Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"First, have a definite, clear practical ideal; a goal, an objective. Second, have the necessary means to achieve your ends; wisdom, money, materials, and methods. Third, adjust all your means to that end."

– Aristotle

U.S. Army Special Forces, which traces its origins to OSS Jedburghs and Operational Groups, was established as one of the Army’s basic branches in 1987. “There was only one predecessor to Special Forces and that was OSS.”

– Col. Aaron Bank

"The first human who hurled an insult instead of a stone was the founder of civilization."

– Sigmund Freud

1. PLA SSF scrapped, it’s now the PLA ISF: What does it mean?

2. US weighs sending additional military advisers to Ukraine as Russia gains momentum

3. China's scenarios for invading Taiwan could be altered following Iran's failed attack on Israel, report says

4. Information Warfare is Integrated Warfare

5. Global military spending surges amid war, rising tensions and insecurity

6. Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023

7. Israel beefs up armored corps with new tank companies, for now and the future

8. THE MONTH IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN FIVE MINUTES

9. Biden Has Allowed the Marine Corps to Become Irrelevant by Gary Anderson

10. The Tech Industry is the New Defense Industrial Base

11. Israel Planned Bigger Attack on Iran, but Scaled It Back to Avoid War

12. Biden’s Small Win — and Bigger Failure — in the Middle East

13. US, Philippine Troops Kick Off Drills as China Tensions Mount

14. Public Disputes Undercut Officer Class

15. Historian says US is ‘in a moral crisis right now’

16. How Washington Can Save its Semiconductor Controls on China

17. Europe—but Not NATO—Should Send Troops to Ukraine

18. The Coming Arab Backlash

19. Comparing Gray-Zone Tactics in the Red Sea and the South China Sea

20. New PLA unit underscores intelligentized warfare shift

21. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 21, 2024

22. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 21, 2024

1. PLA SSF scrapped, it’s now the PLA ISF: What does it mean?

This article will not cut and paste in its entirety . Please go to the link to read it. This provides some more information than the article I sent out last week.

Here is the key excerpt which appears to put PSYOP under cyber. It looks ike the Chinese just do not get it about psychological operations. There is more to PSYOP that takes place outside the cyber domain though of course in today's information environment cyber is the main conduit for transmission of information. But expertise in cyber does not necessarily translate to influence operations. But someone who is expert in influencing operations can effectively use the cyber domain for effecting influence.

How will this change impact these operations?

The preliminary reports indicate that the space operations would be delegated to the Aerospace force, the cyber and electronic, psychological warfare operations would be delegated to the cyberspace force, and the battlefield environment protection, information and communication assurance, and information security protection would be with the ISF. The JLSF would continue with its logistic support and strategic delivery responsibil ..

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pla-ssf-scrapped-its-now-the-pla-isf-what-does-it-mean/printarticle/109476958.cms

PLA SSF scrapped, it’s now the PLA ISF: What does it mean?

By Suyash Desai, ET CONTRIBUTORSLast Updated: Apr 21, 2024, 04:43:00 PM IST

Synopsis

PRC's CMC created the ISF on April 19, 2024, replacing the PLA SSF. Xi Jinping awarded the military flag. ISF focuses on communication networks. New arms redefine PLA's structure for modernization goals.

US weighs sending additional military advisers to Ukraine as Russia gains momentum

By LARA SELIGMAN, ALEXANDER WARD and PAUL MCLEARY

04/20/2024 04:44 PM EDT

Politico

The troops would be serving in a non-combat role, officials said.

Congress had stalled for months on greenlighting additional assistance for Kyiv, as former President Donald Trump repeatedly expressed skepticism about the effort. | Sameer Al-Doumy/AFP via Getty Images

04/20/2024 04:44 PM EDT

The U.S. is considering sending additional military advisers to the embassy in Kyiv, the latest show of American commitment to Ukraine as Russia appears to be gaining momentum in the two-year conflict.

The advisers would not be in a combat role, but rather would advise and support the Ukrainian government and military, according to Pentagon spokesperson Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder.

“Throughout this conflict, the DOD has reviewed and adjusted our presence in-country, as security conditions have evolved. Currently, we are considering sending several additional advisers to augment the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) at the Embassy,” Ryder said in a statement to POLITICO, noting that “personnel are subject to the same travel restrictions as all embassy employees.

The ODC “performs a variety of advisory and support missions (non-combat), and while it is staffed exclusively by DOD personnel, it is embedded within the U.S. Embassy, under Chief of Mission authority like the rest of the Embassy,” Ryder added.

Ryder declined to discuss specific numbers of personnel “for operational security and force protection reasons.”

The additional troops will support logistics and oversight efforts for the weapons the U.S. is sending Ukraine, according to four U.S. officials and a person familiar with the plans, who were granted anonymity to speak about a sensitive topic.

The new contingent will also help the Ukrainian military with weapons maintenance, according to one of the U.S. officials and the person familiar.

A handful of U.S. troops have already deployed for short rotations attached to the embassy in Kyiv, two of the U.S. officials said, with the second official describing the numbers as “onesies and twosies.” Those personnel are helping with oversight and embassy security.

It was not clear how many additional U.S. troops would ultimately be sent to Ukraine, but two of the U.S. officials said the number would be up to 60.

The additional troops, even in a non-combat role, would expand the U.S. military presence in the country, just as the House passed billions in military aid for Ukraine. Congress had stalled for months on greenlighting additional assistance for Kyiv, as former President Donald Trump repeatedly expressed skepticism about the effort.

President Joe Biden has long vowed U.S. troops wouldn’t participate in the war on Ukraine’s behalf, as doing so would increase the risk of a direct confrontation between American and Russian forces.

One of the tasks the advisers will tackle is helping the Ukrainians plan sustainment of complex equipment donated by the U.S. as the summer fighting is expected to ramp up, according to the person familiar. They’ll also buttress what is a relatively small contingent at the U.S. embassy in Kyiv and coordinate new weapons shipments when the current supplemental bill in Congress becomes law and allows more weapons and equipment to flow to Ukrainian front lines.

Ukraine has struggled to regain the initiative against Russia since its counteroffensive last summer failed and Congress stalled in providing billions of dollars in military aid the president requested. The Pentagon has only sent one new tranche of new weapons since December, when it ran out of funding to provide additional aid.

The House on Saturday approved $60.8 billion of long-delayed aid for Ukraine, and the Senate could vote on it early next week. The White House has said it supports the legislation.

Ukraine has clamored for more artillery, air defenses, long-range missiles and fighter jets, which frontline troops and leading politicians insist would help the Ukrainians break through Russian lines and hold their positions.

The news that the U.S. is sending additional forces to Ukraine comes as senior officials warned last week that Russia has been gaining momentum.

CIA Director Bill Burns said Ukraine could lose the war this year if Congress didn’t approve the assistance package.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, speaking to lawmakers, said, “We’re already seeing things on the battlefield begin to shift a bit in Russia’s favor. We are seeing them make incremental gains. We’re seeing the Ukrainians be challenged in terms of holding the line.”

POLITICO

Politico

3. China's scenarios for invading Taiwan could be altered following Iran's failed attack on Israel, report says

There are only so many options for attack and invasion given the geography and simply the location of Taiwan and proximity to the PRC as well as nations who will defend it.

Excerpts:

However, Hammond-Chambers did not believe the pro-Taiwan alliance was operating as smoothly as in the case of Israel.

"The Jordanians, the Brits, the States and the Israelis all worked together to negate the Iranian attack. To what extent do we have that in place in North Asia?" Hammond-Chambers said, per The Telegraph.

"It's coming but I've not seen that yet – that common operating platform that allows for seamless interoperability," he added.

It follows a warning from former commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence Mike Studeman, in which he said Beijing appeared to be on the "march to war."

In an article for War on the Rocks, Studeman wrote: "The war machine of the People's Liberation Army continues to modernize at a sprint in every area."

China's scenarios for invading Taiwan could be altered following Iran's failed attack on Israel, report says

Business Insider · by Cameron Manley

Military & Defense

Cameron Manley

2024-04-21T17:11:53Z

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Chinese military vehicles carrying DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles during a military parade in 2015. Andy Wong - Pool /Getty Images

China is likely analyzing Iran's failed attack on Israel to prepare for a possible invasion of Taiwan.
Experts believe China will focus on how Israel and its allies thwarted the attack, a report said.
Tensions between China and Taiwan have heightened in recent years.

China will analyze the failed Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel in order to better prepare for an invasion of Taiwan, experts believe.

Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles in a direct attack on Israel last week, but Israel and its allies were able to shoot down most of the munitions.

Rupert Hammond-Chambers, the president of the US-Taiwan Business Council, told The Telegraph that China would likely look at the incident to work out how it could get past the technology and the alliance that foiled the attack.

"They will be picking apart what transpired, not just in the way in which the Iranians attacked but also how we responded – the Israelis and the coalition that supported them," he said.

"The kill rate for the drones and the missiles was extremely high, almost perfect. The walk-away for the PLA [People's Liberation Army] will be that the Americans and their allies have the technology to significantly blunt an attack," he added.

Much like Israel, Taipei expects to be able to rely on US support in the event of an attack from China, which considers Taiwan a part of its territory.

A vote in the US House of Representatives on Saturday, which saw almost $61 billion in aid for Ukraine approved by the US House, also confirmed that around $8 billion would go toward security in the Indo-Pacific region, including to Taiwan.

However, Hammond-Chambers did not believe the pro-Taiwan alliance was operating as smoothly as in the case of Israel.

"The Jordanians, the Brits, the States and the Israelis all worked together to negate the Iranian attack. To what extent do we have that in place in North Asia?" Hammond-Chambers said, per The Telegraph.

"It's coming but I've not seen that yet – that common operating platform that allows for seamless interoperability," he added.

It follows a warning from former commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence Mike Studeman, in which he said Beijing appeared to be on the "march to war."

In an article for War on the Rocks, Studeman wrote: "The war machine of the People's Liberation Army continues to modernize at a sprint in every area."

"In 2020, Xi accelerated significant military milestones from 2035 to 2027 because he wanted China's military to modernize faster and give him Taiwan options earlier," he added.

Tensions have risen between China and Taiwan since the island's Democratic Progressive Party, which favors independence from China, won a third consecutive term in Taiwan's 2024 presidential elections.

In August 2022, following then-speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, tensions reached near-boiling point as China began military exercises over the island, including "live-fire drills."

In April 2023, China again launched military drills around the island after then-president Tsai Ing-wen visited the US.

At the time, China described the drills as a "stern warning against the collusion between separatist forces."

China Israel Iran

Business Insider · by Cameron Manley

4. Information Warfare is Integrated Warfare

There is no discussion of psychological warfare/operations or any kind of influence of target audiences which some of us assume is a key element of information warfare.

It begs the question of: should we consider information warfare along the lines the Navy is doing here with PSYOP and influence considered separately or at least not integrated into the information warfare discipline Should we consider psychological warfare/operations as something separate and stand alone?

But would that comport with this bumper sticker (which I like): "information warfare is integrated warfare."

Information Warfare is Integrated Warfare

cimsec.org · by Guest Author

By Corey Grey

When the USS Carney (DDG-64) downed the opening salvos of Houthi land-attack cruise missiles and drones over the Red Sea in October, the Pentagon hailed the feat as a “demonstration of the integrated air and missile defense architecture.” It was much more than that. Long before Carney’s medium-range Standard Missile-2s (SM-2s) erupted from their launch cells, Information Warfare (IW) capabilities provided crucial combat support to neutralize the inbound threats, enabling these shots with critical IW equipment, intelligence, internal communications, and electronic support. In short, naval IW—with the exception of launching the SM-2s— ensured critical strategic objectives. This event, and many others like it, demonstrates the underappreciated depth of IW for the current and future fight.

As the military grapples with recruiting shortfalls, the IW community has a compelling story to counter: integrated warfighting. This narrative, epitomized by Carney and other units’ recent successes, covers efforts across a diverse range of specialties that are too often seen in isolation: meteorology/oceanography, cryptology, intelligence, communications, space, and cyber operations. As important as the success of these individual elements are for the U.S. Navy, the real impact relies on the full integration of information forces and capabilities through improved recruiting, training and career paths integration, as underscored by the recent Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE).

With this in mind, the U.S. Navy should take concrete steps to further promote an integrated warfighting ethos which better incorporates all elements of the IW community, starting from initial officer training to senior level carrier strike group operations. By defining what it means to be an integrated information warfighter rather than just being an Intelligence Specialist, Cryptologist, Meteorologist, or Information Professional, the IW community will better educate, train, and most importantly, recruit the next generation of IW personnel. Equally important is the need to enhance retention. To further maintain the impressive cadre of IW personnel in service, the Navy should improve its career opportunities with better advanced training and cross-detailing availability. In the aftermath of these changes, IW will be better positioned to dominate the information environment and enable mission success.

Shared Identity

The Navy’s IW community currently boasts favorable recruiting but should do more to meet the growing demand from supported operational forces. Vice Admiral Kelly Aeschbach, Naval Information Forces commander, recently confessed that “our biggest challenge right now is facing demand. We are needed everywhere, and I cannot produce enough information warfare capacity and capability to disrupt it everywhere that we would like to have it, and so that remains a real pressing challenge for me: how we prioritize where we put our talent and ensure that we have it in the most impactful place.”

Better recruiting starts with stronger, more compelling messaging. Aviators join to fly, submariners join to drive boats, surface warfare officers to drive ships, but there is less consistency in why each IW officer volunteers for service. Future IW candidates require a holistic message that knits together the disparate range of specialties that encompass the community.

The Navy’s maritime sister service provides a clear model for messaging, encapsulated in five simple words: Every Marine is a Rifleman. This iconic phrase is based on the foundational infantry skills every Marine receives, regardless of their specialty, and the expectation that every Marine can serve in the capacity of a rifleman if called upon to do so. This narrative and ethos is so effective that last year, without any substantial increase in compensation or incentives, the Marine Corps exceeded its recruitment goals while the other services experienced shortfalls not seen in decades. Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Smith said it best: “Your bonus is that you get to call yourself a Marine.”

Sadly, the IW community lacks the clarity of the Marine Corps model. Instead, the community prescribes to an identity built around specialization. Personnel share the title of Information Warfighter, which encompasses seven officer designators and eight enlisted ratings, but the same personnel are only expected to master their own specific capability. Case in point, Congress recently compelled the Navy to produce a new maritime cyber warfare officer designator and cyber warfare technician rating due to a lack of specialization by Cryptologic Warfare Officers and Cryptologic Technicians. This change stands as criticism to the IW community as a whole as it raises questions towards their unified identity. Cyber operations cannot exist without Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) yet the Navy decided to separate the integrated IW capacity under two officer designators (1810, for SIGINT, and 1880, for Cyber Operations). Officers who joined the Navy to perform cyberspace and SIGINT functions should not have to laterally transfer to a new community to ensure they can continue to deliver and lead cyber operations. The capriciousness of this shift only leads to frustration and difficulties in recruiting and retaining talent.

Overall, the true lesson from all this is not the need to create more IW communities, but instead the need to produce a capable warfighter that can understand and provide full IW effects to the operational commander regardless of designator. Many will look to the Information Warfare Commander (IWC) position, both afloat and at maritime operation centers ashore, as the model for this vision, but how does the U.S. Navy assure future and present IW professionals that they will be properly trained to support or even become this commander?

Solutions for Integration

Although the Information Warfare Commander (IWC) for amphibious readiness groups and carrier strike groups drives the Navy towards a more integrated IW force, there is no consolidated career pipeline to properly prepare a rising officer to leverage all IW capabilities. Moreover, if that commander has done well to master his or her specialty, it comes at the opportunity cost of lesser competence in commanding an integrated force. More training is needed to ensure junior IW professionals feel competent, confident, and motivated to stay in the Navy through this milestone. Lengthening and strengthening courses that all IW officers can attend, such as the Information Warfare Officer Basic Course and Information Warfare Officer Intermediate Course, would better develop and refine how every IW specialty supports the fight while also fostering an integrated warfighting ethos, starting from the officer corps and spreading to the enlisted ratings. These trainings should highlight integrated IW operations for air, surface, sub-surface, naval special warfare, amphibious readiness group, and carrier strike group operations while leveraging evolving initiatives such as live, virtual, and constructive training. IW leaders would then be well postured to motivate and further develop the diverse cadres within the larger community.

Beyond better messaging and training is the need for increased cross-detailing, that is, assigning an officer from one IW discipline into a billet normally filled by another. The aim of this process is to ensure greater exposure and integration as IW officers broaden their experiences serving in capacities that are not traditionally aligned with their core skills. However, the IW force is not fully exposed or integrated because few leadership positions at the O-4 to O-6 levels are available for cross-detailing. These few billets are highly selective; consequently, most IW officers will never work outside their designator. The largest pool of IW officers, namely junior officers, are thus unaware of the full breadth and scope of the IW community due to a lack of experience and exposure. One especially important key to retaining talented people is to provide broader career opportunities, especially when they are most impressionable and likely to decide whether to stay in the Navy or leave for industry.

In a time when IW officers are filling senior roles once thought exclusive to unrestricted line officers, such as chief of staff, maritime operations center directors, and IWC, the question stands how they have not fully integrated within their own community. It is inconsistent to think that an Intelligence Officer can serve as the Commanding Officer of the largest Navy Information Operations Command (traditionally a Cryptologic Warfare Command) but a cryptologist cannot serve as a numbered fleet N2/N39. The same can be said for a number of other IW billets at every level. Certainly there are some positions that are best served by specific designators but this should be the exception and not the rule. The lack of cross-detailing creates identity challenges that degrade both community effectiveness and retention.

More deliberate solutions for integration, such as consolidating new accession IW officers under one broad designator and then having them select specific community tracks later in their careers, similar to the Navy’s Human Resource Officer community, should also be considered. Officer candidates would be presented with the full IW portfolio and then have the opportunity to select and support any of the various disciplines. After a set number of years being exposed to the broader community, the officer would then select a designator track from one of the IW disciplines. This could be implemented via a competency based selection process as determined from additional qualification designations (AQDs), type of assignments completed, and personal preference. The framework would enable deliberate career development, preparing officers to better succeed in more challenging IW assignments while also offering greater exposure and integration to succeed in senior level Information Warfare Commander positions.

Five Simple Words

With these solutions and more in this vein, operational commanders will be able to look to a fully pinned IW professional and receive an authoritative voice in navigating throughout the entire IW domain. This expectation should not be reserved for the select few who serve as IWC but for each individual who belongs to the IW community. IW is a compilation of many specialties in one vast domain and each sailor must be able to understand their place within it. As each member of a ship’s crew understands his or her place in maintaining a warship afloat, so must all IW professionals as they sail through the information environment.

The generalist versus specialist argument is not novel, yet these assertions go beyond that. The Navy must refit the individual IW operator’s identity towards integrated domain operations. Attracting and retaining qualified talent to meet the heavy IW demand necessitates a full commitment towards greater interconnectedness. Fourteen years have passed since the establishment of the IW community and while progress has been made, great strides still need to be achieved towards full synthesis. Without a comprehensive approach that meaningfully gets to how the IW community better integrates – from messaging, to training, to detailing. It is questionable whether the Navy will indeed be capable of recruiting and retaining forces for the many and varied challenges along the horizon. More must be done and a good place to start is by putting the community’s initiatives and visions into five simple words – “Information Warfare is Integrated Warfare.”

Lieutenant Corey Grey is a cryptologic warfare officer, qualified in information warfare and submarines. He holds a master’s degree from the Naval War College in defense and strategic studies with an Asia-Pacific concentration. He is assigned as the cryptologic resource coordinator on the staff of Commander, Submarine Group Seven.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 25, 2023) Operations Specialist 2nd Class Itzel Ramirez identifies surface contacts in the combat information center of the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) in the Pacific Ocean, Aug. 25, 2023. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Elliot Schaudt)

cimsec.org · by Guest Author

5. Global military spending surges amid war, rising tensions and insecurity

Global military spending surges amid war, rising tensions and insecurity

sipri.org

(Stockholm, 22 April 2024) Total global military expenditure reached $2443 billion in 2023, an increase of 6.8 per cent in real terms from 2022. This was the steepest year-on-year increase since 2009. The 10 largest spenders in 2023—led by the United States, China and Russia—all increased their military spending, according to new data on global military spending published today by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), available at www.sipri.org.

Read this press release in Catalan (PDF), French (PDF), Spanish (PDF) or Swedish (PDF).

Click here to download the SIPRI Fact Sheet.

Military expenditure increases in all regions

World military expenditure rose for the ninth consecutive year to an all-time high of $2443 billion. For the first time since 2009, military expenditure went up in all five of the geographical regions defined by SIPRI, with particularly large increases recorded in Europe, Asia and Oceania and the Middle East.

‘The unprecedented rise in military spending is a direct response to the global deterioration in peace and security,’ said Nan Tian, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘States are prioritizing military strength but they risk an action–reaction spiral in the increasingly volatile geopolitical and security landscape.’

Military aid to Ukraine narrows spending gap with Russia

Russia’s military spending increased by 24 per cent to an estimated $109 billion in 2023, marking a 57 per cent rise since 2014, the year that Russia annexed Crimea. In 2023 Russia’s military spending made up 16 per cent of total government spending and its military burden (military spending as a share of gross domestic product, GDP) was 5.9 per cent.

Ukraine was the eighth largest spender in 2023, after a spending surge of 51 per cent to reach $64.8 billion. This gave Ukraine a military burden of 37 per cent and represented 58 per cent of total government spending.

Ukraine’s military spending in 2023 was 59 per cent the size of Russia’s. However, Ukraine also received at least $35 billion in military aid during the year, including $25.4 billion from the USA. Combined, this aid and Ukraine’s own military spending were equivalent to about 91 per cent of Russian spending.

USA remains NATO’s major spender but European members increase share

In 2023 the 31 NATO members accounted for $1341 billion, equal to 55 per cent of the world’s military expenditure. Military spending by the USA rose by 2.3 per cent to reach $916 billion in 2023, representing 68 per cent of total NATO military spending. In 2023 most European NATO members increased their military expenditure. Their combined share of the NATO total was 28 per cent, the highest in a decade. The remaining 4 per cent came from Canada and Türkiye.

‘For European NATO states, the past two years of war in Ukraine have fundamentally changed the security outlook,’ said Lorenzo Scarazzato, Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘This shift in threat perceptions is reflected in growing shares of GDP being directed towards military spending, with the NATO target of 2 per cent increasingly being seen as a baseline rather than a threshold to reach.’

A decade after NATO members formally committed to a target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on the military, 11 out of 31 NATO members met or surpassed this level in 2023—the highest number since the commitment was made. Another target—of directing at least 20 per cent of military spending to ‘equipment spending’—was met by 28 NATO members in 2023, up from 7 in 2014.

China’s rising military expenditure drives up spending by neighbours

China, the world’s second largest military spender, allocated an estimated $296 billion to the military in 2023, an increase of 6.0 per cent from 2022. This was the 29th consecutive year-on-year rise in China’s military expenditure. China accounted for half of total military spending across the Asia and Oceania region. Several of China’s neighbours have linked their own spending increases to China’s rising military expenditure.

Japan allocated $50.2 billion to its military in 2023, which was 11 per cent more than in 2022. Taiwan’s military expenditure also grew by 11 per cent in 2023, reaching $16.6 billion.

‘China is directing much of its growing military budget to boost the combat readiness of the People’s Liberation Army,’ said Xiao Liang, Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘This has prompted the governments of Japan, Taiwan and others to significantly build up their military capabilities, a trend that will accelerate further in the coming years.’

War and tensions in the Middle East fuel biggest spending increase of past decade

Estimated military expenditure in the Middle East increased by 9.0 per cent to $200 billion in 2023. This was the highest annual growth rate in the region seen in the past decade.

Israel’s military spending—the second largest in the region after Saudi Arabia—grew by 24 per cent to reach $27.5 billion in 2023. The spending increase was mainly driven by Israel’s large-scale offensive in Gaza in response to the attack on southern Israel by Hamas in October 2023.

‘The large increase in military spending in the Middle East in 2023 reflected the rapidly shifting situation in the region—from the warming of diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab countries in recent years to the outbreak of a major war in Gaza and fears of a region-wide conflict,’ said Diego Lopes da Silva, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

Military action against organized crime pushes up spending in Central America and the Caribbean

Military spending in Central America and the Caribbean in 2023 was 54 per cent higher than in 2014. Escalating crime levels have led to the increased use of military forces against criminal gangs in several countries in the subregion.

Military spending by the Dominican Republic rose by 14 per cent in 2023 in response to worsening gang violence in neighbouring Haiti. The Dominican Republic’s military spending has risen steeply since 2021, when the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse threw Haiti into crisis.

In Mexico, military expenditure reached $11.8 billion in 2023, a 55 per cent increase from 2014 (but a 1.5 per cent decrease from 2022). Allocations to the Guardia Nacional (National Guard)—a militarized force used to curb criminal activity—rose from 0.7 per cent of Mexico’s total military expenditure in 2019, when the force was created, to 11 per cent in 2023.

‘The use of the military to suppress gang violence has been a growing trend in the region for years as governments are either unable to address the problem using conventional means or prefer immediate—often more violent—responses,’ said Diego Lopes da Silva, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

Other notable developments

India was the fourth largest military spender globally in 2023. At $83.6 billion, its military expenditure was 4.2 per cent higher than in 2022.
The largest percentage increase in military spending by any country in 2023 was seen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (+105 per cent), where there has been protracted conflict between the government and non-state armed groups. South Sudan recorded the second largest percentage increase (+78 per cent) amid internal violence and spillover from the Sudanese civil war.
Poland’s military spending, the 14th highest in the world, was $31.6 billion after growing by 75 per cent between 2022 and 2023—by far the largest annual increase by any European country.
In 2023 Brazil’s military spending increased by 3.1 per cent to $22.9 billion. Citing the NATO spending guideline, members of Brazil’s Congress submitted a constitutional amendment to the Senate in 2023 that aims to increase Brazil’s military burden to an annual minimum of 2 per cent of GDP (up from 1.1 per cent in 2023).
Algeria’s military spending grew by 76 per cent to reach $18.3 billion. This was the highest level of expenditure ever recorded by Algeria and was largely due to a sharp rise in revenue from gas exports to countries in Europe as they moved away from Russian supplies.
Iran was the fourth largest military spender in the Middle East in 2023 with $10.3 billion. According to available data, the share of military spending allocated to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps grew from 27 per cent to 37 per cent between 2019 and 2023.

For editors

SIPRI monitors developments in military expenditure worldwide and maintains the most comprehensive, consistent and extensive publicly available data source on military expenditure. The annual update of the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database is accessible from today at www.sipri.org.

All percentage changes are expressed in real terms (constant 2022 prices). Military expenditure refers to all government spending on current military forces and activities, including salaries and benefits, operational expenses, arms and equipment purchases, military construction, research and development, and central administration, command and support. SIPRI therefore discourages the use of terms such as ‘arms spending’ when referring to military expenditure, as spending on armaments is usually only a minority of the total.

Media contacts

For information or interview requests contact Mimmi Shen (mimmi.shen@sipri.org , +46 766 286 133) or Stephanie Blenckner (blenckner@sipri.org, +46 8 655 97 47).

sipri.org

6. Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023

The 12 page report can be down loaded here: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf

Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023

https://www.sipri.org/publications/2024/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2023

Dr Nan Tian, Dr Diego Lopes da Silva, Xiao Liang and Lorenzo Scarazzato

https://doi.org/10.55163/BQGA2180

Publisher: SIPRI

SIPRI, Stockholm:

April, 2024

DOWNLOAD FULL PUBLICATION

World military expenditure increased for the ninth consecutive year in 2023, reaching a total of $2443 billion. The 6.8 per cent increase in 2023 was the steepest year-on-year rise since 2009 and pushed global spending to the highest level SIPRI has ever recorded. The world military burden—defined as military spending as a percentage of global gross domestic product (GDP)—increased to 2.3 per cent in 2023. Average military expenditure as a share of government expenditure rose by 0.4 percentage points to 6.9 per cent in 2023 and world military spending per person was the highest since 1990, at $306.

The rise in global military spending in 2023 can be attributed primarily to the ongoing war in Ukraine and escalating geopolitical tensions in Asia and Oceania and the Middle East. Military expenditure went up in all five geographical regions, with major spending increases recorded in Europe, Asia and Oceania and the Middle East.

This SIPRI Fact Sheet highlights trends in military expenditure for 2023 and over the decade 2014–23. The data, which replaces all military spending data previously published by SIPRI, comes from the updated SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)/EDITORS

Dr Nan Tian is a Senior Researcher and Acting Programme Director with the Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme at SIPRI.

Dr Diego Lopes da Silva is a Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

Xiao Liang is a Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

Lorenzo Scarazzato is a Research Assistant with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

7. Israel beefs up armored corps with new tank companies, for now and the future

Didn't we just read that tanks are becoming obsolete?

Do Tanks Have a Place in 21st-Century Warfare?

As explosive drones gain battlefield prominence, even the mighty U.S. Abrams tank is increasingly vulnerable.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/20/world/europe/tanks-ukraine-drones-abrams.html

Israel beefs up armored corps with new tank companies, for now and the future - Breaking Defense

Breaking Defense talked with a tank company commander who is helping to create the new units, which will mean less reliance on reservists for tank operations.

By SETH J. FRANTZMAN

on April 22, 2024 at 6:01 AM

breakingdefense.com · by Seth J. Frantzman · April 22, 2024

An Israeli soldier walks on the turret of a Merkava Mark IV battle tank stationed at a position along Israel’s northern border with Lebanon in the vicinity of the village of Shtula on April 6, 2023. (OREN ZIV/AFP via Getty Images)

JERSUALEM — The Israel Defense Forces are expanding the number of regular army tank companies in each battalion of the armored corps, a direct result of lessons learned from six months of war in Gaza — and one taken with an eye towards future conflicts.

The IDF’s decision to increase the number of tank companies manned by regular army soldiers, as opposed to reservists, reverses a decision made more than a decade ago to reduce the number of active tank companies, and is one of several new units and reorganizations the IDF has embarked on due to the ongoing war.

It also may seem counter-intuitive on its face, as tanks are generally viewed as ineffective for urban warfare. But while most photos of Gaza show destroyed buildings and high-rises, the region features quite a bit of open area outside of Gaza City proper, which is where Israeli tanks have been largely operational.

Capt. Amitai, a company commander in the 82nd battalion of the 7th armored brigade who spoke to Breaking Defense last week about the new initiative, said that armored vehicles have played a critical role in the conflict.

In addition to the 7th armored, the IDF also operates the 188th and 401st regular armored brigades. Each has seen service in Gaza. The armored brigades played a key role in the ground offensive which began on Oct. 7, with tanks rolling across Gaza and down the coastline to link up and cut off Gaza city from central and southern Gaza.

Amitai — whose full name was not provided for security reasons — praised the tanks’ role as providing “protection and firepower and the ability to move quickly in difficult terrain” for infantry and engineers who then are involved in the more urban elements of the conflict. He noted that tanks have proven themselves in this conflict, especially spotlighting the Trophy Active Protection system on the IDF’s Merkava IV main battle tanks.

“It gives a lot of confidence to know you are protected by such a system, I saw it with my own eyes,” he says, describing how his deputy battalion commander’s tank was targeted by two missiles. “We were in an ambush and it intercepted two missiles and destroyed a squad of three terrorists in seconds.”

Jonathan Spyer, a researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, notes that “as part of combined arms teams, armored forces have played a central and vital role in the fighting in Gaza.” He told Breaking Defense that the decision to “rebuild companies which had been disbanded forms part of the general increase in the defense budget expected to follow the war.”

“It may also reflect an understanding that the IDF of the coming period needs to be equipped to fight semi-regular and regular forces, bringing different needs and requiring different resources to those needed for counter terror and counter insurgency operations,” says Spyer.

Moving On From Reserve Reliance

According to Amitai, IDF tank brigades consist of battalions that have two companies of tanks staffed by regular army conscript soldiers, plus a third company of reservists. Now the IDF is expanding the tank battalions, so they will each have a third regular army tank company. (Tank companies usually have 12 tanks, but numbers can vary, and the IDF doesn’t provide exact figures.) The reservists, now freed from tank duty, will be used in another capacity.

Building up the companies isn’t an overnight process; three companies are being trained now, but that training can take up to nine months, Amitai said. In other words, this process is going to go on for a bit.

However, there doesn’t seem to be concern about where to find the bodies. Amitai claimed that the recent conflict has showed the public how “amazing” the tanks can be in the modern battlefield, and stated there are 30 percent more recruits to the tank brigades than in the past. That would represent the largest recruitment to the armored corps in “many years,” the Israeli website Mako noted.

And that recruitment is going to be important, because the IDF’s long-term goal here is to not rely on reservists for so much of its tank force. Israel pressed into service up to 300,000 reservists in the wake of the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas, which is both a testament to its ability to flow manpower and a sign that the regular military was not equipped to sustain a long-term conflict. The new tank units reflect the need to send reservist soldiers home.

Ultimately, expanding the number of active-duty, full-time tank operators isn’t just about the Gaza conflict. It’s about being prepared for another conflict down the road, whether it be in Lebanon, Syria or in Iran.

Having three regular army tank companies in each battalion, as opposed to two, means the units can stay in the field longer. However, don’t expect to see IDF buyers searching desperately for new tanks to procure: The expansion of the armored corps regular tank units isn’t expanding the overall number of tanks, but rather putting tanks that were used by reservists back into active duty.

The IDF has also opened a similar company in the 52nd battalion of the 401st brigade and 71st battalion of the 188th brigade. The shift is one of several that has happened since the Oct. 7 war began. The IDF established a new Mountain Brigade and also a new Hermes 900 drone unit, called the 147th squadron. The IDF is also expected to return to service more combat helicopters and acquire more F-35s and F-15s as part of a multi-year procurement program.

Amitai was tasked with creating this third company within the 82nd battalion, the first battalion to create this new company. Like the rest of Israel’s armored units, they use the Merkava IV main battle tank. The soldiers he has been training for the unit have all trained together as a group, something unique in the IDF, where tank operators may not have worked together prior to unit assignments. “We established the company three months ago and then had one and a half months of training, and spent the last weeks in Khan Younis,” in southern Gaza, he said.

The unit was withdrawn from Khan Younis in early April, along with the 98th division it had been operating under. Amitai said operations alongside the 98th, which includes the IDF’s elite Commando Brigade, went as expected. The 7th armored is usually part of the IDF’s 36th division, under which it operated when the war began. In the past it has trained with Golani infantry and combat engineers for potential conflict in northern Israel. In training the new battalion, Amitai described the challenges new tank crews face. They spent “a lot of time in the tank under pressure and under heat. Not seeing home for a while.”

8. THE MONTH IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN FIVE MINUTES

This is a new report/service from Strategy Central. I find this a very useful summary of key information. I will be following this and forwarding these reports. You may want to bookmark this web site: https://www.strategycentral.io/stratbot

THE MONTH IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN FIVE MINUTES

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/the-month-in-great-power-competition-in-five-minutes

Updated: 1 hour agoMonthly Report on Great Power Activities and Strategic Intent MARCH & APRIL - 2024

This month's Great Power Competition Report focuses on China's cyber, maritime, and geopolitical activities and intrusion into U.S. academia. Geographically, the content concentrates on the Indo-Pacific and the United States. The "Month in a Minute" is a new product; please let us know if it is informative and useful in your work or studies.

China's Economic and Political Strategy Remains Unyielding Amid Challenges

Despite external pressures and internal challenges, Xi Jinping will unlikely alter China's economic and political strategies. The leadership remains firmly in control of economic policies, focusing on strengthening state-owned enterprises at the expense of the private sector and disregarding international criticisms and advice. This approach is grounded in an ideological framework emphasizing party leadership and a robust state-led economic model.

Economists and political leaders caution against underestimating China's economic and strategic capabilities. Policymakers and global leaders should acknowledge the enduring nature of China's economic model and its implications for global and regional power dynamics. Understanding China's pivotal role on the global stage is crucial for nations aiming to engage effectively with China. Despite numerous challenges, including demographic shifts, technological restrictions imposed by the U.S., and internal economic adjustments, China continues to adapt and grow. This growth challenges the narrative of China's economic decline and holds significant implications for global and particularly U.S. strategic and economic policies. A realistic appraisal of China's economic trajectory is essential for shaping effective international economic and foreign policies, emphasizing the consequences of overlooking China's sustained ascent.

Xi Jinping's Political Maneuvering Over Taiwan

Politically, Xi Jinping continues to influence Taiwan's political future. By meeting with Ma Ying-jeou, Xi aims to project an image of inevitability regarding Taiwan's integration with China, hoping to sway Taiwanese public opinion and international perceptions. This meeting exemplifies China's strategic use of diplomacy to advance its claims over Taiwan while preparing for a tougher stance against Taiwan's current pro-independence government. This strategy underscores the complex interplay of domestic politics, international diplomacy, and regional security concerns in China's approach to Taiwan.

India's Emerging Global Economic Position

India shows considerable potential to emerge as a major global economic power, potentially rivaling China. However, significant barriers remain—challenges in policy implementation, investment climate, and socio-political stability temper optimism about India's economic ascent. While India's economic infrastructure and capabilities have dramatically improved, translating these advantages into sustainable economic superiority over China requires more consistent policy execution and effective risk management. Balancing economic liberalization with nationalistic protectionist policies is crucial for fully leveraging India's demographic and economic potential.

Escalatory Geopolitical Tensions in the South China Sea

Tensions in the South China Sea have intensified this year, especially between China and the Philippines. The escalation directly results from the Philippines' strategic pivot towards the U.S., with newly elected President Marcos seeking to counter Chinese dominance in the region. Beijing perceives Manila's maneuvering as a threat. The PRC prefers to manage South China Sea disputes bilaterally, without external interference. This article highlights the complexity of these tensions, the potential for military conflict, and the broader regional and international ramifications. It underscores the delicate balance of power in Southeast Asia, the strategic importance of the South China Sea, and the ongoing struggle for influence between major powers.

Domestic Political Complications for President Marcos

Domestic politics complicate President Marcos's administration as the rift between Duterte and Marcos Jr. deepens. The conflict between the two leaders represents a struggle over the Philippines' future direction internally and in its dealings with major global powers. This feud has domestic implications, particularly concerning Duterte's legacy and potential legal repercussions for his actions in office. Internationally, it influences the Philippines' foreign policy stance amidst the strategic rivalry between the United States and China. This conflict underscores the complex interplay between personal politics, national governance, and international diplomacy in shaping the country's trajectory.

U.S. National Security Concerns Over Chinese Cyber Activities

FBI Director Christopher Wray recently warned Congress about the proactive and alarming activities of Chinese hackers. These actions are not merely theoretical threats but represent active engagements that could escalate to aggressive disruptions if unchecked. U.S. authorities have exposed persistent access to critical networks maintained by Chinese cyber actors. This ongoing access poses a continuous threat and complicates efforts to mitigate and secure the nation's vital systems from future intrusions and attacks. Chinese state-sponsored cyber activities represent a strategic, persistent threat to U.S. national security and economic interests, potentially impacting the foundational services that sustain everyday life in America.

China's Influence Efforts in U.S. Political Discourse

Moreover, Wray warned that China actively attempts to influence U.S. political discourse and elections. By adopting tactics similar to those used by Russia in 2016, China appears to be aggressively working to sow division, undermine confidence in democratic institutions, and potentially shift U.S. policy in its favor. This development signals a more aggressive and covert approach to foreign influence by Beijing, raising significant concerns about the integrity of the U.S. electoral process and the broader implications for U.S.-China relations and global democracy.

Why Congress Voted to Ban TikTok

Congress's decision to push for the sale or ban of TikTok stems from growing concerns regarding national security and data privacy. The primary concern is that ByteDance, TikTok's parent company based in China, might allow access to sensitive data by the Chinese government. U.S. lawmakers worry about the potential for Chinese interference, where the Chinese government could leverage TikTok for data collection or misinformation campaigns, especially given laws in China that could compel companies to cooperate with government intelligence operations. Despite TikTok's efforts to distance itself from its Chinese roots and assure the international community of its independence in operational decisions, the suspicions persist.

The bill passed by the House of Representatives mandates that ByteDance must divest TikTok to a government-approved buyer within a specific timeframe or face a ban in the United States. The legislation targets app stores and internet hosting companies, which would face civil penalties for distributing or updating TikTok if it remains under Byte Dance's control. This legislative move is part of broader efforts, previously seen through actions like banning TikTok on government devices, to mitigate perceived threats before they manifest.

The congressional action against TikTok underscores a significant challenge in balancing national security with global business operations in the digital age. While legitimate concerns about data privacy and security exist, the situation also highlights the complexities of international relations and Internet governance. It raises questions about the effectiveness of such bans in protecting national security while respecting free speech and market dynamics. The future of TikTok in the U.S. will likely depend on the company's ability to convincingly sever its ties with its Chinese parent company or successfully navigate the legal and political challenges posed by such governmental actions.

Maritime Strengths and Strategic Postures

China has significantly bolstered its coast guard by integrating more than 20 former navy corvettes and has been assertively advancing its territorial claims in the South China Sea. In addition, Chinese fishing vessels often double as a maritime militia. Moreover, Beijing is actively seeking influence in the Pacific, as evidenced by recent diplomatic victories such as persuading the island nation of Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan in January. Analysts note that China's Coast Guard is more focused on the South China Sea than the U.S. Coast Guard, with China's largest ships capable of deploying deeper into the Pacific. This reach could expand further if China secures security agreements with more Pacific Island nations.

The Pentagon's 2023 report reveals that China's Coast Guard possesses over 150 regional and ocean-going patrol vessels, 50 regional patrol combatants suitable for limited offshore operations, and 300 coastal patrol crafts. In contrast, the U.S. Coast Guard now has 11 cutters based in Hawaii and Guam, some of which also conduct missions to Pacific Island nations. Due to delays and cost increases in building a new class of modern ships, the Coast Guard is deploying retrofitted vessels like the Harriet Lane to the Pacific region. Despite a workforce shortage—10% below its authorized strength and expected to worsen—new strategies are in place, including deploying more 154-foot fast-response cutters and establishing forward operating locations to support its fleet in the Indo-Pacific.

AUKUS and Asymmetric Military Capabilities

Under the AUKUS framework, the United States and Australia must effectively enhance their asymmetric military capabilities to counter China's strategic challenges. AUKUS should develop mine warfare, autonomous vehicles, and Integrated Undersea Surveillance Systems capabilities. Traditional focus areas like major naval vessels might be insufficient to contain China, given its advancements in submarine warfare and sea mines. These systems are crucial for maintaining a competitive edge in the Indo-Pacific region. Leveraging these capabilities in an integrated and innovative manner will be vital to ensuring security and stability amid evolving and complex threats.

Chinese Influence in U.S. Academia

On the domestic front, Chinese entities have secured approximately 2,900 contracts with U.S. universities, totaling $2.32 billion from 2012 to 2024. These contracts span various sectors, including medicine, agriculture, and technology, with significant funding from major Chinese companies such as Huawei and WuXi AppTec, which operate in areas critical to national interests like telecommunications and biotechnology. While these funds have supported expansive research and development initiatives in U.S. universities, they also present ethical and security dilemmas related to potential intellectual property theft and the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over critical research areas. This funding supports crucial developments like new cancer treatments but raises concerns about China's potential misuse of academic discoveries for military or strategic advantages.

The U.S. has grown increasingly wary, with policymakers calling for greater scrutiny and potential restrictions on Chinese involvement in American educational and research institutions. Proposed measures include treating Chinese contracts as foreign-funded acquisitions subject to national security screening by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, and legislative efforts are underway to classify companies like Huawei and WuXi AppTec as adversaries, which would restrict their engagement with U.S. institutions receiving federal funding.

The ongoing funding issues underscore the broader Great Power Competition between the U.S. and China, where technological and educational superiority are vital battlegrounds. The U.S. perceives Chinese funding as a strategic move by Beijing to harness American intellectual and technological capital. This situation complicates the U.S.-China relationship, highlighting the delicate balance between beneficial academic collaborations and safeguarding national security.

The tension between the benefits of open academic collaboration and the risk of strategic exploitation is significant, with the United States likely to lose more than it gains in this exchange. This threat to our academic institutions brings into question where to draw the to prevent empowering a geopolitical rival while still fostering an environment of academic freedom and innovation. The article implies a need for a more robust regulatory framework to manage foreign influence in U.S. academia, ensuring that it aligns with national interests without stifling the global knowledge exchange.

Conclusion

This report examined China's multifaceted activities in cyber warfare, maritime domination, geopolitical maneuvers, and deep-seated investment tactics within U.S. academia. These activities collectively represent a portion of Beijing's broad and integrated approach to strengthening its global stance in the face of ongoing great power competition, particularly with the United States.

Cybersecurity concerns have been highlighted with significant evidence of Chinese state-sponsored activities aimed at infiltrating critical U.S. networks, reflecting a clear and ongoing threat to national security. In the maritime domain, China has vigorously enhanced its coast guard capabilities and expanded its presence in the South China Sea, thereby asserting its territorial claims and challenging U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

Politically, China's influence extends into the geopolitical sphere with its unyielding stance on Taiwan and its strategic use of diplomatic engagements to solidify its position in global forums. Moreover, its substantial investments in U.S. academia, totaling billions, have surfaced dual-use technologies and intellectual property concerns, revealing Beijing's intent to leverage U.S. educational resources for strategic gains. Chinese-owned TikTok is regarded as a security threat to the United States because ByteDance (parent company HQ'ed in Beijing) could be compelled to hand over data to the Chinese government or influence content for political purposes.

These concerted efforts by China have profound implications for U.S. national security and its role in global governance. They underscore the necessity for a comprehensive U.S. response that integrates enhanced cybersecurity measures, a fortified maritime strategy, and a vigilant approach to foreign investments in critical sectors. This strategic response must be balanced with preserving the open academic environment that fosters innovation and global collaboration, ensuring that such engagements do not compromise national security. Recognizing and addressing these challenges will be pivotal in maintaining competitive advantage and safeguarding interests in the ongoing great power rivalry.

9. Biden Has Allowed the Marine Corps to Become Irrelevant by Gary Anderson

Excerpts:

General Berger cleverly classified the war games for reasons that have never been fully justified. Consequently, no one without a “need to know” can directly criticize their conduct or analysis. But to date, billions of dollars in capabilities once deemed essential to Marine Corps readiness have been discarded, including all of its tanks and the heavy engineering equipment vital to both sides in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Instead, more will be spent on anti-ship capabilities already possessed by the other services and our regional allies. That should raise some serious questions in Congress and among the inspectors general of the Defense Department and Department of the Navy, to wit:

— Will force design be useful in American efforts to defend Taiwan?

— Second, if Force Design has merit as a strategic or operational concept, could it not have been better implemented by multi-service joint task forces and regional partners rather than by a single service?

— Third, have any of the retired Marine Corps general officers who developed and “validated” Force Design become contractors, board members, or senior corporate officers of the companies trying to sell the anti-ship missiles and sensors used in FD?

If the answers to the first is no, and the two latter is yes, further questions should be asked by an Article 32 investigation, the military equivalent of a grand jury. Many of the retired Marines who have serious questions regarding FD spent their careers building worldwide force readiness capable of handling contingencies ranging from humanitarian disasters to major theater conflict. Seeing it reduced to a region-centric blend of coastal artillery and light naval infantry is distressing indeed.

This is an issue that Mr. Trump and the Republicans should jump on in the coming election. Force Design will not seriously deter China from attacking Taiwan, nor would it be decisive if a war should occur over that island nation.

Biden Has Allowed the Marine Corps to Become Irrelevant - The American Spectator |

spectator.org · by Gary Anderson · April 22, 2024

Biden Has Allowed the Marine Corps to Become Irrelevant

The Nation’s Pulse

Biden Has Allowed the Marine Corps to Become Irrelevant

The current leadership focuses on obtaining anti-ship missiles while its worldwide force readiness slides.

April 21, 2024, 10:36 PM

Yeongsik Im/Shutterstock

Under President Biden and his woeful national security team the Marine Corps has fallen from the nation’s premier 911 force to a regional coastal artillery force concentrated on China and a light infantry force of marginal use in a conflict anywhere else. Moreover, our president and what passes these days for military leadership probably do not realize what they have done.

Force Design will not seriously deter China from attacking Taiwan.

The Marine Corps’ senior leadership promotes itself as China-focused and no one has questioned its wisdom, despite the possibility that China is a “flavor-of-the-month” in national security circles. In addition, what is not to like about a service that voluntarily divests itself of $3.8 billion in capabilities at a time that other services are competing desperately for a share of the defense budget. Harry Truman once vowed to reduce the Marine Corps to little more that the Navy’s police force. Biden has largely succeeded where Truman failed. (READ MORE from Gary Anderson: The End of Civilization Starts With a Phone Call)

The Corps’ situation is largely self-inflicted, as an intellectual civil war within the Marine Corps has entered its fourth year. At issue is the current leadership’s effort to reduce Marine Corps amphibious attack capabilities in return for anti-ship missiles to fight the Chinese Navy. This has upset many inside the Corps and a cadre of former Marine Corps general officers.

In order to placate its critics, the current leadership of the Corps has changed the name of its controversial “Force Design 2030” strategy to simply “Force Design” (FD). Under pressure from critics who believe that the Navy-Marine Corps team had reduced amphibious forward presence to dangerously low levels, the current commandant — General Eric Smith — has thrown a bone to the insurgents, affirming the importance of having forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units in the world’s most likely trouble spots. He has also agreed with the Chief of Naval Operations to “fix” the availability of amphibious shipping. How they will do this in the short term is yet to be explained.

The insurgents in this intellectual battle is led by a group of retired Marine Corps general officers calling themselves Chowder II after a group of retired generals (“The Chowder and Marching Society”) who led the effort to save the Marine Corps during the Truman administration.

Chowder II has reacted to General Smith’s limited concessions with conciliatory statements. Their efforts to date have resulted in “hand wave” efforts by Smith while he has doubled down on the Force Design strategy of giving up critical Marine Corps war-making capabilities to buy anti-ship missiles to fight the Chinese navy in the South China Sea. I am more bloody minded than Chowder II. I want to see Force Design uncovered as the fraud that it is and those responsible for it held accountable.

There are two reasons for my unrelenting opposition to FD. First, it is bad strategy, operational art, and tactics. The second reason flows from the first. The rationale for FD is based on some war games that are suspect at best and rigged at worst. A recent article in the Marine Corps Times detailed this controversy, and the current senior leadership has yet to tell its side of the story.

However, it is instructive that — with the exception of the current commandant in his guidance to the Corps — not a single three or two star general officer has come out to defend Force Design publicly. They are staying low in their foxholes.

General Berger cleverly classified the war games for reasons that have never been fully justified. Consequently, no one without a “need to know” can directly criticize their conduct or analysis. But to date, billions of dollars in capabilities once deemed essential to Marine Corps readiness have been discarded, including all of its tanks and the heavy engineering equipment vital to both sides in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Instead, more will be spent on anti-ship capabilities already possessed by the other services and our regional allies. That should raise some serious questions in Congress and among the inspectors general of the Defense Department and Department of the Navy, to wit:

— Will force design be useful in American efforts to defend Taiwan?

— Second, if Force Design has merit as a strategic or operational concept, could it not have been better implemented by multi-service joint task forces and regional partners rather than by a single service?

— Third, have any of the retired Marine Corps general officers who developed and “validated” Force Design become contractors, board members, or senior corporate officers of the companies trying to sell the anti-ship missiles and sensors used in FD?

If the answers to the first is no, and the two latter is yes, further questions should be asked by an Article 32 investigation, the military equivalent of a grand jury. Many of the retired Marines who have serious questions regarding FD spent their careers building worldwide force readiness capable of handling contingencies ranging from humanitarian disasters to major theater conflict. Seeing it reduced to a region-centric blend of coastal artillery and light naval infantry is distressing indeed. (READ MORE: Israel Isn’t Prepared for a Three Block War)

This is an issue that Mr. Trump and the Republicans should jump on in the coming election. Force Design will not seriously deter China from attacking Taiwan, nor would it be decisive if a war should occur over that island nation.

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and is the author of the Naval War College Newport Paper “BEYOND MAHAN.” He was the Director of Wargaming for the Marine Corps and Chief of Staff of its Warfighting Lab.

spectator.org · by Gary Anderson · April 22, 2024

10. The Tech Industry is the New Defense Industrial Base

Excerpts:

More broadly, the tech industry and the private sector’s agility, innovation, and market viability are the greatest strengths the United States and its allies have in the strategic competition against China.

Governments must be bold and innovative in partnering at scale with the private sector. This means collaborating early in the innovation process to ensure that national security needs are met and sufficient funding is available to support commercialization in emerging technology areas such as quantum, AI, and biotech. Failure to lead in these technology areas places the United States and its allies in a position where the economic advantages of being first to market are lost. However, from a security perspective, there is less autonomy over critical technology supply line chains and influence over standards-setting that align with liberal democratic values and protect users.

Establishing these relationships early on will also help the private sector understand how to engage the government as a customer better and incentivize dual-use technology development. Mobilizing the tech sector as the new defense industrial base is an exercise in public-private collaboration and allied partnership. The fact that these public conversations are occurring at traditionally non-national security-focused forums such as SXSW speaks to the shared recognition from government and industry of the importance of collaboration for shared national security interests.

The Tech Industry is the New Defense Industrial Base

Establishing early relationships between the government and the tech sector will help the latter understand how to engage the government as a customer and incentivize dual-use technology development.

The National Interest · by Bronte Munro · April 21, 2024

Developments in nascent technology areas, such as quantum computing, biotechnology, and Artificial Intelligence (AI), predominantly occur in the private sector, where there is a higher concentration of talent, capital, and competition to drive commercialization. The United States and its allies must better engage technology companies to consider dual-use applications from a commercial opportunity perspective and a national security imperative.

China has recognized the role of civilian research and commercial sectors in boosting military and defense capabilities. Through its strategy of military-civil fusion, China aims to ensure that it will have the most technologically advanced military in the world. The execution of this strategy includes China’s acquisition of, and heavy subsidies for, its own tech sector for state purposes. Critically for the United States, it also involves China attempting to harness global commercial capabilities through intellectual property (IP) theft and strategic adversarial investment in its private sector. This threatens the United States and allied leadership in bleeding-edge technologies.

The United States’ tech sector is feeling the effects of this. Discussion between industry and government at events held by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute at SXSW emphasized that national security-minded investors are unable to compete with the scale and speed of Chinese capital being thrown at early-stage dual-use start-ups in areas such as quantum computing, microelectronics, biotech, and AI.

The natural advantage the United States and its allies have over China’s military-civil fusion strategy is the private sector’s agility, innovation, and market viability compared to Chinese competitors. Silicon Valley’s success and the historically high fraction of global tech leadership in the United States are testaments to this. The United States must help nurture this advantage to accelerate commercial technology adoption to meet national security needs at speed and scale.

The United States government has implemented efforts to actively harness the tech sector for national security and meet the challenges posed by China. As early as January 2021, the Trusted Capital Digital Marketplace (TCDM) was created to help establish “trusted funding sources” for small and medium-sized businesses that offer alternatives to adversarial investment in innovative defence-critical capabilities. While this initiative has stalled in recent years, the potential to revamp the program at scale and partner with allies under the auspices of security agreements, such as AUKUS, Australia, and the United Kingdom, should be prioritized. The TCMP would complement other initiatives, such as establishing the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC), which helps attract and scale private capital to support national security through public-private partnerships and underwrite high-risk investments in emerging technologies.

More broadly, security agreements with allies, notably Australia and the United Kingdom, through AUKUS, speak to the United States government’s increased prioritization of partnerships with industry. Under AUKUS Pillar Two, which focuses on advanced capability sharing, the AUKUS Defense Investor Network has been endorsed, and an industry forum has been established. These efforts have aligned with the United States’ reduction of barriers to entry start-ups and SMEs entering the defense market, such as the proposed amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) for AUKUS partners under the National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) passed in December 2023.

However, ASPI discussions at SXSW highlighted that the United States and its allied governments need to go further upstream to where innovation in emerging technologies is happening and bolster public-private collaboration early in the process. This places the United States and its allied governments in a better position to identify and support national security-relevant tech start-ups early on, ensure their journey to commercialization is free of adversarial capital, and meet defense needs. Increased innovation and rapid scaling will ensure the United States and its allies are leaders in critical technology areas.

The wheel need not be reinvented to achieve this. Instead, the United States and its allies should collaborate to identify existing hubs of public-private innovation and build on these activities. Capital Factory, a technology incubator in Austin, Texas, is one such example that could be emulated and scaled. Capital Factory partners include the Army’s Future Command, which was established to ensure that the Army remained at the forefront of technological innovation and warfighting ability, and AFWEX, the Air Force’s equivalent innovation arm. These relationships ensure that dual-use technology innovators, investors, and end-government users are brought together in one hub to collaborate. This means that national security considerations are brought into the commercialization journey early. Hence, these companies become commercially viable independent of the government, as it is no longer its only customer. However, from the get-go, they are built to make it as easy as possible for the government to work with them, including being security compliant and free of adversarial capital.

The United States should also look beyond domestic activities and broaden innovation partnerships with allies and the tech sector. In Europe, NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) exists to find and accelerate dual-use innovation capacity across the alliance. Under the model, DIANA ensures companies have the resources, networks, and strategic advice to develop and scale technologies critical to defense and security challenges. With over twenty affiliated accelerator sites across Europe, the United States could emulate and engage with this model and coordinate with existing innovation activities, such as Capital Factory, or develop collaborative partnerships, such as AUKUS, strengthening the global network of allied public-private innovation.

The key to the success of these recommendations is ensuring that there are sufficient sources of clean capital, free from adversarial influence, that can support commercialization, particularly in partnership with allies. United States initiatives such as the TCDM and OSC must be supported by allied efforts to leverage their financial strengths creatively. Notably, as increased innovation collaboration occurs under AUKUS, more pressure should be placed on Australia to engage its’ private sector and mobilize the significant pools of capital sitting in retirement funds.

Australia’s pension system is the fifth-largest pool of savings in the world, and it is significantly under-invested and managed by traditionally risk-averse superfunds. Finding a way to incentivize investing this capital in dual-use technology that supports allied national security interests is necessary to outcompete China’s civil-military fusion strategy. For the Australian government, this means driving discussion that frames the commercial opportunities and imperatives of investment in national security more broadly. Focusing beyond defense applications and on the dual-use importance of technology areas such as advanced manufacturing, critical minerals, and biotech can help assuage the concerns of more risk-averse investors.

More broadly, the tech industry and the private sector’s agility, innovation, and market viability are the greatest strengths the United States and its allies have in the strategic competition against China.

Governments must be bold and innovative in partnering at scale with the private sector. This means collaborating early in the innovation process to ensure that national security needs are met and sufficient funding is available to support commercialization in emerging technology areas such as quantum, AI, and biotech. Failure to lead in these technology areas places the United States and its allies in a position where the economic advantages of being first to market are lost. However, from a security perspective, there is less autonomy over critical technology supply line chains and influence over standards-setting that align with liberal democratic values and protect users.

Establishing these relationships early on will also help the private sector understand how to engage the government as a customer better and incentivize dual-use technology development. Mobilizing the tech sector as the new defense industrial base is an exercise in public-private collaboration and allied partnership. The fact that these public conversations are occurring at traditionally non-national security-focused forums such as SXSW speaks to the shared recognition from government and industry of the importance of collaboration for shared national security interests.

Bronte Munro is an Analyst at the Australia Strategic Policy Institute in Washington DC, covering U.S. and Australian defense industrial base policy, innovation, cyber, and technology.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest · by Bronte Munro · April 21, 2024

11. Israel Planned Bigger Attack on Iran, but Scaled It Back to Avoid War

Israel Planned Bigger Attack on Iran, but Scaled It Back to Avoid War

The strike on Iran on Friday was originally intended to be much broader in scope, but after intense pressure from allies, Israeli leaders agreed to ratchet it down.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/22/world/middleeast/israel-iran-war-strike.html

After the Iranian strike on Israel, a billboard in Tehran celebrated the assault.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times

By Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley

To understand the scope of Israel’s initial battle plans, the reporters, working in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, spoke to Israeli and Western officials involved in or briefed on the process.

April 22, 2024

Updated 7:33 a.m. ET

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Israel abandoned plans for a much more extensive counterstrike on Iran after concerted diplomatic pressure from the United States and other foreign allies and because the brunt of an Iranian assault on Israel soil had been thwarted, according to three senior Israeli officials.

Israeli leaders originally discussed bombarding several military targets across Iran last week, including near Tehran, the Iranian capital, in retaliation for the Iranian strike on April 13, said the officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the sensitive discussions.

Such a broad and damaging attack would have been far harder for Iran to overlook, increasing the chances of a forceful Iranian counterattack that could have brought the Middle East to the brink of a major regional conflict.

In the end — after President Biden, along with the British and German foreign ministers, urged Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to prevent a wider war — Israel opted for a more limited strike on Friday that avoided significant damage, diminishing the likelihood of an escalation, at least for now.

Still, in the view of Israeli officials, the attack showed Iran the breadth and sophistication of Israel’s military arsenal.

Instead of sending fighter jets into Iranian airspace, Israel fired a small number of missiles from aircraft positioned several hundred miles west of it on Friday, according to the Israeli officials and two senior Western officials briefed on the attack. Israel also sent small attack drones, known as quadcopters, to confuse Iranian air defenses, according to the Israeli officials.

Military facilities in Iran have been attacked by such drones several times in recent years, and on several occasions Iran has said it did not know who the drones belonged to — a claim interpreted as Iranian reluctance to respond.

Image

An aerial image of clusters of buildings and brown fields on either side of a roadway in Isfahan, Iran, including the damage on the roof of an Iranian military workshop, center, after a drone attack on Feb. 2, 2023.Credit...Planet Labs PBC

One missile on Friday hit an antiaircraft battery in a strategically important part of central Iran, while another exploded in midair, the officials said. One Israeli official said that the Israeli Air Force intentionally destroyed the second missile once it became clear that the first had reached its target, to avoid causing too much damage. One Western official said it was possible the missile had simply malfunctioned.

The officials said Israel’s intention was to allow Iran to move on without responding in kind, while signaling that Israel had developed the ability to strike Iran without entering its airspace or even setting off its air defense batteries. Israel also hoped to show that it could hit those batteries in a part of central Iran that houses several major nuclear facilities, including an uranium enrichment site at Natanz, hinting that it could have also reached those facilities if it had tried.

The Israeli military declined to comment.

The path to this attack began on April 1, when Israel struck an Iranian embassy complex in Damascus, Syria, killing seven Iranian officials, including three senior military leaders. Iran had not retaliated after several similar strikes in the past, leading Israeli officials, they say, to believe that they could continue to mount such attacks without drawing a significant Iranian response.

This time proved different: Within a week, Iran began privately signaling to neighbors and foreign diplomats that its patience had reached a limit, and that it would respond with a major strike on Israel — its first ever direct attack on Israeli soil.

Image

An Iranian complex in Damascus, Syria, after it was hit by an Israeli strike on April 1.Credit...Omar Sanadiki/Associated Press

During the week of April 8, Israel began preparing two major military responses, according to the Israeli officials.

The first was a defensive operation to block the expected Iranian attack, coordinated with the U.S. Central Command — its top commander, Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, visited Israel that week — as well as with the British, French and Jordanian militaries.

Middle East Crisis: Live Updates

Updated

April 22, 2024, 7:18 a.m. ET1 hour ago

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The second was a huge offensive operation to be carried out if the Iranian strike materialized. Initially, Israeli intelligence believed that Iran planned to attack with a “swarm” of large drones and up to 10 ballistic missiles, the Israeli officials said. As the week progressed, that estimate grew to 60 missiles, heightening Israeli desire for a strong counterattack.

Israel’s military and political leaders began discussing a counterstrike that could begin as soon as Iran began firing the drones — even before it was known how much damage, if any, they caused. According to one official, the plan was presented to Israel’s war cabinet by the military chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, and his Air Force chief, Tomer Bar, early on Friday, April 12 — two days before Iran’s attack.

Israel’s intentions changed after Iran attacked, the officials said. The attack was even bigger than expected: With more than 100 ballistic missiles, 170 drones and some 30 cruise missiles, it was one of the largest barrages of this kind in military history.

But Israel’s defense, which were coordinated with pilots from the United States, Britain, France and Jordan, took down most of the missiles and drones, and there was only limited damage on the ground, reducing the need for a swift response. And there were questions about whether Israel should risk taking its focus off defense while the assault was still underway, two officials said.

The turning point, however, was an early-morning phone call between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mr. Biden, during which the American president encouraged the Israeli leader to treat the successful defense as a victory that required no further response, according to three Israeli and Western officials, who described those discussions on the condition of anonymity. Mr. Netanyahu emerged from the call opposed to an immediate retaliation, the Israelis said.

Image

A component from an intercepted ballistic missile that fell near the Dead Sea in Israel.Credit...Itamar Grinberg/Associated Press

The following day, the Israeli government began signaling to foreign allies that it still planned to respond, but only in a contained way that fell far short of what it had previously planned, according to one of the senior Western officials.

Instead of a broad counterattack that might leave Iran’s leaders believing they had no option but to respond in kind, Israeli officials said, they settled on a plan that they hoped would make a point to Iranian officials without publicly humiliating them.

They initially planned the attack for Monday night, the Israeli officials said, pulling out at the last minute amid fears that Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Lebanese militia that has been engaged in a low-level conflict with Israel since October, might significantly increase the intensity of its strikes on northern Israel.

Foreign officials continued, without success, to encourage Israel not to respond at all, then signaled their willingness to accept an Israeli attack that left Iran with the option of moving on without losing face, according to an Israeli and a Western official.

After Israel finally carried out its attack early on Friday morning, Iranian officials did exactly that — focusing on the small drones rather than the missiles and dismissing their impact.

Officials in Tehran also largely avoided blaming Israel for the assault. That, coupled with Israel’s own decision not to claim responsibility for it, helped to reduce the risk of an escalation.

Eric Schmitt and Farnaz Fassihi contributed reporting.

Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv. His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House. More about Ronen Bergman

Patrick Kingsley is The Times’s Jerusalem bureau chief, leading coverage of Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. More about Patrick Kingsley

12. Biden’s Small Win — and Bigger Failure — in the Middle East

From Trita Parsi at the Quincy INstitute.

Excerpts:

Though all of this is presented as a new and innovative plan for the Middle East, it is eerily similar to America’s decades-long failed strategies of organizing the region against Iran instead of supporting an inclusive Middle East security architecture that brings in all of the region’s governments. While Iran’s ideological animosity toward Israel runs deep, Tehran has on numerous occasions in the past hinted that, within a larger regional arrangement that doesn’t exclude it, Iran can live with whatever Israeli-Palestinian agreement the Palestinians themselves find acceptable.

Mr. Biden has pursued policies that have pushed the Middle East to the precipice of war. His tactical successes in avoiding the worst outcomes of his policies should not be belittled. But they can never make up for his government’s broader failure to pursue a strategy that brings real security to America and real peace to the Middle East.

Biden’s Small Win — and Bigger Failure — in the Middle East

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/21/opinion/international-world/bidens-win-failure-middle-east.html

April 21, 2024

Demonstrators chanting anti-Israeli slogans in Tehran last week.Credit...Vahid Salemi/Associated Press

Share full article

By Trita Parsi

Mr. Parsi is the executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

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President Biden’s behind-the-scenes crisis management appears to have helped stop a wider war from igniting in the Middle East — for now. But that tactical win for the administration is actually part of its much larger strategic failure in the region.

Over the past two weeks, Mr. Biden has scrambled to ensure that the unprecedented open exchange of fire between Israel and Iran did not spiral into a full-blown conflict. After Israel struck the Iranian Consulate in Syria on April 1, killing senior Iranian military officials, Mr. Biden publicly urged Iran not to strike back while privately negotiating a choreography that ended in Tehran’s well-telegraphed barrage of missiles and drones being shot down before they could inflict major damage in Israel. Mr. Biden then tried to persuade Israel not to retaliate. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu didn’t heed the order, but Israel’s response was so muted that Tehran effectively ignored it. Mr. Netanyahu’s minister of national security called it “lame.”

Mr. Biden deserves credit for orchestrating this crucial de-escalation. Iran launched an attack that failed, as it was designed to; Israel’s response was limited enough that Iran could pretend it hadn’t been attacked at all. But while the president’s maneuvering helped avoid an immediate disaster, it is his own policies that have set the Middle East on its current dangerous trajectory. Israel and Iran have been embroiled in a shadow war for more than a decade, but they had never been this close to all-out war.

Since Hamas’s attacks on Israel on Oct. 7, Mr. Biden has refused to leverage America’s considerable influence over Israel to rein in the behavior of Mr. Netanyahu’s government, to secure a cease-fire or to deter Israel from committing what may amount to war crimes or acting against American interests. Instead, he has followed Mr. Netanyahu’s lead, even as Israel has put vengeance over interest.

Mr. Biden has armed Israel in the middle of what the International Court of Justice has said could plausibly be considered genocide, including twice circumventing congressional review and oversight of arms shipments. His State Department has made a mockery of his claim of centering America’s foreign policy on the protection of human rights by certifying that Israel is not committing war crimes in Gaza. And most important, he has on three occasions vetoed U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding a cease-fire. He allowed one such resolution to pass last month, only to immediately undermine it by claiming it was nonbinding.

These policies have not only prolonged the war in Gaza, contributing to the slaughter of civilians and isolating the United States internationally. They have also fueled the risk of a regional war into which the United States could easily be dragged. The war in Gaza led to the breaking of the unwritten cease-fire between U.S. troops in the Middle East and Iraqi and Syrian militias aligned with Iran, which in turn led to a significant rise in attacks on American forces and the killing of three American service members in January. Mr. Biden responded by using force against these militias and the Houthis in Yemen, bringing the United States ever closer to open conflict.

The president, while he has often said he supports a two-state solution, has also pushed policies that, at best, ignored Palestinians’ right to statehood and, at worst, directly blocked them. Before the war, the Biden administration paid little attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and failed to reverse several Trump-era decisions, like the closing of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington and the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem, which was the official diplomatic point of contact between the United States and the Palestinians. President Donald Trump’s formula for the Middle East asserted that a two-state solution was no longer the key to peace in the region. Rather, economic integration between Arab states and Israel would deliver peace, and Palestinians would effectively have to accept their fate as a people doomed to indefinite occupation.

Mr. Biden has continued to channel diplomatic energy into building on Mr. Trump’s Abraham Accords. The accords offered costly American concessions to Arab states in return for their dropping of the demand for Palestinian statehood as a condition for normalizing relations with Israel. Mr. Biden embraced this approach early in his presidency, and has sought to outdo Mr. Trump by trying to bring in the most important Arab state, Saudi Arabia. But by blocking any hope that peaceful efforts could deliver the national aspiration of Palestinians — the accords offer nothing more than a pinkie promise of a “pathway” to statehood — both Mr. Trump and Mr. Biden made Palestinian violence all the more likely.

Rather than re-evaluate this approach after Oct. 7, Mr. Biden stuck to that formula. Mr. Biden’s pursuit of a normalization deal with Riyadh was put on hold when the war broke out. Now Washington is once again abuzz with rumors of how close Mr. Biden is to sealing a deal between Saudi Arabia’s dictator, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Israel’s right-wing government. As part of any such deal, Saudi officials are reportedly now considering settling for mere verbal assurances from Israel that it will participate in talks on Palestinian statehood.

Though all of this is presented as a new and innovative plan for the Middle East, it is eerily similar to America’s decades-long failed strategies of organizing the region against Iran instead of supporting an inclusive Middle East security architecture that brings in all of the region’s governments. While Iran’s ideological animosity toward Israel runs deep, Tehran has on numerous occasions in the past hinted that, within a larger regional arrangement that doesn’t exclude it, Iran can live with whatever Israeli-Palestinian agreement the Palestinians themselves find acceptable.

Mr. Biden has pursued policies that have pushed the Middle East to the precipice of war. His tactical successes in avoiding the worst outcomes of his policies should not be belittled. But they can never make up for his government’s broader failure to pursue a strategy that brings real security to America and real peace to the Middle East.

More about the conflict in the Middle East

Opinion | Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh

Why Iran Doesn’t Want a War

Jan. 22, 2024

Opinion | Arash Azizi

Change Is Coming to Iran, Just Not the Change We Hoped For

March 11, 2024

Opinion | Ross Douthat, Carlos Lozada and Lydia Polgreen

Thomas Friedman on Iran, Israel and Preventing a ‘Forever War’

April 19, 2024

Trita Parsi is the author of “Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran and the Triumph of Diplomacy” and the executive vice president of the Quincy Institute.

13. US, Philippine Troops Kick Off Drills as China Tensions Mount

Excerpts;

Balikatan will involve “tracking of simulated air threats and targeting them with multiple air and missile defense systems” as well as “integrating multilateral air and land platforms to increase awareness of the maritime security situation,” the US embassy said in a statement last week.

This year’s exercises will also feature cyber defense and information warfare after the Philippines grappled with recent hacking incidents.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian last week warned that “the region will only become less stable” when countries outside are brought into the South China Sea “to flex muscles and stoke confrontation.”

US, Philippine Troops Kick Off Drills as China Tensions Mount

‘Balikatan’ exercises set to draw over 16,000 participants
Intention of targeting mainland ‘very clear’: Chinese analyst

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-21/us-philippine-troops-kick-off-drills-as-china-tensions-mount?sref=hhjZtX76

By Cliff Harvey Venzon

April 21, 2024 at 7:25 PM EDT

US and Philippine troops will sail beyond the Southeast Asian nation’s territorial waters for the first time since the joint annual drills started three decades ago, risking further maritime tensions with Beijing.

The joint exercises will be held in multiple Philippine locations near the disputed South China Sea and Taiwan despite China’s warning that “tensions could get worse” with the activities set to run from April 22 to May 10.

Over 16,700 personnel are expected to take part in the training called “Balikatan,” a Filipino word that means “shoulder to shoulder.” Australian and French troops will also take part in some of the exercises.

For the first time since Balikatan started in 1991, the allies will sail outside the 12 nautical miles of the Philippines’ baseline off the western Palawan province, which faces the South China Sea. The US military’s maiden deployment in the Philippines of a missile system covering a range that could reach China’s southern provinces shows “the drills are beyond self-defense purposes,” according to Cao Weidong, a retired senior researcher at the PLA Naval Research Academy.

This year’s war games are taking place at a time of increasingly strained relations between China and the Philippines as President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. grew more assertive over territorial rights and bolstered ties with the US and its allies. Maritime encounters between the countries have become more frequent, with China’s recurring use of water cannons damaging Philippine vessels and at times injuring the crew.

The use of the missile system, according to Philippine military Colonel Michael Logico would only be for logistical training and it will not be fired, emphasizing that the drills aren’t aimed against China.

“The intention of targeting China’s mainland is very clear,” Cao said. “We can also deploy corresponding weaponry and alert equipment so that we can respond,” he said without elaborating.

US and Philippine troops will also simulate the sinking of an “enemy ship” and retaking three Philippine islands, seeking to enhance the interoperability of their militaries.

Read More on Philippines-China TensionsPhilippines-China Tensions Hitting Peso, Central Bank Chief Says

Why US-China Tensions Are Growing in South China Sea: QuickTake

Marcos Says a Death May Trigger US Pact as China Tensions Rise

Biden Vows to Back Japan and Philippines as China Jolts Allies

Balikatan will involve “tracking of simulated air threats and targeting them with multiple air and missile defense systems” as well as “integrating multilateral air and land platforms to increase awareness of the maritime security situation,” the US embassy said in a statement last week.

This year’s exercises will also feature cyber defense and information warfare after the Philippines grappled with recent hacking incidents.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian last week warned that “the region will only become less stable” when countries outside are brought into the South China Sea “to flex muscles and stoke confrontation.”

— With assistance from Jing Li

14. Public Disputes Undercut Officer Class

Conclusion:

In an era of rapid technological advancements and evolving security challenges, the dynamic between retired and active military leaders, "ret-mil relations," has become critical in shaping military actions. The U.S. Marine Corps Force Design case exemplifies the negative impact of an unhealthy ret-mil relationship, where the undue influence of retired officers undermines leadership legitimacy, stifles innovation, and complicates recruitment efforts. Conversely, a healthy ret-mil relationship, following principles such as those in Cohen's "Unequal Dialogue," could foster collaboration and enhance military effectiveness by ensuring that retired officers' insights are integrated without overshadowing the authority of current leaders. However, the current Commandant has no obligation to consult retired senior officers and retains the ultimate authority in decision-making. This balance is essential for maintaining an adaptive and effective military that meets contemporary security challenges. As military organizations navigate these complexities, it is crucial for retired officers to recognize the boundaries of their influence and for active leaders to integrate their insights judiciously, ensuring the military remains a robust and dynamic force.

Public Disputes Undercut Officer Class

By Ian Whitfield

April 20, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/04/20/public_disputes_undercut_officer_class_1026397.html?utm

A nation’s strategic security decisions can often be traced back to closed-door discussions and close-knit relationships within a nation's highest echelons of leadership. Traditionally, these processes have been examined through the prism of civilian-military relationships, a study known as "civ-mil." Throughout international relations, the study of this dynamic has evolved significantly from the days of Clausewitz’s "war is an extension of politics" to Eliot Cohen’s concept of "Unequal Dialogue”: the collaborative conversation between civilian and military leaders with civilian leaders maintaining the final authority in decision-making. The latest developments in civ-mil relations have been markedly influenced by the active participation of retired military officers in political discourse. Scholars Risa Brooks, Michael Robinson, and Heidi Urben recently explored the diverse viewpoints among these retired officers regarding when and how it is appropriate to violate traditional norms of military participation in partisan politics. Their research suggests a gradual shift from the traditional interpretation of military involvement in politics, highlighting the profound implications on civ-mil relations as debates around justified violations of norms expand. This nuanced understanding underscores the significant organizational and cultural impact that outspoken retired military leaders possess. From this, a new pivotal relationship—"ret-mil relations"—has emerged between retired and active military leaders in an era marked by rapidly evolving social media and an expanding information environment. This dynamic is reshaping security decisions as retired officers increasingly exert their influence by publicly critiquing current operations and strategies, impacting a military organization’s effectiveness.

The United States Marine Corps’ Force Design, a transformative plan to restructure its forces, exemplifies the negative impacts of an unhealthy ret-mil relationship. The Marine Corps restructuring required a divestment-to-reinvestment strategy to prioritize modernization without increased appropriations. Force Design prescribes a shift away from traditional heavy equipment like armor and artillery to develop a more agile and flexible force tailored to meet contemporary security challenges. This shift was deemed ambitious and necessary as the Marine Corps had increasingly deviated from its maritime assault roots over the past three decades. This need for heavy capabilities was primarily due to the Marine Corps’ expanded role in land operations in the Middle East, transforming it into what some describe as a "second land army." Without a transformation back to the Marine Corps’ amphibious roots, there was a looming concern among military leaders and scholars that the Marine Corps might become redundant, overshadowed by the capabilities of the United States Army.

Resistance to organizational change is not uncommon within the American military. However, the implementation of Force Design marks a notable shift from traditional disagreements between current and former service members. A notable faction of dissent has emerged from within the ranks of retired Marine Corps generals and leaders, collectively known as Chowder II. This group has openly opposed the new strategic direction, placing significant pressure on Commandant Eric Smith and his staff to implement their strategic vision. Their vocal resistance has led to substantial internal rifts and negatively impacted the public perception of the Corps. This scenario epitomizes an unhealthy ret-mil relationship, where the public actions of Chowder II undermine the legitimacy of active Marine Corps leaders, potentially disincentive organizational innovation, and exacerbate recruitment efforts by casting the Marine Corps as a disjointed and unstable organization.

First, Chowder II’s actions in the media either intentionally or inadvertently undermine the legitimacy of active Marine Corps leaders, particularly in their efforts to implement Force Design. These retired members leverage their considerable status and influence within the organization, directly challenging Commandant Smith and impairing his ability to lead effectively. This form of "helicopter grandparenting" creates significant discord and uncertainty within the active and reserve ranks of the Marine Corps, compromising the integrity and execution of the Corps' strategic vision.

Second, the public dissent from Chowder II potentially discourages innovation across the organization. General Charles Krulak, a purported member of Chowder II, emphasized the importance of taking innovative risks, noting that “The Marine Corps has never been unwilling to look foolish to the crowd.” However, when the Marine Corps attempts to overhaul its forces through modernization efforts, Chowder II openly criticizes the move. Under these circumstances, what motivates members and leaders to pursue innovative ideas? Ostensibly, Chowder II members exert their positions to maintain and leverage influence over the organization that they previously led. This criticism creates a bottleneck effect. Innovators fear public backlash for their ideas and actions, institutionalizing doubt toward innovative concepts. As a result, innovators chose to hold their ideas in rather than share them. This public opposition not only demotivates members from proposing new ideas but also casts a shadow of doubt over their endeavors, fostering a conservative atmosphere that deters risk-taking. Such a climate severely limits the Marine Corps' ability to adapt to new challenges and diminishes its overall effectiveness and agility.

Finally, the outspoken opposition from the group further exacerbates recruitment challenges for the Marine Corps. Military services are increasingly struggling to recruit and retain service members. A significant factor contributing to this decline is the eroding public trust in the military, which is only worsened by public disputes like those involving Chowder II. Such conflicts, aired openly on the internet, portray the perception of the Marine Corps as disjointed and unstable. These actions potentially deter prospective recruits from joining an organization seemingly mired in internal discord.

This ret-mil relationship, dominated by a semi-anonymous group of retired officers with an apparent intent on maintaining influence, directly conflicts with the objectives of current leaders who aim to foster innovation and adaptability. This case starkly illustrates how negative dynamics between retired and active military personnel can thwart strategic decisions critical to organizational restructuring and resource management.

Conversely, a positive or healthy ret-mil relationship can lead to a range of advantageous outcomes, such as increased recruitment, strengthened veteran communities, and enhanced avenues for collaboration. This ideal relationship emulates Cohen’s concept of an "Unequal Dialogue," where decision-making is a collaborative effort. While civilian leaders retain ultimate authority, aligning with the Clausewitzian norm that positions the military as a tool within the more extensive political arsenal, active military leaders are encouraged to consult retired officers. Moreover, these interactions between active and retired military leaders should be kept out of the limelight. Ensuring these discussions are kept private will synchronize and unify organizational messaging, alleviating many issues that come with unhealthy ret-mil relations. These seasoned veterans can offer valuable insights, though the extent of their influence is carefully moderated by the current leaders who retain final decision-making power. Retired officers must respect the decisions of active leadership, recognizing the contemporary needs and directions of the military.

This case study underscores a crucial call to action for retired military officers to acknowledge the profound responsibility that accompanies their esteemed status. Retired officers like Lieutenant General Van Riper, General Amos, and General Krulak from Chowder II are all revered within the military community. They must be mindful not to subvert the positions of current leaders, such as Commandant Smith, by using their influence to delegitimize organizational decisions. Like Commandant Smith, active military leaders must be empowered to pursue and enact legally sound policies within their purview. The rapid evolution of social media and the expanding information environment have significantly increased the potential impact of these retired leaders, highlighting the importance of recognizing and adhering to the new "contested norms" as discussed by scholars Brooks, Robinson, and Urben. By respecting the authority and decisions of active military leaders—roles they once held—retired officers can positively contribute to the ongoing evolution and effectiveness of military operations.

In an era of rapid technological advancements and evolving security challenges, the dynamic between retired and active military leaders, "ret-mil relations," has become critical in shaping military actions. The U.S. Marine Corps Force Design case exemplifies the negative impact of an unhealthy ret-mil relationship, where the undue influence of retired officers undermines leadership legitimacy, stifles innovation, and complicates recruitment efforts. Conversely, a healthy ret-mil relationship, following principles such as those in Cohen's "Unequal Dialogue," could foster collaboration and enhance military effectiveness by ensuring that retired officers' insights are integrated without overshadowing the authority of current leaders. However, the current Commandant has no obligation to consult retired senior officers and retains the ultimate authority in decision-making. This balance is essential for maintaining an adaptive and effective military that meets contemporary security challenges. As military organizations navigate these complexities, it is crucial for retired officers to recognize the boundaries of their influence and for active leaders to integrate their insights judiciously, ensuring the military remains a robust and dynamic force.

Ian Whitfield is an Army Officer and a graduate student in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. This article does not represent the views of the Department of Defense or Georgetown University.

15. Historian says US is ‘in a moral crisis right now’

Historian says US is ‘in a moral crisis right now’

BY LAUREN SFORZA - 04/21/24 12:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/4609461-historian-says-us-is-in-a-moral-crisis-right-now/

Historian Doris Kearns Goodwin said Sunday that the United States is in a “moral crisis” amid political divisions in the country.

“But the overall sense is, sometimes we’ve become too much spectators watching what’s happening to ourselves. And that one of the things Dante said is that ‘The lowest place in Hell are for those people in a moral crisis who remain neutral or remain silent,'” she said on NBC’s “Meet the Press.”

“We are in a moral crisis right now, and I always feel so positive about what history can teach us, because we’ve lived through really hard times before. And these are hard times, however, and it won’t get better unless we act, unless we take seriously our citizen responsibilities and use the qualities of character that we need to bring into politics,” she added.

Goodwin has written numerous biographies about former presidents, including Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Lyndon B. Johnson. She has been on a media tour to promote her new book, “An Unfinished Love Story,” which details her and her husband’s personal history with the 1960s.

Welker noted that Goodwin has compared the current state of politics to the expansion of slavery and the Civil War during the 1850s. Goodwin explained that there are two parallels she sees right now when compared to the Civil War era, including the division of the media and worries that there would not be a peaceful transition of power.

She said she is worried that a peaceful transition of power won’t happen after the next presidential election.

“I am concerned that it may not happen, but I somehow think if the majority of the people come out who have different values from that and they vote, voting is absolutely essential,” she said.

“And I just hope they feel that this election could turn on them, and the uncommitted people and the undecided people have to come out and vote, and we have to just take the results of the election. That doesn’t mean we know how it’s going to happen, but if the overwhelming majority vote, then somehow maybe it won’t be as close as we think it is going to be. And then we’ll have a clear-cut choice,” she added later.

16. How Washington Can Save its Semiconductor Controls on China

Excerpts:

Allowing China to displace Western machine tool manufacturers could put Washington’s broader China strategy at risk. In October 2022, the Biden administration correctly bet that slowing China’s progress in advanced semiconductor production would set America’s technological-economic edge over Beijing for years to come. This policy would be well served by preventing China from dodging that export control system altogether.

How Washington Can Save its Semiconductor Controls on China - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Ben Noon · April 22, 2024

If you think America’s controls on China’s access to advanced chips are important, you might have been troubled by the claim from the chief of one of China’s most important semiconductor equipment manufacturers that 80 percent of the chipmaking equipment China imports could be replaced by domestic tools by the end of 2024.

The U.S. export control regime on China is designed to restrain the growth of China’s advanced semiconductor manufacturing by limiting Beijing’s access to exquisite machine tools produced by the United States and its allies. But China is moving to replace Western equipment with domestically made tools. If Beijing were to succeed in doing so, nothing would stop it from building the cutting-edge chips that enable advanced AI, quantum computing, and next-generation weapons.

Yet Americans are largely still allowed to sell technology, capital, and know-how to China’s growing machine tool companies. Washington should restrict these commercial partnerships to ensure its export controls survive.

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Beijing’s Workaround to U.S. Rules

Beijing appears to be doubling down on cultivating homemade semiconductor machine tools. China’s chipmaking equipment manufacturers are rapidly growing after being far behind their Western counterparts for years.

Advanced Micro-fabrication Equipment, an etching firm competing with U.S. company Lam Research, can produce some kinds of etching equipment for chip production at 5 nanometers and 28 nanometers. It has sent tools to Western giants TSMC, Samsung, Intel, and Micron. Advanced Micro-fabrication Equipment’s sales are up 41 percent in the third quarter of 2023 compared to 2022.

Shanghai Microelectronics Equipment, China’s lithography champion, reportedly hopes to reveal soon a machine capable of servicing 28-nanometer manufacturing.

ACM Research, which produces wafer cleaning tools, has invented its own technology that it sells to U.S.-blacklisted Chinese firms SMIC, YMTC, and CXMT and also reportedly to Western giants SK Hynix and Intel. Its third-quarter income of 2023 was up 80 percent from the previous year.

Naura Technology’s etching equipment can be used for 28- and 55-nanometer chips. It reported a 35 percent increase in sales in the third quarter of 2023.

Other firms are reportedly attempting to replace ASML’s crown jewel — extreme ultraviolet lithography tools needed to produce 3-nanometer chips at scale. The Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics, and Physics and the Chinese Academy of Sciences appear to be collaborating to develop extreme ultraviolet technology. Huawei also claims to have “entered the game” of extreme ultraviolet lithography, posting on its website about its development of a new light source technology.

Chinese equipment vendors’ share of sales to Chinese chip foundries has, according to some estimates, risen from 21 percent in 2021 to 47 percent in the first eight months of last year. This sector’s growth has thus far been largely in tools used for mature-node semiconductors, not advanced ones.

These machine tool firms will likely continue to grow on the back of generous state support. Beijing has supercharged its push toward independence in semiconductor production, especially since 2022. China is pursuing new advances “at all costs,” said a Chinese government official to the Financial Times. State subsidies to Huawei doubled in 2022 from the year before. These equipment companies likely receive similar treatment.

Washington’s Response

Washington can slow these chipmaking firms’ development by cutting off their access to Western technology, capital, and know-how. Beijing takes advantage of U.S. openness to jump to the cutting edge, and the chipmaking equipment sector is no different.

In finance, for instance, Western capital is deeply tied to many of these firms. U.S. investors Goldman Sachs, Walden Ventures, Redpoint, Interwest Partners, and Bay Partners have invested in Advanced Micro-fabrication Equipment. ACM Research has received funding from Sycamore Ventures. Naura Technology is on the MSCI China All Shares IMI Robotics Index, posing the risk that Americans invest in the firm via passive vehicles such as pension funds. U.S. financial ties with Chinese firms often bring commercial networks and know-how so crucial for their development.

Here are three ways Washington can limit commercial ties that disproportionately benefit China’s equipment producers.

First, the United States could restrict Chinese machine tool makers’ access to foreign technology by adding each firm, their subsidiaries, and their suppliers to the Entity List. Washington can also apply the “Foreign Direct Product Rule” to that listing. These moves would institute a licensing requirement for any sales of technology to these companies to buy American tech or tech made with U.S. intellectual property. Shanghai Microelectronics Equipment is already on the Entity List, but Washington could ensure it cannot obtain Western technology via shell firms by applying the rules to its subsidiaries and affiliates, and by applying the foreign direct product rule to its listing.

Second, the Biden administration could prohibit American technicians, managers, or chipmaking companies from working with these firms to prevent them from gleaning know-how with its “U.S. persons” authorities. Washington already uses these rules to stop Americans from assisting in manufacturing China’s cutting-edge chips. That same logic can apply to the equipment needed to build semiconductors.

Third, Washington could strengthen its draft strictures on outbound investment into China to block U.S. capital flows to these companies. Fortunately, the Treasury Department’s draft rules will ban future private investment into semiconductor fabrication equipment. It could also consider unwinding existing American investments in Advanced Micro-fabrication Equipment and prohibiting investment into publicly listed companies such as Naura Technology.

This expanded approach to semiconductor controls on China would face multiple serious counterarguments worth considering.

One common argument against additional chip controls on China that some might apply here contends that new rules incentivize Beijing and industry to replace Western technology and build a domestic supply chain. But this concern is moot at this point. China has already been accelerating its push to build all parts of the chip supply chain at home, especially since 2022. It would be misguided for Washington to not take the actions needed to save its semiconductor policy on the belief that doing so will alter Beijing’s behavior.

Second, some observers may suggest that it would be pointless to expand U.S. chipmaking rules since China will inevitably achieve self-reliance. Chinese propagandists have doubled down on the narrative that it is futile for Washington to resist Beijing’s advance since Huawei and SMIC’s “breakthrough” Mate 60 Pro smartphone unveiled last August. China’s chip sector still needs Western inputs to progress. Strengthened controls can slow China’s drive to self-reliance.

Third, others might make the opposite argument: that since China’s machine tool manufacturers are only able to make tools for mostly legacy node semiconductors, there’s no reason to bother targeting them. True, Chinese machine tool players are behind their Western competitors today. Yet China’s industrial policy playbook has repeatedly surprisedoutside observers in leapfrogging its Western competitors in strategic supply chains, whether in electric vehicles, solar panels, or shipbuilding. There’s no reason China cannot eventually do the same for chipmaking equipment. It would be better to act early to slow China’s machine tool development.

Allowing China to displace Western machine tool manufacturers could put Washington’s broader China strategy at risk. In October 2022, the Biden administration correctly bet that slowing China’s progress in advanced semiconductor production would set America’s technological-economic edge over Beijing for years to come. This policy would be well served by preventing China from dodging that export control system altogether.

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Ben Noon is a member of the Vandenberg Coalition National Security Council’s Asia Directorate. His work has been featured in Foreign Policy, the Hill, and Defense One.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Ben Noon · April 22, 2024

17. Europe—but Not NATO—Should Send Troops to Ukraine

Excerpts:

Instead, Russia is basing its hopes for victory almost entirely on Europe treating Ukraine as separate from the rest of the continent. So far, its hopes have come to pass. European leaders have tolerated attacks on Ukraine that would have triggered a united European response had they happened in any NATO or EU member state. This attitude has allowed Russia to escalate its war in Ukraine, safe in the knowledge that the rest of Europe will keep its distance.

The arrival of European forces in Ukraine would change that calculation. Moscow would have to face the possibility that European escalation could make the war unwinnable for Russia. Moreover, a European-led response would subvert Russian propaganda that NATO countries’ intervention in Ukraine is merely an American ploy to undermine Russia. The narrative that NATO is the aggressor in this war is popular in many parts of the world, and countering it could help Europe further isolate Moscow both diplomatically and economically. And because European forces would be acting outside the NATO framework and NATO territory, any casualties would not trigger an Article 5 response and draw in the United States. Russia’s opponent would not be NATO but a coalition of European countries seeking to balance against naked Russian imperialism.

Ukraine is doing the best it can, but it needs help—help that European countries are able and increasingly willing to provide. Rather than force Russian escalation, a European troop presence would be more likely to prevent the conflict from spreading and prevent further damage to Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure. European leaders do not need to follow the dictates of an increasingly unreliable United States about how the battle in Ukraine should be waged; they can and should decide for themselves how best to ensure the continent’s freedom and security. Europe must do what it takes to safeguard its own future, and that starts with making sure Ukraine wins this war.

Europe—but Not NATO—Should Send Troops to Ukraine

To Halt Russia’s Advance, Kyiv Needs More Boots on the Ground

By Alex Crowther, Jahara Matisek, and Phillips P. O’Brien

April 22, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Alex Crowther, Jahara Matisek, and Phillips P. O’Brien · April 22, 2024

A taboo has broken in Europe. Only a few months ago, it would have been inconceivable for European leaders to propose sending European troops to Ukraine. But on February 26, French President Emmanuel Macron said the deployment of European forces to Ukraine could not be “ruled out.” Since then, other European officials have joined the chorus; the Finnish defense minister and Polish foreign minister have both suggested that their countries’ forces could end up in Ukraine. These comments, combined with preexisting support for such measures in the Baltic states, show that there is a growing bloc of countries open to direct European intervention in the war.

These explosive comments are driven by shifting conflict dynamics. The debate in the U.S. Congress over sending military aid to Ukraine has been a debacle. A new aid package is finally on track for approval, but the months of dithering in Washington have dismayed Europeans and given Moscow hope that Western resolve to support Kyiv is cracking. Russian forces—bolstered by equipment from China, Iran, and North Korea—have taken advantage of the gap in U.S. military support for Ukraine by stepping up their attacks on civilians and nonmilitary infrastructure. In early April, knowing that Ukraine was running short of antiaircraft ammunition, Russia launched a missile attack that destroyed the largest power plant in the Kyiv region. Earlier, in March, Russian forces targeted a hydroelectric dam in Dnipro and other electrical facilities around Kherson, undermining Ukrainian industry and making the country’s economy more dependent on the European electrical grid. Further damage to critical infrastructure, nuclear power plants, and agricultural land will dramatically raise the costs of reconstruction, for which Ukraine’s partners in the West will likely have to foot much of the bill.

As Russian forces speed up their advance, the possibility that they could break through Ukrainian defenses along the eastern front and challenge Ukrainian control of Kharkiv or even Kyiv presents Europe with a security threat it cannot ignore. A Russian victory in Ukraine would vindicate President Vladimir Putin’s revisionist ambitions and belief in the inherent weakness of the West. It would enable the Kremlin to keep Russia on a war footing—an all-of-society approach to conquest that European countries would be unable to match. There is no reason to expect Putin to stop with Ukraine; he has already declared that all former Soviet republics should be returned to Russia. The Baltic states could be next, and Finland and Poland—which were both principalities in the pre-Soviet Russian Empire—could follow.

By threatening to send troops, European countries are trying to disrupt this worrying trajectory. To truly change the outcome in Ukraine, however, European countries must do more than simply talk about deployments. If the United States continues to delay aid, and especially if it elects Donald Trump (who has pledged to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours, presumably by allowing Putin to keep his ill-gotten gains) as president in November, Europe will be Ukraine’s only defender. European leaders cannot afford to let American political dysfunction dictate European security. They must seriously contemplate deploying troops to Ukraine to provide logistical support and training, to protect Ukraine’s borders and critical infrastructure, or even to defend Ukrainian cities. They must make it clear to Russia that Europe is willing to protect Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. Accepting the dire reality of the situation in Ukraine and addressing it now is better than leaving a door open for Russia to accelerate its imperial advance.

CHANGE THE CONVERSATION

The idea of European troops deploying to Ukraine has elicited predictable objections. The Kremlin was outraged by Macron and others’ recent statements warning of war—possibly a nuclear one—with all of Europe. Washington and Berlin also responded angrily. Both Germany and the United States have strictly limited the aid they gave Ukraine throughout the war, agonizing that Russia might make good on its threats of escalation, and they sharply criticized the more hawkish European states for what they see as unnecessary provocation.

Such opposition does not lessen the benefits that European forces would provide in Ukraine, and the fact that Berlin, Moscow, and Washington all reacted so strongly shows why it is so important to have this discussion. European leaders have demonstrated that it is possible to break out of a one-sided escalation debate that, until how, has worked to Russia’s advantage. In the previous pattern, Moscow has threatened escalation and Berlin and Washington have responded with words and actions aimed at de-escalation—a dynamic that deters both Germany and the United States from sending the more advanced missile systems that Ukraine desperately needs. Now, Europe is making the threats, and Russia is looking deeply uncomfortable.

Too many politicians and pundits in the United States and Europe echo Putin’s own talking points by warning that any kind of external intervention in Ukraine would lead to World War III. In reality, sending European troops would be a normal response to a conflict of this kind. Russia’s invasion disrupted the regional balance of power, and Europe has a vital interest in seeing the imbalance corrected. The obvious way to do this is to provide a lifeline to a Ukrainian military that could once again be left high and dry by the United States, and the best lifeline would be European soldiers. Unless the politics in the United States change, Ukraine will need alternate sources of assistance to keep its fight going—and Europe is the natural backer.

SEND IN THE TROOPS

European forces could undertake either noncombat or combat operations to relieve some of the pressure on Ukraine. A strictly noncombat mission would be easiest to sell in most European capitals. European forces could relieve the Ukrainians performing logistics functions, such as maintaining and repairing combat vehicles. By staying west of the Dnipro River—a natural barrier protecting much of Ukraine from Russian advances—European forces would demonstrate that they are not there to kill Russian soldiers, preempting the inevitable Russian accusation of European aggression. Some Ukrainian vehicles are already being sent to Germany, Poland, and Romania for substantial repairs, but conducting this task closer to the front would speed up the process, reduce the time equipment is out of combat, and free up more Ukrainian forces for combat duties. French, Polish, and other European military advisers could also provide lethal and nonlethal training within Ukraine to further professionalize the country’s military. If additional mobilization expands the Ukrainian military in the coming year—which seems likely—increased capacity to train new recruits inside Ukraine will be particularly useful.

Of course, European forces could do more than repair and train. The most limited form of European combat missions could still remain west of the Dnipro River and be defensive in nature. One such mission could involve strengthening Ukraine’s air defense capabilities in this region by deploying personnel, providing equipment, or even taking over command and control of the Ukrainian air defense system. The risks of escalation would be minimal, as European forces would have little chance of killing the Russian military pilots who launch munitions into Ukraine from Belarusian and Russian airspace. But they would help shoot down cruise missiles and drones. In doing so, European-led air defense batteries would free up more Ukrainian troops to protect forces near the frontlines while also frustrating Russian attempts to destroy critical infrastructure and terrify the Ukrainian population into surrender. European forces could perform other defensive and humanitarian tasks, too, such as demining and defusing unexploded Russian ordinance. Taking over such work from Ukrainian personnel would help protect civilians and support Ukraine’s economic recovery, as farmers are now struggling to plant and harvest crops in fields full of mines and other unexploded munitions.

Sending European troops would be a normal response to a conflict of this kind.

Another combat role—which, like an air defense mission, would likely not engage Russian forces—would involve patrolling parts of the Ukrainian border where Russian troops are not deployed, such as the Black Sea coast and the borders with Belarus and Transnistria (a breakaway region in Moldova occupied by Russian forces). Guarding these flanks would free up more than 20,000 Ukrainian troops (and the weapons and ammunition they carry) to fight on the frontlines. It would also reduce the likelihood of a new front opening along these borders, as Russia would almost certainly seek to avoid broadening the war by attacking other European militaries. European forces could also help secure Ukraine’s three remaining Black Sea ports, which are vital to both the Ukrainian economy and global food security, relieving additional Ukrainian soldiers. Any kind of European operation in Ukraine would carry emotional weight as well. The presence of European troops would raise the morale of the Ukrainian people and reassure them that their country’s future is in Europe.

Finally, Europe needs to consider a direct combat mission that helps protect Ukrainian territory west of the Dnipro. In addition to reducing the burden of the Ukrainian military in these regions, the presence of European troops would make it unlikely that Russian forces would advance across the river, protecting much of Ukraine from conquest. One potential Russian target is Odessa, Ukraine’s main port where most of the country’s exports are shipped. If Russian troops were to approach the city, European forces in the vicinity would have the right to defend themselves by firing on the advancing soldiers. They could help thwart a Russian offensive that, given Odessa’s strategic position, could strangle the Ukrainian economy and position Russian forces for a potential invasion of Moldova. Moscow would try to spin any lethal response to a Russian attack as European aggression, but Russia would be responsible for any escalation.

PUTIN ON THE BACK FOOT

The risk that deploying European soldiers to Ukraine in any capacity will escalate the conflict is overblown. Russia has precious little room to scale up its conventional attacks, short of deploying biological or chemical weapons. It has already lost upward of 90 percent of its prewar army, with hundreds of thousands of casualties, tens of thousands of combat vehicles destroyed, and the vast majority of its most advanced weapon systems expended in attacks on Ukraine. Sanctions have made Russian weapon production more difficult and costly, and the deployment of troops to Ukraine has left Russia with barely enough forces to guard the rest of its long border, let alone mount a significant operation against other European states. In January 2022, the Russian army was widely considered second only to the U.S. army; today, it may not even be the most powerful army in Ukraine. But if European leaders were to let Russia win in Ukraine, Putin’s takeaway would be that making nuclear threats could allow him to conquer more countries without provoking a European military response.

The real question is whether Russia would actually use nuclear weapons if European forces enter Ukraine. Arguably, this is already a moot point, given that special operations forces from Western countries are currently operating inside Ukraine. Moscow regularly employs aggressive rhetoric toward NATO members, but so far it has been all bark and no bite, avoiding contact with NATO forces and focusing instead on neighboring countries outside the alliance, such as Georgia and Ukraine, that it can safely kick around. Putin threatened to attack Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states back in 2014, and over the next several years he threatened to invade Finland and Sweden for joining NATO, Norway for hosting additional U.S. troops, Poland and Romania for housing ballistic missile defense facilities, and “any European countries” that allowed U.S. missiles to be deployed on their soil. In the past decade and a half, the Kremlin has threatened or run war games that simulate the use of nuclear weapons against Denmark, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the Baltic states, the European Union as a whole, and, of course, NATO and the United States. At some point, European leaders must ignore Putin’s saber-rattling, which is merely propaganda premised on the baseless notion that NATO wants to attack or invade Russia.

The arrival of European forces in Ukraine would change Putin’s calculations.

Ultimately, Russia cannot afford to fight multiple European countries at once, much less start a nuclear war. Tellingly, the countries that are most likely to be targeted in a nuclear attack—those that border Russia, particularly Poland and the Baltic states—are the least concerned about that prospect but rightly fear the aggression of a reconstituted conventional Russian military, buoyed by success in Ukraine. Europe is far richer, is more technologically advanced, and has a much larger population than Russia. Moscow knows it cannot win by provoking the whole continent, and it seeks to avoid the U.S. military intervention that would very likely follow if Russian forces were to invade a NATO country and trigger Article 5 of the alliance’s charter.

Instead, Russia is basing its hopes for victory almost entirely on Europe treating Ukraine as separate from the rest of the continent. So far, its hopes have come to pass. European leaders have tolerated attacks on Ukraine that would have triggered a united European response had they happened in any NATO or EU member state. This attitude has allowed Russia to escalate its war in Ukraine, safe in the knowledge that the rest of Europe will keep its distance.

The arrival of European forces in Ukraine would change that calculation. Moscow would have to face the possibility that European escalation could make the war unwinnable for Russia. Moreover, a European-led response would subvert Russian propaganda that NATO countries’ intervention in Ukraine is merely an American ploy to undermine Russia. The narrative that NATO is the aggressor in this war is popular in many parts of the world, and countering it could help Europe further isolate Moscow both diplomatically and economically. And because European forces would be acting outside the NATO framework and NATO territory, any casualties would not trigger an Article 5 response and draw in the United States. Russia’s opponent would not be NATO but a coalition of European countries seeking to balance against naked Russian imperialism.

Ukraine is doing the best it can, but it needs help—help that European countries are able and increasingly willing to provide. Rather than force Russian escalation, a European troop presence would be more likely to prevent the conflict from spreading and prevent further damage to Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure. European leaders do not need to follow the dictates of an increasingly unreliable United States about how the battle in Ukraine should be waged; they can and should decide for themselves how best to ensure the continent’s freedom and security. Europe must do what it takes to safeguard its own future, and that starts with making sure Ukraine wins this war.

ALEX CROWTHER is a Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis and a retired U.S. Army Colonel.
JAHARA MATISEK is a Military Professor at the U.S. Naval War College, Research Fellow at the European Resilience Initiative Center, and a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force. The views expressed here are his own.
PHILLIPS P. O’BRIEN is Head of the School of International Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of St. Andrews.

Foreign Affairs · by Alex Crowther, Jahara Matisek, and Phillips P. O’Brien · April 22, 2024

18. The Coming Arab Backlash

Excerpts:

This is all happening in an era characterized, even before the Israel-Hamas war, by the declining primacy of the United States and the rising autonomy of regional powers. Leading Arab states have increasingly sought to demonstrate their independence from the United States, building strategic relations with China and Russia and pursuing their own agendas in regional affairs. The willingness of Arab regimes to defy U.S. preferences was a hallmark of the previous decade, as Gulf states ignored American policies toward democratic transition in Egypt, flooded weapons into Syria despite Washington’s caution, and lobbied against the nuclear agreement with Iran. This willingness to flout the United States’ wishes has become even more apparent following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The past two years have seen most Middle Eastern regimes refusing to vote with Washington against Russia, and Saudi Arabia declining to follow the United States’ lead on oil pricing.

Washington’s unblinkered support for Israel in its devastation of Gaza, however, has brought long-standing hostility to U.S. policy to a head, and triggered a crisis of legitimacy which threatens the entire edifice of historic U.S. primacy in the region. It is difficult to exaggerate the extent to which Arabs blame the United States for this war. They can see that only U.S. weapons sales and United Nations vetoes allow Israel to continue its war. They are aware that the United States defends Israel for actions that are the same as those the United States condemned Russia and Syria for. The extent of this popular anger can be seen in the disengagement of a large number of young workers in nongovernmental organizations and activists from U.S.-backed projects and networks built up over decades of public diplomacy, a development cited by Annelle Sheline in her principled resignation from her post as a foreign affairs officer at the State Department in March.

The White House is still acting as if none of this really matters. Arab regimes will survive, anger will fade or be redirected to other issues, and, in a few months, Washington can get back to the important business of Israeli-Saudi normalization. That is how things have traditionally worked. But this time may well be different. The Gaza fiasco, at a moment of shifting global power and changing calculations by regional leaders, shows how little Washington has learned from its long record of policy failures. The nature and degree of popular anger, the decline of U.S. primacy and the collapse of its legitimacy, and Arab regimes’ prioritization of their domestic survival, as well as regional competition, suggests that the new regional order will be much more attentive to public opinion than the old. If Washington continues to ignore public opinion, it will doom its planning for after the war ends in Gaza.

The Coming Arab Backlash

Middle Eastern Regimes—and America—Ignore Public Anger at Their Peril

By Marc Lynch

April 22, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Marc Lynch · April 22, 2024

Since Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel, the Middle East has been rocked by mass protests. Egyptians have demonstrated in solidarity with Palestinians at great personal risk, and Iraqis, Moroccans, Tunisians, and Yemenis have taken to the streets in vast numbers. Meanwhile, Jordanians have broken long-standing redlines by marching on the Israeli embassy, and Saudi Arabia has refused to resume normalization talks with Israel, in part because of its people’s deep fury over Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip.

For Washington, the view is that none of this mobilization really matters. Arab leaders, after all, are among the world’s most experienced practitioners of realpolitik, and they have a record of ignoring their people’s preferences. The protests, although large, have been manageable. Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and other leaders have long encouraged protests about the treatment of Palestinians which allow their people to blow off steam and direct their anger toward a foreign enemy instead of against domestic corruption and incompetence. In time, or so the argument goes, the fighting in Gaza will end, the angry protesters will go home, and their leaders will carry on pursuing self-interests, an activity at which they excel.

U.S. foreign policymakers also have a long history of disregarding public opinion in the Middle East—the so-called Arab street. After all, if autocratic Arab leaders are calling the shots, then it is not necessary to put stock in what angry activists shout or in what ordinary citizens tell pollsters or the media. Since there are no democracies in the Middle East, care need not be given to what anyone outside the palaces thinks. And for all its talk of democracy and human rights, Washington has always been more comfortable dealing with pragmatic autocrats than with publics it regards as irrational, extremist mobs. It rarely pauses to consider how this might contribute to its dismal record of policy failures.

The United States’ willingness to dismiss popular concerns is strengthened by the memory of 2003, when Arab public opinion was wildly against the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, but most of the region’s leaders cooperated with the invasion and none took steps to oppose it. Despite decades of frequent mass protests against Israeli actions in Gaza and the West Bank, Jordan and Egypt have maintained peace treaties with Israel, and Egypt has even actively participated in the siege of Gaza. Indeed, U.S. complacency has actually increased as anticipated eruptions of popular anger—for example, over moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem or bombing Yemen—failed to materialize. Washington’s conviction was briefly shaken by the Arab uprisings of 2011, but it returned in full force as autocracies reasserted control in the following years.

That seems to be what the United States and most policy analysts expect this time around, too. When the bombing is finally over, the crowds will return to their homes and find other things to be mad about, and regional politics can go back to normal. But these assumptions reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of how public opinion matters in the Middle East, as well as a deep misreading of what has truly changed since the 2011 uprisings.

NO IDLE CHATTER

The term “Arab street” is used by policymakers to reduce regional public opinion to the rantings of an irrational, hostile, and emotional mob that might be appeased or repressed but is without coherent policy preferences or ideas. The expression has deep roots in British and French colonial rule and was adopted by the United States as it entered the Cold War and came to believe that education and capitalism are capable of transforming the Middle East into the image of the West. These ideas underpinned Washington’s policy of cooperating with Arab dictators who could control their people. That suited Arab leaders, who could deflect Western pressure on issues such as Israel or democratization by pointing to the threat of popular uprisings, and Islamic bogeymen waiting in the wings to take their place.

Prior to 2011, the high point of the Arab street concept occurred during the so-called Arab cold war of the 1950s, when populist pan-Arab leaders enjoyed great success in mobilizing the masses against conservative Western allies in the name of Arab unity and support for Palestinians. The sight of thousands of angry protestors responding to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s radio addresses by rampaging through the streets in countries including Jordan impressed itself on Western policymakers. Washington, in particular, concluded that the Arab street was dangerous, creating openings for the Soviets. These peoples, then, were not to be reasoned with but, rather, to be controlled by force. Long after the Cold War ended, this perception has endured, although it rests on a basic misunderstanding of Arab politics and continues to drive U.S. Middle East policy, as well as many policy analyses of the region. It has always been easier to dismiss Arab support for the Palestinian territories as rooted in atavistic anti-Semitism—or to wave away public fury at U.S. policies as cynically drummed up by politicians—than to take seriously the reasons for Arabs’ anger and to find ways to address their concerns.

This idea of the Arab street changed somewhat in the 1990s and the subsequent decade. Satellite television, especially Al Jazeera, crystallized in these decades and shaped a pan-Arab public opinion. The rise of systematic, scientific public opinion polling in the 1990s provided considerable nuance about national variances, attitudes changing in response to events, and sophisticated assessments of political conditions. The emergence of social media allowed a wide variety of Arab voices to break the media’s control and shatter stereotypes through their unmediated analysis and interactive engagement. After 9/11, Washington put great effort into a war of ideas, designed to combat extremist and Islamist ideas across the region, an approach that, however misguided, did require significant investment in survey research and careful attention to Arab media and emerging social media. But then the uprisings in 2011 shattered general complacency about the stability of the region’s autocrats, showing that the people’s voices needed to be heard and taken into account.

THE AUTOCRATS SHAKE BUT SURVIVE

The memory of the 2011 uprisings still hangs over every calculation of regime stability in today’s Middle East. The results of those revolutionary events carried mixed lessons. The rapid spread of regime-threatening protests from Tunisia across virtually the entire region showed that the supposed stability of Arab autocracies was mostly a myth. For a brief moment, it stopped making sense for Washington to ignore the subtleties of Arab public opinion or to defer to the assurances of jaded Arab rulers. The uprisings were manifestly not simply the eruption of a mindless Arab street. Rather, the young revolutionaries who captured the spirit of the era articulated thoughtful, incisive critiques of the autocrats they challenged, and even the Islamists in their midst spoke the language of freedom and democracy. Western governments initially raced to engage with these impressive young leaders and tried to support their efforts to bring about democratic transitions and more open political systems.

But such lessons were quickly forgotten as Arab regimes regained control through military coups, political engineering, and wide-ranging repression. Autocrats throughout the region helped other autocrats restore their power, and the West simply stood by. The United States, for example, did not act as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states supported Bahrain’s vicious repression of its protests in 2011 and poured financial and political support into the 2013 Egyptian military coup. The autocratic restoration that followed brought a level of repression that went far beyond that which had existed before 2011, with regimes across the region crushing and silencing civil society, fearing any resurgence of opposition. Digital surveillance aided these repressive measures, giving regimes unprecedentedly nuanced understandings of their citizens’ views and the potential for opposition movements to appear.

The autocratic restoration quickly resulted in the return of an older model of Western foreign policy based on cooperating with autocratic elites and ignoring the views of Arab publics. Nowhere could this be seen more clearly than in U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From 1991 until recently, Washington had shepherded a peace process in part because U.S. leaders believed that delivering a just solution for Palestinians was essential to legitimize U.S. primacy. President Donald Trump’s administration, however, simply ignored Palestinian and Arab public opinion as it brokered the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, without resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The accords also included Sudan, as well as Morocco, after Washington agreed to recognize its sovereignty over Western Sahara.

Autocrats in the region helped other autocrats restore power, and the West stood by.

U.S. President Joe Biden, despite promising campaign rhetoric, instead wholeheartedly embraced Trump’s approach to the Middle East, pushing for Arab-Israeli normalization and ignoring democracy and human rights. After his inauguration in 2021, Biden abandoned his promises to put human rights first and make Saudi Arabia a pariah for its murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and its war on Yemen. Instead, he scrambled with unseemly desperation to finish Trump’s policy of normalization with Israel without resolving the Palestinian issue, and fending off Chinese gains in the region, by securing an agreement with Saudi Arabia. It is not an accident that the Hamas assault on Israel on October 7 coincided with the Biden administration’s full-court press for a Saudi normalization deal in the midst of unprecedented provocations by Israeli settlers in the West Bank. There were many signs of Arab discontent with normalization and countless warnings of an imminent explosion in Gaza, but Washington ignored them as just another instance of misguided deference to an Arab street that it believed its autocratic allies could control. It was wrong.

That is because public opinion matters in the Middle East. Politics matter, even under autocracies and, in the Middle East, political forces move seamlessly between the domestic and the regional. Successful leaders must learn to master both dimensions of the game. Part of ensuring their survival is knowing how to respond to protests, and the response depends on the issue at hand. Western diplomats listen to Arab rulers who would not sacrifice even minor interests for the greater good if they could get away with it. Of course, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would do a deal with Israel if he thought it would serve his government’s interests and he could absorb public anger without too much risk. But that is a big if. Prince Mohammed and other Arab leaders care about what might get them overthrown. For the most part, they care about one thing more than anything else: staying in power. That means not only preventing obviously regime-threatening mass protests but also being attentive to potential sources of discontent and responding as necessary to head them off. With almost every Arab country outside the Gulf suffering extreme economic problems, and accordingly exercising maximum repression, regimes have to be even more careful in responding to issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Arab leaders are, meanwhile, also focused on the regional political game and fiercely compete to position themselves as the most effective defenders of their shared identities and interests. That is why they often dress up even the most nakedly cynical and self-interested moves as serving the interests of Palestinians or defending Arab honor. The recent actions of the United Arab Emirates, such as when it tried to justify the Abraham Accords by claiming to have prevented Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s planned annexation of the West Bank, are a case in point. Arab leaders care about what gives them an advantage or threatens them in the intensely competitive game of regional politics—whether that is against other Arab contenders for influence or against other powers, including Turkey and Iran. The regional dimension of competition has become even more intense over the last decade, as the Arab uprisings highlighted how political developments throughout the region may risk the survival of any domestic regime. Most notably, Qatar competed hard with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over political transitions and civil wars in Syria, Tunisia, and elsewhere, seeking to shape public opinion but also responding to it.

THE BUILDING BACKLASH

Today, it is glaringly obvious that it was wrong for the United States to assume that it could ignore Arab public opinion about the treatment of Palestinians. Arabs have not, in fact, lost interest in the issue. And Arab regimes have not, in fact, established a death grip on public mobilization. Almost every regime now finds its publics extraordinarily mobilized by what they consider to be Israel’s genocidal campaign against Gaza and a new program of displacement and occupation. The resulting level of mobilization and public outrage exceeds the 2003 fury over the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and it is clearly influencing the behavior of the region’s regimes. Indeed, the degree and power of popular mobilization can be seen not only in the media and the crowds in the streets but also in the uncharacteristic criticism of Israel and the United States being voiced by regimes that need to get this right in order to survive. Even Egypt, a close U.S. partner, has threatened to freeze the Camp David Accords if Israel invaded Rafah or expelled Gazans into the Sinai.

The Arab media, which had been badly fragmented and politically polarized during the previous decade’s intraregional political wars, has largely reunited in defense of Gaza. Al Jazeera is back, reliving its glory days through round-the-clock coverage of the horrors there, even as its journalists have been killed in action by Israeli forces. Social media is back, too—not the corpse of Twitter or the woefully censored Facebook and Instagram, so much as newer apps such as TikTok, WhatsApp, and Telegram. The images and videos emerging from Gaza overwhelm the spin offered by Israel and the United States and easily bypass soft-pedaled coverage by Western news outlets. People see the devastation. Every day they confront scenes of unbelievable tragedy. And they know victims directly. They do not need the media to understand WhatsApp messages from terrified Gazans or to view the horrifying videos widely circulating on Telegram.

Arab activists and intellectuals have been developing powerful arguments about the nature of Israel’s domination of the Palestinian territories and these are entering the Western discourse in new ways. The case South Africa brought to the International Court of Justice, alleging an Israeli genocide in Gaza, introduced many of those arguments into circulation across the global South and within international organizations. It did so by referencing not only the statements of Israeli leaders but also conceptual frameworks about occupation and settler colonialism developed by Arab and Palestinian intellectuals. The war of ideas that the United States sought to wage in the Muslim world after 9/11, claiming to bring freedom and democracy to a backward region, has reversed course, with the United States on the defensive because of its hypocrisy in demanding condemnation of Russia’s war on Ukraine while supporting Israel’s war on Gaza.

A REGION ADRIFT

This is all happening in an era characterized, even before the Israel-Hamas war, by the declining primacy of the United States and the rising autonomy of regional powers. Leading Arab states have increasingly sought to demonstrate their independence from the United States, building strategic relations with China and Russia and pursuing their own agendas in regional affairs. The willingness of Arab regimes to defy U.S. preferences was a hallmark of the previous decade, as Gulf states ignored American policies toward democratic transition in Egypt, flooded weapons into Syria despite Washington’s caution, and lobbied against the nuclear agreement with Iran. This willingness to flout the United States’ wishes has become even more apparent following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The past two years have seen most Middle Eastern regimes refusing to vote with Washington against Russia, and Saudi Arabia declining to follow the United States’ lead on oil pricing.

Washington’s unblinkered support for Israel in its devastation of Gaza, however, has brought long-standing hostility to U.S. policy to a head, and triggered a crisis of legitimacy which threatens the entire edifice of historic U.S. primacy in the region. It is difficult to exaggerate the extent to which Arabs blame the United States for this war. They can see that only U.S. weapons sales and United Nations vetoes allow Israel to continue its war. They are aware that the United States defends Israel for actions that are the same as those the United States condemned Russia and Syria for. The extent of this popular anger can be seen in the disengagement of a large number of young workers in nongovernmental organizations and activists from U.S.-backed projects and networks built up over decades of public diplomacy, a development cited by Annelle Sheline in her principled resignation from her post as a foreign affairs officer at the State Department in March.

The White House is still acting as if none of this really matters. Arab regimes will survive, anger will fade or be redirected to other issues, and, in a few months, Washington can get back to the important business of Israeli-Saudi normalization. That is how things have traditionally worked. But this time may well be different. The Gaza fiasco, at a moment of shifting global power and changing calculations by regional leaders, shows how little Washington has learned from its long record of policy failures. The nature and degree of popular anger, the decline of U.S. primacy and the collapse of its legitimacy, and Arab regimes’ prioritization of their domestic survival, as well as regional competition, suggests that the new regional order will be much more attentive to public opinion than the old. If Washington continues to ignore public opinion, it will doom its planning for after the war ends in Gaza.

MARC LYNCH is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University.

Foreign Affairs · by Marc Lynch · April 22, 2024

19. Comparing Gray-Zone Tactics in the Red Sea and the South China Sea

Excerpt:

Conclusion

The Houthis’ activities in the Red Sea and China’s maneuvers near Second Thomas Shoal showcase the diverse ways gray-zone tactics are employed in the 21st century. While the actors and contexts differ, these cases highlight the need for a nuanced and coordinated response from the international community to counter these challenges and maintain a peaceful and stable global order. By fostering unified responses, investing in maritime security, strengthening international law, and addressing underlying issues, the international community can better navigate the murky waters of gray-zone tactics and chart a course toward brighter seas.

Comparing Gray-Zone Tactics in the Red Sea and the South China Sea

thediplomat.com

The Houthis’ activities in the Red Sea and the Chinese actions around Second Thomas Shoal have notable similarities in tactical conduct and adversarial responses.

By Thomas Lim and Eric Ang

April 20, 2024

In this photo provided by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine resupply vessel Unaizah May 4, right, is hit by Chinese coast guard water cannons causing injuries to multiple crew members as they tried to enter the Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed South China Sea, March 5, 2024.

Credit: Armed Forces of the Philippines via AP

Amid turbulent times at sea, gray-zone tactics have become a preferred tool for actors seeking to advance their interests without resorting to outright military conflict. Essentially, gray-zone tactics mean operating in the murky spectrum between peace and war. Such actions risk eroding the freedom of navigation, a central concept undergirding global economic stability.

Two recent cases – the Houthis’ activities in the Red Sea, and the Chinese actions around Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea – display remarkable similarities when it comes to the operationalization of gray-zone tactics, despite being cut from entirely different contextual cloths.

A deep-dive analysis of the two cases reveals notable similarities in tactical conduct and adversarial responses, with three critical lessons distilled for the international community to navigate future iterations of such gray-zone tactics out at sea.

The Red Sea Gambit

Based in Yemen, the Houthi movement is a non-state actor that can be classified as an organized armed group with political aspirations. Since hijacking a cargo ship on November 19, 2023, the Houthis have allegedly been targeting Israeli-linked ships to stop Israel from attacking Palestine in Gaza and the West Bank, with this target list further expanding to United States- and United Kingdom-linked ships in March 2024.

Although the Houthis have utilized military force on commercial vessels, existing international law (including the law of naval warfare) does not apply to conflicts between states and non-state actors. The Houthis’ identity as non-state actors engaging in gray-zone operations makes it tricky for the international community to respond proportionately, despite the threat that their actions pose to regional shipping and maritime security.

Furthermore, the Houthis continue to spread misinformation and pro-Houthi propaganda through social media platforms, aiming to justify their actions while undermining international support for their adversaries. This tactic seeks to challenge the overarching international narrative by playing up the Houthis’ righteousness in upholding their values and defending their place in the world – consequently portraying any action taken (especially Western responses) as modern-day crusades.

Crucially, the Houthis are strategically targeting a key maritime chokepoint and important shipping lane in the Red Sea – the Bab al-Mandab strait, one that sees 25 percent of the world’s daily shipping pass through it. They have employed missiles, drones, and unmanned vessels against unarmed civilian ships, disrupting global maritime trade and exerting pressure on regional powers to respond. This tactic leverages the geographic vulnerability of the chokepoint to raise the stakes for the international community, amplifying the visibility of the Houthis’ objectives.

The Second Thomas Shoal Blockade

On the other side of the world, there has been an increased frequency of gray-zone tactics employed by the China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia since February 2023, especially around Second Thomas Shoal. China seeks to intercept and block the Philippines’ rotation and resupply missions to BRP Sierra Madre, a rusting hulk grounded on the feature in 1999 and since garrisoned by the Philippine Navy.

These actions exemplify a different manifestation of gray-zone tactics, which involves the use of lawfare to justify China’s actions, selective interpretations to claim moral high ground, and a persistent presence to demonstrate assertiveness.

China has attempted to utilize lawfare as a justificatory tool by passing the CCG law in late January 2021. This domestic law vested the CCG (and forces under its command) with the authority to enforce jurisdiction in China’s self-declared territorial waters. While there are points of contention between the CCG law and international law, i.e. the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – a convention which China has been a party to since 1996 – China has ignored these comparative deviations, while justifying their actions as legitimate under the CCG law’s ambit.

Furthermore, the Philippines has been painted by Chinese media outlets as an aggressor intruding into Chinese territorial waters, with accusations of the former contravening the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Additionally, Chinese researchers have contended that China maintains the moral high ground by enforcing full compliance with the DOC, and that they had lawfully expelled trespassing Philippine vessels.

While logical at first glance, this cherry-picking frame omits the fact that the DOC is a non-binding agreement that originated from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member-states disputing China’s territorial claims. Such selective interpretations also downplay the violative actions taken by Chinese authorities near Scarborough Shoal since 2012, as well as recent forceful measures taken by Chinese vessels, even while the DOC specifies the use of peaceful means (without the use of force) to resolve such disputes.

Finally, the CCG has also maintained a near-constant presence around Second Thomas Shoal, with its efforts supplemented by maritime militia vessels manned by “Little Blue Men.” The vessels have employed aggressive actions such as ramming maneuvers and water cannon firings against the Philippines’ resupply vessels, effectively blockading the area and stopping resupply efforts. Given the civilian nature of the Little Blue Men, their actions blur the lines between law enforcement and military action, making it difficult for states to determine the appropriate response. This allows China to demonstrate its assertiveness in defending its South China Sea territorial claims, while avoiding any direct military-on-military engagement.

Parallels in the Gray

While the contexts and motivations behind these two cases differ considerably, there are striking parallels in their use of gray-zone tactics. Both the Houthis and the CCG operate in ambiguous and murky waters by leveraging non-military actors. The Houthis are a non/pseudo-state proxy, whereas China’s maritime militia can either be understood as paramilitary members or civilian fishermen serving similar purposes. Such ambiguity blurs the lines of accountability, making it prohibitively difficult to develop any clear international response. The intentional (or unintentional) weaponization of ambiguity minimizes the risk of escalation, while allowing both groups to advance their political objectives.

Furthermore, both cases show a desire for narrative posturing. While the degree of control differs, both sides have propagated outright falsehoods. While initially claiming to only target Israel/U.S./U.K. linked vessels, the Houthis have also targeted ships with no such connections, such as the vessel STAR IRIS, a Greek-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged ship carrying corn from Brazil to Iran.

Also, there is irrefutable cherry-picking of beneficial facts, such as China’s highlighting militarization encouraged by the U.S. in the South China (and not its own), as well as labelling the Philippines as an aggressor in the Second Thomas Shoal dispute, despite the area falling within the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. There is a concerted effort to either manage the narrative in the public domain, or to simply put out an alternate (and often false) narrative to legitimize their actions.

The two cases also involve targeting maritime supply chain(s), albeit at different levels. The Houthis are disrupting international trade and affecting global economic stability to put pressure on Israel and its Western allies over Gaza. The CCG continues to exert a presence in the South China Sea, while disrupting logistical and troop resupply efforts to the rusting BRP Sierra Madre – possibly to prevent reinforcement to the Philippines’ last physical foothold on the Second Thomas Shoal, which is in danger of falling apart due to the harsh conditions out at sea.

‘Fighting’ in the Gray

Gray-zone tactics are employed to confound the adversary. Even if these tactics are recognized for their gray nature, they are designed such that all parties find it difficult to develop an appropriate response. Thereafter, besides recognizing such tactics for their gray overtones, states need to develop flexible and calibrated responses to prevent transgressors from pushing their limits, while continuing to operate below the threshold of war.

In response to the Houthis, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin elucidated the threat of the Houthis’ actions to the sanctity of the rules-based international order. This was followed up with the establishment of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational coalition formed to protect commercial traffic in the Red Sea from Houthi aggression, under the umbrella of Combined Task Force 153. The larger idea behind this is simple – U.S. actions are designed to stall a closing gambit by securitizing the issue. By bringing in 41 states into Prosperity Guardian and playing up the economic and maritime security angles of the Red Sea gambit, the U.S. approach allows for room to escalate or de-escalate when necessary, while also creating a competing frame of reactivity in response to the Houthis’ narrative.

As for the Second Thomas Shoal interceptions, Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. gathered top officials to discuss the October 2023 collision incident between a Philippines supply ship and a CCG vessel, while simultaneously ordering authorities to conduct a maritime investigation. This was followed up by a direct criticism of China’s escalatory actions, calling out the CCG for its blatant violation and disregard of international law.

Afterwards, the Philippines started to call on other states to bandwagon and securitize against China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea which has culminated into further cooperation on maritime security ventures with Vietnam, reciprocal maritime access agreements with Japan, and joint naval patrols with Australia in the South China Sea, among others. The larger idea here is similar, with the Philippines’ actions designed to present an opposing narrative to China’s, while bringing in other states with similar security concerns to band together in defense of their respective national interests.

There is a modus operandi in both sides’ responses in the Red Sea and the South China Sea – any reaction starts with an assessment, followed by an open call-out of the transgressor operating in the gray. Afterwards, the state targeted by such gray-zone operations proceeds to develop a narrative to raise the stakes for the international community, which brings in like-minded states with similar interests and fundamental security considerations at stake, into the equation.

Lessons in Navigating the Gray Zone

While the securitization actions taken above are contextualized to the gray-zone tactics employed, a detailed analysis of the two cases’ parallels reveal further insights in navigating gray-zone challenges.

First, the ambiguity of gray-zone tactics underscores the pressing need for a coordinated international response across different levels, institutions, and actors. Fragmentation and unilateral responses significantly weaken international efforts, and this logic applies even for powerful states. The intricacy of gray-zone tactics require the pooling of resources and ideas amongst different players with similar stakes.

Furthermore, even as states work together to develop effective strategies for deterring and countering these tactics, what is perhaps critical to the success of such responses is the nuance to how these collaborative efforts come to fruition. In the case of Operation Prosperity Guardian, operations may have started off on the wrong foot as a U.S.-led response could have strengthened the Houthis’ narrative of “the West” continuing an age-old campaign of aggression against Middle East nations. Likewise, the Philippines’ engagements with most of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue partners (Australia, Japan, the U.S., etc.) on South China Sea issues could result in further alienation vis-à-vis China, further weakening the significance of its response to Chinese actions in the Second Thomas Shoal.

Simply put, the frame matters for a multitude of reasons, from the legitimacy of the response to the adversary’s willingness to engage in diplomatic channels to resolve such tensions. The selected frame around Prosperity Guardian could have been refined to avoid associations with such inflammatory narratives.

Second, the growing importance of maritime chokepoints to the international community necessitates stronger international cooperation on maritime security. States, both big and small, need to recognize the importance of investing in maritime security, and to strengthen existing mechanisms to improve situational awareness and enhance common protocols. This process refers not only to interactions among the decision-making bodies of regional and global powers, but also broadened cooperation and capacity-building with local authorities and the commercial shipping community.

Strengthening maritime security frameworks to allow authorities and stakeholders to expose gray-zone tactics by putting out factually correct narratives is important in shaping public perception, and ensuring maritime legislation is updated to hold actors accountable is crucial to deter future violations. Efforts to clarify and strengthen existing legal frameworks, such as the recent revision of the Newport Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare to factor in developments such as the use of autonomous vessels, are critical in safeguarding the relevance and applicability of existing international rules governing interactions out at sea.

Lastly, stakeholders need to return to the soft underbelly of such gray-zone tactics by recognizing that such issues often stem from deeper political and socioeconomic grievances. The roots of Houthis’ actions can be traced to the Iran-Israel proxy war, with Iran supporting multiple proxies (including the Houthis) with the resources to threaten Israel, while Israel had been intercepting suspicious vessels to prevent Iranian supply of arms to these proxies. Israel’s retaliatory responses to the October 2023 Hamas attacks can be understood as the spark that led to the Houthis targeting vessels in the Red Sea.

As for China, its motivation can be traced back to the Century of Humiliation, which made the perceived loss of sovereignty an extremely sensitive issue. It is etched into Chinese collective memory that the maritime area enclosed by the nine-dashed line in the South China Sea is China’s alone, based on historical claims. While China has displayed significant resistance to any external attempts to contravene these claims, protecting the sanctity of the rules-based international order should remain a priority for all states, especially UNCLOS signatories. As such, states need to lay the groundwork for long-term stability by engaging in diplomacy and developmental initiatives to address these underlying motivations, and to reduce the appeal for actors to resort to gray-zone tactics.

Conclusion

The Houthis’ activities in the Red Sea and China’s maneuvers near Second Thomas Shoal showcase the diverse ways gray-zone tactics are employed in the 21st century. While the actors and contexts differ, these cases highlight the need for a nuanced and coordinated response from the international community to counter these challenges and maintain a peaceful and stable global order. By fostering unified responses, investing in maritime security, strengthening international law, and addressing underlying issues, the international community can better navigate the murky waters of gray-zone tactics and chart a course toward brighter seas.

Authors

Guest Author

Thomas Lim

Thomas Lim is a senior analyst with the Military Studies Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, a policy-oriented think tank located in Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University.

Guest Author

Eric Ang

Eric Ang is a research fellow with the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies.

thediplomat.com

20. New PLA unit underscores intelligentized warfare shift

Excerpts:

MDPW may be China’s answer to the US Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) system, a tech-driven plan to enhance military interoperability and AI integration across all warfare domains with allies and partners.

In practice, MDPW may seek to dismantle and destroy CJADC2’s kill chain by targeting critical information nodes such as aircraft and satellites through physical attack, targeting information networks by jamming, electronic warfare and cyberattack. It may also seek to disrupt decision-making within and between the US and its allies.

MDPW may capitalize on the fixed and centralized approach of US kill chains, which lack diversity in sharing information among different components, making them vulnerable and arguably unsuitable for a large-scale conflict in the Indo-Pacific region.

New PLA unit underscores intelligentized warfare shift - Asia Times

PLA-ISF aims to better integrate emerging AI, quantum and other technologies into multi-domain operational concept against the US and its allies

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · April 22, 2024

China has just unveiled its People’s Liberation Army-Information Support Force (PLA-ISF), a rebranding of its previous PLA-Strategic Support Force (PLA-SSF) to reflect new responsibilities and capabilities and guide the military’s technology-driven integrated combat concept, Chinese state media reports said.

In contrast to traditional PLA services such as the Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, the PLA’s strategic arms, such as the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force and Joint Logistics Support, focus on more specialized areas critical to modern warfare.

PLA-SSF, founded in 2015, was initially tasked with developing and implementing most of the PLA’s space-based capabilities and counter-space operations. Stressing the PLA-ISF’s broader responsibilities, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized that the renamed PLA-ISF will be crucial in advancing the PLA’s modernization and effectiveness in modern warfare.

Xi also stated that the PLA-ISF would be integrated into the PLA’s joint operations system, feature unique Chinese characteristics and accelerate the development of integrated combat capabilities more effectively.

China may have rebranded its PLA-SSF into the PLA-ISF in line with its evolving strategic thought and changing operational strategy.

Chinese President Xi Jinping at the PLA-ISF’s establishment ceremony. Photo: Global Times

In December 2022, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) noted that the PLA-SSF was created to centralize the PLA’s information support units. Before the creation of the PLA-SSF, each PLA service branch had its own information support units, potentially resulting in disjointed support efforts that hampered rather than helped operations.

As part of the 2015 reforms establishing the PLA-SSF, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) took over the roles of the PLA general staff and general political departments while those departments’ responsibilities for cyberwarfare, space, electronic warfare and psychological operations were transferred to the PLA-SSF.

The SCMP report mentions that before the PLA-SSF’s rebranding into the PLA-ISF, it had two principal departments – the Space Systems Department, which runs intelligence and communication satellites, and the Network Systems Department, which is tasked with cyber operations, electronic warfare and signals intelligence (SIGINT).

The rebranded PLA-ISF may reflect an evolution in Chinese strategic thought from “winning informationized wars” to “intelligentized warfare,” which in turn implies a broader mission set for the PLA-SSF, necessitating a name change to reflect increased responsibilities and capabilities.

China’s 2015 Military Strategy describes the foundation of “winning informationized wars,” noting the application of information technology in all military operations.

It says that “preparations for military struggle” (PMS) are under the context of winning “informationized local wars,” emphasizing that information is not just vital but will play a dominant role in winning future conflicts.

Building on the premise of China’s 2015 Military Strategy, the 2019 China’s National Defense in the New Era white paper notes that technologies such as AI, quantum information, big data, cloud computing and the Internet of Things (IoT) mark an evolution from “informationized” to “intelligentized” warfare.

Koichiro Takagi mentions in an April 2022 War on the Rocks article that the main idea of China’s “intelligentized warfare” concept is to use AI to directly influence the will of top policymakers, military commanders and citizens.

Takagi says that “intelligence dominance” will become a new area of struggle in intelligentized warfare, emphasizing that China envisions using AI for military purposes differently than the US and its allies.

In a January 2022 article in the Security and Strategy journal, Maasaki Yatsuzuka outlines the imperatives that may have led to the rebranding of the PLA-SSF into the PLA-ISF from political and military angles.

From a political standpoint, Yatsuzuka notes that the Xi administration’s implementation of intelligentized warfare signifies a shift toward a centralized decision-making process in the PLA.

This process, he says, aims to uphold the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) control over the PLA and secure its alignment with the party’s goals and ideology.

He also mentions that the need for centralized control is emphasized by integrating military reforms with broader party policies, such as the Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy.

Further, Yatsuzuka says that the PLA’s emphasis on political education and control through political commissars is becoming increasingly crucial as warfare becomes more technologically advanced and specialized.

From a military standpoint, Yatsuzuka says that to move toward intelligentized warfare, the PLA must establish integrated information systems to effectively manage the diverse aspects of modern warfare, including land, air, sea, space, cyber, cognitive and electromagnetic domains.

He mentions that effective utilization of AI and real-time data processing is crucial for future operations as it requires a robust data flow and analysis framework across various platforms and military units.

Yatsuzuka stresses the importance of a consolidated strategic directive incorporating inputs from multiple military and civilian sources to enable a united and adaptable response driven by centralized military leadership.

The rebranding of China’s PLA-SSF into PLA-ISF may also reflect the need to integrate information warfare and emerging technologies and capabilities into a multi-domain operational concept.

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In October 2023, Asia Times reported on China’s Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW) concept, which utilizes AI and big data advances to identify weaknesses in the US operational system and launch precision strikes. It also tests and improves AI-driven capacities to align with China’s military doctrine.

China’s intelligent warfare strategy is expected to involve a combination of human and machine command and control systems. Humans will have limited control over autonomous weapons and the focus will be on expanding warfare to areas where humans cannot operate, such as the cognitive domain.

China and the US are seeking cyberwar-fighting advantages. Image: Screengrab / CNBC

MDPW may be China’s answer to the US Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) system, a tech-driven plan to enhance military interoperability and AI integration across all warfare domains with allies and partners.

In practice, MDPW may seek to dismantle and destroy CJADC2’s kill chain by targeting critical information nodes such as aircraft and satellites through physical attack, targeting information networks by jamming, electronic warfare and cyberattack. It may also seek to disrupt decision-making within and between the US and its allies.

MDPW may capitalize on the fixed and centralized approach of US kill chains, which lack diversity in sharing information among different components, making them vulnerable and arguably unsuitable for a large-scale conflict in the Indo-Pacific region.

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asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · April 22, 2024

21. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 21, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2024

Key Takeaways:

US Senate Intelligence Committee Chairperson Senator Mark Warner reported on April 21 that US provisions of military aid to Ukraine, including long-range ATACMS missiles, will be in transit to Ukraine “by the end of the week” if the Senate passes the supplemental appropriations bill on April 23 and US President Joe Biden signs it by April 24.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 21 that the swift delivery of US military aid to Ukraine could allow Ukrainian forces to stabilize the frontline and seize the initiative.
Ukrainian forces struck and damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) Kommuna submarine support ship – the world’s oldest active-duty naval vessel – in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on April 21.
US-sanctioned, pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor created the new pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc on April 21, which plans to run a candidate in the October 20 Moldovan presidential election.
The Victory electoral bloc will likely allow the Kremlin to focus on a unified political effort in Moldova instead of maintaining relations with multiple pro-Russian Moldovan actors and parties, as it has done recently.
The Russian and Chinese navies signed a memorandum of understanding and cooperation on April 21 amid recent reports of China’s increased support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
The Kremlin blocked domestic access to the website of the French non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF), depriving Russians of access to independent assessments of Russian freedom of speech and press.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and Avdiivka and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian forces have increased their use of small, lightweight, off-road vehicles along the frontline.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 21, 2024

Apr 21, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 21, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Karolina Hird

April 21, 2024, 8:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on April 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US Senate Intelligence Committee Chairperson Senator Mark Warner reported on April 21 that US provisions of military aid to Ukraine, including long-range ATACMS missiles, will be in transit to Ukraine “by the end of the week” if the Senate passes the supplemental appropriations bill on April 23 and US President Joe Biden signs it by April 24.[1] Warner stated in an interview with CBS News on April 21 that the US presidential administration has been prepared to provide long-range ATACMS to Ukraine, as specified in the bill, for the past several months.[2] Warner emphasized the extensive battlefield impact that Ukrainian forces have achieved using US-provided military assistance, stating that Ukrainian forces have been able to destroy “87 percent of Russian pre-existing ground forces” (potentially in reference to Russia’s pre-full-scale invasion professional force), 67 percent of Russian tanks, and 32 percent of Russian armored personnel carriers (APCs) for the past two years with less than 3 percent of the US defense budget and military aid from the US and Europe. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on April 20 that the National Security Supplemental that provides support to Ukraine, Israel, and the Indo-Pacific allows about $50 billion to flow into the US defense industrial base (DIB) and will create jobs in over 30 US states.[3] Pentagon Spokesperson Brigadier General Patrick Ryder stated on April 20 that the US Department of Defense (DoD) is considering sending “several additional advisors to augment the Office of Defense Cooperation (OCD)” to the US Embassy in Kyiv.[4] Politico reported on April 20 citing an unidentified individual familiar with the matter that the US advisors in Kyiv will help Ukrainian officials plan to sustain US equipment provided to Ukraine and help US embassy officials in Kyiv coordinate new weapons shipments after the supplemental appropriations bill becomes law, likely as part of an effort to alleviate DoD personnel limitations in documenting certain aid.[5]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 21 that the swift delivery of US military aid to Ukraine could allow Ukrainian forces to stabilize the frontline and seize the initiative.[6] Zelensky stated during an interview with NBC News that US military support gives Ukraine a chance at victory but warned that Ukrainian battlefield progress will depend on how fast military aid arrives on the frontlines. Zelensky noted that delays in the delivery of military assistance have already contributed to Ukrainian materiel and personnel losses in “several directions.” Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian military is especially anticipating the deliveries of air defense and long-range weapon systems since Ukrainian forces currently lack significant long-range capabilities to prevent Ukrainian casualties on the frontlines. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces may suffer additional setbacks in the coming weeks while waiting for US security assistance that will allow Ukraine to stabilize the front, but they will likely be able to blunt the current Russian offensive assuming the resumed US assistance arrives promptly.[7] Russian forces will likely intensify ongoing offensive operations and missile and drone strikes in the coming weeks in order to exploit the closing window of Ukrainian materiel constraints.[8]

Ukrainian forces struck and damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) Kommuna submarine support ship – the world’s oldest active-duty naval vessel – in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on April 21.[9] Geolocated footage published on April 21 shows fire and a smoke plume in Sevastopol Bay, and Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted a Ukrainian anti-ship missile in the area.[10] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk confirmed that a Ukrainian strike damaged the Kommuna and that while Ukrainian forces are still clarifying the degree of damage, the Kommuna is clearly incapable of operating.[11] Pletenchuk noted that the Kommuna is over 111 years old and that Russian forces modernized it in 2016 to perform deep sea work, including raising submarines and sunken cargo. Pletenchuk stated that the Kommuna is the only rescue vessel of its class in the BSF. Pletenchuk reported that the Kommuna previously performed rescue operations in the area of the sunken Russian missile cruiser Moskva and large landing ship Tsezar Kunikov and that Russian forces would be unable to perform similar rescue and retrieval operations without the Kommuna. Open-source intelligence analyst HI Sutton noted that the Kommuna provides the Russian Navy with ”valuable capabilities” and that the ship has frequently participated in sea trials and can conduct seabed warfare.[12] Another maritime intelligence analyst suggested that the strike may limit the BSF’s submarine operations and disrupt Russian submarine Kalibr missile launching operations.[13]

US-sanctioned, pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor created the new pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc on April 21, which plans to run a candidate in the October 20 Moldovan presidential election. Shor led a meeting of Moldovan opposition politicians in Moscow on April 21 and announced that the Shor Party, Revival Party, Chance Party, Alternative Forces of the Salvation of Moldova Party, and the Victoria Party will form the Victory electoral bloc.[14] Shor stated that he will act as the chairperson of the bloc’s executive committee.[15] Yevgenia Gutsul, the governor of Gagauzia, a pro-Russian autonomous region of Moldova, will act as the bloc’s executive secretary.[16] Marina Tauber, a US-sanctioned Moldovan member of parliament and close Shor affiliate, will act as the secretary of the executive committee.[17] Shor stated that the bloc aims to improve Moldova‘s relations with Russia and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and advocate against Moldova’s accession into the European Union (EU).[18] The bloc reportedly intends to run a candidate in the October 2024 Moldovan presidential elections and will announce their candidate soon.[19] Shor, Gutsul, and Tauber notably do not meet the minimum age requirement to run for president in Moldova.[20]

The Victory electoral bloc will likely allow the Kremlin to focus on a unified political effort in Moldova instead of maintaining relations with multiple pro-Russian Moldovan actors and parties, as it has done recently.[21] The electoral bloc is likely intended to create the impression of widespread support in Moldova for pro-Russian policies and Shor himself, who continues to be the major conduit of Kremlin influence in Moldovan politics even though he lives in exile in Israel. Most of the parties that make up the new Victory electoral bloc are already extensively affiliated with Shor and do not possess widespread influence in the Moldovan political sphere. The Chance Party, previously known as the Ours Party, joined Shor’s “Chance. Duties. Realization.” (S.O.R.) electoral bloc in June 2023 after Moldovan authorities banned the Shor Party.[22] Moldovan authorities barred the Chance Party from participating in local elections in November 2023, however.[23] The Alternative Forces of the Salvation of Moldova Party registered as a political party in March 2022 and later joined the S.O.R. electoral bloc in June 2023 but does not currently hold any seats in parliament.[24] The Victoria Party is a new party having only registered in late December 2023, and its head, Vadim Groza, was formerly a member of the Socialist Party and is the current mayor of Soldanesti (a city in northeastern Moldova).[25] The Revival Party is likely the most influential of the parties that make up the new Victory electoral bloc, but it currently only holds four seats in Moldova’s 101-seat parliament.[26] The Revival Party was largely defunct until two Moldovan politicians left the Socialist Party to join the Revival Party in May 2023 after meeting with Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky in Russia in March 2023 and with Shor in Israel in May 2023.[27] The Revival Party orchestrated a large-scale protest in Chisinau in February 2024 that called for Moldovan President Maia Sandu to step down.[28] The Moldovan Constitutional Court recently reversed a ruling that banned politicians who were previously members of the Shor Party from running in Moldovan elections, and ISW assessed at the time that the Kremlin would likely more directly exploit and promote Shor Party affiliates before the upcoming Moldovan presidential election.[29] The Kremlin is likely engaged in hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing Moldovan society, attacking Moldova’s democratic government, and preventing Moldova’s accession to the EU, as ISW has extensively reported.[30]

The Russian and Chinese navies signed a memorandum of understanding and cooperation on April 21 amid recent reports of China’s increased support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseev signed a memorandum of understanding and cooperation with Chinese Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Hu Zhongming regarding naval search and rescue operations during Moiseev’s visit to China.[31] Moiseev and Hu also discussed Russian and Chinese naval cooperation, and Moiseev will participate in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao on April 22-23, where he will meet with China‘s and other unspecified countries’ senior navy officials.[32] Moiseev’s visit to China notably precedes US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s travel to China from April 24 through April 26.[33]

The Kremlin blocked domestic access to the website of the French non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF), depriving Russians of access to independent assessments of Russian freedom of speech and press. Independent Russian non-governmental organization Roskomsvoboda reported on April 21 that the RSF website was blocked in Russia alongside other resources that publish information about Russia’s war in Ukraine.[34] Roskomsvoboda noted that the official Russian register of blocked sites did not include the federal agency responsible or the official reason for blocking RSF and assessed that the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office was the likely responsible party.[35] RSF publishes an annual “Freedom Index,” in which it scores and ranks 180 countries based on a quantitative analysis of abuses against media and qualitative analyses of journalists’ answers to a survey that gauges five contextual indicators: political, economic, and sociopolitical contexts, legal framework, and safety. The Freedom Index ranked Russia between 148 and 150 out of 180 between 2015 and 2020 before sharply downgrading to 155 in 2022 and 164 in 2023 due to the 2022 censorship laws criminalizing “fake” or “discrediting” information about the Russian military, ongoing disinformation campaigns, and declaring almost all independent media organizations as “foreign agents” or “undesirable organizations” since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[36] The Kremlin has been slowly increasing its physical and informational control over the Russian information space, including by arresting journalists and other opposition voices, implementing laws depriving certain media organizations and figures of their income, and forcing international telecommunications operators to comply with Russian data laws.[37] Blocking the RSF’s site now deprives Russian citizens of a resource to evaluate the impact of such measures on freedom of speech and press in Russia.

Key Takeaways:

US Senate Intelligence Committee Chairperson Senator Mark Warner reported on April 21 that US provisions of military aid to Ukraine, including long-range ATACMS missiles, will be in transit to Ukraine “by the end of the week” if the Senate passes the supplemental appropriations bill on April 23 and US President Joe Biden signs it by April 24.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 21 that the swift delivery of US military aid to Ukraine could allow Ukrainian forces to stabilize the frontline and seize the initiative.
Ukrainian forces struck and damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) Kommuna submarine support ship – the world’s oldest active-duty naval vessel – in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on April 21.
US-sanctioned, pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor created the new pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc on April 21, which plans to run a candidate in the October 20 Moldovan presidential election.
The Victory electoral bloc will likely allow the Kremlin to focus on a unified political effort in Moldova instead of maintaining relations with multiple pro-Russian Moldovan actors and parties, as it has done recently.
The Russian and Chinese navies signed a memorandum of understanding and cooperation on April 21 amid recent reports of China’s increased support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
The Kremlin blocked domestic access to the website of the French non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF), depriving Russians of access to independent assessments of Russian freedom of speech and press.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and Avdiivka and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian forces have increased their use of small, lightweight, off-road vehicles along the frontline.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Kreminna amid continued positional fighting on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 21. Geolocated footage published on April 19 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced east of Yampolivka (west of Kreminna).[38] Positional fighting continued northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka; west of Kreminna near Terny; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[39] Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kupyansk direction, and elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) reportedly operate near Bilohorivka.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to attack in the Siversk (northeast of Bakhmut) direction on April 21 but did not make any confirmed advances. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Spirne.[41] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue to operate near Spirne, and elements of the Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Siversk direction.[42]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 21 that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces seized Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming this claim.[43] A prominent Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Ukrainian forces recently withdrew from their remaining positions in the southwestern part of Bohdanivka but did not provide visual evidence to confirm this claim.[44] A Russian VDV-affiliated source claimed that Ukrainian forces still control dominant tactical heights north and northwest of Bohdanivka, and that the frontline situation is complex in the area.[45] A Ukrainian National Guard officer stated on April 21 that Russian forces managed to secure positions in the Bohdanivka area, where they transferred significant materiel and established well-prepared defensive positions.[46] The Ukrainian National Guard officer did not specify if Russian forces control Bohdanivka and assessed that Russian forces may attempt to use Bohdanivka to surround Chasiv Yar from the north and to seize Ivanivske (southeast of Chasiv Yar) to threaten Chasiv Yar from the south.

Russian forces continued to attack Chasiv Yar and the surrounding area on April 21 but did not advance. Positional battles continued near Chasiv Yar, including near the Novyi and Kanal Microraions; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, Klishchiivka, and Shumy; and south of Chasiv Yar near Pivdenne, Niu York, and Oleksandropil.[47] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces have not entered Chasiv Yar itself, and Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that Russian forces actively use combat vehicles, aviation, and infantry to attack in the Bakhmut direction.[48] The Ukrainian National Guard officer observed that Ukrainian forces can still defend Chasiv Yar itself, unlike its eastern outskirts that have been “long uninhabited and unfit for defense” as they were ”practically destroyed a year ago“ and do not have strong fortifications.[49] The Ukrainian National Guard officer added that Russian forces do not fully control Ivanivske and are attempting to advance through the lowlands north of Ivanivske. The Ukrainian National Guard officer implied that although Ukrainian forces can observe slow Russian advances through the lowlands north of Ivanivske towards Chasiv Yar, Ukrainian forces are unable to exploit Russian vulnerabilities because Ukrainian forces are preoccupied with constant Russian airstrikes and frontal assaults. The Ukrainian National Guard officer assessed that Russian forces are using glide bombs, artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) before launching ground assaults on Chasiv Yar to set favorable assault conditions by destroying Ukrainian shelters and defensive positions. The Ukrainian National Guard officer added that the Russian military command is serious about seizing Chasiv Yar because Russian forces have successfully trained new mobilized personnel, transferred the most combat-ready units to the Chasiv Yar direction, and are constantly forming reserves to replace heavy losses sustained in assaults on the settlement. The Ukrainian National Guard officer added that Russian VDV elements are leading the assaults on Chasiv Yar, and Russian milbloggers have consistently indicated that elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are operating near Chasiv Yar.[50] Elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) are also reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[51]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka). Geolocated footage published on April 20 and April 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Ocheretyne, and Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Ocheretyne.[52] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces seized Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming this claim.[53] Positional battles continued northwest of Avdiivka near Ocheretyne, Berdychi, Novokalynove, and Novobakhmutivka; west of Avdiivka near Umanske, Yasnobrodivka, and Semenivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, Netaylove, and Nevelske.[54] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting an “operational pause” (likely referring to a tactical pause) near the Domakha gully on the Pervomaiske-Nevelske line likely due to “difficult” Ukrainian minefields and Ukrainian drone operations in the area.[55] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command is attempting to sustain the tempo of offensive operations in this direction and is re-deploying elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], (Central Military District [CMD]) to the area after removing them from combat to restore combat capability.[56] Mashovets noted that elements of the Russian 35th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) redeployed to reinforce elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) and 132nd Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC), which are already fighting in the Novokalynove direction as part of efforts to seize Novobakhmutivka and Ocheretyne. Mashovets added that Russian forces also committed elements of the 74th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) near Berdychi. Mashovets noted that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, which operates in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions (northwest and northeast of Avdiivka), has over 86,000 personnel, no more than 280 tanks, no less than 760 armored vehicles, and around 1,100 tube and rocket artillery systems.[57] ISW cannot independently verify these estimates.

Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City) amid continued positional fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on April 21. Russian milbloggers widely claimed on April 20 and 21 that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the BARS-22 “Tigr” Volunteer Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) completed the seizure of Novomykhailivka and amplified footage of Russian forces allegedly raising a flag on the western outskirts of the village.[58] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on April 20 and 21, however, that Russian forces have not yet completely seized Novomykhailivka and still need to advance in the western and southern outskirts of the settlement.[59] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further west into Novomykhailivka than previously observed and claimed that Russian forces captured the Mashinostroitel community garden immediately north of the settlement. ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming the claimed seizure of Novomykhailivka. Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced westward along a section of the Solodke-Vodyane road (southwest of Donetsk City), but ISW has also not observed visual evidence of Russian advances in this area.[60] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Vodyane (northeast of Vuhledar).[61] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, Moscow Military District [MMD]); 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]); and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC) are reportedly fighting for Novomykhailivka.[62]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional fighting on April 21. Geolocated footage published on April 20 shows that Russian dismounted infantry seized a building south of Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured up to one square kilometer of ground near Urozhaine, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of a one-kilometer advance.[64] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting limited assaults to gauge Ukrainian defenses near Urozhaine.[65] Positional fighting also continued near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[66] Elements of the Russian 36th CAA (EMD) reportedly continue to conduct TOS-1A thermobaric artillery strikes against Ukrainian positions in the south Donetsk direction.[67]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area.[68] Elements of the Russian 56th and 108th airborne (VDV) regiments (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[69]

Positional engagements continued near Krynky in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on April 21.[70] Elements of the Russian ”Dnepr” Cossack Volunteer Brigade are reportedly operating near the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast.[71]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces continued missile strikes against Ukraine during the day on April 21. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces fired an unspecified missile at Zaporizhzhia City and unspecified ballistic missiles at port and logistics infrastructure in Odesa City and Odesa Oblast during the day on April 21.[72] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two Kh-59 missiles during the day.[73]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces are currently intensifying strikes to take advantage of Ukraine’s air defense shortages before Ukraine receives critical military assistance from the US and other Western partners.[74] Yevlash stated that Russia has accumulated a large stockpile of some unspecified missiles while Russian forces strike Ukraine with other newly produced unspecified missiles. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on April 2 that Russian forces will likely temporarily pause strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in order to replenish low missile stockpiles.[75] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces had about 950 high-precision operational-strategic and strategic-level missiles with a range of or exceeding 350 kilometers as of April 2 and that Russia aims to prevent this stockpile from falling below 900 missiles.[76]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian forces have increased their use of small and lightweight off-road vehicles along the frontline. Ukrainian military analyst Petro Chernyk stated on April 21 that the Russian military has been using small two- and four-seat buggies to transport Russian military personnel to the frontline to make up for a shortage of military transport vehicles.[77] Chernyk noted that international sanctions are limiting Russia’s ability to manufacture battery parts for military transport vehicles. Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk stated on April 16 that there is plenty of footage showing Russian forces using small vehicles to transport infantry to assaults because the vehicles allow Russian forces to quickly transport infantry to favorable positions, setting conditions for the next echelon of Russian infantry to secure the position.[78] Muzychuk noted that these small vehicles offer little protection for Russian infantry, however, and footage published in recent weeks shows Ukrainian forces extensively targeting small vehicles transporting infantry and supplies with first-person view (FPV) drones.[79] Ukrainian sources also amplified drone footage showing Russian forces using vehicles similar to golf carts to transport infantry to the battlefield.[80]

The Russian military is reportedly advertising increased salaries in occupied Ukraine in an effort to coerce Ukrainian civilians to sign voluntary military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Russian military is offering a salary of at least 500,000 rubles ($5,325) per month to civilians in occupied Ukraine who sign Russian military contracts for volunteer service.[81] Bloomberg recently reported that Russian regional one-time payments for signing a contract have increased by 40 percent to an average of 470,000 rubles ($4,992), and a Russian insider source claimed that some Russian authorities are offering one million rubles ($10,622) for people to sign military contracts.[82] Russian authorities may be concerned about decreasing recruitment rates and are attempting to mitigate low recruitment with increased economic incentives, particularly targeting occupied areas of Ukraine. Russia’s occupation has severely degraded the economies and infrastructure of occupied Ukraine, so mobilization efforts in these areas are targeting especially vulnerable populations.

Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on April 21 that Russian forces in occupied Crimea have trained dolphins to push potential “underwater saboteurs” (likely meaning special forces divers) to the surface.[83] ISW has previously observed reports that Russian forces are using trained dolphins to defend naval bases in Crimea against special forces divers.[84]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprise Kalashnikov Concern presented the new “Kolizyey-RU" drone at the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School in Ryazan City on April 19.[85] The Kolizyey-RU drone is a multipurpose hexacopter, which reportedly can conduct reconnaissance operations during the day and at night, deliver cargo, and perform other unspecified tasks.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers responded to the US House of Representatives passing the supplementary appropriations bill on the provision of assistance to Ukraine on April 20 by promoting narratives intended to deter American policymakers from finalizing the aid and to degrade Western and Ukrainian expectations about the impact of the aid on the battlefield. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that the US aid will be harmful for Ukrainians and baselessly alleged that the US is a “direct sponsor” of terrorism.[86] Peskov also attempted to discourage the US from seizing frozen Russian assets with claims that this will damage America‘s reputation, and a prominent Russian milblogger expressed concerns that the US seizure of frozen Russian assets will encourage the European Union (EU) to undertake similar measures.[87] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev promoted the longstanding Kremlin narrative that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people” to claim that US aid will continue the “civil war” between Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine.[88] The Kremlin consistently uses this narrative to falsely portray its invasion of Ukraine as a regional conflict and to deliberately misrepresent all Western aid provisions as efforts to prolong the war.[89] Medvedev also explicitly emphasized that he wishes that a civil war would break out in the US to “collapse” the US government. Several Russian milbloggers also aimed to paint the aid as futile, while some noted that Western military aid to Ukraine is bound to significantly impact the frontline situation.[90] ISW assessed on April 20 that Russian officials will likely intensify information operations aimed at weakening US and Western support for Ukraine and promoting Western self-deterrence in the wake of the US House of Representatives passing the aid bill for Ukraine.[91]

Zakharova denied that Russia artificially created a migrant crisis on the Russian-Finnish border in late 2023 as part of its hybrid operations.[92] Zakharova claimed that Western statements about the migrant crisis are “unfounded” and provocative. ISW assessed that Russia created a migrant crisis on the Finnish border in late 2023 by funneling migrants to the Russian-Finnish border as a hybrid warfare tactic meant to destabilize NATO and the EU.[93]

The Kremlin is re-injecting its longstanding false narratives about “neo-Nazism” in Ukraine on state media channels that specifically target international audiences, likely as part of Russian efforts to convince Western decisionmakers to self-deter and not provide military assistance to Ukraine. The Russian MFA stated that Russian state media outlet RT will air a “documentary” about Nazis in Ukraine during the Second World War and in contemporary Ukraine.[94]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

22. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 21, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-21-2024

Key Takeaways:

Gaza Strip: The IDF did not publish information about Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip on April 21. Palestinian militias claimed only one attack targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip.
West Bank: The IDF concluded a major, multi-day “counterterrorism operation” in the Nour Shams Refugee Camp, Tulkarm, on April 21. Several Palestinian militias called for the mobilization of armed Palestinians across the West Bank in response to the IDF’s Nour Shams operation.
Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 20.
Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed one drone attack targeting an unspecified site in the Golan Heights on April 20.

IRAN UPDATE, APRIL 21, 2024

Apr 21, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, April 21, 2024

Andie Parry and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on April 20 and 21, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume on Monday, April 22, 2024.

The IDF concluded a major, multi-day “counterterrorism operation” in the Nour Shams Refugee Camp, Tulkarm, on April 21. Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Nour Shams, killing 14 Palestinian fighters.[1] The IDF Duvdevan unit arrested 15 wanted persons, destroyed two improvised explosive device manufacturing facilities and dozens of explosives, and seized ammunition during operations in the camp. Palestinian fighters wounded ten Israeli soldiers in the operation.[2] Palestinian journalists reported that the IDF had killed a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commander in Tulkarm on April 19.[3] The same PIJ commander attended the funeral of other Palestinian fighters killed in fighting in Tulkarm, confirming that the commander survived the Israeli operation.[4]

Several Palestinian militias called for the mobilization of armed Palestinians across the West Bank in response to the IDF’s Nour Shams operation. Hamas, the Lions’ Den, the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades published statements calling for a mass uprising and armed retaliation against the IDF.[5] Those Palestinian militias and others claimed 15 attacks on Israeli forces, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and Israeli border towns on April 21.[6] PIJ’s Jenin Battalion conducted nine of the 15 attacks.[7] PIJ said that they were responding to the Israeli raid in Nour Shams.[8] Palestinians also conducted unclaimed attacks targeting Israeli checkpoints near Hebron and in the Jordan Valley.[9] The timing of these unclaimed attacks suggests that they are in response to the calls for mobilization. An unspecified group planted an improvised explosive device near Ramallah on April 21. The fighters had connected the IED‘s detonator to a Palestinian flag so that when an Israeli attempted to remove the flag, the IED detonated.[10]

Palestinians also participated in marches and a general strike on April 21 in response to the IDF’s Nour Shams operation.[11] Hamas called for a general strike on April 21.[12]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Key Takeaways:

Gaza Strip: The IDF did not publish information about Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip on April 21. Palestinian militias claimed only one attack targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip.
West Bank: The IDF concluded a major, multi-day “counterterrorism operation” in the Nour Shams Refugee Camp, Tulkarm, on April 21. Several Palestinian militias called for the mobilization of armed Palestinians across the West Bank in response to the IDF’s Nour Shams operation.
Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 20.
Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed one drone attack targeting an unspecified site in the Golan Heights on April 20.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Local Palestinian media reported the Israel Defense Force (IDF) Air Force conducted airstrikes in several areas of the Gaza Strip on April 21. The strikes targeted sites in Gaza City, the central Gaza Strip, and Rafah.[13]

The IDF did not publish information about Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip on April 21.

Palestinian militias claimed only one attack targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on April 21. The National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli armor near the Turkish Hospital in Mughraqa, near the Netzarim corridor.[14]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and IDF Southern Command commander Yaron Finkelman approved plans for future operations in the Gaza Strip on April 21.[15]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad launched rockets targeting an Israeli military site in southern Israel on April 20 after CTP-ISW's data cut-off.[16]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

See topline.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 20.[17] Hamas fighters in Lebanon targeted an Israeli military base in northern Israel with 20 122mm Grad rockets.[18]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed one drone attack targeting an unspecified site in the Golan Heights on April 20.[19] CTP-ISW cannot verify this attack claim. Israeli officials and media have not commented on the attack at the time of this writing.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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