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Quotes of the Day:
“The high-minded man must care more for the truth than for what people think.”
-Aristotle
"All of the great leaders have had one characteristic in common: it was the willingness to confront unequivocally the major anxiety of their people in their time. This, and not much else, is the essence of leadership."
- John Kenneth Galbraith
"Man is so made that whenever anything fires his soul, impossibilities vanish."
- Jean de la Fontaine
1. How the American democratic process has been hijacked | PATRIOCRACY | Free Documentary
2. Pentagon: US arms industry struggling to keep up with China
3. The Pentagon says US warship, commercial ships attacked in Red Sea. Houthis claim attacking 2 ships
4. The gambit to slash Russia's oil profits and undercut Putin's war in Ukraine
5. I've lost confidence in Lloyd Austin, Lindsey Graham says
6. Palestinians Face Harrowing Hunt for Safety as War Intensifies
7. Who will run Gaza after the war? U.S. searches for best of bad options
8. The Case for Conservative Internationalism By Kori Schake
9. Former US ambassador arrested in Florida, accused of serving as an agent of Cuba, AP source says
10. White House Warns Money for Ukraine Will Run Out by Year’s End
11. U.S. Destroyer, Commercial Vessels Attacked by Drones, Missiles in Red Sea
12. The Case for Arab Leadership on Gaza
13. Why More Chinese Are Risking Danger in Southern Border Crossings to U.S.
14. Five Bodies Found in Wreckage of U.S. Air Force Osprey That Crashed Off Japan
15. Army questions best route to launch a new app that can alert troops about their posts
16. Defense authorization deal expected this week
17.Problems persist with how services report extremism, DOD watchdog says
18. Challenging Tom Clancy’s Fantasies About the U.S. Army Special Forces
19. N. Korea’s support of Hamas transcends just a transactional relationship
20. The Many Faces of the Monroe Doctrine
21. Women, Peace, Security: Thinking Creatively to Pursue National Security through Gender Equality
1. How the American democratic process has been hijacked | PATRIOCRACY | Free Documentary
A 1 hour and 26 minute documentary. This was flagged by my old driver, Eddie Douglas, a good man, from when I was a company commander in Korea around 1986-1988. We still keep in touch and we have a back and forth on political issues every week or so. I rarely take the time to spend 90 minutes watching a YouTube documentary but since he recommended it, I watched it Sunday in between football games. This is a fascinating analysis of our political system and how we got where we are today. Obviously it is very critical of the media (and the entertainers in the media) as well as the partisanship and the inability to compromise. It offers some obvious solutions and some interesting ones as well. I thought it was time well spent. You may or may not think so depending on how you feel about the American political system.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P0nRbdAhtE0&t=417s
How the American democratic process has been hijacked | PATRIOCRACY | Free Documentary
31,714 views Nov 9, 2023 #FilmIsNow
Patriocracy: a voice of reason in the age of polarization. Patriocracy is a non-partisan examination of Washington's dysfunction, illustrating the forces that drive a wedge into the middle ground of America and the solutions required to move forward. Directed by Brian Malone Want to be notified when we post new videos? SUBSCRIBE to the channel and click the bell icon - http://bit.ly/SubFIN This film is under a non-exclusive license from Global Digital Releasing NOTICE: All of the films uploaded to FilmIsNow are legally licensed, and we have YouTube rights for specific territories. For any copyright issues, please reach out to us first before filing a claim with YouTube. Send us an email at copyrightfilmisnow@gmail.com detailing your concerns and we'll make sure the matter is resolved immediately Contact us for any partnership inquiries, content submissions or other requests at filmisnowpromo@gmail.com #FilmIsNow Movies is the No.1 channel to watch free full movies (action, thrillers, horror, drama, sci-fi) and the best thought-provoking documentaries. The FilmIsNow team is dedicated to providing you with the best content because we are big movie fans just like you.
Transcript
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2. Pentagon: US arms industry struggling to keep up with China
Excerpts:
Speaking at the Reagan National Defense Forum, LaPlante said the strategy will be executed as a “partnership” with industry. For businesses to expand production capacity, they need DOD to be clear about its future purchasing needs for them to invest in new factories and R&D.
“Number one, we the governments have to show we are committed, and we’re going to be doing it in a sustained manner with getting funding,” he said. “We have to have the conversations together about what you’re going to put in for [construction] and what the government will then going to put in.”
LaPlante said the Pentagon must also show that it is “serious” about buying the prototype weapons it’s developing in large numbers.
“We’ve got to show that we’re going to production and we’re going to stick with it so that it’s worth your while,” he said.
Some who have seen the draft report are frustrated with what they perceive is a lack of hard recommendations.
One defense industry adviser called it “underwhelming,” saying it doesn’t focus on long-term solutions to supply chain issues that have plagued the defense industry.
Pentagon: US arms industry struggling to keep up with China
By PAUL MCLEARY and JOE GOULD
12/02/2023 07:54 PM EST
Politico
A draft copy of the new National Defense Industrial Strategy says American companies can’t build weapons fast enough to meet global demand.
Pentagon acquisition chief William LaPlante said the Pentagon must also show that it is “serious” about buying the prototype weapons it's developing in large numbers. | Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP
12/02/2023 07:54 PM EST
SIMI VALLEY, Calif. — America’s defense industry is struggling to achieve the kind of speed and responsiveness to stay ahead in a high-tech arms race with competitors such as China, an unreleased draft of a new Pentagon report on the defense industry warns.
The first ever National Defense Industrial Strategy, which is set to be released in the coming weeks by Pentagon acquisition chief William LaPlante, is meant to be a comprehensive look at what the Pentagon needs in order to tap into the expertise of small tech firms, while funding and supporting traditional companies to move faster to develop new tech.
As it stands now, the U.S. defense industrial base “does not possess the capacity, capability, responsiveness, or resilience required to satisfy the full range of military production needs at speed and scale,” according to a draft version of the report, obtained by POLITICO.
The document, dated Nov. 27, adds that “just as significantly, the traditional defense contractors in the [defense industrial base] would be challenged to respond to modern conflict at the velocity, scale, and flexibility necessary to meet the dynamic requirements of a major modern conflict.”
It notes that America builds the best weapons in the world, but it can’t produce them quickly enough.
“This mismatch presents a growing strategic risk as the United States confronts the imperatives of supporting active combat operations … while deterring the larger and more technically advanced pacing threat looming in the Indo-Pacific,” the study says.
Speaking at the Reagan National Defense Forum, LaPlante said the strategy will be executed as a “partnership” with industry. For businesses to expand production capacity, they need DOD to be clear about its future purchasing needs for them to invest in new factories and R&D.
“Number one, we the governments have to show we are committed, and we’re going to be doing it in a sustained manner with getting funding,” he said. “We have to have the conversations together about what you’re going to put in for [construction] and what the government will then going to put in.”
LaPlante said the Pentagon must also show that it is “serious” about buying the prototype weapons it’s developing in large numbers.
“We’ve got to show that we’re going to production and we’re going to stick with it so that it’s worth your while,” he said.
Some who have seen the draft report are frustrated with what they perceive is a lack of hard recommendations.
One defense industry adviser called it “underwhelming,” saying it doesn’t focus on long-term solutions to supply chain issues that have plagued the defense industry.
The report notes that after the Cold War, the defense industry shrank as companies merged. Yet China has spent the past 30 years becoming a “global industrial powerhouse” in shipbuilding, critical minerals and microelectronics. China’s industry’ “vastly exceeds the capacity of not just the United States, but the combined output of our key European and Asian allies as well,” it says.
The report also points out that the Covid pandemic laid bare the supply chain’s vulnerabilities. Then Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Hamas attack on Israel “uncovered a different set of industrial demands and corresponding risks” as the U.S. races to produce arms to support Ukraine and Israel.
“It has become clear that insufficient production and supply capacity are now deeply entrenched problems throughout all tiers of production supply chains,” the report says.
To fix the problem, the strategy says DOD “will develop more resilient and innovative supply chains,” invest in smaller businesses and focus more on innovation.
The U.S. also has to acknowledge that not all the answers are at home. “We must solicit entrants of all types: large and small, domestic, and foreign, and those with no previous relationship to the DoD or defense production,” the report says.
“The nation needs to rally to the common defense,” the report concludes. “This NDIS is a call to both the public and private sectors for focused, dedicated efforts to build and secure the industrial capability and capacity necessary to ensure our military has the materiel available to deter our potential adversaries, and if necessary, defeat them in battle. This call to action may seem a great cost, but the consequences of inaction or failure are far greater.”
POLITICO
Politico
3. The Pentagon says US warship, commercial ships attacked in Red Sea. Houthis claim attacking 2 ships
The Pentagon says US warship, commercial ships attacked in Red Sea. Houthis claim attacking 2 ships
AP · December 3, 2023
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — An American warship and multiple commercial ships came under attack Sunday in the Red Sea, the Pentagon said. Yemen’s Houthi rebels later claimed attacks on two ships they described as being linked to Israel, but did not acknowledge targeting a U.S. Navy vessel.
The attack potentially marked a major escalation in a series of maritime attacks in the Mideast linked to the Israel-Hamas war.
“We’re aware of reports regarding attacks on the USS Carney and commercial vessels in the Red Sea and will provide information as it becomes available,” the Pentagon told The Associated Press.
The Carney is an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. It remained unclear what damage, if any, the vessels sustained in the attacks.
Latest on the Israel-Hamas war
The British military earlier said there had been a suspected drone attack and explosions in the Red Sea, without elaborating.
The Pentagon did not identify where it believed the fire came from. However, Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree claimed the attacks, saying the first vessel was hit by a missile and the second by a drone while in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. He described the ships as allegedly ignoring warnings from Houthi officials prior to the attack.
Saree did not mention any U.S. warship being involved in the attack.
“The Yemeni armed forces continue to prevent Israeli ships from navigating the Red Sea (and Gulf of Aden) until the Israeli aggression against our steadfast brothers in the Gaza Strip stops,” Saree said. “The Yemeni armed forces renew their warning to all Israeli ships or those associated with Israelis that they will become a legitimate target if they violate what is stated in this statement.”
Saree identified the first vessel attacked as the Bahamas-flagged bulk carrier Unity Explorer, which is owned by a British firm that includes Dan David Ungar, who lives in Israel, as one of its officers. The second was a Panamanian-flagged container ship called Number 9, which is linked to Bernhard Schulte Shipmanagement. Managers for the two vessels could not be immediately reached for comment.
Israeli media identified Ungar as being the son of Israeli shipping billionaire Abraham “Rami” Ungar.
The Houthis have been launching a series of attacks on vessels in the Red Sea, as well as launching drones and missiles targeting Israel amid the war.
A U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence matters, said the attack began about 10 a.m. in Sanaa, Yemen, and had gone on for as much as five hours. Another U.S. official who similarly spoke on condition of anonymity for the same reason said the Carney had intercepted at least one drone during the attack.
Global shipping had increasingly been targeted as the Israel-Hamas war threatens to become a wider regional conflict — even as a truce briefly halted fighting and Hamas exchanged hostages for Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. However, the collapse of the truce and the resumption of punishing Israeli airstrikes and its ground offensive there had raised the risk of the seaborne attacks resuming.
Earlier in November, the Houthis seized a vehicle transport ship also linked to Israel in the Red Sea off Yemen. The rebels still hold the vessel near the port city of Hodeida. Missiles also landed near another U.S. warship last week after it assisted a vessel linked to Israel that had briefly been seized by gunmen.
However, the Houthis had not directly targeted the Americans for some time, further raising the stakes in the growing maritime conflict. In 2016, the U.S. launched Tomahawk cruise missiles that destroyed three coastal radar sites in Houthi-controlled territory to retaliate for missiles being fired at U.S. Navy ships at the time.
___
Associated Press writers Tara Copp in Dallas and Dana Beltaji contributed.
JON GAMBRELL
Gambrell is the news director for the Gulf and Iran for The Associated Press. He has reported from each of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Iran and other locations across the world since joining the AP in 2006.
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AP · December 3, 2023
4. The gambit to slash Russia's oil profits and undercut Putin's war in Ukraine
Excerpts:
The strategy uses Western shipping, finance, and insurance companies as levers to limit the price of seaborne Russian oil at $60 per barrel for any transaction using these Western services. The aim is to keep Russia's export volume steady while simultaneously depriving Putin of the oil revenue critical for his war effort in Ukraine.
The unorthodox approach had some early successes and noticeably cut into Russian government revenue in the early months of 2023, but it hasn't stopped a second winter of war in Ukraine.
And there is ample evidence that attempts by Putin to evade the cap through the development of his own "shadow fleet" and a pressure campaign on independent shippers have been increasingly successful.
Even Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen acknowledged "some reduction in the effectiveness of the price cap" in September. Her department recently unveiled new enforcement actions in October, November, and just this past week to try and regain the cap's footing.
The gambit to slash Russia's oil profits and undercut Putin's war in Ukraine
The oral history of how Washington tried to weaken Vladimir Putin's war machine by capping the price of Russian oil. A debate about its effectiveness still rages a year later.
finance.yahoo.com
It was one year ago that the West put into force a novel idea designed to weaken Vladimir Putin’s war machine without upending the world economy: a price cap on Russian oil.
The strategy uses Western shipping, finance, and insurance companies as levers to limit the price of seaborne Russian oil at $60 per barrel for any transaction using these Western services. The aim is to keep Russia's export volume steady while simultaneously depriving Putin of the oil revenue critical for his war effort in Ukraine.
The unorthodox approach had some early successes and noticeably cut into Russian government revenue in the early months of 2023, but it hasn't stopped a second winter of war in Ukraine.
And there is ample evidence that attempts by Putin to evade the cap through the development of his own "shadow fleet" and a pressure campaign on independent shippers have been increasingly successful.
Even Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen acknowledged "some reduction in the effectiveness of the price cap" in September. Her department recently unveiled new enforcement actions in October, November, and just this past week to try and regain the cap's footing.
Here is a closer look at how the cap came to be, the debate about its effectiveness, and where it could go from here — in the words of the Biden officials who circled the globe to put the policy in place and the energy experts who closely tracked its implementation.
Early 2022: A policy forged amid chaos
When Russia first invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the danger was immediately apparent. Crude oil prices spiked after the fighting began, prompting fears of both a global recession and an almost unlimited funding source for Putin's war.
Ben Harris, former assistant Treasury secretary for economic policy: It was definitely a nerve-racking moment when we saw the price spike after the invasion.
Robin Brooks, chief economist at the Institute of International Finance: It's fair to say that the world was taken by surprise. There was a scramble on how to respond.
Craig Kennedy, associate at Harvard’s Davis Center: Blocking Russian seaborne exports completely would have meant removing six million barrels a day of crude and refined products from the global marketplace, which would've been a massive shock.
Inside President Biden’s Treasury Department — next door to the White House — the call was open for ideas.
Wally Adeyemo, deputy secretary of the Treasury: [Before the invasion even began] I remember being in a meeting where the president's instructions to the secretary were, I want you to go out and design a set of sanctions that meet two tests. One, if Russia does invade, it would maximize the pain for Russia while taking steps to minimize the impact on our allies and partners. That was what we started from.
Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo during a news conference in Brussels, Belgium on March 29, 2022, during the early stages of the war in Ukraine as the price cap policy was still being developed. (Dursun Aydemir/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images) (Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
Harris: We started to realize, we may actually have leverage here. Over the next few months, the private sector helped design this through a sort of Socratic method.
Eric Van Nostrand, acting assistant Treasury secretary for economic policy: [We spoke] with industry participants, executives from trading houses, shippers, trade financiers, and importantly some of the buyers of Russian oil to understand what we needed to learn.
Catherine Wolfram, former deputy assistant Treasury secretary for climate and energy economics: Eventually, administration leaders tasked me to write a memo on price cap and tariff approaches...I think this early to mid-April memo was the first time we were articulating them specifically with respect to oil.
Elizabeth Rosenberg, assistant Treasury secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes: The fact that it was unprecedented really lent just about everyone to be highly skeptical.
Summer 2022: Convincing the skeptics
The price cap soon began to win out within the administration over other approaches like a tariff on Russian oil. But as details of the plan began to circulate, it drew consternation among some energy observers.
David Wessel, senior fellow in economic studies at the Brookings Institution: It was widely derided, and I think it was derided because it sounded like something that was cooked up in some graduate school seminar room.
Bill Browder, British financier and head of the Global Magnitsky Justice campaign: My reaction was the idea of a price cap is some crazy negotiation with ourselves, which effectively doesn't achieve the objective, which is to cut off the supply of money.
Russian President Vladimir Putin prepares to address troops in central Moscow in June. (SERGEI GUNEYEV/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images) (SERGEI GUNEYEV via Getty Images)
Kennedy: There was a lot of skepticism about whether it could simply work at all. Part of it was a certain dismissiveness on the part of oil traders who seemed to think that no one else can understand the markets the way they do.
Biden officials also faced a more serious challenge in selling the idea to the world. Europe was a key stumbling block as the European Union began to coalesce behind a plan that aimed to block Russian access to the Western oil services completely.
A hastily organized trip was planned for early June to change Europe’s mind.
Harris: It was a brutal trip — four countries in three days — and our concern at the time was that the proposed sanctions package would force Russia to shut in, which would roil global energy prices and potentially cause a global recession.
Wolfram: We went to the UK and then Brussels and then Paris and then Berlin.
Rosenberg: That trip was crucial for rolling up our sleeves, everyone, and discussing the model, the economic assumptions, what we thought the impact would be.
Harris: There was ample skepticism to start. We left that trip not knowing how the rest of the EU would react.
Later 2022: Finding a middle ground
But over the remainder of that summer — which included negotiations at a G7 summit in Germany and repeated trips across the Atlantic — the price cap idea began to win out.
President Joe Biden sits down with other world leaders at a G7 Summit at Elmau Castle in southern Germany on June 28, 2022. (JOHN MACDOUGALL/POOL/AFP via Getty Images) (JOHN MACDOUGALL via Getty Images)
It was formally announced by G7 finance ministers on Sept. 2, but another challenge awaited: deciding what the cap level should be. Outsiders and governments around the world began to weigh in.
Brooks: When the discussions around the cap first started, the level being discussed that I heard was around $40 or $50 a barrel, so it was actually pretty aggressive.
Ben Cahill, senior energy security fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: There were definitely hawkish voices in the European Union calling for a lower price cap, and the Treasury Department wanted a higher price cap and Treasury won out in my reading.
The cap was eventually set at $60 a barrel.
Rosenberg: We felt good about where it landed.
Van Nostrand: $60 is a level that meaningfully reduces Russian revenue. A significantly lower cap would give Putin an incentive to shut the oil inside Russia and not sell it — denying it to the emerging economies that need it most.
Early 2023: Putin’s evasion
The cap came into force on Dec. 5, 2022, backed by a coalition that included the G7 nations, the European Union, and Australia. In the early months, even as Russia increased its oil production, the Kremlin’s energy revenues declined 44%, according to Treasury department estimates.
Detractors acknowledged the initial success of the cap while concerns soon rose about evasion as Putin continued to apply pressure on shippers to flout the cap and develop his own "shadow fleet" of oil tankers not subject to the West's restrictions.
Wessel: Whether it worked perfectly or not, it worked a whole lot better than the critics suggested.
Kennedy: What you've done is you've created a situation where the bargaining power has shifted strongly in favor of Indian buyers who have used it to extract eye-watering discounts from Russian exporters.
A Ukrainian flag is seen in front of a sign reading "Stop Putin's oil" during a vigil for Ukraine near the European Union (EU) headquarters in Brussels in March 2022. (VALERIA MONGELLI/AFP via Getty Images) (VALERIA MONGELLI via Getty Images)
Adeyemo: The reason this works as a strategy is because it allies with everybody's incentives except the Russians.
Kennedy: Sanctions remain vulnerable to subversion, especially fraud and the steadily expanding shadow fleet. Policymakers are now well aware of these vulnerabilities.
Brooks: Tanker sales by Greek and Cypriot shipowners have continued and substantially further undercut the functioning of the G7 cap. All these tanker sales are well known in Brussels, and it’s really up to the EU to prohibit them.
Cahill: We never expected perfect compliance, but the fact is, Russia's losing revenue, and so any lost revenue is good. The more you introduce these kinds of measures, the more incentive you give countries to find a way around them.
Fall 2024: The debate about what to do now
By the fall, while an estimate found that the cap was still having a bite and perhaps costing Putin about $36 per barrel, rising global oil prices put acute pressure on the cap and Yellen publicly acknowledged concerns about the evasion efforts.
Inside the Biden administration, Deputy Secretary Adeyemo met with senior officials at Lloyd's of London, a leading global insurance market, as the administration launched a "phase 2" aimed at both increasing Putin's tanker costs while also adding new scrutiny of western shipping and insurance companies.
Van Nostrand: It’s completely unsurprising that Russia has invested in an infrastructure to sell oil without coalition services; in all sanctions regimes, the adversary has an incentive to move outside our jurisdiction, and we modeled for that up front. The point is that new infrastructure has cost Russia significantly: They sunk money into tankers that otherwise would have gone to tanks.
Wolfram: I get a little bit frustrated when people say, "Oh, there are these violations, therefore it's not working," because I feel like we have laws against shoplifting. People still shoplift. That doesn't mean that you should get rid of those laws. You just want to figure out how to increase their enforcement.
Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to Kyiv in February 2023. Months later, Yellen acknowledged limits in the price cap designed to choke off funds for the war in Ukraine. (Ukrainian Presidential Press Service via Reuters) (No Xcode Please Review / reuters)
Was this cap effective enough? Can it be applied elsewhere during future conflicts? Would harsher measures have brought the Ukraine war to an end, at the cost of more economic pain globally? The debate on these questions is far from over.
Browder: From my perspective, this oil price cap is somebody trying to be too clever by half, and it looks to me like one of these things where the Western governments want to do something and to be seen to be doing something, but at the same time, no one really has the stomach to impose a real oil embargo on Russia.
Brooks: If we had done an embargo and Russia had gone into a big financial crisis, I'm not sure the war would still be going on. It would be painful, but it might be short. Whereas what we have now is kind of a forever war.
Cahill: If you're a price cap architect, what you care about is how much money the Russian Treasury is getting and judged on that metric, it is working.
Harris: Moving forward, the key is to continue to subject a sizable share of Russian oil exports to the coalition’s restrictions on price. This doesn’t mean that every barrel needs to be sold under the price cap — we just need enough volume under coalition control to provide leverage.
Wessel: Treasury has the right to celebrate that, but what's not clear is that it had any effect whatsoever on Russia's conduct of the war. So that seems like a rather unfortunate detail.
Ben Werschkul is Washington correspondent for Yahoo Finance.
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finance.yahoo.com
5. I've lost confidence in Lloyd Austin, Lindsey Graham says
Deep down, are people channeling FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 and "COIN theory?"
I've lost confidence in Lloyd Austin, Lindsey Graham says
By DAVID COHEN
12/03/2023 09:42 AM EST
Politico
I’ve lost confidence in Lloyd Austin, Lindsey Graham says
The South Carolina Republican decries his statements on the Israel-Hamas war.
Sen. Lindsey Graham speaks on Capitol Hill on Nov. 9, 2023, in Washington. | Alex Brandon/AP
12/03/2023 09:42 AM EST
Sen. Lindsey Graham said Sunday he has lost confidence in Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin because of his recent comments about the Israel-Hamas war.
“He’s so naïve. I mean, I just lost all confidence in this guy,” the South Carolina Republican said on CNN’s “State of the Union” in response to a question in which host Dana Bash characterized Austin as saying that Israel’s tactics are turning civilians in Gaza into future enemies.
In remarks Saturday in California, Austin said, “The lesson is that you can only win in urban warfare by protecting civilians.” He said Israel could turn a military victory into defeat by not doing its best to protect civilians in Gaza.
“Strategic defeat would be inflaming the Palestinians? They’re already inflamed,” Graham continued. “They’re taught from the time they’re born to hate the Jews and to kill them. They’re taught math: If you have 10 Jews and kill six, how many would you have left?”
Bash circled back to Graham’s statement, and Graham doubled down.
“I like Secretary Austin, but this war has shown to me … if we were attacked like this, which we were on 9/11, if somebody called for us within two months to have a cease-fire against Al Qaeda, we would have laughed them out of town, we would have run them out of town. Secretary Austin is telling Israel things that are impossible to achieve,” Graham said.
POLITICO
Politico
6. Palestinians Face Harrowing Hunt for Safety as War Intensifies
Palestinians Face Harrowing Hunt for Safety as War Intensifies
Israel urges civilians to move out of harm’s way, while families in Gaza say ‘there’s nowhere else to go’
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-hamas-war-palestinians-safety-1894fead?mod=hp_lead_pos7
By Chao DengFollow
, Menna Farouk and Omar Abdel-BaquiFollow
Dec. 4, 2023 12:01 am ET
The first call came at 1:30 a.m. on Oct. 8. The recorded voice instructed doctor Hussam Abuouda, his wife and five children to get out.
Leave Beit Hanoun, the city at the Israeli border in northern Gaza, Abuouda recalls the unidentified man saying in Arabic.
He had received a call like this before, in the 2014 Israel-Gaza war. That time, he moved out for 45 days, then returned to repair his damaged home. This night felt more urgent. A bomb had obliterated a building hundreds of yards from his home, killing people inside.
“I feared the same would happen to me and my family,” says Abuouda.
At dawn, with explosions all around, the family piled into their green
Fiat, the children crying as they raced along empty roads to Gaza City, as directed, 6 miles south. It was the first of five moves the Abuoudas would make in less than a month as they followed Israeli instructions to get out of the way of airstrikes its military says are aimed at eliminating Hamas, the militant rulers of the enclave.
A truce to free hostages and allow aid into the enclave stopped the bombing for a week late last month. When it expired early Friday, Israel urged Palestinians to make way again.
The resumption of bombing will force the Palestinians to again calculate and recalculate an impossible and potentially deadly equation—whether it is safer to stay put, or keep moving in search of a safe place within Gaza, a territory roughly the size of Philadelphia.
About two months earlier, Hamas stormed the Israeli frontier, carrying out attacks on a desert music festival and in borderland farming communities that left 1,200 people dead, most of them civilians, according to Israeli authorities. Militants took more than 200 people hostage.
A Palestinian mourns people killed in Khan Younis on Sunday. PHOTO: FATIMA SHBAIR/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Apart from the temporary cease-fire, Israel has been striking back ever since. Over 15,000 people have died in Gaza since Oct. 7, according to the government media office in the Hamas-run enclave. Most were women and children. The figures don’t distinguish between civilians and militants.
In recent days, the U.S. has warned Israel that the number of deaths in Gaza must start to trend downward. “Too many innocent Palestinians have been killed,” said U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris. “Frankly, the scale of civilian suffering, and the images and videos coming from Gaza are devastating.”
The death toll has surged as extended families crowd under one roof. Uprooted Gazans camp in relatives’ homes or make do in shelters, and a single strike can take out generations. Of the around 2.2 million people in Gaza, some 1.8 million have been displaced from their homes, according to the United Nations.
Abuouda’s family sheltered for two days at his cousin’s home in Gaza City, with 25 people crammed into a house built for four in the Daraj quarter of the city, sleeping wherever there was floor space. Abuouda returned north to his work as a gastroenterologist at Indonesia Hospital.
Then the second call came. This time, the voice recording told Abuouda’s family to vacate Daraj, but didn’t say where to go.
Israel says it has undertaken extensive efforts—including sending millions of voice messages—to ensure the safety of civilians in the Gaza Strip during the conflict. On Friday, the Israeli military released a map that divides the enclave into hundreds of numbered blocks. Those living in or near the blocks on a list published daily by the military on its social media should follow accompanying instructions on where to go, the Israeli military said Sunday.
“Residents of Gaza! It is a safe means to preserve your safety, lives and the lives of your families,” says the Israeli military website accompanying the map. Most people in Gaza don’t have reliable access to the internet or enough electricity to charge cellphones, so residents are unlikely to see the messages in time, according to U.N. officials.
Israel accuses Hamas of embedding itself in civilian infrastructure such as hospitals and schools, using ordinary Palestinians as human shields, a claim Hamas denies.
“Israel is 100% compliant with international humanitarian law,” says Ophir Falk, an adviser to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “We’ve warned them from day one to get out of harm’s way.”
Palestinians evacuating to the southern Gaza Strip last month. PHOTO: HAITHAM IMAD/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK
Trapped
For most families, there is no way out of Gaza. Israel sealed its border after the Hamas attacks and later only foreign passport holders and their direct relatives or the very badly injured could attempt to cross into Egypt.
The Israeli military began telling everyone in the north of the strip to move south one week into the military campaign through text messages, phone calls and air-dropped fliers. Some messages warned that those who didn’t comply risked association with a terrorist organization.
For decades, Israel has used calls and leaflet drops to minimize civilian casualties in conflict but the Israeli military says it has done so on an “unprecedented scale” in this war, with more than 30,000 phone calls, four million leaflets, and millions of text and voice messages. “This outreach aimed to alert civilians about impending airstrikes and guide them to safety,” a spokesman for the military said.
Many in Gaza heeded the initial warnings right away, traveling south in a chaotic rush only to find it overcrowded. Food and water were scarce, and bombs still fell from the sky. Rents in the south had more than doubled.
Some 807,000 people remained in north Gaza in mid-November, according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, unable or unwilling to move. Israel’s ground operation, which also resumed on Friday and is expected to expand south, includes block-by-block battles with militants in Gaza City. Before the truce, Israel opened what it called a “humanitarian corridor” for a few hours on some days to enable civilians to go south, though some who used it reported shelling nearby. Israel’s military didn’t respond to requests for comment on whether it would do so again.
“We are at war with Hamas, not with the civilians of Gaza,” the Israeli military said last month on X, formerly Twitter.
According to an Israeli security official, Israel estimates it has killed thousands of Hamas fighters, of more than 30,000 that it said were in the group’s ranks before the conflict.
Wafaa Eid has had 68 relatives die in the bombing across Gaza. PHOTO: WAFAA EID
In Al Bureij, near the middle of the Gaza Strip, residents got calls from people who identified themselves as Israeli intelligence as early as Oct. 10. “They said they want to bomb our homes,” psychologist Wafaa Eid recalls her neighbors saying. She grabbed what clothes and tins of food she could and within half an hour fled just over a mile west, to her sister’s home, where no evacuation call came.
In all, 24 members of Eid’s family moved that day. “For me, it was like the world had ended,” Eid says.
Almost every day brought news of another home flattened, crushing beneath it a branch of her family tree. Over the next three weeks, 68 of Eid’s relatives died in the bombing across Gaza.
Eid’s brother Essam Eid, a travel agent, and nine members of his family also left Al Bureij on Oct. 10. They sheltered at his daughter Samah’s home in Nuseirat, in the center of the strip, where no evacuation calls came.
Five days later, that house was blown apart. Children as young as 2 years old were under the rubble, and rescuers digging with hands couldn’t reach them. Some 16 of Eid’s relatives were killed. She remembers feeling numb.
Two days later, she heard news reports of strikes on Al Bureij, the neighborhood where her sister Hayam Eid lived.
“Is it true, is it true?” she cried out to her sister Om Ahmed as she rushed downstairs. Ahmed’s weeping told Eid enough, and she fainted. In all, 16 in her family were killed in the strike. The youngest was 6 years old, and the oldest—her sister Hayam—was 62.
History of flight
Eid’s grandparents had come from Al Maghar in the sun-baked hills above the Sea of Galilee and now a city in Israel’s north. In 1948, at the creation of the Israeli state, the family, like hundreds of thousands of other Palestinians, was forced to leave.
Palestinians refer to that displacement as the Nakba, or catastrophe. Many see the current war through the lens of that 75-year-old event and fear losing their land again.
“We have been living in Gaza ever since, but we have never forgotten our homeland,” says Eid.
Wafaa Eid's sister Hayam Eid, top left, was killed in an airstrike in Al Bureij. Her brother, Essam, top right, and his wife, lower left, had fled to the home of his daughter Samah, lower middle, in Nuseirat. Sixteen family members perished in Nuseirat, including Samah's daughter, lower right.
Her family settled in Al Bureij, a small refugee camp. They became merchants, travel agents and government employees, and as the family grew the neighborhood took on their name, which means holiday or festival, Eid says.
She is the youngest of eight siblings, with two sisters and five brothers, two of whom died before the war. “We are very connected despite the large number of our family,” Eid says.
On Oct. 23, Eid discovered four of her cousins and their families—12 people in all—had died in airstrikes in Zawaida, a neighborhood in Deir Al Balah, further south. On Nov. 2, another cousin, Marwan Eid, living in Al Bureij had taken his grandson across town for a shower. On the way back, they were killed in an airstrike, Eid says.
“None were Hamas,” she says. “They were just living their lives.”
A few days later, three more of her cousins and their families—22 relatives in all—died.
“I am a psychologist but I cannot deal with all of this,” she says through tears. “I need 20 psychiatrists to help me recover from this trauma.”
Her phone is full of the photos of the dozens of slain relatives. One shows her niece Areej, a 23-year-old dentist, with her Egyptian fiancé. The pair were set to marry in November. Areej Eid died on Oct. 17 in the strike that killed her mother, Wafaa Eid’s sister Hayam.
“We are living but dead inside,” Eid says.
Palestinians in Deir Al Balah last month. PHOTO: HATEM MOUSSA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
On the move
As Israel readied to send ground troops into northern Gaza, some Palestinian families held out, wary of Israeli claims that the south was safe and also haunted by their losses from Nakba.
Israel has said Palestinians can go back to their homes after the war but told them not to attempt a return during the temporary cease-fire. Many now have no homes to go back to.
Abuouda, the doctor, says the idea of another Nakba seemed unimaginable at the outset of the war. “I thought that we would be away from our home for a while and then go back,” he says.
On Oct. 10, after the second warning, his wife and children fled to a relative’s home in Al Shati, a refugee camp a few minutes’ drive northwest of Gaza City.
A Survival Odyssey
The route taken by the Abuouda family as they followed Israeli instructions to move out of the way of airstrikes in Gaza
Oct. 8: Hussam Abuouda and his family left Beit Hanoun for Gaza City
Beit Hanoun
1
Jabalia
Refugee
Camp
Oct. 12: All moved to Jabalia refugee camp
4
Oct. 10: Abuouda’s wife and children left to Al-Shati
Al-Shati
Camp
3
Sheltered for two days in the Daraj quarter, Gaza City
2
Gaza City
Mediterranean Sea
ISRAEL
Wadi Gaza evacuation line
Nuseirat Camp
Al Bureij Camp
Oct. 13: Headed to the family home of Abuouda’s sister-in-law in Deir Al Balah, south of Wadi Gaza. It took four hours to drive 12 miles and they congregated with 100 family members.
Deir al Balah
5
Oct. 23: Drove 12 miles south to Rafah, where they sheltered in a U.N. school.
SYRIA
Area of detail
WEST BANK
6
Rafah
ISRAEL
JORDAN
2 miles
EGYPT
N
2 km
Source: Staff reports
Emma Brown/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
The next morning, an airstrike at an adjacent building killed several neighbors. Abuouda heard the news at the end of a 48-hour shift, left the hospital and rode an ambulance to meet his family. “I started to look for ways to protect them,” Abuouda says. They went to a packed U.N. shelter slightly further north in Jabalia.
At 3 a.m. on Oct. 13, the family’s first night in the refuge, U.N. officials told them Israel wanted everyone to move south of Wadi Gaza, roughly midway across the strip.
The family’s car still had fuel, but Abuouda had to retrieve it from Gaza City. They headed to Abuouda’s sister-in-law’s, in Deir Al Balah, just south of the evacuation zone. It took them four hours to travel 12 miles.
Around 100 family members were at that house. The air was thick with the smell of smoke, the sound of shelling never far away. On the ninth day, a strike hit a house about a quarter of a mile away, killing dozens of people, Abuouda says. They brushed the dust from that blast off their clothes and hair, he says.
May 1, 2023
Oct. 21, 2023
Satellite photos show the destruction in Beit Hanoun, Hussam Abuouda's home city in northern Gaza.
MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES
On Oct. 23, the Abuoudas climbed into their Fiat again, dodging craters and driving past burned out buildings, along the 12-mile journey south to Rafah, Gaza’s southernmost town and next to Egypt’s Sinai. They squeezed into another U.N. school shelter as bombs went off nearby. The explosions worsened, Abuouda says, as negotiators homed in on the temporary cease-fire and hostage release deal.
Just over a month after they arrived in Rafah, on Nov. 24, the bombing paused, bringing the first quiet for a long time, Abuouda says. It was also the day he learned his six-story home in Beit Hanoun was destroyed.
“It contained family memories,” he says.
With the cease-fire over, he can hear explosions but not close, he says, and the instructions offered by the Israelis so far remain vague. Israel has designated a small area of land by the coast known as Al Mawasi as a humanitarian zone, but it has no buildings and isn’t a suitable place to live, Abuouda says. Winter is approaching.
“There’s nowhere else to go,” he says.
Wafaa Eid, whose home has also been wiped out, left Gaza for Egypt with her brother, who works for Jordan’s Arab Bank, on Nov. 18. They were among the few people in Gaza who could do so without a foreign passport, in an arrangement facilitated by the Jordanian government. In her exhaustion and grief, she thinks about her two siblings, still in Gaza.
“All I want now is to get my family out of hell and death,” she says.
Dov Lieber contributed to this article.
Write to Chao Deng at chao.deng@wsj.com and Omar Abdel-Baqui at omar.abdel-baqui@wsj.com
A plume of smoke rises over Beit Hanoun in after an Israeli airstrike on Nov. 16. PHOTO: CHRISTOPHER FURLONG/GETTY IMAGES
7. Who will run Gaza after the war? U.S. searches for best of bad options
Excerpts:
The de facto governing body in the Gaza Strip since 2007, when it ousted the Palestinian Authority from power, Hamas has overseen the economy, health care, water and electricity, trade and infrastructure. It runs the security forces in Gaza — not only the militant brigades, like Qassam, now fighting Israeli forces in the streets but also the regular police force, including traffic cops.
The group remains popular among many Palestinians following the attack. Both the Trump and Biden administrations had focused on brokering better relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors — to the detriment of the Palestinians, who had become sidelined as a cause, many felt. Now, thanks to Hamas, Palestinians are again front and center.
Even the week-long pause in Israel’s attack on Gaza was structured in a way that boosted Hamas’s popularity, as joyous Palestinian families welcomed home wives, sisters and children who were freed from Israeli prisons in exchange for hostages taken during October’s attack.
U.S. officials blame Hamas for the desperate humanitarian situation in Gaza, saying the group could have spared Palestinians from Israeli retaliation if it had not carried out the Oct. 7 massacre. But they concede, too, that the hardhanded Israeli response has inflamed Palestinian anger and set back progress toward a more durable peace.
Failing to protect civilians can “drive them into the arms of the enemy,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Saturday.
Who will run Gaza after the war? U.S. searches for best of bad options
The Biden administration says a ‘revitalized’ Palestinian Authority should govern the enclave, but the idea is deeply unpopular with Israel — and many Palestinians
By Michael Birnbaum, William Booth and Hazem Balousha
December 3, 2023 at 4:58 p.m. EST
The Washington Post · by Michael Birnbaum · December 3, 2023
TEL AVIV — The Israelis say they don’t want the job. Arab nations are resisting. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas might volunteer, but the Palestinian people probably don’t want him.
As the Biden administration begins to plan for “the day after” in Gaza — confronting problematic questions such as who runs the territory once the shooting stops, how it gets rebuilt and, potentially, how it eventually becomes a part of an independent Palestinian state — the stakeholders face a host of unattractive options.
On a trip to Israel and the West Bank last week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken sought to advance those discussions, but there were few easy answers. The Biden administration is pushing to install a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority as Gaza’s administrator, but it is an unpopular idea with the Israeli government and even among many Palestinians. U.S. officials acknowledge the challenge, but say the group is the best, and perhaps the only, solution among a list of worse options, which include a return to direct Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip.
“We have no illusions this is going to be easy. We’ll surely have disagreements along the way,” Blinken told reporters while in Tel Aviv. But, he said, “the alternative — more terrorist attacks, more violence, more innocent suffering — is unacceptable.”
Israel-Gaza war
(Oded Balilty/AP)
Israel is expanding its ground operation against Hamas across the Gaza Strip, forcing many civilians already displaced by the conflict to flee again as hostilities resume.
For context: Understand what’s behind the Israel-Gaza war.
End of carousel
Following the Oct. 7 Hamas attack that killed at least 1,200 Israelis, Israel vowed to destroy the group as both a military and governing entity.
But after more than 15 years in power in Gaza, Hamas and its supporters are deeply embedded in every sector of society — not only in the government ministries they run, but also in charities, courts, mosques, sport teams, jails, municipalities and youth groups.
The de facto governing body in the Gaza Strip since 2007, when it ousted the Palestinian Authority from power, Hamas has overseen the economy, health care, water and electricity, trade and infrastructure. It runs the security forces in Gaza — not only the militant brigades, like Qassam, now fighting Israeli forces in the streets but also the regular police force, including traffic cops.
The group remains popular among many Palestinians following the attack. Both the Trump and Biden administrations had focused on brokering better relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors — to the detriment of the Palestinians, who had become sidelined as a cause, many felt. Now, thanks to Hamas, Palestinians are again front and center.
Even the week-long pause in Israel’s attack on Gaza was structured in a way that boosted Hamas’s popularity, as joyous Palestinian families welcomed home wives, sisters and children who were freed from Israeli prisons in exchange for hostages taken during October’s attack.
U.S. officials blame Hamas for the desperate humanitarian situation in Gaza, saying the group could have spared Palestinians from Israeli retaliation if it had not carried out the Oct. 7 massacre. But they concede, too, that the hardhanded Israeli response has inflamed Palestinian anger and set back progress toward a more durable peace.
Failing to protect civilians can “drive them into the arms of the enemy,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Saturday.
Israelis say they don’t want to return to an occupation of Gaza. But they are discussing security enhancements such as a buffer zone along its border with Israel and access to the territory for Israeli forces during a transition period that would revoke some elements of autonomy from Gaza’s residents. The Biden administration hotly opposes any restrictions on how Gazans can use their land, and is eager for Israeli forces to turn over responsibility, possibly to international forces pledged by Arab nations, for the territory’s security.
But any planning for the future will be complicated by what happens while the conflict continues to rage, observers say.
“The way the war is prosecuted will determine the range of options,” said Brian Katulis, vice president of policy at the Middle East Institute. “Every bomb that’s dropped, and every day that Hamas still stands out, increases the costs of the reconstruction.”
The question of who maintains law and order after the conflict is deeply complicated, experts say. Israeli authorities acknowledge the need to make such plans, say U.S. officials who met with them last week, but they don’t have concrete proposals and appear to want others to decide.
After the conflict ends, a stable transition in Gaza will need to find a way to “permit demilitarization, with a mechanism to ensure there can’t be any rearming of anybody,” said Dennis A. Ross, a former adviser to both Democratic and Republican administrations about Israeli-Palestinian negotiations who is now at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a research group.
And the Palestinian Authority needs to change if it is to run anything in Gaza.
“It’s not just that they can’t come in on the back of Israeli tanks,” Ross said. “The fact is, they can’t manage themselves right now.”
The Israelis don’t want United Nations peacekeepers, because they don’t trust the United Nations to be receptive to their concerns. Arab nations are deeply skeptical about sending in their security forces because they worry about the optics of having to impose force on Palestinians should the need arise.
“One Arab official told me, ‘Imagine the footage of our soldiers shooting at Palestinians and being shot by Palestinians,’” said Ghaith al-Omari, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former adviser to Palestinian negotiators. For the Biden administration, the focus on empowering the Palestinian Authority and, eventually, a full Palestinian state, is a way to compel Arab nations to engage in discussions about the complicated transition and potentially to take part in it, he said.
Arab nations, “to even be able to engage with us, they need that framing, the two-state solution framing and the transitional framing,” he said. “Because this way they can always claim, ‘We’re doing this to support the Palestinians.’”
The Palestinian Authority, which the Biden administration sees as the long-term solution, has done little for Palestinians in recent years. Its president, Abbas, turned 88 last month and is widely seen as unimaginative and tired — but still relatively healthy despite the cigarettes he puffs throughout meetings with visiting delegations. He is in the 18th year of what was supposed to be a four-year term.
The Palestinian Authority “may be the best of a range of very bad options to start with,” said Katulis, of the Middle East Institute.
Its credibility with the Palestinian people has been undercut by its security role in the West Bank, which has seen its police force charged not only with protecting Palestinians but by extension assisting the Israeli military occupation.
“The Authority is perceived as corrupt and lacks support among the Palestinian population,” said Shawqi Issa, a human rights activist from Bethlehem and a former Palestinian Authority minister.
Biden officials think of better days between 2007 and 2013, when Salam Fayyad, a former International Monetary Fund official, served as prime minister of the authority. He improved the entity’s ability to deliver basic services. U.S. officials don’t say explicitly that Abbas needs to go, nor do they venture ideas about who should replace him, saying that Palestinians and their regional backers must have that conversation.
But they do have ideas about basic reforms to lay the groundwork for a more open Gazan society, which hasn’t had a chance to vote in elections since 2006. After meeting with Abbas on Thursday, Blinken told reporters that the Biden administration was seeking reforms that would “effectively deliver on the needs of the Palestinian people.”
The Palestinian Authority needs to combat corruption, engage with civil society and improve support for a free media, Blinken said. Ultimately, he said, it should face voters to pick leadership, he said, although he appeared to suggest that doing so should not be the first priority.
“We support free and fair elections around the world, including, of course, for Palestinians,” he said. “But that has to be a process and it’s something to talk about as we move from the conflict to what we’ve been calling the day after.”
Offering elections right now could well lead to a Hamas victory, a non-starter for Israeli leaders and a reason U.S. officials say that other Palestinian choices need to be seen as more attractive. In private, officials from Israel’s far-right government are dismissive, saying they see little difference between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, whom they also accuse of undermining Israeli security.
In the long run, the daily needs of Palestinians — the sort of issues on which democratically elected leaders rise and fall — are unlikely to be addressed so long as their territories are occupied by Israel, said Issa, the former Palestinian Authority minister.
“The average person in the West Bank or Gaza Strip will not see their problems solved unless the occupation ends and the Palestinian people obtain their rights,” he said. “All discussions about temporary solutions fall short of addressing the main problem.”
Many Gazans say they are unhappy with all their options — though thinking about politics is difficult while under Israeli bombardment, one said.
“Our current focus is solely on ending the war,” said Safwan Jamal, 28, who is from Gaza City and has been displaced to the Nuseirat refugee camp, which has experienced devastating bombing, alongside shortages of food, water and electricity.
“While Hamas may be somewhat reckless, the Palestinian Authority is riddled with corruption and unfit to govern us,” he said.
Hamas is “far from ideal,” he said, but “we are oppressed, and those willing to help us must respect our perspectives and facilitate elections, allowing the Palestinian people to choose their leadership, whether it be Hamas or others.”
A mother of two children from Gaza City, Lamees Haddad, 32, said that both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority “are marred by corruption.”
“We endure without support from any party. Current political discussions seem senseless while people in Gaza continue to suffer, not just from bombings, but also due to hunger and thirst,” she said.
In the long run, Biden administration officials say, a separate Palestinian state is the only stable solution for ensuring security for both Israelis and Palestinians. They are still working to convince Israelis about the necessity of their vision.
“There are two schools of thought” among Israelis, said Ross, the former U.S. negotiator. “One school of thought goes, ‘This just proved we can’t afford a Palestinian state next to us because it can be taken over by groups like Hamas.’ And the other school of thought will be, ‘Okay, we just defeated Hamas. And if you think we can control or occupy the Palestinians forever, exclusively on our terms, and we won’t face a successor to Hamas, you live in a dream world.’”
Booth reported from London and Balousha reported from Amman, Jordan. Judith Sudilovsky in Jerusalem contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Michael Birnbaum · December 3, 2023
8. The Case for Conservative Internationalism By Kori Schake
Excerpts:
The world that the United States and its allies created after World War II made the United States much safer and richer. But Americans need to be reminded that if the United States does not enforce this international order, someone else will. That someone else would likely be China. And China in charge would make for a dangerous world in which it and authoritarian allies such as Russia and Iran could amass the military and economic power to impose a repressive vision on the world.
Rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, negotiating and securing the ratification of other trade treaties, increasing defense spending while reforming entitlements and reducing the national debt, securing the U.S.-Mexican border, aiding countries fighting to preserve their liberty: these are big goals. The American Enterprise Institute scholar Fred Kagan observes that “no one wants to die for the international order.” It is too diffuse a concept.
But selling voters on an internationalist foreign policy may not be nearly as hard as some politicians imagine if they approach the public with more concrete arguments grounded in U.S. national interest. The Biden administration and too many Republican leaders now engage in nativist, self-interested appeals—false assertions that internationalism has made the United States weaker or that caring about the U.S. national interest means ignoring the world. This could not be further from the truth. The United States’ international choices shape its domestic landscape. Currently, U.S. leaders are making incoherent foreign policy choices that render the country less safe and less prosperous—choices that will only become much more painful to undo down the line.
Behind the United States’ partisan polarization lies a general confusion and disillusionment. A June-July 2023 Pew poll found that just 16 percent of Americans trust the federal government, the lowest level in 70 years of polling. Just 10 percent agreed that politics made them feel hopeful. In August, in a Wall Street Journal poll, 93 percent of likely Republican primary voters agreed that the United States is headed in the “wrong direction.” These are grim findings. But they also represent an enormous opportunity—an opening for good, clear policies to gain traction, because Americans are obviously dissatisfied with what they are getting.
The solution is not to adopt policies that abandon trade, weaken the U.S. military, leave the U.S.-Mexican border chaotic, and cease giving aid to deserving allies. Americans still resolutely want to secure a role for the United States as a leader in the world, both for the country’s sake and for their own individual safety and prosperity. U.S. leaders must show they know how to do it.
The Case for Conservative Internationalism
How to Reverse the Inward Turn of Republican Foreign Policy
December 4, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Safe Passage: The Transition From British to American Hegemony · December 4, 2023
It is hard to think of a more chaotic moment in the history of the Republican Party than the present; perhaps only Andrew Johnson’s 1865–68 presidency comes close. The GOP’s de facto leader, former President Donald Trump, faces 91 felony charges in four separate criminal cases. After serving just nine months as Speaker of the House, Representative Kevin McCarthy of California was forced out of the speakership by eight members of his own party, triggering a round-robin tournament that left the House paralyzed for weeks before a little-known member pieced together the votes to replace him. House Republicans have been flirting with shutting down the government and defaulting on the national debt in legislation that has no prospect of winning support even from fellow Republicans in the Senate, while Trump spreads lies about the 2020 election and strategizes about weaponizing the U.S. executive branch against his opponents.
The GOP’s disorder is especially evident—and dangerous—in the realm of foreign policy. For decades since 1952, the Republican Party had a fairly clear international vision: promote American security and economic power while supporting the expansion of democracy around the world. That meant providing for a strong military, cooperating with allies to advance shared interests, and boosting U.S. power in international institutions. It meant advancing free trade, ensuring fair international competition for U.S. companies, and promoting the rule of law in immigration policy. And it meant opposing authoritarianism, especially when autocrats directly challenged U.S. interests.
Republicans’ commitments to these principles have weakened dramatically. Trump whiplashes between a wish to project U.S. power abroad and isolationism; recently, he has vowed to withdraw from NATO, end imports of Chinese goods, deploy the U.S. military onto American streets to fight crime and deport immigrants, and “drive out” “warmongers” and “globalists” from the U.S. government. Other conservative leaders—such as Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and the entrepreneur Vivek Ramaswamy—express outright hostility toward sustaining the United States’ international commitments. Most GOP presidential candidates offered unqualified support for Israel after Hamas’s attack, but Trump appeared to be impressed with it. On Ukraine, the party’s politicians are split, with just over half of House Republicans voting in September 2023 to halt U.S. aid to Kyiv’s defense against Russia’s invasion.
So it does not appear to be an auspicious time for traditional Republican internationalism to regain its influence over the GOP. To some degree, GOP leaders’ stances reflect an apparent isolationist turn among their constituents. An August 2023 Civiqs Daily Tracking poll found that 77 percent of registered Republican voters agree that the United States should become less involved in solving problems overseas. It might not even seem urgent that Republicans develop a clear foreign policy at all. As recently as April 2023, when a Wall Street Journal poll asked likely Republican voters which issues were most important when they assessed presidential hopefuls, foreign policy ranked fourth, tied with a candidate’s view on crime. By August 2023, foreign policy had sunk to GOP voters’ lowest priority among 14 policy positions, falling behind the economy, inflation, immigration, and others.
But foreign policy should be an urgent priority. The world is growing more dangerous, and foreign policy bears directly on the state of the domestic economy and, thus, Americans’ very livelihoods. Extending U.S. power abroad—and U.S. influence in international institutions such as NATO—deters foreign aggression that might otherwise disrupt the U.S. economy. Expanding trade helps create fair international competition for U.S. businesses. And U.S. President Joe Biden’s foreign policy has helped generate the economic discomfort that Republican voters put at the top of their list of concerns. The Biden administration works from the theory that U.S. foreign policy has failed the middle class and needs to be repaired through market protections and government subsidies; this approach has stoked inflation, distorted markets, stunted trade, and frustrated U.S. allies.
The United States needs a strong and vibrant Republican Party. To make a more coherent case for how it would solve the country’s problems, the party will have to clarify its foreign policy focus. Traditional conservative internationalism remains the best way to protect U.S. national security and steward the economy. And voters, in fact, may still be eager for an internationalist foreign policy agenda—if that agenda could be presented to them persuasively. A July 2023 Reagan Institute poll revealed that “strong majorities of Americans believe their country should lead the world, invest in military power, promote international trade, support freedom and democracy, and stand with Ukraine until it wins its war against Russian aggression.” Self-described Trump voters mostly identified as internationalists, not as isolationists, and their support for assisting Ukraine increased by nearly a third—from 50 percent to 64 percent—when the pollster explained how that aid contributed to U.S. security.
Americans, including conservatives, remain what they have always been: reluctant internationalists, but internationalists all the same. They do not respond well to abstract appeals about preserving the “international order.” But they understand that if the world lets China set the rules, U.S. liberties will become less secure, U.S. businesses will be disadvantaged, and U.S. allies will be left vulnerable. Voters do not need Republicans to pander to Trumpism or to polls that suggest soft support for internationalism. They do need Republicans to advance a theory for what is happening in the world and how the party intends to protect the country and secure Americans’ prosperity. No such theory can be developed without a clear foreign policy.
PROTECTION RACKET
Despite Biden’s abandonment of Afghanistan, his administration has done well in rallying support for Ukraine, strengthening U.S. defense alliances in the Pacific, and helping Israel respond to Hamas’s terrorist assault. But a gaping hole exists in the middle of Biden’s foreign policy, created by protectionist economics. At the heart of the Biden administration’s foreign policy is a belief that although the United States has many sources of dynamism—its deep private and public capital markets, its relatively permissive legal immigration policies, its world-class universities, its strong Chapter 11 bankruptcy protections, and its uniquely creative and skilled labor force—U.S. businesses cannot prosper domestically or compete internationally unless the government funds them and shields them from competition.
The consequences of this fundamental misconception are both geopolitical and economic. Biden has failed to recommit to ratifying the United States’ accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership—a trade agreement with 12 dynamic Asian countries that President Barack Obama signed but Trump repudiated. Instead, Biden offered a vacuous alternative in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, a nebulous pact that the White House has readily acknowledged “is not a trade agreement.” The administration is forgoing a chance to lower tariffs and strengthen labor and environmental standards on imports, thereby directly advantaging China: in 2021, China applied for admission to the TPP in the United States’ place.
The Biden administration’s “Buy American” restrictions have stressed supply chains, penalized foreign companies such as Samsung and Toyota that have created a huge number of jobs in the United States, and embittered allies that the United States will need in future conflict with China. Biden has retained Trump-era tariffs that even he has described as self-defeating. The global South is eager for international trade and investment, but the Biden team is ceding these trade opportunities to Chinese businesses. That not only passes up mutually beneficial economic opportunities but affords developing countries little reason to support the United States when Washington appeals for help in its efforts to aid Ukraine and Israel.
Going forward, Biden’s foreign policy stance will prevent the United States from achieving the economy of scale that can match or exceed China’s, especially as Beijing deepens its collaborations with Moscow and Tehran. The guiding principle of U.S. policy toward China should be to force or motivate it to become a responsible economic and geopolitical stakeholder—to play by international rules. To prevent China from acquiring critical technologies such as advanced semiconductors, the Biden administration has advocated a “small yard, high fence” approach, protecting a limited number of technologies but imposing severe threats of secondary sanctions against adversaries and allies alike if they do not also restrict sales to China. This position risks alienating allies that share U.S. security objectives, invest in U.S. companies, buy enormous amounts of U.S. products, and boast cutting-edge firms whose technological innovations and manufacturing capacity U.S. companies need. For instance, unilaterally imposing restrictions on chip-making tools and telling allies to follow the United States’ lead was resented in both The Hague and Tokyo.
America’s allies are pleading for a U.S. economic strategy that helps them reduce their reliance on China.
Washington should long ago have tightened restrictions on U.S. funding for Chinese military technologies and reduced dependence on Chinese products in critical areas such as pharmaceuticals. But a better approach to China would also offer trade advantages to allied countries in the form of an economic NATO, urge allied governments to prevent companies from surging into markets that Chinese economic warfare restricts, and rally public demand for products that China penalizes. The United States should also license more friendly countries to produce products critical to the U.S. defense industry.
In a September 2023 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey, 74 percent of Americans surveyed—nearly an all-time high—believed trade was good for the U.S. economy. Eighty percent believed it was good for their own standard of living, and 63 percent thought it was good for creating jobs. In the July 2023 Reagan Institute survey, 58 percent of respondents believed that negotiating favorable trade deals should be a foreign policy priority, and 62 percent of Republican respondents supported signing a trade agreement with Asian countries if the respondents were told that the agreement was designed to counter Chinese economic power.
The problem with U.S. strategy toward globalization in the past 20 years was not that Washington allowed too much trade but that it permitted trade that did not establish reciprocity—trade that did not create a level playing field on which U.S. firms could compete with foreign counterparts, principally China. Trade deficits with China cost the United States 3.7 million jobs between 2001, when China was admitted to the World Trade Organization, and 2018. Three-fourths of these lost jobs—2.8 million—were in manufacturing. After Washington allowed Beijing the benefits of free trade without requiring it to play by the rules, the consequences of unequal trade with China affected every congressional district in the United States. China maintained industrial subsidies, pirated intellectual property, forced companies into joint ventures, and restricted access to its market—practices it continues to this day.
In addition to placing more restrictions on China, the United States should engage in more meaningful trade talks with Indonesia, the Philippines, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. Washington’s current lack of an effective economic line of operations overmilitarizes U.S. strategy. Allies do not want a war with China, and they do not want a moral crusade against authoritarianism. They are pleading for an economic strategy that helps them reduce their reliance on China and remain prosperous. Good, inventive trade policy could create not only a bigger yard—a larger group of countries that adhere to fair rules and norms—but also higher walls, by encouraging more voluntary cooperation against China and others when they do not play fair.
BROKEN ARMOR
Little unites Americans more than the belief that the U.S. military should be strong. The Reagan Institute poll showed that 92 percent of Republicans, 81 percent of independents, and 79 percent of Democrats believe that sustaining the strength of the U.S. military is essential to maintaining the country’s peace and prosperity. More than 70 percent of Americans believe that Washington should increase its spending on defense.
But a gap is growing between what the United States commits itself to doing militarily and the force it funds. In March 2023, Biden proudly advertised his $842 billion budget request for the U.S. Department of Defense as the largest such request in U.S. peacetime history; it represented a 3.2 percent increase in nominal spending. With inflation running higher than that throughout most of 2023, however, the request amounted to a real reduction in defense spending for the second year in a row. Moreover, $109 billion, or one-eighth, of the U.S. defense budget that was approved in 2022 was spent on things that do not directly or indirectly assist in fighting and winning wars, such as breast cancer research.
The U.S. government’s neglect of the military has been a bipartisan problem. In 2011, Republicans helped pass the Budget Control Act, which over the ensuing ten years, cut $600 billion from the Defense Department’s budget. And if the budget agreement that McCarthy negotiated with Biden in May 2023 goes into effect in the spring of 2024, it will cut defense buying power by another $100 billion. Unless the U.S. government radically revises its willingness to fund defense, it will fail to deter its adversaries and could very well lose its next war.
Former South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, and former biotech executive Vivek Ramaswamy in Miami, Florida, November 2023
Marco Bello / Reuters
In 2015, the Chinese navy had 255 ships capable of contributing to combat operations. Now it has 370. The U.S. Navy has only 291, and the Biden administration plans to further reduce that number to 280. Military unreadiness is now perhaps the greatest national security challenge for the United States. In a war against China, U.S. forces could run out of critical munitions in a week.
Fortunately, neither China nor Russia has yet directly challenged the United States in ways that require Washington to fight outright. But they are getting close. After World War II broke out, it was a lucky thing that the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union held out long enough for the United States to ramp up military recruitment and expand its defense industrial base to prepare to join the war. Americans may assume that the United States has similar leeway now; this assumption constitutes a very dangerous temptation to its adversaries.
As the war between Russia and Ukraine drags on, sentimental appeals about Ukrainian courage and Russian depredations are wearing thin. And Republicans have legitimate concerns: they want to reduce federal spending, ensure that U.S. aid money does not get siphoned off by corrupt Ukrainian officials, and understand where assisting Ukraine should rank in the hierarchy of U.S. interests.
Little unites Americans more than the belief that the U.S. military should be strong.
But Biden is giving only enough aid for Kyiv to keep fighting, not enough for it to win. There is a strong conservative case to make for continuing, even increasing, U.S. assistance to Ukraine. For a price of just five percent of the 2023 U.S. defense budget and no U.S. casualties, Ukrainians are fighting the war NATO feared it might have to fight. Voters should know that 60 percent of U.S. assistance to Ukraine goes to U.S. companies that make the weapons sent to Kyiv. And the United States’ engagement with Ukraine has revealed the dangerous deficiencies that Washington has allowed to creep into its defense. Ukraine is in some ways providing both the inspiration and the warning that the United Kingdom did during World War II, allowing the United States to see where its military is unready for what it may be called to do.
Adequately funding defense will ineluctably require entitlement reform. Neither party wants to touch existing entitlement programs—namely, Social Security and Medicare—even though they are becoming unaffordable: entitlements constitute 63 percent of federal spending, up from 19 percent in 1970. Outlays to these programs are squeezing Washington’s discretionary spending, and the interest the country must pay on its huge national debt will further constrict what it can spend on both defense and domestic programs. U.S. federal debt stands at $33 trillion. According to Moody’s Analytics, by 2025 or 2026, federal interest payments on that debt will exceed defense spending.
Former North Carolina Governor Nikki Haley and former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie are the only Republican presidential candidates who own up to the necessity of entitlement reform. But their acknowledgment of it is an excellent start. Legislators already have a blueprint for how to cut entitlement spending in the recommendations made by the 2010 bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. Both parties need to change their attitude toward entitlement reform, but Democrats will likely keep whistling past the graveyard unless Republicans regain their own seriousness about putting entitlements on a sustainable footing to free up funding for defense and other domestic priorities.
BORDER FOLLY
According to analysts at the Brennan Center, a nonprofit law and public policy think tank, many Americans do not understand why the U.S. military does not protect U.S. borders. There is room here for better Republican policy; indeed, immigration policy has a crucial connection to foreign policy and to the United States’ economic health. A January 2021 Pew Research Institute poll found that 68 percent of Americans think the United States is doing a bad job of managing its borders. And that is true: since January 2020, an estimated 200,000 migrants have attempted to cross into the United States illegally every month via the Mexican border, more than at any other point in the last 20 years. Contrary to sensationalized media coverage, the vast majority of these migrants are adults, not unaccompanied minors.
The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the U.S. military from functioning as a domestic police force. Already overstretched generals do not want to take on the job of protecting U.S. borders and are hesitant to launch missions that might tarnish Americans’ respect for the military. But to build more support for U.S. engagements abroad, political leaders need to show they can bring more effort and resources to border security. The January 2023 Pew survey found that a majority of Americans support giving the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency more money to secure the U.S.-Mexican border.
More than money and extra personnel are needed. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency has estimated that over 60 percent of recent migrants are not from Mexico or Central America but begin their journey in farther-flung places such as Colombia, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela and then travel through Mexico. The United States should invest more: in surveillance and other technologies that increase its ability to track migrant movements through Central America and to make interdictions beyond the U.S.-Mexican border; in new immigration courts to process asylum claims more quickly; in more cooperation with Mexico to forestall migrants’ transiting its territory; and in more engagement with migrants’ countries of origin, both to help resolve the problems that precipitate mass emigration and to ease the return of migrants who do not meet U.S. immigration criteria.
The failure to properly regulate immigration is leading the United States to neglect its current biggest geopolitical opportunity: consolidating North American cooperation. U.S. politicians do not worry enough about the downsides of Mexico sinking into criminality and do not act creatively enough to make Canada, Mexico, and the United States a common platform for energy, labor, and manufacturing. With clearer immigration policy, supply chains at risk of weaponization by China could be more easily relocated to Mexico; California’s and Texas’s creaky energy grids could be strengthened by increasing both imports and exports of energy from Canada and Mexico. If the United States created opportunities for nearby neighbors to prosper that directly enhance the U.S. economy, Americans would see the advantages of shaping the world in ways that expand security and prosperity. Until Americans are more confident that the United States has control over its borders, however, they may not be willing to support the cooperation opportunities that its geographical position offers.
HELLO, WORLD
The world that the United States and its allies created after World War II made the United States much safer and richer. But Americans need to be reminded that if the United States does not enforce this international order, someone else will. That someone else would likely be China. And China in charge would make for a dangerous world in which it and authoritarian allies such as Russia and Iran could amass the military and economic power to impose a repressive vision on the world.
Rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, negotiating and securing the ratification of other trade treaties, increasing defense spending while reforming entitlements and reducing the national debt, securing the U.S.-Mexican border, aiding countries fighting to preserve their liberty: these are big goals. The American Enterprise Institute scholar Fred Kagan observes that “no one wants to die for the international order.” It is too diffuse a concept.
But selling voters on an internationalist foreign policy may not be nearly as hard as some politicians imagine if they approach the public with more concrete arguments grounded in U.S. national interest. The Biden administration and too many Republican leaders now engage in nativist, self-interested appeals—false assertions that internationalism has made the United States weaker or that caring about the U.S. national interest means ignoring the world. This could not be further from the truth. The United States’ international choices shape its domestic landscape. Currently, U.S. leaders are making incoherent foreign policy choices that render the country less safe and less prosperous—choices that will only become much more painful to undo down the line.
Behind the United States’ partisan polarization lies a general confusion and disillusionment. A June-July 2023 Pew poll found that just 16 percent of Americans trust the federal government, the lowest level in 70 years of polling. Just 10 percent agreed that politics made them feel hopeful. In August, in a Wall Street Journal poll, 93 percent of likely Republican primary voters agreed that the United States is headed in the “wrong direction.” These are grim findings. But they also represent an enormous opportunity—an opening for good, clear policies to gain traction, because Americans are obviously dissatisfied with what they are getting.
The solution is not to adopt policies that abandon trade, weaken the U.S. military, leave the U.S.-Mexican border chaotic, and cease giving aid to deserving allies. Americans still resolutely want to secure a role for the United States as a leader in the world, both for the country’s sake and for their own individual safety and prosperity. U.S. leaders must show they know how to do it.
Foreign Affairs · by Safe Passage: The Transition From British to American Hegemony · December 4, 2023
9. Former US ambassador arrested in Florida, accused of serving as an agent of Cuba, AP source says
Former US ambassador arrested in Florida, accused of serving as an agent of Cuba, AP source says
AP · by JOSHUA GOODMAN · December 3, 2023
MIAMI (AP) — A former American diplomat who served as U.S. ambassador to Bolivia has been arrested in a long-running FBI counterintelligence investigation, accused of secretly serving as an agent of Cuba’s government, The Associated Press has learned.
Manuel Rocha, 73, was arrested in Miami on Friday on a criminal complaint and more details about the case are expected to be made public at a court appearance Monday, said two people who spoke to the AP on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss an ongoing federal investigation.
One of the people said the Justice Department case accuses Rocha of working to promote the Cuban government’s interests. Federal law requires people doing the political bidding of a foreign government or entity inside the U.S. to register with the Justice Department, which in recent years has stepped up its criminal enforcement of illicit foreign lobbying.
The Justice Department declined to comment. It was not immediately clear if Rocha had a lawyer and a law firm where he previously worked said it was not representing him. His wife hung up when contacted by the AP.
Rocha’s 25-year diplomatic career was spent under both Democratic and Republican administrations, much of it in Latin America during the Cold War, a period of sometimes heavy-handed U.S. political and military policies. His diplomatic postings included a stint at the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba during a time when the U.S. lacked full diplomatic relations with Fidel Castro’s communist government.
Born in Colombia, Rocha was raised in a working-class home in New York City and went on to obtain a succession of liberal arts degrees from Yale, Harvard and Georgetown before joining the foreign service in 1981.
He was the top U.S. diplomat in Argentina between 1997 and 2000 as a decade-long currency stabilization program backed by Washington was unraveling under the weight of huge foreign debt and stagnant growth, triggering a political crisis that would see the South American country cycle through five presidents in two weeks.
At his next post as ambassador to Bolivia, he intervened directly into the 2002 presidential race, warning weeks ahead of the vote that the U.S. would cut off assistance to the poor South American country if it were to elect former coca grower Evo Morales.
“I want to remind the Bolivian electorate that if they vote for those who want Bolivia to return to exporting cocaine, that will seriously jeopardize any future aid to Bolivia from the United States,″ Rocha said in a speech that was widely interpreted as a an attempt to sustain U.S. dominance in the region.
The gambit angered Bolivians and gave Morales a last-minute boost. When he was finally elected three years later, the leftist leader expelled Rocha’s successor as chief of the diplomatic mission for inciting “civil war.”
Rocha also served in Italy, Honduras, Mexico and the Dominican Republic, and worked as a Latin America expert for the National Security Council.
Rocha’s wife, Karla Wittkop Rocha, would not comment when contacted by the AP. “I don’t need to talk to you,” she said before hanging up.
Following his retirement from the State Department, Rocha began a second career in business, serving as the president of a gold mine in the Dominican Republic partly owned by Canada’s Barrick Gold.
More recently, he’s held senior roles at XCoal, a Pennsylvania-based coal exporter; Clover Leaf Capital, a company formed to facilitate mergers in the cannabis industry; law firm Foley & Lardner and Spanish public relations firms Llorente & Cuenca.
“Our firm remains committed to transparency and will closely monitor the situation, cooperating fully with the authorities if any information becomes available to us,” Dario Alvarez, CEO of Llorente & Cuenca’s U.S. operations, said in an email.
XCoal and Clover Leaf Capital did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Foley & Lardner said Rocha left the law firm in August.
____
Tucker reported from Washington.
___ Contact AP’s global investigative team at Investigative@ap.org or https://www.ap.org/tips/
AP · by JOSHUA GOODMAN · December 3, 2023
10. White House Warns Money for Ukraine Will Run Out by Year’s End
White House Warns Money for Ukraine Will Run Out by Year’s End
Without new aid, U.S. will be unable to continue providing weapons and equipment to Kyiv, which would ‘kneecap Ukraine on the battlefield’
https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/white-house-warns-money-for-ukraine-will-run-out-by-years-end-637bddb2?mod=hp_lead_pos9
By Andrew Restuccia
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Dec. 4, 2023 5:00 am ET
Key federal agencies have spent all or nearly all of the $111 billion in supplemental funding approved by Congress to support Ukraine. PHOTO: ALINA SMUTKO/REUTERS
WASHINGTON—The U.S. will be unable to continue providing weapons and equipment to Ukraine if Congress doesn’t approve additional funding by the end of the year, the White House said on Monday, warning of devastating consequences on the battlefield if lawmakers fail to act.
“Cutting off the flow of U.S. weapons and equipment will kneecap Ukraine on the battlefield, not only putting at risk the gains Ukraine has made, but increasing the likelihood of Russian military victories,” Shalanda Young, the director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, wrote in a letter to House Speaker Mike Johnson (R., La.).
The letter marks one of the White House’s most forceful pleas for congressional action to date and lays out in detail the consequences of inaction. “There is no magical pot of funding available to meet this moment. We are out of money—and nearly out of time,” Young wrote.
Without additional money, the U.S. won’t have the necessary resources to procure additional weapons and equipment for Ukraine or to provide resources from existing U.S. military stockpiles, Young said.
Shalanda Young, director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, wrote, ‘We are out of money—and nearly out of time.’ PHOTO: SUSAN WALSH/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Federal agencies have spent all or nearly all of the $111 billion in supplemental funding approved by Congress to support Ukraine. As of mid-November, the Defense Department had used 97% of the money it received and the State Department had spent 100% of the military assistance-related funding it received, according to the letter. Other pots of aid are similarly depleted.
Pentagon officials said they had issued contracts for all of the $10.5 billion in available funds for new weapons for Ukraine, and have only a little left to replenish U.S. stocks after spending $16.8 billion on missile defense systems, artillery shells, tanks and other equipment.
“It’s fumes,” said Pentagon acquisition chief Bill LaPlante when asked what was left for Ukraine. LaPlante, speaking on the sidelines of the Reagan National Defense Forum in Southern California, said there were already standing requests for further Ukraine support amounting to four times more than the available funding.
Officials in the U.S. and Europe are increasingly worried as the war in Ukraine nears the end of its second year, fearing that Russian President Vladimir Putin will be able to outlast the political will of Western countries to continue aiding Ukraine.
Biden in October outlined a $106 billion proposed aid package for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan. The package requested about $60 billion to fund the Ukraine war effort and replenish U.S. weapon stocks.
Speaker Mike Johnson has publicly called Ukraine aid a critical priority for the House. PHOTO: JIM LO SCALZO/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK
Congress is debating how to proceed, with Republicans calling for more border security measures and changes in immigration policy in exchange for approving the additional money. A possible vote on such a measure could come this week in the Senate.
The spotlight would then shift to Johnson, who has publicly and repeatedly called Ukraine aid a critical priority for the House in recent weeks, despite voting against additional security assistance for Kyiv earlier this year before he became speaker.
House Republicans have faced growing pressure to reject Ukraine aid, as voters in their congressional districts have soured on the effort. A recent AP-NORC poll found that 59% of Republicans believe the U.S. is spending too much on Ukraine. Congress has approved more than $100 billion to help Kyiv since Russia invaded.
In a closed-door lunch this past week, Johnson warned Senate Republicans that the House GOP can’t pass a large aid package that combines funds for the border, Ukraine and Israel, the approach sought by Biden and favored by Senate leaders. He told the senators he wants to break up the package and vote on Ukraine aid and border policy separately from Israel aid.
Young used Monday’s letter to make the case to skeptical Republicans in Congress that funding will offer direct benefits to the U.S. by boosting the American defense industry. Sixty-percent of the money that has been approved so far by Congress has supported the U.S. defense industrial base or boosted Defense Department and intelligence operations, she wrote.
“That has improved our own military readiness since DOD is buying new equipment to replace what we are sending Ukraine, jump-starting and expanding production lines, and is supporting good-paying jobs in dozens of states across the country,” she wrote, adding that Biden’s recent request for additional money would funnel tens of billions of additional dollars to the U.S. defense industry.
Lindsay Wise and Doug Cameron contributed to this article.
Write to Andrew Restuccia at andrew.restuccia@wsj.com
11. U.S. Destroyer, Commercial Vessels Attacked by Drones, Missiles in Red Sea
U.S. Destroyer, Commercial Vessels Attacked by Drones, Missiles in Red Sea
Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen claim responsibility, pointing to Israel’s Gaza war; Pentagon warns of possible response
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-destroyer-commercial-vessels-attacked-by-drones-missiles-in-red-sea-f03531af?mod=hp_lead_pos8
By Nancy A. Youssef
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and Saleh al-Batati
Updated Dec. 3, 2023 6:08 pm ET
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Israel intensified its attacks on Gaza over the weekend after a weeklong truce expired on Friday. Israeli officials said they believed several women and children were still held hostage in Gaza by other militant groups. Photo: Naaman Omar/Zuma Press
A U.S. destroyer and three commercial ships operating in the Red Sea came under drone and ballistic-missile attacks, the Pentagon said Sunday, marking the most significant escalation of a weekslong military attack on ships operating in those waters.
In two instances on Sunday, the USS Carney, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, came under attack, including while responding to distress calls from nearby commercial ships that faced missile attacks, the Pentagon said. The Carney also shot down a drone that flew nearby.
Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attacks, and the Pentagon warned Sunday that they could be met with a U.S. response—and pointed part of the blame at Iran.
“These attacks represent a direct threat to international commerce and maritime security. They have jeopardized the lives of international crews representing multiple countries around the world. We also have every reason to believe that these attacks, while launched by the Houthis in Yemen, are fully enabled by Iran,” U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Middle East said in a written statement. “The United States will consider all appropriate responses in full coordination with its international allies and partners.”
The attacks began around 9:15 a.m. local time, when the Carney saw a ballistic missile attack the M/V Unity Explorer, a Bahamas-flagged bulk cargo ship. Around noon, the Carney struck a drone that was headed toward the destroyer, “although its specific target is not clear,” according to the statement. The U.S. vessel wasn’t damaged, CENTCOM said.
The USS Carney and three commercial ships came under drone and ballistic-missile attacks. PHOTO: PETTY OFFICER 3RD CLASS BILL DOD/U.S. NAVY/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Roughly 30 minutes later, the Unity Explorer came under a second ballistic-missile attack near the ship. In that instance, the commercial ship was struck and damaged and sent a distress call, leading the Carney to move toward the ship in response, CENTCOM said.
As the Carney was assessing the damage on the commercial ship, it spotted a second drone operating nearby and shot it down, CENTCOM said. Three hours later, the M/V Number 9, a Panama-flagged bulk carrier, was struck by a missile launched from Houthi-controlled territory, but reported no damage, the Pentagon said.
The final attack was similar to the second. A Panama-flagged cargo ship with a crew representing eight nations, the M/V Sophie II, came under a ballistic-missile attack and, like the Unity, sent a distress signal answered by the Carney, CENTCOM said. When en route, the Carney shot down a drone operating nearby. The Sophie II had minor damage, while the Carney was undamaged, according to the statement.
The Pentagon didn’t say what the destroyer used to bring down the drones.
On Sunday, Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen claimed responsibility for attacking what they said were two Israeli-affiliated ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
In a statement, Houthi military spokesman General Yahya Sarea said the Israeli-linked ships would continue to be considered legitimate targets, and they vowed to impede their navigation in the Red and Arabian seas until Israel halts its perceived “aggression” on Gaza.
The Carney has come under a number of attacks since it began operating in the Red Sea, shortly after Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel, as have other U.S. naval vessels. Last week, the Carney, operating in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, shot down an Iranian-made drone launched from Yemen. And an Iranian-made drone flew near a U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, as it operated in the area.
Write to Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com
12. The Case for Arab Leadership on Gaza
Excerpts:
But Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip, which has killed some 15,000 people, according to health officials in Gaza, has altered these relationships overnight. It is driving Arab states toward a more unified public position on the Israel-Palestine conflict. By the time Israel struck the Jabalya refugee camp at the end of October, the response from Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE had become almost uniform, with all strongly condemning the attack and calling for a cease-fire.
This seeming unity, however, hides the fact that each Arab country’s approach to the Hamas-Israel war is primarily driven by concerns over its own particular priorities. This is especially the case for the “Big Five” Arab powers: Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
...
Targeted coordination strengthens the Big Five’s ability to shape the post-conflict space. With Saudi and Jordanian blessing, Qatar, the UAE, and Egypt have agreed on a scenario in which figures such as Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s Doha-based political leader, would play a role in a Palestinian coalition government proposed at the joint summit between the Arab League and the OIC.
The Big Five can also make the issue of Iran a more central part of talks with Israel and the United States. The aim would be to get the United States and Israel to accept the Arab countries’ call for a cease-fire, which could lead to the resurrection of the peace process. The longer the Hamas-Israel war continues, the greater the chance that Iran-backed groups in the region will escalate, which could prompt the United States to get involved to protect Israel. If Israel ignores the threats the war poses to the security of its Arab allies, it will put a strain on its relationships with them. Any big fissure in Israel’s relationship with Arab countries means added pressure on the United States to step back in to protect U.S. interests in the region.
This gives the Big Five an advantage in their relationships with the United States. Their position is in contrast to Israel, which, under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, appears recklessly willing to accept regional escalation. The ongoing war is an opportunity for Arab countries to go beyond pragmatic de-escalation with Iran and to push for the United States to develop a strategy that addresses Iran’s destabilization of the Middle East. Such a strategy would require more than the imposition of sanctions and targeted retaliatory attacks on Iranian assets in places such as Iraq and Syria. Instead, Arab countries would need to take part in setting the agenda for a long-term plan that would undermine Iran’s political and military influence. If the Big Five could see where their interests intersect, they could amplify the diplomatic gains for their individual countries while seizing a chance to stabilize the region.
The Case for Arab Leadership on Gaza
How Regional Countries Can Pool Their Leverage to End the Israel-Hamas War
December 4, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Lina Khatib · December 4, 2023
When Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, it was 50 years and a day after the start of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. That conflict had also begun with a surprise attack, when forces from Egypt and Syria caught the Israeli military and intelligence services off-guard. Back then, the Arab world stood united against Israel, with Arab oil-producing countries using an oil embargo to gain leverage in postwar peace negotiations and Arab armies supporting Egypt and Syria’s military campaign by sending forces into Syria.
Today, the regional picture is much more complicated. The Arab world is not united against Israel. Instead, on the eve of October 7, each Arab state had a different relationship with Israel. Egypt and Jordan signed peace deals with Israel decades ago and continue to cooperate on security today. The United Arab Emirates normalized its diplomatic relations with Israel more recently, signing the Abraham Accords in 2020. Before Hamas’s attack, Saudi Arabia and Israel, with the backing of Washington, were finalizing a deal to normalize ties. Qatar, adhering to its position of openness to communicating with all sides, kept its relationship with Israel informal while also hosting the political leadership of Hamas in Doha. Although these countries were frustrated with the growing tension between Israelis and Palestinians, none of them expected the situation to turn into war any time soon. Considering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict contained, they focused on their own political and economic objectives, which often meant doing business with the Israeli government.
But Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip, which has killed some 15,000 people, according to health officials in Gaza, has altered these relationships overnight. It is driving Arab states toward a more unified public position on the Israel-Palestine conflict. By the time Israel struck the Jabalya refugee camp at the end of October, the response from Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE had become almost uniform, with all strongly condemning the attack and calling for a cease-fire.
This seeming unity, however, hides the fact that each Arab country’s approach to the Hamas-Israel war is primarily driven by concerns over its own particular priorities. This is especially the case for the “Big Five” Arab powers: Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
As the war in Gaza continues, these countries are using their own diplomatic pressure points to shape the conflict to their advantage and to achieve individual priorities. If they could coordinate their approaches, however, they would have a better chance of obtaining an outcome to the conflict that would benefit them all: an Israeli-Palestinian peace process that they could help broker and a better strategy to counter Iran.
TIGHTROPE WALKING
There is anger about Gaza across the Arab world. Many Arab regimes now find themselves in the difficult position of keeping their publics calm while also protecting their economic and diplomatic ties with Israel. They are trying to position themselves as leaders for peace on the international stage partly to show their own populations that they are responsive when it comes to the Palestinians, thus heading off protests that could spiral out of control.
Although Egypt and Jordan have forged their own peace deals with Israel, they are anxious about what the Hamas-Israel war means for their own security and stability. Egypt and Jordan are particularly wary of a scenario where thousands of Palestinians—including members of Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups—are pushed into their territories. Both countries have voiced their opposition to this prospect.
Jordan is also mindful of potential restiveness among its population, a majority of which is Palestinian in origin. To keep Jordan’s streets calm, Jordanian Queen Rania, herself Palestinian by descent, has spoken twice to CNN since the start of the war to underline international responsibility for the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza. Jordan has withdrawn its ambassador to Israel and Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi has escalated his public criticism of Israel, saying that “all options” are on the table in response to Israel’s actions in Gaza.
The UAE, for its part, is not geographically close to Israel, nor does it have the demographic profile of Jordan. So it does not have the same security worries. But its neighbors include Iran—Hamas’s main backer—and Yemen, where the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels operate. These neighbors present their own security headaches. Although the UAE has signed the Abraham Accords with Israel, Hamas’s attack tested the aura of security that an alliance with Israel was supposed to bring, because Hamas exposed shortcomings in Israel’s security apparatus. In the wake of this security breach, the United States, which brokered the Abraham Accords, has offered the UAE and Israel additional security against Iran and its proxies, deploying aircraft carrier groups to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea as a deterrent to regional conflict. But this is not a long-term solution to Iran’s destabilizing role in the Middle East.
Qatar’s main point of leverage is its close relationship with Hamas.
Unlike the UAE, Qatar has shown no interest in signing a peace deal with Israel. Since the outbreak of war, it has been trying to walk a tightrope: justifying its hosting of Hamas's leaders in Doha without antagonizing Israel, other Arab states, or the international community. Hamas’s political leadership has operated out of Doha since 2012, when the war in Syria forced the group to leave that country. According to Meshal bin Hamad al-Thani, Qatar’s ambassador to the United States, Hamas’s political office opened in Doha after Washington made a request to establish indirect lines of communication with the group. Qatar has tried to appease both sides by serving as an intermediary between Hamas and Israel. Qatar’s strategy is based on using its role as mediator to position itself as “a reliable international partner,” a phrase often repeated in official Qatari government communiqués. Qatar’s main concern is to maintain this political status when the Hamas-Israel war is over.
Saudi Arabia has its own set of concerns. Hamas’s attack stalled its normalization talks with Israel, which may have been one of the reasons Hamas launched its assault. According to the White House, Saudi Arabia has indicated it would like the talks to resume. As the custodian of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, the Arab League-endorsed plan for a two-state solution that would end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Saudi Arabia is mindful of regional popular expectations for how it responds to Israel’s actions. To counter any criticism against it, the Saudi regime has escalated its public criticism of Israel. The state-owned newspaper Arab News labeled the consequences of Israel’s aggression on Gaza “the second Nakba,” referring to the term for the mass displacement of Palestinians that accompanied the 1948 establishment of Israel. Official statements by the Saudi Foreign Ministry have referred to the Israeli Defense Forces as the “Israeli occupation army” and insisted on the implementation of a two-state solution to resolve the conflict. Saudi Arabia is also at risk of attack from Iran and its regional proxies. As with the UAE, Saudi Arabia has increased its diplomatic engagement with Iran to de-escalate tension.
PRESSURE DROP
With their varied domestic concerns in mind, the Big Five are using whatever leverage they have to shape the actions of Hamas, Israel, and the United States. Concerned about domestic security, Egypt was the first in the Arab bloc to reject a U.S. proposal for a temporary Arab mandate over Gaza when the fighting stops. The Wall Street Journal reported that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi rejected CIA Director William Burns’s proposal for Egypt to manage postwar security in Gaza until the Palestinian Authority is ready to take control. Sisi said Egypt would not help eradicate Hamas because it needs Hamas to help secure the Rafah crossing. Even with Egypt’s surveillance of its side of the crossing, Hamas has been able to smuggle all kinds of goods into Gaza. The group’s presence in Gaza gives Egypt a useful tool it can use to pressure Israel; Egypt will not want to lose this card for as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues.
The only real card that Jordan can play is the West’s investment in it as an island of stability in the Middle East. Jordan is confident that it can push Israel without losing the support of the United States or the United Kingdom, because both need Jordan to help protect their respective security interests in the Middle East. With this in mind, Jordan is trying to influence Israel to agree to a cease-fire by refusing to sign a water-for-energy agreement that would have provided Israel with clean energy in return for Israel supplying Jordan with water. Both countries were supposed to ratify the deal last month.
Although the UAE will not pull out of the Abraham Accords, the agreement still gives the UAE some leverage. The UAE has warned Israel of “irreparable ramifications in the region” if the IDF carries out indiscriminate attacks against civilians, suggesting that such attacks would increase threats by Iran-backed groups. This statement intends to communicate that the Arab signatories to the Abraham Accords have not given Israel carte blanche, especially when Israel’s actions increase threats to their own security.
Qatar’s main point of leverage is its close relationship with Hamas, which it has managed to use to its advantage for now. Serving as the regional headquarters of the U.S. military’s Central Command, which oversees the Middle East, and being the United States’ go-to mediator with Hamas, Qatar enjoys the kind of U.S. protection that other Arab countries covet. Qatar has hosted talks between Burns and David Barnea, the head of Israel’s intelligence services, the Mossad, to agree on humanitarian pauses. Qatar will want to keep building on this mediation to help resurrect the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, in which it could then play a larger diplomatic role.
Saudi Arabia’s leverage is centered on the potential normalization of ties with Israel and its role as the custodian of the Arab Peace Initiative. Saudi Arabia has flagged to the United States and Israel that it would lose credibility in the Arab and Islamic worlds were it to move ahead with normalization with Israel without a resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The outbreak of war in Gaza has fortified Saudi Arabia’s support for the two-state solution and given it an opportunity to assert itself as the leader of the Arab and Islamic worlds. Keeping in line with this objective, Saudi Arabia hosted a joint summit on Gaza with the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (a grouping of mostly Muslim-majority countries) in early November. It is also using its relationship with China to strengthen its international standing, leading a ministerial delegation to Beijing in November to signal to the United States that it can rally major countries to support its efforts to end the war. The Saudis have also invited Iran to attend the joint Arab League-OIC summit, easing tensions with Iran while also suggesting that they have the upper hand in the relationship.
COME TOGETHER
Although these separate efforts are promoting the interests of each country, much more could be accomplished if the Big Five pooled their resources, focusing on coordination rather than perfect alignment. The goal should be to jumpstart negotiations involving these countries plus Hamas, Israel, and the United States. The Big Five would be actively involved, but with a more equitable balance of power for themselves vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. They should insist on relaunching the peace process as a precondition for Israel’s normalization with Saudi Arabia so as to preserve Saudi Arabia’s credibility and status. And they should insist on a political rather than a military solution for containing Hamas. This means implementing the Saudi-led proposal that came out of the joint Arab League-OIC summit calling for the establishment of a Palestinian political coalition under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization. But this can only succeed if the United States agrees to cooperate with Saudi Arabia and the UAE on a long-term strategy for containing Iran’s regional interventions.
It has been Israel and the United States, not Saudi Arabia, pushing hardest for normalization. For years, the relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia was conducted behind closed doors and fueled by mutual concern over Iran. Although Saudi Arabia is interested in bringing its relationship with Israel out into the open, it is not desperate for normalization. Instead, Israel has been most keen to upgrade the relationship. Although Saudi Arabia will benefit from the technology transfer and financial, security, and political incentives that improved ties with Israel would bring, normalization is not an indispensable ingredient in Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation plans. Saudi Arabia was never going to grant Israel normalization for free or for a cheap price. Saudi Arabia’s ultimate aim is to bolster its regional and international standing so that major economic and political powers in the world invest in Saudi Arabia. The Hamas-Israel war has only strengthened Saudi Arabia’s bargaining position. It can now use this new leverage to push for the resurrection of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process under new terms: a recognition that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be compartmentalized and must be resolved if the Middle East is going to achieve any real stability.
The war has only strengthened Saudi Arabia’s bargaining position.
For Egypt and Qatar, neither will want to sacrifice Hamas easily, since that would mean losing an important tool of influence. The UAE initially did not see eye to eye with Qatar on the war, with Qatar’s elevated status as mediator seemingly eclipsing that achieved by the UAE through the Abraham Accords. But the meeting of Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan in November shows that the UAE is recognizing the value of increased Arab cooperation to try to contain Hamas.
Targeted coordination strengthens the Big Five’s ability to shape the post-conflict space. With Saudi and Jordanian blessing, Qatar, the UAE, and Egypt have agreed on a scenario in which figures such as Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s Doha-based political leader, would play a role in a Palestinian coalition government proposed at the joint summit between the Arab League and the OIC.
The Big Five can also make the issue of Iran a more central part of talks with Israel and the United States. The aim would be to get the United States and Israel to accept the Arab countries’ call for a cease-fire, which could lead to the resurrection of the peace process. The longer the Hamas-Israel war continues, the greater the chance that Iran-backed groups in the region will escalate, which could prompt the United States to get involved to protect Israel. If Israel ignores the threats the war poses to the security of its Arab allies, it will put a strain on its relationships with them. Any big fissure in Israel’s relationship with Arab countries means added pressure on the United States to step back in to protect U.S. interests in the region.
This gives the Big Five an advantage in their relationships with the United States. Their position is in contrast to Israel, which, under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, appears recklessly willing to accept regional escalation. The ongoing war is an opportunity for Arab countries to go beyond pragmatic de-escalation with Iran and to push for the United States to develop a strategy that addresses Iran’s destabilization of the Middle East. Such a strategy would require more than the imposition of sanctions and targeted retaliatory attacks on Iranian assets in places such as Iraq and Syria. Instead, Arab countries would need to take part in setting the agenda for a long-term plan that would undermine Iran’s political and military influence. If the Big Five could see where their interests intersect, they could amplify the diplomatic gains for their individual countries while seizing a chance to stabilize the region.
- LINA KHATIB is Director of the SOAS Middle East Institute at SOAS University of London and Associate Fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Program.
Foreign Affairs · by Lina Khatib · December 4, 2023
13. Why More Chinese Are Risking Danger in Southern Border Crossings to U.S.
Excerpts:
Mr. Gao said he felt he had no choice but to leave China.
“I think we will only be safe by coming to the U.S.,” he said, adding that he believed that Xi Jinping, China’s leader, could lead the country to famine and possibly war. “It’s a rare opportunity to protect me and my family,” he said.
A growing number of Chinese have entered the United States this year through the Darién Gap, exceeded only by Venezuelans, Ecuadoreans and Haitians, according to Panamanian immigration authorities.
It is a dangerous route once used mostly by Cubans and Haitians, and to a lesser extent people from Nepal, India, Cameroon and Congo. The Chinese are fleeing the world’s second-largest economy.
Educated and affluent Chinese are migrating through legal channels, such as education and work visas, to escape bleak economic prospects and political oppression — motivations shared by the Darién Gap émigrés.
Most of them followed a playbook circulating on social media: Cross the border through the Darién Gap, surrender to U.S. border control officers, get detained in immigration jails, and apply for asylum citing a credible fear if returned to China. Many will be released within days. When their asylum applications are accepted, they can work and make a new life in the United States.
Why More Chinese Are Risking Danger in Southern Border Crossings to U.S.
By Li Yuan
Reporting from New York and San Francisco
Dec. 3, 2023
阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版
The New York Times · by Li Yuan · December 3, 2023
the new new world
Trekking the perilous Darién Gap and seeking asylum are risks worth taking for migrants from China who have lost hope in the country’s future.
Gao Zhibin tries to comfort his daughter, who was sick, vomiting and in pain while crossing the Darién Gap between Colombia and Panama to reach the United States in March.Credit...Federico Rios for The New York Times
Reporting from New York and San Francisco
Dec. 3, 2023, 5:02 a.m. ET
Gao Zhibin and his daughter left Beijing on Feb. 24 for a better life, a safer one. Over the next 35 days, by airplane, train, boat, bus and foot, they traveled through nine countries. By the time they touched American soil in late March, Mr. Gao had lost 30 pounds.
The most harrowing part of their journey was trekking through the brutal jungle in Panama known as the Darién Gap. On the first day, said Mr. Gao, 39, he had sunstroke. The second day, his feet swelled. Dehydrated and weakened, he threw away his tent, a moisture-resistant sleeping pad and his change of clothes.
Then his 13-year-old daughter got sick. She lay on the ground, vomiting, with her face pale, her forehead feverish, her hands on her stomach. Mr. Gao said he thought she might have drunk dirty water. Dragging themselves through the muddy, treacherous rainforests of the Darién Gap, they took a break every 10 minutes. They didn’t get to their destination, a camp site in Panama, until 9 p.m.
Mr. Gao said he felt he had no choice but to leave China.
“I think we will only be safe by coming to the U.S.,” he said, adding that he believed that Xi Jinping, China’s leader, could lead the country to famine and possibly war. “It’s a rare opportunity to protect me and my family,” he said.
A growing number of Chinese have entered the United States this year through the Darién Gap, exceeded only by Venezuelans, Ecuadoreans and Haitians, according to Panamanian immigration authorities.
It is a dangerous route once used mostly by Cubans and Haitians, and to a lesser extent people from Nepal, India, Cameroon and Congo. The Chinese are fleeing the world’s second-largest economy.
Mr. Gao, who survived the journey to the United States from China, now lives in San Francisco.Credit...Jim Wilson/The New York Times
Educated and affluent Chinese are migrating through legal channels, such as education and work visas, to escape bleak economic prospects and political oppression — motivations shared by the Darién Gap émigrés.
Most of them followed a playbook circulating on social media: Cross the border through the Darién Gap, surrender to U.S. border control officers, get detained in immigration jails, and apply for asylum citing a credible fear if returned to China. Many will be released within days. When their asylum applications are accepted, they can work and make a new life in the United States.
Their flight is a referendum on the rule of Mr. Xi, now in his third five-year term. Boasting that “the East is rising while the West is declining,” he said in 2021 that China’s governance model had proved superior to Western democratic systems and that the center of gravity of the world economy was shifting “from West to East.”
Every immigrant I interviewed this year who passed through the Darién Gap — a journey known as zouxian, or walking the line, in Chinese — came from a lower middle-class background. They said that they feared falling into poverty if the Chinese economy worsened, and that they could no longer see a future for themselves or their children in their home country.
In Mr. Xi’s China, anyone could become a target of the state. You could get in trouble for being a Christian, Muslim, Uyghur, Tibetan or Mongolian. Or a worker who petitions for back pay, a homeowner who protests the delayed completion of an unfinished apartment, a student who uses a virtual private network for access to Instagram access or a Communist Party cadre who is found with a copy of a banned book.
More than 24,000 Chinese migrants were temporarily detained on the southern border of the United States in the 2023 fiscal year, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Over the previous decade, fewer than 15,000 Chinese migrants were caught crossing the southern border illegally.
Chinese migrants in the Darién jungle in March.Credit...Federico Rios for The New York Times
The surge of desperate Chinese braving the Darién Gap is a reversal of a longtime pattern.
In the 1980s and 1990s, millions of Chinese migrated to developed countries, including the United States, for higher living standards and freer societies. As China’s economy took off in the early 2000s and the government relented on some control of its society, a vast majority of Chinese students returned to their country after graduation. Salaries in China were rising rapidly, and job opportunities were abundant.
Until September 2018, Mr. Gao was a Chinese success story. He grew up in a village in the eastern province of Shandong and moved to Beijing in 2003 to work on an assembly line at an electronics factory. He made about $100 a month. With street smarts, Mr. Gao made money helping factories and construction sites hire workers.
In 2007, he leased a plot of land on the outskirts of Beijing and constructed a building divided into 100 or so tiny rooms. He made about $30,000 a year renting them to migrant workers. He married, had two children and moved his parents to Beijing, too.
In 2018, the local government wanted the land back for development. Mr. Gao refused. The authorities cut water and electricity and pumped toilet sewage into the yard, forcing the tenants to leave. He won a lawsuit he brought against the government but received no compensation. When he petitioned to the higher authorities, he and his family were harassed, threatened and beaten. He and his wife divorced, in the hope that the authorities would leave her alone.
For the next few years, Mr. Gao did odd jobs, spending most of his time on his petition and studying law. Life became very tough during the pandemic. Mr. Gao and his ex-wife, still living together, had twin sons in January. He had four children and no job, no future. He was at his wits’ end.
In February, Mr. Gao came across social media posts about Chinese reaching the United States through the Darién Gap. He and his daughter applied for passports, and within weeks they flew to Istanbul and then to Quito, the capital of Ecuador, where most Chinese were starting their journey to the United States.
Migration authorities in Necoclí, a Colombian town at the entrance to the Darién Gap, check the passports of Chinese migrants.Credit...Federico Rios for The New York Times
Another migrant I spoke with who crossed the Darién Gap, Mr. Zhong, who wanted to use only his family name for fear of retribution, has a background similar to Mr. Gao’s.
Born in a Christian family, he made his way from a village in Sichuan Province, in southwestern China, to a middle-class city life. He was trained as a cook at age 16 and worked at restaurants all over China. During the pandemic, he struggled financially. To pay his mortgage and car loan, about $800 a month, he worked on an assembly line in 2020.
The trouble for Mr. Zhong, now in his early 30s, started last December when police officers stopped his car for a routine alcohol test and saw a copy of a Bible on the passenger seat. They told Mr. Zhong that he believed in an evil religion and tossed the Bible on the ground and stomped on it. The officers then took his phone and installed an app on it that turned out to have software that would track his movements.
On Christmas Day, four police officers broke into a home where Mr. Zhong and three fellow Christians were holding a prayer service. They were taken to the police station, beaten and interrogated.
Like Mr. Gao, Mr. Zhong came across social media posts about the Darién Gap. He borrowed about $10,000 and left home on Feb. 22.
He said he had cried three times. The first was at the end of his first day on the Darién Gap: He lay in his tent full of regret, thinking the trip was too hard. The second time he cried was during a three-day motorbike ride with a fellow Chinese migrant through Mexico in the pouring rain. He cried again when he was detained at an immigration center in Texas. He applied for asylum and didn’t know how long he would be there. It could be three years or five years, he thought. He was released after seven days and flew to New York.
Chinese migrants readying to cross the Darién Gap in March.Credit...Federico Rios for The New York Times
When he arrived in Flushing, a neighborhood in Queens and a hub for Chinese immigrants, he was disappointed: The neighborhood was shabby and expensive. “I thought walking the line was tough,” he said in early April. “Starting a life here is even more difficult.”
Mr. Zhong soon moved to a town of 30,000 people in Alabama. He had grown up near Chengdu, a city of 20 million. Now he felt truly alone. He works at a Chinese restaurant 11 hours a day, he said, and is unwilling to take a day off. He has learned to cook General Tso’s chicken and other Chinese American dishes. The pay is much better than in China, and he can send more money home. Every Sunday, he joins an online religious service, hosted by a church in Brooklyn’s Sunset Park, another community with a large population of Chinese immigrants.
He told me a joke over the phone: “Why did you go to the United States?” someone asks a Chinese immigrant. “Aren’t you satisfied with your pay, your benefits and your life?” The immigrant responds: “Yes, I’m satisfied. But in the U.S., I will be allowed to say that I’m not satisfied.”
“I can live like a real human being in the U.S.,” he said.
Mr. Gao and his daughter are settling down in San Francisco. Life for them is also not easy. We first met in April at a community service center that had helped them find a shelter, the gymnasium of a high school in the city’s Mission District.
They could stay there from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m., sleeping on gymnasium mats and carrying all their belongings during the day. Mr. Gao’s daughter started school within two weeks after arriving in the city. He hoped that she would be able to visit her mother in China one day.
Chinese migrants head toward the Darién Gap in February. The most harrowing part of their journey to the United States is trekking through the brutal jungle.Credit...Federico Rios for The New York Times
They moved to a studio apartment in a housing shelter. Then Mr. Gao got his work permit, bought a car and started delivering packages for an e-commerce company. He makes $2 per package. The more he delivers, the more he makes.
He said repeatedly how grateful he was for the kindness he had encountered since leaving China. He and his daughter were robbed, extorted and shot at. But strangers gave them bottled water and food. After traveling on an open train car for three days, he and his daughter met a Mexican couple who insisted they take a shower at their home.
On one Wednesday in November, Mr. Gao said, he woke at 4 a.m., delivered more than 100 packages and didn’t get home until after 9 p.m.
He took the next day off. When the motorcade of Mr. Xi, who was in San Francisco for a meeting with President Biden, drove by, Mr. Gao joined other protesters on the sidewalk, chanting in Chinese, “Xi Jinping, step down!”
Julie Turkewitz contributed reporting from the Darién Gap, and Eileen Sullivan from Washington.
Li Yuan writes the New New World column, which focuses on the intersection of technology, business and politics in China and across Asia. More about Li Yuan
The New York Times · by Li Yuan · December 3, 2023
14. Five Bodies Found in Wreckage of U.S. Air Force Osprey That Crashed Off Japan
Oh no. But I suppose we had to expect this. RIP airmen.
Five Bodies Found in Wreckage of U.S. Air Force Osprey That Crashed Off Japan
The aircraft went down in the water Wednesday during a training mission
Published 12/04/23 05:18 AM ET|Updated 1 hr ago
Luke Funk
themessenger.com · December 4, 2023
Crews have found the wreckage of a U.S. Air Force Osprey that crashed last week in the waters off Japan with the remains of several crew members aboard.
Japanese broadcaster NHK said five bodies had been recovered, citing sources.
The aircraft crashed Wednesday off Yakushima island with eight American crewmembers aboard.
The CV-22 Osprey was on a training mission when it went down.
The body of one victim was recovered earlier. He was identified as Staff Sgt. Jacob “Jake” M. Galliher, 24, a native of Pittsfield, Mass.
The aircraft carrier Carl Vinson and divers have been involved in the recovery operations.
The Air Force Special Operations Command said the remains were being recovered and the identities have yet to be confirmed.
In a statement, it said: “The main priority is bringing the Airmen home and taking care of their family members.”
The cause of the crash was also unknown but witnesses reportedly saw fire coming from the Osprey's left engine before the crash.
The U.S.-made Osprey is a hybrid aircraft that takes off and lands like a helicopter but can rotate its propellers forward and cruise much faster, like an airplane, during flight.
Ospreys have had a number of crashes, including in Japan, where they are used at U.S. and Japanese military bases, and the latest crash rekindled safety concerns.
There have been at least five fatal crashes of Marine Ospreys since 2012, causing a total of at least 19 deaths.
Three U.S. Marines died in an August Osprey crash in Australia.
themessenger.com · December 4, 2023
15. Army questions best route to launch a new app that can alert troops about their posts
I have been using Digital Garrison to get information about Fort Belvoir. It is somewhat useful though not always up to date and not very intuitive to use.
Army questions best route to launch a new app that can alert troops about their posts
defensescoop.com · by Brandi Vincent · December 1, 2023
The Army is conducting market research to determine the best path forward to release a smartphone app that troops can use for timely and true information about the facilities, conditions and supplies on any military installations where they’re visiting or stationed.
In October, the service’s Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George first told DefenseScoop about how he’d charged a team of Army Software Factory technologists to prototype such a tool — dubbed then “My Army Post” — in a bid to improve soldiers’ and their families’ lives with support from technology.
Following that, the Army now “requires development of an enterprise mobile application that portrays a responsive, user-centric solution to address the specific challenges and demands faced by soldiers, dependents, retirees, Department of the Army Civilians, and installation visitors entering and exiting military installations,” and is tailored for each specific post, according to a new contracting document.
“An initial version of the mobile app, ‘My Army Post,’ was developed by the Army Software Factory (ASWF). It is undetermined if this requirement will incorporate use of ASWF efforts or if a new app will be requested to be developed by industry. Feedback from industry could assist in shaping any related technical requirements,” officials wrote in the sources sought synopsis.
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That 7-page document outlines a variety of features that Army leadership envisions for the final product, including information about local housing, spouse employment and child care options; senior commander messaging capabilities; map navigation and real-time gate traffic alerts; and more.
Officials confirmed that “this requirement may be set aside for small businesses or procured through full and open competition, and multiple awards may be made” based on responses they receive to this request.
Notably, they also state explicitly that the “requirement will necessitate servers capable of handling Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) materials, Federal Employees and Contractors Only (FEDCON) shared with Department of Defense (DoD) contractors.”
Those interested in providing feedback to the Army are asked to address 7 questions in their responses. Among other topics, officials want input on pricing and the contract types that could make the most sense for this pursuit — and on appropriate data and software rights.
Responses are due by Dec. 6.
defensescoop.com · by Brandi Vincent · December 1, 2023
16. Defense authorization deal expected this week
I certainly hope so. Should we cross our fingers?
Defense authorization deal expected this week
militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · December 4, 2023
House and Senate negotiators hope to finalize a deal on the annual defense authorization bill this week, wrapping up a major piece of military legislation before the end of the year.
Conference committee members began their inter-chamber work on the massive military budget policy bill on Wednesday. By late last week, leaders from the House and Senate Armed Services Committee said only a few disagreements remained, and were expected to be worked out early this week.
Those conflicts largely revolve around fights over abortion access policies, diversity training in the military and other social issues inserted into the House draft of the authorization bill. Senate Democrats have been opposed to those changes.
But both Republicans and Democrats are focused on finding a way to finish the work. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Ala., vowed ahead of last week’s conference work that “we will enact an authorization bill this year.” Despite partisan fights on Capitol Hill, the measure has advanced out of Congress for more than 60 consecutive years.
Monday, Dec. 4
House Veterans' Affairs — 3 p.m. — 360 Cannon
Online VA services
Veterans Affairs officials will testify on improvements and challenges with their online services.
Tuesday, Dec. 5
House Veterans' Affairs — 10 a.m. — 360 Cannon
Pending legislation
The committee will consider several pending bills.
House Foreign Affairs — 10 a.m. — Visitors Center H210
Belarus
Cabinet officials from Belarus will testify on the future of democracy in that country.
House Financial Services — 10 a.m. — 2128 Rayburn
Financial services technology
Officials from the Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal Reserve will testify on potential technology advances.
House Judiciary — 10 a.m. — 2141 Rayburn
Department of Justice oversight
Justice Department officials will testify on the agency’s Civil Rights Division.
Senate Judiciary — 10 a.m. — 216 Hart
FBI
FBI Director Christopher Wray will testify on current operations.
House Foreign Affairs — 2 p.m. — Visitors Center H210
Africa
State Department officials will testify on instability in the Sahel region in Africa.
Wednesday, Dec. 6
House Veterans' Affairs — 10 a.m. — 360 Cannon
VA background checks
Veterans Affairs officials will testify on rules regarding employee background checks.
Senate Foreign Relations — 10 a.m. — 419 Dirksen
Authoritarian regimes
Outside experts will testify on threats posed by foreign authoritarian regimes.
House Armed Services — 2 p.m. — 2118 Rayburn
DOD technology
Pentagon officials will testify on future plans for technology improvements.
House Oversight — 2 p.m. — 2154 Rayburn
Artificial Intelligence
Outside experts will testify on the White House’s new policies regarding artificial intelligence.
Senate Armed Services — 3 p.m. — 222 Russell
DOD recruiting efforts
Service officials will testify on success and challenges in their recent recruiting efforts.
Thursday, Dec. 7
House Armed Services — 9 a.m. — 2212 Rayburn
Missile defense
Defense Department officials will testify on regional missile defense assets.
About Leo Shane III
Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.
17. Problems persist with how services report extremism, DOD watchdog says
Problems persist with how services report extremism, DOD watchdog says
militarytimes.com · by Nikki Wentling · December 1, 2023
The Defense Department investigated 183 allegations of extremist activity among service members in the past year, including 78 cases of troops advocating for the overthrow of the U.S. government, according to a report published Thursday by a Pentagon watchdog.
New findings from the Pentagon’s Office of Inspector General reveal DOD investigated 37 more cases of extremism this year than in 2022, which was the first year the IG issued a report on the subject. Congress mandated in 2021 that the IG annually gauge how effectively the Defense Department prevents and responds to extremist activities in the ranks.
The report’s findings show ongoing issues with how the services track and report data, which in turn makes measuring the military’s response challenging. While the Army, Navy and Air Force reported the number of allegations that were investigated, the departments did not track how many allegations of extremist activity were received but not investigated, the IG found.
“Tracking of allegations not referred for inquiry or investigation is challenging, impacting data accuracy,” the IG’s office said in a news release Thursday. “The report highlights ongoing challenges in compiling and validating data, emphasizing the need for consistent implementation of data collection.”
Earlier this year, the IG’s office found that the Army, Navy and Air Force each had a different reporting structure and used different electronic systems for reporting allegations of extremism.
The Army uses several independent databases to collect information, “making it impossible to track” the number of allegations that weren’t referred for investigation, the report states.
The Air Force also lacks a single reporting system, and the Air National Guard was inconsistent at reporting allegations it received because of the complexity of cases in which members weren’t activated at the time of the alleged misconduct.
The Navy said reporting the data to the IG was “time consuming” and that multiple policies “created confusion.” The sea service also cited concerns about compromising the privacy of troops.
All services are in the process of implementing a standardized system to streamline how data is collected and reported, the analysis said. The new process includes notifying the IG’s office about new allegations and reporting whether the allegations are referred for investigation.
The system is also designed to notify the IG about decisions on whether the allegations are substantiated and what punishments are doled out. The report didn’t say when that new process is expected to go into effect.
Though the information was difficult to compile and validate, the IG’s office did report a breakdown of allegations that were investigated from Oct. 1, 2022, through Sept. 30, 2023. During that period, the Defense Department investigated 58 allegations of gang activity, in addition to the 183 cases of extremism.
Of those 275 total allegations, 68 were not substantiated and 136 are open cases. Sixty-nine of the allegations led to service members receiving some sort of punishment, including two courts-martial and 19 involuntary discharges. The report did not specify what types of allegations led to disciplinary measures.
In addition to the 78 allegations involving troops wanting to overthrow the US government, the 183 cases of extremist activity included 44 instances of service members advocating for terrorism and 22 cases of service members advocating for or committing violence to achieve political, religious or discriminatory goals.
Three allegations were made about troops advocating for or committing violence to deprive people of their rights, and 32 allegations centered on troops advocating for widespread discrimination of people based on race, religion, sex, gender identity or sexual orientation.
The final four allegations involved service members encouraging other military personnel or DOD civilians or contractors to break the law or disobey orders in order to disrupt military activities.
This story was produced in partnership with Military Veterans in Journalism. Please send tips to MVJ-Tips@militarytimes.com.
About Nikki Wentling
Nikki Wentling covers disinformation and extremism for Military Times. She's reported on veterans and military communities for eight years and has also covered technology, politics, health care and crime. Her work has earned multiple honors from the National Coalition for Homeless Veterans, the Arkansas Associated Press Managing Editors and others.
18. Challenging Tom Clancy’s Fantasies About the U.S. Army Special Forces
This is actually a positive review of Canadian forces.
Challenging Tom Clancy’s Fantasies About the U.S. Army Special Forces
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/12/04/challenging_tom_clancys_fantasies_about_the_us_army_special_forces_996442.html?mc_cid=079cb12e40&mc_eid=70bf478f36
.
By Roger Thompson
Members of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the Canadian Special Operations Regiment laid a wreath at the 1st SFG (A) Memorial Wall in honor of those American and Canadian special operations forces who paid the ultimate sacrifice at Joint Base Lewis McChord, WA, December 5, 2022. This year’s Menton Week celebrated 65 years of the 1st SFG (A). (U.S. Army photo by SGT Samuel Kim)
Tom Clancy really loved to brag about America’s military forces, and the Army’s Special Forces were no exception. In his 2001 book Inside Special Forces: A Guided Tour of the Army’s Special Forces everyone and everything in the Special Forces is the best not just in the U.S. military, but in the entire world. For example, in his description of the Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs) he says: “ODAs are probably the finest and most capable light infantry units in the world, and they can conduct a variety of missions across the full spectrum of warfare and conflict.” (Kindle Locations 1728-1729). But what exactly are ODAs? “The ODAs are the basic building blocks of the Special Forces. We’ll talk more about how these fit into the larger picture of SF organizations and missions later, but right now I want to concentrate on how they are put together. Officially, each ODA is composed of twelve Special Forces soldiers. It is commanded by a captain (O-3), who is assisted by an assistant detachment commander, normally a warrant officer. They lead ten SF soldiers, whose skills cover six specific specialties, or technically, five Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) codes.” (Kindle Locations 1690-1694).
Clancy certainly provided a lot of detail and the book was well written, but the basic premise, that the U.S. Army Special Forces are head and shoulders above all other soldiers in the world is inaccurate, and that’s not coming from me, it’s coming from a retired SF senior officer who wrote a wonderful letter to the editor to a Canadian newspaper in 2002, just a year after Clancy published his propaganda book. In the January 2, 2002, edition of The Ottawa Citizen, Lieutenant Colonel Kalev L. Sepp, U.S. Army Special Forces (Ret.) wrote: “… the Canadian Land Forces I trained with are, man-for-man and unit-for-unit, fully the equal of their American counterparts and often better. (Emphasis added) In addition, the modest American SF officer opined: “I learned early in my career that the Canadians are easily our peers at soldiering. The three Canadians who successfully completed the U.S. Ranger course with me (while 55 percent of my fellow Americans did not) were considered the toughest and most reliable soldiers in the class. When I went on exchange to the Canadian parachute school (then at Edmonton), the instruction was more advanced and thorough than the American equivalent at Fort Benning, Georgia. And the Canadian air crews who flew us to our drop zones in jarring ‘combat profile’ (low-level, high speed) were superb. I later served in Alaska, where I saw U.S. units improve their arctic warfare expertise by emulating Canadian tactics and equipment.”
So much for the militarism of Clancy, who was never in the military, ever (Even I served in the Militia, Canada’s Army Reserve). I will take the word of Colonel Sepp over this former insurance agent any time. It’s nice to see that even some of America’s best soldiers acknowledge the skills and capabilities of NATO allies, especially the ones that get no respect at all from right wing pundits in the U.S.
Colonel Sepp said “That the Canadian military operates on a different scale than the Americans does not take away from the thoroughgoing competence and unsurpassed quality of its people. Smaller often allows for better in key skills, the meagre Canadian defense budget notwithstanding.” Just because some NATO countries, not just Canada, need to do more but do not want to spend as much as the U.S. for defense, often wanting to maintain universal health care and free university education for all, does not mean the U.S. military is “better.” Thanks for setting the matter straight, Colonel Sepp.
Roger Thompson is a research fellow at Dalhousie University’s Centre for the Study of Security and Development, the author of "Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy’s Status Quo Culture," and a former researcher at Canada’s National Defence Headquarters.
Notes:
Tom Clancy. Special Forces: A Guided Tour of U.S. Army Special Forces. Berkley Books. Kindle Edition.
19. N. Korea’s support of Hamas transcends just a transactional relationship
Why does everyone ignore north Korea's malign activities in the Middle East (and around the world)? Everyone except Abe Cooper, Greg Scarlatoiu, and Bruce Bechtol that is.
And yes, the pro-north Korean groups should be considered pro-Hamas. Anyone who gives north Korea a pass for their malign activities are, indirectly at least, supporting Hamas and other terrorist groups and malign actors.
Important excerpt here. Why is there not more press and pundit reporting on this?
Excerpts:
North Korea’s relationship with Hamas is long-established. In his 2018 book, North Korea’s Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa, Dr. Bruce Bechtol provided a thorough record of North Korea’s proliferation to Iran, Syria, and terrorist groups, including Hamas and Hezbollah.
Bechtol identifies four categories of North Korean assistance to Iran: weapons of mass destruction and the platforms that carry them, conventional weapons sales, refurbishment of Soviet-era weapons, and military advising. Hamas has been the destination of proliferation across all categories, primarily through Iranian facilitation.
North Korea’s support of Hamas is not a purely transactional matter. There are strong ideological overtones behind North Korea’s assistance to anti-Israel, antisemitic groups.
Kim Jong Un’s criminal rule is grounded in grandfather Kim Il Sung’s fundamental ideological tenets. Kimilsungism is essential to Kim regime preservation.
In “Under the Banner of Marxist-Leninist Proletarian Internationalism, While Holding High the Standard of the Anti-Imperialist, Anti-American Struggle, Let Us Accelerate World Revolution,” Kim Il Sung states:
“Israel is a Middle Eastern outpost of Anglo-American aggression, which opposes the Arab people, obstructs their progress, and threatens their safety.”
N. Korea’s support of Hamas transcends just a transactional relationship
“North Korean leader Kim Jong Un instructed various agencies to find ways to comprehensively support Palestine in the war between Israel and Hamas,” Korea Broadcasting System reported.
By ABRAHAM COOPER, GREG SCARLATOIU
DECEMBER 4, 2023 00:56
Jerusalem Post
The October 7 savage Hamas invasion and genocidal attack on Israeli civilians has spawned revulsion from President Biden and top European leaders. Their crimes against humanity have also earned accolades and support from Hamas’ puppet master Iran, Tehran’s lackeys in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, as well as calls for declarations of war against Israel from as far away as Algeria.
As pundits and media dig deeper, they discover another distant player: North Korea.
It was hard not to notice North Korea’s supply of rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons deployed by Hamas. Quoting South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, the Korea Broadcasting System reported:
“North Korean leader Kim Jong Un instructed various agencies to find ways to comprehensively support Palestine in the war between Israel and Hamas.”
US-based and self-declared “pacifist” or “feminist” organizations sympathetic to the Kim regime were quick to react. Hyun-sook Cho, Cathi Choi, and Kathleen Richards, senior operatives for Women Cross DMZ/Korea Peace Now, co-signed a statement by Nodutdol condemning Israel and legitimizing Hamas.
Palestinian Hamas militants take part in an anti-Israel rally in Gaza City May 22, 2021 (credit: REUTERS/MOHAMMED SALEM)
Pro-North Korea, pro-Hamas
Nodutdol is a US-based pro-North Korean organization that is also rabidly antisemitic, having condemned US and South Korean support of Israel while calling for “an end to the Zionist occupation of Palestine, once and for all.”
North Korea’s relationship with Hamas is long-established. In his 2018 book, North Korea’s Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa, Dr. Bruce Bechtol provided a thorough record of North Korea’s proliferation to Iran, Syria, and terrorist groups, including Hamas and Hezbollah.
Bechtol identifies four categories of North Korean assistance to Iran: weapons of mass destruction and the platforms that carry them, conventional weapons sales, refurbishment of Soviet-era weapons, and military advising. Hamas has been the destination of proliferation across all categories, primarily through Iranian facilitation.
North Korea’s support of Hamas is not a purely transactional matter. There are strong ideological overtones behind North Korea’s assistance to anti-Israel, antisemitic groups.
Kim Jong Un’s criminal rule is grounded in grandfather Kim Il Sung’s fundamental ideological tenets. Kimilsungism is essential to Kim regime preservation.
In “Under the Banner of Marxist-Leninist Proletarian Internationalism, While Holding High the Standard of the Anti-Imperialist, Anti-American Struggle, Let Us Accelerate World Revolution,” Kim Il Sung states:
“Israel is a Middle Eastern outpost of Anglo-American aggression, which opposes the Arab people, obstructs their progress, and threatens their safety.”
In Answers to the Questions Raised by Foreign Journalists, Kim Il Sung affirms:
“The Middle East crisis is the result of aggressive machinations by imperialists and their American masterminds, who have set up Jewish restorationists as shock troops to crush the rising Arab people’s liberation struggle.” Kim Il Sung blames tensions in the region on “Israeli aggression” and Israel’s “American imperialist manipulators.”
In 1967, North Koreans flew alongside Syrian pilots during the Six-Day War against Israel. North Korea trained Egyptian and Syrian pilots to fight against Israel. In an October 16, 1986, interview with the Egyptian newspaper Al Massa, Kim Il Sung states:
“Whenever the imperialists and the Zionists provoked an aggressive war in the Middle East, the [North] Korean people stood firmly on the side of justice. […] During the [Yom Kippur] war in October 1973, our airmen fought shoulder to shoulder with the Egyptian brothers on the same front.”
Through Iran’s abetment, North Korean weapons are in the hands of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in Yemen. Iran’s “indigenous” weapons systems are engineered and produced by over 1,000 Iran-based North Korean personnel. According to a May 24, 1984 declassified CIA document, North Korean “training officers” were delivering military training to “foreign nationals” in Iran alongside “Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen, previously trained foreigners, [and] Palestinians.”
North Korea proliferates instability and violence. None of the profits go to its people. The regime runs five gulags. Around 120,000 men, women, and children face forced labor, malnutrition, and brutality. To dare be a Christian is to declare yourself an enemy of the State.
Besides proliferation, the Kim regime oppresses and exploits its people at home and abroad to procure the funds needed to build its arsenal of terror. Pre-COVID, 100,000 workers were dispatched to 40 countries, one-third as construction workers in Qatar and the UAE. Most of their wages were confiscated by the regime.
Embedded in Kim Il Sung thought, North Korean support of Hamas, Hezbollah, and regimes determined to extinguish Israel transcends a purely transactional relationship.
Tunnel construction, the transfer of North Korean weapons and tactical training to Hamas is, in the worldview of the Kim regime, a way of bringing its anti-American, “anti-imperialist struggle” to the greatest US ally in the Middle East. Anti-Semitism is not merely a side effect of North Korea’s proliferation. Anti-Semitism and hatred of Israel and its people lie at the core of North Korea’s ideology.
Just as antisemitic hate crimes and invective soar to unprecedented heights in the US, the Kim regime, through its loyal followers, is adding their hatred online and on American streets.
Abraham Cooper is associate dean and director of global social action at the Simon Wiesenthal Center and chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. Greg Scarlatoiu is executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.
Jerusalem Post
20. The Many Faces of the Monroe Doctrine
Conclusion:
From these specific questions, two broader ones arise that echo the contestations over the Monroe Doctrine from the critical 1914–41 period. First, can democracy, at home and abroad, survive if the United States hunkers behind tariffs, immigration restrictions, and a walled-off “fortress America” in the Western Hemisphere? Conversely, are voters and policymakers prepared to foot the bill to regenerate the international system, in effect globalizing the Monroe Doctrine, as was then advocated by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt?
These are the questions that future U.S. policymakers and voters will need to tackle. But they are also the questions the United States confronted in the past. This is why the history of the Monroe Doctrine has become newly relevant, regardless of whether office-seeking politicians continue to invoke the hoary old shibboleth in future election cycles. It isn’t the political symbol that matters — what matters are the underlaying geopolitical structures and domestic dynamics to which its evolution has always been tethered.
Whatever one thinks of the Monroe Doctrine, let alone the global challenges that loom on the horizon, it is obvious that U.S. foreign policy needs more buy-in from voters, requires a broader consensus among the fractured classes of today’s political elites, and must be more responsive to geopolitical dynamics and the moves of rival powers. The Monroe Doctrine’s history provides a 200-year record, replete with successes, failures, and much in between, of past attempts of the United States to juggle these layered internal and external dimensions of statecraft. Let’s hope that those who invoke it today take a moment to study that history during its bicentennial.
The Many Faces of the Monroe Doctrine - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Jay Sexton · December 4, 2023
In yet another curious twist in its long history, the Monroe Doctrine, which turned 200 on Saturday, is making an unexpected political comeback in the United States. “I think it’s as relevant today as it was the day it was written,” declared Rex Tillerson, Donald Trump’s first secretary of state, in Mexico City in 2018. More recently, contestants for the 2024 Republican presidential nomination have competed to lay claim to the doctrine. The evening of his botched campaign announcement on Twitter/X, Florida governor Ron DeSantis took to Fox News’ airwaves to call for “a 21st-century version of the Monroe Doctrine” to counter rising Chinese influence in Latin America. Vivek Ramaswamy announced that, were he elected president, “The North Star of my foreign policy will be the modern Monroe Doctrine.” Not to be outdone, Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently introduced a resolution declaring their fidelity to this doctrine from the days of sailing ships, flintlock muskets, and monarchs.
Those hearing these unexpected shout-outs to a piece of early 19th-century history could be forgiven for sharing the reaction that John F. Kennedy had when advisors encouraged him to invoke the doctrine during the Cuban Missile Crisis: “The Monroe Doctrine — what the hell is that?” Kennedy’s question remains a good one: What is the Monroe Doctrine? And why is it reappearing in its bicentennial year?
The answer lies in recognizing that the doctrine is not simply an instrument of foreign policy, but rather a shape-shifting and contested symbol of domestic politics. As I argued in my 2011 book on the topic, the secret to understanding the Monroe Doctrine is that Americans have invoked it against one another far more than they have used it against foreign governments.
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Over the course of its 200-year history, the doctrine has had a jack-in-the-box quality: It has framed political debates in one period, only to disappear in the next. To be sure, this waxing and waning have responded to geopolitical shifts, but it has primarily been the result of how those shifts in the global system have intensified domestic political debate and partisan conflict. The historical periods in which the doctrine has jumped out of the history books and into popular discourse — the present included — are those moments in which there is most internal debate concerning the role of the United States in the wider world.
A Nothingburger Message
If you’re American, the high school textbook that you once read probably presented James Monroe’s 1823 message as a foreign policy equivalent of the U.S. Constitution. It allegedly outlined basic rules, headlined by a prohibition on further European colonization in the Western Hemisphere, that structured U.S. foreign policy thereafter. But this clean and tidy view of the doctrine always has been more myth than reality.
For starters, the nonsequential foreign policy paragraphs of James Monroe’s 1823 annual message were not intended to be a timeless set of policy prescriptions. Rather, Monroe and his team muddled through a complex situation, dodging critical questions and controversies as they responded to events beyond their control. When Monroe audaciously proclaimed an end to European intervention in the Western Hemisphere at a critical moment in the Spanish-American revolutions, he failed to mention how it would be enforced (fortuitously, by the time Monroe delivered his message, the British had already cut a secret deal with France that resolved the diplomatic crisis). The ambiguous text of the 1823 message to Congress also sidestepped the critical matter of future U.S. imperial expansion.
Monroe fudged the key issues. He kicked the can of an alliance offer from Britain down the road, while offering only lip-service support to the revolutions in Latin America and Greece. Most of all, his message stopped short of committing the United States to any action. The evidence is clear: The 1823 message was never intended to become a binding foreign policy “doctrine.” Monroe’s message was a nothingburger.
But the subsequent “Monroe Doctrine,” a phrase that first appeared in the decades before the Civil War, had very little to do with the original text. Rather, it was an adaptable symbol of U.S. foreign policy that ricocheted back and forth across the American political spectrum, sometimes even bouncing across borders when appropriated by foreign officials. The best definition of the Monroe Doctrine might be as follows: a contested political symbol into which varying actors have loaded their agendas.
The utility of the Monroe Doctrine lay in the elasticity of the 1823 message, which amounted to a blank canvas waiting to be filled by an astonishingly diverse range of political interests. The invented tradition of the Monroe Doctrine was appropriated by slavers and abolitionists, isolationists and internationalists, pacifists and war hawks, protectionists and free traders, anti-imperialists and advocates of colonial rule. There have been as many Monroe Doctrines as perspectives on America’s role in the world.
A Contested Corollary
That the Monroe Doctrine was a contested creation of America’s messy democratic politics can be seen by revisiting one of the most famous episodes in its 200-year history: the formulation of the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary. This addendum to Monroe’s old prohibition on European intervention explicitly and controversially transformed the doctrine into a justification for unilateral U.S. imperial intervention.
Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary was itself a reaction to external events — namely a crisis in Santo Domingo that threatened to trigger the intervention of European creditor powers. Meanwhile, Latin American states, led by Argentina, sought to preempt any intervention through the “Drago Doctrine,” which amounted to a multilateral, hemispheric version of the old Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt appears to have had some sympathy for the Drago option, but he wanted to maintain U.S. control of this complex situation that fell within what he considered America’s sphere of influence: “If we intend to say ‘Hands off’ to the powers of Europe, then sooner or later we must keep order ourselves,” he concluded.
But the Roosevelt Corollary was also the product of domestic political dynamics. At this moment in the doctrine’s schizophrenic history, the symbol was most closely associated with anti-imperialists, who invoked it in support of reining in U.S. colonial expansion and a limited foreign policy more broadly. The anti-imperialists had lost the battle in 1898, when imperialists connected to Roosevelt narrowly rammed through the Senate a treaty that mandated the full-blown colonial annexation of former Spanish colonies, most notably the Philippines. But the ensuing colonialist outburst proved to be a poisoned chalice. The United States inherited instability in the Caribbean and an anticolonial war of resistance in the Philippines. As the costs mounted, U.S. public opinion turned away from the imperialist project advocated by Roosevelt and his band of “large policy men,” shifting to the side of the old anti-imperialists.
This was the situation when Roosevelt and his team confronted the crisis in Santo Domingo in 1904–5. In an audacious power grab, Roosevelt appropriated the favored symbol of his domestic opponents, using it as cover for a nakedly imperialist program of unilateral intervention in the Caribbean that they opposed. This was part of a sophisticated and coordinated public relations push, which included a prominent speech by Secretary of State Elihu Root on Cuban independence day, Roosevelt’s famous message to Congress, and a covering letter to the U.S. Senate for the bilateral protocol that transferred Dominican customs houses to U.S. management. “The protocol affords a practical test of the efficiency of the United States Government to maintain the Monroe doctrine,” Roosevelt declared in words that infuriated the anti-imperialists that he had outfoxed.
Domestic politics shaped the substance, as well as the presentation, of the Roosevelt Corollary. Historians tend to interpret the corollary as the climax of the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine and 19th-century U.S. imperialism. Yet it represented a retreat from the position that Roosevelt had occupied just a few years earlier. Rather than advocate further colonial expansion of the 1898 type, the failings and unpopularity of this “large policy” now led Roosevelt to formulate a hybrid imperial policy that constituted something of a compromise between those on either side of the great debate of 1898.
Constrained by domestic opponents and commitments in the Philippines and Cuba, the Roosevelt administration limited the number and scope of its ventures in the Caribbean, not least by outsourcing the details of debt repayment to private Wall Street banks and seeking to train up local constabulary forces to take over the burden of bringing stability to Santo Domingo. This was unilateral imperialism, to be sure, but it was not the full-blown colonial annexation that Roosevelt had previously championed. As was the case in other pivotal moments in the history of the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary was a compromise policy generated by the contingent interaction of geopolitical developments with the dynamics of internal politics.
Cold War Eclipse
As the example of the Roosevelt Corollary reveals, the history of the Monroe Doctrine is not the story of a set of policy prescriptions outlined in 1823 that subsequent statesmen implemented over time. Rather, it is the disjointed narrative of competing domestic interests, each seeking the upper hand as the United States stumbled, crab-like, toward the position of global preeminence that it would achieve in 1945.
But as the internationalist “American century” dawned, the old symbol from the age of sailing ships and monarchy began a long ride into the sunset. As the following Google Ngram for the term “Monroe Doctrine” illustrates, 20th-century references to the symbol of 1823 peaked during the two world wars (thanks to debates over the League of Nations and entry into World War II) before steadily waning during the Cold War (albeit with an ephemeral uptick during the Cuban missile crisis that prompted JFK to ask his aforementioned question).
Google Ngram results for “Monroe Doctrine” between 1900 and 2000
To be sure, the post-1945 Monroe Doctrine retained a legacy seat within the pantheon of nationalist traditions. There were celebratory chapters in Cold War–era schoolbooks, commemorative coins, and still the occasional presidential shout-out, such as when Ronald Reagan sought cover for his Central American policies in the 1980s. But the doctrine had become ornamental, not instrumental. It more resembled a flintlock musket in a Revolutionary War museum or a Founding Father statue in a public square than it did the Constitution of 1787, which remained a structuring framework for contemporary statecraft.
The Monroe Doctrine faded from view because it didn’t speak to the 1945–2001 era. The Cold War consensus limited domestic political debate on foreign policy, which had always been the lifeblood of the doctrine. Moreover, this was an era of geopolitics distinct from the previous century and a quarter. The hallmarks of the post-1945 world were internationalism, U.S. preeminence, and the dispersed proliferation of universalist projects such as globalization and human rights. It is revealing that those Americans most likely to invoke the doctrine in this period, such as Robert Taft, Bricker amendment advocates, and lingering isolationists from the Midwest, were those who sought to pump the brakes on America’s new international commitments. Even in the heyday of the “American century,” invocations of the Monroe Doctrine signaled domestic dissent, not consensus.
It Is a measure of the declining relevance of the Monroe Doctrine that, beginning with Harry S. Truman, U.S. presidents began to invent foreign policy doctrines that bore their own names, rather than announcing new corollaries to the 1823 message. In fact, Theodore Roosevelt had been advised to do just this back in 1904, but opted instead to cloak his new policies in the cloth of Monroe. After 1945, the new presidential doctrines typically pertained to far-flung geographic regions well beyond America’s traditional sphere of influence. The “imperial presidency” of the “American century” desired not to be constrained by archaic edicts from the 19th century.
21st-Century Battles
But as that era has come to a messy end, the Monroe Doctrine has started to make an unexpected comeback, just in time for its 200th birthday this December. The first strike came in a 2013 speech made by President Barack Obama’s Secretary of State John Kerry, who sought to curry favor in the Organization of American States by repudiating an unpopular symbol of U.S. imperialism. “The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over,” Kerry declared to muffled applause from an incredulous audience of Latin American officials.
But Kerry’s eulogy of the doctrine was fighting words to the American right, hypersensitive as it is to any putative “cancellation” of revered national symbols. Aggressive reassertions of the old dogma started to pop up with regularity during the Trump presidency. This was an administration, after all, that lost no chance to exploit patriotic symbols and traditions. National Security Advisor John Bolton moved most aggressively in the direction of Monroeism when reports surfaced of Russian involvement in the Venezuela political crisis of 2019. “In this administration,” Bolton brashly asserted, “we’re not afraid to use the phrase ‘Monroe Doctrine.’ This is a country in our hemisphere.” China hawks similarly have turned to it to justify their positions. Rep. Mike Gallagher recently conjured up fears that China’s moves in Latin America seek to “turn the Monroe Doctrine into the Mao Doctrine.” Such invocations of the Monroe Doctrine by right-wing critics of post-1945 internationalism cloak a policy of global retrenchment (as favored by DeSantis and Ramaswamy) in the garb of nationalist tradition and power.
On one level, the reemergence of Monroe talk in U.S. politics can be explained by the simple fact that the old symbol has become yet another source of fuel for the inferno of today’s partisan culture wars. Like the fights over statues of founding fathers and national origin dates (1619 or 1776?), today’s talk of the Monroe Doctrine follows predictable lines of division and patterns of escalation. When Democrats clumsily distance themselves from a nationalist symbol, as Kerry did with the doctrine, Republicans respond with self-pity, bemoaning the alleged “cancellation” of revered traditions. It is a familiar pattern.
But there is more to the recent revival of the doctrine than just today’s destructive vortex of culture wars. The Monroe Doctrine speaks to a wider, and more substantive, domestic debate concerning the future role of the United States in an era of declining American power, geopolitical rivalry, and economic competition. The Monroe Doctrine has re-entered our politics today not because it offers relevant policy prescriptions — to repeat: it never has — but because the future course of American foreign policy is now contested and entangled in partisan politics. The process of political sorting concerning foreign policy is now well under way: Those on the right seeking to reduce global commitments invoke the Monroe Doctrine, while those seeking to salvage the post-1945 order on the left avoid mentioning the doctrine, if not declare it dead.
It must be noted here that recent references to the Monroe Doctrine have also come from outside of the United States. Both Russia and China have sought to project power far from their borders, including into Latin America. They have gone further, staking exclusive claims to their own regional zones of influence, in effect announcing Monroe Doctrines of their own. Revanchist Russia’s “Kozyrev Doctrine” and more recent “Putin Doctrine” attempt to justify murderous campaigns at restoring power and influence, most notably in Ukraine. Though China has shied away from officially announcing its own Monroe Doctrine, its presumptuous “nine-dash line” that reaches into the contested waters of the South China Sea echoes the expansive sphere of influence charted by the United States back in the 19th century. And China’s claims on Taiwan and Hong Kong resemble those of the United States on Canada and Cuba in the days of Monroe.
By challenging the post-1945 order based upon unrivalled U.S. power, today’s geopolitics have revived old questions that historically have structured debates over the Monroe Doctrine. What type of foreign intervention in Latin America should be regarded as a threat to U.S. security? What U.S. policies best thread the needle of deterring such interventions while minimizing blowback from the Yankeephobic political cultures of Latin America? Should U.S. rivals be allowed to construct regional spheres of influence outside of the Western Hemisphere — or, to put it differently, and in today’s terms, should the United States support Hong Kongers, Taiwanese, and Ukrainians, or leave them to fend for themselves?
Conclusion
From these specific questions, two broader ones arise that echo the contestations over the Monroe Doctrine from the critical 1914–41 period. First, can democracy, at home and abroad, survive if the United States hunkers behind tariffs, immigration restrictions, and a walled-off “fortress America” in the Western Hemisphere? Conversely, are voters and policymakers prepared to foot the bill to regenerate the international system, in effect globalizing the Monroe Doctrine, as was then advocated by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt?
These are the questions that future U.S. policymakers and voters will need to tackle. But they are also the questions the United States confronted in the past. This is why the history of the Monroe Doctrine has become newly relevant, regardless of whether office-seeking politicians continue to invoke the hoary old shibboleth in future election cycles. It isn’t the political symbol that matters — what matters are the underlaying geopolitical structures and domestic dynamics to which its evolution has always been tethered.
Whatever one thinks of the Monroe Doctrine, let alone the global challenges that loom on the horizon, it is obvious that U.S. foreign policy needs more buy-in from voters, requires a broader consensus among the fractured classes of today’s political elites, and must be more responsive to geopolitical dynamics and the moves of rival powers. The Monroe Doctrine’s history provides a 200-year record, replete with successes, failures, and much in between, of past attempts of the United States to juggle these layered internal and external dimensions of statecraft. Let’s hope that those who invoke it today take a moment to study that history during its bicentennial.
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Jay Sexton is author of seven books, including The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (2011). He is Director of the Kinder Institute of Constitutional Democracy at the University of Missouri, as well as Distinguished Fellow of the Rothermere American Institute at the University of Oxford.
Image: Wikimedia Commons
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Jay Sexton · December 4, 2023
21. Women, Peace, Security: Thinking Creatively to Pursue National Security through Gender Equality
Excerpts:
It is easy to think that when working in the Middle East or Central Asia, cultural norms in partner nations are the biggest obstacle to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. But what our research, and the stories above, suggest is that these countries are often eager to make progress on women’s participation. Instead, the biggest obstacle is often a lack of awareness within the U.S. government. A 2023 RAND report advocated better alignment between Women, Peace, and Security rhetoric and action: “Many of our partners are paying attention when the United States emphasizes the importance of considering gender perspectives and are working to improve their implementation of [Women, Peace, and Security] principles. However, they also notice when we do not “walk the walk” — for example, during a training exercise in Eastern Europe, where a young foreign officer demanded to know why there were no American women present.”
Ground-up awareness and knowledge of Women, Peace, and Security within the U.S. military won’t happen overnight, but with serious commitment it can be achieved. There are lots of opportunities to use existing programs and funding streams to implement Congressional mandates and advance U.S. interests across the globe. Security cooperation programs are intended to promote national security by enhancing relationships, capacities, and capabilities in partner nations. When the U.S. government understands internally how Women, Peace, and Security contributes to this, much more can be done externally.
Women, Peace, Security: Thinking Creatively to Pursue National Security through Gender Equality - War on the Rocks
GEOFFREY BRASSE AND JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE
warontherocks.com · by Geoffrey Brasse · December 4, 2023
Twenty-three years after the U.N. Security Council passed the Women, Peace, and Security framework and six years after the United States became the only country to legislatively mandate its implementation, widespread misunderstanding remains about why it matters to national security. Contrary to what is sometimes heard among U.S. security practitioners in classrooms, conferences, and conversations, this is not a social justice program. It is not a diversity, equity, and inclusion mandate, or a call for the government to “do the right thing.” And regardless of what the name might make you think, it is not just about women.
Rather, the Women, Peace, and Security framework is a way to advance national security through gender equality. Gender-related grievances — men being unable to find or pay for wives, for example — are often the underlying cause of conflicts. Because of its earlier one-child policy, China’s 2020 census counted 34.9 million more men than women. These men, referred to as “bare branches” and untethered to society through marriage and children, are considered a potential security problem by the Chinese government. Given China’s past propensity to unite its population — now over 1.4 billion — in times of internal stress by focusing on an external enemy, China’s bare branches could prove a security issue for the United States as well.
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Right now, the Department of Defense’s budget allocation for Women, Peace, and Security is low, and the framework’s integration into the professional military education core curricula is still being slow-rolled. To date, the United States has done more to ensure that allies and partners are knowledgeable regarding the framework’s principles, and been more successful in that regard, than it has among its own forces. Security cooperation, for example, has proven an effective vehicle to support Women, Peace, and Security external implementation. But so long as misunderstanding continues within the Department of Defense, opportunities will go unrealized.
Importance
Decades of longitudinal empirical research have unequivocally demonstrated the relationship between gender equality and security. Specifically, if a nation has extremely high gender inequality, it is more than twice as likely to be a fragile state, more than three times as likely to have a more autocratic, less effective, and more corrupt government, and more than one and a half times as likely to be violent and unstable. Further, where gender inequality and domestic violence are high within a country, there is a greater likelihood of state use of violence internationally. Violence breeds violence.
The Women, Peace, and Security framework is built upon four pillars: participation of women in all aspects of security affairs; protection of women from gender-based violence; prevention of conflict and all forms of violence in conflict and post-conflict situations; and ensuring the relief needs specific to women and vulnerable populations are met in post-crises recovery operations. Participation means giving women not just a seat at the table but also a voice, as they bring information, perspectives, and problem-solving skills that increase the potential to address the root causes of conflict. The protection pillar acknowledges that gender-based violence is an often-used tool to silence women’s voices. The prevention pillar urges the utilization of gendered considerations in assessments related to potential conflict to stem conflict before it begins. It also recognizes that post-conflict relief offers the best opportunity for transforming old discriminatory systems into more egalitarian ones.
Implementation
The U.S. government’s ongoing efforts to advance the Women, Peace, and Security framework with the resources it has available demonstrates the variety of ways more funding could get results. Congress released a report in July 2022 evaluating the progress of the four U.S. government agencies charged with 2017 act implementation. According to the report, the Department of State invested $110 million and the U.S. Agency for International Development $239 million. The Department of Defense, for its part, spent $5.5 million. While this is a tiny amount considering the size of the military’s total budget, the Department can and does make use of synergies in its cooperation with other agencies.
The State Department, for example, is allocated approximately $400 million annually for International Military Education and Training toward strengthening partner nation forces, improving human rights, providing professional military education, and supporting improved country-to-country communication. This program is run by the Defense Department, blending authorities and funding. Security cooperation has traditionally focused on “hard” security activities such as foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, hybrid sales, leases of weapons, military alliances, and joint military exercises and training. These activities strengthen interoperability for better defense but can also act as tools to build relationships important to Women, Peace, and Security.
One example is Jordan’s 2015 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter acquisition case. The Hashemite Kingdom lacked enough medically and linguistically qualified male pilots to receive American flight training in time for the desired delivery date. The program was used as an incentive to begin recruiting, training, and supporting female military pilots for the first time. As a result, Jordan changed its internal policies to support co-ed pilot training for the first time. This program continues today and is expanding to include fighter aircraft. To build on this, the Colorado National Guard, under the State Partnership Program, engaged with the new pilots to discuss gender integration concerns and provide training. This brought in a third funding and authorities stream if you consider International Military Education and Training for language training, Foreign Military Sales funding for aviation training and a blend of authorities for the National Guard events.
More recently, security cooperation has expanded to include elements such as economic development, human rights, environmental protection, and relationship building. In that context, U.S. security cooperation programs also facilitate the implementation of Women, Peace, and Security principles. The Defense Department can be and has been involved in some of these “soft” activities, which are classified under defense institution building, traditional commander’s activities, or similar programs for both security cooperation and security assistance.
Earlier this year, Tahina Montoya, who now serves as an Air Force gender advisor, described to us witnessing how effective soft security cooperation could be while at the U.S. Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan, between 2011 and 2102. After receiving $318 million in direct investment from the United States, Kyrgyzstan faced tremendous pressure from Russia to close the transit center. This came in the form of generous financial offers and an assertive Russian-sponsored media campaign centering on the negative impacts of the American presence. To counter this, the U.S. government, through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, launched a humanitarian assistance program where each U.S. unit based out of the transit center would have a humanitarian assistance coordinator. As Montoya describes it:
I volunteered to be the 376th Expeditionary Operations Groups Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator, which included trips to the town of Bishkek to meet with university women to discuss the similarities and differences of what it was like to be a woman in our respective countries. At the unit-level, over the course of 6 months, our unit conducted 17 humanitarian missions at the local level, starting with engagements with community leaders to discuss challenges, but, over time, included reconstructing playgrounds, building 2 new classrooms, purchasing heaters and a new kitchen stove for the local school, and, perhaps my favorite, the donation of over 200 lightly used mattresses for the village children and elders, and the donation of over 200 winter jackets for the community. With the help of unit members who volunteered on their “days off,” our unit volunteered 850 hours and raised over $4.5K in donations.
Ultimately, the program did not prevent the 2014 closure of the transit center in Manas, but Montoya believes the soft-power efforts her unit made contributed to keeping the base open for a few extra years. During its time in operation, the base, known as the gateway to Afghanistan, “moved more than 5.3 million servicemen in and out of Afghanistan and handled tens of thousands of cargo shipments and refueling missions.”
Beyond conflict zones, military commands engage in security cooperation efforts to further Women, Peace, and Security principles, especially to increase female participation in military and security roles. Southern Command activities have included workshops, conferences, podcasts, and, in partnership with the organization Women in International Security, development of a regional partnership tool, or scorecard, “to integrate the principles of gender equality and the [Women, Peace, and Security] agenda within Central, South America and Caribbean security forces.” Similarly, Africa Command engaged in a range of activities including, in partnership with the North Carolina National Guard’s State Partnership Program, the Women’s African Military Professional Legal Network, which focused on networking and training more regional women in legal best practices. Other commands have more recently ramped up Women, Peace, and Security–related engagement as well.
Finally, the Defense Security Cooperation University offers opportunities to promote the Women, Peace, and Security framework to those working specifically on security cooperation. At a September 2022 security cooperation workshop, the university launched an enterprise-wide effort to take a rigorous, scholarly look at the ways in which implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 advances U.S. national security objectives. This was especially important given that professional military education has been identified as a key road to both domestic and foreign implementation of the framework, especially when dedicated time is allotted to training and education.
More Will Be Better
It is easy to think that when working in the Middle East or Central Asia, cultural norms in partner nations are the biggest obstacle to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. But what our research, and the stories above, suggest is that these countries are often eager to make progress on women’s participation. Instead, the biggest obstacle is often a lack of awareness within the U.S. government. A 2023 RAND report advocated better alignment between Women, Peace, and Security rhetoric and action: “Many of our partners are paying attention when the United States emphasizes the importance of considering gender perspectives and are working to improve their implementation of [Women, Peace, and Security] principles. However, they also notice when we do not “walk the walk” — for example, during a training exercise in Eastern Europe, where a young foreign officer demanded to know why there were no American women present.”
Ground-up awareness and knowledge of Women, Peace, and Security within the U.S. military won’t happen overnight, but with serious commitment it can be achieved. There are lots of opportunities to use existing programs and funding streams to implement Congressional mandates and advance U.S. interests across the globe. Security cooperation programs are intended to promote national security by enhancing relationships, capacities, and capabilities in partner nations. When the U.S. government understands internally how Women, Peace, and Security contributes to this, much more can be done externally.
Become a Member
Colonel Geoffrey Brasse, USAF, is an assistant professor at the Joint Forces Staff College and a foreign area officer with multiple assignments supporting security cooperation and security assistance.
Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a university professor emeritus at the Naval War College, a senior fellow at Women in International Security, and the author of Women, Peace, and Security: An Introduction.
The views expressed are those of the authors alone and not those of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Air Force.
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warontherocks.com · by Geoffrey Brasse · December 4, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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