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Quotes of the Day:
“Withholding information is the essence of tyranny. Control of the flow of information is the tool of the dictatorship.”
― Bruce Coville
“As a nation, we began by declaring that 'all men are created equal.' We now practically read it 'all men are created equal, except negroes.' When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read 'all men are created equal, except negroes, and foreigners, and Catholics.' When it comes to this I should prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretense of loving liberty – to Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy.”
― Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln Letters
“You only have power over people as long as you don't take everything away from them. But when you've robbed a man of everything, he's no longer in your power—he's free again.
― Alexander Solzhenitsyn
1. Is this the end for Zelenskyy?
2. Air Force Investigation into Leak of Classified Information
3. Did Army Blast Exposure Play Role in Maine Gunman’s Rampage?
4. Can Hamas actually be eliminated? This is what military and security analysts think
5. Russian links with China, Iran and North Korea a threat, warns Finland
6. Rebuilding Resiliency: Kyiv’s Opportunity to Bolster its Defense
7. Pentagon alarmed by Chinese rush for 'intelligentized' warfare, but experts warn about over-reliance on AI
8. White House declassifies intel as it pushes for more Ukraine funding
9. UN General Assembly votes overwhelmingly to demand a humanitarian cease-fire in Gaza
10. Harvard board keeps president as leader of Ivy League school following antisemitism backlash
11. Life in Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine is grim. People are fleeing through a dangerous corridor
12. Empowering Chinese Diaspora Messaging
13. The 1983 “War Scare” and its Relevance for Strategic Competition Today
14. Sheathing the Sword of Damocles: 6 steps to righting the ship as 2023 ends and 2024 begins
15. China’s cyber army is invading critical U.S. services
16. Israel-Gaza war live updates: Biden says Israel is losing support worldwide over ‘indiscriminate bombing’ in Gaza
17. The Self-Doubting Superpower By Fareed Zakaria
18. Biden Administration Announces New Security Assistance for Ukraine
19. Taking Additional Sweeping Measures Against Russia - United States Department of State
20. Boeing lands SOCOM order for six MH-47G Chinook helicopters
21. Beyond the Neutral Card: From Civil-Military Relations to Military Politics
22. Israeli Army Soldier Says She Played Dead After Being Shot 12 Times by Hamas: 'I Waited for the Final Bullet'
1. Is this the end for Zelenskyy?
Everyone better be careful about trying to engineer something. How has the blowback been in the past? The irony is that if something bad happens the US will be blamed even if our hand was not in it. And if we try to use Ukraine for our won elections it is unlikely to go over well.
Excerpts:
One way for the Biden administration to save face could be to “freeze” the conflict for the time being — at least until the US elections — through some kind of informal agreement with Russia. But this strategy presents its own problems: not only is it far from clear that Russia would accept freezing the war while it enjoys a tactical advantage, but it would also require getting Zelenskyy onboard — or getting him out of the picture.
From the US perspective, a democratic regime change in Ukraine would arguably be the preferable solution; but, as noted, elections aren’t on the table at the moment. This doesn’t mean that change isn’t coming, though; if anything, it only heightens the risk of Zelensky’s opponents — inside and outside of the country — trying to get rid of him by other means. Indeed, Zelenskyy himself recently expressed concern that a new Maidan-type coup is being plotted in Ukraine — though he accused Russia, not local enemies, of being behind these plans. Regardless of how credible one believes this scenario to be, it speaks to Zelenskyy’s changing status on the world stage: as Western countries, and important segments of the Ukrainian establishment, look for an exit strategy, Zelenskyy is no longer seen as an asset — but as a liability.
Is this the end for Zelenskyy?
The Ukrainian president is facing calls for regime change
BY THOMAS FAZI
unherd.com · by Thomas Fazi · December 12, 2023
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Western public has been sold the story of a Ukrainian front united in its unwavering commitment to a total military victory over Russia. Over the past few weeks, however, this narrative has started to crumble.
Despite the failure of Ukraine’s Nato-backed counteroffensive, which is now universally accepted, Zelenskyy continues to stick to the maximalist victory-at-all-costs narrative — that Ukraine must go on fighting until it retakes every inch of lost territory, including Crimea, and that Putin should not be negotiated with. This is understandable: he has staked everything on achieving that objective — anything less would probably mean the end of his political career.
But Zelenskyy’s position is looking increasingly isolated. As Simon Shuster wrote in Time magazine, “Zelenskyy’s associates themselves are extremely skeptical about the [current] policy”, describing the president’s belief in Ukraine’s ultimate victory over Russia as “immovable, verging on the messianic”.
In early November, none other than Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny, told The Economist that the war with Russia had reached a stalemate and was evolving into a long war of attrition — one in which Russia has the advantage. Many took this to mean that the general believes that the time has come to negotiate a deal with Russia. This led to a public confrontation between Zaluzhny and Zelenskyy, who rebuked the general’s assessment and repeated his refusal to negotiate any ceasefire deal with Moscow.
Since then, the rivalry between the two has grown into an all-out power struggle. According to the Ukrainian news site Ukrainska Pravda, Zelenskyy views Zaluzhny’s popularity as a political threat — and recent events have only heightened the president’s fears. Indeed, the army, it reports, is divided between those who are subordinate to Zaluzhny and those who are loyal to Ground Forces Commander Oleksandr Syrskyi, an ally of Zelenskyy.
But Zaluzhny has not been alone in criticising Zelenskyy. Last week, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko publicly supported Zaluzhny’s comments about the war, stating that Zelenskyy was “paying for mistakes he made”. At the start of this month, a long-standing conflict between Zelenskyy and the former president Petro Poroshenko also came to the fore, when Ukrainian authorities stopped the former head of state from leaving the country for a planned meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
According to his critics, this is evidence of Zelenskyy’s increasingly authoritarian grip on the country. “At some point, we will no longer be any different from Russia, where everything depends on the whim of one man,” Klitschko told Der Spiegel. Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, Poroshenko’s former vice-prime minister, also spoke of “an authoritarian regression”.
But Zelenskyy isn’t just facing criticism over the way forward for Ukraine; some are now saying that the entire strategy was botched from the start. Oleksii Arestovych, Zelenskyy’s former presidential advisor now turned critic, recently wrote that “the war could have ended with the Istanbul agreements, and a couple hundred thousand people would still be alive”, referring to a round of peace talks that took place in March and early April 2022, mediated by Turkey.
On that occasion, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators had reached a tentative agreement on the outlines of a negotiated interim settlement — whereby Russia had agreed to withdraw troops along the lines prior to February 24, 2022 in exchange for Ukraine’s neutrality — but the deal was allegedly blocked by Boris Johnson and representatives of the American State Department and the Pentagon. Even David Arakhamia, the parliamentary leader of Zelenskyy’s own Servant of the People party who led the Ukrainian delegation in peace talks with Moscow, recently claimed that Russia was “ready to end the war if we accept neutrality”, but that the talks ultimately collapsed for several reasons — including Johnson’s visit to Kyiv informing Ukrainian officials that they should continue fighting.
But Zelenskyy isn’t only facing growing opposition from rival politicians and the military — it’s also from ordinary Ukrainians. Across the country, the families of soldiers have started taking to the streets to demand a cap on military service time and the return of those who have served 18 months or more, as well as information about the more than 15,000 soldiers who have gone missing in action. Meanwhile, a petition demanding a change to mobilisation rules has reached the 25,000-signature threshold for presidential consideration, further complicating Zelenskyy’s push for more troops, which has already been hindered by massive draft dodging.
This growing tide of hostility towards the president — and Ukraine’s war strategy in general — means that his political future looks increasingly in doubt. According to a recent poll, Zelenskyy and Zaluzhny’s approval ratings are now almost identical, while The Economist reported that trust in the president has fallen to 32%. Another poll still indicated Zelensky as the favourite candidate, but with growing support for both Poroshenko — in second place — and Zaluzhny (whom, it should be noted, has not yet shown any political ambitions).
We shouldn’t be surprised, then, that Zelenskyy recently ruled out holding elections, originally scheduled for next March, citing problems of security and funding. Most Ukrainians reportedly support the decision, but this doesn’t mean Zelenskyy’s problems are over. After all, the failure of the counteroffensive is also causing a backlash among his Western backers, as they realise that Ukraine is unlikely to improve its position on the battlefield.
Some Western analysts paint an even grimmer picture, noting that Ukraine isn’t even in a position to defend the territorial status quo. “Every category is in Russia’s favor and will continue to tilt in Russia’s favor”, according to former US Army Lt Col Daniel Davis, Senior Fellow and Military Expert at Defense Priorities. Even Nato’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that Nato “should be prepared for bad news”.
With such pessimism widespread, new aid pledges to Ukraine have fallen to their lowest level since the start of the war, according to the German-based Kiel Institute’s Ukraine aid tracker. EU member states have been struggling for months to reach an agreement on a €50-billion aid package to Ukraine, mostly due to Hungary’s opposition, and it’s no mystery that European leaders are “tired” of the war in Ukraine, as Giorgia Meloni recently told two Russian pranksters posing as officials with the African Union. The military deadlock is reinforcing the view in Germany — and in British diplomatic circles — that negotiations with Moscow would be in Ukraine’s best interest.
Across the Atlantic, meanwhile, support for Zelenskyy’s strategy is at a record low. The Biden administration’s increasingly desperate attempts to convince Congress to approve a new round of emergency funding for Ukraine failed again last week, when the Senate blocked yet another aid bill. In some respects, Biden is in a similar position to Zelenskyy: he has systematically promised a complete Ukrainian victory and refused to negotiate with Putin, so is understandably concerned about doing an about-face before the next elections. Yet, in US defence circles, there is growing awareness that a protracted conflict would seriously jeopardise US interests.
One way for the Biden administration to save face could be to “freeze” the conflict for the time being — at least until the US elections — through some kind of informal agreement with Russia. But this strategy presents its own problems: not only is it far from clear that Russia would accept freezing the war while it enjoys a tactical advantage, but it would also require getting Zelenskyy onboard — or getting him out of the picture.
From the US perspective, a democratic regime change in Ukraine would arguably be the preferable solution; but, as noted, elections aren’t on the table at the moment. This doesn’t mean that change isn’t coming, though; if anything, it only heightens the risk of Zelensky’s opponents — inside and outside of the country — trying to get rid of him by other means. Indeed, Zelenskyy himself recently expressed concern that a new Maidan-type coup is being plotted in Ukraine — though he accused Russia, not local enemies, of being behind these plans. Regardless of how credible one believes this scenario to be, it speaks to Zelenskyy’s changing status on the world stage: as Western countries, and important segments of the Ukrainian establishment, look for an exit strategy, Zelenskyy is no longer seen as an asset — but as a liability.
unherd.com · by Thomas Fazi · December 12, 2023
2. Air Force Investigation into Leak of Classified Information
Download the IG report here: https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24215605/report-of-investigation-s9691-unauthorized-disclosure-of-national-security-information-august-2023.pdf
Air Force Investigation into Leak of Classified Information - USNI News
news.usni.org · by Sam LaGrone · December 12, 2023
The following is the Inspector General of the Department of the Air Force investigation into the disclosure of classified information by Airman 1st Class Jack D. Teixeira over an online game chat group earlier this year.
From the report
Executive Summary
SecAF directed this investigation in response to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information from the 102d Intelligence Wing (102 IW), Otis Air National Guard Base (ANGB), Massachusetts. SecAF directed The Inspector General of the Department of the Air Force (SAF/IG) to “investigate compliance with policy, procedures, and standards and the unit environment at the 102 IW related to the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information.” While the precipitating event was centered on the 102 IW, the investigation included organizations and areas outside the 102 IW regarding security-related policies and procedures. Although related, this administrative investigation is separate from the criminal investigation currently being led by the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 13 Apr 23, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents from the Boston Field Office arrested A1C Jack D. Teixeira, a Cyber Transport Systems Apprentice in the Massachusetts ANG (MAANG), on suspicion of willfully retaining and transmitting classified national defense information to a person not entitled to receive it via Discord, a social media platform. A1C Teixeira enlisted in the USAF on 26 Sep 19, and his Top Secret-Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS-SCI) background check was adjudicated on 29 Jun 21. On 1 Oct 21, he began the first of two consecutive in-place Title 10 (T10) tours. As a computer/IT specialist in the 102d Intelligence Support Squadron (102 ISS), A1C Teixeira had access to numerous classified systems, including the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS), a TS-SCI platform, to perform system maintenance. His access to JWICS enabled him to view intelligence content and analysis that reside on those systems.
A1C Teixeira was reportedly involved in an online chat group on Discord discussing geopolitical affairs and current and historical wars. FBI currently assesses A1C Teixeira started to post classified information as early as Feb 22. Initially, A1C Teixeira was allegedly posting rewritten “paragraphs of text.” Then, around Jan 23, he allegedly started posting photographs of documents that contained Top Secret classification markings and described the status of a current military conflict, including troop locations. A1C Teixeira reportedly stated he was concerned he would be discovered making the transcriptions in the secure work center on Otis ANGB, so he began taking the documents home to photograph and post online.
Evidence indicates the primary cause of the unauthorized disclosure is the alleged actions of one individual, A1C Teixeira, who is suspected to have violated trust and security protocols to unlawfully disclose national security information. Determining A1C Teixeira’s motives and actions remain the focus of the DOJ and FBI efforts. However, there are also a number of factors, both direct and indirect, that contributed to the unauthorized disclosures.
Download the document here.
Related
news.usni.org · by Sam LaGrone · December 12, 2023
3. Did Army Blast Exposure Play Role in Maine Gunman’s Rampage?
Did Army Blast Exposure Play Role in Maine Gunman’s Rampage?
Medical scientists and the military are looking into whether Robert Card’s psychological collapse was linked to brain damage from his role as a grenade instructor.
By Dave Philipps
The New York Times · by Dave Philipps · December 11, 2023
New cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., threw live grenades at targets under the direct supervision of soldiers from the 104th Training Division during the Cadet Summer Training exercise in 2015.Credit...U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Brian Hamilton
Medical scientists and the military are looking into whether Robert Card’s psychological collapse was linked to brain damage from his role as a grenade instructor.
New cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., threw live grenades at targets under the direct supervision of soldiers from the 104th Training Division during the Cadet Summer Training exercise in 2015.Credit...U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Brian Hamilton
By
After a 40-year-old Army Reservist named Robert Card went on a shooting spree in Lewiston, Maine, in October, his community grasped for answers.
Eighteen people were killed. Neighborhoods were locked down for days as the police hunted for Mr. Card. Then, after he was found dead from a self-inflicted gunshot wound, his family and fellow soldiers revealed that he had become delusional, paranoid and potentially violent, and that the police had not acted on their warnings about him for months.
Why he unraveled remains a mystery. But the authorities have started to explore one possible answer: that Mr. Card’s brain may have been damaged by his time in the Army.
In recent weeks, the state medical examiner has sent part of Mr. Card’s brain to a laboratory that analyzes brains for maladies caused by repeated hits to the head, including chronic traumatic encephalopathy, or C.T.E. And Army investigators have asked members of Mr. Card’s battalion if his work in the military could have affected his mental state, two soldiers who served with him said.
Publicly, the Army has said almost nothing about Mr. Card’s time in uniform — only that he was trained as a petroleum supply specialist and never deployed to combat. But soldiers who spoke to The New York Times said that description left out something crucial: Mr. Card worked every summer for years as an instructor at an Army hand grenade training range, where he was rocked by thousands of brain-jarring explosions.
For generations, the military assumed that the blast waves that troops experienced from firing weapons or throwing grenades in training posed no danger to them. It is only in the last few years that increasing evidence of harm from repeated exposure, along with mandates from Congress, has driven the Defense Department to start trying to track, study and understand the impact of blast exposure.
People in Lewiston, Maine, were left searching for answers after Mr. Card’s shooting rampage in October killed 18 people. Children placed crosses and signs honoring the victims near one of the shooting sites.Credit...Hilary Swift for The New York Times
An investigation by The Times this fall found that many artillery soldiers who fired thousands of 155-millimeter howitzer rounds developed brain injuries and suffered panic attacks, depression and, in a few cases, hallucinations.
Mr. Card was a sergeant first class assigned to the Army Reserve’s 3rd Battalion, 304th Regiment, a training unit based in Maine that runs a two-week summer field course for cadets from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, teaching them how to use rifles, machine guns, anti-tank weapons and grenades. Mr. Card joined the unit in 2014, the Army said.
One senior member of the platoon who worked with Mr. Card for years, and asked not to be named because the Army told soldiers not to speak to the media about him, said that as an instructor, Mr. Card worked with grenade launchers, AT4 anti-tank weapons and machine guns, but spent the vast majority of his time on the hand grenade range.
Each summer, all 1,200 West Point cadets have to throw at least one M67 grenade. Most throw two. Mr. Card was nearly always one of the instructors with the cadets in the grenade pits. The soldiers from his unit said he could easily have been exposed to more than 10,000 blasts in all.
The Army did not respond to repeated requests for details about Mr. Card’s work in uniform.
“The concussion from the grenade is brutal, brutal — it will shake your heart,” the senior platoon member said. “We have a berm at the range that protects from shrapnel, but it doesn’t protect from the blast. Some guys got a lot. Probably too much.”
By age 39, Mr. Card was wearing hearing aids.
The senior soldier said that he, too, had hearing trouble, along with headaches and vertigo, and had not slept well in years — all conditions often associated with blast injuries. He added that another longtime soldier in the unit had to be pulled off the grenade training range in 2022 because of mental health concerns. That soldier is currently in a psychiatric hospital, a member of his family said.
“Is it related? I don’t know,” the senior soldier said. “But I know he was right there in the grenade pits with Card.”
Marines demonstrated the use of M67 fragmentation grenades in 2020 during annual training at Camp Grayling Mich. The military has long seen indications that blast exposure during grenade training may take a toll on instructors.Credit...By Lance Cpl. Samwel Tabancay/u.s. Marine Corps
Researchers have found a unique pattern of damage in the brains of a number of deceased veterans who were exposed to blasts, but there is no way to detect that damage in living troops. And even if it could be detected, there is no way to predict when the damage might cause a psychiatric disorder, or who might be prone to violence.
Even though so much remains unknown, members of Mr. Card’s platoon said they were concerned that simple steps were not being taken to protect soldiers from blasts.
Blast injuries can cause behavioral changes including insomnia, anxiety, mood swings and substance abuse. Some studies suggest that traumatic brain injuries increase the risk of psychosis, but the evidence is limited.
The military tests all troops who deploy to war zones — even those in desk jobs — for signs of brain injuries when they return. But it does not test instructors who work on training ranges, even though they may be exposed to far more blasts than troops in war zones are.
Mr. Card never deployed, so he never was tested, the senior platoon member said.
Maine’s medical examiner sent Mr. Card’s brain tissue to Boston University, which has the nation’s largest brain bank focused on C.T.E.
“In an event such as this, people are left with more questions than answers,” said a spokeswoman for the Maine Office of Chief Medical Examiner, Lindsey Chasteen. “It is our belief that if we can conduct testing that may shed light on some of those answers, we have a responsibility to do that.”
Detecting C.T.E. would not put to rest questions about what drove Mr. Card’s actions. Experts say people who commit mass violence usually do so for complex reasons that rarely hinge on a single factor.
A spokeswoman for Boston University declined to comment, saying the university could not discuss specific cases without the written consent of the family. Mr. Card’s family did not respond to requests for comment.
Years before Mr. Card became delusional, the Army had indications that grenade ranges were taking a toll on soldiers. In 2015, an Army research team went to the grenade range at Fort Jackson, S.C., after instructors there complained of headaches, fatigue, memory issues and confusion. In 2017, the Army investigated again after receiving more complaints from instructors at Fort Moore, Ga.
“They had instructors who would leave the range, have to stop their car on the side of the road and throw up,” said Gary Kamimori, a retired Army researcher involved in both studies. “They had all the symptoms of concussion.”
Robert Card in a photo released by the police in Lewiston, Maine.Credit...Lewiston Maine Police Department, via Associated Press
The research team placed sensors in the pits to measure blasts. They found that the concussive force from each grenade explosion largely dissipated by the time it reached the pits, but not the sound wave generated when the explosion created a sonic boom. The soldiers in the pits were being hit by sound waves measuring up to 160 decibels — several times more intense than the sound energy of a jet engine.
“Above 140 decibels, sound can vibrate bone. You feel your body shake,” Mr. Kamimori said. “The skull is bone. You are vibrating the brain, the nerves, the connections. Any of those connections get screwed up, you got problems.”
After Mr. Kamimori shared his findings, he said, some ranges altered their schedules to limit individuals’ blast exposure, but the Army did not take any forcewide action. Nor did it continue the research. During the studies, the team collected blood samples from instructors to check for chemical evidence of brain injuries, but with no further funding, the samples were never tested. Mr. Kamimori said they were still sitting in an Army freezer.
Early this year, just before Mr. Card turned 40, he started complaining that voices were accusing him of being a pedophile, his relatives and fellow soldiers told the police. Bouts of paranoia and delusion over the next few months led to him being hospitalized by the Army for two weeks in July.
It’s extremely rare for someone to have a first outbreak of psychosis at age 40, according to Dr. Stephen Xenakis, a psychiatrist and retired Army brigadier general. The condition most often appears when people are young adults.
“If someone has their first psychotic breakthrough at 40, that’s really unusual,” he said. “If he’s my patient, I’m asking what else might be going on that could cause it.”
For safety, Marines at Camp Grayling call out warnings that a fragmentation grenade is about to be thrown during a training demonstration in 2020.Credit...By Lance Cpl. Samwel Tabancay/u.s. Marine Corps
Military psychologists for generations have noticed that a surprising number of high-performing soldiers tended to become erratic and self-destructive, and were plagued by anxiety, insomnia and difficulty concentrating as they neared retirement in their 40s. It was so commonplace that doctors even had a label for it, Old Soldier Syndrome.
In a 1965 article in the journal Military Medicine, an Army psychologist suggested that the symptoms were caused by fear of retirement. Later generations of military psychologists were more likely to ascribe them to combat exposure and latent post-traumatic stress disorder.
It is only recently that a group of psychologists has suggested that years of weapons blast exposure might be to blame.
A 2021 paper documented Operator Syndrome — a widespread pattern of behavioral and physical problems among career Navy SEALs and other special operations troops — and argued that brain injury, both from enemy blasts and from the operators’ own weapons, lay at the root of most of the problems.
“It wasn’t PTSD, it wasn’t based on a fear response — it was something else,” said Chris Frueh, a professor of psychology at the University of Hawaii and the lead author of the paper. “There is no question in my mind that blast plays a big part in that.”
Dave Philipps writes about war, the military and veterans and covers The Pentagon. More about Dave Philipps
The New York Times · by Dave Philipps · December 11, 2023
4. Can Hamas actually be eliminated? This is what military and security analysts think
“You can kill a man but you can't kill an idea.”
― Sophocles
Can Hamas actually be eliminated? This is what military and security analysts think
KEY POINTS
- The war's aim, Israel's government says, is to fully eliminate Hamas — it denies targeting civilians, although even its staunchest ally, the United States, is now saying that it must do more to protect civilian life.
- "To 'eliminate' or destroy Hamas, Israel will have to destroy the root cause of Hamas, its reason for existence," one retired U.S. general told CNBC.
CNBC · by Natasha Turak · December 12, 2023
An Israeli army self-propelled artillery howitzer fires rounds from a position near the border with the Gaza Strip in southern Israel on Dec. 7, 2023.
Menahem Kahana | Afp | Getty Images
Israel's war against Hamas — which has turned the blockaded and then besieged Gaza Strip into a post-apocalyptic wasteland — is now in its third month.
The offensive, launched on Oct. 7 after Hamas militants killed some 1,200 people in Israel in a brutal terror attack and took another 240 hostage, has now killed more than 18,000 Palestinians in Gaza, health authorities there say. Hospitals have ceased to function, entire families have reportedly been wiped off the registry and scores of aid workers and journalists are among those killed.
The aim, Israel's government says, is to fully eliminate Hamas — it denies targeting civilians, although even its staunchest ally, the United States, is now saying that it must do more to protect civilian life.
Hamas, an Islamist militant and political organization designated as a terrorist group by the U.S. and European Union, has governed the Gaza Strip since 2007. It has a stated goal of destroying the state of Israel, which the United Nations classifies as an occupier over the Palestinian territories since 1967. In the years since Hamas took power in the small enclave, its capabilities, finances and weapons supplies have grown significantly, thanks to financial support from the likes of Iran and Qatar.
CNBC spoke to ten experts in counterterrorism, Middle Eastern history and security, and military operations to get their answers to the question: Can Hamas be, in fact, eliminated?
Hussein Ibish, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
"No. Hamas is not a bunch of individuals, or a set of equipment and infrastructure. It's a brand, and as long as there are a group of living Palestinians who want to call themselves Hamas, Hamas still exists. It is extremely stupid to declare a war aimed that cannot be accomplished. Yet this is what Israel has done. And unless the Israeli leadership begins to draw down its rhetoric about war aims, Israel perforce will fail because it has set itself unachievable goals and they are writing Hamas's victory speech with their own proclamations."
Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe
"To 'eliminate' or destroy Hamas, Israel will have to destroy the root cause of Hamas, its reason for existence. That means Israel will have to accept progress towards a two-state solution and Palestinian statehood for Gaza and the West Bank.
Hamas cannot have a leading role in governing Gaza but Israel's refusal to accept the two-state solution only guarantees continued efforts by Hamas to destroy Israel. Israel taking away that motivation, and getting the illegal settlement problem solved, will make it much easier for Arab nations to support Israel. It will also require the U.S. to put more pressure on Iran to stop supporting Hamas.
At the end of the day, IDF will kill a lot of Hamas and destroy much of their current network and infrastructure. But using lethal kinetic force only, without a political non-kinetic component to the strategy, is unlikely to lead to the 'elimination' of Hamas."
Smoke rises over Gaza, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, as seen from southern Israel on Dec. 9, 2023.
Athit Perawongmetha | Reuters
Retired Col. Miri Eisin, Israel Defense Forces; managing director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism
"Can Hamas be eliminated? Yes, the military portion can be eliminated in the sense that you can systematically destroy the weapons, the armaments, the production sites, the positions both above ground and below ground. It's systematic, it's slow, but that can be eliminated.
Hamas' ideology is part of the issue. It's also a social movement and a governance. How to ensure people don't join Hamas is first and foremost, you have to show that that way does not bring about a better future. That means that hand in hand with defeating Hamas, you have to let the people in Gaza distinguish and try to define the future they want. If I'm not clear enough, if the future they want is the Hamas genocidal version of destroying Israel, then we are going to seclude them, sideline them and make sure that they cannot get to us."
Ryan Bohl, senior Middle East and North Africa analyst, Rane
"Total eradication of Hamas requires for Israel to not only carry out a military campaign in the Gaza Strip but also now Lebanon, Syria, Iran and even potentially Qatar where Hamas has a presence. But even that is pretty far-fetched given that the IDF hasn't even successfully eradicated Hamas from the West Bank, which Israel more thoroughly controls.
Hamas, like all militant organizations, has the capacity to reorganize and replace lost fighters and leadership so long as the deeper social and political drivers towards its ideology remain present. The only viable way that Hamas could cease to exist is if those ideological drivers disappear or the organization is supplanted by a rival militant group."
Daniel Byman, director, Georgetown University Security Studies Program
"Hamas is very difficult to eliminate. It has substantial support in Gaza, at least compared with its rivals. In addition, it has deep educational, social welfare, and religious ties as well as being the de-facto government of Gaza. All this means that Israel could kill many Hamas leaders and still not eliminate the organization. The best hope would be to try to keep Hamas weak and off balance while building up rivals, such as the Palestinian Authority — but that is a long-term solution and a difficult one."
Palestinian fighters from the military wing of Hamas take part in a military parade near the border with Israel, to commemorate the 2014 war, which lasted for 51 days of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Yousef Masoud | SOPA Images | Lightrocket | Getty Images
Michael Knights, senior fellow at The Washington Institute; co-founder, Militia Spotlight platform
"Military campaigns such as the Second World War against Nazism or the war against ISIS don't eliminate the ideology or even all remnants of the terror regime, but that's not the point. The point is to get a regime like Hamas as close to elimination as possible with military means, and then hand off a more manageable task to policing and counter-terrorism forces, judiciaries, and political and economic processes."
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What's happening in Gaza is 'a huge human catastrophe,' Qatar minister says
Capital Connection
Jack Watling, senior research fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute
"It is realistic for the IDF to degrade Hamas's military capabilities through their ground operation by killing its fighters and destroying their stockpiles of equipment. Furthermore, the removal of Hamas from control of Gaza can deny them the infrastructure that they had used to pose a serious and sustained threat to Israel.
The ideology will not be destroyed, nor will Hamas as an organization. Nevertheless, Israel probably feels it can better manage a terrorist group than a hostile proto-state."
Natan Sachs, director, Brookings Institution Center for Middle East Policy
"Hamas cannot be totally eliminated as an organization or an ideology, but that is not the Israeli goal, precisely. Its ideology is well-rooted in Palestinian society and draws from the broader Muslim Brotherhood family of organizations.
But Israel's goal is actually more limited, it aims to destroy Hamas's ability to govern the Gaza Strip or to pose a military threat from the Gaza Strip to Israeli civilians as in the October 7th massacre. This is a very difficult task, but one that can be achieved at great cost to the civilian population in Gaza and to Israel. The unresolved question is what or who will govern the Gaza Strip if and when Hamas is toppled completely from power there."
Dave Des Roches, associate professor at Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University
"Can Hamas be eliminated? Yes, it is possible to destroy any military organization, even one which claims a religious justification. Defeating it would require a complete destruction of its command network and most of its weapons facilities. This is not an easy task, and will probably not be possible without occupying most of all of Gaza for at least some period of time.
So in order to truly defeat Hamas, the critical aspect is to ensure that Palestinians are free to reject Hamas, if they so chose. What that means is that Hamas adherents must lose the ability to impose their will on Palestinians who chose not to follow them – Hamas will have to lose its weapons and any ability to operate covertly in Gaza. This means that there will have to be a political entity which is capable of policing Gaza which is not Hamas. That is unlikely."
CNBC · by Natasha Turak · December 12, 2023
5. Russian links with China, Iran and North Korea a threat, warns Finland
Good to see that Korea is not an afterthought. Or is it? :-)
Russian links with China, Iran and North Korea a threat, warns Finland
Reuters
HELSINKI, Dec 12 (Reuters) - Russia's increasing cooperation with China, Iran, North Korea and its other global allies is a serious, long-term threat to European countries, Finland's Defence Minister Antti Hakkanen said on Tuesday.
Finland and Estonia are investigating the destruction in October of the Balticconnector gas pipeline and telecom cables on the Baltic seabed and have named a Hong Kong registered container vessel as their main suspect for the damage.
"While these issues are not public, what Russia does at the moment together with China, Iran, North Korea and its other allies, also from the global south, constitutes a very serious prospect in the long term," Hakkanen said in a speech.
As the NATO military alliance's newest member, which shares a 1,340-km (830-mile) border with Russia, Finland and its intelligence services are monitoring Russia's action globally, Hakkanen said.
He called Russia's new cooperation with its global allies "a weather system of security policy that is unfortunately troublesome".
Reporting by Anne Kauranen; editing by Barbara Lewis
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
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6. Rebuilding Resiliency: Kyiv’s Opportunity to Bolster its Defense
Conclusion:
Throughout history, cities — especially capital cities — have been operational and strategic objectives in war. As such, numerous cities around the world have risen, fallen, and been rebuilt as they rise again. While Kyiv may not have fallen during Russia’s most recent invasion, it easily could have. Regardless, the city’s metropolitan area likely suffered tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in damage, and many countries have pledged billions to help Ukraine rebuild.
As Kyiv rebuilds, it should consider how to include dual-purpose strongpoint buildings, large concrete waterways, an expanded and enhanced underground, and green space around major intersections so that bunkers could be built down instead of up. Population centers were once built with defense as a top priority. Recent history has shown that leaving a city’s defense to its nation’s borders is a dangerous proposition. It is time that Kyiv, and other cities in nations that border expansionist neighbors, once again make the defense part of city planning.
Rebuilding Resiliency: Kyiv’s Opportunity to Bolster its Defense - War on the Rocks
LIAM COLLINS, JOHN SPENCER, AND BENJAMIN YARCKIN
warontherocks.com · by Liam Collins · December 12, 2023
When the Russian military invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian leadership believed that it would obtain a quick victory by overthrowing the Ukrainian government through surprise, speed, and overwhelming force — a coup de main. But the Ukrainian military repelled this numerically superior Russian force at the battle of Kyiv by denying the Russian military the use of Ukrainian airfields, blowing up their bridges, flooding their rivers, weaponizing a large portion of the civilian population, and ultimately grinding the military’s main effort to a halt. Yet this defensive success was achieved haphazardly. There was little preparation or city-wide defense plan or design. Had the Russian military made it to Kyiv, many of the defensive barriers that the Ukrainian military hastily laid out throughout the city would have been ineffective against it.
Dating as far back as the 16th century, the city of Kyiv developed as a fortress and was built to be defensible from an invading force. These defensive measures included earthen, brick, and stonework walls, moats, towers, and multiple gates and gatehouses. A replica of the “Golden Gate” remains in the heart of Kyiv as a visible reminder of how the city was originally constructed. Centuries ago, as the city expanded well beyond the Kyiv fortress, the urban areas around the city center expanded with a design based on efficiency rather than defense. As a result, when the Russian military invaded, Kyiv lacked existing defensive capabilities, and its residents were left to throw thousands of steel hedgehogs and tires at key intersections throughout and surrounding Kyiv. A well-trained Russian militia could have easily breached these rudimentary obstacles, had they made it to the city.
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Likewise, fighting positions built to cover these intersections posed another issue for Kyiv’s defenders. Because Kyiv is a concrete jungle, the positions had to be built up instead of digging down, making them vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenades and other larger direct and indirect fire weapons.
Throughout history, communities have leveraged natural obstacles (rivers, hilltops, and cliffs) and manmade obstacles (moats, walls, and other fortifications) to defend themselves against invaders. With the development of the nation-state, however, populations started to defend at the nation’s borders as opposed to a city’s boundary, and city planners stopped thinking about defending themselves. But recent wars in Ukraine, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh have demonstrated that wars are rarely contained at the border and the fighting often moves to the cities. Thus, it is once again time for potentially vulnerable cities — cities in nations that border aggressive and expansionist neighbors — to think of designing themselves to be more defensible.
Much of the damage the capital incurred during the battle of Kyiv will be repaired. There is, and will continue to be, major reconstruction in Kyiv and its peri-urban areas — those immediately adjacent to or surrounding the city, including Bordyanka, Bucha, Irpin, and Hostomel. As part of this reconstruction effort, city administrators and government officials should consider modifications that deter future invasions — and make future assaults more difficult should deterrence fail — by increasing their cities’ defense capabilities.
Rivers
One of the most challenging military operations to conduct is a contested water crossing. In the opening weeks of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Ukrainian military destroyed over 150 bridges to force the invading Russian military to have to undertake this complex challenge. At the confluence of the Irpin and Dnipro rivers, Ukrainian forces blew a hole in the Kozarovychi dam, helping defend the capital. The action slowed Russian armor and vehicles but at the cost of significant damage to the city. The tactic resulted in uncontrollable flooding that sacrificed many farms and much of the city of Demydiv in the process.
Had the Ukrainian government constructed the dam in a way that would have allowed it to control the flooding, the Ukrainian military could have accomplished the same objective — impede the Russian advance —without destroying the dam and causing as much collateral damage to the surrounding communities. By contrast, when the Ukrainian government flooded the Teterev and Zdvyzh rivers, they controlled the flooding without damaging the dams. When the Ukrainian government rebuilds the Kozarovychi dam, it would be prudent to do so in a way that allows it to flood the Irpin without damaging the dam.
Likewise, many of the bridges that the Ukrainians destroyed will have to be completely rebuilt because the structural integrity of the remaining portions is compromised. However, it is possible to construct bridges in a way that makes it easy to destroy a portion without damaging the columns or piers. Bridges built in such a manner would be cheaper and faster to repair, thus allowing commerce and livelihoods to return to normal more quickly.
City planners should also consider building a system of modern moats, giant cement irrigation ditches that serve two purposes: giant cement irrigation ditches that could also serve as obstacles in times of war. These manmade riverways also serve the valuable purpose of helping to prevent flooding during times of heavy rain, which only seem to be becoming more common with climate change. Some cities already have these, but they are not designed with defense in mind, so vehicles can easily cross them. If, however, they were built with a nearly vertical angle, vehicles would be unable to cross, and these ditches would become “urban moats” or, in military parlance, tank ditches.
Strongpoints
A strongpoint is “a heavily fortified battle position tied to a natural or reinforcing obstacle” to create an anchor for a defense or to deny an enemy decisive or key terrain. In urban areas, the right buildings can serve as perfect strongpoints in a defense. These buildings should be heavy-clad steel rebar–reinforced concrete that protects against many direct and indirect fire weapons. They should have multiple floors and a basement, offer lots of firing positions, and be located at dominant intersections along key approaches with clear fields of view and fire.
The history of urban warfare has demonstrated that single buildings can halt attacking militaries for days, weeks, or even months. Shining examples such as the Pavlov house in Stalingrad, the treasury building in Hue, the Santo Tomas University of the Philippines in Manila, and the “Pink building” in Marawi give strategic planners something to study.
In the 2017 battle of Marawi, the Philippine army initially struggled to fight Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant defenders that used strongpoint after strongpoint to turn the battle into a grueling five-month war. The Philippine army fought weeklong battles to clear single buildings like the large multistory pastel pink building in which the Islamic State housed fighters, snipers, and improvised explosive devices on every floor. Despite multiple bombing runs, to include 500-pound bombs, 105mm artillery, and mortars, it still took more than two weeks for multiple platoon- and company-size mechanized and dismounted infantry attacks to clear the building.
Unfortunately, many existing potential strongpoints — such as government buildings — are in the center of Kyiv. This does not need to be the case. An apartment building along a key avenue of approach in the city’s periphery could be built in such a way that it could serve as a strongpoint. Take, for example, Jerusalem, where Israel built dual-purpose apartment buildings that not only were homes but also served as strongpoints at the dividing line with East Jerusalem. The apartment buildings were built with reinforced concrete and had walls around their exteriors with few openings and narrow slit windows with special drainage features to facilitate rifle, machine gun, and sniper firing positions. The reserve forces of the city were assigned buildings and even specific floors to man if conflict erupted.
Underground
Defending an urban area is easier with a complex underground network because the defender can use it to protect critical military capabilities and political leadership, shield civilian populations, and surreptitiously move around the battlefield.
When Russia invaded Ukraine, Kyiv utilized its expansive underground. Tens of thousands of civilians sought refuge from Russian bombings in Kyiv’s immense subway tunnels. Ukraine’s political and military leadership moved into secret bunkers. The 72nd Mechanized Brigade — the military unit responsible for Kyiv’s defense — moved its headquarters into one of the city’s subway tunnels.
But unlike the battle of Mariupol — where the military planned from the onset to establish its headquarters in the steel factory’s underground — much of the use of Kyiv’s underground was unplanned. While officials in Kyiv mapped the available bunkers after the full-scale invasion, many were deemed unusable or unsatisfactory. As a result, many residents were forced to find impromptu underground shelters during Russian air raids. With sufficient planning, however, Kyiv could have developed, and can now develop, infrastructure to shield its civilian population beyond existing subway tunnels. They could produce dedicated air raid shelters, something that Sweden did from 1938 until 2002. It is important to remember that any physical structure — be it an air raid shelter or a concrete riverbed — must be maintained. Reports show that thousands of Sweden’s 65,000 air raid shelters are not serviceable, and the status of tens of thousands more is unknown because they have not been inspected in over a decade.
Using tunnels to surreptitiously move soldiers and materiel is a tactic common to many urban battles including the 1945 battle of Manila, the 1994–95 battle of Grozny, and the 2022 battle of Mariupol. Kyiv’s vast network of underground catacombs and utility and transportation tunnels could be properly mapped, connected, and expanded to facilitate both defensive and offensive operations. These tunnels could also be equipped with hardwired communication lines that cannot be hacked or jammed and provisioned with nonperishable food, potable water, and medical supplies.
Entrenched fighters can often hold out and tie up forces many times their size for weeks or months. A few thousand Ukrainian fighters held out against tens of thousands of Russian soldiers for weeks by using the Azovstal Steel Plant’s underground network during the battle of Mariupol. If they had not exhausted all their ammunition, food, and medical supplies, the Russian military might still be fighting at the plant to this day. Similarly, during the 1944 Warsaw uprising, the Polish resistance forces used the sewers and tunnels of Warsaw to fight and escape German attackers for over two months.
Conclusion
Throughout history, cities — especially capital cities — have been operational and strategic objectives in war. As such, numerous cities around the world have risen, fallen, and been rebuilt as they rise again. While Kyiv may not have fallen during Russia’s most recent invasion, it easily could have. Regardless, the city’s metropolitan area likely suffered tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in damage, and many countries have pledged billions to help Ukraine rebuild.
As Kyiv rebuilds, it should consider how to include dual-purpose strongpoint buildings, large concrete waterways, an expanded and enhanced underground, and green space around major intersections so that bunkers could be built down instead of up. Population centers were once built with defense as a top priority. Recent history has shown that leaving a city’s defense to its nation’s borders is a dangerous proposition. It is time that Kyiv, and other cities in nations that border expansionist neighbors, once again make the defense part of city planning.
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Liam Collins is executive director of the Madison Policy forum and a fellow at New America. He was the founding director of the Modern War Institute at West Point and served as a defense advisor to Ukraine from 2016 to 2018. He is a retired Special Forces colonel with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa, and South America. He holds a PhD from Princeton University and is co-author of the book Understanding Urban Warfare.
John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, codirector of the institute’s Urban Warfare Project, and host of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast. He previously served as a fellow with the chief of staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group. He served 25 years on active duty as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connections in Modern War and co-author of Understanding Urban Warfare.
Benjamin Yarckin is a graduate student at George Mason University, where he serves as a student fellow at the Center for Security Policy Studies.
Image: Ukraine Presidency
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Liam Collins · December 12, 2023
7. Pentagon alarmed by Chinese rush for 'intelligentized' warfare, but experts warn about over-reliance on AI
Excerpts:
"Beijing has a clear understanding of its remaining S&T deficiencies and wields industrial policies and the country’s massive tech transfer apparatus in an effort to close these gaps," the report stated. "China also sustains high levels of R&D funding and offers significant subsidies to domestic companies working on frontier technologies."
...
"China wants to match and surpass the United States in AI by 2025," Matt McInnis, senior fellow for the Institute for the Study of War's China program, told Fox News Digital. "The United States is at risk of falling behind China in this area, including the integration of AI into warfighting systems."
...
McInnis and Anderson both highlighted the nuclear development as a significant concern in the report: McInnis called China’s advancements "concerning," while Anderson called the trajectory "alarming."
"The strategic significance of this development is hard to overstate," Anderson said. "In just a few years, the United States will, for the first time in its history, have to deter two nuclear peers in Russia and China simultaneously."
Pentagon alarmed by Chinese rush for 'intelligentized' warfare, but experts warn about over-reliance on AI
China could overtake the US in AI capabilities by 2025 and lead globally by 2030
By Peter Aitken Fox News
Published December 12, 2023 4:00am EST
foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken Fox News
Video
Defense forum focuses on China, AI and new US military technologies
FOX News' Jennifer Griffin reports from the Reagan National Defense Forum in Simi Valley, California.
The U.S. Department of Defense has warned that China’s artificial intelligence (AI) initiatives have seen heavy integration with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), raising concerns of a possible AI arms race.
"The size, scope and sophistication of Chinese military modernization programs is breathtaking," James Anderson, who served as the deputy undersecretary of defense during the Trump administration, told Fox News Digital. "The report makes clear that Beijing remains hellbent on developing a world-class military force, despite its recent economic slowdown."
The annual Pentagon report on the Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China argues in the preface that China remains "the" pacing challenge for the Department of Defense as Beijing seeks "national rejuvenation" by 2049 – the centenary anniversary for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Chief among the various avenues the party has pursued to achieve this goal stands the "multi-domain precision warfare" concept, which seeks to incorporate advances in big data and AI to "rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes," according to the report.
EUROPE SEALS WORLD'S FIRST SET OF RULES REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
The concept would help China develop "additional subordinate operational concepts" with an eye toward refining China’s capabilities to fight and win "future wars." The country’s latest Five-Year Plan prioritizes these developments, which the Pentagon claimed would include advances in "brain science" and biotechnology, semiconductors and deep space, deep sea and polar-related tech.
Chinese President Xi Jinping inspects an exhibition on Shanghai's sci-tech innovations in Shanghai on Nov. 28, 2023. (Wang Ye/Xinhua via Getty Images)
Brain science looks to integrate new biotech and AI applications, including a quantum computer capable of "outperforming a classical high-performance computer for a specific problem," spending over a billion dollars on a national quantum facility that will be the world’s largest such facility when completed.
"Beijing has a clear understanding of its remaining S&T deficiencies and wields industrial policies and the country’s massive tech transfer apparatus in an effort to close these gaps," the report stated. "China also sustains high levels of R&D funding and offers significant subsidies to domestic companies working on frontier technologies."
Soldiers quickly get out of their cars to take up positions during military drills in Jiangxi, China, on Jan. 29, 2023. (CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images)
China seeks to lead the world in AI development by 2030, according to the report, having designated the technology as key to "intelligentized warfare," which is how the CCP views the future of combat. The Pentagon admits China already is the world leader in facial recognition and natural language processing technology, but it remains "silent" on "certain foreign capabilities" to produce hardware, including the most advanced semiconductor chip factories and electronic design automation software.
WHAT IS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI)?
"China wants to match and surpass the United States in AI by 2025," Matt McInnis, senior fellow for the Institute for the Study of War's China program, told Fox News Digital. "The United States is at risk of falling behind China in this area, including the integration of AI into warfighting systems."
Chinese President Xi Jinping inspects the Shanghai Futures Exchange, an exhibition on Shanghai's sci-tech innovations, and a government-subsidized rental housing community, learning about the city's efforts in strengthening its competitiveness as an international financial center, building the city into an international sci-tech innovation center, and constructing government-subsidized rental housing projects. (Xie Huanchi/Xinhua via Getty Images)
"America still has enormous resources and potential to stay at the top of the AI game, though," he argued. "In addition to our more open and competitive environment for AI development … we may have an advantage in taking a slower, more deliberative approach to deploying AI in warfare."
"China places enormous importance on AI and other advanced technologies to overtake the U.S. military, often to the detriment of the training, doctrine, and personnel development that the PLA also needs. AI is not the panacea for the PLA’s weaknesses," he stressed, adding that success for the U.S. will require "finding the vulnerabilities China creates by being over-dependent on AI."
Employees work at an intelligent furniture factory using 5G and artificial intelligence technologies on Oct. 21, 2020 in Ganzhou, Jiangxi Province of China. (Liu Zhankun/China News Service via Getty Images)
The Pentagon’s report included a wide range of assessments of China’s current capabilities, but Anderson warned that the broadly "opaque nature" of China’s systems makes it difficult to ascertain the full extent of the country’s development of AI technology.
AI DEVELOPMENT BOOM COULD PIT US VS CHINA WITH ANOTHER CHIP SHORTAGE: EXPERTS
"The U.S.’s advantages in AI-related technologies is no cause for comfort since they appear to be shrinking relative to Chinese advances," Anderson warned. "There is no question that China aims to be the world leader in AI by the end of the decade, and it is sparing no expense to achieve this goal."
"AI technologies will increase the speed and lethality of new military platforms, while breathing some new life into old ones," he noted. "Air, sea, land, and spaced-based unmanned platforms driven by AI will proliferate in the coming years and play a key role in any major U.S.-China military confrontation."
A Chinese soldier salutes in front of a drone during a parade to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China at Tiananmen Square in 1949, on Oct. 1, 2019 in Beijing. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)
"The ability to employ AI-related technologies at scale is critical," Anderson explained. "Last summer, the Pentagon announced its Replicator Initiative to produce and deploy thousands of AI-guided drones in the Indo-Pacific. It is an open question whether the Pentagon can follow through given the shrunken and dilapidated state of America’s Defense Industrial Base."
In addition to the AI capabilities, the report highlighted the frightening pace at which China has developed its nuclear arsenal, with the intention to match up against U.S. and Russian capabilities, which in turn would create a tripolar global dynamic.
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McInnis and Anderson both highlighted the nuclear development as a significant concern in the report: McInnis called China’s advancements "concerning," while Anderson called the trajectory "alarming."
"The strategic significance of this development is hard to overstate," Anderson said. "In just a few years, the United States will, for the first time in its history, have to deter two nuclear peers in Russia and China simultaneously."
Peter Aitken is a Fox News Digital reporter with a focus on national and global news.
foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken Fox News
8. White House declassifies intel as it pushes for more Ukraine funding
As an aside, is the Biden administration using publically released intelligence more than any previous one to gain public support for policy decisions?
White House declassifies intel as it pushes for more Ukraine funding
By ALEXANDER WARD and LARA SELIGMAN
12/12/2023 11:19 AM EST
Updated: 12/12/2023 12:52 PM EST
Politico
The U.S. assesses that more than 13,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded in a key eastern Ukrainian battleground since October.
Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy walks with Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.). as he departs a meeting with senators at the U.S. Capitol on Dec. 12, 2023. | Francis Chung/POLITICO
12/12/2023 11:19 AM EST
Updated: 12/12/2023 12:52 PM EST
The U.S. has declassified intelligence on the situation in Ukraine to bolster the Biden administration’s case that Congress should further support Kyiv, timing the release with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Washington.
President Joe Biden is desperate to push a $111 billion assistance package, which includes at least $60 billion for Ukraine, through Congress despite Republican resistance. The newly public intelligence, released by the White House, will help Biden and Zelenskyy make their pitch on Tuesday.
The U.S. assesses that Russia believes it is helped by a military stalemate with Ukraine that saps Western support for Kyiv, making its war easier to win. “Russia is determined to press forward with its offensive despite its losses,” National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson said in a statement. “It is more critical now than ever that we maintain our support for Ukraine so they can continue to hold the line and regain their territory.”
Further American intelligence indicates the Western-backed Ukrainian campaign is having some success. More than 13,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded and over 220 combat vehicles destroyed along the Avdiivka-Novopavlivka axis in eastern Ukraine since October, Watson said. She added that the Kremlin’s forces continue to pound targets in eastern Ukraine including around Avdiivka, Lyman and Kupyansk.
In declassifying the intelligence, the administration has returned to a well-trodden path of revealing some of the nation’s secrets in service of helping Ukraine. Before the war, the U.S. provided information about Russia’s war plans, and has since occasionally detailed the Kremlin’s secret dealings with Iran and North Korea to rearm its depleted military.
Zelenskyy arrived in Washington on Monday to lobby skeptical lawmakers to approve the funding so his forces can ultimately prevail. “Let me be frank with you friends,” the Ukrainian leader told a military audience at the National Defense University, “if there’s anyone inspired by unresolved issues on Capitol Hill it is just Putin and his sick clique.”
On Monday evening, he told a group of Ukraine-friendly analysts that he doesn’t consider the battle to be at a stalemate, noting that Russia’s fleet in the Black Sea has been pushed out of Ukrainian waters, allowing Ukraine to trade normally with other countries in the midst of a war. If Ukraine were to receive more long-range missiles, he said at his country’s embassy in Washington, Ukraine could expand its defense coverage and protect the port city of Odesa, according to a person at the session, granted anonymity to detail Zelenskyy’s private comments.
Zelenskyy has briefed senators and chatted separately with House Speaker Mike Johnson on Tuesday before he stands side-by-side with Biden for a press conference in the afternoon.
The administration has offered no alternative to getting the mammoth legislation passed through Congress. Should it fail to reach Biden’s desk –– a possibility if Republicans and Democrats don’t strike a border-policy deal in exchange for votes for the bill –– the U.S. would struggle to pump Kyiv full of weapons that have helped it fend off Russia’s invasion for nearly two years.
After the U.S. announced its latest package of aid for Ukraine last week, the Pentagon had $4.66 billion left in presidential drawdown authority to transfer weapons directly from its stockpiles, according to DOD spokesperson Maj. Charlie Dietz. The more urgent limitation is that there are only $1.1 billion in existing resources available to backfill U.S stocks, Dietz said.
Some Republicans who support further Ukraine funding, however, aren’t overly worried, with one Senate aide saying that deals that seem impossible tend to come together as the clock nears zero. “It will go through,” said the staffer, granted anonymity because they weren’t authorized to speak to the press.
Pentagon spokesperson Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder acknowledged that Ukraine is in “a very hard fight.”
“That’s, again, why we need supplemental funding, to ensure that as they go through this winter, they have the support that they need,” Ryder said.
POLITICO
Politico
9. UN General Assembly votes overwhelmingly to demand a humanitarian cease-fire in Gaza
No vetoes in the General Assembly of course.
UN General Assembly votes overwhelmingly to demand a humanitarian cease-fire in Gaza
AP · December 12, 2023
UNITED NATIONS (AP) — The U.N. General Assembly voted overwhelmingly on Tuesday to demand a humanitarian cease-fire in Gaza in a strong demonstration of global support for ending the Israel-Hamas war. The vote also shows the growing isolation of the United States and Israel.
The vote in the 193-member world body was 153 in favor, 10 against and 23 abstentions. The support was higher than for an Oct. 27 resolution that called for a “humanitarian truce” leading to a cessation of hostilities, where the vote was 120-14 with 45 abstentions.
After the United States vetoed a resolution in the Security Council on Friday demanding a humanitarian cease-fire, Arab and Islamic nations called for an emergency session of the 193-member General Assembly to vote on a resolution making the same demand.
Unlike Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding. But the assembly’s messages “are also very important” and reflect world opinion, U.N. spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said Monday.
The General Assembly vote reflect the growing isolation of the United States as it refuses to join demands for a cease-fire. More than the United Nations or any other international organization, the United States is seen as the only entity capable of persuading Israel to accept a cease-fire as its closest ally and biggest supplier of weaponry.
In tougher language than usual, though, President Joe Biden warned before the vote that Israel was losing international support because of its “indiscriminate bombing” of Gaza.
“I think it will send a message to Washington and to others,” Riyad Mansour, the Palestinian ambassador to the United Nations, told reporters before the vote. He said a demand from the United Nations, whether it’s the Security Council or the General Assembly, should be looked at as binding.
“And Israel has to abide by it, and those who are shielding and protecting Israel until now should also look at it this way, and therefore act accordingly,” Mansour said.
The resolution expresses “grave concern over the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and the suffering of the Palestinian civilian population,” and it says Palestinians and Israelis must be protected in accordance with international humanitarian law.
It also demands that all parties comply with international humanitarian law, “notably with regard to the protection of civilians,” and calls for “the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, as well as ensuring humanitarian access.”
The resolution makes no mention of Hamas, whose militants killed about 1,200 people and abducted about 240 in the surprise attack inside Israel on Oct. 7 that set off the war.
One amendment proposed by the United States would have added a paragraph stating that the assembly “unequivocally rejects and condemns the heinous terrorist attacks by Hamas.”
A second amendment proposed by Austria would have added that the hostages are “held by Hamas and other groups” and should be released “immediately.”
Both amendments were voted down.
The war has brought unprecedented death and destruction, with much of northern Gaza obliterated, more than 18,000 Palestinians killed according to the Hamas-run health ministry, 70% of them reportedly children and women, and over 80% of the population of 2.3 million pushed from their homes.
AP · December 12, 2023
10. Harvard board keeps president as leader of Ivy League school following antisemitism backlash
Circling the wagons around the ivory tower.
Harvard board keeps president as leader of Ivy League school following antisemitism backlash
AP · December 12, 2023
CAMBRIDGE, Mass. (AP) — Harvard President Claudine Gay will remain leader of the prestigious Ivy League school following her comments last week at a congressional hearing on antisemitism, the university’s highest governing body announced Tuesday.
“Our extensive deliberations affirm our confidence that President Gay is the right leader to help our community heal and to address the very serious societal issues we are facing,” the Harvard Corporation said in a statement following its meeting Monday.
Only months into her leadership, Gay came under intense scrutiny following the hearing in which she and two of her peers struggled to answer questions about campus antisemitism in the wake of the latest Israel-Hamas war, which erupted in early October. Their academic responses provoked backlash from Republican opponents, along with alumni and donors who say the university leaders are failing to stand up for Jewish students on their campuses.
Some lawmakers and donors to the the university had called for Gay to step down, following the resignation of Liz Magill as president of the University of Pennsylvania on Saturday.
A petition signed by more than 600 faculty members had asked the school’s governing body to keep Gay in charge.
At issue was a line of questioning that asked whether calling for the genocide of Jews would violate the universities’ code of conduct. At the hearing, Gay said it depended on the context, adding that when “speech crosses into conduct, that violates our policies.”
“So many people have suffered tremendous damage and pain because of Hamas’s brutal terrorist attack, and the university’s initial statement should have been an immediate, direct, and unequivocal condemnation,” the corporation’s statement said. “Calls for genocide are despicable and contrary to fundamental human values. President Gay has apologized for how she handled her congressional testimony and has committed to redoubling the university’s fight against antisemitism.”
In an interview with The Harvard Crimson student newspaper last week, Gay said she got caught up in a heated exchange at the House committee hearing and failed to properly denounce threats of violence against Jewish students.
“What I should have had the presence of mind to do in that moment was return to my guiding truth, which is that calls for violence against our Jewish community — threats to our Jewish students — have no place at Harvard, and will never go unchallenged,” Gay said.
Testimony from Gay and Magill drew intense national backlash, as did similar responses from the president of MIT, who also testified before the Republican-led House Education and Workforce Committee.
U.S. Rep. Elise Stefanik, R-New York, a committee member who repeatedly asked the university presidents whether “calling for the genocide of Jews” would violate the schools’ rules, voiced her displeasure about the school’s decision on X, the social media platform.
“There have been absolutely no updates to (Harvard’s) code of conduct to condemn the calls for genocide of Jews and protect Jewish students on campus,” she said. “The only update to Harvard’s code of conduct is to allow plagiarists as president.”
On the Harvard campus, the news about the decision came as students and teachers were rushing to classes. Gunduz Vassaf, a visiting professor in psychology, said he supports Gay.
“I fully support her testimony before Congress. I do believe that the situation has been taken out of context in the emotions of the immediate moment,” Vassaf said.
“As long as there’s no incitement and a call for violence, this falls within the freedom of speech,” he added.
Evan Routhier, a student at Harvard, said he also supports Gay.
“My experience since she’s taken over has been positive,” he said.
The news drew others to the campus.
Rabbi Chananel Weiner, the director of Aish Campus Boston, said he came to Harvard to show solidarity with students.
“We need to resist the ideas really that are being spread here that are really against the Jewish people,” he said. “The Jewish people are under attack and we’re under attack from all angles, academia being one of them and this is the heart of academia.”
Celebrity lawyer Alan Dershowitz, a longtime defender of Israel and a professor at Harvard Law School, said Tuesday it was a mistake for the Harvard Corporation to support Gay, saying she championed a diversity, equity and inclusion bureaucracy “that has become an incubator for antisemitism.”
He said he hopes that Gay changes her views on free speech to ensure everyone is treated the same.
“Right now she has been presiding over a dangerous double standard that permits free speech attacking some groups but not others. The school must decide on a policy, either free speech for all, equally, or limited restrictions, equally applied. She has not been the champion for that kind of equality and therefore she is the wrong person, at the wrong time, in the wrong job,” he said.
A grassroots watchdog group called StopAntisemitism said on X that Harvard’s decision “serves only to greenlight more Jew-hatred on campus.” It said it continues to call for Gay’s resignation and urged the corporation to reconsider.
College campuses nationwide have been roiled by protests, antisemitism and Islamophobia since the start of the war in Gaza two months ago, putting university administrators across the nation on the defensive.
The corporation also addressed allegations of plagiarism against Gay, saying that Harvard became aware of them in late October regarding three articles she had written. It initiated an independent review at Gay’s request.
The corporation reviewed the results on Saturday, “which revealed a few instances of inadequate citation” and found no violation of Harvard’s standards for research misconduct, it said. Gay is proactively requesting four corrections in two articles to insert citations and quotation marks that were omitted from the original publications, the statement said.
Harvard’s announcement came the same day several prominent universities faced new federal investigations for allegations of antisemitism or Islamophobia.
The U.S. Education Department announced it opened civil rights investigations at Stanford, UCLA, the University of California-San Diego, the University of Washington-Seattle, Rutgers University and Whitman College. Details about the complaints were not released. Those schools join Harvard, Penn, Cornell, Columbia and several others that have come under investigation by the department since Oct. 7.
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McCormack reported from Concord, New Hampshire. Associated Press reporter David Sharp contributed from Portland, Maine.
AP · December 12, 2023
11. Life in Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine is grim. People are fleeing through a dangerous corridor
We must not ignore what is happening to the people in Ukraine.
Life in Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine is grim. People are fleeing through a dangerous corridor
AP · December 11, 2023
SUMY, Ukraine (AP) — Whenever 52-year-old Anna is agitated, she senses the chilling touch of a gun barrel between her brows — a haunting reminder of an encounter with a group of Russian soldiers on her street about a year ago.
On that day, amid tears and screams, the soldiers threatened to kill her and her husband, fired bullets on the ground between their feet and then dragged her brother-in-law to an unknown location, apparently furious that he couldn’t guide them to where they could find alcohol.
Two weeks later, Anna’s husband, who himself had been hospitalized previously because of heart problems, found his brother’s body in the forest, not far from the village where they lived, in a Russian-occupied area of Ukraine’s southeastern Zaporizhzhia region. Two weeks after that, he died.
“His heart couldn’t bear it,” Anna said.
Alone and afraid, Anna sank into a depression.
“I don’t know how I coped with it,” she says, repeating the phrase over and over as tears run down her face. On Nov. 22, she finally fled her home, joining a trickle of refugees on “the corridor,” a 2-kilometer (1.2-mile) trek along a front line of the fighting that Ukrainians also refer to as the “gray zone,” situated between the Belgorod region of Russia and Ukraine’s Sumy region.
THE LAST CORRIDOR OUT
Since the war in Ukraine began, thousands of people have fled Russian-occupied areas over myriad routes. Now, nearly two years in, “the corridor” is their only option to cross directly into Ukraine.
Allowed to move freely through Russian-controlled zones, most take buses to the corridor from homes throughout the country: Zaporizhzhia and Kherson in the southeast, Donetsk and Luhansk in the northeast, and Crimea, the southern peninsula that Russia annexed in 2014.
Once they get to the corridor, they must proceed on foot, traipsing through an open, treeless no man’s land, the whir of artillery and the whine of drones from nearby battles echoing in their ears. They are warned before they go that no one will be able to guarantee their safety as they cross. Some travel with children or elderly parents.
By the time they arrive in Sumy, they are exhausted, barely finding the strength to carry the few belongings they were able to grab before they fled. And yet, for many, to remain in the occupied zones is not an option.
“Staying there is equal death for them,” said Kateryna Arisoi, director of the nongovernmental organization Pluriton, which set up a volunteer-staffed shelter in Sumy. “They are struggling because of torture, kidnapping, killing. They simply cannot stay there.”
A GRIM AND DANGEROUS LIFE IN OCCUPIED UKRAINE
Civilians in occupied territories are detained for minor reasons, such as speaking Ukrainian or simply for being a young man, according to an an investigation The Associated Press conducted earlier this year. Thousands are being held without charge in Russian prisons and areas of the occupied territories.
Ukraine’s government estimates at least 10,000 civilians are detained.
On both sides of the corridor, refugees are subjected to rigorous searches and questioning. On the Russian side, some, especially men, are not allowed to cross.
Many are afraid and agreed to speak to the news media only on condition of anonymity. Anna declined to provide her last name for fear of repercussions against relatives who still live in the occupied area of her province.
“They don’t consider us human,” Anna says of the Russian soldiers.
Also prompting many to flee are new laws forcing residents of occupied areas to acquire Russian citizenship. A report by the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale University’s School of Public Health says they must do so by July 2024 or they could be deported, including to remote areas of Russia.
At the shelter, those who were able to avoid being issued a Russian passport speak with evident pride. No one speaks aloud about receiving one.
A STEADY FLOW OF REFUGEES
The rate at which people cross the corridor depends on the weather and the situation at the front line. Recently, with temperatures steadily dropping ahead of winter, an average of 80-120 people have been returning daily, Arisoi said. She said the highest numbers were recorded after the collapse of the Kakhovka dam in southern Ukraine earlier this year, when about 200 people a day were fleeing.
More than 15,500 people have passed through the Pluriton shelter since it opened in March, said Arisoi, herself a refugee who fled her home in the eastern city of Bakhmut after it was reduced to rubble and taken over by Russian military forces in May.
“I also lost everything. ... I know the feeling when you lose your home, your life, your status, when you become like a zero,” she said.
A LENGTHY JOURNEY TO A PLACE CLOSE BY
Before the war, 73-year-old Halyna Sidorova left Zaporizhzhia city, where her children and grandson are located, to care for her elderly mother in a village outside of Polohy, another city in Zaporizhia province about two hours away by car.
During the war, the two areas were divided by a front line that Sidorova could not cross, and she suddenly found herself in occupied territory, isolated from the relatives she had left behind.
Sidorova made a decision. Shortly before her 93-year-old mother’s death, she told her, “Mom, when you pass away, I’ll stay here for up to nine days, come to your grave to say goodbye, and then I’ll go home.”
When the time came, she silently packed her things, grabbed a walking stick, and embarked on the challenging journey: a full day’s bus ride through other occupied territories and into Russia, where she set out on foot along the corridor.
Sidorova told no one that she was leaving. Throughout the difficult journey, she found solace in a prayer.
“I read the prayer the whole way ... the entire journey, even when falling asleep, I continued reading,” she said while sitting in the shelter in Sumy.
When she finally arrives back home in Zaporizhia city, Sidorova’s journey will have taken her nearly full circle.
A CONFLICTED DECISION
Anna and her husband initially resisted leaving.
But as the days passed, more Russian troops began occupying empty houses and forests, a situation that she said became “terrifying to the core.”
In January, they intercepted her husband’s brother as he was returning home from work, asking him where they could get alcohol. He told them the truth: He didn’t know. When he got home, two armed Russians came to his house and started beating him with a rifle in his yard, Anna said.
When she and her husband, who lived opposite the brother’s house, ran out to see what was happening, the Russians started shooting at their feet.
She said one of them pointed a rifle at her forehead, and remarked: “I’ll kill you now.”
The Russian soldier alternated between aiming the pistol at her chest and shooting at her and her husband’s feet before eventually letting them go. The brother-in-law would not be spared. Two weeks later, her husband would be dead.
But it wasn’t until 10 months later, on her 10-year-old grandson’s birthday, that Anna finally decided to leave.
The grandson had fled with Anna’s daughter to Poland in the early days of the war. When Anna called to wish him a happy birthday, he said to her, “Why are you there? We need you.”
Less than a week after the call, she left.
The minute she departed, she was homesick, missing the flowers she had planted in the yard of her home and the little fence and pathway she had built with her husband.
“We always did everything together,” she said.
As she entered the corridor on the Russian side, soldiers shouted at her to “get out of here!” and she burst into tears.
The journey was not easy. The weather was cold and she fell and bruised her knees while dragging a few bags containing her meager belongings.
At the shelter in the Sumy region, she sits on a lower bunk, her head leaning against the edge of the bed above her. Still ahead of her is the trip to Poland.
Adorning her frostbitten hands are two wedding rings: Hers on the left, her deceased husband’s on her right.
“I want to go home already,” she says, her voice trembling.
___
Associated Press writer Volodymyr Yurchuk contributed to this report.
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Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine
AP · December 11, 2023
12. Empowering Chinese Diaspora Messaging
Excerpts:
PRC’s success in stalemating the US and the UN in Korea, and the US’s defeat in the Vietnam War, inculcated an internal belief that the PRC could win a “people’s war under modern conditions” against the US. The US military showed technological superiority during limited conflicts in Grenada and Panama, but the PRC still believed they could overcome a technologically superior force with a “people’s war.” The Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq served as a proxy for China’s military capabilities and some believed the US would struggle against the Iraqi forces. The US’s rapid defeat of the Iraqi military challenged many of the working assumptions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) about power. US success in Operation Desert Storm was a clarion call to the PRC and PLA leadership, which shifted to an explicit principle of “whatever the enemy is afraid of, we develop that.” This was a foundational principle in the development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapon systems aimed at preventing the US from projecting force in the Indo-Pacific and freeing the PRC to build its power as a regional hegemon.
The PRC’s desire for “assassin’s mace” weapons that can challenge the US’s military strengths and, importantly, sow doubt in the minds of military and civilian planners and leaders, are essential to their quest for regional hegemony. The PLA concentrated resources in building “weapons in the struggle against global hegemon.” In 2021, the Defense Secretary’s report to Congress noted PRC’s “sustained effort to develop the capability to attack, at long ranges, military forces that might deploy or operate within the western Pacific, which the DoD characterizes as “anti-access” and “area denial” (A2/AD) capabilities.” The PRC developed these weapons to counter the US Navy’s strengths. Since that time, the PLA has focused resources on the creation of maneuverable reentry vehicles; hypersonic weapons; directed energy and electromagnetic weapons; and counterspace, unmanned, and artificial intelligence weapons to continue countering the US military’s technological advantages. However, these weapon systems do not change the PRC’s fundamental weaknesses.
...
The war that doesn’t come
A US-PRC conflict over Taiwan is a worst-case scenario for all parties involved. The risk for escalation is high and the US exposed some of its most powerful financial options in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The PRC’s focus on creating asymmetric advantages and attempts to limit its exposure to US economic pressure increase the need for the US to develop asymmetric responses that target the PRC’s inherent weaknesses. Any of these plans must also include challenges to the PRC’s continued efforts to control the Chinese diaspora. Challenges to PRC’s control will sow doubt regarding its ability to win a war over Taiwan. Voices of dissent within the Chinese diaspora can more readily carry across cultural and technological barriers and speak with an authenticity that lends weight to their criticism. These criticisms and the ability to speak to the Chinese people are direct challenges to the Communist Party’s control over China. Affecting this decision making requires investment beyond Taiwan and a prioritization of influence options now.
Empowering Chinese Diaspora Messaging - Irregular Warfare Initiative
irregularwarfare.org · by Justin McIntosh · December 12, 2023
In January 2023, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a report of multiple wargames focused on a People’s Republic of China (PRC) invasion of Taiwan. In the more pessimistic scenarios, the US and Japan lost 645 combat aircraft, 28 vessels, and tens of thousands of service members. Despite the significant loss, the wargame showed the US could win, but in a pyrrhic victory: it would emerge with a weakened international position and a decimated military. CSIS believes that strengthening deterrence through increased cooperation with Japan and improving Taiwanese ground forces capabilities are necessary to prevent this conflict. This recommendation, and the results, are in line with the “Poison Frog” strategy’s aim to create Taiwanese defensive network that can survive a PRC invasion long enough to isolate the PRC politically, economically, and militarily but they lack a response option, outside of survival, should deterrence fail.
This paper contends that the US should adopt a more preemptive approach that seeks to weaken the government from within. A key aspect in that effort would be to empower dissidents in the global Chinese diaspora to directly challenge Beijing’s hold over information in China and around the world. Developing and propagating Chinese language media and pro-democracy voices, directed at the “Great Firewall” and the Chinese population, is a first step in attacking an inherent weakness in a society with controlled media.
PRC’s focus on an “assassin’s mace”
PRC’s success in stalemating the US and the UN in Korea, and the US’s defeat in the Vietnam War, inculcated an internal belief that the PRC could win a “people’s war under modern conditions” against the US. The US military showed technological superiority during limited conflicts in Grenada and Panama, but the PRC still believed they could overcome a technologically superior force with a “people’s war.” The Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq served as a proxy for China’s military capabilities and some believed the US would struggle against the Iraqi forces. The US’s rapid defeat of the Iraqi military challenged many of the working assumptions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) about power. US success in Operation Desert Storm was a clarion call to the PRC and PLA leadership, which shifted to an explicit principle of “whatever the enemy is afraid of, we develop that.” This was a foundational principle in the development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapon systems aimed at preventing the US from projecting force in the Indo-Pacific and freeing the PRC to build its power as a regional hegemon.
The PRC’s desire for “assassin’s mace” weapons that can challenge the US’s military strengths and, importantly, sow doubt in the minds of military and civilian planners and leaders, are essential to their quest for regional hegemony. The PLA concentrated resources in building “weapons in the struggle against global hegemon.” In 2021, the Defense Secretary’s report to Congress noted PRC’s “sustained effort to develop the capability to attack, at long ranges, military forces that might deploy or operate within the western Pacific, which the DoD characterizes as “anti-access” and “area denial” (A2/AD) capabilities.” The PRC developed these weapons to counter the US Navy’s strengths. Since that time, the PLA has focused resources on the creation of maneuverable reentry vehicles; hypersonic weapons; directed energy and electromagnetic weapons; and counterspace, unmanned, and artificial intelligence weapons to continue countering the US military’s technological advantages. However, these weapon systems do not change the PRC’s fundamental weaknesses.
The PRC’s need for control
The US military’s focus on high-end combat ensures it is prepared for the outbreak of large-scale conflict and reassures allies and partners. The US cannot focus solely on developing high-end capabilities against the PRC and needs to develop asymmetric capabilities that offer response options targeted at PRC weaknesses. A key PRC weakness the US should target is Beijing’s desire for control of Chinese language information in China and within the Chinese diaspora. The US government should prioritize and direct resources for creating a freer flow of communications and messages across the Great Firewall. Returning to the CSIS wargaming report, one of the core assumptions is, “do not plan on striking the mainland.” The report argues that the U.S. National Command Authority might withhold permission to strike at PRC locations in China even in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. This may be correct regarding the development of lethal fires options for response, but a key weakness of the PRC is its control and need for control over internal narratives. The PRC’s control of China’s historical narrative allows it to marshal China’s population and resources towards perceived threats. However, the PRC does this by curating China’s history to fit its desired narrative. The US can exploit the weakness inherent in a closed society’s need for information control by strengthening authentic voices of dissent from the Chinese diaspora.
Direct expansion of the US government’s ability to communicate into China has proven difficult given the PRC’s control over media and the internet. However, efforts have centered on pushing US created and US-based media into China via channels with limited access and reach in China due to PRC control. Investing in identifying and strengthening networks of social media influencers, reporters, and pro-democracy social groups among the Chinese diaspora in China’s near-abroad and in Taiwan is an asymmetric approach to challenge the PRC. The development and cultivation of Chinese-language media and pro-democracy voices and the propagation of their voices, directed towards the Great Firewall and to the Chinese population, is a first step in attacking an inherent weakness in a society with controlled media.
The PRC acknowledges that the Chinese diaspora is a weakness and has attempted to reinforce adherence to party rule in the diaspora by increasing pressure on regional governments. The PRC has insisted other nations assist in or arrest and deport Chinese citizens they view as harmful, including extradition of Uyghurs and the creation of covert “police stations” to monitor the diaspora. The time and resource investment in policing this group highlights the latent potential of the diaspora to challenge the PRC. The diaspora’s authenticity and ability to speak to the internal issues of the PRC is a core weakness of the party’s control that the US can support. The US government should increase support to voices within the Chinese diaspora and assist in amplifying their voices and their ability to scale the “Great Firewall.”
The PRC’s ability to influence state behavior is evident in Australia, a close American ally in the Indo-Pacific. Professor Wanning Sun at the University of Technology Sydney noted in 2016 that: “Across the board, the Chinese-language media in Australia have had to shift their business strategies to cater to this Mandarin-speaking cohort, and thereby sustain the viability of their businesses. As a result, migrant Chinese media—and, for that matter, mainstream Australian media have been willing to lend their platforms as carriers of China’s state media.”
This is a cycle that the PRC has repeated in multiple countries and highlights the opportunity that exists and fear the PRC has regarding these communities. Andrew Chubb of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) developed a useful analysis of the types of influence operations the PRC engages in that highlights their assessed vulnerabilities. This chart highlights the PRC’s interest, their target issues, and selected messaging themes and methods they employ.
The PRC’s focus on the extraterritorial suppression of dissent and control of diaspora media are opportunities the US and allies can exploit to challenge the PRC’s control of media narratives and expand their reach into China. The US should identify and assist in funding credible, independent Chinese language journalism globally, specifically aimed at the Chinese diaspora. Additionally, as the US and allies identify targets of censorship, they should provide support to these individuals and assistance in maintaining their platforms and avoiding PRC surveillance and harassment. These small actions will provide these actors a space to challenge PRC’s media control.
The US must expand support to these voices beyond Voice of America and Radio Free Asia and invest in the types of media currently consumed within the Chinese diaspora. This means increasing support to media and influencers using WeChat, Weibo, Tencent, and Douyin, as these systems can more readily reach beyond the Great Firewall into mainland China. This must be a whole-of-government approach to identify and support these personalities with funding and amplification. Additionally, by identifying and supporting these networks, the US government can tie these voices together and assist in creating a more resilient and unified dissident community.
The war that doesn’t come
A US-PRC conflict over Taiwan is a worst-case scenario for all parties involved. The risk for escalation is high and the US exposed some of its most powerful financial options in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The PRC’s focus on creating asymmetric advantages and attempts to limit its exposure to US economic pressure increase the need for the US to develop asymmetric responses that target the PRC’s inherent weaknesses. Any of these plans must also include challenges to the PRC’s continued efforts to control the Chinese diaspora. Challenges to PRC’s control will sow doubt regarding its ability to win a war over Taiwan. Voices of dissent within the Chinese diaspora can more readily carry across cultural and technological barriers and speak with an authenticity that lends weight to their criticism. These criticisms and the ability to speak to the Chinese people are direct challenges to the Communist Party’s control over China. Affecting this decision making requires investment beyond Taiwan and a prioritization of influence options now.
Justin McIntosh is a Special Forces Warrant Officer who has served in the PACOM, CENTCOM, and EUCOM AORs. He currently serves as a plans officer in 1st SFG(A) and has a master’s degree in history from the University of Nebraska – Kearney.
Main image: Chinatown, San Francisco (Tony Webster/Wikimedia)
13. The 1983 “War Scare” and its Relevance for Strategic Competition Today
Discuss.
Excerpts:
Against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical tensions, NATO conducted Exercise Able Archer 83, a command post exercise envisioning eventual nuclear escalation with the Soviet Union. While some U.S. officials evinced concerns about the nature of the exercise, there was insufficient understanding of, and appreciation for, how the Soviet Union would interpret the exercise. Only later would it be revealed the extent to which Moscow ratcheted up nuclear readiness in response by moving nuclear weapons, putting aircraft on alert, transferring some leadership to bunkers, and so forth. Fortunately, the exercise ended without incident, and over the course of the next year, the war scare passed as Washington and Moscow sought to stabilize relations. How close the two superpowers came to war remains a matter of debate, but the margin for error was far smaller than generally realized at the time.
President Reagan acknowledged in his diary that he hadn’t fully appreciated the gravity of the situation. And a declassified study by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) concluded that the Soviets were “genuinely worried” and “that at least some Soviet forces were preparing to preempt or counterattack a NATO strike launched under cover of Abler Archer.” The PFIAB’s bottom line was that “the President was given assessments of Soviet attitudes and actions that understated the risks to the United States.”
The 1983 “War Scare” and its Relevance for Strategic Competition Today
justsecurity.org · by Russell E. Travers · December 12, 2023
December 12, 2023
In late 1983 the United States and Soviet Union stumbled into the “war scare” – after the Cuban missile crisis, perhaps the most dangerous period of the Cold War. With the 40th Anniversary of the war scare last month, and as the United States again finds itself focused on Strategic Competition with Russia and China, this historical episode has important crisis management lessons for today.
In the early 1980s, a British-run spy, Oleg Gordievski, revealed that the Russian KGB was looking for indicators of a U.S.-led surprise nuclear strike. This shouldn’t have been a shock; the CIA also looked for indicators of a potential Soviet attack on the United States. But U.S. national security officials largely downplayed alleged Soviet concerns. The more charitable reason stemmed from the fact that the Warsaw Pact maintained a 2:1 military advantage over NATO, and the Soviet Union possessed robust nuclear forces; why would Moscow be concerned about a surprise U.S. nuclear attack? The less charitable reason stemmed from an underlying ideological narrative that the Americans were the “good guys,”, the Soviets were the “bad guys,” and Moscow certainly “knew” the United States would never attack. In other words, a strategic world view created blindspots and unduly impacted military planning judgments and assumptions.
What wasn’t fully appreciated by those dismissing the Gordievski reporting was the extent to which the Reagan administration’s prudent military build-up spooked Kremlin planners. Increases in defense spending, military modernization, doctrinal war-fighting concepts like Air/Land Battle that envisioned attacks deep into Warsaw Pact territory, the Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) which could potentially neutralize the Soviet nuclear deterrent , politically provocative rhetoric (“ash heap of history”), and various offensively oriented Presidential Directives fed a Soviet inferiority complex. Marshal Ogarkov, then Chief of the General Staff, even lamented that Soviet military equipment was two generations behind that of NATO.
Against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical tensions, NATO conducted Exercise Able Archer 83, a command post exercise envisioning eventual nuclear escalation with the Soviet Union. While some U.S. officials evinced concerns about the nature of the exercise, there was insufficient understanding of, and appreciation for, how the Soviet Union would interpret the exercise. Only later would it be revealed the extent to which Moscow ratcheted up nuclear readiness in response by moving nuclear weapons, putting aircraft on alert, transferring some leadership to bunkers, and so forth. Fortunately, the exercise ended without incident, and over the course of the next year, the war scare passed as Washington and Moscow sought to stabilize relations. How close the two superpowers came to war remains a matter of debate, but the margin for error was far smaller than generally realized at the time.
President Reagan acknowledged in his diary that he hadn’t fully appreciated the gravity of the situation. And a declassified study by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) concluded that the Soviets were “genuinely worried” and “that at least some Soviet forces were preparing to preempt or counterattack a NATO strike launched under cover of Abler Archer.” The PFIAB’s bottom line was that “the President was given assessments of Soviet attitudes and actions that understated the risks to the United States.”
In today’s environment of Strategic Competition, a few crisis management-related lessons and implications are evident:
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The importance of understanding adversary perceptions of their security interests and red lines. The Biden administration explicitly highlighted these issues in its National Defense Strategy. And DOD leaders have made every effort to engage counterparts to avoid inadvertent escalation; the recent agreement between President Biden and Chinese President Xi to restart military-to-military contacts is a step in the right direction.
- We must continually reevaluate whether Great Power intelligence services are competent and exercise sound tradecraft. Can Russian and Chinese intelligence organizations discern actual U.S. military intentions given Washington’s fractious, polarized political environment? Assuming they draw accurate conclusions, do they tell Putin/Xi the truth or do they shape the message in an ideological manner to curry favor? And how is the message received? The Russian debacle in Ukraine highlights the relevance of such concerns.
- We must appreciate the extent to which serendipity and coincidence can further complicate efforts at managing a crisis . Earlier in 1983, unrelated events – a Soviet technical failure that created an illusion that the United States had launched 5 ICBMs toward Moscow, the KAL 007 shootdown that wasn’t as straightforward as a seemingly deliberate attack on a civilian airliner, and U.S. worldwide readiness increases responding to the Beirut Embassy bombing rather than Soviet activity, , all contributed to a backdrop of tensions and heightened geopolitical risk.
- And finally, the contemporary dangers of the “deep state” narrative and a potential “Schedule F” could threaten our ability to successfully manage crises. The U.S. Intelligence Community isn’t always right, but a commitment to objectivity and a willingness to speak “truth to power” are critical attributes of the IC. Public servants’ oath is to the Constitution, not an Administration of any political party. If a President can recklessly remove nonpartisan civil servants because he doesn’t like intelligence assessments, it risks undermining continued objectivity and could easily lead to a chastened workforce self-censoring its judgments. The entire national security system could be undermined.
The 1983 war scare does not in any way suggest that the United States back down from bullies or forego actions that are in the U.S. national security interest. It does suggest that the United States needs sophisticated, knowledgeable, and non-ideological individuals weighing the impact of its actions; as evidenced by U.S. policy in Ukraine, extraordinary care is being taken to calibrate weapons’ transfers and other actions. Crisis management is invariably hard – assuming political leadership understands the level of the crisis at hand. Unfortunately, if an administration is prone toward ideologues unaccustomed to viewing matters from an adversary’s perspective, and/or if political leadership tends toward uninformed, impulsive decisions, the outcome could be catastrophic. Exposure to a broad array of opinions and reasoned decision making are critical – particularly during periods of crisis with other nuclear armed adversaries. Sun Tzu’s timeless guidance from 2000+ years ago remains prophetic: “know your enemy and know yourself.”
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government.
Image: Fighter jet (via GettyImages).
justsecurity.org · by Russell E. Travers · December 12, 2023
14. Sheathing the Sword of Damocles: 6 steps to righting the ship as 2023 ends and 2024 begins
Excerpts:
What would this first-ever, administration-written quasi-continuing resolution look like? It would provide the Defense Department with funding aligned to the already agreed upon FRA. It would provide DoD with 10 percent reprogramming flexibility to move money around for items such as a pay raise. And it would cover all of the anomalies needed for new starts, including military construction programs and multi-year approvals.
Some might argue that Congress will not surrender this much power to DoD. But Congress has also indicated it wants regular order and to protect national security. It could negate this continuing resolution by passing the 2025 appropriations on time. In effect, this CR, approved as part of any 2024 compromise, would be the sword of Damocles hanging over Congress.
These six items, split between the end of this year and early next year are essential if we are to signal to the world that our military and security posture are secure and solid as we head into a vibrant election year.
Sheathing the Sword of Damocles: 6 steps to righting the ship as 2023 ends and 2024 begins - Breaking Defense
As 2023 is coming to a close, time is running out for Congress, the Pentagon and the Biden administration to act, write AEI's Elaine McCusker and John Ferrari in this op-ed.
By ELAINE MCCUSKER and JOHN FERRARI
on December 11, 2023 at 11:39 AM
breakingdefense.com · by Elaine McCusker, John Ferrari · December 11, 2023
U.S Army Spc. Breyana Semans, a military police officer with the 46th Military Police Company, Michigan National Guard, secures an area near the U.S. Capitol in Washington, March 1, 2021. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sgt. 1st Class R.J. Lannom Jr.)
Some logjams in Congress have been broken, but others stubbornly remain. In this op-ed AEI’s Elaine McCusker and John Ferrari warn that time is running out to solve critical problems of the US government’s own making. Here are six things lawmakers and policymakers need to do, ASAP.
As we approach the end of a year that has been congressionally chaotic and strategically dangerous, we find our nation in a precarious position.
Scarce funds and unrecoverable time are being deliberately wasted under continuing resolutions (CRs). War is raging in Europe and the Middle East, regions dubbed by multiple administrations as less important than strategic competition with China.
The US needs to take our own side in the fight against these challenges rather than seemingly, intentionally stumbling into the threat of global war: one that we could very well be unprepared to win.
There are three things Congress needs to do before the end of 2023:
First, pass the conference agreement on the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a piece of legislation with crucial authorities that enable our military to function.
Second, act on a bipartisan compromise in the works on Ukraine and Gaza war funding and border security. It is increasingly necessary that this supplemental funding is provided before currently available money runs out, which the Office of Management and Budget said would happen in the next few weeks.
Third, approve the extension of the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act in order to avoid hobbling our intelligence agencies in the middle of two active wars.
If 2023 concludes with these three major challenges off the table, 2024 could start with a focus on strategic priorities and the military strength necessary to decrease the risk of a global war that nobody wants.
In turn, there are three key things that must happen as soon as Congress returns in January 2024:
First, complete and pass the 2024 appropriations bills prior to the expiration dates of the current CR on January 19 and February 2.
Second, eliminate the “sequester-like” provisions required by the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA).
Third, keep the government open and functioning at the start of the 2025 fiscal year on October 1.
Sounds simple. It won’t be, particularly during a national election year with the acrimonious divisions in the House and resulting difficulty in obtaining majority consensus. But it can be done. And, even better, without destructive and wasteful continuing resolutions or debilitating government shutdowns.
The damage to our national security resulting from governance by continuing resolution is cumulative, compounding and staggering. Starting in January, defense will lose an estimated $288 million per day in buying power, an increase of $69 million over the $219 million per day it is losing now. This estimate assumes absorption of the military pay raise, inflation adjustments, the cuts that will be required by the FRA, and emergency supplemental requirements for Ukraine, Gaza, Taiwan, and the southwest border. On top of that, time, which is a non-recoverable resource, is withering away due to program disruptions and delays and new start restrictions.
As the 2024 NDAA is likely to authorize DoD funding close to the previously approved FRA caps of $842 billion, and assuming sufficient supplemental funding is approved before the end of this calendar year, the appropriation should match this number. It is important to note that Congress needs to pass both the Defense and Veterans Affairs/Military Construction appropriations for DoD to get its soon-to-be-authorized funding.
Second, even once agreement is reached to finally move fiscal year 2024 appropriations, the sword of Damocles which in this case is the sequester-like cuts required by the FRA, remains. Since this provision of fiscal realignment was supposed to force Congress back into regular budget order and that has now failed, Congress should include language repealing these cuts, while keeping in place the agreed upon budget levels for both 2024 and 2025, both of which are too low for defense, but better than continued budget uncertainty.
Lastly, and perhaps the most important over the course of the next year, is the FY25 budget submission which is supposed to take place the first Monday in February. In the past few years, the administration has held back on this submission until after the previous budget was settled. This is not the strategy they should take this year. Instead, they should submit the 2025 budget on time in February and include in this submission a request for Congress to approve all of the permissions, funding realignments, and other anomalies that they need to start the fiscal year as part of the 2024 appropriation end game process.
This approach is not ideal, but it acknowledges up front that Congress probably will not complete its primary job of enacting appropriations on time and protects our national security from any political shenanigans just before an election.
What would this first-ever, administration-written quasi-continuing resolution look like? It would provide the Defense Department with funding aligned to the already agreed upon FRA. It would provide DoD with 10 percent reprogramming flexibility to move money around for items such as a pay raise. And it would cover all of the anomalies needed for new starts, including military construction programs and multi-year approvals.
Some might argue that Congress will not surrender this much power to DoD. But Congress has also indicated it wants regular order and to protect national security. It could negate this continuing resolution by passing the 2025 appropriations on time. In effect, this CR, approved as part of any 2024 compromise, would be the sword of Damocles hanging over Congress.
These six items, split between the end of this year and early next year are essential if we are to signal to the world that our military and security posture are secure and solid as we head into a vibrant election year.
Elaine McCusker is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. She is a former acting undersecretary of defense (comptroller). Retired US Army Maj. Gen. John Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the Army.
breakingdefense.com · by Elaine McCusker, John Ferrari · December 11, 2023
15. China’s cyber army is invading critical U.S. services
How much cyber reconnaissance is taking place that goes undetected because the hackers are just exploring methods for future attacks while not doing any damage currently?
Excerpts:
The hackers often sought to mask their tracks by threading their attacks through innocuous devices such as home or office routers before reaching their victims, officials said. A key goal was to steal employee credentials they could use to return, posing as normal users. But some of their entry methods have not been determined.
The hackers are looking for a way to get in and stay in without being detected, said Joe McReynolds, a China security studies fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, a think tank focused on security issues. “You’re trying to build tunnels into your enemies’ infrastructure that you can later use to attack. Until then you lie in wait, carry out reconnaissance, figure out if you can move into industrial control systems or more critical companies or targets upstream. And one day, if you get the order from on high, you switch from reconnaissance to attack.”
The disclosures to The Post build on the annual threat assessment in February by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which warned that China “almost certainly is capable” of launching cyberattacks that would disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines and rail systems.
“If Beijing feared that a major conflict with the United States were imminent, it almost certainly would consider undertaking aggressive cyber operations against U.S. homeland critical infrastructure and military assets worldwide,” the assessment said.
China’s cyber army is invading critical U.S. services
A utility in Hawaii, a West Coast port and a pipeline are among the victims in the past year, officials say
By Ellen Nakashima and Joseph Menn
December 11, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EST
The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · December 11, 2023
The Chinese military is ramping up its ability to disrupt key American infrastructure, including power and water utilities as well as communications and transportation systems, according to U.S. officials and industry security officials.
Hackers affiliated with China’s People’s Liberation Army have burrowed into the computer systems of about two dozen critical entities over the past year, these experts said.
The intrusions are part of a broader effort to develop ways to sow panic and chaos or snarl logistics in the event of a U.S.-China conflict in the Pacific, they said.
Among the victims are a water utility in Hawaii, a major West Coast port and at least one oil and gas pipeline, people familiar with the incidents told The Washington Post. The hackers also attempted to break into the operator of Texas’s power grid, which operates independently from electrical systems in the rest of the country.
Several entities outside the United States, including electric utilities, also have been victimized by the hackers, said the people, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity.
None of the intrusions affected industrial control systems that operate pumps, pistons or any critical function, or caused a disruption, U.S. officials said. But they said the attention to Hawaii, which is home to the Pacific Fleet, and to at least one port as well as logistics centers suggests the Chinese military wants the ability to complicate U.S. efforts to ship troops and equipment to the region if a conflict breaks out over Taiwan.
These previously undisclosed details help fill out a picture of a cyber campaign dubbed Volt Typhoon, first detected about a year ago by the U.S. government, as the United States and China struggle to stabilize a relationship more antagonistic now than it has been in decades. Chinese military commanders refused for more than a year to speak to American counterparts even as close-call intercepts by Chinese fighter jets of U.S. spy planes surged in the western Pacific. President Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed only last month to restore those communication channels.
“It is very clear that Chinese attempts to compromise critical infrastructure are in part to pre-position themselves to be able to disrupt or destroy that critical infrastructure in the event of a conflict, to either prevent the United States from being able to project power into Asia or to cause societal chaos inside the United States — to affect our decision-making around a crisis,” said Brandon Wales, executive director of the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). “That is a significant change from Chinese cyber activity from seven to 10 years ago that was focused primarily on political and economic espionage.”
Morgan Adamski, director of the National Security Agency’s Cybersecurity Collaboration Center, confirmed in an email that Volt Typhoon activity “appears to be focused on targets within the Indo-Pacific region, to include Hawaii.”
The hackers often sought to mask their tracks by threading their attacks through innocuous devices such as home or office routers before reaching their victims, officials said. A key goal was to steal employee credentials they could use to return, posing as normal users. But some of their entry methods have not been determined.
The hackers are looking for a way to get in and stay in without being detected, said Joe McReynolds, a China security studies fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, a think tank focused on security issues. “You’re trying to build tunnels into your enemies’ infrastructure that you can later use to attack. Until then you lie in wait, carry out reconnaissance, figure out if you can move into industrial control systems or more critical companies or targets upstream. And one day, if you get the order from on high, you switch from reconnaissance to attack.”
The disclosures to The Post build on the annual threat assessment in February by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which warned that China “almost certainly is capable” of launching cyberattacks that would disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines and rail systems.
“If Beijing feared that a major conflict with the United States were imminent, it almost certainly would consider undertaking aggressive cyber operations against U.S. homeland critical infrastructure and military assets worldwide,” the assessment said.
Some of the victims compromised by Volt Typhoon were smaller companies and organizations across a range of sectors and “not necessarily those that would have an immediate relevant connection to a critical function upon which many Americans depend,” said Eric Goldstein, CISA’s executive assistant director. This may have been “opportunistic targeting ... based upon where they can gain access” — a way to get a toehold into a supply chain in the hopes of one day moving into larger, more-critical customers, he said.
Chinese military officers have described in internal documents how they might use cyber tools or “network warfare” in a conflict, said McReynolds, who has seen some of the writings. He said military strategists speak of synchronizing air and missile strikes with disruption of command-and-control networks, critical infrastructure, satellite networks and military logistics systems.
They have talked about these tools applying in amphibious invasions, he said. “This is stuff they pretty clearly see as relevant to a Taiwan scenario,” he said, “though they don’t explicitly say this is how we’re going to take over Taiwan.”
This is far from China’s first foray into hacking critical infrastructure. In 2012, a Canadian company, Telvent, whose software remotely operated major natural gas pipelines in North America, notified customers that a sophisticated hacker had breached its firewalls and stolen data relating to industrial control systems. The cybersecurity firm Mandiant traced the breach to a prolific PLA hacking group, Unit 61398. Five members of the unit were indicted in 2014 on charges of hacking U.S. companies.
At the time, the U.S. government wasn’t sure whether China’s aim was to collect intelligence or pre-position itself to disrupt. Today, based on intelligence collection and the fact that the facilities targeted have little intelligence of political or economic value, U.S. officials say it’s clear that the only reason to penetrate them is to be able to conduct disruptive or destructive actions later.
Threat researcher Jonathan Condra of security company Recorded Future — which during the summer found Volt Typhoon probing the Texas grid — said the secrecy with which the Chinese have conducted the attacks argues against any notion that they wanted the United States to know their capabilities.
The hackers “were doing this a lot more stealthily than if they were trying to get caught,” he said.
The U.S. government has long sought to improve coordination with the private sector, which owns most of the nation’s critical infrastructure, and with tech companies that can detect cyberthreats. Companies such as Microsoft share anonymized information about adversary tactics, indicators that a system has been compromised, and mitigations, said CISA’s Goldstein. Generally, these companies are not seeing the hacker’s presence within the customers’ networks, but rather are detecting it through communications to the servers the hacker is using to direct the attack, he said.
In some cases, the victims themselves seek assistance from CISA. In others, Goldstein said, CISA is alerted by a software or communications vendor to a victim and the government must seek a court order to compel the vendor to reveal the victim’s identity.
In May, Microsoft said it had found Volt Typhoon infiltrating critical infrastructure in Guam and elsewhere, listing a number of sectors. Those included telecommunications firms, according to people familiar with the matter. The hacks were especially concerning, analysts said, because Guam is the closest U.S. territory to the contested Taiwan Strait.
The intrusions into sectors like water and energy systems come as the Biden administration has sought to strengthen industries’ ability to defend themselves by issuing mandatory cybersecurity rules. In the summer of 2021, the administration rolled out first-ever oil and gas pipeline cyber regulations. In March, the Environmental Protection Agency announced a requirement for states to report on cyberthreats in their public water system audits. Soon after, however, three states sued the administration, charging regulatory overreach.
The EPA pulled back the rule and has asked Congress to act on a regulation. In the meantime, the agency must rely on states to report threats voluntarily.
In a joint advisory issued in May, the Five Eyes intelligence alliance of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand offered advice on how to hunt for the intruders. One of the challenges is the hackers’ tactic of evading detection by firewalls and other defenses by using legitimate tools so that the hackers’ presence blends in with normal network activity. The technique is called “living off the land.”
“The two toughest challenges with these techniques are determining that a compromise has occurred, and then once detected, having confidence that the actor was evicted,” said the NSA’s Adamski, whose Cybersecurity Collaboration Center coordinates with private industry.
The NSA and other agencies recommend mass password resets and better monitoring of accounts that have high network privileges. They have also urged companies to require more secure forms of multifactor authentication, such as hardware tokens, rather than relying on a text message to a user’s phone, which can be intercepted by foreign governments.
Despite the heightened scrutiny growing out of the May advisory, the hackers persisted, seeking new targets.
In August, according to Recorded Future, the hackers attempted to make connections from infrastructure that had been used by Volt Typhoon to internet domains or subdomains used by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, which operates that state’s electric grid. Though there is no evidence the attempts succeeded in penetrating the system, the effort highlights the kinds of targets the Chinese military is interested in. The two Texas agencies declined to answer questions about the incidents from The Post.
The Reliability Council said it works closely with federal agencies and industry groups and that it has redundant systems and controlled access as part of a “layered defense.”
In the weeks leading up to the Biden-Xi meeting last month, NSA officials speaking at industry conferences repeated the call to the private sector to share information on hacking attempts. The NSA can peer into adversaries’ networks overseas, while U.S. companies have visibility into domestic corporate networks. Together, industry and government can have a fuller picture of attackers’ goals, tactics and motives, U.S. officials say.
China “is sitting on a stockpile of strategic” vulnerabilities, or undisclosed security flaws it can use in stealthy attacks, Adamski said last month at the CyberWarCon conference in Washington. “This is a fight for our critical infrastructure. We have to make it harder for them.”
The topic of Chinese cyber intrusions into critical infrastructure was on a proposed list of talking points to raise in Biden’s encounter with Xi, according to people familiar with the matter, but it did not come up in the four-hour meeting.
The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · December 11, 2023
16. Israel-Gaza war live updates: Biden says Israel is losing support worldwide over ‘indiscriminate bombing’ in Gaza
Are the Israelis really conducting indiscriminate bombing? Or is that how the press and pundits are describing it? Are they using their intelligence to the best of their ability to conduct effective targeting though large areas are likely stuck due to their relation to Hamas and its terrorist activities?
Should an American president accuse Israel of indiscriminate bombing? It may be the appearance of indiscriminate bombing but is that really the case? On the other hand for most perception is reality and it will be hard to undo the perceptions about Israeli military operations since there are so many who want to believe the press and the pundits.
Israel-Gaza war live updates: Biden says Israel is losing support worldwide over ‘indiscriminate bombing’ in Gaza
The Washington Post · December 12, 2023
President Biden offered sharp criticism of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government Tuesday, calling for a change to the approach embraced by Israel’s leadership — which Biden described as “the most conservative” in Israel’s history. The president said Israel was beginning to lose support around the world due to “indiscriminate bombing” in remarks made during a fundraiser in Washington, and urged Israel to seek a long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He added that he warned Netanyahu about repeating mistakes made by the U.S. after 9/11, while reiterating his support for Israel’s mission to “take on Hamas.”
Here's what to know:
Netanyahu said earlier in the day that there was still disagreement with the United States about the future of Gaza after Hamas. In a statement Tuesday, he said he would not allow Gaza to be controlled by the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority. “I will not allow the entry into Gaza of those who educate for terrorism, support terrorism and finance terrorism,” he said. “Gaza will be neither Hamastan nor Fatahstan.”
U.S. officials said a missile launched from Yemen on Monday hit the Strinda, a Norwegian oil and chemical tanker. The White House has pitched to allies a multinational task force to protect commercial ships traveling near Yemen after several Red Sea attacks by the Houthis, a Yemeni militant group aligned with Iran.
Israel said it opened a new site to screen aid for Gaza, at the southern Kerem Shalom border crossing, but the aid will not cross through there; aid will continue to enter Gaza only via Egypt. Supplies have trickled into Gaza through the Rafah crossing with Egypt, although aid groups warn that it is far below daily needs as Palestinians face mass starvation.
The U.N. General Assembly is expected to hold an emergency session Tuesday at the request of Egypt and Mauritania. Both nations cited the United States’ veto of a cease-fire resolution backed by the majority of the Security Council as a reason.
Israel used U.S.-supplied white phosphorus munitions in an October attack that injured at least nine civilians in southern Lebanon, according to a Washington Post analysis of shell fragments found in a village. Rights groups said the attack should be investigated as a war crime.
At least 18,412 people have been killed in Gaza and more than 50,100 wounded since the war began, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. At least 1,200 people were killed in Israel during Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack.
1/6
End of carousel
Here's what to know
Netanyahu said earlier in the day that there was still disagreement with the United States about the future of Gaza after Hamas. In a statement Tuesday, he said he would not allow Gaza to be controlled by the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority. “I will not allow the entry into Gaza of those who educate for terrorism, support terrorism and finance terrorism,” he said. “Gaza will be neither Hamastan nor Fatahstan.”
U.S. officials said a missile launched from Yemen on Monday hit the Strinda, a Norwegian oil and chemical tanker. The White House has pitched to allies a multinational task force to protect commercial ships traveling near Yemen after several Red Sea attacks by the Houthis, a Yemeni militant group aligned with Iran.
Israel said it opened a new site to screen aid for Gaza, at the southern Kerem Shalom border crossing, but the aid will not cross through there; aid will continue to enter Gaza only via Egypt. Supplies have trickled into Gaza through the Rafah crossing with Egypt, although aid groups warn that it is far below daily needs as Palestinians face mass starvation.
The U.N. General Assembly is expected to hold an emergency session Tuesday at the request of Egypt and Mauritania. Both nations cited the United States’ veto of a cease-fire resolution backed by the majority of the Security Council as a reason.
Israel used U.S.-supplied white phosphorus munitions in an October attack that injured at least nine civilians in southern Lebanon, according to a Washington Post analysis of shell fragments found in a village. Rights groups said the attack should be investigated as a war crime.
At least 18,412 people have been killed in Gaza and more than 50,100 wounded since the war began, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. At least 1,200 people were killed in Israel during Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack.
End of carousel
The Washington Post · December 12, 2023
17. The Self-Doubting Superpower By Fareed Zakaria
"Don't give up the ship." (or "keep the faith")
Excerpts:
If the United States reneges on this broad, open, generous vision of the world out of fear and pessimism, it will have lost a great deal of its natural advantages. For too long, it has rationalized individual actions that are contrary to its avowed principles as the exceptions it must make to shore up its own situation and thereby bolster the order as a whole. It breaks a norm to get a quick result. But you cannot destroy the rules-based system in order to save it. The rest of the world watches and learns. Already, countries are in a competitive race, enacting subsidies, preferences, and barriers to protect their own economies. Already, countries violate international rules and point to Washington’s hypocrisy as justification. This pattern unfortunately includes the previous president’s lack of respect for democratic norms. Poland’s ruling party spun Trump-like conspiracy theories after it lost a recent election, and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s claims of election fraud drove his supporters to mount a January 6–style attack on his country’s capital.
The most worrying challenge to the rules-based international order does not come from China, Russia, or Iran. It comes from the United States. If America, consumed by exaggerated fears of its own decline, retreats from its leading role in world affairs, it will open up power vacuums across the globe and encourage a variety of powers and players to try to step into the disarray. We have seen what a post-American Middle East looks like. Imagine something similar in Europe and Asia, but this time with great powers, not regional ones, doing the disrupting, and with seismic global consequences. It is disturbing to watch as parts of the Republican Party return to the isolationism that characterized the party in the 1930s, when it resolutely opposed U.S. intervention even as Europe and Asia burned.
Since 1945, America has debated the nature of its engagement with the world, but not whether it should be engaged to begin with. Were the country to truly turn inward, it would mark a retreat for the forces of order and progress. Washington can still set the agenda, build alliances, help solve global problems, and deter aggression while using limited resources—well below the levels that it spent during the Cold War. It would have to pay a far higher price if order collapsed, rogue powers rose, and the open world economy fractured or closed.
The United States has been central to establishing a new kind of international relations since 1945, one that has grown in strength and depth over the decades. That system serves the interests of most countries in the world, as well as those of the United States. It faces new stresses and challenges, but many powerful countries also benefit from peace, prosperity, and a world of rules and norms. Those challenging the current system have no alternative vision that would rally the world; they merely seek a narrow advantage for themselves. And for all its internal difficulties, the United States above all others remains uniquely capable and positioned to play the central role in sustaining this international system. As long as America does not lose faith in its own project, the current international order can thrive for decades to come.
The Self-Doubting Superpower
America Shouldn’t Give Up on the World It Made
January/February 2024
Published on December 12, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Fareed Zakaria · December 12, 2023
Most Americans think their country is in decline. In 2018, when the Pew Research Center asked Americans how they felt their country would perform in 2050, 54 percent of respondents agreed that the U.S. economy would be weaker. An even larger number, 60 percent, agreed that the United States would be less important in the world. This should not be surprising; the political atmosphere has been pervaded for some time by a sense that the country is headed in the wrong direction. According to a long-running Gallup poll, the share of Americans who are “satisfied” with the way things are going has not crossed 50 percent in 20 years. It currently stands at 20 percent.
Over the decades, one way of thinking about who would win the presidency was to ask: Who is the more optimistic candidate? From John F. Kennedy to Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, the sunnier outlook seemed to be the winning ticket. But in 2016, the United States elected a politician whose campaign was premised on doom and gloom. Donald Trump emphasized that the U.S. economy was in a “dismal state,” that the United States had been “disrespected, mocked, and ripped off” abroad, and that the world was “a total mess.” In his inaugural address, he spoke of “American carnage.” His current campaign has reprised these core themes. Three months before declaring his candidacy, he released a video titled “A Nation in Decline.”
Joe Biden’s 2020 presidential campaign was far more traditional. He frequently extolled the United States’ virtues and often recited that familiar line, “Our best days still lie ahead.” And yet, much of his governing strategy has been predicated on the notion that the country has been following the wrong course, even under Democratic presidents, even during the Obama-Biden administration. In an April 2023 speech, Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, criticized “much of the international economic policy of the last few decades,” blaming globalization and liberalization for hollowing out the country’s industrial base, exporting American jobs, and weakening some core industries. Writing later in these pages, he worried that “although the United States remained the world’s preeminent power, some of its most vital muscles atrophied.” This is a familiar critique of the neoliberal era, one in which a few prospered but many were left behind.
It goes beyond mere critique. Many of the Biden administration’s policies seek to rectify the apparent hollowing out of the United States, promoting the logic that its industries and people need to be protected and assisted by tariffs, subsidies, and other kinds of support. In part, this approach may be a political response to the reality that some Americans have in fact been left behind and happen to live in crucial swing states, making it important to court them and their votes. But the remedies are much more than political red meat; they are far-reaching and consequential. The United States currently has the highest tariffs on imports since the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930. Washington’s economic policies are increasingly defensive, designed to protect a country that has supposedly lost out in the last few decades.
A U.S. grand strategy that is premised on mistaken assumptions will lead the country and the world astray. On measure after measure, the United States remains in a commanding position compared with its major competitors and rivals. Yet it does confront a very different international landscape. Many powers across the globe have risen in strength and confidence. They will not meekly assent to American directives. Some of them actively seek to challenge the United States’ dominant position and the order that has been built around it. In these new circumstances, Washington needs a new strategy, one that understands that it remains a formidable power but operates in a far less quiescent world. The challenge for Washington is to run fast but not run scared. Today, however, it remains gripped by panic and self-doubt.
STILL NUMBER ONE
Despite all the talk of American dysfunction and decay, the reality is quite different, especially when compared with other rich countries. In 1990, the United States’ per capita income (measured in terms of purchasing power) was 17 percent higher than Japan’s and 24 percent higher than Western Europe’s. Today, it is 54 percent and 32 percent higher, respectively. In 2008, at current prices, the American and eurozone economies were roughly the same size. The U.S. economy is now nearly twice as large as the eurozone. Those who blame decades of American stagnation on Washington’s policies might be asked a question: With which advanced economy would the United States want to have swapped places over the last 30 years?
In terms of hard power, the country is also in an extraordinary position. The economic historian Angus Maddison argued that the world’s greatest power is often the one that has the strongest lead in the most important technologies of the time—the Netherlands in the seventeenth century, the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century, and the United States in the twentieth century. America in the twenty-first century might be even stronger than it was in the twentieth. Compare its position in, say, the 1970s and 1980s with its position today. Back then, the leading technology companies of the time—manufacturers of consumer electronics, cars, computers—could be found in the United States but also in Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea. In fact, of the ten most valuable companies in the world in 1989, only four were American, and the other six were Japanese. Today, nine of the top ten are American.
What is more, the top ten most valuable U.S. technology companies have a total market capitalization greater than the combined value of the stock markets of Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. And if the United States utterly dominates the technologies of the present—centered on digitization and the Internet—it also seems poised to succeed in the industries of the future, such as artificial intelligence and bioengineering. In 2023, as of this writing, the United States has attracted $26 billion in venture capital for artificial intelligence startups, about six times as much as China, the next highest recipient. In biotech, North America captures 38 percent of global revenues while all of Asia accounts for 24 percent.
Of the ten most valuable companies in the world, nine are American.
In addition, the United States leads in what has historically been a key attribute of a nation’s strength: energy. Today, it is the world’s largest producer of oil and gas—larger even than Russia or Saudi Arabia. The United States is also massively expanding production of green energy, thanks in part to the incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. As for finance, look at the list of banks designated “globally systemically important” by the Financial Stability Board, a Switzerland-based oversight body; the United States has twice as many such banks as the next country, China. The dollar remains the currency used in almost 90 percent of international transactions. Even though central banks’ dollar reserves have dropped in the last 20 years, no other competitor currency even comes close.
Finally, if demography is destiny, the United States has a bright future. Alone among the world’s advanced economies, its demographic profile is reasonably healthy, even if it has worsened in recent years. The U.S. fertility rate now stands around 1.7 children per woman, below the replacement level of 2.1. But that compares favorably with 1.5 for Germany, 1.1 for China, and 0.8 for South Korea. Crucially, the United States makes up for its low fertility through immigration and successful assimilation. The country takes in around one million legal immigrants every year, a number that fell during the Trump and COVID-19 years but has since rebounded. One in five of all people on earth who live outside their country of birth live in the United States, and its immigrant population is nearly four times that of Germany, the next-largest immigration hub. For that reason, whereas China, Japan, and Europe are projected to experience population declines in the coming decades, the United States should keep growing.
Of course, the United States has many problems. What country doesn’t? But it has the resources to solve these problems far more easily than most other countries. China’s plunging fertility rate, for example, the legacy of the one-child policy, is proving impossible to reverse despite government inducements of all kinds. And since the government wants to maintain a monolithic culture, the country is not going to take in immigrants to compensate. The United States’ vulnerabilities, by contrast, often have ready solutions. The country has a high debt load and rising deficits. But its total tax burden is low compared with those of other rich countries. The U.S. government could raise enough revenues to stabilize its finances and maintain relatively low tax rates. One easy step would be to adopt a value-added tax. A version of the VAT exists in every other major economy across the globe, often with rates around 20 percent. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that a five percent VAT would raise $3 trillion over a decade, and a higher rate would obviously raise even more. This is not a picture of irremediable structural dysfunction that will lead inexorably to collapse.
BETWEEN WORLDS
Despite its strength, the United States does not preside over a unipolar world. The 1990s was a world without geopolitical competitors. The Soviet Union was collapsing (and soon its successor, Russia, would be reeling), and China was still an infant on the international stage, generating less than two percent of global GDP. Consider what Washington was able to do in that era. To liberate Kuwait, it fought a war against Iraq with widespread international backing, including diplomatic approval from Moscow. It ended the Yugoslav wars. It got the Palestine Liberation Organization to renounce terrorism and recognize Israel, and it convinced Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to make peace and shake hands on the White House lawn with the PLO’s leader, Yasser Arafat. In 1994, even North Korea seemed willing to sign on to an American framework and end its nuclear weapons program (a momentary lapse into amicable cooperation from which it quickly recovered). When financial crises hit Mexico in 1994 and East Asian countries in 1997, the United States saved the day by organizing massive bailouts. All roads led to Washington.
Today, the United States faces a world with real competitors and many more countries vigorously asserting their interests, often in defiance of Washington. To understand the new dynamic, consider not Russia or China but Turkey. Thirty years ago, Turkey was an obedient U.S. ally, dependent on Washington for its security and prosperity. Whenever Turkey went through one of its periodic economic crises, the United States helped bail it out. Today, Turkey is a much richer and more politically mature country, led by a strong, popular, and populist leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It routinely defies the United States, even when requests are made at the highest levels.
Washington was unprepared for this shift. In 2003, the United States planned a two-front invasion of Iraq—from Kuwait in the south and from Turkey in the north—but failed to secure Turkey’s support preemptively, assuming it would be able to get that country’s assent as it always had. In fact, when the Pentagon asked, the Turkish parliament declined, and the invasion had to proceed in a hasty and ill-planned manner that might have had something to do with how things later unraveled. In 2017, Turkey inked a deal to buy a missile system from Russia—a brazen move for a NATO member. Two years later, Turkey again thumbed its nose at the United States by attacking Kurdish forces in Syria, American allies who had just helped defeat the Islamic State there.
Scholars are debating whether the world is currently unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, and there are metrics one can use to make each case. The United States remains the single strongest country when adding up all hard-power metrics. For example, it has 11 aircraft carriers in operation, compared with China’s two. Watching countries such as India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey flex their muscles, one can easily imagine that the world is multipolar. Yet China is clearly the second-biggest power, and the gap between the top two and the rest of the world is significant: China’s economy and its military spending exceed those of the next three countries combined. The gap between the top two and all others was the principle that led the scholar Hans Morgenthau to popularize the term “bipolarity” after World War II. With the collapse of British economic and military power, he argued, the United States and the Soviet Union were leagues ahead of every other country. Extending that logic to today, one might conclude that the world is again bipolar.
Visitors standing before the Star-Spangled Banner in Washington, D.C., June 2023
Kevin Lamarque / Reuters
But China’s power also has limits, derived from factors that go beyond demographics. It has just one treaty ally, North Korea, and a handful of informal allies, such as Russia and Pakistan. The United States has dozens of allies. In the Middle East, China is not particularly active despite one recent success in presiding over the restoration of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In Asia, it is economically ubiquitous but also draws constant pushback from countries such as Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea. And in recent years, Western countries have become wary of China’s growing strength in technology and economics and have moved to limit its access.
China’s example helps clarify that there is a difference between power and influence. Power is made up of hard resources—economic, technological, and military. Influence is less tangible. It is the ability to make another country do something that it otherwise would not have done. To put it crudely, it means bending another country’s policies in the direction you prefer. That is ultimately the point of power: to be able to translate it into influence. And by that yardstick, both the United States and China face a world of constraints.
Other countries have risen in terms of resources, fueling their confidence, pride, and nationalism. In turn, they are likely to assert themselves more forcefully on the world stage. That is true of the smaller countries surrounding China but also of the many countries that have long been subservient to the United States. And there is a new class of medium powers, such as Brazil, India, and Indonesia, that are searching for their own distinctive strategies. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has pursued a policy of “multi-alignment,” choosing when and where to make common cause with Russia or the United States. In the BRICS grouping, it has even aligned itself with China, a country with which it has engaged in deadly border skirmishes as recently as 2020.
In a 1999 article in these pages, “The Lonely Superpower,” the political scientist Samuel Huntington tried to look beyond unipolarity and describe the emerging world order. The term he came up with was “uni-multipolar,” an extremely awkward turn of phrase yet one that captured something real. In 2008, when I was trying to describe the emerging reality, I called it a “post-American world” because it struck me that the most salient characteristic was that everyone was trying to navigate the world as U.S. unipolarity began to wane. It still seems to be the best way to describe the international system.
THE NEW DISORDER
Consider the two great international crises of the moment, the invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war. In Russian President Vladimir Putin’s mind, his country was humiliated during the age of unipolarity. Since then, mainly as a result of rising energy prices, Russia has been able to return to the world stage as a great power. Putin has rebuilt the power of the Russian state, which can extract revenues from its many natural resources. And now he wants to undo the concessions Moscow made during the unipolar era, when it was weak. It has been seeking to reclaim those parts of the Russian Empire that are central to Putin’s vision of a great Russia—Ukraine above all else, but also Georgia, which it invaded in 2008. Moldova, where Russia already has a foothold in the breakaway Transnistria republic, could be next.
Putin’s aggression in Ukraine was premised on the notion that the United States was losing interest in its European allies and that they were weak, divided, and dependent on Russian energy. He gobbled up Crimea and the borderlands of eastern Ukraine in 2014, and then, just after the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline bringing Russian gas to Germany, decided to frontally attack Ukraine. He hoped to conquer the country, thus reversing the greatest setback Russia had endured in the unipolar age. Putin miscalculated, but it was not a crazy move. After all, his previous incursions had been met with little resistance.
In the Middle East, the geopolitical climate has been shaped by Washington’s steady desire to withdraw from the region militarily over the last 15 years. That policy began under President George W. Bush, who was chastened by the fiasco of the war he had started in Iraq. It continued under President Barack Obama, who articulated the need to reduce the United States’ profile in the region so that Washington could take on the more pressing issue of China’s rise. This strategy was advertised as a pivot to Asia but also a pivot away from the Middle East, where the administration felt the United States was overinvested militarily. That shift was underscored by Washington’s sudden and complete withdrawal from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021.
The result has not been the happy formation of a new balance of power but rather a vacuum that regional players have aggressively sought to fill. Iran has expanded its influence, thanks to the Iraq war, which upset the balance of power between the region’s Sunnis and Shiites. With Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-dominated regime toppled, Iraq was governed by its Shiite majority, many of whose leaders had close ties to Iran. This expansion of Iranian influence continued into Syria, where Tehran backed the government of Bashar al-Assad, allowing it to survive a brutal insurgency. Iran supported the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Israel’s occupied territories.
There is a difference between power and influence.
Rattled by all this, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and some other moderate Sunni states began a process of tacit cooperation with Iran’s other great enemy, Israel. That burgeoning alliance, with the 2020 Abraham Accords as an important milestone, seemed destined to culminate in the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The obstacle to such an alliance had always been the Palestinian issue, but the retreat of Washington and the advances of Tehran made the Arabs willing to ignore that once central issue. Watching closely, Hamas, an ally of Iran, chose to burn down the house, returning the group and its cause to the spotlight.
The most portentous challenge to the current international order comes in Asia, with the rise of Chinese power. This could produce another crisis—far bigger than the other two—if China were to test the resolve of the United States and its allies by trying to forcibly reunify Taiwan with the mainland. So far, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s hesitation about using military force serves as a reminder that his country, unlike Russia, Iran, and Hamas, gains much from being tightly integrated into the world and its economy. But whether this restraint will hold is an open question. And the increased odds of an invasion of Taiwan today compared with, say, 20 years ago are one more signal of the weakening of unipolarity and the rise of a post-American world.
Yet another indication of the United States’ reduced leverage in this emerging order is that informal security guarantees might give way to more formal ones. For decades, Saudi Arabia has lived under an American security umbrella, but it was a sort of gentleman’s agreement. Washington made no commitments or guarantees to Riyadh. Were the Saudi monarchy to be threatened, it had to hope that the U.S. president at the time would come to its rescue. In fact, in 1990, when Iraq menaced Saudi Arabia after invading Kuwait, President George H. W. Bush did come to the rescue with military force—but he was not required to do so by any treaty or agreement. Today, Saudi Arabia is feeling much stronger and is being courted actively by the other world power, China, which is its largest customer by far. Under its assertive crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom has become more demanding, asking Washington for a formal security guarantee like the one extended to NATO allies and the technology to build a nuclear industry. It remains unclear whether the United States will grant those requests—the question is tied in with a normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel—but the very fact that the Saudi demands are being taken seriously is a sign of a changing power dynamic.
STAYING POWER
The international order that the United States built and sustained is being challenged on many fronts. But it remains the most powerful player in that order. Its share of global GDP remains roughly what it was in 1980 or 1990. Perhaps more significant, it has racked up even more allies. By the end of the 1950s, the “free world” coalition that fought and would win the Cold War was made up of the members of NATO—the United States, Canada, 11 Western European countries, Greece, and Turkey—plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. Today, the coalition supporting Ukraine’s military or enforcing sanctions against Russia has expanded to include almost every country in Europe, as well as a smattering of other states. Overall, the “West Plus” encompasses about 60 percent of the world’s GDP and 65 percent of global military spending.
The challenge of combating Russian expansionism is real and formidable. Before the war, the Russian economy was about ten times the size of Ukraine’s. Its population is almost four times larger. Its military-industrial complex is vast. But its aggression cannot be allowed to succeed. One of the core features of the liberal international order put in place after World War II has been that borders changed by brute military force are not recognized by the international community. Since 1945, there have been very few successful acts of aggression of this sort, in marked contrast to before then, when borders around the world changed hands routinely because of war and conquest. Russia’s success in its naked conquest would shatter a hard-won precedent.
The China challenge is a different one. No matter its exact economic trajectory in the years ahead, China is a superpower. Its economy already accounts for close to 20 percent of global GDP. It is second only to the United States in military spending. Although it does not have nearly as much clout as the United States on the global stage, its ability to influence countries around the world has increased, thanks in no small measure to the vast array of loans, grants, and assistance it has offered. But China is not a spoiler state like Russia. It has grown rich and powerful within the international system and because of it; it is far more uneasy about overturning that system.
Traders working at the New York Stock Exchange in New York City, July 2023
Brendan McDermid / Reuters
More broadly, China is searching for a way to expand its power. If it believes that it can find no way to do so other than to act as a spoiler, then it will. The United States should accommodate legitimate Chinese efforts to enhance its influence in keeping with its rising economic clout while deterring illegitimate ones. Over the past few years, Beijing has seen how its overly aggressive foreign policy has backfired. It has now pulled back on its assertive “Wolf Warrior diplomacy,” and some of the arrogance of Xi’s earlier pronouncements about a “new era” of Chinese dominance has given way to a recognition of America’s strengths and China’s problems. At least for tactical reasons, Xi seems to be searching for a modus vivendi with America. In September 2023, he told a visiting group of U.S. senators, “We have 1,000 reasons to improve China-U.S. relations, but not one reason to ruin them.”
Regardless of China’s intentions, the United States has significant structural advantages. It enjoys a unique geographic and geopolitical leg up. It is surrounded by two vast oceans and two friendly neighbors. China, on the other hand, is rising in a crowded and hostile continent. Every time it flexes its muscles, it alienates one of its powerful neighbors, from India to Japan to Vietnam. Several countries in the region—Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea—are actual treaty allies with the United States and host U.S. troops. These dynamics hem China in.
Washington’s alliances in Asia and elsewhere act as a bulwark against its adversaries. For that reality to hold, the United States must make shoring up its alliances the centerpiece of its foreign policy. Indeed, that has been at the heart of Biden’s approach to foreign policy. He has repaired the ties that frayed under the Trump administration and strengthened those that didn’t. He has put in place checks on Chinese power and bolstered alliances in Asia yet reached out to build a working relationship with Beijing. He reacted to the Ukraine crisis with a speed and skill that must have surprised Putin, who now faces a West that has weaned itself from Russian energy and instituted the most punishing sanctions against a great power in history. None of these steps obviate the need for Ukraine to win on the battlefield, but they create a context in which the West Plus has substantial leverage and Russia faces a bleak long-term future.
THE DANGER OF DECLINISM
The greatest flaw in Trump’s and Biden’s approaches to foreign policy—and here the two do converge—derives from their similarly pessimistic outlooks. Both assume that the United States has been the great victim of the international economic system that it created. Both assume that the country cannot compete in a world of open markets and free trade. It is reasonable to put in place some restrictions on China’s access to the United States’ highest-tech exports, but Washington has gone much further, levying tariffs on its closest allies on commodities and goods from lumber to steel to washing machines. It has imposed requirements that U.S. government funds be used to “buy American.” Those provisions are even more restrictive than tariffs. Tariffs raise the cost of imported goods; “buy American” prevents foreign goods from being bought at any price. Even smart policies such as the push toward green energy are undermined by pervasive protectionism that alienates the United States’ friends and allies.
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the director-general of the World Trade Organization, has argued that rich countries are now engaging in acts of supreme hypocrisy. Having spent decades urging the developing world to liberalize and participate in the open world economy and castigating countries for protectionism, subsidies, and industrial policies, the Western world has stopped practicing what it has long preached. Having grown to wealth and power under such a system, rich countries have decided to pull up the ladder. In her words, they “now no longer want to compete on a level playing field and would prefer instead to shift to a power-based rather than a rules-based system.”
U.S. officials spend much time and energy talking about the need to sustain the rules-based international system. At its heart is the open trading framework put in place by the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947. The statesmen who came out of World War II saw where competitive nationalism and protectionism had led and were determined to prevent the world from going back down that path. And they succeeded, creating a world of peace and prosperity that expanded to the four corners of the earth. The system of free trade they designed allowed poor countries to grow rich and powerful, making it less attractive for everyone to wage war and try to conquer territory.
China is not a spoiler state like Russia.
There is more to the rules-based order than trade. It also involves international treaties, procedures, and norms—a vision of a world that is not characterized by the laws of the jungle but rather by a degree of order and justice. Here as well, the United States has been better at preaching than practicing. The Iraq war was a gross violation of the United Nations’ principles against unprovoked aggression. Washington routinely picks and chooses which international conventions it observes and which it ignores. It criticizes China for violating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea when Beijing claims sovereignty over waters in East Asia—never mind that Washington itself has never ratified that treaty. When Trump pulled out of a nuclear deal with Iran signed by all the other great powers, despite confirmation that Tehran was adhering to its terms, he wrecked the hope of global cooperation on a key security challenge. He then maintained secondary sanctions to force those other great powers not to trade with Iran, abusing the power of the dollar in a move that accelerated efforts in Beijing, Moscow, and even European capitals to find alternatives to the dollar payment system. American unilateralism was tolerated in a unipolar world. Today, it is creating the search—even among the United States’ closest allies—for ways to escape, counter, and challenge it.
Much of the appeal of the United States has been that the country was never an imperial power on the scale of the United Kingdom or France. It was itself a colony. It sits far from the main arenas of global power politics, and it entered the twentieth century’s two world wars late and reluctantly. It has rarely sought territory when it has ventured abroad. But perhaps above all, after 1945, it articulated a vision of the world that considered the interests of others. The world order it proposed, created, and underwrote was good for the United States but also good for the rest of the world. It sought to help other nations rise to greater wealth, confidence, and dignity. That remains the United States’ greatest strength. People around the world may want the loans and aid they can get from China, but they have a sense that China’s worldview is essentially to make China great. Beijing often talks about “win-win cooperation.” Washington has a track record of actually doing it.
KEEP THE FAITH
If the United States reneges on this broad, open, generous vision of the world out of fear and pessimism, it will have lost a great deal of its natural advantages. For too long, it has rationalized individual actions that are contrary to its avowed principles as the exceptions it must make to shore up its own situation and thereby bolster the order as a whole. It breaks a norm to get a quick result. But you cannot destroy the rules-based system in order to save it. The rest of the world watches and learns. Already, countries are in a competitive race, enacting subsidies, preferences, and barriers to protect their own economies. Already, countries violate international rules and point to Washington’s hypocrisy as justification. This pattern unfortunately includes the previous president’s lack of respect for democratic norms. Poland’s ruling party spun Trump-like conspiracy theories after it lost a recent election, and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s claims of election fraud drove his supporters to mount a January 6–style attack on his country’s capital.
The most worrying challenge to the rules-based international order does not come from China, Russia, or Iran. It comes from the United States. If America, consumed by exaggerated fears of its own decline, retreats from its leading role in world affairs, it will open up power vacuums across the globe and encourage a variety of powers and players to try to step into the disarray. We have seen what a post-American Middle East looks like. Imagine something similar in Europe and Asia, but this time with great powers, not regional ones, doing the disrupting, and with seismic global consequences. It is disturbing to watch as parts of the Republican Party return to the isolationism that characterized the party in the 1930s, when it resolutely opposed U.S. intervention even as Europe and Asia burned.
Since 1945, America has debated the nature of its engagement with the world, but not whether it should be engaged to begin with. Were the country to truly turn inward, it would mark a retreat for the forces of order and progress. Washington can still set the agenda, build alliances, help solve global problems, and deter aggression while using limited resources—well below the levels that it spent during the Cold War. It would have to pay a far higher price if order collapsed, rogue powers rose, and the open world economy fractured or closed.
The United States has been central to establishing a new kind of international relations since 1945, one that has grown in strength and depth over the decades. That system serves the interests of most countries in the world, as well as those of the United States. It faces new stresses and challenges, but many powerful countries also benefit from peace, prosperity, and a world of rules and norms. Those challenging the current system have no alternative vision that would rally the world; they merely seek a narrow advantage for themselves. And for all its internal difficulties, the United States above all others remains uniquely capable and positioned to play the central role in sustaining this international system. As long as America does not lose faith in its own project, the current international order can thrive for decades to come.
Foreign Affairs · by Fareed Zakaria · December 12, 2023
18. Biden Administration Announces New Security Assistance for Ukraine
Biden Administration Announces New Security Assistance for Ukraine
defense.gov
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Immediate Release
Dec. 12, 2023 |×
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Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance to meet Ukraine's critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration's fifty-third tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. This package includes additional air defense capabilities, artillery ammunition, anti-tank weapons, and other equipment to help Ukraine counter Russia's ongoing war of aggression.
This package utilizes assistance previously authorized for Ukraine during prior fiscal years under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) that remained after the PDA revaluation process.
The capabilities in this package, valued at up to $200 million, include:
- AIM-9M missiles for air defense;
- Air defense system components;
- Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
- 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds;
- High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs);
- Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
- Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
- More than 4 million rounds of small arms ammunition;
- Demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing;
- Equipment to protect critical national infrastructure;
- Spare parts, generators, maintenance, and other ancillary equipment.
In close cooperation with its Allies and partners, the United States continues to support Ukraine's most pressing battlefield requirements, including capabilities needed to protect Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure from Russia's unrelenting aerial attacks. U.S. leadership remains essential to sustaining the coalition efforts of some 50 allies and partners currently supporting Ukraine. This support has enabled Ukrainian forces to defend their sovereignty and independence. It is critical that Congress takes action soon and passes the President's national security supplemental request to ensure that Ukraine can consolidate and extend its battlefield gains.
Security assistance for Ukraine remains a smart investment in our national security. It deters potential aggression elsewhere in the world, while strengthening our defense industrial base and creating highly skilled jobs for the American people.
Publication: Ukraine Fact Sheet – 12 Dec.
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19. Taking Additional Sweeping Measures Against Russia - United States Department of State
A lot to parse here. I will have to leave it to the experts.
Taking Additional Sweeping Measures Against Russia - United States Department of State
state.gov · by Office of the Spokesperson
Today, in coordination with the Department of the Treasury, the Department of State is imposing sanctions to further target individuals and entities associated with Russia’s war effort and other harmful activities. All targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, which authorizes sanctions with respect to specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation. The Department is designating over 100 individuals and entities targeting Russia’s future energy export and production capabilities, Russia’s metals and mining sector, and third country networks facilitating sanctions evasion and circumvention. We are also designating several shipping companies that have been involved in the transfer of munitions between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia.
CONSTRAINING RUSSIA’S FUTURE ENERGY PRODUCTION AND EXPORT CAPACITY
The Department of State continues to designate entities involved in the development of Russia’s future energy production and export capacity. Today, the Department of State is designating three entities involved in the development of Russia’s Ust-Luga Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) terminal, a facility under construction in Russia’s Port of Ust-Luga, which will be operated by Gazprom and RusGazDobycha. The equipment and architectural expertise provided by these entities is meant to significantly expand Russia’s future LNG production and export capacity.
The Department is designating the following two entities pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NORTHERN TECHNOLOGIES is a Russia-based company responsible for manufacturing heat exchange equipment necessary for gas processing and liquefaction at Russia’s future LNG terminal at Ust-Luga.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY KAZAN COMPRESSOR MACHINERY PLANT is a Russia-based company that manufactures compressor equipment necessary for production and export from Russia’s future LNG terminal at Ust-Luga.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the architecture sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GAZPROM LINDE ENGINEERING is a Russia-based company providing architecture and design services for Russia’s future LNG terminal facilities at Ust-Luga.
TARGETING RUSSIA’S METALS AND MINING SECTOR
In alignment with our commitments outlined in the May 19, 2023, G7 Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine, the Department of State is continuing to constrict Russia’s revenue from its metals and mining sector by designating individuals and entities associated with VLADISLAV VLADIMIROVICH SVIBLOV and HIGHLAND GOLD MINING LIMITED. HIGHLAND GOLD MINING LIMITED is the seventh-largest gold producer in Russia and is majority owned and controlled by VLADISLAV VLADIMIROVICH SVIBLOV. The Department is joining the United Kingdom in designating both VLADISLAV VLADIMIROVICH SVIBLOV and HIGHLAND GOLD MINING LIMITED, who were sanctioned by the United Kingdom on November 8, 2023.
The Department is designating the following entity and individual pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- HIGHLAND GOLD MINING LIMITED (HGM LTD) is a UK-registered gold mining company that conducts operations in Russia.
- VLADISLAV VLADIMIROVICH SVIBLOV (SVIBLOV) is a Russian oligarch that has earned his wealth mainly through investments in metals and mining companies that conduct operations in Russia. SVIBLOV holds majority ownership of multiple top gold producing companies operating in Russia to include HGM LTD, TRANS SIBERIAN GOLD LIMITED, JSC KAMCHATSKOE ZOLOTO, and JSC CHUKOTKA MINING GEOLOGICAL COMPANY.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, SVIBLOV, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- HOLDING LIMITED is a Cyprus-based holding company that is controlled by SVIBLOV.
- FORTIANA HOLDINGS LIMITED is a Cyprus-based holding company that is beneficially owned by SVIBLOV and holds majority ownership of HGM LTD.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- TRANS SIBERIAN GOLD LIMITED is a UK-registered gold mining company that conducts operations in Russia and is ultimately owned and controlled by SVIBLOV.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY KAMCHATSKOE ZOLOTO (JSC KAMCHATSKOE ZOLOTO) is a Russia-based gold mining company that conducts operations in Russia. JSC KAMCHATSKOE ZOLOTO is ranked in the top 15 gold miners in Russia and is ultimately owned and controlled by SVIBLOV.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY CHUKOTKA MINING GEOLOGICAL COMPANY is a Russia-based gold mining company.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KHORVIK is a Russia-based holding company that is used by SVIBLOV.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY BERING METALS is a major Russia-based holding company that is ultimately owned and controlled by SVIBLOV.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY OZGRK is a Russia-based holding company that is managed by SVIBLOV.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VOSTOK ZOLOTO is a Russia-based holding company that is ultimately owned and controlled by SVIBLOV.
- INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ASTECLING is a Russia-based company that is ultimately owned and controlled by SVIBLOV.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the management consulting sector of the Russian Federation economy:
INTERNATIONAL COMPANY JOINT STOCK COMPANY HIGHLAND GOLD is a Russia-based holding company used by SVIBLOV.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY FORTIANA is a Russia-based holding company managed by SVIBLOV.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY DV HOLDING is a Russia-based holding company managed and 99 percent owned by SVIBLOV.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY AVRORA is a Russia-based holding company managed by SVIBLOV.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FORTIANA INVEST is a Russia-based holding company managed and solely owned by SVIBLOV.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ASTECLING is a Russia-based holding company managed and solely owned by SVIBLOV.
DISRUPTING RUSSIA-DPRK MUNITIONS TRANSFERS
The Department is designating several shipping companies and associated vessels that have been involved in the transfer of munitions between the DPRK and the Russian Federation. The IBEX SHIPPING INC-owned vessel, MARIA, has been identified via imagery and multiple press reports as being part of a group of commercial vessels that have completed multiple deliveries of military equipment and munitions provided by the DPRK to Russia. Other vessels linked to this Russian-DPRK proliferation network, including the LADY R and the ANGARA, were previously designated by the Department pursuant to E.O. 14024 on May 8, 2022. Additionally, the IBEX SHIPPING INC-owned vessel CAPTAIN YAKUBOVICH has also previously been involved in the delivery of Russian-made armored vehicles to Burma. These designations follow the Department’s designations of several other individuals involved in munitions transfers from the DPRK to the Russian Federation in July and September 2023.
The Department is designating the following entities pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the marine sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- IBEX SHIPPING INC is the registered owner of three Russian-flagged vessels. The following vessels are being identified as blocked property in which IBEX SHIPPING INC has an interest: MARIA
- CAPTAIN YAKUBOVICH
- ARKADIY CHERNYSHEV
- AZIA SHIPPING HOLDINGS LIMITED is the manager of eight Russian-flagged vessels, including the CAPTAIN YAKUBOVICH and the ARKADIY CHERNYSHEV.
- AZIA SHIPPING COMPANY is based in Vladivostok, Russia, and describes itself as an exclusive goods carrier of the Russian Ministry of Defense.
CONSTRAINING RUSSIA’S DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Additional Entities Supporting the Russian Defense Industry
The Department is designating the following entities pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY TULATOCHMASH is a Russian company that works within the weapons and ammunition manufacturing industry.
- FEDERAL STATE ENTERPRISE PERM POWDER PLANT is a weapons manufacturer that produces ammunition and charges and igniters for rocket engines for various functional purposes.
Degrading Weapons and Ammunition Manufacturing
The Department is designating numerous defense entities and facilities that manufacture weapons, ammunition, and related equipment for the Russian defense sector to support its illegal war against Ukraine.
The Department is designating the following entities pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY CHEBOKSARY PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION NAMED AFTER V.I. CHAPAEV manufactures weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other materials for use by the Russian military and defense sector.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY NOVOSIBIRSK CARTRIDGE PLANT specializes in the manufacture of small arms ammunition for use by the Russian military and defense sector.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY BARNAUL CARTRIDGE PLANT manufactures small arms ammunition and has supplied cartridges and its other products to the Russian military.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY TETIS PRO specializes in the design, manufacture, and supply of diving and submersible equipment, including the Marlin-350 Uncrewed Underwater Vehicle (UUV) used by the Russian Navy and the MAIN DIRECTORATE OF DEEP-SEA RESEARCH (GUGI). GUGI was designated by the Department of State pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 on February 24, 2023.
- OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY TAMBOVSKY BAKERY assembles unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) called “Bekas” for use by the Russian military against Ukraine.
- YAKT-SOKOL manufactures all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) for use by the Russian military against Ukraine.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY NIZHNY NOVGOROD PLANT OF THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF VICTORY (NIZHNY NOVGOROD 70TH ANNIVERSARY VICTORY PLANT) is a subsidiary of Russian government-owned JOINT STOCK COMPANY AEROSPACE DEFENSE CONCERN ALMAZ-ANTEY and manufactures components for the S-400 and S-500 surface-to-air missile systems. JOINT STOCK COMPANY AEROSPACE DEFENSE CONCERN ALMAZ-ANTEY was designated by the Department of the Treasury pursuant to E.O. 14024 on January 26, 2023, and pursuant to E.O. 13661 on July 16, 2014.
- VASILY NIKOLAEVICH SHUPRANOV is the CEO of NIZHNY NOVGOROD 70TH ANNIVERSARY VICTORY PLANT.
- JSC RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CORPORATION URALVAGONZAVOD NAMED AFTER F.E. DZERZHINSKY (URALVAGONZAVOD) is a Russian government-owned company and the largest producer of tanks in the Russian Federation. URALVAGONZAVOD was previously designated by the Department of the Treasury pursuant to E.O. 13661 on July 16, 2014.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(C), the following individual is being designated for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of URALVAGONZAVOD:
- ALEKSANDR VALERYEVICH POTAPOV is the CEO of URALVAGONZAVOD.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY V.A. DEGTYAREV PLANT (V.A. DEGTYAREV PLANT) manufactures small arms and related equipment, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, for use by the Russian military against Ukraine. Pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(C), the following individual is being designated for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of V.A. DEGTYAREV PLANT:
- ANDREY PETROVICH KAZAZAEV is the CEO of V.A. DEGTYAREV PLANT.
Defense Industrial Base and Technology Procurement
The Department is designating multiple defense entities and procurement companies working to acquire and produce electronics and technologies in support of Russia’s war effort.
The Department is designating the following entities pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RADIOCOMP is one of the leading Russian suppliers of radio-frequency components from manufacturers worldwide to the Russian domestic market.
- JSC OPTRON STAVROPOL produces power optoelectronics and is the one of the only manufacturers of high-quality rotary silicon rectifier diodes in Russia, which have wide-ranging applications found in military and industrial hardware.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF OPTICAL MATERIALS ALL RUSSIA SCIENTIFIC CENTER S.I. VAVILOV STATE OPTICAL INSTITUTE designs optoelectronic systems with wide-ranging applications, including the development of optical fibers benefiting Russia’s industrial and military sectors.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOREIGN TRADE ASSOCIATION ELEKTRONINTORG produces the Shtora-1 defensive system mounted on the Russian T-90 series main battle tanks.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY AND PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION ELEKTROMASHINA (ELEKTROMASHINA) designs and manufacturers electrical components for armored vehicles used by the Russian military.
- IGOR YURIEVICH AFANASIEV is the CEO of ELEKTROMASHINA.
CUTTING OFF SANCTIONS EVASION AND BACKFILLING EFFORTS
The Department of State continues to disrupt the networks and channels through which Russia attempts to procure technology and equipment from third countries. Specifically, these designations target producers, exporters, and importers of items critical to Russia’s defense-industrial base, including common high-priority items identified by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, alongside the EU, UK, and Japan. Entities based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Turkiye, and the UAE have continued to send these items and other important dual-use goods to Russia, including critical components that Russia relies on for its weapons systems.
Russia and UAE-based Entities Procuring High-Priority Items
The Department is designating the following entities pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- LASERCHIPS FZCO (LASERCHIPS) is a UAE-based company that has supplied Russian companies with common high-priority items critical for Russia’s war in Ukraine, including to Russian company LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CHIPDEVICE, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024. Products supplied by LASERCHIPS include common high-priority items such as electronic integrated circuits (HS code 854239).
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CHIPDEVICE (CHIPDEVICE) is a Russia-based company that is a receiver of common high-priority electronic components of U.S. and European origin, supplied by UAE-based company, LASERCHIPS, a person whose property and interests in property are proposed for concurrent designation pursuant to E.O. 14024.
- RESOLUTE MACHINERY TRADING LLC is a UAE-based company that has supplied STAUT COMPANY LIMITED, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024, with common high-priority electronic components.
- GLOBAL CENTRAL LOGISTICS FZCO is a UAE-based company that has supplied Russian companies with electronic components.
- L D S COMPUTER SYSTEMS TRADING is a UAE-based company that has supplied electronic components to OOO VNESHEKOSTIL, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024.
Targeting a Network for State Corporation Rostec’s Defense Procurement
The Department is taking action to degrade a network of entities and individuals involved in procuring microelectronic components for the previously designated STATE CORPORATION ROSTEC (ROSTEC), which was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy. These microelectronics are being used for the development of electronic warfare systems. ROSTEC is a large Russian state-owned enterprise formed to consolidate Russia’s technological, aerospace, and military-industrial expertise. ROSTEC is also sanctioned by Australia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the UK.
The Department is designating the following entities pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY CONCERN RADIO ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES (KRET) is a Russia-based holding company for ROSTEC, which is currently designated under E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy. KRET controls over 80 subsidiaries and plants producing specialized systems for the Russian Armed Forces, including advanced electronic warfare and intelligence systems.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RADIOPRIBORSNAB (LLC RADIOPRIBORSNAB) is a Russia-based company involved in the wholesale of computers, computer peripheral equipment, and software. PROMTECHNOCERT, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024, owns 99.8 percent of LLC RADIOPRIBORSNAB.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VMK (VMK) is a Russia-based company involved in the wholesale trade in industrial electrical equipment, machinery, and materials.
- TURKIK UNION DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORMATION OFFICE INCORPORATED COMPANY (TURKIK UNION) is a Turkiye-based company that has supplied Russia-based companies with shipments of common high-priority electronic components, including Russia-based company, VMK.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(C), the following individual is being designated for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of TURKIK UNION:
- MUSTAFA CANKAT AYTEK (AYTEK) is the sole President of the Executive Board of TURKIK UNION, which has supplied Russia-based companies with shipments of common high-priority electronic components.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- TORDAN INDUSTRY LIMITED (TORDAN INDUSTRY) is a Hong Kong-based company that sent multiple shipments of common high-priority items, critical to Russia’s war in Ukraine, to the Russia-based company, VMK. TORDAN INDUSTRY has shipped at least $122 million in microelectronics to Russia.
- ALPHA TRADING INVESTMENTS LIMITED is a Hong Kong-based company that sent shipments of common high-priority items to Russia-based company, VMK.
- WARGOS INDUSTRY LIMITED is a Hong Kong-based company that sent several shipments of common high-priority items to Russia-based company, VMK.
- UNITED ELECTRONICS GROUP COMPANY LIMITED (UNITED ELECTRONICS) is a Hong Kong-based company that sent shipments of common high-priority items to Russia-based and U.S.-designated company, TESTKOMPLEKT, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024. UNITED ELECTRONICS was TESTKOMPLEKT’s largest supplier in 2022, shipping over $15.5 million in microelectronics.
- C&I SEMICONDUCTORS CO LIMITED (C&I SEMICONDUCTORS) is a Hong Kong-based company that sent shipments of common high-priority items to TESTKOMPLEKT. C&I SEMICONDUCTORS was one of TESTKOMPLEKT’s top ten suppliers in 2022, shipping over $4.5 million worth of items.
- CADY TECH HK LIMITED (CADY TECH) is a Hong Kong-based company that sent shipments of common high-priority items to TESTKOMPLEKT. CADY TECH was one of TESTKOMPLEKT’s top ten suppliers in 2022, shipping over $1 million worth of items.
- UU INNOVATION TECHNOLOGY CO LTD (UU INNOVATION TECHNOLOGY) is a PRC-based company that sent shipments of common high-priority items to TESTKOMPLEKT. UU INNOVATION TECHNOLOGY was one of TESTKOMPLEKT’s top ten suppliers in 2022, shipping over $3 million worth of items.
- SHENG CORE TECHNOLOGY CO LIMITED (SHENG CORE TECHNOLOGY) is a Hong Kong-based company that sent shipments of common high-priority items to TESTKOMPLEKT. SHENG CORE TECHNOLOGY was one of TESTKOMPLEKT’s top ten suppliers in 2022 shipping over $1 million worth of items.
- ROBOTRONIX SEMICONDUCTORS LIMITED (ROBOTRONIX SEMICONDUCTORS) is a Hong Kong-based company that sent common high-priority items to TESTKOMPLEKT. ROBOTRONIX SEMICONDUCTORS was one of TESTKOMPLEKT’s top ten suppliers in 2022, shipping over $1.5 million worth of items.
- GREAT SHARE INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LIMITED (GREAT SHARE) is a PRC-based company that sent shipments of common high- priority items to TESTKOMPLEKT. GREAT SHARE was one of TESTKOMPLEKT’s top ten suppliers in 2022, shipping over $4 million worth of items.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following individuals are being designated for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH PAN is the General Director of KRET, an entity being designated for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy.
- DARYA ANDREYEVNA KHORKINA is the General Director of LLC RADIOPRIBORSNAB, an entity being designated for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy.
- RUSLAN RUSTEMOVICH BULATOV is the General Director of TESTKOMPLEKT, an entity designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY RADIOPRIBORSNAB (JSC RADIOPRIBORSNAB) is a Russia-based company involved in the manufacturing of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation. JSC RADIOPRIBORSNAB is wholly owned by KRET.
- AUTONOMOUS NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION TESTING AND CERTIFICATION CENTER PROMTECHNOCERT (PROMTECHNOCERT) is a Russia-based company that develops and manufactures computing equipment. PROMTECHNOCERT is wholly owned by KRET.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MODERN CONVERSION TECHNOLOGIES (SKT) is a Russia-based company primarily engaged in the manufacturing electrical machinery and equipment. SKT is wholly owned by PROMTECHNOCERT.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following individual is being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH CHERKOVSKIY (CHERKOVSKIY) is the General Director of JSC RADIOPRIBORSNAB.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the engineering sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PROMELEKTRO ENGINEERING (PROMELEKTRO ENGINEERING) is a Russia-based company involved in engineering activities and related technical consultancy. PROMELEKTRO ENGINEERING is wholly owned by BULATOV.
PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MALIGN ACTORS
The Department is also taking further action to target those involved in supporting the Russian government’s war effort and other harmful activities.
The Department is designating the following entity and individuals pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- GOD SEMENOVICH NISANOV (NISANOV) is a co-founder of LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KYIV SQUARE, and was previously designated by the Department of State on June 2, 2022, pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KYIV SQUARE (KYIV SQUARE) is a Moscow-based construction company co-founded by NISANOV and ILIEV.
- ZARAKH BINSIONOVICH ILIEV is a long-time business partner and childhood friend of NISANOV, and a co-founder of KYIV SQUARE.
The Department is also re-designating one Russian national pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- ILYA BORISOVICH BRODSKIY (BRODSKIY) was designated on March 24, 2022, pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(C) for his role as a member of the board of the directors of U.S.-designated PJSC SOVCOMBANK. BRODSKIY is a founder and 50 percent shareholder of an entity that engages in the construction of both residential and non-residential buildings.
The Network Of Russian Oligarch Ivan Tavrin
The Department is designating the following individual pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the accounting sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- IVAN VLADIMIROVICH TAVRIN (TAVRIN) is the former CEO of the U.S.-designated MEGAFON PAO and is a former business partner of U.S.-designated ALISHER USMANOV. TAVRIN has become one of Russia’s biggest wartime dealmakers since the beginning of Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, TAVRIN, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KISMET CONSULTING (KISMET CONSULTING) is a Russia-based management consulting company that is owned 100 percent by TAVRIN.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the accounting sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KISMET CAPITAL GROUP (KISMET CAPITAL) is a Russia-based holding company in Moscow owned by TAVRIN.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KISMET CAPITAL, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INVESTMENT DECISIONS 1 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INVESTMENT DECISIONS 2 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INVESTMENT DECISIONS 3 (INVESTMENT 3) is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, INVESTMENT 3, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY DZHI EL EL RUS is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of INVESTMENT 3.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KISMET CAPITAL, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INVESTMENT DECISIONS 5 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INVESTMENT DECISIONS 6 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INVESTMENT DECISIONS 7 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEW DECISIONS 1 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEW DECISIONS 2 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEW DECISIONS 3 (NEW 3) is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, NEW 3, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INFRASTRACTURE HOLDING 3 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of NEW 3.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INFRASTRACTURE HOLDING 4 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of NEW 3.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KISMET CAPITAL, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEW DECISIONS 5 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY NEW HOLDING 2 (HOLDING 2) is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, HOLDING 2, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FINANCE DECISIONS is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of HOLDING 2.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KISMET CAPITAL, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY NEW HOLDING 3 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEW MEDIA HOLDING (NEW MEDIA) is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, NEW MEDIA, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 7TV MEDIA GROUP is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of NEW MEDIA.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MEDIA 1 MANAGEMENT is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of NEW MEDIA.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HOLDING CHOOSE RADIO is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of NEW MEDIA.
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY KREDO is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of NEW MEDIA.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KISMET CAPITAL, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INTEGRATED SOLUTIONS is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INFRASTRACTURE HOLDING 1 (INFRASTRACTURE 1) is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, INFRASTRACTURE 1, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RADIO REKLAMA NN is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of INFRASTRACTURE 1.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KISMET CAPITAL, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KISMET TELECOM INFRASTRUCTURE (KISMET TELECOM) is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KISMET TELECOM, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KISMET TELECOM INFRASTRUCTURE 2 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of KISMET TELECOM.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KISMET CAPITAL, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY NEW TOWERS is a Russia-based holding company that is owned 65 percent by KISMET CAPITAL.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(i), the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the management consulting sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- JOINT STOCK COMPANY NEW HOLDING 1 (HOLDING 1) is a Russia-based management consulting company that was previously a subsidiary of KISMET CAPITAL.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, HOLDING 1, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEW DECISIONS 4 is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of HOLDING 1.
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INFRASTRACTURE HOLDING 2 (INFRASTRACTURE 2) is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of HOLDING 1.
Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii), the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, INFRASTRACTURE 2, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:
- LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RADIO REKLAMA VOLOGDA is a Russia-based holding company that is a subsidiary of INFRASTRACTURE 2.
Sanctions Implications
As a result of today’s action, and in accordance with E.O. 14024, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Additionally, all individuals or entities that have ownership, either directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
For more information on E.O. 14024, see full text.
state.gov · by Office of the Spokesperson
20. Boeing lands SOCOM order for six MH-47G Chinook helicopters
My favorite helicopter.
Boeing lands SOCOM order for six MH-47G Chinook helicopters
flightglobal.com · by Ryan Finnerty
Helicopters
By 2023-12-11T20:23:00+00:00
US airframer Boeing has secured a $271 million order from US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) for additional MH-47G Block II Chinook helicopters.
The deal was announced by the Pentagon on 8 December and covers six remanufactured aircraft, according to Boeing. The aircraft are to be delivered by 2027.
“With the new and improved MH-47G Block II aircraft, [SOCOM] is not only receiving the most capable Chinook helicopter, they are also provided the flexibility to add additional upgrades as their needs evolve over time,” says Heather McBryan, cargo programmes manager at Boeing.
The MH-47G is the latest special-operations variant of Boeing’s long-serving Chinook platform. The company is currently under contract to provide SOCOM with 42 MH-47Gs, with some examples already in active service.
Boeing is under contract to provide 42 MH-74G special operations Chinook helicopters to US Special Operations Command
The CH-47 Block I Chinook variant is used by conventional US Army aviation units for heavy-lift and troop-transport missions. Both helicopters are produced at the same Boeing production line in Philadelphia.
The deal for six MH-47G special-operations helicopters will help sustain Boeing’s Chinook Block II production line, while the manufacturer awaits a hoped-for acquisition decision by the US Army.
While the service is in the midst of a major modernisation of its aviation fleet, its focus until now has upgrading utility-lift and reconnaissance assets through the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft and Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft programmes.
The future of the army’s heavy-lift fleet remains uncertain.
Boeing is pitching the CH-47 Block II as the logical successor to the CH-47F Block I type currently in service.
Service officials have said this year that they expected to make an decision regarding heavy-lift rotorcraft procurement before year-end. With 2023 entering its final weeks, no decision has emerged.
The army has been ordering a handful of helicopters at a time, mandated to do so by lawmakers in Congress who control US defence spending.
Separate from SOCOM MH-47G orders, Boeing won a $22.5 million army contract in July to cover advanced procurement for CH-47 Block II Lot 4 production.
Funds for at least 10 aircraft have been allocated under the initial low-rate production lots. Boeing expects to deliver the first Lot 1 aircraft in 2024.
Congress appears poised to continue supporting the Chinook Block II production line, regardless of the army’s decision.
Included in the 2024 currently under consideration, is $41 million to support advanced procurement for Lot 5 production and nearly $380 million to purchase at least four additional CH-47F Block II aircraft.
Boeing in July received what it expects to be the final CH-47 Block I contract, covering aircraft for South Korea and Spain.
A separate $8.5 billion order from Germany approved in July covers 60 Block II Chinooks.
21. Beyond the Neutral Card: From Civil-Military Relations to Military Politics
Excerpts;
The military politics subfield we propose is, by contrast, primarily concerned with military-political behavior in democratic contexts. This emerging subfield foregrounds the role of military actors, institutions, and events in explaining political realities, focusing particularly on the active role played by officers in shaping their political environments.[18] This literature guides officers to become reflexive practitioners in their domestic political arenas. Here Roennfeldt has argued for “wider officer competence,” specifically in managing politically dilemmas; Allen proposed that the field adopt the “political savvy” scale to describe the political attributes that officers need to succeed; Coletta and Crosbie have argued that officers should be encouraged to develop not just wisdom but also virtù.[19] What these suggestions share in common is the idea that our scholarship should help officers be more effective in their political engagement, not to advance the interests of the military, but rather to achieve better democratic outcomes.
Although rarely communicated to officer-students, many specific methods of political influence have been noted in the literature. Best known is perhaps the “resign in protest” debates of 2017-2018.[20] Less noted have been forms of military voice ranging from Sarkesian’s “enlightened advocacy” to Feaver and Kohn’s categories of insist, advocate, advise and “be neutral” to Brooks’s observations of officers directly appealing to the public, grandstanding, shoulder-tapping, politicking and so on, or the notions of engaging in a continuous or iterative dialogue. We could logically also consider theories of social influence originating from literatures beyond the military domain, including influence tactics such as pressure tactics, legitimating tactics, coalition tactics, personal appeals, ingratiation, inspirational appeals, consultation, rational persuasion, and collaboration.[21] In this sense, officers never stand powerless before their civilian masters, for they are always armed with the tools of influence (whether they have refined these tools or not).
Let us reconsider Milley’s position from a perspective of military-political agency. Milley was directed to join the president in what turned out to be a partisan photoshoot. Through inaction, Milley believed he unintentionally brought the military into domestic politics. What we argue is that the military was (and always is) already fully inside domestic politics. What went wrong was that Milley, by playing the neutral card, chose an inappropriate tactic for the situation. A range of tactics could have been considered (and perhaps where) including advising, advocating, or insisting on a different course of action, pressuring the president, building a coalition to oppose the president’s directive, or ingratiating himself with the president in an attempt to exert a softer form of influence.[22] Those were also potential choices, and future officers who find themselves in Milley’s position would be better served considering the full banquet of options, and their appropriateness for the given situation, rather than view themselves as forced to play a losing card.
As a final word, we believe it is important to acknowledge that this theoretical intervention carries with it a risk to democracy. By following our suggestions, unethical officers may find inspiration in how to improperly influence their political environments. It is justified because it addresses what we consider to be a greater risk: another generation of ethical officers expected to muddle through the political landscape they are required to inhabit. By refining our language to better approximate how these relations really work in practice, we aim to provide civilians and military professionals alike with valuable new tools to navigate these very challenging environments. Sunlight, in this case, is the best disinfectant.
Beyond the Neutral Card: From Civil-Military Relations to Military Politics
thestrategybridge.org · December 12, 2023
Thomas Crosbie and Anders Klitmøller
How should senior military officers in democratic states influence their domestic political environments? The flippant answer is that they should not; they should do as they’re told. The American civil-military relations literature, written largely in the shadow of Samuel P. Huntington’s myth of an apolitical military, has consistently downplayed the positive role officers play in politics, to such a degree that we have only a dim outline of what constitutes appropriate and effective political influence by officers Thus, in practice, we fear that too many officers find their professional military education fails to prepare them for the realities of being a commander. They discover to their chagrin that there is no neutral ground available; even doing nothing is a willful political act, rife with significance, which is easily turned against them. We do not believe that officers can remove themselves from politics by “playing the neutral card.” Apolitical neutrality often seems prudent from a traditional perspective, but can fail spectacularly when applied in practice. We argue instead for a new theoretical posture, for soldiers and scholars alike, that foregrounds the political agency of officers. We call this the military politics approach.
General Mark Milley with President Trump as he departs the White House en route to St. John's Church. (Patrick Semansky/AP)
Mark Milley and the Neutral Card
The fundamental problem with playing the neutral card was underscored when President Donald Trump told Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley to join him for a short walk (which ended up taking them to Lafayette Square).[1] When told to come, Milley played the neutral card and went. One week later Milley reflected, “My presence in that moment and in that environment created a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.”[2]
What should Milley have done, if doing nothing is also doing something? Milley’s answer provides no great insight: “We must hold dear to the principle of an apolitical military…and that is not easy.”[3] Milley’s misstep and his subsequent frustration were not surprising. Officers are not educated in how to navigate complex political environments, not least because there is so little research done on this topic. Whatever the cause, there is no structured means to develop political competencies, and indeed most officers in democratic countries spend their careers being told that they are and must remain apolitical.[4]
We see a need for a new theoretical language to describe the ways officers do politics, and for a more open discussion, particularly in military education, for what constitutes effective and appropriate political influence. Consider Stanley McChrystal’s reflections on the politics of the military: “The process of formulating, negotiating, articulating and then prosecuting even a largely military campaign involved politics at multiple levels that were impossible to ignore.”[5] Indeed, we would turn the dominant argument, captured in McChrystal’s formulation, on its head. By denying that officers can, should, and do seek political influence, we (practitioners, scholars, educators) are collectively guilty of a grand deception, elevating officers to a position of enlightened disinterest that is false and untenable. The truth is that officers are powerful and their words have an impact—and so does their silence. The question is not whether one should speak or remain silent, but which tactics of influence can be deemed appropriate (and inappropriate) given the situation the senior officers find themselves in.[6] Our approach is, admittedly, discordant with the dominant traditions in American civil-military relations scholarship. Indeed, it is so far beyond the pale that we find it easier to make the case by pivoting to an alternate frame, military politics.
The Problems with Civil-Military Relations
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Civil-military relations and military politics have long co-existed in the global literature, although the former has almost entirely eclipsed the latter in the American context. Civil-military relations was introduced in 1940 to broadly encompass any research “bearing upon those problems of public policy which were posed by the prospect of a continuing high mobilization even in peacetime, and by the continuing necessity for a careful coordination of military, diplomatic, and industrialization policy.”[7] A little over a decade after the term was introduced, several efforts were launched to reappraise American civil-military relations.[8] Amid this flurry of activity, the young Samuel P. Huntington, working closely with the sociologist Morris Janowitz, achieved a theoretical breakthrough by using the theory of professions as the primary explanans for military effectiveness and subordination to civilian authority.[9]
The breakthrough established what became the civil-military relations subfield as we know it, coalescing (in the U.S.) around Huntington’s distinctive vision of civilian control. Peter D. Feaver and others disrupted the field in the late 1990s, giving rise to several alternative paradigms.[10] Feaver notably abandoned the use of the military profession as an explanatory variable, and shifted instead to a principal-agent model.[11] This tradition explored the gaps that separate civilian and military policy preferences. Unfortunately, both earlier and later traditions are marked by serious theoretical problems that severely limit their conceptual coherence and predictive value. Let us briefly summarize their limitations.
Huntington asked why some militaries succeed in being both effective and subordinate? And he answered: because those militaries have a professional officer corps and lack civilian meddling in military affairs. This works because a professional officer corps has monopolized expert knowledge, has a collective identity, and internalizes a sense of responsibility to the client (the state). In other words, some militaries are effective (expert) and subordinate (responsible) because they are professional (which means, in part, expert and responsible). This is equivalent to saying that to succeed, you need to be successful.[12]
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Feaver asked the same question. His answer: some militaries succeed in being both effective and subordinate because they are closely overseen by civilian masters who make credible threats to keep them working. They succeed (are effective and subordinate) because they are successful (are effective and are subordinated). But why would we assume that such a tightly managed military is committed to or capable of ensuring the security of the state? Logically, we would expect almost any other outcome. Indeed, militaries run by officers who are primarily motivated by their fear of civilian punishment and who are at all times conscious of civilian oversight seem more likely to become good at buffering from civilian oversight and satisfying civilian preferences than to become good at achieving military security or wielding the military instrument.[13]
David Pion-Berlin and Andrew Ivey have argued for “scrutiny or revision” of American civil-military relations theory based on counter-indications from Latin American states, noting military dissent “has garnered no new powers for the military, nor has it eroded civilian supremacy,” but has effectively checked certain forms of corrupt behavior by civilian leaders.[14] Indeed, as Risa Brooks has argued in her analysis of the “paradoxes of professionalism”, there is still lively scholarly debate among American civil-military relations scholars concerning what constitutes effective and appropriate political influence by American officers.[15]
From Civil-Military Relations (Back) to Military Politics
Huntington in the early 1960s still seemed uncertain about the name for the field he dominated. In an influential article published in 1961, he used “military politics” and “civil-military relations” interchangeably, and chose the former for the name of a widely reviewed edited volume he published in 1962.[16] Eventually, he dispensed with the “military politics” language, and indeed the term was abandoned by the core of the field by the early 1960s, although it was retained by scholars studying militaries overtly involved in domestic politics (mainly in authoritarian states).[17]
The military politics subfield we propose is, by contrast, primarily concerned with military-political behavior in democratic contexts. This emerging subfield foregrounds the role of military actors, institutions, and events in explaining political realities, focusing particularly on the active role played by officers in shaping their political environments.[18] This literature guides officers to become reflexive practitioners in their domestic political arenas. Here Roennfeldt has argued for “wider officer competence,” specifically in managing politically dilemmas; Allen proposed that the field adopt the “political savvy” scale to describe the political attributes that officers need to succeed; Coletta and Crosbie have argued that officers should be encouraged to develop not just wisdom but also virtù.[19] What these suggestions share in common is the idea that our scholarship should help officers be more effective in their political engagement, not to advance the interests of the military, but rather to achieve better democratic outcomes.
Although rarely communicated to officer-students, many specific methods of political influence have been noted in the literature. Best known is perhaps the “resign in protest” debates of 2017-2018.[20] Less noted have been forms of military voice ranging from Sarkesian’s “enlightened advocacy” to Feaver and Kohn’s categories of insist, advocate, advise and “be neutral” to Brooks’s observations of officers directly appealing to the public, grandstanding, shoulder-tapping, politicking and so on, or the notions of engaging in a continuous or iterative dialogue. We could logically also consider theories of social influence originating from literatures beyond the military domain, including influence tactics such as pressure tactics, legitimating tactics, coalition tactics, personal appeals, ingratiation, inspirational appeals, consultation, rational persuasion, and collaboration.[21] In this sense, officers never stand powerless before their civilian masters, for they are always armed with the tools of influence (whether they have refined these tools or not).
Let us reconsider Milley’s position from a perspective of military-political agency. Milley was directed to join the president in what turned out to be a partisan photoshoot. Through inaction, Milley believed he unintentionally brought the military into domestic politics. What we argue is that the military was (and always is) already fully inside domestic politics. What went wrong was that Milley, by playing the neutral card, chose an inappropriate tactic for the situation. A range of tactics could have been considered (and perhaps where) including advising, advocating, or insisting on a different course of action, pressuring the president, building a coalition to oppose the president’s directive, or ingratiating himself with the president in an attempt to exert a softer form of influence.[22] Those were also potential choices, and future officers who find themselves in Milley’s position would be better served considering the full banquet of options, and their appropriateness for the given situation, rather than view themselves as forced to play a losing card.
As a final word, we believe it is important to acknowledge that this theoretical intervention carries with it a risk to democracy. By following our suggestions, unethical officers may find inspiration in how to improperly influence their political environments. It is justified because it addresses what we consider to be a greater risk: another generation of ethical officers expected to muddle through the political landscape they are required to inhabit. By refining our language to better approximate how these relations really work in practice, we aim to provide civilians and military professionals alike with valuable new tools to navigate these very challenging environments. Sunlight, in this case, is the best disinfectant.
Thomas Crosbie is an Associate Professor in the Institute for Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College. He is the editor of the Military Politics book series with Berghahn Books.
Anders Klitmøller is an Associate Professor in the Institute for Leadership and Organization at the Royal Danish Defence College.
The views expressed are the authors’ alone and do not reflect those of the Danish Ministry of Defence, the Royal Danish Defence College, or the Danish Government.
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Header Image: U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley, Pentagon, Arlington Virginia, 2019 (Spc. Keisha T Brown).
Notes:
[1] Robert Kagan provides an extensive discussion of the incident. He asserts that “the military remains as wedded as ever to the tradition of military abstention”, despite Milley’s misstep, in Robert Kagain, “The Battle of Lafayette Square and the Undermining of American Democracy” Brookings, June 6, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-battle-of-lafayette-square-and-the-undermining-of-american-democracy/. Also, Kori M. Schake has argued in traditional civil-military relations terms that Milley’s behavior was apolitical and appropriate in Kori M. Schacke, “The Military and the Constitution Under Trump” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 62 (2022) https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1792096
[2] David Welna, “Gen. Mark Milley Says Accompanying Trump To Church Photo-Op Was A Mistake,” NPR, June 11, 2020, https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/06/11/875019346/gen-mark-milley-says-accompanying-trump-to-church-photo-op-was-a-mistake
[3] Ibid.
[4] We draw a significant distinction here between “structured” and “unstructured”. Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Warrant Officers who rise to the top of their fields will have almost certainly benefited from mentors passing on hard-won lessons in political effectiveness. War Colleges, as well as CAPSTONE, and PINNACLE-type courses, likewise create unstructured or loosely-structured opportunities for officers to meet and learn from a variety of politically-savvy actors, in uniform and out. What is missing, and what we call for, is explicit and transparent education in gaining appropriate political competencies.
[5] McChrystal in the book by Lawrence Freedman, Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (Dublin: Allen Lane, 2022), pp. 513.
[6] For work on influence tactics see: Falbe, Cecilia M., and Gary Yukl. "Consequences for Managers of Using Single Influence Tactics and Combinations of Tactics." Academy of Management Journal 35, no. 3 (1992): 638-52.; for work on ’hard’ versus ’soft’ influence tactics see van Knippenberg, Barbara, Rob van Eijbergen, and Henk Wilke. "The Use of Hard and Soft Influence Tactics in Cooperative Task Groups." Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 2, no. 3 (1999): 231-44.
[7] These civil-military relations were of interest because they had already begun to show signs of stressing America’s democratic institutions. See William T.R. Fox, “Civil-Military Relations: The SSRC Committee and Its Research Survey”, World Politics 6, no. 2 (1954): 278-288.
[8] See pages 22-23 of Thomas Crosbie “What is Military Politics?” in Military Politics: New Perspectives ed. Thomas Crosbie, (Berghahn Books, 2023).
[9] Damon Coletta and Thomas Crosbie, “The Virtues of Military Politics” Armed Forces and Society 47:1 (2021): 3-24.
[10] Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control” Armed Forces and Society 23:2 (1996), pp. 149-178; and Peter D. Feaver Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Harvard University Press, 2003); and Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance” Armed Forces Society Vol. 22, No.1 (Fall 1995), pp. 7-24; and Deborah Avant “Conflicting Indicators of “Crisis” in American Civil-Military Relations” Armed Forces & Society” (April 1998).
[11] See Suzanne C. Nielsen “Civil Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness” in Handbook of Military Administration ed. Jeffrey A. Weber and Johan Eliasson (New York: Routledge, 2007); See also Deborah D. Avant “Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control? Why the U.S. Military is Averse to Responding to post-Cold War Low-Level Threats” Security Studies 6:2 (1996/1997), pp. 51-90, since Avant also used the Principal-Agent framework.
[12] Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Harvard University Press, 2003); and Thomas Crosbie “What is Military Politics?” in Military Politics: New Perspectives, ed. Thomas Crosbie (Berghahn Books, 2023), pp. 27-30.
[13] This argument is expanded in Thomas Crosbie “What is Military Politics?” in Military Politics: New Perspectives ed. Thomas Crosbie (Berghahn Books, 2023) pp. 27-30.
[14] David Pion-Berlin and Andrew Ivey, “Military dissent in the United States: Are there lessons from Latin America?” Defense & Security Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, Vol 37(2) (April 2021), pp. 36-37.
[15] Risa Brooks, “Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States,” International Security 44(4) (2020), pp. 7-44.
[16] Samuel P. Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics, (Free Press, 1962)
[17] See Thomas Crosbie “What is Military Politics?,” in Military Politics: New Perspectives ed. Thomas Crosbie (Berghahn Books, 2023) pp. 30-33, for a summary of this literature.
[18] Thomas Crosbie, “Military Politics as Research Program” in Military Politics: New Perspectives, ed. Thomas Crosbie (Berghahn Books, 2023), pp. 246-252
[19] Carsten F. Roennfeldt “Wider Officer Competencies: The Importance of Politics and Practical Wisdom,” Armed Forces and Society 45:1 (2019), pp. 59-77, and; Charles D. Allen “Military Officers Need to Be Politically Savvy,” Australian Journal of International Affairs (2018) – The attributes noted by Allen are social astuteness, interpersonal influence, networking, and apparent sincerity. See also Damon Coletta and Thomas Crosbie, “The Virtues of Military Politics,” Armed Forces and Society 47(1) (2019): 3-24.
[20] James M. Dubrik, “Taking a ‘Pro’ Position on Principled Resignation,” Armed Forces and Society 43:1 (2017), pp. 17-28; and Peter D. Feaver, “Resign in Protest? A Cure Worse than Most Diseases,” Armed Forces and Society, 43:1 (2017), pp. 29-40; and Richard H. Kohn, “On Resignation,” Armed Forces and Society, 43:1 (2017), pp. 41-52; and Don M. Snider, “Dissent, Resignation, and the Moral Agency of Senior Military Professionals,” Armed Forces and Society, 43:1 (2017), pp. 5-16.
[21] see Falbe and Yukl (1992) see also Lee, Soojin, Soojung Han, Minyoung Cheong, Seckyoung Loretta Kim, and Seokwha Yun. "How Do I Get My Way? A Meta-Analytic Review of Research on Influence Tactics." The Leadership Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2017): 210-28.
[22] see van Knippenberg, van Eijbergen, and Wilke (1999)
thestrategybridge.org · December 12, 2023
22. Israeli Army Soldier Says She Played Dead After Being Shot 12 Times by Hamas: 'I Waited for the Final Bullet'
Israeli Army Soldier Says She Played Dead After Being Shot 12 Times by Hamas: 'I Waited for the Final Bullet'
Eden Ram survived a slew of gunshots to her leg, left hand and shoulder during the Hamas attack on Oct. 7
Published 12/12/23 06:58 PM ET|Updated 20 hr ago
Monique Merrill
themessenger.com · December 11, 2023
An Israeli soldier was shot 12 times during a harrowing ambush while she was stationed at Urim Southern District and miraculously survived the horrifying ordeal.
Israel Defense Forces First Lt. Eden Ram said "everything was quiet and peaceful" when she started her weekend duty — until 6:30 a.m. on Oct. 7 when the sound of sirens and missiles changed everything, she wrote in a post on Octber7.org. She and the 12 other soldiers she was with ran to the shelter.
"We waited there a bit and then started to hear rumors that terrorists had infiltrated, but we didn’t believe it," she wrote. "But then we started to hear shots being fired."
As she ran to the Operations Room for protection, she was shot in the leg but continued to flee until she was barricaded inside the room. She sent goodbye messages to her loved ones as she heard gunshots and grenades detonate in the facility.
Hamas assailants eventually blew through security doors until they breached the Operations Room and opened fire on the soldiers hiding stacked underneath a table.
Eden Ram sent goodbye messages to her loved ones as she heard gunshots and grenades detonate in the facility.Courtesy of Eden Ram
"Throughout this, I was not sure if I was dead or alive, I felt dead, but I could still see and hear and feel," she wrote. "I waited for the final bullet that would hit me and kill me, but it never came."
Ram played dead when the attackers checked the bodies. She was struck by bullets 12 times and waited four hours for help to arrive.
"I began to touch my whole body to see where I was hit, how much I am bleeding, and how much time I have to live," she wrote. "I felt like I was dying."
Then, help finally arrived and transported Ram to the hospital.
Eden RamCourtesy of Eden Ram
"On the way, I immediately asked to call my family and tell them that I was alive against all odds," she wrote.
She spent two weeks in the hospital and underwent two procedures to recover from her injuries until she was transferred to a rehabilitation center.
Though she sustained multiple wounds on her legs, hand and shoulder, Ram said she should be able to regain full functioning.
themessenger.com · December 11, 2023
23.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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