Greetings from Camp Humphreys, Korea.

Camp Humphreys: the largest US military base outside the continental US. It cost some $7.8 billion, and some 93% of the costs were provided by Korea outside the SMA/burden sharing process. It is actually quite a gift to the US military and the ROK/US alliance.

Quotes of the Day:

"Always forgive your enemies; nothing annoys them so much." 

– Oscar Wilde

"One of the lessons of history is that nothing is often a good thing to do and always a clever thing to say." 

– Will Durant

"Be great in act, as you have been in thought." 

–mWilliam Shakespeare

1. How Russians and the West Failed Navalny

2. Brave Russian Tributes for Alexei Navalny

3. Israel Sets Deadline for Rafah Ground Offensive Within Weeks

4. Aboard a U.S. Aircraft Carrier, a Front-Row Seat to China Tensions

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2024

6. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 18, 2024

7. Can Loose Lips Sink an Alliance?

8. Houthi Rebels Cry Havoc! And Let Slip the Drones of War

9. 'There’s only Plan A': Defense leaders fear failure in Ukraine

10. Worrywurst at the Munich Security Conference

11. The Moral Blindness of Putin’s Apologists on the Right

12. A Reconsideration of Women’s Role in Special Operations: Critical Questions, Mooted a Decade After the Fact

13. Special forces blocked UK resettlement applications from elite Afghan troops

14. Generally speaking, Don Bolduc, now a Pittsfield police officer, has tested himself for years 

15. NATO Ally Pledges All Its Artillery to Ukraine in Boost for Kyiv

16. The Liberum Veto: A History and a Warning

17. US Army under increasing pressure as it foots bill for Ukraine support

1. How Russians and the West Failed Navalny

Conclusion:

Alexei Navalny was a man of courage and action, and only courage and action can honor him now.

How Russians and the West Failed Navalny

The dissident might still be alive if his countrymen showed the same courage that Ukrainians have.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-russians-and-the-west-failed-navalny-putin-prison-regime-ukraine-biden-0bc32803?mod=hp_opin_pos_3#cxrecs_s

By Garry Kasparov

Feb. 19, 2024 12:01 pm ET

A photo of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny at a makeshift memorial in Frankfurt, Germany, Feb. 16. PHOTO: -/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Munich

Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny was murdered in a prison north of the Arctic Circle on Friday. There is no need for semantic blame games when a political prisoner dies. There are no natural causes or accidents in the gulag. It’s murder by dictatorship, as damning as if Vladimir Putin pulled the trigger himself.

Mr. Putin tried and failed to kill Navalny quickly and secretly with poison in 2020, and now he has murdered him slowly and publicly in prison. Navalny’s only crime was to expose Mr. Putin and his mafia as the bandits they are, and to do it with charisma and humor.

Navalny and I disagreed on many things about the past and future of Russia, as he did with many in the broad anti-Putin coalition. But we agreed that Mr. Putin had to go, and that none of the disagreements among us would matter until that happened.

Now Alexei is dead, and with him the last gasp of Russian society that failed him, failed Russia and failed the world with its apathy. He was a man of optimism and action in a country of nihilism and inaction, a tragic condition he shared with me and our colleague Boris Nemtsov, who returned to Russia only to be gunned down in the street in front of the Kremlin in 2015.

Mr. Putin killed Navalny, but there is blame enough to go around. First, we Russians who failed to match Alexei’s courage and end Mr. Putin’s dictatorship and war can’t escape responsibility. Some of us tried, and he marched with us in numbers that seem a fantasy now. It wasn’t enough.

Is it wrong to wonder what might have been? If we had been as brave as the Ukrainians were a few years later when they took to the streets and risked their lives to free themselves?

Perhaps the last, best chance was the huge demonstration in Moscow on Dec. 24, 2011, not long before the regime cracked down heavily on such actions. Navalny surely sensed the moment when he took his turn on the stage in front of tens of thousands of protesters.

“I can see that there are enough people here to seize the Kremlin and the White House”—the federal government headquarters—“right now. We are a peaceful force and will not do it now. But if these crooks and thieves try to go on cheating us, if they continue telling lies and stealing from us, we will take what belongs to us with our own hands!”

Would the people have followed us? Would the thousands of police have opened fire, or joined us? Would we now be free, or long dead? The regret of inaction is tenfold the regret of action.

Also deserving of blame are the Western politicians who treated Navalny’s poisoning in 2020 and jailing the following year as just another negotiating point with Mr. Putin. Lots of talk, no action, more pointless peace talks and corrupt deals, more blood on their hands.

President Biden’s threat in 2021 of “devastating” consequences should anything happen to Navalny in prison will now be put to the excruciating test. After decades of crimes and aggression, Mr. Putin has crossed another bloody red line. He feels confident there will be no repercussions. If he’s proved correct, his murderous confidence will increase.

Ukraine is the weak point in Mr. Putin’s armor. Mr. Biden can’t hide behind Republican obstruction of Ukraine aid, as reprehensible as it is. The White House doesn’t need Congress to send Ukraine long-range artillery like ATACMS and fighter jets essential to protect civilians from Russia’s incessant bombing.

Nor can Mr. Biden blame MAGA obstruction for failing to seize more than $300 billion in Russian Central Bank assets and using them to aid Ukraine. Seizing and selling the luxury yachts and real estate in the West belonging to Mr. Putin and his oligarchs would also be a fitting tribute to Navalny, whose anticorruption campaigns exposed their looted riches.

But I’m afraid Western politicians prefer dissidents to be martyrs. They can leave flowers and say nice words while negotiating with the murderer. No one challenges such hypocrisy. Navalny was a fighter first and always, and unless Mr. Biden, Germany’s Olaf Scholz and the rest are going to fight, they should keep his name off their forked tongues.

We may also use this tragic moment to shame those who openly side with Mr. Putin, from Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump to propagandists like Tucker Carlson and amplifiers like Elon Musk. But should we bother, when they can’t be shamed?

Mr. Carlson was just in Moscow, where he had a fawning interview with Mr. Putin before producing a series of videos in which he gaped in awe at Russian supermarkets and subway stations. The parallels with Western communist sympathizers such as Walter Duranty are accurate. But this is more, and worse. It’s a concrete campaign to promote Mr. Putin’s bloodthirsty dictatorship, to normalize his regime and his war crimes. If Mr. Carlson were still in Moscow, he could gape at the amazingly low price of human life in Mr. Putin’s dictatorship.

Why murder Navalny now? Mr. Putin obviously felt safe to finish the job, and, as a coward and bully, he is always most dangerous when he feels safe and triumphant. Consider why he feels that way, with American aid for Ukraine paralyzed by the GOP House, Mr. Biden feigning helplessness, and Mr. Trump leading the polls.

In discussions at the Munich Security Conference, an annual forum on international security policy, Navalny’s murder threatened to overshadow the daily deaths of innocent Ukrainians at the same hand. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the leaders of the free world are treading water while Ukrainians spill blood. If Mr. Biden and the rest of the free world really wish to strike a “devastating” blow against the killer in the Kremlin, they need only provide Ukrainian hands with the weapons they need to strike it.

The West seems intent on duplicating the apathy of Russians in the face of Mr. Putin’s aggression and the results will be the same. He will grow bolder and the price of stopping him will keep going up. The risk to Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Poland will rise along with the threat to other political prisoners like activist Vladimir Kara-Murza and Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich. Mr. Gershkovich was taken into custody in March on an allegation of espionage that he, the Journal and the U.S. government vehemently deny.

Alexei Navalny was a man of courage and action, and only courage and action can honor him now.

Mr. Kasparov is chairman of the Human Rights Foundation and the Renew Democracy Initiative and a board member of the World Liberty Congress.

WSJ Opinion: The Congressional Fight Over Aid to Ukraine and Israel 

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Journal Editorial Report: Paul Gigot interviews Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska. Images: AFP/Getty Images/Zuma Press Composite: Mark Kelly

2. Brave Russian Tributes for Alexei Navalny

Can or will Nalvany be the spark for resistance or will Putin crush it?

Brave Russian Tributes for Alexei Navalny

His courage is mirrored by those taking risks to honor his memory.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/brave-tributes-for-alexei-navalny-russia-putin-56783a7c?mod=latest_headlines

By The Editorial Board

Follow

Feb. 19, 2024 12:03 pm ET

Police officers detain a man laying flowers to Alexei Navalny at the Memorial to Victims of Political Repression in St. Petersburg, Russia on Friday, Feb. 16. PHOTO: /ASSOCIATED PRESS

The sad truth is that Alexei Navalny’s death last week—murder in prison by any other name—has at least for now advanced Vladimir Putin’s autocratic interests by removing a main focus of domestic opposition. Yet the political assassination is also exposing the illegitimacy of Mr. Putin’s rule as ordinary Russians take personal risks to honor Navalny’s memory.

A telling example is a short video published by the Times of London, which shares ownership with the Journal, showing Russians leaving flowers at a makeshift memorial in St. Petersburg. On the video, two black-clad men who appear to be security agents are seen removing tributes left by earlier mourners. But other Russians then follow and lay their own bouquets at the site.

Such impromptu memorials have popped up across Russia. Citizens take a personal risk if they participate. Some 400 people were detained across Russia over the weekend for participating in rallies commemorating the Putin opponent and anti-corruption activist, according to human-rights group OVD-Info. This is the largest display of open defiance to the Kremlin since protests against Mr. Putin’s Ukraine invasion in 2022.

Navalny’s death deprives Mr. Putin’s opponents of one of their few remaining prominent leaders, as Mr. Putin intended. But his martyrdom for liberty will also live on across the years as an example for others—and perhaps long after Mr. Putin is gone and dead, which may have to occur at the same time given that he fears what a successor might expose about his rule.

Still, the brave tributes to Navalny show that Mr. Putin hasn’t succeeded in killing the courage and conviction of Russians who want a better government. Which is perhaps Alexei Navalny’s greatest legacy, and his most fitting monument.

3. Israel Sets Deadline for Rafah Ground Offensive Within Weeks

Israel Sets Deadline for Rafah Ground Offensive Within Weeks

War-cabinet member Benny Gantz says hostages must be released by Ramadan

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-sets-deadline-for-rafah-ground-offensive-within-weeks-0d5d0818?mod=world_lead_story

By Thomas GroveFollow

Updated Feb. 19, 2024 2:25 pm ET

Israel gave Hamas a Ramadan deadline to return the hostages held in Gaza or face a ground offensive in Rafah, the first timeline it has provided for looming operations in the city that have become a source of tension with the U.S.

“The world must know and Hamas leaders must know if our hostages are not home by Ramadan the fighting will continue and expand to Rafah,” Israeli war-cabinet member Benny Gantz said Sunday.

Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, is set to begin around March 10 and has in recent years been a flashpoint for violence in Israel and the Palestinian territories. 

Israel has launched airstrikes on Rafah—a southern Gaza city where more than one million Palestinians are sheltering—in recent weeks and threatened to send in troops, as heavy fighting continues around Khan Younis, further north. Israel says the two cities are Hamas’s last strongholds in the strip and it thinks hostages are being held there. Last week, Israel rescued two hostages from a residential area of Rafah.

The Biden administration has warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against conducting an operation without a credible plan to ensure the safety of civilians in Rafah, which had a prewar population of 300,000.

Netanyahu said over the weekend that he had spoken with President Biden and other world leaders. “I tell them clearly: Israel will fight until complete victory is achieved,” Netanyahu said. “And yes, that also includes operating in Rafah, of course after we allow civilians in the fighting areas to evacuate to safe areas.” Aid organizations and civilians living in Gaza have said that people have nowhere else to go, having been displaced by the war and followed Israeli instructions to move south to Rafah.

“There is a lot of space north of Rafah,” Netanyahu said when asked about evacuation plans.

The Ramadan deadline may be part of efforts by Israel to increase pressure on Hamas to reach a hostage deal, analysts said. It puts into focus the holiest month in Islam, during which Israel normally loosens restrictions on Muslim Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank to visit the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The mosque sits on top of the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Judaism. Violent clashes between Palestinians and Israeli police during the period, however, in recent years have marred events marking Ramadan.

In Islam’s lunar calendar, the beginning of Ramadan is determined by the sighting of a crescent moon, meaning the start and ending of the month can only be approximated ahead of time.

Israel’s Benny Gantz said the hostages being held in Gaza must be released by Ramadan. PHOTO: MARK SCHIEFELBEIN/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

A spokesman for Hamas didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment. Last week, senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan said attacks on Rafah were “a criminal step driven only by Netanyahu’s personal motives, through which he seeks to save himself and evade the consequences of any cessation of aggression, by escalating further in the blood of Palestinian civilians.” 

Any ground offensive would likely severely hamper further aid for Gazans in Rafah, where a food crisis is already taking hold. Ghada Zaki, 23, who is in the Al-Remal neighborhood of Rafah, said she and her family were starving after the flour and animal feed they were eating ran out. Hunger and desperation have caused fights to break out between Gazans over aid deliveries, she said.  

“We eat once a day. If we are lucky, we manage to get some rice, if not, one slice of bread that’s made of animal feed and tastes awful,” she said.

Bags of flour are taken from an aid truck Monday amid a food crisis for Gaza residents. PHOTO: STRINGER/REUTERS

Israel has warned for weeks it is preparing to enter Rafah, where more than half of the population of Gaza is sheltering in around 20% of the strip, but its government has faced international criticism for the plan because of the toll it could take on civilians. The Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza is one of two entry points for aid into the territory; a ground operation could further frustrate already stilted deliveries of food, water and medical supplies. 

Israel is pursuing twin goals of eliminating Hamas from Gaza and freeing the dozens of hostages still held there after the Oct. 7 attacks on southern Israel, which killed 1,200 people, mostly civilians, according to Israeli authorities. Health authorities in Gaza said Monday that more than 29,000 people had been killed in the war triggered by those attacks. That figure doesn’t distinguish between civilians and combatants. 

On Sunday, Netanyahu said that he hoped to reach a deal to free hostages soon. “But deal or no deal, we have to finish the job to get total victory,” he said. 

Around 130 hostages taken during Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack are still in Gaza, including at least 30 whom Israel says have died, though it has shared an assessment with U.S. and Egyptian officials that as many as 50 could be dead. The majority of the remaining hostages are Israeli, including dual nationals, according to Israel.

Their families have increased pressure on the government to negotiate their freedom and criticized Israel’s decision not to send a delegation to Cairo for cease-fire talks. On Monday, families of the hostages protested outside Gantz’s home, where he came out to speak with them. 

Banners in Tel Aviv display photos of hostages. PHOTO: DYLAN MARTINEZ/REUTERS

“Most likely [they will be returned] through a deal, and where there are other options to do this while ensuring the safety of the hostages, that is what we will do,” Gantz said.

Gantz also said Monday that Israel would introduce security measures during Ramadan given the conflict in Gaza after recommendations by security forces.

Far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has called for maximum measures to keep Palestinians from the West Bank away from Al Aqsa. An aide to Ben-Gvir said the minister had proposed barring entry of Palestinians from the West Bank to the holy site entirely during the month.

Israeli government officials who participated in the discussion over the proposed restrictions said Ben-Gvir’s position had been rejected but that no final decision had been made on the level or nature of the restrictions.

“The prime minister made a balanced decision which allows for freedom of worship under the restrictions of security needs that are determined by the professionals,” the Israeli prime minister’s office said, without elaborating.

In a sign of growing tensions on Israel’s northern border with Lebanon, two Israeli airstrikes hit a warehouse in an industrial area and another unidentified target. The attacks are the deepest strikes inside Lebanon since the start of the current war, both of them some 30 miles from the capital of Beirut.

The Israeli military said the two targets were infrastructure sites belonging to the militant group Hezbollah and came after Hezbollah launched a drone into Israeli territory.

In Yemen, the Iranian-backed Houthi militant group claimed attacks on three commercial ships in less than 24 hours. A missile strike late Sunday forced the crew of a U.K.-owned bulk carrier to abandon the ship amid fears it could sink, British security company Vanguard Tech said. After the attack, U.S. and French naval forces were en route to assist the vessel as it waited to be towed to safety, it said. On Monday morning, the U.S.-owned bulk carrier Sea Champion was also attacked twice in the Gulf of Aden, suffering minor damage, Vanguard said. The Houthis claimed responsibility for that attack and one on another American vessel, as well.

The Yemeni rebels also said they had downed an American MQ9 reaper drone near the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah. U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Middle East, didn’t respond to a request for comment. Centcom said Saturday it had intercepted one unmanned underwater vehicle sent by the Houthis.

The aftermath of an Israeli airstrike in Rafah. PHOTO: KHALED OMAR/ZUMA PRESS

Anat Peled, Abeer Ayyoub, Saleh al-Batati and Benoit Faucon contributed to this article.

Write to Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com

4. Aboard a U.S. Aircraft Carrier, a Front-Row Seat to China Tensions

Photos and map graphic at the link.

Aboard a U.S. Aircraft Carrier, a Front-Row Seat to China Tensions

Both nations stage naval exercises in the Philippine Sea, east of Taiwan—a vital region that would be prized in any East Asia conflict

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/aboard-a-u-s-aircraft-carrier-a-front-row-seat-to-china-tensions-a88b4da9?mod=world_lead_pos3

By Alastair GaleFollow

Updated Feb. 19, 2024 12:08 am ET

ABOARD THE USS CARL VINSON—During recent exercises in the Philippine Sea, U.S. jet fighters screamed into flight from the USS Carl Vinson as two Chinese intelligence-gathering ships lingered a few miles away.

Three months earlier in a nearby location, the Chinese military had its turn as its jet fighters took off and landed hundreds of times from a Chinese aircraft carrier, under the watchful eyes of U.S. ally Japan. 

The Philippine Sea, a swath of the Pacific Ocean east of Taiwan, was the site of a decisive aircraft carrier battle in World War II between the U.S. and Japan. Carriers are once again gathering here, and for good reason.

Control of the Philippine Sea would be prized in any conflict between China and the U.S. over Taiwan or the South China Sea. U.S. warships, troops and supplies deployed from bases on Guam or Hawaii would likely need to transit through the area. 

China would want to interrupt those flows. In a full-scale conflict over Taiwan, it would seek to use the region to target Taiwanese military bases on the mountainous eastern side of the island or impose a blockade, military analysts say. 

“Control of the Philippine Sea would be a critical military objective in any war in East Asia,” said Brent Sadler, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a U.S. think tank.

U.S. warships in the Philippine Sea in January, as a Chinese military vessel patrols nearby. PHOTO: RICHARD A. BROOKS/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Japanese shells splash around the escort carrier USS White Plains at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Oct. 25, 1944. PHOTO: U.S. NAVY/GETTY IMAGES

The recent U.S.-Japanese exercises in late January involved two U.S. aircraft carriers, nine additional American warships, F-35C and F/A-18 jet fighters, electronic-warfare jets and Japan’s Ise helicopter carrier, among other hardware. 

In June 1944, the U.S. inflicted one of the final blows on the Imperial Japanese Navy by sinking two of its largest aircraft carriers, Taiho and Shokaku, and destroying hundreds of Japanese aircraft in the two-day Battle of the Philippine Sea. 

The battle helped the U.S. capture the Mariana Islands including the island of Tinian, from which U.S. planes would later take off to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. No U.S. ships were lost, and the American fleet delivered the knockout blow to the Japanese navy a few months later in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Sea of Activity

Some recent Chinese and U.S. naval exercises show how the Philippine Sea has become a zone of superpower contention.

Approximate zone of naval activity

JAPAN

Possible military supply routes

East China Sea

CHINA

Jan. 31, 2024

Two U.S. aircraft carriers and other

warships from the U.S. and Japan

TAIWAN

Oct. 28, 2023

Chinese aircraft carrier

and four other warships

TO HAWAII

Headquarters of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and major military bases

Philippine Sea

Sept. 13, 2023

Chinese aircraft carrier and five

other warships

South China Sea

PHILIPPINES

GUAM

Major U.S. Air Force and Navy bases

Sources: U.S. Navy (U.S. exercises); Japanese defense ministry (China exercises)

Emma Brown/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The Philippine Sea is bordered by Taiwan and the Philippines to the west, Japan to the north and the Mariana Islands, including Guam, to the east, covering an area of over two million square miles. Most of the recent naval activity by China and the U.S. has been a few hundred miles east of Taiwan.

In mid-September last year, the Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong and around two dozen other Chinese warships congregated in the area, according to authorities in Taiwan and Japan. A nearby Japanese destroyer reported Chinese jet fighters and helicopters taking off from and landing on the Shandong on Sept. 13 as five other Chinese warships sailed close by.

In similar exercises involving the Shandong and other Chinese warships in the same area during a nine-day period beginning Oct. 28, Chinese jet fighters made around 420 takeoffs and landings from the aircraft carrier, Japan’s Defense Ministry said.

“For China, it’s an opportunity to showcase its growing military confidence, an opportunity to train in a theater of core importance and an attempt at projecting the notion that U.S. military superiority shouldn’t be taken for granted,” said Alessio Patalano, professor of war and strategy in East Asia at King’s College London.

A handout released in October by Taiwan’s Defense Ministry shows the Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong in a waterway that separates Taiwan from the Philippines. PHOTO: HANDOUT/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

After the most recent exercises, a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman said the Shandong and other warships had conducted combat training to “better safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and development interests.” Further exercises would be conducted on a regular basis, he said, according to the official Xinhua News Agency. 

The Chinese military has also stepped up activity in the Taiwan Strait with a higher tempo of air and naval sorties close to the island. Chinese jet fighters from the mainland can make it as far as the ocean east of Taiwan, aided by refueling aircraft, but they can operate more intensively in the region by using aircraft carriers in the Philippine Sea.

The U.S. Seventh Fleet, based in Japan, has long operated in the Philippine Sea, and the scale of training has ratcheted up recently. January’s exercises followed similar training in June and November last year, the first drills with several U.S. aircraft carriers in the region since 2021.

Speaking on the deck of the USS Carl Vinson, Rear Adm. Carlos Sardiello, commander of the Vinson carrier strike group, called the drills a “great rehearsal opportunity” to “rapidly aggregate these large, capable, agile platforms in the Philippine Sea.”

Rear Adm. Carlos Sardiello, center, commander of the Vinson carrier strike group with Rear Adm. Christopher Alexander, left, and Japan’s Rear Adm. Hitoshi Shimizu, on the bridge of the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier. PHOTO: RICHARD A. BROOKS/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

The Philippine Sea’s seabed plunges tens of thousands of feet from its western edge. The depth and the clear acoustic qualities of the sea make it an ideal environment for submarines, military analysts say.

Sardiello said undersea warfare was among the areas in which the USS Carl Vinson conducted training with Japan. Carrier strike groups sometimes include submarines, but the U.S. Navy doesn’t disclose submarine operations.

The Philippine Sea is also a significant thoroughfare for trade. If China dominates the region, it could put a chokehold on Japan and South Korea by controlling their access to shipments of oil and other fuels, analysts say. 

As Sardiello and other navy leaders spoke on the deck of the USS Carl Vinson, a Dongdiao-class Chinese surveillance ship, used for intercepting communications, could be seen a few miles away. Vinson crew members said another Chinese surveillance ship had been close by for the duration of the exercises.

China’s military represents a more formidable threat to U.S. aircraft carriers than Japan did in mid-1944, particularly with Beijing’s large arsenal of land-based missiles. The Pentagon said last year that China had “the capability to conduct long-range precision strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers, out to the Western Pacific from mainland China.” 

Sardiello said U.S. carriers would continue to sail and train in the region despite their potential vulnerability to Chinese missiles. 

“Our highly trained sailors can operate these complex, contested domains and be lethal and survivable, and execute the mission regardless of what the threat is,” he said.

How Chinese Aggression Has Pushed the Philippines Closer to the U.S.

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How Chinese Aggression Has Pushed the Philippines Closer to the U.S.

Play video: How Chinese Aggression Has Pushed the Philippines Closer to the U.S.

Located near Taiwan and the South China Sea, the Philippines has found itself at the center of a global effort to counter China. WSJ’s Shelby Holliday traveled there to learn about the nation’s strategic importance and its growing ties with the U.S. Photo: David Fang

Write to Alastair Gale at alastair.gale@wsj.com

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces will likely be able to establish new defensive lines not far beyond Avdiivka, which will likely prompt the culmination of the Russian offensive in this area.
• Delays in Western security assistance to Ukraine are likely helping Russia launch opportunistic offensive operations along several sectors of the frontline in order to place pressure on Ukrainian forces along multiple axes.
• Russian forces are likely seeking to take advantage of two windows of opportunity with the recent initiation of their simultaneous offensive operations—the period before the upcoming spring thaw and the nuanced dynamics of Western aid provision.
• The Russian capture of Avdiivka after four months of intensified offensive operations exemplifies the way that Russian forces pursue offensive operations that do not necessarily set conditions for wider operational gains but still force Ukraine to commit manpower and materiel to defensive operations.
• Russian forces have not yet demonstrated an ability to secure operationally significant gains or conduct rapid mechanized maneuver across large swaths of territory, and the capture of Avdiivka should not be taken as demonstrating this capability.
• Ukrainian officials are investigating two instances of apparent Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to recognize 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps (DNR AC) Commander Lieutenant General Sergei Milchakov and the “Veterany” Assault Brigade (Volunteer Corps) for aiding in the Russian capture of Avdiivka, highlighting continued tension between Russian regular and irregular forces.
• The Washington Post reported that the Kremlin has been orchestrating a large-scale effort to spread disinformation in the Ukrainian media since January 2023, corroborating recent Ukrainian official reports about Russian information operations that use fake Telegram channels to infiltrate the Ukrainian information space.
• Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced on February 18 that Denmark is donating its “entire artillery” to Ukraine.
• The US is reportedly turning to India and China to engage Russia about Russia’s reported intent to launch an unspecified anti-satellite nuclear weapon into space.
• Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance in western Zaporizhia amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on February 18.
• Russian occupation officials continue to use educational programs as means of Russifying occupied Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 18, 2024

Feb 18, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2024

Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 18, 2024, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on February 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces will likely be able to establish new defensive lines not far beyond Avdiivka, which will likely prompt the culmination of the Russian offensive in this area. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 18 that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces completely captured Avdiivka, advancing 8.6 kilometers in depth in the area, and that Russian forces continue offensive operations to capture additional territory in Donetsk Oblast.[1] Several Russian milbloggers claimed on February 18 that Ukrainian forces lack well prepared defensive positions west of Avdiivka and that Russian forces will be able to advance further into western Donetsk Oblast behind “panicked” and “disorganized” Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Avdiivka.[2] ISW has still not observed footage of disorderly Ukrainian withdrawals to support these Russian claims and would expect to observe such footage if the withdrawal was disorderly on a large scale given the normal patterns of Russian sources with access to such material. One Russian milblogger claimed that a large-scale collapse of the Avdiivka front is “unlikely” as Ukrainian forces withdraw to prepared defensive lines, however, indicating that the Russian understanding (or presentation) of Ukrainian defensive capabilities on this sector of the front differs from source to source.[3]

Available imagery, which ISW will not present or describe in greater detail at this time to preserve Ukrainian operational security, does not support claims that Ukrainian forces lack prepared defensive positions west of Avdiivka. The Ukrainian command also recently committed fresh units to the Avdiivka front to counterattack advancing Russian forces and provide an evacuation corridor for Ukrainian units withdrawing from Avdiivka.[4] These newly committed units are likely able to establish and hold defensive positions against Russian forces, degraded by their assaults on the town, west of Avdiivka. Russian forces, which have suffered high personnel and equipment losses in seizing Avdiivka, will likely culminate when they come up against relatively fresher Ukrainian units manning prepared defensive positions.

Delays in Western security assistance to Ukraine are likely helping Russia launch opportunistic offensive operations along several sectors of the frontline in order to place pressure on Ukrainian forces along multiple axes. Russian forces are currently conducting at least three offensive efforts—along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border, particularly in the directions of Kupyansk and Lyman; in and around Avdiivka; and near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast. After the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Avdiivka and the subsequent Russian claim of control over the entirety of Avdiivka, ISW, and several Ukrainian and Western sources assessed that delays in Western security assistance, namely artillery ammunition and critical air defense systems, inhibited Ukrainian troops from defending against Russian advances in Avdiivka.[5] Critical Ukrainian shortages in Western-provided equipment and fears of the complete cessation of US military aid have forced Ukrainian troops to husband materiel along the entire front, which has likely encouraged Russian forces to exploit the situation and launch limited offensive operations outside of the Avdiivka area, which they have done along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area since early January 2024 and in western Zaporizhia Oblast over the past 48 hours. These Russian offensive efforts will likely hinder Ukrainian forces from preparing personnel and materiel for renewed counteroffensive operations, emphasizing the operational disadvantages that Ukraine will suffer if it simply digs in and attempts to defend for the rest of 2024 as some Western states and analysts advocate.[6]

Russian forces are likely seeking to take advantage of two windows of opportunity with the recent initiation of their simultaneous offensive operations—the period before the upcoming spring thaw and the nuanced dynamics of Western aid provision. Ukraine is heading into its rasputitsa season, the Spring period in which the frozen winter ground thaws and makes mechanized movement more difficult throughout the theater, thereby slowing (but notably not entirely stopping) offensive operations along the frontline. Some Russian milbloggers are already reporting that mud in southern Ukraine is inhibiting Ukrainian forces from bringing new reserves to Zaporizhia Oblast to reinforce against Russian offensive efforts, and these conditions will also likely slow Russian offensive momentum as the weather continues to warm.[7] Russian forces are likely trying to secure tactical advances throughout the theater while the terrain and weather generally favor offensive movement in order to exhaust and attrit defending Ukrainian forces as well as to secure favorable positions for future operations before the rasputitsa begins in earnest. The Russian military command, furthermore, likely realizes that security assistance from Ukraine’s European partners, particularly promised European deliveries of artillery ammunition, will begin to have effects in the medium term, likely before Fall 2024, and is trying to take advantage of Ukraine’s current shell hunger to pressure Ukrainian troops throughout the theater while Ukraine experiences a relative (but likely temporary) artillery disadvantage.[8] The eventual provision of more European security assistance to Ukraine, however, will not fill the gap in critical equipment that the full cessation of US military assistance would create, particularly with advanced air defense systems such as Patriot surface-to-air missiles. The scaling-up of European security assistance is necessary but not sufficient for Ukrainian forces to stabilize the front, let alone to regain the initiative in areas where Russian forces are pressing.

The Russian capture of Avdiivka after four months of intensified offensive operations exemplifies the way that Russian forces pursue offensive operations that do not necessarily set conditions for wider operational gains but still force Ukraine to commit manpower and materiel to defensive operations. Russian forces have been fighting near Avdiivka for most of the full-scale invasion thus far and intensified operations to capture the city in mid-October 2023.[9] In the subsequent four months since October, Russian forces managed to advance nearly nine kilometers in Avdiivka according to Russian estimates.[10] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated on February 18 that during this four month period, Russian forces lost over 47,000 personnel, 364 tanks, 248 artillery systems, 748 armored fighting vehicles, and five aircraft.[11] Russian forces were also unable to complete a full operational encirclement of Avdiivka within that four-month window, and Ukrainian forces appear to have been able to withdraw in mainly good order. A Russian milblogger and volunteer with the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) remarked on the rate of Russian losses compared with the territory gained on February 17, suggesting that even some Russian sources are cognizant of the extremely high price these limited Russian gains have cost.[12] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces suffered 16,000 “irretrievable losses” (likely those killed in action, whereas Tarnavskyi’s estimate may have also included wounded) in the Avdiivka direction since October 2023.[13] The milblogger also sardonically noted that the tank regiments and tank divisions that were operating near Avdiivka “distinguished” themselves by advancing a few kilometers in four months and taking massive personnel losses.[14] By contrast, according to the milblogger, Ukrainian forces suffered far fewer losses and were able to withdraw to prepared defensive positions mostly on their own terms, meaning that exhausted and attrited Russian forces will now have to once again fight Ukrainian troops on new lines. Russian forces succeeded in drawing Ukrainian forces to Avdiivka and away from other areas of the front and forcing Ukrainians to use up already limited Ukrainian stores of critical equipment but did so without securing major operational gains. This outcome is likely to recur in ongoing offensive operations on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border line and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian forces have not yet demonstrated an ability to secure operationally significant gains or conduct rapid mechanized maneuver across large swaths of territory, and the capture of Avdiivka should not be taken as demonstrating this capability. ISW distinguishes between tactical gains, relevant at the tactical level of war in the near vicinity of the fighting, and operational gains which are significant at the operational level of war and affect large sectors of the entire front line. When ISW assesses that a given advance has or has not made “operationally significant” gains we are referring to this distinction. Since the intensification of Russian offensive efforts in Avdiivka in October 2023, Russian forces managed to traverse fewer than 10 kilometers through and around Avdiivka. Avdiivka is nearly 60 kilometers from the Donetsk Oblast border, however. Russian forces would need to conduct widespread and competent cross-country maneuvers to reach the borders of the oblast in a period of less than years and would have to go even further and through more fortified territory to reach the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk area in northern Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have not displayed the capability to conduct such maneuvers, either near Avdiivka or in any other sector of the front. Russian offensive efforts to take Kupyansk could plausibly force Ukrainians to the left bank of the Oskil River, but Russian forces in this area have remained largely impaled on small tactical positions in the Kupyansk direction for months.[15] Russian offensive efforts south of Orikhiv are unlikely to advance past Orikhiv itself or even to reach Orikhiv quickly, given the climatological challenges discussed above.

Ukrainian officials are investigating two instances of apparent Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Prosecutor’s Office reported that it is investigating footage published on February 18 showing Russian forces executing six injured Ukrainian POWs near Avdiivka and footage showing Russian forces executing two Ukrainian POWs near Vesele (northwest of Bakhmut).[16] The killing of POWs violates Article III of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of POWs.[17]

Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to recognize 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps (DNR AC) Commander Lieutenant General Sergei Milchakov and the “Veterany” Assault Brigade (Volunteer Corps) for aiding in the Russian capture of Avdiivka, highlighting continued tension between Russian regular and irregular forces. A prominent Russian milblogger complained that Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated Russian Central Grouping of Forces commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev for capturing Avdiivka, but not Milchakov, who the milblogger claimed has led the 1st DNR AC since its previous commander’s death in Popasna, Luhansk Oblast.[18] Russian milbloggers also complained that Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu did not credit the “Veterany” Assault Brigade with the Russian capture of Avdiivka, although noted that the Russian MoD later edited its statement to credit the “Veterany” Assault Brigade.[19] The Russian MoD may have edited its statement to credit the ”Veterany” Assault Brigade in an effort to prevent wider complaints from spreading in the Russian ultranationalist information space and appeal to Russian volunteer servicemen (dobrovoltsy). Tension between Russian regular and irregular forces – especially the 1st DNR Army Corps and DNR-affiliated formations – has continued throughout the war despite, and likely in part because of, ongoing Russian efforts to formalize irregular formations.[20]

The Washington Post reported that the Kremlin has been orchestrating a large-scale effort to spread disinformation in the Ukrainian media since January 2023, corroborating recent Ukrainian official reports about Russian information operations that use fake Telegram channels to infiltrate the Ukrainian information space.[21] The Washington Post reported on February 16 that it gained access to more than 100 Kremlin documents obtained by unspecified European intelligence services that show that the Kremlin has been overseeing Russian troll farms that use social media and fake news articles on Telegram, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram to penetrate Ukrainian media and promote various Kremlin narratives. These narratives include claims about exaggerated Ukrainian losses and how the West intends to replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, among many others. Russian First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko reportedly tasked a team of Kremlin officials and political strategists, including Kiriyenko’s deputy, Alexander Kharichev, who is reportedly known for “fixing” Russian elections to produce the Kremlin’s desired outcome, to oversee these efforts in January 2023. The Washington Post reported that Russian trolls were producing over 1,300 texts and 37,000 comments on Ukrainian social media every week by March 2023. The documents reportedly indicate that Kiriyenko identified the effort’s four key objectives at a meeting in January 2023: discrediting Ukrainian military and political leadership, splitting the Ukrainian elite, demoralizing the Ukrainian military, and disorienting the Ukrainian population. The documents reportedly showed that officials at nearly weekly meetings highlighted some of the fake posts in Ukrainian media that garnered high numbers of views, including a post alleging that the Ukrainian state is not helping the families of killed Ukrainian military personnel, which received two million views, and a post claiming that former Ukrainian commander-in-chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi could become the next Ukrainian president, which received 4.3 million views. Kiriyenko also reportedly tasked another deputy, Tatyana Matveeva, to oversee a similar effort aimed at spreading disinformation and fake news in European information spaces, including in France and Germany, and the team overseeing the information operations in the Ukrainian media tried to reuse the disinformation spread in European media, including allegations that Zelensky is involved in military procurement corruption schemes.[22] The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation reported on December 21, 2023, that Russian actors planned to promote several information operations aimed at degrading Ukrainian morale through a network of fake Telegram channels disguised as official accounts of Ukrainian regional officials and military brigades that would promote several narratives, including those about alleged divisions between Ukrainian political and military leadership and allegations of Ukrainian government corruption.[23]

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced on February 18 that Denmark is donating its “entire artillery” to Ukraine.[24] The Danish government had not issued an official statement with details of the announcement at the time of this writing, and it is unclear if Denmark will give Ukraine all of its artillery guns, all of its artillery ammunition stocks, or both.

The US is reportedly turning to India and China to engage Russia about Russia’s reported intent to launch an unspecified anti-satellite nuclear weapon into space. The New York Times (NYT) reported on February 17 that US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken spoke with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar at the Munich Security Conference about the possibility of Russia deploying a nuclear weapon into space that would, if detonated, disrupt American, Chinese, and Indian satellites and affect global communications systems. Blinken reportedly urged Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to speak to Russian President Vladimir Putin about the matter. The NYT reported that Wang reiterated the importance of the peaceful use of outer space for China. The NYT stated that US officials agree that if Russia deployed a nuclear weapon into orbit in space, Russia would likely not detonate it but would keep it in low orbit as a deterrence measure. Reuters reported on February 15, however, that analysts following Russian space programs indicated that Russia is likely trying to deploy a nuclear powered-device to carry out attacks against satellites and not a weapon with a nuclear warhead.[25] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba met with Wang on February 17 to discuss Chinese-Ukrainian trade and the need for stable peace in Ukraine, suggesting that China is hesitant to support Russia‘s war in Ukraine at the level Russia desires, as ISW continues to assess.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces will likely be able to establish new defensive lines not far beyond Avdiivka, which will likely prompt the culmination of the Russian offensive in this area.
• Delays in Western security assistance to Ukraine are likely helping Russia launch opportunistic offensive operations along several sectors of the frontline in order to place pressure on Ukrainian forces along multiple axes.
• Russian forces are likely seeking to take advantage of two windows of opportunity with the recent initiation of their simultaneous offensive operations—the period before the upcoming spring thaw and the nuanced dynamics of Western aid provision.
• The Russian capture of Avdiivka after four months of intensified offensive operations exemplifies the way that Russian forces pursue offensive operations that do not necessarily set conditions for wider operational gains but still force Ukraine to commit manpower and materiel to defensive operations.
• Russian forces have not yet demonstrated an ability to secure operationally significant gains or conduct rapid mechanized maneuver across large swaths of territory, and the capture of Avdiivka should not be taken as demonstrating this capability.
• Ukrainian officials are investigating two instances of apparent Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to recognize 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps (DNR AC) Commander Lieutenant General Sergei Milchakov and the “Veterany” Assault Brigade (Volunteer Corps) for aiding in the Russian capture of Avdiivka, highlighting continued tension between Russian regular and irregular forces.
• The Washington Post reported that the Kremlin has been orchestrating a large-scale effort to spread disinformation in the Ukrainian media since January 2023, corroborating recent Ukrainian official reports about Russian information operations that use fake Telegram channels to infiltrate the Ukrainian information space.
• Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced on February 18 that Denmark is donating its “entire artillery” to Ukraine.
• The US is reportedly turning to India and China to engage Russia about Russia’s reported intent to launch an unspecified anti-satellite nuclear weapon into space.
• Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance in western Zaporizhia amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on February 18.
• Russian occupation officials continue to use educational programs as means of Russifying occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly redeployed units to the Kupyansk-Svatove area. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 18 that the Russian command redeployed units of the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps, Baltic Sea Fleet) to the area east of Ivanivka (east of Kupyansk) from Belgorod and Bryansk oblast border areas, where the Russian command initially redeployed them in early January 2024.[27] Mashovets also stated on February 18 that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards the Kyslivka-Kotlyarivka line (northwest of Svatove) from the Tabaivka-Krokhmalne area (south of the Kyslivka-Kotlyarivka line).[28] Mashovets stated that Russian forces in the Tabaivka-Krokhmalne area have redirected their efforts to advancing towards Pishchane (west of Krokhmalne) and that the redeployment of elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment near Ivanivka is “directly and immediately” related to failures by elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division to make significant advances in the Tabaivka area.

Positional engagements continued near Kreminna on February 18, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Kreminna near Terny, Yampolivka, and Torske and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[29] Mashovets stated that Russian forces introduced almost the entire 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], reportedly either Central Military District [CMD] or Eastern Military District), including its 31st and 27th Motorized Rifle Regiments, 19th Tank Regiment, and an unspecified number of attached units, to the Yampolivka direction (west of Kreminna).[30] Russia formed the 25th CAA in 2023, and its constituent elements are likely not staffed to full doctrinal end strength.[31] Mashovets stated at least three reinforced Russian motorized rifle battalions are operating in the first echelon near Yampolivka but have failed to advance towards Yampolivka itself.[32] Mashovets has previously stated that the Russian command likely redeployed various Russian units to the Lyman direction to relieve elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) and allow the full 90th Tank Division to deploy to the Avdiivka direction, where some of the 90th Tank Division’s constituent elements had already been operating.[33] The redeployment of elements of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division could be intended to replace Russian forces in the area that redeployed to the Avdiivka direction rather than meant as providing operational-level reinforcements. Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the “GORB” detachment (both of the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported limited and unsuccessful Russian attacks near Vyimka (northeast of Bakhmut) on February 18.[35]

Limited positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on February 18, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported positional fighting near Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut), and Klishchiivka and Andriivka (both southwest of Bakhmut).[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Ivanivske, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[37] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction.[38]

Russian forces continued to clear recently captured positions in Avdiivka on February 18 after the Russian military command announced that Russian forces “completed the capture” of the settlement of February 17.[39] ISW has not yet observed footage showing such clearing operations but has no reason to doubt that Russian forces are currently clearing and consolidating positions as Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from the settlement over the past two days. Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces are clearing positions in Avdiivka, and a prominent Russian milblogger noted that limited Ukrainian forces likely remain at the Avdiivka Coke Plant and are still trying to withdraw.[40] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade reported that Ukrainian forces still control an unspecified part of Avdiivka, likely on the outskirts of the settlement, and Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lukhoviy stated that the situation in Avdiivka has stabilized as Russian forces conduct fewer assaults.[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces advanced eight kilometers in depth on February 17 and captured a total area of nearly 32 square kilometers in Avdiivka.[42] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are now trying to break through Ukrainian defenses near Lastochkyne (just west of Avdiivka) and are using small infantry groups for assaults on the outskirts of the settlement.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported the Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Lastochkyne.[44] Elements of the 1st “Slavic ” Brigade and “Sparta” Battalion (both of the 1st DNR AC); the “Veterany” Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps); 30th and 15th Motorized Rifle Brigades (both of the 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]); and 35th, 55th and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigades (41st CAA, CMD) continue to operate in and around Avdiivka.[45]

Limited positional engagements continued southwest of Avdiivka on February 18 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[46]

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on February 18, but there were no confirmed changes to this part of the frontline. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are developing offensive operations towards Kurakhove from the Heorhiivka area.[48]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks south of Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and west of Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) on February 18.[49]

Russian forces made a marginal confirmed gain in western Zaporizhia Oblast following reports of renewed offensive operations on this sector of the front. Geolocated footage posted on February 18 shows that Russian forces recently advanced along a windbreak north of Kopani (6km northwest of Robotyne).[50] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.7 kilometers northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne) and up to two kilometers near Robotyne itself, although ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming such extensive Russian advances.[51] The Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces stated on February 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack consisting of ”a fairly large number of personnel” with about 30 vehicles in an unspecified area in the Zaporizhia direction (likely near Robotyne) on February 17, which corresponds with numerous Russian claims that Russian forces renewed offensives towards Robotyne on February 17.[52] A Russian milblogger complained that Russian forces used modernized Soviet era T-55 main battle tanks with poor anti-drone protection and weak hull and turret armor in a large assault near Robotyne on February 17.[53] Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District) reportedly continue operating near Robotyne.[54] Elements of the Russian 7th VDV Division reportedly continue operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[55]

Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on February 18.[56] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that assault units of the Russian 26th and 28th Motorized Rifle Regiments (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]); 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade (18th CAA, SMD); 328th and 337th VDV Regiments (104th VDV Division), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), and “Storm” assault detachments continue to attack Ukrainian positions near Krynky.[57]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian military officials reported on February 18 that Russian forces launched 14 Shahed-136/131 drones at Ukraine from occupied Crimea and Kursk Oblast, six S-300 anti-aircraft guided missiles from occupied Donetsk Oblast, three Kh-22 cruise missiles from Voronezh Oblast, a Kh-59 guided missile from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and an unspecified number of Iskander-M ballistic missiles from unspecified launch points on the night of February 17 to 18.[58] Ukrainian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems intercepted and destroyed 12 Shahed drones and a Kh-59 missile over Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[59] Ukrainian officials reported that three Russian Kh-22 missiles and an unspecified number of Iskander-M missiles struck Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast, killing civilians and damaging civil infrastructure.[60] Ukrainian officials reported that two unspecified Russian missiles also struck a school in Selydove, Donetsk Oblast.[61]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed another Russian Su-34 aircraft in eastern Ukraine on the morning of February 18.[62] Ukrainian forces reportedly downed two Russian Su-34s and one Su-35 over Donetsk Oblast on February 17.[63]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian news outlet Shot reported on February 18 that Ural Technoport Company recently began to mass produce a new drone variety, the “Antonov” drone, in Chelyabinsk Oblast, which is more resistant to wind and poor weather conditions than other drones.[64] The “Antonov” drone is reportedly capable of flying up to 140 kilometers per hour and carrying a payload weighing up to three kilograms. Shot claimed that the Ural Technoport Company will produce up to 500 “Antonov” drones per month for the Russian military for use in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that the “Antonov” drone is still undergoing tests.[65]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced on February 17 that it will open a new ammunition plant in Ukraine with a local Ukrainian joint venture partner. Rheinmetall noted that the plant will produce a “six-digit” number of 155mm caliber shells per year. Rheinmetall already announced that it will establish a repair center in Ukraine for Leopard tanks and other German-provided military equipment.[66]

Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov stated on February 18 that the Ukrainian-made analog of the Russian Lancet loitering munitions has passed preliminary testing and that Ukrainian forces will soon test the model in combat.[67] Fedorov initially announced the Lancet analog on February 7.[68]

Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte stated on February 17 that the Netherlands is “on schedule” to provide Ukraine with at least 24 F-16 aircraft but did not specify a date for the transfer.[69] Lithuanian Defense Minister Arvydas Anušauskas stated that the first F-16s may appear in Ukraine by June 2024.[70] The Netherlands is currently leading an international coalition alongside Denmark to provide F-16 aircraft to Ukraine and is involved in training efforts for Ukrainian pilots in Romania.[71]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to use educational programs as a means of Russifying occupied Ukraine. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated on February 18 that he attended a meeting of the supervisory board of the “Znanie” (Knowledge) Society, and that the organization will educate “a new generation of scientists and educators who are already becoming the driving force of cultural change” in occupied Ukraine.[72] “Znanie” is a Russian public non-profit that carries out education work in Russia and occupied Ukraine as part of a presidential mandate on “mass educational organization.”[73] Russian occupation officials appear to have recently intensified efforts to train Ukrainian youth to staff public service positions in the future, likely in an effort to provide a personnel pool for Russian occupation organs operating in occupied areas.[74]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, a notable Russian nationalist and extreme voice in the Russian government, reiterated a Russian information operation aimed at undermining the continued provision of Western military aid to Ukraine. Medvedev claimed on February 18 that continued Western support for Ukraine could force Russia to use nuclear weapons against the West.[75] Medvedev routinely espouses alarmist nuclear rhetoric, and his February 18 statements are not an inflection in Russian rhetoric.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

6. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 18, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-18-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: Reuters reported on February 18 that Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani directed Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to “pause” attacks on US forces during a January 29 meeting in Baghdad. Ghaani’s visit illustrates the degree to which Iran controls its proxy network across the Middle East.
• Khan Younis: The Israeli Defense Minister stated on February 18 that Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade has been “defeated and does not function as a military entity in any way.”
• Rafah: Israeli War Cabinet Minster Benny Gantz said Israeli forces will enter Rafah at the start of Ramadan if Hamas does not release the remaining Israeli hostages the group holds.
• Gantz’s statement reflects a possible change in the Rafah operation’s timeline. Channel 12 reported on February 10 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a War Cabinet meeting that the IDF would need to complete the operation into Rafah by March 10 due to international pressure.
• Yemen: US Central Command conducted five preemptive strikes in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on February 17 that targeted three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, one subsurface naval attack drone, and one surface naval attack drone.

IRAN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 18, 2024

Feb 18, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, February 18, 2024

Andie Parry, Brian Carter, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on February 17 and 18, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, February 19, 2024.  

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Reuters reported on February 18 that Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani directed Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to “pause” attacks on US forces during a January 29 meeting in Baghdad.[1] Ghaani met with the leaders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia groups less than 48 hours after the Iranian-backed drone attack on January 28 that killed three US servicemembers in Jordan. Kataib Hezbollah responded to Iranian directives from Ghaani by announcing that it would “suspend attacks” on January 30.[2] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba did not “initially agree” to Ghaani’s directive.[3] The group said that it would continue attacks targeting US forces on February 2, after Ghaani’s visit.[4] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed three attacks targeting US forces after Ghaani’s visit.[5] It has not claimed any attacks after February 4.[6]

Ghaani’s visit illustrates the degree to which Iran controls its proxy network across the Middle East. Most of Iran’s proxies and partners in Iraq immediately ceased attacks following Ghaani’s order. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba initially did not agree but Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have not resumed attacks targeting US forces since February 4.[7] Ghaani and Iran can pressure their partners and proxies to pause or resume attacks as needed, however. Nine Iranian and Iraqi sources told Reuters that Ghaani chose to pause attacks to “avoid a similar escalation” to the 2020 escalation cycle that resulted in the US airstrike that killed former IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani.[8] Ghaani could resume attacks in pursuit of Iranian objectives—namely, expelling US forces from Iraq—as needed when or if Iran calculates that the risk of “similar escalation” decreases.

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: Reuters reported on February 18 that Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani directed Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to “pause” attacks on US forces during a January 29 meeting in Baghdad. Ghaani’s visit illustrates the degree to which Iran controls its proxy network across the Middle East.
• Khan Younis: The Israeli Defense Minister stated on February 18 that Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade has been “defeated and does not function as a military entity in any way.”
• Rafah: Israeli War Cabinet Minster Benny Gantz said Israeli forces will enter Rafah at the start of Ramadan if Hamas does not release the remaining Israeli hostages the group holds.
• Gantz’s statement reflects a possible change in the Rafah operation’s timeline. Channel 12 reported on February 10 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a War Cabinet meeting that the IDF would need to complete the operation into Rafah by March 10 due to international pressure.
• Yemen: US Central Command conducted five preemptive strikes in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on February 17 that targeted three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, one subsurface naval attack drone, and one surface naval attack drone.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli Defense Minister stated on February 18 that Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade has been “defeated and does not function as a military entity in any way.”[9] Hamas has not claimed attacks against Israeli forces in Khan Younis since February 13.[10] Other Palestinian militias aligned with Hamas have continued attacks targeting Israeli forces in Khan Younis, however.[11]

Israeli special operations forces continued clearing operations in and around Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis on February 18. Israeli special operations forces (assigned to the 98th Division) began operating in Nasser Hospital on February 15 after receiving “credible intelligence” that Hamas-held hostages were in the hospital.[12] The special operations forces captured Israeli cars that Palestinian fighters stole on October 7 and seized weapons near Nasser Hospital.[13] The 35th Paratrooper Brigade killed Palestinian fighters and confiscated military equipment.[14] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on February 18 that over 200 suspected fighters had surrendered to Israeli forces at Nasser Hospital. Gallant added that the surrender of suspected fighters indicates Hamas' loss of ”fighting spirit.”[15] The IDF said many of the suspected fighters who surrendered participated in the October 7 attack and have links to the hostages held by Hamas.[16]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in additional areas of Khan Younis City. The 7th Brigade raided Palestinian militia weapons caches and killed over 20 fighters in Khan Younis City.[17] The IDF 98th Division directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters and a weapons warehouse.[18]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip. The Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed a Palestinian militia cell transporting weapons near Israeli forces.[19] Israeli aircraft conducted airstrikes targeting a Hamas operational headquarters and additional targets in Nuseirat and Deir al Balah on February 17.[20] The Israeli Defense Minister said on February 18 that the IDF would continue its operations to dismantle Hamas’s remaining six battalions in the central Gaza Strip and Rafah.[21] Hamas did not claim any attacks in the central Gaza Strip on February 18.

Israeli War Cabinet Minster Benny Gantz said Israeli forces will enter Rafah at the start of Ramadan if Hamas does not release the remaining Israeli hostages the group holds.[22] Ramadan is expected to begin on March 10, 2024. Gantz’s statement reflects a possible change in the Rafah operation’s timeline. Channel 12 reported on February 10 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a War Cabinet meeting that the IDF would need to complete the operation into Rafah by March 10 due to international pressure.[23] Israeli officials have committed to minimize civilian casualties in operations in Rafah, but they have not publicly outlined a plan for how the IDF would evacuate civilians from Rafah.[24] Israel’s partners and allies, including the United States, have refused to support a Rafah operation without a plan in place to protect civilians. The IDF Chief of Staff stated on February 13 that Rafah contains an estimated 10,000 Hamas fighters and over a million displaced Palestinian civilians.[25] Netanyahu said on February 17 that the IDF would enter Rafah to destroy the remaining Hamas battalions even if a hostage deal is achieved.[26] The Israeli Defense Minister said on February 16 that Israel would not evacuate Rafah’s civilian population into Egypt.[27]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks into southern Israel from the Gaza Strip on February 18.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters six times in the West Bank on February 18.[28] Israeli forces killed an al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade commander during an IDF raid in Tulkarm refugee camp.[29]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 18.[30]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted five preemptive strikes in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on February 17 that targeted three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, one subsurface naval attack drone, and one surface naval attack drone.[31] CENTCOM reported that the Houthis used a subsurface naval attack drone on February 17 for the first time since the Houthis launched their attack campaign targeting international shipping in October 2023.[32] CENTCOM conducted the strikes after determining that the cruise missiles and naval drones were an “imminent threat” to merchant vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea.[33]

7. Can Loose Lips Sink an Alliance?

Perhaps the allies only want term insurance or employer paid for life insurance and not whole life. This is quite a quote:

Trump’s pay-for-protection approach “is in essence a whole-life insurance policy for members,” said retired Army Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, who served as NATO ambassador under former President Obama.  

“It’s like he’s saying, ‘You pay your premiums or the policy lapses,’” Lute said. The campaign line resonates because voters understand life insurance, Lute said, but it weakens NATO’s certainty.

​We must consider this (this is a both a Biden and Trump issues - regardless of who is elected in November):

“Countries like China, Iran and North Korea are looking at how we are behaving,” said Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren. “If they feel that maybe, after all, NATO wouldn’t act, then that can have consequences.”

Can Loose Lips Sink an Alliance?

As Trump sows doubt about U.S. commitment to NATO, allies warn deterrence is fraying

https://www.wsj.com/world/can-loose-lips-sink-an-alliance-c7625f3d?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

By Daniel Michaels

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Updated Feb. 19, 2024 12:08 am ET

BRUSSELS—NATO, a military alliance, is like a dollar bill: Its value rests on the faith people put in it.

Now that faith is under attack from Donald Trump and politicians allied to him.

Trump’s recent broadsides against European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for not spending sufficiently on defense raised the question of whether shaming allies strengthens or weakens the alliance. 

The attacks might prompt countries to boost military outlays, but NATO is more than just its troops and weapons. Its unity has proved a powerful force, too.

“Deterrence is in the mind of our adversaries,” said Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in response to Trump’s comments. “We should not undermine the credibility of NATO’s deterrence.”

NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg has warned against undermining the alliance’s perceived unity. PHOTO: JOHN THYS/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Created by a 12-country pact signed in Washington 75 years ago this April, NATO is enshrined in U.S. law by an act of Congress, Senate approval of the founding treaty. Today, more than 30 other countries have embedded NATO in their basic laws. All of them did it willingly, if not enthusiastically.

NATO calls itself the most successful military alliance in human history, and that isn’t hollow bragging or crass marketing. Never before have so many countries, representing almost one-eighth of the world’s population, pledged to protect each other so consistently, for so long. NATO prevailed in the Cold War, when the stakes were no less than nuclear annihilation.

NATO’s success stemmed from the certainty that, if needed, the U.S. would come to its allies’ aid. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty obliges all allies to defend each other against “an armed attack,” and each will assist by taking “action as it deems necessary.” For decades, the assumption was that Washington would send troops into harm’s way to defend its allies.

Trump, a former president and the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, is putting that article of faith into question.

Doubt spread by Trump’s questioning of NATO’s founding principle resonates externally and internally because it hasn’t just defended against foreign threats. NATO has also kept peace among centuries-old enemies.

Dean Acheson, secretary of state under President Truman, signs NATO’s founding treaty. PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS

United under NATO’s security umbrella, long-feuding neighbors including France and Germany have become close allies. Others, including Greece and Turkey, have kept animosities from turning to war. Were NATO to atrophy or disappear, it isn’t inconceivable European leaders would once again fear and rearm against each other. 

Instead, Europe has experienced its longest period of peace and widespread prosperity ever, becoming a valuable market for U.S. companies. It is by far America’s biggest foreign investor. 

While the U.S. has underwritten European security for years, the cost in money and lives was far less than intervening to end two world wars. 

That return on investment is guaranteed by NATO through its pivotal roles deterring adversaries and reassuring allies, said former U.S. ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder. 

The alliance also gives the U.S. something that Russia, China and other major powers lack, said Stoltenberg, “And that is more than 30 friends and allies.”

Now Trump has threatened not to defend NATO members that don’t hit a spending target set a decade ago. Instead, he said, he would encourage Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to underspending allies. He also questioned whether European countries would come to America’s aid in a crisis.

Europeans acknowledge they must spend more on defense, and most are doing it—driven primarily by concerns about adversaries to the east, not an ally to the west. And some Europeans are urging their partners to stop hyperventilating over every Trump campaign remark and instead focus on building their capabilities. 

“All that whining and moaning about Trump,” said Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who is the leading candidate to succeed Stoltenberg as NATO secretary-general later this year, at the Munich Security Conference on Saturday. “I heard that constantly over the last couple of days. Let’s stop doing that.”

Donald Trump, in airing frustrations over NATO allies’ defense spending, has returned to a theme from his presidency. PHOTO: WIN MCNAMEE/GETTY IMAGES

Still, Trump’s recent comments crossed a line, even if they were inflated with campaign-trail hyperbole. No former—and possibly future—commander in chief has ever openly stomped on NATO’s core tenet. 

Trump’s pay-for-protection approach “is in essence a whole-life insurance policy for members,” said retired Army Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, who served as NATO ambassador under former President Obama.  

“It’s like he’s saying, ‘You pay your premiums or the policy lapses,’” Lute said. The campaign line resonates because voters understand life insurance, Lute said, but it weakens NATO’s certainty. 

“Trump, when he denigrates Article 5 and NATO, achieves a greater effect in NATO members than Vladimir Putin ever could,” said Lute of Russia’s president. “It’s a strategic gift to Putin.“

President Biden called Trump’s comment un-American. European leaders and even some Republicans lashed out at Trump, accusing him of undermining U.S. security. 

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President Biden called on the GOP-led House to approve the foreign-aid bill and denounced Donald Trump’s comments that he would encourage Russia to invade U.S. allies that don’t contribute enough to NATO. Photo: Anna Moneymaker/Getty

Vice President Kamala Harris, speaking at the Munich conference on Friday, noted that the sole time Article 5 has been invoked was by Europeans, in support of the U.S. after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

NATO’s Stoltenberg said Trump’s remarks endangered troops from the U.S. and other allies by potentially emboldening Putin.

“Countries like China, Iran and North Korea are looking at how we are behaving,” said Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren. “If they feel that maybe, after all, NATO wouldn’t act, then that can have consequences.”

When Trump was president, he grew so frustrated with low European military spending that he intimated he might pull the U.S. out of the alliance. His recent comment represents an attitude that could gut NATO without a single piece of legislation or executive order.

A president could refuse to invoke Article 5, or send only a token response, or obstruct allied responses, said Daalder, who served under Obama.

“You don’t have to withdraw to undermine NATO,” said Daalder. “You’re violating the spirit of the treaty, but not the law.”

Retired Army Gen. David Petraeus, a former Central Intelligence Agency director who led U.S. troop surges in Iraq and Afghanistan, said it is good news that European countries are increasing military spending, which should help bolster U.S. political support for NATO. 

German military equipment heads to Norway as part of large-scale NATO exercises. PHOTO: SINA SCHULDT/ZUMA PRESS

But post-Cold War conflicts in Libya, former-Yugoslavia and Afghanistan demonstrate that the U.S. will need to remain the indispensable backbone of NATO if the alliance is to endure, he said, in part for practical, technical reasons.

The U.S. is vital, he said, “because although the European countries can assemble on paper very substantial force and capability, then you get into the issues of interoperability and efficiency.” Without the U.S., deterrence “becomes exceedingly difficult.”

NATO has faced crises and hiccups before, but its fundamental premise never came into serious question. 

During the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the second Gulf War in 2003, allies didn’t hide their anger with each other. In recent years, Trump hinted at an exit and French President Emmanuel Macron warned of “the brain death of NATO.” The alliance rebounded. 

Putin’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago boosted NATO’s credibility. Ukrainian forces stopped Russian troops from taking Kyiv in part thanks to training they had received from NATO forces over the eight years following Moscow’s first push into their country. 

After the 2022 invasion, NATO activated defensive procedures and rushed reinforcements to its easternmost members. It has since worked to orchestrate new battle plans, similar to ones jettisoned at the end of the Cold War, for alliance-wide operations involving hundreds of thousands of troops.

In a sign of NATO’s enduring appeal, Finland and Sweden shed decades of military neutrality and in 2022 applied to join the alliance. The high-spenders on defense will strengthen NATO. Finland’s accession took less than a year, while Sweden’s membership could become official within weeks.

To demonstrate deterrence capabilities, NATO is now staging its largest maneuvers since 1988, Steadfast Defender, involving roughly 90,000 troops from all 31 members and Sweden. The exercise will last months, stretching across the Atlantic and from the Arctic to near the Black Sea. The goal is to show that NATO can fight as one.

Among European leaders now, “there’s a great sense of urgency” to spend and achieve more to protect their countries, said Ollongren, the Dutch defense minister.

Laurence Norman contributed to this article.

Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com

8. Houthi Rebels Cry Havoc! And Let Slip the Drones of War

Excerpts:

What’s the upshot? It is doubtful this will be over quickly. The Houthis have been at missile warfare on the Arabian Peninsula since 2015, suggesting they possess a sizable armory. They enjoy Iranian patronage, including seaborne weapon shipments, while availing themselves of armaments seized from the regular Yemeni armed forces during the civil war. And they have proved deft at repurposing old weaponry for maritime missions. Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally sporting U.S. weaponry, found itself unable to fully subdue cross-border Houthi attacks on Saudi infrastructure.

Judging from recent history, the smart betting suggests the rebels can replenish their expenditures of ammunition and their losses to coalition strikes through resupply from Iran or through their own weaponeering efforts. They don’t need that much. A low-rate campaign is enough to wreak havoc. If making yourself troublesome is your purpose, you have set a low threshold for success. Havoc is easy.

If stopping those intent on making mayhem is the goal, on the other hand, you have set a daunting threshold for success. One hundred percent success—scouring the Red Sea of all threats to the sea lanes—is an exceedingly demanding standard for the U.S. Navy and its coalition partners to meet. Disappointment lies in store should the coalition persevere with its current cumulative strategy, while shifting to a sequential strategy that could bring victory borders on unthinkable. Sequential operations would mean putting soldiers ashore—and embroiling the United States in yet another Middle East ground war at a time when it needs to focus attention and resources elsewhere on the map.

To all appearances, there is no easy way out of the Red Sea imbroglio.

Houthi Rebels Cry Havoc! And Let Slip the Drones of War

By James R. Holmes

February 2024 Proceedings Vol. 150/2/1,452

usni.org · February 14, 2024

The world wonders: What is the endgame in the low-grade maritime war in the Red Sea, and when will we get there? My answer: Don’t hold your breath. Yemen’s Houthi rebels don’t need to mount much of a threat to shipping to achieve their goals, while the U.S.-led naval coalition needs to completely defeat the Houthi threat to prevail. Coalition leaders likely will balk at what needs to be done. And if they don’t, land warfare in Yemen lies in store. Seldom does ground combat in the Middle East end swiftly or neatly. Regardless, the auguries point to protracted, indeterminate fighting between shore and sea.

Disruption in the Red Sea

Since 19 November, the Houthis have pelted commercial shipping passing through this critical waterway for trade and commerce, conducting 30 antiship missile or drone attacks and scoring 14 hits. As insurance rates skyrocketed, major shipping firms such as Maersk began rerouting merchantmen around the Red Sea, directing them to take the longer and more arduous but also safer route around the Cape of Good Hope into the South Atlantic. Shipping-firm executives profess little faith in navies’ ability to restore order to regional waters.

In a bid to restore maritime security, Washington has assembled a coalition dubbed Prosperity Guardian to police the sea. To date, U.S. destroyers have brought down 21 missiles and 50 drones bound for merchant traffic. After U.S. leaders ordered missile and air strikes against shore positions in Yemen, Houthi rocketeers took U.S. Navy and coalition warships under fire as well. A missile closed to within a mile of the destroyer USS Gravely (DDG-107) last week before being swatted down by the Gravely’s close-in weapon system.

Martial Logic

What does the future hold? Let us peer through a glass darkly, discerning the nature of this limited but consequential sea war. Carl von Clausewitz, who knew a thing or two about affairs of arms, explains that “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”

Four facets of this strange conflict stand out. One, it pits a land-based, substate armed group wielding military-grade hardware against oceangoing state combatants deploying conventional naval forces. The coalition confronts yet another irregular war blurring the lines between unconventional and conventional methods of war making.

Two, both the Houthis and the guardians of the sea lanes are waging “limited” war against each another. “Unlimited” war connotes forcibly unseating a hostile government and imposing your will on the vanquished. Yemeni rebels have neither the means nor the need to topple the U.S. government to make a statement about solidarity with the Palestinian cause. They merely need to make mischief for Israel and the seafaring societies that have supported Israeli operations in Gaza. Doing so inflicts economic pain and exacts a price for standing with Israel, meeting Houthi goals.

For their part, U.S. leaders have said nothing about eradicating the Houthis as a fighting force. They merely want to halt attacks on shipping so normal trading patterns can resume. They too entertain a limited aim; namely, restoring the status quo of tranquil sea lanes. The problem for Washington is that there may be no way to stop Houthi attacks short of destroying the armed group. To succeed may mean embracing unlimited aims, requiring military escalation. Remaining constrained courts failure.

Three, there is a mismatch between how much the combatants prize their goals and how much they are prepared to spend to attain them. As Clausewitz observes, the value a contender places on its “political object”—the goal it sets for a warlike undertaking—determines the “magnitude” and “duration” of the effort it puts forth to obtain that object. The magnitude is the rate at which a belligerent expends militarily relevant resources on its goal; duration is how long it keeps up the expenditure. Rate x time = the cost of the political goal.

If the belligerent’s political leaders, society, and armed forces want the goal enough to pay the requisite price, they proceed with the endeavor. If not, they forgo it.

Clausewitzian martial logic resembles consumer logic. When you go to buy an automobile on the installment plan, you determine the amount of each monthly payment and the number of payments it will take to pay off the loan. Multiplying the two numbers reveals the total price of your new car. If you care enough about that particular car to pay the price, you sign the contract. If not, you look for a humbler ride that fits your needs and wants.

The same holds in martial encounters: If you covet something ardently, you’re prepared to spend lavishly on it for a long time. If you harbor only middling desire for the goal, you invest middling resources in it for a finite period. And if the cost spirals out of control after you launch into the venture, you write off the goal and quit the venture on the best terms possible.

Now, consider the Red Sea. Religion is an accelerant for Houthi political and strategic calculations. It primes militant leaders to place enormous weight on their political object. In other words, how much the Houthis crave their goals in the Red Sea governs the rate at which they are prepared to expend military resources to make trouble for Israel and the West and how long they are prepared to keep doing so.

It’s of surpassing importance to Houthi magnates to make their statement about Gaza. So, they are prepared to spend to the utmost—out of a meager stock of military resources, granted—for as long as it takes for that statement to resound. That portends a prolonged campaign against shipping.

The same logic goes for Western defenders of nautical freedom, yet it’s far from clear that U.S. leaders treasure their aims in the Red Sea as much as Houthis do theirs. Prosperity is at risk in marginal seas all around the Eurasian periphery, including not just the Red Sea but also the Black Sea, eastern Mediterranean, Arabian Sea, and South China Sea. Freedom of navigation—freedom of movement for ships to proceed from point A to point B on the nautical chart—is in jeopardy. Houthi attacks are a pocketbook issue for the electorate, and votes concentrate minds—especially in an election year. “No shipping, no shopping,” as one maritime consultant recently told Congress.

Freedom of the Sea

The problem is about more than freedom of movement. Freedom of the sea is likewise in peril. Freedom of the sea refers to seafaring states’ liberty to do as they wish in the maritime commons with exceptions codified by treaty. It encompasses the freedom to conduct reconnaissance flights, underwater surveys, and kindred military activities. Yet, the United States has proven a tepid defender of freedom of the sea in expanses such as the South China Sea, where China unlawfully asserts “indisputable sovereignty”—in effect state ownership—of an economically critical sea route.

If successive presidential administrations have done little to uphold freedom of the sea in East Asia, a region of paramount importance to the Pentagon, it seems doubtful they would display more resolve in the Red Sea, a theater of secondary importance. If not, the United States’ commitment could prove wobbly despite its infinitely superior resource base vis-à-vis the Houthis. The rebels could prevail despite being outmatched by all conceivable material measures.

Four, both the Houthis and the guardians of commercial shipping are waging what Admiral J. C. Wylie would call “cumulative” campaigns. Such campaigns are indecisive in themselves, but that does not matter much for the Houthis. It matters a great deal for the United States and its partners because they need decisive results to prevail. Wylie observes that “sequential” operations constitute the norm in military history: A campaign proceeds from one tactical action to the next to the next until the campaign reaches its goal. Each action depends on the preceding one and shapes the subsequent one. He opines that only sequential operations can yield a decisive outcome, giving the combatant prosecuting them control of whatever its leaders want to control. For Wylie, control is the point of military strategy, whether it is control of geographic space, the enemy fighting force, or something else.

By contrast, cumulative operations are scattershot. They are made up of individual tactical actions that don’t follow one another in sequence, either on the map or in time. The contestant pursuing a cumulative strategy attempts to grind down its antagonist by inflicting low-grade damage at many places rather than meting out a series of punishing blows in sequence to bring about victory. If a vector—a continuous line pointing to a final destination—makes a fitting metaphor for sequential strategies, a paint splatter best represents a cumulative strategy.

Air and missile strikes are quintessential cumulative strategies. Again, Wylie asserts that cumulative strategies are invaluable adjuncts to sequential strategies but are never decisive pursued in isolation. He would take a dim view of either the Houthis’ or the Western coalition’s capacity to score a decisive outcome through scattershot means.

However, the Yemeni rebels can accomplish their goals without a decisive outcome. They don’t need to sink all shipping that comes within reach. They just need to sow enough mischief to keep insurance rates high, deterring passage through the Red Sea or exacting a significant price for risking the voyage. In other words, they just need to inflict economic pain on the trading world. The occasional low-volume missile or drone attack is enough to suit their purposes. For their part, coalition warships and warplanes do need a decisive result. They need to stop Houthi sallies altogether to restore confidence in sea-lane security and allow maritime trade to return to normal. Yet, according to Wylie, they are executing an intrinsically indecisive campaign.

Advantage: Houthis.

Looking Forward

What’s the upshot? It is doubtful this will be over quickly. The Houthis have been at missile warfare on the Arabian Peninsula since 2015, suggesting they possess a sizable armory. They enjoy Iranian patronage, including seaborne weapon shipments, while availing themselves of armaments seized from the regular Yemeni armed forces during the civil war. And they have proved deft at repurposing old weaponry for maritime missions. Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally sporting U.S. weaponry, found itself unable to fully subdue cross-border Houthi attacks on Saudi infrastructure.

Judging from recent history, the smart betting suggests the rebels can replenish their expenditures of ammunition and their losses to coalition strikes through resupply from Iran or through their own weaponeering efforts. They don’t need that much. A low-rate campaign is enough to wreak havoc. If making yourself troublesome is your purpose, you have set a low threshold for success. Havoc is easy.

If stopping those intent on making mayhem is the goal, on the other hand, you have set a daunting threshold for success. One hundred percent success—scouring the Red Sea of all threats to the sea lanes—is an exceedingly demanding standard for the U.S. Navy and its coalition partners to meet. Disappointment lies in store should the coalition persevere with its current cumulative strategy, while shifting to a sequential strategy that could bring victory borders on unthinkable. Sequential operations would mean putting soldiers ashore—and embroiling the United States in yet another Middle East ground war at a time when it needs to focus attention and resources elsewhere on the map.

To all appearances, there is no easy way out of the Red Sea imbroglio.

usni.org · February 14, 2024

9. 'There’s only Plan A': Defense leaders fear failure in Ukraine

Primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency. PACE plans for all things (not just comms)

'There’s only Plan A': Defense leaders fear failure in Ukraine

Politico

By ALEXANDER WARD and PAUL MCLEARY

02/18/2024 03:08 PM EST

Attendees of the Munich Security Conference were worried about Ukraine’s prospects against Russia and American commitment to Kyiv.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (left) and Vice President Kamala Harris (right) as well as members of their delegations meet for talks at the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in Munich, Germany, on Saturday Feb. 17, 2024. | Tobias Schwarz/Pool via AP

02/18/2024 03:08 PM EST

MUNICH — Four American senators recounted a story Ukrainian officials told them at the Munich Security Conference: A soldier in a muddy trench with Russian artillery exploding nearby, scrolling on his phone for signs the U.S. House would approve military aid.

Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), leader of one of the congressional delegations, said it was “heartbreaking” to hear the tale. “For young Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines, this is a persistent topic of conversation,” the senator relayed, a somber tone in his voice.

The episode highlighted the pall over this weekend’s gathering of transatlantic-minded officials and dignitaries in the Bavarian capital. Ukraine’s worsening prospects on the battlefield and questions about America’s commitment to Kyiv dominated the annual event. The gloom was amplified by news of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny’s death, which hit just as leaders were arriving on the event’s first day.

Many politicians and officials used the moment to press that Ukraine would lose the war without the $60 billion more in U.S. military aid currently awaiting a vote in the House. But they also sounded far from certain about what a victory might look like for Ukraine even with that boost.

The conference comes as confidence in whether President Joe Biden can deliver for Ukraine is particularly low and as former President Donald Trump, the Republican frontrunner, works to undermine the package.

The plan now, as detailed or lamented in interviews with eight U.S. lawmakers and five foreign officials, is to just keep the Ukrainian military from collapsing.

Many sidestepped the question of what a Ukrainian victory would look like, or when it might happen.

Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.), chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said the aid package would be a “game changer” for Ukraine. But he declined to say that the support would ensure a Ukrainian triumph, simply stating American assistance was Kyiv’s last, best hope.

“I am not aware of any other way for, in the short term, the Ukrainians to get the arms and ammunition and tools they need, other than from the United States,” added Warner — one of 44 U.S. lawmakers at Munich.

The range of battlefield possibilities remains enormous, with or without more weapons flowing to Ukraine. “Somewhere between Afghanistan, driving the Russians out with essentially partisan guerrilla warfare, and great-armies conflict, like we have right now, is where it ends up,” Whitehouse said.

Ukraine is low on ammunition and infantry. The decade-long stronghold of Avdiivka fell to the Russians over the weekend, giving the Kremlin its first major conquest since May. Before Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy changed leadership at the top of his country’s military, generals insisted the president had to mobilize 500,000 more troops to keep pace with a larger, still-stronger Russian force that appears willing to take massive casualties to gain just a few yards of ground.

“When a citizen of Europe reads that Ukraine retreated from Avdiivka, he should realize one single fact: Russia has got a few kilometers closer to his own home,” said Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba in an interview. “Every advance Russia makes in Ukraine brings Russian weapons closer to the home of a middle-class European.”

Senior administration officials insist America’s commitment to Ukraine’s cause hasn’t diminished. “Putin is not going to stop unless he is stopped,” said U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth, who arrived in Munich fresh from watching U.S. troops train a new Ukrainian battalion at an American base in Germany. “And for adversaries who are watching what’s happening in Ukraine, and what it says about American will, I would not want them to draw the conclusion that we’ll let a leader like Putin do whatever he wants.”

The best — and only — option to prevent that, they argue, is still the one on the table: Congress passing the military assistance. “Pass the supplemental. That’s it. Let’s destroy Putin’s army. The Ukrainians know how to do that, so let’s help them do it,” added Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colo).

Lawmakers from both parties in Munich assured ally after ally that the House would eventually greenlight the aid, with some predicting passage as soon as March. They insisted the majority of representatives would support the bill once on the House floor. But Mikie Sherrill (D-N.J.) feared an X factor: the Republican party’s leader, former President Donald Trump.

“Former President Trump appears to be trying to derail support for the current bipartisan supplemental passed in the Senate,” the House Armed Services Committee member said in an interview.

Zelenskyy, clearly worried about that prospect, used public opportunities to plead his nation’s case. “For us, this package is vital. We do not currently look into alternatives because we are counting on the United States as our strategic partner,” he said at a news conference with Vice President Kamala Harris on Saturday.

There’s no Plan B if the lawmakers fail to greenlight the package, Harris confirmed. “There’s only Plan A.”

Confidence in what Ukraine can accomplish — and in President Joe Biden — is seemingly at its lowest point in two years. “The U.S. wants a photo op of happy allies working together,” one NATO official, who like some others in this story was granted anonymity to offer candid views, said on the sidelines of the event. “But without that real American support, without that leadership, this is going to be very difficult.”

Ukrainian officials aren’t talking about alternatives, insisting that they need the arms and ammunition — particularly Taurus and the long-range Army Tactical Missile System — to fend off Russia. One Ukrainian parliamentarian said there’s worry in Kyiv about the lack of leadership shown by Washington both in passing the supplemental and in sending — and nudging allies along — to send more long-range munitions to Ukraine. The official had just come from the frontlines in the south and said that the lack of munitions are directly resulting in Ukraine losing ground, and losing soldiers.

At the Munich Security Conference last year nerves were visible, but were not as all-consuming. The U.S. and its allies had rallied to Ukraine’s defense, taking back seized territory from Russia and preparing for a decisive counteroffensive. There was a long road ahead, but the fight trended in a positive direction. It was just days afterward that Biden stood in Warsaw, after a surprise visit with Zelenskyy in Ukraine, announcing that “Kyiv stands proud, it stands tall, and most important, it stands free.”

But the counteroffensive failed and the ground campaign stalled, causing both Ukrainian and Russian forces to play a game of artillery ping pong across the 600-mile front. Kyiv has seen more success in the Black Sea, sinking several Russian ships in the strategic waterway, but it didn’t do much to improve the optics of a war that’s trudging along. No one on either side of the Atlantic — and especially in Kyiv and Moscow — can predict what’s to come.

“We will have a Russia problem no matter how the war ends,” said Adm. Rob Bauer, chair of NATO’s Military Committee, who also warned that while the West “might have been overly optimistic in 2023” about the war, “but we have to guard against being overly pessimistic in 2024.”

The uncertainty has empowered Ukraine skeptics. They insist the U.S. cut off the tap and focus on the homefront instead. Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio), who arrived in Munich to offer a countering viewpoint, said he was supportive of Kyiv’s fight but that America couldn’t produce enough weapons to arm Ukraine and protect the U.S. at the same time.

“Europe has to be a little more self-sufficient” in defending itself” he insisted in a solo news conference outside the conference venue. “You guys have to step up. There’s going to be a pivot in American policy focused in East Asia. Given that reality, the Europeans have to take a more aggressive role.”

Most lawmakers, though, didn’t want to leave Munich without offering hope. Time and again, they pushed back on the idea that Ukraine was irreversibly on the ropes.

“I don’t see how Russia ever wins this war. Their definition of winning is taking over the country and occupying it. They are never going to occupy Ukraine,” said Idaho Sen. Jim Risch, the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Wars end when one or both sides have fought to the point of exhaustion, and then they sit down and talk. Neither side is there.”

And Whitehouse argued Ukraine would never stop resisting against Russia, even if it doesn’t receive more support: “There is literally zero chance that the Ukrainians will peacefully abide Russian occupation.”

Suzanne Lynch and Josh Posaner contributed to this report.

POLITICO

Politico

10. Worrywurst at the Munich Security Conference

Excerpts:

As this informal report describes, the mood was downbeat in Munich. Perhaps I’ve simply been to too many of these conferences over the years, but things seemed to me too pessimistic. It’s true: Russia has some advantages in Ukraine it previously lacked, and Kyiv is running low on weapons and manpower. Yes, there is trouble across the world, from the Middle East to Europe to the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The U.S. Congress is tied in knots and has trouble agreeing on solutions to major national challenges. And of course, it’s an election year in the United States, with two very different presidential candidates on offer and deep uncertainty about the way ahead.

And yet. The allies — advanced democracies across the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific — retain enormous strengths and advantages of their own. It is the task of leaders to convert those into specific actions that protect their interests and uphold an orderly world. That is entirely possible.

Worry is fine insofar as it goes. Next year in Munich, I hope we’ll hear less in the way of anxiety-ridden diagnoses and more about specific prescriptions. Better still would be commitments to action, such as more Denmark-like pledges of weapons transfers to Ukraine, increased defense spending by the nearly half of NATO countries still under the 2 percent threshold, agreements on joint industrial production, moves to draw down Russia’s frozen foreign reserves, additional nations joining Red Sea patrols, and countries harmonizing their export controls and other economic steps vis-à-vis China.

Shared uneasiness should spur common action. We can envision the alternatives.

Worrywurst at the Munich Security Conference - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Richard Fontaine · February 19, 2024

The foreign policy elite descended on Munich again this weekend, primed for beer, brats, and bilats. The 2024 Munich Security Conference was crowded and frenzied, as security details jostled delegates straining to connect with movers and shakers. The gathering boasted both an online portal and a smartphone app, and participants used them to set up meetings with old friends and total unknowns. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called the affair “diplomatic speed dating,” and that about nailed it.

For all the conviviality, however, a somber mood prevailed this year. I’ve been attending this conference for almost two decades now, and the ratio of worries to solutions has rarely felt higher. One year ago, the trans-Atlantic allies were united in their resolve to resist Russia and help Ukraine. Kyiv had recently retaken vast swaths of territory, Moscow’s offensive was sputtering, and hopes for the Ukrainian counteroffensive were high. There were worries about Western industrial production, the sustainability of a long campaign, and balancing a focus on European security with challenges in Asia. But the 2023 Munich zeitgeist was more steely-eyed resolve than wide-eyed alarm.

This year was different.

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Russia on the March

Just as the sessions were set to commence, the shocking news of Alexei Navalny’s death stunned participants. Vice President Kamala Harris addressed it up front. “If confirmed,” she said, “this would be a further sign of Vladamir Putin’s brutality. Whatever story they tell, let us be clear: Russia is responsible.” After her speech, and to the audience’s surprise, Yulia Navalnaya, wife of Alexei, then took the stage. She addressed a silenced ballroom with utter composure. Upon hearing the devastating news of her husband’s death, she said, “I thought: should I stand here before you or should I go back to my children? And then I thought: what would have Alexei done in my place? And I’m sure that he would have been standing here on this stage.” After she called with great dignity and eloquence for Putin to be held accountable, the audience rose in sustained applause.

Navalny’s passing hung over the weekend’s proceedings and seemed to reflect Moscow’s new trajectory. Gone were the hopes of a major Ukrainian counteroffensive or claims that Western sanctions would grind Russia’s economy to a halt. So too were predictions that last year’s Prigozhin mutiny would irreparably harm Putin’s domestic invincibility. Instead, participants now worried about Russia retaking land in Ukraine — and during the weekend the town of Avdiivka fell, marking the first major Russian territorial gain since May 2023. Ukraine is running low on ammunition across the eastern front (the head of Ukrainian forces in the south said that the Russians enjoy a 10-to-1 shell advantage), missile and air defense stocks are dwindling, and — absent U.S. assistance — government coffers will soon be bare. Russia, on the other hand, has created a wartime economy, is absorbing ammunition and weapons from North Korea and Iran, and is apparently willing to throw away many more Russian lives in its pursuit of conquest. In the meantime, Putin grows more confident, droning on about ancient history with Tucker Carlson and declaring “Forward! Success! To new borders!” before his countrymen. Reports suggest that he is planning to put a nuclear weapon in space.

For the first time, there was serious talk about an eventual Russian threat to NATO territory. Previously, Russia’s attack on Ukraine was seen, even in Europe, as an affront to the international order, and an impermissible attempt to forcibly change borders. Sentiment has begun to shift toward a view that Russia must be stopped in Ukraine lest it move on to other targets, like Moldova and eventually even NATO countries. The Danish defense minister said that Russia is rearming quickly and could attack NATO within three to five years. The chair of Germany’s Bundestag defense committee put the timeline at five to eight years and the Estonian intelligence service said it was more like a decade.

There was not much consensus to be found on how exactly to stop Russia in Ukraine, beyond calls to provide Kyiv with more military, economic, and humanitarian support. U.S. Sen. J.D. Vance observed that Ukraine would need to make territorial concessions to end the conflict. European leaders pledged new efforts to ramp up weapons production and touted their recent $50 billion assistance pledge. Last month NATO signed a contract to produce $1.2 billion in artillery rounds and Denmark’s prime minister announced in Munich that her country would transfer all of its artillery to Kyiv. Czech President Petr Pavel said that an additional 800,000 artillery rounds could be sourced abroad and delivered to Ukraine in weeks — if a funding source were available.

Europeans talked up the need to boost their own defense spending and industrial output. Germany is expected to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense this year for the first time since the 1990s. Chancellor Olaf Scholz reaffirmed his pledge to maintain defense spending at 2 percent of GDP through “the 2020s, 2030s, and beyond.” His defense minister said German defense spending could one day climb to 3.5 percent of GDP. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, considered a front-runner to replace Jens Stoltenberg as NATO secretary general, said that Europe should “stop moaning and whining” about Donald Trump and instead start spending more on defense. NATO projects that 18 of its 31 members will hit the 2 percent mark this year, up from 2014 when only three members did so. Even so, today the European average remains just 1.6 percent, while Russia this year plans to spend 6 percent of its GDP on defense.

On one matter, everyone — Europeans, Ukrainians, Americans, and delegates from other regions — concurred: What America does, or fails to do, will be vital.

This realization provoked big worry number two.

Come Home America?

The inability of Congress thus far to pass a supplemental aid package, including over $60 billion in assistance to Ukraine, has rattled Europeans and others. Trump’s recent comment — that he would encourage Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to inadequately spending NATO countries — combined with the real potential of a second Trump term to worry them further. Washington has repeatedly pledged to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes.” What happens if it doesn’t?

The vice president sought to calm such anxieties. “I know there are questions here in Europe and around the world,” she said, “about the future of America’s role of global leadership. These are questions the American people must also ask ourselves.” It is, she continued, “in the fundamental interest of the American people for the United States to fulfill our longstanding role of global leadership,” and in partial fulfillment of that role, the administration “will work to secure critical weapons and resources that Ukraine so badly needs.” Yet with a House of Representatives led by the other party and a presidential election less than nine months away, no administration official could fully reassure skittish allies.

Harris and other administration officials pledged allied solidarity, deep engagement, and sustained support. But that might only be so if President Joe Biden is re-elected. If Trump is elected, the United States might still do the right thing after trying everything else. The reality remains: No matter who said what, next year might see the arrival in Munich of a starkly different U.S. team, with very different priorities.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy, attending in person, made the case for urgency. He, too, was focused on American assistance. Referring to the House of Representatives’ two-week recess, he reminded the audience that “dictators do not go on vacation.” “Keeping Ukraine in artificial deficits of weapons,” Zelenskyy said, “particularly in deficits of artillery and long-range capabilities, allows Putin to adapt to the current intensity of the war. This self-weakening of democracy over time undermines our joint results.”

With Russia up and Europe worried, was Washington in or out? Long gone is talk about European “strategic autonomy” or about accommodations with other great powers. Europeans want the United States active and on their side. And while it has grown unfashionable to talk of America as an indispensable power, on the matter of Ukraine and Russia at least, it is.

Everything Else Everywhere, All at Once

European security issues quite naturally dominated a conference founded to discuss important but sometimes arcane trans-Atlantic matters. Yet the war in Gaza raged on and Israeli President Isaac Herzog made an impassioned plea for the return of Hamas-held hostages — even drawing attention to former hostages standing in the balcony. Herzog reportedly met quietly in Munich with Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani, raising hopes that a return might be in the offing — and perhaps even an end to the fighting on the horizon.

Iranian officials, who for years appeared in Munich to rail against the West, were nowhere to be seen, again this year disinvited by the organizers. The “Axis of Resistance” and Iran’s role in destabilizing the Middle East garnered a decent amount of discussion, as did the prospects for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine issue. Few concrete proposals emerged.

Then there was China. While Beijing persistently occupies Washington’s foreign policy minds, China produced only a minor ripple in Munich. Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke, sticking to well-rehearsed bromides about Taiwanese independence and the dangers of economic decoupling. Wang met with Blinken and, unlike last year, there were no immediate reports of diplomatic fireworks behind the scenes. If things felt better in Europe, and if the U.S. trajectory were not so uncertain, it’s likely that delegates would focus to a far greater extent on Asia’s promise and China’s challenge. This time around, there were more urgent issues to worry about.

* * *

As this informal report describes, the mood was downbeat in Munich. Perhaps I’ve simply been to too many of these conferences over the years, but things seemed to me too pessimistic. It’s true: Russia has some advantages in Ukraine it previously lacked, and Kyiv is running low on weapons and manpower. Yes, there is trouble across the world, from the Middle East to Europe to the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The U.S. Congress is tied in knots and has trouble agreeing on solutions to major national challenges. And of course, it’s an election year in the United States, with two very different presidential candidates on offer and deep uncertainty about the way ahead.

And yet. The allies — advanced democracies across the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific — retain enormous strengths and advantages of their own. It is the task of leaders to convert those into specific actions that protect their interests and uphold an orderly world. That is entirely possible.

Worry is fine insofar as it goes. Next year in Munich, I hope we’ll hear less in the way of anxiety-ridden diagnoses and more about specific prescriptions. Better still would be commitments to action, such as more Denmark-like pledges of weapons transfers to Ukraine, increased defense spending by the nearly half of NATO countries still under the 2 percent threshold, agreements on joint industrial production, moves to draw down Russia’s frozen foreign reserves, additional nations joining Red Sea patrols, and countries harmonizing their export controls and other economic steps vis-à-vis China.

Shared uneasiness should spur common action. We can envision the alternatives.

Become a Member

Richard Fontaine is chief executive officer of the Center for a New American Security and coauthor of the forthcoming book Lost Decade: The US Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Richard Fontaine · February 19, 2024

11. The Moral Blindness of Putin’s Apologists on the Right

"The moral is to the physical as three is to one." (or so said Bonaparte). This should mean more than the fighting spirit of the troops but also the political will of the government and the people.

Most of these apologolists are not serious people, and the politicians who are apologists are not serious political leaders. We can, should, and must debate funding and support to Ukraine but the apologists are not interested in such debate or even concerned with the outcome of Putin's War in Ukraine.

The Moral Blindness of Putin’s Apologists on the Right

They have embraced the moral equivalence that used to define the self-loathing left-wing elites.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/moral-blindness-of-putin-apologists-on-the-right-russia-civil-liberties-carlson-navalny-44a5d687?mod=hp_opin_pos_1

By Gerard Baker

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Feb. 19, 2024 11:58 am ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin responds to a question from Tucker Carlson during an interview at the Kremlin in Moscow, Feb. 9. PHOTO: GAVRIIL GRIGOROV/KREMLIN POOL/ZUMA PRESS

Why can’t we be more like Russia?

The minute you see the welcoming smiles on the faces of the kindly immigration guards, all spiffy in their shiny jackboots, at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport you realize that unlike our own morally louche, spiritually decrepit cesspit, run by a corrupt and brutal regime bent on destroying its opponents, Russia is a nation united around a vision of the historic greatness of its civilization.

From state-of-the-art supermarket cart technology to a president who is youthful and vigorous, able to dilate on European history at length, the contrast couldn’t be greater with a technologically backward and collapsing U.S. in the grip of a geriatric autocrat who can’t remember what day it is.

American capitalism is corrupt and exploitative. Russia’s is well-regulated and committed to the common good. In the U.S., tech billionaires and Wall Street fat cats get rich on the surplus value their workers produce. Benevolent Russian oligarchs, cooperating with the state for the benefit of the people, are able to supply all Russians’ needs at a fraction of the exorbitant prices Americans pay. They are so successful that they create demand for hard-pressed sectors of the global economy, such as yachts, luxury London real estate and Swiss casinos.

Unlike America, Russia has firm control over its borders. Millions of migrants flow into the U.S. Russia definitely doesn’t have that problem. The system works so well that in the past two years, almost a million Russians, many of them vigorous young men of fighting age, have left the country, and Russia is pushing its borders onto the territory of grateful neighbors.

It’s easy to mock the credulousness of some grown-ups who travel abroad and, like a high-school exchange student, wax lyrical about baroque subway stations and demonstrate a lack of understanding of exchange rates.

But we have a deeper problem than publicity-hungry provocateurs on ill-timed pilgrimages. A large part of the American right actively embraces the moral equivalence that used to be a defining feature of self-loathing left-wing elites.

They have taken the illogical leap from legitimate alarm about America’s direction to the idea that America is a moral pariah. In some inexplicable way, they have chosen to see the nation that nurtured them and elevated them, equipped them with opportunities half the world can only dream of, as a moral monster. They use the freedom this country gives them to denounce it, insisting it is no better than a place in which even to harbor those kinds of thoughts could get you eliminated.

The only response of all decent people to the death of Alexei Navalny, the brave critic of Vladimir Putin’s regime, in a Siberian prison camp is grief, disgust and unqualified condemnation. It is the sort of event that defines the malevolent nature of Mr. Putin’s Russia.

But that sort of decency evidently was above the moral reach of some of the more prominent leaders of what used to be the conservative movement.

Newt Gingrich saw a parallel that many others also highlighted: Navalny’s “death in prison is a brutal reminder that jailing your political opponents is inhumane and a violation of every principle of a free society,” he tweeted. “Watch the Biden Administration speak out against Putin and his jailing of his leading political opponent while Democrats in four different jurisdictions try to turn President Trump into an American Navalny.”

You can believe, as I do, that Joe Biden is doing significant harm to the U.S. You can believe, as I do, that he has weakened our national security, exposed us to dangerous levels of mass illegal immigration, and is contributing to the corrosion of our national cohesion with his promotion of progressive ideology. You can believe, as I do, that he has many more questions to answer about his and his family’s work for foreign entities. You can believe, as I do, that he and his fellow Democrats have manipulated the levers of justice in pursuit of the man who stands as their principal political opponent.

He should be held accountable for all these.

But, need I say this? Mr. Biden isn’t Vladimir Putin. Mr. Biden doesn’t invade neighbors on a false pretext, killing indiscriminately. He doesn’t make people who have fallen into disfavor fall from the windows of tall buildings. He doesn’t throw a foreign journalist in jail for reporting the truth about what is going on in his country. He doesn’t arrange the murder of his domestic political opponents on the soil of other countries. And he doesn’t imprison, torture and preside over the “death by sudden death” of his principal domestic critic.

If you can’t see the difference then I say, respectfully, that you have lost—or discarded—your capacity for moral reasoning. And that is an even bigger problem.

WSJ Opinion: America’s Space War Vulnerability to Russia and China

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Review and Outlook: Will Mike Turner’s national-security threat warning over Russia's new anti-satellite program wake up a complacent Washington, D.C.? Images: Getty Images/Fox News/CNP/Zuma Press Composite: Mark Kelly

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​12. A Reconsideration of Women’s Role in Special Operations: Critical Questions, Mooted a Decade After the Fact

This should rekindle some controversy.

A Reconsideration of Women’s Role in Special Operations: Critical Questions, Mooted a Decade After the Fact | Small Wars Journal

Small Wars Journal

A Reconsideration of Women’s Role in Special Operations: Critical Questions, Mooted a Decade After the Fact

By al Dhobaba

In August of 2023, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) updated its 2021 study, "Breaking Barriers: Women in Army Special Operations."1 According to an Army News Service article, the study "outlined 42 recommendations... to better address obstacles facing female Soldiers serving in special operations units and to retain its top talent," and its "findings will guide USASOC in optimizing female warfighters while noting their physical and anatomical differences." The study's focus group responses highlighted "equipment fitting, childcare, gender bias, social support, sexual harassment, pregnancy and postpartum, and morale and wellbeing." According to the USASOC commander, Lieutenant General Jonathan Braga, "Although disappointed by some of the findings and comments in the study, we are committed to addressing these issues with candor and transparency."2

Anyone who has followed the Army's integration of women into the special operations forces (SOF) ranks since mid-2015 should either be laughing or crying at this juncture.

The study reported no decline in morale arising from the integration of women into SOF units. However, among other findings, "80% of men reported that gender-related concerns had no impact on their decision to remain in special operations forces." The implication, of course, is that the within the community of Army personnel who are the most difficult and expensive to recruit, evaluate, train, and especially retain, one in five were willing to answer that gender-related concerns negatively impacted their interest in remaining in the USASOC ranks. Citing USASOC Command Sergeant Major JoAnn Naumann, the article claims that "researchers found most gender-biased comments and attitudes during the study came from senior NCOs, indicating a difference in generational views," the obvious insinuation being that these "differences in generational views" will gradually diminish. Presumably, these are the sort of comments that "disappointed" LTG Braga: skepticism from old-timers whose opinions result from "gender bias," but who will age out of the Army over time.

To be fair, a distinction must be made between the study, which encompassed female soldiers in all roles in USASOC, to include support roles; and the more contentious issue of female soldiers serving as actual special operators. However, contrary to both the study's intent and the clear bias of USASOC leadership, the implications of the issues noted in the study necessarily reintroduce the argument about what roles women should -- or should not -- play in the SOF ranks.

Let's backtrack a bit.

In 2011, the Washington Post reported that female candidates for assignments in support of SOF underwent an exhaustive selection process.3 Then, in August of 2015, amid great controversy, the Army graduated its first female Ranger School candidates, Captain Kristen Griest and First Lieutenant Shayne Haver.4 Two months later, Major Lisa Jaster, a 37-year-old mother of two, became the third female Ranger School graduate.5 The admission and subsequent graduation of female candidates occurred at a time when women were still excluded from combat arms careers, the subsequent end of which appeared to result from political pressure more so than any military justification. Unsurprisingly, this effort to graduate female candidates from Ranger School generated a heated debate between passionate supporters of gender integration, and those who were adamant that the only way to do so was to compromise the high standards that set the SOF community apart from conventional units. Conspiracy theories about relaxed standards for Griest and Haver were fueled by a lack of transparency by the Army, leading one Congressman -- a Ranger School graduate himself -- to demand that the Army release the records from the female candidates' Ranger School class.6, 7 This request allegedly revealed that the Army had destroyed some of the records in question.8 As one anonymous commentator noted at the time:

"Are the results of the pilot/assessment published? Lessons learned? Applicability of the findings to the larger question of assigning women to [Direct Combat Probability Code] slots? Hell, did they even collect any data? You know, the sort of stuff that was the public rationale for this move in the first place? Or, was all that just a cover story for a policy shift that was a fait accompli? I am not against women in Ranger School and I don't buy the claim that this process was rigged for the [female] soldiers who graduated, but the route the Army took to get here, as a matter of process, looks sleazier by the minute. This clamming up on what the hell this assessment was may hold up, but my gut tells me there is a hell of a backstory here."

In fact, despite having been sold as a pilot program to study the issue and produce hard data, no data appears to have been collected, nor has a study been published for independent review. Instead, the Army seems to have seized every opportunity to appear malfeasant. This raises two questions, both of them pertinent to the future of the SOF community writ large, and the Army's SOF units more specifically. First: how does this relate to the future of Ranger School? Second: what role will women play in the foreseeable future of SOF? Relative to the first question, another commentator discussing the first female graduates noted:

"That is the million dollar question and the reason for a majority of the angst, [in my opinion]. [Ranger School] morphed into a 'leadership' school. Because of this I think the school has been schizophrenic over the years; only volunteers, all commissioned officers, back to volunteers, only combat arms, branch immaterial, yes desert phase, no desert phase, etc. The screwy thing is that a whole lot of the supporters of integration can't seem to fully articulate what should be going on. There is a lot of talk about 'maintain the standards,' but the logical question is why can't we create a leadership course that physically stresses a 5'2" 130 lb. female at the same rate as a 6'2" 210 lb. male? So then my question becomes, if everyone who attends has to hump the machine gun with a winter packing list in the mountain phase when half the squad goes on sick call, because of 'standards,' is this really a 'leadership' school at all? See my reference to schizophrenia above."

Another anonymous commentator, whose remarks focused upon Major Jaster's graduation, was more direct: "If a 37-year-old mother of two can graduate from Ranger School, it's not hard enough." Several years after her graduation from Ranger School, Captain Griest published an essay opposing the institution of gender-specific fitness standards.9 However, during an August 2015 interview with NPR's Rachel Martin, the Christian Science Monitor's Anna Mulrine offered what seemed to be an unintended admission that Captain Griest and Lieutenant Haver were not meeting the same physical standards as their male peers:

"They're proving themselves in other ways because these big guys kind of prove their worth by carrying the big guns. You know, they can haul a lot of stuff. You know, not all women can do that. They're physically smaller. They have to find other ways to prove their worth. And that's what these women have been doing."10

This underscores the anonymous commentator's question: is Ranger School a "small unit tactics and leadership course" for the entire Army? Or is it a key element of the training and promotion pipeline for soldiers who might be referred to as "entry level special operators"?

The logical answer is simple and straightforward: what has heretofore been referred to as "Ranger School" should be reconstituted as the Army Leadership Academy, and act as a deliberate leadership course, stripped of any vernacular connection to the Rangers. Its standards and curriculum should be adjusted to focus on training and evaluating candidates for leadership positions. The 75th Ranger Regiment's commissioned and junior non-commissioned officers should still attend -- as should any commissioned and non-commissioned officers who wish to remain competitive for promotion, particularly in the combat arms occupational specialties -- but all efforts should be made to discontinue the seemingly deliberate linguistic confusion.

This leaves the second question: what role will women play in the foreseeable future of SOF? As women were poised to graduate from Ranger School, the individual service branches considered whether to request waivers for new regulations requiring the gender integration of combat units. Of the four service branches, plus U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), only the Marine Corps sought a waiver for some occupational specialties.11 During this period of projected integration, a great deal of ink was spilled in discussing the relative merits and shortcomings of gender-integrating combat occupations.

While women have provided indirect support to SOF units for many years, questions arose during the course of post-9/11 operations for several reasons.12, 13 First, as evidenced by the high profile 2003 capture of Specialist Shoshana Johnson and Private Jessica Lynch, the character of modern warfare now forces rear echelon units into situations that may be exposed to danger from enemy forces.14 This line was further blurred by the recruitment of female soldiers and Marines to serve in Female Engagement Teams (FETs) and Cultural Support Teams (CSTs).15, 16 To some degree, this reflected the failure of the DoD's Human Terrain System. Unfortunately, these developments further confused the rhetoric on this issue by affording gender integration advocates the opportunity to claim that women had "fought alongside SOF personnel," even though their training and tasking were not equivalent. Women were not raiding terrorist strongholds, and insinuations to the contrary are disingenuous.

Another lingering question of note is the alleged benefits of gender integration, particularly in SOF units, which remain ephemeral when weighed against the tangible costs of integration. In late 2020, the first (and apparently sole) female Green Beret graduate faced misdemeanor charges for a negligent firearm discharge.17 By mid-2021, the Navy had graduated a single female candidate from its Special Warfare Combatant Crewman (SWCC) training pipeline.18 Without detracting from these graduates' accomplishments, one could reasonably question whether this statistically negligible influx of female personnel warranted the significant effort required to provide them the opportunity to qualify, or the inevitable disruption to SOF units' critical morale and esprit de corps.

While open criticism of SOF gender integration from the active duty ranks has been sparse -- accusations persist that any who would care to express their concerns would jeopardize their careers -- the debate in the veteran community has raged. Notably, the aforementioned documentation request by Oklahoma Congressman and Ranger School graduate Steve Russell inspired a group of female West Point graduates to file a Freedom of Information Act request for Russell's own service records.19 In a 2016 study cited by the Washington Post, a sample of nearly 54,000 Marines opposed gender integration for ground combat units: two of every three male Marines, one of every three female Marines, and 76.5% of infantry Marines surveyed.20 A 2021 article seeking to highlight gender bias in the SOF community nonetheless highlighted the frustrations expressed by special operators with being part of a "social experiment," widespread perception in the ranks that female personnel plan their pregnancies to avoid deployment, and fear among special operators that social interactions with female colleagues could threaten their careers.21 While some of these factors are disputed, their impact upon unit cohesion, morale, and esprit de corps is indisputable. Writing in 2014, Professor Anna Simons of the Naval Postgraduate School noted:

"Dig beneath the political correctness that those in uniform know they better parrot, and it quickly becomes apparent that academics have split an impossible hair. For instance, U.S. Army Special Forces Command has been waging a quiet dissuasion campaign against Special Forces soldiers joining motorcycle 'clubs.' And though some wonder why any special operator would feel the need to join a bunch of wannabe outlaws when SF teams already constitute the 'baddest' gangs around, operators enamored with biker subculture are clearly seeking something SF does not provide. For many that something is camaraderie."22

This is to say nothing of the military's perpetual challenges with sexual harassment and assault. A detailed discussion of these issues falls beyond the scope of this discussion, but must at least be acknowledged in passing. Decades after widespread gender integration in mainstream units, these second order effects remain so disruptive that Sexual Harassment and Rape Prevention (SHARP) training requirements compete for precious training time with actual operational training. These ongoing challenges represent yet another obstacle to the gender integration of the SOF community. Given the publicity that the Pentagon's efforts to curtail these problems has received, proponents of gender-integrated SOF have no grounds to deny this issue’s gravity.

Another factor, discussed by one of two female Marine officers who expressed their concerns about infantry gender integration in writing, is the statistical disparity between men and women with regard to significant injuries. In her 2012 article for the Marine Corps Gazette, Katie Petronio recounted her experience on deployment to Afghanistan:

"By the fifth month into the deployment, I had muscle atrophy in my thighs that was causing me to constantly trip and my legs to buckle with the slightest grade change. My agility during firefights and mobility on and off vehicles and perimeter walls was seriously hindering my response time and overall capability. It was evident that stress and muscular deterioration was affecting everyone regardless of gender; however, the rate of my deterioration was noticeably faster than that of male Marines and further compounded by gender-specific medical conditions. At the end of the 7-month deployment, and the construction of 18 [patrol bases] later, I had lost 17 pounds and was diagnosed with polycystic ovarian syndrome... which was brought on by the chemical and physical changes endured during deployment... I can say with 100 percent assurance that despite my accomplishments, there is no way I could endure the physical demands of the infantrymen whom I worked beside as their combat load and constant deployment cycle would leave me facing medical separation long before the option of retirement. I understand that everyone is affected differently; however, I am confident that should the Marine Corps attempt to fully integrate women into the infantry, we as an institution are going to experience a colossal increase in crippling and career-ending medical conditions for females."23

She went on to note:

"[W]e need only to review the statistics from our entry-level schools to realize that there is a significant difference in the physical longevity between male and female Marines. At [Marine Corps Officer Candidate School] the attrition rate for female candidates in 2011 was historically low at 40 percent, while the male candidates attrite at a much lower rate of 16 percent. Of candidates who were dropped from training because they were injured or not physically qualified, females were breaking at a much higher rate than males, 14 percent versus 4 percent. The same trends were seen at [The Basic School] in 2011; the attrition rate for females was 13 percent versus 5 percent for males, and 5 percent of females were found not physically qualified compared with 1 percent of males. Further, both of these training venues have physical fitness standards that are easier for females; at [Infantry Officers Course] there is one standard regardless of gender. The attrition rate for males attending IOC in 2011 was 17 percent. Should female Marines ultimately attend IOC, we can expect significantly higher attrition rates and long-term injuries for women."

In a subsequent Gazette article, Lauren Serrano summarized this impact:

"[L]ong infantry careers for female Marines will eventually lead to career-ending medical conditions as they get older and their bodies are unable to withstand the years of constant infantry training. For the already fiscally strained military, this will lead to an increase in medically retired Marines who rate medical financial support for the rest of their lives."24

These articles by Petronio and Serrano preceded the 2015 release of a Marine Corps study that concluded that units composed solely of male Marines performed better across the board than gender-integrated units, even if the exclusively male units consisted of average or below-average Marines.25, 26

Additionally, the aforementioned case of Shoshana Johnson and Jessica Lynch, coupled with both old and new reports from the Middle East, necessarily raise political questions about what would happen if female SOF troops -- or even women in support roles -- were to be captured by enemy forces. Other notable cases in this regard include the numerous reports of egregious sexual assaults by Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives connected with the October 7th, 2023 attack on Israel. Additionally, women captured by Somali pirates and militias have reported systematic sexual assault during their prolonged captivity; and Islamic State members' sexual assaults against Kurdish Yazidis, in addition to captured Western women like Kayla Mueller, reached a point of infamy.

At a tactical level, integrating women as operators raises the question of what situations could unfold in manners different than those that one might expect of exclusively male teams. At a strategic level, one might suggest that the same activists who continue to advocate for women's integration into SOF units are likely to oppose the escalation of conflicts, but might very well find themselves witnessing precisely such an escalation if the American electorate learned that female special operators -- or even embedded support personnel -- had endured sexual violence at the hands of unscrupulous enemy captors.

Reasonable Americans might expect that questions such as these had been raised years ago, when the Army first started augmenting field units with female soldiers, or when the first female candidates were being considered for Ranger School. The Army's conduct, resulting either from the malfeasance following from a politically-mandated "fait accompli," or from run-of-the-mill procedural incompetence, lays those expectations to rest. A military justification for gender integration in the SOF community has not been developed, and the Army -- and arguably, the entire Defense Department -- continues to muddle through even basic logistical and administrative requirements.

One would be foolish to deny that a truly egalitarian military, built on adherence to standards, represents a noble and desirable objective. However, at its core, military service requires individuals to subordinate their needs and desires to the good of the unit, and ultimately the country, for the purpose of defeating America's enemies in battles, campaigns, and wars. Proponents of integration have failed to demonstrate that women add value to the SOF enterprise by serving in the same capacity as traditional special operators. Instead, all objective evidence, to include the manner in which they were actually employed in recent overseas theaters, demonstrates precisely the contrary: that women add value by providing the unique capabilities that only they as women can provide, rather than by joining the SOF ranks in the minimal numbers that may be able to meet a minimum standard at the cost of lethality, morale, and their long-term physical health. As the army seeks to develop a coherent concept to this end, leaders should emphasize these unique capabilities that women can provide, while seeking to protect the morale and esprit de corps of those traditionally gender-exclusive special operations units that have played such key roles in recent decades, and which are poised to continue acting as spoilers in projected conflicts.

Sources

1) Breaking Barriers: Women in Army Special Operations; United States Army Special Operations Command; originally published December 2021, updated August 18, 2023; https://www.soc.mil/wia/women-in-arsof-report-2023.pdf

2) Lacdan, Joe; USASOC study outlines measures to optimize female Soldiers; Army News Service; Washington; August 22nd, 2023; https://www.army.mil/article/269270/usasoc_study_outlines_measures_to_optimize_female_soldiers

3) Maurer, Kevin; In new elite Army unit, women serve alongside Special Forces, but first they must make the cut; The Washington Post; Washington, DC; October 27th, 2011; https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/in-new-elite-army-unit-women-serve-alongside-special-forces-but-first-they-must-make-the-cut/2011/10/06/gIQAZWOSMM_story.html

4) Neuman, Scott; First Female Soldiers Graduate From Army Ranger School; National Public Radio (NPR); Washington, DC; August 21st, 2015; https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/08/21/433482186/first-female-soldiers-graduate-from-army-ranger-school

5) Martinez, Luis; Mother of 2 Becomes Only Third Woman to Graduate From Army Ranger School; ABC News; October 12th, 2015; https://abcnews.go.com/US/mother-woman-graduate-army-ranger-school/story?id=34429827

6) Keating, Susan; Was It Fixed? Army General Told Subordinates: 'A Woman Will Graduate Ranger School,' Sources Say; People; N/A; October 25th, 2015; https://people.com/celebrity/female-rangers-were-given-special-treatment-sources-say/

7) N/A; Congressman continues push for records of Ranger School classes with women; Stars and Stripes; N/A; October 15th, 2015; https://www.stripes.com/branches/army/congressman-continues-push-for-records-of-ranger-school-classes-with-women-1.373352

8) O'Connor, Phillip; Russell says female Army Ranger records destroyed; The Oklahoman; N/A; October 15th, 2015; https://www.oklahoman.com/story/news/politics/2015/10/15/russell-says-female-army-ranger-records-destroyed/60716572007/

9) Losey, Stephen; Pioneering Female Ranger School Grad: Lowering Fitness Standards for Women Is a Bad Idea; Military.com; N/A; February 25th, 2021; https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/02/25/pioneering-female-ranger-school-grad-lowering-fitness-standards-women-bad-idea.html

10) Martin, Rachel; Two Women On The Final Stage Of Army Ranger Training; Weekend Edition Sunday, National Public Radio (NPR); N/A; August 16th, 2015; https://www.npr.org/2015/08/16/432453612/two-women-on-the-final-stage-of-army-ranger-training

11) Baldor, Lolita C.; Officials: Marine commandant recommends women be banned from some combat jobs; Marine Corps Times; Washington, DC; September 18th, 2015; https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2015/09/18/officials-marine-commandant-recommends-women-be-banned-from-some-combat-jobs/

12) Alexander, Nicole and Kohistany, Lyla; Dispelling the Myth of Women in Special Operations; Center for a New American Security; Washington, DC; March 19th, 2019; https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/dispelling-the-myth-of-women-in-special-operations

13) Kent, Joe; Women in special operations is nothing new; Military Times; N/A; February 28th, 2020; https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/02/28/women-in-special-operations-is-nothing-new/

14) Collins, Elizabeth M.; Life as first African-American female POW; Soldiers Magazine; Washington, DC; February 29th, 2012; https://www.army.mil/article/74463/life_as_first_african_american_female_pow

15) Rivers, Eileen; Beyond the Call: Three Women on the Front Lines in Afghanistan; Hachette Books; New York City; November 6th, 2018; https://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Call-Three-Women-Afghanistan/dp/0306903075/

16) Tzemach Lemmon, Gayle; Ashley's War: The Untold Story of a Team of Women Soldiers on the Special Ops Battlefield; HarperCollins; New York City; April 21st, 2015; https://www.amazon.com/Ashleys-War-Soldiers-Special-Battlefield/dp/B01LTHXL58

17) Cox, Matthew; 1st Female Green Beret Faces 'Minor Misdemeanor' Charge for Accidentally Firing Gun, Police Say; Military.com; N/A; December 31st, 2020; https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/12/31/1st-female-green-beret-faces-minor-misdemeanor-charge-accidentally-firing-gun-police-say.html

18) N/A; First woman completes Navy special warfare training; The Associated Press; Washington, DC; July 15th, 2021; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/first-woman-completes-navy-special-warfare-training-n1274125

19) Mellen, Ruby; West Point Women Hit Back At Congressman Questioning Female Ranger Graduates; The Huffington Post; N/A; September 25th, 2015; https://www.huffpost.com/entry/steve-russell-ranger-women_n_56055590e4b0dd8503072e09

20) Lamothe, Dan; How big is opposition to women in combat units among Marines? This report explains.; The Washington Post; N/A; March 10th, 2016; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/10/survey-details-depth-of-opposition-in-marine-corps-to-allowing-women-in-combat-jobs/

21) Britzky, Haley; ‘Stop the social experiment’ — New survey spotlights bias against women in Army special ops; Task and Purpose; May 18th, 2021; https://taskandpurpose.com/news/army-special-operations-women-survey/

22) Simons, Anna; Here's Why Women in Combat Units is a Bad Idea; War on the Rocks; Washington, DC; November 18th, 2014; https://warontherocks.com/2014/11/heres-why-women-in-combat-units-is-a-bad-idea/

23) Petronio, Katie; Get Over It! We Are Not All Created Equal; Marine Corps Gazette; Quantico, VA; July 3rd, 2012; https://web.archive.org/web/20120708015020/https://mca-marines.org/gazette/article/get-over-it-we-are-not-all-created-equal

24) Serrano, Lauren F.; Why Women Do Not Belong in the U.S. Infantry; Marine Corps Gazette; Quantico, VA; September 2014; https://web.archive.org/web/20190130175809/https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2014/09/why-women-do-not-belong-us-infantry

25) Bowman, Tom; Marine Corps Releases Results of Study On Women In Combat Units; National Public Radio (NPR); N/A; September 10th, 2015; https://www.npr.org/2015/09/10/439246978/marine-corps-release-results-of-study-on-women-in-combat-units

26) Davis, Paul O.; Sports Science, Physiology, and the Debate Over Women in Ground Combat Units; War on the Rocks; December 1st, 2015; https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/sports-science-physiology-and-the-debate-over-women-in-ground-combat-units/

About the Author(s)

Al Dhobaba

Al Dhobaba (“The Fly”) is the pseudonym of a freelance foreign policy analyst and military historian. Having trained as a naval officer, a congenital medical condition prevented him from commissioning, leading him to pursue an ongoing career as a security practitioner. His professional experience includes providing force protection training for deploying soldiers, managing physical security at a DoD activity in the USCENTCOM theater, and advising federal, state, and private sector organizations on information security management. He holds a bachelor’s degree in History and a master’s degree in International Relations.

Small Wars Journal

13. Special forces blocked UK resettlement applications from elite Afghan troops

Special forces blocked UK resettlement applications from elite Afghan troops

BBC

• By Hannah O'Grady, Rory Tinman, Joel Gunter, and May BulmanBBC Panorama

Ben Taggart

Some of the commandos from Triples units, pictured training with British troops, are now in hiding in Afghanistan

UK Special Forces blocked Afghan troops they had fought alongside from relocating to the UK after the Taliban seized power, BBC Panorama can reveal.

Leaked documents show special forces rejected applications despite some containing compelling evidence of service alongside the British military.

Afghan commandos accompanied British special forces on some of the most dangerous missions of the conflict.

The Ministry of Defence said it was conducting an independent review.

When the Taliban swept to power in August 2021, members of Afghan Special Forces units CF 333 and ATF 444 - known as the "Triples" - were among the groups most at risk of reprisal, having supported UK Special Forces in their fight against the Taliban.

They were eligible to apply for resettlement to the UK under the Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (Arap) scheme, but hundreds had their applications rejected. Dozens have reportedly been beaten, tortured, or killed by the Taliban since.

The Armed Forces Minister, James Heappey, has now announced a review of about 2,000 applications after admitting that the decision-making process behind some rejections was "not robust".

The documents seen by Panorama include a Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) document showing that since at least 2023 all Triples applications reaching a basic threshold were sent to UK Special Forces for approval or denial of sponsorship.

The SOP document, which was obtained by the investigative newsroom Lighthouse Reports and shared with Panorama, shows that if UK Special Forces denied sponsorship, the applicant was automatically deemed ineligible and a rejection letter was sent out.

Panorama has also seen internal Ministry of Defence emails in which civil servants administering the relocation scheme describe being unable to challenge special forces' rejections, even when they believed there was a strong case for resettlement.

Ben Taggart

British and Afghan Special Forces fought together in Afghanistan.

Former members of the SAS, the army's elite special forces regiment, have now told Panorama that they believe the veto outlined in the SOP document represents a clear conflict of interest for UK Special Forces.

The veto gave special forces decision-making power over applications at a time when a public inquiry in the UK was investigating allegations that SAS soldiers had committed war crimes on operations in Afghanistan where the Triples units were present.

The public inquiry has the power to compel witnesses who are in the UK, but not non-UK nationals who are overseas. If the Afghan Special Forces members were in the UK they could be asked to provide potentially significant evidence.

"It's a clear conflict of interest," said one former UK Special Forces officer.

"At a time when certain actions by UK Special Forces are under investigation by a public inquiry, their headquarters also had the power to prevent former Afghan Special Forces colleagues and potential witnesses to these actions from getting safely to the UK."

Another former UK Special Forces officer who spoke to the BBC said: "At best it's not appropriate, at worst it looks like they're trying to cover their tracks."

A spokesperson for the public inquiry team told Panorama that it could not comment on specific witnesses but was "aware of the recent press articles about the Triples" and would "continue to ask anyone with relevant information to come forward".

Panorama has spoken to former members of the Triples who had their relocation applications rejected in 2023 and say they witnessed or reported what appeared to them to be war crimes committed by UK Special Forces.

We have also seen the documents submitted by two former Triples officers along with their applications to the Arap scheme. They include:

• An official invitation to SAS headquarters in Hereford to give a talk about the Triples
• Letters from the British embassy regarding pay
• Photographs with two directors of UK Special Forces and a British ambassador
• Photographs with Gen David Petraeus, commander of the Nato coalition and all US forces in Afghanistan
• A letter from a British officer describing an applicant as part of the "UK mentored Afghan SF" unit
• Previous visas to enter the UK

The officers behind these applications were both denied entry to the UK.

They told Panorama they are now in hiding in Afghanistan, moving from house to house, unable to stay with their families or to work.

One said he had been interrogated and beaten by the Taliban before he went on the run, the other said he had escaped first but that he heard the Taliban had gone to his home looking for him.

"I'm living in a very bad situation. I am in hiding and mostly my family can't live together and we cannot go out and we cannot work," he said.

"I was sure that my British colleagues and friends, who we worked for several years alongside, would help me to evacuate to safety. Now I feel that the sacrifices I made have been forgotten.

"I feel I have been left alone in the midst of hell."

• UK reconsiders relocating ex-Afghan special forces
• 'Betrayed' Afghan troops face return to Taliban
• How a British special forces raid went wrong

Both officers worked on SAS operations which are now under scrutiny by the public inquiry.

One made a number of complaints to the British military at the time of those operations. He alleged that the SAS had committed war crimes, and even withdrew his men from their supporting role in SAS operations in protest at what he alleged were extrajudicial killings of Afghan civilians.

That move set off a crisis within UK Special Forces, forcing senior British officers to attempt to defuse the situation and bring the Afghan partner units back on side.

Photographs submitted as evidence showed applicants in meetings with and alongside senior British military figures, including former Director Special Forces Gwyn Jenkins.

Lawyers who have worked to support former members of the Triples in their applications said that there had been a significant increase in the number being rejected under the Arap scheme.

"A large number of Triples contacted us having been rejected in 2023, despite providing ample evidence of their work with the UK Special Forces in Afghanistan and the clear, serious risks they continue to face," said Erin Alcock, a lawyer at Leigh Day.

The applications appeared to have been rejected under a "blanket policy", Ms Alcock alleged.

The Ministry of Defence told Panorama that final decisions are made by Arap caseworkers and that cases deemed eligible are then sent for ministerial approval.

But it did not dispute that UK Special Forces had the power to reject applications in 2023.

A spokesperson said: "We are conducting an independent, case-by-case review of all applications from former members of Afghan specialist units, which includes applications from the Triples. This review will consider all available evidence, including that provided by third parties.

"The review is being carried out by independent staff who have not previously worked on these applications."

A team photograph that showed members of the Triples, who have been obscured from view, alongside the British ambassador and US General David Petraeus. The Triples' applications were later rejected

Mr Heappey, the Armed Forces Minister, told Parliament that Triples applications had been denied in part because the government did "not hold comprehensive employment or payment records in the same way as we do for other applicants".

But military figures who served alongside the Triples dismissed the minister's account, saying that the Afghan forces were paid directly by the British and that records were kept for every payment.

"I've seen spreadsheets where it's very clear we paid them, not just for their service but for their skills, rank, and number of operations," said one former officer.

"These guys were out on the ground most days for 20 years, fighting and dying and putting their lives on the line for us, in operations that we directed they should take part in," he said.

A former special forces officer told the BBC that Mr Heappey had "either been mis-briefed or misled. Either way, it shows a real lack of professional curiosity on his part".

UK Special Forces have previously been accused of preventing military investigators from questioning Afghan partner units about alleged war crimes committed by the SAS.

Former senior investigators from the Royal Military Police (RMP) told the BBC that special forces leadership repeatedly stood in the way of them interviewing Afghan troops in the course of their investigations between 2012 and 2019.

"We had identified the Afghan partner forces working alongside UKSF as being potentially key witnesses, but whenever we tried to conduct interviews, special forces leadership made it almost impossible," said one former senior RMP investigator.

The RMP felt so obstructed in their inquiries that in 2014 it formally requested the military prosecutor charge a high-ranking UK Special Forces officer with perverting the course of justice after he terminated an interview with an Afghan soldier regarding allegations of war crimes - a case which the Service Prosecuting Authority declined to take up.

This story was published in collaboration with Lighthouse Reports. Additional reporting by Farhad Mohammadi.

BBC

14. Generally speaking, Don Bolduc, now a Pittsfield police officer, has tested himself for years 

I had no idea that Don Bolduc is now a police officer (or has been for some awhile). Few have had as diverse a retirement path as Don.

Generally speaking, Don Bolduc, now a Pittsfield police officer, has tested himself for years  

https://www.concordmonitor.com/Former-General-Don-Bolduc-new-job-police-officer-Pittsfield-NH-53966518?fbclid=IwAR2pqqUeTCwnYpQe9eng15q_8nBpE2X9Mk8l2WZb03-q224T7UJHSk6istc

Pittsfield police officer Don Bolduc greets James Wesson at the Bell Brothers convenience store in downtown Pittsfield on Feb. 8. Wesson remembered that Bolduc recently passed on giving him a ticket when Wesson said he couldn’™t afford to pay the fine. GEOFF FORESTER photos / Monitor staff

Pittsfield police officer Don Bolduc greets James Wesson at the Bell Brothers convenience store in downtown on Thursday, February 8, 2024. Wesson remembered that Bolduc passed on giving him a ticket in the past when Wesson said he couldn’t afford to pay the fine. GEOFF FORESTER—Monitor staff

Pittsfield police officer Don Bolduc greets the customers at the Bell Brothers convenience store in downtown on Thursday, February 8, 2024. GEOFF FORESTER—Monitor staff

Pittsfield police officer Don Bolduc at the the station before going on patrol. Bolduc, at 61, has started at the bottom of the ranks.

Pittsfield police officer Don Bolduc leaves the station to go on Patrol on Thursday, February 8, 2024. GEOFF FORESTER—Monitor staff

Pittsfield police officer Don Bolduc shows his vest at the the station before going on patrol on Thursday, February 8, 2024. GEOFF FORESTER—Monitor staff

Pittsfield police officer Don Bolduc waits in line at the Bell Brothers convenience store in downtown on Feb. 8. GEOFF FORESTER / Monitor staff

Pittsfield police officer Don Bolduc vest at the the station before going on patrol on Thursday, February 8, 2024. GEOFF FORESTER—Monitor staff

><

By RAY DUCKLER

Monitor columnist

• Published: 02-17-2024 6:44 PMedpick
• Pittsfield NH
• facebook

He walked into the local convenience store loaded with the protective gear that he uses to defend himself and the residents of Pittsfield.

He wore a bulletproof vest and carried a taser, two magazine cartridges, a service pistol, pepper spray and a nightstick, all tucked away in a uniform with more zippers than a retail pants store.

But Don Bolduc, a retired general, brought more than that to the store. He brought his upbeat personality and gift of gab to his new role as a police officer in a small town.

“How you doing?” Bolduc said to anyone within earshot, extending his hand. “You doing OK?”

He’s 61, old for an officer who joined the 10-member force in 2022. He wanted to keep working after he retired from his medal-filled military career and his two losing runs for a U.S. Senate seat.

He had done some part-time police work in his hometown before joining the Army soon after graduating from Laconia High School.

“I’ve always been interested in law enforcement work,” Bolduc said. “I wanted to see if there’s a department out here in the state of New Hampshire that will hire me. And some said yes, some said no, and I landed here in Pittsfield.”

He was hired for a part-time position, and when a full-time job opened up offering just under $50,000 a year to start, he stepped forward.

“The rest is history,” said Selectman Jim Adams.

“People in town like him. He’s just a regular guy,” Adams said. “We’re lucky to get him.”

Pittsfield Police Chief Joe Collins gave Bolduc the job. He didn’t care about Bolduc’s age. What he lacked in police experience, he more than made up for with his other life experiences, including reaching the rank of brigadier general.

Bolduc marked the other boxes on Collins’ checklist. He was willing to pay his dues all over again, despite his two Purple Hearts and 10 tours of duty in Afghanistan, training with fresh-faced high school graduates 45 years after Bolduc had finished at Laconia High. Age was not a factor.

“He was probably in better shape than anyone else here,” Collins noted.

Bolduc agreed to a three-year commitment, a requirement on the force. And while Collins said Bolduc’s war record was not a factor in the hiring process, it certainly could not be ignored, illustrating Bolduc’s leadership skills during the most stressful circumstances imaginable.

“He came in as a patrolman, the last man on the totem pole,” Collins said. “He said he would embrace that, and he has done so.”

Just last month, Bolduc was first on the scene of a shooting in a bank parking lot across the street from the Pittsfield Police Department.

He sees domestic abuse, drunk driving, burglaries, speeding, vandalism and so on. Bolduc knows that pulling a car over could turn deadly.

“You have the uncertainty of a traffic stop,” Bolduc said. “And there’s also a lot of uncertainty when you have a case of domestic violence. Very dangerous.”

Throughout his career, Bolduc has gravitated toward danger and public service.

He spent 36 years in the Army. He entered southern Afghanistan about six weeks after Sept. 11, one of about 300 soldiers who rode horseback – helicopters and land vehicles were too loud for a clandestine operation – to gather intelligence. He commanded a special operation force of 6,000 Navy Seals. He lost 72 men.

He suffered a traumatic brain injury when a 2,000-pound bomb – from friendly fire – exploded near him. He crashed in a helicopter. He suffered PTSD. He retired from the Army in 2017.

The bullets and bombs, metaphorically speaking, did not stop when Bolduc ran for U.S. Senate as a Republican in 2020 and 2022. He lost the 2020 primary to Corky Messner, who was defeated by Democrat Jeanne Shaheen. In 2022, Bolduc became the Republican nominee to challenge Maggie Hassan.

Bolduc made national headlines by flip-flopping his position on former President Donald Trump’s assertion that the 2020 presidential election was stolen by Joe Biden. Bolduc was accused by Trump loyalists as waffling for personal gain, a politician who makes decisions based on which way the wind was blowing.

Never one to mince words, Bolduc was straightforward, not defensive, when answering questions earlier this month about his change of heart on what happened during the presidential election.

The 2020 presidential election was fair, Bolduc said. At least fair enough.

“I do believe there was fraud,” Bolduc said. “That’s something that can’t be disputed, but at the end of the day, I played a political game, right? So then I decided no more political games. I’m going to say what I honestly believe, and that is the election wasn’t stolen.”

But it was too late. Bolduc had become a lightning rod for controversy.

He strengthened that notion when he called Republican Gov. Chris Sununu, a Republican, a “Chinese communist sympathizer” while campaigning for the ’22 Senate seat.

At one point he called the governor a “pansy.”

“We both said things during the election cycle that are just part of the election cycle,” Bolduc said.

Bolduc and Sununu later joined forces in their support for Republican presidential candidate Nikki Haley. Bolduc remains politically active – just last week he traveled to South Carolina to defend the former U.N. ambassador against attacks from Trump, who mocked Haley’s husband for not being on the campaign trail with his wife. Haley’s husband, Michael, is currently deployed in Africa with the South Carolina Army National Guard. Trump’s comments were disgraceful and illustrate that he’s unfit to serve as commander-in-chief, Bolduc said.

On his day job, Bolduc walks his beat, goes to local schools to talk with children, looks for speeders zipping through town and walks into downtown convenience stores, his hand extended for hearty handshakes. Sometimes he sees people like James Wesson, a man with a bushy salt-and-pepper beard. He’d met Bolduc previously.

“I once saw the blue lights in my back window,” Wesson said. “I pulled over to talk to him to see what was the point. I needed an inspection sticker. I told him, ‘Don’t write me a ticket because I’m poor as hell,’ and he let me go. A good man.”

That’s all part of community policing, getting to know the 4,000 or so people of Pittsfield.

“I remembered him when I walked in,” Bolduc said. “It’s our opportunity to develop rapport with the citizens. People go through tough times and have to make decisions to put food on the table. Sometimes that inspection sticker takes a back seat.”

And sometimes, the nature of Bolduc’s job can change suddenly. A 911 call came later in the morning while Bolduc sat in his cruiser in the department parking lot.

“Possible suicidal subject,” the dispatcher said.

“Unfortunately, I have to head out, and I can’t take you with me,” Bolduc said. “I have to go.”

He sped from the parking lot and turned left onto Main Street, disappearing around a corner, his blue strobe lights flashing.

15. NATO Ally Pledges All Its Artillery to Ukraine in Boost for Kyiv

This is quite a commitment. But I guess it is the philosophy that it is better to stop them over there before they get to our border.

NATO Ally Pledges All Its Artillery to Ukraine in Boost for Kyiv

newsweek.com · by Ellie Cook

By Ellie Cook

Security & Defense Reporter

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President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky (right) with the Prime Minister of Denmark, Mette Frederiksen, on September 6, 2023 in Kyiv, Ukraine. Denmark has pledged its “entire artillery” stocks to Kyiv, the country’s leader has said.

About the writer

Ellie Cook

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Ellie Cook is a Newsweek security and defense reporter based in London, U.K. Her work focuses largely on the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S. military, weapons systems and emerging technology. She joined Newsweek in January 2023, having previously worked as a reporter at the Daily Express, and is a graduate of International Journalism at City, University of London.

Languages: English, Spanish.

You can reach Ellie via email at e.cook@newsweek.com.

Ellie Cook is a Newsweek security and defense reporter based in London, U.K. Her work focuses largely on the Russia-Ukraine … Read more

To read how Newsweek uses AI as a newsroom tool, Click here.

newsweek.com · by Ellie Cook

16. The Liberum Veto: A History and a Warning

Conclusion:

A de facto Liberum Veto exists in Europe’s two most influential organisations: the EU and NATO. Reforms that allow for careful consideration of alliance equities without letting one nation prevent all others from moving towards a common good are needed. Requiring a supermajority of three-quarters, seven-eighths, or even 90 per cent of member states to agree on EU or NATO decisions would still require that a decision be equitable for the overwhelming majority of members without the disruption or manipulation that a modern-day Liberum Veto can cause. Otherwise, both organisations risk letting 18th-century Russian tactics undermine another multinational union again in the 21st century.

The Liberum Veto: A History and a Warning

tdhj.org · by Philip Wasielewski · February 15, 2024

Abstract: Based on recent political disagreements between the European Union/NATO and Hungary, the requirements for unanimity in decision-making by these two multinational organisations repeat the tradition of the Liberum Veto of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and could very well lead to their self-destruction—just as happened to the Commonwealth. There are similarities between today and an earlier era when Moscow was able to manipulate an opponent’s requirement for unanimity in decision-making. By providing a short history of the Commonwealth and the Liberum Veto, it becomes apparent how Russia was able to undermine Commonwealth politics via the Liberum Veto and, through political subversion and other statecraft tools, eventually destroy it. The same statecraft tools used by Russia in the 18th century against the Commonwealth are being used in the 21st century against NATO.

Problem statement: How to understand the issues related to the Liberum Veto in the context of international organisations?

So what?: The two largest and most useful multinational organisations designed to safeguard the collective prosperity and security of the West must solve this problem immediately to guarantee quick responses to national security threats. Otherwise, a requirement for unanimity in decision-making can lead to either the organisation being manipulated by Moscow or its eventual self-destruction.

Source: shutterstock.com/Alexandros Michailidis

Stemming the Expansion of Russian Power into Europe?

Requirements for unanimity in decision-making have slowed or continue to shackle two specific efforts by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) to respond to Russian aggression: Sweden’s accession into NATO and a €50-billion ($54.5-billion) EU aid package to Ukraine, respectively. The veto requirement in these organisations is likely to thwart or seriously delay other efforts towards security in the future.

Requirements for unanimity in decision-making have slowed or continue to shackle two specific efforts by NATO and the EU to respond to Russian aggression.

This situation has an almost direct parallel in European history. An earlier requirement for unanimity, the Liberum Veto (free veto), helped destroy another multinational polity stemming the expansion of Russian power into Europe: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The history of the Commonwealth provides a clear warning that a desire for unanimity can lead to self-destruction. History seems to be repeating itself with regard to the recent Hungarian vetoes in EU and NATO forums to either help Ukraine or strengthen Europe against Russian aggression.

The Hungarian Veto

Hungary’s veto on December 15, 2023, of the €50-billion EU aid package to Ukraine was partly another chapter of a political struggle between Brussels and Budapest.[1] Just two days before, the EU agreed to release €11 billion to Budapest, which had been withheld due to Hungarian democratic backsliding. However, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán vetoed the Ukrainian aid measure because the EU continued to freeze an additional €23 billion in funds intended for Hungary. By vetoing the Ukrainian aid package, Hungary hoped to get something it wanted by preventing the EU from doing something it wanted. On February 1, 2024, Orbán dropped his veto just prior to a second EU vote for the aid package after being threatened with a possible suspension of Hungary’s EU voting rights. For this concession, Hungary is likely to receive an additional € 6.3 billion in EU cohesion funds that have been frozen over its rule-of-law shortcomings.[2] Therefore, Orbán won a domestic political victory by gaining another substantial infusion of previously frozen EU funds while continuing to weaken Brussels’ attempts to hold Hungary accountable for violations of EU democratic norms. The delay of this vital aid package by almost two months also benefited Orbán’s erstwhile ally, Russian President Vladimir Putin, by helping Russian efforts weaken Ukraine’s economy and degrade Kyiv’s ability to defend itself.

Similarly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also has a close personal relationship with Putin and has not been shy in sometimes balancing Turkish foreign policy between NATO and Russian priorities to receive the best deal for Ankara. Türkiye delayed its vote approving NATO membership for Sweden for over a year and a half to pressure Stockholm on its support for Kurdish refugees in its country, many of whom Ankara considers terrorists or terrorist supporters, as well as to show its pique over Swedish criticisms of Türkiye’s human rights abuses.[3]

Türkiye delayed its vote approving NATO membership for Sweden for over a year and a half to pressure Stockholm on its support for Kurdish refugees in its country.

Now that Türkiye has finally voted in favour of Swedish NATO membership, the only hurdle is again Hungary. NATO would greatly benefit from Swedish membership based on its geographic position, modern armed forces, and strong military-industrial base. These factors seem to be of little concern to Orbán, who said in September 2023 that Hungary was in “no rush” to approve Sweden’s membership request, while members of his government accused Swedish politicians of lying about the state of democracy in Hungary.[4] On January 23, 2024, the day that Türkiye voted for Swedish NATO membership, Orbán invited Sweden to “negotiate” with Hungary over its NATO bid. However, Sweden’s prime minister, Ulf Kristersson, declined, basically refusing to take back earlier criticisms of Hungarian democratic backsliding on norms that NATO is designed to protect.[5] While Orbán recently said that he would urge parliament to support Sweden’s accession, Hungary’s speaker of the parliament repeated that Hungary is in to address the issue.[6] Should this impasse continue over Sweden’s NATO membership, the greatest beneficiary will again be Orbán’s key foreign partner—Vladimir Putin—because a Hungarian veto would prevent a strong candidate country with impeccable democratic credentials from strengthening the alliance.

Both events can be interpreted as the cynical manipulation of alliance goals by national leaders putting domestic political needs ahead of the foreign policy priorities of other states. However, they demonstrate the disproportionate amount of power and leverage that EU/NATO requirements for unanimity in decision-making give to such leaders, which can only encourage them further and encourage other imitators. These two examples should also serve as a warning of worse problems to come should Moscow ever develop decisive influence with the leader or political party of an EU or NATO member state.

The Destroyed Political System

This situation recalls the circumstances of an earlier era when a requirement for unanimity helped destroy a multinational political system that shielded Europe from Eastern threats for centuries. That system was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the requirement for unanimity in decision-making was known as the Liberum Veto. Understanding the Commonwealth’s history and how the Liberum Veto undermined it as a warning for our age is timely.

This situation recalls the circumstances of an earlier era when a requirement for unanimity helped destroy a multinational political system that shielded Europe from Eastern threats for centuries.

The Commonwealth was established in 1386 when the marriage of Poland’s Queen Jadwiga and Lithuania’s Grand Duke Jagiełło co-joined the two countries into a single political entity, ruled for almost two centuries by what would become known as the Jagiellonian dynasty. Its territory would expand until, in the 16th century, it extended from the Baltic Sea through modern-day Poland, western Belarus, and Ukraine to the headwaters of the Black Sea.

When the Jagiellonian line died out, what had been a personal dynasty was transformed into a constitutional union via the Treaty of Lublin (1569). While the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania each remained sovereign with their own laws and nobilities, they were jointly ruled by an elected king and a common parliament known as the Sejm. The king swore an oath to the Sejm promising to uphold a list of constitutional principles that included the continued elections of kings, religious tolerance, and the rights of the nobles to overview royal decisions, including those imposing taxes, concluding foreign treaties, and declaring war. These prerogatives became known as “Polish liberties.”

A key “Polish liberty” was the Liberum Veto, which allowed a single noble to reject a law being debated by the Sejm and dissolve the Sejm. The Liberum Veto was designed to respect decisions made at the Commonwealth’s lower administrative levels, promote consensus, and encourage nobles to win over minority factions rather than defeat them with majority votes.

For almost a century and a half after the Treaty of Lublin, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth prospered and served as a check against the further Western expansion of the empires of the Russian Tsars and Ottomans. During Russia’s extended dynastic political crisis known as the Time of Troubles, Polish forces occupied Moscow (1610-1612). In 1683, Polish cavalry under King Jan Sobieski III lifted the Ottoman siege of Vienna, which halted the expansion of Islam into Europe.

However, while successful in blunting threats from the east and south, the Commonwealth was less successful in defending itself against threats from the north or from within. A Swedish invasion in the mid-17th century weakened the country, while internally, the Liberum Veto prevented political and social reforms. As Russia recovered from the Time of Troubles, it restarted its advance westward, defeated the Commonwealth in the Great Northern War (1700-1721), and made it a Russian protectorate.[7]

A Tool for Manipulation

The Liberum Veto served as an excellent tool for Russia to manipulate Commonwealth politics. Russian ambassadors often only needed to bribe just a single noble to exercise the Liberum Veto and prevent the Commonwealth from regaining its strength by either enlarging its army, reforming its tax structure, or ending the Liberum Veto itself.

Russian ambassadors often only needed to bribe just a single noble to exercise the Liberum Veto.

Russia also used other tools to control the Commonwealth’s politics. Sometimes, it used overt military force, as in the War of Polish Succession (1733-1735), to put its claimant, Augustus III, on the throne. During his 30-year reign, only one session of the Sejm passed any legislation due to the Liberum Veto and other infighting. After the death of Augustus III, Russia used bribery and threats of military force to coerce the Sejm into electing Stanislaus Augustus Poniatowski, a former lover of Tsarina Catherine the Great, as the Commonwealth’s next king. When Poniatowski turned out to be not as pliable as Catherine had hoped, Russia fomented religious strife among the Commonwealth’s Orthodox and Protestant minorities. When these minorities petitioned the Tsarina for aid, Russian troops were sent “to protect” them and ensure that the Sejm abandoned planned reforms and acquiesced to a treaty allowing Russia to “guarantee Polish liberties” perpetually.

This cynical intervention caused an anti-Russian rebellion known as the Bar Confederation (1768-1772), which led to the first partition of the Commonwealth. The partition raised fears of Russian encroachment amongst the other great powers abutting the Commonwealth, Prussia and Austria, so they too had to be rewarded with territory. Unfortunately for the Commonwealth, every time Russia “guaranteed Polish liberties,” there ended up being less of Poland and fewer liberties. Two further partitions (1793 and 1795) wiped both Lithuania and Poland from the map of Europe for 123 years.[8]

Consensus over Effectiveness

The value of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth should not be underestimated. From the late 14th century to the end of the 18th century, the union, first dynastic and later constitutional, protected Europe from Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire. This protection allowed the intellectual currents of the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment to form, flourish, and set the foundation for what is today the West’s liberal democratic tradition. Had it been otherwise, the canon of Western political and social traditions might have been formed by quite different influences.

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s fate and the Liberum Veto’s misuse are clear warnings of how a desire for consensus over effectiveness can destroy an institution from within and allow for manipulation from without.

A Need for Qualified Majorities

NATO and the EU are the current bulwarks against Russian aggression: overt and covert. Yet modern Russia is as adept at military coercion, bribery, manipulating ethnic and religious minorities, and political subversion via complicit political parties and figures, as it was in the 18th century. If Russian subversion makes just one country its Trojan Horse, Moscow can manipulate any institution requiring unanimity in decision-making that country belongs to. NATO and the EU must reform to prevent this. While Hungary is the prime example, it may not be the only one.

If Russian subversion makes just one country its Trojan Horse, Moscow can manipulate any institution requiring unanimity in decision-making that country belongs to.

A de facto Liberum Veto exists in Europe’s two most influential organisations: the EU and NATO. Reforms that allow for careful consideration of alliance equities without letting one nation prevent all others from moving towards a common good are needed. Requiring a supermajority of three-quarters, seven-eighths, or even 90 per cent of member states to agree on EU or NATO decisions would still require that a decision be equitable for the overwhelming majority of members without the disruption or manipulation that a modern-day Liberum Veto can cause. Otherwise, both organisations risk letting 18th-century Russian tactics undermine another multinational union again in the 21st century.

Philip Wasielewski is the Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and an FPRI Templeton Fellow for National Security. Before retirement, he had a dual career in government service as a paramilitary operations officer in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations for 31 years and as a colonel in the United States Marine Corps Reserve. He has an MA from the Army War College in National Security Studies and an MA from Harvard in Regional Studies: Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Besides publications with FPRI and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the author published in the Wall Street Journal, Lawfare, Moscow Times, Washington Times, Real Clear Defense, Real Clear World, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, and the Marine Corps Gazette. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone.

[1] Alexandra Sharp, Hungary Vetoes EU Aid Package for Ukraine: Russian President Vladimir Putin celebrated Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s decision, Foreign Policy, December 15, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/15/hungary-orban-veto-eu-ukraine-aid-package-membership-bid-russia/.

[2] Gregoria Sorgi, Barbara Moens, and Elisa Braun, EU approves €50B Ukraine aid as Viktor Orban folds, POLITICO, February 01, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-gets-eu-aid-as-orban-folds/; Moens, Barbara; Barigazzi, Jacopo; Caulcutt, Clea, and Wax, Eddy, EU threatens to silence Hungary if it blocks EU funds, POLITICO, January 26, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-threatens-silence-hungary-orban-if-blocks-ukrainian-aid-funds-article-7/.

[3] Simon Johnson, Huseyin Hayatsever, and Anne Kauranen, Why are Turkey and Hungary against Sweden joining NATO?, Reuters, April 05, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/after-finland-joins-nato-why-is-turkey-making-sweden-wait-2023-04-04/; Ben Hubbard and Lara Jakes, Turkey Backs Sweden’s NATO Bid, New York Times, January 23, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/23/world/europe/turkey-sweden-nato.html.

[4] Bela Szandelszky, Prime Minister Orban says Hungary in no rush to ratify Sweden’s NATO bid, Associated Press, September 25, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/hungary-orban-delay-sweden-nato-bid-f0529443019c3f8161947d30acc59b68.

[5] Gergely Szakacs, Anita Komuves, and Simon Johnson, Hungary’s Orban invites Swedish PM for NATO talks, Reuters, January 23, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/hungarys-orban-invites-swedish-pm-nato-talks-2024-01-23/; Simon Johnson, Bart Miejer, Andrew Gray, and Krisztina Fenyo, Swedish PM says won’t negotiate with Hungary on NATO, Stoltengerg ‘confident’, Reuters, January 26, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-will-not-negotiate-with-hungary-nato-much-discuss-pm-kristersson-says-2024-01-26/.

[6] Andrew Higgins, Orban Uses Sweden’s NATO Bid to Take Center Stage in Europe, New York Times, January 24, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/24/world/europe/hungary-sweden-nato-orban.html; Anita Komuves, and Gergely Szakacs, Hungary parliament speaker sees ‘no urgency’ in voting on Sweden’s NATO accession, Reuters, January 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungary-feels-no-urgency-regarding-swedens-nato-accession-parliament-speaker-2024-01-25/.

[7] For more on the history of the Jagiellonian Dynasty and the Polish-Lithuianian Commonwealth, see Norman Davies, Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland, Oxford University Press, 1984, 291-306.

[8] Davies, op. cit; Daniel Stone, The Polish-Lithuanian State, 1386-1795, University Washington Press, 2001, 268-288; John LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment, Oxford University Press, 1997, 41-62.

tdhj.org · by Philip Wasielewski · February 15, 2024

17. US Army under increasing pressure as it foots bill for Ukraine support

The Army foots the bill for everything and pays the bills for all our sins: In blood and treasure.

US Army under increasing pressure as it foots bill for Ukraine support | CNN Politics

CNN · by Haley Britzky, Natasha Bertrand · February 19, 2024

The Mississippi Army National Guard takes command of the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine mission from the Arkansas Army National Guard on January 5, 2024.

2nd Lt. Jarvis Mace/7th Army Training Command/US Army

CNN —

As funding for Ukraine faces an uncertain future in Congress, the US Army has been left to foot the bill for hundreds of millions of dollars in support for Ukraine’s war effort against Russia over the last few months — and Army officials are increasingly concerned that without new funding, they will have to begin pulling money from other critical projects to continue supporting Kyiv.

Since October 2023, the beginning of the fiscal year, the Army has spent over $430 million on various operations, including training Ukrainian troops, transporting equipment, and US troop deployments to Europe.

“We’re basically taking it out of hide in the Army,” a senior Army official told CNN.

So far, that bill has been paid from the Army’s Europe and Africa Command. Without a 2024 budget approved by Congress, and without additional funding specifically for Ukraine, the command has roughly $3 billion to pay for $5 billion of operations costs, a second senior Army official explained. That includes not only the operations related to Ukraine support — training and ferrying weapons and equipment to Poland and Ukraine — but other operations for the US command throughout Europe and Africa.

If Congress still hasn’t passed new funding for Ukraine within a few months, Army officials say they will have to start making hard decisions and divert money from less critical projects, such as badly needed barracks construction or enlistment incentives amid record-low recruiting.

If the Army doesn’t pull funds from elsewhere, Army Europe and Africa’s roughly $3 billion budget would run out of money for operations not just related to Ukraine, but elsewhere in Europe and Africa, by the end of May, the second senior Army official told CNN.

“If we don’t get a base budget, if we don’t get Ukraine supplemental [funding package], if the government shuts down, if we get nothing else and nothing changes from today … we will run out of [operations and maintenance] funding in May,” the Army official said. Those operations include training exercises for Army forces in Europe and Africa and equipment moving into the theater. Contracts also wouldn’t be paid on time and would garner penalty fees, he added.

“We would cease to exist” if these funds were not allocated from elsewhere within the Army’s budget, the official said.

Army Secretary Christine Wormuth — the service’s senior civilian leader who ultimately decides where much of the budget is spent — told CNN she expects the Army would “have to sort of rob Peter to pay Paul.”

“Every incremental dollar I have, it’s very important where I put that dollar. And I’m constantly choosing between, do we put it on barracks? Do I put it on enlistment incentives? Do I put it on exercises? Do I put it on modernization? I don’t have spare cash to be just sort of donating some of that,” Wormuth said.

“This was money that we anticipated to be replenished, obviously, by the supplemental,” she added, echoing the urgent need for funding.

Training continues

While US funding for Ukraine has dried up, training for Ukrainian troops has continued because it has been deemed mission critical by the president. Col. Martin O’Donnell, spokesman for US Army Europe and Africa, told CNN the US is training roughly 1,500 Ukrainians at Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany. Stateside, the US is also continuing its training of Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 fighter aircraft at Morris Air National Guard Base in Arizona.

In addition to training, equipment is still flowing to the Ukrainians from US stocks under previous Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) packages and from weapons and equipment that was purchased from the defense industrial base under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).

The US was regularly announcing PDA and USAI packages until funding dried up at the end of 2023.

Lawmakers in Congress have been debating a next tranche of funding for Ukraine for months. Last week, the Senate voted to advance a $95.3 billion foreign aid bill, including $60 billion in support for Ukraine. But it’s unclear what future the bill has in the House; Speaker Mike Johnson told reporters Tuesday that he “certainly” does not intend to bring it to the floor for a vote.

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, left, and House Speaker Mike Johnson.

Getty Images

Related article Schumer demands Johnson, House GOP pass foreign aid bill following Ukrainian withdrawal from key city and Navalny’s death

“Right now, we’re dealing with the appropriations process, we have immediate deadlines upon us, and that’s where the attention is in the House in this moment,” he said.

The millions of dollars the Army has spent this fiscal year to keep the wheels turning in Europe is divided into three main categories, the second official explained — contracts, travel and transport, and supplies.

This includes logistics needs; food; key equipment, including tents; and supplies such as petroleum and repair parts, not just for Ukrainians but also the US troops training them. So far in fiscal year 2024, the Army has spent $39.7 million on ground transportation, the first senior Army official told CNN.

While some of what the Army is spending can be replenished through the supplemental spending bill being debated on Capitol Hill, it’s also critical to the service for Congress to approve budget for the 2024 fiscal year. Last month, lawmakers approved a short-term funding bill to keep the government open until the beginning of March. And it’s not just the Army; National Guard Bureau Chief Gen. Daniel Hokanson told reporters the agency would eventually need more resources if the US intended to train more Ukrainian F-16 pilots.

“We do have the resources to continuing the training that’s already started … and hopefully get all those folks completed later on this year,” Hokanson said. “And then if we decide to increase that, obviously, we’ll need the resources to train additional pilots and ground support personnel.”

In a briefing earlier this month, Sabrina Singh, the deputy Pentagon press secretary, raised the lack of a 2024 budget, saying the Pentagon is “losing critical time.”

“We are already in our fifth month of this fiscal year and the DOD is still … operating under our third continuing resolution. That puts at risk our national security and prevents the department from modernizing, as we are constrained to existing funding level,” Singh said. “We ask that Congress immediately pass our base budget and supplemental request.”

And the second senior Army official warned that ultimately, a delay in funding has broader consequences than a disruption in training or aid to Ukraine.

“It’s all interconnected,” the official said. “And what we’re doing in one space is impacting us everywhere. We renege on this stuff — you don’t think China’s watching out there in the Pacific? You don’t think that’s going to have direct impacts on the Pacific? … Russia is definitely watching.”

CNN · by Haley Britzky, Natasha Bertrand · February 19, 2024

18.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com