounds that it evoked slavery and colonialism. Students in Elihu, a society named for Elihu Yale, also tried to rechristen the organization over its namesake’s ties to the slave trade.

Secret societies have long been the purest distillation of what makes Yale Yale. They are famous for their mysterious rituals, their arcane symbols, and the imprint they’ve left on the broader culture. Skull and Bones shows up, variously, in The Great Gatsby (the 2013 film version), Gossip Girl, and The Simpsons. It is among the wealthiest, most exclusive, most well-connected groups at one of the wealthiest, most exclusive, most well-connected universities in the country. Contemplating their own rarefied status, members of Yale’s secret societies aren’t entirely sure what to do with it. They face the question roiling America’s elite campuses taken to its logical extreme: whether the modern social-justice politics advanced by college students can coexist with the staggering selectivity and privilege that benefit those same students.

Skull and Bones, the oldest of Yale’s senior societies, was formed in 1832. The other groups, composed mainly of Bones rejects, followed soon after. The Ancient Eight societies each own private buildings, known as tombs, where members meet twice weekly for dinner, debate, and “bios”—a ritual in which members share their life histories. Membership is for seniors only. Every spring, the current members “tap” a group of Yale juniors to take their place the following fall. The clubs were originally intended to prepare Yale men for leadership beyond the university. At this, they have found extraordinary success, producing a stream of C-suite executives, diplomats, and politicos. The reputation of society alumni as kingmakers and masters of the universe guaranteed that students would always be hungry to join.

From the April 2021 issue: Private schools have become truly obscene

Until they weren’t. In the 1960s, secret societies were criticized for elitism and discrimination. They faced pressure to disband. Instead, they adapted. Skull and Bones admitted its first Black member in 1965, and in 1975 tapped the head of Yale’s recently founded gay-student organization. The pattern repeated two decades later, as the societies feared they were becoming irrelevant by clinging to their all-male identity. In 1991, the Bonesmen tapped their first Boneswomen. (Alumni who didn’t want women in their secret society retaliated by changing the locks on the tomb.)

Today, many of the societies continue to resist students’ most progressive demands. When the Bones class of 2019 took down the portraits, some of their predecessors were aghast. It was “bad manners,” a former member of the Bones alumni board who graduated from Yale in the 1960s told me. (I interviewed 12 current or recent members for this article, along with several members from earlier generations; many of them requested anonymity, citing confidentiality agreements.) Given that the society’s former members were overwhelmingly white, he argued, it didn’t make sense to criticize Skull and Bones for accurately portraying its own legacy. “Their historical protest was silly,” he said. Still, the Bones board tried to appease students by putting up photographs of nonwhite alumni alongside the portraits. This year, the former board member told me, the board will unveil the society’s first portrait of a Black alumnus. Similarly, Berzelius agreed to rename the Colony Foundation. Elihu, however, is keeping its name.

Reports of alumni-student schisms within Yale’s secret societies are nearly as old as the societies themselves. Every decade or so, especially when a member of the Bush family runs for president (George H. W. Bush was also a member), opinion writers argue that left-wing students have trampled the values that sustained societies. That makes it easy to miss a much more significant shift within these groups. Picture a member of Skull and Bones, or any of the other Ancient Eight secret societies, and you’ll probably conjure a preppy white guy who summers on the Cape. In fact, in recent years, the demographics of Yale’s most elite organizations have been utterly transformed. In 2020, Skull and Bones had its first entirely nonwhite class. (Every year, the society admits around 15 rising seniors; selections must be unanimous, and members have final say.) Many of the societies now have only one or two students each year who aren’t from historically marginalized groups.

Today, the idea of Skull and Bones selecting someone whose dad was a Republican president seems inconceivable. The so-called tap lines—the tradition guaranteeing that the football captain and the student-body president would end up in Bones—are long gone, and few descendants of alumni members get in. Instead, the secret societies affirmatively select for students who are the first in their family to attend college, who come from a low-income background, or who are part of a minority group. This has created something of a diversity arms race. “People are, intentionally or not, thinking, ‘Does this cohort have too many white people?’” said Ale Canales, a member of the Berzelius class of 2020. “It’s definitely an undercurrent.”

I graduated from Yale last spring, and I didn’t belong to a secret society, but when it came time for members in my year to select the next class, a friend in an Ancient Eight society worried that the person she wanted to tap wouldn’t get in: He was a person of color but came from a wealthy family and was not the first in his family to attend college. (She was right to worry: The society rejected my friend’s pick, although a different one accepted him.) A history of progressive activism is an asset among secret-society hopefuls. One of the leaders of Yale’s Democratic Socialists of America chapter joined Scroll and Key, one of the oldest secret societies, last year. The Bones class of 2021 had “people from all kinds of backgrounds,” one member of the class told me—but no conservatives. (Unless you count centrists as conservatives, which some members do.) Like Yale’s student body overall, members of secret societies mostly range from far left to left of center.

In short, Yale’s secret societies are now filled with students who, as a matter of political conviction, consider wealth and privilege indefensible—but who, as members of Yale’s most elite clubs, enjoy enormous advantages. Skull and Bones pairs students with alumni mentors in the field they hope to enter. It has an endowment of $17 million. Bones members spend a week in late summer getting to know one another at the group’s private island on the St. Lawrence River. Dinners at the Ancient Eight societies are prepared by private chefs.

In 2021, Caleb Dunson, then a Yale sophomore, published an op-ed in the school newspaper with the title “Abolish Yale.” In the essay, he described his discomfort attending an opulent holiday feast for students while homeless people suffered in the cold nearby. The school operates “under the assumption that only a small group of remarkable people can push humanity forward,” wrote Dunson, who is Black. “It started off excluding women and people of color from its student body and now parades them around for diversity photos and social justice brownie points.” Even if the university made marginal changes—which Dunson argued it had been reluctant to do—its nature would remain the same. “Since we can’t change Yale, we have to tear it down,” he wrote.

Today, Dunson is a member of one of the Ancient Eight societies. He knows how that looks. When I asked him about the apparent contradiction, he said he decided to join in order to make new friends and be part of a community, but acknowledged that he was attracted to the status that being in a society confers. “Once you get a tap for a society, it’s funny how quickly you get invested in the preservation of that society,” he told me. Ultimately, he said, given that his political views are at odds with attending Yale in the first place, “there’s already a bit of cognitive dissonance,” so joining a secret society wasn’t such a big leap.

The most common argument current and recent members give for preserving the societies is that, by opening them up to groups that have previously been excluded, they can help diversify the elite. Ale Canales recalls being tapped by a senior who wanted to “keep the Latino line going.” Once inside, Canales focused on a different diversity metric. “I chose three trans people,” Canales told me. “That was my specific goal.”

Today’s students believe that their values are better than those of the secret-society members who came before them, and thus that they will use their positions in more socially beneficial ways, even if they’re not yet sure exactly how. The member of the 2021 Bones class had been uneasy about joining, but was convinced by a student from the year above. “Yes, there is that baggage that we do have to reckon with,” the older student told her. “But the fact that you are reckoning with it, the other people in your class are reckoning with it, is a very good sign.” Her class included many students from low-income families, and they often talked about how they would leverage their new network to help their communities. One recent Bones member used an alumni gathering to fundraise for a nonprofit she ran. Nearly all of the current and recent members I spoke with said it would be better if secret societies didn’t exist at all; but given that they do exist, they decided they might as well join and try to make them better.

From the September 2019 issue: Daniel Markovits on how meritocracy harms everyone

The most full-throated critique of the societies tends to come from the people who didn’t get in. Isabella Zou, who graduated from Yale in 2023, felt confident in her odds to be tapped by St. Elmo’s, one of the Ancient Eight. But she spent tap day crying because she wasn’t chosen and comparing her qualifications against those of her friends who were. In a Yale Daily News op-ed, she argued that secret societies should be torn down rather than opened up. By including more students from marginalized backgrounds, she wrote, the society system merely “diversifies the ranks of the worthy without transforming the underlying structures that deem others unworthy.” And yet, she admitted, “I know in my bones that if I had gotten tapped by St. Elmo’s, I would have taken it and likely wouldn’t have developed a critical mode of participation.” (Zou declined to comment additionally for this article, directing me to her op-ed.)

This is the fight raging across so many of America’s institutions: change from the inside or blitz and build something new? Yale’s secret societies don’t appear to be going anywhere, but they certainly look different than they used to. And the same pattern is playing out across elite higher education more broadly: These institutions have become more diverse while retaining the trappings of extreme exclusivity. In this sense, the traditionalist grumbling over secret societies’ acts of rebellion is overblown. In everything beyond demographics, the societies have stayed true to their traditions. “Everyone talked a really big game,” one member of the Elihu class of 2019 told me. “In the first month of my time in the society, there were people like, We got to burn this place down. We need to mobilize the endowment to redistribute the wealth back to New Haven. And then, inevitably, we all just ended up doing exactly what had been done in years previous, which is doing the bios, hanging out with each other, and a few volunteer things. But it wasn’t anything radical.”

And so alumni and students seem to have settled into an uneasy truce. Sam Chauncey, who passed through Wolf’s Head—another Ancient Eight society—in 1957 before spending nearly a quarter century in Yale’s administration, told me that most alumni understand that their secret society will not always exist as it did in their day. Some older conservative alumni try to weed out “wokeness,” and others grouse that women were ever accepted, Chauncey said, but many more are content to change the demographics of the societies if that keeps the groups relevant and preserves their core rituals. As the 1960s Bones alumnus and former board member told me, “If you want things to stay the same, everything has to change.” In his view, the secret societies are thriving. When students and alumni meet for the annual Bones celebration in New York City, the old guard gives a hearty applause to the new members. “And the kids are thinking, There’s somebody in this room who is going to help me get a job.”

The Atlantic · by Rose Horowitch · January 11, 2024

15. Scandalous Indoctrination: Inside a Kings College Counter-Terrorism Course for UK Civil Servants

A UK perspective.

Excerpts:

None of the Counter Terrorism lecturers (bar two) posted about the attacks on their otherwise informative social media platforms. Of these two, one Professor wrote a RUSI Think Tank commentary, saying Israeli ‘crisis meetings could be affected by a desire for revenge’ and why ‘restraint in Counterterrorism is so important’.

During the span of the course, there was no mention of immigration being relevant to terrorism in the UK, except as a view ‘given by the right wing’.

The course’s overriding emphasis was that Islamist extremism is exaggerated. Right-wing extremism was given more weight than is proportionate. This is in direct conflict with William Shawcross’ findings, in the latest government commissioned review of its anti-radicalisation programme, Prevent.

One lecturer derogatively described Shawcross as ‘the type of person who would say all current counter-terrorism professionals are woke…He is of that ilk.’ This of course discredited Shawcross to the course attendees.

The lecturer further argued that Douglas Murray and Joe Rogan are both examples of the far right. ‘To what extent should Joe Rogan and Douglas Murray be suppressed?’ he asked. ‘They have millions of followers. To de-platform them would cause issues.’

Concluding his talk, the lecturer told a room full of government professionals, ‘so, society needs to find other ways to suppress them.’

Scandalous Indoctrination: Inside a Kings College Counter-Terrorism Course for UK Civil Servants

by Anna Stanley

fathomjournal.org

A former civil servant, Anna Stanley reports on a counter-terrorism course she attended which she found a deeply, existentially depressing experience. She argues that ‘prestigious’ educational institutions are delivering politically biased, anti-government training, amounting to indoctrination and that extremism and terrorism are misunderstood by civil servants to the point of being a national security risk.

I recently attended a Kings College course called ‘Issues in Countering Terrorism’. Organised by the Centre for Defence Studies, it was designed for civil servants and professionals in Counter Terrorism. Staff from the Foreign Office, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defence and Home Office attended. Facilitating this relatively new 3 day course were senior lecturers from the Security Studies Department.

The civil servants were given presentations by Kings College lecturers while Visiting Senior Research Fellows and Professors also spoke. These included those formerly holding positions such as Permanent Secretary of the Home Office and Director of GCHQ, Defence Minister and Foreign Office Director.

The course was a deeply, existentially depressing experience.

‘Prestigious’ educational institutions are delivering politically biased, anti-government training, amounting to indoctrination. It confirmed my fears – that extremism and terrorism are misunderstood by civil servants to the point of being a national security risk.

Underpinning their presentations, some of the lecturers relayed typical post-modern identity politics.

The course began with the issue of definitions. What is Terrorism? Without anyone providing an opposing standpoint, we were taught the adage, ‘One man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist.’

I posed to the room: ‘Surely we can acknowledge subjectivity while being able to come up with a collective understanding of what terrorism is?’ Some 40 civil servants looked at me blankly. No?

I wondered why we were there.

The danger of understanding terrorism with cultural relativism is that it breeds moral apathy; the kind that says ‘Who are we, mere democratic, liberal Westerners to impose our morality onto others? Who are we to say our culture is superior to others?’

These are luxury attitudes. It is easy to be sat in Kings College London and feel that all cultures are equal, when you haven’t been anally raped at a peace festival by someone shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ and held hostage. In the introduction to the course, labeling an organisation as terrorist was described as a problem because it ‘implies a moral judgment’. Nothing was said about why a moral judgment might be appropriate.

All the civil servant participants were given a topic to research and present. One attendee said her brother had been radicalised and fought in Syria for Islamic State (ISIS). ’Phew’, I thought. At least one person here will understand the problems of extremism (!) Her presentation was about the UK’s Counter Terrorism Strategy, Prevent. She argued Prevent is inherently racist because it focuses on Islamist extremism. The mere mention of Islamist extremism makes Muslims ‘feel uncomfortable’, she argued. Her brother would most certainly have agreed.

I raised the point that nearly 70 per cent of terrorist attacks in the UK are Islamist. Similarly, 70 per cent of lung cancer cases are caused by smoking. It would be absurd to avoid mentioning this in the study of cancer so smokers don’t feel uncomfortable. Unsurprisingly, this comparison was not well received.

Later on, we were shown an ISIS propaganda recruitment video filmed in Syria. The same attendee’s face lit up. Laughing and pointing at the Jihadi in the video, ‘He used to go to my school! I know him!’ she exclaimed. Mouth agape, I looked around the room for responses to yet another disclosure involving personal links to ISIS terrorists. I appeared to be the only one to find this extraordinary.

There was an irony to being surrounded by civil servants who hate the concept of the State. As young professionals, they represented a microcosm of the views emanating from British universities: When it comes to extremism and counter terrorism, the State is not to be trusted.

The head of Security Studies at Kings College read concernedly, ‘Problems of Definitions: Labelling a group terrorist can increase the state’s power.’ The civil servants nodded in agreement.

The visiting speakers were political heavyweights. Possessing genuine expertise with interesting anecdotes, their past responses to crises like the ‘Northern Ireland Troubles’ were referenced frequently. Yet I couldn’t help but feel many of their insights were lost by the audience.

One attendee provocatively asked a former head of GCHQ whether he ‘felt bad infringing on our civil liberties in the pursuit of terrorists?’ Naïve and uninformed, the questioner had highlighted mainstream opinion that security services are routinely listening to innocent, random people’s phone calls or stalking their WhatsApps. Lacking was any appreciation the UK is exemplary. Protective legislation is laborious to the point of being near obstructive and investigations pursuing criminals and terrorists are rigorously audited.

Israel was referenced throughout the course. We were told some consider Hamas terrorists as freedom fighters whereas Israel was provided as a prime example when considering the question of whether a state can commit terrorism. In the introduction, one slide read ‘Condemning terrorism is to endorse the power of the strong over the weak’, a dangerous conclusion breeding anti-Israel positions. In this perspective, Israel is seen as a powerful aggressor and the Palestinians militarily disadvantaged in asymmetric warfare. Thus, the Palestinians are inherently oppressed an axiom that fuels the view that Israel is a terrorist state and Hamas’ atrocities are justifiably ‘contextualised’. To call Hamas terrorist – as the BBC is so pointedly resistant to doing – would be to ‘endorse the power of the strong over the weak’.

Another slide read, ‘Terrorism is not the problem, rather the systems they oppose are terrorist,’ reflecting post-modern identity politics wrapped up as counter terrorism education. Everything was viewed through the lens of power.

While the lecturer did not explicitly present the slides as reflecting his own beliefs, he said nothing to counter them.

I am grateful I attended the course before the October 7 Hamas terrorist attacks. I have no doubt the pogrom would have been contextually justified as ‘merely the oppressed countering the oppressor’; with Israel’s response described as morally equivalent (or worse) to the atrocities.

None of the Counter Terrorism lecturers (bar two) posted about the attacks on their otherwise informative social media platforms. Of these two, one Professor wrote a RUSI Think Tank commentary, saying Israeli ‘crisis meetings could be affected by a desire for revenge’ and why ‘restraint in Counterterrorism is so important’.

During the span of the course, there was no mention of immigration being relevant to terrorism in the UK, except as a view ‘given by the right wing’.

The course’s overriding emphasis was that Islamist extremism is exaggerated. Right-wing extremism was given more weight than is proportionate. This is in direct conflict with William Shawcross’ findings, in the latest government commissioned review of its anti-radicalisation programme, Prevent.

One lecturer derogatively described Shawcross as ‘the type of person who would say all current counter-terrorism professionals are woke…He is of that ilk.’ This of course discredited Shawcross to the course attendees.

The lecturer further argued that Douglas Murray and Joe Rogan are both examples of the far right. ‘To what extent should Joe Rogan and Douglas Murray be suppressed?’ he asked. ‘They have millions of followers. To de-platform them would cause issues.’

Concluding his talk, the lecturer told a room full of government professionals, ‘so, society needs to find other ways to suppress them.’

fathomjournal.org

16. Myanmar insurgents virtue signaling to China

Will China be able to dominate the post-Junta Burma/Myanmar?

Myanmar insurgents virtue signaling to China

MNDAA ethnic army’s strategic messaging nods to Beijing as speculation swirls around China’s role in wildly successful Operation 1027 offensive

asiatimes.com · by David Scott Mathieson · January 12, 2024

The unprecedented “Operation 1027” resistance offensive launched in late October 2023 continues to make advances on Myanmar military positions in northern Shan State.

Hundreds of ruling State Administration Council (SAC) bases have fallen or been abandoned to the rolling onslaught of the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BA) comprised of the insurgent Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA).

The major towns of Hsenwi and Kutkai, both north of the main SAC-controlled (for now) city of Lashio, have fallen along with Namshan and Namtu.

The Kokang enclave capital of Laukkai has been recaptured after 15 years, and in a flourish of civil war theater, the towns of Hopang and Panglong have been “taken” by the alliance and handed over to Myanmar’s largest non-state armed group, the United Wa State Army (UWSA).

Today’s report of a “cease-fire” brokered by China between the SAC and 3BA may take the momentum out of the offensive, or like similar talks in recent weeks, do little to shape events on the ground in northern Shan state and hardly impact on armed conflict in so many other areas of Myanmar, especially as fighting rages in Rakhine state and the Karenni and Sagaing regions.

Yet in many respects, Operation 1027 has already achieved many of the long-standing aims of the MNDAA, as outlined in a recent New Year public message from its commander Lieutenant General Peng Deren, who is also the General Secretary of the group’s “political wing”, known as the Myanmar National Justice Party (MNJP).

The statement is a detailed and intriguing addition to the quixotic area of insurgent communications and strategic messaging, at times virtue signaling, to multiple audiences. Unlike the Myanmar language version, the original Chinese referred to the offensive as “Operation 1027 Hurricane (Jùfēng)”, which appears to be a designation almost totally absent from most media coverage of the past several weeks.

MNDAA commander Peng Deren has a message for Beijing. Image: X Screengrab

But it suggests that the Chinese version of Peng’s speech has slightly different audiences (an official English version was not released), although a major factor was clearly contributing to a major Chinese crackdown on cyber-fraud scam centers.

Peng claimed the operation had seized 250 “large and small (SAC) military strongholds…blocked several large-scale reinforcements”, accepted some 1,000 surrendering troops, claimed five border crossings, forcibly closed down 300 ‘electronic fraud dens’ (Chinese organized crime-run scam call centers) and sent back 40,000 “fraudsters to return home and surrender.”

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As is well established by now, a prime objective of Operation 1027 was to close down the border scam centers. “The harm of electronic fraud to human society is comparable to that of drugs, and is far more severe and profound than a new coronavirus epidemic!” (emphasis in original) the Kokang leader stated amid reports of horrific mistreatment of captives, including the massacre perpetrated in the so-called “1020 Crouching Tiger Villa Incident” in Laukkai a week before Operation 1027.

Peng further alleges that the SAC military junta spirited away by helicopter, at exorbitant prices for a seat, leaders of the scam centers to KK Park near Myawaddy on the Myanmar-Thailand border, “the largest electronic fraud park in Southeast Asia.”

Yet the MNDAA commander also cast the operation in national anti-regime terms. As Peng argued, “Our party and our army conform to the trend of civilization of the times and bravely serve as the pioneers of Myanmar’s national democratic revolution. ‘Operation Hurricane’ made me very gratified to see the support and response of democratic fighters and revolutionary organizations across the country, and achieved unprecedented brilliant results for ethnic armed forces.”

The link to the Kokang site which carried the message has since been removed from Facebook as it does not comply with their “Community Standards”: the social media company de-platformed the 3BA and their nominal ally the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in February 2019 for being “dangerous organizations.”

Given how pivotal the northern ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) have become to the course of the anti-SAC struggle, Meta/Facebook should reconsider this decision and render primary communications messaging from these groups more readily available.

The 3BA has translated many of their general statements in the past, including after Operation 1027 was launched, but Peng’s New Year’s message was more candidly detailed than the alliance’s usual messaging.

Yet the MNDAA, at least for the past 14 years and likely since its formation in 1989, is neither (ethnic) “Myanma” (Bama) or “national”, and certainly not “democratic.”

The Kokang enclave has been an isolated hive of illicit enterprise since 1989 when the MNDAA was formed out of factions of the imploding Communist Party of Burma (CPB) by Peng Deren’s father, the colorful drug trade personality Peng Jaisheng.

An anti-military guerilla and opium merchant, the older Peng created a semi-autonomous enclave, legally guaranteed by the 2008 constitution, until his ousting by the army in 2009 (personally led by SAC leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing).

Myanmar military commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has history in Kokang. Photo: Asia Times Files / Reuters / Lynn Bo Bo / Pool

Peng Jaisheng’s funeral in 2022 in another China-Myanmar border enclave called Mong La was a guerilla’s gala of A-list veteran and new-wave rebel leaders: many who led Operation 1027 and post-coup resistance forces such as the Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF) were in attendance.

The MNDAA conducted a major offensive in 2015 to wrestle control of Laukkai away from their bitter rivals who expelled the Peng family 15 years ago: “the Four Big Families…in Kokang Old Street” heavily involved in the call center scams according to Peng’s statement.

In one of northern Shan state’s most surreal conflict incidents, the MNDAA raided several casinos in Laukkai in March 2017, reaping an estimated US$73 million according to an investigation by Ann Wang in the South China Morning Post.

Far from “justice” or “democracy”, the MNDAA’s struggle is largely predicated on restoring its monopoly on criminal enterprise in Kokang Another post-1027 reality is the centrality of China to the gravity of the northern theater of Myanmar’s post-coup civil war.

It is still a matter of speculation what role China played in the preparation for the offensive, but the synchronicity of a Chinese official call-center crackdown and an anti-SAC military operation against the Myanmar army with multiple interlocking agendas for all the EAOs involved was almost certainly within Beijing’s tolerance zone.

Absent from Peng’s messaging seems to be the West, whose capitals were shaken from their analytical stupor of conflict stagnation in Myanmar to the possibility the revolution might be won after all – albeit by groups not in the traditional diplomatic orbit of the United States or Europe.

The Sinophobic saber-rattling from some quarters of the American foreign policy establishment, those not consumed with Gaza, Ukraine and containing China, is also out of step with many of the Myanmar resistance forces and the network of loose alliances that the 3BA represents.

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Many resistance groups quietly express concerns over being caught in the middle of a new Cold War between Beijing and Washington. Bashing China for predominantly US political agendas, therefore, is counterproductive, if not hypocritical, to supporting the anti-SAC resistance

If Peng’s allegations that Chinese gangsters were spirited away by helicopter to the Thailand-Myanmar border scam centers, then it behooves American officials to consider listing the local warlord Saw Chit Thu and the Kayin State Border Guard Force (BGF) that provides protection for these border zones and has been involved in various illicit rackets over the years.

Chit Thu in Border Guard Force uniform in a 2014 file photo. Photo: Facebook

Western humanitarian assistance is urgently needed and much appreciated in many parts of Myanmar. Despite manifold difficulties, a great deal of health and livelihood aid is navigating around SAC restrictions. Money for redevelopment and stabilization of the northern borderlands such as Laukkai, Muse and the territory north of Lashio will not come from Western donors.

China is a repressive dictatorship and its interest in Myanmar is purely transactional and exploitative, but its immediacy is forcing nearly all anti-SAC forces to engage in complex bargaining with Beijing.

The anti-coup National Unity Government (NUG) has launched into its own virtue signaling to China strategy, releasing a ten-point China strategy on January 1 that in part vowed to safeguard legitimate Chinese investment in Myanmar. The statement was criticized for being formulaic, dull and obvious, and an approach that should have been pursued in mid-2021 soon after the NUG was formed.

But it was roundly ridiculed for confusing the “One China Principle” (that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China) and the “One China Policy” (one that doesn’t take a position on the issue). In its zeal to emulate the 3BA approach to Beijing, the NUG may have overstretched its tone. Peng Deren struck a difficult balance, absent of any genuine sincerity, pretty much just right.

David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues

asiatimes.com · by David Scott Mathieson · January 12, 2024

17. A Top Biden Official Is Pushing An Alarming Plan For Gaza After The War

Excerpts:

Beyond the McGurk gambit’s questionable chances of winning real Palestinian backing, the bid would likely face serious challenges on Capitol Hill.

Lawmakers have repeatedly said their interest in helping Israel make friends in its neighborhood does not outweigh their concerns about what the U.S. would need to commit to in diplomacy for a Saudi-Israel pact — likely a binding American defense treaty with Saudi Arabia and U.S. assistance with a Saudi nuclear program, among other enticements. Congress would have to approve a treaty and could also scrutinize or bar other U.S.-Saudi deals.

Calling Saudi Arabia “an authoritarian regime which regularly undermines U.S. interests in the region, has a deeply concerning human rights record, and has pursued an aggressive and reckless foreign policy agenda,” 20 senators urged Biden in an Oct. 4 letter to tread carefully in pursuing a Saudi-Israel agreement.

A Top Biden Official Is Pushing An Alarming Plan For Gaza After The War

Brett McGurk is pursuing a proposal to rebuild the Palestinian territory that focuses on a deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, U.S. officials told HuffPost. Many say that plan would sow seeds of future instability in the region.

By 

Akbar Shahid Ahmed

Jan 12, 2024, 06:28 PM EST

huffpost.com · January 12, 2024

LOADINGERROR LOADING

Top White House official Brett McGurk is quietly floating a controversial plan to reconstruct Gaza after Israel’s assault concludes, HuffPost has learned, despite serious concerns from some officials inside the administration that it would sow the seeds for future instability in the region.

In recent weeks, McGurk has been pitching national security officials on a plan suggesting an approximately 90-day timeline for what should happen once active fighting in Gaza ends, three U.S. officials said. It argues that stability can be achieved in the devastated Palestinian region if American, Israeli, Palestinian and Saudi officials launch an urgent diplomatic effort that prioritizes the establishment of Israel-Saudi ties, the officials continued. Such a development is widely referred to as “normalization,” given Saudi Arabia’s refusal to recognize Israel since its founding in 1948.

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There is a widespread belief that similar U.S.-led deals that involved Israel and other regional Arab governments — and that downplayed Palestinian concerns — have fueled anger and violence, including the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas and other Palestinian militants inside Israel.

Still, U.S. President Joe Biden has echoed his predecessor Donald Trump in arguing that those agreements are vital for the region’s future. Biden’s focus on an Israel-Saudi pact has been especially alarming for Palestinians and officials working on Israeli-Palestinian peace. And McGurk’s accelerated timeline has only caused more concern.

McGurk’s plan would use the incentive of aid for reconstruction from Saudi Arabia and possibly other wealthy Gulf countries like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to pressure both the Palestinians and the Israelis, per the officials. In this vision, Palestinian leaders would agree to a new government for both Gaza and the occupied West Bank and to ratchet down their criticisms of Israel, while Israel would accept limited influence in Gaza.

Foreign policy experts in the U.S. and global governments say that they understand the logic of uniting U.S. partners in the region who share a deep skepticism of Iran, a U.S. foe. Given Arab solidarity with Palestinians and its stature as the most influential country in the Muslim-majority world, Saudi Arabia would find it hard to publicly embrace Israel without being able to say that it helps the Palestinians. Meanwhile, building closer ties with historic enemies has long been a top Israeli objective, and the Palestinians have few options for and limited leverage over their international backers.

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But for years in the run-up to Oct. 7, experts were warning that the key to any settlement is meaningful progress for Palestinians toward statehood, not simply promises of additional economic support or limited Israeli concessions. Skeptics of McGurk’s effort to craft an Israel-Saudi deal said that Palestinian frustration over such an agreement could doom it and prompt cycles of unprecedented violence, and noted that Biden had refused to take even minimal steps to build U.S. credibility in the Palestinian territories, like reversing precedent-shattering pro-Israel moves by Trump.

McGurk is leading post-war Gaza planning in Washington, and his proposal comes after initial discussions among a broad range of U.S. officials that did not so heavily emphasize a Saudi angle. McGurk’s suggestions reflect the Biden administration’s pre-Oct. 7 approach of treating the Palestinians as an afterthought, argued all three officials, who requested anonymity to describe sensitive internal discussions.

“It misses the point,” one U.S. official said of the plan. Another said that McGurk has laid out his vision in a top-secret document shared in some circles of the Washington national security establishment — a plan that envisions Biden traveling to the region in the coming months on “a victory tour” to claim credit for an Israel-Saudi deal as an answer to Gaza’s pain. The document references a preliminary deal called “the Jerusalem-Jeddah Pact,” the official told HuffPost.

“The clock [for the 90 days] starts when you can say, ‘Saudi and Israel have agreed on X,’” the first official added.

“They really think they can utilize the reconstruction portion of this to ease the pain of normalizing with Saudi,” said a third official who works on regional policy, referring to the wariness of the Saudi public over a deal with Israel and the prospect of pro-Palestinian activism scuttling the agreement. “They want to show that Israel is giving more than they have before.”

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A recently conducted poll of Saudis by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy found that nearly 96% believe Arab states should cut any ties with Israel over its conduct in Gaza, and Saudi Arabia has long maintained that it will not establish ties with Israel unless the Israelis permit the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Meanwhile, a host of other forces in the region would rage against an agreement perceived as sidelining Palestinians. That group includes the Houthis — the Yemeni militia that has crippled Red Sea shipping, citing concern for Gaza, and that the U.S. and allies launched airstrikes against on Thursday. “These plans are delusionally optimistic and have numerous spoilers and parties that will be unlikely to cooperate or do what the U.S. plans,” one U.S. official said, pointing to the Houthis but also Palestinians and Israelis

“It seems to lack a lot of reality on where the Israeli government is headed,” the official working on regional policy continued, in a reference to hard-line statements from right-wing Israeli ministers and the country’s unprecedented crackdown on Palestinians both in Gaza and the occupied West Bank. “This is what happens when you put people at the top who lack a lot of historical and cultural context in the region.”

Another U.S. official shared a similar view, telling HuffPost, “I’m not sure this is realistic with the Israelis,” though they noted Saudi “eagerness.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken this week told Israeli counterparts that he expects them to do more to achieve a Saudi-Israel pact than they would have had to do prior to their campaign in Gaza, The Times of Israel reported.

A spokesperson for the U.S. National Security Council declined to provide comment for this story.

White House official Brett McGurk (left) has worked closely with Princess Reema bint Bandar al Saud (right), the Saudi ambassador to the U.S.

AMER HILABI via Getty Images

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McGurk has long focused on relations with Saudi Arabia, arguing for Biden to treat a Saudi-Israel agreement as a major international success that could be useful for his reelection bid. He was instrumental in organizing Biden’s controversial 2022 trip to Saudi Arabia, and his policy shift away from his campaign trail pledge to treat the kingdom as a “pariah.” McGurk previously worked on Middle East issues under Trump, who promoted his set of agreements between Arab states and Israel — the so-called Abraham Accords — as one of his biggest triumphs.

Regardless of whether his plan is feasible, the White House adviser and his team have a clear interest in trying to win support for it in terms of their influence within the government and over Biden, per the official focused on regional policy. “It’s for them to disprove the talking point that all the work McGurk has done on normalization is lost because of [Gaza] — there’s a lot of saving face,” the official said, describing the White House push for a U.S.-Saudi deal as “intensified.”

In his first public remarks after the Oct. 7 attack, McGurk claimed that he never sidelined Palestinian concerns in pursuing an Israel-Saudi agreement. Palestinians were “both a partner and at the center of the developing package deal,” he said. And on his latest visit to the region, earlier this week, Blinken explicitly discussed the potential deal, saying: “It would require the conflict to end in Gaza, and it would clearly require there be a practical pathway to a Palestinian state. … The interest is there. It’s real and it could be transformative.”

Outside experts and some American and foreign officials are extremely skeptical that the U.S. will be able to win real support for a Saudi-Israel agreement from Palestinians, given the community’s horror over the Gaza crisis and Washington’s reported focus on reengineering Palestinian leadership from the outside with help from Arab partners.

“There’s a lot of deja vu in what we’re hearing about the allegedly new thinking,” said Khaled Elgindy, an analyst at the Middle East Institute think tank and former adviser to the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah. “I have a hard time believing that the administration that misread the region for three years before Oct. 7 and certainly deprioritized the Palestinians … can understand Palestinian aspirations.”

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“Even if they did understand what was required, would any Palestinian leader be willing to trust them after they have facilitated the annihilation of Gaza?” Elgindy added.

Biden administration officials are focused on bolstering the Palestinian Authority, which controls parts of the West Bank and works closely with Israel and the U.S., although it has not controlled Gaza since 2007 and is led by officials whom many Palestinians disdain. McGurk’s plan calls for developing a new cabinet for the body, one U.S. official said, and Washington is widely understood to be attempting to loosen the hold of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

“When they talk about revitalized leadership, someone other than Mahmoud Abbas but very, very similar in almost every other way” — in terms of ties to Israel and the U.S. — “the echoes of 2002 and 2003 are quite loud because it was exactly that thinking: If we could just reengineer Palestinian politics to diminish [Palestinian leader Yasser] Arafat’s power, all would be well,” Elgindy said. Abbas became the Palestinian Authority’s first prime minister in 2003, before becoming its president in 2005 and since then intensely centralizing his own power.

Elgindy challenged the idea that the U.S. could seriously address Palestinian discontent by staffing the Palestinian Authority with more effective leaders, such as those seen as mostly focused on technical matters rather than politics like Salam Fayyad and Mohammad Mustafa. Technocratic experience “is important but what Palestinians are looking for is leadership. That is not Abbas; it is not these people,” he added. He envisions a figure who could have appeal across the spectrum of Palestinian politics, from the left to Hamas, but said that is “a disincentive for Israel” and that the U.S. would be “ambivalent” on the importance of that influence.

“They’re just going to fall back on simple power: We can control the flow of funds, we’re the only ones who can convince Israel to do anything. That’s been the modus operandi of the U.S.-led peace process all along, but look where it’s gotten us,” Elgindy said.

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Blinken raised the idea of a new Palestinian Authority cabinet with Abbas this week and the Palestinian leader’s response was “poor,” a U.S. official told HuffPost. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller disputed that presentation in an email to HuffPost, writing, “This account is false in every respect.”

Beyond the McGurk gambit’s questionable chances of winning real Palestinian backing, the bid would likely face serious challenges on Capitol Hill.

Lawmakers have repeatedly said their interest in helping Israel make friends in its neighborhood does not outweigh their concerns about what the U.S. would need to commit to in diplomacy for a Saudi-Israel pact — likely a binding American defense treaty with Saudi Arabia and U.S. assistance with a Saudi nuclear program, among other enticements. Congress would have to approve a treaty and could also scrutinize or bar other U.S.-Saudi deals.

Calling Saudi Arabia “an authoritarian regime which regularly undermines U.S. interests in the region, has a deeply concerning human rights record, and has pursued an aggressive and reckless foreign policy agenda,” 20 senators urged Biden in an Oct. 4 letter to tread carefully in pursuing a Saudi-Israel agreement.

huffpost.com · January 12, 2024

18. Is the US prepared for war in the Far East?

You can always expect Don Kirk to include the Korean threat, unlike many others in the press and among the pundits.

But the question is who is really threatening Xi, Putin, and Kim?

Excerpt:

Just as fighting has broken out suddenly, unexpectedly, elsewhere, so war could erupt in Northeast Asia if any of the actors — Xi, or Putin, or Kim — feel unduly threatened or need a war as an antidote to unrest at home. The U.S., riding high economically, may have the resources to pour into the struggle with any or even all of them, but does it have the will?  

Is the US prepared for war in the Far East? 

BY DONALD KIRK, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 01/12/24 10:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4403903-is-the-us-prepared-for-war-in-the-far-east/

War is breaking out where most of us had not expected it. 

By now we are accustomed to daily headlines on the Russian invasion of Ukraine and on the Israelis fighting to destroy Hamas terrorists in Gaza. What’s next, and how capable is America of standing by still more countries under siege and under attack? 

The question assumes special relevance when you consider U.S. troops are not fighting on the ground in Ukraine or Gaza. These are proxy wars. America is sending arms and funds, but it is not Americans who are fighting and dying. 

What’s going to happen, then, if the U.S. is called on to send its own troops? 

We must face that possibility, with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un escalating his threats against South Korea, not to mention Japan and the U.S. The United States is bound by separate treaties with both South Korea and Japan to defend them. Washington maintains huge bases in both countries. The fear, though, is that of a war involving hundreds of thousands of troops against the two other major powers, China and Russia, in contention for the region.

At the moment, that concern seems abstract. China’s President Xi Jinping may talk big when it comes to taking over the independent island province of Taiwan, but he does not appear to be quite willing to go to war. That was clear from his recent meeting with President Biden in San Francisco. 

Sure, he’s asserting Chinese influence from the Korean peninsula to the South China Sea, and in Southeast Asia and beyond, but he’s not interested in anything much more serious than skirmishes with Indian troops along the Himalayan frontier. 

The Taiwan presidential election Jan. 13 may test the degree of Xi’s warlike intentions. 

The outgoing Taiwan president, Tsai Ing-wen, has resolutely refused to upset China by declaring Taiwan’s independence; her vice president, Michael Lai Ching-te, running to succeed her, now favors the “status quo” after having infuriated Xi by advocating Taiwan’s “sovereignty” as an independent entity. He’s up against the candidate of the Kuomintang (KMT), the old “Nationalist” party whose forces fled across the Formosa Straits to Taipei before Mao’s victorious Red Army in 1949. The KMT now is all for placating Beijing, by far Taiwan’s biggest business partner.

Lately, Chinese coast guard vessels have been spraying Philippine fishing boats with water cannons in the South China Sea, which China claims as its own. That’s a far cry from firing real live bullets. 

The Americans completely sympathize with their Philippine ally, to whom Biden is promising much support after years of sometimes bumpy relations. Washington occasionally orders its warships and planes to show the flag over the South China Sea, but Biden will not risk an armed clash in those disputed waters.  

We’ve been surprised, however, by the outbreak of wars in Ukraine and Israel, and we have to be ready for shocks in Asia too. North Korea’s relationship with Russia is disturbing. There is no doubt the Russians are providing much-needed technological support for North Korean satellites and missiles. 

Russian expertise is seen in Kim’s plans to send more spy satellites on orbits around the Earth. The first satellite was probably not too helpful technically, but the North Koreans are sure to get better under Russian tutelage. Similarly, Russian expertise is seen in the launching of the North’s latest Hwasong-18 missile, an intercontinental model capable, theoretically, of carrying a nuclear warhead to targets in the U.S. 

The common denominator between satellites and missiles is they’re launched the same way. North Korean satellite technology has as much to do with perfecting the launching phase as with picking up photographic images of U.S., South Korean and Japanese facilities, many of which can be found via Google Earth. It’s because of its potential military ramifications that the United Nations theoretically bans North Korea from launching satellites and long-range missiles and has sanctioned the North repeatedly.  

North Korea’s relations with China and Russia mean that it can easily avoid sanctions while remaining confident those two great powers will offer the ultimate defense in a showdown.   

China is North Korea’s greatest trading partner, the source of almost all its oil and half its food, and Russia has been a terrific market for North Korean artillery shells and other arms since Kim’s historic mission in September to the Russian far east, where he met President Vladimir Putin at a cosmodrome near the Amur River. 

Putin, fighting in Ukraine suffering from worse economic difficulties than China, is even less interested than Xi in waging a war in the Far East, including the Korean peninsula. 

It’s not China or Russia but political divisions within the U.S. that may be America’s worst enemy. Americans are in no mood for sending troops overseas when they are fighting one another politically and socially at home. Anti-war sentiment is intense. It was for that reason that the U.S. had to withdraw its troops from Vietnam, leaving the South Vietnamese government to go down in defeat in 1975. 

Similarly, the U.S. withdrew precipitously from Afghanistan in 2021. 

Biden has sounded determined in asking Congress to authorize extra funding for Israel and Ukraine, but he may not be so tough about deploying hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops to engage in wars for countries about which Americans know very little. Unlike Harry Truman, who staked his presidency on turning back the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, Biden does not give the impression of being such a fighter. It’s one thing to assure the leaders of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, as well as the Philippines, of America’s “commitment” to defend them; it’s quite another to risk putting America on a real war footing.  

Nor should we expect former President Trump, if he returns to the White House after this year’s presidential election, to be any better. In fact, he might be far worse. He bonded with Putin during his presidency and professed to “love” Kim after their summit in Singapore in June 2018. Despite the failure of their summit in Hanoi in February 2019, he would want to keep up the relationship. Amazingly, Trump also talked about withdrawing U.S. troops from Korea and Japan while asking Korea to pay an excessively huge amount for the privilege of having them on vital bases in the South. 

It took the election of Biden in the U.S. and then of Yoon Suk Yeol as president of South Korea in 2002 to bring the longstanding alliance back to combat effectiveness. 

Just as fighting has broken out suddenly, unexpectedly, elsewhere, so war could erupt in Northeast Asia if any of the actors — Xi, or Putin, or Kim — feel unduly threatened or need a war as an antidote to unrest at home. The U.S., riding high economically, may have the resources to pour into the struggle with any or even all of them, but does it have the will?  

Donald Kirk has been a journalist for more than 60 years, focusing much of his career on conflict in Asia and the Middle East, including as a correspondent for the Washington Star and Chicago Tribune. He is currently a freelance correspondent covering North and South Korea, and is the author of several books about Asian affairs.  ​

​19. SOF Pic of the Day: Bringing SFC Chapman Home, 2002

Nate was in 1-1 with us until just before 9-11 when he rotated back to 3-1 SFG at Fort Lewis and then volunteered immediately for this mission to Afghanistan. Nate was a helluva soldier and a great American. Let us never forget.

There is video at the link: https://sofrep.com/news/sof-pic-of-the-day-bringing-sfc-chapman-home-2002/?utm

SOF Pic of the Day: Bringing SFC Chapman Home, 2002

sofrep.com · by Guy McCardle · January 11, 2024

1 day ago

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In a solemn tribute at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, the honor guard of the 1st Special Forces Group carries the flag-draped coffin of Sergeant First Class Nathan R. Chapman, marking a poignant moment of remembrance and respect.

A somewhat sad choice for today’s SOF Pic of the Day.

I’ve chosen to highlight the repatriation of the remains of Sergeant First Class Nathan R. Chapman. The image shows an honor guard from the 1st Special Forces Group moving Chapman’s flag-draped coffin at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport in January 2002. His final resting place is at Tahoma National Cemetary in Kent, Washington. It’s damn hard to believe that was 22 years ago.

SFC Chapman on a CH-53 Sea Stallion in November of 2001. Image Credit: Scott Satterlee

Remembering Nathan Chapman

Nathan Ross Chapman was born on April 23, 1970, and tragically fell to enemy fire on January 4, 2002. He was a Sergeant First Class in the United States Army, serving with the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne). Chapman holds the somber distinction of being the first U.S. soldier to lose his life due to enemy actions during the war in Afghanistan.

Born at Andrews Air Force Base to Wilbur and Lynn Chapman, Nathan’s early life was marked by frequent relocations across the United States due to his father’s military assignments. He completed his high school education at Centerville High School near Dayton, Ohio. Though he enlisted in the military, claiming San Antonio, Texas, as his hometown, a place he never lived in, although it held sentimental value for him as the residence of his grandparents.

Chapman’s impressive military career, spanning over a decade, saw him actively engaged in various international conflicts. His service record includes participation in Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, where he was involved in airborne operations and engagement in the Persian Gulf War. Subsequently, he was selected for the Army Special Forces, training at Fort Bragg in North Carolina.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, Chapman was assigned to the 1st Special Forces Group at what was then called Fort Lewis in Washington. His final mission involved directing troop movements from a flatbed truck when he tragically fell to enemy fire. This incident also resulted in injuries to a CIA Paramilitary Operations Officer from the Special Activities Division.

For his bravery and service, Chapman was honored posthumously with prestigious awards, including the Purple Heart and the Bronze Star. In tribute to his sacrifice, Forward Operating Base Chapman was named in his memory.

In a significant recognition on May 18, 2015, the CIA acknowledged Chapman’s involvement with a covert six-person unit, “Team Hotel.” He was posthumously honored with a star on the CIA’s memorial wall, commemorating his contributions to national security and his ultimate sacrifice. Chapman had been officially detailed to the Agency (CIA) in the weeks following 9/11 and was functioning for them as a communications specialist.

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About Guy McCardle View All Posts

sofrep.com · by Guy McCardle · January 11, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com