Quotes of the Day:

"Americans behave as if intelligence were some sort of hideous deformity."

- Frank Zappa

The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane."

- Marcus Aurelius

"I believe that reading and writing are the most nourishing forms of meditation anyone has so far found. By reading the writings of the most interesting minds in history, we meditate with our own minds and theirs as well. This to me is a miracle."

- Kurt Vonnegut

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 6, 2023

2. Americans grow tired of sending money to Ukraine

3. Putin’s Forever War

4. U.S. companies are buying less from China as relations remain tense

5. Former British Special Forces Instructor Now Training Ex-Soldiers How to Fight in Ukraine

6. Opinion: Giving the US Credit Where Credit Is Due

7. A key U.S. ally wants to walk back its 'atrocious' embrace of China

8. Why the Populist Right Hates Universities

9. Why Ukrainian Soldiers Have to Learn to Fight on YouTube and How to Change That

10. Delivering the Army of 2030

11. An Enduring Coalition to Protect Ukraine

12.  Election Interference Demands a Collective Defense

13. Alabama readies for battle over Space Command HQ

14. Senate forces Biden into personnel standstill ahead of 2024

15. As climate change worsens, military eyes base of the future on Gulf Coast

16. We Have Enough Old Colonels Running Around

17. Russia and China Sent Large Naval Patrol Near Alaska

18. Woman detained in connection to plot to assassinate Zelensky, Ukraine security service says

19. China TV Documentary Showcases Army's Ability to Attack Taiwan

20. The world's most powerful navies in 2023, ranked

21. Rapid Dragon: the US military game-changer that could affect conventional and nuclear strategy and arms control negotiations

22. Ukraine Wants to Be European. Russia Wants to Be North Korean

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 6, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck two key road bridges along critical Russian grounds lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast on August 6, causing Russian forces to reroute road traffic from shorter eastern routes to longer western routes.
• Ukrainian strikes on bridges along critical Russian GLOCs are a part of the Ukrainian interdiction campaign focused on setting conditions for future decisive counteroffensive operations.
• Russian forces conducted one of the largest missile and drone strike series on Ukraine in recent months on the night of August 5-6.
• Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian air defenses have destroyed 3,500 aerial targets since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
• International talks aimed at drafting the main principles for a future settlement to the war in Ukraine continued in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 6.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov gave an unclear and contradictory answer to a New York Times reporter who asked whether Russia seeks to conquer more Ukrainian territory beyond the four partially occupied oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in September 2022.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 6.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast August 6 and made advances in certain areas.
• Russian military command finally allowed personnel of the Russian “Alga” volunteer battalion – which has been involved in the most combat intense frontlines in Donetsk Oblast since Fall 2022 – to return to Russia on leave.
• Russian occupation authorities in Ukraine continue establishing institutional linkages between Russian and Ukrainian governance structures and social services in occupied Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 6, 2023

Aug 6, 2023 - Press ISW

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 6, 2023

Riley Bailey, George Barros, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 6, 2023, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces struck two key road bridges along critical Russian grounds lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast on August 6, causing Russian forces to reroute road traffic from shorter eastern routes to longer western routes. Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vadimir Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 12 missiles at a road bridge across the Henichesk Strait connecting Henichesk Raion to the Arabat Spit and that Russian air defenses intercepted nine of the missiles.[1] Russian sources amplified images showing significant damage to the bridge and claimed that Ukrainian strikes partially collapsed a section of the bridge.[2] Russian sources amplified footage showing Ukrainian forces striking the Chonhar road bridge along the M-18 (Dzhankoi-Melitopol) highway connecting occupied Crimea with occupied Kherson Oblast and subsequent minor damage to both sides of the bridge.[3] Crimean occupation head Sergei Aksyonov claimed that Ukrainian forces launched two missiles at the bridge and that one missile made it through Russian air defenses and damaged the roadbed of the road bridge.[4] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces used Storm Shadow cruise missiles to conduct both strikes, although ISW has yet to observe confirmation of Russian forces intercepting Storm Shadow cruise missiles.[5]

Aksyonov announced that repair work is underway at the Chonhar bridge and that Russian officials will reroute all traffic through the Armyansk and Perekop checkpoints along the M-17 (Armyansk-Oleshky) and T2202 (Armyansk-Nova Kakhovka) highways.[6] The Crimean occupation transport ministry announced that all traffic through the Dzhankoi checkpoint along the M-18 highway is closed but that traffic along the Kerch Strait bridge and the Kerch Strait ferry crossing is operating normally.[7] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) suspended civilian entry to the Arabat Spit as of July 31, and Russian officials have not commented on the status of traffic along the Henichesk-Arabat Spit GLOC.[8] The extent of the damage to the bridge across the Henichesk Strait is likely forcing Russian forces to redirect military traffic from the Arabat Spit to longer western routes between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast. The M-17 highway passes through Armyansk before branching at a junction with the T2202 highway to the north and continuing to the northwest, meaning that most if not all Russian road traffic between Crimea and Kherson Oblast will have to pass along or very close to one 20km section of the M-17 between Ishun and Armyansk. This major bottleneck in Russian GLOCs will likely pose significant disruptions to logistics and chances for delays and traffic jams. It is unclear how quickly Russian officials will be able to repair the Chonhar bridge and it is equally as unclear if Russian officials have repaired the Chonhar railway bridge that Ukrainian forces struck on July 29.[9] The damage to the Henichesk Strait bridge will likely take Russian officials substantially longer to repair. Russian GLOCs along the T2202 northwest of Crimea - especially routes along primary and trunk roads south of Nova Kakhovka - are closer to Ukrainian positions in upper Kherson Oblast and in many cases within artillery range of the Ukrainian-held western bank of the river. Russian forces likely can reduce risks from Ukrainian indirect fire in this area by taking slower and less efficient village roads northeast of Chaplynka, but at the cost of slower and more complicated logistics support.

Ukrainian strikes on bridges along critical Russian GLOCs are a part of the Ukrainian interdiction campaign focused on setting conditions for future decisive counteroffensive operations. A prominent Wagner-affiliated Russian milblogger argued that the Ukrainian strikes on August 6 show that Ukrainian forces are methodically trying to cut off the Russian grouping in southern Ukraine and disrupt its logistics in a way similar to the Ukrainian interdiction campaign during the Kherson counteroffensive.[10] The milblogger noted that Russian defenses on west (right) bank Kherson Oblast broke down in a matter of days following months of Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics and expressed concern that the situation could repeat itself.[11] The Ukrainian strikes on the eastern crossing points will likely disrupt the transport of Russian personnel, materiel, and equipment from occupied Crimea to critical Russian defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area for some, undetermined, time. Ukrainian forces appear to be also expanding their interdiction efforts to target Russian naval targets involved in Russian logistics in the Black Sea as ISW has previously observed.[12] Ukrainian officials have routinely stated their commitment to a deliberate interdiction campaign against Russian military targets to degrade Russian logistics and defensive capabilities to set favorable conditions for future Ukrainian counteroffensive activity.[13]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian offensive operations near Bakhmut.[15] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Major General Kyrylo Budanov stated in an interview published on August 5 that Ukrainian forces are advancing faster around Bakhmut than in southern Ukraine.[16] Budanov also stated that Russian forces have built stationary, fully equipped, concrete-filled defense posts in southern Ukraine, making the Ukrainian offensive there difficult.[17]

Russian forces conducted one of the largest missile and drone strike series on Ukraine in recent months on the night of August 5-6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched the first wave of strikes on the night of August 5 consisting of 14 Kalibr cruise missiles and three Kh-47 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, and that Ukrainian forces shot down 12 Kalibr cruise missiles.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched a second wave of strikes on August 6 consisting of 27 Shahed-131/136 drones, six Kalibr missiles, and 20 Kh-101/555 air-launched cruise missiles and that Ukrainian forces shot down all 27 Shahed drones, five Kalibr missiles, and 13 Kh-101/555 missiles.[19] Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on August 6 that Russian attacks targeted the Starokostyantyniv airfield in Khmelnytskyi Oblast and noted that this is not the first time that Russian forces have attacked the airfield.[20] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russians targeted the Starokostyantyniv airfield because Ukrainian forces store foreign-supplied missiles including Storm Shadow cruise missiles at warehouses on the base and because the Ukrainian aviation unit that operates at the base is the only one with Storm Shadow missiles.[21] ISW has not observed any evidence to confirm these claims, however. The milbloggers’ claims that Russian forces specifically targeted an area where Ukrainian forces allegedly store and launch Storm Shadow missiles suggests that Russian forces are increasingly concerned about Ukraine’s interdiction campaign.

Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian air defenses have destroyed 3,500 aerial targets since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on August 6 that Ukrainian air defenses have intercepted and destroyed 3,500 aerial targets, including 350 Russian fixed and rotary wing aircraft, 1,200 cruise missiles, including 13 hypersonic Russian "Kinzhal" Kh-47M2 missiles, and 24 ballistic missiles.[22] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 6 that Ukrainian air defenses have intercepted and destroyed over 2,000 Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (types unspecified) and that Ukrainian pilots have conducted over 14,000 sorties since February 24, 2022.[23]

International talks aimed at drafting the main principles for a future settlement to the war in Ukraine continued in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 6. Diplomats from 42 countries including the US, Japan, South Korea, South Africa, the United Kingdom, India, and China reportedly agreed that future peace talks between Ukraine and Russia should be based on principles of international law, such as respect for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.[24] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak reported that the Ukrainian delegation spoke with representatives from each country present at the meeting.[25] Chinese diplomats reportedly reintroduced China’s 12-point peace plan from February 2023, prompting European delegations to respond that an unconditional ceasefire would create a frozen conflict and allow Russia to consolidate its control over occupied Ukrainian territories.[26] The Wall Street Journal reported on August 6 that most countries in attendance in Saudi Arabia, including China, agreed to meet again in the near future in a similar format that again would not include Russia.[27]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov gave an unclear and contradictory answer to a New York Times reporter who asked whether Russia seeks to conquer more Ukrainian territory beyond the four partially occupied oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in September 2022. The New York Times reported that Peskov said, “No... We just want to control all the land we have now written into our Constitution as ours,” when asked whether Russia seeks to capture more territory in Ukraine.[28] Peskov’s seemingly straightforward answer is contradictory, vague, and does not answer the reporter’s original question. Russian forces do not fully occupy the four oblasts — Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts — that the Russian government formally claims. Russian forces would have to conduct significant offensive operations to capture over 16,000 square kilometers of land in these four oblasts to bring de facto Russian-occupied territory in line with the Russian constitution as Peskov described. Russia also occupies territory in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and in Mykolaiv Oblast (the Kinburn Spit) — territory that the Kremlin has not formally annexed. Peskov’s statement implies that Russian forces should relinquish their territory in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts, but the Russian government has made no indication that it plans to do so and, in fact, is continuing offensive operations to gain more territory in Kharkiv. The Kremlin likely seeks to continue significant military operations against Ukraine to – at a minimum – capture the remaining parts of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts that Russian forces do not yet occupy. The Kremlin has articulated further maximalist objectives in Ukraine beyond that, including changing the Ukrainian government and constitution.[29]

Peskov also strangely stated that Russia’s presidential election is “not really democracy” but rather a “costly bureaucracy” and that Russian President Vladimir Putin “will be re-elected next year with more than 90 percent of the vote,” but walked back on this statement the same day it was publicized.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck two key road bridges along critical Russian grounds lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast on August 6, causing Russian forces to reroute road traffic from shorter eastern routes to longer western routes.
• Ukrainian strikes on bridges along critical Russian GLOCs are a part of the Ukrainian interdiction campaign focused on setting conditions for future decisive counteroffensive operations.
• Russian forces conducted one of the largest missile and drone strike series on Ukraine in recent months on the night of August 5-6.
• Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian air defenses have destroyed 3,500 aerial targets since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
• International talks aimed at drafting the main principles for a future settlement to the war in Ukraine continued in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 6.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov gave an unclear and contradictory answer to a New York Times reporter who asked whether Russia seeks to conquer more Ukrainian territory beyond the four partially occupied oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in September 2022.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 6.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast August 6 and made advances in certain areas.
• Russian military command finally allowed personnel of the Russian “Alga” volunteer battalion – which has been involved in the most combat intense frontlines in Donetsk Oblast since Fall 2022 – to return to Russia on leave.
• Russian occupation authorities in Ukraine continue establishing institutional linkages between Russian and Ukrainian governance structures and social services in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance on August 6. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked Russian forces near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk), Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove), southwest of Kovalivka (10km southwest of Svatove), and near the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[31]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 6 and reportedly advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian forces near Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), Vilshana, Synkivka, and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[32] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that Russian assault groups of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) advanced into Ukrainian defenses near Vilshana.[33] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces took control of Novoselivske on August 5.[34] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces ”decisively” captured Novoselivske after several months of fighting and pushed Ukrainian forces out of their last positions in the western part of the settlement on August 5.[35] The milblogger claimed that fierce fighting continues for the heights south of Novoselivske.[36] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of these claims.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on August 6, but did not make any confirmed or claimed gains. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Major General Kyrylo Budanov stated in an interview published on August 5 that Ukrainian forces are advancing faster around Bakhmut than in southern Ukraine.[37] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian artillery strikes are preventing either side from gaining a foothold or the initiative near Klishchiivka, however.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified Russian airborne units (VDV) repelled a Ukrainian attack near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[40] 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on August 6, but did not make any confirmed or claimed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut) and northeast of Dyliivka (15km southwest of Bakhmut).[41] Footage published on August 5 purportedly show elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps) operating near Klishchiivka.[42]

The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not advance on August 6. The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City).[43]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on August 6, but did not make any confirmed or claimed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka, Marinka, and Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka).[44] Footage published on August 6 purportedly shows elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) operating in the Avdiivka direction and elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) operating in the Marinka direction.[45]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on August 6 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk direction (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area).[46] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[47] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) repelled the Ukrainian assaults near Urozhaine.[48] Russian sources, including ”Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky who is defending in the area, claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked from Staromayorske towards Urozhaine with two infantry platoons with several tanks and armored vehicles and managed to temporarily cross the shallow river separating the two settlements.[49]

Russian forces conducted limited unsuccessful counterattacks in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area on August 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain lost positions near Staromayorske.[50]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed gains on August 6. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv).[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults in the area with small, armored groups.[52] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached an unspecified Russian trench position along the Robotyne-Verbove line (up to 18km southeast of Orikhiv) and engaged Russian forces there with small arms fire, but that Russian forces later counterattacked and pushed Ukrainian forces from the trenches.[53] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian infantry groups without vehicle support that attempted to advance near Mala Tokmachka (7km southeast of Orikhiv) and Novopokrovka (14km southeast of Orikhiv).[54]   

Russian forces counterattacked in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 6 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Robotyne.[55]

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Tokmak with HIMARS rockets on the night of August 5 to 6.[56]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) 

The Russian military command finally allowed personnel of the Russian “Alga” volunteer battalion – which has been involved in the most combat intense frontlines in Donetsk Oblast since Fall 2022 – to return to Russia on leave.[57] A Russian regional branch of Radio Liberty reported that most “Alga” volunteers are receiving treatment for injuries, while a portion of the volunteers returned to the Republic of Tatarstan. The outlet added that the “Alga” Battalion has been operating in Bakhmut for the past four months after previously fighting in Pisky and Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast. The “Alga” Battalion had previously suffered significant losses during failed assaults near Vuhledar on February 6.[58] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces lack operational reserves that would allow them to conduct personnel rotations.[59]

Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian officials are fining Russian enterprises that did not account for employees liable for military service before the announcement of the partial mobilization.[60] The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service reported that Russian enterprises are now informing Russian officials about their employees receiving military summonses.

Russian officials are continuing to recruit volunteers for the war effort via coercion and promises of immunity from mobilization. Russian human rights organization Gulagu.net amplified a letter from a Kaluga Oblast prisoner claiming that Russian security forces coerce Russian prisoners to join the war effort by creating terrible conditions in Russian colonies.[61] The prisoner added that Russian prison guards physically abuse prisoners who refuse to deploy to Ukraine. A Russian opposition outlet amplified an advertisement recruiting volunteers for service with the 3rd Operational Battalion of Russian special police (OMON) of Rosgvardia’s Main Directorate, which guaranteed volunteers exemption from mobilization.[62]

A Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel claimed that Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s confidant Konstantin Pikalov is continuing to train personnel as part of “Convoy” private military company (PMC) in occupied Perevalne, Crimea.[63] The Telegram channel noted that Crimean occupation head Sergei Aksyonov supports Convoy PMC’s exercises in occupied Crimea. Russian opposition outlets reported in March 2023 that Aksyonov created Wagner-affiliated Convoy PMC, and its operation after Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24 may suggest that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has yet to fully absorb all remaining Wagner entities in occupied Ukraine and in Russia.[64]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)  

Russian occupation authorities in Ukraine continue establishing institutional linkages between Russian and Ukrainian governance structures and social services in occupied Ukraine. The Kherson Oblast occupational administration announced on August 6 that Russian authorities have registered over 55,000 Kherson Oblast residents with compulsory medical insurance policies since Russia integrated occupied Kherson Oblast’s healthcare system with Russia’s in March 2023.[65] Russian occupation officials reported that these Russian medical insurance plans enable their holders to receive free medical care.[66]

Russian occupation authorities are reportedly conditioning Ukrainian youth in occupied Ukraine to participate in Russia’s controlled and undemocratic elections. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on August 6 that Russian occupation authorities are establishing school programs to teach highschoolers in occupied Ukraine about how Russian election officials work to falsify election results as part of a larger effort to condition young Ukrainians to normalize participating in Russia’s controlled and falsified elections.[67]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Americans grow tired of sending money to Ukraine

Excerpts:

But now, a year and a half into the war, it appears most Americans do not support Biden's indefinite commitment. A new CNN poll shows that a majority, 55%, say Congress "should not authorize additional funding to support Ukraine in the war with Russia." Another smaller majority, 51%, say the U.S. "has already done enough to stop Russian military actions in Ukraine."

...

What does that mean? It's hard to tell. Other Republican candidates have been stronger in their support, among them Nikki Haley, Tim Scott, and Mike Pence. Chris Christie actually traveled to Ukraine this week to express his support.

Now, if the new poll numbers are correct, it is more clear than ever that the voters those candidates are trying to appeal to, both in the primary and, if they make it, in a general election, are very skeptical of continued high levels of aid to Ukraine. That is not a fringe position. It is the mainstream, majority view in the U.S.

Americans grow tired of sending money to Ukraine

by Byron York, Chief Political Correspondent |  August 04, 2023 03:41 PM

Washington Examiner · August 4, 2023

AMERICANS GROW TIRED OF SENDING MONEY TO UKRAINE. President Joe Biden has often said the United States will continue military aid to Ukraine "for as long as it takes" to win the war with Russia. On Jan. 25 of this year, for example, Biden said to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, "We're with you for as long as it takes." Last month, Biden said, "Our commitment to Ukraine will not weaken. We will stand for liberty and freedom today, tomorrow, and for as long as it takes." There are many other examples of the president saying the same thing.

But now, a year and a half into the war, it appears most Americans do not support Biden's indefinite commitment. A new CNN poll shows that a majority, 55%, say Congress "should not authorize additional funding to support Ukraine in the war with Russia." Another smaller majority, 51%, say the U.S. "has already done enough to stop Russian military actions in Ukraine."

Not surprisingly, a majority, 53%, also disapprove of Biden's handling of the Ukraine problem.

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The poll shows that most demographic groups oppose an indefinite commitment. No matter the race, sex, age, income, or whatever — majorities say Congress should not authorize additional funding for the war. The factor that does make a difference, of course, is political affiliation. Sixty-two percent of Democrats say Congress should authorize additional funding, while 55% of independents and 71% of Republicans say Congress should not authorize more money.

People who call themselves liberals (69%) support more funding, while people who call themselves centrists (56%) and conservatives (69%) oppose more funding. It is a war effort supported by liberals and opposed by everyone else.

The divisions are similar on the question of whether the U.S. has already done enough to stop Russian military actions in Ukraine. Sixty-one percent of Democrats say the U.S. should do more, while 56% of independents and 59% of Republicans say the U.S. has done enough. Most liberals want the U.S. to do more, while centrists and conservatives say the U.S. has already done enough.

These opinions do not mean Americans want the U.S. to do nothing to help Ukraine. The pollsters listed a number of options and found that a majority supports U.S. "assistance in intelligence gathering" for Ukrainian forces. A majority also supports "military training" for Ukrainian forces. But everything else — no majority. The pollsters asked whether people supported "weapons" or "U.S. military forces to participate in combat operations" or "another form of assistance" and found that none of those options had majority support.

On perhaps the biggest question of all, whether voters support "U.S. military forces to participate in combat operations," just 17% said yes. Huge, bipartisan majorities oppose such a move, as they have from the beginning of the war. Biden has pledged not to send U.S. forces to Ukraine, and there would be enormous opposition should he ever change that position.

All this is happening, of course, as the U.S. presidential campaign gets underway in earnest. Biden, for all the talk about Robert F. Kennedy Jr. or Cornel West, has no real competition, at least so far, in the Democratic race. Democrats who oppose ever-increasing Ukraine funding — and there are a lot of them, about a third of the party — have nowhere to go.

The Republican side is more diverse. The leader, former President Donald Trump, promises to resolve the conflict quickly upon taking office. He has not said how he would do it. The second-place candidate, Gov. Ron DeSantis (R-FL), has also been unclear about his position. Last week, DeSantis was asked the Ukraine question by Fox News's Bret Baier — what would you do? — and was remarkably vague in response:

We need a sustainable peace in Europe without rewarding Putin's aggression. We don't want this to be an issue for the next 10, 20, 30, 40 years. Well, how do you get there? The Europeans need to do their fair share. I think the fact that we have drawn down our ammunition to crisis levels, some of our weapons stocks, we have other contingencies we have to be worried about. So as president, I would prioritize the China threat first. I would have more resources and power in the Indo-Pacific. I would also deal with issues in our own hemisphere, starting with our border and some of the threats there. And then I'm willing to work with the Europeans. But I think the goal needs to be, you know, let's bring it to a sustainable conclusion. You know, I think the Europeans really need to take the lead will help to try to bring this in for a landing.

What does that mean? It's hard to tell. Other Republican candidates have been stronger in their support, among them Nikki Haley, Tim Scott, and Mike Pence. Chris Christie actually traveled to Ukraine this week to express his support.

Now, if the new poll numbers are correct, it is more clear than ever that the voters those candidates are trying to appeal to, both in the primary and, if they make it, in a general election, are very skeptical of continued high levels of aid to Ukraine. That is not a fringe position. It is the mainstream, majority view in the U.S.

For a deeper dive into many of the topics covered in the Daily Memo, please listen to my podcast, The Byron York Show — available on Radio America and the Ricochet Audio Network and everywhere else podcasts can be found.

Washington Examiner · August 4, 2023

3. Putin’s Forever War

Long read about Putin's "civilizational war."

Putin’s Forever War

Vladimir Putin wants to lead Russians into a civilizational conflict with the West far larger than Ukraine. Will they follow him?

By Roger CohenPhotographs by Nanna Heitmann

Roger Cohen and Nanna Heitmann traveled from Moscow to Siberia to Russia’s border with Ukraine to report and photograph this article.

Aug. 6, 2023

The New York Times · by Roger Cohen · August 6, 2023

Putin’s Forever War

The conflict in Ukraine is hardly felt in Moscow.

The impact is shunted to Russia’s poorest regions.

Or it intrudes at the fringe from Ukrainian shelling.

How long the toll can be obscured could determine the fate of the Russian leader and his country.

Vladimir Putin wants to lead Russians into a civilizational conflict with the West far larger than Ukraine. Will they follow him?

By

Photographs by Nanna Heitmann

Roger Cohen and Nanna Heitmann traveled from Moscow to Siberia to Russia’s border with Ukraine to report and photograph this article.

Aug. 6, 2023

Through towering pine forests and untouched meadows, the road to Lake Baikal in southern Siberia winds past cemeteries where bright plastic flowers mark the graves of Russians killed in Ukraine. Far from the Potemkin paradise of Moscow, the war is ever visible.

On the eastern shore of the lake, where white-winged gulls plunge into the steel-blue water, Yulia Rolikova, 35, runs an inn that doubles as a children’s summer camp. She is some 3,500 miles from the front, yet the war reverberates in her family and in her head.

“My ex-husband wanted to go fight — he claimed it was his duty,” she said. “I said, ‘No, you have an 8-year-old daughter, and it’s a much more important duty to be a father to her.’”

“People are dying there in Ukraine for nothing,” she said.

“People are dying there in Ukraine for nothing,” said Yulia Rolikova, who persuaded her former husband not to join the fight thousands of miles from their home in Siberia.

He finally understood and stayed, she told me, with a look that said: Mine is just another ordinary Russian life. That is to say the life of a single mother in a country with one of the highest divorce rates in the world, a nation plunged into an intractable war, fighting a neighboring state that President Vladimir V. Putin deemed a fiction, where tens of millions of Russians, like herself, have ties of family, culture and history.

I spent a month in Russia, a country almost as large as the United States and Canada combined, searching for clues that might explain its nationalist lurch into an unprovoked war and its mood more than 17 months into a conflict conceived as a lightning strike, only to become a lingering nightmare. The war, which has transformed the world as radically as 9/11 did, has now taken 200,000 lives since Feb. 24, 2022, roughly split between the two sides, American diplomats in Moscow estimate.

By The New York Times

As I traveled from Siberia to Belgorod on Russia’s western border with Ukraine, across the vertigo-inducing vastness that informs Russian assertiveness, I found a country uncertain of its direction or meaning, torn between the glorious myths that Mr. Putin has cultivated and everyday struggle.

Along the way, I encountered fear and fervid bellicosity, as well as stubborn patience to see out a long war. I found that Homo sovieticus, far from dying out, has lived on in modified form, along with habits of subservience. So with the aid of relentless propaganda on state television, the old Putin playbook — money, mythmaking and menace of murder — has just about held.

Victory Day, commemorating the defeat of Nazi Germany, has become an exercise in fusing past conflicts with the current one.

A Communist Party youth event this year in Moscow. A new generation is being taught to adopt patriotic values from an early age.

But I also heard ambivalent voices like Ms. Rolikova’s, along with a few raised in outright dissent, especially from young people in a country with a stark generational divide.

It was this restiveness, this impatience with the seeming incoherence of the war and with the insouciance of the privileged in Moscow and St. Petersburg, that formed the backdrop to the short-lived revolt led by Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, the founder of the Wagner group, in late June. It was not for nothing that he named his uprising the “march for justice.”

“That Prigozhin rebelled was symptomatic of many social problems, but the way he advanced toward Moscow unhindered also demonstrated nervousness about whether all army units would fight,” said Alexander Baunov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “Putin clearly did not want to give an order to fire he was unsure would be implemented.”

Making a martyr of Mr. Prigozhin was too risky in the short term for other reasons, too. Wagner’s role in avoiding recourse to an unpopular draft, by recruiting many thousands of criminals to bear the brunt of much heavy fighting in Ukraine, has been crucial. If Mr. Putin, 70, did not blink, he certainly flinched.

Yet, after 23 years leading Russia, Mr. Putin’s hold on power is still firm as fighting intensifies in southern and eastern Ukraine. He learned long ago, indeed from the outset of his rule in 2000, that, as the author Masha Gessen has put it, “wars were almost as good as crackdowns because they discredited anyone who wanted to complicate things.”

He has always used war — in Chechnya, in Georgia and in Ukraine — to unite Russians in the simplistic myths of nationalism and to usher them to the simplistic conclusion that his increasingly repressive rule is so essential that it must be eternal.

Funeral rites were given for Wagner group mercenaries in February on the outskirts of Bakinskaya, a village in Russia’s Krasnodar region.

Soldiers in Moscow returning from Belgorod, one of the few Russian regions that has seen any destruction as a result of the war.

Still, as far as possible, the war must be invisible, banished to places like Ulan-Ude, near Lake Baikal, not far from the Mongolian border. That is done, in part, by paying recruits about $2,500 a month, a huge sum in a region where a monthly salary of $500 is more typical.

“Money is the main reason people go to fight,” Ms. Rolikova said. “The contracts being offered volunteers are crazy by our standards.”

But all of the money that Mr. Putin showers on remotest Russia only brings the war into sharper relief. It is etched in the fearful faces of young recruits lining up at the airport for flights to Moscow, and from there overland to Rostov-on-Don and into Ukraine. It is in the freshly turned soil of cemeteries where young men are laid to rest. It is in the air, a pall of dread.

The life partner of Ms. Rolikova’s best friend was killed in Ukraine in February, leaving the friend with two young children. Her half brother has fled to Georgia. Her grandfather was from the Donetsk region of Ukraine, a family tie that compounds her anguish.

Ms. Rolikova gazed out at the vast shimmering lake that contains more than 20 percent of the world’s fresh water. The wind was suddenly up; the gulls beat their wings hard against it to hold still. She said she tried to derive wisdom from nature, finding in it a refuge from the turmoil of war.

For her daughter Valeriya’s sake, at least, Ms. Rolikova hopes the war will be over within two years. “We are told one truth, they are told another truth,” she said. “But why do we need to kill each other like in World War I?”

Moscow’s New Czar

In Moscow, a world away from Ulan-Ude, Western sanctions appear to have had little effect beyond stores like Dior that have signs saying, “Closed for technical reasons,” and the comical renaming of departed Western businesses, like “Stars,” for Starbucks.

The subway is spotless; restaurants offering a popular Japanese-Russian fusion cuisine overflow; people make contactless payments for most things using their phones; there is a ridiculous concentration of luxury cars; the internet functions impeccably, as it does in all of Russia.

The war is nowhere to be seen, other than in the billboards from the Ministry of Defense and, until recently, Mr. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group (now of uncertain future) that try to lure recruits with slogans like, “Heroes are not born, they become heroes.”

These may be found next to a multitude of new high-rise developments with English names like “Trendy Towers” or “High Life.” For all of Mr. Putin’s efforts to vilify the West, it still lives in the Russian imagination as a chimera of cool.

I first visited Moscow four decades ago, when it was a city devoid of primary colors eking out existence in the penury of Communism. Gazing at Moscow today, it is possible to discern why Mr. Putin earned so much respect from his countrymen. He opened Russia, only to slam it shut to the West; he also modernized it, while leaving the thread to Russia’s past unbroken.

Western sanctions have had little discernible effect in Moscow.

The capital’s restaurants are full and the subway is spotless.

Sitting at a cafe overlooking the Patriarch’s Ponds in one of the toniest areas of central Moscow, Pyotr Tolstoy, a deputy chairman of the State Duma and a direct descendant of the great novelist Leo Tolstoy, exuded confidence as a moneyed crowd ate large crab claws and other delicacies.

When I asked him how Russia proposed to pay for a prolonged war effort, he shot back: “We pay for it all from our sales of oil to Europe via India.”

This was bravado, but it had some truth to it. Russia has rapidly adjusted to the loss of European markets with oil sales to Asia — and India has sold some of it on to Europe in refined form.

“Our values are different,” Mr. Tolstoy said. “For Russians, freedom and economic factors are secondary to the integrity of our state and the safeguarding of the Russian world.”

Mr. Putin’s rule is all about the reconstitution of this imagined Russian world, or “Russkiy mir,” a revanchist myth built around the idea of an eternal Russian cultural and imperial sphere of which Ukraine — its decision to become an independent state never forgiven — is an integral part.

As for the future, Mr. Putin has very little to say, leaving people guessing.

Rarely in Moscow or elsewhere in Russia is Mr. Putin’s image visible, other than on television, even if he has ventured out a little more of late. He governs from the shadows, unlike Stalin, whose portrait was everywhere. There is no cult of the leader of the kind Fascist systems favored. Yet mystery has its own magnetism. The reach of Mr. Putin’s power touches all.

It is evident in the bodyguards bursting into upscale Moscow restaurants to make room for some capo or oligarch of a system where great wealth comes only at the price of unwavering loyalty to the president.

Above all, it is in the fear that causes people to lower voices and hesitate before uttering that treacherous word of Mr. Putin’s double-think — “war.”

The Kremlinology of the Cold War has been replaced by the equally arduous pursuit of trying to penetrate the utter opacity of the Kremlin to read the mind of a new czar, Mr. Putin, now in the autumn of his rule.

Repression has become fierce and the war Mr. Putin started in Ukraine has been waged with near total unconcern for the consequences of his decision, a human trait that John le Carré once described as “a primary qualification for psychopathy.”

Putinism is a postmodern compilation of contradictions. It combines mawkish Soviet nostalgia with Mafia capitalism, devotion to the Orthodox Church with the spread of broken families, ferocious attacks on a “unipolar” American world with revived Russian imperialist aggression — all held together by the ruthless suppression of dissident voices and recourse to violence when necessary.

Conscripts at the Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces, dedicated to “the military feats of the Russian people.”

Mr. Putin has largely rehabilitated Stalin, his gulag notwithstanding, as the thread to the past remains unbroken.

An increasingly disarming phenomenon in Russia is that it looks familiar to an American or a European, yet it is not. It is “operating on a different software,” as Pierre Lévy, the French ambassador, put it to me. The definition of state secrets keeps shifting.

I was advised to accept no document, unless it was a menu, and even then, to use a QR code to order food whenever possible.

Putin’s True Believers

Five time zones away from Moscow, a dilapidated Soviet-era coal-burning power station belches smoke over the corrugated-iron roofs of modest wooden homes in Ulan-Ude. A bust of Lenin’s head, the world’s largest at 42 tons, still towers over the central square of this city of more than 400,000 people.

Now, this quiet capital of Russia’s Buryatia Republic, a center of aircraft and helicopter production that was closed to foreigners during the Cold War, finds itself enmeshed in another war against the West, whose roots lie in the breakup of Lenin’s Soviet Union.

Aleksandr Vasilyev, 59, an economist, was about to return to the distant front for a second tour, having signed one of those $2,500 contracts with the Ministry of Defense.

Last December, a Ukrainian shell killed his closest friend, Viktor Prilukov, near Soledar, in eastern Ukraine. Days later, Mr. Vasilyev was blown into the air by a grenade. “I am not a very good bird,” he said. He returned to Siberia with a shattered shoulder, now largely healed.

Many believe in Mr. Putin, like Aleksandr Vasilyev, 59, who is returning to the front for a second time. “I fight out of duty to the motherland,” he said.

“Of course, the money is nice, but it’s not the main reason for going again,” said Mr. Vasilyev, a vigorous man who makes regular use of the weights on the floor of his Soviet-era apartment.

“I fight out of duty to the motherland,” he said. “Our grandfathers went all the way to Berlin in 1945 to ensure we not have an enemy country next door. We won’t allow America to install that.”

As Mr. Vasilyev spoke, a clock with the faces of Mr. Putin and his servile sometime stand-in, Dmitri A. Medvedev, stared down at him from the wall of his kitchen.

“My mother gave me the clock 10 years ago because she thought I criticized them too much!” he said. “You know, our usual Russian grumbling, taxes and corruption. We criticize — the czars, Stalin and his gulag, Yeltsin — and we accept.”

Others’ embrace of the war is still more ardent. Nikolai Vorodnikov, 44, invited me to his garage where he repairs and readies vehicles to be sent to the front. About 100 SUVs and trucks have already made their way from his Siberian garage to Ukraine.

He himself fought in Mariupol, a Ukrainian city pulverized by Russian forces. In April 2022, as he stormed the main administration building there, Mr. Vorodnikov took two bullets to his chest. He recuperated for many months back in Ulan-Ude after receiving emergency care.

Nikolai Vorodnikov, left, has sent about 100 vehicles to the front from his Siberian garage. Mr. Putin “was sent to Russia by God,” he said.

Like Mr. Putin, he believes that the 10th-century Kievan Rus — comprising territory that partially overlapped with today’s Ukraine — was the birthplace of modern Russia and that the region has always constituted the inalienable borderlands of greater Russia. Russia and Ukraine are “one body,” he says.

“The body has a tumor — it is in Ukraine, and we have to cure it,” he told me. “The tumor comes from Americans who go places they have no need to go. Our task is clear and will be accomplished, justice restored, fascism defeated.”

I asked him about Mr. Putin. “He was sent to Russia by God,” he said.

The Magic Solution

In a time of terror, the great mass is enthusiastic, compliant, calculating or cowed. A few brave people, by contrast, move to an inner compass.

The problems of Yevgeny Vlasov, 39, started late last year when he began posting critical commentary on Vkontakte, or VK, a Russian version of Facebook.

A tall, lean man with a disarming frankness and fearlessness, Mr. Vlasov, an electrical engineer in Ulan-Ude, posted a graphic from an opposition website illustrating the war’s toll.

It showed that for every Muscovite who dies in the war, 87.5 people die in Dagestan, Russia’s southernmost republic; 275 people in Buryatia, where he lives; and 350 people in Tuva, home to an Asian minority and the poorest region of Russia.

In contrast to all the recruitment billboards, whose images are almost exclusively of white ethnic Russians, a disproportionate number of those dying at the front come from Russia’s ethnic minorities, a pattern confirmed by Mediazona, among other independent news outlets. That was Mr. Vlasov’s point.

His friends told him to stop posting. He paid no attention. As a nobody, he thought nobody would be interested in his antiwar videos.

Mr. Vlasov’s friends, most of whom admire Mr. Putin, asked him when he had last watched TV. He replied: “I stopped watching 10 years ago. It’s all garbage. And that’s why I have a different view.”

The Soviet past is ever-present.

It is felt even in remote corners like Ulan-Ude.

Some, like Yevgeny Vlasov, oppose the war as “a magic solution” ...

... conjured up by Mr. Putin to rally support after 23 years in power.

But conscripts still flow from the region, lured by the money paid.

What view is that?

“I have been angry,” he said. “I just did not understand why we had to attack Ukraine last year. There was no normal reason.”

The president, Mr. Vlasov argued, had lost his bearings. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 went so smoothly that Mr. Putin thought eliminating Ukraine would be easy.

“The only problem,” Mr. Vlasov said, “was that Ukraine was preparing all this time, while Putin’s cronies were stealing billions all this time, which is why our soldiers were scrounging for socks.”

Mr. Vlasov thought for a moment. “Putin is a thief,” he said. “The war in Ukraine has shown Russians how much money has disappeared to build his palaces.”

Last December, a police officer called and ordered Mr. Vlasov to report to the local police station. Mr. Vlasov demanded the reason. None was given. He went anyway and was asked if the social media page containing the criticism of the war was his. He said it was.

The police compiled a report saying that he had admitted guilt — he had not — and that he would be fined 60,000 rubles, or about $630, and be imprisoned if he did it a second time.

Mr. Vlasov hired a lawyer, Nadezhda Nizovkina, who has been active in the political opposition in Ulan-Ude. “I fight for freedom of speech, but I also fight against all that is going on,” she told me. “Under the Constitution, my client should be free to post what he wants.”

Over the past six months, Mr. Vlasov has appeared in court three times. His fine was eventually halved, then dropped in April, but he has not received any official communication that the case is closed.

With his children aged 10, 9, 4 and 2, Mr. Vlasov wants to leave Russia. He sees no future for the family in Ulan-Ude. His dream is to become an electrician in California; he thinks his wife could find a job in a nail salon.

“Putin has been in power so long that children do not ask who the next president will be, they ask who the next Putin will be,” he said. “That is not a good thing.”

Mr. Vlasov recalled going in 2021 to a demonstration in support of Aleksei A. Navalny, the imprisoned opposition leader who was sentenced this week to a further 19 years in prison under brutal conditions. “There were lots of people protesting,” he said. “Support for Putin was down.”

Two years on, some of his friends who protested are now supporters of Mr. Putin, a change he attributes to “this magic solution brought about by the war!”

We agreed to meet the next day at the Southern Cemetery, a 40-minute drive from Ulan-Ude, in a pine forest. There is no more room in the cemeteries in the city center.

We strolled through the vast burial ground, past scrawny stray dogs and picnic tables and large bouquets of multicolored plastic flowers glinting in the sunlight around newly dug graves of soldiers.

An entire section of the cemetery is given over to Ulan-Ude’s dead in the war.

An old couple was preparing a grave, shoveling the earth and beating it back down. A level lay on the ground next to the headstone they were about to place.

I asked who they were burying.

“Our grandson.”

How old was he?

“Nineteen.”

What happened?

“Ukraine happened.”

The headstone read: Andrei Malykh, born May 4, 2003, died Oct. 31, 2022.

As I read it, their daughter approached, threatening to call the ubiquitous Federal Security Service, or F.S.B., if the conversation continued.

Refighting an Old War

The celebration of the centennial of the Buryatia Republic was held on May 30 at the ornate Ulan-Ude opera house beneath a frescoed ceiling of Soviet planes with red stars and a Soviet flag emblazoned with Lenin’s image.

The governor, Aleksei S. Tsydenov, of Mr. Putin’s United Russia party, spoke for a half-hour, extolling the 39,000 Buryats who died in World War II. He then honored eight local soldiers of the current war already elevated to the status of “Hero of Russia.”

The whole theater rose to applaud the pinning of medals on the lapels of three of these heroes, as well as on the lapels of several veterans of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

The centennial celebration of the Buryatia Republic, during which medals were pinned on heroes past and present.

“The role of conquerors of Nazism is played again by a new generation,” the governor of Buryatia, from Mr. Putin’s party, said, drawing a historical link between the conflicts.

It was a perfect image of the far-fetched fusion of the two wars that Mr. Putin has sought to engineer.

“Today, the role of conquerors of Nazism is played again by a new generation,” Mr. Tsydenov declared. “Our army will win. During all the stages of history there were those who wished evil on us. But we overcame all obstacles.”

A theatrical performance, of stylized Soviet influence, followed, including an all-male dance troupe that gyrated to a hymn to coal production, slashing their arms downward as they sang: “YES! YES! COAL PRODUCTION IS ON OUR SHOULDERS AND ALL RUSSIA IS BEHIND US!”

Outside, the mood was less exultant.

Salaries averaging a few hundred dollars a month mean a hardscrabble existence for many.

Irina Kontsova’s two daughters, 7 and 9, learned on TV of the death of their father, Maksim Kontsov, 33, last year in Ukraine. She had found herself unable to tell them. Her older daughter, Margarita, was back from school early and saw a TV announcement that her father had received a Gold Star Hero of Russia award.

Irina Kontsova beside the plaque dedicated to her former husband, Maksim Kontsov.

We drove to the high school where the couple first met. A plaque is newly affixed to the facade. It commemorates the heroism of Mr. Kontsov, killed in a distant land in service to an aging leader’s obsession.

Ms. Kontsova, a forestry expert, stood beside the plaque. “You cannot break the Russian people,” she said. “Especially Russian women.”

Watching her, all I could think of was the waste, the fatherless children, the poisonous bequest of tangled history, and all of those medals handed out to glorify the bloody sacrifice of war.

‘A Tower of Silence’

To reach the Moscow office of Dmitri A. Muratov, the Nobel Prize-winning editor of the shuttered independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta, you walk past the office of Anna Politkovskaya, murdered by the Putin regime in 2006 for her reporting on Russian human rights abuses in Chechnya.

Her typewriter sits on her desk, along with her glasses and notes and a book with a title that sums up the impunity of the Putin era: “History of an Inconclusive Investigation.”

You walk on past the photographs of six other Novaya journalists killed since 2000. In different ways, they had adhered to a maxim of the great wartime photographer, Robert Capa, that Mr. Muratov cited in his Nobel acceptance speech: “If your pictures aren’t good enough, you aren’t close enough.”

Mr. Muratov, 61, sits in an office featuring a photograph of Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the leader now reviled by many Russians, who rejected Communism in favor of free speech, free enterprise and open borders.

“We are the suffocated society,” said Dmitri A. Muratov, the editor of the shuttered independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta.

His restructuring and openness — perestroika and glasnost — of the late 1980s led to the dismantling of the Soviet Union and, peacefully and fleetingly, brought a divided Europe together in liberty. In the photograph, Mr. Gorbachev, who died last year, holds an egg.

“He was very careful with live things,” Mr. Muratov tells me. “He was a farmer. He valued life. Now, in our state, death is more important than life.”

The past 17 months have resembled a funeral march. The government closed down Novaya, along with most independent media, soon after the war began. A branch of the paper, Novaya Gazeta Europe, now publishes in Riga, Latvia. Mr. Muratov stayed on in Russia, a country “where truth is now a crime,” as he put it.

The truth speakers — Mr. Navalny, the outspoken Kremlin critic Vladimir Kara-Murza, the war critic Ilya Yashin, the theater director Yevgeniya Berkovich, the playwright Svetlana Petriychuk and countless other writers and poets — are all in prison.

“We are the suffocated society,” Mr. Muratov says. “Russia has become a tower of silence.”

Nobody, he argues, knows what the country really thinks. All that is known is that the older generation believes in Mr. Putin with a religious passion.

As for the young, up to one million of the best and the brightest have left since the war began. These young Russians, Mr. Muratov tells me, did not want to kill or be killed. They did not think that glory was attained through bloodshed. If anything, they believe glory lies in art and intellect. To replace them will take a generation or more, he believes.

A priest blessing conscripts. Up to one million young Russians who did not want to kill or be killed have fled since the war began.

Shebekino, in the Belgorod region near Russia’s western border, has been hit as Ukrainians strike back.

There are angry young people in Russia, too.

In the Belgorod region, close to Russia’s western border with Ukraine, where Ukrainian cross-border attacks have forced thousands of Russians to flee their homes, I met Ilya Kostyukov, 19.

He was thrown out of college last year for his opposition to the war but learned enough about the law to work as what he called a “lawyer,” mainly helping Russians desperate to avoid or leave the war’s front.

“We put an F.S.B. guy at the top of the government, we allowed bandits to operate and rule, we thought whatever went wrong could be rectified in an election,” Mr. Kostyukov said, “but it was too late when people started to realize — and here we are!”

Beneath the surface of Russian life, a stark generational conflict lurks. It is unclear when it will erupt, but it seems possible that one day it will.

Ilya Kostyukov was thrown out of college for his opposition to the war and now helps Russians desperate to avoid or leave the war’s front.

In Moscow, I asked Mr. Muratov what drove Mr. Putin to his reckless invasion of Ukraine.

“He developed utter contempt for the West,” Mr. Muratov said. “All these leaders and politicians would come to Moscow and go to Politkovskaya’s grave in the morning, and talk about human rights with representatives of civil society, and then they would go see Mr. Putin and sign deals for oil and gas.”

“After they left office,” he said, “Mr. Putin would buy them — former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, former French Prime Minister François Fillon — they were all happy to take Putin’s money. So he concluded all this Western talk of values was garbage.”

Mr. Putin, in Mr. Muratov’s view, also reached another conclusion: Western powers had exploited a period of post-Soviet Russian weakness to undermine the glory of the Red Army that had fought its way to Hitler’s Berlin in 1945. In effect, the West had insulted the 27 million Soviets lost to the war, among them Mr. Putin’s older brother. His father was badly injured.

The West did so by expanding NATO east toward Russia’s borders, a broken pledge in Mr. Putin’s view.

“So Putin decided to win the already finished World War II,” Mr. Muratov said. “He resolved to protect the result of that war. That is why we are told we are fighting Nazis and Fascists.”

The miraculous bloodless end of Soviet totalitarian Communism and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 were not bloodless after all.

A New State Ideology

For Mr. Putin, the war has expanded in character, becoming the culmination of a civilizational war against the West. It may unfold in Ukraine, but Moscow’s enemies lie beyond.

The United States, Europe and NATO are now consistently identified as sources of “outright Satanism,” in the recent words of Sergei Naryshkin, the director of Russia’s foreign intelligence service.

Being ideological, the war is doubly intractable. “There are currently no grounds for an agreement,” Dmitri S. Peskov, the Kremlin’s spokesman, told me. “We will continue the operation for the foreseeable future.”

Anti-Western invective has attained phantasmagorical proportions. It is part of an emergent state ideology that is setting a course for possibly decades of confrontation.

Thirty years after Russia — in the midst of the ardent liberal hopes of the 1990s — adopted a Constitution whose Article 13 said, “No ideology shall be proclaimed as State ideology,” Mr. Putin’s Russia is hurtling toward a new official ideology of conservative values.

The war has expanded into a civilizational conflict.

It is being passed from one generation to the next.

A new ideology extols the Orthodox Church, the fatherland, the family and the “the spiritual over the material.”

It turns a war of aggression in Ukraine into a defensive war against the West’s moral decay.

The indoctrination starts early.

The possibility of an amendment rescinding Article 13 has been raised by the justice minister, Konstantin Chuychenko, among others.

This anti-Western ideology is based around the Orthodox Church, the fatherland, the family and the “priority of the spiritual over the material,” as laid out in Mr. Putin’s decree on spiritual and moral values issued in November.

The enemy, it proclaims, is the United States and “other unfriendly foreign states,” intent on the cultivation of “selfishness, permissiveness, immorality, the denial of the ideals of patriotism” and “destruction of the traditional family through the promotion of nontraditional sexual relations.”

If the West was portrayed during the Cold War as the nightmarish home of ruthless capitalism, it is now, as Russia sees it, the home of sex changes, the rampages of drag queens, barbaric gender debates and an L.G.B.T.Q. takeover.

“For how long should Russia tolerate open warfare from the West using Ukrainian meat?” Sergei Karaganov, a well-connected Russian foreign policy expert, asked in an interview.

“There is a high risk of nuclear war, and it is increasing,” he said. “The war is a prolonged Cuban missile crisis, but this time with Western leaders who reject normal values of motherhood, parenthood, gender, love of country, faith, God.”

This scarcely veiled Russian nuclear threat is part of a relentless onslaught against the West. From late March to May, Russia signaled that a new phase of outright confrontation had begun.

In the first arrest of a foreign correspondent since the Cold War, Evan Gershkovich of The Wall Street Journal was detained on charges of espionage that are vehemently denied by the United States government and his newspaper. Four months on, he languishes in Moscow’s Lefortovo prison.

Outside a Moscow court during the hearing of the Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, the first Western journalist arrested since the Cold War.

A Halloween bash last year at a gay club in Moscow, where partying continues despite the state propaganda.

The Anglo-American School of Moscow, an institution at the core of Russian-American cooperation for almost 75 years, shut down for good on May 12 after a court ruling and charges by a local newspaper that it was propagating L.G.B.T.Q. values.

Mr. Putin will no doubt use this ideological onslaught and the war in Ukraine relentlessly in the run-up to Russia’s next presidential election, in March 2024. His re-election, nearly inevitable, would be for a renewable six-year term.

“Our presidential election is not really democracy, it is costly bureaucracy,” said Mr. Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman. “Mr. Putin will be re-elected next year with more than 90 percent of the vote.”

The only time that Mr. Putin’s popularity plunged was last September when a partial mobilization was ordered. “We saw the biggest overnight drop in support for Mr. Putin in 30 years of polling,” Denis Volkov, the director of Levada Center, the only major independent pollster in Russia, told me in Moscow. “Suddenly the war was here!”

A Russian conscript embracing his partner last year in Moscow.

Cadets running toward the Victory Museum in Moscow.

Mr. Putin’s approval rating fell to around 50 percent from 80 percent, according to Levada, which focuses on door-to-door polling. Support for Mr. Putin has since returned to around 80 percent, in so far as polling can be trusted in the current environment.

By insisting, against all evidence, that Ukraine is a nation run by Fascists and Nazis, and by suggesting that the West wants Ukraine to be another home of gender-transitioning moral decay, Mr. Putin has successfully turned a war of aggression into a defensive war, essential to save Russia from those intent on ripping apart its physical and moral fabric.

“What we see is not the measured language of an establishment in power for decades,” said Mr. Baunov, the fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “It has the ardor of revolutionaries, and it emanates from a major world power with a nuclear arsenal.”

Putin, the Romantic

A mirror effect is at work in this late Putin era. The accusations he levels at the West and Ukraine — aggression, fascism, nuclear threats — become his own actions. Russian-pulverized Mariupol in Ukraine in 2023 looks like nothing so much as Nazi-pulverized Stalingrad (now Volgograd) in 1943.

The vindictive fever churning inside the Russian leader came to a head on the eve of the war in Ukraine. The loss of Crimea, in particular, as the Soviet Union broke up was a festering wound because of the widespread Russian sentiment that it is a core part of the country’s history.

“Putin was obsessed with justice, as he saw it,” said Aleksei A. Venediktov, whose popular Echo of Moscow radio station was shut down soon after the war began. “He told me in 2014, ‘You might not like the annexation of Crimea, but it’s just.’”

“We did not see the Putin who was on a historical mission of revenge,” said Aleksei A. Venediktov.

Mr. Venediktov says he knows Mr. Putin well. He believes everyone, himself included, got the Russian leader wrong.

“We did not see the Putin who was on a historical mission of revenge,” he told me. “We thought he was a corrupt guy from a poor family who wanted yachts and palaces and girls and money. We did not see the K.G.B. officer who thought the loss of the Soviet Union was unjust. We thought he was a cynic. In fact, he was a romantic.”

Nationalism is not fascism, but it is an essential component of it. Its perennial essence is a promise to change the present in the name of an illusory past in order to forge a future vague in all respects except its glory.

“History for Putin is an instrument to shape current events. He is absolutely uninterested in historical truth,” said Oleg Orlov, a leading human rights activist for more than three decades at the head of Memorial, which was shut down in 2021.

Mr. Orlov, 70, is now on trial for “public actions aimed at discrediting the use of Russian Federation armed forces.” He faces up to three years in prison.

For years, Mr. Putin’s regime has deployed all means to re-energize and redirect history. “My History” theme parks spread, to remind Russians of their heroism, from resistance to the Mongols in the 13th century until the Nazi invasion. Children are indoctrinated through lessons and extracurricular activities built around military themes.

Children in Russia have been indoctrinated through lessons and extracurricular activities built around military themes.

Parades for Russians carrying images of forbears killed in past wars were dropped from Victory Day commemorations this year.

The march of millions of Russians carrying images of their dead forbears in parades across the country became a feature of the May 9 Victory Day celebration, marking the Russian triumph in the Great Patriotic War. This year, however, in a subdued ceremony, these so-called Immortal Regiment events were dropped.

“Perhaps there was a fear in the Kremlin that someone would march with a photograph of a son killed in Ukraine,” Géza Andreas von Geyr, the departing German ambassador to Russia, told me.

At the beginning of the war last year, Mr. Orlov stood alone on Red Square with a banner saying, “1945: A country victorious over fascism. 2022: A country where fascism is victorious.”

He told me that there were now two options. The first was that Mr. Putin would be replaced somehow, and that a period of reform would start, as under Khrushchev after Stalin.

“The second option, which is more realistic, is that the regime stays in place and Russia will be slowly dying,” Mr. Orlov said. “It will fall behind other countries, and to make this regime stable, the level of repression will rise.”

“History for Putin is an instrument to shape current events,” said Oleg Orlov, a leading human rights activist.

Mr. Putin almost certainly has enough of his country, and enough cash, behind him to pursue the war for at least another 18 months to two years, three Western ambassadors to Russia told me in Moscow.

I asked Mr. Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, if Russia sought more Ukrainian territory beyond the four provinces annexed.

“No,” he said. “We just want to control all the land we have now written into our Constitution as ours.”

Russia Turns in its Gyre

The fishery museum on Lake Baikal, a wooden building that has partly subsided into the water, is officially closed. But Ms. Rolikova, the innkeeper, thought it was important to see it, and so she opened the padlocked door to reveal a palimpsest of Russia over the past century.

Scattered here and there were barrels in which salted fish once lay, sleds, nets, benches and faded photographs of fishermen headed out in wooden boats onto the immense lake. I was reminded of the observation of Roland Barthes, the French philosopher, that in every old photograph lurks catastrophe.

Soviet posters from the time of the Great Patriotic War adorned the walls: “Big Fish to the Front Line!” “The Duty of Every Fisherman is to Exceed the Plan!”

A vision of vats of salted fish being hauled across thousands of miles of Russian steppe to nourish the Red Army battling its way to Hitler’s Berlin seemed to capture the immensity of the Soviet resolve and sacrifice that Mr. Putin insists he must honor through yet more war.

“Nobody came and asked us: Do we want this war or do we not?” Ms. Rolikova said.

On the road back to Ulan-Ude from Lake Baikal, the toll of Mr. Putin’s war to reverse history was inescapable.

The fishery museum at Lake Baikal where faded photographs and Communist-era posters capture Soviet resolve.

The small shrine near the Kremlin marking where the opposition politician Boris Y. Nemtsov was gunned down on Feb. 27, 2015.

In one cemetery lay Andrei Mezhov, a Marine, born in 2000 and killed on March 6, 2022, in Ukraine. He was from the nearby town of Talovka, had studied at the Baikal State University and served in the army in Vladivostok.

A Marine flag flapped in the wind above a bouquet of flowers. On it was the Marines’ motto, “Wherever we are, there lies victory.”

On each visit I made to a cemetery to see the graves of the war dead, F.S.B. agents would park their car 50 meters away, a gentle reminder.

On my last day in Moscow, I went to the Bolshoy Moskvoretsky Bridge beneath the Kremlin. A small shrine marks the spot where Boris Y. Nemtsov, a towering opposition figure, was gunned down on Feb. 27, 2015 — a flagrant political murder.

Somebody is always present at the shrine, watching over it, making sure there is a fresh bouquet of flowers. On this day, the task fell to Arkady Konikov, who told me: “Nemtsov was an honest politician, a very unusual thing. He was a brave man, a great man.”

The year before Mr. Nemtsov died, almost a decade ago, as the Russian-instigated fighting in the Donbas region of Ukraine began, he wrote on his Facebook page: “Putin has declared war on Ukraine. This is a fratricidal war. Russia and Ukraine will pay a high price for the bloody insanity of this mentally unstable secret-police agent. Young men will die on both sides. There will be inconsolable mothers and sisters.”

More recently, just before Mr. Gorbachev’s death on Aug. 30, 2022, Mr. Muratov, the Novaya editor, visited his friend as he lay in a Moscow hospital. The condition of the Soviet leader who decided to set Russians free, and whose funeral Mr. Putin would not attend, was grave. He could not understand much.

There was a big TV in his room. On it, playing over and over, were images of bombings and explosions in Ukraine. As Mr. Muratov left the room, he heard Mr. Gorbachev say: “Who could be happy because of this?”

Conscripts at the Alabino training site outside Moscow.

Roger Cohen is the Paris bureau chief. He has worked for The Times for 33 years and has served as a foreign correspondent, foreign editor and an Opinion columnist. In 2023, he won a Pulitzer Prize and George Polk Award as part of Times teams covering the war in Ukraine. More about Roger Cohen

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The New York Times · by Roger Cohen · August 6, 2023

4. U.S. companies are buying less from China as relations remain tense

Excerpts:

“China’s U.S. market share has fallen far more if the U.S. data is used than if the Chinese export data is used,” he said in an email. “There is no doubt about the recent weakness by the way — but some real doubt about the extent the U.S. really has decoupled with China.”

Shortcomings in U.S. trade policy are keeping some American buyers from shifting more factory orders out of China.

Since the expiration three years ago of a program that allowed goods from many developing nations to enter the United States duty-free, companies no longer have an incentive to shift their orders from China to those locations, said Steve Lamar, president of the American Apparel and Footwear Association. A similar program for dozens of African nations is set to lapse in 2025.

“The federal government has done a clear job of encouraging diversification away from China,” he said. “But it has not clearly suggested where that diversification needs to go.”

U.S. companies are buying less from China as relations remain tense

Chinese imports down 24 percent through May, and Mexico is now the U.S.’s top trading partner

By David J. Lynch

August 6, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by David J. Lynch · August 6, 2023

U.S. companies are accelerating efforts to reduce their dependence upon Chinese suppliers, even as officials in Washington and Beijing labor to put a floor under their sour relationship.

Through the first five months of this year, U.S. imports from China were down 24 percent from the same period one year ago, according to the Census Bureau. Companies such as HP, Stanley Black & Decker and Lego are among those that have been repositioning their supply lines for American consumers, either to avoid the risk of being pinched between rival superpowers or as part of a longer term strategy to produce goods closer to customers.

Either way, China’s role at the center of global manufacturing may be facing its stiffest challenge since the country joined the global trading system more than two decades ago. Mexico, Vietnam and Thailand are nibbling at China’s dominance, though they lack its size and world-class infrastructure.

A combination of political and economic forces is driving the supply chain makeover.

U.S. tariffs on roughly two-thirds of Chinese goods, imposed during the Trump administration, have cut into new orders. Wages for Chinese factory workers have risen, eroding one of the country’s competitive advantages. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state-centric economic strategy, related crackdowns on private companies and wary approach to the Biden administration have further chilled commercial ties.

“The behavior of the governments toward each other — the more hostile, confrontational stance — is starting to affect private-sector decision-making because it changes the risk profile,” said Adam Slater, lead economist for Oxford Economics in London.

Chinese products account for roughly one out of every six dollars Americans spend on imports, down from nearly one in four before the pandemic, according to Oxford data. Japan also is buying less from China. But European countries such as Germany and France are largely standing pat.

Foreign investors, meanwhile, are building fewer new Chinese factories, suggesting that other Asian countries will keep increasing their share of U.S. imports at China’s expense. Annual spending on new or “greenfield” sites in China fell from around $100 billion in 2010 to $50 billion in 2019 and hit just $18 billion last year, according to Oxford data.

“What we’re seeing from the U.S. decoupling seems set to continue,” Slater said. “The only real question is how far it spreads.”

The Biden administration has been putting a positive spin on U.S.-China trade, seeking to reassure the Chinese government that the United States wants only to “de-risk” commercial ties by moving critical supply lines to the United States or allied countries — not pursue an economic divorce.

Amid rising national security concerns, the administration has restricted exports to China of the most advanced semiconductors and plans soon to announce new limits on U.S. investment in Chinese technology sectors.

During a trip to Beijing in July, Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen said “record” high U.S.-China trade last year demonstrated “there is ample room for our firms to engage in trade and investment.”

But even before this year’s drop in U.S. purchases from Chinese supplies, trade between the two countries was shrinking in real, or inflation-adjusted, terms. Accounting for rising prices, last year’s $690 billion two-way trade was 7 percent lower than the pre-trade war peak in 2018, according to calculations by Alfredo Carrillo Obregon, a research associate at the Cato Institute.

The inflation-adjusted value of U.S. imports from China last year was down 12 percent from five years ago.

A senior Treasury official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations about the secretary’s remarks, said the inflation-adjusted total remained “highly significant and close to an all-time high.”

Earlier this year, Mexico became the United States’ top trading partner, as manufacturers increasingly favored regional supply networks rather than global ones. Mexico, Canada and China have taken turns occupying the No. 1 spot since the start of the 2018 trade war.

Vietnam and Thailand have emerged as leading alternatives for companies looking to diversify out of China while staying in the neighborhood. And India is attracting attention from manufacturers such as Apple, which plans to beef up its production of iPhones there.

The electronics industry is leading the push to new manufacturing locations. China’s share of U.S. personal computer imports fell to 45 percent last year from 61 percent in 2016, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence. Over the same period, Chinese suppliers’ share of U.S. printer imports fell to 23 percent from 48 percent.

Decisions made in countless boardrooms — not the White House — are behind the change.

“Governments don’t do reshoring. Companies do reshoring,” said Chris Rogers, head of supply chain research for S&P Global Market Intelligence.

HP Inc. is planning to make more of its business-oriented laptops in Mexico while boosting production of consumer models in Thailand. In a statement posted on its website last month, HP said it is adding in Mexico “incremental notebook PC production to serve customers throughout the region” and hopes to expand its existing printer manufacturing facility in Corvallis, Ore.

With 12,000 Chinese suppliers and a top research and development center in Shanghai, the company remains committed to China.

“We are always looking at ways to improve the resiliency of our global supply chain … One of the key lessons of the past three years is the need to have added flexibility, and a growing number of customers are demanding multi-source production,” an HP spokesperson emailed in response to questions.

Stanley Black & Decker is redesigning its supply chain to strip out $1.5 billion in annual costs by 2025. The toolmaker is consolidating plants; it closed a Chinese power tool factory in Shenzhen three years ago, and now serves the North American market from a plant in Mexico. “With our supply chain transformation, we have taken steps to improve responsiveness and delivery for our customers, accelerate innovation and time to market,” a spokesperson said.

Toymaker Lego also has been reducing shipments from China to the United States. In 2015-2017, an annual average of almost 18 percent of the company’s U.S. products came from China, according to S&P Global. That dropped to just 3 percent last year.

Mexico, which has long provided more than half of the company’s U.S.-bound shipments, including its most popular items, now accounts for 70 percent.

Lego has had a regional sourcing strategy for roughly 15 years, said Oliver Leach, the company’s senior communications manager. Lego serves the Chinese market from a factory in Jiaxing and expects to open a $1 billion factory in Vietnam next year to handle growth in Asia. In 2025, the company plans to open a new factory in Richmond to supply the Americas.

“By locating production and prioritizing suppliers close to our major markets this allows us to meet local demand quickly, shorten supply chains and reduce disruption and environmental impact of shipping products long distances,” he said.

Still, China remains the world’s factory, accounting for 31 percent of global manufacturing value added, compared with 17 percent for the second-ranked United States.

With modern ports, highways and high-speed rail, along with factory clusters that can rapidly adjust to changing conditions, China retains advantages that no other country can match. Chinese suppliers still dominate markets for goods such as electric vehicle batteries, kitchenware and aluminum door and window frames, S&P Global said.

“Countries like Mexico, India, and Vietnam are taking advantage of global supply chain realignments to nip at China’s share in world manufacturing but will not fundamentally alter its dominance anytime soon,” said economist Eswar Prasad, a senior professor of international trade policy at Cornell University. “The reality is that no other economy can match the scale and scope of China’s manufacturing sector, although the evolution of both domestic and external factors suggest that we have already hit or passed the peak share of China in world manufacturing.”

Some economists say the drop in Chinese shipments to the United States may not be as dramatic as the Census Bureau data suggests. Chinese government reports show a smaller decline.

U.S. and Chinese trade numbers have long disagreed, partly because they differ in their accounting for shipments via Hong Kong. But a bigger gap between the two sets of books opened during the trade war. U.S. companies appear to have underreported their imports from China to escape tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, according to a 2021 Federal Reserve research note.

Smaller Chinese shipments to the United States also reflect conditions in specific industries. Retailers such as Target and Walmart are ordering fewer Chinese goods while they focus on reducing unusually high inventories. And changes in the pan-Asian electronics trade also may be clouding the picture, as some products that originate in China are sent to Vietnam for some minor finishing touches before heading to the United States, according to economist Brad Setser, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

“China’s U.S. market share has fallen far more if the U.S. data is used than if the Chinese export data is used,” he said in an email. “There is no doubt about the recent weakness by the way — but some real doubt about the extent the U.S. really has decoupled with China.”

Shortcomings in U.S. trade policy are keeping some American buyers from shifting more factory orders out of China.

Since the expiration three years ago of a program that allowed goods from many developing nations to enter the United States duty-free, companies no longer have an incentive to shift their orders from China to those locations, said Steve Lamar, president of the American Apparel and Footwear Association. A similar program for dozens of African nations is set to lapse in 2025.

“The federal government has done a clear job of encouraging diversification away from China,” he said. “But it has not clearly suggested where that diversification needs to go.”

The Washington Post · by David J. Lynch · August 6, 2023

5. Former British Special Forces Instructor Now Training Ex-Soldiers How to Fight in Ukraine

Excerpts:

Before he takes anyone on for training, they have to be vigorously checked out by the SIA (Security Industry Authority) and by his own firm for any criminal activity or wrongdoing.

He turns away people who have failed in the military and the “Walter Mitty” types who indulge in fantasies and don’t comprehend the harsh realities of war.

He tells them this conflict is “a lot more bloody and gory than you can possibly imagine.”

The training his company offers he regards as of a higher standard than that offered by the Ministry of Defence here in the UK. “They do infantry training, while we deal with the threat to life training.”

Nobody knows how many foreign volunteer fighters there are in Ukraine, but estimates claim there are up to 20,000, of which 3,000 are from Britain.

Former British Special Forces Instructor Now Training Ex-Soldiers How to Fight in Ukraine

Rob Paxman says Kyiv’s elite troops are “the best I have worked with” and recent operations suggest UK-Ukraine military cooperation is paying dividends.

by Tony Leliw | August 6, 2023, 1:33 pm

kyivpost.com

A former soldier in the elite British Special Forces has said the recent attacks on the Crimea Bridge are further evidence of the effectiveness of the UK’s training of Ukraine’s special forces.

Rob Paxman, 55, who served as a corporal in the Special Air Service (SAS) and now runs Paradigm Security Solutions UK, said: “It’s an absolutely classic SAS offensive action.”

Asked about how good Kyiv’s most elite troops are, he adds: “They are probably the best special forces I have worked with.”

Paxman was not surprised by a recent article in the UK media claiming that British forces are training an elite Ukrainian commando brigade aimed at recapturing Crimea before Christmas.

“The SAS has been training Ukrainian Special Forces since the late 1990s, and they are very, very good,” he said.

According to reports, more than 2,000 soldiers are taking part in specialist exercises in a remote part of Dartmoor. Their goal is to strike Russian forces from the air, land and sea.

Armored units would also be supplied with new long-range missiles by the UK, US and Germany.

This news follows hot on the heels of Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov making clear Ukrainian forces would enter Crimea “soon.”

He even made a broadcast in Ukrainian and Russian to regions annexed by Russia saying: “The Donbas and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea will be coming home forever.

“We are going to find every traitor in Ukraine, wherever they might be. All of them will be destroyed. I say to all patriots: the time has come to act. Stay tuned. We’re coming to you.”

Other British involvement was revealed last year by the British media, detailing how the British Navy’s Special Boat Service (SBS) trained Ukrainian Commandos to help them recapture Snake Island, a rocky piece of land in the Black Sea, 22 miles (35 km) off Ukraine’s south coast.

The SBS taught Ukrainian combat divers how to operate underwater vehicles known as sea scooters and instructed them on how to search the coastline for explosives before they attacked Russian forces with a barrage of missiles, rockets and drones.

While he is no longer part of Britain’s special forces, Paxman’s company has been training foreign volunteers who have gone to Ukraine to fight against Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Speaking from his base in Shrewsbury, Rob, who trains people in how to work in conflict zones around the world, said he runs three courses for his would-be fighting volunteers.

These include 21 days of training in basic close protection, 16 days of advanced covert surveillance, and another 16 days of hostile environment training.

“It’s a series of courses bolted together to make a more rounded operator,” he said. He started the training two years ago when approached by a soldier who wanted to fight in Ukraine.

During training, they use simulations, which are special cartridges that fire colored paint-filled plastic projectiles which are used to mark targets much like paintballs, and airsoft guns which launch non-metallic spherical projectiles.

“We use these to prevent any injuries,” he said. “By the time they finish the training they are doing live firing on the ranges.”

Before he takes anyone on for training, they have to be vigorously checked out by the SIA (Security Industry Authority) and by his own firm for any criminal activity or wrongdoing.

He turns away people who have failed in the military and the “Walter Mitty” types who indulge in fantasies and don’t comprehend the harsh realities of war.

He tells them this conflict is “a lot more bloody and gory than you can possibly imagine.”

The training his company offers he regards as of a higher standard than that offered by the Ministry of Defence here in the UK. “They do infantry training, while we deal with the threat to life training.”

Nobody knows how many foreign volunteer fighters there are in Ukraine, but estimates claim there are up to 20,000, of which 3,000 are from Britain.

Rob is a one-man operation, giving specialist training. Over the last two years, he has trained 10 to 15 men and 5 or 6 women. He gets two to three inquiries a month.

From those that have gone to Ukraine, Rob has had positive feedback, including messages that some of them have picked up medals from their work in fighting and in training soldiers in Ukraine.

One of his recruits, Shareef Amin, from Bristol, received a bravery award from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and was recently featured in a BBC news bulletin.

He had suffered horrific injuries when his unit came under attack from Russian tanks in October.

Shareef, known as Rambo by his comrades, spent months in a military hospital in Odesa, where surgeons saved his arm and leg. The Afghan veteran was then brought back to Britain for surgery and recovery. He then did more training with Rob and other soldiers before heading back to the frontline in Ukraine.

Another important aspect of Rob’s work is security. He has trained around 600 people in the UK and a few thousand overseas in places like Libya, Syria, and Iraq. He joined the army in the early 1990s and left in 2000.

“I served in the Middle East, Bosnia, former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland,” he said. “Post-military I have spent a lot of time in Southern Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, doing reconstruction projects and securing supply lines.”

In the past, he has given security protection to high-profile figures that he can’t mention, including numerous heads of state, billionaires and Russian oligarchs, though that was before Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Although he has not been to Ukraine, he has been approached to do three security jobs and is hoping to visit soon.

With the Americans behind them, Paxman believes Ukraine can win this war.

“Americans are banking on the reconstruction of Ukraine, that’s where they are going to make their money, plus on the sales of arms and ammunition,” he says.

“The Russians are doing the same. They have got their oligarchs on the other side that are making an absolute packet out of this conflict.”

He adds: “At some stage, whether it will be months or a couple of years down the line, there will be a peace accord, and the reconstruction will go ahead. Many people will again make lots of money.”

kyivpost.com

6. Opinion: Giving the US Credit Where Credit Is Due

Excerpts:

In addition, this most recent aid package includes: additional munitions for Patriot air defense systems and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), Stinger anti-aircraft systems, howitzer artillery rounds, 32 Stryker armored vehicles, demolition equipment, mortars, Hydra-70 rockets and 28 million rounds of small arms ammunition.

All of these weapon systems and ammunition, especially the NASAMS and demolition equipment, will be vital to ensuring the AFU can successfully advance through the immense minefields and also survive the relentless aerial and artillery attacks from Russian forces as they advance meter by bloody meter.

So, as much as I criticize what I often call the glacial American (and NATO) support of Ukraine, the fact is that without the incredible and unprecedented support from the United States and NATO, the situation in Ukraine would almost certainly be much different, with an out-gunned AFU and Ukrainian partisans fighting heroically against a much larger and better equipped Russian invasion force.

With the continued – and hopefully unwavering – support of the United States and NATO, that grim scenario has not, and I believe, will not come to pass.

Opinion: Giving the US Credit Where Credit Is Due

kyivpost.com · by David DeBatto

Although there is much that the United States could still do to ensure Ukrainian victory, one mustn’t dismiss the huge level of support the Americans have already given.

By David DeBatto

August 5, 2023, 4:36 pm | Comments (4)

August 5, 2023, 4:36 pm |

Photo:Ukrinform

I will admit that on several occasions I have been a very harsh critic of my country, the United States, when it comes to not supplying Ukraine with the weapons and ammunition it needs not only to survive, but to defeat Russia on the battlefield. I have written about this many times on several media platforms, and for the most part I stand by my opinion on this critical issue.

Although I fully appreciate the tremendous amount of aid the US (and NATO) have given Ukraine, I am also very frustrated at the pace and types of military aid given to Ukraine. But I understand that politics – not threats of nuclear attack – is what is stopping the US and other NATO countries from supplying the military aid that Ukraine needs to actually win the war, not to just survive another bloody day.

Having said that, I also want to point out that the United States has been, and continues to be, by far the single largest provider not only of military aid to Ukraine, but all forms of aid.

For example, in terms of total aid to Ukraine since February 2022, the US has sent Ukraine $78.7 billion. Comparatively, the entire EU has sent US $76.2 billion. That is not an insignificant amount, to be sure, but keep in mind that is the total for 27 of the wealthiest economies on earth, versus the total contribution of just one (admittedly) wealthy nation, the United States. That should put this issue into some sort of perspective.

Moreover, in just military aid, America has sent $47.7 billion, while the next largest contributor, Germany, has sent $8.6 billion. I believe it can safely be said that the German economy, while experiencing some recent glitches, is by far the largest economy in Europe and can certainly find a way to contribute vastly more resources in support of Ukraine. But I must also add here that the transfer of 18 Leopard tanks and other armored vehicles to Ukraine is very much appreciated. Thank you, Germany.

On July 25, the Pentagon announced another aid package of $400 million including a variety of munitions for advanced air defense systems and a number of small, surveillance Hornet drones. Significantly, this is the first time the US has provided Ukraine with the mini-Black Hornet nano drone surveillance drones. These Norwegian made drones have already been used by the Armed Forces of Ukrainian (AFU) forces in the past to good effect, and this additional number will surely add to the ability of the AFU to detect and target the deeply entrenched lines of Russian forces currently opposing AFU advances during the counteroffensive.

In addition, this most recent aid package includes: additional munitions for Patriot air defense systems and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), Stinger anti-aircraft systems, howitzer artillery rounds, 32 Stryker armored vehicles, demolition equipment, mortars, Hydra-70 rockets and 28 million rounds of small arms ammunition.

All of these weapon systems and ammunition, especially the NASAMS and demolition equipment, will be vital to ensuring the AFU can successfully advance through the immense minefields and also survive the relentless aerial and artillery attacks from Russian forces as they advance meter by bloody meter.

So, as much as I criticize what I often call the glacial American (and NATO) support of Ukraine, the fact is that without the incredible and unprecedented support from the United States and NATO, the situation in Ukraine would almost certainly be much different, with an out-gunned AFU and Ukrainian partisans fighting heroically against a much larger and better equipped Russian invasion force.

With the continued – and hopefully unwavering – support of the United States and NATO, that grim scenario has not, and I believe, will not come to pass.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

7. A key U.S. ally wants to walk back its 'atrocious' embrace of China

Excerpts:

Italy’s decision may not only be economic.

Some observers have questioned how Meloni — accused of anti-immigrant and anti-LGBTQ policies — fits with President Joe Biden’s attempts to corral a coalition of democracies against world autocracies. Nevertheless she has made no secret of her desire to be seen by Washington as a reliable partner when it comes to both China and Russia, at a time of swirling questions over the mettle of other powers like France and Germany.

To that end she was in Washington last week, touting her credentials as leader of a "center-right government" and brushing off "false propaganda" about her political leanings, as she told Italy's Sky Tg24, owned by NBC News' parent company Comcast.

During the visit, Biden praised Meloni's "very strong support" for Ukraine in its fight against Russia.

“Part of this is about trying to put bilateral relations with Washington on a sounder footing,” said Francesco Sisci, a senior researcher at the Center for European Studies at China’s Renmin University. “Withdrawing from it now is a signal of a change of heart in the Western approach to China.”

A key U.S. ally wants to walk back its 'atrocious' embrace of China

Italy was the only G7 nation to sign on to China's Belt and Road Initiative. Now it says it wants to quit the plan and pivot back to Washington.

NBC News · by Alexander Smith

It has long been a sore spot for the Western alliance: Italy, a key partner of the United States, cozying up to China.

But now Rome is trying to back away — without angering the Asian giant 10 times its economic size — and Washington will be watching the balancing act closely as it pushes allies to reimagine their own delicate ties with Beijing.

The U.S. was deeply critical of Italy's decision in 2019 to become the only major Western economy to sign on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The BRI, as it’s known, is an unprecedented global infrastructure project that critics see as Beijing’s attempt to gain influence abroad and make smaller countries financially dependent on Chinese investment.

But this week Italy gave its strongest signal yet that it planned to pull out of the project.

Biden, Italian Prime Minister Meloni meet to discuss foreign policy

July 27, 202301:51

Signing the deal four years ago was “an improvised and atrocious act,” Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto told the Corriere della Sera newspaper on Sunday. “We exported a load of oranges to China, they tripled exports to Italy in three years.”

Crosetto added a more measured coda: “The issue today is, how to walk back without damaging relations? Because it is true that while China is a competitor, it is also a partner.”

These remarks followed months of reports that Italy planned to quit the BRI. Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s far-right prime minister, said her government would make a decision by December, when the pact between Rome and Beijing is due to renew.

Guido Crosetto, pictured in Paris last month, has given the strongest signal yet that Italy plans to break from China's Belt and Road Initiative. Geoffroy Van Der Hasselt / AFP via Getty Images

Whichever way Rome goes, it has already become a test case for today’s Western dilemma over China: How to continue tapping into the lucrative Chinese market while restricting certain areas, such as microchips, and holding Beijing to account over human rights — all without provoking a backlash.

Four years ago, Italy’s allies “thought we were selling our soul to the devil” by signing up to the BRI, said Filippo Fasulo, an expert in Italian-Chinese relations at the Italian Institute for International Studies, a think tank based in Milan. Today Italy wants to show it is “closely aligned with the U.S., Western camp” while keeping a “stable relationship with China,” Fasulo told NBC News. “The problem is, how to explain that to China?”

China’s hawkish Global Times newspaper on Monday derided the Italian defense minister's comments as resulting from “mounting pressure from the U.S. and the E.U.” as well as Italy's right-wing politics.

“The current government is quite pro-U.S.,” Wang Yiwei, a professor at the Center for European Studies at China's Renmin University, said of Italy. "It's their decision, but we feel regret."

Asked about the Italian defense minister’s comments, a spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry said in a statement Friday that the BRI “unleashed great enthusiasm and potential for bilateral cooperation.”

They added that some forces had “launched malicious hype and politicized the cultural exchange and trade cooperation between China and Italy under the Belt and Road framework in a bid to disrupt cooperation and create division.”

Indeed this was the future that successive Italian leaders dreamed of before the country signed up. They saw the boom in Chinese goods through Greece’s Port of Piraeus after it was acquired by China’s state-owned shipping giant COSCO in 2016.

Xi and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis shake hands at the Chinese-owned Port of Piraeus in November 2019.Orestis Panagiotou / AFP via Getty Images file

There was also an alluring historical narrative. The BRI is based loosely on the ancient Silk Road trade route, the same that was traversed by the medieval Venetian explorer Marco Polo. When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Italy to sign the deal in 2019, he described Polo as a “pioneer of cultural exchanges between East and West” and an inspiration for centuries of friendship since.

Though European countries had spoken warmly about the Chinese government in the years previously, by the time Italy inked its deal Western attitudes had begun to turn, with increased scrutiny on China's human rights record and President Donald Trump launching a trade war on Beijing.

At the time, however, Italy’s populist leadership “was a government of inexperienced people,” said Fasulo, the Italy-China expert. “They did not realize in time that the international scenario was changing so fast.”

The outcome — while not quite “a load of oranges” — has not been kind to Italy. Since signing the BRI, Chinese exports to Italy have risen 51%, but Italy's exports to China have gone up only 26%, according to Italian government figures.

Italy’s decision may not only be economic.

Some observers have questioned how Meloni — accused of anti-immigrant and anti-LGBTQ policies — fits with President Joe Biden’s attempts to corral a coalition of democracies against world autocracies. Nevertheless she has made no secret of her desire to be seen by Washington as a reliable partner when it comes to both China and Russia, at a time of swirling questions over the mettle of other powers like France and Germany.

To that end she was in Washington last week, touting her credentials as leader of a "center-right government" and brushing off "false propaganda" about her political leanings, as she told Italy's Sky Tg24, owned by NBC News' parent company Comcast.

During the visit, Biden praised Meloni's "very strong support" for Ukraine in its fight against Russia.

“Part of this is about trying to put bilateral relations with Washington on a sounder footing,” said Francesco Sisci, a senior researcher at the Center for European Studies at China’s Renmin University. “Withdrawing from it now is a signal of a change of heart in the Western approach to China.”

Alexander Smith

Alexander Smith is a senior reporter for NBC News Digital based in London.

Reuters contributed.

NBC News · by Alexander Smith

8. Why the Populist Right Hates Universities

Excerpts:

Universities are not usually understood, and even more rarely defended, as guardrail institutions that keep a democracy from succumbing to the tyranny of the majority, but that is one of their roles: to test, criticize, and validate the knowledge that citizens use to make decisions about who should rule them. Because this is the universities’ democratic rationale, the message for those who want to defend them should be clear. So long as academic freedom is considered a privilege of a liberal elite, it has no constituency beyond academia. Liberals should defend academic freedom not as the privilege of a profession, nor to preserve universities as bastions of progressive opinion, but because universities—like courts, a free press, and independent regulatory bodies—are essential restraints on majoritarian rule that keep us all free. That was precisely what the citizens of Budapest understood when they marched past the CEU’s doors, chanting, “Free country, free university.”

Why the Populist Right Hates Universities

American conservatives are taking cues from Hungary’s Viktor Orbán because elite education is a convenient enemy for authoritarian populists.

By Michael Ignatieff

The Atlantic · by Michael Ignatieff · August 6, 2023

When in the spring of 2017 Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister, made it illegal for the Central European University to offer U.S.-accredited degrees at its Budapest campus, everyone there knew that this was more than an attack on George Soros, the Hungarian American businessman and philanthropist who’d founded the CEU. I was then the university’s president and rector, posts I held from 2016 to 2021, so I witnessed the more than 50,000 citizens of Budapest who marched past our windows one Sunday a few weeks later in defense of our academic freedom. Chanting “Szabad orszag, szabad egyetem” (“Free country, free university”), they knew that their freedom was at stake too. Since coming to power in 2010, Orbán had neutered the country’s supreme court, rewritten Hungary’s constitution, radically curtailed the free press, and stigmatized foreign donations to its civil-society organizations. The chanting crowds knew that the attack on the university was another step in the consolidation of single-party authoritarian rule.

Orbán’s campaign against universities didn’t end with the CEU. First, he decapitated Hungary’s preeminent scientific institution, the Academy of Science, stripping it of its independent research institutes. Then he forced the privatization of a large part of Hungary’s own university system, packing its governing boards with party loyalists and pouring resources into the Mathias Corvinus Collegium, a new elite institution with the explicit task of providing a traditional and patriotic education for the Hungarian elite of tomorrow.

From the June 2019 issue: Viktor Orbán’s war on intellect

A larger project of geostrategic realignment was at work here. Having thrown out a U.S.-accredited institution, Orbán tried to replace it by offering a campus site on the Danube to Fudan University, a Shanghai-based institution that has recently acknowledged in its statutes the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party. He also took steps to distance himself further from NATO and the European Union.

As a young prodemocracy activist in 1989, Orbán was among the first to call for the repatriation of Soviet troops from Hungary. Three decades later, he has been an outlier among the leaders of NATO and EU member countries for his pro-Russian stance. Slow to condemn President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Orbán has urged Ukrainians to seek a peace deal and barred arms shipments across the Hungarian border that would aid the Ukrainian war effort.

Instead of balking at Orbán’s courtship of autocrats or his eviction of a higher-education institution with U.S. accreditation, the Trump administration and its ambassador in Budapest offered only token resistance to the attack on the CEU, seemingly on the principle that any enemy of Soros had to be a friend of theirs. Since 2019, foreign conservatives have been flocking to Budapest to sit at the feet of the Hungarian master. Some of them, such as Canada’s former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, just seem naive. Ostensibly seeking closer international ties between parties of the right, they seem to want to believe that, like them, he is a constitutional conservative—when he is, in fact, the authoritarian boss of a one-party state.

Others know exactly who he is, and that’s what attracts them: his despotic machismo. The list of American supplicants to the Orbán court includes political figures such as Mike Pence and Tucker Carlson, and right-wing intellectuals such as Rod Dreher, Christopher Rufo, and Patrick Deneen. The U.S. Conservative Political Action Conference has held one of its meetings in Budapest, and Orbán was invited to be a keynote speaker at the group’s conference in Dallas last year.

Bernard-Henry Lévy: How an anti-totalitarian militant discovered ultranationalism

American conservatives are not alone in harkening to the music from Budapest. Orbán’s systematic dismantling of liberal institutions in Hungary has made him the titular head of a global national-conservative movement, which currently includes Giorgia Meloni of Italy, Marine Le Pen of France, Santiago Abascal of the Vox party in Spain, Jaroslaw Kaczynski of Poland’s Law and Justice party, Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud in Israel, the far-right Sweden Democrats party, and now America’s MAGA Republicans. Each of these right-wing populists takes what they like from Orbán’s menu. Among its ingredients are a fantasy theory that liberals rule the world, a values campaign that denies gay men and women a place in the family, and protectionist economic policies that transfer public assets to party insiders. Add to this one-party rule that dismantles checks and balances, a politics that defines all opponents as enemies of the nation, and a vision of cultural struggle that identifies schools and universities as a crucial battleground for the control of future generations.

All together, this has made an intoxicating cocktail for 21st-century conservatives. The conservative task, Orbán proclaims, is nothing less than reversing the decline of the West. The hour is late. Godless liberalism, hedonism, permissiveness, and cosmopolitanism have done their fatal work. Decadence is at an advanced stage. At a party gathering in July, he thundered, “Today, ‘Western values’ mean three things: migration, LGBTQ, and war.” The idea that Western values might also include helping a democracy repel an invasion is as foreign to Orbán as it is to some far-right American conservatives.

The Germans have a word for this: Kulturkampf. Orbán’s appeal to American conservatives is that he understands politics as a struggle for cultural hegemony. It may be odd to think of American conservatives becoming followers of Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist who made winning hegemony central to his conception of political strategy, but they share a view of universities as axes of influence. Whoever has cultural hegemony, they believe, will secure political hegemony.

This is a far-fetched idea, by the way. Does anyone, of whatever political stripe, have any hope of exercising cultural hegemony in a country as wildly, exuberantly varied and divided as America? Nevertheless, the goal of cultural hegemony appears to be what drives Governor Ron DeSantis’s focus on gaining control of the Florida education system; rewriting the school curriculum on Black studies and other subjects; firing diversity, equity, and inclusion officers; and giving university trustees the power to review and dismiss tenured faculty in the state system. It also explains the importance DeSantis attaches to his recent takeover of New College, a respectable but little-noticed liberal-arts institution in Sarasota. In January, he packed the board of trustees with his appointees, who imposed a new management team, and dismissed the president—all in service of reinventing the institution as a Christian conservative bastion in his battle against “woke” ideology.

Why would a Republican presidential candidate waste political capital shaking up a small liberal-arts college, and how have universities’ curricula and administration become another battleground for the soul of America? Unlike former President Donald Trump, who doesn’t seem to care much about these issues, DeSantis seems obsessed with controlling the sector—betting everything on this struggle for cultural hegemony.

From the May 2023 issue: How did America’s weirdest, most freedom-obsessed state fall for an authoritarian governor?

In this regard, he is Orbán’s disciple. In Budapest, the CEU was a small, research-oriented social-science and humanities graduate school—hardly a thorn in the side of the Orbán regime, you might think. But that would be to misunderstand how Orbán saw us. To him, our university made a valuable symbolic target in his effort to fashion himself as a conservative culture warrior, fighting back the supposedly tentacular influence of liberal cosmopolitanism. Once universities are framed in this way, they become irresistibly attractive to self-promoting demagogues.

Universities have another crucial feature: They are vulnerable to populist attack. New College in Florida is a small institution, with loyal alumni to be sure, but hardly a powerhouse of political clout. It’s the kind of institution that would have had Stalin ask, archly, How many divisions does it have? The same was true of the CEU. It had some cultural capital, as George Soros’s émigré legacy in Eastern Europe, but Orbán realized that the CEU, as a small American-accredited institution operating in a foreign country with a growing but modest alumni base, was a sitting duck. These demagogues are too clever to pick a fight with someone their own size.

For this sort of right-wing populist, attacking colleges and universities also mobilizes the resentments of people who never went to university and may dislike, often justly, the entitlement that a college degree can confer on its beneficiaries. If a crucial component of the Trump-era Republican electorate comprises people who may not have graduated from high school, then an attack on universities is pure gravy for the demagogue. Similarly, for these angry voters, the downside of such an attack—weakening the scientific, technical, and cultural innovation that universities make possible—does not carry much weight.

Jacob Heilbrunn: Behind the American right’s fascination with Viktor Orbán

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, Kulturkampf attacks on universities are both definitional, in the sense of the leader’s brand, and diversionary. If a leader were serious about addressing the resentments of an excluded voter base, he wouldn’t focus on universities at all. Instead, he’d take a hard look at the power of corporations, their tax rates and tax avoidance, and their offshoring of jobs, not to mention their overwhelming control of the digital public sphere. That leader would look at the incomes of the richest citizens and see what could be done to transfer some of that wealth to improve schools, hospitals, clinics, and other public goods that give people, especially those without a college education, a fair start in life. But it’s so much easier to target universities and their supposedly cosseted liberal professors than to tackle the perquisites and power of the corporate-donor class that funds his campaigns.

Orbán is a master of such diversionary politics, happily courting liberals’ denunciations for his attacks on academic freedom while patiently getting on with his core business—which is to use state power to enrich his supporters. He once confessed to a friend of mine, a banker, that he had a lot of mouths to feed: He knows, as do other autocrats such as Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, that feeding friends is how authoritarians hold on to power.

Six years after Viktor Orbán started his campaign against the CEU, the conservatives who imitate him have grasped how convenient it is to make universities your enemy. These attacks on university autonomy and academic freedom—in U.S. states, in Narendra Modi’s India, and in Erdoğan’s Turkey—are principally about one thing: systematically weakening any institution that may act as an obstacle to authoritarian power. Although American conservatives, no less than their autocratic counterparts abroad, consistently portray their attacks on universities in pseudo-democratic terms—as attempts to protect the silent majority from the ideological hectoring of the liberal elite—their real agenda is to weaken democratic checks and balances.

Universities are not usually understood, and even more rarely defended, as guardrail institutions that keep a democracy from succumbing to the tyranny of the majority, but that is one of their roles: to test, criticize, and validate the knowledge that citizens use to make decisions about who should rule them. Because this is the universities’ democratic rationale, the message for those who want to defend them should be clear. So long as academic freedom is considered a privilege of a liberal elite, it has no constituency beyond academia. Liberals should defend academic freedom not as the privilege of a profession, nor to preserve universities as bastions of progressive opinion, but because universities—like courts, a free press, and independent regulatory bodies—are essential restraints on majoritarian rule that keep us all free. That was precisely what the citizens of Budapest understood when they marched past the CEU’s doors, chanting, “Free country, free university.”

The Atlantic · by Michael Ignatieff · August 6, 2023

9. Why Ukrainian Soldiers Have to Learn to Fight on YouTube and How to Change That

Train the trainer.

Excerpts:

In Weisz’s piece, he argued that the United States and its NATO allies should continue with the status quo of providing all large-scale formal training. Here is the challenge: The Ukrainian military has grown from a total of 250,800 personnel in 2015 to over one million strong since mobilization in 2022. To train as many soldiers as is required, it is imperative for NATO, volunteers, and contractors to work together — or at least in parallel — to keep up with demand. In our experience, Ukrainian soldiers are often left with no other option but to learn to use foreign aid and weapons from watching videos on YouTube. Our recommendation to teach Ukraine’s own instructors, providing them their own in-house uniform combined-arms maneuver training, helps solve this capacity issue right now and in the future without waiting on NATO or spending billions more in aid.

This recommendation acknowledges the obvious: The United States and other NATO allies have worked hard over the last decade with the Ukrainian political and military leadership to develop a modern combined-arms military. However, it would be a mistake to assume that Western training can keep pace with a demand that has far exceeded expectations. NATO is credited with training “tens of thousands” since 2014, with the bulk of those coming from the recent training and equipping of 36,000 soldiers, or nine brigades, since Russia’s special military operation in 2022. The problem is that “tens of thousands” only meets a small percentage of the Ukrainian military’s training demands for over a million servicemembers.

Why Ukrainian Soldiers Have to Learn to Fight on YouTube and How to Change That - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Paul Schneider · August 7, 2023

Erik Kramer and I answered the call early last year when Ukrainian commanders pleaded for volunteers to train them given the very limited opportunities to attend NATO training or any training with instructors of combined-arms maneuver. We believed in Ukraine’s plight and put our lives on hold believing we could make a difference, no matter how small or large. For those of us that joined the Ukraine Defense Support Group, we faced suicide drones, artillery barrages, and foreign intelligence service threats while conducting medical training and stabilizing patients near the front lines. We did so because we truly believe that Ukrainian lives are worth preserving and that efforts to bring this war to a swift conclusion are worth the personal risk.

As a former Special Forces ground force commander, I personally have lost soldiers in close combat, cried and trembled as I placed my hand on their coffins — coffins holding the remains of someone who was once young, full of life, and a close friend — then delivered neatly folded flags to their widows and children. In Ukraine I have heard the heartfelt cries of commanders as they ask if they will ever be alright after losing over half of their unit, composed of their close friends. To stop this incredible loss of life is why we started the Ukraine Defense Support Group.

Become a Member

Like many volunteers in Ukraine, we sought numerous funding streams to continue to offset the great personal expense we incurred to keep operations running, but the organization is essentially a not-for-profit in its mission. As founders and directors of the organization, we have not taken a single dollar in profit. The only reason we are not a not-for-profit is because our activities are inconsistent with interpretations of U.S. or Ukrainian tax law for that specific entity.

In a recent article for War on the Rocks, Rudy Weisz pushed back against an article that we wrote detailing significant challenges that the Ukrainian military faces with offensive operations. He also disagreed with our recommendation for month-long short-duration combined-arms training despite relying on his own counter-example of a 2015 training event in Ukraine that featured just eight-week training intervals. The piece also stood in stark contrast to our efforts and the harsh realities that we had personally seen while training the Ukrainian military. Erik and I believe that a “train the trainer” program could overcome several of the cultural and endemic challenges that the Ukrainian military members are facing in combat. Our recommendation is based on the fact that we have literally done it on a limited scale over the last nine months. In Ukraine. That this could be done is because it has been done — on the ground by U.S. volunteers.

Addressing the Real Problem

In Weisz’s piece, he argued that the United States and its NATO allies should continue with the status quo of providing all large-scale formal training. Here is the challenge: The Ukrainian military has grown from a total of 250,800 personnel in 2015 to over one million strong since mobilization in 2022. To train as many soldiers as is required, it is imperative for NATO, volunteers, and contractors to work together — or at least in parallel — to keep up with demand. In our experience, Ukrainian soldiers are often left with no other option but to learn to use foreign aid and weapons from watching videos on YouTube. Our recommendation to teach Ukraine’s own instructors, providing them their own in-house uniform combined-arms maneuver training, helps solve this capacity issue right now and in the future without waiting on NATO or spending billions more in aid.

This recommendation acknowledges the obvious: The United States and other NATO allies have worked hard over the last decade with the Ukrainian political and military leadership to develop a modern combined-arms military. However, it would be a mistake to assume that Western training can keep pace with a demand that has far exceeded expectations. NATO is credited with training “tens of thousands” since 2014, with the bulk of those coming from the recent training and equipping of 36,000 soldiers, or nine brigades, since Russia’s special military operation in 2022. The problem is that “tens of thousands” only meets a small percentage of the Ukrainian military’s training demands for over a million servicemembers.

The trends in the war are also disconcerting. Despite the allocation and expenditure of well over $150 billion in U.S. and NATO aid, Ukraine’s current offensive operations have, as Michael Kofman and Rob Lee recently noted, and a German reporter on the front lines stated, largely stalled and are very likely to become a prolonged war of attrition. According to our field research and other reports, the rate of attrition of personnel and equipment strongly indicates a continued unimaginable loss of life that severely reduces Ukraine’s ability to maintain offensive operations if additional training needs are not met. Units with less training are far more likely to see higher attrition rates, which further accelerates the need for replacements.

To meet mounting personnel requirements in Vietnam, the United States started drafting soldiers who would not have met previous draft requirements under Project 100,000. These soldiers, over 350,000 in total, also received less in-person hands-on training as then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, informed by think tanks and generals, believed that significant advances in weapons and other technology such as video training would supplement their time-constrained training needs. Those soldiers died at a rate nearly three to five times that of their peers and after the war this prompted reform in requirements for military service. Overwhelmingly superior tech and equipment could not in fact supplement their personnel losses and could not win that war. The attrition of trained personnel is a vicious cycle that, once started, is challenging to interrupt. In fact it may already be too late for Ukraine to interrupt their current cycle of trained personnel attrition if it is not immediately and aggressively addressed.

Ukrainian commanders need to develop their own internal capacity to increase soldier training. Given that we have on-the-ground experience and expertise working in developing indigenous partner capacity, we offer that instructors like us are uniquely qualified to modify existing training approaches for the Ukrainian military. Pundits and even experienced NATO commanders who have not stood in Ukraine recently and have not spoken to front line commanders cannot be faulted for not seeing ground-level issues, but they should seek to understand these issues before making too-broad assumptions about how to train Ukrainian forces as this conflict continues.

Our Approach: A Quintessential Method

Our personal motto is De Oppresso Liber, to liberate the oppressed. In Ukraine, Erik and I have gone to where our partners are, shared their risks to understand their exact issues, then developed their cadre and organized their training — all while adapting to each unit’s unique combination of equipment and personnel to build their capacity to not just fight, but to prevail in armed conflict. Finally, we advise Ukrainian units when they go to the front lines and employ their training. We stay in near-constant contact with many of them as they ask for advice while they serve their time on the front, and this also serves to directly feed us relevant real-time observations. These observations allow us to adapt training immediately in response to rapidly changing enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as advances in Ukrainian capabilities — something that longer, more doctrinally rigid training programs abroad cannot do.

Our “train-the-trainer” program is the quintessential method in the Special Forces organization phase of unconventional warfare. This phase is where we develop the cadre and organic capacity of a partner nation. This is what we have done in Ukraine and the results of our work have been some of the most personally rewarding of our professional careers.

We believe that many outsiders, to include former experts, are not fully aware of what it is like for front-line Ukrainian units. From our personal experience, we know that many reports that filter out of the conflict are heavily sanitized and so it is difficult for outsiders to truly comprehend. In Weisz’s article, he states that that other Special Forces teams training in 2019 told him that “the Ukrainians [eagerly] approached training with the U.S. military.”

This is undeniable and is evident in our own personal experience. However, there is a big difference between having the will to modernize and adopt new methodologies, and actual widespread uniform modernization. The challenges that we identified in our previous article for War on the Rocks have prevented wide-scale implementation of this training. In my experience, having trained virtually all types of units in Ukraine and many others around the world, Ukrainian soldiers are some of the best and most attentive students I have ever had the pleasure of working with. They just need help in facilitating these methodologies given significant evolving challenges.

We also believe that training should take roughly 30 days. This is based, in part, on previous U.S. efforts to train the Ukrainian armed forces. In 2015, the six-month Operation Fearless Guardian that trained rotations of approximately 200 soldiers, which Weisz cited as his main example for maintaining the status quo, had just eight weeks of tactical training. That entire operation also trained just 900 soldiers. At the end of it, they were far from “modernized” — then-President Petro Poroshenko addressed the culmination of the event by saying “the training would give a New Face to Ukraine’s conscript army, which is poorly trained and equipped.” Each eight-week training rotation of Operation Fearless Guardian also resulted in live fire exercises at just the “squad and then platoon level.”

We have no doubt that higher-level training likely occurred, but our organization does higher-level, company live-fire exercises as early as the five to 10-day mark. We have chosen to accelerate training and accept more risk because most Ukrainian units have just three to six weeks of training before going to the front lines. This is because of the demand to replace or reconstitute units that regularly see attrition rates as high as 70 to 80 percent before they can be rotated out of their position. The harsh reality of large-scale combat operations allows little luxury beyond a short individual basic course followed by a condensed three-week collective training program. It is also important to realize that most of this training has to be conducted with little ammunition and without most of the equipment they will be expected to fight with, as the priority for limited resources must go to the front. It is very common that military units pick up their equipment on the way to the front or fall in on a rotating unit’s equipment that they leave behind in the trenches. The training for Ukrainian forces in Europe has been a great benefit, but it requires significantly longer periods of time that cannot keep up with requirements to replace front-line units.

This exceptionally high attrition rate, which Konrad Muzyka recently cited on the Russia Contingency podcast, also means that lessons taught to students or units are essentially lost after a single combat rotation. This is why reliance on foreign NATO instructors abroad does not create enough capacity and will not in the foreseeable future. The continued attrition rate also means that most units are severely under-manned and lack offensive capability. Almost every company we have encountered resembles a U.S. platoon in strength.

To send whole units off for months, as required by NATO training programs, means that remaining soldiers in those units must go forward missing large elements of combat power. Every day in Ukraine we would have multiple units asking for training and we would often train almost every single day. Without widely available combined-arms style training that is effective many units have reverted back to older and more available Soviet training, YouTube, and legacy NATO doctrine found in publications like the Ranger Handbook to fill the considerable gaps.

The unprecedented access that the Ukraine Defense Support Group has had at the National Academy of The State Border Guards, the military academy of the Ministry of Interior, has resulted in the internal capacity of Ukraine’s most senior instructors to teach uniform combined-arms training without any additional assistance. This “indigenous” approach allowed them to provide their own uniform combined-arms training for the brigade and battalion commanders and staff of over 15,000 soldiers in both the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense in just one month. This was largely in part because it was already adapted to their specific nuanced circumstances and needs.

Another critical difference to our approach is that we helped to develop Ukraine’s adapted doctrine and laws. These modifications further enabled immediate implementation. Instead of just teaching our doctrine and leaving them to shoehorn it to their unique circumstances, we first took the time to understand the Ukrainian military’s varied conflicts and issues, then worked with senior leaders to overhaul old doctrine and rules that prevented NATO training from being uniformly implemented. We were allowed to work at that strategic level because we demonstrated value, credibility, and reliability in person, in Ukraine. This is what Green Berets can do. This is also what separates us from virtually all other training offered in Ukraine and makes us and other western “contractors” uniquely capable of providing instruction.

The whole effort at the National Academy was with just eight Ukraine Defense Support Group instructors including interpreters. It also cost the U.S. taxpayers nothing. If properly scaled it would supplement all of Ukraine’s needs very quickly and leave us without a job, because the Ukrainian military would have all the tools they need to continue that effort without external assistance.

Problem-Solution Match

What is the real problem with NATO training? In our experience, Ukrainian soldiers are generally very appreciative of the training they have received. However, many soldiers have faced significant challenges in implementing that training. Many units were trained by different NATO partners, so the doctrine they were taught was not uniform. This means that the units could not readily work together or achieved shared understanding to work seamlessly with adjacent units. The trained units also did not have uniform personnel and equipment. It was also common that they would not have access to the equipment they were expected to deploy with. In our experience, soldiers felt that they did not actually get significant hands-on experience with specific equipment, and that training was often based on theoretical or simulated scenarios with instruction relying heavily on old, approved NATO-member doctrine training programs.

Most of the combined-arms training has not been adapted for the Ukrainian battlefield. Compounding this issue is that most combined-arms training is based on integrated and interdependent concepts such as targeting cycles, sustainment systems, and medical systems. For example, NATO trainers can teach a Ukrainian soldier how to use a medical evacuation form. However, if there are no uniform communications protocols to make a radio transmission with, or a person on the other end who understands the shorthand transmission, the value of this training is greatly reduced. Worse, it can be completely useless if they cannot provide medical evacuation due to a sheer lack of equipment — an issue that Lee has pointed out on War on the Rocks.

Another major issue is that whole cohesive units are not always participating in NATO training. Ukrainian units would be given “slots” to train, and in an effort to maximize the benefits of these courses many units would send a couple of their best to attend the courses, and then attempt to extract what they learned and adapt this to their varied specific organic personnel and equipment situations. Most of the men sent were junior soldiers. Officers were expected to manage almost all aspects of training in Ukraine given a near complete lack of non-commissioned officer cadre and were therefore incapable of attending. This means that commanders often did not have the chance to receive the training or methodology.

As such, and at no fault to NATO, the Ukrainian military has struggled to adapt to the rapidly changing threats and demands on the battlefield, and has largely moved away from NATO style combined-arms tactics in the face of a challenging offensive. In contrast, with understanding of these complex issues, Ukraine Defense Support Group members always asks training units — who invariably all have different weapons systems — what equipment and personnel they have or are expected to have so we can train whole units including commanders on realistic scenarios and real expected missions. These are all things that smaller groups working with the Ukraine Armed Forces can do in-country.

Considering all these observations earned through genuine in-person relationships, sharing their risks, and applying years of expertise adapted to Ukraine’s needs, we are able to address each unit’s exact personnel, equipment, time constraints, and unique mission considerations to give them the tools to maximize their combat power in offensive operations. One thing that also separates our efforts from other known efforts is that we can directly influence doctrine and legal changes. A low-cost indigenous approach like ours that costs less than a single tank also directly complements current NATO efforts and could potentially save billions in additional aid. The most important thing, though, is that our recommendations could result in tens of thousands of lives being saved. That is hundreds of thousands of parents and fellow Ukrainians who would not need to bury their sons and daughters.

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Paul Schneider is the co-founder of the Ukraine Defense Support Group. He is a former commander in U.S. Special Forces who retired to pursue humanitarian efforts that included evacuating his former Afghan allies and U.S. citizens in 2021. After Russia’s invasion in early 2022, Paul then volunteered to help humanitarian efforts in Ukraine and has been an instructor to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Paul Schneider · August 7, 2023

10. Delivering the Army of 2030

Excerpts:

The Army 2030 plan follows the priorities provided in the 2022 National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, which identified China as the Defense Department’s pacing challenge and Russia as an acute threat, and maintained North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations as persistent threats. The document also notes that the character of war has changed. It cites the early examples found in Russian operations in Georgia, Moscow’s follow-on invasion of Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the current war in Ukraine. Army leaders also study China’s military reforms. The Chinese Communist Party has continued to invest in capabilities to deny others’ aerial and maritime freedom of access to littoral areas in the islands that ring China. Our understanding of future warfare is further informed by years of experiments, studies, and wargames.

Rather than locking in requirements early and following a long development process that may be outmatched by competitors, Army leaders are adjusting our procurement process to adapt to the rapid pace of technological innovations.

As an example, mid-tier acquisition authority allowed the Army to accelerate the delivery of the Next Generation Squad Weapons system by years, delivering greatly improved capabilities over current systems. The war in Ukraine has provided an opportunity to make several observations on the character of warfare and the implications of rapid technological adaptation. Based on what we’ve seen in Ukraine, the Army has greatly accelerated the procurement and integration of new capabilities such as lethal unmanned systems known as loitering munitions. When combined with tough, realistic training, continued leader development, and organizational modifications, new materiel solutions can increase the lethality and survivability of our formations. The Army also has the support of Congress to assess various acquisition pathways/authorities using a “buy, try, modify/decide” methodology to rapidly target existing industry solutions while continuing to refine requirements for enduring capabilities.

Achieving the Army of 2030’s goals also requires implementing significant organizational and doctrinal innovations and improving professional military education and training so our people have the skills and knowledge required to win multidomain conflicts. As the 40th Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. James McConville has noted, “This bold transformation will provide the Joint Force with the range, speed, and convergence of cutting edge technologies that will be needed to provide future decision dominance and overmatch required to win the next fight.”

Delivering the Army of 2030 - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Gen. James Rainey · August 6, 2023

The U.S. Army is transforming how it prepares to fight and win the nation’s wars. Senior Army leaders developed fresh concepts and logic to guide the Army’s most significant transformation in the past 40 years to ensure the service retains the capability to defeat current and future adversaries. The Army plans to do this by maintaining an advantage in speed of decision-making, an ability to create a shared understanding of the battlefield, and an overmatch in lethality in time and space. Army leaders bear a moral obligation to ensure our Army, as part of the joint force, is ready to fight and win the nation’s wars now and in the future.

Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth charged Army leaders to establish a sustainable strategic path to transform from a counter-insurgency–optimized force toward a force prepared for the challenges of any major power conflict. Unveiled last fall as the organizing theme of the Association of the United States Army’s annual meeting, Army 2030 is the service’s deliberate, budget-informed, multiyear plan that prioritizes people and balances maintaining warfighting readiness with the need to adapt our equipment, organization, and training to meet an evolving threat by major competitors. We believe the Army must adjust the way it is organized to fight to meet the challenges of the future battlefield. The experience of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan led the Army to favor building small units, capable of operating independently from their parent organizations in a counter-insurgency environment.

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine provides the U.S. Army an ongoing opportunity to study how technology changes the battlefield and the enduring challenges of state-on-state conflict. The Army will shift to a model that empowers theater armies and corps to work with our sister services, allies, and partners to converge fires, leverage nonlethal effects, and deliver logistics support. Divisions must be able to provide intelligence, deep fires, and logistics to ensure the survivability and dominance of brigade combat teams on future battlefields.

Strategic Imperative for Change

The Army 2030 plan follows the priorities provided in the 2022 National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, which identified China as the Defense Department’s pacing challenge and Russia as an acute threat, and maintained North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations as persistent threats. The document also notes that the character of war has changed. It cites the early examples found in Russian operations in Georgia, Moscow’s follow-on invasion of Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the current war in Ukraine. Army leaders also study China’s military reforms. The Chinese Communist Party has continued to invest in capabilities to deny others’ aerial and maritime freedom of access to littoral areas in the islands that ring China. Our understanding of future warfare is further informed by years of experiments, studies, and wargames.

Rather than locking in requirements early and following a long development process that may be outmatched by competitors, Army leaders are adjusting our procurement process to adapt to the rapid pace of technological innovations.

As an example, mid-tier acquisition authority allowed the Army to accelerate the delivery of the Next Generation Squad Weapons system by years, delivering greatly improved capabilities over current systems. The war in Ukraine has provided an opportunity to make several observations on the character of warfare and the implications of rapid technological adaptation. Based on what we’ve seen in Ukraine, the Army has greatly accelerated the procurement and integration of new capabilities such as lethal unmanned systems known as loitering munitions. When combined with tough, realistic training, continued leader development, and organizational modifications, new materiel solutions can increase the lethality and survivability of our formations. The Army also has the support of Congress to assess various acquisition pathways/authorities using a “buy, try, modify/decide” methodology to rapidly target existing industry solutions while continuing to refine requirements for enduring capabilities.

Achieving the Army of 2030’s goals also requires implementing significant organizational and doctrinal innovations and improving professional military education and training so our people have the skills and knowledge required to win multidomain conflicts. As the 40th Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. James McConville has noted, “This bold transformation will provide the Joint Force with the range, speed, and convergence of cutting edge technologies that will be needed to provide future decision dominance and overmatch required to win the next fight.”

Adapting to the Changing Character of War

The governments in Russia and China are increasingly challenging the existing rules of the international order. To retain a military advantage, the U.S. Army must address the threat they and other adversaries pose across a wide range of challenges. First, technology is changing the scale, speed, and transparency of the battlefield. Sensors will saturate the future battlefield, rendering challenges for any force to avoid detection or achieve surprise. Ubiquitous and cheap sensors — cell phones, commercial drones, and increasingly accessible sophisticated space-based assets — are becoming available to a wider range of actors. A military force able to immediately link these sensors to extended-range weapons capable of precisely hitting moving targets will have a distinct advantage over any adversary. To counter this threat, both sides will need to employ electronic warfare and target space-based assets to disable sensors or affect the ability of distributed forces to coordinate action. Future military forces can expect to face swarms of unmanned aerial systems, extended-range rockets, maneuvering warheads, and hypersonic missiles that will force it to disperse across the battlespace, while simultaneously confronting ground forces by using technology that increases the lethality of these small teams of soldiers and vehicles.

The changing character of warfare also means the U.S. homeland will no longer be a sanctuary. Cyberattacks on networks and critical infrastructure combined with mis- and disinformation campaigns pose a significant nonkinetic threat in any future conflict. These campaigns will target the U.S. population, aiming to manipulate the American people, sow discord, stall political decisions, and disrupt or delay our ability to mobilize and deploy forces. Additionally, China and Russia can strike the homeland from air and maritime weapons with long-range missiles and may strike through sabotage by operatives within the United States. While we assess our adversaries will only kinetically strike our homeland if they perceive an existential threat to their regime, the fact that they possess the ability to directly attack the United States requires us to factor that into our planning considerations.

How the Army of 2030 Will Fight

For the U.S. military to maintain dominance on the future battlefield, the Army is embracing comprehensive change affecting how we recruit, retain, train, and organize for war. The power of this transformation resides in how all of the pieces work together to deliver a decisive advantage now and into the future. Last fall, the Army published Field Manual 3-0, Operations, transitioning multidomain operations from concept to doctrine. This doctrine is an evolution of multiple previous concepts, including Air-Land Battle, full spectrum operations, and unified land action. It also encompasses lessons learned from over two decades of counter-insurgency and observations of more recent military operations, reflecting the changing character of war and China as the pacing challenge. Multidomain operations require commanders to synchronize effects from land, air, sea, space, and cyber to defeat an adversary in concert with our allies and partners as part of the joint force. The greatest distinction between the United States and China or Russia is this strong and resilient network of willing and reliable allies and partners that the United States, especially the Army, has built and maintained over decades.

The most important factor to winning on the future battlefield is not a new piece of equipment or concept, but our people: the highly skilled soldiers, leaders, and commanders who create cohesive teams that are highly trained, disciplined, and fit to fight and win. Experienced and well-trained soldiers and leaders identify opportunities and act independently to achieve the overall intent without specific orders accelerating the speed of decision-making and creating overmatch at multiple levels. The ability to recruit and develop the best performing soldiers and leaders at scale and echelon is the U.S. Army’s most significant asymmetric advantage.

Furthermore, Army leaders are professionally committed to providing our nation’s sons and daughters with the equipment necessary to prevail. With its technological investments, the Army seeks to maintain a dominant advantage that saves lives by deterring aggression and, if necessary, defeating adversaries in conflict as rapidly as possible. Finally, to maximize the effect of our new doctrine, new equipment, and existing talent, the Army must relook how it organizes to fight by echelon.

Organizing to Fight in Large-Scale Combat Operations

For the better part of two decades, the brigade combat team was the U.S. Army’s primary fighting formation at the tactical level. This shift sustained the rotational mission requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. As we have observed combat in Ukraine and multiple simulated large-scale exercises, successful operations require the skills, experience, and capacity found at the higher echelons of theater army, corps, and divisions. Army 2030 prioritizes investments across echelons that will deliver battlefield and theater overmatch.

Theater armies play essential roles in both competition and conflict. Theater armies plan and execute active campaigning in support of combatant commander priorities with exercises, bilateral engagements, and forward-positioning capabilities to deter aggression. Large-scale combat with either China or Russia would require multiple corps of ground forces from many nations, and we must reinvest to expand the capacity of our Army service component commands from an economy of force echelon to a warfighting headquarters. U.S. Army-Pacific and U.S. Army-Europe/Africa must have the capacity to synchronize effective campaigning and be prepared to lead not only Army forces, but also formations drawn from our sister services, allies, and partners in conflict.

To enable a theater army’s increased responsibilities, the Army is investing in theater-controlled organizations like the multidomain task force, security force assistance brigade, theater fires command/element, theater strike effects group, theater information advantage element, and theater military intelligence brigade. Multidomain task forces are purpose-built formations capable of coordinating and integrating cyberspace, electromagnetic activities, and space capabilities with long-range surface fires to deny enemy commanders the ability to prohibit friendly forces from operating in any land, air, or sea area. Security force assistance brigades develop the capabilities of our foreign partners through advising and strengthening relationships. Theater fires commands or theater fires elements provide theater commanders with the dedicated command and control capability to develop targets and coordinate assigned and joint-provided fires capabilities. Theater strike effects groups synchronize task-organized ground-based space and high-altitude forces, while theater information advantage elements coordinate the information advantage capabilities across the theater. Finally, theater military intelligence brigades provide indications and warnings and multidisciplined intelligence to these and other theater formations and the joint force. Adding these capabilities to theater armies ensures combatant commanders have the necessary tools to synchronize ground force capabilities with the joint force to ensure continued dominance and deterrence over the growing Chinese and Russian threats.

With the theater focused on integrating the theater joint fight, the joint task force–certified Army corps will be charged with the responsibility to converge capabilities from all domains in support of the theater operational objectives. Corps are the Army’s primary echelon for synchronizing and delivering multidomain effects. A corps staff must synthesize the vast amount of data received from land, air, the electronic spectrum, and space sensors to create a shared visualization of the complex battlefield and then set conditions for divisions to dominate the close fight. Corps commanders bear responsibility for shaping the deep battle by synchronizing the delivery of long-range fires like missiles, aircraft, and unmanned vehicles with cyber, space, or information operations to disrupt an adversary’s operational level of operations. A key enabler for the corps is the Army’s contribution to the objectives of joint all-domain command and control. The unified network and interoperable command and control systems provide a corps with the ability to integrate sister services, allies, and partners into the “sensor, to shooter, to sustainer” concept at the heart of multidomain operations. Joint all-domain command and control principles will also help counter adversary attempts to disrupt our command and control in space or cyberspace. Army investments in corps headquarters’ capabilities enable command of joint and multinational forces in support of the theater army and combatant commander.

Army 2030 divisions serve as the primary tactical formation on the future battlefield because of their ability to synchronize maneuver with effects to place brigade combat teams in a position of advantage. Delivering the enabling capabilities to the division level allows these commanders to allocate the weight of the main effort and shift quickly to support brigade combat team commanders in the close fight. These commanders are therefore freed to concentrate on maneuvering their forces, offloading the more complex allocation and coordination challenges to division commanders who retain the staff and connectivity to connect sensors, shooters, and sustainers, allowing them to visualize and act faster than an enemy despite the complexity of large-scale combat operations. For example, reinforcing division artillery commanders with more capabilities will better enable the division to mass fires at a decisive point or exploit an emerging adversary vulnerability. Division air defense battalions allow division commanders to place limited air defense capability where most needed. Division-level engineers, particularly in armored formations, will be far more capable of executing complicated contested river crossing and breaching operations. Consolidating enablers at the division level also improves the training, readiness, and employment oversight of unique skillsets and equipment for engineers, cyber, intelligence, electronic warfare, and artillery soldiers.

Army 2030 retains the brigade combat team formation’s advantages in lethality and speed of decision-making while reducing its size to emphasize strategic mobility, tactical maneuverability, and survivability through dispersion across the battlefield. Current brigade combat team commanders lack the capabilities to serve as the primary tactical unit on a battlefield dominated by sensors and high-responsive fires without guaranteed air dominance. Freeing commanders from coordinating the responsibility for synchronizing the growing list of lethal and nonlethal effects enables them to remain mobile and engaged, fighting from tank turrets or dismounted rather than being vulnerable while tied to command posts. On a future battlefield, this will not only keep them alive, but it will also make them more lethal and dominant in a close fight.

None of these organizational changes stand alone but work in concert to meet the challenges of the future battlefield. Army 2030 delivers vastly different capabilities at the division, corps, and theater levels because the threat on the future battlefield is more complex and technology far more advanced than envisioned under Air-Land Battle. Army 2030 echelons are purpose-built to deliver varying capabilities to each echelon, enabling our Army to win on the future battlefield, thus sending a clear deterrent signal to any potential adversary.

Conclusion

Army leaders recognize that the force optimized over the past 20 years to support counter-insurgency operations must undergo major changes to ensure it is prepared for large-scale combat against a major military power. Cheap and abundant sensors, paired with increasingly precise long-range fires and space, electronic warfare, and cyber capabilities, are changing the character of warfare and the type of force best suited for the battlefield. Army 2030 is the Army’s transformation plan to deliver the force required to deter aggression by maintaining a clear military advantage. This requires Army leaders to balance our ability to respond to today’s challenges with the transformation of our equipment, doctrine, and force structure for the future threat. Technological advances drive change in how armies organize and fight, while war remains a violent, bloody contest of wills between humans. Because people live on the land, conflicts will continue to be ultimately decided by the force with the capability to seize and hold ground. Victory is, and will always be, reliant on cohesive teams, disciplined, fit, and ready to fight and win. The United States is fortunate that we have the people — officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and civilians that make up our Army — giving us this asymmetric advantage over any adversary.

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Gen. James Rainey is the commanding general of U.S. Army Futures Command and responsible for transforming the Army to ensure war-winning future readiness. He’s also contributed to U.S. Army’s transformation efforts in his two previous assignments as the deputy chief of staff G-3/5/7 at Headquarters Department of the Army, and the commanding general of the Combined Arms Center. Gen. Rainey has commanded soldiers at the battalion, brigade, and division level in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

Lt. Gen. Laura Potter is the deputy chief of staff for intelligence (G-2) at the Headquarters Department of the Army. She led intelligence modernization and readiness efforts in her previous assignments as the commanding general and commandant of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence at Fort Huachuca, as well as director, J-2, U.S. European Command. Lt. Gen. Potter commanded and led troops while deployed, including Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Gen. James Rainey · August 6, 2023

11. An Enduring Coalition to Protect Ukraine

Excerpts:

Ukraine could, of course, decide to fight on regardless of what its partners want. But with victory elusive and Western support uncertain, even Kyiv might decide that it is better to seek a negotiated and imperfect peace than to continue the war. A coalition-based guarantee would then provide Ukrainians with the assured external protection they need to feel safe, rather than requiring that Kyiv gamble on armed neutrality.

NATO’s European members will doubtless be reluctant to create a new coalition to protect Ukraine. Yet if doing so could end the war, these countries might well decide that it is worth it. NATO’s European members have a self-evident interest in keeping their continent free of upheaval and war, a stake that the United Kingdom, with its centuries of relations to the continent, shares. Moreover, given their wealth and level of technological advancement, European countries cannot credibly claim that they lack the resources to backstop Ukraine’s security, particularly given that Ukraine will emerge from the war as one of Europe’s major military powers. Indeed, Kyiv will become even stronger because it will receive open-ended Western military assistance. And the coalition’s NATO members could take comfort in the fact that if Russia does decide to attack them, the United States will still have to come to their defense.

A coalition-based security guarantee may be a far cry from what Ukrainians yearn for. But in view of the war’s current trajectory and the fact that Ukraine cannot be certain about NATO membership, its leaders may have to accept what they now deem unacceptable. And if Kyiv cannot achieve its ideal military outcome, this coalition could turn out to be the best, most feasible way of ensuring that Russia never again tries to extinguish Ukrainian sovereignty.

An Enduring Coalition to Protect Ukraine

How to Keep the Country Safe Without NATO Membership

By Rajan Menon

August 7, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Rajan Menon · August 7, 2023

In the weeks since July’s NATO summit in Vilnius, Western debate about Ukraine’s long-term security arrangements has fallen into three categories. The country’s most bullish backers want it to become a NATO member and enjoy the alliance’s protection, even though Kyiv did not receive a formal invitation to join at the summit. Their critics respond that admitting Ukraine into NATO will only up the ante and risk all-out war with Russia, and that the West should persuade Kyiv to settle the conflict. Seeking a middle ground, a third group proposes that the West should continue providing Ukraine with arms and training its soldiers for the long haul but refrain from making a formal commit to defend it against future Russian attacks.

But these are not the only options available to Ukraine’s friends and supporters once the current war ends. There is at least one other choice: the West could give Ukraine a formal security guarantee without admitting it to NATO. Crucially, that guarantee would not come from the alliance or involve the United States in any way. Instead, a coalition of European countries, particularly some of Ukraine’s neighbors, would pledge to defend it from future Russian aggression. Their commitment would help deter Russia, and it would also increase the chances of a diplomatic settlement to the conflict by addressing Moscow’s opposition to Ukrainian NATO membership.

IN, OUT, OR IN BETWEEN

Ukraine’s brave and determined fight against Russian aggression has inspired many of its Western backers to demand the country’s formal inclusion in NATO. They portray Ukrainians’ resistance to Russia as an instance of the larger struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, a clash in which cardinal values are at stake. As they see it, the ramifications of denying Ukraine membership in the alliance would reach far beyond its borders. Democrats everywhere would be demoralized and authoritarians, particularly Russian President Vladimir Putin, emboldened. Many in this camp contend that Putin’s ambitions extend beyond Ukraine to, at a minimum, Poland and the three Baltic states. And they point to Ukraine’s wartime success as proof that Kyiv will strengthen the alliance rather than become a burden. Unsurprisingly, Ukrainian leaders present an identical brief.

Critics of this argument are legion. Many fear that Ukraine’s membership in the alliance would cause more problems than it would solve. They insist that inducting it into NATO would demonstrate a dangerous disregard for Russia’s repeated warnings that NATO membership is intolerable, pointing out that Putin has described the expansion of the alliance along Russia’s borders as “a direct threat.” Ignoring this Russian redline would, they insist, place NATO and the Kremlin on a collision course and possibly risk nuclear war. The people who hold this view are not just wary of provoking Moscow; they also don’t think that Ukraine warrants such a commitment. The country is not, they contend, important enough to the national security of the United States to justify such risks, particularly because Americans, not their NATO allies, would end up doing the bulk of the fighting and dying required to defend Kyiv.

Those seeking a middle ground propose what effectively amounts to armed neutrality. Ukraine would continue to receive Western arms and military training, with no time limit and regardless of whether the country comes under attack. But it would not be admitted to NATO or receive alternative security guarantees. Many advocates of this arrangement doubt that Ukraine will ever enter NATO, no matter what was said at Vilnius, because its borders with Russia will remain hotly disputed. Some of them also think that Ukraine is not important enough to merit NATO admission (and the accompanying risks). But those supporting this third way do believe that continuous Western support would protect Ukraine’s security because Kyiv has proved that it has the grit and guile to resist Russian aggression—it just needs a more muscular, advanced military. This middle solution, known as the Israel model, would mimic that state’s template of building a highly trained armed forces enabled by a continuing inflow of American armaments and defense technology, even without the treaty-based promise of protection.

COALITION OF THE WILLING

Given what they have endured, Ukrainians are entirely in their rights to seek protection from future Russian aggression. And given that Ukrainians have been attacked by Russia twice in the last ten years, they can be forgiven for believing that Moscow will be deterred only if Kyiv secures an explicit Western commitment to defend it. Some believe that Russia will not attempt another invasion after the bitter lessons it will have learned from this one, but Ukraine’s leaders are understandably unwilling to make that wager: the consequences of being wrong could prove catastrophic. That reasoning explains Ukrainians’ outrage at those who call for excluding them from NATO.

At the same time, Ukrainians are wary of armed neutrality. During my three trips to wartime Ukraine, I did not hear one good word about this option; Ukrainians appear to see it as a mere consolation prize for failing to gain NATO membership. They do not believe that their admission would make Europe and the United States less safe. Instead, they argue that Article V has been erroneously interpreted as a commitment to collective defense using military force. According to these Ukrainians, the article really lets individual alliance members decide how they will respond to an attack—it is not a switch that, once flipped, triggers a military rescue operation. This understanding of the provision helps explain Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s insistence, repeated at the Vilnius summit, that Ukraine cannot settle for anything less than membership.

No matter how hard Zelensky tries, Ukraine’s desire to join NATO may never come to pass. But even if it doesn’t, there is still a way to provide Kyiv with the explicit security guarantee it seeks. A subset of NATO members—those that have been the most vocal in insisting that Ukraine be admitted to the alliance—could jointly provide Kyiv the equivalent of an Article V commitment. Poland and the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are the obvious candidates, but others, including Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, could also participate.

Together with Ukraine, a coalition of this sort—which would operate separately from NATO and therefore not include the United States—could raise the risks and costs to Russia of another invasion. (The United States could, and should, still train, modernize, and equip Ukraine’s armed forces.) The coalition of guarantors, all of whom would be NATO countries, would promise not to invoke Article V if forced to fight Russia to defend Ukraine. But NATO’s joint defense provision would become operative if Russia directly attacked territory belonging to the coalition’s NATO members. The risk of triggering Article V could narrow Russia’s military options and limit the geographic ambit of the war. It could also strengthen the deterrence provided by Ukraine’s guarantors. Moscow, after all, would not want to do anything that could trigger a direct conflict with Washington.

COMING TO TERMS

Of course, no Ukrainian official or military expert would see such a coalition-based guarantee as an acceptable substitute for the protection provided by NATO’s Article V, and Kyiv will understandably continue its fight for NATO membership. But no matter how badly they might want to join, Ukrainians should begin to at least consider alternatives. At Vilnius, NATO specified that Kyiv must meet all the benchmarks required for membership and reiterated that, to join, it needs to win the approval of all its members. Since some of them have been wary of allowing Ukraine into the alliance, Kyiv may in fact be no closer to joining NATO than it was after the 2008 Bucharest summit, when the door to membership was first opened. In the run-up to Vilnius, even the United States said that it opposed providing Ukraine with a formal invitation, let alone a firm commitment and timeline for accession. As a friend who advises the Ukrainian government remarked to me, the result was a summit declaration that amounted to saying, “Ukraine will join NATO when it joins NATO.”

To Ukrainians, this was, quite naturally, disappointing. But if Kyiv mulls over alternatives, it might decide that accepting a different security arrangement could ultimately prove helpful. At some point, Russia might conclude that victory is impossible. Public support for the war within the country is already withering, and protests have become common. Sanctions, once manageable, are beginning to bite. If these trends continue, and if Ukraine’s troops find more battlefield success, albeit not decisive ones, Putin might consider a peace agreement that gives Ukraine back most of the territory it took after February 2022. Even under these circumstances, however, the Kremlin would demand a concession that Putin could present to Russia’s citizens as proof that the war was worth it. A promise by Ukraine not to join NATO could be such a concession.

To safeguard its security, Kyiv could then sign a security pact with some of NATO’s members. This option could also become attractive if Ukraine faces pressure to settle from the West—which is a distinct possibility. Despite heroic efforts and hundreds of billions of dollars in military aid, Ukraine has been unable to achieve a military result that its leaders deem minimally acceptable. Western defense industries are increasingly hard-pressed to meet Ukraine’s incessant military needs, and American officials worry that U.S. military readiness could fall below the levels the president’s military advisers consider safe. In the United States and Europe, public support for pressing on, previously solid, has begun to wane, and NATO’s once remarkable unity has also started to fray. Western states also know that they will have to spend tremendous amounts of money to rebuild Ukraine: a March 2023 World Bank report pegged the cost at $1 trillion. They might want Ukraine to compromise on its NATO aspirations.

COULD THE UNACCEPTABLE BECOME ACCEPTABLE?

Ukraine could, of course, decide to fight on regardless of what its partners want. But with victory elusive and Western support uncertain, even Kyiv might decide that it is better to seek a negotiated and imperfect peace than to continue the war. A coalition-based guarantee would then provide Ukrainians with the assured external protection they need to feel safe, rather than requiring that Kyiv gamble on armed neutrality.

NATO’s European members will doubtless be reluctant to create a new coalition to protect Ukraine. Yet if doing so could end the war, these countries might well decide that it is worth it. NATO’s European members have a self-evident interest in keeping their continent free of upheaval and war, a stake that the United Kingdom, with its centuries of relations to the continent, shares. Moreover, given their wealth and level of technological advancement, European countries cannot credibly claim that they lack the resources to backstop Ukraine’s security, particularly given that Ukraine will emerge from the war as one of Europe’s major military powers. Indeed, Kyiv will become even stronger because it will receive open-ended Western military assistance. And the coalition’s NATO members could take comfort in the fact that if Russia does decide to attack them, the United States will still have to come to their defense.

A coalition-based security guarantee may be a far cry from what Ukrainians yearn for. But in view of the war’s current trajectory and the fact that Ukraine cannot be certain about NATO membership, its leaders may have to accept what they now deem unacceptable. And if Kyiv cannot achieve its ideal military outcome, this coalition could turn out to be the best, most feasible way of ensuring that Russia never again tries to extinguish Ukrainian sovereignty.

• RAJAN MENON is Director of the Grand Strategy Program at Defense Priorities, Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor Emeritus of International Relations at City College of New York, and Senior Research Fellow at Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.

Foreign Affairs · by Rajan Menon · August 7, 2023

12. Election Interference Demands a Collective Defense

Excerpts:

None of these complexities, however, justify inaction. The North Atlantic Treaty’s definition of an attack and its delineation of the responses an attack requires also remain quite broad and open to interpretation. But even the possibility of a collective response from an alliance of strong military powers has proved a potent deterrent. An agreement on the common defense of democracy itself could have a similar effect. And where deterrence fails, collective action could induce future behavior change and bar foreign meddlers from picking off democracies one by one.

Meddling in democratic practices now constitutes a threat almost as severe as the kinds of military attacks against which democracies concertedly defend themselves, and it is far more commonplace. Washington spends an enormous amount of time and treasure to protect itself against low-probability, high-consequence threats such as a conventional invasion of western Europe or a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland. These investments are appropriate. But the probability that malicious foreign actors will seek to meddle in U.S. democratic practice is much higher, closer to 100 percent. And the consequences can be grave and enduring. Russia’s meddling in 2016 has continued to disrupt U.S. politics, seven years on.

Over the years, there have been many proposals for some sort of alliance of democracies to strengthen democratic cohesion, ensure that democracies work more closely in international institutions, and demonstrate the superiority of the democratic model. These proposals have failed, largely because they never addressed a specific threat. By now, they have also become insufficient. What is needed today is not a casual club but a literal alliance of democracies, one focused on protecting the institutions, processes, and activities that reside at the very heart of democratic political life.

Election Interference Demands a Collective Defense

How Democracies Can Fight Back Against Foreign Meddling

By Richard Fontaine

August 7, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Richard Fontaine · August 7, 2023

As campaign season heats up ahead of the 2024 U.S. election, so does the potential for foreign political interference. Russia and China both pair a willingness to do harm with sophisticated cyber capabilities. Iran has its own track record of meddling in American politics, and it, too, may be tempted to interfere. And the United States is not the only target. In recent years, Australia, Canada, France, and Germany have all been subject to attempts at foreign interference. For the foes of democracy, distorting electoral politics now seems to be a low-cost, high-reward way to support their favored candidates, harm their perceived enemies, or simply deepen polarization and sow internal distrust—often with the added benefit of plausible deniability.

This threat cuts to the core of the liberal democratic way of life. So far, however, democracies have mostly responded unilaterally. The United States’ democratic friends looked at Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential election as mainly an American problem, to be dealt with by Washington. Similarly, Moscow’s interference in the 2017 French presidential election was considered a problem for Paris. Chinese intrusions into Australian politics that year were deemed a matter for Canberra. None of these episodes, nor other incidents since, have elicited a collective response, even from allied democracies.

Contrast this lack of coordination with the unified response to Russian violence in recent years. In 2018, when Russian agents poisoned former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom, the United States coordinated with a number of allies, including Australia, Canada, and Germany, to urge the United Kingdom to expel Russian diplomats. In 2020, after Russian intelligence agents attempted to poison the opposition activist Alexei Navalny inside Russia, the EU and the United States imposed sanctions. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO allies and G-7 leaders denounced Russia’s move and stepped up their security cooperation with Ukraine; most of the largest democratic economies sanctioned Moscow.

It is time for democracies to muster such combined action against foreign political interference. To better coordinate their common defenses, they must create a formal response mechanism akin to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, binding allies to come to the aid of one of their own in the event of an attack. The stakes have grown too high and the threats too pervasive to leave every democracy to its own devices.

MEDDLING’S SPREAD

Russia’s predations ahead of the 2016 U.S. election are widely known. Less well known, however, are the numerous episodes of foreign interference that occurred in democracies before and since. This kind of interference has long existed. But in the last decade, social media and new digital tools have made meddling much easier, while sharpened domestic polarization and international competition have made democracies more vulnerable to it. The German Marshall Fund, which continually tracks such attempts, has identified Russian and Chinese political interference—in the form of information manipulation, cyberattacks, the co-opting of civil society groups, and support for divisive domestic movements—in more than 40 transatlantic countries since 2000. In 2020, when the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, an independent think tank, examined cyber-enabled foreign interference in democratic politics over the previous decade, it discovered interference in 41 elections and seven referendums across 33 countries. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia were the primary perpetrators.

Russia is the chief culprit. In 2017, suspected hackers from Russia infiltrated the campaign servers of French presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron. The hackers stole thousands of emails and files, which they distributed online just ahead of Macron’s runoff with Marine Le Pen, whom Russia viewed as a friendlier candidate. In 2020, the Russian government conducted influence campaigns to denigrate U.S. presidential candidate Joe Biden and undermine Americans’ confidence in their electoral process. Last year, the U.S. State Department estimated that Moscow covertly delivered some $300 million to political actors in more than two dozen countries over the previous eight years and that it planned to finance more in the future.

China comes in second on the roster of top meddlers. But it combines a will to interfere with increasingly substantial capabilities to achieve results. Its intrusions into Australian politics should be considered a warning sign to other democracies: in 2017, donors linked to the Chinese Communist Party directly funded Australian politicians. Last year, after Canadian intelligence officials alleged Chinese interference in the country’s federal elections, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau accused Beijing of playing “aggressive games with our institutions, with our democracies.”

Iran has sought to influence democratic politics as well, particularly in the United States. In 2020, according to John Ratcliffe, then the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Tehran gathered voter data and sent faked emails that appeared to originate from the Proud Boys extremist group in an effort to intimidate voters in Alaska and Florida. U.S. officials later found that Iran had stolen data on American voters that could be used to compromise the 2020 election, and in 2021 the Department of Justice indicted two Iran-based hackers for their involvement in a cyber-campaign to influence voters, undermine confidence in the election, and spread discord in the United States.

WAR BY OTHER MEANS

Since 2016, many democracies have undertaken far-reaching domestic efforts to defend their democratic practices from outside attacks. In the wake of revelations about the Chinese Communist Party’s influence in Australia’s universities and Chinese-language media, the Australian government enacted legislation criminalizing foreign political interference and banning foreign donations to politicians. Elsewhere, intelligence agencies are allocating more resources to tracking foreign interference attempts and preemptively knocking cyber-meddlers offline. Law enforcement agencies are investigating and charging malign actors. Social media companies are weeding out more foreign-state-sponsored material.

But these efforts are clearly not enough. China, for one, appears only to have ramped up its influence schemes. For years, Chinese agents have stalked and harassed Chinese American dissidents inside the United States, including Yan Xiong, an ultimately unsuccessful 2022 congressional candidate for New York. During the 2022 U.S. midterm elections, Meta, the company that owns Facebook, uncovered a China-based operation targeting its users with political propaganda. U.S. officials publicly warned that Beijing might seek to undermine candidates it believed threatened Chinese interests. And this April, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York charged 42 Chinese officials with harassing Chinese dissidents living in the United States, creating fake social media accounts, spreading propaganda, and attempting to have dissidents removed from a telecommunications platform.

Even as Russia has become bogged down in its war against Ukraine, it has continued to try to attempt to shape politics abroad. As The Washington Post has reported, the Kremlin in February tried to facilitate a coalition between a left-wing member of Germany’s Bundestag and the right-wing party Alternative for Germany. In June, Viginum, the French government agency that monitors foreign digital interference, discovered a major Russian disinformation campaign aimed at weakening French support for Ukraine; the effort included faking articles from top media outlets such as Le Monde and Le Figaro. In the words of Catherine Colonna, France’s foreign minister, Moscow is undermining “the conditions for democratic debate.”

Malign actors do not have to create discord in the United States. They can merely exacerbate the tensions that exist.

Ahead of the 2022 U.S. midterm elections, social media research firms discovered Russian efforts to create fake social media accounts, spread disinformation, and incite voters to oppose aid to Ukraine. Just days before the vote, in a Telegram session, a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter raised the subject of U.S. elections with Yevgeny Prigozhin, the mercenary chief indicted by the United States for operating a Russian troll farm in 2016. “Gentlemen,” Prigozhin said, “we interfered, we interfere, and we will interfere.”

Even casual observers know that U.S. politics has more than enough kindling for foreign adversaries to start fires. Americans’ rising distrust in key democratic institutions such as elections, the judiciary, law enforcement, and the military means that malign actors do not have to create discord in the United States. They can merely exacerbate the tensions that exist. Meddling is made even easier by new digital tools, such as generative artificial intelligence models that quickly produce believable images and authentic-sounding speech. Foreign interference threatens the United States’ already weakened ability to forge the political consensus necessary to confront major national challenges.

Indeed, rendering the United States and other democracies less able to cohere politically, and thus less able to wield power and act decisively, appears to be a driving motive for foreign meddlers. Of Iran’s efforts to interfere in U.S. elections, the scholar Ariane Tabatabai has observed that “the main goal pursued by Iran—similarly to Russia and China—is to exacerbate divisions along ethnic, religious, socioeconomic, and partisan lines” and to “sow chaos and confusion.”

COME TOGETHER, RIGHT NOW

Given the high potential benefits and low cost of meddling in democratic processes, democracies should expect more of it. Fortunately, policymakers are much more aware of the problem of foreign interference than they were in 2016. They also recognize that a multifaceted approach to defense and deterrence is required. But there is still a big gap between what is being done and what needs to be done. Last year, for example, a European Parliament report found that its member states “appear to lack the appropriate and the sufficient means to be able to better prevent, detect, attribute, counter, and sanction these threats.”

Missing among the attempts to combat foreign political interference is any significant mechanism for international collaboration. Many democracies share the same threat, but too often each defends itself individually, if at all. Democracies must actively cooperate by exchanging threat information, identifying areas of vulnerability, monitoring foreign activity, and sharing best approaches for deterring and defending against interference.

Even this kind of loose coordination, however, will likely prove insufficient to deal with the sharply increased threat of foreign interference in democratic practice. Even strong individual responses from targeted countries have not deterred new attacks. Democracies must go further. They should agree to devise a multilateral approach to ensure that interference elicits a collective reaction.

Democracies already have a model for the kind of coordination that will be required to defend their political systems from attack: the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5. Article 5 provides that an attack on one NATO ally will be considered an attack on every member and that each member will assist the victim with “such action as it deems necessary.” A coalition of key democracies—the G-7 members, NATO countries, and other like-minded countries such as New Zealand and South Korea—should adopt a similar formal mechanism to handle political interference. In a multilateral agreement, they should declare their intent to consider a significant, state-based attack on one member’s democratic processes to be an attack on all and should pledge to respond to the attacker collectively.

The probability that malicious foreign actors will seek to meddle in U.S. democratic practice is close to 100 percent.

Members of such a new coalition would need to identify the most appropriate and effective defensive measures, such as tightening security on digital electoral systems, spreading awareness among social media users, and building expertise among officials to detect interference. The coalition’s intelligence agencies should cooperate to identify and publicize ongoing foreign interference campaigns, especially ahead of elections. The prototype should be the kinds of specific and intelligence-backed warnings U.S. officials issued about Russia’s plans to invade Ukraine in March 2022, not the belated and general statements they made in 2016 about Russia’s plans to interfere in the U.S. election. Crucially, major interference attempts should elicit combined response measures such as the naming and sanctioning of individuals and entities engaged in malign activities, the coordinated expulsion of diplomats, integrated efforts to shut down the meddlers’ financing, and offensive cyber-operations aimed at taking down foreign interference networks or interrupting their work.

Formalizing a coalition approach to interference would have a few obvious complications. The deliberately covert nature of much foreign interference makes clear attribution much harder than when a state attacks another state militarily. Members of a democracy-protection coalition would need to agree on a common definition of interference, distinguishing it from both legitimate foreign political activity and the malicious work of homegrown actors. The coalition would need to account for its members’ differing campaign and electoral practices, as well as their divergent free speech laws. And coalition states would need to develop a sense of when outside interference rises to the level that should trigger a common response.

None of these complexities, however, justify inaction. The North Atlantic Treaty’s definition of an attack and its delineation of the responses an attack requires also remain quite broad and open to interpretation. But even the possibility of a collective response from an alliance of strong military powers has proved a potent deterrent. An agreement on the common defense of democracy itself could have a similar effect. And where deterrence fails, collective action could induce future behavior change and bar foreign meddlers from picking off democracies one by one.

Meddling in democratic practices now constitutes a threat almost as severe as the kinds of military attacks against which democracies concertedly defend themselves, and it is far more commonplace. Washington spends an enormous amount of time and treasure to protect itself against low-probability, high-consequence threats such as a conventional invasion of western Europe or a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland. These investments are appropriate. But the probability that malicious foreign actors will seek to meddle in U.S. democratic practice is much higher, closer to 100 percent. And the consequences can be grave and enduring. Russia’s meddling in 2016 has continued to disrupt U.S. politics, seven years on.

Over the years, there have been many proposals for some sort of alliance of democracies to strengthen democratic cohesion, ensure that democracies work more closely in international institutions, and demonstrate the superiority of the democratic model. These proposals have failed, largely because they never addressed a specific threat. By now, they have also become insufficient. What is needed today is not a casual club but a literal alliance of democracies, one focused on protecting the institutions, processes, and activities that reside at the very heart of democratic political life.

• RICHARD FONTAINE is CEO of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. Department of State, on the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain.

Foreign Affairs · by Richard Fontaine · August 7, 2023

13. Alabama readies for battle over Space Command HQ

Excerpts:

A U.S. Government Accountability Office report last year said Trump met with military leaders, and his decision was largely consistent with military recommendations. However, it noted the process could have involved more transparency and better practices. A Pentagon Inspector General evaluation also confirmed the location was selected through a correct and fair process.

Other lawmakers have expressed concern the Colorado base was being built before a final decision was even made.

The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes language that strips funding for Space Command military construction and slashes Kendall’s travel budget until a final decision on the headquarters is made.

It’s likely those amendments are now irrelevant because of Biden’s final decision, but new ones may be introduced by Alabama lawmakers. The House NDAA bill is unlikely to pass as is because it must reconcile with a vastly different Senate version.

Alabama readies for battle over Space Command HQ

BY BRAD DRESS - 08/06/23 5:16 PM ET

The Hill · August 6, 2023

Alabama’s congressional delegation is fuming after President Biden nixed the relocation of U.S. Space Command headquarters to their state and have warned the fight is far from over.

Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, launched an investigation this week into the motives behind the decision after publicly alleging Biden’s choice was political.

Lawmakers also accuse the Biden administration of improperly building up the Colorado Springs temporary headquarters before making the final decision that scuttled the move to Huntsville, Ala.

“It is clear the Biden administration cares more about advancing their far-left agenda than the security of our nation,” Rep. Jerry Carl (R-Ala.) wrote on X, the platform formerly known as Twitter. “We will not give up this fight because Space Command belongs in Huntsville.”

It’s unclear what legislative or legal action can be taken even if the lawmakers uncover evidence of any improper decisionmaking. Congress is still working through the annual defense bill that could technically defund programs or stipulate certain conditions related to Space Command.

Biden’s decision means a major loss of economic stimulus that would have been brought to Huntsville from a new military headquarters — an estimated 1,400 jobs for an estimated annual $1 billion economic impact.

The Biden administration’s official rationale was that relocating the headquarters would take years, possibly up to the mid-2030s, which would impact military readiness. In contrast, the headquarters at Colorado Springs can become operational in a month.

Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said at a press conference this week that “politics played no role in this decision,” and the Air Force did a “thorough analysis and assessment.”

“A decision had to be made,” he said. “Recommendations were provided and the president made a decision, and that decision came down to operational readiness.”

Alabama lawmakers suspected a reversal was looming months ago — and believe abortion politics was a driving force in the decision.

In May, NBC News reported Biden would not relocate the headquarters because of a near-total abortion law in the state.

And a months-long blockade on more than 200 general and flag officers at the Pentagon from Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) has upset the Biden administration, eliciting numerous statements blasting the senator’s hold. Tuberville is protesting a new Defense Department policy that provides paid leave and reimburses travel costs for service members who cross state lines for an abortion.

In a press conference this week, Rep. Terri Sewell (D-Ala.) said the state’s restrictive laws, along with Tuberville’s blockade, likely affected the outcome of the decision, though she did not offer any evidence for the claim.

“I’m frustrated because I expected more from the Biden administration. I had hoped for Alabama’s sake that politics would not win out,” she said. “But I certainly understand the feeling that you don’t want to reward the reckless antics of elected officials.”

Rogers opened an investigation into the delay of the relocation in late May, shortly after the NBC News report. His investigation appears to have yielded few results so far. But Rogers is now seeking to force the administration to hand over the information he is requesting.

In a letter this week to Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall and Space Command Gen. James Dickinson, Rogers said he requested documents related to the relocation five times, all of which have gone unanswered.

“This is unacceptable,” Rogers wrote. “Your refusal to abide by the committee’s repeated requests for responsive documents and transcribed interviews can only be considered obfuscation and purposeful delay, highlighted by the fact that the basing decision was decided while the committee’s requests are outstanding.”

Rogers is demanding the documents by Aug. 9, threatening a subpoena if they don’t comply. He accused the Biden administration of having “something to hide” by not providing them.

U.S. Space Command is one of 11 combat command centers for the U.S. military across the world. Its predecessor was established in 1985 as a part of the Air Force before merging with Strategic Command in 2002.

Former President Trump reestablished Space Command in 2019, and its headquarters was temporarily located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs.

The permanent headquarters search stretched from December 2020 to mid-January 2021, involving a nomination process in all 50 states. That was followed by administration analysis and environmental reviews.

Six finalists were chosen, with candidates including Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville and Colorado’s Peterson Air Force base. Trump eventually selected Huntsville, also known as Rocket City because of its history developing major space rockets, to be the permanent location.

The decision stirred speculation that Trump chose Alabama over Colorado because he enjoys more political support in the Yellowhammer state. Colorado lawmakers, who have applauded Biden’s final decision, had blasted Trump’s choice as political.

Trump told “The Rick & Bubba Show” in 2021 he selected Huntsville for the next headquarters.

“They were looking for a home and I single-handedly said, ‘Let’s go to Alabama,’” Trump said. “I love Alabama.”

At the heart of the Alabama delegation’s claims of foul play from Biden are government reviews ordered by his administration that found Huntsville was selected through a fair process.

A U.S. Government Accountability Office report last year said Trump met with military leaders, and his decision was largely consistent with military recommendations. However, it noted the process could have involved more transparency and better practices. A Pentagon Inspector General evaluation also confirmed the location was selected through a correct and fair process.

Other lawmakers have expressed concern the Colorado base was being built before a final decision was even made.

The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes language that strips funding for Space Command military construction and slashes Kendall’s travel budget until a final decision on the headquarters is made.

It’s likely those amendments are now irrelevant because of Biden’s final decision, but new ones may be introduced by Alabama lawmakers. The House NDAA bill is unlikely to pass as is because it must reconcile with a vastly different Senate version.

Rep. Dale Strong (R-Ala.), who has publicly backed an investigation into the administration’s decisionmaking, told a local Huntsville news station the Biden administration already spent $52 million to build out a Space Command site in Colorado.

Strong said the construction site lies nine miles outside the walls of the base, which he said was a national security issue because it lacks military protection.

“I promise you right here, at no point would this happen in Huntsville,” he said.

The Hill · · August 6, 2023

14. Senate forces Biden into personnel standstill ahead of 2024

Senate forces Biden into personnel standstill ahead of 2024

BY ALEX GANGITANO AND AL WEAVER - 08/06/23 6:00 AM ET

The Hill · · August 6, 2023

The Senate’s unprecedented lack of action on President Biden’s nominees has left the administration at a personnel standstill, with a Cabinet official’s confirmation process at a dead end and military leadership unable to move forward with promotions.

Almost six months after the president nominated Julie Su to head the Department of Labor, the Senate has made little progress getting her across the finish line because moderate Democrats do not support her. Meanwhile, Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) is holding up hundreds of military advancements in protest of the Pentagon’s abortion policy.

The Senate went into August recess with no end in sight to Tuberville’s hold and could go into the 2024 election without a confirmed Labor secretary.

The former Labor secretary, Marty Walsh, is the first and only Cabinet official to leave the Biden administration. Reports swirled about Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen wanting to leave her post after the 2022 midterm elections, but she shut down the rumors at the time.

Multiple sources close to the administration say that as the 2022 election approached, there was a point when Cabinet officials were told if they wanted to leave, they should leave at that time. Administrations typically want a solid team in place going into an election. If Yellen were to have left, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo was floated as her replacement, but backfilling that spot would have been the challenge, sources mentioned.

At issue for the administration is the state of play in the Senate that has made even the prospect of moving high-profile nominations to be a troublesome process. Any nominee could face an uphill climb to win some support from within the Senate Republican ranks, especially if the candidate in question is a controversial choice just as Su has turned out to be.

Now, with what Su is going through in the Senate, one source familiar with the administration questioned, “Who would offer themselves for a nomination in an environment that they may get jammed up?”

But exacerbating those problems is winning support from Sens. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.), Jon Tester (D-Mont.) and Kyrsten Sinema (I-Ariz.), a trio of moderate members who hold the keys to any nominee getting across the finish line.

Manchin is the only one of the three who has explicitly announced their opposition to Su, but he has also sided against multiple Biden nominees in recent months. Included in that is a host of judicial selections, Jared Bernstein’s nomination to become Biden’s top economic adviser and any of the administration’s picks for the Environmental Protection Agency.

“Not only does the administration have a problem with Republicans, but they have problems with Democrats as well,” said Jim Manley, a former top aide to former Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) and Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.). “And in weeks and months ahead, they’re going to have to figure out who to prioritize, who to put off and who to figure out who they can get to fill jobs in an acting capacity.”

“Short term through the end of the fiscal year, the dance card is full. We’ll see what opens up then, but given that Republicans are vowing to block every [Defense and State Department] nominee, if you throw a Cabinet secretary on top of that, it’s going to be tough to get anything done,” Manley added.

Earlier this year, two Biden nominees who weren’t getting enough support in the Senate withdrew their names in one month — Phillip Washington, the former pick to lead the Federal Aviation Administration, and Gigi Sohn, the former pick to serve as the top telecommunications regulator for the Federal Communications Commission.

Adding to the administration’s headaches is the continued hold on military promotions by Tuberville that shows no signs of letting up. The hold is set to enter its fifth month next week, with Democrats — including Biden —increasingly trying to use the former Auburn University football coach as a boogeyman.

“By the fall, we may not have a chairman of the joint chiefs of staff,” Biden recently warned, though, calling Tuberville’s hold “outrageous” and “nonsense.”

Biden recently picked Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. to become the next chairman and, if confirmed by the full Senate, he would become only the second Black man to hold that role, after Colin Powell. Current chairman Army Gen. Mark Milley’s term expires at the start of October.

He also picked Adm. Lisa Franchetti to be the next chief of naval operations. If confirmed, she would be the first female member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Despite the outcry over the military holdup, the White House doesn’t seem to be in a rush to get a full-time Labor secretary in place.

The administration hasn’t changed its strategy to get Su confirmed and has denied reports of pulling her nomination.

“The president’s support for acting Secretary Su is unwavering,” a White House official said.

The official said that when Walsh left his post, Su automatically became acting secretary, adding she is not subject to the time limits of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, so she can serve there indefinitely.

When UPS and the Teamsters struck a deal over workers’ contracts to avoid a strike, the White House said Su remained in close contact with both parties. When asked in late July if Su has legal authority to act as secretary in a full capacity, press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said the White House is “confident” in her legal standing.

Multiple Senate GOP sources argued that if future nominees are in the mold of Su, it would be well within their right to oppose them. But they are leaving the door open to supporting other potential nominees down the line.

North Korean leader Kim tours weapons factories and vows to advance his arms and his war readiness Hole-in-one pic led to arrest of suspect in Florida country club manslaughter: affidavit

“Su is a unique candidate but in all of the wrong ways. The opposition is rooted in her lack of qualifications, not just in being a Biden nominee. … It would depend on who the nominee is,” one Senate GOP aide said. “The closer it gets to the election and there’s a potential vacancy, there’s politics at play. For the administration, if it does get closer and they’re trying to woo the base, maybe that forces them to swing further to the base.”

“I don’t think Senate Republicans would reject them for the sole reason that they were nominated by Biden,” the aide continued. “If you send flawed candidates to the Senate, they’re likely to face opposition. But every nominee is different.”

One Senate Republican added that “it depends” on who the nominee is and noted that some members could back a “reasonable candidate without a milelong political rap sheet.”

The Hill · August 6, 2023

15. As climate change worsens, military eyes base of the future on Gulf Coast

Excerpts:

The rebuild at Tyndall, which is expected to continue into 2027, marks the largest military construction project undertaken by the Pentagon.

“Think of it as the Air Force throwing its Costco card down on the table and buying buildings in bulk,” Dwyer said of the massive undertaking.

A dizzying array of new technologies and approaches have been incorporated into the effort, from semiautonomous robot dogs patrolling the grounds to artificial intelligence software designed to detect and deter any armed person who enters the base. But the most robust funding is aimed at making Tyndall more efficient, connected and resilient in the face of a warming world.

Structures under construction — from dormitory complexes to a child care center to hangars that will house three new squadrons of the F-35A Lightning II later this year — are being built to withstand winds in excess of 165 mph. Steel frames, high-impact windows, concrete facades and roofing with additional bracing are among the features meant to weather the stronger storms to come.

At nearby Panama City, sea level rise has accelerated in recent years, with federal data showing seas have risen there more than 4 inches since 2010.

Planners factored in the potential for as much as 7 feet of sea level rise by the end of the century, and as a result placed the “vast majority” of new buildings at elevations that should be safe from storm surges for decades, Dwyer said. In addition, sensors placed near the low spots of buildings will send alerts the moment a flood threatens.

As climate change worsens, military eyes base of the future on Gulf Coast

The Washington Post · by Brady Dennis · August 6, 2023

Climate

After Tyndall Air Force Base was leveled by 2018′s Hurricane Michael, those overseeing its reconstruction hope it becomes the ‘test bed’ for bases to defend against the perils posed by a warming atmosphere.

August 6, 2023 at 7:00 a.m. EDT

PANAMA CITY, Fla. — Five years later, the scars of Hurricane Michael are still visible across Tyndall Air Force Base.

The snapped and jagged trunks of once-towering pines protrude across its 29,000 acres, leaving expansive views toward the Gulf of Mexico where thick forests once stood. Dusty, empty lots remain on the site of some of the hundreds of buildings that succumbed to the Category 5 storm in 2018.

But these days, what is most striking about life at Tyndall — home to roughly 3,500 employees and their families, including the 325th Fighter Wing, a key combat training force — is not what is gone, but rather what is emerging.

The daily soundtrack is one of bulldozers and backhoes, of whirring saws and spinning drills, of thousands of workers in hard hats bustling across the sprawling base. There are piles of sheetrock and electrical conduit, stacks of pipes large and small, mountains of metal duct work, prefab concrete slabs and sheet metal.

All of it is part of a $5 billion, roughly 7-year effort to rebuild one of the most strategically important bases in the nation, one that’s also threatened by climate change. And not merely to rebuild it, but to construct what the U.S. military calls “the installation of the future,” which will be able to withstand rising seas, stronger storms and other threats.

“What Michael did for us is, it wiped the slate clean,” said Don Arias, a spokesman at Tyndall’s Natural Disaster Recovery Office. “It gave us the opportunity to reimagine.”

That reimagining includes elevating buildings above projected storm surges in coming decades, building housing units and aircraft hangers that can withstand fierce winds and enhancing the natural landscape to protect the peninsula where the base sits.

While the fixes are primarily geared toward making Tyndall more resilient for generations, another hope is that the lessons unfolding here can be replicated at other bases around the world that will face — or already are facing — similar threats.

“Tyndall becomes the test bed,” said Col. Robert L. Bartlow, Jr., chief of the Air Force Civil Engineer Center’s Natural Disaster Recovery Division, which was created after Michael.

“We don’t want Tyndall to be a one-off.”

A chance to rebuild on a valuable location

Hurricane Michael was a monster.

The deadly storm barreled into the Florida Panhandle on Oct. 10, 2018, packing winds in excess of 160 miles per hour and fueling a catastrophic storm surge. The eye of the storm passed directly over Tyndall, where most service members and F-22 fighter jets had been evacuated.

The devastation left behind was staggering.

On the base alone, 484 buildings were destroyed or damaged beyond repair, according to the Air Force. The roofs of Tyndall’s hangars, which housed some of the most expensive and high-tech airplanes in the nation, were shredded. Piles of rubble littered the base. The military eventually removed 792,450 cubic yards of debris — an amount that would fill the Capitol Rotunda nearly 17 times.

“I think ‘biblical’ is a fair word,” Michael Dwyer, deputy chief of the Natural Disaster Recovery Division, said of the damage.

The disaster at Tyndall prompted fears in Florida that the Air Force might decide to shutter the base, which sits adjacent to badly damaged Panama City and contributes hundreds of millions of dollars a year to the local economy.

The military itself faced hard questions about whether to resurrect Tyndall — an endeavor that would cost billions of dollars, require years of disruption and still result in an installation perched on a vulnerable peninsula.

“A lot of people ask, ‘Why rebuild?'” Col. Christian M. Bergholdt, commander of the 325th Operations Group, said on a recent morning at Tyndall.

He unfurled a map that shows the regions over the Gulf of Mexico where the Air Force trains pilots, including the use of live combat exercises. It’s a massive area that encompasses 180,000 square miles of military-controlled airspace.

“This,” he said, “is kind of a national treasure.”

That ability to train over water and away from populated areas make Tyndall’s location incredibly valuable to the Defense Department.

“It has unique military value that we cannot replace anywhere else,” said Richard Kidd, who, before retiring at the end of May, was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for environment and energy resilience, overseeing the Pentagon’s climate initiatives. “You can’t pick that up and move it.”

Given its prime real estate and historic importance, the military decided to take advantage of something it rarely gets these days — a blank slate.

The rebuild at Tyndall, which is expected to continue into 2027, marks the largest military construction project undertaken by the Pentagon.

“Think of it as the Air Force throwing its Costco card down on the table and buying buildings in bulk,” Dwyer said of the massive undertaking.

A dizzying array of new technologies and approaches have been incorporated into the effort, from semiautonomous robot dogs patrolling the grounds to artificial intelligence software designed to detect and deter any armed person who enters the base. But the most robust funding is aimed at making Tyndall more efficient, connected and resilient in the face of a warming world.

Structures under construction — from dormitory complexes to a child care center to hangars that will house three new squadrons of the F-35A Lightning II later this year — are being built to withstand winds in excess of 165 mph. Steel frames, high-impact windows, concrete facades and roofing with additional bracing are among the features meant to weather the stronger storms to come.

At nearby Panama City, sea level rise has accelerated in recent years, with federal data showing seas have risen there more than 4 inches since 2010.

Planners factored in the potential for as much as 7 feet of sea level rise by the end of the century, and as a result placed the “vast majority” of new buildings at elevations that should be safe from storm surges for decades, Dwyer said. In addition, sensors placed near the low spots of buildings will send alerts the moment a flood threatens.

The Air Force also has created a “digital twin” of Tyndall — essentially, a virtual duplicate of the base that allows officials to simulate how roads, buildings and other infrastructure would hold up in different scenarios, such as a hurricane or historic rainfall events.

The job of protecting Tyndall, while largely a construction and engineering project, goes beyond just concrete and steel. The military also is determined to enhance the natural defenses that already exist along the base’s dozens of miles of coastline.

On a sweltering spring afternoon, Gary Payne stood on the sugar-white beach along the Gulf of Mexico, stretching a hand far above his head to show how high the storm surge was from Michael.

“These dunes used to be 10 to 12 feet tall, but Michael pretty much flattened them,” said Payne, the division’s resilience coordinator.

Already, there are several projects planned around the base to help reduce coastal flood risks and erosion. Among them are efforts to restore dunes and sea grass meadows; the construction of a “living shoreline” composed of natural materials such as plants and rock and the installation of submerged oyster reef breakwater that can reduce wave energy and erosion.

“The nature-based components are really critical, because they are already there and already providing a benefit,” said Christine Shepard, director of science for the Gulf of Mexico program at The Nature Conservancy, which is partnering with Tyndall on the resilience projects. “If you lose those habitats, you lose those benefits.”

Shepard describes the military as an “early adopter” of such solutions. “The military has been appropriately considering sea level rise a lot longer than some other sectors,” she said. “They know that the risk is real.”

Payne agrees, and not just in the future. While leaders intend to scale up the nature-based projects over time, he is eager for any additional projection, as soon as possible.

“Even without [additional] sea level rise,” he said, “the areas we are focusing on are already at risk today.”

Making hard decisions 'before nature makes them for us’

As it faces more intense hurricanes and rapidly rising seas, Tyndall might be on the front lines of climate change. But it is hardly the only U.S. military installation grappling with the consequences of a warming planet.

“You have bases that are in every climate around the globe,” said John Conger, director emeritus of the Center for Climate and Security and a former Defense Department official. “As the military looks at climate change, they look at it through the lens of mission. … It affects their ability to do their job.”

Conger noted that U.S. installations exist on low-lying islands threatened by rising seas, in places such as Alaska and Greenland where permafrost is melting and sea ice is shrinking, in areas threatened by wildfires and extreme heat, saltwater intrusion and inland flooding.

The Pentagon long studied the potential impacts — it calls climate change ” a critical national security threat and threat multiplier” — and has produced a growing body of research about the challenges, the potential solutions and increasingly specific plans to adapt.

The Defense Department maintains a web-based climate assessment tool, known as DCAT, that uses historical observations, global climate models and other data to help personnel plan for potential climate-fueled hazards at thousands of military outposts around the globe.

In addition, the Defense Department has spent years working on working on climate exposure assessments for major installations in the United States and abroad, though studies by the Government Accountability Office and even outside researchers have said work remains to make climate a key consideration throughout military planning.

Kate White, a DOD program director for climate and a veteran of the Army Corps of Engineers, said the military has a much better grasp than it once did of the “tough choices” that lie ahead.

“The department really has been thinking seriously the last few years of how to understand and plan for these future realities,” White said.

But even when as the risks become more fully understood, policymakers will have to decide — as they have with Tyndall — what is worth defending, and how best to do that.

“There’s not enough money in the DOD’s budget to build a sea wall around all of our coastal installations,” said Kidd. “Given that, the nation will be faced with hard choices. Right now, we are starting to prepare the analytics to support those hard choices when the day comes.”

In many places, he believes, those choices might come sooner than later.

“We may be too late to make these hard decisions before nature makes them for us.”

‘This is really the test base’

Back at Tyndall, the rebuilding is entering a period known as “peak construction.”

As many as 4,000 contractors are flocking to the base each day — plumbers, carpenters, electricians, welders — to work on the dozens of structures that are rising from the ashes of Michael.

New hangars for fighter jets, dormitories for service members, a housing facility for visitors, a child development center, a chapel, fire stations and a new headquarters building are each in various stages of construction.

A sense of urgency surrounds the hive of activity, even as it remains years from completion. After all, sea levels in the nearby Gulf are rising at a rapid clip; ocean temperatures are hotter than ever as another hurricane season arrives; torrential rains are becoming more common as warmer air holds more moisture.

Despite those threats, Bartlow, the chief of the Natural Disaster Recovery Division, feels optimistic about the base’s long-term viability once construction winds down.

“I’m confident that if Tyndall were to experience another storm, a Category 5,” he said, “the installation would survive largely intact.”

But on this day, he and his team are monitoring potential damage at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, where Typhoon Mawar is making landfall — the latest reminder that the threats at Tyndall are not unique, and that what the military learns here has implications around the planet.

“This really is the test base,” Arias said. “This could very well set the standard.”

Chris Mooney contributed reporting from Washington.

The Washington Post · by Brady Dennis · August 6, 2023

16. We Have Enough Old Colonels Running Around

(The author means on active duty)

Of course we also have too many old politicians running around.

We Have Enough Old Colonels Running Around

The U.S. military pushes its experienced members toward retirement for a reason.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-military-marines-early-retirement-benefits-83f68ae7?mod=hp_user_preferences_pos2#cxrecs_s

By Readers

Aug. 6, 2023 11:06 am ET

A U.S. Marine Corps AH-1 Viper attack helicopter in Yuma, Ariz., March 9, 2019. PHOTO: ALLISON LOTZ/ZUMA PRESS

The U.S. military’s up-or-out promotion system, including the provision for some modest retirement-style benefits as early as the 20-year point, isn’t perfect (“The Military Encourages Its Best to Retire Too Soon,” Letters, July 29). The basic structure, however, has stood the test of time. Combat, and even many strenuous, noncombat positions, favors the young. The last thing our military needs is a lot of old colonels and captains running around—there are probably too many as it is—much less a surfeit of older, midrange officers and NCOs.

I would have been delighted to stay on and fly my helicopter gunship for a few more years. The Marine Corps was wise to give my cockpit over to a younger pilot, likely with sharper reflexes than mine. More important, that young officer might possess the rare talent, that I clearly lacked, for a high-level command position in the future.

Maj. Mike Leach, USMC (Ret.)

Virginia Beach, Va.

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the August 7, 2023, print edition as 'We Have Enough Old Colonels Running Around'.

17. Russia and China Sent Large Naval Patrol Near Alaska

Excerpts:

Sullivan said that the U.S. response in September had been “tepid” and that he had encouraged a stronger message be sent in the future.

The joint Russian and Chinese naval patrols are part of a broader great power competition in the Arctic and northern climes, which is increasingly becoming contested territory.

U.S. officials also see the increased cooperation between the Russian and Chinese navies as a bid to counter U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea and other regional partners.

Russian warships and Chinese research vessels have been observed in the Arctic region before.

“But to see these combatants form up in a surface action group together and steam together, that’s what’s rare,” Rear Adm. Nathan Moore, who was Coast Guard commander for the Alaska region until last month, told The Wall Street Journal about the September episode.

Russia and China Sent Large Naval Patrol Near Alaska

Four U.S. destroyers were dispatched to monitor Russian and Chinese ships

https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-and-china-sent-large-naval-patrol-near-alaska-127de28b?mod=hp_lead_pos4

By Michael R. Gordon

Follow​ and Nancy A. Youssef

Follow

Updated Aug. 6, 2023 5:11 pm ET

The ships traveled close to Alaska’s Aleutian Islands, but never entered U.S. territorial waters, according to U.S. officials. PHOTO: MATT LOEWEN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

A combined Russian and Chinese naval force patrolled near the coast of Alaska last week in what U.S. experts said appeared to be the largest such flotilla to approach American shores.

Eleven Russian and Chinese ships steamed close to the Aleutian Islands, according to U.S. officials. The ships, which never entered U.S. territorial waters and have since left, were shadowed by four U.S. destroyers and P-8 Poseidon aircraft.

“It is a historical first,” said Brent Sadler, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation and a retired Navy captain. “Given the context of the war in Ukraine and tensions around Taiwan, this move is highly provocative.”

A spokesman for the U.S. Northern Command confirmed that Russia and China had carried out a combined naval patrol near Alaska, but didn’t specify the number of ships or their precise location.

“Air and maritime assets under our commands conducted operations to assure the defense of the United States and Canada. The patrol remained in international waters and was not considered a threat,” the command said.

Sen. Dan Sullivan of Alaska, a Republican member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the patrol was a reminder that the U.S. has entered “a new era of authoritarian aggression” and applauded the robust U.S. response.

The Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., didn’t respond to a request for comment. Russia’s Defense Ministry on Friday said that Russian and Chinese vessels had carried out drills that involved communications training, helicopter landings and takeoffs from the decks of each other’s ships and a joint anti-submarine exercise in the southwestern part of the Bering Sea in which a mock target was detected and destroyed.

Since the start of the joint patrol, the Russian Defense Ministry added, the ships had traveled more than 2,300 nautical miles, including operations in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington said the patrol wasn’t aimed at Washington.

“According to the annual cooperation plan between the Chinese and Russian militaries, naval vessels of the two countries have recently conducted joint maritime patrols in relevant waters in the western and northern Pacific Ocean. This action is not targeted at any third party and has nothing to do with the current international and regional situation,” the Chinese Embassy spokesman, Liu Pengyu, said.

The USS John S. McCain, the USS Benfold, the USS John Finn and the USS Chung-Hoon responded to the flotilla, tracking its movement, a U.S. defense official said. The four destroyers were in addition to the American maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft.

In contrast, a lone U.S. Coast Guard cutter was on the scene when a flotilla of seven Russian and Chinese ships operated in September near the Aleutians off Alaska.

The Russian and Chinese ships were shadowed by four U.S. destroyers and P-8 Poseidon aircraft, officials said. PHOTO: JON NAZCA/REUTERS

Sullivan said that the U.S. response in September had been “tepid” and that he had encouraged a stronger message be sent in the future.

The joint Russian and Chinese naval patrols are part of a broader great power competition in the Arctic and northern climes, which is increasingly becoming contested territory.

U.S. officials also see the increased cooperation between the Russian and Chinese navies as a bid to counter U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea and other regional partners.

Russian warships and Chinese research vessels have been observed in the Arctic region before.

“But to see these combatants form up in a surface action group together and steam together, that’s what’s rare,” Rear Adm. Nathan Moore, who was Coast Guard commander for the Alaska region until last month, told The Wall Street Journal about the September episode.

The USS Chung-Hoon was one of the ships that responded to the flotilla, according to a U.S. defense official. PHOTO: LUCY PEMONI/REUTERS

Adm. John Aquilino, who leads U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, which is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Asia Pacific, said last month that the U.S. had already begun watching the current Russian and Chinese patrol and was trying to determine whether they were headed to the Aleutian Islands, Philippine Sea, Guam or Hawaii.

Joint Russian and Chinese “exercises have increased, their operations have increased. I only see the cooperation getting stronger, and boy that’s concerning. That’s a dangerous world,” Aquilino said last month while speaking at the Aspen Security Forum.

While the Pentagon’s latest defense strategy casts China as the principal long-term threat to the U.S. it also describes Russia as an “acute threat” to Washington and its allies.

U.S. officials have been closely monitoring signs of increased cooperation between Beijing and Moscow.

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Taiwan’s annual military exercises and civilian drills have expanded dramatically this year in the wake of the Ukraine war and increasing fears of invasion from mainland China. WSJ visited the island democracy to see how it is preparing to defend itself. Photo: Joyu Wang

China has become Russia’s most important trading partner since Moscow’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and a July report by the U.S. director for national intelligence says China has provided Russia with critical technology that can be used for military and civilian purposes.

But Biden administration officials say there is no indication that China has sent lethal military aid to Moscow for its war in Ukraine.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the August 7, 2023, print edition as 'Russia, China Teamed to Send Large Navy Patrol Near Alaska'.

18. Woman detained in connection to plot to assassinate Zelensky, Ukraine security service says

Woman detained in connection to plot to assassinate Zelensky, Ukraine security service says

https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-08-07-23/index.html

From CNN's Tim Lister and Olga Voitovych

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) says it has detained a Russian informant "who was preparing a Russian airstrike in the Mykolaiv region during the visit of the President of Ukraine."

The alleged informant "on the eve of the recent trip of the President of Ukraine to Mykolaiv region, was gathering intelligence about the planned visit," the SBU said.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was in the region at the end of July.

The SBU said in a statement that the alleged conspirator "tried to establish the time and list of locations of the approximate route of the Head of State in the territory of the region."

However, SBU agents had obtained information about the "subversive activities of the suspect" and adopted additional security measures.

In monitoring the communications of the woman, the SBU had established that she also had the task of identifying the location of electronic warfare systems and warehouses with ammunition of the armed forces.

According to the investigation, the perpetrator was a resident of Ochakov, southern Ukraine, and a former saleswoman in a military store on the territory of one of the military units of the region.

She allegedly traveled around the territory of the district and filmed the locations of Ukrainian objects.

The woman has not been named.

1 hr 9 min ago

19. China TV Documentary Showcases Army's Ability to Attack Taiwan

Excerpts:

State media and the PLA frequently release propaganda materials promoting the army's modernization as well as sleek videos of military drills.

The materials serve to fan rising Chinese nationalism and display military confidence against Taiwan and, implicitly, its ties with the United States. While the U.S. doesn't recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country, it has pledged to help the island defend itself in case of an invasion.

...

The documentary also features Shandong, one of China's three aircraft carriers, sailing in formation with several other warships.

The PLA has repeatedly dispatched Shandong to the Taiwan Strait over the past few months as a threat to Taiwan. PLA jets have also crossed the strait's median line, an informal demarcation zone between China and Taiwan, relatively often over the past couple of years, especially in reaction to exchanges between Taiwan and the U.S. that have angered Beijing.

China TV Documentary Showcases Army's Ability to Attack Taiwan

english.chosun.com

August 07, 2023 08:02

China has released a new documentary about the army's preparation to attack Taiwan and showcasing soldiers pledging to give up their lives if needed as Beijing continues to ramp up its rhetoric against the self-ruled island.

"Chasing Dreams," an eight-part docuseries aired by state broadcaster CCTV earlier this week to mark the People Liberation Army's 96th anniversary, features military drills and testimonials by dozens of soldiers, of which several express their willingness to die in a potential attack against Taiwan.

China claims Taiwan, a self-ruled democracy, as its own territory, to be conquered by force if necessary.

State media and the PLA frequently release propaganda materials promoting the army's modernization as well as sleek videos of military drills.

The materials serve to fan rising Chinese nationalism and display military confidence against Taiwan and, implicitly, its ties with the United States. While the U.S. doesn't recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country, it has pledged to help the island defend itself in case of an invasion.

Last month, the White House announced a $345 million military aid package for Taiwan. The move, which experts said drew on lessons from the U.S. military assistance to Ukraine, was criticized by Beijing.

In this photo released by China's Xinhua News Agency, a J-15 Chinese fighter jet takes off from the Shandong aircraft carrier during military exercises around Taiwan by the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army on April 9, 2023.

The "Chasing Dreams" documentary showcased, among other things, the PLA's "Joint Sword" drills, which simulated precision strikes against Taiwan. The exercises were undertaken around the self-governed island in April after a visit by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen to the U.S.

Among the more dramatic parts of the program are pledges by PLA soldiers from various divisions to relinquish life in a potential attack on Taiwan.

"If war broke out and the conditions were too difficult to safely remove the naval mines in actual combat, we would use our own bodies to clear a safe pathway for our (landing) forces," Zuo Feng, a frogman with the PLA Navy's minesweeper unit, said in a testimonial.

Li Peng, a pilot from Wang Hai Squadron under the PLA Air Force, echoed his statement, saying his "fighter jet would be the last missile rushing towards the enemy if in a real battle, I had used up all my ammunition."

Fan Lizhong, a special tactics unit commander, said in the docuseries that while losing comrades is painful, he has to remain calm to respond to emergencies and always be ready to fight.

The documentary also features Shandong, one of China's three aircraft carriers, sailing in formation with several other warships.

The PLA has repeatedly dispatched Shandong to the Taiwan Strait over the past few months as a threat to Taiwan. PLA jets have also crossed the strait's median line, an informal demarcation zone between China and Taiwan, relatively often over the past couple of years, especially in reaction to exchanges between Taiwan and the U.S. that have angered Beijing.

• Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com

english.chosun.com

20. The world's most powerful navies in 2023, ranked

An interesting list.

Spoiler Alert: US, CHina, Russia is 1-3 and South Korea is number 5 with Indonesia number 4 and Japan number 6.

The world's most powerful navies in 2023, ranked

Business Insider · by Sinéad Baker

Chinese sailors atop a naval vessel in April 2009. China's navy is one of the world's most powerful.

REUTERS/Guang Niu/Pool

• The World Directory of Modern Military Warships ranked the world's navies based on their power.
• It looked at overall strength, modernization, logistical support, attack and defense capabilities.
• See below for the 25 strongest navies in the world for 2023.

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The World Directory of Modern Military Warships (WDMMW) ranked the strongest navies in the world, covering 36 nations.

The ranking looked at the total number of warships and submarines, alongside factors like the age of a fleet, its logistical support, and attack and defense capabilities.

It also looked at the balance of each force: How many different types of assets they have, and if they are concentrating their assets in one area. It included most ships but left out smaller craft, survey ships, and historical ceremonial vessels.

The ranking distinguished between several classes of combat ship — listing the relatively small corvette and frigate types as well as larger destroyers and cruisers.

Each navy was given a final "True Value Rating" to measure them against one another.

This is how the top 25 countries stack up:

25: Brazil

A Brazilian sailor with a helicopter on board the ship Navio Atlantico in February 2023.

REUTERS/Roosevelt Cassio

The 46 total units in Brazil's active naval inventory are one helicopter carrier, seven submarines, six frigate warships, two corvettes, five mine/countermine warfare ships, 22 offshore patrol vessels, and three amphibious assault vessels, according to the WDMMW.

It has no destroyers or cruisers.

It said Brazil's naval force balance is "average" and its median hull age is 30.3 years.

The WDMMW gave Brazil's navy a True Value Rating of 39.9.

24: Singapore

Singapore's RSS Sovereignty in the waters off the island nation in May 2017.

AP Photo/Wong Maye-E

The WDMMW gave Singapore's navy a True Value Rating of 43.2.

It had 37 total units in its active naval inventory as of November 2022, made up of five submarines, six frigates, six corvettes, four mine/countermine warfare ships, 12 offshore patrol vessels, and amphibious assault vessels.

It has no aircraft carriers, destroyers, or cruisers.

The WDMMW listed its force balance as "average" and said its median hull age is 19.2 years.

23: Canada

The Royal Canadian Navy's offshore patrol vessel HMCS Harry DeWolf returns after a circumnavigation of North America in December 2021.

REUTERS/Ted Pritchard

The WDMMW gave Canada's navy a True Value Rating of 43.7.

Canada has four submarines, 12 frigates, and 21 offshore patrol vessels, making up its 37 active units as of December 2021. The nation has the world's largest coastline.

The WDMMW noted that Canada "lacks a dedicated aircraft carrier fleet" and also cited its lack of a helicopter force of amphibious assault capabilities.

Canada also has no destroyer warships, corvette warships, cruiser warships, or mine/countermine warfare ships.

Canada's median hull age is a relatively young 16.8, and WDMMW described its naval force balance as "fair."

22: Greece

Greek sailors at the launch ceremony of the fast attack missile ship Lt. Vlachakos at a naval base near Athens in September 2022.

AP Photo/Thanassis Stavrakis

Greece has 11 submarines, 3 frigates, three mine/countermine warfare ships and 36 offshore patrol vessels, making up its 63 active units as of November 2022, according to the WDMMW.

It noted that Greece has put its focus on the offshore vessels, with that fleet "making up over half of all fighting strength."

The balance makes sense for the Mediterranean nation, which has some 6,000 islands.

The WDMMW described the rest of the Greece's fleet as "an aging fleet of submarines and frigates for the most part."

Greece has no destroyers, corvettes, cruisers, or amphibious assault vessels.

The WDMMW said the navy's force balance is "fair" and median hull age is 27.5 years.

It gave Greece's navy a True Value Rating of 47.2.

21: Thailand

A Thai sailor in February 2022.

REUTERS/Soe Zeya Tun

Thailand had 86 total units in its active naval inventory as of January 2023.

They were one helicopter carrier, four destroyers, seven frigates, six corvettes, five mine/countermine warfare ships, 51 offshore patrol vessels, and 12 amphibious assault vessels.

It has no submarines, with the WDMMW describing it as "a surface force built primarily around local and regional defense."

It noted Thailand's long coastline and near neighbors of Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia.

The WDMMW said Thailand is working with China to acquire submarines.

It also has no cruisers.

The Thai navy has a median hull age of 25.6 years and had an "average" force balance, the WDMMW said.

The WDMMW gave Thailand's navy a True Value Rating of 47.6.

20: Australia

Royal Australian Navy Ships Canberra, Supply, and Warramunga sail in formation during Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2022.

Petty Officer 2nd Class Wesley Richardson/Australian Defense Force via AP

The WDMMW gave Australia's navy a True Value Rating of 48.9.

It said Australia has a young median hull age, at 16.2 years, and that its naval force balance is "average."

Its 36 active units as of October 2022 were six submarines, three destroyers, eight frigates, four mine/countermine warfare ships, 12 offshore patrol vessels, and 12 amphibious assault vessels.

It has no corvettes, cruisers, or aircraft carriers.

The WDMMW noted that the navy's "bulk of strength" comes from its offshore patrol vessel force, "which makes up more than a quarter of all available strength."

19: Iran

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) speedboats during an exercise in Abu Musa Island, in a picture obtained on August 2, 2023

IRGC/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS

The WDMMW gave Iran's navy, wth its 66 total active units as of November 2022, a True Value Rating of 50.3.

It has 25 submarines, seven frigates, three corvettes, 12 offshore patrol vessels, and 10 amphibious assault vessels.

It has no aircraft carriers, destroyer warships, or cruiser warships.

The WDMMW said Iran's naval force balance is "fair" and that it has an old median hull age, 32.6 years.

18: Germany

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz being transferred the frigate Mecklenburg-Vorpommern during a visit the naval forces in Rostock in June 2023.

Kay Nietfeld/Pool via REUTERS

The WDMMW gave Germany's navy a True Value Rating of 54.7.

Its 34 active units as of July 2023 were six submarines, 11 frigates, five corvettes, and 12 mine/countermine warfare ships.

Germany has no aircraft carriers, no amphibious assault vessels, no cruisers, and no offshore patrol vessels.

The WDMMW said Germany's naval force balance is "fair" and its median hull age is 17.7 years.

17: Spain

Spanish AV-8B Harrier IIs land on the assault ship-aircraft carrier LHD Juan Carlos I during a 2019 NATO military exercise in the Baltic Sea.

REUTERS/Ints Kalnins

The 42 units that in Spain's active inventory as of November 2022 were two submarines, 11 frigates, six mine/countermine warfare ships, 20 offshore patrol vessels, and three amphibious assault vessels.

It has no aircraft carriers, destroyers, corvettes, or cruisers.

It has a median hull age of 24 years, and an "average" force balance, the WDMMW said.

Spain's navy was given a True Value Rating of 56.

16: Bangladesh

A Bangladesh Navy vessel in the Bay of Bengal in February 2017, with a fishing boat in the foreground.

AP Photo/Joshua Paul

The WDMMW gave Bangladesh's navy a True Value Rating of 58.6.

It has a modern navy, with a median hull age of just 14.3 years.

Bangladesh had 66 total active units as of February 2023. They were two submarines, seven frigates, six corvettes, five mine/countermine warfare ships, 30 offshore patrol vessels, and 16 amphibious assault vessels.

It has no aircraft carriers, cruisers, or destroyers.

It has 21 units on order, the WDMMW said, which shows its navy is growing and modernizing further.

The WDMMW said its navy has an "average" force balance.

15: Algeria

An Algerian submarine during a 2021 training exercise.

Ministry of National Defence Naval Forces

Algeria's navy had 96 total active units as of June 2023, according to the WDMMW.

They were six submarines, eight frigates, 11 corvettes, three mine/countermine warfare ships, 65 offshore patrol vessels, and three amphibious assault vessels.

It has no aircraft carriers, cruisers, or destroyers.

The WDMMW said its naval force balance is "fair" and its median hull age is 16 years.

It gave Algeria's navy a True Value Rating of 61.5.

14: North Korea

North Korean sailors at a military parade in Pyongyang in April 2017.

AP Photo/Wong Maye-E

The WDMMW gave North Korea's navy a True Value Rating of 67.9.

Though it has a huge fleet, its ships tend to be old and small, unlikely to seriously trouble a more modern force.

The isolated dictatorship has 19 submarines, two frigates, seven corvettes, one mine/countermine warfare ships, and 157 offshore patrol vessels.

It has 186 total units in its active naval inventory as of January 2023.

It has no aircraft carriers, destroyers, cruisers, or amphibious assault vessels.

The WDMMW said the navy's force balance is "fair."

North Korea also has an old fleet: Its median hull age is 49.2 years.

13: Egypt

The Egyptian fast attack craft M. Fahmy in Istanbul, Turkey, in November 2020.

REUTERS/Yoruk Isik

Egypt's navy is the largest such force in Africa or the Middle East, the WDMMW said.

It listed 107 active units as of November 2022. They were eight submarines, 12 frigates, seven corvettes, 18 mine/countermine warfare ships, 48 offshore patrol vessels, and 12 amphibious assault vessels.

It also has two helicopter carriers, making it "the only African/Middle East power to have aircraft carriers in the force."

It has no destroyers and no cruisers and it only has one vessel in production.

The WDMMW said Egypt's force balance is "average" and its median hull age is 27.5 years.

It gave Egypt a True Value Rating of 72.4.

12: Taiwan

Candidates training to join the Taiwan navy's elite Amphibious Reconnaissance and Patrol unit in December 2021.

REUTERS/Ann Wang

The WDMMW said Taiwan has 91 total active units as of November 2022, and gave it a True Value Rating of 74.9.

It said Taiwan's force balance is "average" and its median hull age is 26.9.

The navy is a key concern for Taiwan, an island nation which fears invasion from its massive and powerful neighbor China, which disputes its right to exist.

Taiwan has four submarines, four destroyers, 22 frigates, two corvettes, 1o mine/countermine warfare ships, 42 offshore patrol vessels,and seven amphibious assault vessels.

It has no aircraft carriers or cruisers.

11: Italy

The Italian navy ship San Giorgio comes to dock in Catania, Sicily, in February 2011.

AP Photo/Carmelo Imbesi

The WDMMW gave Italy's navy a True Value Rating of 80.7.

Two aircraft carriers, eight submarines, four destroyers, 11 frigates, 10 mine/countermine warfare ships, 16 offshore patrol vessels, and three amphibious assault vessels made up its 54 active units as of November 2022.

It has no corvettes or cruisers.

The WDMMW said Italy's naval force balance is "average" and its median hull age is 24.7.

10: Turkey

TCG Anadolu, Turkey's first amphibious assault ship, in Istanbul in April 2023.

REUTERS/Murad Sezer

Turkey has 90 active units as of April 2023, the WDMMW said, which are one helicopter carrier, 12 submarines, 16 frigates, 10 corvettes, 11 mine/countermine warships, 35 offshore patrol vessels, and five amphibious vessels.

Turkey, a NATO member, has no destroyers or cruisers.

Turkey controls a vital maritime chokepoint: the crossing between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

Its median hull age is 18.8 years, and its force balance is "average," according to WDMMW.

Turkey got a True Value Rating of 80.5.

9: UK

Britain's HMS Prince of Wales aircraft carrier at Portsmouth Naval Base on October 7, 2022.

Finnbarr Webster/Getty Images

The WDMMW gave the UK navy a True Value Rating of 88.3.

The force "puts a premium on multi-mission warships with nearly a quarter of its force dedicated to frigates followed by a focus on mine warfare and then submarines," the WDMMW said.

It has two aircraft carriers, 10 submarines, six destroyer warships, 12 frigate warships, 11 mine/countermine warfare ships, six offshore patrol vessels, and two amphibious assault vessels.

It has no corvette warships or cruiser warships.

The WDMMW said the UK has 51 total units in its active naval inventory as of November 2022, and the balance of its force is "average." It has just three more vessels on order, much less than most of the world's top navies.

The UK's median hull age is 17.7 years, which is younger than many of the world's most powerful navies.

8: France

Frances's Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier alongside US and Danish warships in the Red Sea on April 15, 2019.

US Navy/MCS3 Skyler Okerman

The WDMMW said France has 65 active units as of January 2023, and gave it a True Value Rating of 92.9.

France has "a modern, multi-role force covering airpower, surface combatants, and undersea boats," it said.

The WDMMW focused on France's efforts to modernize its navy, including its destroyer force of 21 ships.

France also currently has one aircraft carrier — the Charles de Gaulle — as well as nine submarines, 14 offshore patrol vessels, and three amphibious assault vessels.

It said France's 17-strong mine/countermine warfare ship feet is "considerable considering France's shorelines along European waters."

France has no frigates, cruisers, or corvettes and its median hull age is 23 years.

The WDMMW said France has an "average" force balance.

7: India

The submarine INS Vagir in Mumbai, India, in January 2023.

REUTERS/Niharika Kulkarni

The WDMMW gave India's navy a True Value Rating of 99.1.

It said India had 102 active units as of January 2023, which were one aircraft carrier, 17 submarines, 1o destroyers, 13 frigates, 23 corvette s, 29 offshore patrol vessels, and nine amphibious assault vessels.

India has no mine/countermine warfare ships or cruisers and its median hull age is 20.1 years, the WDMMW said.

It said India's naval force has an "average" balance.

6: Japan

JS Kumano of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in May 2023.

REUTERS/Caroline Chia

The WDMMW gave Japan's navy a True Value Rating of 121.3, and said it had 102 active units as of November 2022.

Japan also has a more modern navy than many of the top-ranked countries, with a median hull age of 14.8 years, the WDMMW said.

Japan has four helicopter carriers, 22 submarines, 22 destroyers, three frigates, 22 mine/countermine warfare ships, six offshore patrol vessels, and three amphibious assault vessels.

It has no aircraft carriers, no cruisers, and no corvettes.

The WDMMW said Japan's naval force has an "average" balance.

5: South Korea

South Korea's ROKS Shin Dol-seok submarine in July 2022.

US Navy/MCS3 Aleksandr Freutel

The WDMMW said South Korea's navy had 138 active units.

It said the navy is "a well-balanced fighting force that includes all expected naval unit types short of dedicated fixed-wing aircraft carriers."

Its force is "built with defense and deterrence in mind," likely a reference to its aggressive neighbor North Kora.

Its force was listed as 18 submarines, 12 destroyers, 12 frigates, 11 corvettes, 11 mine/countermine warfare ships, 64 offshore patrol vessels, and 1o amphibious assault vessels, as of May 2023.

It has no aircraft carriers or cruisers.

It has a median hull age of 22.4 years.

The WDMMW gave South Korea a True Value Rating of 122.9.

4: Indonesia

Indonesian sailors and a military celebration in Jakarta in October 2010.

REUTERS/Enny Nuraheni

The WDMMW gave Indonesia's navy a True Value Rating of 137.7, with 243 active units as of July 2023.

Indonesia has four submarines, seven frigates, 25 corvettes, nine mine/countermine warfare ships, 168 offshore patrol vessels, and 3o amphibious assault vessels.

It has no aircraft carriers, cruisers, or destroyers, WDMMW said.

It said Indonesia's fleet has an "average" balance of assets.

Indonesia's median hull age is 21.8.

3: Russia

Vladimir Putin at Russian Navy Day in St. Petersburg, Russia, on July 30, 2023.

Alexander Kazakov, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP

Russia's navy, with 265 units in its active inventory assets as of March 2023, was ranked third in the world by the WDMMW.

But it said Russia has a lot of ageing units, including its only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov.

Many of it 58 submarines, 12 destroyers, and four cruisers are also showing their age.

It said Russia's median hull age is 30 years.

Russia, it said, had one frigate, 83 corvettes, 28 mine/countermine warfare ships, 27 offshore patrol vessels, and 21 amphibious assault vessels.

The WDMMW said "The mine warfare division is primarily aging Soviet Cold War-era instruments as is the bulk of the amphibious assault/support force."

It noted Russia is trying to modernize its navy, with a big number of units on order, at 82, and a "noticeable commitment" to new corvette warships, submarines, and mine/countermine warfare ships.

The WDMMW gave Russia a True Value Rating of 242.3 and said it has a "good" force balance.

Russia's military has seen some major equipment losses in its invasion of Ukraine, but its navy has not played a major role, keeping its fleet largely intact.

One significant loss was its the Moskva, its flagship in the Black Sea, which was taken out in a Ukrainian missile strike.

2: China

Chinese sailors at a fleet review to celebrate the 60th anniversary of its navy in April 2009.

REUTERS/Guang Niu/Pool

China, a rising naval power, had the largest fleet in the WDMMW ranking, with 425 active units as of August 2023.

They were three aircraft carriers, 72 submarines, 48 destroyers, 71 corvettes, 44 frigates, 49 mine countermeasures/countermine warfare ships, 127 offshore patrol vessels, and 11 amphibious assault vessels.

It has no cruisers.

It has a much younger median hull age than the US, at 13.8 years, but also has fewer assets on order, at 14. It said China's navy has a "good" balance of assets.

The WDMMW gave China a True Value Rating of 318.9.

1: US

The USS Connecticut after surfacing through Arctic sea ice during an exercise in Alaska in March 2011.

REUTERS/Lucas Jackson

The US Navy is widely considered the most powerful the world has ever known.

The WDMMW gave it a True Value Rating of 323.9, its highest score.

It said the US scored so highly because it "features a broad mix of warship and submarine types as well as balance strengthened by overall numbers (quantity) - pulling ahead by its vaunted carrier fleet."

The US navy had a total of 243 active units as of November 2022, the listing said. They were 11 aircraft carriers, 68 submarines, 22 cruisers, 70 destroyers, 21 corvettes, eight mine/countermine warfare ships, 10 offshore patrol vessels, and 33 amphibious assault vessels.

It has no frigates.

It said the US has a "good" balance in its types of assets, and its median hull age is 23.3 years.

It also noted that the US has many more units on order, at 67, a sign that it is "attempting to keep pace with global rival China."

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Business Insider · by Sinéad Baker

21. Rapid Dragon: the US military game-changer that could affect conventional and nuclear strategy and arms control negotiations

Rapid Dragon: the US military game-changer that could affect conventional and nuclear strategy and arms control negotiations

By George M. Moore | August 4, 2023

https://thebulletin.org/2023/08/rapid-dragon-the-us-military-game-changer-that-could-affect-conventional-and-nuclear-strategy-and-arms-control-negotiations/

The United States Air Force recently announced the successful test of its Rapid Dragon system in a major Pacific exercise.[1] This followed an earlier successful test during an exercise in Norway in late 2022.[2]

The Air Force’s Research Laboratory says that “Rapid Dragon is a palletized munitions experimentation campaign exploring feasibility and operational advantages of airdropping long-range palletized munitions from existing airlift platforms, such as the C-130 and C-17, without aircraft modifications.”[3] In standard English, Rapid Dragon converts cargo aircraft into weapons carriers that can deploy cruise missiles (and potentially other standoff or self-defense weapons) by releasing them on pallets via the planes’ rear cargo ramps. Such a system makes a cargo aircraft into the equivalent of a bomber. Potentially the cargo aircrafts’ weapons load is limited only by how many pallets will fit in the cargo bay.

In US military circles, there has been discussion of the potential impacts Rapid Dragon can have on increasing the level of conventional threat that potential adversaries, particularly China, will have to deal with. But there has been little discussion about the implications of Rapid Dragon for future nuclear arms limitation talks, or what will happen to conventional balances of power on both the global and regional level once, as is certain to happen, other technically sophisticated nations develop their own such systems, perhaps even improving on the initial US concept.[4] The genie is now out of the bottle and will never return.

The potential to develop Rapid Dragon so it can deliver nuclear weapons does not seem to have received any attention. The AGM-86 Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is nuclear capable and currently deliverable by the B-52. It appears that nothing would prevent the Rapid Dragon deployment of the ALCM, turning any cargo aircraft capable of using Rapid Dragon into a nuclear delivery aircraft.

The potential to use Rapid Dragon for nuclear weapons delivery (and eventually this will occur) will create new issues when serious nuclear weapons limitation resume. Unlike some past arms control agreements that required elimination of launch vehicles, there is no way to negotiate a limitation on cargo aircraft with rear ramps.[5] Therefore, it appears clear that future arms limitation negotiations will need to focus on limitations on the number of warheads a party possesses and how to conduct verifiable inspections of the party’s stockpile.

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A Rapid Dragon-like nuclear delivery system also has potential impact on nuclear relations with NATO and other potential regional allies. Since most—perhaps even all—of the principal alliance members and potential allies have cargo aircraft, the United States could consider a NATO-like sharing agreement under which, in times of crisis, palletized nuclear systems could be loaded (perhaps with a US-controlled security and launch team) on non-US aircraft. In contrast to the current system, which requires potential non-US nuclear users to have nuclear trained pilots and qualified delivery aircraft, a palletized system would require little to no additional training or cost for the host/user nation. In the long run, such palletized systems might be seen as superior to the current NATO system of pre-positioned nuclear gravity bombs.

The potential for nuclear launch from cargo aircraft creates new tactical problems that could affect survivability and deterrence concepts. Wide dispersal of potential palletized nuclear weapons in time of crisis is somewhat akin to the problems that mobile launchers for missile systems create for an adversary. How can an aggressor locate enough of the potential weapons and launch vehicles to ensure the success of a first strike, and how survivable are the possible cargo aircraft to ensure the viability of a retaliatory strike?

Another factor that seems to have been ignored in the considerations of how Rapid Dragon will potentially strengthen US conventional capabilities is a discussion of what impact the inevitable spread of the pallet deployment technology will have on the ability of US forces to defend themselves in hostile environments. It is the flip side of the coin. Will a US carrier battlegroup now need to be able to respond to attacks much further from a potentially hostile shore? Note that cargo aircraft have far longer ranges than many of the current attack aircraft of most adversary states; a system like Rapid Dragon may result in significantly expanding the threat envelope posed by a hostile state.

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Some may suggest that the detection of cargo aircraft is far simpler than that of conventional attack aircraft. With no stealth capability and limited, if any, ability to protect themselves,[6] current cargo aircraft might be easy to defend against. However, should the cargo aircraft fly at very low altitudes, detection and the ability to engage them may not be easy.

Once a potential enemy has Rapid Dragon-like systems, there may need to be a total rethinking of the United States’ current concepts for use of conventional forces in many areas of the world.

Rapid Dragon will be a game-changing concept for conventional and, possibly, nuclear weapons use, now for the United States and its allies, but in the future for potential US adversaries. The Rapid Dragon development is somewhat reminiscent of England’s introduction of the Dreadnaught, a type of battleship that made the rest of its large fleet obsolescent and allowed other nations to compete with England in building modern battleships. Rapid Dragon appears to be a similarly game-changing development for the United States and its allies but will need to be carefully monitored to ensure that the advantage it creates is maintained. Similarly, the nuclear potential for Rapid Dragon-like systems will need to be tracked, arms limitation strategies for such systems developed, and the potential increase in threat potentials and/or new threat vectors defined as counterstrategies are conceived.[7]

Notes

[1] See “USAF Tests Palletized Munition System In Pacific,” Aviation Week Network: https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/usaf-tests-palletized-munition-system-pacific

[2] See https://www.afmc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3215261/sdpes-rapid-dragon-capability-demonstrated-in-norway/

[3] See U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory website: https://afresearchlab.com/technology/rapid-dragon

[4] See, for example: https://taskandpurpose.com/news/air-force-rapid-dragon-mobility-guardian-2023/

[5] Consider only the ubiquitous C-130: ”[M]ore than 2,500 C-130s have been ordered and/or delivered to 63 nations around the world. Seventy countries operate C-130s, which have been produced in more than 70 different variants.” See the Lockheed Martin website: https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/c130/history.html

[7] Future developments following the Rapid Dragon system might include palletized self-defense systems to afford protection for the cargo aircraft.

[8] Could, for example, a country like North Korea, use a nuclear capable Rapid Dragon-like system to mask a regional or even intercontinental attack?

22. Ukraine Wants to Be European. Russia Wants to Be North Korean

Conclusion:

The cleft between Russians and Ukrainians and, importantly, between their identities is growing and may have reached the point of no return. Ukrainians have made their choice: to be European. So, too, apparently have Russians: to be North Korean.

Ukraine Wants to Be European. Russia Wants to Be North Korean

There’s bad news for Americans who still think Ukrainians are really Russians in disguise. A recent concert and public opinion survey convincingly demonstrate just how out of touch with reality such a view is.

19fortyfive.com · by Alexander Motyl · August 6, 2023

There’s bad news for Americans who still think Ukrainians are really Russians in disguise. A recent concert and public opinion survey convincingly demonstrate just how out of touch with reality such a view is.

On July 27, North Korea celebrated the 70th anniversary of the end of the Korean War with a gala concert in Pyongyang. An army choir and orchestra, accompanied by a bevy of elegantly coiffed singing ladies in long dresses, devoted several songs to North Korea’s love for and adulation of Russia—in heavily-accented Russian, no less. The clip shows a stone-faced Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and his equally listless entourage listening to rousing military marches and saccharine melodies reminiscent of Soviet hits.

Was Shoigu struck by the fact that he was reliving his youth in North Korea’s capital while his comrades in Moscow were drinking it up? Was he impressed by the Stalinist performance? Or was he thinking about how isolated his country had become as a result of his boss’s decision to invade Ukraine?

We don’t know, of course. All we can say with absolute certainty is that a display of North Korean love of Ukraine would have been impossible, whether in Pyongyang or in Kyiv. Indeed, it is unthinkable—partly because Ukraine has had no diplomatic relations with North Korea since July 22, 2022, but mostly because Ukrainians have turned their back on Joseph Stalin and Stalinism.

According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and published on August 3, 61 percent of Ukrainians have a negative attitude toward the Soviet dictator, 26 percent are indifferent, and only 4 percent view him positively.

Contrast these numbers with those for Russia, where 63 percent of the general population and 48 percent of 18-24-year olds regard Stalin positively.

Consider also the trends. In 2012, 28 percent of Russians and 23 percent of Ukrainians viewed Stalin positively. Since then, Russian admiration for Stalin has boomed, while Ukrainian has shrunk to insignificance.

It’s surely no accident that this divergence in attitudes has taken place since just before the Maidan Revolution and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. At that time, Ukrainians were beginning to mobilize against their homegrown dictator, Viktor Yanukovych. The Revolution of late 2013 and early 2014 galvanized anti-Stalinist tendences, but only slightly. It was the war that Russia unleashed again in 2022 that fundamentally altered Ukrainian attitudes toward Stalin. The war provided Ukrainians firsthand evidence of just what Vladimir Putin and his neo-Stalinist regime stood for: their death and their country’s destruction. When faced with genocide, only 4 percent of Ukrainians appear to have missed the link between Putin’s mass murders and Stalin’s.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin Meeting with members of the Government (via videoconference).

Vladimir Putin observes strategic deterrence forces exercise in the Kremlin’s situation room.

The cleft between Russians and Ukrainians and, importantly, between their identities is growing and may have reached the point of no return. Ukrainians have made their choice: to be European. So, too, apparently have Russians: to be North Korean.

Author Expertise

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com