Quotes of the Day:

"I have ventured to commit a serious crime, offering my life for my country. This is the behavior of a noble-minded patriot."

– Ahn Jung-geun (1879-1910) was an activist who assassinated Itō Hirobumi, the Japanese official who had been appointed as Japan's first Resident-General of Korea in 1905 - when the country was held under Japanese jurisdiction but not formally annexed. Before doing so, he cut off his ring finger alongside eleven other activists, signifying a pledge to assassinate someone.

"You cannot live a perfect day without doing something for someone who will never be able to repay you."

– John Wooden

“No one man can terrorize a whole nation unless we are all his accomplices.”

– Edward R. Murrow

1. North Korea: Preparing for War, Mere Blustering, or Something in Between?

2. N. Korea fires several cruise missiles off west coast: JCS

3. Vice unification minister highlights role of N. Korean defectors for unification

4. N.K. intends to turn Korean Peninsula into Middle East-like conflict zone: Seoul

5. U.S. admiral says 'symbiotic' N.K.-Russia cooperation runs counter to global peace principles

6. N. Korean leader calls for bolstering navy's war readiness during visit to shipyard

7. S. Korea, US hold first joint Army special operations drills of year

8. North Korea is ramping up missile tests as Kim Jung Un weighs war with South Korea

9. North Korean missiles won't defeat Ukraine10.

1. North Korea: Preparing for War, Mere Blustering, or Something in Between?

North Korea: Preparing for War, Mere Blustering, or Something in Between?

csis.org · by Commentary by Sydney Seiler Published February 1, 2024

For the 70 years of shaky peace that have defined the Korean Peninsula since the conclusion of the July 1953 Armistice Agreement, the question of whether North Korea preparing for war has been a central concern of the United States, South Korea, and the international community. For the first several decades of armistice, repeated lethal provocations—including multiple armed incursions into the demilitarized zone, attempts to assassinate the South Korean president, the bombing of a South Korean civilian airliner, the seizing of the USS Pueblo, and a steady stream of threatening propaganda—strained, but did not break, the durability of the armistice and the fragile peace it accomplishes.

Even nuclear weapons have not yet fully tested this peace. The crisis created by Pyongyang’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has led to rumors of war at numerous key points of North Korea’s “nuclear crisis” going back to the early 1990s. Most recently, the intense pace of missile launches in 2017 and over the past few years has led to concerns about a U.S.-North Korea conflict, or even an inter-Korean conflict. Pyongyang’s refusal to engage either Washington or Seoul in dialogue, its growing nuclear and missile capabilities, and its threats that these capabilities could serve as a first-use preemptive strike capability have once again raised the question, “Is North Korea preparing for war?” The answer, in the author’s experience of having to contend with this question multiple times over the past 40-plus years, is no, with some caveats.

Of Course War Preparations Are Underway

At a certain level, the answer to that question is, of course, yes. Every country’s military prepares for war. Such preparation is crucial to that military’s success in battle as well as to its deterrence of potential adversaries in peacetime. For a militant garrison state such as North Korea, whose national identity and leadership legitimacy are inextricably tied to a perpetual struggle with outside enemies, real or concocted, there is a need for the million-man Korean People’s Army (KPA) to be portrayed by North Korea’s propaganda apparatus as training and enhancing its force capability so as to be ready for war.

On the other hand, the Korean Peninsula since 1953 has survived repeated concerns that war might be imminent, yet with no resultant war. A large reason for that has been the U.S. security commitment to South Korea, the presence of United States Forces South Korea (USFK) to support that commitment, and the role of the United Nations Command (UNC) in maintaining the armistice. Deterrence has worked. There is every reason to believe that is the case today. Yes, North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities are concerning. Yes, Pyongyang’s proclivity toward provocative language and actions, to include lethal strikes to advance both tactical and strategic political goals, warrants continued attention. And yes, the United States and South Korea should be concerned about the possibility that Kim Jong-un might conclude that using or threatening to use nuclear weapons could be a viable option down the road. But, for now, there is no reason to question what U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin proclaimed in describing the U.S.-South Korea alliance as “one of the most robust, capable and interoperable alliances on earth” that has “deterred greater conflict on the Korean Peninsula for seven decades,” adding that “if necessary, we remain ready to fight tonight.”

Avoiding Nuclear Complacency? Already There

All of this is not designed to dismiss Pyongyang’s growing nuclear threat and the possibility of increasingly aggressive and coercive North Korean behavior. In fact, experts on the country’s nuclear program, particularly those within the U.S. intelligence community, have been thinking about the possibility of a nuclear war launched by North Korea for many years. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines in June 2023 authorized the declassification of a National Intelligence Estimate—the most authoritative and comprehensive analysis published by the intelligence community—that addresses the likelihood of North Korea’s coercive or offensive use of nuclear weapons to achieve a variety of strategic objectives, including dominating South Korea and seizing the lead in determining the future of the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, recent analysis that suggests North Korea may be preparing for nuclear war is not new in a strategic warning context—this is something about which the United States has been concerned for many years, and will need to be concerned going forward.

That said, the types of indicators one would expect to see on the eve of a North Korea attack simply have not been observed. The 2024 rhetoric—particularly Kim’s proclamation that reunification with South Korea is no longer a national goal of North Korea—has been troubling, but not unprecedentedly so. Most importantly, there is nothing in recent rhetoric of high predictive value: the atmosphere is clearly conducive to provocative behavior, but it is difficult to know the what and when of Pyongyang’s intent. The element of surprise traditionally has been a crucial element of North Korea’s provocations, making it the best tool Pyongyang has to establish and maintain escalation control by complicating U.S. and South Korean in-kind, proportionate responses. What North Korea threatens—such as blowing up conservative South Korean media companies, shelling the launch site of South Korean balloon launches, or destroying a Christmas tree near the border—it does not actually follow up on. When it does decide to engage in lethal provocations, such as the 2010 sinking of the South Korean navy vessel Cheonan or the shelling of the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong-do, it does not telegraph such actions in advance.

For Now, It’s the Economy

Ascertaining Kim’s intent is difficult, but North Korea is not the “black hole” some describe it to be. For the past several years, Kim has used major Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) meetings, particularly in the final days of the year, to present reports or speeches that summarize advances across political, ideological, economic, national defense, diplomacy, and inter-Korean relations sectors over the past year, describe the environment and challenges that North Korea faces, and lay out goals and priorities for the coming year. Such reports should be taken with a grain of salt: there is no way of verifying claims of accomplishments, prioritization of goals, or precise details of the various objectives. That said, such documents serve as guidelines or “commander’s intent” for North Koreans across all sectors of society, and are often reinforced with various rallies, study sessions, project launches, resource and personnel movements, and other efforts.

Two recent significant political meetings—the 9th Expanded Plenum of the WPK Central Committee 8th Party Congress in late December 2023 and the 19th Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK in January 2024—provided opportunities for Kim to articulate his policies for the near term, with a focus on economic development. While Kim admitted that the road ahead would be difficult, he made an impassioned call for maximum state and party efforts to be directed toward improving economic conditions throughout the country. Reports of discharged soldiers being sent to the countryside, and the KPA doing its part to contribute to national development, reflect the fact that North Korea is not a country mobilizing for imminent war.

That said, Kim troublingly continues to prioritize advancement of his WMD program. More launches and testing will come in 2024, as seen in North Korea’s claimed test of a “new solid-fuel hypersonic missile with intermediate range” on January 15 and test of a “new-type strategic cruise missile” on January 24. The KPA’s winter training cycle will overlap with the upcoming U.S.-South Korea annual military exercises, providing an environment conducive to North Korea to ratchet up pressure and tension to support its standing disinformation messaging efforts to portray the United States and South Korea as culprits. It is impossible to rule out heightened rhetoric, bombastic proclamations and threats, shows of force, challenges to the Northern Limit Line that has served to separate maritime activities of the two sides in the West Sea, and perhaps even a lethal provocation of limited scale designed to foment criticism of North Korea policies in both Seoul and Washington. As regrettable as such coercive behavior is, it is likely to be limited in scope, with sufficient de-escalation built in: all-out war seems to be the last thing Kim seeks at this time.

The Russia Variable

There is justifiable concern that recent developments in Russian-North Korean relations could enhance North Korea’s WMD and conventional forces, expand provocation options for Kim, and embolden him to believe he has, if not a green light from Russia, at least a flashing yellow light to act more aggressively toward South Korea. The White House has revealed that Pyongyang “is seeking military assistance from Russia, including fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment or materials, and other advanced technologies.” Glenn Snyder’s stability-instability paradox asserts that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. One must conclude that any improvement to North Korea’s conventional capabilities achieved through its growing military cooperation with Moscow raises the possibility of conflict that would include either the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. There is no separating North Korea’s nuclear threat from its conventional threat.

Inter-Korean Trainwreck Ahead?

Concerns are also growing about the state of inter-Korean relations given Kim’s recent pronouncement that South Korea is the “most hostile state” to North Korea, that reconciliation and reunification between the two Koreas are no longer goals, and that in case of war North Korea would seek to, in Kim’s own words, “completely occupy, subjugate, and reclaim the ROK and annex it as a part of the territory of our Republic.” A debate has ensued as to the practical implications of this action: Does this imply that Kim is laying the groundwork for justifying an attack on South Korea based upon South Koreans no longer portrayed as being “fellow countrymen?” Or does this two-state solution justify Kim simply ignoring South Korea until a friendlier government replaces the Yoon administration in 2027? Perhaps just as Kim had to moderate any domestic enthusiasm for a breakthrough in U.S.-North Korea relations following his failed Hanoi gambit, growing affinity for South Korean culture, particularly among younger North Koreans, requires Kim to direct ideological and cultural education efforts to avoid giving the impression that South and North Koreans are “fellow countrymen,” reminding his citizens that South Korea is their primary foe and invariable principle enemy. Public executions and prison camp sentences for young North Koreans with an affinity for South Korean music, culture, clothing, and hair styles already reflect that the North Korean regime perceives South Korea ontologically as an existential threat: South Korea is a living model to North Koreans of what their country might be without the Kim family’s regime. Regardless of the motivation, the move to lay aside denuclearization is not a predictively helpful event to assess the what, when, and where of future North Korean provocations.

The China Variable

China remains an additional important variable. Long gone are the days of hoping that Beijing would finally cooperate with the level of pressure necessary to bring North Korea to the negotiating table: it will not. China dismissed calls for pressure on Pyongyang as risking destabilization of the region with no guarantee of success. The United States countered by warning that Chinese inaction toward North Korea would lead to an exponentially greater destabilization risk as North Korea’s nuclear program grows. That day is now here, particularly if Kim is emboldened by developments in North Korean-Russian military cooperation. Expansion of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities has so far not been seen by Beijing as a threat to China’s interests. However, a war on the Korean Peninsula that would reach the nuclear threshold quite quickly would pose a direct threat to China’s interests, even if it cannot envision such an outcome at this point in time. The United States should use all diplomatic means possible to push Beijing to use its influence, with both Moscow and Pyongyang, to prevent such a scenario from unfolding in the years ahead.

The late Henry Kissinger, in describing why the international community was unable to take action to counter Hitler during the interwar period, wisely noted, “Statesmen always face the dilemma that, when their scope for action is greatest, they have a minimum of knowledge. By the time they have garnered sufficient knowledge, the scope for decisive action is likely to have vanished.” He added, “Had the democracies forced a showdown with Hitler early in his rule, historians would still be arguing about whether Hitler had been a misunderstood nationalist or a maniac bent on world domination.”

Sydney Seiler is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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csis.org · by Commentary by Sydney Seiler Published February 1, 2024

2. N. Korea fires several cruise missiles off west coast: JCS

(LEAD) N. Korea fires several cruise missiles off west coast: JCS | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · February 2, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with latest details in paras 5-10; ADDS photo)

SEOUL, Feb. 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korea fired several cruise missiles off the west coast Friday, the South Korean military said, in the latest in a series of the North's cruise missile launches this year.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the North's launch at around 11 a.m. from its west coast. It did not specify the number of missiles.

"While strengthening our monitoring and vigilance, our military has been closely coordinating with the United States to monitor additional signs of North Korea's provocations," the JCS said in a text message sent to reporters.

It marked the North's fourth cruise missile launch this year.

This photo, released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Jan. 31, 2024, shows the North staging a drill to launch the Hwasal-2 strategic cruise missile off its west coast the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The latest launch came just three days after the North fired the Hwasal-2 cruise missile off the west coast.

On Jan. 24, North Korea test-fired a new strategic cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, named Pulhwasal-3-31, for the first time. The country fired submarine-launched cruise missiles off the east coast Sunday, later saying that they were Pulhwasal-3-31s.

Cruise missiles, powered by jet engines, fly low and maneuver, making them harder to detect and intercept.

Hwasal means an "arrow" in Korean, and Pulhwasal means a "fire arrow."

The cruise missiles add threats to the South Korean air defense system at a time when North Korea has been improving capabilities of ballistic missiles with varying ranges, warheads and launch platforms.

Experts say the submarine-launched cruise missiles could pose a serious threat to South Korea's air defense system if perfected, as they are harder to detect and shoot down due to their low-flying altitude and precision strike capabilities.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · February 2, 2024

3. Vice unification minister highlights role of N. Korean defectors for unification

It is very good to read this. Vice Minister Moon is exactly right. Escapees (defectors) are very important for the future of Korea. Mathew Ha and I recommended this 4 years ago. (IIA is information and influence activities)

• Establish a Korea Defector Information Institute (KDII): There is no single organization in the United States or South Korea that harnesses the information of defectors to support IIA. If both nations worked together to establish a KDII, it could serve as a repository for defector information to inform policymakers, strategists, and those responsible for developing IIA themes and messages. This institute should utilize defector knowledge and advice in devising appropriate messages and communications techniques. It could also encourage North Koreans to defect, particularly members of Office 39 (also known as Department 39), who are knowledgeable of the Kim family regime’s finances.

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/12/3/maximum-pressure-2/#:~:text=Establish%20a%20Korea,family%20regime%E2%80%99s%20finances.

Vice unification minister highlights role of N. Korean defectors for unification | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · February 2, 2024

SEOUL, Feb. 2 (Yonhap) -- Vice Unification Minister Moon Seoung-hyun on Friday emphasized the importance of North Korean defectors, calling them "precious assets" who can serve as South Korea's link to the North Korean people.

Moon made the remarks as South Korea has been putting an emphasis on supporting the settlement of North Korean defectors and improving the dire human rights situation in the North.

In a Cabinet meeting last month, President Yoon Suk Yeol called for embracing the North Korean people, saying they have the "same rights as us to enjoy freedom, human rights and prosperity." Yoon also instructed the ministry to designate a day for North Korean defectors.

Vice Unification Minister Moon Seoung-hyun speaks in a meeting of ministries and provincial governments at the government complex in Seoul on Feb. 2, 2024, to discuss support measures for North Korean defectors. (Yonhap)

"North Korean defectors, for us, are a link to the North Korean people and very precious assets for unification as they have experienced both South and North Korea," Moon said at a meeting of 20 government ministries and three provincial governments to discuss support measures for defectors.

"Every citizen should be aware that North Korean defectors are contributing to the country's capabilities for preparing for unification, as well as national development," he said.

The vice minister vowed to swiftly designate a day for the defectors as instructed by Yoon and draw up more effective measures to support them.

The total number of North Korean defectors in South Korea had reached 34,078 as of the end of last year, according to ministry data.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · February 2, 2024

4. N.K. intends to turn Korean Peninsula into Middle East-like conflict zone: Seoul

Minister Kim is describing the regime's political warfare strategy.

Excerpts:

"North Korea appears to intend to make (the Korean Peninsula) a region where constant risks of military conflicts exist, such as the Middle East," Kim said in a radio program. "We should never fall for North Korea's scheme."

He said with military provocations, North Korea seems to aim to instigate security jitters and drive a wedge in South Korean society ahead of April's general elections.

The North fired several cruise missiles off the west coast Tuesday, the third of such weapons tests in a week. Pyongyang also fired the new Pulhwasal-3-31 submarine-launched cruise missiles Sunday.

(LEAD) N.K. intends to turn Korean Peninsula into Middle East-like conflict zone: Seoul | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 2, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with more info throughout; CHANGES photo)

SEOUL, Feb. 2 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho said Friday that North Korea has focused on staging provocations in an apparent bid to turn the Korean Peninsula into areas similar to the Middle East, with constant risks of military conflicts.

North Korea has been ramping up weapons tests in the new year, including the launches of cruise missiles from land and sea and a hypersonic missile.

"North Korea appears to intend to make (the Korean Peninsula) a region where constant risks of military conflicts exist, such as the Middle East," Kim said in a radio program. "We should never fall for North Korea's scheme."

He said with military provocations, North Korea seems to aim to instigate security jitters and drive a wedge in South Korean society ahead of April's general elections.

The North fired several cruise missiles off the west coast Tuesday, the third of such weapons tests in a week. Pyongyang also fired the new Pulhwasal-3-31 submarine-launched cruise missiles Sunday.

Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho speaks at a meeting with former unification ministers at Lotte Hotel in Seoul, in this file photo taken Jan. 8, 2024. (Yonhap)

Seoul's unification ministry said North Korea appears to regularly issue military threats and spark anxiety about security in order to undermine the South Korean people's trust for the government.

"The North also intends to draw attention from the international community in a bid to create an atmosphere that North Korea's demand should be accepted for the resolution of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula," Kim In-ae, deputy spokesperson at the ministry, told a press briefing.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un recently defined inter-Korean ties as those between "two states hostile to each other" and ordered the dismantling of agencies in charge of inter-Korean affairs.

"There is a view that North Korea's foreign ministry may handle inter-Korean affairs from now on. But the government has a clear stance that the unification ministry should deal with issues related to the ties between the two Koreas," the minister said.

Meanwhile, Kim, Seoul's point man on North Korea, said the food rationing system in North Korea has "completely" collapsed amid chronic food shortages, citing a soon-to-be-released report on North Korea's economic and social situations.

The ministry plans to make the report public for the first time this month after it compiled information based on interviews with more than 6,300 North Korean defectors.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 2, 2024

5. U.S. admiral says 'symbiotic' N.K.-Russia cooperation runs counter to global peace principles

Excerpts:

During a confirmation hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Adm. Samuel Paparo, currently U.S. Pacific Fleet commander, also noted that Russia might have given "potentially high-end" technology to the North in return for the North's arms supplies to Russia.

"It is concerning deeply. It is symbiotic," he said, referring to the bilateral partnership.

"It closes gaps each for the other, providing conventional weapons to Russia from North Korea ... providing sanctions evading materials and potentially high-end technology to North Korea," he added.

(3rd LD) U.S. admiral says 'symbiotic' N.K.-Russia cooperation runs counter to global peace principles | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 2, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS more remarks in paras 13-18; TRIMS)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 (Yonhap) -- The nominee for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command chief expressed deep concerns Thursday over the burgeoning military partnership between North Korea and Russia, portraying it as a "symbiotic" one that goes against the principles of global peace.

During a confirmation hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Adm. Samuel Paparo, currently U.S. Pacific Fleet commander, also noted that Russia might have given "potentially high-end" technology to the North in return for the North's arms supplies to Russia.

"It is concerning deeply. It is symbiotic," he said, referring to the bilateral partnership.

"It closes gaps each for the other, providing conventional weapons to Russia from North Korea ... providing sanctions evading materials and potentially high-end technology to North Korea," he added.

Adm. Samuel Paparo, the nominee for commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, speaks during a confirmation hearing at the Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington on Feb. 1, 2024, in this photo captured from a livestream from the committee's website. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

He went on to say, "In all cases, it runs counter to the principles of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and globally."

The White House has revealed that the North supplied Russia with several dozen ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine in addition to its earlier shipments of military equipment and munitions to Russia.

In return for the North's armed support, Pyongyang has been seeking military assistance from Russia, "including fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment or materials, and other advanced technologies," according to U.S. officials.

Paparo touched on the "changing dynamic" of the Korean Peninsula where inter-Korean tensions have risen.

"The changing dynamic is continued saber-rattling, continued proliferation, a greater volume of testing and weapons demonstrations on the part of the North," he said.

"In response, South Korea has increased its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities in the vicinity of the North ... It continues to be tense."

Against the backdrop of evolving North Korean threats, the admiral highlighted the importance of extended deterrence, America's commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend its ally.

"Whatever the public statements (by North Korea), as a military commander, I must look at the capability development, and to be able to pace that, to deter that, extended deterrence, particularly with U.S. strategic forces, is absolutely essential," he said.

In his written answers to the Senate's advance questions, Paparo said that there are "significant strategic and military risks" associated with a potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula -- a warning at a time of tensions heightened by the North's bellicose rhetoric and continued weapons tests.

He also noted that the U.S.' airborne intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) allocation is "less than" what the U.S. requires to support the "multifaceted problem-set" and to enhance deterrence by detection against the North Korean threats.

On the question of China's influence to address North Korean threats, Paparo voiced skepticism.

"The PRC has not fulfilled its international obligations regarding multiple U.N. Security Council Resolutions restricting the DPRK's nuclear and missile development and related activities," he said. DPRK and PRC stand for the official names of North Korea and China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, respectively.

"Simply stated, I do not assess we should rely on the PRC to restrain the DPRK."

Casting the South Korea-U.S. alliance as the linchpin of peace and security on the peninsula, he underscored the importance of the U.S. facilitating an "increased" role for South Korea "commensurate with its economic status and influence in as many multilateral venues as possible."

The hearing also touched on the issue of North Korea's reported cryptocurrency theft that is thought to have helped the reclusive regime evade sanctions and continue to bankroll its weapons programs.

Asked if cutting off the North's access to cryptocurrency would strengthen global security, Paparo said, "Yes, directly."

"Cryptocurrency inherently with its opaqueness, is a key enabler worldwide for proliferation, for terror, for illicit trafficking, including illicit trafficking in drugs," he said.

He added, "People can make money outside the eyes of law, and it provides a moral hazard whereby people can do bad things without fear of punishment because it's opaque."

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 2, 2024

6. N. Korean leader calls for bolstering navy's war readiness during visit to shipyard

Excerpts:

During his visit to the Nampho Dockyard on the country's west coast, Kim stressed that bolstering the country's naval force is the "most important issue" that also calls for the modernization of the North's shipbuilding industry, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said. It did not elaborate on when Kim's visit took place.

...

The KCNA's Friday dispatch marked its first coverage of Kim's visit to the Nampho Dockyard although it has reported on Kim's visit to the shipyard in Sinpo.

(LEAD) N. Korean leader calls for bolstering navy's war readiness during visit to shipyard | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · February 2, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with details, Seoul unification ministry's response in last 2 paras)

SEOUL, Feb. 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has called for strengthening the country's navy to step up war preparations and protect maritime sovereignty during a visit to a shipyard for warships, state media said Friday.

Kim made the remarks as the North has been dialing up tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the new year -- an election year for South Korea and the United States -- with weapons tests and harshly worded rhetoric.

North Korea conducted three rounds of cruise missile launches in a week recently, including test-firings of a new submarine-launched strategic cruise missile, named the "Pulhwasal-3-31."

During his visit to the Nampho Dockyard on the country's west coast, Kim stressed that bolstering the country's naval force is the "most important issue" that also calls for the modernization of the North's shipbuilding industry, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said. It did not elaborate on when Kim's visit took place.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) visits the Nampho Dockyard, in this photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 2, 2024. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Kim was briefed on ongoing preparations to build warships and ordered officials to "unconditionally" push ahead with a five-year military development plan put forth during a party congress in 2021, according to the KCNA.

During the key meeting, Kim had vowed to develop high-tech weapons, including a nuclear-powered submarine, along with a hypersonic warhead, spy satellite and solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles.

While the Sinpo South Shipyard, located in the eastern namesake city, is considered the North's main submarine shipyard, construction of a barge for launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles has been observed at Nampho Dockyard.

The KCNA's Friday dispatch marked its first coverage of Kim's visit to the Nampho Dockyard although it has reported on Kim's visit to the shipyard in Sinpo.

South Korea's unification ministry, in charge of inter-Korean affairs, condemned Kim for mentioning preparations for a war while turning a blind eye to his people's lives.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) visits the Nampho Dockyard, in this photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 2, 2024. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · February 2, 2024

7. S. Korea, US hold first joint Army special operations drills of year

S. Korea, US hold first joint Army special operations drills of year

The Korea Times · February 2, 2024

South Korean and U.S. special operations forces stage special reconnaissance drills at the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex in Pocheon, 51 kilometers northeast of Seoul, Jan. 31. Courtesy of Republic of Korea Army

The Army's special operations troops wrapped up this year's first combined exercise with the U.S. Green Berets on Friday, officials said, amid joint efforts to hone combat capabilities against North Korean threats.

The exercise took place at Rodriguez Live Fire Complex in Pocheon, 51 kilometers northeast of Seoul, from Jan. 22, involving troops from the North Star battalion under the Army Special Warfare Command and the U.S. 1st Special Forces Group, according to the South Korean Army.

The two sides staged various drills, including those on combat shooting and first aid, special reconnaissance, and directing air support, it said.

They also formed combined teams to stage a two-day reconnaissance and infiltration exercise without sleep to identify and destroy a target by directing simulated air strikes.

"The Army Special Warfare Command will closely analyze the exercise's results and strengthen education and training to enhance combined special operations capabilities," the Army said in a release.

The U.S. special operations unit in South Korea confirmed the drills, adding that U.S. SEALs and other troops from the Naval Special Warfare Command also separately trained with South Korean soldiers and police personnel last week.

"Through the presence of a strong, credible, and combined (special operations forces) ... we round out an integrated deterrence posture that enables a free and open Indo-Pacific," U.S. Special Operations Command-Korea said on its Facebook page.

The joint drills took place as tensions are running high amid North Korea's continued saber-rattling in the new year, including the launch of cruise missiles Friday. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · February 2, 2024

8. North Korea is ramping up missile tests as Kim Jung Un weighs war with South Korea

North Korea is ramping up missile tests as Kim Jung Un weighs war with South Korea

NPR · by By · February 1, 2024

North Korea test-fired cruise missiles from its western coast for the third time this week, as Kim Jung Un warns of war with South Korea. Is it rhetoric or has North Korea decided to go to war?

MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST:

Is North Korea gearing up for war? Well, here are a few data points to consider. This week North Korea test fired cruise missiles from its western coast. This is actually the third time in a week. Meanwhile, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is warning of possible war with South Korea, announcing his army is planning for a, quote, "great revolutionary event." So is this rhetoric, or has Kim made a strategic decision to go to war? Joining me now is Germany's former ambassador to North Korea, Thomas Schafer. Ambassador, welcome.

THOMAS SCHAFER: Thank you for having me.

KELLY: And Nick Kristof of The New York Times, who has covered and reported from North Korea since the 1980s and who recently wrote about this in a column headlined "As If We Didn't Have Enough To Frighten Us." Hey there.

NICK KRISTOF: Hi - good to be with you.

KELLY: So, Nick Kristof, you first. You have covered plenty of false alarms from Pyongyang over the years. Why are you warning we need to take this current moment very seriously?

KRISTOF: So something strange is going on in North Korea and has been for a few years. They've been more distant. They've held the West off. They've ratcheted up the rhetoric. The recent warning about a great revolutionary event was concerning. And what really got my attention was that there were a couple of North Korea real old hands. One is Robert Carlin, who spent 50 years examining North Korea for the CIA, for the State Department and others, and also Siegfried Hecker, who's a nuclear expert who visited North Korea seven times. And they both warned that they believe North Korea has actually made a decision to go ahead and launch an attack. Now, I guess my starting point is I have no idea what North Korea will do. And the one thing I've learned from covering it is that we need to have a lot of humility in examining it. But when North Korea is acting strangely, when it's ratcheting up the rhetoric and when you have some real experts warning that it may have made a decision, I think we need to take that indeed very seriously.

KELLY: Ambassador Schafer, let me bring you in because you are of the view that Kim Jong Un is bluffing. Why?

SCHAFER: Well, first, I would like to say that I believe that the danger of a military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula has indeed been growing for some time, and it keeps growing.

KELLY: Has been growing. Yeah.

SCHAFER: The international conditions - Ukraine, tensions because of Taiwan, the Mideast - are favorable to North Korea, and Pyongyang has been trying to increase tensions for some time. But this is due to the upcoming U.S. presidential elections. Pyongyang hopes for a win, I believe, by Trump or another isolationist Republican to get another chance to come closer to their main strategic goal, which is a weakening of the U.S.-South Korean alliance and withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. So to come back to your question, I do not believe that Pyongyang wants war, neither now nor later. But I do believe that the possibility that a war might break out would increase considerably in the case of a retreat from the U.S. from the Korean Peninsula.

KELLY: Let's just go to the worst-case scenario. If a nuclear armed North Korea has decided on war, the first question - what is the risk to the U.S.? What could that look like? Nick Kristof.

KRISTOF: So I don't think that North Korea would start with nuclear weapons because I think it would see them as a shield to limit a response. But what has always scared people is the idea that Seoul is this huge metropolis that is so close to the DMZ that North Korea can reach it with artillery, including artillery with biological or chemical weapons, for example. And if it hit Okinawa, if it hit Guam, if it - you know, there would be a response. And then the risk is that North Korea then escalates to nuclear weapons. Could North Korea reach the continental U.S. with a nuclear warhead? We don't know. It doesn't - it hasn't proved that it has the capacity to have a warhead reenter the atmosphere. But, boy, you know, even if it were just conventional weapons, even if nuclear weapons were never used, it would be just devastating throughout Asia.

KELLY: Ambassador Schafer, do you agree?

SCHAFER: What I would like to say is we have to think more about the objectives, North Korean objectives. What do they really want? What do they consider its gravest danger? And it's not just a military invasion. I believe what they consider their greatest danger is the influx of destabilizing ideas and the German-style reunification by absorption, as Pyongyang calls it. South Korea is considered by the North Korean regime as an existential threat, which it can only hope to somehow neutralize once the alliance between South Korea and the U.S. has been weakened. So the overriding intention to push the U.S. off the Korean Peninsula, the scope of Pyongyang's nuclear objectives and the fear of the so-called spiritual pollution does, of course, not bode well for efforts to convince North Korea to change course.

KELLY: Well, this prompts a question as I start to bring us toward a close here, which is, what can anyone do to convince North Korea this is a bad idea? And, Ambassador Schafer, I guess I would love to ask you specifically about China, which, of course, shares a border with North Korea.

SCHAFER: Well, I think what the international community has been doing in the last decades - that is, trying to engage with North Korea, offering political and economic incentives, giving security guarantees and building confidence - is the right course. One should remember that North Korea does not only consist of one person who decides all. Actually, it's 25 million. And, as I believe, the leadership is broader than many people think, and not all have the same thinking. Some of them believe that following the Chinese way, doing reforms internally, giving more personal freedom to their people and coming to an understanding with the international community is the right way to follow. So I believe the international community should actually continue that approach in the hope to convince those people in the leadership in North Korea that might be willing to respond to such an approach.

KELLY: So I hear you're sounding optimistic that North Korea can be influenced. Nick Kristof, do you share that optimism? And I'll ask you specifically about the U.S. What can or should the U.S. do?

KRISTOF: So, frankly, I don't think that there's a great deal we can do. I agree with Ambassador Schafer that we should try engagement. I doubt it will get terribly far. You know, one thing we can do is that the more we help Ukraine make Russia pay a price and the more Russia is degraded militarily and Putin is seen as a loser, I think the more that makes North Korea wonder about its decision to ally itself so closely with Putin and see its future as a partner of Putin. So, you know, I think that's one thing we can do that maybe, at the margin, can help a little bit.

KELLY: Nick Kristof of The New York Times and Thomas Schafer, Germany's former ambassador to North Korea. Thanks to you both.

KRISTOF: Thank you.

SCHAFER: Thank you.

(SOUNDBITE OF HERMANOS GUTIERREZ'S "EL BUENO Y EL MALO")

NPR · by By · February 1, 2024

9. North Korean missiles won't defeat Ukraine

North Korean missiles won't defeat Ukraine

Business Insider · by Michael Peck

Military & Defense

Analysis by Michael Peck

2024-01-29T22:19:25Z

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North Korea has supplied Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, like this one North Korea fired into the East Sea on March 19, 2023.Kim Jae-Hwan/Getty Images

• Russia is firing North Korean-made missiles that some fear could change the war.
• An expert believes that North Korean short-range ballistic missiles could hit pinpoint targets.
• Even if that's the case, the missiles won't win the war for Russia.

Russia's use of North Korean-made ballistic missiles in Ukraine has sparked fears that this could prove a powerful new weapon able to degrade Ukraine's arms industry or blast a path through the deadlocked battlefields.

This story is available exclusively to Business Insider subscribers. Become an Insider and start reading now.

Yet while the prospect of yet more intensive bombardment is hardly good news for war-weary Ukrainians, these weapons appear to be far from a silver bullet. Their power derives not only from their accuracy, but also the size of the arsenal North Korea has provided and its ability to manufacture more — all of which are unclear. Nor can Moscow assume that additional missile strikes will break Ukrainian morale where waves of earlier attacks have failed.

In early January, the White House announced that North Korean-made missiles had been launched from southwest Russia into southwest Ukraine, near the city of Zaporizhia. The weapons are apparently Kn-23 and Kn-24 short-range ballistic missiles, or SRBM, according to US intelligence.

North Korean arms are known for being cheap rather than good, as Moscow discovered when it recently began importing shoddy North Korean ammunition. But these North Korean ballistic missiles are not some knockoff of the notorious 1950s Soviet Scud, a liquid-fueled rocket that takes more than an hour to launch. The Kn-23, with an estimated range of up to 500 miles and a one-ton warhead, bears some resemblance to Russia's SS-26 Iskander SRBM. The Kn-24, with a range of 250 miles and a one-ton warhead, looks like a US ATACMS missile.

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"These are more sophisticated, solid-fueled missiles that can be launched without much preparation time," Masao Dahlgren, a missile defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, told Business Insider. "They may have some design heritage with Russian systems, but they borrow heavily from North Korean expertise."

The world has tended to focus on North Korea's ICBM and nuclear weapons programs, which may have the potential to hit the United States with an atomic weapon. Short-range ballistic missiles have received less attention, weapons that could target South Korea command centers and US bases and ships. "These theater-range missiles are often overlooked," Dahlgren said. "There hasn't been enough focus on these shorter-range missiles that North Korea and Iran are exporting."

As North Korean SRBMs are used in Ukraine, knowledge of their capabilities will grow from analysis of impact sites and missile debris. But for now, not much is known about their capabilities, especially their accuracy.

"The real secret sauce" will be learning about their guidance systems, Dahlgren said. "We hope to learn a little bit more from parts that the Ukrainians will be picking up in the next couple of months."

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Older ballistic missiles like the Scud, and its ancestor the Nazi V-2, were area bombardment weapons that might land within a couple of miles of the target. However, Dahlgren believes that North Korean SRBMs could be accurate enough to hit pinpoint targets, just as Iranian missiles did during recent strikes in Iraq, Pakistan and Syria. "I wouldn't underestimate North Korea's capability to make tactically relevant systems that could strike at military targets."

But for Moscow, quantity may be more important than quality. To compensate for the poor performance of its ground troops and air force, Russia has expended vast quantities of guided missiles and artillery shells, so far without decisive effect. This suggests that Russia will need a lot of North Korean missiles, which in turn raises the question of North Korea's rocket manufacturing capacity.

"There have been numbers thrown all over the place," said Dahlgren. "The problem here is that North Korea has substantially advanced the state of its production base as of the past couple of months." In 2023, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that North Korea has built a dozen ICBMs and intermediate-range missiles apiece, plus at least 70 SRBMs.

A worry for Ukraine – and the US, Japan and South Korea – is what Pyongyang will get from Moscow in return for missiles. Payment could include money for the cash-strapped regime, food or weapons such as advanced jets. But Russia could also turn over missile designs and components, such as for hypersonic weapons. For the Kremlin, this would mean a chance to import more missiles, and allow Russian industry to focus on producing other weapons. For Kim Jong Un's regime, this would boost its capabilities to threaten its neighbors and opponents, and generate cash as the new global arms race spurs nations to buy more rockets.

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But for now, the issue is whether Russia can use North Korean missiles to either achieve victory on the battlefield, or to break civilian morale and compel Kyiv to sue for peace. Yet for two years, Ukraine has withstood relentless bombardment by everything from hypersonic missiles to waves of Iranian-made kamikaze drones.

Unless Moscow can obtain massive numbers of North Korean SRBMs, this would seem an incremental addition to Russian firepower. If Russia's existing missiles can't break Ukraine, then neither will North Korea's.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds a master's in political science. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

Business Insider · by Michael Peck

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