Quotes of the Day:

"You can sway a thousand me by appealing to their prejudices quicker than you can convince one many by logic."

- Robert Heinlein

"You can't separate peace from freedom because no one can be at peace unless he has his freedom."

- Bob Marley

"Fearful men control, intelligent men analyze, but wise men listen with intent to understand."

-J. Mike Fields

Announcement:  Green Beret veteran-turned-writer Bill Raskin has his first play premiering in Washington, DC, October 7-28 at The Keegan Theatre! “The Team Room” follows a fictional Special Forces ODA that deploys in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The production is running on a non-profit basis, and net proceeds will go the Special Operations Warrior Foundation. This non-profit mission has benefitted greatly from other SOF and SOF family leaders, including MG(Ret) Jim Linder and a cohort of retired SF NCOs who have mentored and advised our team of actors. Learn more and purchase tickets at the website below! Bill also welcomes any direct questions or outreach at chair@teamroomfoundation.org https://teamroomfoundation.org

1. Senate confirms army, marines chiefs as senator's objection blocks other military nominations

2. Possible Personnel Cuts at Army Special Operations Command Loom

3. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20, 2023

4. Additional U.S. Security Assistance for Ukraine

5. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine (with equipment list)

6. Opinion | As Joint Chiefs chair, Milley was a Pattonesque presence stepping carefully

7. I just returned from South China Sea. The CCP is not yet done there By Rep. Young Kim

8. Australia to focus R&D on asymmetric warfighting, chief scientist says

9. House GOP in no rush to give more Ukraine aid after $6 billion error

10. Zelenskyy to meet U.S. military leaders in first visit to the Pentagon since war

11. Air Force general defends incendiary memo but says ‘war is not inevitable’

12. 160th SOAR veteran to build memorial out of CH-47D fuselage

13. Opinion | How to Make Russia Really Pay for Invading Ukraine

14. Ukraine war inspires weapons that crack battle tanks at weakest point

15. “The Team Room” follows a fictional Special Forces ODA that deploys in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

1. Senate confirms army, marines chiefs as senator's objection blocks other military nominations

Some good news but we still need the CNO and CSAF and 300 or so more nominees confirmed.

Senate confirms army, marines chiefs as senator's objection blocks other military nominations

AP · September 21, 2023

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WASHINGTON (AP) — The Senate has confirmed three top military leaders, filling the posts after monthslong delays and as a Republican senator is still holding up hundreds of other nominations and promotions for senior officers.

Thursday afternoon, Gen. Randy George was confirmed as Army Chief of Staff, and Gen. Eric Smith was confirmed as commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. On Wednesday, the Senate confirmed Gen. CQ Brown as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, putting him in place to succeed Gen. Mark Milley when he retires at the end of the month.

Democrats are still trying to maneuver around holds placed on more than 300 nominations by Alabama Sen. Tommy Tuberville over the Pentagon’s abortion policy. Tuberville has been blocking the Senate from the routine process of approving the military nominations in groups, forcing Democrats to bring the nominations up one by one — a process that could take months and delay other priorities.

The Senate usually holds roll call votes to confirm top Pentagon leadership such as Brown, George and Smith. But lower-ranking promotions and nominations are always approved in large groups by unanimous consent, meaning no objections from senators. Tuberville has upended that tradition by objecting, and he has said he will continue to object unless the Pentagon reverses its new policy of paying for travel when a service member has to go out of state to get an abortion or other reproductive care.

In an effort to force Tuberville’s hand, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer had originally said he would not move any of the nominations, including the top leaders, until Tuberville lifted the holds. But Tuberville has dug in, repeatedly coming to the floor to object to the nominations.

On Wednesday, Schumer reversed course and said the Senate would hold votes on the three military leaders. “Senator Tuberville is forcing us to face his obstruction head on,” Schumer said.

The other two nominated service leaders for the Navy and Air Force have not gotten votes yet. Adm. Lisa Franchetti is the current vice chief of the Navy and Gen. David W. Allvin is the vice chief of the Air Force. Franchetti is currently serving as acting chief.

The blockade has frustrated members on both sides of the aisle, and it is still unclear how the larger standoff will be resolved. Schumer did not say if he would put additional nominations on the floor.

George, nominated by President Joe Biden in April, was confirmed on a 96-1 vote. The current vice chief of the Army, he is also a highly decorated infantry officer, who commanded at all levels and did multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has been focused on efforts to modernize the Army and revamp recruiting as the service expects to fall short of its enlistment goal this year.

Smith is a highly decorated Marine officer who has been involved in the transformation of the force to be better able to fight amphibious wars in the Pacific after years of battling terrorist groups in the Middle East. He was confirmed on a 96-0 vote.

Nominated by Biden in May, Smith is the assistant commandant and a career infantry officer who has commanded at every level and served multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, including time in Fallujah and Ramadi during heavy combat in 2004 and 2005 in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

A host of military officers have spoken out about the damage of the delays for service members at all levels. While Tuberville’s holds are focused on all general and flag officers, the delays block opportunities for more junior officers to rise.

Shortly after the Senate vote, George was sworn in by Army Secretary Christine Wormuth.

“While this is a great day for the Army, I am keenly aware that hundreds of apolitical military officers still have their nominations blocked in the Senate by a blanket hold,” Wormuth said, adding that the holds are “discouraging signal for the talented junior and field grade officers as they contemplate their future as senior Army leaders.”

After Brown was confirmed, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said the holds are endangering national security and military readiness.

“It is well past time to confirm the over 300 other military nominees,” Austin said in a statement.

In a closed, classified Senate briefing on the Ukraine war Wednesday evening, Austin again took the opportunity to criticize Tuberville’s holds.

“It wasn’t flattering, but I’m sure he’s a little disgusted by what’s going on,” Tuberville said Thursday. “It doesn’t bother me.”

___

Associated Press writer Tara Copp contributed to this report.

AP · September 21, 2023

2. Possible Personnel Cuts at Army Special Operations Command Loom

Operational force or enabling force (or both)?

Here is the key excerpt, of course who knows what will happen to the NDAA. We should never forget that a joint Special Operations force with a combatant command HQ and unique service like responsibilities (such as for R&D and acquisition) exist only because of congressional support.

As an aside, this just struck me since we are talking about people here. Even back in 1986-1987 we still violated the first SOF truth - Humans are more important than hardware. Congress saw fit to give SOCOM a budget line and according to some, acquisition authorities (to buy hardware) but did not give it any authority for personnel management other than directing coordination with the services. We say people are more important than hardware but we never put our money where our mouth is.

Excerpt:

Section 597 of the House Armed Services Committee’s fiscal 2024 defense bill would require the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict–Christopher Maier–and the head of U.S. Special Operations Command–Army Gen. Bryan Fenton–“to conduct a coordinated review of force structure and personnel requirements for special operations forces under the jurisdiction of the secretaries of the military departments to carry out special operations activities.”

“The Secretary of Defense would be unable to make any reduction in force structure, personnel requirements, or staffing levels to a special operations force until after the secretary submits the required report,” according to Section 597.

Possible Personnel Cuts at Army Special Operations Command Loom - Defense Daily

defensedaily.com · by Frank Wolfe · September 19, 2023

A looming challenge for U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth and Gen. Randy George, the nominee to become the next Army Chief of Staff, is opposition among those in the service’s special forces community to a possible 10 to 20 percent personnel cut to help fund Army modernization.

The proposal is under consideration for the Army’s fiscal 2025 budget request, and congressional defense authorizers have already moved to head off the possible cuts that may target specific billets.

Section 597 of the House Armed Services Committee’s fiscal 2024 defense bill would require the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict–Christopher Maier–and the head of U.S. Special Operations Command–Army Gen. Bryan Fenton–“to conduct a coordinated review of force structure and personnel requirements for special operations forces under the jurisdiction of the secretaries of the military departments to carry out special operations activities.”

“The Secretary of Defense would be unable to make any reduction in force structure, personnel requirements, or staffing levels to a special operations force until after the secretary submits the required report,” according to Section 597.

Section 1059 of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s version of the fiscal 2024 defense authorization bill would also require Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to submit a report to Congress by March 1 next year on the optimal force structure for special operations forces (SOF).

While the service may end up making end strength cuts across the board, in part because of recruiting difficulties in the regular Army, special operations advocates said that Army special operations forces (SOF), including the storied Green Beret Operational Detachment As (ODAs)–“A-teams,” should not absorb cuts.

“We have the European Deterrence Initiative that has worked pretty well, and then we created the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, but less than one percent of that money goes to irregular warfare activity,” said Stu Bradin, president of the Global SOF Foundation. “Why is that? A significant part of what’s happening in Ukraine is irregular warfare–what they call hybrid warfare, but we’re not taking any of that money and building out those partners in the region. None of it’s dedicated to that.”

“There’s nothing like a Lend-Lease program that’s been established in that region,” he said. “We’re gonna do like we did in Ukraine. We’re gonna wait until there’s a major conflict and then give them billions of dollars. Why don’t they take the European and Pacific Deterrence Initiatives and turn those more into a Lend-Lease program? We’re giving them [allies] the stuff anyway. It would be more intelligent to be more deliberate in our process. If they had it and trained on it, that’s a huge deterrent right there alone. Working with our partner nations, all these things are what SOF does better than anyone else.”

A Lend-Lease program like that established by the United States for Great Britain during World War II would help reduce defense corruption and graft in partner nations, such as Ukraine, Bradin said. The United Kingdom, which used U.S. loans to buy at steep discounts some U.S. war supplies after the Lend-Lease program ended on Sept. 2, 1945, repaid the last installment of the loan–$83.3 million–on Dec. 29, 2006.

defensedaily.com · by Frank Wolfe · September 19, 2023

3.Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2023 

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 20.
• Russian servicemen and milbloggers revealed that the Russian military command orders Russian troops to carry out “ill-conceived and unsupported” counterattacks on Bakhmut’s southern flank to urgently regain lost ground.
• Russian forces conducted another round of Shahed drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 19-20.
• A Russian milblogger outlined Russian reconnaissance groups’ drone operator training and operation tactics in Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that unspecified saboteurs damaged Russian strategic aircraft at Chkalovsky airfield near Moscow on September 18.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on September 20 that he is in good health amidst continued speculations about his possible illness or death.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu met with Iranian Chief of the General Staff Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran, Iran to discuss Russian-Iranian military cooperation on September 19, a day after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi denied Iran’s provision of drones to Russia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized Russian peacekeepers’ humanitarian actions in Nagorno-Karabakh as the Russian information space continues to observe that Russia is losing influence in Armenia.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed gains.
• The Russian Red Cross (RKK) indicated that the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, particularly partial mobilization efforts in autumn 2022, caused a decline in mental health among many Russians.
• Russian and occupation authorities continue efforts to deport Ukrainian children to Russia and integrate Ukrainian children into Russian culture.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 20, 2023

Sep 20, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20, 2023

Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 20, 2023, 8:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on September 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 20. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations and inflicted significant losses on Russian manpower and equipment in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction and are consolidating in newly secured lines.[2] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed that Ukrainian forces secured positions in Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) and that Russian redeployments of airborne (VDV) forces from Bakhmut to the Zaporizhia direction have weakened Russian defenses around Bakhmut.[3] ISW had previously observed elements of the 83rd Separate Air Assault Brigade operating in Zaporizhia, although it is unclear how large a proportion of that unit was redeployed from Bakhmut.[4] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces are preparing defensive positions before Russian forces renew their assaults in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[5]

Russian servicemen and milbloggers revealed that the Russian military command orders Russian troops to carry out “ill-conceived and unsupported” counterattacks on Bakhmut’s southern flank to urgently regain lost ground.[6] Elements of Altai Krai’s 1st Battalion of the 1442nd Regiment (a mobilized unit) published a video appeal in which the soldiers claim that they abandoned their military equipment in the Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) area after receiving an order from the Russian military command to form an assault group and attack in the Bakhmut direction.[7] The servicemen noted that the Russian military command began deploying different types of personnel to the frontlines — including soldiers who are currently resting in the rear — without providing them with enough functional artillery shells. The servicemen noted that their shells do not explode when fired, which is likely a symptom of Russia's defense industrial base’s (DIB) efforts to speed up the production of shells and skipping quality assurance measures to do so.[8] The servicemen added that the unit is suffering from low morale after hearing reports that Ukrainian forces destroyed most of an unspecified Russian regiment and almost an entire retreating assault group in the area. The servicemen also claimed that they do not have prepared defensive positions and have to rely on small arms whereas the Ukrainians have artillery. Relatives of the personnel in the 1442nd Regiment had previously appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin after the Russian military command beat the troops for refusing to carry out an assault on September 14.[9]

A Russian milblogger also accused the Russian military command of ordering Russian troops to recapture Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) and the surrounding area without setting proper conditions for such counterattacks.[10] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command was planning “weak” counterattacks and failed to provide accurate intelligence to Russian assault units. The milblogger observed that Russian forces also lack artillery support, while “hysterical” counterattacks are depleting Russian resources and reserves. The milblogger also claimed that Russian defenses on the adjacent heights in the Andriivka area had collapsed, and it is likely that the Russian military command’s efforts to regain lost positions are preventing Russian forces from preparing new defensive positions on Bakhmut’s southern flank.

Russian forces conducted another round of Shahed drones strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 19-20. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 17 of 24 launched Iranian-made Shahed 136/131 drones in Sumy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and that some of the drones struck an oil refinery in Poltava Oblast.[11] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reiterated that Russian forces have predictably increased the use of drones against Ukraine because Russia can obtain, manufacture, or assemble more drones domestically.[12] Ihnat stated that Russian forces have not changed their drone tactics and continue attempts to bypass Ukrainian air defenses.

A Russian milblogger outlined Russian reconnaissance groups’ drone operator training and operation tactics in Ukraine. The milblogger claimed that most Russian reconnaissance groups have two types of drone operators — a Mavik drone operator who carries out reconnaissance operations and a first-person viewer (FPV) drone operator who conducts attacks.[13] The milblogger noted that Mavik drone operators usually adjust fire and direct ground and drone attacks, while FPV drone operators strike targets that the Mavik drone operators identify.[14] The milblogger claimed that competent Mavik operators will train for up to six months while FPV drone operators train for three months, but noted that the battlefield effectiveness of drones is contingent upon their operators’ skill.[15] The milblogger noted that Russian reconnaissance group commanders do not need approval from senior commanders to strike targets.[16] The milblogger also claimed that the Russian military is training fewer FPV drone operators due to the time and money needed for FPV drone repair, assembly, and operator training.[17] ISW has not observed a decrease in reconnaissance and FPV drone usage, however. The milblogger may be claiming that the Russian military is decreasing drone usage due to high costs in order to generate monetary and drone donations.[18]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that unspecified saboteurs damaged Russian strategic aircraft at Chkalovsky airfield near Moscow on September 18.[19] The GUR reported on September 20 that the saboteurs planted explosives on an An-148 and an Il-20 aircraft subordinate to the Russian 354th Special Purpose Aviation Regiment and an Mi-28N helicopter that Russian forces use to repel Ukrainian drones. The GUR stated that the explosions severely damaged the aircraft, including the Mi-28N's tail, and inflicted minor damage on a second An-148 nearby. Russian authorities have not yet reported an attack at the Chkalovsky airfield as of September 20.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on September 20 that he is in good health amidst continued speculations about his possible illness or death. Ramzan Kadyrov directly addressed speculations about his health in a social media post on September 20 claiming that he remains alive and in good health.[20] Kadyrov claimed to not understand why speculations of his health necessitate “fuss” and stated that publications that speculate on his health are untrustworthy. Kadyrov included a video of himself visiting his uncle Magomed Kadyrov in the hospital.

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu met with Iranian Chief of the General Staff Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran, Iran to discuss Russian-Iranian military cooperation on September 19, a day after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi denied Iran’s provision of drones to Russia. Raisi denied that Iran provides drones to Russia during his speech to the United Nations on September 18.[21] Shoigu and Bagheri visited an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force facility where Shoigu saw Iranian-made drones, air defense systems, missiles; and tactical, medium, and long-range missile systems on September 20.[22] Shoigu stated that Russia and Iran plan to implement a range of unspecified activities in spite of Western sanctions, likely in order to evade the sanctions.[23]

Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized Russian peacekeepers’ humanitarian actions in Nagorno-Karabakh as the Russian information space continues to observe that Russia is losing influence in Armenia. The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities accepted a Russian peacekeeper-mediated ceasefire agreement with Azerbaijan on September 20 and reported that Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani officials will meet in Yevlakh, Azerbaijan on September 21 to discuss “reintegration” and “ensuring the rights and security of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.”[24] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenian authorities were not involved in the ceasefire agreement and that Armenian forces were not present in Nagorno-Karabakh.[25] Putin emphasized on September 20 Russian peacekeepers’ roles in protecting civilians and claimed that Russia is in constant contact with Armenian, Azerbaijani and Nagorno-Karabakh authorities.[26]

The Russian MoD reported that Azerbaijani small arms fire killed Russian peacekeeping personnel driving in Nagorno-Karabakh and that Russian and Azerbaijani investigative authorities are working to clarify the incident.[27] Several milbloggers noted that the Russian military did not respond when Azerbaijani forces shot down a Russian Mi-24 helicopter during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and expressed irritation at the assumption that the Russian military would similarly ignore these deaths.[28] Russian milbloggers continue to lament Russia’s waning influence in Armenia.[29] Russia’s role as a security guarantor for Armenia may be declining as Russia continues to prioritize its military operations in Ukraine at the same time as the Armenian government increasingly expresses its dissatisfaction with its security ties to Russia.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 20.
• Russian servicemen and milbloggers revealed that the Russian military command orders Russian troops to carry out “ill-conceived and unsupported” counterattacks on Bakhmut’s southern flank to urgently regain lost ground.
• Russian forces conducted another round of Shahed drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 19-20.
• A Russian milblogger outlined Russian reconnaissance groups’ drone operator training and operation tactics in Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that unspecified saboteurs damaged Russian strategic aircraft at Chkalovsky airfield near Moscow on September 18.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on September 20 that he is in good health amidst continued speculations about his possible illness or death.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu met with Iranian Chief of the General Staff Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran, Iran to discuss Russian-Iranian military cooperation on September 19, a day after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi denied Iran’s provision of drones to Russia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized Russian peacekeepers’ humanitarian actions in Nagorno-Karabakh as the Russian information space continues to observe that Russia is losing influence in Armenia.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed gains.
• The Russian Red Cross (RKK) indicated that the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, particularly partial mobilization efforts in autumn 2022, caused a decline in mental health among many Russians.
• Russian and occupation authorities continue efforts to deport Ukrainian children to Russia and integrate Ukrainian children into Russian culture.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on September 20 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove) and established control over operationally significant heights near the settlement.[31] ISW has not observed evidence of this claim, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk).[32] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated on September 20 that Russian forces have infrequently conducted assaults in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction over the past week.[33] Yevlash also stated that 110,000 Russian frontline, rear, and support personnel are located in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction and that Russian forces accumulated this number of troops in an attempt to pin Ukrainian forces on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna frontline.[34] Footage published on September 20 purportedly shows artillery elements of the Russian 25th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) operating in the Kupyansk direction and elements of the Russian 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Guards Tank Division, Central Military District) operating near Kreminna.[35]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in Bakhmut but have not made confirmed territorial gains on September 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing to assault Russian positions south of Bakhmut and are entrenching themselves on newly achieved lines.[37] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed that Ukrainian forces had secured Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), while Russian forces still control the railway line located between Klishchiivka and the T0513 highway to the east of the settlement.[38] The UK MoD added that recent redeployments of Russian VDV forces from the Bakhmut area to the Zaporizhia Oblast may have weakened the Russian defenses around Bakhmut. The Ukrainian 3rd Separate Mechanized Brigade reported on September 19 that Ukrainian forces were clearing the approaches to Andriivka.[39]

The Russian “Hispaniola” Volunteer Reconnaissance Assault Brigade – a volunteer formation composed of Russian radical soccer fans and operating in the Bakhmut direction – reported that Ukrainian forces struck the brigade’s headquarters near Svitlodarsk (20km southeast of Bakhmut City).[40] The “Hispaniola” Brigade added that the strike resulted in the destruction of the headquarters, the loss of several vehicles, and casualties. The “Hispaniola” Brigade claimed that it continues to fight in the Bakhmut direction, is deploying additional personnel, and is recruiting more volunteers.

Russian forces continued to counterattack Ukrainian positions on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks but did not advance on September 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian counterattacks northeast of Andriivka, near Yahidne just north of Bakhmut, and west of Zaitseve (it's unclear if the Ukrainian General Staff was referring to the Zaitseve 6km southeast of Bakhmut or the Zaitseve 13km south of Bakhmut).[41] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Andriivka and Klishchiivka.[42] Russian sources claimed that fighting is ongoing near Klishchiivka and that certain segments of the settlement remain contested as of September 20.[43] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces carried out a successful counterattack in Klishchiivka and pushed Ukrainian forces from an unspecified part of the settlement but did not provide visual confirmation to support this claim.[44]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made limited advances on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the “Yugra” battalion — composed of mobilized personnel from the Khanty-Mansi Okrug — seized unspecified Ukrainian positions in the Donetsk direction and were fiercely fighting in order to advance by 100 to 300 meters.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued to unsuccessfully attack Ukrainian positions in the Marinka area, just west of Donetsk City.[46]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger posted footage on September 20 claiming to show elements of the Russian 14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade operating in the Vuhledar direction.[47]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on September 20 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled a Ukrainian attack in the direction of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and stopped a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that small groups of Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks north of Pryyutne and near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and retreated under Russian artillery fire.[49] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces withdrew from the outskirts of Staromayorske, likely reporting on the same Ukrainian retreat in the area.[50] Another Russian milblogger claimed on September 19 that Ukrainian forces are regrouping in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[51] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 20 that Ukrainian forces continued defensive operations that caused Russian forces to suffer manpower and equipment losses in the Shakhtarske operational direction, presumably referring to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[52]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 20 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations and inflicted significant losses on Russian manpower and equipment in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[53] Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) and in the direction of Novoprokopivka (16km south of Orikhiv) and Kopani (12km southwest of Orikhiv).[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces skirmished on Verbove’s western outskirts.[55] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Robotyne on the night of September 19 to 20.[56] North Ossetian “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” volunteer battalions, which are operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast, claimed that the intensity of fighting decreased by the morning of September 20 near Robotyne and Verbove.[57] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces were advancing through the lowlands because Russian forces controlled the heights in this area.[58]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Mala Tokmachka (7km southeast of Orikhiv), Novodanylivka (5km south of Orikhiv), and Robotyne.[59] A Russian milbloger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Robotyne’s southern outskirts but did not specify an outcome.[60] North Ossetian “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” volunteer battalions claimed that elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) captured a Ukrainian position west of Verbove on September 19.[61] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.

Ukrainian forces may have struck Russian rear military infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on September 20. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that unspecified actors conducted strikes on Russian military infrastructure near Melitopol, Tokmak, and Polohy.[62] Fedorov stated that locals reported smoke coming from a Russian military headquarters and barracks near Melitopol.[63]

Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continue to operate on the islands in the Dnipro River delta in Kherson Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed four Ukrainian Special Forces sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Kozatske (northwest of Nova Kakhovka) and the “Aleshkinsky” and “Pereyaslavsky” islands, likely referring to islands with different names in an unspecified sector of the Dnipro River delta.[64] Other Russian sources claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces are operating on unspecified islands in the Dnipro River delta in Kherson Oblast.[65]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian command post near Verkhnosadove (15km northeast of Sevastopol) in occupied Crimea on September 20. Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications (UA StratCom) reported that Ukrainian forces successfully struck a Russian Black Sea Fleet command post near Verkhnosadove, but did not specify the weapons used in the strike.[66] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian aircraft launched eight Storm Shadow missiles over Crimea and that Russian air defenses downed five missiles.[67] The milblogger claimed that three Ukrainian-launched Storm Shadows ‘fell’ near Verkhnosadove.[68] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed that Ukrainian forces also launched an unspecified number of drones during the missile strikes.[69] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing their planned operations in occupied Crimea and that the Ukrainian General Staff will release additional information later.[70]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Red Cross (RKK) indicated that the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, particularly partial mobilization efforts in autumn 2022, caused a decline in mental health among many Russians. The RKK told Russian newswire RBK that it has recorded an increase in the number of Russians with symptoms of depression since February 2022.[71] The RKK reported that over 28,500 people contacted the RKK’s mental health hotline for support since February 2022 and over 500 people have requested “individual psychological support” since October 2022, coinciding with the start of partial mobilization in Russia. The RKK reported that 61 percent of callers were relatives of Russian military personnel and mobilized personnel. The RKK noted that Russians reported feeling an increase in aggressive sentiment and a decrease of anxiety and fear after fall 2022.

The Russian MoD reportedly continues to recruit personnel from penal colonies to support the war effort. Udmurtia-based activist movement “Udmurtiya Protiv Korruptsii” (Udmurtia Against Corruption) reported on September 19 that Russian MoD representatives visited penal colonies in the Republic of Udmurtia to recruit prisoners by promising them pardons after returning from Ukraine to Russia and 100,000 ruble ($1,036) monthly salaries.[72] “Udmurtiya Protiv Korruptsii” reported that the MoD representatives did not have the penal recruits go through medical or psychological evaluations prior to signing contracts with the MoD.

Russian and occupation authorities are reportedly set to open the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School in occupied Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2023. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command school will open by December 1, 2023, and will support over 3,500 employees and cadets.[73] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on August 17 establishing the new Donetsk command school likely to further integrate the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) proxy formations into the conventional Russian military structure, while simultaneously preventing DNR and LNR servicemen from leaving to Russia amidst full-scale invasion.[74]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian and occupation authorities continue efforts to deport Ukrainian children to Russia and integrate Ukrainian children into Russian culture. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on September 20 that Russian authorities are offering Russian citizens increased social benefits for taking guardianship of Ukrainian children and that Russian authorities plan to assimilate many Ukrainian children into Russian populations instead of returning the children to Ukrainian relatives.[75] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that Russian authorities are bringing Russian student teachers to teach Ukrainian children in occupied areas to teach Russian language and history.[76]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

4. Additional U.S. Security Assistance for Ukraine

Additional U.S. Security Assistance for Ukraine

PRESS STATEMENT

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE

SEPTEMBER 21, 2023

HTTPS://WWW.STATE.GOV/ADDITIONAL-U-S-SECURITY-ASSISTANCE-FOR-UKRAINE-10/

Ukraine’s resilience, courage, and determination have inspired the world and galvanized U.S. and global efforts to help it defend itself and secure its future.  Following President Biden’s announcement of a new security assistance package for Ukraine, pursuant to a delegation of authority from the President, I am authorizing additional security assistance for Ukraine, which will provide $128 million worth of U.S. arms and equipment from Department of Defense stocks.  The Department of Defense will also be providing $197 million in arms and equipment under previously directed drawdowns.

The arms and equipment include additional air defense munitions to help strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses against aerial assaults from Russia now and in the coming winter, when Russia is likely to renew its attacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. It also contains artillery ammunition and anti-armor capabilities, as well as cluster munitions, which will further enhance Ukraine’s capacity to continue its counter-offensive against Russia’s forces.

The United States and Ukraine have forged a partnership that is stronger than ever. In the past year, Ukraine’s forces have taken back more than 50 percent of the territory seized by Russia’s forces since February of 2022. We will stand united with Ukraine as it secures its future – a future in which its people rebuild and live safely in a resilient and thriving democracy, fully integrated with Europe.

5. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine

Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3534283/biden-administration-announces-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/

Sept. 21, 2023 |   

As President Biden just announced, the Department of Defense is sending an additional security assistance package to meet Ukraine's critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration's forty-seventh tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. This package includes additional capabilities to strengthen Ukraine's air defenses as it faces brutal aerial assaults from Russia, dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) which are helping Ukraine on the battlefield, anti-tank weapons, and other equipment to meet Ukraine's critical needs and to help Ukraine counter Russia's ongoing war of aggression.

The capabilities in this package, valued at up to $325 million, include:

• AIM-9M missiles for air defense;
• Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
• Avenger air defense systems;
• .50 caliber machine guns to counter Unmanned Aerial Systems;
• 155mm artillery rounds, including DPICM;
• 105mm artillery rounds;
• Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
• Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
• Over 3 million rounds of small arms ammunition;
• 59 light tactical vehicles;
• Demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing; and
• Spare parts, maintenance, and other field equipment.

This security assistance package will utilize assistance previously authorized under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) for Ukraine that remained after the PDA revaluation process concluded in June as well as assistance under a new PDA.

The United States will continue to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with capabilities to meet its immediate battlefield needs and longer-term security assistance requirements.

6. Opinion | As Joint Chiefs chair, Milley was a Pattonesque presence stepping carefully

Excerpts:

Milley’s most important but least recognized contribution to the military might have been his advocacy of new technology. Starting when he became Army chief of staff in 2015, he sought out tech leaders such as Elon Musk and pressed for ideas that could modernize Army logistics and weapons. He used the 18th Airborne Corps, headed at the time by Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla and Lt. Gen. Chris Donahue, as a test bed for new technology. Those two officers and many dozens of others have become advocates of preparing for digital warfare.

The Army had modern tools ready to help Ukraine identify and target attackers when Russian invaded, in what I described in December as “algorithmic warfare.” Milley hopes this technological edge will deter China from attacking Taiwan and ensure a pulverizing defeat of any attempted Chinese invasion of the island.

As a student of military history, Milley understood better than most that war is an extension of politics. He tried to fence the chairman’s office from political pressure, but in the Trump era, that proved impossible.

One of Milley’s favorite military aphorisms is from Chinese strategist Sun Tzu. “See yourself, see your enemy, win a thousand battles.” Milley did the first two, but as he made his last visit to Germany as chairman of the Joint Chiefs to urge support for Ukraine, victory was still an uncertain and probably distant vision.

Opinion | As Joint Chiefs chair, Milley was a Pattonesque presence stepping carefully

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · September 20, 2023

Opinion As Joint Chiefs chair, Milley was a Pattonesque presence stepping carefully

By

Columnist|

September 20, 2023 at 4:23 p.m. EDT

RAMSTEIN, Germany — Gen. Mark A. Milley’s last overseas trip as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was all about the war in Ukraine — a cause he passionately supported even as he sought to prevent it from expanding into a direct conflict between the United States and Russia.

Milley had a farewell meeting last weekend with NATO allies in Oslo and then traveled here Tuesday to join Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in meeting the Western “contact group” that is supplying an ever-expanding arsenal of weapons to Kyiv — “for as long as it takes,” Milley said, to expel Russian troops from Ukraine or force Moscow to the bargaining table.

Adm. Rob Bauer, a Dutch officer who chairs NATO’s military committee, told his colleagues in Oslo that Milley had led the alliance through the unparalleled stress of a pandemic, America’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Russian assault on Ukraine. And he recalled what might be the most enduring moment of Milley’s tenure: his opposition to what he saw as President Donald Trump’s effort to politicize the military.

“At a time when your nation’s constitutional values were shaken to their core, you made sure that the U.S. military continued to embody the values and ideals of the nation,” Bauer said in remarks provided to me and other journalists traveling with Milley. “There were mornings when you didn’t know if you would be fired by sunset, and yet you continued to fight for what you knew to be right.”

Milley’s stint as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, which ends this month, was as bold and sometimes as noisy as an artillery barrage. But the portrait that emerges from observing him over the past four years reveals a complex and sometimes surprising figure, in some ways the opposite of his public image.

Milley seems at first glance a modern-day George Patton, barrel-chested and often profane in private, with an ex-hockey player’s sense of leadership as a contact sport. But he is a Princeton graduate with an encyclopedic knowledge of military history and a familiarity with arcane nuclear theorists such as Thomas C. Schelling.

Despite Milley’s bravado, “his constant concern as chairman was to avoid great-power conflict,” said Col. David Butler, his spokesman. That meant carefully weighing risks of Russian escalation in Ukraine and avoiding needlessly provocative military exercises or saber-rattling in the South China Sea.

Milley’s view of war was conditioned by seeing battle up close in Iraq. As a colonel commanding a combat brigade in Baghdad in 2005, he scrambled across a minefield to stop an Abrams tank that was about to detonate the explosives, according to an account published this spring by the military publication Task and Purpose.

He never forgot the grim warning given to him in 2019 by a World War II veteran at a commemoration of the D-Day assault. When Milley asked the paratrooper for advice, the veteran said with a tear in his eye: “Don’t let it happen again.” For all his outward bluster, Milly tried to follow that admonition.

Milley’s time as chairman was jolted by his collision with Trump. It was a strange accident of history. Trump, who had avoided military service and knew nothing of war, was attracted to Milley’s Patton-like demeanor. The relationship exploded on June 1, 2020, when Trump led Milley, in uniform, across a forcefully cleared Lafayette Square for a photo opportunity before which Trump denounced the racial-justice protests that came after the killing of George Floyd.

Milley was furious that he had let Trump use him as a prop and quickly apologized to his colleagues in uniform. From then on, he battled to defend the military from what he saw as Trump’s assault on its independence and professionalism. If anything, Milley might have overcorrected. He was so worried about the military being used to quell a civil disturbance on Jan. 6, 2021, that he was wary of an aggressive response to the mob assault on the Capitol that he sensed was coming.

After Trump’s departure, Milley became a close and trusted adviser to President Biden, reinforcing the White House’s twin goals of supporting Ukraine and avoiding war with Russia. His baseline advice was that the United States should concentrate on what he described as “line-drive singles,” rather than swing for flashier but higher-risk home runs. That middle course suited Biden.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Milley thought Kyiv would probably fall quickly. Fearing that President Volodymyr Zelensky would be arrested or killed, he urged Ukraine to prepare a continuity of government plan. From the beginning, he foresaw a long, bloody conflict. Before the invasion, he is said to have warned his Russian counterpart, Gen. Valery Gerasimov: “You may get into Ukraine in 14 days, but it will take you 14 years to get out.”

Milley’s twin poles in assessing Ukraine were captured in two quotations he shared with me early on. The brave defiance of Zelensky and the Ukrainian people reminded him of Napoleon’s remark that, “In war, the moral is to the physical as three is to one.” To support Zelensky’s courageous defiance, he rushed weapons to Ukraine — though always weighing the danger that it might provoke Russian retaliation against NATO.

In assessing the danger of escalation, Milley recalled a phrase attributed to Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping: “We are crossing the river by feeling the stones” — meaning, one wrong step might bring disaster.

Critics argue that he was overly careful, and that the administration’s response to requests for weapons such as HIMARS missiles or F-16 fighters amounted to “no, no, no, yes.” But Milley’s approach was calculated. Rather than jumping over Russian red lines, as some hawks wanted, Milley, in effect, wriggled through them — at first resisting and then supporting the provision of long-range missiles and other systems. As late as this week, he was cautioning NATO allies that sending ATACMS missiles or F-16 jets to Ukraine, while militarily useful, wasn’t a “silver bullet.” Milley has worked closely with Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s top commander. But when the Ukrainian military fired a drone at the Kremlin this year, Milley is said to have cautioned Zaluzhny: “Don’t use American weapons” in such attacks inside Russia.

The tensest time for Milley in the Ukraine war might have been last fall, when Kyiv broke through Russian lines and seized Kharkiv and Kherson — and U.S. intelligence warned that Russia might use tactical nuclear weapons to prevent a general collapse of its forces. To contain what he believed was the greatest risk of nuclear war since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Milley contacted Gerasimov and queried him on Russian doctrine on tactical nukes. That call, and similar contacts by Austin and other top officials with their Russian counterparts, reduced their concern about escalation but didn’t extinguish it.

Milley likes to cite Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s warning that human factors can drive wars toward extremes because the terrible loss of life usually stiffens combatants’ resolve rather than breaking it. He worries that this hardening of position could lead both Ukraine and Russia to resist a negotiated settlement they might otherwise seek as rational actors if a grinding war of attrition stretches into next year.

After struggling so hard to keep the military out of politics during the Trump years, Milley ironically became a figure in America’s poisonous culture wars. He’s a White Irish Catholic from outside Boston, but when he defended the U.S. Military Academy teaching critical race theory, he was attacked by right-wing media as a symbol of a “woke” military leadership. The criticism infuriated Milley, but he held his ground as a proponent of a modern, diverse military.

Milley’s most important but least recognized contribution to the military might have been his advocacy of new technology. Starting when he became Army chief of staff in 2015, he sought out tech leaders such as Elon Musk and pressed for ideas that could modernize Army logistics and weapons. He used the 18th Airborne Corps, headed at the time by Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla and Lt. Gen. Chris Donahue, as a test bed for new technology. Those two officers and many dozens of others have become advocates of preparing for digital warfare.

The Army had modern tools ready to help Ukraine identify and target attackers when Russian invaded, in what I described in December as “algorithmic warfare.” Milley hopes this technological edge will deter China from attacking Taiwan and ensure a pulverizing defeat of any attempted Chinese invasion of the island.

As a student of military history, Milley understood better than most that war is an extension of politics. He tried to fence the chairman’s office from political pressure, but in the Trump era, that proved impossible.

One of Milley’s favorite military aphorisms is from Chinese strategist Sun Tzu. “See yourself, see your enemy, win a thousand battles.” Milley did the first two, but as he made his last visit to Germany as chairman of the Joint Chiefs to urge support for Ukraine, victory was still an uncertain and probably distant vision.

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · September 20, 2023

7. I just returned from South China Sea. The CCP is not yet done there By Rep. Young Kim

Excerpts:

For the United States to continue to lead on the world stage, push back on CCP aggression, and be able to promote peace from a position of strength, we must show up and support our allies and partners in the South China Sea. This directly ties into our national security, our allies, global trade, supply chains, and international law.

Congress must tackle these unlawful behaviors head-on, and I am committed to working with my colleagues in Congress and counterparts from allied nations to finding real solutions. This includes support for more maritime domain awareness, more joint patrols in the region, stronger economic ties with Southeast Asian nations, and calling out unlawful behavior. The administration must be held accountable to promises made to allies, show up to key engagements, and stop sidelining Congress for fruitless meetings with Beijing that yield no progress.

The CCP’s voyage toward world dominance sails through the South China Sea, and I refuse to let United States give the CCP the green light.

I just returned from South China Sea. The CCP is not yet done there

China's voyage toward world dominance sails through the South China Sea

  By Rep. Young Kim Fox News

Published September 20, 2023 12:00pm EDT

foxnews.com · by Rep. Young Kim Fox News

Video

We should not be taking freedom for granted: Rep. Young Kim

Rep. Young Kim, R-Calif., discusses how low military recruitment poses a national security threat on ‘Fox News @ Night.’

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During a visit to the United States in 2016, Chinese Communist Party Chairman (CCP) Xi Jinping declared that China "does not intend to pursue militarization" and is "committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea."

I just got back from the South China Sea, and Xi Jinping’s words could not be further from the truth.

The CCP is not done in the South China Sea. In fact, they are doubling down on militarizing outposts in the South China Sea, acting aggressively toward U.S. allies and partners, and repeating lies about its "ten-dash line" to claim ownership of the region.

The South China Sea is a strategic waterway which nearly $5.3 trillion worth of trade passes through annually, including $1.2 trillion trade between the United States and four of our top ten trading partners. The highly contested area includes competing claims to islands, reefs, and waterways by China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

As Chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Indo-Pacific Subcommittee, I led a bipartisan Congressional Delegation to the First Island Chain, including Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. We saw and heard time and time again that the CCP is doubling down on unlawful claims and aggressive tactics to assert and expand its control of the region.

CLICK HERE FOR MORE FOX NEWS OPINION

Video

Just a week before our trip, the CCP’s Coast Guard used lasers to temporarily blind Philippine sailors and water cannons to stop Philippines Coast Guard ships from re-supplying Philippine marines at the Sierra Madre, a Philippines ship permanently stationed in the South China Sea to protect the Philippines’ claims to the Spratly Islands.

I flew on a mission with the U.S. Navy over the South China Sea and saw its congestion. Instead of open water, I saw civilian fishing fleets from Southeast Asian countries, patrols from the Philippine Coast Guard, and vessels from the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Chinese Coast Guard – by far the largest and most common vessels in the seas – all vying for the same water between reefs and islets.

Across the South China Sea, China has illegally dredged nearly 3,200 acres of new land and created many military outposts, including runways for military aircraft, isolated "research" platforms that can port vessels, and a constant China Coast Guard presence in waters that our allies claim.

A Philippine supply boat, center, maneuvers around Chinese coast guard ships as they tried to block its way near Second Thomas Shoal, locally known as Ayungin Shoal, at the disputed South China Sea on Aug. 22, 2023. (AP Photo/Aaron Favila)

The CCP’s presence is felt not just with their growing outposts, but also with their aggressive tactics. Our military and Philippine counterparts shared the unprofessional and unsafe ways that the CCP targets the Philippines, our important ally in the Indo-Pacific that we have a treaty with to defend.

From lasers, water cannons, and unsafe intercepts to aggressive language directed toward pilots, the CCP’s harassment appears to have no standards. What we heard on the ground echoes reporting we have seen from our own military at INDOPACOM about how People’s Liberation Army aircraft and vessels will fly or sail dangerously close to U.S. military aircraft or vessels.

Video

Indonesia was no different. My counterparts described how the CCP conducts illegal and unregulated fishing activity in the South China Sea, damaging not only their surroundings but also the livelihoods of thousands of Indonesian fishermen and women.

HOUSE DEMOCRAT SOUNDS ALARM ON BEIJING'S PLAN TO DOMINATE TECH SECTOR

The CCP aims to exert complete control over the South China Sea, and, as it grows its foothold in the region, our allies and partners are unable to effectively push back on their own while following a rules-based international order.

The efforts by allies and partners to stop the CCP’s activities using international law and legal mechanisms are met with the CCP blatantly ignoring or slow-rolling negotiations, lawful arbitration rulings, and other attempts to work through differences about contested waters.

CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

For the United States to continue to lead on the world stage, push back on CCP aggression, and be able to promote peace from a position of strength, we must show up and support our allies and partners in the South China Sea. This directly ties into our national security, our allies, global trade, supply chains, and international law.

Congress must tackle these unlawful behaviors head-on, and I am committed to working with my colleagues in Congress and counterparts from allied nations to finding real solutions. This includes support for more maritime domain awareness, more joint patrols in the region, stronger economic ties with Southeast Asian nations, and calling out unlawful behavior. The administration must be held accountable to promises made to allies, show up to key engagements, and stop sidelining Congress for fruitless meetings with Beijing that yield no progress.

The CCP’s voyage toward world dominance sails through the South China Sea, and I refuse to let United States give the CCP the green light.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM REP. YOUNG KIM

Republican Rep. Young Kim represents California's 40th Congressional District.

foxnews.com · by Rep. Young Kim Fox News

8. Australia to focus R&D on asymmetric warfighting, chief scientist says

Excerpts:

Instead of focusing on capability gaps, the review instead asks what Australia can invest in that would cause a potential adversary to question its approach or incur more cost, she said.

The review highlighted innovation, science and technology as priorities, with six areas of focus: long-range fires; directed energy; hypersonics; trusted autonomous systems in all domains; quantum technologies, such as quantum-assisted precision navigation and timing and quantum-aided communication tools; and information warfare and automated intelligence systems.

“All of these areas have the potential to disrupt the way our forces operate now, and allow us to leap ahead technologically so that we can do things differently when we work with our allies,” Monro said.

But as part of the defense review, Australia has also shifted to a mindset where “warfighter problems are at the center of what we do, that they’re crafted as problem statements that are technology-agnostic, and then allow us to harness the creativity and good ideas of our whole ecosystem.”

And that approach doesn’t quite line up with the Australia, U.K. and U.S., or AUKUS, Pillar 2 effort that includes working groups devoted specific advanced technology areas rather than warfighting problems.

Australia to focus R&D on asymmetric warfighting, chief scientist says

c4isrnet.com · by Megan Eckstein · September 20, 2023

WASHINGTON — Australia has two defining military efforts taking shape — the implementation of its Defence Strategic Review at home and the kickoff of a trilateral technology-sharing agreement — that are changing the way the nation’s defense and innovation ecosystems interact.

The Defence Strategic Review, released publicly in April, “is a significant change in posture for Australia” that asks the country to take an asymmetric approach to deterring or winning a conflict in the Pacific, Tanya Monro, the chief defence scientist at the Australian Department of Defence, said Wednesday during a Center for a New American Security event in Washington, D.C.

Instead of focusing on capability gaps, the review instead asks what Australia can invest in that would cause a potential adversary to question its approach or incur more cost, she said.

The review highlighted innovation, science and technology as priorities, with six areas of focus: long-range fires; directed energy; hypersonics; trusted autonomous systems in all domains; quantum technologies, such as quantum-assisted precision navigation and timing and quantum-aided communication tools; and information warfare and automated intelligence systems.

“All of these areas have the potential to disrupt the way our forces operate now, and allow us to leap ahead technologically so that we can do things differently when we work with our allies,” Monro said.

But as part of the defense review, Australia has also shifted to a mindset where “warfighter problems are at the center of what we do, that they’re crafted as problem statements that are technology-agnostic, and then allow us to harness the creativity and good ideas of our whole ecosystem.”

And that approach doesn’t quite line up with the Australia, U.K. and U.S., or AUKUS, Pillar 2 effort that includes working groups devoted specific advanced technology areas rather than warfighting problems.

‘Star shots’

That’s leaving Australia to determine what development priorities it has that it wants to pursue with its closest allies, and which it would like to pursue on its own, to make the most of its limited innovation resources.

In 2020, Australia released a “More, Together” science and technology strategy that included eight “star shots,” or specific warfighting capabilities the service chiefs wanted to have by 2030. The star shots defined the end capability, such as undersea surveillance or resilient satellite constellations, not the technology solution that would get the military there; with this strategy, “our aim has been to align the work done in our universities and in our industry” so these researchers would help address national needs, rather than develop technology for technology’s sake.

Monro said Australia’s innovation sector, unlike in the U.S., largely resides in university labs and with small- and medium-sized companies, rather than large prime contractors that can devote attention to future tech — so Australia determined it was important to focus its limited resources on the most important needs of the military.

The MARTAC T38 Devil Ray unmanned vessel conducts speed and handling exercises with safety personnel on-board during Exercise Autonomous Warrior 2022 in the waters of Jervis Bay Territory in May 2022. (Justin Brown/Royal Australian Navy)

The Defence Strategic Review doubles down on this, with the creation of an Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator that officially began its work July 1. Monro described this new organization as “quite a bit of [Strategic Capabilities Office] flavor, a lot of [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and a sprinkling of [Defense Innovation Unit].”

ASCA, which will receive $3.4 billion in funding over the next decade, will take tech-agnostic military problems and look to solve them within two or three years.

To get an early win, Monro said, the group put out a call to Australian industry to create a sovereign drone ecosystem, after the government determined it was not safe to use Chinese-made DJI small drones for military or government purposes. Monro said ASCA received more than 250 responses, from companies offering drones to components to software, all of which will be pulled together to help address small unmanned aerial system needs in the Australian Defence Force.

Though this example is one where Australia needed to pursue the effort alone, Monro called out autonomy more broadly as an area where close coordination among the AUKUS allies is critical: she highlighted an early effort the countries already demonstrated, where they not only operated autonomous systems side by side but also passed control of the vehicles among different users.

More information on the Pillar 2 effort and the tech areas it includes will be released this fall. Monro said it would be important to get problem statements, or warfighting requirements, from each of the three militaries to contextualize the need for these advanced tech areas — “and make sure that technology development done under each of those working groups aligns with our warfighters’ highest priority problems. That has been a bit of a forcing function for winnowing down what we do.”

More information on ASCA’s focus areas, too, will be released shortly, Monro said.

“We’re working through the process of which of the problem statements [for ASCA] press an AUKUS button, or another bilateral or multilateral piece. So you can understand there’s a little bit of work between us deciding what’s most important to us, and us deciding what we’re doing alone and what we’re doing together,” she said.

About Megan Eckstein

Megan Eckstein is the naval warfare reporter at Defense News. She has covered military news since 2009, with a focus on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations, acquisition programs and budgets. She has reported from four geographic fleets and is happiest when she’s filing stories from a ship. Megan is a University of Maryland alumna.

9. House GOP in no rush to give more Ukraine aid after $6 billion error

Yes this will haunt DOD for some time and certain congressmen will use this to support their agendas.

House GOP in no rush to give more Ukraine aid after $6 billion error

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · September 20, 2023

WASHINGTON ― House Republicans who have previously supported Ukraine are in little rush to approve a fifth round of aid amid growing skepticism within their caucus.

The Pentagon says it still has roughly $5.5 billion worth of authority to keep transferring weapons to Kyiv, even though the last Ukraine aid package Congress passed is set to expire at the end of the month.

How? Pentagon lawyers argue that they can use the remaining drawdown authority indefinitely due to a complicated confluence of circumstances arising from the Biden administration miscalculating the value of Ukraine military aid earlier this year.

The miscalculation has prompted an audit from the Pentagon Inspector General, but it’s also given the Defense Department more leeway to keep arming Ukraine even if Congress fails to pass the White House’s latest $25 billion supplemental request in military and economic aid for Kyiv. It also means Republicans who have voted for Ukraine aid in the past don’t feel much urgency to pass another package, even with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy set to travel to Capitol Hill to persuade them otherwise on Thursday.

“I’m not necessarily opposed to supporting the Ukrainians further, but I am opposed to doing it at this point without some sort of explanation from the executive branch, Secretary of Defense [Lloyd Austin] telling us what we are doing with this money and where it’s going and what the end state is,” Rep. Mike Garcia, R-Calif., a defense appropriator, told reporters last week. “You can’t give a blank check to the executive branch.”

Garcia said Republicans have been asking for “oversight and accountability reports from the Ukrainian Congress” but “we haven’t gotten that feedback from Zelenskyy and this parliament.”

Even if the Biden administration maintains it can use the outstanding authorization to keep transferring weapons to Ukraine, another $2.5 billion in funding to backfill U.S. stockpiles of items sent to Kyiv expires at the end of the month absent another supplemental spending bill from Congress.

Defense Appropriations Chairman Ken Calvert, R-Calif., told reporters last week that Congress needs to prioritize passing a defense spending bill, which the House failed to do last week amid a Freedom Caucus revolt, before a Ukraine supplemental.

And Rep. Mike Waltz, R-Fla., who chairs the House Readiness subcommittee on Armed Services, declared “The era of Ukraine’s blank check from Congress is over” in a Fox News op-ed on Monday. Waltz called for conditions on Ukraine aid, without specifying what they should look like.

“There must be policy space between Biden’s current strategy of ‘as long as it takes’ and those demanding “not another dollar,” Waltz wrote.

A $6 billion error

The GOP criticism marks a turnaround from last year, when pro-Ukraine Republicans criticized the Biden administration last year for allowing $2.1 billion in drawdown authority expire at the end of fiscal 2022. Republican senators argued that the Biden administration should have used the expiring funds to give Kyiv additional weapons.

This year, the Pentagon is arguing it can use its remaining $5.5 billion in Ukraine drawdown authority as long as it wants, so long as Secretary of State Antony Blinken notifies Congress of the intent to execute a drawdown before the end of the fiscal year. And because the remaining $5.5 billion is the result of a $6 billion Ukraine drawdown accounting error, the Pentagon argues, those State Department notifications have already taken place. Thus, the Biden administration says, the Ukraine drawdown funds can carry over into FY24.

“Therefore, the department’s execution of a drawdown can extend across fiscal years,” Pentagon spokesman Chris Sherwood told Defense News in a statement. “Drawdowns that the Secretary of State has directed this fiscal year may continue to be executed using the adjusted proper valuation of the defense articles drawn from [the Defense Department’s] inventory, until the monetary cap of the particular existing drawdown is reached.”

The Biden administration has said that the accounting error, first announced in May, stemmed from a miscalculation in the Pentagon’s valuation of weapons aid to Ukraine.

Prior to the accounting error, the Pentagon had calculated the total values of weapons using the projected costs to replace that equipment. Since then, the Pentagon has calculated drawdown amounts using the original cost of the weapons, minus depreciation. This has freed up substantially more drawdown funds to transfer weapons to Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addresses a joint meeting of Congress in the House chamber of the U.S. Capitol on Dec. 21, 2022. (Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

Pentagon Inspector General Robert Storch this month announced an audit of the valuation of weapons sent to Ukraine.

The Pentagon “must comply with Federal laws and regulations, and it is important that it be consistently applied” across the department, he said in a statement. “The policies for how to value equipment provided under [presidential drawdown authority] also are not unique to Ukraine assistance and could impact future use of [presidential drawdown authority] for other foreign partners.”

Storch briefed the Senate alongside other inspectors general on Ukraine aid last week. And on Tuesday, four pro-Ukraine Republican senators – including Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky – praised Storch’s appointment as the lead inspector general for Ukraine aid.

“Thanks in large part to the requirements Senate Republicans have attached to our aid since the beginning of Russia’s escalation, the United States has unprecedented visibility into how Ukraine is using American weapons,” said McConnell.

McConnell has made the case for passing additional Ukraine aid on the Senate floor in recent weeks. Zelenskyy will also brief the full Senate on Thursday, but Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., has not made similar arrangements for the wartime leader to do the same in the House – the major obstacle to securing another $25 billion in U.S. support.

It marks a downgrade from Zelenskyy’s last trip to Washington, where leaders in both parties invited him to address a joint meeting of Congress – though the majority of House Republicans skipped that speech.

“The more this drags out and the more it looks like a stalemate and a war of attrition,” the less support it gets,” said House Foreign Affairs Chairman Mike McCaul, R-Texas. “And that’s why it’s going to be very important for Zelenskyy to talk about what is your plan for victory, what do you need? So we can go to the administration and say this is what they need in a supplemental.”

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

10. Zelenskyy to meet U.S. military leaders in first visit to the Pentagon since war

Zelenskyy to meet U.S. military leaders in first visit to the Pentagon since war

By LARA SELIGMAN

09/20/2023 04:37 PM EDT

Politico

The Ukrainian president will meet with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Mark Milley.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s trip to the U.S. comes ahead of an expected political fight over sending additional military and humanitarian aid for Ukraine’s fight against the Russian invasion. | Seth Wenig/AP Photo

09/20/2023 04:37 PM EDT

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to visit the Pentagon on Thursday, his first trip to the U.S. military’s headquarters in Arlington, Va., since last year’s full-scale Russian invasion, a top White House official said Wednesday.

At the Pentagon, Zelenskyy will meet with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Mark Milley and other senior military leaders, said John Kirby, a spokesperson for the National Security Council. New Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov will also attend, according to a person familiar with the visit, who was granted anonymity to speak about sensitive plans.

The visit is just one stop on the Ukrainian president’s trip to the United States this week. In the morning he will meet with lawmakers on Capitol Hill, before heading to the Pentagon, and then meeting with President Joe Biden at the White House, Kirby said. It will be the third time the two leaders have met at the White House.

During his meetings on the Hill, Zelenskyy is expected to discuss his goals in Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russia, Kirby said.

“We think it’s really important that he’s the best messenger for the people of Ukraine and his armed forces,” Kirby said.

The Biden administration is weighing sending Ukraine long-range missiles, the Army Tactical Missile System that can reach 190 miles, but has not made a final decision, Kirby said.

“It is still in active discussion within the interagency and certainly with our Ukrainian partners,” Kirby said.

Zelenskyy’s trip to the U.S. comes ahead of an expected political fight over sending additional military and humanitarian aid for Ukraine’s fight against the Russian invasion. Biden has requested Congress provide as much as $24 billion in additional support, but some Republicans have called for slashing funding for the war.

The visit comes after Biden is slated to return to Washington this week from New York City, where he made the case for countries to continue supporting Ukraine at the United Nations General Assembly.

“I ask you this: If we abandon the core principles of the United States to appease an aggressor, can any member state in this body feel confident that they are protected?” Biden said in his address Tuesday. “If we allow Ukraine to be carved up, is the independence of any nation secure?”

Paul McLeary contributed to this report.

POLITICO

Politico

11. Air Force general defends incendiary memo but says ‘war is not inevitable’

You have to break a fw\ew eggs to make an omelet.

Excerpts:

The first concept is “max endurance operations,” essentially staying on a mission for longer, and AMC demonstrated this throughout the exercise, Minihan said.

...

Another is “palletized effects,” or a program called Rapid Dragon, which delivers long-range munitions from typically unarmed aircraft. The Air Force fired a Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile Extended Range, JASSM-ER, from a C-17 cargo plane during the exercise.

...

The third important concept, Minihan said, is “distributed battle management” or “mobility battle management”: AMC’s effort to modernize its communications systems and provide situational awareness to the force.

Air Force general defends incendiary memo but says ‘war is not inevitable’

Minihan says a mindset of urgency helped produce three “game-changing” concepts in a recent exercise.

BY AUDREY DECKER

STAFF WRITER

SEPTEMBER 20, 2023

defenseone.com · by Audrey Decker

A contentious memo penned by Gen. Mike Minihan was intended to create a sense of urgency for his troops, the Air Mobility Command leader said, adding that this mindset delivered “success” in the organization’s recent exercise.

Minihan’s memo, which circulated earlier this year, predicted war with China by 2025 and instructed AMC commanders to report all major efforts to prepare for “the China fight.” After the memo drew criticism, Pentagon officials distanced themselves from its remarks.

Asked last week whether he still thinks the U.S. will fight in the Pacific within two years, Minihan said, “My assessment is that war is not inevitable, but the readiness I’m driving with that timeline is absolutely essential to deterrence and absolutely essential to the decisive victory.”

“There needs to be tension on readiness, more than just ‘be ready tonight.’ You need to have readiness that drives urgency. The urgency and the action are paramount,” Minihan told Defense One last week on the sidelines of the Air & Space Forces Association’s annual Air, Space & Cyber conference.

Minihan also emphasized that the memo, which said, “My gut tells me we will fight in 2025,” began with “I hope I am wrong.”

The memo, which was dated February 1 but started circling on social media several days earlier, instructed AMC airmen to “fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most. Aim for the head.”

Since that memo, Minihan said, he has sent “seven or eight more” to his airmen.

“All of the actions I described in that memo, those are actually the actions that got us Mobility Guardian and the success and will be the actions that get us through the next year on securing the irreversible momentum too,” he said.

The memo also directed his command’s KC-135 units to send him, by March, a “conceptual means” to deliver a hundred “off-the-shelf size and type” drones from a single aircraft.

Minihan said the Air Force is “still driving towards” that concept and that he hopes to see this idea realized during his remaining time at AMC.

These “little drones” could have many roles, including surveying a runway before a plane lands, flying a life vest or radio to a downed pilot, or searching for an enemy force. The drones could also “simply fly down and go to sleep and be there available for when you want to wake it up,” the general told reporters at the AFA conference.

This effort isn’t expensive, and the technology is already there, Minihan said. It’s more about getting operational practice with these systems, he added.

The general also outlined three “mobility game changers” following Mobility Guardian 2023, a massive two-week exercise that ended in July where the Air Force practiced tactics for operating across vast distances during a conflict.

The first concept is “max endurance operations,” essentially staying on a mission for longer, and AMC demonstrated this throughout the exercise, Minihan said.

“We're normally limited to about a 24-hour crew day, but we were in the lower 30s to lower 40s in crew days that we experimented with and we did all the proper risk mitigation,” he said.

Another is “palletized effects,” or a program called Rapid Dragon, which delivers long-range munitions from typically unarmed aircraft. The Air Force fired a Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile Extended Range, JASSM-ER, from a C-17 cargo plane during the exercise.

The concept isn't just for munitions, Minihan said: AMC “could deploy a decoy, we could put out a jamming sensor, we could put out a sensor that could find a radio and provide search and rescue.”

The third important concept, Minihan said, is “distributed battle management” or “mobility battle management”: AMC’s effort to modernize its communications systems and provide situational awareness to the force.

This would enable AMC to “not just pass gas but pass situational awareness. If you put the right person on board, you can affect more than that plane, more than that formation, more than that mission you have an ability to really just exponential effects across the entire battlespace if we get that right,” he said.

defenseone.com · by Audrey Decker

12. 160th SOAR veteran to build memorial out of CH-47D fuselage

MH-47G

160th SOAR veteran to build memorial out of CH-47D fuselage

Thibodeaux plans to rebuild the fuselage to resemble an MH-47G Chinook, the same type of helicopter that Arcane 22 was.

BY JOSHUA SKOVLUND | PUBLISHED SEP 20, 2023 1:12 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · September 20, 2023

Jeremy Thibodeaux was driving back to Hunter Army Airfield, where he was assigned to B Co., 3rd battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) — known as the “Nightstalkers” — when he heard that a special operations Chinook helicopter had crashed in Afghanistan over the radio. Thibodeaux immediately felt sick — he knew this meant some of his friends had probably died.

His worst fear was realized after arriving on base. Two of his friends, Josue “Sway” Hernandez and Nickolas Mueller, were aboard an MH-47G helicopter, “Arcane 22,” that had crashed during a counter-narcotics raid in Afghanistan on Oct. 26, 2009.

“Upon arriving, I found out exactly who was killed, and I just dropped to my knees, just screaming and crying — kind of pulling my hair out,” Thibodeaux said. “I didn’t really know what to do. You know, two of my best friends were on that aircraft. It was just a really — it was a horrible day.”

On Tuesday, Thibodeaux received approval from the Internal Revenue Service for his newly established non-profit, The Arcane Project.

The idea was born years ago when Thibodeaux was still serving. As older CH-47 models became outdated, he joked that he wanted to acquire one to convert into a private bar for guys from the unit. Years later, Thibodeaux brought up the idea with one of his best friends, Chip Davis, and the idea for a non-profit was born.

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They posted on Facebook requesting leads on a Chinook fuselage, and that’s when Lance Classen entered the scene. Classen works for Protective Group, a defense company that provides armor solutions for various military applications. Now that the US Department of Defense has moved on to MH-47F models, the CH-47D airframe the Protective Group used for designing armor and modifications became outdated.

When Classen saw Thibodeaux’s post, he jumped at the opportunity to give the old fuselage a new life for a great cause instead of getting smashed and discarded. Classen was a crewmember of a Chinook for over 13 years, and like anyone who has manned it, he didn’t want to see it destroyed.

“This is a great opportunity,” Classen said. “Instead of us trying to find some way to destroy and dispose of it, the aircraft that’s already helped protect so many continues doing the same job.”

Thibodeaux plans to rebuild the fuselage to resemble a CH-47G Chinook, the same type of helicopter that Arcane 22 was. The Arcane Project will start by turning it into a memorial and place of healing for gold star families, friends of the fallen, and anyone with a special relationship with the airframe.

Nickolas Mueller’s parents, Sharon and Larry, said their entire family is excited to see the project completed, and it gives them a good feeling inside anytime Nickolas is remembered.

“This project will be one more thing, keeping Nick’s memory alive, along with the rest of the crew we lost from Arcane 22,” said Nickolas’ parents. “Our family loves to hear and see Nick’s memory staying alive, even though it feels like just yesterday — it has been almost 14 years.”

Nickolas’ parents believe their son, Nickolas, will be right behind Thibodeaux throughout the project, helping and encouraging him as he works.

After the airframe is converted, Thibodeaux plans to donate funds to VA addiction and mental health hospitals that offer addiction, mental health, and financial counseling; and provide scholarships and homeless shelters. He said he wants to offer financial assistance to those who cannot afford it. He has needed services like these in the past and wants to give back to his community.

He is now pursuing fundraising for the transportation of the Chinook fuselage. Thibodeaux has raised a little over $2,000 of the $40,000 it will cost to transport the fuselage from Miami, Florida, to its final destination near Toledo Bend Reservoir in Northwest Louisiana. He has a team of volunteers ready to make the dream come true, but they need more funds to make it happen.

Though it’s a lofty project, Thibodeaux is determined and stays true to his unit’s motto, “Nightstalkers don’t quit.”

“I’ve run into hard times in my life after my military service. And I never did quit, no matter how low I was, no matter how many times I hit rock bottom, I kept getting up and kept pushing forward and pushing forward and pushing forward,” Thibodeaux said. “I plan on doing the same thing with this project.”

UPDATE: A previous version of this article stated Arcane 22 was a Ch-47G and has been updated to correctly reflect that it was an MH-47g.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · September 20, 2023

13. Opinion | How to Make Russia Really Pay for Invading Ukraine

Opinion | How to Make Russia Really Pay for Invading Ukraine

The New York Times · by Bret Stephens · September 19, 2023

Bret Stephens

How to Make Russia Really Pay for Invading Ukraine

Sept. 19, 2023

Credit...Emile Ducke for The New York Times

By

Opinion Columnist

Volodymyr Zelensky will visit Washington this week to give thanks to the United States for its generosity — while asking for $24 billion more, which is what the Biden administration is seeking from Congress in additional military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. That will bring the total amount of American aid to $135 billion, which so far has been $223 million a day since the war began, according to one calculation.

Maybe it’s time to open a new funding source before American largess runs out — this time from Russia.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States and our democratic partners have frozen roughly $300 billion in Russian central bank assets, amounting to a little less than half of the Kremlin’s foreign currency and gold reserves. Some of us have been arguing ever since that the money should be transferred to Ukraine, both as a matter of justice and as a deterrent against this kind of aggression. As the former Treasury secretary Larry Summers has put it, “Bank robbers should not expect banks to honor their safe deposit boxes.”

So far, the Biden administration has disagreed. “It would not be legal now in the United States for the government to seize” Russia’s assets, Janet Yellen, the Treasury secretary, said in May 2022. The Economist magazine has argued that such measures would violate international law, and there are worries that they would also harm American economic interests as foreign countries sought to de-dollarize their economies.

But those objections are themselves flimsy. A carefully argued and exhaustively researched 184-page report circulated this week among journalists, government officials and NGO leaders by the Renew Democracy Initiative shows why.

The report’s lead author is Harvard’s Larry Tribe, the legendary liberal law professor with whom I disagree about many things — but not about this. (Full disclosure: I helped start the Renew Democracy Initiative six years ago and I sit on its advisory board, but I had no hand in the making or publication of the report.) The report’s central conclusion is that the president has ample authority, under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or I.E.E.P.A., to transfer Russia’s frozen assets to Ukraine.

“I.E.E.P.A. plainly states that the president can ‘investigate,’ ‘block,’ ‘regulate,’ ‘direct and compel,’ ‘nullify,’ ‘void’ and ‘prevent or prohibit’” the conveyance of property from one entity to another, Tribe and his colleagues write. “Those powers address conveyances of ‘any right, power or privilege’ with respect to property that a foreign country has an interest in and that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Past presidents have used this authority before: George H.W. Bush froze Iraq’s assets in the United States after its invasion of Kuwait, and ultimately transferred them to the United Nations Compensation Commission for victims of Saddam Hussein’s aggression.

What about Russia’s “sovereign immunity,” the legal doctrine that a state is immune from the judgments or penalties of foreign courts? That’s one of the arguments sometimes trotted out against transferring Russia’s assets to Ukraine. It’s also irrelevant. “It’s a doctrine applicable only in judicial proceedings, not one designed to hamstring a country’s foreign policy as reflected in executive or legislative action,” Tribe wrote me in an email. “There is simply no basis for saying Russia can violate Ukraine’s sovereignty while invoking its own sovereignty as an inviolable shield.”

There is a well established doctrine in international law, Tribe’s report notes, of “countermeasures,” actions that might otherwise violate international law but are lawful “because the action is taken against another state for an internationally wrongful act.” The principle is simple: Violators of international law don’t get a veto over the penalties for their violations.

Finally, there is the argument that the United States could suffer long-term economic damage if other countries avoided parking their money here for fear it could be taken from them. I put that argument to Summers, who allowed that there was a risk of the United States acting unilaterally, without the coordination of European countries where most of Russia’s funds are currently frozen. “The idea is to do this multilaterally,” he told me. “If others didn’t, there might be a flight from the dollar. But if it is done by all the major currencies, where are people going to move their money?”

Summers is a powerful proponent of transferring funds to Ukraine. Not the least of his arguments is that the Rubicon has already been crossed. We’ve frozen Russia’s assets and declared Vladimir Putin a war criminal; it’s unthinkable that the money will ever be unfrozen except to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. So why not get on with it now, when additional funding could hasten Ukraine’s victory, help its people as they are under fire, and send a potent message to the Kremlin and other would-be aggressors that the financial price of invasion is as countable as it is steep?

The Biden administration has compiled an honorable record of doing right by Ukraine — but generally comes around to it a bit late. Helping to defeat Russia with Russia’s own money is vital to that effort. The moral logic is compelling. The legal case is clear. And, as the bills add up, the political moment is now.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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Bret Stephens has been an Opinion columnist with The Times since April 2017. He won a Pulitzer Prize for commentary at The Wall Street Journal in 2013 and was previously editor in chief of The Jerusalem Post. Facebook

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 27 of the New York edition with the headline: How to Make Russia Pay for Invading Ukraine

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The New York Times · by Bret Stephens · September 19, 2023

14. Ukraine war inspires weapons that crack battle tanks at weakest point

Ukraine war inspires weapons that crack battle tanks at weakest point

c4isrnet.com · by Sebastian Sprenger · September 20, 2023

LONDON — Western companies are developing weapons aimed at cracking battle tanks from the top, their weakest point, or that can rain down thousands of metal fragments on dug-in infantry from falling drones.

The novelties come as arms manufacturers tune their lineups to the immediate experience of the brutal, close-range fighting in Ukraine, a trend on display at the DSEI defense trade show held last week in London.

Germany’s Rheinmetall, for example, is reviving a Cold War concept of bouncing mines in its proposed Area Defence Weapon. The system, which resembles a small beer keg sitting on radial stabilizers, uses a combination of sensors to verify that a tank is passing by only to launch itself into the air and drill a 155-millimeter artillery munition into the vehicle’s topside on the way down.

The company said the weapon, ready for use in a few years, could be used in combination with traditional anti-tank mines, where the ADW munition goes after mine-clearing vehicles to keep adversaries’ armored columns from advancing through mined areas.

The re-emergence of mine warfare brings to mind the situation on the frontlines of Ukraine’s defense against Russia, described in a recent Washington Post report as the world’s most mine-contaminated piece of land.

Rheinmetall, for its part, doesn’t refer to the Area Defence Weapon as a mine because the units can be turned off remotely or be programmed to let friendly forces through, with a human operator involved in the process of arming the system.

“Battlefield barriers, and anti-tank mines in particular, have been taken out of commission by NATO forces almost completely since the end of the Cold War,” a company representative explained. “The re-building of that capability is currently the subject of analyses and concepts.”

Meanwhile, Finnish company Insta is throwing its Steel Eagle shrapnel-throwing drone into the ring for meeting a Ukrainian need for killing large numbers of foot soldiers on the open battlefield with fewer scarce munitions fired as they repel Russian invaders and take back territory.

The quadcopter drone carries a fragmentation charge, which notably started its developmental life as a bouncy mine à la ADW, over infantry positions, shredding fighters with 3,000 projectiles so forceful they even penetrate thin armor, according to the company.

Steel Eagle can spray an area as large as a third of a soccer pitch with enough fragments that every square meter will get an average of one-and-a-half projectiles. The drone can also programmed to fall down to a low altitude right before exploding for a denser spray, Tuure Lehtoranta, a vice president at Insta’s defense unit, told Defense News.

Ukrainian officials have been pleading with Western allies for controversial cluster munitions that deal a similar effect, with the United States agreeing this summer to deliver some of the Pentagon’s old stocks.

According to videos circulated on social media, frontline troops have used drones to drop grenades on Russian soldiers, an effect that Lehtoranta said is too “pointed” for the kind of mass punch envisioned by Ukrainian commanders.

The company says its primary target is equipping its home forces of Finland with the Steel Eagle capability.

“There is interest not limited to Finland,” the executive said.

About Sebastian Sprenger

Sebastian Sprenger is associate editor for Europe at Defense News, reporting on the state of the defense market in the region, and on U.S.-Europe cooperation and multi-national investments in defense and global security. Previously he served as managing editor for Defense News. He is based in Cologne, Germany.

15. “The Team Room” follows a fictional Special Forces ODA that deploys in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

I am very much looking forward to this performance next month.

 Green Beret veteran-turned-writer Bill Raskin has his first play premiering in Washington, DC, October 7-28 at The Keegan Theatre! “The Team Room” follows a fictional Special Forces ODA that deploys in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The production is running on a non-profit basis, and net proceeds will go the Special Operations Warrior Foundation. This non-profit mission has benefitted greatly from other SOF and SOF family leaders, including MG(Ret) Jim Linder and a cohort of retired SF NCOs who have mentored and advised our team of actors. Learn more and purchase tickets at the website below! Bill also welcomes any direct questions or outreach at chair@teamroomfoundation.org https://teamroomfoundation.org