Quotes of the Day:

"I have ventured to commit a serious crime, offering my life for my country. This is the behavior of a noble-minded patriot."

– Ahn Jung-geun (1879-1910) was an activist who assassinated Itō Hirobumi, the Japanese official who had been appointed as Japan's first Resident-General of Korea in 1905 - when the country was held under Japanese jurisdiction but not formally annexed. Before doing so, he cut off his ring finger alongside eleven other activists, signifying a pledge to assassinate someone.

"You cannot live a perfect day without doing something for someone who will never be able to repay you."

– John Wooden

“No one man can terrorize a whole nation unless we are all his accomplices.”

– Edward R. Murrow

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2024

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 1, 2024

3. The Tip of the American Spear? How the United Kingdom Could Pursue Military Specialization

4. A U.N. Agency Is Accused of Links to Hamas. The Clues Were There All Along.

5. Shadow War With Iran Risks Turning Into a Direct Conflict

6. Opinion: Biden needs to follow Trump’s lead on Iran

7. Iraq and Iran were complicit in the Tower 22 attack

8. The deterrence problem: America took its eye off Iran with Indo-Pacific pivot, ex-CENTCOM chief says

9.  Pacific Fleet chief Paparo on China’s big lesson from Ukraine: Win quickly

10. Why NATO Needs Ukraine

11.  Trump-Proofing Europe

12.  A silent killer is stalking veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan

13. In Ukraine and the Middle East, only force can restore deterrence

14. Military hospitals still chasing bugs out of $4.3 billion digital health records system

15. Ukraine Sinks Russian Navy Missile Corvette In Drone Boat Attack

16. Inside China's execution conveyor belt

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi presented an overarching strategy to seize the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine and retain it to facilitate Ukrainian battlefield victories despite Russia’s numerical advantages in manpower and materiel. Zaluzhnyi’s strategy aims to offset Ukraine’s existing challenges and pursue advantages over the Russian military through widespread technological innovation and adaptation.
• Ukrainian forces successfully struck and sunk a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessel in the Black Sea near occupied Crimea on the night of January 31 to February 1.
• Russian milbloggers continued to voice frustrations about Russian forces’ continued tactical blunders during offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.
• The European Union (EU) unanimously approved a financial support package for Ukraine for 2024 ­­– 2027.
• EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borrell stated that the European Union (EU) will not be able to send the promised one million shells to Ukraine by March 2024, but is planning to fulfill this promise by the end of 2024.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appointed another one of his children to a senior position in the Chechen government as of January 31.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on February 1.
• Turkish banks have reportedly started closing Russian companies’ accounts due to the threat of US secondary sanctions.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted Russian plans to integrate occupied territories of Ukraine into Russia over the next six years.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 1, 2024

Feb 1, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2024

Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and George Barros

February 1, 2024, 7:40pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on February 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW added a new section on Russian air, missile, and drone campaign to track Russian efforts to target Ukrainian rear and frontline areas, grow its drone and missile arsenals, and adapt its strike packages.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi presented an overarching strategy to seize the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine and retain it to facilitate Ukrainian battlefield victories despite Russia’s numerical advantages in manpower and materiel. Zaluzhnyi’s strategy aims to offset Ukraine’s existing challenges and pursue advantages over the Russian military through widespread technological innovation and adaptation. The Ukrainian Armed Forces published an essay on February 1 by Zaluzhnyi titled “On the Modern Design of Military Operations in the Russo-Ukrainian War: In the Fight for the Initiative,” wherein Zaluzhnyi argued that the requirements for any given war are unique and that these requirements dictate a unique strategy for victory.[1] Zaluzhnyi identified “decisive conditions” for Ukraine to conduct successful operations, which include achieving absolute air superiority to enable effective Ukrainian fires, logistics, and reconnaissance; seizing the initiative by denying Russian forces the ability to conduct offensive or defensive operations; increasing Ukrainian mobility while limiting Russian mobility; securing safe access to unspecified key lines and important terrain; and denying Russian forces any opportunities to recapture lost positions and increase Russian operational efforts. The decisive conditions that Zaluzhnyi highlighted would effectively give Ukrainian forces the theater-wide initiative and set conditions for Ukraine to conduct operationally significant defensive and offensive operations. Zaluzhnyi argued that the rapid development of new technology changes the means by which Ukraine can achieve these “decisive conditions” and that Ukrainian forces cannot use conventional methods to achieve these conditions given Russia’s superior ability to mobilize men. Zaluzhnyi argued that new technological means, such as drones, unmanned systems, systems integration, and other advanced technological systems can allow Ukrainian forces to maximize their combat potential using fewer resources and inflict maximum damage on Russian forces.

Zaluzhnyi argued that Ukrainian limitations and geopolitical challenges are incentivizing Ukraine to pursue the development and institutionalization of these new means. Zaluzhnyi stated that an “unstable political situation around Ukraine” has led to reduced international military support for Ukraine, that Russia will likely try to provoke other conflicts to further draw the West’s attention away from Ukraine, and that Ukraine’s partners have depleted their missile and artillery ammunition stocks without the means to rapidly produce these weapons. Zaluzhnyi argued that ineffective sanctions allow the defense industrial bases (DIBs) of Russia and its partners to support a positional war of attrition that benefits Russia over Ukraine and that Russia has a significant advantage over Ukraine in the mobilization of human resources. Zaluzhnyi further highlighted imperfect Ukrainian regulatory frameworks to expand Ukraine’s DIB, although Ukrainian officials are increasingly prioritizing efforts to remedy this issue.[2] Zaluzhnyi notably concluded that the uncertain nature of the war in Ukraine makes it difficult for Ukraine’s allies to determine specific security assistance priorities for Ukraine.[3] Zaluzhnyi stated that the “main option for gaining an advantage is to master the entire arsenal of relatively cheap, new, and extremely effective and rapidly developing assets.” Zaluzhnyi specifically highlighted unmanned systems as an area where Ukraine can leverage new capabilities since they can provide continuous situational awareness, support round-the-clock fire and strikes in real-time, provide real-time intelligence, and produce accurate targeting information for strikes on the frontline and in rear areas.

Zaluzhnyi called on Ukraine to introduce a new “philosophy” for the preparation and conduct of military operations that would allow Ukrainian forces to cohesively employ these new methods in pursuit of a cohesive objective. Zaluzhnyi stated that new technological means will also expand the types of operations Ukraine can conduct in support of the war, which may include operations to reduce Russia’s economic potential, operations aimed at Russia’s complete isolation and exhaustion, robotic search and strike operations, robotic operations to control a crisis area, psychological operations, and defensive “contactless” operations. Zaluzhnyi also called on Ukrainian forces to systematically advance separate lines of effort to generate “necessary effects” in developing a coherent “digital field”; controlling the radio-electronic (the cyber-electromagnetic domain) situation along the frontline; combining attacks with unmanned and cyber assets; and improving logistics. Zaluzhnyi specifically suggested that retooling operations to integrate unmanned systems may allow Ukrainian forces to conserve personnel, weapons, and equipment while inflicting massive strikes on Russian military assets and infrastructure.

Zaluzhnyi called on Ukraine to overhaul its war effort to create “a completely new state system of technological reequipment" to master new assets and their operation. Zaluzhnyi advocated for Ukraine to retool state systems to support Ukrainian research, development, scientific support, production and maintenance, personnel training and the generalization of combat experience, the employment of forces, flexible financing, and logistics in order to prioritize the development and employment of rapidly developing technology. Zaluzhnyi added that Ukraine could create the system he envisions, with a sufficient volume of production, within five months. Zaluzhnyi concluded that this new system, alongside a new approach to military operations, can enable Ukraine to stop Russia’s current aggression and protect Ukraine in the future.

Ukrainian forces successfully struck and sunk a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessel in the Black Sea near occupied Crimea on the night of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published footage on February 1 showing Ukrainian maritime drones striking the Ivanovets Tarantul-class corvette (41st Missile Boat Brigade) near Lake Donuzlav in occupied Crimea.[4] The Ukrainian Navy reported that the sinking of the Ivanovets is a significant loss to the BSF since the BSF has only three ships of its project 1241.1 (Tarantul) class and noted that Ukrainian forces previously damaged a project 1239 Bora-class corvette in the 41st Missile Boat Brigade.[5] The Ukrainian Navy stated that the Ivanovets is usually staffed with 40 personnel, and the GUR stated that Russian search and rescue operations were unsuccessful.[6] ISW continues to assess that successful Ukrainian strikes on BSF vessels and infrastructure have limited the BSF’s ability to operate in the western part of the Black Sea.[7] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 12 Western-provided SCALP or Storm Shadow missiles against occupied Crimea on the night of January 31 to February 1.[8] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces downed five missiles near Belbek Air Base in occupied Sevastopol and six missiles over Yana Kapu, Hvardiske, and northwest of Sevastopol and that one missile struck the ground near Belbek Air Base but did not damage it.[9] Neither Ukrainian nor Russian officials confirmed these claims. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that the January 31 Ukrainian strikes on Belbek Air Base damaged “several objects” but noted that Ukrainian authorities need more satellite imagery to confirm what objects Ukrainian forces struck.[10]

Russian milbloggers continued to voice frustrations about Russian forces’ continued tactical blunders during offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. Several Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command on January 31 and February 1 for failing to account for the “[drone] factor” when planning tactical assaults in response to footage posted on January 30 showing Ukrainian forces striking a column of advancing Russian vehicles and tanks near Novomykhailivka.[11] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted that Ukrainian minefields are canalizing Russian routes but argued that the Russian military command still needs to stop attacking in mechanized columns due to consistently taking high equipment losses.[12] The milblogger also criticized the Russian command for failing to account for Ukrainian drone operations and to equip Russian armored vehicles with electronic warfare (EW) systems to counter Ukrainian drones.[13] Another Russian milblogger questioned how Russian commanders can fail to account for Ukrainian drones in attack plans and afford to lose so much equipment and manpower, accusing the Russian commanders of “complete stupidity and incompetence.”[14] Other Russian milbloggers seized on the discourse to advocate for continued domestic support for drone and EW production in Russia and to argue that Russian sources should not have to censor themselves if they have constructive criticism for Russian commanders.[15] The Russian military command has actively censored some Russian milbloggers in recent months for criticizing the military likely to encourage and enforce self-censorship among other Russian milbloggers.[16]

Russian milbloggers have previously argued that Russian forces need to improve their planning and coordination at the tactical and operational levels to break out of the current positional warfare in Ukraine.[17] Russian forces in Ukraine have proven capable of successfully learning lessons and adapting while conducting defensive operations and have shown limited offensive adaptation on certain sectors of the front.[18] Russian forces conducted a series of unsuccessful mechanized assaults near Avdiivka in October 2023 after analogous costly mechanized assaults along several different axes over the course of 2022 and 2023, and the recent footage of similar unsuccessful mechanized assaults near Novomykhailivka from January 30, 2024 suggests that Russian forces’ success in adapting their tactical planning and execution of assaults varies by unit-to-unit or commander-to-commander, however.[19]

The European Union (EU) unanimously approved a financial support package for Ukraine for 2024 – 2027. European Council President Charles Michel announced on February 1 that all 27 EU member states approved a support package for Ukraine worth 50 billion euros (about $54 billion), including 33 billion euros (about $35.8 billion) of loans and 17 billion euros (about $18.4 billion) in “non-repayable support” that could potentially come from frozen Russian assets.[20] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that continued EU financial support will strengthen Ukraine’s long-term economic stability.[21]

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borrell stated that the European Union (EU) will not be able to send the promised one million shells to Ukraine by March 2024, but is planning to fulfill this promise by the end of 2024. Borrell stated on February 1 that the EU delivered 330,000 rounds of artillery ammunition to Ukraine between March 2023 and January 2024 and that he expects the EU to deliver a total of 524,000 rounds by March 2024.[22] Borrell stated that the EU plans to deliver an additional 630,000 shells to Ukraine by the end of 2024. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that the European defense industrial base (DIB) has increased its production by 40 percent over an unspecified time frame and that the EU member states are working to deliver munitions to Ukraine by drawing from national stockpiles, concluding new orders, or redirecting other orders.[23] Von der Leyen stated that the European Commission will soon present a new defense and industrial strategy that will create greater coherence and coordination throughout the EU from planning to procurement. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated in an interview with CNN that ammunition is “one of the most decisive factors” in the war and that the quantity of rounds is more important than quality.[24]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appointed another one of his children to a senior position in the Chechen government as of January 31. Kadyrov appointed his 24-year-old daughter Khadizhat Kadyrova as First Deputy Head of the Chechen Republic Head’s Administration from her prior post leading the Grozny City Department of Preschool Education.[25] Kadyrov previously appointed his now-26-year-old daughter Aishat Kadyrova and 17-year-old-son Adam Kadyrov to similarly senior positions.[26]

In accordance with its policy against speculating about future Ukrainian actions, ISW is not covering reported leaks concerning possible changes in the Ukrainian command structure. ISW will continue to report official statements by Ukrainian government officials and organizations as they are made.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi presented an overarching strategy to seize the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine and retain it to facilitate Ukrainian battlefield victories despite Russia’s numerical advantages in manpower and materiel. Zaluzhnyi’s strategy aims to offset Ukraine’s existing challenges and pursue advantages over the Russian military through widespread technological innovation and adaptation.
• Ukrainian forces successfully struck and sunk a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessel in the Black Sea near occupied Crimea on the night of January 31 to February 1.
• Russian milbloggers continued to voice frustrations about Russian forces’ continued tactical blunders during offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.
• The European Union (EU) unanimously approved a financial support package for Ukraine for 2024 ­­– 2027.
• EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borrell stated that the European Union (EU) will not be able to send the promised one million shells to Ukraine by March 2024, but is planning to fulfill this promise by the end of 2024.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appointed another one of his children to a senior position in the Chechen government as of January 31.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on February 1.
• Turkish banks have reportedly started closing Russian companies’ accounts due to the threat of US secondary sanctions.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted Russian plans to integrate occupied territories of Ukraine into Russia over the next six years.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk amid continued positional engagements in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on February 1 indicates that Russian forces advanced to a section of the P07 Kupyansk-Svatove highway east of Tabaivka (southeast of Synkivka).[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and west of Tabaivka and that Russian forces entered Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and are advancing towards Kyslivka.[28] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman and southeast of Kupyansk near Ivanivka, Berestove, Krokhmalne, and Tabaivka.[29]

Positional engagements continued near Kreminna on February 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional fighting continued west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, Yampolivka, and Dibrova and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Terny and Yampolivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[31] Elements of the Russian 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly formed during partial mobilization in fall 2022) are reportedly operating near Kreminna, and elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Aida” detachment reportedly continue to operate near Bilohorivka.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional fighting continued near Bakhmut on February 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced west of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka and from Khromove towards Ivanivske, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[33] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued west of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka and Ivanivske and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[34] Elements of the Russian “Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Bohdanivka-Chasiv Yar area, and elements of the “Brodyaga” Spetsnaz group are reportedly operating near Klishchiivka.[35]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on February 1. Geolocated imagery published on February 1 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the dacha area on the northern outskirts of Avdiivka.[36] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along Sportyvna, Soborna, and Chernyshevskoho streets in southernmost Avdiivka and on Avdiivka’s southern outskirts, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[37] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Stepove; near the Avdiivka Coke Plant on Avdiivka‘s northwestern outskirts; near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant area in the southeastern outskirts of Avdiivka; west of Avdiivka near Sieverne; and southwest of Avdiivka near Opytne, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[38] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Avdiivka direction stated that Russian forces are not changing their tactics in the Avdiivka direction and continue constant infantry assaults in the area.[39] Elements of the Russian 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) are reportedly operating near Avdiivka.[40]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements west and southwest of Donetsk City on February 1. Geolocated footage published on February 1 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Heorhiivka and Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[42] Positional fighting continues west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on February 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[44] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting occurred southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Zolota Nyva; south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryyutne.[45] A Russian milblogger noted that Russian infantry groups are attacking with armored vehicle and tank support north of Pryyutne.[46] Elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Staromayorske.[47]

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces captured a forest area northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[48] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting occurred near Verbove, Robotyne, and Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne).[49]

Positional fighting continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on February 1.[50] A Russian milblogger continued to stress that Ukrainian drone operations pose a significant threat to Russian forces on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[51]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of strikes against targets in Ukraine on February 1. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched four Shahed-136/131 drones and two missiles at targets in Ukraine.[52] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian air defenses intercepted two of the Shaheds in Kharkiv Oblast and that a Kh-59 missile struck Myrnohrad, Donetsk Oblast.[53] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces routinely change the number of Shahed drones that they use in strikes to test Ukrainian air defense capabilities.[54]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Turkish banks reportedly have started closing Russian companies’ accounts due to the threat of US secondary sanctions. Unnamed Russian business owners, financial consultants, and business representatives told Russian outlet Vedemosti in a February 1 article that some Turkish banks are closing multiple accounts of Russian companies and have stopped working with Russian companies that became clients after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[55] Vedemosti’s sources stated that the Turkish banks began closing Russian businesses’ accounts and tightening restrictions after the US authorized secondary sanctions on financial institutions that support Russia’s war effort on December 22, 2023.[56] ISW recently observed Russian reports that Turkish banks have ”universally” begun to refuse to work with Russian banks.[57] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that “overt and aggressive US pressure” caused Turkish banks to close Russian companies’ accounts.[58]

The Washington Post reported that a Russian company has imported over $20 million in precision machine tool equipment made in Taiwan since January 2023.[59] The Washington Post stated that the Russian company imported Taiwanese-made computer numerical control (CNC) machine tools in 63 separate shipments since January 2023 according to trade records and Russian tax documents.[60] Russia uses CNC tools in defense manufacturing, and the Washington Post reported that the Russian company explicitly aimed to sell the machine tools to Russian defense enterprises.[61] ISW cannot independently confirm the Washington Post’s report.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 1 that “intelligence confirms that Russia will receive a million shells from North Korea” by an unspecified date.[62] It is unclear whether Zelensky’s count of one million shells was referring to entirely new ammunition deliveries from Russia or included previous North Korean ammunition deliveries from Russia. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that North Korea delivered one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Russia from September to November 2023.[63]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov-linked firm Tallamkho Design Bureau designed a new automatic optical guidance system for robotic combat platforms. Tallamkho told Kremlin newswire TASS that the new guidance system can automatically identify targets, including by detecting the glare from enemy thermal imagers, aim at targets, and open fire.[64] Tallamkho stated that it will work with unspecified Russian turret developers to design the robotic combat platform.[65]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine continues efforts to streamline and strengthen its domestic defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on February 1 that the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers approved three resolutions to strengthen Ukraine’s DIB.[66] The first resolution deregulates ammunition production to allow new enterprises to begin production quickly; the second resolution caps drone profit margins to 25 percent to prevent drones from becoming too expensive; and the third resolution establishes a procedure for the competitive procurement of defense items with transparent pricing and protections against information leaks.

Ukraine continues efforts to galvanize its domestic drone production. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov met with more than 120 companies involved with the Brave1 defense platform, and Umerov stated that Ukraine codified 67 new drone models and signed state contracts for 58 new drone models and that over 200 Ukrainian companies are currently working to increase domestic drone production.[67]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted Russian plans to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories into Russia over the next six years. Putin stated that Russia plans for occupied areas of Ukraine to be on par with Russia in unspecified “key areas” by 2030, further indicating that Russia is commencing long-term plans and does not foresee any territorial concessions.[68] Putin urged Russian banks to not fear Western sanctions and to increase their work in occupied areas and noted that Russian federal subjects have established patronage networks with occupied Ukrainian regions.

Russian officials continued to implicate themselves in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated that Ukraine has been able to return 388 Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities illegally deported to Russia.[69] Lubinets stated that Russia has been more willing to return deported Ukrainian children following the International Criminal Court’s warrants for the arrest of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova. Lvova-Belova continued to admit that Russia deported Ukrainian children to Russia, stating that Russian authorities took Ukrainian children from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to “rehabilitation centers” near Moscow or placed them in foster families in Russia.[70] The Russian Embassy in the United States claimed that US statements about how Russia is forcibly deporting Ukrainian children are “blasphemous and groundless” and falsely compared Russia’s actions to American families adopting Ukrainian children legally through international adoption programs.[71]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials attempted to undermine and intimidate the European Union (EU) likely in an effort to prevent the EU from providing further military assistance to Ukraine and set informational conditions to later oppose EU expansion. Russian Acting Permanent Representative to the EU Kirill Logvinov published an essay with state newswire TASS on February 1 in which Logvinov accused the EU of eroding member states’ sovereignty and expanding its security role in a way that is tantamount to it merging with NATO.[72] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused the EU of “demonizing” Russia in order to justify raising taxes.[73]

The Kremlin continues efforts to informationally punish Armenia for distancing itself from Russia. Russian Ambassador-at-Large for Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Affairs Viktor Vasilyev claimed on February 1 that the West is attempting to interfere in CSTO affairs and that Armenia’s participation is necessary to ensure security throughout CSTO member states.[74]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Moldova’s decision not to open polling stations for the Russian presidential election in separatist Transnistria disenfranchises Russian citizens and separatist Transnistria.[75] The milblogger and other Kremlin mouthpieces have recently attempted to spread information operations about Moldova in order to internally destabilize the state and set information conditions to justify future operations against Moldova.[76]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov announced on February 1 that Russia and Belarus agreed to create a Russian-Belarusian Commission on History and that Russia and Belarus will use a unified history textbook for schools and universities which will “eliminate discrepancies in the understanding of a number of important historical events.”[77]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 1, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-1-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: A spokesperson for the Israeli prime minister’s office said that the IDF “shifted into a new phase of the fighting” and will “target pockets of resistance” in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Political Negotiations: Two Israeli sources told Axios that Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar and Egyptian Intelligence Minister Abbas Kamel discussed future Israeli operations in the southern Gaza Strip during a meeting in Cairo.
• West Bank: US President Joe Biden signed an executive order that enables the United States to place financial and visa sanctions on foreign nationals involved in attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said on February 1 that northern Israelis will only return when it is safe for them to do so during a meeting with the IDF Northern Command and 91st Division commanders.
• Iraq: US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby emphasized the role that all of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—plays in attacks on US forces in Iraq.
• Syria: Reuters reported on February 1 that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) withdrew several of its senior and mid-ranking officers from Syria ahead of possible US strikes, according to unspecified regional sources “familiar with the matter."
• 
  

IRAN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 1, 2024

Feb 1, 2024 - ISW Press

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Iran Update, February 1, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: A spokesperson for the Israeli prime minister’s office said that the IDF “shifted into a new phase of the fighting” and will “target pockets of resistance” in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Political Negotiations: Two Israeli sources told Axios that Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar and Egyptian Intelligence Minister Abbas Kamel discussed future Israeli operations in the southern Gaza Strip during a meeting in Cairo.
• West Bank: US President Joe Biden signed an executive order that enables the United States to place financial and visa sanctions on foreign nationals involved in attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said on February 1 that northern Israelis will only return when it is safe for them to do so during a meeting with the IDF Northern Command and 91st Division commanders.
• Iraq: US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby emphasized the role that all of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—plays in attacks on US forces in Iraq.
• Syria: Reuters reported on February 1 that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) withdrew several of its senior and mid-ranking officers from Syria ahead of possible US strikes, according to unspecified regional sources “familiar with the matter."

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in the northern Gaza Strip. The commander of the IDF Southern Command met with division commanders and IDF personnel in the northern Gaza Strip on February 1.[1] He said that the IDF can operate and attack Palestinian fighters in "the heart of” Gaza City despite the IDF’s withdrawal. A spokesperson for the Israeli prime minister’s office said that the IDF “shifted into a new phase of the fighting” and will “target pockets of resistance” in the northern Gaza Strip.[2] The IDF 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) raided unspecified Hamas-affiliated military buildings and killed fighters in the northern Gaza Strip on February 1.[3]

Palestinian militias, including Hamas, attempted to disrupt Israeli raids in Gaza City on February 1. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters claimed that they fired a thermobaric rocket targeting Israeli infantry inside a building in western Gaza City.[4] Hamas published footage that showed its fighters firing small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces in Tal al Hawa in southwestern Gaza City and Sheikh Radwan in northwestern Gaza City.[5] Hamas claimed two attacks targeting Israeli forces in Sheikh Radwan on February 1.[6] CTP-ISW previously reported on January 16 that Palestinian militias had renewed attacks in Sheikh Radwan during January.[7]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on February 1.[8] Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting a Palestinian militia cell in an unspecified location in the central Strip. Hamas fighters fired RPGs at Israeli armor in Bureij and Maghazi.[9] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the current war, also clashed with Israeli forces east of Bureij.[10]

The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 1. The IDF 35th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the IDF 98th Division) killed fighters in western Khan Younis City in “close-range incidents.”[11] The 98th Division destroyed a long-range rocket launcher in western Khan Younis.[12]

Palestinian militias continued to attempt to defend against Israeli operations in the southern Gaza Strip. Hamas’ military wing fired a thermobaric rocket and a tandem rocket targeting Israeli forces in western Khan Younis City.[13] The military wing of PIJ engaged Israeli forces in small arms clashes southwest and west of Khan Younis.[14] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades clashed with and mortared Israeli forces in separate engagements in Khan Younis.[15]

Israel told Egypt that it would not operate in Rafah until it allowed civilians to evacuate the area. Two Israeli sources told Axios that Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar and Egyptian Intelligence Minister Abbas Kamel discussed future Israeli operations in the southern Gaza Strip during a meeting in Cairo.[16] Egypt has expressed concern that an operation could create a flow of Palestinian refugees into the Sinai Peninsula.[17] Unspecified sources familiar with the details of the negotiations told an Israeli Army Radio correspondent on February 1 that Egypt and Israel are “on the way to finding solutions [to the issues over Rafah and Philadelphi].” The correspondent added that Israel has not decided where it will evacuate the civilian population.[18] The correspondent reported that in the Israeli-Egyptian agreement over the Philadelphi Corridor, Israel will have “some influence” along the border but there will not be a permanent Israeli force presence.[19] The Philadelphi Corridor is a 14-kilometer-long strip of land between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. An unspecified Arab Gulf country will finance the construction of an underground wall to prevent smuggling via tunnels if Egypt agrees to the plan.[20]

The IDF’s Home Front Command eased restrictions on civilian activities in southern Israel on February 1.[21] IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari said that Israel will allow educational activities in schools near “protected” areas in the Gaza Envelope. The Gaza Envelope describes populated areas in southern Israel that are within seven kilometers of the Israel-Gaza border. Hagari also said that the IDF is allowing gatherings of 100 people in open-air settings and 300 in indoor settings in the envelope. Hagari said that gathering size limits are lower in some areas, including Kissufim and Nahal Oz. Palestinian militias have repeatedly targeted some of these areas, including Kissufim and Nahal Oz, with rocket and mortar fire in January.[22]

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks into southern Israel on February 1. The military wing of PIJ fired mortars targeting Israeli forces in Kissufim.[23] The Mujahideen Brigades fired rockets at an Israeli military base and ”airstrip“ in Reim.[24] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas and has expressed close ties with Iran.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters and Israeli forces clashed in four locations across the West Bank on February 1.[25] The Tubas Battalion of Hamas and the Tubas Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted multiple attacks on Israeli forces during an Israeli raid in Tubas.[26]

US President Joe Biden signed an executive order that enables the United States to place financial and visa sanctions on foreign nationals involved in attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank.[27] The US State Department sanctioned four Israeli West Bank settlers after the executive order went into effect.[28] The order also allows the United States to sanction individuals who direct, order, or fail to enforce policies that lead to acts of violence against Palestinian civilians.[29] Axios reported that the Biden “administration had considered including ultranationalist Ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich on the list of sanctioned individuals, but it ultimately decided to leave them off for now and focus on those who perpetrated attacks.”[30]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six cross-border attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 1.[31]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said on February 1 that northern Israelis will only return when it is safe for them to do so during a meeting with the IDF Northern Command and 91st Division commanders.[32] Israeli media reported separately that local residents will not return until mid-2024.[33]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting the port of Haifa, Israel on February 1.[34] CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that this attack took place. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq later deleted the claim on its Telegram channel after posting the claim.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh discussed security and counterterrorism cooperation with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev in Baghdad on February 1.[35] Fayyadh and Kutrashev discussed “exchanging experiences” between the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and Russia. The PMF is an Iraqi security service that contains several Iranian-backed Shia militias. Kutrashev told Russian media on January 25 that Russia seeks to expand its “presence” in Iraq and “invest additional resources in areas related to security.”[36] Kutrashev met with Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid and Iraqi Shia cleric and politician Ammar al Hakim on January 23 and 31, respectively.[37]

Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein discussed the “repercussions” of the January 28 attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan in a phone call with his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan on February 1.[38] Western media previously reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah conducted the one-way drone attack targeting US forces in Jordan.[39] The Iraqi federal government condemned the attack and called for an end to “the cycle of violence” on January 29.[40] Hussein and Farhan emphasized the need for continued cooperation and communication between Baghdad and Riyadh to prevent an “all-out war” in the Middle East and to safeguard the security of Iraq and Saudi Arabia.[41]

US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby emphasized the role that all of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—plays in attacks on US forces in Iraq. Kirby said that the United States does not take Kataib Hezbollah’s announcement that it will suspend its attacks targeting US forces “at face value,” and added that Kataib Hezbollah is not the only Iranian-backed militia attacking US forces.[42] Kataib Hezbollah suspended attacks on US forces on January 30 following the January 28 attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan.[43] Western media previously reported that Kataib Hezbollah launched the January 28 one-way drone attack from southwestern Iraq.[44] Kataib Hezbollah’s announcement also followed Iraqi media reports that IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on January 29 to “stop [the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias'] military escalation” against US forces.[45]

Kirby’s statement is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran and Kataib Hezbollah are conducting an information operation to distance Iran from the January 28 attack.[46] Iranian officials denied Iran's involvement in the attack and Kataib Hezbollah claimed in its January 30 announcement that Iran opposes “pressure and escalation” against US forces in Iraq and Syria.[47]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) said that it conducted strikes targeting a Houthi drone ground control station and 10 one-way attack drones on January 31.[48] A senior US defense official in Bahrain told a CBS reporter that F-18 aircraft struck the targets in western Yemen as the Houthis prepared to launch the drones.[49] Local Yemeni sources reported the strikes hit Hudaydah city.[50]

CENTCOM said that it intercepted two Houthi attacks on international shipping on February 1.[51] US forces shot down one drone over the Gulf of Aden. US forces also destroyed a Houthi one-way attack naval surface drone maneuvering towards international shipping lanes in the Red Sea. CENTCOM said that the naval surface drone “presented an imminent threat to merchant vessels and the US Navy ships in the area.”[52] The Houthis first used a naval surface drone during the Israel-Hamas war to attack international shipping lanes on January 4.[53]

The Houthi movement claimed that it fired anti-ship ballistic missiles at the Liberian flagged, Bermuda-owned KOI cargo ship in the Red Sea on January 31.[54] CENTCOM said that it monitored two anti-ship ballistic missiles fired toward the KOI in the Red Sea on February 1.[55] CTP-ISW cannot confirm whether the Houthis conducted more than one attack on the KOI. The Houthis claimed that the KOI was bound for an Israeli port.[56] Marine Traffic, a maritime analytics provider, reported that the KOI is bound for Djibouti in eastern Africa, not Israel.[57]

The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the group targeted an unspecified British commercial vessel with anti-ship missiles in the Red Sea on February 1.[58] The spokesperson did not name the vessel or clarify when the attack occurred. He said that the attack was in retaliation for US-UK strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. He also claimed that the vessel was headed to an Israeli port.

Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the West Bank, the Israel-Hamas war, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, and other unspecified regional developments with the Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal bin Farhan by phone on January 31.[59] The Saudi Foreign Affairs Ministry said that the two officials discussed the latest developments in the Gaza Strip, focusing on security and humanitarian concerns. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry reported that the two ministers discussed ending the war and the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. It added that they discussed restoring peace in the region. Abdollahian invited Farhan to visit Iran in the future, according to the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry.

CBS News reported on February 1 that the United States will conduct multiple strikes targeting Iranian personnel and facilities in Iraq and Syria over the coming days, according to unspecified US officials.[60] CBS News reported that the strikes will be in retaliation for the January 28 Iran-backed militia drone attack targeting US forces in Jordan, which killed three US servicemembers and injured at least 30 others.[61]

Reuters reported on February 1 that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) withdrew several of its senior and mid-ranking officers from Syria ahead of possible US strikes, according to unspecified regional sources “familiar with the matter.”[62] Local Syrian media also claimed on January 31 that the IRGC withdrew a senior officer from Syria.[63] Reuters caveated that the Iranian commanders would continue to remotely oversee Iranian efforts inside Syria with support from Lebanese Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq. This caveat illustrates that Iran remains committed to its long-term project in Syria, even if it has temporarily recalled some of its officers to prevent further losses.[64] Israel already conducted a series of strikes in December 2023 and January 2024 that killed multiple senior IRGC officers in Syria.[65]

The Iranian interior minister discussed the Israel-Hamas war with the Saudi ambassador to Iran in a meeting in Tehran on January 30.[66] The Iranian minister called the situation in the Gaza Strip “the most important issue of the Islamic world,” before also highlighting the importance of distributing humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. The Saudi ambassador said that the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia are on the “natural and correct path,“ according to the Iranian readout. The Iranian interior minister previously served as Iranian defense minister and Quds Force commander. The Saudi Foreign Ministry did not publish a readout.

3.  The Tip of the American Spear? How the United Kingdom Could Pursue Military Specialization

Excerpts:

These ideas are already in the policy ether: specialization, interdependence, reliance on multinational coalitions. The concept I have sought to outline is simply to carry this further, to embrace its underlying logic and pursue it to make significant changes to the way the United Kingdom plans defense policy. The refresh of the Integrated Review is the fourth major reassessment of British defense I have watched at close quarters, and they have all been marked by depressingly similar corrosive compromises. Always driven by financial constraints, they have nevertheless always been portrayed by the government as clear-headed assessments of strategic priorities. This has led to a situation where, in effect, the Ministry of Defense tries to negotiate as much of the budget as it can, for as many of the capabilities it thinks it requires.

This will always undermine robust planning and strategic coherence. If the armed forces manage to win 70 percent of what they initially request, but still develop policy and doctrine based on the 100 percent, it will lead to compromise and disappointment. It is better surely to reduce the whole by a third, but secure all the necessary resources.

There will be a general election in the United Kingdom in 2024 and probably a change of administration. An incoming Labor government has pledged to undertake a defense review within months of taking office. I have laid out one strategic direction that the new government could choose to adopt. It does not solve all of the challenges facing the United Kingdom, nor is it how I would approach defense policy in an ideal world. But while conceptually radical, it is both rational and realistic. It is based on an honest assessment of the world as it is, and it attempts to imagine a global role that would maintain British influence based on the country’s international standing and economic prosperity. It would be a painful journey, but more than 20 years observing defense policy has shown me an unsustainable fiction that needs to end.

The Tip of the American Spear? How the United Kingdom Could Pursue Military Specialization - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Eliot Wilson · February 2, 2024

For all but the biggest countries, this century is going to be one of hard choices. Britain’s armed forces face fundamental questions, but the most crucial is: Can the United Kingdom continue to possess “full-spectrum” military capability? Can it undertake every kind of military operation, on land, in the air, and at sea, and do so if necessary independent of any other nation? Unfortunately, the answer is no.

It should be to the United Kingdom’s embarrassment that allies can see this. The U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Carlos Del Toro, recently told an audience at the Royal United Services Institute in London that Britain needed to “reassess” (by which he meant “increase”) its defense spending given the current global threats. This, he went on, would mean making a “decision around whether the army needs to be strengthened,” adding that “investments in their navy are significantly important.” Del Toro was staying within the bounds of politeness, but his message was thunderous.

As an official in Parliament, and then as an adviser and commentator, I have seen defense review after defense review based on the most optimistic of assumptions and best-case scenarios. The Ministry of Defense has shuffled budgets, extended the lifespan of equipment, and waved away capability gaps to be seen to keep the show on the road, and the effect on both what the armed forces can do and the policy framework has been viciously corrosive.

Become a Member

Now is the time for a different approach. Britain should begin by looking at the elements of its armed forces that work well, have credibility with allies, and are sustainable and affordable, specifically in light of the challenges the country will face. The British Army is too small but paradoxically too heavy, still holding on to the footprint of a force designed to fight on the plains of Germany. It should shed its heaviest and least useful armor and become a lighter, more flexible force tailored to work alongside its allies.

With this in mind, it is time to build a force for the missions Britain will actually undertake, rather than adapting one tailored to a theoretical conflict. The country’s main battle tanks are aging, far too heavy, and designed for 20th-century missions. The new tracked armored personnel carriers are years behind schedule and wracked by technical gremlins. A smaller armored force based on wheeled vehicles should be paired with more forces on the model of the new Ranger Regiment, created to operate on the margins of full-scale conflict and in training and capacity-building.

Adopting these and other similar changes will bring significant long-term benefits. But the necessary transformation cannot be achieved unless the U.K. leadership — civilian and military — is rigorously honest with itself about what it can do, what it can afford, and where it is failing.

Full Spectrum in Name Only

The United Kingdom has never given up a significant military capability. It was the world’s third nuclear power, after the United States and Russia, but since 1952 it has been theoretically full spectrum. It has possessed every kind of military capability its allies and adversaries have exercised, despite its diminishing status on the world stage: heavy armor, strategic bombers, aircraft carriers, submarines, and, since 1969, continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence.

Some of these capabilities have now worn almost impossibly thin. U.K. defense policy assumes that the Army can put a division-sized warfighting unit into the field, maintaining it “at continual operational readiness.” Experts have cast significant doubt on this. The House of Commons Defense Committee heard from leading analysts in June 2023 that 3rd (U.K.) Division at best comprises two understrength brigades rather than the official three, and that only one brigade, 7th Light Mechanized Brigade, is currently deployed. Raising this to division strength in the event of a conflict would take weeks.

There are also gaps in Britain’s maritime strength. Asked, “Could the Royal Navy fight tonight?” Nick Childs of the International Institute for Strategic Studies said that while the Navy “could deliver some key capabilities at pretty short notice,” other critical components were simply not in place. The Royal Navy’s carrier capability was “potentially uncertain,” and while HMS Queen Elizabeth was at high readiness, “there are questions over aircraft that you could put there.”

These deficiencies are going to get worse. A recent report by the U.K. public audit body, the National Audit Office, concluded that the Ministry of Defense’s 10-year equipment plan for 2023–33 was “unaffordable, with forecast costs exceeding its current budget by £16.9 billion.” Even the Ministry of Defense itself predicts that the shortfall, the gap between aspiration and reality, could be between £7.6 billion and £29.8 billion. These are fantasy numbers.

The British Army currently stands at around 77,500 personnel, and it is proposed that it will shrink to 72,500 by 2025. In March 2023, Armed Forces Minister James Heappey, M.P., told the House of Commons that the plan represented a “clear judgment” and that, despite the conflict in Ukraine, there was no intention to change those numbers.

This is the smallest the Army has been since 1799, which some believe verges on unsupportable. General Sir Nick Carter, chief of the Defense Staff from 2018 to 2021, said last year that “the Army probably has to be in the order of 80,000,” while Professor Michael Clarke, former director of the Royal United Services Institute, refers to a “threshold of strategic significance,” a size below which British forces are “too small to make a significant difference.” I argue 72,500 is right on that threshold, and may even be under it: Witness the fact that the Army cannot currently generate a full warfighting division.

The Case for Specialization

If the United Kingdom cannot do everything and is either unable or unwilling to spend significantly more resources on defense, something has to give. The sustainable and intellectually coherent approach would be to accept that some capabilities are unaffordable and will have to be surrendered.

The idea of countries specializing in military terms is not revolutionary. At the Munich Security Conference in 2011, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen unveiled the concept of “Smart Defense.” In light of the global financial crisis of 2007–8, he noted that defense spending by NATO’s European member-states had fallen by $45 billion and that, while in 2001 the United States had provided less than half of the total NATO budget, that proportion had risen to nearly three-quarters and was still growing. This could not continue.

Rasmussen proposed that the alliance could “ensure greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility.” A major part of this was to reframe the way NATO looked at capabilities. Instead of a range of roles, equipment, and missions in 28 individual member-states, governments should consider capabilities as comprising a coherent whole across all member-states. Nations could then specialize, delivering a smaller range of functions at an alliance level.

Consider the Czech Republic, which has been developing a specialization in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats since 2003. The Smart Defense concept was adopted at the NATO summit in Chicago in 2012, and there is now a Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Center of Excellence at Vyskow: 70 personnel from 14 nations working on planning, training, and equipping the alliance to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It has allowed NATO to develop a coordinated policy on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats based on specialized forces and equipment.

The flipside of this is “negative specialization,” giving up capabilities that are too expensive and that will be supplied by allies in the event of a major commitment. In 2004, Denmark retired its submarine fleet as part of its Defense Agreement 2005–2009 and focused resources on the capabilities it most required. The Netherlands retired its Lockheed P-3 Orions in 2005 and focused on naval sensors and communications in which it could specialize through domestic supplier Thales Nederland and its own research facility

Strategic constraints follow this kind of specialization. Military operations become reliant on allies for the full range of functions, which inhibits the ability to take action unilaterally. For the United Kingdom, this would be a major psychological hurdle. No British government has ever permanently given up a discrete capability. Even when the Royal Navy’s CVA-01 aircraft carrier program was cancelled in the 1966 Defense Review and the last carrier was decommissioned in 1979, naval aviation was maintained by the building of the Invincible class of “through-deck cruisers” beginning in 1973.

Where to Specialize

If Britain took the radical step of specialization, what might a restructured armed forces look like? The current “temporary” gaps invite examination. In March 2021, the Army cancelled the upgrade for its Warrior infantry fighting vehicles, anticipating that they would be replaced in the mid-2020s by the Boxer armored fighting vehicle; but Boxer is wheeled rather than tracked, is not a like-for-like replacement, and is still in trials. The tracked Ajax program will include the Ares armored fighting vehicle, but the whole project has been plagued by problems and is badly behind schedule.

While the Army’s fleet of “battle taxis” is being significantly downgraded, there are doubts about the long-term future of its main battle tanks. Challenger 2 entered service with the Royal Armored Corps in 1998. It acquitted itself well during the 2003 invasion of Iraq but was pitted against much older ex-Soviet hardware. Fourteen Challenger 2s were delivered to the Ukrainian Army in March 2023 and have been in combat against Russian units, and the accuracy of the tank’s main gun has won praise from Ukrainian personnel. However, there are only slightly more than 200 Challenger 2s in service.

The Challenger 2 is due to receive a major upgrade as Challenger 3, but this will not be fully operational until 2030. Although Defense Secretary Ben Wallace told the House of Commons in January 2023 that he would “consider whether the lessons of Ukraine suggest that we need a larger tank fleet,” only 148 tanks are currently due to be upgraded. At a meeting of the House of Commons defense committee in November 2023, members of Parliament questioned the full strength of the fleet, suggesting “you have very few Challengers that you can actually use.”

Having worked for the committee, I am acutely aware of the Ministry of Defense’s persistent optimism bias and ability to deny reality when it comes to procurement. With so many questions over the Army’s suite of armored vehicles, the Ministry of Defense could instead choose to rethink its requirements.

In March 2020, the U.S. Marine Corps published Force Design 2030, which set out a radically reconfigured shape for the Corps focused on its central tasks. Its guiding principle was “purpose-build[ing] forces capable of assurance and deterrence — forces that are ‘combat credible’ in accordance with the National Defense Strategy.” A major element of the new plan was retiring all 450 M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks as “operationally unsuitable for our highest-priority challenges in the future.” Armored mobility continues to be provided by the wheeled LAV-25, in service since 1983, which will be partially replaced by the Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle program.

This decision was dictated by the Marine Corps’ transition from being, in effect, the U.S. Navy’s own army to a more narrowly focused and lighter strike force that will operate in littoral areas and seek to “compete and win” in what it calls “the gray zone.” This is defined by the United States Special Operations Command as “competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality.”

The U.S. Marine Corps can design itself to complement the U.S. Army, while the British Army cannot. Let us suppose that the army decided to phase out its Challenger 2s and Warriors and to cancel the Ares variant of Ajax. The United Kingdom would be surrendering the ability to match a peer competitor in terms of tank versus tank.

Realistically, which nation operating a significant main battle tank fleet is Britain likely to face alone in a conventional land war? The countries with the largest armored forces are either allies — the United States, India, South Korea — or rivals the United Kingdom would only ever fight as part of a multinational coalition — Russia, North Korea, China. Looking at the past 40 years, Britain’s two major unilateral military deployments have been the Falklands War and the intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, neither of which was appropriate for heavy armor. Retaining a tank force would be keeping the ability to contribute perhaps 150 to 200 main battle tanks to a force led by the United States, which operates more than 2,500. Bluntly, Britain can offer more in other areas.

Pointing at niche capabilities is the recent creation of the four-battalion Ranger Regiment, a special operations–capable unit that was established in 2021. This force of around 1,000 personnel is designed to “operate in complex, high threat environments below the threshold of war alongside specialized Partner Forces to deliver operational insights and effects.” Comparisons have been made with the U.S. Green Berets, though they are only partially valid: The Rangers will carry out training and mentoring and unconventional warfare, but not the whole range of functions that the Green Berets encompass.

Former Chief of the General Staff General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith described the Ranger Regiment as the “vanguard of the Army’s global footprint,” and in its first year, it deployed personnel to over 60 countries. The 1st Battalion has served in West Africa training the Ghanaian Armed Forces, while the 3rd Battalion has been training in the Arctic with units from soon-to-be-NATO-member Sweden.

We need to see the Rangers as part of a whole alongside U.K. Special Forces proper. Since the beginning of the “War on Terror” in 2001, U.K. Special Forces have developed an enviable reputation for counter-terrorism including strikes against high-value targets. Dr. Simon Anglim of King’s College London has emphasized that the Ministry of Defense regards its special forces as “one of those national military assets allowing the U.K. to ‘punch above its weight’ globally into the 21st century.” The army also learned some tough lessons in counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, with initial overconfidence giving way to hard-won experience and expertise.

Drawing down the armored fleet and strengthening the Ranger Regiment and other similar units point toward a future much more focused on the “grey zone.” They would meanwhile preserve the ability to contribute to multilateral peacekeeping and stabilization forces, as Britain currently does principally in Cyprus and Somalia. There is an attractive logic in stepping away from areas in which Britain is already struggling and placing greater emphasis on already strong and improving functions.

This radical reordering of defense priorities would only make sense if it was supported by the United Kingdom’s allies and, particularly, by the United States. I chose the title “The tip of the American spear” for this essay because a realistic assessment of British foreign policy suggests that military operations are very likely to be carried out in partnership with the United States. There are concerns in the U.S. military that the British Army is a “barely tier two” fighting force, and that Britain is “decidedly not what it used to be.” The precise shape of a restructured armed forces would have to be negotiated with the United States and compatible with the kind of strengths Washington would look for in a first-preference junior partner.

Conclusion

There will be undoubtedly be those objecting that it is disastrous and humiliating for the United Kingdom to abandon its — theoretical — position at the front of second-tier powers. But Britain remains a nuclear power, has a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, is one of the few NATO member-states to achieve the spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product, and has the world’s sixth-largest economy.

The “refresh” of the Integrated Review, published in March 2023, refers to alliances, partners, cooperation, and burden-sharing. Overall foreign policy is becoming more interdependent, and the assumption running through the document is that the United Kingdom will always be part of an international military coalition. That assumption vastly derisks the idea of Britain reducing its capabilities, and refocuses thinking on what should be provided. And the Integrated Review refresh already touches on specialization: “Science and technology is increasingly vital to our future. We are a top five nation in innovation, artificial intelligence (A.I.) and cyber, and a major international power in science and technology.”

These ideas are already in the policy ether: specialization, interdependence, reliance on multinational coalitions. The concept I have sought to outline is simply to carry this further, to embrace its underlying logic and pursue it to make significant changes to the way the United Kingdom plans defense policy. The refresh of the Integrated Review is the fourth major reassessment of British defense I have watched at close quarters, and they have all been marked by depressingly similar corrosive compromises. Always driven by financial constraints, they have nevertheless always been portrayed by the government as clear-headed assessments of strategic priorities. This has led to a situation where, in effect, the Ministry of Defense tries to negotiate as much of the budget as it can, for as many of the capabilities it thinks it requires.

This will always undermine robust planning and strategic coherence. If the armed forces manage to win 70 percent of what they initially request, but still develop policy and doctrine based on the 100 percent, it will lead to compromise and disappointment. It is better surely to reduce the whole by a third, but secure all the necessary resources.

There will be a general election in the United Kingdom in 2024 and probably a change of administration. An incoming Labor government has pledged to undertake a defense review within months of taking office. I have laid out one strategic direction that the new government could choose to adopt. It does not solve all of the challenges facing the United Kingdom, nor is it how I would approach defense policy in an ideal world. But while conceptually radical, it is both rational and realistic. It is based on an honest assessment of the world as it is, and it attempts to imagine a global role that would maintain British influence based on the country’s international standing and economic prosperity. It would be a painful journey, but more than 20 years observing defense policy has shown me an unsustainable fiction that needs to end.

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Eliot Wilson is a writer and commentator on politics, defense, and foreign policy. From 2005 to 2016 he was a senior official in the U.K. House of Commons, including on the Defense Committee and the U.K. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He writes regularly for City AM, The i, The Spectator, and The Hill, and blogs at The Ideas Lab. He is a member of the Royal United Services Institute and a co-founder and director of Pivot Point Group, a strategy advisory and PR consultancy.

Image: Ministry of Defence

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warontherocks.com · by Eliot Wilson · February 2, 2024

4. A U.N. Agency Is Accused of Links to Hamas. The Clues Were There All Along.

So many issues with this. A lot of people (especially my former colleagues at FDD),can say I told you so.

But here is something so fundamentally wrong that should have been an indicator. If an aid agency is performing governmental functions it is preventing the society from developing normally. This should have been a huge red flag.

Excepts:

Aid agencies say Unrwa holds the biggest role in providing shelter and lifesaving aid to the vast population displaced by Israel’s campaign to eradicate Hamas, which has killed more than 26,000 people, according to local authorities. The numbers don’t distinguish between combatants and civilians. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres pleaded Tuesday with representatives of donor countries to resume aid, his spokesperson said.

Besides providing schooling and healthcare, Unrwa maintains streets, sewage and water systems in the sprawling neighborhoods of refugees that it oversees. Israeli officials say that by taking care of such municipal tasks, the U.N. agency freed up Hamas, Gaza’s de facto authority, to expand its terrorist capacities over the years, including construction of an estimated 300 miles of underground tunnels. 

The tunnels are believed to be holding many of the more than 100 Israeli hostages who remain in Gaza. One tunnel found in 2020 had an entrance inside a food distribution warehouse operated by Unrwa, according to images viewed by the Journal.

Beyond the current humanitarian crisis, Unrwa is in some ways too big to fail, especially in Gaza, say some Israeli and former agency officials. U.S. officials said the funding freeze is temporary.

Whatever is learned about the U.N. agency’s role before, during and after the Oct. 7 attack will figure largely in its postwar future. U.S. officials expect to see fundamental changes at the agency before it resumes direct funding, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield said Tuesday.

A U.N. Agency Is Accused of Links to Hamas. The Clues Were There All Along.

The Western-funded group providing lifesaving aid in Gaza has long struggled to defend its neutrality from militants

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-israel-attack-united-nations-unrwa-0ec8d325?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By David LuhnowFollow and Carrie Keller-Lynn

Feb. 2, 2024 12:01 am ET

For years, international relief workers and the Israeli military have reported weapons caches occasionally found in schools operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, the organization that for decades has provided schooling, healthcare and other assistance to Palestinian refugees in Gaza. 

They learned of underground tunnels beneath Unrwa facilities and the theft by Hamas of agency-provided fuel and aid. Some had run-ins with teachers over textbooks promoting the hatred of Jews and Israel. 

In 2014, part of the parking lot at the Unrwa headquarters in Gaza began sinking, likely from a Hamas tunnel dug beneath. “No one talked about what was causing the collapse,” a former Unrwa official said, “but everyone knew.” 

Suspicions that Hamas and other militant groups wielded untoward influence over Unrwa spread worldwide this week after Israeli intelligence reported that a dozen employees of the U.N. agency allegedly participated in the Oct. 7 attacks on Israel. 

What began as a small agency providing tents, food and other emergency relief for refugees of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war has grown into an organization with a staff of 30,000 people, nearly all Palestinians, operating in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Western nations pay for most of its roughly $1.3 billion budget.

Its future is now in doubt. Western donors are questioning whether the agency has become irrevocably radicalized. The U.S. is among 18 countries that have suspended funding, including most of Unrwa’s largest givers. 

Six Unrwa employees were allegedly among the thousands of Palestinians and Hamas militants who entered Israel on Oct. 7, in an assault that killed the most Jewish people since the Holocaust and sparked a war that threatens the region.

People in Gaza displaced by the war gathering in the yard of an Unrwa school in Gaza. PHOTO: MAJDI FATHI/NURPHOTO/ZUMA PRESS

Several of the assailants were from Unrwa schools, including an Arabic teacher and a math teacher, according to Israeli intelligence reports viewed by The Wall Street Journal. Six other agency workers allegedly coordinated logistics for the assault, helped provide weapons, or were told to report to staging grounds for the attack. 

Israeli intelligence estimates that 10% of the agency’s 12,000 staff in Gaza are affiliated or have membership in Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad and half the employees have a close relative with an active membership in the militant groups. Since Hamas has both a military and political wing, affiliation doesn’t mean membership in the armed group.

“Unrwa is totally infiltrated with Hamas,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a meeting Wednesday of U.N. ambassadors in Jerusalem, saying it was time for the agency to be scrapped and replaced by other U.N. or aid agencies that would operate in a neutral fashion. “We need such a body today in Gaza. But Unrwa is not that body.”

Secretary of State Antony Blinken said this week the U.S. hasn’t done its own investigation into Israel’s claims but called them “highly, highly credible.” Even so, American officials have also said the actions of individuals shouldn’t taint the entire agency, a sentiment echoed in other donor countries.

Unrwa officials questioned the Israeli assessment. “What qualifies an alleged involvement?” Unrwa spokesperson Tamara Alrifai said. “Since when is someone accountable for what their cousin does?” 

Phillipe Lazzarini, Unrwa’s director general, said the agency took swift action to fire the employees alleged to have been involved while the U.N. continues its investigation. Two others died. He said the West’s funding freeze amounted to “collective punishment.” 

Aid agencies say Unrwa holds the biggest role in providing shelter and lifesaving aid to the vast population displaced by Israel’s campaign to eradicate Hamas, which has killed more than 26,000 people, according to local authorities. The numbers don’t distinguish between combatants and civilians. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres pleaded Tuesday with representatives of donor countries to resume aid, his spokesperson said.

Besides providing schooling and healthcare, Unrwa maintains streets, sewage and water systems in the sprawling neighborhoods of refugees that it oversees. Israeli officials say that by taking care of such municipal tasks, the U.N. agency freed up Hamas, Gaza’s de facto authority, to expand its terrorist capacities over the years, including construction of an estimated 300 miles of underground tunnels. 

A garbage truck operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency at a Gaza refugee camp before the war. PHOTO: ABED RAHIM KHATIB/DPA/ZUMA PRESS

The tunnels are believed to be holding many of the more than 100 Israeli hostages who remain in Gaza. One tunnel found in 2020 had an entrance inside a food distribution warehouse operated by Unrwa, according to images viewed by the Journal.

Beyond the current humanitarian crisis, Unrwa is in some ways too big to fail, especially in Gaza, say some Israeli and former agency officials. U.S. officials said the funding freeze is temporary.

Whatever is learned about the U.N. agency’s role before, during and after the Oct. 7 attack will figure largely in its postwar future. U.S. officials expect to see fundamental changes at the agency before it resumes direct funding, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield said Tuesday.

“I can’t from personal knowledge say how entwined Hamas is with Unrwa,” said James Lindsay, the legal counsel for Unrwa from 2000 to 2007. “Unrwa minimizes the problem, and Israel tries to maximize it. The truth is probably somewhere in between.”

By the book

Some teachers on Unrwa’s payroll voiced support for the Oct. 7 attack, according to conversations in a Telegram group for contract workers for the agency’s Gaza school system. The information, prepared by UN Watch, a pro-Israel advocacy group, was presented Tuesday to a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee hearing in Washington. Transcripts of the alleged conversations were reviewed by the Journal.

As Hamas mounted its attack, one group member wrote, “Our boys are inside on jeeps,” and “God protect them and bring them back safe.” Another person said she wanted to raise her children to emulate the Oct. 7 attackers. Both people were said to be linked to Unrwa’s payroll by UN Watch. 

Unrwa, which helped pioneer schooling for girls in Arab countries, has a record of helping refugee students outperform their peers at public schools in host countries. Among its graduates is a NASA engineer. Israel has long criticized classroom lessons at Unrwa schools for stoking grievances and inciting violence. 

A class at a Unrwa school in Gaza during the summer of 2020. PHOTO: MAJDI FATHI/NURPHOTO/ZUMA PRESS

Unrwa’s Gaza and West Bank classrooms teach the Palestinian Authority curriculum and use the same textbooks taught by Hamas. Several of the books inject doses of antisemitism and martyrdom into class exercises, the Journal found. 

One textbook to teach fifth-grade reading comprehension features Palestinian militant Dalal Mughrabi, who joined a 1978 terrorist attack that killed 38 Israelis, including 13 children. Middle-school science students learn physics accompanied by images of Palestinians using slingshots to hurl rocks at Israeli soldiers. 

Unrwa said it uses the same national curriculum wherever it operates. The agency said it reviews problematic content and, while not removing it, offers teachers guidance for offering criticism, context or skipping the lesson, and provides supplementary materials to teach tolerance. A U.S. Government Accountability Office report in 2019 said teachers weren’t given such guidance or the supplementary materials.

Militants began to make extensive use of Unrwa facilities to shield their activities during the 2014 conflict with Israel, according to Israeli military officials. Unrwa said it found weapons kept in three of its schools. Israel also identified at least 28 incidents of militants firing projectiles from close to a Unrwa school or facility.

Unrwa staff told Israeli officials at the time they had found rockets in an Unrwa elementary school in Gaza. When Israel asked what happened, the agency said it called local authorities, linked to Hamas, to collect them, according to two former Israeli military officials.

Then-U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed outrage that rockets had not only been found in an Unrwa school but then went missing. Militants, he said, were responsible for “turning schools into potential military targets.”

Unrwa criticized Hamas in 2021 for commandeering one of its schools and for tunneling under Unrwa facilities. The agency said the following year that it had identified a “man-made cavity” beneath the grounds of a school in Gaza.

Alrifai, the Unrwa spokeswoman, said in an interview that Unrwa checks schools for weapons and immediately reports any findings to donor countries. Any crimes by small numbers of teachers shouldn’t condemn an entire school system, she added. “I sometimes wonder if we can hold the entire U.S. education system accountable for one mass shooting from someone who went to a school,” she said.

Displaced Palestinians at a camp operated by Unrwa in western Khan Younis, Gaza, in October. PHOTO: AHMAD SALEM/BLOOMBERG NEWS

Unruly

Unrwa has had at least 152 of its Palestinian staff killed so far during the war in Gaza. Thousands continue to work handing out food and medicine, many of them displaced themselves.

The agency emerged from the turmoil after World War II, when borders were redrawn and millions of refugees displaced worldwide. Shortly after Unrwa was founded, the U.N. created its Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. It focused on long-term resettlement and rehabilitation for refugees who couldn’t return to their homes. 

Arab countries and Palestinian refugees didn’t want Unrwa to be part of that refugee office because they opposed permanent resettlement. The refugees wanted to return to their lives in Israel, a right blessed by the U.N.

During the 1950s, neighboring Arab states and many refugees refused to take part in U.S.-backed proposals for homes outside of Israel. One was an agricultural development project in the Jordan Valley that would have created a permanent home for 200,000 refugees.

American officials at the time warned of trouble. “The presence of three quarters of a million idle, destitute people whose discontent increases with the passage of time, is the greatest threat to the security of the area,” George McGhee, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, said in 1950.  

Unrwa’s unique definition of a refugee extends even to Palestinians holding citizenship and fully resettled in other countries, including Jordan and the U.S. Two of Unrwa’s five areas of operations, Lebanon and Syria, refuse to nationalize Palestinians. Other than Jordan, no Arab country has agreed to resettle Palestinians en masse.

U.N. workers preparing aid for distribution in Gaza to Palestinians displaced by the war. PHOTO: MAJDI FATHI/NURPHOTO/ZUMA PRESS

Neighborhoods of impoverished refugees overseen by Unrwa became fertile ground for Palestinian nationalism and militancy. The Trump administration cut off funding for the agency in 2018, saying “The fundamental business model and fiscal practices that have marked Unrwa for years—tied to Unrwa’s endlessly and exponentially expanding community of entitled beneficiaries—is simply unsustainable.” The Biden administration restored funding in 2021. 

Starting 2007, when Hamas took power in a coup, Unrwa leaders trying to enforce the agency’s neutrality in Gaza faced threats and attacks. That year, John Ging, the agency’s local head, was in an Unrwa convoy when armed militants blocked its path and tried to enter the vehicles. They fired shots, but Ging wasn’t harmed. 

Two years later, Ging suspended aid imports to Gaza after Hamas stole hundreds of tons of food and other assistance as it arrived. Days later, Hamas returned the goods.

A former top Unrwa official, who oversaw the firing of employees with suspected links to Hamas and the removal of weapons from schools, left Gaza in 2015 after death threats, including a box with a grenade, said people familiar with the incident. 

Evidence mounted that Hamas was burrowing into the U.N. agency. In 2017, the longtime head of Unrwa’s union in Gaza, an elementary school principal, resigned after it was revealed that he was elected to Hamas’s political leadership.  

In 2021, Israeli warplanes bombed roads near the Unrwa headquarters in Gaza during a brief conflict with Hamas. Unrwa’s Gaza chief at the time, Matthias Schmale, raised protests after he acknowledged the precision of Israeli strikes on Israeli TV. Hamas said it couldn’t guarantee his safety, and he left Gaza. He said later in a radio interview that it was a “safe assumption” that Hamas tunnels ran near or under Unrwa schools.

Some in Israel’s government want the agency abolished. Others worry there is no better option, especially for delivering emergency aid. Ronny Leshno-Yaar, former head of the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s unit on U.N. agencies, said Israel’s diplomatic position has been “until there is an alternative, we need Unrwa.”

Write to David Luhnow at david.luhnow@wsj.com

5. Shadow War With Iran Risks Turning Into a Direct Conflict

Shadow War With Iran Risks Turning Into a Direct Conflict

White House says response to drone attack that killed three American soldiers to include nonmilitary measures along with strikes

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/shadow-war-with-iran-risks-turning-into-a-direct-conflict-6b8eddd9?mod=hp_lead_pos4

By David S. Cloud

Follow

Feb. 1, 2024 4:03 pm ET

A woman walks past a mural of Iranian revolutionary guard soldiers in a street in Tehran. PHOTO: ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH/SHUTTERSTOCK

WASHINGTON—For decades, the U.S. and Iran have waged a shadow war across the Middle East following a rule understood by both sides: If you hit us, we will hit back, at least as hard.

But as the Biden administration prepares to retaliate for a drone strike by Iranian-backed militias that killed three American soldiers last weekend, the calculations of the two longstanding adversaries has changed. Neither Washington nor Tehran appears eager for a direct military confrontation.

Sunday’s drone strike against a small outpost in Jordan near its borders with Iraq and Syria was the first attack by Iran-backed proxies since October to cause U.S. fatalities, sparking calls in Congress for the White House to respond with military action targeting Tehran.

U.S. Misidentified Enemy Drone in Attack That Killed Three in Jordan

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The U.S. failed to stop a deadly drone attack on Sunday that killed three troops on a military outpost in Jordan because the American forces confused the enemy drone with a U.S. drone. Photo: Planet Labs PBC/Associated Press

For the Biden administration, hitting Iran’s paramilitary forces risks a counterstrike against American troops or Middle East bases by Tehran’s formidable arsenal of advanced missiles and drones, expanding the war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas into a wider regional conflict that the White House is seeking to avoid in a presidential election year.

For Iran, the calculation is at least as complex. If it tries to rein in the proxy forces it backs in Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon, it risks tarnishing its claim to be leading the so-called axis of resistance of militias and friendly Middle East allies against the U.S. and Israel. But if it takes on the more powerful U.S. directly, it faces a potentially punishing military defeat.

“Each side is trying to calibrate the use of force as a way of trying to change the behavior of the other side, but they don’t want to cross red lines,” said Gerald Feierstein, a former U.S. State Department official and a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, a Washington think tank.

President Biden has said he holds Iran responsible for the drone attack that killed three American soldiers in Jordan. PHOTO: KENT NISHIMURA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

President Biden has declared he holds Iran responsible for the deadly drone attack, arguing that the Iraqi militias he says were behind the drone strike are among the many proxy forces in the Middle East funded and armed by Iran’s paramilitary Quds Force.

Biden has approved plans for multiday strikes in Iraq and Syria against multiple targets, including Iranian personnel and facilities, according to U.S. officials. But the response, expected to begin as soon as this weekend, will be “tiered,” mixing military actions with other steps that can be adjusted to signal that Washington doesn’t seek further escalation.

The goal, U.S. officials say, is to get Iran and its proxies to dial back their attacks across the region as the White House and its allies pursue talks on a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel that they hope will de-escalate tensions.

Iran has sent its own signals, insisting it didn’t order the attack and warning that U.S. reprisals against Iranian territory or personnel deployed around the region would prompt it to strike back. The underlying message, analysts said, was one of restraint as long as Washington doesn’t cross its red lines.

“What we’re seeing is a kind of negotiation behind the scenes to manage tensions so that they don’t escalate,” said Sanam Vakil, the director of the Middle East program at Chatham House, a London think tank.

By signaling its intention well in advance of any strikes, the White House may give Iran time to reposition personnel and equipment, limiting the effectiveness of the U.S. attacks, analysts said. But it could also ease pressure on Tehran to respond.

Joseph Votel, a retired U.S. Army general and former top Middle East commander, said the U.S. response had to send a message to Iran that would only be effective if it included direct attacks on Iranian targets, along with other strikes on its proxies.

“There has to be a very unambiguous message to Iran that we hold them responsible for the actions of these militias,” he said. “I think the targeting has to include some targets that are of value to Iran.”

The targets don’t need to be inside Iran to deliver the message, he added, but they need to be chosen carefully to avoid sparking a wider war. “They have the ability to strike back across the region with a fairly robust missile capability,” he said.

As recently as 2020, tensions between Washington and Tehran nearly spilled into sustained conflict after then-President Trump ordered a U.S. airstrike in Baghdad that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps paramilitary Quds Force. Iran responded with a barrage of ballistic missiles against U.S. troops in Iraq, an attack that caused dozens of casualties but no U.S. deaths.

A photo of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the late leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps paramilitary Quds Force, seen at a protest in Tehran in January. PHOTO: WANA NEWS AGENCY/REUTERS

It is far from clear, however, that Washington and Iran can avoid an escalation this time that neither side appears to want.

Iranian military and financial power forms the backbone of its proxy network around the region, but Tehran doesn’t exert full command and control over it. Not every member shares Iran’s Shiite ideology, and all the groups have domestic agendas that sometimes conflict with Tehran’s.

Some operate in geographically isolated areas, making it tricky for Iran to provide weapons, advisers and training. That includes Hamas, which is a Sunni movement, and the Houthis in Yemen, whose attacks on shipping have upended global trade flows and triggered U.S. and U.K. counterstrikes. In Syria and Iraq, Iranian-backed groups have launched drone and rocket attacks against U.S. bases, most of which have been intercepted by air-defense systems.

On Wednesday, a U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer in the Red Sea said it intercepted a ballistic missile fired from a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen and shot down three Iranian drones “in its vicinity” without injuries to the crew or damage to the ship.

If a Houthi missile hits a U.S. warship, it could produce even more pressure on the White House to respond with attacks on Iran, Feierstein said.

Ali Vaez, director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group, a conflict-resolution think tank, said the death of U.S. service members in the Jordan attack has likely forced Biden to choose targets that could result in Iranian casualties.

“If they target IRGC assets but minimize fatalities, Iran might not necessarily respond in a way that would then extend the cycle of violence,” he said. “But if there are IRGC fatalities, it will be hard for them to absorb that cost and not respond.”

Write to David S. Cloud at david.cloud@wsj.com

6. Opinion: Biden needs to follow Trump’s lead on Iran

Opinion: Biden needs to follow Trump’s lead on Iran | CNN

Opinion by Mark Dubowitz and Jonathan Schanzer

 7 minute read

Published 8:37 PM EST, Wed January 31, 2024

CNN · February 1, 2024

'They're supplying the weapons': Biden holds Iran responsible for drone strike

02:16 - Source: CNN

Editor’s Note: Mark Dubowitz is chief executive officer at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Jonathan Schanzer is senior vice president for research. FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. Follow them on X @MDubowitz and @JSchanzer. The opinions expressed in this commentary are their own. View more opinion on CNN.

CNN —

The death of three US service members in Jordan Sunday, along with more than 40 injured, is just the latest – and deadliest – example of Iranian-backed militias targeting American forces in the Middle East. The Sunday drone attack came just weeks after two Navy SEALS died while trying to disrupt a weapons smuggling operation by Iran-backed Houthi militia members off the coast of Somalia. American targets, meanwhile, have sustained at least 165 different attacks by Iran-backed militias since mid-October.

Mark Dubowitz

Mark Dubowitz/FDD

Slowly but surely, the Islamic Republic of Iran has pulled the United States into the war it is waging across the Middle East. The Houthis have all but shut down international trade in the Red Sea, a major shipping route from Asia to Europe. And it is Iran that helps fund and supply the Hamas and Hezbollah terror organizations now fighting against Israel.

Jonathan Schanzer

Jonathan Schanzer/FDD

It’s clear that President Joe Biden desperately wishes to avoid a wider war in the region. However, the regime in Iran has a vote, and it doesn’t appear to be backing down.

Throughout the fall, the Biden administration avoided the language of confrontation. After this weekend, the president said he has decided how he will respond to “radical Iran-backed militant groups” operating in Iraq and Syria, but has not disclosed what that response will be. However, surgical strikes on rockets, drones and warehouses of Iranian proxies — what the US has mostly done until now in response to the attacks on US bases over the past three months — will not be sufficient to end the violence.

America must be prepared to use force directly against Iran, including its expanding nuclear weapons program. The fear of sparking wider conflict is understandable in the wake of failures in our “war on terror.” But declining to respond to aggression by proxy is often seen by Tehran as an invitation to escalate. And that is exactly what the regime has done since October.

As retired Gen. Wesley Clark told CNN on Sunday of the anticipated US response, “If you do this strike the right way, the Iranians will understand they can’t afford to escalate into war,” Clark said. “They can’t stand up to the United States,” especially given the domestic opposition the regime faces. “This government in Iran is on very shaky grounds, and it’s in no position to have a war with the United States,” he continued, suggesting that it’s time “to go to the source of the trouble in Iran.”

Republican senators, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, Roger Wicker, Lindsey Graham and Tom Cotton, are also urging the president to take such a step.

Sadly, some of Biden’s current challenges with Iran are of his own making. The policy of non-confrontation, interrupted by occasional, limited and proportionate strikes against Iran-backed proxies while giving Tehran itself a free pass, was an approach adopted by the Obama administration and one that emboldened Iran.

This satellite photo from Planet Labs PBC shows a military base known as Tower 22 in northeastern Jordan, on Oct. 12, 2023. Three American troops were killed and "many" were wounded Sunday, Jan. 28, 2024, in a drone strike in northeast Jordan near the Syrian border, President Joe Biden said. He blamed Iran-backed militia groups for the first U.S. fatalities after months of strikes against American forces across the Middle East amid the Israel-Hamas war. U.S. officials identified Tower 22 as the site of the attack. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)

Planet Labs PBC/AP/File

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President Donald Trump’s use of sanctions pressure and American military power saw less Iranian aggression in comparison to what followed under the Biden administration, according to the JINSA Iran Projectile Tracker. The think tank’s tracker charts Iranian malign activities such as missile strikes, maritime aggression, cyber intrusions and hacking, kidnappings and wrongful detentions, terrorist attacks, weapons tests and production.

Biden reflexively returned to the previous status quo. His administration’s combination of billions of dollars in sanctions relief, in the form of weak sanctions enforcement that led to a spike in Iranian oil sales and revenue for Iran, and relaxe­d international pressure on Tehran’s nuclear program has only served to benefit the Islamic Republic.

Cashing in on this reversion, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) funneled weapons capabilities to its terrorist allies, financed their operations, trained their fighters and provided overall strategic direction. Though the regime also funded its proxies under Trump, his “maximum pressure campaign” denied it tens of billions of dollars that could have otherwise flowed to its proxy armies and its economy. The result: cuts in proxy funding as the Iranian currency cratered. Today, the regime’s proxies — Hezbollah, the Houthis and other militias — are more powerful than ever before.

And all of this could get worse. A widening war in the Middle East may serve as a “weapon of mass distraction” to obscure one of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s most important goals: advancing the nuclear program, which could enable the regime to build a weapon of mass destruction.

The regime is now enriching uranium to levels just shy of 90% weapons-grade, stonewalling UN weapons inspectors and working on another underground facility – one that may be impervious to American and Israeli bombs. All told, Iran is on the cusp of a nuclear weapon, having amassed enough enriched uranium to make weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear device in just 12 days.

These undated photos from the US Army Reserve Command show Sgt. William Jerome Rivers, 46, Spc. Kennedy Ladon Sanders, 24, and Spc. Breonna Alexsondria Moffett, 23.

US Army Reserve Command

Despite repeated White House denials, our organization, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, has found that since May 2018, when Trump withdrew the US from the 2015 nuclear deal, the most dangerous steps in the expansion of the nuclear program have occurred since Biden’s election, though some of the seeds were planted during Trump’s term when Iran began to take preliminary steps towards developing nuclear weapons including enrichment using advanced centrifuges and breaching caps on enrichment and heavy-water levels imposed under the 2015 nuclear deal.

But these were only tentative and incremental steps compared to the massive expansion of Iran’s nuclear program under Biden, according to our assessment. As we have charted, the regime remained cautious as it faced Trump, who demonstrated his willingness to use punishing sanctions and military force.

This changed development under Biden is easy to explain: The administration abandoned Trump’s campaign of financial pressure – which Biden derided as counterproductive – and gave no indication that it would threaten military force, then allowed Khamenei access to billions of dollars in frozen oil funds while China purchased hundreds of millions of barrels of Iranian oil. Iran thus saw no downside to expanding its nuclear program.

We opposed the Iran nuclear deal that Obama accepted from the start. Those who argue it was a mistake for Trump to exit the 2015 nuclear deal, or that maximum pressure didn’t work, are overlooking the fact that the deal itself enabled Iran to legally expand its nuclear program in the next decade, attempt to reach threshold nuclear weapons capability starting in 2030 – though it would have restrained the nuclear program in the current decade – and reap what our organization estimates would be $1 trillion in sanctions relief. Had the US remained in the pact, Biden could be dealing with an even wealthier enemy today.

Pick-up trucks carrying Houthi policemen and tribal supporters of the group parade during a protest against recent U.S.-led strikes on Houthi targets, near Sanaa, Yemen January 14, 2024. REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah

Khaled Abdullah/Reuters

Related article Opinion: War is a way of life for the Houthis

In the wake of the war Hamas launched on October 7, the bill for America abandoning its pressure on Iran has come due. The White House acknowledged this, at least in part, by redesignating the Houthis as a terrorist organization after delisting the group in 2021 (in a move it described as motivated by humanitarian concerns but may well have been a preemptive concession to Tehran), though the president left many loopholes for the terrorists to exploit per our analysis.

This is not to say that Trump’s policy was perfect. Far from it. But the numbers don’t lie. Thanks to aggressive sanctions enforcement, Iranian oil sales plummeted to 100,000 to 350,000 barrels per day in June 2020 from 2.5 million barrels per day in January 2017 (they were back to 1.29 million in 2023), and fully accessible Iranian foreign exchange reserves cratered to $4 billion from highs of $122 billion in 2018 (they were back to $21 billion as of 2022).

Trump also struck a military blow by ordering the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the deadly IRGC-Quds Force commander who built Iran’s proxy army into a lethal fighting force. And he nurtured the regime’s domestic opposition by voicing support for the masses of Iranian people who oppose the regime. As a result, the Islamic Republic’s economy sputtered, the regime’s aggression appeared to slow, and its nuclear activities even stalled for several months after the death of Soleimani.

The maximum pressure campaign lasted only two years before Trump’s electoral defeat in 2020. Shortly thereafter, Biden terminated the policy; it could have borne further fruit if allowed to run its course.

Biden may not want to acknowledge Trump’s relative success in an election year. But he should nevertheless revive the policy of maximum pressure and put his own mark on it. He can do that by undertaking things that Trump could have done more to advance, like providing maximum support for the Iranian people.

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Support for anti-regime Iranians should include: rolling out technology platforms to help Iranians circumvent regime surveillance; declassifying intelligence about the movement of internal security forces to assist Iranians mounting protests; developing labor funds to finance Iranians who go on strike; isolating the regime in all international forums; and massively expanding security for the brave Iranian dissidents abroad. Biden can also direct American officials to speak out more forcefully against the regime’s leadership and security forces who have killed, tortured and sexually abused protesters.

Admittedly, the very possibility of engaging in new conflicts during an election year will be viewed by the president’s advisers as risky. But the failure to respond sufficiently to continued aggression from the Islamic Republic is a recipe for a wider war.

CNN · February 1, 2024

7. Iraq and Iran were complicit in the Tower 22 attack

Iraq and Iran were complicit in the Tower 22 attack - Asia Times

To keep its relationship with Iraq and protect Iran, self-defeating Biden administration compromises US forces

asiatimes.com · by Stephen Bryen and Shoshana Bryen · February 2, 2024

Tower 22 is a US base in Jordan, just across the border from a US base at Al Tanf, Syria. It was attacked early in the morning on January 28th – killing three American soldiers and injuring 47 more. Eight soldiers were evacuated, some with physical wounds and others with concussions, described as traumatic brain injuries.

The Biden Administration is misleading the American public about the Tower 22 attack to obscure Iran’s direct involvement and hide the fact that Iraq is complicit in the killing and wounding of our soldiers.

Admiral John Kirby, the coordinator for strategic communications at the National Security Council, said explicitly that the United States is not looking for a war with Iran. He failed to mention that Iran has proclaimed itself at war with the United States and has been using its proxies to attack US bases and killing and wounding American soldiers for years. Iran now controls Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said the base was hit by a one-way drone, but no photographs have been released and there is, in fact, no confirmation of what the drone actually hit. From various reports it could have been living quarters, a common meeting area or a cafeteria.

Typically in a drone or rocket attack parts of the weapon survive in the wreckage. Often this includes parts of the drone or rocket body, the engine, sometimes electronic components, actuators, cameras or radios. It is important to retrieve the surviving components because they usually are evidence of the model and origin of the drone or rocket.

Strictly speaking, since CENTCOM says this was a one-way drone, we are talking about a loitering munition. It is likely that the absence of more detailed information is deliberate and would expose Iran’s direct involvement.

On the ground

Tower 22 and al Tanf are in the area where Jordan, Iraq, and Syria meet. The situation is politically complicated because Jordan is an American ally, and the United States has made a massive policy blunder believing it could (and still can) hang onto its bases in Iraq and Syria even though their missions have been badly compromised. This leaves our troops vulnerable to attack and destruction.

Making the US position even more untenable, the Biden administration has been appeasing Iran, which is the main enemy of all US allies in the region – Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States.

Tower 22 is a US logistics base that supports al Tanf. The attack there was unexpected, although al Tanf has been attacked several times, wounding American troops and killing a US contractor.

Apparently, the Army decided not to do anything to protect Tower 22 because it is in Jordan, which is technically an American ally and not seen as a target of Iran’s effort to control the Middle East “Shiite Crescent,” That conclusion reflects the poor level of analysis in Washington.

What we actually know is very limited. CENTCOM says the attack was carried out by a drone operated by an Iranian proxy – likely the previously sanctioned Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), the Party of God Brigades, which is aligned with the elite Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

KH is a Shia militia that gets money and policy support from Iraq’s government. It has taken part in combat operations against ISIS in Iraq and anti-government forces in Syria. It staffs the 45th, 46th, and 47th Brigades in the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, which were formed in 2014 to fight ISIS and became an official part of Iraq’s security apparatus in 2016.

Tower 22 buildings

Tower 22 is a logistic supply hub with approximately 350 personnel. It supports its larger neighbor, al Tanf, which has approximately 1,200 Americans and houses a Syrian-origin fighting force called the Revolutionary Commando Army, which is trained and directed by the US. Both use containerized housing units and other prefab structures for dining halls and meeting rooms.

Containerized housing units, abbreviated CHU, are paper-thin structures that often are bunched together. Sometimes they have some sandbags around the base, and in some instances (but not here) they may also have sandbags on the roof. Usually, an officer above the rank of major gets one of these tiny sheds to himself or herself; otherwise, there are two soldiers in each one.

A CHU has barely enough room for a bed (or two), a small desk and a locker or closet. Each unit typically has an installed combination air conditioner/heat pump. They generally have steel frames and walls of plywood, tin, rock wall sandwich or other low cost material.

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If a shrapnel-filled bomb exploded near a CHU it could do a great deal of damage, since literally nothing stands in the way to stop the fragments. Even individual bullets can fly right through these structures.

The Army could, of course, provide more secure housing, especially at vulnerable base areas. Congress should investigate why the Army chose to expose US troops to such an obvious risk.

In the past, when al Tanf was attacked, CENTCOM celebrated that it was able to defend these bases.

The trdth is otherwise. There are “Before and After” satellite photos of one strike at al Tanf that show significant destruction.

Why didn’t air defenses work?

We do not know what kind of air defense systems, if any, may have been at Tower 22.

The best guess would be the Avenger Air Defense System and Stinger MANPADS, both used by the Army. (Avenger was previously operated by the US Marines, but it became obsolete and taken out of service.) First fielded in 1989, Avenger is a 35-year-old air system that has never shot down a drone in combat anywhere.

The system is mounted on a HMMWV Jeep-like vehicle and fires Stinger air defense missiles. It can be linked to an external radar source, but typically it is mobile and stand-alone. It does not have its own radar, so the operator has to physically see the threat.

Avenger is present in Syria and Iraq.

Stinger is a MANPADS, that is a man-carried and operated air defense weapon that has to see the threat, just like Avenger. Stinger can have a dual seeker-sensor in the missile’s nose that is sensitive to both infrared and ultraviolet light.

Drone makers using gasoline engines usually port the engine exhaust above the wings and fuselage of the drone to make detection of any heat source difficult. The Stinger missile, in either application, has to “lock onto” the heat source of the drone or other enemy target.

Both Avenger and Stinger are “fire and forget systems” and, as in the case of Avenger, there are no reports of Stingers shooting down drones in combat. A few drones have been shot down on test ranges to demonstrate they can work.

A Pentagon “preliminary report” says that Tower 22 had its own drone in play and that the enemy drone either took advantage of the US drone’s flight path or was shielded by the US drone, so the air defense operators at Tower 22 did not fire on it.

There is, however, a problem with the story.

Both Stinger and Avenger are equipped with a system to differentiate between threats and friendlies called IFF (Identification Friend or Foe). In fact, modern IFF transponders, known as Mode 5 class, can identify a friendly if the friendly is “beeping” the right encrypted code; but if it is not sending the correct code then the ground operator must assume it is a threat and take action to destroy it.

In modern combat scenarios, IFF is critical, and most US military drones have miniature IFF transponders on board.

The bottom line is that if there was a US air defense system at Tower 22 it would have had IFF, and the base operators would not have been confused.

Is it possible that the drone the US launched, the drone that caused confusion, did not have an IFF transponder? Perhaps.

The Task Force 99 alternative

In October 2022 CENTCOM created a new organization called Task Force 99 to plan for the use of cheap commercial drones, either bought on the market or 3D printed, for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions (ISR). The organization is based at the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and is made up of about 15 people.

When Task Force 99 was interviewed last year, it had approximately 98 drones (broken down into 13 types) with ranges between 12.5 and 900 miles. It also produced its own 3D printed drone called Kestrel.

By and large all these are small plastic drones, usually in quadcopter format. Some of these drones are battery powered and include group 1 and group 2 unmanned aerial systems (UAS) platforms. Group 1 small UAS are back-packable and used for “over-the-hill” missions. They typically operate at altitudes under 1,200 feet. Group 2 are somewhat larger and operate below 3,500 feet.

Task Force 99 is tasked with finding unique drone solutions to support US operations in the Middle East. But because Task Force 99 is looking for cheap commercial products, the drones it works with are not equipped with IFF.

We don’t know whether Tower 99 was using a Task Force 99-supplied drone but given its location and the need to search the perimeter around the base, this would have been a cheap way to do the job.

There is, unfortunately, in the reporting of Task Force 99, no discussion of how commercial drone systems can be compatible with air defense systems. Nor is there any reported protocol for working with air defenses in order to avoid fratricide situations or fatal mistakes. More information is needed, but the possible presence of a Task Force 99 drone may indicate that air defenses were being shut down during US Army drone operations.

The loitering munition

As former CIA analyst Larry Johnson has expounded, it would take a large munition to cause the damage at Tower 22. We know that multiple drones hit al Tanf causing significant damage. It is also reasonable to think that the strike on Tower 22 was well-planned and intended to cause maximum casualties. This means either the base had been previously surveyed by hostile drones, or the enemy got satellite pictures, or the enemy had spies at the base – or possibly all of the above.

The most likely loitering munition fired at Tower 22 would have been a version of the Iranian Ababil 3. It is manufactured by the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA). It is a single engine drone with an engine reported as coming from German company Limbach Flugmotoren.

Some loitering munition versions of this drone are called Qasef-1 and Qasef-2. In Iraq, the drone is called the Basir-1 and is used by the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq. At least four different terrorist organizations operating under the umbrella of the PMF – the Badr Brigades, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Kata’ib Jund al Imam and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba – have used these drones in past attacks.

There are two other Iranian drones that could have been used. Mohajer-6 was used exclusively by the IRGC in the past. It is a large drone that carries four precision-guided munitions. It is not a loitering munition (or kamikaze drone), and after delivering its bombs it returns to base, operating somewhat like the Bayraktar Turkish drone that was prominent in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, in Ukraine, Libya and elsewhere.

The other candidate is the Shahed 136, today used widely by the Russians in Ukraine (now under the name Geran-2). It is a loitering munition with a warhead of between 40 and 50 kg.

The attack on Tower 22 occurred “in the early morning,” meaning the weapon itself was probably launched, some distance away, at night. All these drones are slow flying. It also means that if the soldiers were gathered in one place they would have been at breakfast. If the drone arrived from the East with the rising sun, observing it would have been difficult.

The perpetrators

The Biden administration has been adamant that the actual attack was carried out by Iranian proxies, without naming the group or individuals responsible, although certainly it knows. Moreover, and even more importantly, the administration has avoiding pointing a finger at Iran for directing its proxy or proxies.

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According to Entifadh Qanbar, President & Founder of the Kurdish Protection Action Committee (KPAC), the actual attack was done by Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), an Iranian-sponsored, anti-American Shiite militia operating in Iraq with collateral operations throughout Syria. It is tied directly to the IRGC-Quds Force. [Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi, known widely by his nom de guerre Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes, was its leader until his death on January 3, 2020, in a US drone strike at Iraq’s Baghdad International Airport that also killed Qasem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s Quds Force.]

Abu Fadak Al-Mohammedawi is the general secretary of KH and is the overall head of PMF forces in Iraq. KH maintains strong ties with Iran and pledges spiritual allegiance to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The PMF is directly funded by the Government of Iraq which pays for its operations and provides a separate budget for PMF weapons’ acquisitions. According to available Iraqi government budget documents, Kata’ib Hezbollah receives more than $3 billion annually via the PMF from Iraq, in addition to the arms it receives from Iran.

Abu Fadak, real name Abdul Aziz Al-Mujirish Al-Mohammadawi and nicknamed Al-Khal (The Maternal Uncle), was born in January 1968. He is the chief of staff of the PMF and led the Iraqi militia attack on the US Embassy in Baghdad on December 31, 2019. According to former U.S. Army infantry officer Thomas Kurtzweil, after that attack, the name “Al-Khal” was graffitied over the walls of the Embassy.

Conclusion

The administration is working hard to keep its relationship with Iraq and protect Iran, holding back information that would directly implicate either. This compromises American forces in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan in two ways.

First, US bases are poorly defended and not strongly fortified, meaning they are relatively easy to attack with drones, mortars, rockets, and missiles. As they have been repeatedly.

Second, the US is allowing Iraq to fund and support hostile operations aimed at US installations and bases in the region. This means that US security information flowing to the government of Iraq (and its military) may be handed off to the Popular Mobilization Forces, as they are a military arm of the Iraqi government – but associated with Iran.

A US policy in which the enemy is part of the government we are supporting cannot work.

In addition to the compromised position of US forces in the region, the US response to attacks has been less than optimal. American passivity encourages even more attacks, exposing American weakness and indecisiveness and humiliating US forces who are hogtied and can’t reply.

With respect to Iran, the Biden administration’s failure to act on hundreds of Iranian-planned and ordered provocations means the situation will continue to deteriorate, and more American lives will be lost.

The policy is unacceptable.

Stephen Bryen served as staff director of the Near East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as a deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.

Shoshana Bryen is senior director of The Jewish Policy Center and editor of inFOCUS Quarterly.

This article was first published by War and Policy and is republished with permission.

asiatimes.com · by Stephen Bryen and Shoshana Bryen · February 2, 2024

8. The deterrence problem: America took its eye off Iran with Indo-Pacific pivot, ex-CENTCOM chief says

Did we take our eye off Iran to focus on the Ais Pacific or is it that this administration operates under some misguided perception that it can somehow create a different relationship with Iran?

The deterrence problem: America took its eye off Iran with Indo-Pacific pivot, ex-CENTCOM chief says - Breaking Defense

As the US and Israel contend with multiple Iranian proxy groups in the Middle East, Joseph Votel told Breaking Defense the US must “hold [Iran] accountable.”

breakingdefense.com · by Riad Kahwaji · February 1, 2024

Iranian protesters are carrying a portrait of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and a Yemeni flag as they tear an Israeli flag during an anti-U.S. and anti-British protest in front of the British embassy in downtown Tehran, Iran, on January 12, 2024. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

DUBAI — The rapid escalation of violence by Iranian proxies against the US and Israel in the Middle East since Oct. 7 is the result of a failure of deterrence that reaches back into years of US foreign policy shifts and the lack of direct action against Iran for its aggressive behavior in that time, according to former top US general in the Middle East and other experts.

“I think the problem with all of these strikes (in Iraq, Syria and the Red Sea) is that we have failed to directly hold Iran accountable,” Gen. Joseph Votel, former US Central Command chief, told Breaking Defense. “We need to strike back at the groups perpetrating these attacks, but we also have to recognize that Iran is behind all these attacks, and we must use all forms of national power to hold them accountable.”

Ever since Hamas’s deadly surprise attack on Oct. 7 against Israeli military posts and settlements, Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen have launched a series of attacks that targeted Israeli territories and US bases in the Middle East, as well as commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

While Hezbollah has been exchanging rocket and gun fire daily with the Israelis on Lebanon’s southern border, pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq have been firing rockets and explosives-laden drones against US bases there. The US says American bases in Syria and Iraq were attacked at least 150 times by Iranian proxies since Oct. 7. A drone attack on Jan. 28 resulted in the death of three US soldiers and the injury of dozens of others at a US installation in Jordan.

Meanwhile, Iranian-backed Houthi militiamen in Yemen have launched rocket attacks against Israel and have decided to target commercial ships in the Red Sea. The Houthi attacks have disrupted commercial shipping and prompted Washington to mobilize an international naval coalition to check the attacks and protect the ships in the area.

And though it’s unclear how much direct control Tehran has over the proxy forces that the US says it funds, trains and equips — and Iran has denied involvement with the violence — in the view of Votel and other experts a more robust deterrence of Iran is likely to have dissuaded much of the current violence.

According to Votel, who headed US forces in the Middle East between 2016 and 2019, there was a time the United States “did have an effective deterrence strategy that was primarily focused on the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program.”

This strategy, he added, “brought the Iranians to the table for negotiations and prevented regional conflict between Israel and Iran. It was successful because we combined military pressure with significant diplomatic, informational, and economic actions.”

In Votel’s view, problems started when the US administration under President Barack Obama decided to “pivot” to Asia and reduced its involvement in the Middle East region.

“As we began to pull back from the region to focus on challenges in the Indo-Pacific, we did not put sufficient attention into maintaining this level of deterrence against Iranian malign behavior,” he said.

Furthermore, the Obama administration focused only on brokering an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, which neglected the growing threat of its proxy groups in the region.

“Additionally, our main concern was about the Nuclear Program and not about all the other activities that Iran was pursuing, especially their robust support to proxies, and this, more than nuclear weapons, became Iran’s primary way of exporting their revolutionary ideology across the region,” added Votel.

Critics of the Iranian nuclear deal at the time said it didn’t do enough to restrict Iran’s “malign behavior” in the region unrelated to nuclear issues — an argument then-President Donald Trump made with he withdrew the US from the nuclear deal in 2018. (The Trump presidency mostly continued America’s pivot to the Pacific, with the notable exception of a drone strike that killed Iranian senior military official Gen. Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad in 2020, who Trump said “was plotting imminent and sinister attacks on American diplomats and military personnel.”)

Hasan Alhasan, senior fellow for Middle East policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, agreed with Votel’s analogy about the Pacific pivot.

“After witnessing a robust US deterrence under the administration of President George W. Bush in the Global War on Terrorism and the invasion of Iraq, the Obama pivot to Asia policy revealed a sharp drop of interest by Washington in the region, which encouraged Iran and its proxies to become bolder in their actions against American interests in the region,” Alhasan told Breaking Defense.

He pointed out that the sharp public differences between US officials over foreign policy and the worry of the American people of being sucked into another Middle East war were perceived by Iran “as signs of US weakness and encouraged Tehran to use its proxies to target American forces as well as US allies in the region.”

Bilal Saab, Senior Fellow and Director of Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington told Breaking Defense, “It’s hard to effectively implement deterrence if your adversary doesn’t believe you’re willing to escalate. America’s deterrence problem in the region is not about lack of firepower, it’s about lack of political will, and Iran can see that quite clearly.”

And though Israel’s attention never strayed far from Iran, experts said it’s deterrence strategy, too, had its limitations.

Hesham Youssef, a career diplomat and senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, believes that the Israeli deterrence policy towards Iran is very much linked to that of America.

“The Israeli calculations pertaining to Iran are much more complicated, as Israel cannot attack Iran without a green light from Washington,” Youssef said. “With the current challenges facing the Israeli coalition and society, Israel will not expand the scope of the war except if it is forced to do so.

“The current US administration has not been interested in a military escalation with Iran since it took office, and it is now entering the election cycle and unless the war spreads this situation will continue,” Youssef told Breaking Defense.

For many years Israel has adopted a deterrence strategy that has come to be known as the “campaign between wars,” largely based on carrying out limited pre-emptive strikes against Iranian proxies in neighboring countries to prevent them from acquiring advanced weapons or gain game-changing capabilities. (It also involved allegedly assassinating several Iranian nuclear scientists.)

It was successful, to a point.

“The main achievement of Israel’s campaign between the wars was thwarting the emergence in Syria of major formations of Syrian and Iraqi militias backed by a massive rocket array, like we see in possession of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon,” said Michael Eisenstadt, Kahn Fellow and director at the Military and Security Studies Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “Had that occurred, Israel would be fighting a three-front war (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) and would possibly be dealing with ground assaults across the Golan – or at least large quantities of rocket fire from Syria.”

Retired Lebanese Army brigadier general and defense expert Khalil Helou agreed.

“The efficiency of the campaign between wars had a limited effect as a deterrent strategy, but on the other hand it contributed to the serious degradation of Hezbollah capabilities in Syria and Iraq — the capabilities that were intended to target Israel.”

But Ehud Yaari, the Lafer International Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said the “conflict between wars” policy failed to significantly rein in Hezbollah and Hamas — or convince Iran to hold them at bay.

Yaari pointed out that “Israel understands now that its deterrence is fragile so the lessons will follow.” He expected Israel to focus more on removing Iranian proxies from its borders, and believes that once Israel is done with Hamas, its next target will be Hezbollah — a potential next step in the current conflict for which Israel increasingly appears to be preparing and one feared by Lebanese civilians.

Israeli officials maintain that tens of thousands of Israeli settlers who fled their homes in northern Israel will not return home so long as Hezbollah fighters are at the borders, clearly suggesting they’ll have to be pushed back.

In the meantime, the US and Israel will also have to consider exactly what to do about the Shiite powerbroker in the region, Iran. Biden has not yet said how the US plans to respond to the proxy attack that killed three American servicemembers, and experts previously told Breaking Defense that striking Iran directly is most likely not a consideration for fear of a wider war. But Biden is under enormous pressure to do something.

“The main gap in Israel’s and the United States’s deterrence strategy toward Iran is the failure to impose direct costs on the Islamic Republic for its regional proxy strategy,” said Eisenstadt. “Filling this gap will require a new approach by Israel and the United States — one that finds a way to impose material costs on Iran — without leading to escalation and a broader conflict.”

9. Pacific Fleet chief Paparo on China’s big lesson from Ukraine: Win quickly

I am reminded of this quote:

“In all history, there is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close.”

— Sun Tzu

Excerpts:

China, Paparo acknowledged, expects to have the ability to invade Taiwan by 2027, a year the admiral stated is mostly related to the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army. Pentagon officials have often stressed an invasion is neither imminent nor inevitable and wargames have shown such an attempt would be extremely costly, though Paparo emphasized it could still happen at any time.

“In fact, I think they’re working to be ready every day and they could go and we’ve got to be constantly vigilant,” he continued. “There’s no holiday between now and when they may go. And we must be ready now next week, next month and in the decades to come.”

Pacific Fleet chief Paparo on China’s big lesson from Ukraine: Win quickly - Breaking Defense

“Instead of seeing the Ukraine conflict and deciding ‘this is too hard,’ [China’s] intention, on the other hand, is to take note of the actions of Russia in order to effect a short, sharp, fait accompli conflict,” Adm. Samuel Paparo told lawmakers.

breakingdefense.com · by Michael Marrow · February 1, 2024

Adm. Samuel Paparo, commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, speaks to the crew of the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) over the ship’s public address system. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Samuel Osborn)

WASHINGTON — China has closely watched the nearly two years of war in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but rather than concluding a similar course of action in Taiwan would be in vain, Beijing has discerned that toppling the leadership in Taipei must be done swiftly to present a “fait accompli” to the world, according to President Joe Biden’s nominee to head up Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).

Speaking during a Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing today, Adm. Samuel Paparo, who currently commands the US Pacific Fleet, reiterated longstanding Pentagon concerns about the so-called “pacing challenge” posed by China and the looming threat that the country may invade its island neighbor of Taiwan. During the hearing, Paparo stressed that the Taiwan Relations Act requires the Defense Department to respond if China took such a step, warning that the prolonged conflict in Ukraine is not deterring Beijing from seizing Taipei by force.

“Instead of seeing the Ukraine conflict and deciding ‘this is too hard,’ their intention, on the other hand, is to take note of the actions of Russia in order to effect a short, sharp, fait accompli conflict,” Paparo said. “So rather than take the strategic lesson of the futility of aggression, instead [China] is doubling down on their ability to shrink strategic, operational and tactical warning and act quickly.”

A key deterrent of Chinese aggression in the western Pacific, Paparo said, is continued support of Ukraine and thwarting Russia’s invasion. To that end, committee Chairman Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., asked whether passing a stalled supplemental aid package that includes funds for Ukraine and furnishes further shipbuilding investments would be the “most decisive” thing that Congress could presently do, to which Paparo agreed.

Paparo, who was warmly received by senators on both sides of the aisle, said that despite China’s rapid naval buildup, the US Navy is not “overmatched.” Still, the admiral said he “[doesn’t] like the pace of the trajectory,” additionally identifying some weaknesses such as calling out a “vulnerability” posed by the size of the current US Merchant Marine fleet.

To combat the threat posed by China, Paparo said a key capability is “persistent stare” intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), noting that behind homeland defense, countering China’s own ISR capabilities is his “number one priority.”

Taiwan has made strides to equip itself for defense and has also studied lessons from Ukraine, Paparo said, though he emphasized he would continue to urge Taipei to build up its military prowess.

China, Paparo acknowledged, expects to have the ability to invade Taiwan by 2027, a year the admiral stated is mostly related to the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army. Pentagon officials have often stressed an invasion is neither imminent nor inevitable and wargames have shown such an attempt would be extremely costly, though Paparo emphasized it could still happen at any time.

“In fact, I think they’re working to be ready every day and they could go and we’ve got to be constantly vigilant,” he continued. “There’s no holiday between now and when they may go. And we must be ready now next week, next month and in the decades to come.”

breakingdefense.com · by Michael Marrow · February 1, 2024

10. Why NATO Needs Ukraine

Excerpts;

NATO membership is the only long-term means Kyiv has to deter future Russian attacks. Ukraine has recently inked valuable bilateral security assistance agreements with Canada, the United Kingdom, and other countries, but these will not be enough. If Russia ends up controlling any part of Ukraine’s territory—an outcome that the West should continue to work to avoid—the lands under Kyiv’s control must be secured by being anchored in NATO. The concern that Ukrainian membership in NATO will create instability by threatening Russia has the problem backward: the failure to include Ukraine in NATO would leave the Russian threat to Ukraine and Europe intact for the foreseeable future.

The 2024 NATO summit is also an opportunity for Biden to lock in his Ukraine policy’s successes before the United States’ 2024 presidential election. These successes could be erased by a second Donald Trump presidency unless NATO moves toward institutionalizing its commitment to Ukraine’s security. This institutionalization benefits the United States: paradoxically, integrating Ukraine into NATO reduces the likelihood that the U.S. military will become overextended. NATO’s military planners estimate that it will take three to five years for Russia to rebuild and modernize its military into a more sophisticated force than it was before 2022. If Russia is not deterred, a renewal of its militarism could coincide with a confrontation between the United States and China over Taiwan.

NATO does not need to offer Ukraine an immediate formal invitation. It can announce that it is opening accession talks with an invitation to follow at a future date, as the European Union has done with Ukraine regarding EU membership. But as NATO representatives and the alliance’s heads of state and government gather in Washington, there must be a broad recognition that Ukraine should be a part of NATO as soon as it meets specifically stated requirements, particularly on defense sector reforms. In terms of preparedness, Ukraine already has the most capable army in Europe, with a battle-tested force that would become an asset, not a liability, to the alliance. Without strong concrete action by NATO at the upcoming summit demonstrating that Ukraine’s future is in the alliance, the situation in Ukraine is likely to continue to erode in Moscow’s favor—with profound negative consequences for Europe and the United States.

Why NATO Needs Ukraine

Kyiv’s Survival and Europe’s Security Depend on a More Unified Front

By Alina Polyakova and James Goldgeier

February 1, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Alina Polyakova and James Goldgeier · February 1, 2024

As the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine draws near, Kyiv’s allies are struggling to articulate a common vision for the long-term security of Ukraine and of Europe. The invasion, and the Ukrainian people’s subsequent courageous resistance, appeared to be a watershed moment for the transatlantic alliance—underscoring its value and illuminating Ukraine’s importance to Europe. NATO mobilized troops to its eastern flank, Europe and the United States offered Kyiv unprecedented aid, and Europeans stepped up to host millions of Ukrainian refugees.

But two years later, both the shock prompted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression and the awe at Ukraine’s fighting spirit seem to have worn off. The July 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius exemplified the shift in mood. The gathering rightfully celebrated Finland’s historic accession, but it also exposed deep rifts between NATO allies on whether to admit Ukraine. Despite a concerted effort by the Baltic states and Poland to push the alliance to offer Ukraine membership, the summit failed to yield such an invitation, instead settling on an ambiguously worded communiqué declaring that NATO could invite Ukraine to join “when Allies agree and conditions are met.”

NATO must not make the same mistake in 2024. The absence of a clear plan for Ukraine to join NATO has given Putin more confidence that he can wait out the West and defeat Ukraine in a war of attrition. Moreover, the lack of resolve on NATO membership sends all the wrong signals about the West’s own confidence in Ukraine’s ability to win, which makes policymakers more reticent to approve large military assistance packages. NATO’s ambiguity sets up a feedback loop whereby Kyiv’s purported failures—driven, to a large degree, by a lack of adequate Western military aid and lags in the delivery of support—appear to offer evidence that further support in the form of NATO membership would be of little use or might even backfire, forcing the West to become more directly involved in the war. But Russia’s ability to improve its logistics and fighting in recent months is, in part, a result of NATO’s ambivalence. Putting Ukraine on the path to NATO accession is no symbolic matter: it is the country’s best hope to prevent Russian aggression in the long run.

It is also the best way to strengthen NATO’s deterrence capabilities and its value as an alliance. Some analysts may fear that the alliance’s Article 5 provision would require Washington and its allies to join the war more directly. But Article 5 does not automatically commit the alliance to enter the war. Rather, it stipulates that the alliance determines “action as it deems necessary,” which may or may not include putting troops on the ground. And Putin has long framed the war against Ukraine as a war against NATO and the West. So whether Ukraine’s Western allies like it or not, the world, including China, would see Ukraine’s subjugation by Moscow as a defeat for NATO, with profound global consequences for U.S. global leadership and for international security. This summer, NATO must move to make things right, asserting that the only possible path to durable peace in Europe starts with putting Ukraine on a clear path toward membership.

PARADISE LOST

In late 2021, as Russia amassed forces on Ukraine’s eastern borders, U.S. intelligence officials began warning Europe and Ukraine about Moscow’s intention to attack. These intelligence assessments correctly identified Moscow’s strategic objectives as political: Putin wished to subjugate Ukraine through military force, thereby keeping Ukraine in Russia’s sphere of influence and preventing it from further integration with the West.

From February 2022 through the summer of 2023, Ukraine’s battlefield triumphs—built on the extraordinary military and financial assistance from the United States and its NATO allies—created a sense that momentum was on Ukraine’s side. Kyiv did not fall to Russian troops in three days, as Putin hoped and as many in the West feared. In fact, the Ukrainian military pushed back Russia’s advances in four regions Putin claimed to have annexed and, in the winter of 2022–23, successfully withstood numerous missile attacks against military and civilian infrastructure. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky became the face of courage, successfully lobbying European and American policymakers to provide Ukraine with over $200 billion in military, economic, and humanitarian assistance.

Heading into the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, the Ukrainian leadership hoped to gain a formal invitation to join NATO. But without the United States on board, that effort stalled. U.S. President Joe Biden has firmly maintained since 2022 that while the alliance would defend “every single inch of NATO territory,” he saw direct NATO engagement in Ukraine as a path to World War III, which is why the United States had to find workarounds to coordinate military assistance from NATO member states in the U.S.-led “Ramstein format.”

The hope that Ukraine can trade land for peace is a fantasy.

NATO member states on the alliance’s eastern flank nonetheless consistently worked to push the United States to provide Ukraine with a clear path to accession. Their argument was that the alliance had to telegraph to Russia that continuing the war would not prevent NATO’s enlargement. And if Ukraine fell under Russia’s control, a hostile state would share a border with Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia—NATO territory that the Kremlin still sees as belonging to Russia’s sphere of influence. But fears of escalation won out over this long-term strategic vision.

To some degree, Ukraine then became the victim of its own success. The country’s political and military achievements in the first year of the war surpassed all expectations, setting tremendously high hopes for the 2023 counteroffensive. When Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner paramilitary group, launched his June 2023 mutiny, Putin looked even weaker. As preparations for the counteroffensive began, Western policymakers started carefully calibrating the amounts and types of weapons they would provide Kyiv, fearing that overwhelming Ukrainian successes could provoke a desperate Putin to use tactical nuclear weapons.

To be sure, Ukraine achieved important successes in the second half of 2023. It pushed Russia’s fleet in the Black Sea further east, enabling Kyiv to resume its grain exports. But optimism has now flagged with respect to what Ukraine can achieve militarily. It is an open question whether the United States will sustain its support for Kyiv, and if it does not, Europeans will not be able to fill the gap. Amid the growing belief that little territory will change hands during 2024, some analysts and politicians are calling for a cease-fire, followed by negotiations in which Ukraine would be expected to cede territory to Russia.

But obtaining any peace deal—much less one that would be enduring—will be a huge challenge. Thanks to China, Iran, and North Korea, Russia has replenished its drone and missile stocks and is terrorizing Ukrainian civilians with increasingly aggressive attacks. Putin has shown no indication that he would compromise with Kyiv. Previous attempts to engage Russia diplomatically on the future of Ukraine have been failures, revealing that the Kremlin is not interested in negotiating seriously. Most important, Russia’s strategic objectives have not changed. Putin evidently still wishes to subjugate all of Ukraine, not occupy a portion of the country’s territory. The idea that Ukraine can trade land for peace and thus remain free on the land it controls is a fantasy.

TUNNEL VISION

Biden has indicated that NATO will not formally invite Ukraine to join the alliance at its upcoming July summit in Washington. Those who believe that extending Ukraine a NATO invitation would be a mistake claim that the country’s accession would only worsen the binds in which Europe and the entire West now find themselves. They say that Russia will not or cannot pose a serious threat to existing NATO allies but that adding Ukraine to the alliance would increase the risk of a direct NATO-Russian war. They assert that if Ukraine joined NATO, allies would have to declare war on Russia as a consequence of Article 5—and if they did not, Article 5 would be revealed to be toothless, dangerously undermining the alliance’s deterrence value.

These arguments are wrong. While it is at war, Ukraine will certainly not join NATO. And the critics of a Ukrainian accession are correct that NATO needs to consider how it would uphold Article 5 if conditions allow Ukrainian membership to go forward. Only the territory that Ukraine holds at the end of the war would be covered by Article 5, even if the West refuses to formally recognize Russian-held territory as part of the Russian Federation. NATO would need to beef up its military presence on its eastern flank and add rotating troop deployments into Ukraine to deter further Russian military attacks, including drone and missile attacks against civilians.

The war in Ukraine has already demonstrated that NATO membership deters Russian attacks.

But these tasks are well worth undertaking—indeed, they are necessary. At its July summit, NATO will have to determine how to prevent Russia from continually threatening Ukraine in the long term, a scenario that would in turn give Moscow carte blanche to foment perpetual instability in Europe. The experience of the past three decades indicates that offering NATO membership to Ukraine would help deter Russian aggression, not prompt it. For now, Moscow sees states left in the “gray zone” between NATO and Russia as ripe for military incursions in ways that NATO members are not. If the alliance fails to move beyond the 2023 Vilnius summit declaration, its hesitation will motivate Putin to keep pursuing the war in Ukraine—to prevent it from joining NATO—and even, potentially, to attack other non-NATO states such as Moldova.

Some critics also argue that creating a formal accession process for Ukraine is unnecessary given the overall robustness of Western support for Kyiv. Accession to NATO would not materially change Ukraine’s short-term military prospects, this argument goes, but it would needlessly aggravate Putin. The war in Ukraine, however, has already demonstrated that NATO membership deters Russian military attacks on member states’ territory. Putin knows full well where the supplies inflicting high casualties on his troops come from. And yet he has not attacked NATO territory to prevent resupply efforts. Like Biden and European leaders, he does not want a NATO-Russian war.

By providing significant military, economic, and humanitarian support since February 2022, NATO has shown that it understands how deleterious a Russian victory over Ukraine would be for Europe’s long-term security. A Russian takeover of Ukraine—demonstrating the failure of Western deterrence—would vastly increase the likelihood that war in Europe will expand beyond Ukraine. Russian imperialism is today the greatest threat to European security. Putin has made it clear that he is not content with Russia’s internationally recognized 1991 borders, and he has again and again publicly stated an expansive vision of what territory properly belongs to Moscow. His imperialist vision appears to have broad popular support in Russia. Putin has put his country on a war footing, and he is already rebuilding his military. The return of Russian aggression is inevitable even if a temporary cease-fire puts the current situation on ice.

ELEVENTH HOUR

NATO membership is the only long-term means Kyiv has to deter future Russian attacks. Ukraine has recently inked valuable bilateral security assistance agreements with Canada, the United Kingdom, and other countries, but these will not be enough. If Russia ends up controlling any part of Ukraine’s territory—an outcome that the West should continue to work to avoid—the lands under Kyiv’s control must be secured by being anchored in NATO. The concern that Ukrainian membership in NATO will create instability by threatening Russia has the problem backward: the failure to include Ukraine in NATO would leave the Russian threat to Ukraine and Europe intact for the foreseeable future.

The 2024 NATO summit is also an opportunity for Biden to lock in his Ukraine policy’s successes before the United States’ 2024 presidential election. These successes could be erased by a second Donald Trump presidency unless NATO moves toward institutionalizing its commitment to Ukraine’s security. This institutionalization benefits the United States: paradoxically, integrating Ukraine into NATO reduces the likelihood that the U.S. military will become overextended. NATO’s military planners estimate that it will take three to five years for Russia to rebuild and modernize its military into a more sophisticated force than it was before 2022. If Russia is not deterred, a renewal of its militarism could coincide with a confrontation between the United States and China over Taiwan.

NATO does not need to offer Ukraine an immediate formal invitation. It can announce that it is opening accession talks with an invitation to follow at a future date, as the European Union has done with Ukraine regarding EU membership. But as NATO representatives and the alliance’s heads of state and government gather in Washington, there must be a broad recognition that Ukraine should be a part of NATO as soon as it meets specifically stated requirements, particularly on defense sector reforms. In terms of preparedness, Ukraine already has the most capable army in Europe, with a battle-tested force that would become an asset, not a liability, to the alliance. Without strong concrete action by NATO at the upcoming summit demonstrating that Ukraine’s future is in the alliance, the situation in Ukraine is likely to continue to erode in Moscow’s favor—with profound negative consequences for Europe and the United States.

• ALINA POLYAKOVA is President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis and Donald Marron Senior Fellow at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
• JAMES GOLDGEIER is a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Professor of International Relations at American University.

Foreign Affairs · by Alina Polyakova and James Goldgeier · February 1, 2024

11. Trump-Proofing Europe

Excerpts;

Europe handled aspects of Trump’s first presidency surprisingly well. But it needs to grow more as wars flare and climate change accelerates. Surveys regularly show that European citizens want the EU to play a larger role in solving global challenges. In 2024, EU leaders must heed their desires by making bold, concrete moves to boost European defense, secure their countries’ economic sovereignty, and protect democratic values.

Should Trump be reelected, the risks to Europe’s unity will be substantial. Some European leaders may feel tempted to forge bilateral deals with the United States to try to guarantee their country’s security in the short term. But Europeans need to remember that Trump cannot be relied on—and that the United States cannot guarantee Europe’s security forever. Instead of gambling on national self-reliance, they should bet on a more integrated Europe.

The European Parliament election in June presents an opportunity. A business-as-usual election campaign would not do justice to the challenges that may lie ahead. Instead, political parties need to debate fundamental strategic choices and make the defense of democracy and EU institutional reform a key part of their appeals. The message the EU sends in its election campaign must be a strong counterpoint to an isolationist, antidemocratic rhetoric: Europe will be able to protect its own borders, defend human rights, help safeguard open trade, fight climate change, and champion democracy, even if the United States won’t. And the United States may, in fact, be able to look to Europe for help and inspiration if it stumbles.

Trump-Proofing Europe

How the Continent Can Prepare for American Abandonment

By Arancha González Laya, Camille Grand, Katarzyna Pisarska, Nathalie Tocci, and Guntram Wolff

February 2, 2024

Foreign Affairs · February 2, 2024

As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, Europe has performed far better than expected. For decades after World War II, it counted on the United States to be the ultimate guarantor of its security. The continent relied on Washington to guide NATO policy, provide nuclear deterrence, and forge consensus among European countries on controversial questions such as how to resolve the 2009–12 European debt crisis. Europe continued to take the U.S. security umbrella for granted after the Cold War ended, slashing defense spending, failing to stop the Bosnian genocide in the early 1990s, and refusing to play a political role in resolving the crisis in Syria, even as it remained the region’s biggest provider of humanitarian aid. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, many anticipated that Europeans might balk at helping Kyiv. The last time Russian President Vladimir Putin marched over Ukrainian borders—annexing Crimea in 2014—Europe responded with weak sanctions and halfhearted attempts at diplomatic compromise while increasing its dependence on Russian gas.

But over the last few years, the world has seen a glimpse of a stronger Europe. European countries have sustained a united front in resisting Russia’s aggression, hosting millions of refugees, coordinating painful decoupling from Russian gas supplies, imposing strong economic sanctions and export restrictions on Russia, training Ukrainian soldiers, and inviting Ukraine to join the European Union. The $53 billion EU aid package to Ukraine that was slated for approval in February set Europe’s combined economic and military assistance to Kyiv, including its multiyear commitments, at double the amount the United States is providing. For the first time since 2007, the EU has even gathered the confidence to substantially enlarge itself. In December 2023, it extended candidate status to Georgia and launched accession talks with Moldova and Ukraine.

These steps were undergirded by a solid transatlantic relationship. But European leaders cannot count on a friendly United States. They must prepare for the possibility that, a year from now, the United States will again be led by Donald Trump. During his GOP primary campaign for president, Trump has suggested that if he is reelected in November 2024, he will negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the Ukraine war “in 24 hours,” demand that Europe reimburse the United States for ammunition used in Ukraine, withdraw from the Paris climate accords, and roil the global economy by imposing a ten percent tariff on all imports.

Last December, the U.S. Senate passed a measure making it harder for Trump to unilaterally pull the United States out of NATO. But Europeans cannot depend on smooth military collaboration with a Trump administration: Trump directs special ire toward the alliance, and when he chooses his staff, he will likely pass over seasoned bureaucrats in favor of loyalists. Putin would likely interpret even the slightest hint that Trump may not fully honor the U.S. commitment to NATO’s Article 5 as an invitation to test the robustness of the transatlantic alliance, possibly even in the Baltic states.

Well before Russia invaded Ukraine, European leaders knew they had to grow up—which meant, in part, relying less on the United States. The European debt crisis motivated the EU to more fully integrate its banking systems. In some ways, the first Trump era spurred the EU toward greater self-reliance as Trump demonstrated that his only alliance was with his own interests. The EU established a European defense fund and a more constructive relationship with NATO. During the COVID-19 pandemic, European countries tasked the EU Commission with buying vaccines, and for the first time, the commission borrowed on a large scale to fund Europe’s economic recovery.

Only after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, however, did the European debate—and behavior—about security change dramatically. Although Europe’s combined military and financial aid to Ukraine now exceeds that of the United States, U.S. support remains vital to Ukraine’s war effort—and to Europe’s broader security. And many longer-term consequences of Trump’s first presidency are still unfolding: peace around the world is unraveling, and authoritarian leaders are becoming bolder. Azerbaijan drove 120,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh unchecked. The rivalry between the United States and China has heated up. A chain of military coups in West Africa has ousted democratically elected presidents—as well as European peacekeepers. And thanks in part to policies instituted by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—whom Trump backed—a hot war has broken out in the Middle East.

These are European problems, too. Refugees flooding to EU borders have an enormous impact on European domestic politics. Renewed conflict in the Middle East has prompted new waves of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in Europe as well as a heightened threat of terrorism. Even if Ukraine thwarts Russia’s ambitions to rule its territory and people, Russia will likely remain a long-term security challenge, forcing Europeans to revisit collective defense scenarios and establish a level of military readiness it has not possessed since the Cold War.

European leaders are hoping for a second Biden presidency that would protect the transatlantic bond and give them time and support to assume greater responsibility for their turbulent continent and neighborhood. But they may not get this time and support. A second Trump term may well exacerbate the instability Europe is already struggling to manage. Europeans will respect Americans’ choice of their next president. But it is in Europe’s hands to act now and take concrete steps to bulwark its security and economy. It must also increase the EU’s power, addressing institutional weaknesses that limit the organization’s capacity to lead in a world characterized by geopolitical conflict. In short, it needs to Trump-proof its future. The continent weathered four years of a Trump presidency. But a second four years will likely be much harder to sail through.

THE USES OF ADVERSITY

Trump’s first four years in power forced European policymakers to plan around a far less consistent and engaged U.S. president, one who took a distinctively transactional view of the transatlantic relationship. European leaders have traditionally had more in common with Democratic than Republican U.S. presidents, and the transatlantic relationship took strain long before Trump took office: think of the deep rift over President George W. Bush’s war in Iraq.

But the challenges Trump posed were new. He was the first U.S. president who did not treat Europe as family. He seemed visibly more at ease with authoritarian rulers such as Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping than with democratically elected European leaders such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Trump did not hesitate to withdraw from the 2015 Iran deal that President Barack Obama forged together with the EU and the E3—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—nor to threaten to punish Europeans with sanctions if they abided by it. He also failed to consult with European leaders or even inform them before making major foreign policy moves, such as inking the 2020 Abraham Accords or withdrawing U.S. troops from Syria. Trump not only abandoned the United States’ plans for a trade deal with the EU. He instituted unprecedented protectionist measures that targeted European exporters.

In some ways, Trump’s first presidency spurred the EU toward greater self-reliance.

And he sought to weaken multilateral cooperation in areas such as climate change, trade, migration, and human rights, withdrawing from the Paris climate accords—an EU priority. He undermined international organizations such as the World Health Organization and UNESCO, as well as the UN’s attempts to reach an agreement on handling migration and refugees. Trump’s actions had a galvanizing effect on Europe: the United States had played a star part in shaping the EU itself, but then the country seemed to withdraw from its lead role in supporting the rules-based international order.

Europe’s leaders realized their continent had to become more sovereign and autonomous—plainly put, more capable and responsible for world affairs. They had to step up to sustain the multilateral system. The EU, for example, increased its support for the World Health Organization. Trump’s threat to put economic sanctions on Europe sparked the continent’s leaders to strengthen the euro by further integrating their banks and financial systems and to sign trade agreements with new partners in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In terms of security, Trump’s attacks on Europe’s low defense spending and his threats to leave NATO pushed the EU to take steps toward establishing institutional, legal, and financial incentives for European countries to spend more on defense. The European Peace Facility, an EU mechanism to provide military assistance to other countries—which the EU has used since 2022 to provide military aid to Ukraine—was created in response to the pressure Trump put on the continent.

But other phenomena that emerged in the Trump years proved more difficult to manage—most important, his rhetorical attacks on law and order and centrist democracy. When Trump pressured Ukraine, in 2020, to damage his Democratic rival’s candidacy, he legitimized the tactic for other actors. Populist forces in Europe read off Trump’s harsh script when it came to immigration, hobbling EU efforts to enact a general policy on migration. Overall, Trump actively supported right-wing nationalists, populists, and anti-EU voices in Europe. As the EU heads into parliamentary elections in June 2024, there is a real risk that these emboldened forces will gain significant ground, shaping the EU’s future generation of leaders. Whether they do or not, Trump’s second candidacy is already encouraging nationalist figures such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

DOUBLE TROUBLE

Trump may well be more antagonistic to Europe and European values in a second term, dramatically increasing the risks to the continent’s security and aggravating its existing difficulties. A reelected Trump would be completely unchained from the old, pro-democracy Republican establishment. He would likely surround himself with loyal administrators who do not challenge him. Moreover, the world has grown accustomed to his outrageous statements and decisions, making individual transgressions feel less shocking and less crucial to resist.

The biggest immediate danger presented by a second Trump term is clear: Trump has already indicated he would end U.S. support for Ukraine. Although Europeans have been increasing their financial and military support to Kyiv, both bilaterally and using the EU’s toolbox, their efforts fall short of fully substituting for U.S. military assistance. In fact, the EU’s short-term military support to Ukraine constitutes only 55 percent of what the United States has offered. A scenario in which the United States completely terminates its assistance to Ukraine is not in the realm of fantasy, and it would require Europeans to more quickly and comprehensively support Ukraine.

The critical issue for the Europeans to understand is that the risk posed by a more isolationist United States goes beyond Europe’s eastern border. For decades, Europeans have tolerated significant shortfalls in their defense budgets and capabilities. This explains European countries’ limited capacity to ramp up defense industrial production to arm Ukraine and replenish stocks of ammunition and weaponry. Europeans reasonably assumed that the United States would take the lead in an emergency.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump at his New Hampshire primary election party, Nashua, New Hampshire, January 2024

Mike Segar / Reuters

The essential contribution the United States makes to European security is no longer primarily boots (and tanks) on the ground, as it was during the Cold War, but in domains such as intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, strategic air transport, air-to-air refueling, and space observation and communication. It also offers comfort in the form of nuclear deterrence and the ability to quickly deploy a significant volume of highly trained forces if needed. In practice, the United States is currently the only NATO ally that has a truly “full force” package.

The risks a second Trump presidency poses, however, go well beyond defense and security. Under Trump, the U.S.-Chinese relationship could further deteriorate. This would put European firms that operate in both jurisdictions in a difficult position: by threatening secondary sanctions, Trump could actively force European companies to cease operations in China or pressure Europeans to block Chinese investments in Europe. Trump has promised to impose a ten percent tariff on all imports if he is reelected, and the impact of such a move—were Congress to approve it—would be acutely felt in Europe. Europe could also see its digital sovereignty affected by the reelected U.S. president. For capabilities including geolocation, satellite-based communication, cloud computing, data privacy, and AI, Europe is dependent on the United States and vulnerable to disruption.

For decades, the deepening of democracy in Europe has been tied to U.S. influence. As recently as 2021, the Biden administration stepped up to defend freedom of the press in Poland by convincing the Polish president to veto a controversial media bill that would restrict who could own local broadcasters. If he gets a second term, Trump may well seek to further weaken democratic institutions in the United States, including the Department of Justice, and foment general disdain for the rule of law. This would embolden populists and Euroskeptic parties. The first Trump presidency already taught Europeans how a U.S. president’s political support for populists can practically endanger European unity.

THE BEST OFFENSE

Europeans want to preserve the cherished transatlantic relationship. But they need to urgently prepare for a weakened one. First, Europeans must more categorically shift their attitude toward Europe’s defense. In the immediate term, European leaders must ramp up the production and procurement of materiel to support Ukraine: Kyiv needs an estimated two million rounds of ammunition or more per year, as well as replacement artillery barrels, spare parts, and air defense systems. Europe must immediately decide whether to expand its ability to produce ammunition and other critical weapons. Some of the world’s foremost armament producers are European, and boosting their capabilities is practically and financially within reach, but it will require much more deliberate planning.

Even if Ukraine did not have such acute immediate requirements, Europe would need to increase its weapons and ammunition production, because European armies need to reconstitute their defense supplies and address shortfalls. The speed with which European countries have deployed troops to NATO’s eastern flank since 2022 has been impressive. But to ensure those forces’ long-term effectiveness, Europeans must improve their training and logistics planning. The continent must also build up its fleet of critical strategic enablers, such as drones and satellites, and develop its cyber and airlift capabilities.

This strategy will benefit from a concrete plan similar to the one the European Commission created to successfully fast-track the development and production of COVID-19 vaccines. Currently, European countries’ budget forecasts and planning cycles often fail to offer weapons manufacturers the assurances they need to increase production. In 2022, for example, Germany established an impressive $110 billion five-year emergency fund to rebuild its armed forces. In 2023, however, the German defense minister admitted that this will not be enough money.

Boosting Europe’s defense capacity is financially within reach, but it will require much more deliberate planning.

In 2022, European countries—both EU member states and NATO allies—spent a total of $350 billion on defense. A sustained effort by these countries to spend a minimum of two percent of their GDP on defense, or about $450 billion per year, would significantly reduce Europe’s dependence on the United States. The EU must play a stronger role as an accelerator and facilitator, using financial incentives and regulatory measures to mobilize member states and discourage unnecessary duplication of effort. Even if most defense spending remains national, the EU can use its budgetary resources for defense research and technology and to strengthen manufacturing capacity by placing joint orders to defense companies through the European Defense Agency or other collective mechanisms. It can employ the European Investment Bank and other financial tools to support this defense effort, as well as relax some fiscal and deficit constraints to favor defense investment.

All these goals require Europe to plan ahead because building defense capability takes time. Waiting to move until the U.S. election has been decided is not an option. The EU will not be able to quickly acquire the same skill in planning and commanding large-scale territorial defense operations that NATO has developed over 75 years. But Europeans can Europeanize the NATO command structure by deploying manpower and investing resources to cover for a U.S. retreat from the organization. A more European NATO might be able to adequately compensate a reduced American commitment even if the alliance loses some transatlantic backing. It would also address Trump’s recurring criticism that the United States shoulders too big a share of NATO’s tasks. And should the United States soften its commitment to provide nuclear deterrence to Europe, France and the United Kingdom—Europe’s two nuclear powers—must revisit their contribution to deterrence. All Europeans, too, will need to discuss effective policies that could prevent nuclear escalation.

RISKY BUSINESS

Because Europe is such an open economy and transatlantic trade relations run so deep, a more hostile United States can badly damage Europe. For now, the EU has no appropriate institutional framework to react to economic security risks from China—or from a more hostile United States. Economic security is mostly handled by member states, not the EU itself, and incongruent security policies on imports, exports, investments, and financial flows pose a growing threat to the European economy.

Consider digital security: the consequences of a second Trump presidency could be particularly severe in the digital space unless Europe acts now. European countries manufacture relatively little of their own cloud-computing systems, key software, and telecommunications infrastructure. They depend on both American and Chinese products. But when a European telecom operator active in several countries incorporates Chinese equipment into its infrastructure, security risks can easily spill over borders.

In the event of heightened political confrontation between China and the United States, Trump could threaten sanctions on major telecom operators who use Chinese equipment. The EU must have a ready, forceful response teed up or the EU telecommunications market could fragment. European countries must also work to reduce their dependence on Chinese telecommunications products to prepare for a tougher line from the White House.

Europe currently sources the lion’s share of its cloud-computing capacity—essential to military operations—from the United States. If Trump is reelected, he is likely to undo recent transatlantic efforts to cooperate on data privacy. To ensure legal immunity from foreign laws, EU countries may want to follow the examples of France, Italy, and Spain in demanding that cloud-computing services be exclusively provided by firms whose headquarters and staff are located in the EU. Even before the U.S. election, the EU can move to secure cooperation with the United States on digital matters; it is important to show the country’s leaders that such transatlantic cooperation also benefits the United States. European leaders, for instance, could already begin cooperating more closely with Washington on AI governance, setting standards that limit harmful applications of AI technologies.

The consequences of a second Trump presidency could be particularly severe in the digital space.

China is increasingly investing in European strategic infrastructure, illuminating the problem of having an integrated market without properly integrated security. In 2016, the Netherlands allowed major Chinese investments into the Rotterdam port, and in 2023, the China Ocean Shipping Company took a share in the port of Hamburg. But the EU could not formally weigh in on either the Dutch or the German decision, even though goods arriving in Rotterdam are not primarily destined for the Dutch market but make their way throughout the entire EU.

The EU, as an institution, is also weak on export restrictions and sanctions policy. The exporting of dual-use high-tech goods is often limited by individual countries, sometimes under pressure from the United States. The Dutch government’s recent decision, for instance, to limit the export of Dutch lithography machines needed to produce top-performing semiconductor chips affected the entire EU. It required Zeiss, a German company, to ensure that the components it supplies for those machines are not instead delivered directly to China, undermining the Netherlands’ export restriction, and the German government has even been debating whether German engineers who know how to develop these machines should be banned from working in China. As for sanctions, the EU has been able to pass 12 sanctions packages against Russia. But unanimity requirements make decisions slow, and enforcement remains imperfect.

Because Trump favors bilateral relations over working with the EU, it is EU oversight of economic security that must be improved, lest individual countries diverge even further on their policies. The EU needs to commit to institutional reforms—for instance, moving from requiring a unanimous vote to approve some economic-security policies to allowing their adoption with majority votes. It should also establish an economic security committee, staffed by economists and security experts from EU institutions, as well as member states, to undertake security assessments of decisions that affect the whole EU.

Protectionist policies instituted by Trump would damage the world, but they could particularly harm the EU. Europe must become more economically competitive by forging trade agreements with third markets—especially given the U.S. reluctance to define its trade policy—and deepening its single market. The EU has not sufficiently integrated its single market, particularly the financial, digital, and service sectors. More integrated banking and capital markets would provide businesses with much-needed funding and would support entrepreneurs, who too often leave the EU to get access to U.S. venture capital. Furthering the EU’s economic integration has a political purpose, too. To counter the rise of populism in countries such as France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, the EU must show that more economic integration can help ordinary citizens.

LANGUAGE LESSONS

Perhaps the greatest risk Trump poses to Europe is to its values: multilateralism, care for the environment, the rule of law, and democracy itself. Through his rhetoric, Trump degrades the worth of these principles in public opinion. Europe needs to start preparing now to withstand that pressure internally, girding itself to better defend the rule of law within its borders. A potentially powerful EU instrument to protect the rule of law has existed since the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam: a procedure outlined in Article 7 of the EU treaty that allows member states to sanction a country when it commits “a serious and persistent breach” of European values. In effect, however, this instrument has often been toothless, because other EU states must agree unanimously that a member state undermined the rule of law.

To get around this unanimity requirement, in 2021 the EU adopted a regulation allowing the European Commission to suspend certain payments from its budget if only a qualified majority of EU states found that a member state had breached EU values. The effectiveness of this regulation is currently being tested: the EU is now withholding, for instance, some COVID-19 recovery funds from Hungary after finding that the country had persistently breached the rule of law. But if the EU is serious about defending its principles, it should not shy away from considering the use of treaty provisions that suspend a member state’s voting rights in the European Council.

The EU must also promote democracy in its direct neighborhood by using the most effective tool it has: EU enlargement. Previous rounds of expansion have shown that the EU accession process itself gives the body considerable leverage to transform the governance and political culture of applicant countries. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has given the accession process new meaning and urgency. The EU should aim for another major big bang enlargement round by 2030: setting a concrete date for such an expansion would motivate some applicant countries to undertake reforms and strengthen their democracies with a view toward fulfilling the conditions to enter the EU.

Europe can no longer rely on the United States to be a consistent partner, no matter who’s in charge.

Worldwide, Europe must become more outspoken and determined in defending democracy, the rule of law, and multilateralism. Europe is already a keystone to global efforts to protect the climate and defend against threats to public health; ahead of a potential Trump reelection, it needs to work hard to keep its global partners rallied behind those goals. The EU should also use its existing partnerships with advanced and developing economies more strategically. The EU’s Global Gateway Initiative could serve as the backbone for deeper trade, investment, and financial partnerships with developing countries that support international cooperation in a world characterized by U.S. isolationism and growing geopolitical rivalry. Many developing countries have long looked to the United States as an example of the dividends that democracy pays. They have also depended on Washington for material support. European leaders must step up so the world can also look to Europe.

Even if Trump does not win in November, Europe has work to do. It may simply no longer be able to rely on the United States to be a consistent partner, no matter who’s in charge. The United States is already making foreign policy moves without consulting Europe, especially in the economic sphere. President Joe Biden’s 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, for instance, was also an act of protectionism. Using subsidies and domestic production requirements, it induced European firms to relocate to the United States at a cost to Europe’s economy. Both Republican and Democratic lawmakers have made it clear that they intend to prioritize the Indo-Pacific going forward, and circumstances may draw U.S. military efforts toward the Middle East and Asia. The partisanship that roils the U.S. Congress will likely become an increasingly difficult obstacle to a flourishing transatlantic relationship. And the worrying state of America’s democracy at home is likely to absorb more political energy than European priorities such as battling climate change.

Europe handled aspects of Trump’s first presidency surprisingly well. But it needs to grow more as wars flare and climate change accelerates. Surveys regularly show that European citizens want the EU to play a larger role in solving global challenges. In 2024, EU leaders must heed their desires by making bold, concrete moves to boost European defense, secure their countries’ economic sovereignty, and protect democratic values.

Should Trump be reelected, the risks to Europe’s unity will be substantial. Some European leaders may feel tempted to forge bilateral deals with the United States to try to guarantee their country’s security in the short term. But Europeans need to remember that Trump cannot be relied on—and that the United States cannot guarantee Europe’s security forever. Instead of gambling on national self-reliance, they should bet on a more integrated Europe.

The European Parliament election in June presents an opportunity. A business-as-usual election campaign would not do justice to the challenges that may lie ahead. Instead, political parties need to debate fundamental strategic choices and make the defense of democracy and EU institutional reform a key part of their appeals. The message the EU sends in its election campaign must be a strong counterpoint to an isolationist, antidemocratic rhetoric: Europe will be able to protect its own borders, defend human rights, help safeguard open trade, fight climate change, and champion democracy, even if the United States won’t. And the United States may, in fact, be able to look to Europe for help and inspiration if it stumbles.

• ARANCHA GONZÁLEZ LAYA is Dean of the Paris School of International Affairs at Sciences Po and the former Foreign Minister of Spain.
• CAMILLE GRAND is a Distinguished Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and an Associate Professor at the Paris School of International Affairs at Sciences Po. From 2016 to 2022, he served as an Assistant Secretary-General of NATO.
• KATARZYNA PISARSKA is Chair of the Warsaw Security Forum, President of the European Academy of Diplomacy, and Professor at the Warsaw School of Economics.
• NATHALIE TOCCI is Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome, a Professor at the School of Transnational Governance at the European University Institute, and Europe’s Futures Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna.
• GUNTRAM WOLFF is Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations and a Professor at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy.

Foreign Affairs · February 2, 2024

12. A silent killer is stalking veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan

A silent killer is stalking veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan

Cancer strikes GWOT vets at rates that recall Agent Orange. We’re not doing enough to support them.

defenseone.com · by Ethan Brown

In this 2010 photo taken in Camp Taji, Iraq, bird flock around a tractor moving trash into a burn pit. Mayra Beltran / Houston Chronicle via Getty Image

Cancer strikes GWOT vets at rates that recall Agent Orange. We’re not doing enough to support them.

By Ethan Brown

Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress

February 1, 2024 02:46 PM ET

On Dec. 9, the Air Force special operations community mourned Alan Yoshida, a combat controller who deployed with an Army Special Forces team into Afghanistan in the first days of the Global War on Terror in 2001. Yoshida, who spent years recovering from wounds sustained in an errant bomb strike, is remembered for developing safety technologies to protect his close air support colleagues. But he could not escape the silent killer that stalks so many GWOT veterans: cancer.

Yoshida’s story is far too common. While I was recently interviewing combat veterans for a forthcoming history on the War on Terror, two other service members from a small sample of sources notified me that they too were battling cancer: a British soldier who served in Iraq and Afghanistan spent this year undergoing treatment for lymphoma, and a German Army air controller with multiple Afghanistan rotations had just been diagnosed with prostate cancer.

In fact, combat veterans of the post-9/11 wars are disproportionately affected by cancer. When the War on Terror officially ended on December 31, 2022, the Pentagon’s official count noted 3,965 U.S. service members had been killed in direct combat, while a further 1,180 died in incidents not directly related to combat (accidents, suicides, illnesses, and injuries). In total, our nation’s longest war claimed 5,145 service members, an average of 257 per year.

Yet between January and May of last year, 108 GWOT combat veterans are known to have died of cancer, according to researchers at the Hunter Seven Foundation. That’s nearly equivalent to the pace at which servicemembers died in combat during the war. And those 108 cases represent only the ones reported to the Foundation. An estimated two to three million U.S. service members were deployed in America’s post-9/11 wars, according to statistics collated by the National Library of Medicine. More than 500,000 have been diagnosed with some form of cancer since 2001.

That is an inordinately high rate of cancer in an otherwise healthy cohort of individuals under 40 years old, according to a 2020 study in the Journal of Military Medicine, that suggested combat and other service-specific factors as possible causes.

And yet this quiet epidemic has gone largely unreported, sparking little action. The current silence is hauntingly similar to the indifference Vietnam veterans experienced following their service in Southeast Asia, which left more than 650,000 of them suffering from Agent Orange exposure and subsequent cancers and other exposure morbidities.

In the long fight to pass the 2022 PACT (Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics) Act in Congress—which mandates health coverage for broad toxic exposures for GWOT and Gulf War veterans—it came to light that as recently as 2021 the Veterans Administration (VA) was denying 80 percent of Gulf War sickness claims. Until 2020, the VA was also denying nearly 80 percent of GWOT veterans’ claims of burn pit injuries. After the passage of the PACT Act last year, the VA has processed some 843,500 claims related to burn pit and other toxic exposures, roughly an 80 percent acceptance rate for claims.

Yet the passage of the PACT act is only an important first step. Congress and the federal government must be less reactive, and more preventive, in understanding and dealing with the causes of this insidious threat that is stalking our service members. In the long decades after 9/11, America’s combat veterans had our back. It’s past time that we had theirs.

Ethan Brown is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress, and a former Air Force Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC).

13. In Ukraine and the Middle East, only force can restore deterrence

Excerpts:

These lessons are in full view in these two wars. While we may dislike the lessons, the results of disregarding them are now indisputable facts. And facts, as both John Adams and Nikita Khrushchev have reminded us, are stubborn things.

In Ukraine and the Middle East, only force can restore deterrence

BY STEPHEN BLANK, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 02/01/24 12:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4440250-in-ukraine-and-the-middle-east-only-force-can-restore-deterrence/

By killing three U.S. reservists, Iran and its proxies have forced the questions of deterrence and escalation to the forefront of U.S. policymaking. However, these questions are not confined to the wars now roiling the Middle East, but apply equally to the war in Ukraine, Chinese threats of aggression against Taiwan and in the South China Sea and the increasing danger of a North Korean attack against South Korea.  

All of these threats are, to one degree or another, ripostes to our inadequate thinking about escalation and deterrence.  

The administration’s view is that Washington and its allies must avoid escalating the situation in the Middle East to a general regional war and turning the conventional war in Ukraine into a potential nuclear war. To that end, it has sought to restrain Israel and push them toward a two-state solution. It has also constrained the shipment of weapons to Ukraine, the consequences of which have already been seen there. Likewise, it has only struck back at Iran’s proxies a few times, despite over 150 attacks on U.S. forces and personnel.  

However, these efforts to avoid escalation have been resounding failures. The Houthis and other Iranian proxies are clearly undeterred. Likewise, Russian President Vladimir Putin firmly believes the West is disorganized, demoralized, unwilling to sustain Ukraine’s defense and, in general, an effete society whose time has passed. Therefore, he is or at least professes to be confident in Russia’s victory.

This underscores the point that the issue is not to avoid escalation but to restore deterrence by retaking control of the escalation process and depriving our enemies of that leverage. Sadly, our previous failure to grasp what deterrence in these cases entails has now made the discriminating use of force necessary.  

Admittedly these unique situations require tailored actions to restore deterrence. But for both, tailoring our responses with strategic and discriminating uses of force is, nonetheless, necessary. If we focus on preventing escalation rather than restoring deterrence, we will get more escalation and less deterrence.  

Since the issue is regaining control of the “escalation ladder”, which enables the U.S. and allies in both theaters to restore deterrence, we must now act resolutely. The U.S. and NATO must provide Ukraine with the weapons it needs to defeat Russia and regain its prewar territorial integrity and sovereignty. That also means providing for its membership in NATO and the regeneration of the alliance’s military capability for as long as Russia, under Putin or his successors, insists on a European empire.  

By restoring conventional deterrence in Europe, we prevent similar wars and regain control over escalatory processes. We also strengthen nuclear deterrence, meaning Russia’s habitual resort to bloodcurdling nuclear threats will diminish over time, if not disappear entirely, especially under a new Russian regime. 

Reestablishing deterrence means using disproportionate force against Iran and its proxies not only to convey resolution but also to impose unaffordable costs on Iran for allowing its proxies free rein against the U.S. and its regional allies — the real target in the Red Sea and Jordan.

Ariel Sharon famously remarked that terrorism has an address, the implication being that those charged with deterrence should send a direct message to control escalation and reestablish peace. We should, therefore, send Iran and its proxies a direct show of force, and do so decisively and in disproportionate terms. 

In Ukraine, we need to restore conventional deterrence and reinforce nuclear deterrence. We must dispel the notion that Russia or anyone else can simply start a war against the U.S., its interests and its allies and use the threat of escalation into a wider or even a nuclear war to prevail. Sustaining partners and allies in Ukraine is the sole path to peace and security.  

These lessons are in full view in these two wars. While we may dislike the lessons, the results of disregarding them are now indisputable facts. And facts, as both John Adams and Nikita Khrushchev have reminded us, are stubborn things.

Stephen Blank, Ph.D., is a Foreign Policy Research Institute senior fellow and independent consultant focused on the geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasia. He is a former professor of Russian national security studies and national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and a former MacArthur fellow at the U.S. Army War College. 

14. Military hospitals still chasing bugs out of $4.3 billion digital health records system

Military hospitals still chasing bugs out of $4.3 billion digital health records system

Stars and Stripes · by Jeremy Stillwagner and Kelly Agee · February 2, 2024

U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka, pictured here in June 2023, serves patients at Yoksuka Naval Base, Japan. (Jennessa Davey/Stars and Stripes)

YOKOTA AIR BASE, Japan — Three months after Military Health System Genesis debuted at military hospitals in Japan, the digital recordkeeping and appointment system’s shortcomings are leaving some patients and medical professionals frustrated.

Patients at most bases in Japan have been unable to use MHS Genesis to book visits at local clinics since the system came online in October, said Maj. Mark Pomerleau, the officer responsible for its installation at Yokota Air Base, the home of U.S. Forces Japan in western Tokyo.

That function, which requires patients to search by their primary care manager or appointment type, was deliberately disabled at many hospitals in Japan because of the added work it caused.

“It lets you select any provider in the world, which, as you can imagine, is hundreds if not thousands,” Pomerleau, chief nursing informatics officer for Yokota’s 374th Medical Group, told Stars and Stripes on Jan. 23.

“If we were to enable online booking, a patient in Alabama or Germany could book appointments in our slots,” he added.

Medical facilities at Yokosuka Naval Base, Sasebo Naval Base and Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni have also disabled the appointment function, Yokosuka Naval Hospital spokesman Daniel Taylor said an email Friday.

The hospital is working with MHS Genesis’ deployment team to open online appointments as soon as possible, Taylor wrote. “We apologize for any inconvenience and hope to have this option available soon,” he said.

MHS Genesis became operational at military bases in the Pacific Northwest in 2017, followed by elsewhere in the United States and then European bases last September.

Indo-Pacific bases began implementing the system in October. By Jan. 13, installation was completed for Guam, its final overseas location, according to an email Thursday from Defense Health Agency spokesman Peter Graves.

Japanese and American ambulances park outside the 374th Medical Group building at Yokota Air Base, Japan, in March 2023. (Kelly Agee/Stars and Stripes)

In Genesis’ early days in Japan, staff spent “a considerable amount of their day scrubbing their appointments to figure out if the patient belongs with their clinic and making a lot of phone calls, which causes a lot of headaches for the staff,” Pomerleau said.

A fix is in the works, Pomerleau said, but he had no information on how long that’s expected to take.

Graves said the problem with the appointment function is part of an adjustment period.

“Each military hospital and clinic choose when they are ready to implement that capability once local conditions are properly set to accommodate online booking,” he said. “This is a normal part of the MHS Genesis deployment.”

MHS Genesis was developed as a “state-of-the-market electronic health record system” for the Military Health System under a $4.3 billion contract signed in 2015 with Leidos Partnership for Defense Health. The partnership includes the Leidos, Accenture, Oracle and Henry Schein One corporations.

The system’s rollout was delayed while the Defense Department reviewed and tested it for functionality and cybersecurity, according to a November 2016 health.mil newsletter, The Scope.

Among other improvements, MHS Genesis has smoothed communication between patients and medical care providers through its patient portal, Pomerleau said.

But a military spouse who visited Naval Hospital Yokosuka at the Navy base south of Tokyo on Jan. 4 said the system slowed health care providers’ response to her medical emergency.

At every step, an MHS Genesis problem popped up, said the spouse, who spoke to Stars and Stripes on condition of anonymity to discuss a personal health matter.

The woman arrived at the hospital with abdominal pain, she said by phone Jan. 25. She required surgery, but getting checked in and provided the appropriate pain relief after surgery was complicated by MHS Genesis, she said.

“I was up in the recovery room and in a tremendous amount of pain,” she said.

The medical staff was trying to help, the woman said, but MHS Genesis seemed to be crashing or refusing to accept her information.

“I got to the point where I looked at [the medical staff]. They’re like, ‘We’re trying to get into the system and it’s just not registering it. We’re trying to get it set up so that it will give us the medication to put into it.’ ”

“And I was like, ‘Please … I can’t take this pain.’ It was horrible,” she said.

She was accompanied that day by friend Alexandra Cummings, the spouse of a Navy contractor at Yokosuka.

“Thankfully, she was one of the only patients there, but I can’t imagine on a busy night if you have three or four people having medical issues, and you can’t get the medications,” Cummings said by Facebook Messenger on Jan. 19. “It felt like Genesis was sucking up time and energy from intelligent, skilled professionals.”

In response, Taylor said laws governing patient confidentiality forbid the naval hospital from discussing the woman’s case. But the hospital delivers health care according to U.S. medical standards “and the health and wellness of every patient is our priority,” he said.

Cummings previously worked for a company that made software for the government. Software updates like Genesis come with “a certain amount of difficulty with transition and training,” she said.

“To me, the company needs to work on that user interface so that it behaves in a way that does the job in the way that the professionals that are using it expected it to,” she said.

Stars and Stripes reporter Jonathan Snyder contributed to this report.

Stars and Stripes · by Jeremy Stillwagner and Kelly Agee · February 2, 2024

15.  Ukraine Sinks Russian Navy Missile Corvette In Drone Boat Attack

Ukraine Sinks Russian Navy Missile Corvette In Drone Boat Attack

The Russian corvette Ivanovets was hit by six Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessels and sunk in the Black Sea, Ukraine’s spy boss told us.

BYHOWARD ALTMAN|PUBLISHED FEB 1, 2024 1:27 PM EST

twz.com · by Howard Altman · February 1, 2024

A dramatic new view released by the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) shows several of its uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) strike and sink the Russian Tarantul-III class missile corvette Ivanovets. The attack took place Wednesday night local time on the Black Sea near Lake Donuzlav in western Crimea, the GUR said on its Telegram channel.

A 128-second video posted on Twitter shows what appears to be a complex attack on the Ivanovets by what Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, commander of GUR, told us were Maritime Autonomous Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus (MAGURA V5) USVs operated by the GUR’s Group 13 drone unit.

“In the course of special (active) measures in the period from Jan. 31 to Feb. 1, the department planned and carried out the destruction of" the Ivanovets "on the raid of Lake Donuzlav,” Budanov told us. “During the destruction of the specified ship, six direct hits by naval drones were made to the hull of the ship. As a result of the damage, the ship rolled astern and sank. According to preliminary data, the search and rescue operation conducted by the enemy was not successful.”

The video, however, appears to show three USVs hitting the corvette.

The first is seen approaching the Ivanovets on the starboard side as the corvette is underway. The USV then makes a sharp turn to the left and advances toward the Ivanovets’ stern. A bright flash is seen as the USV explodes upon impact.

A bright flash is seen as the first MAGURA V5 USV hits the Ivanovets astern. (GUR screencap)

At around the 21-second mark, a second USV comes into view, speeding toward the stricken ship in a zig-zag pattern as it avoids the vessel’s 30 mm AK-630M Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) firing at it in a desperate and unsuccessful attempt to stop it. That USV hits the Ivanovets at around the 38-second mark astern on the port side.

Another USV strikes the Ivanovets around midship on the port side at the 48-second mark. It hit where another USV previously created a large gash.

The USV strikes caused a gaping hole amidship on the Ivanovets. (GUR screencap)

The video ends with the missile corvette sinking stern-first as the bow protrudes from the water.

The Ivanovets is captured on video sinking stern first in the Black Sea. (GUR screencap)

The attack took place more than 130 miles from the nearest Ukrainian port, though it is possible the USVs could have been launched from a mothership further out into the Black Sea. Budanov declined to specify the USV’s launch point.

While the Russian Defense Ministry had not addressed the sinking as of noon Eastern time, several Russian Telegram channels confirmed it.

“The Ivanovets MRK sank while repelling a night attack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Sevastopol,” the Russian VoenkorKotenok Telegram channel wrote. “The ship took three hits from naval drones. The crew fought until the last to keep the ship afloat.”

A retired Russian Navy officer who uses the @Capt_Navy twitter handle confirmed it to The War Zone.

“Yes, the rocket boat has sunk,” he told us.

Created by the Ukrainian state enterprise “SpetsTechnoExport,” the MAGURA V5 is a 5.5 meter (18 feet)-long USV with a range of 450 nautical miles, a cruising speed of 22 knots and a burst speed of 42 knots thanks to its waterjet propulsion and streamlined hull, according to according to the Ukrainian Militarnyi media outlet. Sitting a half meter (1.6 feet) above the waterline with a payload capacity of 320 kilograms (705 pounds), the Magura V5 packs a significant punch in a hard-to-spot USV. The company says it communicates via mesh radio with an air-based repeater and/or SATCOM.

As we have written about previously, GUR used MAGURA V5 drones in the past. In one case, they destroyed two Russian landing craft docked at a Russian Navy base in Chornomorske, in western Crimea on Nov. 10. GUR released a video of that attack at the time, which you can see below.

It's unclear when the MAGURA V5 was first used in combat, but it was introduced publicly at the International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF) in Turkey in July, according to Militanaryi.

Also in July, a CNN report on Ukraine's USV program included video that shows the MAGURA V5. While CNN does not name the USV, it's the same USV depicted in the images released on Russian Telegram previously, but there are some differences in terms of sub-component configuration.

A few weeks later, the Russians claimed they captured a V5, marking the second known time that Russia has gotten its hands on a Ukrainian USV.

As we reported in September 2022, an early version of a Ukrainian USV was found beached in Sevastopol. It was the first time we had ever seen a Ukrainian USV and it was a month before Ukraine unleashed its drone boat campaign against Russian naval assets, starting with a massive attack on Sevastopol.

The first appearance of a Ukrainian USV was in September 2022, and it too fell into Russian hands.

The 56-meter-long Ivanovets was commissioned on Dec. 30, 1989 and received its current name on Oct. 29, 1998, according to the semi-official Black Sea Fleet website. It has a top speed of up to 41 knots and a crew of up to 45.

The Russian Tarantul-III class missile corvette Ivanovets. (Russian Black Sea Fleet website)

On July 21, 2023, the Ivanovets “carried out live firing of anti-ship cruise missiles at a target ship” in a combat training rage in the northwestern part of the Black Sea, the Russian Defense Ministry (MoD) said on its Telegram channel at the time.

From our story at the time: "The ship reportedly fired P-270 Moskit supersonic anti-ship missiles, whose NATO reporting name is the SS-N-22 Sunburn. They have conventional and nuclear warhead capacity, are capable of flying at a speed three times the speed of sound and have a range of around 75 miles. The missiles were aimed at the corvette Ternopil, according to the Ukrainian OperativnoZSU Telegram channel. The Ternopil, once one of Ukraine's most capable warships, was captured by Russia when it seized Crimea in 2014. The Russian MoD released video showing the missiles being launched, then the target vessel exploding. The target was destroyed, according to the Russian MoD."

The attack on the Ivanovets is part of Ukraine's asymmetrical offense against the Russian Navy that we have written about frequently.

Budanov vowed that that this won't be the last such attack against a Russian warship. And he shared with us a message for Moscow.

"Get ready," he said.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

twz.com · by Howard Altman · February 1, 2024

16. Inside China's execution conveyor belt

Inside China's execution conveyor belt: How 'mobile injection vans and firing squads are used to put thousands to death a year' - outstripping capital punishment figures for the rest of the world combined

• Under China's draconian laws, as many as 46 crimes carry the death sentence
• For Beijing, the number of people it executes each year is a closely guarded secret, but rights groups estimate it to be in the thousands 

By CHRIS JEWERS

PUBLISHED: 10:47 EST, 1 February 2024 | UPDATED: 12:59 EST, 1 February 2024

Daily Mail · by Chris Jewers · February 1, 2024

Mobile death vans, firing squads, lethal injections: These are all methods used by China to carry out more state-sanctioned executions than all other nations combined.

While the communist state does not release its official figures, rights groups believe many thousands of people are executed each year - more than the likes of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the US, even when tallied together.

Criminal law in the country is as severe as it is obfuscated, with many crimes punishable by death under Beijing's draconian legislation.

Death sentences are frequently handed down for crimes ranging from drug trafficking to murder, but also white collar crimes such as corruption.

According to a report published in 2021, China's Penal Code of 1997 - which is still in force today - has 46 crimes punishable by death, including 24 violent crimes and 22 non-violent crimes.

While the number of such crimes has slowly reduced (in 1979 it was 74, according to the Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty), executions remain widespread, creating what Amnesty International calls a 'conveyor belt of executions'.

In 2022, the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty said that at least 8,000 people per year were executed in China from 2007.

Criminal law in the country is as severe as it is obfuscated, with many crimes punishable by death under Beijing 's draconian legislation. Pictured: Police parade a group of convicts at a sentencing rally in Wenzhou, 2004. People are often handed death sentences at such rally

Excluding China, Amnesty International said it had recorded 883 executions in 2022 - a huge jump from 579 in 2021. After China, it said Iran had executed around 570 people, followed by Saudi Arabia, which executed 196. But China's total outstripped them all, and is estimated to be more than all other countries combined

The death penalty in China made headlines this week, when on Wednesday the country executed a couple for killing two young children, as well as a son who was executed for bludgeoning his mother to death with a dumbbell.

The case of the couple in particular, who threw the children out of a window of an apartment building, caused nationwide outrage.

Zhang Bo and Ye Chengchen were found responsible for the fatal falls of the two-year-old girl and one-year-old boy from the 15th floor of a residential tower in southwest China's Chongqing.

Zhang, who was the father of the two children, had begun an affair with Ye, who was initially unaware he was married and had children.

She then urged Zhang to kill his two children, which she 'regarded as obstacles' to their getting married and a 'burden on their future life together', the Chongqing No. 5 Intermediate People's Court said in a statement.

In November 2020, Zhang threw his children out of the window of the apartment in the absence of their mother, with whom he had agreed to divorce.

Both were found guilty of conspiring 'to kill his daughter and younger son by staging an accidental fall from the 15th floor of his apartment building', state-backed China Daily reported last year, and sentenced to death in December 2021.

They were executed on Wednesday, the court said.

The news came the same day as another high-profile execution - of Wu Xieyu, found guilty of killing his mother by repeatedly striking her with a dumbbell in 2015, a statement by a court in eastern Fujian province said.

Zhang and Ye's crime sent shock waves across China for its cold-blooded premeditation, as well as the youth of the victims.

Their executions quickly rose to the top of a list of trending topics on Chinese social media site Weibo on Wednesday, receiving nearly 200 million views.

'Today is truly a good day,' read one widely liked comment under a related post by state news agency Xinhua. 'The punishment fits the crime', wrote another.

Father Zhang Bo and his girlfriend Ye Chengchen (pictured together) were previously found responsible for the fatal falls of the two children from the 15th floor of a residential tower in southwest China's Chongqing. They were executed on Wednesday

Wu Xieyu (pictured on CCTV in 2016), 30, a former Peking university student, was found guilty of repeatedly striking his mother Xie Tianqin with a dumbbell before wrapping her body in layers of plastic film and sealing her in her room in 2015. He was also executed

While these cases were made public, China keeps data on its use of the death penalty secret. Nevertheless, details have emerged from the country.

Despite the number crimes punishable by death being reduced, the Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty says the number of executions has largely remained stable.

It puts this down to the fact that some of the crimes punishable by death include imparting criminal methods, or stealing ancient relics or ancient vertebrates - crimes that are not common.

While Beijing has removed the death penalty attached to some of these crimes, more common criminal practices that carry the penalty remain prevalent.

But Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty says that only a small number of death sentences and executions are ever made public.

It does note, however, that 2007 saw a significant reduction in the number of executions when the Supreme People's Court took over the power to review sentences. For 27 years before 2007, it had delegated the responsibility.

There have been glimpses into China's 'conveyor belt of executions' over the years, with videos and pictures emerging of public 'execution rallies' and summary killings.

Perhaps one of the most shocking revelations was that Beijing deploys 'execution vans,' also known as a mobile execution unit.

Perhaps one of the most shocking revelations was that Beijing deploys 'execution vans,' also known as a mobile execution unit, which travels to the person set to be executed. The convict is put in the back of the truck and administered a lethal injection

The vans allows roaming death squads to carry out state-sanctioned killings without the need to move the prisoner to an execution ground.

From what we do know about the vans, they tend to be converted 24-seat buses.

On the outside, they appear as normal police vehicles, with no external markings to indicate what it is used for. On the inside, however, is an execution chamber.

According to reports, the rear of the vehicle houses a windowless chamber where the execution itself takes place.

Several CCTV cameras are also present in the van, meaning the execution can be recorded or watched if officials desire to monitor it.

A bed slides out from the wall of the van, to which the convicted criminal is strapped. A syringe is then put into their arm by a technician, before a police official administers the lethal injection by pressing a button.

The concept of the vans, which reports suggest were first used in the late 1990s, have drawn comparisons to larger models developed by the Nazis in the Second World War to gas Jewish prisoners during the Holocaust.

China has previously insisted their death vans are 'progress', being cheaper to run than execution facilities and removes the need to transport prisoners.

In 2012, a spectator appeared to capture an execution by firing on camera (pictured)

Footage showed police officers leading a man out into a clearing near a village, as a crowd of people watched from a nearby overpass, before shooting him in the back of the head

China is also reported to use firing squads as a means of executing prisoners.

While the practice was meant to have been discontinued in 2010 in favour of the use of lethal injections, the use of firing squads have been recorded since.

In one case, a man who stabbed nine school children - Zhao Zewei - was shot dead by a firing squad in 2018, in front of a crowd of villagers.

There have also been examples of summary executions in China - where a person accused of a crime is executed immediately upon being deemed guilty, although often without the benefit of a faie and free trial.

The country's justice system is notorious for favouring prosecutors, with Chinese courts having a 99.9 percent conviction rate.

In 2017, China sentenced 10 people to death, mostly for drugs related crimes.

In scenes reminiscent of the early days of the People's Republic, when capitalists and landlords were rounded up and publicly denounced, the 10 people were tried outdoors in front of a large public crowd.

They were executed immediately after their sentencing in Guangdong.

In another case in 2014, 55 people were sentenced in a stadium in front of 7,000 spectators, before many were carted off by police to be executed.

In 2012, a spectator appeared to capture an execution on camera.

Footage showed police officers leading a man out into a clearing near a village, as a crowd of people watched from a nearby overpass.

The man is seen being taken into the middle of the clearing, where he is photographed, made to kneel, before a gun is aimed at the back of his head.

He is then shown being shot dead by a police officer.

Police parade prisoners during an execution rally at a stadium in Kunming, the capital of China's southwestern Yunnan province, 26 June 2001

Chinese police show a group of hardcore convicts at a sentencing rally in the east Chinese city of Wenzhou, 07 April 2004

Police officers stand guard behind suspects during a public sentencing rally in Baokang, central China's Hubei province September 28, 2007

It is not just violent or drug crimes that carry the death penalty in China.

In January 2021, Chinese tycoon and senior government official Lai Xiaomi was sentenced to death for receiving bribes and committing bigamy.

The 58-year-old was accused of soliciting $300 million in bribes from 2008 to 2018, and of starting a secret family while married to his wife.

He is reported to have confessed on state television of stockpiling luxury cars and gold bars through his role as China's state banking regulator.

He was executed January 29, 2021 - 24 days after his sentencing.

Another shocking factor in China's use of the death penalty is the practice of organ harvesting, which benefits from the country's high numbers of executions.

The vans in particular are said to be a key part of China's organ trade, with a 2012 estimate suggesting 65 percent of donated organs came from executed people.

So many prisoners are executed in the vans, reports suggest, to meet the high demand for organs.

Convicted murderer Naw Kham is seen being taken to his execution in March 2013 in China

Activists say bodies are quickly cremated - making it impossible for the families of those executed to determine if their organs have been removed.

According to the figures released by Amnesty International last year, China was far and away the most prolific executing country.

Excluding China, the group said it had recorded 883 executions in 2022 - a huge jump from 579 in 2021. After China, it said Iran had executed around 570 people, followed by Saudi Arabia, which executed 196.

Like China, other countries do not release their death sentence figures, such as Vietnam and North Korea, but even then are not estimated to kill as many people as Beijing does - which likely executed well over 1,000 people in 2022.

Daily Mail · by Chris Jewers · February 1, 2024

17.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com