Quotes of the Day:

The 1919 Korean Declaration of Independence:

We hereby declare that Korea is an independent state and that Koreans are a self-governing people. We proclaim this fact to all nations to reaffirm the great truth that all humans are equal, so that our descendants may forever enjoy their rights to live as an autonomous people.

...

Our Three Pledges

First, our declaration of independence today represents the wish of our people to safeguard and advance justice and human principles in their lives. Therefore, we shall only spread the spirit of freedom far and wide and avoid from being exclusive of others.

Second, everyone, down to the last of us, shall represent the voice of our people’s rightful will.

Third, all actions shall be respectful of order to demonstrate our honorable cause and rightful conduct.

On the first day of March, in the four thousand two hundred fifty-second year since the founding of our nation(1919).

https://overseas.mofa.go.kr/us-losangeles-en/brd/m_4394/view.do?seq=761378

"As our own species is in the process of proving, one cannot have superior science with inferior morals. The combination is unstable and self-destroying."

- Arthur C. Clarke

"Unlimited power in the hands of limited people always leads to cruelty."

- Aleksander Solzhenitsyn

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 14, 2023

2. Finland negotiating Defence Cooperation Agreement with the United States

3. Chinese spies who read State Dept. email also hacked GOP congressman

4. Air Force considers training changes across all special ops jobs

5. Let’s not forget what a nuclear war would actually mean

6. Former Marine captain’s Syrian detention reaches 11th year

7. Why Will Roper still believes the Pentagon should work more like Formula One

8. 'Unprecedented' Promotion Hold Leads to 3rd Service Without a Confirmed Chief

9. How to Unsettle an Alliance: Subordinate Extended Deterrence to Antiquated Arms Control Initiatives

10. Beyond Defense: China’s Pursuit of Unorthodox Force Multipliers

11. America’s Window of Opportunity in Asia

12. India’s Foreign Policy In A Multipolar World: Navigating Multipolarity And Strategic Alliances – Analysis

13. Logisticians battle distance, weather, red tape in giant Pacific exercise

14. General Officer Assignments - Army (and 7th Infantry Division)

15. How Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Might End (Interview with John Nagl)

16. China to disclose secret US ‘global reconnaissance system,’ claims official

17. US to open expanded aid mission to Pacific island countries

18. Ukraine Says It Stopped Air Attacks on Odesa, While British and Dutch Jets Go After Russian Bombers

19. How to Think about Proxy Wars in the Twenty-first Century

20. Rethinking Civil-Military Relations for Modern Strategy

21. The Allure of Conscription

22. A feud is heating up between Arizona workers and the world's leading chipmaker after the company said the US didn't have the skills to build its new factory

23. ‘Dnipro Devils’ Drilled by British Special Forces

24. Biden Establishes Review Process to Regulate China-Bound Investment in Key Industries

25. The Corruption War: Russia Is Losing the War for the Same Reason It Started It

26. Judge rules in favor of Montana youths in landmark climate decision

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 14, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: 

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 14 and reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• Crimean occupation authorities are attempting to impose new federal penalties on individuals who publish content revealing the locations and operations of Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, likely in response to Ukraine’s ongoing interdiction campaign.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes targeting Odesa Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely remains unable to fully take control of some Russian private military companies which are affiliated with or receive sponsorship from Russian officials and businessmen.
• US officials announced a new $200 million security assistance package for Ukraine on August 14.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Bakhmut.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kupyansk.
• The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) continues to form new regiments and appoint prominent Russian ultranationalists to command its units, possibly in an effort to incentivize recruitment.
• Russian authorities are removing local officials in occupied territories of Ukraine likely in order to fill openings with preferred candidates in the upcoming regional elections.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 14, 2023

Aug 14, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 14, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark

August 14, 2023, 6:45pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on August 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 14 and reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Berdyansk (western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[1] Malyar added that Ukrainian forces achieved some unspecified successes south and southeast of Staromayorske (9km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) in the Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) direction. Malyar noted that Ukrainian forces are continuing to advance in Urozhaine, and some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces control the northern part of the settlement.[2] Alexander Khodakovsky, commander of the “Vostok” battalion defending near Urozhaine, complained that Russian forces are not deploying additional reserves and artillery battalions to the area.[3] Khodakovsky claimed that the “Vostok” battalion is fighting for Urozhaine with all available forces but that the forces operating in the area are exhausted and suffering losses. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces lack available operational reserves that would allow them to carry out rotations or bring in additional reinforcements, and that Russian defensive lines may be brittle.[4] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Robotyne (13km south of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in southern Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[5] Malyar added that Ukrainian forces advanced by three square kilometers in the Bakhmut direction in the past week and liberated 40 square kilometers total since Ukrainian forces began their offensive operations in this direction.[6]

Crimean occupation authorities are attempting to impose new federal penalties on individuals who publish content revealing the locations and operations of Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, likely in response to Ukraine’s ongoing interdiction campaign. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov announced on August 14 that Crimean occupation officials will propose amendments at a federal level to increase the liability for the spread of photos and videos showing the location and operation of Russian air defense systems, other systems, and military and strategic assets.[7] The amendments would also penalize individuals who publish images of the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes. Aksyonov’s initiative likely intends to improve Russian operational security and limit awareness of Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas in the Russian information space, and occupation officials have previously discussed similar restrictions following the attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 17.[8] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger and prominent Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov both expressed concern that Russian authorities could wrongfully use such amendments to censor Russian journalists and milbloggers who report on Ukrainian strikes.[9] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian officials are unlikely to successfully prevent the publication of strike footage.[10]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes targeting Odesa Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed all eight Russian-launched Kalibr cruise missiles and 15 Shahed-131/136 drones.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that falling missile and drone debris caused fires in several locations in Odesa City.[12]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely remains unable to fully take control of some Russian private military companies which are affiliated with or receive sponsorship from Russian officials and businessmen. Russian opposition outlet Dossier reported on August 14 that longtime associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin Arkady Rosenburg and the Russian state-affiliated bank VTB have provided over 300 million rubles ($3.04 million) to the Convoy PMC since late 2022.[13] Dossier reported that Russian energy enterprises Promresurs and Coal Trading also gave a combined 109.5 million rubles ($1.11 million) to Convoy PMC, even though neither enterprise’s profit margins supported the donations. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov reportedly politically supports the Convoy PMC. The Convoy PMC began formal recruitment for activities in Ukraine in November 2022, and Convoy personnel signed contracts either directly with Convoy PMC or with the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District). Dossier noted that Convoy is not subordinate to the 150th Motorized Rifle Division and has its own area of responsibility in Ukraine and command structure. Convoy PMC is reportedly based out of occupied Perevalne, Crimea, and is currently operating in the Kherson direction after originally defending Russian logistics lines on the Melitopol-Dzhankoy highway.[14] Convoy PMC reportedly has 400 personnel as of summer 2023, who receive salaries of 200-300 thousand rubles ($2,030-3,045) per month.[15] Ongoing private financial and political support for the Convoy private military company (PMC) and its continued operations in Ukraine separate from the MoD command structure indicates that the MoD is unable to fully integrate irregular formations into the conventional Russian military despite its announced intent to do so.

Convoy PMC founder Konstantin Pikalov has prior affiliations with the Wagner Group and is reportedly affiliated with the Russian General Staff Main Directorate (GRU). Dossier reported that Pikalov is also the cofounder of the St. Petersburg Cossack Society “Convoy,” and that Pikalov attempted to break into the military services industry starting in 2014 but did not experience much success until he joined the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2018.[16] Pikalov reportedly served as an advisor to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin or as part of a security detail rather than as a fighter. Dossier reported that Pikalov is affiliated with GRU agent Stanislav Poluzanov, whom he later recruited as a deputy commander in Convoy. Dossier reported that there are no records of Pikalov interacting with Prigozhin-affiliated structures after 2018, and Convoy PMC continued international security work in 2019. Dossier reported that Pikalov had little military experience prior to his involvement with the Wagner Group and that Pikalov is the opposite of Prigozhin: “manual and safe for power.”

US officials announced a new $200 million security assistance package for Ukraine on August 14.[17] US officials announced that the package will include additional HIMARS rockets; Patriot air defense missiles; TOW anti-tank missiles; and mine-clearing equipment.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 14 and reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• Crimean occupation authorities are attempting to impose new federal penalties on individuals who publish content revealing the locations and operations of Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, likely in response to Ukraine’s ongoing interdiction campaign.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes targeting Odesa Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely remains unable to fully take control of some Russian private military companies which are affiliated with or receive sponsorship from Russian officials and businessmen.
• US officials announced a new $200 million security assistance package for Ukraine on August 14.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Bakhmut.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kupyansk.
• The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) continues to form new regiments and appoint prominent Russian ultranationalists to command its units, possibly in an effort to incentivize recruitment.
• Russian authorities are removing local officials in occupied territories of Ukraine likely in order to fill openings with preferred candidates in the upcoming regional elections.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk and advanced on August 14. Geolocated footage published on August 13 indicates that Russian forces advanced near Orlianka (22km east of Kupyansk) and Mykolaivka (24km east of Kupyansk).[19] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) took control of multiple Ukrainian positions and observation posts near Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk).[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured positions and occupied the line from Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) to Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), where positional battles are ongoing.[21] One of the milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are currently about 7km from Kupyansk.[22] Former deputy interior minister of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Vitaly Kiselev similarly claimed that Russian forces are directly on the outskirts of Kupyansk, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[23] Kiselev claimed that Russian forces are unlikely to capture Kupyansk in the near future due to Ukrainian force composition and defensive preparations in the city.[24] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Petropavlivka, Synkivka, and Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[25] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Pershotravneve (21km east of Kupyansk) and Mankivka (about 15km east of Kupyansk).[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are accumulating reinforcements and introducing new units into battle in the Kupyansk direction, and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are increasing the density of mine-explosive barriers along the international border between Kharkiv and Belgorod oblasts, possibly to disrupt further pro-Ukrainian cross border raids.[27]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kupyansk on August 14. The Russian MoD and Zybinsky claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Synkivka and the Usa forest (likely between Synkivka and Lyman Pershyi).[28]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance on August 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations southeast of Andriivka (15km west of Svatove), and Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Andriivka.[29] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to push Ukrainian forces out of the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to advance near Karmazynivka (13km southwest of Svatove) and Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[31] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Myasozharivka (15km west of Svatove) and that this is a new Russian direction of attack.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have not been able to break through Ukrainian defenses near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[33]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance on August 14. Russian sources including the Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Novoselivske, Bilohorivka, and Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian counterattacks near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and Terny (17km west of Kreminna) have slowed Russian activity in the area.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and marginally advanced on August 14. Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows that Ukrainian forces made minor advances south of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) while attacking Russian positions.[36] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in southern Klishchiivka, while others claimed that Russian forces repelled the attacks.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted a failed attack near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) on August 13.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly advanced on August 14. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured lost positions in Klishchiivka while counterattacking, and some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured the entire settlement.[39] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attempts to recapture lost positions near Klishchiivka, west of Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and near Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[40]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in positional battles on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on August 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Avdiivka, Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City.[41] A Russian milblogger characterized fighting in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions as positional because both Russian and Ukrainian forces are focusing on other areas of the front.[42]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 14 and reportedly advanced. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces achieved some unspecified successes south and southeast of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and in the Urozhaine direction (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[43] Malyar also reported that Ukrainian forces continue offensive operations in the Berdyansk direction (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area).[44] The “Vostok” Battalion, which is defending near Urozhaine, claimed that it is deploying personnel to the rear and second or third levels of defense, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may have advanced near Urozhaine.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attempts to advance in Urozhaine.[46] Several milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces control the northern part of Urozhaine while Russian forces continue to occupy the southern part of the settlement and that the rest of the area in and near the settlement remains contested.[47]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 14 but did not make any confirmed or claimed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain lost positions west of Staromayorske.[48] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces withdrew from Urozhaine and that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) covered their withdrawal.[49] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have completely withdrawn from Urozhaine, and Russian forces likely maintain some positions in the south of the settlement. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the “Sokol” Volunteer Battalion of the 108th Air Assault (VDV) Regiment and a reconnaissance company of the 247th VDV Regiment (both of the 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division) are operating near Staromayorske and Urozhaine.[50]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 14, but did not make confirmed or claimed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[51] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled small Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne (13km south of Orikhiv).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th Guards Mountain VDV Division) repelled Ukrainian attacks in the Orikhiv direction.[53]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 14 and recently made claimed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 13 that elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and elements of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th Guards Mountain VDV Division) advanced in the Orikhiv direction.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain lost positions east of Robotyne.[55]

Russian sources continue to claim that Ukrainian forces hold limited positions on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to cross to the east bank of the Dnipro River on small boats near the Antonivsky Bridge and Kozachi Laheri.[56] Russian sources amplified footage of a Russian Su-24 bomber flying over Kherson Oblast and speculated that it was striking Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky Bridge or Kozachi Laheri.[57]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) continues to form new regiments and appoint prominent Russian ultranationalists to command its units, possibly in an effort to incentivize recruitment. Russian sources claimed that Rosgvardia is reorganizing its “Oplot” battalion into a regiment and that the battalion is receiving heavy military equipment.[58] Rosgvardia also appointed Russian State Duma Deputy (and a prominent Russian ultranationalist) Zakhar Prilepin as the deputy commander for military political work of the “Oplot” regiment and awarded Prilepin the rank of lieutenant colonel.[59] Prilepin led a battalion in Donbas prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and was a celebrity in the occupied Donetsk Oblast.[60]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu opened the “Army 2023” international military-technical forum (which runs from August 14 to 20) near Moscow on August 14.[61] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that it anticipates signing contracts worth over 433 billion rubles (about $4.4 billion) at the forum.[62] Putin claimed that 82 foreign military industrial companies exhibited their military equipment at the forum, whereas only 32 companies attended in 2022.[63] Putin claimed that Russia expects to sign agreements for the export of military equipment during the forum.[64]

Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to form and deploy new volunteer formations to reinforce the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Khabarovsk Krai reportedly formed a “Maksim Passar” volunteer battalion – the krai’s third volunteer battalion.[65] Khabarovsk officials also extended the recruitment period for the “Yerofey Khabarov” volunteer battalion.

The Russian military command subordinated a Magadan Oblast-based “Kolyma” volunteer battalion to the Donetsk People’s Republic’s 1st Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Army Corps) and then dissolved the battalion to reinforce existing regular military units.[66] Elements of the “Kolyma” volunteer battalion published an appeal addressing Putin and the governors of Primorsky Krai and Magadan Oblast on August 13, stating that the battalion suffered significant losses on the battlefield. The volunteers claimed that Magadan Oblast promised that the volunteers would serve together as part of the “Kolyma” battalion under an experienced and familiar commander. The volunteers also claimed that Magadan Oblast promised them three to four months of training prior to deployment to Ukraine. The volunteers complained that they were subordinated to a different commander who dismantled the unit to create reinforcements for his other units when the “Kolyma” volunteer battalion deployed to the frontlines. The reformation of the “Kolyma” volunteer battalion indicates that the Russian military command continues to leverage personnel of new irregular military formations as individual reinforcements instead of cohesive units.

Russian convicts fighting in Ukraine continue to suffer significant losses on the battlefield. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that convicts fighting as part of “Storm Z” detachments suffer “serious” losses because they are immediately committed to the first line of defense.[67] A Russian convict who guarded Russian positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast told The New York Times that only 40 convicts out of 120 from his unit survived in combat.[68] The convict noted that the hastily formed convict unit endured several weeks of bombardment, sniper attacks, and ambushes on very flat terrain, making them a very vulnerable target.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities are removing local officials in occupied territories of Ukraine, likely in order to fill openings with preferred candidates in the upcoming regional elections. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian authorities in Svatove, Luhansk Oblast, are demanding that local administration and city council representatives – presumably occupation bodies – resign their positions and that Russian authorities plan to create new local administrations that will be headed by officials "elected” in the upcoming regional elections.[69]

Russian officials and occupation officials continue to establish patronage systems in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia. The Ministry of Fuel and Energy Complex, Housing, and Communal Services of Krasnodar Krai, Russia sent construction equipment and materials to areas in Kherson Oblast for social and residential infrastructure projects.[70]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

A Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel claimed on August 14 that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on an unspecified date in the past week, but ISW cannot confirm this claim.[71] The channel noted that the topic of the meeting is unclear. If true, a Prigozhin-Lukashenko meeting would likely indicate that Prigozhin is still in Belarus.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Belarusian forces are increasing their electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on the Ukrainian-Belarusian international border.[72] The Resistance Center reported, citing Belarusian partisans, that Russian experts arrived in Belarus to train Belarusian forces to repel drone attacks.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Finland negotiating Defence Cooperation Agreement with the United States

Finland negotiating Defence Cooperation Agreement with the United States

The agreement will dictate the specifics regarding the stationing of US troops in Finland for military exercises and overall preparedness, which would be the first instance of an extended foreign military presence in Finland during peacetime.

yle.fi · August 13, 2023

In a significant departure from its previous stance, Finland is currently in negotiations with the United States over a new defence cooperation agreement. The proposed agreement would permit the presence of foreign troops for extended periods, specifically for conventional military exercises.

The agreement's primary aim is to grant US military personnel access to facilities and areas within Finland for training, weapons storage, and equipment maintenance. This includes the potential use of airports, harbours and designated training zones.

It is likely that the US military would be granted access to at least one airport and harbour, as well as a training area. The Finnish Defense Forces' (FDF) existing barracks or locations in close proximity might be allocated for US use.

Iro Särkkä, a senior researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), summarised that the agreement sets in stone the capability of Finland to provide and receive assistance. This development aligns Finland more closely with the United States, ultimately enhancing Finland's security.

"This marks a highly significant shift in Finland's security policy. Never before in peacetime has Finland hosted foreign troops for extended periods. Now, all barriers to practical cooperation between Finland and the United States are being removed," states Särkkä.

Finland's chief negotiator for the agreement is Ambassador Mikael Antell, also Deputy Director General of the Political Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Antell viewed the agreement primarily as an enabler.

"In principle, it enables collaboration with the United States in all circumstances. Consequently, it significantly strengthens Finland's security and defence," Antell emphasised.

The push for this defence collaboration was initiated after a meeting between Presidents Sauli Niinistö of Finland and Joe Biden of the US in March 2022, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The agreement is referred to as the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA).

US President Joe Biden visited Helsinki earlier in July, meeting with Finnish President Sauli Niinistö. Image: Benjamin Suomela / Yle

US troop placements still undetermined

From Finland's perspective, the agreement bolsters defence capabilities through the storage of US weapons and the presence of troops for joint training with their Finnish counterparts. However, the practical implementation is likely to emphasise joint exercises over the storage of large quantities of equipment.

"When US soldiers are in Finland, it's because we've jointly decided to engage in something. Primarily, we're talking about joint training activities. They are here temporarily, based on a rotation. The extent will be determined in due time." Antell clarified.

Although the exact number of soldiers present in Finland simultaneously is uncertain, a focus on Northern Finland could be logical due to the expansive FDF training area in Rovajärvi, situated between Rovaniemi and Kemijärvi in Lapland.

"Undoubtedly, Finland and Sweden's future Nato membership, alongside Norway's existing Nato membership, create entirely new prospects for cooperation in the north," Antell assessed.

Finland's stance emphasises the temporary nature of US troops' presence. These temporary periods may follow one another.

US forces could operate throughout Finland — on land, sea, and in the air. Joint exercises between Finnish and American soldiers could span various parts of the country.

Researcher Iro Särkkä stressed the importance of Finland safeguarding its national sovereignty. The agreement should ensure that Finland isn't leveraged for another country's purposes.

"Finland and the United States need to share a common understanding of the agreement's purpose and content, so that Finland doesn't become a tool for another country's aims."

Särkkä, however, does not believe that Finland's national sovereignty will be compromised due to the new cooperation agreement.

Russia's Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, recently announced plans to reinforce forces along its western border, including areas near Finland.

Both the researcher and the chief negotiator of the new defence agreement hesitate to draw direct conclusions linking Russia's announcement to the new agreement.

US and Finnish soldiers already have a long history of cooperation, even prior to Finland joining Nato last year. Image: Tiina Jutila / Yle

Parallel agreements and broader implications

Norway already has a similar cooperation agreement with the United States. Meanwhile, Sweden and Denmark are also in separate negotiations with the US for comparable agreements. This trend appears to be forming a new coalition of countries with similar interests, akin to an alliance.

Särkkä from the FIIA suggested that President Joe Biden's visit to Finland and the Nordic summit with the United States underscores America's commitment to Northern European security.

"One could infer that the United States, together with other Nordic countries, by intensifying defence cooperation, is establishing a concrete alliance," Särkkä explained.

It's worth noting that the agreement excludes nuclear weapons. Finnish law prohibits the housing of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the use of antipersonnel landmines is also prohibited since Finland is bound by the international Ottawa Treaty, which enforces this ban.

The agreement is expected to see increased cooperation between the Finnish and US militaries. Image: NATO

Ongoing legal considerations for soldier accountability

The agreement covers a range of matters beyond just the presence of US troops and the storage of arms. These issues span customs and tax exemptions for goods, as well as how US soldiers would be treated if they were to face legal consequences in Finland.

Iro Särkkä from the FIIA highlighted that there are several contentious issues within the agreement, particularly the legal accountability of soldiers. Negotiations regarding this aspect are still ongoing, with the next round set for the autumn.

"In Nato's Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the premise is that the sending state's troops adhere to their own legislation while respecting the receiving state's laws," explained Ambassador Mikael Antell from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Finland is likely to relinquish jurisdiction over crimes committed by US soldiers but may seek the ability to handle certain cases on Finnish soil as per its own legal framework.

In practical terms, this could mean that the United States would handle minor offences, like traffic violations, while Finland could insist on jurisdiction for more serious crimes under the Finnish legal code.

Finland has sought insights from Norway's experience with relinquishing jurisdiction. Norway's response suggests that no major issues have arisen.

Last May, the USS Kearsarge visited Helsinki en route to naval exercises in the Baltic. Image: Antti Haanpää / Yle

Exceptional majority required by Parliament

Negotiations between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and US authorities are expected to conclude by the beginning of next year. The talks commenced last autumn.

Upon the completion of the agreement, the Finnish Parliament will decide on its approval.

Some sources suggest that a simple majority might not suffice for parliamentary approval, and instead, a two-thirds majority could be required. This stems from the Finnish Constitution's stipulation that a significant transfer of sovereignty necessitates a larger majority.

The final decision will be determined by the Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament. However, it remains uncertain whether the committee will require a two-thirds majority for the vote.

In its statement on Nato membership, the committee emphasised that Finland's full sovereignty permits the country to independently decide on defence cooperation.

For Nato membership, a simple majority sufficed formally, even though a substantial majority of MPs ultimately voted in favour of joining the defence alliance.

yle.fi · August 13, 2023

3.Chinese spies who read State Dept. email also hacked GOP congressman

Chinese spies who read State Dept. email also hacked GOP congressman

Rep. Don Bacon said he was told of the hacking Monday; he pledged to 'work overtime’ to win passage of an aid package for Taiwan

By Joseph Menn

August 14, 2023 at 9:52 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Joseph Menn · August 15, 2023

The suspected Chinese hackers who forged Microsoft customer identities to read the emails of State Department employees also obtained the personal and political emails of Rep. Don Bacon, a moderate Republican on the House Armed Services Committee.

Bacon tweeted Monday that he had been notified by the FBI that his emails were hacked by Chinese spies who took advantage of a Microsoft mistake for a month between mid-May and mid-June, which lines up with when investigators said the other breaches occurred.

Bacon said that he would “work overtime” to make sure that Taiwan receives all of the billions in U.S. weaponry that it has ordered.

“I’m a big proponent for Taiwan,” Bacon told The Washington Post by text message. “I suspect they’d like info to embarrass me or to undercut me politically. As I told FBI, I have nothing to be embarrassed about."

Government and private sources told The Post a month ago that victims of the hacking campaign included Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, unnamed State Department employees, a human rights advocate and think tanks.

They also said that a congressional staffer had been targeted.

Bacon told The Post he was notified of the hacking only Monday, which suggests that new victims are still being discovered. The FBI did not respond to requests for comment. Neither did Microsoft.

Officials have described the spying as traditional espionage of the sort expected by all sides. It was about observation on issues of special concern, such as the U.S. response to escalating tensions between the autonomous island of Taiwan and mainland China, which claims it.

But the breach has alarmed experts for another reason: It was unclear how the government could have prevented it while relying exclusively on Microsoft for cloud, email and authentication services.

Microsoft has said that the hackers obtained powerful signing keys they needed to create verified customer identities that could sidestep multifactor authentication. Combined with other Miscrosoft failings, millions of people could have been exposed to attack.

Officials have said that only a couple dozen entities were impersonated before the State Department found suspicious behavior in its activity logs. Microsoft was then able to search its own logs for the master key that the hackers had obtained and block future access.

Multiple members of Congress have demanded that federal agencies explain how they plan to combat similar attacks in the future and that Microsoft make logs more widely available, which it agreed to do.

Sen. Ron Wyden has gone further, asking the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission to investigate whether Microsoft’s security practices were so poor as to be in violation of laws or its 20-year-old FTC consent decree requiring better security after the breach of what was then it’s single sign-on tool for authentication, Passport.

Wyden also urged the Department of Homeland Security to have its two-year old Cyber Safety Review Board examine the Microsoft cloud breach. Last week, the board said it would take up the task.

The Department of Homeland security referred questions to the FBI.

Leigh Ann Caldwell and David DiMolfetta contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Joseph Menn · August 15, 2023

4. Air Force considers training changes across all special ops jobs

Beware or be wary of chopping "legacy skills" in the name of trying to achieve efficiencies. Once lost they will be very hard to regenerate when history tells us they will likely be needed again in the future.

Air Force considers training changes across all special ops jobs

airforcetimes.com · by Rachel Cohen · August 14, 2023

Air Force Special Operations Command is taking a closer look at how it trains airmen to join each of its career fields, as the service’s elite corps prepares for a new era in combat.

The wide-ranging review, led by AFSOC Commander Lt. Gen. Tony Bauernfeind, will prompt changes to the initial qualification and advanced training phases that airmen move through on their way to their first operational units, command spokesperson Lt. Col. Becky Heyse said in an Aug. 11 email.

It’s a bid to move the organization forward after decades at war in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and revamp it for a faster-paced, more collaborative way of doing business — particularly as the Air Force shrinks and pivots toward competing with China rather than warding off terror groups.

With the U.S. out of Afghanistan and largely withdrawn from its wars in Iraq and Syria, officials see the lull in operations as an opportunity to ensure that airmen have training that is relevant to the combat environments they’ll see in the future.

That means cutting skills that airmen don’t often use, or that may no longer have a place in a future fight. Those shifts will also affect how airmen are picked to continue on in the most grueling pipelines.

First on the chopping block: combat dive training for three special warfare fields.

In a June 21 memo to the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for operations, Bauernfeind asked Lt. Gen. Jim Slife — who led AFSOC before moving to the Pentagon in December — to cut the combat dive qualification course from the initial training pipeline for special tactics, combat control and special reconnaissance officers.

The document was leaked on X, formerly known as Twitter, on Aug. 3. The Air Force has confirmed its authenticity.

The five-week combat dive qualification course prepares Air Force ground troops to infiltrate areas by water so they can conduct underwater searches and call in airstrikes, among other missions, from otherwise inaccessible places.

Without that course, airmen would still complete water confidence training at the four-week pre-dive course that is a prerequisite for the longer combat dive training, Bauernfeind suggested in the memo.

The pre-dive course is known as one of the more arduous parts of training to become part of the “special tactics” ground forces that accompany AFSOC units in the field. There, they are introduced to drownproofing and tasks like underwater knot tying that can come in handy on missions with maritime elements.

The proposed change indicates that the Air Force believes those skills aren’t must-haves for many special warfare officers, even as the U.S. military lists the Pacific as its top-priority theater in the coming years.

Instead, AFSOC may make combat diving a special qualification, Bauernfeind wrote. That would mean airmen could earn their combat dive badge, or “scuba bubble,” later on in their career if needed.

Bauernfeind said his command would figure out what taking that route would require of students by the end of September.

He asked Slife to quickly incorporate the change into training requirements for special tactics, combat control and special reconnaissance officers — a process done in collaboration with Air Education and Training Command. Before it takes effect, he wrote, airmen should be allowed to continue on in those pipelines without having completed the combat dive course.

Combat controller and special tactics officer students plan a simulated ambush July 18 during Tactics Field Week in the North Carolina forests. he week prepares students within the Special Warfare Training Wing's 352nd Training Squadron for careers as combat controllers, special tactics officers and special reconnaissance airmen. (Miriam Thurber/Air Force)

But because an airman’s performance in the combat dive course is a key consideration in whether they should move forward in special tactics training, it’s unclear how removing it from the pipeline would affect that grading.

Asked how AFSOC might adapt the selection process, Heyse said those details are still under analysis.

Eliminating combat dive is the only request Bauernfeind has made to update training so far, she said.

The expertise needed

The top-level review is one piece of a broader reckoning within AFSOC over the expertise its members should bring to the battlefield and how its units should be organized.

For instance, airmen vying to join special warfare — the most elite subset of special operations — now face a fitness test that is broadly more challenging than in the past. But the test was also revised to make it easier to succeed in events, such as the long jump, that officials believe are less valuable to tomorrow’s commandos.

The Air Force codified multiple changes to special warfare training after allegations surfaced last year that it had allowed an unqualified female candidate to progress through the pipeline. An internal investigation found that conflicting fitness standards within the enterprise contributed to an appearance of foul play.

Slife, then the top officer at AFSOC, pushed back on claims that the organization is growing soft.

“We do make changes in how we train airmen in order to improve the effectiveness of our training, but we do not lower our standards,” he wrote in January 2022. “Period.”

About Rachel S. Cohen

Rachel Cohen joined Air Force Times as senior reporter in March 2021. Her work has appeared in Air Force Magazine, Inside Defense, Inside Health Policy, the Frederick News-Post (Md.), the Washington Post, and others.

5. Let’s not forget what a nuclear war would actually mean

Excerpts:

Today, the risk of a nuclear exchange – and its devastating impact on medicine and public health worldwide – has only escalated compared to previous decades. Nine countries are known to have nuclear weapons, and international relations are increasingly volatile.

The US and Russia are heavily investing in the modernization of their nuclear stockpiles, and China, India and Pakistan are rapidly expanding the size and sophistication of their nuclear weapon capabilities.

The developing technological sophistication among terrorist groups and the growing global availability and distribution of radioactive materials are also especially worrying.

In recent years, a number of government and private organizations have held meetings (all of which I attended) to devise large-scale medical responses to a nuclear weapon detonation in the US and worldwide.

They include the National Academy of Sciences, the National Alliance for Radiation Readiness, National Disaster Life Support Foundation, Society for Disaster Medicine and Public Health, and the Radiation Injury Treatment Network, which includes 74 hospitals nationwide actively preparing to receive radiation-exposed patients.

Despite the gloomy prospects of health outcomes of any large-scale nuclear event common in the minds of many, there are a number of concrete steps the US and other countries can take to prepare. It’s our obligation to respond.

Let’s not forget what a nuclear war would actually mean

Here’s what would happen if a nuclear device were detonated in an urban area today

asiatimes.com · by Cham Dallas · August 15, 2023

Because several generations have passed since the atomic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki – the only use of nuclear weapons in warfare – some may think the threat from nuclear weapons has receded. But international developments, including nuclear threats from Russia in the war in Ukraine, have brought a broader awareness of the vulnerability to global peace from nuclear events.

I’ve been studying the effects of nuclear events – from detonations to accidents – for over 30 years. This has included my direct involvement in research, teaching and humanitarian efforts in multiple expeditions to Chernobyl- and Fukushima-contaminated areas.

Now I am involved in the proposal for the formation of a Nuclear Global Health Workforce, which I proposed in 2017.

Such a group could bring together nuclear and nonnuclear technical and health professionals for education and training, and help to meet the preparedness, coordination, collaboration and staffing requirements necessary to respond to a large-scale nuclear crisis.

What would this workforce need to be prepared to manage? For that we can look back at the legacy of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as nuclear accidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima.

What happens when a nuclear device is detonated over a city?

Approximately 135,000 and 64,000 people died, respectively, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The great majority of deaths happened in the first days after the bombings, mainly from thermal burns, severe physical injuries and radiation.

A visitor to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum views a photo of the aftermath of the 1945 bombing. Carl Court/Getty Images

The great majority of doctors and nurses in Hiroshima were killed and injured, and therefore unable to assist in the response. This was largely due to the concentration of medical personnel and facilities in inner urban areas. This exact concentration exists today in the majority of American cities, and is a chilling reminder of the difficulty in medically responding to nuclear events.

What if a nuclear device were detonated in an urban area today? I explored this issue in a 2007 study modeling a nuclear weapon attack on four American cities. As in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the majority of deaths would happen soon after the detonation, and the local health care response capability would be largely eradicated.

Models show that such an event in an urban area in particular will not only destroy the existing public health protections but will, most likely, make it extremely difficult to respond, recover and rehabilitate them.

Very few medical personnel today have the skills or knowledge to treat the kind and the quantity of injuries a nuclear blast can cause. Health care workers would have little to no familiarity with the treatment of radiation victims.

Thermal burns would require enormous resources to treat even a single patient, and a large number of patients with these injuries will overwhelm any existing medical system. There would also be a massive number of laceration injuries from the breakage of virtually all glass in a wide area.

Officials in protective gear check for signs of radiation on children who are from the evacuation area near the Fukushima Daini nuclear plant in Koriyama in this March 13, 2011 photo. Photo: Reuters via The Conversation / Kim Kyung-Hoon / Files

Contamination zone escape

A major nuclear event would create widespread panic, as large populations would fear the spread of radioactive materials, so evacuation or sheltering in place must be considered.

For instance, within a few weeks after the Chernobyl accident, more than 116,000 people were evacuated from the most contaminated areas of Ukraine and Belarus. Another 220,000 people were relocated in subsequent years.

The day after the Fukushima earthquake and tsunami, over 200,000 people were evacuated from areas within 20 kilometers (12 miles) of the nuclear plant because of the fear of the potential for radiation exposure.

The evacuation process in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Japan was plagued by misinformation, inadequate and confusing orders and delays in releasing information. There was also trouble evacuating everyone from the affected areas.

Elderly and infirm residents were left in areas near radioactive contamination, and many others moved unnecessarily from uncontaminated areas (resulting in many deaths from winter conditions). All of these troubles lead to a loss of public trust in the government.

However, an encouraging fact about nuclear fallout (and not generally known) is that the actual area that will receive dangerous levels of radioactive fallout is actually only a fraction of the total area in a circle around the detonation zone.

For instance, in a hypothetical low-yield (10 kiloton) nuclear bomb over Washington, DC, only limited evacuations are planned. Despite projections of 100,000 fatalities and about 150,000 casualties, the casualty-producing radiation plume would actually be expected to be confined to a relatively small area.

(Using a clock-face analogy, the danger area would typically take up only a two-hour slot on the circle around the detonation, dictated by wind: for example, 2-4 o’clock.)

People upwind would not need to take any action, and most of those downwind, in areas receiving relatively small radiation levels (from the point of view of being sufficient to cause radiation-related health issues), would need to seek only “moderate shelter.”

That means basically staying indoors for a day or so or until emergency authorities give further instructions.

The long-term effects of radiation exposure

The Radiation Effects Research Foundation, which was established to study the effects of radiation on survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has been tracking the health effects of radiation for decades.

According to the Radiation Effects Research Foundation, about 1,900 excess cancer deaths can be attributed to the atomic bombs, with about 200 cases of leukemia and 1,700 solid cancers. Japan has constructed very detailed cancer screenings after Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Fukushima.

But the data on many potential health effects from radiation exposure, such as birth defects, are actually quite different from the prevailing public perception, which has been derived not from validated science education but from entertainment outlets (I teach a university course on the impact of media and popular culture on disaster knowledge).

While it has been shown that intense medical X-ray exposure has accidentally produced birth defects in humans, there is doubt about whether there were birth defects in the descendants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb survivors. Most respected long-term investigations have concluded there are no statistically significant increases in birth defects resulting in atomic bomb survivors.

Looking at data from Chernobyl, where the release of airborne radiation was 100 times as much as Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined, there is a lack of definitive data for radiation-induced birth defects.

A wide-ranging WHO study concluded that there were no differences in rates of mental retardation and emotional problems in Chernobyl radiation-exposed children compared to children in control groups. A Harvard review on Chernobyl concluded that there was no substantive proof regarding radiation-induced effects on embryos or fetuses from the accident.

A tour guide measures radiation at Chernobyl. Photo: WikiCommons

Another study looked at the congenital abnormality registers for 16 European regions that received fallout from Chernobyl and concluded that the widespread fear in the population about the possible effects of radiation exposure on the unborn fetus was not justified.

Indeed, the most definitive Chernobyl health impact in terms of numbers was the dramatic increase of elective abortions near and at significant distances from the accident site.

In addition to rapid response and evacuation plans, a Nuclear Global Health Workforce could help health care practitioners, policymakers, administrators and others understand myths and realities of radiation. In the critical time just after a nuclear crisis, this would help officials make evidence-based policy decisions and help people understand the actual risks they face.

What’s the risk of another Hiroshima or Nagasaki?

Today, the risk of a nuclear exchange – and its devastating impact on medicine and public health worldwide – has only escalated compared to previous decades. Nine countries are known to have nuclear weapons, and international relations are increasingly volatile.

The US and Russia are heavily investing in the modernization of their nuclear stockpiles, and China, India and Pakistan are rapidly expanding the size and sophistication of their nuclear weapon capabilities.

The developing technological sophistication among terrorist groups and the growing global availability and distribution of radioactive materials are also especially worrying.

In recent years, a number of government and private organizations have held meetings (all of which I attended) to devise large-scale medical responses to a nuclear weapon detonation in the US and worldwide.

They include the National Academy of Sciences, the National Alliance for Radiation Readiness, National Disaster Life Support Foundation, Society for Disaster Medicine and Public Health, and the Radiation Injury Treatment Network, which includes 74 hospitals nationwide actively preparing to receive radiation-exposed patients.

Despite the gloomy prospects of health outcomes of any large-scale nuclear event common in the minds of many, there are a number of concrete steps the US and other countries can take to prepare. It’s our obligation to respond.

Cham Dallas, University Professor Department of Health Policy & Management, University of Georgia

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Related

asiatimes.com · by Cham Dallas · August 15, 2023

6. Former Marine captain’s Syrian detention reaches 11th year

Let us never forget.

Former Marine captain’s Syrian detention reaches 11th year

marinecorpstimes.com · by Todd South · August 14, 2023

WASHINGTON ― The mother of a Marine veteran who has been held hostage in Syria for 11 years has long tired of the secrecy and backroom dealings that leave her and her family in the dark as to the whereabouts and fate of her son Austin Tice.

Debra Tice, 62, has watched the man who controls the White House change from President Barack Obama to President Donald Trump to President Joseph Biden.

All three commanders-in-chief have pledged to bring Austin Tice, 42, home. Thus far, all have failed.

Monday during a panel at the National Press Club in Washington, Debra Tice had a direct message for Biden.

“Mr. President, actions speak louder than words,” Debra Tice said. “Show me.”

“Show Austin that Austin has value to you and to his country. That he is worth bringing home.”

RELATED

The continued campaign to free journalist and Marine vet Austin Tice

Marine veteran Austin Tice was taken hostage in Syria in 2012. Here's what we know, 10 years later.

Austin Tice became a Marine officer in 2005 and served multiple Middle East deployments before concluding his time in the Reserve as a captain before attending law school.

While working as a freelance journalist covering the Syrian conflict, he was taken around Aug. 14, 2012.

Austin Tice had reported on a freelance basis for the Washington Post and the McClatchy news organization on the Syrian conflict at the time but was returning to the United States to continue his studies at the Georgetown University Law Center.

Reporting by Sonia Smith, writer-at-large for Texas Monthly, revealed previously unreported information regarding Syrian government overtures to the U.S. government. The Tice family lives in Texas.

Smith reported through an interview with Lebanon’s general security chief, Abbas Ibrahim. Ibrahim told Smith that he brokered a meeting between U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs Roger Carstens and Syrian government officials in 2020.

That meeting also was reported by other media outlets.

But what was not known publicly, not even to the Tice family, until Smith’s interview with Ibrahim, was that Syrian officials offered to provide proof of life information about Austin Tice if U.S. government officials would agree to certain conditions.

The exact conditions were not shared with Smith, she said during Monday’s panel, in which she participated remotely.

However, Syrian government officials previously have stated they are calling for the renewal of diplomatic relations and the removal of U.S. troops from Syrian territories.

Debra Tice speaks about her son Austin Tice, the only American journalist held captive in Syria, during the unveiling of a new banner calling for his release at the Newseum in Washington, D.C., on Nov. 2, 2016. (Andrew Caballero Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images)

Both during the press club panel, which focused on journalists being held hostage by foreign governments, and in multiple interviews with Marine Corps Times, Debra Tice pointed to various U.S. hostage scenarios since her son was taken and how those have been handled in very “pragmatic” ways that resulted in those hostages returning home.

The most recent example includes the release of five U.S. citizens from an Iranian jail in exchange for $6 billion of seized Iranian funds. The Americans remain under house arrest in Iran pending the transfer of funds, according to media reports.

Tice pointed to the approach taken by Secretary of State Antony Blinken following the arrest and detention in Russia of professional basketball player Brittney Griner in February 2022 at a Moscow airport on drug charges and detained until December 2022, partially in exchange for notorious Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout.

Blinken confirmed Griner’s detention and publicly discussed offers and processes by which the United States was working to secure her release. Scant information on Austin Tice, after more than a decade, primarily has come from media coverage, not the U.S. government.

While both cases have obvious differences from Austin Tice’s, the Iranian hostages and Griner were acknowledged to be in custody and Tice was working as a freelance journalist while in Syria, both in Debra Tice’s view, were pragmatic and got Americans released.

The U.S. approach with Syria, for Austin Tice, has been anything but pragmatic.

Marine Corps Times reached out to both the White House and U.S. State Department, which handles hostage affairs for the president, in the week ahead of this anniversary.

The White House did not respond.

State department officials provided the following background statement not attributable to an individual member of the department:

“This coming week marks 11 years since journalist Austin Tice was abducted in Syria while he was working to show the world the truth of the brutal Syrian civil war. We call on the Syrian government to ensure Austin Tice and every U.S. national held hostage in Syria is able to return home. The United States is actively pursuing every channel we can to seek his safe return to his family and we will not cease until we bring Austin home. That includes discussing this case with a number of countries in the region.

In order to protect any avenues for progress, we can’t provide details at this time. Sometimes securing the release of a U.S. national requires direct talks with regimes with which we do not ordinarily communicate. SPEHA continues to engage and maintains close coordination with relevant stakeholders across the U.S. government to promote progress on these cases. We will keep working until we see his safe return to the United States,” according to a background, emailed statement from a U.S. State Department staffer.

Statements of this kind make Debra Tice laugh out of exasperation.

Shortly after the Marine veteran was taken, the Tice family was told to not speak publicly about the case, for fear of jeopardizing negotiations.

It was only when the then-Czech Republic ambassador to Syria spoke with Czech media in late August 2012 when public acknowledgement came that Austin Tice had been detained at Syrian checkpoint days before he was scheduled to leave the country.

Five weeks after his capture a 43-second video with footage of Austin Tice in a blindfold and surrounded by armed men on a rocky desert hillside emerged.

For Debra Tice, who has seen a revolving door of government officials tell her they are working on her son’s case, she simply doesn’t care anymore how it gets done, only she sees her son again.

“I’m completely apolitical, whoever gets my son home, that’s my hero.”

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

7. Why Will Roper still believes the Pentagon should work more like Formula One

Sounds cool. Is it practical?

Why Will Roper still believes the Pentagon should work more like Formula One - Breaking Defense

“Formula One is amazingly complex from an aerodynamic perspective. And in my opinion, it's more complex than what we do in aviation,” said Will Roper, the Air Force’s former acquisition chief.

breakingdefense.com · by Michael Marrow · August 14, 2023

Dr. Will Roper, then Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, speaks during the Air Force Association Air, Space and Cyber Conference in National Harbor, Md., Sept. 16, 2019. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Chad Trujillo.)

WASHINGTON — It’s been over two years since Will Roper left the Pentagon as the Air Force’s acquisition czar, and though senior service leaders seem to have moved away from some of his more ambitious ideas, Roper is not giving up on the digital design tools that he claims are critical for the United States to keep ahead of China.

“Imagine if China makes this pivot,” Roper said of a revolution in digital design, where data-rich models can enable quick refreshes of complex weapon systems like aircraft. “Well, their designs may not be perfect between digital reality and physical, but if they have a way to iterate and tighten those gaps, then they will be exploring at an echelon far beyond us,” he warned Breaking Defense in an August 4 interview.

Throughout his tenure in the Air Force, Roper advocated for pushing the envelope on digital design for some of the service’s top priorities. Chief among them was the Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, where Roper envisioned sixth-gen jets whose designs could be rapidly iterated to accommodate some of the newest advances. That idea appears to have gone by the wayside at least in the case of NGAD, though officials have said the service’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft drone wingmen could be more viable candidates.

“Now that I’m not in the government, it’s really not my place to judge anymore,” Roper said when asked about officials seeming to abandon some of his ideas for aggressively pursuing digital engineering. “I certainly have hopes for the government as a whole and for the Air Force as a whole.”

Recently, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall called digital engineering “over-hyped” when discussing the service’s delayed T-7A Red Hawk training jet, noting that while digital engineering provided real improvements, it didn’t deliver all what was promised.

Roper responded by laying blame at the Red Hawk’s acquisition strategy — the program was awarded as a fixed-price contract, leading Boeing to incur over $1.1 billion in losses to date — and rebuffed narratives of failure. (Roper was the head of Air Force acquisitions when the contract was awarded in 2018, though he was not in the post when the program was being structured.)

The T-7A “is a wonderful achievement in our first lesson on digital engineering,” he said. “An aircraft was built in three years and flown in three years. And that hasn’t happened since 1958.”

He then added, “That’s time to circle the wagons and say, ‘now what exactly enabled that, and what is limiting us taking this next step into production.’”

The Push for Formula One

After leaving the Pentagon in 2021, Roper co-founded a startup called Istari, which was unveiled earlier this year. Backed by former Google chief executive officer Eric Schmidt, Istari is offering a platform for clients to pursue their own digital engineering journey who may not otherwise have the resources or knowledge for how to do it themselves.

“What we’ve done is take the system engineering function that is the digital thread as well as a huge degree of potential automation and turn it into a software platform available to everyone,” Roper explained.

Roper is inspired in large part by one industry that has already seized on the concept, which he talked up frequently in his Air Force days: Formula One racing.

F1 cars, Roper explained, extensively use digital engineering to rapidly iterate designs, leading to constant improvements to give drivers an edge — including in real time on race day.

“Formula One is amazingly complex from an aerodynamic perspective. And for my opinion, it’s more complex than what we do in aviation,” Roper said. “They are dealing with micro forces that they need to predict to within a millisecond of lap time, and they’re able to do that.”

Roper also pointed to a key tradeoff F1 drivers make to inform their digital models by rigging their cars with hundreds of sensors, a lesson he said is applicable to aircraft. Though each of these gizmos carries a weight penalty, the sacrifice is worth it, he said, “because the data coming off of it is more valuable.”

The same should be true for aircraft, where designers are often extremely sensitive to considerations like weight to maximize performance. “If I were building aircraft today, I would instrument them as much as my tolerances would allow,” Roper said.

There will be failures along the way as the Pentagon slowly incorporates digital engineering, Roper said, and officials will need to think differently about challenges like cybersecurity and pushing ahead with software updates forged in a digital environment.

Ultimately, a key challenge will be embracing digital models as a “source of truth,” which must be backed by enough data to make the models reliable. It’s a change that won’t happen overnight, Roper said, though he assured the same was true for Formula One, which has already passed that milestone.

“There will be myriad learning events on the way to Formula One prowess at this new tradecraft,” he said. “The government needs to buckle up, pun intended, and get ready to learn and decide is it really in the business of innovation? Or does it like talking about it, knowing that somehow innovation is always denied to the public sector.”

8. 'Unprecedented' Promotion Hold Leads to 3rd Service Without a Confirmed Chief

Excerpts:

Tuberville's spokesman, Steven Stafford, pushed back in a statement sent out shortly after the Navy's ceremony on Monday concluded, noting eight instances between 1992 and 2023 when other lawmakers used or threatened to use a promotion hold to influence the Pentagon.

The reasons ranged from protesting base closures to dealing with the fallout of the Navy's massive sexual assault scandal commonly known as "Tailhook." Some were also far smaller in scope than what Tuberville has done. Sen. Michael Bennet, D-Colo., had a hold over the location of U.S. Space Command's headquarters that threatened only six civilian nominees, for example.

However, Stafford did acknowledge that what makes Tuberville's move "unprecedented … is the length of time that it has gone on."

The timing of Franchetti's nomination by the White House -- a week before the Senate started its August recess -- would have also made it hard to confirm her in time for Gilday's retirement even without the hold.

As a result of the hold, near the end of the ceremony, Franchetti didn't read a set of orders that instructed her to lead the Navy. Instead, she read a designation letter.

"As provided in Title 10 of US Code 8035, when there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the vice chief of naval operations shall perform the duties of the CNO until its successor is appointed," Franchetti told the crowd.

'Unprecedented' Promotion Hold Leads to 3rd Service Without a Confirmed Chief

military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · August 14, 2023

ANNAPOLIS, Md. – Standing under a battle flag emblazoned with the words "Don't Give Up the Ship," Adm. Mike Gilday, the Navy's outgoing uniformed leader, turned to Adm. Lisa Franchetti on Monday morning and said that he "will be proud to call her my CNO."

The moment should have been a joyous and historic one. Franchetti was nominated by President Joe Biden on July 21 to take over for Gilday as the chief of naval operations, or CNO. She was set to become the first female officer to lead the Navy and to join the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

However, she did not take over the job Monday because of a political move that has unnerved military leaders so much that every speaker at the relinquishment ceremony addressed it in some way -- most quite directly. The move in question is a hold on Senate confirmations of admiral and general promotions by Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala.

As a result, at the end of the ceremony, held inside a marbled hall at the Naval Academy dedicated to fallen graduates of the institution that has produced Navy officers like Gilday for more than 100 years, Franchetti -- who is currently the vice chief of naval operations -- took over the Navy in only an acting capacity.

The Navy now joins the Army and the Marine Corps in being without a Senate-confirmed leader. The upcoming chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is also affected. While the immediate impacts of the ongoing retirements seem minor and ceremonial -- empty picture frames in the halls of the Pentagon and use of words like relinquishment rather than change of command -- military leaders say the lack of confirmed military leaders will be dire.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin called Tuberville's move "unprecedented," before adding that "it is unnecessary and it is unsafe."

"This sweeping hold is undermining America's military readiness," he added, using some of the harshest language on the topic to date.

The hold that Tuberville has placed over all top promotions and appointments does actually not prevent the Senate from confirming nominees, but it does mean that the chamber would need to hold roll call votes on each nominee individually -- something that would take months under the Senate's infamously slow pace.

Usually, the Senate confirms military nominees in batches with voice votes.

Tuberville began the hold in February to protest the Pentagon's new travel and leave policy for reproductive health care.

Pentagon officials have said the policy -- which allows service members to take time off and receive travel funds to get a variety of reproductive procedures, including abortions -- is about ensuring everyone has access to equal health care.

"Service members don't have the right to choose which state they get deployed to or stationed in, and so this policy is intended to ensure that there's equitable treatment of all service members," Pentagon spokesman Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters Aug. 1.

The march toward what Austin called a "painful milestone" of Gilday's retirement and the record number of vacancies began June 23, when Marine Corps leader Gen. David Berger retired, replaced with an acting commandant.

Then came the Army, when Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville retired in early August.

The Navy's top civilian official, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro, said Tuberville's hold "puts the very lives … of servicemen and women … at risk by not allowing our most experienced warfighters to lead."

"Our troops deserve better," Austin said, before adding that "our military families deserve better, our allies and partners deserve better, and our national security deserves better."

Tuberville's spokesman, Steven Stafford, pushed back in a statement sent out shortly after the Navy's ceremony on Monday concluded, noting eight instances between 1992 and 2023 when other lawmakers used or threatened to use a promotion hold to influence the Pentagon.

The reasons ranged from protesting base closures to dealing with the fallout of the Navy's massive sexual assault scandal commonly known as "Tailhook." Some were also far smaller in scope than what Tuberville has done. Sen. Michael Bennet, D-Colo., had a hold over the location of U.S. Space Command's headquarters that threatened only six civilian nominees, for example.

However, Stafford did acknowledge that what makes Tuberville's move "unprecedented … is the length of time that it has gone on."

The timing of Franchetti's nomination by the White House -- a week before the Senate started its August recess -- would have also made it hard to confirm her in time for Gilday's retirement even without the hold.

As a result of the hold, near the end of the ceremony, Franchetti didn't read a set of orders that instructed her to lead the Navy. Instead, she read a designation letter.

"As provided in Title 10 of US Code 8035, when there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the vice chief of naval operations shall perform the duties of the CNO until its successor is appointed," Franchetti told the crowd.

-- Konstantin Toropin can be reached at konstantin.toropin@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @ktoropin.

military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · August 14, 2023

9. How to Unsettle an Alliance: Subordinate Extended Deterrence to Antiquated Arms Control Initiatives

Download the 11 page report at this link: https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/IS-561.pdf

How to Unsettle an Alliance: Subordinate Extended Deterrence to Antiquated Arms Control Initiatives

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/08/15/how_to_unsettle_an_alliance_subordinate_extended_deterrence_to_antiquated_arms_control_initiatives_972958.html

By Keith B. Payne & Michaela Dodge

Conclusion

The TLAM-N/SLCM-N case study illustrates well the frequent differences in U.S. and allied perspectives regarding the requirements for extended deterrence and assurance, and Washington’s occasional apparent willingness to subordinate allies’ views—seemingly in deference to domestic political constituencies. Further illustrative of this tendency is the fact that some presidential administrations continue to show interest in NFU or “sole purpose” nuclear policies—despite the fact that U.S. allies and partners strongly oppose them as being detrimental to extended deterrence. Continued U.S. attraction to antiquated “anti-nuclear” initiatives likely to degrade extended deterrence clearly is not the only source of the U.S-Allied incongruence, but it surely is an avoidable cause.

The different U.S. and allied perceptions and expectations regarding assurance and extended deterrence require an improved two-way understanding of the contemporary realities of deterrence and assurance. Mutual recognition of those realities and their requirements would contribute both to the continued viability of the U.S. alliance structure and to the goal of nuclear non-proliferation. The alternative contributes to unforced errors and alliance strains.​

10. Beyond Defense: China’s Pursuit of Unorthodox Force Multipliers

Excerpts:

The PLA predicts that future war will evolve from “informationized” to “intelligentized” conflict. For Beijing, the starting point was the 2016 launch of its integrated brain research, which was a response to the United States’ $2 billion BRAIN Initiative, established in 2013. China seeks hybridization of human and machine intelligence, leveraged from brain-computer interfaces to create intelligent autonomy. According to PLA scientists, the future human brain will become the new combat space. Cutting-edge technologies will be developed from biosensing to biomaterials to accelerate human enhancement for achieving military mental/cognizance dominance.

China believes the means to securing operational advantage and overpowering adversaries will be determined by algorithmic competitive advantage. This will be leveraged by futuristic intelligentized military systems, which are mooted to include transcranial magnetic stimulation to maximize integration between humans and weapons on future complex battlefields. Research aimed at brain mimicry and brain control has already commenced, with the purpose of facilitating a transition to completely autonomous robotic weapons systems.

Future weapon systems will also derive from biological dominance, broadening the battlefield canvas not only to include bioengineering of living organisms but also to capture genomics – the next disruptive technology frontier. Work has already begun on the gene-editing of animals and human embryos. In fact, one research team has successfully inserted a gene from a microscopic tardigrade into human embryonic stem cells, leading to increased resistance to radiation and raising the prospect of super-troops able to survive nuclear fall-out.

Prospective changes to the nuclear calculus reinforce the judgment that the present China-U.S. AI-powered arms race will transition the world beyond “defense,” as commonly understood, profoundly changing the nature of war.

Beyond Defense: China’s Pursuit of Unorthodox Force Multipliers

From animal mimicry to neuroscience, there is a hidden arms race underway in areas beyond “defense,” as traditionally understood.

By Ron Matthews and Fitriani Bintang Timur

August 14, 2023​

thediplomat.com · by Ron Matthews · August 14, 2023

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The super-power rivalry between the United States, Russia, and China is intense, but nuclear capability means there is a strong incentive to avoid direct conflict. The Ukraine-Russian war is viewed in some quarters (Moscow) as a proxy conflict between NATO and Russia, but both are aware of strategic “red lines” that must not be crossed to avoid triggering nuclear catastrophe.

This aversion to using weapons of mass destruction has led to the emergence of “hidden” arms races below the nuclear threshold. These involve unconventional military capabilities, in a non-nuclear sense, that are unorthodox in the exploitation of novel and disruptive hard and soft technological power. Such capabilities fall into three thematic areas: first, military mimicry, whereby the superior capabilities of animals are copied to improve military performance; second, artificial intelligence (AI), through which autonomous “robotic” weapon systems are developed to replace and/or extend conventional military capability; and, third, neuroscience, reflected by extraordinary innovations to gain military advantage through the development of super-intelligent soldiers.

Russia has identified the strategic benefits from the first two of these fields, exemplified by the use of beluga “spy” whales in the waters off the Scandinavian Peninsula and deployment of semi-autonomous unmanned drones in the Ukraine conflict. Moscow is committed to the AI-driven arms race, symbolized by President Vladimir Putin’s oft-quoted statement that “AI is the future, not only for Russia but for all mankind…whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”

However, the rhetoric does not match reality. Analysts have labeled Russia as an “outsider” in this fourth industrial revolution, arguably due to the distractions of war, sanctions, and the demise of its non-military economy. As a result, only paltry sums have been invested into AI, and hence the principal rivalry is between the United States and China.

In the military mimicry domain, the U.S. is remarkably advanced in utilizing animal (non-human) capabilities. For example, it exploited dolphins’ highly-evolved bio-sonar to protect U.S. sailors in Cam Ranh Bay during the Vietnam War, and again in the 2003 and 2011 Gulf Wars through detection of underwater mines, affording safe passage to troop carrier and logistical supply ships. Moreover, around one-quarter of the United States’ nuclear submarine bases are guarded by “serving” dolphins.

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The U.S. has also been researching the wider military benefits of marine life. This includes a program focused on “hiding” covert messages in sounds emanating from mammals, with the U.S. Persistent Aquatic Living Sensors (PALS) project researching innate marine animal sensing capabilities for identifying and tracking adversary assets in the oceans. Similarly, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is investigating whether goliath groupers can serve as underwater surveillance systems to detect adversarial oceangoing drones, nuclear submarines, and other threatening underwater vehicles.

Chinese mimicry research initiatives have sought to match if not surpass U.S. efforts. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) researchers have gone beyond simply using recordings of whale and dolphin songs as secret code, unnoticed by enemy eavesdroppers, to now using artificial signal synthesis to “create” whale and dolphin sounds. In particular, Chinese scientists have used sperm whale sounds as a means of transmitting coded messages from Chinese submarines to prevent enemy reconnaissance systems from detecting and deciphering their content.

In the bio-engineering domain, military scientists are aggressively pushing the boundaries of knowledge by developing robotic weapons systems. The U.S. has invented “Legged” Squad Support Systems and cyborg cockroaches that carry mini-power packs on their backs to transport and reconnoiter hostile terrain. Additionally, advanced research is exploring the potential of adapting dragonfly “hover” techniques as well as engineering “bio” armor adapted from the unique fiber and exoskeleton configurations found in snail shells and mantis shrimp claws.

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Similar marine mimicry is pursued by the PLA, as exemplified by a remotely controlled robo-shark whose bionic tailfin power source is able to reach a top speed of six knots, can maneuver to avoid underwater obstacles, and conduct missions, including reconnaissance, search and rescue and battlefield surveillance. Also under development is a bright yellow biomimetic manta ray, possessing the capability to dive 1,000 meters and employ high propulsion efficiency, but with the ability to soft land on the seafloor.

In land systems, since 2016 China’s Ground Force Equipment Department has been incorporating animal robotics into its forces, including armed combatant robo-dogs. In 2022, Chinese engineers developed a large, four-legged robotic “yak” capable of hauling up to 160 kilograms and traveling at 6.21 miles per hour over various terrains including grasslands, deserts and snow fields.

In the aerial domain, the PLA has been experimenting with insects, creating flying robotic machines that mimic the ways lightning bugs move, communicate and fly. Chinese security forces are also developing a high-tech spy drone code-named “dove” that mimics 90 percent of actual dove movements. Dissimilar to conventional UAVs, it can gain altitude, dive, and accelerate, and is hard to detect since it attracts actual birds, and flies within the flock. Robotic doves can be used for surveillance, incorporating a high-definition camera, GPS antenna, and a flight control system, enabling satellite communication capability. China has reportedly deployed these bird-drones in the highly securitized Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The next step is to develop drone swarms, and here China is in in fierce competition with the United States. The U.S. Department of Defense has committed $3 billion to research human machine combat teaming and swarming operations by unmanned drones. The work is propelled by the imperative of acquiring an autonomous drone swarm system to counter China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems. An AI-enhanced command swarm will have the ability to control other swarms of thousands of unmanned aerial, surface, underwater, and ground drones to overwhelm military installations. DARPA’s Autonomous Multi-Domain Adaptive “Swarms-of-Swarms” (AMASS) research project is directed primarily at countering China’s DF-16 and DF-21D short-range ballistic missiles and “carrier-killer” anti-ship missiles that can take-out U.S. naval flotillas.

In response, China is attempting to build a counter drone-swarm capability. It will likely succeed, as China is already the world’s leader in drone technology, possessing the widest range of attack, surveillance, and logistics drones. In fact, in late 2022, evidence emerged of a 10 drone swarm navigating through a thick bamboo forest in fully autonomous mode, though scientists admit the technology needs to mature, and thus the search continues to find the elusive “intelligent algorithm.”

Aside from the requirement for drones to be autonomous, parallel research is examining the delivery vehicle for launching drone swarms. One possible option is China’s notorious high-altitude balloon. Indeed, in 2017 at least two uncrewed “bat-sized” drones were launched in Inner Mongolia from a stratospheric balloon. An inherent benefit of high-altitude balloons is that they offer the possibility of low-cost, long-endurance, maneuverable military missions. Once navigated into range of the target, the balloons can then loiter and release fully networked swarms in which individual drones can be configured to perform just one mission, with the entire group then able to carry out multiple tasks simultaneously. Significantly, the Pentagon has stated that the Chinese spy balloon shot down near the coast of South Carolina in February 2023 had the ability to maneuver via four sets of propellers.

The China-U.S. AI military race is clearly full on, with Beijing viewing the fourth industrial revolution as an opportunity to seize the initiative and become the world’s leading power in weaponizing AI and biotechnology. However, through its national strategy of military-civil fusion, China is also investigating the military applications of neuroscience. A recent paper by Elsa B. Kania paints a vivid picture of the PLA’s pursuit of military advantage via cognitive science and biotechnology.

The PLA predicts that future war will evolve from “informationized” to “intelligentized” conflict. For Beijing, the starting point was the 2016 launch of its integrated brain research, which was a response to the United States’ $2 billion BRAIN Initiative, established in 2013. China seeks hybridization of human and machine intelligence, leveraged from brain-computer interfaces to create intelligent autonomy. According to PLA scientists, the future human brain will become the new combat space. Cutting-edge technologies will be developed from biosensing to biomaterials to accelerate human enhancement for achieving military mental/cognizance dominance.

China believes the means to securing operational advantage and overpowering adversaries will be determined by algorithmic competitive advantage. This will be leveraged by futuristic intelligentized military systems, which are mooted to include transcranial magnetic stimulation to maximize integration between humans and weapons on future complex battlefields. Research aimed at brain mimicry and brain control has already commenced, with the purpose of facilitating a transition to completely autonomous robotic weapons systems.

Future weapon systems will also derive from biological dominance, broadening the battlefield canvas not only to include bioengineering of living organisms but also to capture genomics – the next disruptive technology frontier. Work has already begun on the gene-editing of animals and human embryos. In fact, one research team has successfully inserted a gene from a microscopic tardigrade into human embryonic stem cells, leading to increased resistance to radiation and raising the prospect of super-troops able to survive nuclear fall-out.

Prospective changes to the nuclear calculus reinforce the judgment that the present China-U.S. AI-powered arms race will transition the world beyond “defense,” as commonly understood, profoundly changing the nature of war.

GUEST AUTHOR

Ron Matthews

Ron Matthews currently holds the chair in Defense and Security Capability at Rabdan Academy, Abu Dhabi. He is also a visiting professor in Defense Economics at Cranfield University at the U.K. Defence Academy, and was formerly professor of Defence Economics at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

GUEST AUTHOR

Fitriani Bintang Timur

Fitriani Bintang Timur holds a doctorate from Cranfield University at the U.K. Defence Academy. She is a senior research fellow at CSIS, Jakarta, and is presently a visiting fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Singapore.

thediplomat.com · by Ron Matthews · August 14, 2023

11. America’s Window of Opportunity in Asia

Time for JAROKUS. (Japan- Korea - US)

Excerpts:

The Biden administration’s stewardship of this trilateral relationship is reflective of its broader approach to order building in the Indo-Pacific. Through a network of alliances and institutions, the Biden administration believes it can extend its influence and legitimacy and ultimately sustain a rules-based order despite geostrategic competition with China. Campbell and Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security adviser, previewed this approach in Foreign Affairs in 2019 when they wrote, “The United States will ultimately need to embed its China strategy in a dense network of relationships and institutions in Asia and the rest of the world.”

At the same time, strengthened trilateral cooperation carries the risk of further escalating tensions with North Korea, which will unlikely be in any mood to give up its nuclear weapons or return to talks. This type of coalition building can also provoke China and Russia, which have criticized recent U.S. efforts to strengthen alliances in Europe and Asia. The two countries conducted joint military exercises in the East China Sea in December and the Sea of Japan in July. Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu stated in December that the Russian deployment of a coastal defense missile system in Paramushir, part of Russia’s Kuril Islands, was partly in response to U.S. efforts to contain Russia and China. Shoigu also visited Pyongyang in late July, allegedly requesting more munitions for the war in Ukraine. By deepening trilateral ties and expanding its scope beyond North Korea to the wider Indo-Pacific, the United States may inadvertently push Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang closer, as well.

For this reason, it is important for the United States to elucidate the goals of collaboration and to clearly articulate what the partnership is not. Security cooperation and contingency planning are not geared to produce collective defense commitments, as is the case with NATO. This message will matter not only to the reception that closer trilateral alignment receives in the region but also to how voters in Japan and South Korea feel about the scope and pace of deepening cooperation.

America’s Window of Opportunity in Asia

How Biden Can Boost Cooperation With Japan and South Korea

By Andrew Yeo, Mireya Solís, and Hanna Foreman

August 15, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Japan’s Quiet Leadership: Reshaping the Indo-Pacific · August 15, 2023

Later this week, U.S. President Joe Biden will host Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol at Camp David. The summit comes at a now-or-never moment in relations among the three countries. Missile threats from North Korea and deep concerns about Chinese military capabilities and intentions have motivated the three allies to band together in recent months. But those mutual concerns have existed for decades, and domestic politics—particularly in Seoul and Tokyo—have often prevented the three countries from successfully coordinating their strategies. Right now, however, there is an internationalist American president, a bold South Korean leader with foreign policy ambitions beyond the Korean Peninsula, and a Japanese prime minister bent on cementing Japan's proactive security policy. This combination presents a unique opportunity for trilateral cooperation, and Biden is seeking to take advantage of it.

Biden’s desire to advance the trilateral relationship reflects his broader approach to geostrategic competition: building U.S. power by strengthening institutions and alliances. The U.S.-Japanese-South Korean relationship has muscle, as it is built around two technologically advanced U.S. allies that possess formidable defense capabilities and together host around 100 permanent U.S. military bases and approximately 80,000 U.S. troops. But owing to a history of colonial occupation and antagonism, Japan and South Korea make for uneasy partners, and getting them to come to terms will not be easy. What is more, the window of opportunity may be closing, so Biden needs to move quickly.

ORIGIN STORY

Trilateral cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States has moved in fits and starts over the last three decades, accelerating during heightened periods of North Korean threats and often stumbling whenever relations between South Korea and Japan started to deteriorate.

Nevertheless, the three-way partnership has come a long way. Efforts to coordinate began in the mid-1990s in response to North Korea’s emerging nuclear program. In 1998, North Korea launched its first multistage ballistic missile over Japan. Although similar provocations from North Korea may seem routine today, back then, they rattled the entire region. That same year, Japan and South Korea took an important step toward healing their shared painful history. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi held a historic meeting in Tokyo, where Obuchi acknowledged Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea from 1910 to 1945 and offered an official apology. This step eased tensions and helped Washington set the stage to advance trilateral relations, eventually institutionalizing the ad hoc meetings under the Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group in 1999.

In 2002, North Korea admitted that it had a covert nuclear weapons program. The so-called six-party talks on North Korean denuclearization, which included China and Russia, began in 2003 and ultimately subsumed Washington’s attempt to strengthen trilateral ties. Meanwhile, historical animosities and domestic politics continued to hobble the Japanese-South Korean leg of the trilateral. For example, in 2012, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak made a controversial visit to a set of islands—known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan—that both South Korea and Japan claim as their own, raising tensions between the two countries. In 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited a shrine that honors Japan’s war dead, including convicted war criminals, angering South Korea and China.

South Korea exports more than 40 percent of its semiconductors to China.

Despite Seoul-Tokyo tensions, North Korean nuclear tests and U.S. diplomatic prodding helped sustain relations through this period. Following North Korea’s third nuclear test in 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama convened a summit with Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye to present unity in the face of Pyongyang’s aggressive posture. Washington also encouraged Seoul and Tokyo to address the issue of “comfort women,” a euphemistic name for the thousands of Korean women that Japan forced to work as sex slaves during World War II. Obama’s efforts resulted in Park and Abe signing an agreement in 2015 declaring that both countries wanted to see the issue “finally and irreversibly resolved.”

Unfortunately, a shift in domestic political winds in South Korea following the 2017 impeachment of Park reversed many of these gains. Park’s progressive successor, Moon Jae-in, was critical of the deal with Japan on comfort women and scrapped the foundation that the two governments set up with Japanese funding to provide restitution to the victims and their families. In 2018, South Korea’s Supreme Court ordered several Japanese companies to compensate unpaid South Korean World War II laborers. This prompted a series of new punitive measures from each side, driving relations to a nadir in 2019.

In 2021, the resumption of North Korean provocations, including a long-range cruise missile test, prompted the Biden administration to once again push forward trilateral meetings. Although there was no leaders meeting, officials from the three countries met ten times in 2021. This did not mean tensions disappeared. At a deputy-level meeting hosted by the United States in November of that year, Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Mori Takeo objected to joining a joint press conference with South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun because of disputes over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. This left U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman awkwardly standing alone at the press conference. “There are some bilateral differences between Japan and the Republic of Korea that are continuing to be resolved,” she noted.

NOW OR NEVER

Today, however, the stars have aligned at the regional and domestic levels and the Biden administration is therefore looking to solidify trilateral cooperation while there is still momentum.

Yoon’s decision to prioritize South Korean-Japanese ties despite weak domestic support, matched by Kishida’s pragmatic approach to Korean affairs, has helped dramatically repair the Tokyo-Seoul leg of the relationship. Meanwhile, Biden’s liberal internationalist outlook and his desire to bolster alliances and institutions make him a true champion for trilateral engagement. Several former Obama administration officials now serving under Biden, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Kurt Campbell, the National Security Council coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, also bring ample experience planning and executing high-level trilateral meetings. Campbell, arguably the biggest driving force behind reinvigorating the three-way relationship, carries decades of experience and deep networks in Japan and South Korea.

But despite the rapid progress made over the past year, future success is not assured. Yoon’s engagement with Japan, although hailed in Washington, has been met with resistance in Seoul. The Democratic Party of Korea, which currently controls the National Assembly and is the main rival of Yoon’s People Power Party, lambasted a deal Yoon struck with Japan on the World War II forced labor issue as the “most humiliating moment” in South Korea’s diplomatic history. And although the next South Korean presidential election is still four years away, the loss of seats in parliamentary elections next year or a change in government following Yoon could once again stall trilateral cooperation. Similarly, Kishida’s weak approval ratings and speculation about the timing of a snap election may also place limits on the potential for making progress should “Korea fatigue” once again take over in Japan.

In the United States, both Democratic and Republican administrations have generally supported trilateral relations. U.S. President Donald Trump’s dismissal of alliances, and his administration’s relatively hands-off approach to worsening relations between Japan and South Korea, however, do not inspire confidence that a Republican president will support trilateral cooperation to the same extent as Biden. In the near term, Biden will be bogged down next year with his reelection campaign and may not have the bandwidth to host another trilateral summit before his term ends. It is therefore imperative for all three leaders to make the most of this moment before the political sands shift again.

ON THE AGENDA

The visit to Camp David is especially significant because it will be the first standalone meeting of the three leaders dedicated to trilateral cooperation. Always on the agenda for Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington are new ways to boost deterrence against North Korea. Earlier this year, the three sides agreed to share real-time information on North Korean missile tests. Further details on the exact processes for sharing that information will likely be discussed this week.

The three leaders may also address other potential gaps or misunderstandings related to nuclear contingency planning, including the recently launched bilateral U.S.-South Korean Nuclear Consultative Group, which does not involve Japan. Conversely, South Korea and the United States will want to know more about Japan’s future counterstrike capabilities announced in its 2022 National Security Strategy.

The three sides will also look to build on last November’s Phnom Penh Statement. Economic security cooperation, including supply chain resiliency, remains a high priority for all three countries. South Korea and Japan find themselves in a similar position as they navigate the uncertainty of U.S.-Chinese competition. Despite the recent U.S. endorsement of a de-risking approach to economic relations with China, doubts persist about the will and ability of the Biden administration to keep the focus of its defensive economic measures narrow and well coordinated with allies. These doubts will only grow as the 2024 U.S. election nears and the temptation to appear tough on China grows. Japan and South Korea want to see the United States keep its promises: maintaining a “small yard, high fence,” friend shoring when it comes to supply chains, and consulting with allies.

Differences on China are inevitable. For example, Seoul has navigated its relationship with Beijing more cautiously than either Washington or Tokyo, given the geographic proximity and relatively larger economic stakes in its relations with China. South Korea exports more than 40 percent of its semiconductors to China. Korean firms such as Samsung have large production facilities in China, which recently have been in the crosshairs of the U.S.-Chinese competition. They received temporary waivers to U.S. restrictions on the supply of chip-making equipment, without which the manufacturing facilities would be shut down. Japan’s and South Korea’s initial responses to U.S. export controls levied against China last October have also differed. Japan is more willing than South Korea to tighten its export controls to align with U.S. restrictions.

Finally, Kishida, Yoon, and especially Biden will look for ways to institutionalize cooperation. One possibility is holding a leaders summit annually, or at least formalizing trilateral meetings for national security advisers, which have taken place annually the past three years but on an ad hoc basis. Trilateral cooperation might also be routinized at the deputy or working levels on specific issues such as economic security, energy cooperation, and climate. Institutionalization would help preserve trilateral cooperation even in the face of domestic political change or deterioration in Japanese-South Korean relations.

EYES ON THE PRIZE

The Biden administration’s stewardship of this trilateral relationship is reflective of its broader approach to order building in the Indo-Pacific. Through a network of alliances and institutions, the Biden administration believes it can extend its influence and legitimacy and ultimately sustain a rules-based order despite geostrategic competition with China. Campbell and Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security adviser, previewed this approach in Foreign Affairs in 2019 when they wrote, “The United States will ultimately need to embed its China strategy in a dense network of relationships and institutions in Asia and the rest of the world.”

At the same time, strengthened trilateral cooperation carries the risk of further escalating tensions with North Korea, which will unlikely be in any mood to give up its nuclear weapons or return to talks. This type of coalition building can also provoke China and Russia, which have criticized recent U.S. efforts to strengthen alliances in Europe and Asia. The two countries conducted joint military exercises in the East China Sea in December and the Sea of Japan in July. Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu stated in December that the Russian deployment of a coastal defense missile system in Paramushir, part of Russia’s Kuril Islands, was partly in response to U.S. efforts to contain Russia and China. Shoigu also visited Pyongyang in late July, allegedly requesting more munitions for the war in Ukraine. By deepening trilateral ties and expanding its scope beyond North Korea to the wider Indo-Pacific, the United States may inadvertently push Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang closer, as well.

For this reason, it is important for the United States to elucidate the goals of collaboration and to clearly articulate what the partnership is not. Security cooperation and contingency planning are not geared to produce collective defense commitments, as is the case with NATO. This message will matter not only to the reception that closer trilateral alignment receives in the region but also to how voters in Japan and South Korea feel about the scope and pace of deepening cooperation.

• ANDREW YEO is Senior Fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation Chair at the Brookings Institution and Professor of Politics at The Catholic University of America.
• MIREYA SOLÍS is Director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and Senior Fellow and Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies at the Brookings Institution. She is the author of the forthcoming book Japan’s Quiet Leadership: Reshaping the Indo-Pacific.
• HANNA FOREMAN is a Research Assistant at the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies.

Foreign Affairs · by Japan’s Quiet Leadership: Reshaping the Indo-Pacific · August 15, 2023

12. India’s Foreign Policy In A Multipolar World: Navigating Multipolarity And Strategic Alliances – Analysis

Conclusion:

The emerging world order is likely to go on the path of the balance of power as its operating principle, rather than collective security. China has never missed the role of the great disrupter, unlike Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN, its emergence cannot be accommodated in the liberal order. The ability of India and China to work together could determine a balance between many fronts. As S. Jaishankar says, “Asia is being shaped largely by the outlook of the UN, the power of China, the weight of Russia, the collectivism of ASEAN, the volatility of the Middle East, and the rise of India. In India’s engagement with the West, the shared values and the changes are underway.” (Jaishankar, 2020) The West and the US should accept that India’s growth is a strategic development for its larger interests of liberal world order. When it comes to China, the mantra of strategic maturity is at work between the two countries. India refers to its strategy as multi-aligned, but its systemic interactions stand in stark contrast to its scant involvement at the regional level. A strong multilateral framework has not yet been developed in Asia as well as the global level. India has to adopt multi-polarity in place of neutrality with the changing world without compromising on its strategic autonomy.

India’s Foreign Policy In A Multipolar World: Navigating Multipolarity And Strategic Alliances – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · by Dr. Surendra Kumar Yadawa · August 14, 2023

1. Introduction

The decade from the global financial crisis (2008) to COVID-19 has seen a transformation of the new world order. This era of global uncertainty entails a different story and greater expectations for middle powers like India, Brazil, Germany, and South Africa on the path to becoming leading powers.

Consequently, India has to redefine relationships with different powers while considering of its interests. It also requires a new approach to dealing with its neighbours. The changing order—during the Cold War, it was largely bipolar and then briefly unipolar after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but now there is an emerging multipolarity. India the largest democracy in the world holds together as a single nation, manifests successes, achieved against the odds and deserves greater role in the Security Council of the United Nations.

It is India’s long-term record as a stable, multicultural democracy that lies behind its claims for a place (Guha, 2012). International Monetary Fund (IMF) report says India is set to be the world’s fastest-growing economy in 2023. Its GDP is expected to expand by 6.1%, well ahead of the emerging market average of 4% and five times the pace of the world’s average of 1.2%. India’s young consumers occupy pride of place in the growth forecasts of many Fortune 500 companies. This year, India will simultaneously hold the presidencies of the G-20 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—a symbolic satisfaction for its efforts to be seen as a leading, rather than balancing, power on the global stage (Vaishnav, 2023, April 14). India is projected to be the fastest-growing large economy as well, at 5.9% this year. As PM Narendra Modi said recently, “India’s time has arrived.” India has the potential to be admired for not just the quantity of its growth but also the quality of its values. And that would truly be an incredible India (Zakaria, 2023, April 28). Introduction:

The current century has witnessed a profound transformation in the geopolitical landscape, marked by the gradual shift from a unipolar to a multi-polar world order. “Either way, whether it is the West or the rest that poses the greater challenge to the existing order, its basic elements will likely outlast American hegemony” Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). This new configuration of power centers, comprising a diverse array of regional powers, has significantly altered the dynamics of international relations and diplomacy. As traditional global hegemons’ influence wanes, emerging regional powers have found themselves presented with unique opportunities and challenges to shape the course of world affairs. Among these influential actors, India stands prominently as a key player in the ever-changing geopolitical chessboard. Moreover, a shift in the balance of power at the global level, with China and other major powers assuming a stronger stance in the international politics. At the same time, the international order, largely shaped by the West after II world war, has come under pressure (Keukeleire & Delreux 2022).

The transformation of the international system has allowed regional powers like India to assert themselves on the global stage, fostering a new environment that allows for greater manoeuvrability and influence. As New Delhi grapples with the complexities of this multipolar world, it faces both unprecedented opportunities and daunting challenges in defining and executing its foreign policy objectives. However, the emergence of multiple centres of power presents a complex set of challenges. This paper seeks to identify the key challenges that New Delhi must confront while pursuing its foreign policy objectives in a multipolar world. Balancing divergent interests, managing geopolitical rivalries, and addressing regional and global security concerns are some of the critical challenges that India must grapple with. By analysing the nuances of this dynamic global landscape, the paper seeks to shed light on the strategic choices and diplomatic approaches New Delhi can employ to maximise its influence.

1.1 Research Objective

The article evaluates Indian foreign policy in light of the changing multi-polar world order, its effects on regional powers, and the shifting global order. The study also examines the decision-making process in New Delhi, the opportunities and challenges it faces, and the effects on India’s foreign policy, regional dynamics, and the global order.

1.2 Research Questions

1. What key factors influence India’s approach and policy initiatives to navigate multipolarity and how do India’s geopolitical positioning and regional dynamics impact its strategy to deal with regional powers?
2. How does India’s economic growth and development agenda align with its approach to multipolarity, and what role does it play in shaping its strategic decisions?
3. What are the implications of India’s relations with major global powers, such as the United States, China, and Russia?
4. How does India’s engagement with multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations and regional organizations, contribute to its strategy for navigating multipolarity?

1.3 Research Methodology

This study analytically delineates India’s engagement with the United States, China, and other regional powers considering India’s approach to multipolarity. This also examines strategy, its rationale, and its implications for India’s position in the multipolar world.

2. Historical Context

India’s foreign policy and its traditional approach to non-alignment during the Cold War era were shaped by various historical factors. These factors include India’s colonial past, its quest for strategic autonomy, and its commitment to global peace and stability. Instead of joining any of the two blocs, India along with many of the then newly independent colonies established the Non-Aligned Movement (Ranjan, Amit. 2022). India’s long history of colonization by the British Empire greatly influenced its foreign policy outlook. The experience of being ruled by a foreign power for nearly 200 years fostered a strong sense of nationalism and self-determination among Indian leaders. The struggle for independence and the subsequent process of decolonization shaped India’s approach to international relations. India’s colonial past instilled a deep aversion to external interference and a commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity. This historical context played a significant role in shaping India’s foreign policy decision-making, fostering a desire for autonomy and independence in its international engagements. BJP core ideology and promise of radically overturning this Nehruvian consensus are then taken up and empirically tested against three significant theatres of Indian foreign policy since 1998 – nuclear proliferation, relations with Pakistan and ties with the USA (Chaulia, 2002)

2.1 Quest for Strategic Autonomy

India’s quest for strategic autonomy was another important factor in shaping its foreign policy during the Cold War era. India, under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, sought to establish itself as a leader of the newly independent countries of the Global South. Nehru envisioned a world order where countries could maintain their independence and pursue their own development paths free from alignment with the superpowers. India’s desire for strategic autonomy led to the formulation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. The NAM aimed to provide a platform for developing countries to promote their collective interests and resist the pressures of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. India, along with other like-minded nations, advocated for a policy of non-alignment, which meant avoiding formal alliances and maintaining equidistance from both superpowers.

2.2 Commitment to Global Peace and Stability

India’s commitment to global peace and stability also played a crucial role in shaping its foreign policy during the Cold War era. India’s leaders believed in the principles of peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. As a country that had undergone a long and arduous struggle for independence, India empathized with the aspirations of other nations seeking freedom from colonial rule. India actively supported the decolonization process and advocated for the rights of self-determination for all nations. India also played a prominent role in peacekeeping operations under the United Nations, demonstrating its commitment to maintaining global peace and stability. The deployment of Indian troops in various conflict zones around the world highlighted India’s dedication to international peacekeeping efforts. In summary, India’s foreign policy and its traditional approach to non-alignment during the Cold War era were shaped by historical factors such as its colonial past, quest for strategic autonomy, and commitment to global peace and stability. These factors influenced India’s decision-making and positioned it as a champion of independence, non-alignment, and peaceful coexistence on the global stage.

2.3 Changing Global Dynamics

The balance of economic power among nations has been shifting over the years. Emerging economies, like China, Brazil, South Africa, and India, have been gaining influence and challenging the dominance of traditional economic powers, such as the United States and the European Union. These changes can lead to new alliances, trade patterns, and geopolitical strategies. Rapid technological advancements continue to revolutionise various industries and societies worldwide. Developments in artificial intelligence, automation, renewable energy, and biotechnology can alter labour markets, economic structures, and military capabilities. Climate change poses significant challenges and affects global dynamics. Rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and resource scarcity can exacerbate existing tensions, force migration, and impact economies. International cooperation and competition over resources and environmental issues will likely increase. Power struggles between nations may intensify due to the changing global landscape.

Existing rivalries, like the one between the United States and China, and new geopolitical tensions may shape alliances and conflicts. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the interconnectedness of global health systems and economies. The emergence of new infectious diseases and health crises can reshape international cooperation and health policies. Examine the emerging multipolar world order characterised by the rise of multiple power centres, including the United States, China, Russia, and regional players (Turner, S. 2009). Analyse the challenges and opportunities posed by this multipolar environment for India’s foreign policy objectives, national security concerns, and economic interests. The emerging multipolar world order, characterised by the rise of multiple power centres such as the United States, China, Russia, and regional players, presents both challenges and opportunities for India’s foreign policy objectives, national security concerns, and economic interests. Let’s analyse these aspects:

3. Emerging of a new order-multipolarity

On many fronts including demography, technology, economy, geopolitics, and others, the world is passing through a period of profound upheaval. The paradigms of global politics are changing, with new standards clearly emerging in geopolitics–financially and strategically (Wiseman, 2023, April 27). Further, these changes are occurring on account of deteriorating US fiscal fundamentals and the use of the dollar as a tool of diplomatic pressure is becoming counterproductive. Consequently, many nations are looking for an alternative exchange of currency. Russia and China are preferring Yuan in place of Dollar in bilateral trade.

Over the past decade, several emerging economies have grown more quickly than developed ones, changing the distribution of income globally in their favour. China has the second-largest economy in the world, behind the United States and ahead of Japan (Wade, 2011). Francis Fukuyama argues that populist nationalism is not a threat to ‘democracy’ if democracy simply means majorities for certain policies. It’s a threat to the liberal order, which is protected through the rule of law, and through constitutions that prevent abusive use of political power. (Fukuyama, 2018, August,14).

3.1 The global economic landscape

The global economic landscape is changing, and the economic centre of gravity is shifting from the West to the East. Mike Pence, an American politician said on February 16, 2019 “We cannot ensure the defense of the West if our allies grow dependent on the East.” Emmanuel Macron argued “Take India, Russia, and China for example. They have a lot more political inspiration than Europeans today. They take a logical approach to the world, they have a genuine philosophy, a resourcefulness that we have to a certain extent lost. And so, all of that has a major impact on us and reshuffles the cards” (The Munich Report 2020).

In April 2022, Christine Lagarde, president of the European Central Bank, gave a speech titled “A new global map: European resilience in a changing world”, she acknowledged the West did not have a monopoly on power. Despite that the West is losing power relatively, she observed, many Western policymakers are against proposals for wider power redistribution in global governance. (Hashem, 2022) On April 5, 2023, Macron urged China’s President Xi Jinping to help negotiate an end to the War in Ukraine (The Wall Street Journal 2023).

3.2 War of Currency

Moreover, the contemporary multipolar world not a single nation or group of nations is leading the charge to address global issues. In other words, new emerging powers have replaced the status quo. New paradigms are emerging, and old paradigms are disappearing. The efforts by Russia and China that the yuan overtake the US dollar as the most traded currency in Russia are in progress. Russian President Vladimir Putin has hinted that his country wants to use the yuan in trade with other countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Importantly, India is actively promoting its currency in trade; 18 countries have agreed to use the rupee in bilateral trade, with more countries expected to join the group (Bhattacherjee, K. 2023, March 14). China and Brazil have decided to phase out the dollar in their trade and use their own currencies. Saudi Arabia has publicly stated that it is ready to conduct its trade, including energy, in currencies other than the dollar. On June 5, 2019, Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with Putin at the Kremlin, China and Russia have agreed to use the dollar in their bilateral trade.

3.3 The world economic order consists of ‘three major poles’

The current world economic order consists of three major poles, the United States, China, and the European Union. The EU as a regional bloc, not a country, is also an important world player, although it is aligned with the US in terms of NATO and committed to expanding NATO with possible new memberships of Sweden and Finland. The United Kingdom is now permanently separated from the European Union and the European Union is looking weak. Post-Elizabethan Britain faces further decline. On the other hand, India has overtaken it as the world’s fifth leading economy. Under these circumstances, even as integration is promoted in Europe, it is not clear that the EU can fulfil its ambition of becoming a global power.

4. The multipolarity and regional order

The global financial crisis, COVID-19, and the Ukraine war are catalysts of trends that have been in motion since World War II. Surprisingly, those who have dominated the world order since World War II seem unable to think pragmatically about a new world order. They think in terms of a zero-sum game that cannot move in the right direction. Multipolarity is revealing new power realities in various places. Significantly, geoeconomic and geopolitical realignments are taking place in various parts of the world due to the emerging power of nations like China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil. The Middle East and North Africa are undoubtedly where this is the case. Arab countries are diversifying their strategic alliances in light of changing interests and the reality of power relations.

The Arabs are finding that their interests and strategic objectives increasingly align with multiple nations not limited to the West and the US. To gauge the decline of US influence in the Arab region, one needs to understand China’s active role in resolving regional conflicts (in Yemen and Syria). The Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement under China is certainly a clear signal that the US is not the single dominant player in a region of now-fluid alliances and partnerships. However, is not leave a vacuum. American influence is being replaced by the collective efforts of nations in the region to restructure the regional order and deepen strategic partnerships with countries such as China, Russia, and India. The age of Western hegemony is over. Whether or not America itself declines, the post-war liberal international order underpinned by US military, economic and ideological primacy and supported by global institutions serving its power and purpose, is coming to an end (Acharya, A. 2018).

4.1 Confront of visions for the region:

No longer a single power can be dominated by the Arabs, some US and West policymakers are still focusing on the region as subject to unipolarity, Arab leaders do not want any single power or group of nations to have a monopoly on regional affairs. Not limiting our partnerships to the US or the West, but expanding them to emerging powers such as China, Russia, and India. “The 21st century is touted to be the Asian age, belonging to China and India. Cold war and growing impacts of globalization are making India redefine its position and role at the regional and the global level” (Bava, 2007).

This is the reason for seeking membership in organizations such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, etc.). Arab countries with and South Africa), and its New Development Bank (NDB), headquartered in Shanghai. Strategically, it is not true that the Arabs do not want to continue their relationship with the US and the Western powers. However, Arab nations want to build up relations with countries based on mutual interests and benefits.

The Arab world’s future strategic direction will help determine how the game of great power competition plays out and how it contributes to shaping international and regional dynamics. The Arabs are strategically, demographically, and geographically well-positioned to emerge as a pole of global influence. The Arab world is a decisive player in the balance of power. The changing nature of the present is no less than the change in global governance. The change accelerated only after the global financial crisis (2008). The major shift got a further boost after the COVID-19 and Ukraine crises. The war in Ukraine demonstrates a battle between those who support privileges and the status quo and others who call for equality and fairness in the distribution of power. The process of global multipolarity is seen as Russia striving for its global role and relevance, India’s carefully crafted strategic autonomy, the resurgence of the Arabs, and political awakening in other areas.

Germany and France are increasingly taking decisions independently to protect their national interests. Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholtz made a one-day visit to China, the first European leader to visit since the COVID pandemic, drawing criticism from the US and his own party. The consequences of the Asian tilt of world capitalism and the eventual overcoming of the legacy of the colonial world order are especially evident in the growing solidarity and expansion of BRIC. Asia’s shift from the rich trans-Atlantic democracies to the centre of economic gravity has helped define China’s rise within the network of bilateral trading relations, with ASEAN. Asian countries in terms of population such as China, India and Indonesia support large domestic markets. The Ukraine war and Russia’s annexation of the eastern states of Crimea and Donbas have reduced Russia’s chances of occupying a powerful pole in the multipolar order. The liberal world order did expand and strengthen with the economic liberalisation in China and India, and with the end of the cold war. And while the champions of that order celebrated its expansion, they still assumed that its main challenge would come from the rising powers (Acharya, 2017).

5. India navigates in the emerging multiport order

China must be a competitor as well as an inspiration in shaping India to be a global player. The international and regional scenarios are very volatile. India should not allow events to come upon us; it is better to anticipate and analyse them in advance. Since the 1949 revolution, communist nationalism, and economic rise, our understanding of China has been inadequate. India missed the importance of the UN Security Council seat. China’s arrival on the global stage as a superpower has repercussions in terms of several strategic challenges. The US-China dynamic as an emerging new world order is a major challenge for India’s policymakers. The era of globalisation that facilitated the dramatic rise of China has probably come to an end, when anyone learns the complex dynamics of the world economic order, only then can India execute strategic policies in a new order. The world started to take notice of India’s rise when New Delhi signed a nuclear pact with the US in July 2005, but that breakthrough is only one dimension of the transformation of Indian foreign policy that has taken place since the end of the Cold War (Mohan, 2006).

5.1 The choice before US and West

Today the West acknowledges India’s potential to match China, with depth and skills, over the long term. Shyam Saran cautions that India must be careful of the economic chasm which makes China less sensitive to India’s interests and exhibits a lower threshold of tolerance towards India. But an aspirational India should pursue a similar economic course, creating a knowledge and technological ecosystem that promotes quick innovation and assimilation. India must painstakingly pursue this rationale, which has been adopted by the majority of developed nations.

India is the only country which has the civilizational depth, population, significant managerial, technical, and entrepreneurial skills to compete with China – and more, sustainably and over the long term (Saran, 2022). China is one of India’s toughest strategic challenges. Consequently, the bilateral push-and-move over the border has years of twists and turns. Following the liberal perspective, Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao decided to target administrative management of the border over a political solution. India’s strategy against a much stronger opponent, as diplomatic efforts focused on convincing China that any misadventure would result in full-scale war will affect long-term relations (Menon, S. 2018).

5.2 Chain has an edge

In the geopolitical competition with India in South Asia, China has scored more success in creating an opportunity between India and the smaller states that were traditionally close to New Delhi due to geography and cultural factors (Mosca, M. 2020). However, even here the relationships in South Asian states have benefitted from the India–China-managed rivalry. The political psychology of Sino-Indian relations and of the roles of those two countries in the world understanding of contemporary world politics and to the approach of two of Asia’s rising powers to one another and to the global order. (Miller, 2020). The main reason for smaller nations’ strategic manoeuvring is the absence of a balance of power between China and India, which has enabled the smaller states to play off each other. India has been pursuing a mix of diplomatic engagement, limited hard balancing, and soft balancing policies towards China. India’s policy suggests a wait-and-watch approach, sending a message to the other powers that benign actions will create responses while aggressive measures may result in hard balances (Paul, 2019).

5.3 Geopolitics and India

The past international opportunities and forthcoming strategies require historical shifts. Indian geopolitical position has made it strategically important to hold a key position. The growing recourse of unilateral measures by the major powers poses one of the gravest challenges to contemporary multilateralism which is acore principle of international cooperation and is essential to create a supportive external environment. India has been proactive in using multilateralism to meet its objectives. Menon (2021) finds India as central to Asia’s geopolitics and yet also set apart from it is a major contribution to our understanding of this great, rising power in this Asian century. In the process, India has contributed significantly to the rapid transformation of world order, driven by its ambitious socio-economic development programmes, which are steered by its international trade demands. The fact that this trade accounts for as much as 40 per cent of India’s gross domestic product (GDP) underscores the critical importance of the interlinkage between India’s aspirations need for international cooperation through multilateralism.

A nation’s hard power is defined by the ability to alter the behaviour of others to get what you want. Soft power is the ability to achieve this through ‘attraction’ rather than ‘coercion’ (hard power). Without, in any way, impeding or limiting the development of a nation’s hard power, it is very much visible that strategizing soft power projection by India should be prioritized as the pathway of primary foreign policy.

5.4 Opportunities and Struggle for Power

International politics may face difficulties in today’s multipolar world with its rivals, power imbalances, and value collisions. India’s participation in any alliance for power tussling along with the traditional non-alignment position However, once the rivalry between its two main poles could no longer be restrained, others were forced to choose one side. New Delhi cannot allow prejudices and assumptions to get in the way. Delhi’s dogmas now stand in the way of India’s progress. Our national policy cannot be static in a complex, evolving environment if we are to achieve even more constant goals. Some examples include the 1971 Bangladesh War, the 1991 Economic and Political Repositioning, the 1998 Nuclear Tests, and the 2005 India-US Nuclear Deal. In fact, India was only able to effect significant adjustments in its favour through a series of upheavals.

5.5 Non-alignment – End of an era

From 1946 to 1962, the first phase could be characterised as an era of non-alignment. In a bipolar world, India’s objective was to resist the constraining choices while protecting its sovereignty, rebuilding its economy, and consolidating its integrity. India’s goal was to lead Asia and Africa in a quest for a more equitable and just world order. “This was the heyday of Bandung and Belgrade, the peak of Third World solidarity. It also saw energetic Indian diplomacy everywhere, from Korea and Vietnam to Suez and Hungary. For a few years, our position on the world stage seemed assured. The 1962 conflict with China not only brought this period to an end but did so in a manner that significantly damaged India’s standing.” (Jaishankar, S. 2020).

From 1962 to 1971, the second phase is a decade of realism and recovery. India adopted more pragmatic choices on security and political challenges. From 1971 to 1991, the third phase was one of the greater regional assertions. It began with the creation of Bangladesh and the paradigm shift towards India-Pakistan relations, but it came to an end with the IPKF misadventure in Sri Lanka. The fourth phase was marked by the fall of the USSR and the establishment of a unipolar world. It encouraged India to shift towards safeguarding strategic autonomy. The Look East Policy has changed the Indian approach to world affairs, like engagement with Israel. This fifth phase took a balancing act, resulting in the India-US nuclear deal, a better understanding of the West, and a common cause with China.

One has to acknowledge the ethos of India, that being a democratic polity, a pluralistic society, and a market economy, India can grow along with others, not separately. India has to overcome three burdens of the past: first, the partition of 1947 reduced India’s geo-political strength against China and created an enemy like Pakistan, second, a delayed economic reform delayed India’s growth story; and third, a prolonged wait in the exercise of the nuclear option lost strategic strength.

5.6 Vaccine Diplomacy

COVID-19 has allowed India to project innovation in pharmacy and engage in vaccine diplomacy. The Declaration of International Yoga Day is an achievement to demonstrate India’s traditional healthy lifestyle. India’s humanitarian intervention, especially in the form of UN peacekeeping missions in the Congo and Korea, served to cement its image as a helping hand and timely help to Turkey after a devastating earthquake earned praise altogether, and New Delhi’s “disaster diplomacy” served as potent tools for outreach to countries in need. We must remember thatChina has been winning without fighting, while the US is fighting without winning. It is even more about economic growth, political influence, and quality of life. As a result, America lost its famous optimism.

5.7 Strategic autonomy?

In a globalised world, strategic autonomy is secured through creating mutually beneficial relationships of interdependence. In an interdependent world, the fruit of economic growth and development is pursued when a nation is able to utilise the benefits of interdependence. Hence, the concepts of “autonomy” and “self-reliance” should be defined in the context of the economic interdependence of nations. India has the military capability to defend its territorial integrity and security; however, it will have to sustain higher rates of economic growth to be able to alter the strategic balance in Asia, and across the globe. It is not economic growth that holds the key to India’s global profile and power, but the nature of that growth process and the manner in which the economic challenges it faces decide the real power of the nation. Social and economic backwardness, inequalities and political uncertainty show the quality of economic development (Baru, 2016).

5.8 Neighbourhood First

Today, non-state security or non-traditional security as it is commonly referred is not entirely new thinking. It was given as much importance to India’s neighbourhood policy as more than a mere subset of its foreign policy. Ever since Indian Independence, the neighbourhood has always received prime attention from the leadership. In spite of challenges posed by legacy issues and concerns about its dominance as the dominant country in the region, this has been quite evident in the choice of seasoned diplomats to represent India in the neighbouring countries and the economic and political capital that India spends to maintain friendly relations with each of the countries. The ‘Neighbourhood First’ strategy is a logical extension of the approach to India’s neighbours. Foreign policy initiatives, defence preparedness, along with accurate and timely intelligence about external threats and challenges, technological prowess, and economic growth that invites foreign investment and promotes trade would be some of the main means for the preservation and enhancement of India’s national interests.

Indian foreign policy is remained reactive to the strategic environment rather than to strategic realities. Such a casual response to the structural imperatives gives little outcome when India is on the periphery of geopolitics. Sundaram (2022) says, “India’s quest for power must be viewed in geopolitical terms not as hubris, but as a long-term driver of its foreign and security policies. He reminds us that Asian geopolitical structures from Iran to Indonesia are interdependent, and that India’s agency in the past worked within this coexisting multiverse in the pursuit of its interests. Such an inheritance must lead to prioritizing connections rather than exclusion, prudential agency rather than geopolitical determinism, and an outcome orientation that brings prosperity to the masses rather than flaunting India’s ambitions for international prestige.” Michael (2013) argues why and how India has until now preferred bilateral negotiation processes and has used a multitude of multilateral organizations in order to push through its own self-interests.

It holds grave risks now when India seems poised to play a significant role in global politics. India must come to grips with its discomfort with the very notion of power, particularly its wariness of using hard power. India’s reluctance to accept a more sophisticated understanding of power, in general, and military power, in particular, will continue to undermine Indian foreign and security policy. By its very nature, India’s South Asia policy has to be extremely dynamic and nimble. Over the last few years, the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy has invested significant diplomatic capital in it. But the underlying factors that have traditionally framed India’s difficulties in getting its neighbourhood policy right remain as potent as ever (Pant, 2019).

6. Conclusion

The emerging world order is likely to go on the path of the balance of power as its operating principle, rather than collective security. China has never missed the role of the great disrupter, unlike Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN, its emergence cannot be accommodated in the liberal order. The ability of India and China to work together could determine a balance between many fronts. As S. Jaishankar says, “Asia is being shaped largely by the outlook of the UN, the power of China, the weight of Russia, the collectivism of ASEAN, the volatility of the Middle East, and the rise of India. In India’s engagement with the West, the shared values and the changes are underway.” (Jaishankar, 2020) The West and the US should accept that India’s growth is a strategic development for its larger interests of liberal world order. When it comes to China, the mantra of strategic maturity is at work between the two countries. India refers to its strategy as multi-aligned, but its systemic interactions stand in stark contrast to its scant involvement at the regional level. A strong multilateral framework has not yet been developed in Asia as well as the global level. India has to adopt multi-polarity in place of neutrality with the changing world without compromising on its strategic autonomy.

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10. Hashem, Ebrahim. (2022). The Changing Regional and Global Order – and the Implications for Arabs and the World, Asian Global Online. https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/changing-regional-and-global-order-and-implications-arabs-and-world
11. Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). Why the liberal world order will survive. Ethics & International Affairs, 32(1), 17-29. [Google scholar]
12. Jaishankar, S. (2020). The India way: Strategies for an uncertain world. New Delhi. Page 137
13. Keukeleire, S., & Delreux, T. (2022). The foreign policy of the European Union. Bloomsbury Publishing. [Google scholar]

eurasiareview.com · by Dr. Surendra Kumar Yadawa · August 14, 2023

13. Logisticians battle distance, weather, red tape in giant Pacific exercise

Our superpower since the 20th century has always been that we will outproduce our adversaries and "out logistics" them. Do we still have those capabilities?

It is good that we are focusing on logistics in our exercises and war games. How will our transparency influence our adversaries?  

Logisticians battle distance, weather, red tape in giant Pacific exercise

A joint U.S.-Australian wargame turns its focus to supply challenges

BY SAM SKOVE

STAFF WRITER

AUGUST 14, 2023 06:03 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

Logistics moved to center stage in a giant Army exercise in Australia this summer, a nod to the Pacific region’s vast distances and rough weather. But another age-old hurdle also popped up: government regulations.

“Probably our most significant obstacle was the agricultural inspections” in Australia, said Col. Daniel Duncan, assistant chief of the logistics section of I Corps, which plays a major role in Army operations in the Pacific. “They are very, very stringent.”

From July 22 to Aug. 4, U.S. forces participated in the largest-ever iteration of the Australia-based Talisman Sabre exercise, with Duncan’s soldiers helping provide logistics to more than 34,000 people from 13 participating nations.

Duncan said this year’s iteration of the exercise saw a new focus on logistics.

“This is probably the largest in scale that anybody has seen in a long time,” he said in an interview. “It’s a significant shift.”

Navy and Army ship transports started their journey to the exercise thousands of miles away in the United States before winding their way to various Pacific bases and finally arriving in Australia.

Ships involved included two Navy Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off class vessels, Duncan said, as well as Army watercraft.

Once in Australia, the exercise’s operations spread more than 1,500 miles from Darwin on the Timor Sea to Gladstone Port on the Pacific.

“If we were to do a similar exercise in the United States,” Duncan said, “You’re talking about an exercise that spans from about Los Angeles to Seattle.”

Duncan’s unit was responsible for ferrying around 1,200 pieces of equipment, including tanks, trucks, and other vehicles, some of which stayed in Australia for future use.

The exercise also saw the Army’s first-ever use of a floating pier in an Australian exercise. The pier, which allows the Army to offload vehicles to damaged ports, is 24 feet wide and stretches over 360 feet. The Army normally only practices using the pier once a year.

But bad weather prevented the Army from using the platform to ferry tanks onto the beach, Duncan said, citing high winds that he was told were far higher than normal.

Some problems were merely a matter of practice, such as agricultural inspections, which Duncan said was fixed thanks to support from Australia and a permanently deployed U.S. liaison group.

Other problems are more enduring, such as outdated ships which Duncan said “gradually put things behind schedule.”

The U.S. Department of Transportation announced in March that it would acquire two transport vessels to replace aging ones.

“I think it has a lot more attention now,” said Duncan, who sounded an optimistic note, although some Congress have said the military is neglecting sea transport.

On the plus side, Duncan said that the Army faced no significant problems when drawing material from prepositioned stocks across the Pacific as part of the exercise.

The Army has previously hailed the prepositioned stock program as key to a snap deployment to Europe last year, although it has also found maintenance problems, most notably misfiring howitzers stored in the Middle East.

This year’s exercise included virtual simulations of logistics, with an emphasis on spreading out logistic points in order to present smaller targets to accurate enemy missiles.

Army Maj. Gen. Joseph Ryan, commander of the 25th Infantry Division which participated in the exercise, told Defense One separately that the Army’s ability to “disaggregate”—essentially, spread out—is one of his service’s key advantages in the Pacific.

“Land forces are more survivable,” said Ryan. “You can't disaggregate a C-17” military transport plane.

In future exercises, Duncan hopes to include landings protected by cyber, air, naval, and other forces to get a more realistic look at what an actual war might entail.

The question of landing under enemy fire isn’t abstract to Ryan, who said he uses physical training sessions with new unit members to emphasize that the 25th Infantry Division will be the first to deploy in case of war in the Pacific.

‘The question for our folks today is, ‘What makes us more ready?’” Ryan said. “If there's conflict here, we're going to get called first.”

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

14.

I think Major General Schmidt will be the first woman to command an Infantry Division. BZ to her.

General Officer Assignments

defense.gov

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Immediate Release

Aug. 14, 2023 |×

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The acting chief of staff of the Army announces the following officer assignments:

Maj. Gen. Michelle A. Schmidt to commanding general, 7th Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. She most recently served as director, Force Development, G-8, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

Brig. Gen. Antoinette R. Gant, commanding general, South Pacific Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, San Francisco, California, to chief, Army Enterprise Marketing Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Chicago, Illinois.

Brig. Gen. Kirk E. Gibbs, commanding general, Pacific Ocean Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, to commanding general, South Pacific Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, San Francisco, California.

Army Reserve

Maj. Gen. Kris A. Belanger, special assistant to the assistant secretary of the Army (Individual Mobilized Augmentee), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C., to commanding general, (Troop Program Unit) 99th Readiness Division, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey.

Maj. Gen. Tracy L. Smith, commander (Troop Program Unit), 807th Medical Command (Deployment Support), Salt Lake City, Utah, to commanding general, (Troop Program Unit), 63rd Readiness Division, Mountain View, California.

Brig. Gen. Katherine A. Simonson, director, Research and Development, Defense Health Agency, Falls Church, Virginia, to deputy commander (Troop Program Unit), 3rd Medical Command (Mission Support Element), Fort Gillem, Georgia.

Brig. Gen. Peter J. Whalen, deputy commanding general (Individual Mobilized Augmentee), U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to deputy commander (Troop Program Unit), 84th Training Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Brig. Gen. Michael L. Yost, deputy commander (Troop Program Unit), 807th Medical Command (Mission Support Element), Salt Lake City, Utah, to deputy commander for Professional Services (Troop Program Unit), 3rd Medical Command (Mission Support Element), Fort Gillem, Georgia.

Army

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15. General Officer Assignments - Army (and 7th Infantry Division)

I think Major General Schmidt will be the first woman to command an Infantry Division. BZ to her.

Her biography is below. She has a very wide range of experience across the Army, special operations, the 82d, Korea, the Pentagon, and joint force as well as numerous combat deployments and was awarded the combat action badge.

General Officer Assignments

defense.gov

Release

Immediate Release

Aug. 14, 2023 |×

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The acting chief of staff of the Army announces the following officer assignments:

Maj. Gen. Michelle A. Schmidt to commanding general, 7th Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. She most recently served as director, Force Development, G-8, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

Brig. Gen. Antoinette R. Gant, commanding general, South Pacific Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, San Francisco, California, to chief, Army Enterprise Marketing Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Chicago, Illinois.

Brig. Gen. Kirk E. Gibbs, commanding general, Pacific Ocean Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, to commanding general, South Pacific Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, San Francisco, California.

Army Reserve

Maj. Gen. Kris A. Belanger, special assistant to the assistant secretary of the Army (Individual Mobilized Augmentee), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C., to commanding general, (Troop Program Unit) 99th Readiness Division, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey.

Maj. Gen. Tracy L. Smith, commander (Troop Program Unit), 807th Medical Command (Deployment Support), Salt Lake City, Utah, to commanding general, (Troop Program Unit), 63rd Readiness Division, Mountain View, California.

Brig. Gen. Katherine A. Simonson, director, Research and Development, Defense Health Agency, Falls Church, Virginia, to deputy commander (Troop Program Unit), 3rd Medical Command (Mission Support Element), Fort Gillem, Georgia.

Brig. Gen. Peter J. Whalen, deputy commanding general (Individual Mobilized Augmentee), U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to deputy commander (Troop Program Unit), 84th Training Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Brig. Gen. Michael L. Yost, deputy commander (Troop Program Unit), 807th Medical Command (Mission Support Element), Salt Lake City, Utah, to deputy commander for Professional Services (Troop Program Unit), 3rd Medical Command (Mission Support Element), Fort Gillem, Georgia.

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Major General Michelle A. Schmidt

Director of Force Development Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8

Major General Michelle A. Schmidt attended the United States Military Academy and was commissioned as a Military Intelligence Officer in 1992.

She began her career as a platoon leader in the 2^nd Infantry Division in Korea. Over her 30 years of service, MG Schmidt has served in numerous command and staff assignments in conventional and special operations units. In addition to a deployment to Haiti early in her career, she deployed numerous times to Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Some notable assignments include, company command in the 82d Airborne Division, S2 for the 504^th Parachute Infantry Regiment, intern for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Senior Intelligence Officer and Squadron Commander for 1^st Special Operations Detachment – Delta, G2 for the 82d Airborne Division, JSOC Intelligence Brigade Commander, Chief of Staff for the 82d Airborne Division, Chief of the Initiatives Group for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Director of Intelligence J-2, United States Special Operations Command, and Deputy Commanding General for the 10^th Mountain Division. She most recently served as the Director of Operations for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Deployments include, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti in 1994, numerous conventional and special operations joint task force deployments to Iraq in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and INHERENT RESOLVE from 2003-2015, and multiple conventional and special operations deployments to Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Her most recent deployment was in Kabul, Afghanistan serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff, J2 for Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT 2020-2021.

MG Schmidt’s awards and decorations include the Defense Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, the Combat Action Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge, and the Army Staff Identification Badge. MG Schmidt is a graduate of the United States Army Command and General Staff College and the United States Army War College.

15. How Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Might End (Interview with John Nagl)

Some very pithy comments from John!

​Excerpts:

People like Michael Kofman have said that these counteroffensives tend to take many months, and we’re still relatively near the beginning of this one.

Was it Hemingway who said, “When you go broke, you grow broke gradually and then all at once.” The counteroffensive succeeds slowly and then all at once.

Is there a particular point where you’d say, “Okay, there’s been no breakthrough. There probably won’t be one”?

The fighting conditions go to hell in October. Mud is the enemy, speaking as an old tank driver. If we haven’t had the breakthrough by November, we’re not going to have the breakthrough.

Perhaps it’s more likely that those months would see more political talks, since there’s less possibility for a military advance.

Correct. What does political negotiation look like? Is Ukraine willing to settle for getting the Donbas back? The Russians aren’t willing to give up Crimea. The most favorable Russian regime from the West’s perspective wouldn’t give it up. If Navalny is the Russian president, I don’t think he’s willing to do that.

The best outcome I can see for Ukraine is giving up Crimea and an American tank division stationed in Donetsk. That’s a win for Zelenskyy. That’s a win-win for Ukraine. Are the Americans going to be willing to do it? I’m not sure. Again, I’m not sure they should. I don’t want Americans and Russians shooting at each other directly.

Understandably.

But Poles? They’re probably ready. The Poles hate the Russians with a blinding passion, and Poland is buying a whole bunch of tanks.

I didn’t quite realize how much Russia’s neighbors hated it until the war.Yeah. It’s one thing not liking your in-laws, it’s another thing when they move in with you.

How Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Might End

New York Magazine · by Benjamin Hart · August 14, 2023

Photo-Illustration: Gian Marco Benedetto/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

Ukraine had high hopes for its long-anticipated counteroffensive, the goal of which is to reclaim territory Russia seized in the country’s south and east last year (as well as Crimea, taken in 2014) and force Vladimir Putin into a weak negotiating position. And although the country’s forces have made some promising recent gains, the operation has thus far been a deadly and demoralizing slog. Ukrainian soldiers have run up against vast minefields and other elaborate Russian defenses and have been able to make only slow progress, at a steep cost in men and equipment. With the limited time before the onset of the fall mud season, what can Ukraine realistically accomplish? For perspective on that question, I spoke with John Nagl, a former lieutenant commander in the U.S. Army who has written extensively about counterinsurgency and is now a professor of warfighting studies at U.S. Army War College.

I was reading a Wall Street Journal article you were recently quoted in, and its premise was that the West had not properly trained or equipped Ukrainian forces ahead of Ukraine’s big counteroffensive, which hasn’t been hitting its goals. That was mid-to-late July; have things changed much since then?

Not a lot. The defensive is the stronger form of war, as we teach at places like the Army War College. You should have a three-to-one advantage if you’re going to succeed on the offense. Force ratios are really tough to determine in this war, because the Ukrainians have been really closed-lipped about their capabilities and the forces they have, but it’s probably closer to a one-to-one. You try to achieve local superiority, but that’s hard to do because the other side is also looking to create a counteroffensive. In fact, the Russians have done that in the northeast of the country.

The Ukrainians aren’t just lacking air power and air superiority, without which the United States would not attempt a deliberate attack; they also lack the force ratios. They lack expertise in combined arms warfare. They probably don’t have sufficient armor. They’re running short on artillery. They don’t have the long-range fires we’d like to have. In addition to close air support at the point of penetration, you’d like to have the ability to interdict deep with deep fires, either with air power or with really long-range missiles to take out ammo dumps and to preclude the possibility of reinforcements. Once you figure out where the enemy is trying to breach, you move reimbursements to that area. I think often about Hitler’s failure to achieve air superiority over the English Channel, when Churchill said, “Never has so much been owed by so many to so few.”

Though air superiority was never on the table for Ukraine in this counteroffensive.

That’s correct. The hope was that the Russian forces were fragile, and I don’t think it was an invalid hope. I think it was worth the try.

Because of the disorganization and shambolic nature of their fighting early in the war?

Absolutely, but also because of the political fragility of Putin, the internal dissent he’s facing, the loss of so many of the good Russian forces, the evident morale problems we’ve seen among the Russian forces, and poor training among the conscript forces who are defending. But the truth is that defense isn’t just the stronger form of war, it’s the easier form of war. So far, the Russian forces haven’t broken. That’s not to say they won’t, but it’s also the key to this war.

Without western support, Ukraine loses. You can criticize western policy and say we’ve given them just enough not to lose at every phase of the war. I don’t think it’s an unfair criticism, but that certainly hasn’t been why we’ve been relatively stingy with our support, or at least tardy with our support. We are fighting a proxy war. The brave Ukrainians are doing the fighting and the dying, and the United States and our allies are providing the weapons with which they’re conducting that war against a nuclear-armed power.

You can see why Zelenskyy might be frustrated, since the timeline seems to be that he requests something from the U.S., is rejected, and then three months later he gets it. Given this pivotal point in the war, why wouldn’t Biden be a bit more generous right now?

Predictions are difficult, especially about the future. President Biden has been feeling Putin out. Putin keeps drawing red lines, and we keep pretty deliberately crossing them and he redraws another red line further back. I have no idea what sort of ears we have listening to Putin and his deliberations, but it appears that we have ears pretty close to Putin, or did. Early in the war, we knew that he was going to attack and broadcast it to the world. Without knowing what’s being said in the Kremlin, I am not willing to fault the Biden administration for being careful as they essentially play chicken with a nuclear-armed power that can destroy the United States in the blink of an eye.

Well, when you put it that way …

But that’s the game, right? Biden’s primary responsibility is the safety of the American people, and in my eyes at least, he has balanced his desire to defend Ukraine, preserve the rules-based international order, and stick more than a finger in Putin’s eye. He has achieved all of those objectives while not creating conditions that lead to global thermonuclear war against an opponent who is not necessarily stable.

Where you stand depends on where you sit. Zelenskyy would prefer us to take more risks. He says, “Putin’s not going to go nuclear.” Okay, how do you know that?

Yes, it certainly calls for a good dose of caution.

I don’t fault the Biden administration for that. Also, there is no single magic weapon. F-16s are terrific airplanes, but they are effective in a coordinated network of air-defense systems and artillery systems designed for suppression of enemy air defense and airborne-warning and control systems and in-the-air traffic controllers. So giving the Ukrainians F-16s, which is going to happen, isn’t the magic bullet either, because the Russians have not been wasting time.

Ukraine is now the most heavily mined country in the world. There are millions of mines along the front line in Ukraine. The most likely outcome of this war, I think, is a frozen conflict on the ground as we wait to see what happens politically. Who is the next president of the United States? The Ukrainians are watching that with, as you can imagine, enormous interest. As long as the next American president and the next American Congress continue to support Ukraine, Ukraine will not fall. The Ukrainians will continue to fight. They will fight conventionally.

If the country falls, they will fight as insurgents and try to turn this into Afghanistan, after which the Soviet Union essentially ceased to exist. I wrote a piece before the invasion, back in February of ’22, in Foreign Policy. I believed that Ukraine would fall, and I argued that Putin was going to be the dog who caught the truck — that the grinding insurgency that he would be confronted with would lead to the collapse of his regime as it had led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

I was wrong on the first part. I’m comforted that I had really good company in being wrong. Everybody thought that the Russian advantage was going to prove decisive, including General Milley, who has access to a lot better information than I do. But Ukrainians are absolutely determined to fight for the survival of their country. I just got back from ten days in Poland — I attended the NATO conference on the subject with a bunch of Ukrainian professors, military analysts, people like me. Their determination was absolute. One of the faculty members stood up — her son had been killed the week before. Another of the faculty members talked about his grandma being gunned down by a helicopter. The Russians are literally flying attack helicopters and taking out little babushkas.

Whatever happens on the ground here in the short-term, Ukrainians are going to hate the Russians with a blinding passion for generations to come. This war has been a catastrophe for Russia, and for Putin personally.

One of the few optimistic pieces I’ve read about Ukraine’s position recently was about cluster munitions, and how they were helping break some of these heavily mined lines.

Google it for me — I can’t remember who it was, but somebody said, “There’s an awful lot of ruin in the nation.” I think it was a Brit.

It was Adam Smith.

Adam Smith said, “There’s a lot of ruin in the nation.” So to paraphrase, there’s an awful lot of ruin in a prepared defense. The cluster munitions are killing an awful lot of Russian soldiers. Certainly the Ukrainians are glad to have them, but by themselves, they are not going to win this war. F-16s are terrific airplanes, by themselves they’re not going to win this war. Additional Leopard tanks are terrific weapons. By themselves, they’re not going to win this war. Have you read Steve Biddle’s piece in Foreign Affairs?

No.

He’s the smartest guy on the planet. He talks through why new weapons don’t make that big of a difference, why it’s hard to create breakthroughs in modern war. The most likely outcome is that this war turns into a frozen conflict, not far from the present lines, until either the West stops supporting Ukraine or the Russians decide to stop prosecuting the war. Probably with the demise of Vladimir Putin.

That seems far off.

We came close. Prigozhin quit!

Maybe he was our source all along.

That he’s still alive astounds me.

None of it really adds up.

None of it adds up, but it certainly inspired the Ukrainians to fight on, right? It’s a huge, huge crack at the waterline in the bad ship Putin. So, that’s what they’re fighting for. They do need to demonstrate to the United States and the West that they’re worth continuing to support, and they are earning that with their blood.

We thought the Russians might be more fragile than they are. That hasn’t turned out to be the case. That doesn’t mean they’re not going to break tomorrow. If a Russian unit cracks at the right place and the Ukrainians happen to have a couple of tank battalions right there? Could they in fact cut the land bridge to Crimea? They could. Is it worth trying? Absolutely. Is it likely? It’s not. But it’s nonzero.

People like Michael Kofman have said that these counteroffensives tend to take many months, and we’re still relatively near the beginning of this one.

Was it Hemingway who said, “When you go broke, you grow broke gradually and then all at once.” The counteroffensive succeeds slowly and then all at once.

Is there a particular point where you’d say, “Okay, there’s been no breakthrough. There probably won’t be one”?

The fighting conditions go to hell in October. Mud is the enemy, speaking as an old tank driver. If we haven’t had the breakthrough by November, we’re not going to have the breakthrough.

Perhaps it’s more likely that those months would see more political talks, since there’s less possibility for a military advance.

Correct. What does political negotiation look like? Is Ukraine willing to settle for getting the Donbas back? The Russians aren’t willing to give up Crimea. The most favorable Russian regime from the West’s perspective wouldn’t give it up. If Navalny is the Russian president, I don’t think he’s willing to do that.

The best outcome I can see for Ukraine is giving up Crimea and an American tank division stationed in Donetsk. That’s a win for Zelenskyy. That’s a win-win for Ukraine. Are the Americans going to be willing to do it? I’m not sure. Again, I’m not sure they should. I don’t want Americans and Russians shooting at each other directly.

Understandably.

But Poles? They’re probably ready. The Poles hate the Russians with a blinding passion, and Poland is buying a whole bunch of tanks.

I didn’t quite realize how much Russia’s neighbors hated it until the war.Yeah. It’s one thing not liking your in-laws, it’s another thing when they move in with you.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

New York Magazine · by Benjamin Hart · August 14, 2023

16. China to disclose secret US ‘global reconnaissance system,’ claims official

Excerpts:

Du Zhenhua, a senior engineer from the CVERC, claimed that the “US military intelligence agencies' use of their information technology advantage to launch cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure is a criminal act in clear violation of international law, seriously infringing on China's national security and public interest.”

Du warned that if damage had been caused to the monitoring system, it could have impacted early warning and disaster assessment efforts in the case of an earthquake, potentially “leading to more severe loss of life and property.”

“Even more dangerous is that if the attackers tamper with the earthquake monitoring data, triggering false alarms, it could lead to social panic and disorder, resulting in casualties among innocent people," he added.

It is not clear whether there were any such attempts to cause damage. Recorded Future News previously asked the CVERC whether it had observed any attempts to interfere with the integrity of the seismological data, or if the malware was capable of doing so. Despite an initial interest in receiving our questions, a spokesperson subsequently declined to comment.

The claims by Chinese officials that the data was of legitimate intelligence value and that the computer network exploitation was a violation of international law appear to be inconsistent. Typically, espionage is not considered to be a violation of international law, though there is some ambiguity around the interpretation of the UN Charter on the matter.

China to disclose secret US ‘global reconnaissance system,’ claims official

Alexander Martin

August 14th, 2023

therecord.media

Chinese authorities have pledged to “publicly disclose a highly secretive global reconnaissance system” operated by the U.S. government following an investigation into the alleged hacking of earthquake monitoring equipment in Wuhan.

The claim marks the latest of a series of attempts by the People’s Republic of China to highlight Washington’s intelligence-gathering efforts in response to criticisms of Beijing’s activities, which, according to the U.S., are often conducted in breach of international law by targeting commercial rather than national security material.

The Global Times, China’s state-controlled English-language newspaper, reported Monday that the disclosure would be made as a result of progress in a joint investigation by China's National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center (CVERC) and the internet security company Qihoo 360 into alleged espionage targeting seismic intensity data.

It quoted Xiao Xinguang, a member of a crucial advisory body to the Chinese Communist Party and the chief software architect at anti-virus company Antiy Labs, saying the seismological data had “significant intelligence value for judging geological terrain, analyzing weapons system tests, and nuclear tests.”

Violation of international law?

Du Zhenhua, a senior engineer from the CVERC, claimed that the “US military intelligence agencies' use of their information technology advantage to launch cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure is a criminal act in clear violation of international law, seriously infringing on China's national security and public interest.”

Du warned that if damage had been caused to the monitoring system, it could have impacted early warning and disaster assessment efforts in the case of an earthquake, potentially “leading to more severe loss of life and property.”

“Even more dangerous is that if the attackers tamper with the earthquake monitoring data, triggering false alarms, it could lead to social panic and disorder, resulting in casualties among innocent people," he added.

It is not clear whether there were any such attempts to cause damage. Recorded Future News previously asked the CVERC whether it had observed any attempts to interfere with the integrity of the seismological data, or if the malware was capable of doing so. Despite an initial interest in receiving our questions, a spokesperson subsequently declined to comment.

The claims by Chinese officials that the data was of legitimate intelligence value and that the computer network exploitation was a violation of international law appear to be inconsistent. Typically, espionage is not considered to be a violation of international law, though there is some ambiguity around the interpretation of the UN Charter on the matter.

The United States explicitly considers espionage a legitimate part of statecraft. It avows the existence of its intelligence agencies and has legislation governing their operations domestically and abroad.

China has been accused of foreign intelligence activities, but Beijing does not publicly avow these. China has also been criticized in the West for what are perceived to be the overly-broad powers afforded to its security apparatus under its laws.

‘It’s espionage. It’s what nation-states do.’

The Global Times’ report on the earthquake monitoring equipment hack was published shortly after Microsoft announced a threat actor based in China known as Storm-0558 had exploited a bug in its cloud email service to spy on government agencies in the U.S. and Western Europe.

Unlike alleged incidents in which state-sponsored Chinese hacking groups have targeted commercial companies to steal intellectual property, or have left exposed web shells on victim servers in what was described as a “reckless” breach of U.N. cyber norms, the Storm-0558 incident did not prompt the U.S. to accuse China of breaking international law.

Rob Joyce, the NSA's director of cybersecurity, told the Aspen Security Forum that the hack was “China doing espionage” adding: “It is what nation-states do. We have to defend against it, we need to push back against it. But that is something that happens.”

Last September, China denounced the U.S. Embassy in Beijing following a joint report from two of the country’s most prominent cyber authorities accusing the NSA of stealing “sensitive information” from Chinese institutions.

The Northwestern Polytechnical University, which the NSA was accused of targeting, is considered to be “a Chinese military university that is heavily involved in military research,” according to the U.S. Department of Justice — and thus likely to be seen as a legitimate target for espionage under international law.

Global reconnaissance system

Xiao told the Global Times that “by leveraging its global comprehensive reconnaissance ability, along with various means of intrusion, theft, and other comprehensive measures to obtain all kinds of telemetry data, and combining other multi-source auxiliary data, [the U.S.] forms the ability to analyze, judge, attribute, and locate China's economic, social operations, and even military actions.”

It is not clear that this reconnaissance ability involves, nor did Xiao state when the Chinese authorities would attempt to publicize it. Through the Global Times, officials in the country have made several allegations about U.S. intelligence collection activities in recent years, but these often seem dependent upon material that is already in the public domain.

Reports often cite public-domain material leaked by Edward Snowden, the Shadow Brokers, and WikiLeaks — with a reference to the ECHELON system appearing in Monday’s report.

However they appear without the kinds of details often included in U.S. Department of Justice indictments, nor do they provide indicators of compromise (IoCs) or other technical intelligence used when the Western cybersecurity community attributes similar incidents to China and attempts to inform defenders about how to protect their networks.

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Alexander Martin

Alexander Martin is the UK Editor for Recorded Future News. He was previously a technology reporter for Sky News and is also a fellow at the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative.

therecord.media

17. US to open expanded aid mission to Pacific island countries

US soft power - USAID.

US to open expanded aid mission to Pacific island countries

Stephen Wright

2023.08.10

Brisbane, Australia

benarnews.org

The U.S. aid agency will open its expanded mission to Pacific island countries next week, aiming to show commitment to a region that now has the option of turning to China for infrastructure and development assistance.

The visit of the agency’s top official, former diplomat and journalist Samantha Power, to Papua New Guinea and Fiji from Aug 13-16 coincides with the Chinese navy’s hospital ship, Peace Ark, visiting several Pacific island countries to provide medical care.

Power’s trip would be an opportunity for the U.S. to listen to “partners and to discover how we can more effectively deliver on the priorities set by Pacific islanders,” said Michael Schiffer, assistant administrator for the Bureau of Asia at the United States Agency for International Development, or USAID, at a briefing on Thursday.

The U.S. government outlined plans to boost its USAID presence during a summit with Pacific island leaders in September last year that was a response to China’s inroads in the region.

U.S. participation in the vast ocean region dwindled after the early 1990s disintegration of its Cold War-era rival, the Soviet Union. Its diminished diplomatic presence was an opening for China’s government to expand its influence by helping to meet the substantial development needs of economically-lagging Pacific island nations.

In Papua New Guinea, Power will mark the elevation of the USAID presence there to a country representative office overseeing USAID programs in Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea. In Fiji’s capital Suva, she will open what the agency says is a reestablished regional mission that will work with nine Pacific island countries.

In Fiji, she will also address an annual conference of defense chiefs, which is jointly hosted by Fiji’s military and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, on the subject of “underpinning U.S. engagement in the region based on defense, diplomacy and development,” according to Schiffer.

Samantha Power, the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), speaks during a press conference in Sarajevo, Jan. 21, 2022. [Dado Ruvic/Reuters]

Pacific islands nations hope to benefit from the China-U.S. rivalry but are also critical of what some see as the gap between reality and the rhetoric of donors and multilateral financial institutions, particularly on insufficient financing for projects to withstand climate change and projections for sea-level rise this century.

“They say they are with us on our regional threats but there’s a disconnect between this and the resources they offer on the table,” Fiji’s Finance Minister Biman Prasad said Thursday at a meeting of the region’s economic ministers.

China, over several decades, has become a substantial source of trade, infrastructure and aid for developing Pacific island countries as it seeks to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and build its own set of global institutions.

The Solomon Islands has been China’s highest profile success in building influence among Pacific island countries in recent years. It switched its diplomatic recognition to Beijing from Taiwan in 2019 and last year signed a security pact with China, alarming the U.S. and allies such as Australia, who fear it could pave the way for a Chinese military presence.

Schiffer said the U.S. and Solomon Islands governments are continuing to discuss a greater contribution of U.S. aid and infrastructure for the country of 700,000 people, which grapples with lack of roads, spotty telecommunications and insufficient basic healthcare.

A USAID project in the most populous Solomon Islands province, Malaita – which in February ousted premier Daniel Suidani who blocked China-funded aid and projects – had disappointed locals by not providing immediate benefits.

The Chinese naval hospital ship Peace Ark docks on a visit to Nuku'alofa, Tonga, July 28, 2023. [Tupou Vaipulu/AFP]

The Peace Ark hospital ship has recently visited Tonga, Kiribati and Vanuatu as part of its current mission in the Pacific, according to Chinese state media and Pacific island media reports.

Its stop in Tonga last month happened just a couple of days after a visit by the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to underline the recent opening of a U.S. embassy in the Polynesian kingdom.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy hospital ship, Mercy, will be docked in the Solomon Islands capital Honiara in November to provide medical care when the city hosts the Pacific Games, according to the Solomon Islands government.

Eileen Natuzzi, a Pacific islands health expert and affiliate faculty at Georgetown University’s Centre for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies, has said that the hulking white hulled hospital ships are only “big public relations.”

“Regardless of which country provides them, military medical missions do not address the significant health system issues that people living in Pacific Island countries currently face,” she said in a July commentary for the Lowy Institute, an Australian think-tank.

“These problems require a much deeper long-term commitment than the Mercy or Peace Ark can achieve,” she said.

benarnews.org

18. Ukraine Says It Stopped Air Attacks on Odesa, While British and Dutch Jets Go After Russian Bombers

Ukraine Says It Stopped Air Attacks on Odesa, While British and Dutch Jets Go After Russian Bombers

military.com · by 14 Aug 2023 Associated Press | By Susie Blann · August 14, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine -- Russia launched three waves of drones and missiles against the southern Ukraine port city of Odesa, officials said Monday, though the Ukrainian air force said it intercepted all the airborne weapons fired during the nighttime attacks.

Falling debris from the interceptions of 15 Shahed drones and eight Kalibr missiles damaged a residential building, a supermarket and a dormitory of an educational facility in the city, Odesa Gov. Oleh Kiper said.

Two employees of the supermarket were hospitalized, Kiper said. Video showed a huge blaze at the store during the night and, the next day, the large building’s charred and mangled wreckage.

Meanwhile, Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, rebuked critics who suggest a 2½-month-old counteroffensive aimed at dislodging Russian forces from occupied areas of Ukraine should be advancing more quickly.

The Ukrainian army does not intend to engage in conspicuous “large-scale battles” against the Russians as the operation moves forward, Podolyak said on the X platform, formerly known as Twitter.

The goal, he said, is a piecemeal and systematic destruction of “the capabilities of the enemy army: its logistics, technical potential, officers and personnel.”

Also Monday, the Dutch Defense Ministry and the British Royal Air Force said they scrambled fighter jets when Russian bombers were tracked flying toward the airspace of the Netherlands and off Scotland, respectively. The pair of Russian warplanes spotted in each location were flying in international airspace.

Britain’s air force said two Typhoon fighters were launched from RAF Lossiemouth to monitor the Russian bombers as they flew north of the Shetland Islands off Scotland. The Russian Tu-142 Bear-F and Tu-142 Bear-J, which are used for maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare, were in airspace that is part of NATO’s northern air policing area, the U.K. Defense Ministry said.

Russian aircraft entering the U.K.’s zone of international airspace can pose a hazard to other planes because they often don’t communicate with air traffic control or broadcast their coordinates, the military said.

The Typhoons stayed with the Russian planes until they were out of the U.K.’s area of interest, according to a statement from the lead pilot, who wasn’t named.

Denmark's air force said its fighter jets identified the Russian bombers flying over the Baltic Sea toward the Netherlands. The Dutch Defense Ministry said it then scrambled two of its own F-16 fighters.

“This doesn’t happen often, but today’s incident demonstrates the importance of rapid deployment,” the ministry said. “The F-16s are on standby 24 hours a day and can take off within minutes and intercept an unidentified aircraft.”

British and German fighter jets were sent up in mid-March to intercept a Russian aircraft flying close to Estonian airspace, officials said at the time. The day before, the U.S. had said a Russian fighter jet struck a U.S. surveillance drone over the Black Sea.

Russia insisted its warplanes didn’t hit the MQ-9 Reaper drone, arguing the drone had maneuvered sharply and crashed into the water. The back-to-back incidents raised concerns about aerial standoffs near Russia and Ukraine

The Kremlin's forces have pummeled Odesa since Russia last month broke off a wartime deal to protect Ukraine’s crucial grain exports. The Russian attacks appear aimed at facilities that transport grain and also at wrecking cherished Ukrainian historical sites.

The landmark agreement negotiated by the U.N. and Turkey had allowed grain to resume flowing from Ukraine to countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia and to help reduce the threat of hunger.

Russia has since declared wide areas of the Black Sea unsafe for shipping. On Sunday, a Russian warship fired warning shots at a cargo ship in the southwestern Black Sea.

Russia’s Defense Ministry said the ship was heading north to the Ukrainian Danube River port of Izmail. Russian forces fired shots from automatic small arms to force the ship to stop, the ministry said on Telegram.

Ukraine’s presidential office reported Monday that at least eight civilians were killed and 23 others were wounded in Ukraine between Sunday and Monday mornings.

In other developments Monday:

-- Russia’s Defense Ministry said the country's air defense systems shot down an unspecified number of Ukrainian drones over the Belgorod region without causing damage or casualties. The region, which borders Ukraine, is a regular target of Ukrainian cross-border shelling and drone strikes. Neither Russia nor Ukraine's latest battlefield claims could be independently verified.

-- The Norwegian government said Norway-based Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace will provide a newly developed anti-drone system to Ukraine in a deal worth 740 million kroner ($71 million). Russia has made frequent use of drones, especially Iranian-made Shahed drones, to pound Ukrainian territory.

Mike Corder in The Hague, Netherlands; Jan M. Olsen in Copenhagen, Denmark; Illia Novikov in Kyiv, Ukraine; Yuras Karmanau in Berlin and Brian Melley in London contributed.

military.com · by 14 Aug 2023 Associated Press | By Susie Blann · August 14, 2023

19. How to Think about Proxy Wars in the Twenty-first Century

Excerpts:

If we achieved so much, then, what’s next for proxy wars in the twenty-first century? Proxy war has been labelled “the most successful kind of political war” being waged today, but what does success look like in indirect warfare? This is one crucial area of interest future research should consider. The handbook offers a useful starting point with discussions of how to engage and control proxies. Of the two, control is a key dynamic of the sponsor-proxy relations and one we need to further conceptualize and theorize beyond the carrot-and-stick approach. In addition, any assessment of successful proxy wars should discuss their consequences, not least if we consider that the C.I.A.’s review of its own practice of aiding rebels fuelled the Obama administration’s initial skepticism about arming Syrian rebels. Analysis has also concluded that “war by proxy is a strategy depended on now as never before,” and the corollary to this is to expand the empirical terrain of the study of proxy wars. We know they overlap with civil wars, yet what about inter-state conflict or the broader “peaceful” great power competition, in its short-of-war guise? The Russian invasion of Ukraine found itself at the center of politicized arguments about whether it falls short of being a proxy war, underscoring the need for further work on the intersection of indirect war and military and security assistance. As was argued recently, “supporting and arming a sovereign government is conceptually and practically different from arming an insurgency, in terms of international norms as well as how that support proceeds in practice.” We need to know more about this, not least in the context of another problem, escalation. The policy relevance of this issue cannot be overstated, and the Russian invasion of its neighbor, starting in 2014, presents a spectrum of escalation and de-escalation in which threat of and use of direct and indirect war blocked and thwarted attempts at conflict resolution. These are just some ideas about a policy problem that cuts across geostrategic contexts, involves a wealth of actors in complex configurations, and appeals to states of greater or lesser power.

The Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars is the first volume of its kind to make sense of the challenges of proxy wars in a comprehensive way. At minimum, it reflects the state of the art in research about proxy wars, one of the most critical challenges for contemporary international security. At maximum, it sets the stage for a debate that will assist students, scholars, and practitioners interested in this problem. As editor, I hope and believe that the volume will shape our understanding of the future evolution of proxy conflicts.

How to Think about Proxy Wars in the Twenty-first Century - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Vladimir Rauta · August 15, 2023

The recently published Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars invites a reconsideration of the transformation of proxy wars, from ostensible Cold War relic to reality of war and warfare in the twenty-first century. As one of the editors of the handbook, I offer some reflections on the thinking behind the thinking about proxy wars, as this field has changed over the last decade and matured into what we call proxy war studies. In this short essay, I hope to tease out some key takeaways. Three observations preface this discussion. First, edited together with Assaf Moghadam and Michel Wyss, the handbook owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to the nearly 50 contributors whose work amounts to an intellectual reset of our thinking about proxy wars. Second, while the handbook directly addresses an audience of scholars, practitioners, and students of proxy wars and conflict delegation, it hopes to engage skeptics too. Third, the handbook is tasked with answering questions about a contentious yet undeniable reality of warfare in the twenty-first century. In line with recent data on external support and proxy wars, the handbook does not make claims that the future of war is proxy and that all war is delegated. Rather, it strikes a balance by looking at where proxy wars – and their study – are today and where they might be going. With this in mind, I discuss the nature of the problem the handbook addressed, the relevance of the debate, and what puzzles lie ahead.

Conceptually, we chose the label “proxy war.” This was a deliberate choice grounded in recent work that robustly and rigorously explained what the concept is and is not, its utility, and how it might be developed typologically. We saw no need to pursue novelty through neologisms. As we wrote in the introduction to the handbook, the term is “emotive and evocative, provocative and pejorative, often commended and criticized, renamed and reified, rejected and replaced.” It has been excessively politicized and used for ideologically charged commentary, but this is not unique to proxy war. It is, of course, not without its faults, but what concept of war today is? In fact, one can simply look at “civil war,” one of the most established categories of conflict, for conceptual competition and disagreement. We dispensed with conceptual debates not because they do not matter – they most certainly do and I have written about this at length – but because the charges brought against proxy war were often superficial and driven not by an honest engagement with the notion, but by the desire to introduce a rival term. On this, I am firmly of the opinion that if the adjective “proxy” has limitations, they are shared equally and entirely by “ally,” “partner,” or whatever preposition counterinsurgency and irregular warfare rest on these days.

Instead, we used the conceptual space in the handbook more productively by rejecting the need for a single definition and by presenting a level of analysis framework aimed at integrating existing arguments and facilitating future research. We then took a step further and gave space to critiques of the notion of proxy war against two benchmarks: international law and colonial politics. We used these to take the debate – and us – to task on limitations, presuppositions, and hidden biases. As a result, the handbook applies the conceptual framework, and several chapters discuss proxy wars as a logic of indirect intervention that substitutes foreign policy options; others focus on the relationship between actors and some on the processes behind proxy wars. We were not concerned with a trendy and fashionable label or with coining the next buzzword, but rather with answering questions about a reality of the spectrum of war in the twenty-first century that comes in many guises and with significant consequences. Note that, of the International Crisis Group’s Ten Conflicts to Watch in 2023, eight are shaped by proxy war dynamics. The exceptions are Haiti and Taiwan, but one could speculate that a potential Chinese invasion of the island will see a flurry of “arm/don’t arm Taiwanese rebels” articles in the early days of the conflict. In the context of the handbook, our conceptual setup worked for our research aims, and we were clear that it is one way of thinking, not the way of thinking. We hope that our framework is a conversation starter because its intellectual strength lies in the ability to be the point at which scholars meet, and also, from where scholars depart.

Intellectually, the handbook aimed to give the debate a sense of self. This meant going big and calling for a (sub)-field of research, rather unimaginatively called proxy war studies. At its core, this captures the enormous transformation of a debate that a decade ago was denied a narrative in international relations, strategic and/or security studies. I have written elsewhere about how the debate developed across generations of scholarship, yet the handbook was an opportunity to make the following as clear as possible: proxy wars are not under-studied; proxy wars are not under-conceptualized; proxy wars are not under-theorized. In fact, our definitions have largely settled on what empirical problems we seek to address, and our theories constructively compete to present causal arguments about the drivers and dynamics of proxy wars. This must come as a shock to some pundits and think tanks, several of whom have recently discovered the topic, although not the existing scholarship. It is not groundbreaking to conclude that proxy wars are waged because of risk, deniability, and cost considerations; to present case studies on Russia and Iran; or to extoll the virtues of the Mujahideen and the Contras. What is remarkable, however, is how much we have indeed come to know from a diverse cohort of scholars (for a review of the debate see this exchange). The handbook tapped into this genuine collective effort at bridging different traditions of research, marrying quantitative research with its qualitative counterpart, and embracing an interdisciplinary approach. Herein comes the call for proxy war studies: its aim is to “make the study of proxy wars specific, identifiable, comparable, and researchable from different perspectives and methodologies, while outlining a vision for the future of a debate that takes its motivation from the challenges proxy wars pose to international security in the twenty-first century.” And regardless of whether we make proxy war studies happen, the handbook is an attempt to shape and foster an epistemic community, actively and consciously preoccupied by questions and puzzles emanating from proxy wars. On this, we were clear: “our proposed field is fundamentally about a scholarly community pursuing knowledge as a collective achievement.”

If we achieved so much, then, what’s next for proxy wars in the twenty-first century? Proxy war has been labelled “the most successful kind of political war” being waged today, but what does success look like in indirect warfare? This is one crucial area of interest future research should consider. The handbook offers a useful starting point with discussions of how to engage and control proxies. Of the two, control is a key dynamic of the sponsor-proxy relations and one we need to further conceptualize and theorize beyond the carrot-and-stick approach. In addition, any assessment of successful proxy wars should discuss their consequences, not least if we consider that the C.I.A.’s review of its own practice of aiding rebels fuelled the Obama administration’s initial skepticism about arming Syrian rebels. Analysis has also concluded that “war by proxy is a strategy depended on now as never before,” and the corollary to this is to expand the empirical terrain of the study of proxy wars. We know they overlap with civil wars, yet what about inter-state conflict or the broader “peaceful” great power competition, in its short-of-war guise? The Russian invasion of Ukraine found itself at the center of politicized arguments about whether it falls short of being a proxy war, underscoring the need for further work on the intersection of indirect war and military and security assistance. As was argued recently, “supporting and arming a sovereign government is conceptually and practically different from arming an insurgency, in terms of international norms as well as how that support proceeds in practice.” We need to know more about this, not least in the context of another problem, escalation. The policy relevance of this issue cannot be overstated, and the Russian invasion of its neighbor, starting in 2014, presents a spectrum of escalation and de-escalation in which threat of and use of direct and indirect war blocked and thwarted attempts at conflict resolution. These are just some ideas about a policy problem that cuts across geostrategic contexts, involves a wealth of actors in complex configurations, and appeals to states of greater or lesser power.

The Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars is the first volume of its kind to make sense of the challenges of proxy wars in a comprehensive way. At minimum, it reflects the state of the art in research about proxy wars, one of the most critical challenges for contemporary international security. At maximum, it sets the stage for a debate that will assist students, scholars, and practitioners interested in this problem. As editor, I hope and believe that the volume will shape our understanding of the future evolution of proxy conflicts.

Vladimir Rauta is an Associate Professor in International Security at the University of Reading. He researches conflict delegation to proxies and has published in International Security, International Studies Review, International Relations, Contemporary Security Policy, Civil Wars, etc. He would like to thank Assaf Moghadam and Michel Wyss for comments to this essay.

Main image: A firing line of Syrian Democratic Forces soldiers take aim and fire at targets during a marksmanship training exercise to prepare for Operation Roundup, an SDF-led campaign to clear the last ISIS strongholds in the country, near Shaddadi, Syria, May 27, 2018. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Timothy R. Koster)

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irregularwarfare.org · by Vladimir Rauta · August 15, 2023

20. Rethinking Civil-Military Relations for Modern Strategy

Excerpts:

This series recognizes the need for new thinking about civil-military relations in the United States. Modern warfare will increase the need for trust, holistic planning, and civilian control between political and military leaders. The authors in this series offer a variety of perspectives on the problems civil-military relations needs to address and possible ways to bolster the national security establishment in this new environment. One recurring theme they address is the need for new organizational and leadership practices that better integrate civilians and civilian perspectives into the military, whether through everyday language and jargon, professional military education reform, or formal hiring and promotion procedures. Others address how the military presents itself to the public, while still others address the challenges in particular military subcommunities, like special operations. Together, these pieces offer refreshing and important takes on new and understudied challenges.

As norms continue to change, we must ask how the United States can continue to ensure a healthy civil-military relationship that supports good strategy. Which norms should be reinforced? Which should evolve? What are the policies and systems that the US government and US military should enact to ensure they are prepared to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century and preserve American national security? This series, with some of the brightest minds from across the civil-military spectrum, tackles these questions and offers some solutions and ways ahead. What got us here won’t get us there. It’s time for some rethinking.

Rethinking Civil-Military Relations for Modern Strategy - Modern War Institute

Carrie Lee and Max Margulies | 08.14.23

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Carrie Lee, Max Margulies · August 14, 2023

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Editor’s note: This is the first piece in a series on civil-military relations that endeavors to present expert commentary on diverse issues surrounding civil-military relations in the United States. Read all articles in the series here.

Special thanks to MWI’s research director, Dr. Max Margulies, and MWI research fellow, Dr. Carrie A. Lee, for their work as series editors.

New technologies are changing the way that militaries prepare to fight wars, emerging domains are changing the range of actions that states have to deter and defend against, and the rapidly changing information environment is challenging states’ ability to signal intentions and respond to accurate information. What’s more, domestic security concerns have sprung to the forefront in the United States, challenging traditional conceptions of threat as domestic extremist groups seek to undermine democratic processes and encourage political violence.

What do these changes have in common? They all blur the lines between American civilians and the military. These emerging challenges demand new, clear thinking about civil-military relations—an area of study best thought of as the relationship between the military, government, and society. We solicited ideas from a wide range of civil-military relations scholars and curated them into a series of articles to tackle this challenge head on. Each author offers a new idea to help guide American strategy-making in the complex environment of modern civil-military relations.

Security in the United States has never been about simply defending borders. However, the range of actors, potential threats, and targets that blend civilian and military capabilities and vulnerabilities continues to grow in the modern era. Whereas traditionally we think about war as a primarily military phenomenon, novel technologies, domains, and threats now clearly involve commercial and private interests as well. Cyber capabilities threaten not only military targets but also civilian infrastructure and the intellectual property that forms the basis for American competitive success. Space assets, which can be held hostage by foreign anti-satellite capabilities, enable GPS (used by both military and civilians) and, in turn, the global banking and investment system. Domestic threats to democratic political processes require intense coordination between civilian law enforcement and National Guard leaders who may be called upon to enforce peace. And military leaders today must attract a different kind of recruit who can meet these new demands.

Today, the very civil-military norms thought essential for developing effective strategy are eroding, leaving the United States unprepared to deal with the complex challenges ahead. The fresh ideas in this series offer ways strengthen American civil-military norms and practices to meet contemporary national security challenges.

Breaking Ranks

Scholarship on both civil-military relations and strategy point to two norms as fundamental for managing military conflict successfully: (1) respecting civilian control of the military; and (2) internalizing professional military ethics, including a non-partisan identity. While both norms are essential for a society’s democratic health, their relationship to effective strategy is less well understood. Civilian control—by which we mean the ability of civilian leaders to guide, influence, and authorize national security policy—limits the extent to which the organizational biases of the military can drive strategy. Similarly, professional military ethics require members of the military to obey lawful and ethical orders and to hold each other accountable for maintaining professional standards. A key, but by no means the only, dimension of this ethic is maintaining a non-partisan identity, which allows political leaders and American society to trust that the military is acting in the interests of the entire nation rather than partisan goals.

However, these norms have been eroding at a rapid pace over the last ten years, and have drawn notice from the broader national security community. Scholars and practitioners alike have raised significant concerns about eroding civilian control, partisanship, extremism, recruiting challenges, and more—arguing that eroding norms result in diminished democratic resilience, the militarization of foreign policy, and recruiting and retention challenges that threaten the future effectiveness of the All-Volunteer Force.

This erosion has clear implications for effective strategy in the modern world. For example, military leaders are more frequently taking liberties to maneuver for their preferences over those of civilian leaders; while this has occurred occasionally across every administration, the problem accelerated under President Trump in ways that are concerning to the national security community. Rebellions during the Obama administration against what many military leaders declared to be “micro-management” led to severe distrust between the Pentagon and the White House, undermining cooperation on important strategic decisions such as the 2009 surge in Afghanistan, 2011 intervention in Libya, and non-intervention in Syria. Under the Trump administration, military leaders routinely sought to mitigate presidential directives and messaging that threatened alliance relationships. They further pressed for increased involvement in foreign conflicts that President Trump had declared a desire to withdraw from, and participated in hiding US involvement in some conflicts such as Syria. In other cases, military leaders were empowered to make decisions traditionally reserved for civilian authorities due to both a shortage of confirmed civilian personnel and the preferences of then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis. As a result, some have commented that defense policy took a decidedly more aggressive tone and was shaped in ways that benefitted the services’ interests rather than following presidential priorities.

While this pattern seems to be improving under the Biden administration, it has not always been easy to claw back portfolios from uniformed staff and gain support for civilian guidance. For example, military leaders in the Pentagon were quick to blame civilian administration officials for what was perceived as a bungled Afghanistan withdrawal, undermining presidential authority and supremacy.

Compounding these internal pressures on strategy-making are public perceptions of civilian control that are inherently shaped by partisan attitudes. This reduces the incentives for politicians to refrain from involving the military in polarizing political disputes, and we see that civilians in government have made deliberate efforts to involve military leadership in partisan fights for political gain. President Trump regularly called senior military leaders “my generals,” while recent reporting indicates that he explicitly sought total personal loyalty. These actions further undermine trust between the president and his/her military advisors as military leaders seek to balance their obligations to the Constitution with their duty to obey lawful orders from the executive branch.

All this has also undermined professional ethics in the military. The current hyper-partisan and polarized domestic environment means that military leaders today must walk an increasingly fine line to avoid becoming involved in domestic political fights. Indeed, in a world where decisions about schools, clothing, healthcare, religion, and other personal preferences increasingly are increasingly aligned along partisan identity, previously uncontested military policies around readiness, recruitment, and retention are similarly becoming increasingly divisive and partisan. Political leaders have brought the so-called culture war to the military, challenging leaders on standard trainings and education programs on diversity and inclusion and accusing senior military leaders, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, of being partisan political actors.

As a result, military efforts to increase the diversity of recruits, improve retention of women and racial minorities, and acknowledge the contributions of LGBTQ service members are increasingly viewed through partisan lenses. Once considered to be necessary for maintaining professional cohesion and unity, trainings that discuss racial, religious, and gender challenges in the military are now considered by some to be partisan (and, by extension, illegitimate). And as civilian political leaders take aim at non-traditional members of the military, senior officers must struggle with the desire to defend those under their command or risk the condemnation of a Department of Defense that prefers its senior members not make waves.

What’s more, professional norms have deteriorated as political elites have encouraged service members to disobey lawful orders that ensure members’ deployability in the face of a global pandemic—significantly weakening bonds of cohesion across the force and reducing readiness. Right wing militia groups actively recruit members from the military’s ranks, and the military faces a sexual assault crisis that threatens the entire premise of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. The insurrection on January 6 further polarized the force, as military leaders struggle with how to frame and address the events when some veterans openly express sympathy for those who stormed the Capitol building. All this has implications for the ability to maintain good order and discipline, as individual service members—sometimes in positions of authority—feel emboldened to publicly break from official positions. If, as many suggest, professions are responsible for self-regulation, maintaining ethical standards, and defining the scope of their influence, the US military risks losing its claim to professional status.

The decline in professional ethics is not limited to the active duty. Retired military officers are also breaking traditional norms of silence in elections to increasingly endorse political candidates—particularly for the presidency. In the 2020 election, both the Trump and the Biden campaigns advertised endorsement lists that heavily featured retired military members and argued that the opposing side presented a grave national security risk. During the midterm elections last November, the number of Congressional candidates who touted their military service—often in ways that implied that military service is a prerequisite for policy decisions—dramatically expanded. These actions further degrade the ability of the country to develop a holistic and balanced national strategy as it privileges military voices above those belonging to other citizens.

The National Security Challenge

Declines in civilian control and professional norms are occurring at precisely the moment when the character of warfare is changing in a way that requires more—not less—trust and coordination between civilian and military leaders. This leaves the United States ill-equipped to deal with modern threats, and in need of dramatic reformation in civil-military relations.

Modern challenges that blur the lines between military and civilian targets will require political and military leaders to work in close consultation with one another and require significant levels of trust. No longer will the classic Huntington division of labor—always an imperfect construct—suffice when military operations will so clearly have consequences for civilian life and political decisions may have military and security impacts. For example, new technologies, like hypersonic missiles and artificial intelligence, raise important questions about speed of decision-making on the modern battlefield and the potential for escalation that call into question longstanding assumptions about the structure of civilian oversight. And yet, trust in the military is declining both among the general public and the political elite.

This lack of trust will reduce the government’s ability to engage in iterative strategy-making—something that will become increasingly important as military operations have father-reaching second- and third-order effects. Modern war will require strategists to understand and account for the vulnerabilities introduced by domains and technologies that affect both civilian and military power: space assets, digital infrastructure, and economic interdependence to name a few. As a result, strategies will need increasingly regular assessment and reassessment that measure both the military value and political/economic costs.

Healthy civil-military relations are essential to ensure that this iterative process can continue between parties in good faith. Trust is particularly critical to ensure that each side in the political-military relationship has the space to admit mistakes and adjust as necessary to reach the political ends of war. As trust declines and military leaders increasingly attempt to insulate themselves from political discussions, it follows that we will then observe less and less space for honest evaluation and adjustments of strategies at exactly the moment when commitment to evaluation is necessary.

Finally, the insurrection on January 6 revealed the presence of organized domestic actors that pose a threat to US democracy and national security. As these segments of society have grown and found continued support from foreign and domestic actors, we have already seen calls to use the military to solve domestic disputes—even when well outside the bounds of military authority. Such calls take important attention and resources away from efforts to address external threats through sound strategy. Healthy civil-military relations and, particularly, maintaining trust between civilian society and the US military will be critical to successfully navigating the coming tensions and legitimately maintaining the military’s obligations to defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

The Need for New Thinking

This series recognizes the need for new thinking about civil-military relations in the United States. Modern warfare will increase the need for trust, holistic planning, and civilian control between political and military leaders. The authors in this series offer a variety of perspectives on the problems civil-military relations needs to address and possible ways to bolster the national security establishment in this new environment. One recurring theme they address is the need for new organizational and leadership practices that better integrate civilians and civilian perspectives into the military, whether through everyday language and jargon, professional military education reform, or formal hiring and promotion procedures. Others address how the military presents itself to the public, while still others address the challenges in particular military subcommunities, like special operations. Together, these pieces offer refreshing and important takes on new and understudied challenges.

As norms continue to change, we must ask how the United States can continue to ensure a healthy civil-military relationship that supports good strategy. Which norms should be reinforced? Which should evolve? What are the policies and systems that the US government and US military should enact to ensure they are prepared to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century and preserve American national security? This series, with some of the brightest minds from across the civil-military spectrum, tackles these questions and offers some solutions and ways ahead. What got us here won’t get us there. It’s time for some rethinking.

Dr. Carrie A. Lee is an MWI research fellow and the chair of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College.

Dr. Max Margulies is MWI’s research director.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Maj. Jason Elmore

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Carrie Lee, Max Margulies · August 14, 2023

21. The Allure of Conscription

Conclusion:

History cannot tell us if reintroducing conscription is right or wrong. But it reveals that this policy has been the exception throughout the nation’s existence. A historically informed approach to supplying the personnel levels the U.S. military needs might begin with examining the anachronistic personnel policies, largely derived from World War II, that remain in existence today. These include a failure to acknowledge the incongruence of military service and modern families, shifting family forms, archaic promotion schemes, outdated pay tables, and frequent relocation. A new study on military service could also include some of the factors that the original Gates Commission ignored in 1973, including the role of women and families. This could provide a basis for more lasting and meaningful change to enhance military effectiveness going forward.

The Allure of Conscription - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Ryan Pallas · August 15, 2023

When the all–volunteer force turned fifty last month, civilian and military leaders called it the most challenging environment since the force’s establishment in 1973. Amidst the ensuing discussion about how to solve the nation’s military recruiting woes, many people have suggested that a return to mandatory national service could help. Often, they imagine that conscription could fix the challenges facing a country they see as less fit, less patriotic, and less eager to serve than previous generations.

Unfortunately, contemporary debates about conscription often rely on a distorted understanding of its history. Over the past 250 years, the nation has generally used conscription sparingly. Whatever the benefits or drawbacks of reintroducing the practice today, this historical experience suggests that it is unlikely to be a panacea for the country’s problems. As military historian Brian Linn put it, “Nostalgic references to a golden age where Americans were fit, patriotic, and motivated have been a staple of Army lore for well over a century, but they hardly reflect historical reality.”

Being Selective with Selective Service

During the Revolutionary War, the colonies depended upon militias comprised of “raw untrained troops, for the very good reason that none others were available, except in paltry numbers.” The “first scheme of mobilization” was instituted on July 18, 1775, and the Revolutionary War was “fought by a Continental army that was staffed in part by a militia draft.” After this, the nation saw the first national conscription act passed during the Civil War. If one investigates further, it was not President Abraham Lincoln who initially did this, but rather Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Congress in April 1862. It would not be until March 1863 that a National Conscription Act was passed by the United States.

Become a Member

The establishment of the Selective Service, the agency responsible for instituting the military draft, occurred in May 1917 and received widespread public support. Prior to World War II, lawmakers foresaw a rising need for increased personnel levels leading to the first peacetime conscription law in 1940. At the conclusion of World War II, the United States continued to see the need for a peacetime draft and in 1948 again reintroduced it after President Harry S. Truman had ended it the year before. This trend toward peacetime conscription was aimed at providing adequate personnel levels necessary for the Cold War. The U.S. Army has remained the largest consumer of conscripts, more so than any other service due to its historical manpower challenges. In this context, the benefits of conscription were “a steady and sufficient number of recruits at low cost in salaries and benefits.”

Between 1951 and 1967, Congress repeatedly voted to extend conscription with little opposition. Then, as the United States navigated Vietnam, senior military leaders began to increasingly present the practice as the country’s historical default. As a result, when the all-volunteer force was established in 1973, it was easy to forget that this “marked less of a rupture with custom than a remembrance of a venerable practice.” In fact, America “only relied on conscription to field an armed force four times: the Civil War (1863–1865), World War I (1917–1918), World War II (1940–1945), and the Cold War (1946–1947 and 1948–1973), a total of 35 years.” Some quick math shows this only amounts to 15 percent of the country’s existence.

Old and New Concerns

Not only has conscription seldom been the norm, but American and European history offer further warnings against viewing it as a panacea. Consider the verdict of historians on the use of conscription during the Napoleonic wars. After the country’s revolution, France’s citizens rallied around calls for mandatory military service, or the levée en masse, which provided the French government with an endless supply of personnel. This “enabled the French commandeers to fight more aggressive and costly campaigns, and to fight more of them.” Whatever the short-term benefits, France ultimately paid the price for this approach.

Despite emerging victorious in its wars with France, Britain also faced problems regarding conscription. Bernard Rostker, one of the foremost experts on U.S. military personnel policy and an Army officer who served during a time of conscription, argued that, in Britain as in America today, it was “the romantic and utopian who longed for the conscript force of citizens.” By contrast, he concluded that the transformation to a standing professional army was “inevitable” on account of broader historic trends. In short, “it was the practical consideration that a conscript force could no longer produce a viable military institution that moved England toward a professional military.”

Tellingly, it was frustration with the British practice of conscription that helped drive early American leaders’ resistance to the practice. Describing impressment into the Royal Navy, Benjamin Franklin wrote: “The question then will amount to this; whether it be just in a community, that the richer part should compel the poorer to fight for them and their properties for such wages as they think fit to allow, and punish them if they refuse?” Franklin, for his part, concluded that while the practice might be legal, “I cannot persuade myself it is equitable.”

In addition to these historical precedents, conscription would face greater challenges today, even if it was conducted more elegantly than British impressment. Rostker recently commented that calls for conscription fail to account for the small percentage of personnel the policy would actually be required to provide. Where many see an idealistic policy in which hordes of able-bodied men report for mandatory service, their arguments fail to account for the increased costs, logistics, and personnel requirements to process and train such a force. Thus, calls for a return to conscription become more about reviving an imagined past than responding to the concrete needs of a modern military establishment.

Arguments in favor of conscription also fail to consider that of the available population, the military requires only a fraction of a percent of total eligible males. History reveals a similar situation where “the size of the eligible population of young men reaching draft age each year in the 1960s was so large and the needs of the military so small in comparison, that in practice, the draft was no longer universal.”

Calls for conscription also fail to include women, half of the national population and a majority of those with higher education levels. The male-only draft was upheld on June 25, 1981, by Justice William Rehnquist on the grounds that women could not participate in combat-related functions. This argument no longer holds, as Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Ash Carter opened combat-related positions and all military occupations in 2013 and 2015 respectively. What’s more, a 2019 district court ruling declared a male-only draft unconstitutional.

Conclusion

History cannot tell us if reintroducing conscription is right or wrong. But it reveals that this policy has been the exception throughout the nation’s existence. A historically informed approach to supplying the personnel levels the U.S. military needs might begin with examining the anachronistic personnel policies, largely derived from World War II, that remain in existence today. These include a failure to acknowledge the incongruence of military service and modern families, shifting family forms, archaic promotion schemes, outdated pay tables, and frequent relocation. A new study on military service could also include some of the factors that the original Gates Commission ignored in 1973, including the role of women and families. This could provide a basis for more lasting and meaningful change to enhance military effectiveness going forward.

Become a Member

Ryan Pallas is an active-duty Marine Corps officer who has completed tours at Miramar, CA; Yuma, AZ; Kaneohe Bay, HI; and Quantico, VA. He currently serves as a Commandant of the Marine Corps Strategist Fellow in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University in Arlington, VA.

The views are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Marine Corps, Department of Defense, or any other government agency.

Image: Library of Congress

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Ryan Pallas · August 15, 2023

22. A feud is heating up between Arizona workers and the world's leading chipmaker after the company said the US didn't have the skills to build its new factory

Korean manufacturers are having the same problem with their US factories: a lack of skilled workers.

This is a national security issue.

A feud is heating up between Arizona workers and the world's leading chipmaker after the company said the US didn't have the skills to build its new factory

Business Insider · by Jacob Zinkula

US President Joe Biden walks with the CEO of TSMC, C. C. Wei, and its chairman, Mark Liu, during a visit to TSMC's first Arizona Fab (semiconductor fabrication plant) in Phase 1A in December 2022.

REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

TSMC says the opening of its Arizona chip factory has been delayed due to a shortage of skilled workers.

• The company says it needs to bring Taiwanese workers to Arizona to get construction back on track.
• An Arizona union says US jobs are being threatened — and is urging lawmakers to deny the workers' visas.

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Who knew that building a chip factory in Arizona could be the source of so much drama?

To get the construction of its Arizona chip factory back on track, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company says it needs more workers with the expertise and skillsets that Americans don't have. Since June, the company has been in discussions with the US government about receiving accelerated non-immigrant E-2 visas for as many as 500 Taiwanese workers.

Not everyone's happy about this potential development.

The Arizona Pipe Trades 469 Union, a labor union that says it represents over 4,000 pipefitters, plumbers, welders, and HVAC technicians, has started a petition to urge US lawmakers to deny these visas. The petition says that TSMC has deliberately misrepresented the skillset of Arizona's workforce. By approving TSMC's visa requests, a union website says lawmakers would be laying the groundwork for "cheap labor" to replace American workers.

The dispute marks the latest development in the US's race to build a presence in the semiconductor-chip industry — something that's become a major priority as the world gets more reliant than ever on the devices that need chips to run. That includes devices as varied as smartphones, televisions, refrigerators, and washing machines. And should the US ever enter into conflict with China — something that looks increasingly possible — it wants to be self-sufficient when it comes to making chips.

Last summer, President Joe Biden signed into law the CHIPS Act, which included over $52 billion in semiconductor subsidies to boost chip manufacturing in the US and create American jobs. The legislation was among the reasons TSMC, the world's leading chipmaker, announced plans last December to build a second factory in Arizona.

But construction of TSMC's first Arizona factory, which began in the Phoenix area in 2021, has run into some hiccups. Initial plans were for the factory to open by late 2024, but in a July earnings call, the company said this would likely be pushed back to 2025.

The reason: US workers weren't cutting it.

"We are now entering a critical phase of handling and installing the most advanced and dedicated equipment," said TSMC chairman Mark Liu. "However, we are encountering certain challenges as there is an insufficient amount of skilled workers with those specialized expertise required for equipment installation in a semiconductor-grade facility."

Liu said the company planned to get construction back on track by "sending experienced technicians from Taiwan to train the local skilled workers for a short period of time" — these workers would join the undisclosed number of Taiwanese workers already in Arizona. But to do this, TSMC needs the US government to approve worker visas, something the Arizona union is trying to stop.

Given that TSMC is seeking billions of dollars in US subsidies via the CHIPS Act, the union says American jobs should be prioritized.

"Replacing Arizona's construction workers with foreign construction workers directly contradicts the very purpose for which the CHIPS Act was enacted — to create jobs for American workers," the petition read.

TSMC, however, has maintained that the incoming Taiwanese workers will not be a threat to any US jobs — and will only be there to support the construction process.

When reached for comment, TSMC said that any Taiwanese workers who come to Arizona will only be there for a limited timeframe and not impact the 12,000 workers currently on-site every day. It said its investment in Arizona is an opportunity to create thousands of high-paying jobs and drive innovation in the state and across the US.

"We have not replaced any of our local workers with foreign workers and continue to prioritize the hiring of local workers in Arizona," the company told Insider. "Our current focus is on recruiting local workers to fill electrical, process-related, sheet-metal, and welding positions."

The degree to which American workers can get the job done without additional assistance is up for debate. The union did not immediately respond to Insider's request for comment.

Other factors have contributed to the heightened tensions between TSMC and union workers. In June, The American Prospect spoke with workers who said injuries and safety violations were common on the construction site.

"It's easily the most unsafe site I've ever walked on," said Luke Kasper, a representative of the sheet metal workers union.

TMSC has denied these allegations.

When Biden announced in December that over 3,000 union workers would be helping to build the Arizona factory, TSMC founder Morris Chang reportedly said that this was "a little painful" to hear. In 2016, Chang said one of the key reasons companies such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook had been successful was that they didn't have unions.

The controversy in Arizona has even picked up steam back in Taiwan. On July 24, a Taiwanese Youtube channel with nearly three million subscribers posted a video accusing the Arizona workers of being lazy, a bilingual newsletter on tech, business, and US-Asia relations reported. Insider was unable to contact the administrator of the YouTube channel.

—Kevin Xu (interconnected.blog) (@kevinsxu) August 10, 2023

It's not clear when the US government will make a decision regarding the Taiwanese visas. In the meantime, construction on the factory continues.

Do you work in the semiconductor chip industry and have a story to tell? Reach out to this reporter at jzinkula@insider.com.

Update: August 14, 2023 — This story was updated after publication to include comment from TSMC.

Business Insider · by Jacob Zinkula

23. ‘Dnipro Devils’ Drilled by British Special Forces

‘Dnipro Devils’ Drilled by British Special Forces

kyivpost.com

• The Ukrainian special forces troops that are now launching daring raids across the Dnipro River and wreaking havoc on Russian positions were trained by UK Royal Marines.

by Pete Shmigel | August 14, 2023, 9:15 am |

Ukrainian marines training alongside Royal Marines instructors in the UK (Royal Navy)

The “Dnipro Devils” making waves with special forces missions on the Russian-occupied left-bank of southern Ukraine have had training with the UK’s Royal Marines, the UK Government has revealed.

The Royal Navy issued a statement saying that “while Ukraine’s riverine commando forces have been getting attention in the West for daring raids across the Dnipro River, where they have used small-boat tactics to disrupt Russian defenses far from the front lines, less known is the role that the Royal Navy has played in training and equipping Ukrainian forces for these high-risk missions.”

Ukrainian marines training alongside Royal Marines instructors in the UK (Royal Navy)

“Royal Marines have spent more than 6 months training about 1,000 Ukrainian soldiers in the art of commando raiding and complex amphibious operations,” the statement said.

The British-provided instruction included “how to plan and carry out raids using small boats by day and night.”

One unnamed Ukrainian marine is quoted saying that “the training I have received from the UK Royal Marines has been far more intense than I expected.”

“I have learned so much and never expected to be doing the things I have done. All the way through, our British instructors have been beside us, showing us how to move and how to work together in a small team,” he said.

Ukrainian marines training alongside Royal Marines instructors in the UK (Royal Navy)

More on this topic

Norway to Provide Ukraine with Anti-Drone Detection and Weapons Systems

The CORTEX Typhon Counter Uncrewed Aerial Systems (C-UAS) are designed to counter a wide range of unmanned aerial threats.

Some 900 Ukrainian troops undertook and completed a specific five-week program, including instruction in survival, first aid, close quarters combat, demolition, drone reconnaissance and unit-level planning.

Weapons training included use of Next Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapons (NLAW) and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, drones for reconnaissance, and explosive demolition of obstacles such as “dragon’s teeth” anti-tank fortifications that are typically located along the so-called Surovikin Line constructed in occupied Ukraine by Russian forces.

Trainees came from a variety of backgrounds from civilian volunteers with no prior military experience to those who have transferred from other sections within the Armed Forces of Ukraine – some having already been engaged in combat on the front line, the Royal Navy said.

Instructors from 42 Commando and 47 Commando Raiding Group delivered the training, alongside Army Commandos from 24 Commando Engineers and Royal Artillery Gunners from 29 Commando, the Royal Navy added.

As reported by Kyiv Post, a team of Ukrainian special forces soldiers crossed the Dnipro and Konka Rivers near Kherson and landed at the village of Kozachi Laheri. There, the “Dnipro Devils” managed to break through Russian lines and advance up to one kilometer.

Pro-Russian milbloggers, who blamed the incursion and set-back on “troop rotation” and “inexperience” of those on duty, have confirmed that Ukrainian forces continue to hold a bridgehead at Kozachi Laheri – as well as at Dachi near the Antonivka Bridge and potentially Oleshky.

“The [Kherson] region is far from the front lines in Zaporizhzhia, and the raids tie up Russian defenders who could otherwise be deployed to block Ukraine’s main attempts at an advance,” a British defense publication, Maritime Executive, pointed out.

The training of Ukrainian marines is part of broader support provided by the UK.

The Ukrainian Naval Infantry – aka marines – also maintains its own small special forces unit in the form of the 73rd Marine Detachment. The detachment is named “Seals” after the US equivalent and is tasked with the same purpose, such as waterborne raids and missions.

More than 20,000 soldiers from the Armed Forces of Ukraine have received training in the UK since the start of 2022, learning essential frontline skills including trench and urban warfare, leadership, and medical training.

Military instructors from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden have also participated in the UK-led training program.

At the start of 2023, the UK committed to train 20,000 more Ukrainian recruits – approximately double the amount trained the previous year – under one of the largest training programs of its kind in the world, the Royal Navy’s statement said.

Russian milbloggers have used the term “devils” to describe the Ukrainian units wreaking havoc on Russian positions on the shores of the Dnipro River’s left bank, as well as its many islands and estuaries.

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Pete Shmigel

Pete Shmigel is an Australian writer. With a background in politics, business, sustainability, the military and mental health, he has been published by the major newspapers in Australia. He helped initiate Lifeline Ukraine.

kyivpost.com

24. Biden Establishes Review Process to Regulate China-Bound Investment in Key Industries

Excerpts;

Overall, however, the most significant impact of the executive order will be on the private sector, which has now received an unambiguous signal about U.S. opposition to Chinese-bound investment.

China has already seen a massive reduction in the amount of capital flowing into the country, largely as a result of its own hostile policies toward Western companies and the private sector’s due diligence efforts. President Biden’s new order, however, is likely to significantly amplify those existing trends, causing even more investors to retreat from China.

Biden Establishes Review Process to Regulate China-Bound Investment in Key Industries

Elaine K. Dezenski

CEFP Senior Director and Head

fdd.org · · August 14, 2023

President Joe Biden signed an executive order on Wednesday that enables the Treasury Department to review and block outbound private-sector investment in China within key industries that are critical to Beijing’s military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities. The order reflects Washington’s increasing concern that the provision of advanced U.S. technologies to China could undermine U.S. national security interests.

The order adds another tool to address vulnerabilities in U.S. economic security and builds on the foundation of government review already conducted on certain high-risk inbound investments made in America by companies from countries such as China and Iran. This review process, conducted by the multi-agency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), has been in place since 1975.

The CFIUS review process has evolved, and the types of investment deals subject to CFIUS reviews have significantly broadened along with national and economic security threats over the decades. Similarly, the scope of U.S. outbound investment requirements is likely to be refined, expanded, and improved as the United States responds to China’s weaponization of technology to circumvent and destabilize U.S. global leadership. Over time, additional countries and industries of concern will almost certainly be added.

There is currently broad bipartisan support for strong investment guardrails to protect against the military applications of China’s key high-tech industries, and this order is the first step. This fall, lawmakers in Congress will introduce more comprehensive outbound investment bills, focusing on additional high-risk technologies, that are likely to receive broad support from both sides of the aisle. Even the executive order itself could widen in scope, as it goes into effect only after the Treasury Department has addressed feedback from the public that it is soliciting over the next 45 days. The White House anticipates that the order will go into effect in early 2024.

As a result of the order, forward-looking corporate boards will likely begin pulling back on China-bound investment plans immediately. Companies already present in China will begin to implement plans to mitigate risk and limit their exposure.

Other countries are also considering following America’s lead. For instance, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has indicated that Britain is considering a similar approach to outbound investment. The European Union has also said that it plans to study the issue.

Overall, however, the most significant impact of the executive order will be on the private sector, which has now received an unambiguous signal about U.S. opposition to Chinese-bound investment.

China has already seen a massive reduction in the amount of capital flowing into the country, largely as a result of its own hostile policies toward Western companies and the private sector’s due diligence efforts. President Biden’s new order, however, is likely to significantly amplify those existing trends, causing even more investors to retreat from China.

Elaine Dezenski is senior director and head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where she also contributes to FDD’s China Program. For more analysis from Elaine and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Elaine on Twitter @ElaineDezenski. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · · August 14, 2023

25. The Corruption War: Russia Is Losing the War for the Same Reason It Started It

Excerpts:

Russia’s war in Ukraine is of, by, and for corruption. Putin’s corruption-diminished armies are fighting to safeguard the Kremlin’s corrupt influence over an increasingly Western-facing Ukraine. Kyiv, likewise, is fighting a two-front war. While repelling the Russian military, Ukraine has simultaneously been coming to grips with the activities of its own corrupt oligarchs and government officials. The Ukrainians have made important progress (and taken some missteps) on this front. In the past year, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government has arrested scores of corrupt officials and deported or subdued numerous pro-Russian oligarchs.

But much more remains to be done. To win this war, Ukraine must be victorious on both the corruption and military battlefields. That is why it is essential that Washington and its allies support Kyiv’s efforts to combat corruption as an essential precondition for both aid and membership in Western multinational alliances. Western countries must tie their military and financial aid to continued anti-corruption reforms, and the EU must continue to condition Ukrainian accession on transparency and good governance. On the battlefield and in smoky back rooms, Ukraine must be freed from the clutches of Russia and its deep arsenal of kleptocracy.

The Corruption War: Russia Is Losing the War for the Same Reason It Started It

19fortyfive.com · by Elaine Dezenski and Ted Shepherd · August 13, 2023

On Feb. 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin cited corruption as a motivator for his decision to invade Ukraine.

While complaining about Ukrainian corruption in his televised speech on the eve of the invasion, Putin singled out the dangers posed by the anti-corruption actions of Ukraine’s “National Agency on Corruption Prevention, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, and the High Anti-Corruption Court,” which he argued served as puppets of the United States.

As Ukrainian activists have claimed, Ukrainian progress against corruption scares Putin. It is understandable that it would. Ukraine’s fight against corruption might be as critical as its fight against Putin.

How Corruption Defeats Armies

Over the previous decades, Ukraine had evolved into a vassal state for the more powerful Russia, one held in check by Russia’s corrupting influence. A network of pro-Russian oligarchs held unparalleled sway in Ukrainian society. The Kremlin’s control over these oligarchs allowed Moscow to influence the government and promote pro-Russian policies.

Putin’s corrupt grip on Ukraine began to weaken with the Maidan Revolution of 2014, which overthrew the comically corrupt Viktor Yanukovych, whose presidential palace was filled with absurd proceeds of his embezzlement — a stuffed lion, a floating pirate ship restaurant, and a solid gold loaf of bread. Since then, Ukraine has made substantial progress in the fight against corruption — an effort that is critical to its aspirations to join the European Union and NATO.

Putin viewed these anti-corruption efforts — correctly — as a threat to Russian influence. To maintain his control, he turned to military power. In the wake of the Maidan Revolution in 2014, following fictional claims of a “neo-Nazi” coup, Putin sent Russian special forces into Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Then, in 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine wholesale, seeking to topple Ukraine’s democratically elected government.

The Russian invaders were stopped, and then pushed back, because of logistical issues, strategic errors, and general incompetence. But underlying these issues was the same sickness with which Russia had infected and controlled Ukraine: corruption. In 2022, Transparency International noted that “Russia’s defense sector is at high risk of corruption, owing to extremely limited external oversight of the policies, budgets, activities and acquisitions of defense institutions.” Russia spent $62 billion — 4.3% of its GDP — on its military in 2022. But various Russian officials and experts have estimated that at least 20% of the defense budget, and possibly as much as 50%, is lost to internal theft and corruption. This corruption in the military sector is nothing new — the former Russian general prosecutor under Boris Yeltsin, Yury Skuratov, claimed that the military was the most corrupt of all Russia’s government structures.

Top-Down Issues

Ukrainian military-sector corruption has also traditionally been very high, though the wartime instinct to pilfer critical supplies likely differs for an army defending home and family. In addition, Ukraine is increasingly fighting with weapons and ammunition provided by the United States and its allies, which mitigates the potential impact of corruption in Ukraine’s defense industrial base.

Russian military procurement is especially prone to corruption. The Peter the Great Cruiser scandal, for instance, involved a fake ship repair yard that won numerous multimillion dollar contracts to repair nuclear submarines and guided missile cruisers over several years, without actually repairing a single ship. Similarly, Russia’s procurement of military-grade Azart radios seems to have been a victim of corruption, with cheap Chinese replacement components and a third of the 18 billion ruble budget lost to embezzlement. Instead of modern, fully encrypted radios, Russian troops frequently have to make do with cheap radios and walkie-talkies, which Ukrainian forces have exploited for eavesdropping and location tracking for targeted artillery strikes.

But corruption is not just a procurement issue. The culture of embezzlement and graft seeps down through the ranks and onto the battlefield. Higher-level officers steal their military budgets, such as when a Russian major general embezzled $25 million intended for the purchase of satellites. Likewise, a Russian colonel was arrested for stealing the engines out of his T-90 battle tanks. Supply officers pawn off military equipment: thousands of suits of body armor were sold on Avito (Russia’s eBay). Lower-level officers rent out their troops for construction work and pocket their subordinates’ combat bonuses. In turn, the lowest-level conscripts sell any supplies not permanently attached to the ground. On the eve of the 2022 invasion, for example, such soldiers sold off untold gallons of vehicle fuel on the black market, as tanks and trucks lined the side of the road on the highway to Kyiv.

The Fruits of Corruption

The fruits of this endemic corruption were on display as soon as Russian soldiers crossed into Ukraine in 2022. Poorly maintained vehicles and tanks (some missing critical protective armor) broke down or ran out of fuel and were destroyed in large numbers. Many infantrymen lacked body armor, and others wore bulletproof vests whose plates had been hollowed out and sold. Common grunts ran out of warm clothes, and many received rations seven years past their expiration date. Countless soldiers ended up buying supplies and uniforms for themselves and crowdsourcing body armor, medicines, and even gun sights online. The invasion suffered death by a thousand, corruption-fueled cuts. Even hardline nationalists like former Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin have been increasingly vocal about the catastrophic impact of defense sector corruption, with Prigozhin justifying his short-lived revolt against the Kremlin as a response to corruption.

Corruption was doubly damaging, however, because it was largely hidden from Putin and other decisionmakers. Although Putin certainly knew about the malfeasance of his top military officials, it appears — based on his cocky actions and declassified U.S. intelligence — that he was unaware of the depth and breadth of graft in the military. Thus, Putin and his advisors were given a fundamentally inaccurate and exaggerated picture of the military’s competence, causing them to invade Ukraine with an army incapable of quick victory but also to blunder by spreading out their forces along multiple axes and forsaking an initial heavy bombardment. Contrary to Sun Tzu’s dictum, Russia knew neither the enemy nor itself.

Beating the Kleptocrats

Russia’s war in Ukraine is of, by, and for corruption. Putin’s corruption-diminished armies are fighting to safeguard the Kremlin’s corrupt influence over an increasingly Western-facing Ukraine. Kyiv, likewise, is fighting a two-front war. While repelling the Russian military, Ukraine has simultaneously been coming to grips with the activities of its own corrupt oligarchs and government officials. The Ukrainians have made important progress (and taken some missteps) on this front. In the past year, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government has arrested scores of corrupt officials and deported or subdued numerous pro-Russian oligarchs.

But much more remains to be done. To win this war, Ukraine must be victorious on both the corruption and military battlefields. That is why it is essential that Washington and its allies support Kyiv’s efforts to combat corruption as an essential precondition for both aid and membership in Western multinational alliances. Western countries must tie their military and financial aid to continued anti-corruption reforms, and the EU must continue to condition Ukrainian accession on transparency and good governance. On the battlefield and in smoky back rooms, Ukraine must be freed from the clutches of Russia and its deep arsenal of kleptocracy.

Author Expertise

Elaine Dezenski is senior director and head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and former acting and deputy assistant secretary for policy at the Department of Homeland Security.

Ted Shepherd is a CEFP research intern and a rising junior at Yale University majoring in History and Global Affairs.

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19fortyfive.com · by Elaine Dezenski and Ted Shepherd · August 13, 2023

26. Judge rules in favor of Montana youths in landmark climate decision

National security related? Potential impact on US energy security.

Judge rules in favor of Montana youths in landmark climate decision

‘This is a monumental decision,’ said a lawyer for the young plaintiffs. The ruling could influence how judges handle similar cases in other states.

By Kate Selig

Updated August 14, 2023 at 6:13 p.m. EDT|Published August 14, 2023 at 12:46 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Kate Selig · August 14, 2023

In the first ruling of its kind nationwide, a Montana state court decided Monday in favor of young people who alleged the state violated their right to a “clean and healthful environment” by promoting the use of fossil fuels.

The court determined that a provision in the Montana Environmental Policy Act has harmed the state’s environment and the young plaintiffs, by preventing Montana from considering the climate impacts of energy projects. The provision is accordingly unconstitutional, the court said.

The win, experts say, could energize the environmental movement and reshape climate litigation across the country, ushering in a wave of cases aimed at advancing action on climate change.

“People around the world are watching this case,” said Michael Gerrard, the founder of Columbia’s Sabin Center for Climate Change Law.

The ruling represents a rare victory for climate activists who have tried to use the courts to push back against government policies and industrial activities they say are harming the planet. In this case, it involved 16 young Montanans, ranging in age from 5 to 22, who brought the nation’s first constitutional and first youth-led climate lawsuit to go to trial.

Though the cumulative number of climate cases around the world has more than doubled in the last five years, youth-led lawsuits in the United States have faced an uphill battle. Already, at least 14 of these cases have been dismissed, according to a July report from the United Nations Environment Programme and the Sabin Center. The report said about three-quarters of the approximately 2,200 ongoing or concluded cases were filed before courts in the United States.

Experts said the Montana youth had an advantage in the state’s constitution, which guarantees a right to a “clean and healthful environment."

Coal is critical to the state’s economy, and Montana is home to the largest recoverable coal reserves in the country. The plaintiff’s attorneys say the state has never denied a permit for a fossil fuel project.

Across five days of emotional testimony in June, the youths made claims about injuries they have suffered as a result of climate change. A 15-year-old with asthma described himself as “a prisoner in my own home” when isolating with covid during a period of intense wildfire smoke. Rikki Held, the 22-year-old plaintiff for whom the lawsuit is named, detailed how extreme weather has hurt her family’s ranch.

Held testified that a favorable judgment would make her more hopeful for the future. “I know that climate change is a global issue, but Montana has to take responsibility for our part in that,” she said.

Attorneys for the state countered that Montana’s contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions is small. If the law in question were altered or overturned, Montana Assistant Attorney General Michael Russell said, there would be “no meaningful impact or appreciable effect” on the climate.

The state began and rested its defense on the same day, bringing the trial to an unexpectedly early close on June 20. In a pivot from its expected defense disputing the climate science behind the plaintiffs’ case, the state focused instead on arguing that the legislature should weigh in on the contested law, not the judiciary.

Russell derided the case in his closing statement as a “week-long airing of political grievances that properly belong in the Legislature, not a court of law.”

Gerrard said the change in strategy came as a surprise: “Everyone expected them to put on a more vigorous defense,” he said. “And they may have concluded that the underlying science of climate change was so strong that they didn’t want to contest it.”

Though the state is expected to appeal the decision, experts said the favorable verdict for the youths could influence how judges approach similar cases in other states and prompt them to apply “judicial courage” in addressing climate change. The nonprofit law firm Our Children’s Trust, which represents the plaintiffs, has taken legal action on behalf of youths in all 50 states, and has cases pending in four other states.

Juliana v. United States, a 2015 case brought by Our Children’s Trust that drew international attention, is also back on path to trial after facing repeated setbacks. The case took aim at the federal government, alleging that it had violated the 21 youths’ rights to life, liberty and property, as well as failed to protect public trust resources, in taking actions that contribute to climate change.

Plaintiffs’ attorney Phil Gregory said the court’s verdict could empower youth everywhere to take to the courts to secure their futures.

“There are political decisions being made without regard to the best scientific evidence and the effects they will have on our youngest generations,” he said. “This is a monumental decision."

The Washington Post · by Kate Selig · August 14, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com