Korea has not been the only battleground since the end of the Second World War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Algeria and Cuba and Cyprus, and almost continuously on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.

John F. Kennedy, 35th President of the U.S.

Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy, June 06, 1962

Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

The Stockdale Paradox.

The Hopeful Realist.

“When I asked which prisoners didn't make it out of Vietnam, James Stockdale replied: Oh, that's easy, the optimists. Oh, they were the ones who said, ‘we are going to be out by Christmas.’ And Christmas would come, and Christmas would go. Then they say, ‘we're gonna be home by easter.’ And Easter would come, and Easter would go. And then Thanksgiving, and then it would be Christmas again. And they died of a broken heart. This is a very important lesson. You must never confuse faith that you will prevail in the end – which you can never afford to lose – with the discipline to confront the most brutal facts of your current reality, whatever they might be.

"The hardest thing to learn in life is which bridge to cross and which to burn."

- David Russell

"I would rather be ashes than dust!

I would rather that my spark should burn out in a brilliant blaze than it should be stifled by dry-rot.

I would rather be a superb meteor, every atom of me in magnificent glow, than a sleepy and permanent planet.

The function of man is to live, not to exist.

I shall not waste my days in trying to prolong them.

I shall use my time.”

- Jack London's credo

1. Time to Radically Downsize the West’s Special Forces

2. In Ukraine, Peace Now Means War Later

3. Looks Like ‘Axis of Evil’ Is Back on the Menu

4. As America’s Military Rearms, It Needs Minerals—and Lots of Them

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2023

6. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, November 29, 2023

7. Retired Lt. Gen. Julius Becton Dies

8. “Digging ourselves out of a hole.” Some thoughts on the current recruiting crisis

9. How to Avoid Defeat in Ukraine

10. Henry Kissinger, America’s most influential diplomat, dies at 100

11. Henry Kissinger, War Criminal Beloved by America's Ruling Class, Finally Dies

12. Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence

13. Moscow’s Search for Foreign Recruits Reveals Its Growing Desperation

14. 78-Country Map Rebuffs Claim That US 'Not at War'

15. Poll finds strong support for arming Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan

16. US Air Force Osprey crashes off southern Japan, at least 1 dead

17. Rather than play another year, Utah State QB Levi Williams plans for Navy SEAL training

18. Opinion | Ukraine aid’s best-kept secret: Most of the money stays in the U.S.A.

19. Keep soldiers out of our creek, farm owners tell Fort Liberty

20. Hamas Kills 3 Israelis at Jerusalem Bus Station; Blinken Visits as Gaza Ceasefire Extended With New Hostage Release

21. Is there anything to Learn from Ukraine?

22. The United Kingdom's Indo-Pacific Engagement

23. The Maritime Dimension to the Conflict in Israel

1. Time to Radically Downsize the West’s Special Forces

This is a European view but a heavy focus on the US. . Special forces (lower case) is used in the generic sense but they are talking about special operations forces.

But this is a numbers argument based on the inability to quantify the effects of SOF versus the requirements for large scale combat operations.

The budget and force structure argument is not zero sum or either/or. But again the issue is the inability to use conventional military accounting methods to quantify the effects of special operations to make a one for one comparison to conventional forces. Which begs the question, should we be using conventional accounting methods to measure the effects of SOF>

That said, sometimes less is more. Or perhaps we should be relooking the make-up of SOF and consider an OSS like model.

Excerpts:

Special forces will continue to have a significant role in fighting groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS, and will also have a key role in any bigger conflict, but the current threats and geopolitical risks are wide-scale nation-state conflicts and these are very different threats.

Special forces solve specific a problem at a tactical level, which might have a strategic or operational impact, but you can’t dedicate a significant part of the army and its budget to these niche tasks and then be unable to field an army to fight a regular ground war.

Time to Radically Downsize the West’s Special Forces

By Jan Kallberg

November 29, 2023

The Western military focus has been distorted by decades of wars in remote places. Ukraine shows that needs to change, and quickly.

cepa.org · by Jan Kallberg · November 29, 2023

After three decades of increasing focus on special forces as a crucial component of Western national security, the shift to large-scale combat operations in Ukraine has revealed an uncomfortable truth — the unhealthy imbalance between costly and small elite units, and the large forces needed to fight a conventional war.

The conflicts against terrorist and insurgent forces in the developing world have bent the military out of shape. That’s perhaps understandable; more than two decades of fighting in the Middle East and Central Asia emphasized small-force operations in harsh terrain.

Special forces will continue to have a significant role in fighting groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS, and will also have a key role in any bigger conflict, but the current threats and geopolitical risks are wide-scale nation-state conflicts and these are very different threats.

Special forces solve specific a problem at a tactical level, which might have a strategic or operational impact, but you can’t dedicate a significant part of the army and its budget to these niche tasks and then be unable to field an army to fight a regular ground war.

The war in Ukraine has a 600-mile-long (1,000 km) front, with at least 200 miles (300 km) seeing active ongoing military operations. The front needs to be covered by units, firepower, and the ability to sustain the war, hopefully driving it to an acceptable conclusion and victory for Ukraine. The government in Kyiv must also prepare to fight along the border of Belarus, now little more than a Kremlin puppet regime.

The West is not alone in this problem. Russia too had significant special forces units when it launched the war of aggression against Ukraine 21 months ago. It was unable to find a niche role for this significant component in the conventional war (other than an embarrassing blooding at Hostomel airport right at the outset.) Commanders then chose to use these highly trained and expensively equipped units as light infantry.

The consequences were disastrous. Leaked US intelligence material assessed that “all but one of five Russian Separate Spetsnaz Brigades that returned from combat operations in Ukraine in late summer 2022 suffered significant losses.” It stated that one unit, the 346th, “lost nearly the entire brigade with only 125 personnel active out of 900 deployed.”

Losses, especially of officers in places like Mariupol skyrocketed. The adjoining elite Marine infantry and Russian special forces were so depleted in the port city that they had to be withdrawn and reorganized.

The Russians made a significant mistake and no doubt Western commanders would argue they would avoid such errors, but elite units continue to struggle. The open terrain in Southern Ukraine where most fighting is now concentrated, offers few, if any, opportunities for infiltration of special forces, either by foot or airmobile, and the rapidly increasing presence of Ukrainian short-range air defense made parachute drops, even at risky low altitudes, a doomed idea.

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Given the sheer weight of special forces units in the initial February 2022 invasion force — the 19 battalions of Spetsnaz were likely a sixth of the available ground fighting force — high causalities were likely. But the costs were disproportionate. Such troops likely cost four times the cost to train and equip than any enlisted infantry unit. These highly trained and exquisitely equipped young men were the highlight of every Victory Day parade in Moscow, but that does not make them supermen. In the brutal urban fighting of Ukraine, they are as human as any other frontline soldier.

Let’s consider Russia’s alternatives. If pre-war Russia had maybe downsized the special forces to a third of their 2022 level and instead staffed, equipped, and organized regular infantry units, the Russians could have fielded far more infantry battalions. That might have had some effect — the depletion and shortage of good infantry units is one of the main reasons the Russian offensives stalled once they made contact with the Ukrainian defenses.

Of course, special forces do have a purpose in major conflicts, as Ukraine has shown. While the Ukrainians too have found it difficult to utilize such units (as mentioned above, flat fields are not great for their use), they have also been imaginative in exploiting opportunities and showing the way forward.

Ukrainian special forces were instrumental in crossing the Dnipro River to establish a bridgehead on the eastern bank, and in striking Russian installations in Crimea from the sea. The Ukrainian Army’s total personnel is about 500,000 soldiers, of which 4,000 are special forces. That is one member per 125 soldiers (1:125).

The US Army has 500,000 soldiers and about 35,000 special forces members. The US ratio between special forces and the regular army is 1:14. These calculations are crude, and do not take into calculation detailed force assessments, but they give an approximation.

The outline of a debate about the future may be beginning to emerge. In the UK, Just before he left as Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace attempted to cancel an order for 14 high-spec Chinook helicopters for the special forces. The costs have soared to £2.3bn ($2.9bn), with Wallace reportedly pointing out that he could have a number of general-purpose Atlas transport aircraft for the same price. He was overruled.

The UK’s strategy has been focused on special forces and its growing support arms even as army strength has slumped to 73,000, the smallest since before the 1756-1763 Seven Years War. (Even if UK special forces are limited to 2,000 personnel, that’s a ratio of 1:36).

Considering the Ukrainian experience, the US and other NATO special forces are several times too large for the future peer-to-peer fight.

They do of course have a role, the role they were once intended for, which is to support the main army’s effort either through deep strikes, intelligence gathering, or high-risk missions targeting high-value enemy assets, but they are not the lead actors in a large force-on-force war.

They are costly to train, retain, equip, and maintain, and should be because these units are tailored for highly qualified work. But a military with perhaps four to five times more units than they likely need amounts to a significant waste of money and also risk.

Why risk? The risk is that governments may believe that their special forces are crucial in a future conflict, prioritizing these units, and not paying enough attention to the need for greater numbers of regular maneuver units and their manning, readiness, and equipment to be able to execute large-scale military operations.

War is a practical business, and in the future peer-on-peer conflict, today’s force outline, with large numbers of special forces, is much like a toolbox with 20 screwdrivers, but no wrench.

The wrench is represented by a sufficient number of maneuver battalions to stop an invasion, to retake terrain, and to defend frontlines that may be hundreds of miles long. That change in Western military thinking can tweak the trajectory of history before we find ourselves in trouble.

Jan Kallberg, Ph.D., LL.M., is a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Dr. Kallberg is a former US Army Cyber Institute research scientist. Follow him at cyberdefense.com and @Cyberdefensecom.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Europe's Edge

CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.

cepa.org · by Jan Kallberg · November 29, 2023

2. In Ukraine, Peace Now Means War Later

Excerpts:

INSTEAD OF PUSHING CONCESSIONS on the Ukrainians that only encourage Putin, as Haass and Kupchan have done repeatedly, and instead of parroting Kremlin propaganda, as Ramaswamy does, the United States and its allies should state in clear terms that our policy is to help Ukraine win this war and defeat Russia. To that end, Congress should move expeditiously in passing a major assistance package for Ukraine that will get the country what it needs for the next year. We should ramp up the deliveries of weapons and technology that Ukraine needs. We should tighten the sanctions regime on Russia and impose secondary sanctions. The European Union should extend membership to Ukraine on an expedited basis.

We also should prepare to invite Ukraine to join NATO at next summer’s summit in Washington. No country is more deserving of membership, and no country has more experience fighting Russia—or fighting modern war in general—than Ukraine. Haass and Kupchan urge instead that Ukraine be offered weak Article 4 protection, well short of the guarantees under Article 5 in the NATO charter. In short, this would give Ukraine the right to complain, but no assurance that anyone would listen. Such a proposal is just a recipe for more future wars.

Since Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Ukraine’s military has become a formidable force, as Jonathan Tepperman notes in the Catalyst. “While Ukraine’s military may not yet fully meet NATO standards, it’s come so far that many Western experts now believe that, given enough time and supplies, it can ultimately beat the Russians.”

Zelensky has been compared by some to Winston Churchill. Ramaswamy, Haass, Kupchan, and the other American defeatists echo Viscount Halifax, an ally of former UK prime minister Neville Chamberlain of appeasement fame, who was bent on negotiating a disgraceful surrender to Hitler. As Churchill is often quoted as saying to Halifax during a cabinet meeting, “You cannot reason with a tiger while your head is in its mouth.”Ramaswamy, Haass, and Kupchan are no doubt all grateful that Halifax lost that argument. Going forward, our money is on Ukraine’s Churchill and the Ukrainian people.

In Ukraine, Peace Now Means War Later

Ukraine's war aims are designed to guarantee a lasting peace, not a reprieve before another Russian attack.

https://plus.thebulwark.com/p/ukraine-peace-now-means-war-later

DAVID J. KRAMER, JOHN HERBST, AND WILLIAM TAYLOR

NOV 28, 2023

Kyivans walk after the night of one of the largest Russian attacks on Kyiv and Ukraine by kamikaze drones on November 25, 2023 in Kyiv, Ukraine. (Photo by Andrew Kravchenko/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

BEFORE VLADIMIR PUTIN LAUNCHED his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many analysts, including in the U.S. intelligence community, predicted that the war would be over in a matter of days, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky toppled. Some even argued that there was no point in providing Ukraine with military assistance, since it wouldn’t make a difference. Those misjudgments were wide of the mark, and to the degree they influenced the Biden administration’s willingness to provide Ukraine with the weapons its needed to defend itself, they were also dangerous.

As it turned out, Ukrainians fought heroically and successfully, regaining more than half of their territory under Russian occupation, and dealing Russian forces tremendous setbacks and staggering loss of life. Ukraine, despite having no real navy of its own, has driven Russia’s ships out of the Crimean port of Sevastopol, delivering a major and humiliating defeat to Russia in the Black Sea. According to Ukrainian naval officials, 15 Russian warships have been destroyed and 12 damaged since the start of the full-scale invasion.

The recent arrival of American long-range ATACMS missiles, (the variant with a maximum range of 100 miles, rather than the 190-mile variant), has enabled Ukraine to deliver serious blows to Russian military bases and airfields and placed Russian control of Crimea at risk. Ukraine has been able to break the Russian blockade of its Black Sea ports by restoring passage along the coast, with help from Romania and Bulgaria. And Ukraine’s forces recently gained multiple bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River in the Kherson region. Roughly 18 percent of Ukrainian territory remains under Russian control. It should be no surprise that Russian forces have hunkered down and that this territory has become the scene of difficult fighting. The 2023 counteroffensive has not liberated huge swaths of land, like the campaigns in Kherson and Kharkiv in late 2022, as many wished. But just because Ukraine’s territorial gains have been small does not mean they are insignificant.

Despite horrific loss of life, including from Russian war crimes, and terrible damage to its infrastructure, Ukraine has performed above and beyond expectations. Ukrainians in surveys show determination in driving all Russian occupying forces from their land and reject by huge majorities (some 80 percent) any effort to negotiate with Moscow or make territorial concessions.

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DESPITE UKRAINIANS’ OBVIOUS SKILL and tenacity, many in the United States appear to be overcome with defeatism—even though no American service members are in the fight. From the GOP debate stage to the pages of journals and newspapers, some Americans seem ready to give up, suffering from Ukraine fatigue or a sense that we should focus on the Middle East or East Asia instead.

Vivek Ramaswamy, during the third Republican presidential debate in which he called Zelensky (Ukraine’s Jewish president) a “Nazi,” voiced glee at Ukraine’s seeming lack of progress in its counteroffensive: “I’m actually enjoying watching the Ukraine hawks quietly, delicately tiptoe back from their position as this thing has unwound into a disaster.”

Congressman Andy Harris, co-chair of the Congressional Ukraine Caucus and a past supporter of Ukraine, said in August that Ukraine’s counter-offensive had “failed,” adding, “I’m not sure it’s winnable anymore.”

Both Ramaswamy and Harris are operating with false premises, bad information, or both. And it’s not hard to see why.

Headlines in “news” stories, such as the New York Times’s “‘I Am Dreaming It Will Stop’: A Deadlocked War Tests Ukrainian Morale,” don’t stand up to the facts presented in the article. Support for a negotiated settlement with Russia increased to 14 percent from 10 percent, the Times reported, “though the vast majority of Ukrainians still staunchly reject trading territory for peace,” it claimed. This is the difference between relative and absolute changes: The percentage of Ukrainians who didn’t support a negotiated settlement is still at 86 percent.

And then there are the armchair pundits, many of whom have wanted to sell out Ukraine even before last February. In Foreign Affairs, Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan repeated their previous calls for Ukraine to make concessions and strike a deal with Russia to end the war. They, along with Thomas Graham, have engaged in “secret” talks with Russian officials without Ukrainians involved for months, even well before Ukraine’s counteroffensive.

In their latest misfire, Haass and Kupchan fail to understand that an aggressive Kremlin has its sights set on not just Ukraine but other countries in the region. If not stopped in Ukraine, Moldova or NATO member states might be next.

IN AN ESSAY IN THE WASHINGTON POST two days after the Haass-Kupchan piece appeared, President Biden demonstrated a superior understanding of the stakes in Ukraine:

Both Putin and Hamas are fighting to wipe a neighboring democracy off the map. And both Putin and Hamas hope to collapse broader regional stability and integration and take advantage of the ensuing disorder. America cannot, and will not, let that happen. For our own national security interests—and for the good of the entire world.

We know from two world wars in the past century that when aggression in Europe goes unanswered, the crisis does not burn itself out. It draws America in directly. That’s why our commitment to Ukraine today is an investment in our own security. It prevents a broader conflict tomorrow.

The only way to prevent that broader conflict is to provide Ukraine with everything it needs to win. “Win”—as distinct from ‘not lose’—means driving every Russian occupying and invading force from Ukrainian territory, forcing Russia to pay compensation for the damage it has done, and holding Putin and others responsible for the atrocities they have committed. Doing that will prevent Putin’s war from widening and will deter other would-be Putins.

Haass and Kupchan acknowledge that their own proposal is unlikely to work. Putin is “much more likely” to “spurn a cease-fire proposal,” they acknowledge. If so, why bother to press Ukraine to chase this fool’s errand? Doing so would damage Ukrainian morale, signal to Putin our lack of commitment to Ukraine, and signal to our enemies everywhere that we cannot be trusted. It would give Putin the impression that he can wait out the West.

Moreover, under the Haass-Kupchan proposal, millions of Ukrainians would be condemned to life under Russian occupation, complete with oppression and war crimes. Yet somehow they write that “what began as a war of necessity for Ukraine—a fight for its very survival—has morphed into a war of choice, a fight to recapture Crimea and much of the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine.” Tell that to the Ukrainians living in those regions, or those in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson under Russian occupation now. If the Ukrainians reach a point where they decide they have had enough, that will be their call to make. Haass and Kupchan would have the United States force that decision on Ukraine—even though they acknowledge that Putin wants more.

Even in the unlikely event that Putin were to agree to a ceasefire, he would use the interlude to rebuild his military and launch yet another invasion of Ukraine. He’s looking for a rest stop, not an off ramp.

Had the United States provided the weapons Ukraine has been asking for sooner, the war would look a lot different from how it does now. According to what a top Ukrainian official told us, since the launch of the counteroffensive in June, Ukraine has regained 483 square kilometers of territory. Top Ukrainian officials believe regaining control over all occupied Ukrainian territory is possible with the right level of Western support.

Ukraine has achieved great victories without any air support; the F-16s the United States promised won’t arrive in Ukraine until next year, and even then, not in large numbers. Only recently has Ukraine acquired the long-range missiles it has needed from day one, and only in limited supplies and with reduced range. Ammunition supplies on the Ukrainian side are running low, and supporters of Ukraine have done a poor job of ramping up their domestic production. The longer we take to deliver what Ukraine needs, the longer it will take Ukraine to reach victory. With the arrival of these new weapons, together with new electronic warfare technology and advanced drones and air defense, the Ukrainians tell us they can achieve a real breakthrough. Indeed, had we provided Ukraine in adequate numbers weapons like the 190-mile range ATACMs, F-16’s, and electronic warfare equipment this year’s land offensive would likely have achieved more than modest success.

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And yet Haass and Kupchan assume Russia will prevail no matter what. Not only does this run counter to the facts on the ground and to major draft dodging in Russia during last year’s“partial mobilization,” but it is a disservice to the brave men and women of Ukraine, who have not only held back Russian forces but have gone on the offensive. Despite all the suffering on the Ukrainian side—indeed, paradoxically, maybe because of it—Ukraine has morale on its side.

Russian forces, by comparison, are deeply demoralized, as evidenced by reports of defections and executions of those who try to flee the fighting. Major breakthroughs by the Ukrainians could lead to mass defections among the Russian forces, leaving Putin without the troops to carry out his orders. Some one million Russians fled Russia when the war started and after Putin announced a mobilization last September. Russia has become a junior partner to China and relies on Iran and North Korea for materiel. Putin is limited in where he can travel abroad—nowhere where the host nation recognizes the International Criminal Court, which has indicted the Russian leader for war crimes. It’s doubtful he could be entirely sure of his security if he were to take an impromptu stroll through central Moscow. And over the weekend, the wives of Russian soldiers published an extraordinary appeal on Telegram calling for their husbands’ return home.

Surveys of Americans show a drop in support for assistance to Ukraine, though the level of support remains significant. In one poll, 58 percent support additional economic and military aid; in another, 65 percent of respondents said that supporting Ukraine was in America’s national interest. This decline is fed in part by the reckless commentary of Ramaswamy, Haass, Kupchan, and others that Ukraine cannot possibly win and the fighting needs to end, and by their naïve assumption that Putin’s aggressive designs do not go beyond Ukraine’s western border. Nobody wants the war to end sooner than Ukrainians, as they are the ones fighting, suffering, and dying. But they want the war to end in victory and to ensure that Russia doesn’t pose a threat again.

INSTEAD OF PUSHING CONCESSIONS on the Ukrainians that only encourage Putin, as Haass and Kupchan have done repeatedly, and instead of parroting Kremlin propaganda, as Ramaswamy does, the United States and its allies should state in clear terms that our policy is to help Ukraine win this war and defeat Russia. To that end, Congress should move expeditiously in passing a major assistance package for Ukraine that will get the country what it needs for the next year. We should ramp up the deliveries of weapons and technology that Ukraine needs. We should tighten the sanctions regime on Russia and impose secondary sanctions. The European Union should extend membership to Ukraine on an expedited basis.

We also should prepare to invite Ukraine to join NATO at next summer’s summit in Washington. No country is more deserving of membership, and no country has more experience fighting Russia—or fighting modern war in general—than Ukraine. Haass and Kupchan urge instead that Ukraine be offered weak Article 4 protection, well short of the guarantees under Article 5 in the NATO charter. In short, this would give Ukraine the right to complain, but no assurance that anyone would listen. Such a proposal is just a recipe for more future wars.

Since Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Ukraine’s military has become a formidable force, as Jonathan Tepperman notes in the Catalyst. “While Ukraine’s military may not yet fully meet NATO standards, it’s come so far that many Western experts now believe that, given enough time and supplies, it can ultimately beat the Russians.”

Zelensky has been compared by some to Winston Churchill. Ramaswamy, Haass, Kupchan, and the other American defeatists echo Viscount Halifax, an ally of former UK prime minister Neville Chamberlain of appeasement fame, who was bent on negotiating a disgraceful surrender to Hitler. As Churchill is often quoted as saying to Halifax during a cabinet meeting, “You cannot reason with a tiger while your head is in its mouth.”Ramaswamy, Haass, and Kupchan are no doubt all grateful that Halifax lost that argument. Going forward, our money is on Ukraine’s Churchill and the Ukrainian people.

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5 Restacks

A guest post by

David J. Kramer

David J. Kramer, a former assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor in the George W. Bush administration, is executive director of the George W. Bush Institute and chairs the board of the Free Russia Foundation.

A guest post by

John Herbst

John Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.

A guest post by

William Taylor

William Taylor is a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.

3. Looks Like ‘Axis of Evil’ Is Back on the Menu

Excerpts:

Bush said that countries were either with America or against it. It’s actually more complicated than that, and, experts widely agree, global politics in general is vastly more complicated than it was in 2001 or 2002, when the United States stood as the lone and unchallenged world superpower.

The West “needs to acknowledge that sometimes what we see as major global problems don’t resonate the same way in other parts of the world,” said Sarah Margon, director of foreign policy at the Open Society Foundations.

“‘Axis of Evil’ is a great title for an article, but when it becomes the driver of policy, it makes it really difficult for countries in the middle, because they feel like they have to choose a side, and that’s just not how international politics will work in the world today,” she said.

Looks Like ‘Axis of Evil’ Is Back on the Menu

The Bush-era credo is back in vogue, to the delight of some and the dismay of others.

By Robbie Gramer

Foreign Policy · by Robbie Gramer · November 27, 2023

November 29, 2023, 4:15 PM

In his 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush warned that the United States needed to confront a new “axis of evil” threatening the world—a turn of phrase that would come to define Bush’s controversial foreign-policy legacy and years of costly quagmires in the Middle East.

If you thought Washington was past all that, think again.

More than two decades later, the axis of evil is back on the menu. The phrase, and others like it, have again burrowed into the Washington zeitgeist to describe what some believe is a growing alliance between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

“We have to always remember [that] a win for Russia is a win for China. And we can never let that axis of evil gather any more momentum,” former South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley said in late August on her Republican presidential primary campaign. “There’s an axis of evil in the world: China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran,” Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell similarly warned in a CBS News interview in October. “And we need to stand up to the axis of evil, not try to do business with them.”

“Axis of evil” is a phrase that harkens back to an era of badly misguided optimism about American power abroad—and the badly mishandled wars that followed. The fact that it has come back could be a harbinger of what U.S. foreign policy will look like in the coming years.

Both Republicans and Democrats in Washington warn of the increasing links between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Russia is leaning on Iranian and North Korean arms shipments to supply its war in Ukraine, and the United States and its allies are anxiously eyeing any military or economic lifelines Beijing could throw Moscow’s way to prolong the war. Russia’s support for Iran, meanwhile, has positive knock-on effects for militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah that are viewed as Iranian proxies in the fight against Israel, and Russia appears to be using the ongoing Israel-Hamas war to try to burnish its own credentials in the global south.

President Joe Biden has tied U.S. support for Israel and Ukraine together in his pitch to Congress for more national security funds, framing both conflicts as part of a global fight to defend democracy. And many in Washington, rightly or wrongly, argue that a Russian victory in Ukraine would embolden China to invade Taiwan. Many in Washington view these rivalries as deeply interconnected—even if they are not banging the axis drum.

“I think it’s important to be clear who our adversaries are,” Jeanne Shaheen, a Democratic foreign-policy heavyweight in the Senate, told Foreign Policy in a recent interview. “We need to understand who is trying to undermine the United States, who is trying to undermine democracies around the world. And it is China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea.”

There isn’t apparently a single instance of Biden or top administration officials using the phrase, but that doesn’t mean it’s not catching on. On the Republican side, McConnell and Sens. Tim Scott and Marsha Blackburn, as well as Rep. Cory Mills, have all tossed the term around, while on the other side of the aisle, one of the most influential and longest-serving Democrats in the House, Rep. Steny Hoyer, has adopted it.

Not everyone’s on board, however. Some experts bristle at the idea of lumping these four disparate powers together, wary that it could lead to a new generation of U.S. foreign-policy debacles and mishaps. “There are a lot of differences in the overall strategic goals of these countries,” said Matt Duss, executive vice president of the Center for International Policy. “It’s not ultimately going to be productive to just group them all together and go at them as if they’re an anti-U.S. Voltron.”

They are all nuclear powers, or soon will be. They all create mayhem in their neighborhoods. But the security challenges posed by Russia, currently at war in Europe, or China, which has set its sights on conquering Taiwan in the indeterminate future, are different from those posed by Iran and North Korea.

“Each of these countries needs to be treated in its own right,” said Comfort Ero, president and CEO of the International Crisis Group think tank.

Unlike Washington’s network of alliances abroad, which run deep on interconnected economies, militaries, values, and other links, the alliances between these four U.S. adversaries are more alliances of convenience, Ero and other experts and Western diplomats argue. These alliances of convenience, furthermore, are laced with mutual suspicion and distrust, and they are more fragile than those in the axis of evil camp seem to suggest.

China, North Korea’s main benefactor, views it as a key buffer state between Washington and its allies in the Asia-Pacific, namely South Korea. But according to several senior Western and East Asian officials, China is growing uneasy about how North Korea is deepening its ties with Russia, lest that reduce the leverage Beijing has over Pyongyang or further exacerbate tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Iranian power brokers are split over how their country has deepened its ties with Russia, and Tehran still views Moscow with suspicion even as they expand military ties, according to regional experts. China may look to deepen its relationship with Russia, but only in ways that benefit Beijing’s economic and political interests, not out of any affinity or loyalty toward Moscow, as recent talks on energy cooperation between the two powers show. This axis wobbles.

It may be “a convenient shorthand, but it’s not convenient in terms of shaping policy,” Ero said. “I think there’s a danger in putting them all into one basket and with a master stroke assuming you can have just one policy on all of them as well.”

Foreign-policy hawks have been testing phrases, portmanteaus, and acronyms to describe threats to the West in recent years. Former U.S. Vice President Mike Pence tried out “wolf pack of rogue states” for a brief period in 2019 when he was working to burnish his foreign-policy credentials. Earlier this month at the Halifax International Security Forum, an annual gathering of hundreds of top foreign-policy officials and experts from democratic countries, some began using the acronym CRINK—China, Russia, Iran, North Korea—to describe these Western rivals, in a nod to the BRICS bloc of countries. But recycling is easier than inventing something new.

If this rhetorical game previews a new era in U.S. foreign policy—depending in part on who wins the 2024 presidential election—some foreign dignitaries warn there could be some real-world consequences for Washington trying to revive an era of “good versus evil” in global politics.

Multiple foreign diplomats at Halifax voiced concern, saying the trend could drive middle powers and countries in the so-called global south away from the United States; many, like India and South Africa, have deep economic and military relationships with both China and Russia.

Top Biden administration officials have repeatedly stressed they don’t want to force countries in Africa, Latin America, or elsewhere to choose between the United States and China, wary of driving potential partners away. But explicitly lumping China into an axis of evil may, in the end, have the same effect.

Even dignitaries from some of Washington’s closest partners are voicing concern at lumping China into the same pool as Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Top Ukrainian officials have been cautious not to derail ties with China even as Kyiv’s primary backers in the West gear up for a new cold war against Beijing, lest it push China to ramp up support for Russia in the ongoing war.

“I hate the idea [of] put[ting] China in the list of nations with the evil axis,” Petro Poroshenko, the former president of Ukraine, told Foreign Policy on the sidelines of the Halifax forum. “I mean Russia, Iran, North Korea, maybe Belarus, but definitely not China. Let’s not put it together that way, because that would be the biggest mistake,” he said.

“I still keep my fingers crossed that China’s influence can help de-escalate the situation,” he said, adding that he had “very positive experiences cooperating with China and President Xi [Jinping].”

Bush said that countries were either with America or against it. It’s actually more complicated than that, and, experts widely agree, global politics in general is vastly more complicated than it was in 2001 or 2002, when the United States stood as the lone and unchallenged world superpower.

The West “needs to acknowledge that sometimes what we see as major global problems don’t resonate the same way in other parts of the world,” said Sarah Margon, director of foreign policy at the Open Society Foundations.

“‘Axis of Evil’ is a great title for an article, but when it becomes the driver of policy, it makes it really difficult for countries in the middle, because they feel like they have to choose a side, and that’s just not how international politics will work in the world today,” she said.

FP intern Olatunji Osho-Williams contributed to this report.

Foreign Policy · by Robbie Gramer · November 27, 2023

4. As America’s Military Rearms, It Needs Minerals—and Lots of Them

Excerpts:

Minerals and their associated supply chains—including markets and institutions—are foundational to effectively producing defense munitions and enabling military platforms. However, these mineral supply chains face risks, including enormous demand and possible supply disruption. As regional wars continue and US-China tensions rise, these risks grow further. To ensure a secure and sufficient mineral supply for its platforms and munitions, the Department of Defense should support new approaches to stockpiling, mining, refining, and recycling of key minerals. Without these minerals, the defense industrial base cannot manufacture the munitions and platforms that the US military and its allies need to fight—and win.

As America’s Military Rearms, It Needs Minerals—and Lots of Them - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Gregory Wischer, Morgan Bazilian, Macdonald Amoah · November 29, 2023

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The US military is attempting to quickly replenish diminished weapons stocks in its largest production ramp-up in decades. With an eye on its pacing threats and the risk of major conflict—with China, in particular—it is transitioning to modern platforms, including attack submarines, heavy bombers, and air defense systems, as well as new approaches to electric vehicles. Given its security assistance to Ukraine and recent military support to Israel, and conflict risks with China, it is simultaneously rearming with legacy munitions—155-millimeter artillery, Javelin antitank missiles, and surface-to-air Stinger missiles. Because of the quantity of minerals required to meet these dual demands, for replenishment of munitions and construction of new platforms, both endeavors could be put at risk. Specifically, the mineral supply chains that the US military depends on could face overwhelming demand and possible supply disruption. To ensure a secure, resilient, and sufficient mineral supply for its platforms and munitions, the Department of Defense should refine its approach to mineral stockpiling, its engagement with mineral mining and refining, and its implementation of mineral recycling.

Legacy munitions are mineral-intensive. Generally, 155-millimeter shells have bodies of steel, which is an alloy of iron, carbon, and other elements; mortars have steel or cast-iron bodies; and small-arms munitions have cartridge cases of brass, which is an alloy of copper, zinc, and other elements. Copper is especially prevalent in munitions. It is often used as a driving band in artillery shells, as a liner in shaped-charge antitank munitions, and jackets for small-arms rounds. According to an Institute for Defense Analyses report for the Defense Logistics Agency, the Department of Defense used approximately 106,000 tons of copper in 2008, making it the second most used material by weight in US defense production.

Modern platforms are also mineral-intensive. The USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier contains 70,000 tons of steel. The B-2 bomber uses 4-foot by 12-foot panels of titanium in its wing sections. And about 40 percent of the F-35 fighter jet’s airframe is aluminum. Moreover, the Department of Defense intends to purchase up to nine thousand electric vehicles per year over the next ten years, and the US Army seeks a fully electric nontactical vehicle fleet by 2035. These vehicles will be powered by mineral-rich lithium-ion batteries. Lithium and graphite are necessary in these batteries, and depending on their chemistry, batteries also contain other elements, such as nickel, cobalt, and manganese.

Supply Chains at Risk

However, the mineral supply chains for these munitions and platforms face risks and there is competing demand from nonmilitary applications. For munitions, copper faces skyrocketing demand amid US arsenal restocking. For instance, the Department of Defense plans to increase its annual production of copper-containing 155-millimeter shells from ninety-three thousand to 1.2 million in 2025. Globally, Dubai-based Simon Hunt Strategic Services estimated copper usage in military applications in 2021 at 2.186 million metric tons—nearly 9 percent of global refined copper production—and growing at about 14 percent year-over-year through 2026. Copper supply chains also face disruption risks. In an Office of the Secretary of Defense survey conducted in June and August 2008, a Department of Defense respondent said copper supply problems have “already caused some kind of significant weapon system production delay for [the Department of Defense].” Furthermore, in a 2008 report for the Defense Logistics Agency, the Institute for Defense Analyses found that a peacetime supply disruption scenario may cause a copper shortage for defense-essential needs.

Mineral supply chains also face disruption risks as China, the top global producer and import source for many such minerals, has already shown a willingness to place export controls on key minerals and manufacturing technology. For example, China is the world’s largest producer of natural and synthetic graphite—which has both electric vehicle and military applications—and also the largest import source for the United States for natural and synthetic graphite. However, China now requires licenses to export certain graphite products, which will likely disrupt graphite supplies to the United States. China is also reportedly mulling export controls on manufacturing technology for rare earth magnets, which are necessary for electric vehicle motors and various defense systems. As the Department of Defense warns, “Dependence on foreign sources of minerals and on foreign production of lithium-ion battery components creates vulnerabilities for the [Department of Defense] and the US [electric vehicle] market.”

A Way Ahead: Three Steps

The Department of Defense can take three specific steps to address these mineral supply chain risks. First, it should refine and augment its approach to stockpiling key materials. Congress has appropriated $218.5 million for new acquisitions for the National Defense Stockpile. To ensure access to these materials and to support domestic miners and refiners, the Department of Defense should prepay domestic producers for minerals to supply the stockpile. This arrangement is common in the mining industry where customers like automakers prepay for minerals, providing mining companies with the necessary capital to develop their mines.

Second, the Department of Defense should continue its effective use of the Defense Production Act to support domestic mines. After World War II, the US government used the Defense Production Act to finance copper exploration, expand copper mining, and procure domestic copper to support the copper sector. Today, the department is again financially supporting domestic mining projects, including a cobalt refinery feasibility study and cobalt resource drilling in Idaho, a feasibility study for a graphite resource in Alaska, environmental and engineering studies for an antimony trisulfide project in Idaho, mining equipment for reopening a lithium mine in North Carolina, and nickel exploration and resource definition at a nickel project in Minnesota.

Third and finally, the Department of Defense could also implement broad mineral recycling programs, including for copper scrap and its end-of-life electric vehicle batteries. The National Defense Authorization Act for 2023 included the Strategic EV Management Act, which directs the US government to establish “guidelines for reusing and recycling the batteries of retired vehicles.” Yet, the law does not detail recycling requirements. Thus, recycling could be construed to pertain only to easily recyclable components like copper wiring, electrical steel, and aluminum battery pack enclosures, but not battery chemicals like cobalt sulfate, nickel sulfate, and manganese sulfate. Recycling all minerals from electric vehicle batteries—rather than disposing them and importing replacement minerals from China, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—would increase US mineral production and decrease supply chain risks. As an example to emulate, the Department of Defense expects to yield up to three thousand kilograms annually of recycled germanium from various night-vision devices.

Minerals and their associated supply chains—including markets and institutions—are foundational to effectively producing defense munitions and enabling military platforms. However, these mineral supply chains face risks, including enormous demand and possible supply disruption. As regional wars continue and US-China tensions rise, these risks grow further. To ensure a secure and sufficient mineral supply for its platforms and munitions, the Department of Defense should support new approaches to stockpiling, mining, refining, and recycling of key minerals. Without these minerals, the defense industrial base cannot manufacture the munitions and platforms that the US military and its allies need to fight—and win.

Gregory Wischer is principal at Dei Gratia Minerals, a critical minerals consultancy.

Morgan Bazilian is director of the Payne Institute and Professor of Public Policy at the Colorado School of Mines.

Macdonald Amoah is a researcher at the Payne Institute for Public Policy at the Colorado School of Mines.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Dori Whipple, Scranton Army Ammunition Plant

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Gregory Wischer, Morgan Bazilian, Macdonald Amoah · November 29, 2023

5. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2023

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2023

Key Takeaways:

The apparent Russian failure to establish a cohesive command structure among forces defending on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast continues to degrade Russian morale and combat capabilities.
The Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces is increasingly comprised of disparate elements of recently transferred and degraded units and new formations, which may be contributing to this apparent lack of cohesive command structure.
Russian authorities plan to extend criminal liability for crimes against the law on military service to participants in volunteer formations, a measure that would impact many irregular military formations and personnel on which the Russian military relies for manpower in Ukraine.
Russian officials proposed laws that would restrict the actions of foreign citizens in Russia, likely to support continued efforts to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
The NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) met at the foreign minister-level for the first time on November 29 and discussed steps to increase weapons and ammunition production.
Poland is reportedly considering sending military advisors to Finland in response to Russia's ongoing attempts to artificially create a migrant crisis on the Finnish-Russian border as part of a known Russian hybrid warfare tactic meant to destabilize NATO and the EU.
The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) formally announced Russia’s termination of a nuclear reduction pact with Japan on November 28.
Russia's efforts to generate combat power via recruitment from Central Asian countries may become a source of tension in Russia's relationship with its Central Asian neighbors.
Adam Kadyrov, younger son of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, will reportedly “oversee” the newly formed “Sheikh Mansur” volunteer battalion in a new unspecified position, possibly further indicating Ramzan Kadyrov’s desire for Adam to succeed him as head of Chechnya.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances.
Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky proposed a bill on November 28 that would grant war correspondents "combat veteran" status and associated social support benefits.
Russian authorities continue efforts to erase Ukrainian culture and identity in occupied Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 29, 2023

Nov 29, 2023 - ISW Press

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2023

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, George Barros, and Frederick W Kagan

November 29, 2023, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The apparent Russian failure to establish a cohesive command structure among forces defending on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast continues to degrade Russian morale and combat capabilities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 29 that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) operating near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) are refusing to conduct assaults on Ukrainian positions due to a lack of artillery coordination, tactical intelligence transmission, and proper communication about the location of Russian minefields.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that maps of the Russian minefields are classified and that Russian commanders have not properly coordinated with assault units about the locations of these minefields, leading to 50 casualties among elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade in the last month.[2] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry brigade arrived in the Krynky area in early October 2023 and appear to have taken over responsibility for the immediate Krynky area from elements of the newly created 18th Combined Arms Army (CAA) following the start of Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank of the Dnipro in mid-October 2023.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the 18th CAA’s 28th Motorized Rifle Regiment is currently operating in Pishchanivka (14km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River).[4] Additional elements of the 18th CAA and the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly hold positions in near rear areas on the east bank, and the joint command of these formations is likely overseeing much of the current Russian response to the Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank.[5] The reported minefield incident suggests that the command of the 18th CAA did not share relevant tactical details with the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s command, suggesting that higher-level Russian commanders responsible for the defense of the east bank have yet to remedy this failure in coordination.

The Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces is increasingly comprised of disparate elements of recently transferred and degraded units and new formations, which may be contributing to this apparent lack of cohesive command structure. Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and 177th Naval Infantry Brigade (Caspian Flotilla) transferred to the Kherson direction likely after sustaining heavy casualties defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast in the summer of 2023.[6] The majority of the 7th VDV Division’s combat elements are currently still defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast, although the 7th VDV’s 171st Air Assault Battalion (97th VDV Regiment) and 104th Separate Tank Battalion are reportedly operating on the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[7] Elements of the 49th CAA (Southern Military District) have reportedly been operating in the Kherson direction since the Ukrainian liberation of Kherson City in November 2022, but some Russian and Ukrainian sources claim that the Russian command has since redeployed elements of at least one of its brigades to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[8] The newly created 18th CAA’s 70th Motorized Rifle Division and 22nd Army Corps (formerly of the Black Sea Fleet) are operating on the east bank.[9] Elements of the newly created 104th VDV Division’s 328th VDV Regiment are reportedly defending in the Krynky area, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that additional elements of the 104th VDV Division are currently deploying to the Kherson direction.[10] ISW previously observed elements of the 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) operating on the left bank in July 2023, and November 28 reports of 14th Army Corps Deputy Commander Major General Vladimir Zavadsky’s death in the Kherson direction suggests that these elements may still be in the area.[11] Elements of the 41st CAA (Central Military District) reportedly transferred from the Kupyansk direction to Kherson Oblast in early October and may be defending on the east bank.[12]

The Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces, therefore, appears to be comprised of elements of the Black Sea Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla, the Southern Military District, the Central Military District, the Northern Fleet, and the VDV. Russia’s other grouping of forces in Ukraine largely correspond with Russia’s military districts reinforced in some cases with VDV units, making the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces a notable aberration. The unnamed force grouping in charge of the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast is primarily comprised of elements of the 58th CAA (Southern Military District) reinforced with elements of several VDV regiments but has not suffered any of the apparent coordination issues that the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces has faced. The Russian military command should be able to form groupings of forces interchangeably between formations from different military districts and combined arms armies. Persistent Russian issues with sharing situational awareness between units and creating common operating pictures and coherent command structures throughout Ukraine have likely incentivized the creation of groupings of forces comprised of formations and units largely from the same military districts as mitigations.[13] The recent arrival of likely degraded, understaffed, and undertrained Russian elements to the Kherson direction and their immediate commitment to defensive operations has likely further complicated Russian efforts to create a coherent command structure for the disparate elements of the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces.[14] The Russian military command appointed VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky as Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander on October 29, 2023, and one of Teplinsky’s main objectives is likely to establish a more unified command for the grouping.[15] The Russian military command is unlikely to remedy the “Dnepr” Grouping of Force’s command issues in the short term, however, and the continuation of Ukrainian ground operations on the left bank will likely only complicate these efforts. It is not yet clear if the command-and-control challenges facing Russian forces in Kherson will generate notable battlefield effects.

Russian forces launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 28 to 29. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 29 that Russian forces launched three Kh-59 missiles, primarily targeting Khmelnytskyi City, and 21 Shahed-131/-136 drones at targets in Ukraine.[16] Ukrainian air defenses destroyed two of the three Kh-59s and all of the Shahed drones over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force Command reported that the third Kh-59 missile did not reach its target.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff later reported that Russian forces also launched a Kh-31 missile and two S-300 missiles targeting civilian infrastructure in an unspecified location.[18] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Russian forces are flying drones over riverbeds and highways to avoid Ukrainian mobile fire groups that have deployed throughout Ukraine.[19]

Russian authorities plan to extend criminal liability for crimes against the law on military service to participants in volunteer formations, a measure that would impact many irregular military formations and personnel on which the Russian military relies for manpower in Ukraine. Russian media reported on November 29 that the Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading extending criminal liability for crimes against regular military service to volunteer servicemen.[20] Russian volunteer servicemen are currently exempt from existing legislation that holds Russian conscripts, contract servicemen, and reservists liable for crimes committed while performing combat missions. The new bill empowers Russian military courts to try volunteer servicemen for select crimes including desertion, failure to comply with an order, resistance to or violent actions against a superior, unauthorized leaving of a place of service, evasion of duties by feigning illness, and intentional or accidental destruction, damage, or loss of military property. Russian senators previously called for the introduction of criminal penalties for volunteer servicemen for “improper performance of their contractual duties” and desertion.[21] This legislation may impact the Kremlin’s ongoing volunteer recruitment efforts if the threat of criminal liabilities outweighs incentives for volunteer service such as high salaries and additional social benefits.[22]

Russian officials proposed laws that would restrict the actions of foreign citizens in Russia, likely to support continued efforts to coerce migrants into Russian military service. Russian Duma deputies Alexei Zhuravlev, Mikhail Matveev, and Dmitri Kuznetsov proposed a bill that would consider migration violations an aggravating circumstance in a criminal offense.[23] Zhuravlev, Matveev and Kuznetsov cited figures that Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin released on September 25 claiming that the number of serious crimes that foreign citizens committed in Russia increased by 32 percent from 2022 to 2023.[24] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on November 28 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) proposed a bill that would require all foreigners entering Russia to sign a ”loyalty agreement” banning them from discrediting Russian domestic and foreign policy, denying Russian family values, or “disrespecting the diversity of regional and ethnocultural ways of life” in Russia among other restrictions.[25] The proposed measures likely seek to increase Russian law enforcement’s ability to investigate and arrest migrants with foreign citizenship as part of an effort to coerce them into Russian military service. Russian authorities are also continuing efforts to coerce migrants with Russian citizenship into the Russian military by threatening to revoke their citizenship and forcibly issuing them military summonses.[26]

The NATO–Ukraine Council (NUC) met at the foreign minister-level for the first time on November 29 and discussed steps to increase weapons and ammunition production. NATO reported that it is developing a roadmap for full Ukrainian interoperability with NATO and reaffirmed its support for Ukraine’s democratic and security sector reforms “on its path toward future membership in NATO.”[27] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated that the NUC discussed increasing the production of weapons and ammunition and noted on the sidelines of the NUC that the European Union (EU) has provided Ukraine with 300,000 rounds of ammunition of the promised 1 million.[28]

Poland is reportedly considering sending military advisors to Finland in response to Russia's ongoing attempts to artificially create a migrant crisis on the Finnish-Russian border as part of a known Russian hybrid warfare tactic meant to destabilize NATO and the EU. Polish Secretary of State and Head of the Polish National Security Bureau Jacek Siewiera stated on November 28 that during Finnish President Sauli Niinistö's official visit to Poland, Niinistö requested "allied support" against the hybrid Russian attack on the Finnish border.[29] Siewiera reported that Poland intends to respond to the request by sending a team of military advisors to Finland to provide "on-site knowledge on border security" and other unspecified operational support.[30] Finnish authorities announced on November 28 that Finland will close the last open border checkpoint at midnight on November 30 until at least December 13, following Russia's artificial creation of a migrant crisis on the Finnish border that started on November 18.[31] Russian sources, including Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov and a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, responded negatively to Siewiera's announcement and claimed that it is "excessive" and meant to prepare Finland for a confrontation against Russia in the Arctic.[32] Poland has experienced the impacts of Russian hybrid warfare firsthand on its borders from a Russian-orchestrated migrant crisis on the Poland-Belarus border in fall of 2021, and Finland likely seeks to leverage Poland's knowledge of such crises to address the current situation on the Finnish border.[33] Poland and Finland both belong to a number of military, political, economic, and diplomatic organizations, including NATO, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) formally announced Russia’s termination of a nuclear reduction pact with Japan on November 28.[34] The Russian MFA stated that the bilateral agreement with Japan on cooperation in nuclear weapons reduction, initially signed in 1993, will terminate on May 21, 2024, six months after Russia’s formal notification of termination.[35] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on November 9 that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order approving Russia’s termination of the bilateral agreement with Japan.[36] Japanese news outlet the Japan Times reported that the agreement allowed Japan to support the decommissioning of weapons, including Russian nuclear submarines.[37] The Russian MFA claimed that Russia is withdrawing from the agreement against the backdrop of ”the openly anti-Russian policy of [Japanese Prime Minister Fumio] Kushida’s administration” including Japanese sanctions against Russia and alleged increasing Japanese military activity near the Japanese-Russian border.[38] The Japan Times also noted that Russia has withdrawn from several other bilateral negotiations and initiatives following the imposition of Japanese sanctions against Russia after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[39]

Russia's efforts to generate combat power via recruitment from Central Asian countries may become a source of tension in Russia's relationship with its Central Asian neighbors. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)'s Central Asian service Radio Azattyk reported on November 28 that a Kazakh court sentenced Kazakh citizen Alexei Shompolov to six years and eight months in prison on charges of mercenarism.[40] Shompolov reportedly fought in a Wagner Group artillery unit near Bakhmut.[41] Shompolov's case represents the second charge of mercenarism pursued by a Central Asian country against a combatant who fought for Russia in Ukraine—an Uzbek court similarly sentenced an Uzbek man who fought with Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) troops in Ukraine in 2014–2015 on October 31.[42] Russian milbloggers responded to Shompolov's sentencing by criticizing Kazakh leadership for taking an "anti-Russian" stance and questioned if Kazakh authorities would similarly charge Kazakh citizens who fought in the Ukrainian army.[43] Russia's continued insistence on leveraging Central Asian populations for force-generation purposes, both within Central Asian countries and in Central Asian migrant communities in Russia itself, is likely to create friction between Russia and its neighbors as Central Asian countries use mercenarism laws to punish residents who fought for Russia.[44]

Adam Kadyrov, younger son of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, will reportedly “oversee” the newly formed “Sheikh Mansur” volunteer battalion in a new unspecified position, possibly further indicating Ramzan Kadyrov’s desire for Adam to succeed him as head of Chechnya. Chechen Republic Parliament Deputy Magomed Daudov claimed on November 29 that Adam will “oversee” the battalion but did not provide additional information regarding Adam’s official title, although the role may be more ceremonial than combat- or command-oriented given Adam’s age.[45] Daudov stated that Adam also received the star of the “Sheikh Mansur” Battalion award. Ramzan Kadyrov has previously appeared increasingly favorable to Adam in recent months, including appointing Adam to a prominent yet unspecified “important position” in the Chechen secret service.[46]

Key Takeaways:

The apparent Russian failure to establish a cohesive command structure among forces defending on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast continues to degrade Russian morale and combat capabilities.
The Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces is increasingly comprised of disparate elements of recently transferred and degraded units and new formations, which may be contributing to this apparent lack of cohesive command structure.
Russian authorities plan to extend criminal liability for crimes against the law on military service to participants in volunteer formations, a measure that would impact many irregular military formations and personnel on which the Russian military relies for manpower in Ukraine.
Russian officials proposed laws that would restrict the actions of foreign citizens in Russia, likely to support continued efforts to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
The NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) met at the foreign minister-level for the first time on November 29 and discussed steps to increase weapons and ammunition production.
Poland is reportedly considering sending military advisors to Finland in response to Russia's ongoing attempts to artificially create a migrant crisis on the Finnish-Russian border as part of a known Russian hybrid warfare tactic meant to destabilize NATO and the EU.
The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) formally announced Russia’s termination of a nuclear reduction pact with Japan on November 28.
Russia's efforts to generate combat power via recruitment from Central Asian countries may become a source of tension in Russia's relationship with its Central Asian neighbors.
Adam Kadyrov, younger son of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, will reportedly “oversee” the newly formed “Sheikh Mansur” volunteer battalion in a new unspecified position, possibly further indicating Ramzan Kadyrov’s desire for Adam to succeed him as head of Chechnya.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances.
Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky proposed a bill on November 28 that would grant war correspondents "combat veteran" status and associated social support benefits.
Russian authorities continue efforts to erase Ukrainian culture and identity in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 29 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults in the Kupyansk direction northeast of Petropalivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and in the Lyman direction near the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna), Torske (15km west of Kreminna), Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna), and east of Terny (17km west of Kreminna).[47] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into Synkivka, near Zahoruykivka (a settlement 16km east of Kupyansk that was disincorporated in the 1980s) and Tymkivka (19km east of Kupyansk) and captured unspecified positions south and southwest of Lyman Pershyi (11km northeast of Kupyansk).[48] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces also attacked south of the Zhuravka Gully (18km west of Kreminna).[49] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces also counterattacked and advanced near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna) on November 28.[50] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian unit reportedly deployed in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction stated on November 29 that Russian forces continue conducting attacks despite worsening weather conditions.[51]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued unsuccessful counterattacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 29. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Lyman Pershyi and Synkivka in Kharkiv Oblast, Yampolivka in Donetsk Oblast, and the Serebryanske forest area.[52] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Terny and the Zhuravka gully.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on November 29 and reportedly advanced. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces captured Khromove (on the western outskirts of Bakhmut).[54] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division captured Khromove and additionally advanced near the Berkhivka Reservoir (3km northwest of Bakhmut).[55] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have completely captured Khromove, however. Russian sources claimed that fighting continues northwest and southwest of Bakhmut, and a Ukrainian reserve officer noted that the situation southwest of Bakhmut along the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line (5km-12km southwest of Bakhmut) is especially challenging due to an increased number of Russian assaults and the number of Russian units fighting in the area.[56] The Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian assaults near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (5km west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.[57]

Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in the Bakhmut direction on November 29 but did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Khromove and Klishchiivka.[58] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also unsuccessfully counterattacked near the Berkhivka Reservoir.[59] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing successful assault actions south of Bakhmut.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction on November 29 and reportedly advanced northwest of Avdiivka. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced between 300 to 500 meters in the direction of Novokalynove (10km northwest of Avdiivka) and near Stepove (7km northwest of Avdiivka), although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Russian advances in either of these areas.[61] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces are clearing and consolidating positions within the industrial zone just southeast of Avdiivka.[62] A Russian soldier who is reportedly fighting in the industrial zone claimed that the situation is very challenging and that it is difficult for Russian forces to move through the area due to Ukrainian drone use and constant mortar fire.[63] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured several unspecified Ukrainian positions near Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka).[64] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces are also trying to capture the Avdiivka Coke Plant just northwest of Avdiivka, and a Ukrainian battalion commander reportedly defending near the Coke Plant characterized Russian attacks in this area as highly attritional squad-sized frontal assaults.[65] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi noted that Russian activity near Avdiivka has significantly increased over the past day and reported that Russian forces are using armored vehicles.[66] The Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian offensive actions near Avdiivka itself, Stepove, Novokalynove, Sieverne, Pervomaiske (10km southeast of Avdiivka), east of Novobakhmutivka (11km northeast of Avdiivka), and south of Tonenke (6km west of Avdiivka).[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 29 but did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian assaults on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Marinka, near Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City), and near Vodyane (25km southwest of Donetsk City).[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the "Kaskad" formation of the Donetsk People's Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs (DNR MVD) are fighting near Novomykhailivka and Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[69]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 29 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled more than two Russian assaults south of Prechystivka (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and southwest of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[70]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 29 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults west of Robotyne, near Novoprokopivka (3km south of Robotyne), and northwest of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[72] A Russian milblogger amplified footage purporting to show elements of the Russian 247th Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) striking Ukrainian infantry near Verbove.[73]

Russian forces counterattacked in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 29 and reportedly advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled more than nine Russian assaults near Robotyne and west of Verbove.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured several unspecified Ukrainian positions near Robotyne.[75] Another milblogger claimed on November 28 that Russian forces counterattacked along the Kopani-Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove (7km northwest of Robotyne to 9km east of Robotyne) line and that elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (all of the 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) advanced up to 800 meters in several areas near Kopani and Robotyne.[76] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces also captured unspecified Ukrainian strongholds near Verbove. ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claimed Russian advances in the Robotyne area. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on November 29 that Russian forces are focused on capturing tactically advantageous positions in the Robotyne area and do not intend to launch larger counterattacks.[77]

Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 29 and reportedly advanced. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest of Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) and established a foothold in a nearby forest area.[78] Russian milbloggers claimed that battles are ongoing near Krynky and that Russian aviation and artillery units are heavily striking the area.[79] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[80] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to transfer new assault groups to the left bank and that 300 to 400 Ukrainian personnel are operating near Krynky.[81] Continued Russian claims about the arrival of Ukrainian reinforcements on the east bank of the Dnipro River suggest that Russian forces are struggling to interdict Ukrainian efforts to supply and reinforce their positions in east bank Kherson Oblast.[82]

Ukrainian forces struck a building in occupied Yuvileine, Kherson Oblast, on November 28 during a Russian occupation law enforcement meeting. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike killed four occupation police and injured 18 others.[83] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Ukrainian forces struck the occupation law enforcement meeting in Yuvileine (49km southeast of Kherson Oblast) thanks to information from local Ukrainian partisans and killed five high-ranking Russian officials.[84]

The recent cyclone in the Black Sea on November 27 destroyed water barriers that Russian forces constructed to protect naval assets and ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in occupied Crimea. Satellite imagery from November 27 indicates that the recent storm destroyed protective Russian structures near the Kerch Strait Bridge that connects Russia to occupied Crimea.[85] Satellite imagery from November 29 shows storm damage to defensive barriers at the entrance to the port in occupied Sevastopol.[86] A Russian milblogger responded to the imagery by expressing concern about Russian vulnerability to Ukrainian naval drone strikes.[87]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head and Duma Deputy Leonid Slutsky proposed a bill on November 28 that would grant war correspondents "combat veteran" status and associated social support benefits. Slutsky argued that war correspondents do “selfless work” in high-risk environments and therefore deserve the same social guarantees, such as payments in the case of injury or death and support measures to relatives, as combat veterans receive.[88] The Russian Ministry of Digital Development and the Russian Union of Journalists previously expressed support in July 2023 for measures that would grant military correspondents some type of veteran status.[89] ISW continues to assess that Russian ultranationalist figures are likely supporting these measures to court the Russian milblogger community and that the Kremlin could use such measures to exert more control over milbloggers.[90]

St. Petersburg Municipal Deputy Valery Veremeychik reportedly sent an appeal to the Russian State Duma requesting the establishment of service limits for mobilized personnel on November 28.[91] Veremeychik’s appeal reportedly proposed limiting the period of partial mobilization for a mobilized citizen to one year starting from the issuance of an individual’s military summons and limiting the duration of service under partial mobilization to six months.[92] Veremeychik’s appeal to the Russian State Duma may be a response to a recent increase in protests among relatives of mobilized personnel calling for the return of their loved ones.[93] ISW recently observed a report that the Kremlin instructed Russian regional authorities to prevent relatives of mobilized personnel from protesting by paying them off.[94]

The Russian 1st “Hispaniola” Fan Volunteer Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade is recruiting women into assault units and other combat roles.[95] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on November 28 that the 1st “Hispaniola” Fan Volunteer Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade, which is reportedly subordinate to the Kremlin-affiliated “Redut” private military company (PMC), began to advertise recruitment for women into combat roles such as assault personnel, communications operators, drone operators, and electronic warfare (EW) operators.[96] ISW previously observed reports that Redut’s “Borz” Battalion began to advertise recruitment for women into combat roles in October 2023.[97]

The Russian Navy reportedly received a new submarine for its Pacific Fleet on November 29. Kremlin newswire RT reported that St. Petersburg-based Russian ship builder Admiral Shipyards transferred a new Project 636.3 “Mozhaisk” multi-purpose diesel-electric submarine to the Russian Navy.[98] The “Mozhaisk” submarine is reportedly the fifth submarine of six submarines that are designated for the Pacific Fleet.[99] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Russian shipbuilder Sevmash Enterprise delivered the Project 885M “Arkhangelsk” Yasem-M class nuclear submarine to the Russian Navy for testing on November 29.[100] The “Arkhangelsk” is reportedly one of six Project 885M submarines that Sevmash is building.[101]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec announced on November 29 that it is developing a training program for “Okhotnik” combat drone operations to accelerate their use in unspecified Russian military units.[102] Rostec noted that it is currently conducting preliminary tests with the “Okhotnik” combat drone.[103]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities continue efforts to erase Ukrainian culture and identity in occupied Ukraine. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik announced on November 29 that Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko and Russian Deputy Culture Minister Sergei Obryvalin visited occupied Luhansk Oblast to discuss the development of Russian culture and education in the occupied territories.[104] Kiriyenko and Obryvalin met with representatives of unspecified cultural institutions in occupied Luhansk Oblast and emphasized the need to convey “patriotism and love for the Motherland [Russia]” to Ukrainian youth. Kiriyenko announced that the Russian Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives will continue to fund grants for institutions that help promote the Kremlin’s objectives in 2024. Pasechnik, Kiriyenko, and the Russian Military Society’s Deputy Chairman Nikolai Ovsienko also attended the opening of the “Unhealing Wound of Donbas” memorial in occupied Luhansk City, dedicated to residents of occupied Luhansk Oblast who have died since 2014.[105]

Russian authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of educational trips. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration head Artem Lysohor reported on November 29 that the Russian government ordered occupation officials to send 10,000 children to Moscow during fall and winter 2023–24, likely to visit the “Rossiya” International Exhibit and Forum.[106] Lysohor reported that the Russian federal government is paying for the children to travel to Moscow by train.

Russian authorities continue to facilitate the arrival of Central Asia migrants to occupied Ukraine to artificially alter the demographics of occupied areas. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 29 that more than 100,000 Central Asian migrants have arrived in occupied Ukraine and are mainly working for Russian-controlled construction companies.[107] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that Russian authorities may offer the migrants Russian citizenship in exchange for military service in the future, which would be consistent with ongoing Russian efforts to coerce Central Asian migrants into military service.[108]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov posted footage on November 29 purportedly showing 50 Palestinian refugees from the Gaza Strip arriving in Chechnya.[109] Kadyrov claimed that the Gazan refugees will stay at the “Gorny Klyuch” children’s health camp in Shalinsky Raion, Chechnya and that an additional 100 Gazan refugees will arrive in Chechnya on November 30.[110] Kadyrov’s claims reflect the Kremlin’s shift to a much more anti-Israel position in the Israel-Hamas war, as well as Kadyrov‘s desire to show unwavering support for Russian President Vladimir Putin.[111] ISW cannot independently verify the footage or any of Kadyrov’s claims, however.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced on November 29 that Belarusian military delegations met with Egyptian and Cuban military officials to discuss bilateral military cooperation and training. Head of the Belarusian Armed Forces Military Education Department Colonel Andrei Klishevich visited military education institutions and met with his counterparts in Egypt.[112] Belarusian Assistant Defense Minister for International Military Cooperation Colonel Valery Revenko met with Chief of the Cuban General Staff General Roberto Legra Sotolongo in Havana.[113]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

6. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, November 29, 2023

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-29-2023

Key Takeaways:

Israeli officials and international mediators expect that the humanitarian pause with Hamas will be extended. The current pause in fighting between Israel and Hamas lasts until November 30.
The New York Times reported on November 29 that international mediators are hoping that short-term pauses will pave the way for a longer-term cease-fire to end the war.
Israel is insisting that it will continue operations in the Gaza Strip to eliminate Hamas, which is consistent with Israel’s stated objectives.
Hamas and Israel completed the sixth swap of hostages in the Gaza Strip for Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners on November 29 in accordance with their humanitarian pause agreement.
The US destroyer USS Carney shot down a Houthi drone launched from Yemen on November 29.
An Iranian drone conducted “unsafe and unprofessional actions" near US aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Persian Gulf on November 28.
Saudi Arabia offered to increase investments in the Iranian economy if Iran reins in its proxies and prevents the Israel-Hamas war from turning into a regional conflict, according to Arab and Western officials.
The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, al Quds Brigades, and unspecified Palestinian fighters conducted small arms clashes and IED attacks against Israeli forces during Israeli raids in Jenin.
Lebanese Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed militias did not conduct any attacks into northern Israel on November 29.

IRAN UPDATE, NOVEMBER 29, 2023

Nov 29, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, November 29, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, Brian Carter, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

Israeli officials and international mediators expect that the humanitarian pause with Hamas will be extended. The current pause in fighting between Israel and Hamas lasts until November 30.
The New York Times reported on November 29 that international mediators are hoping that short-term pauses will pave the way for a longer-term cease-fire to end the war.
Israel is insisting that it will continue operations in the Gaza Strip to eliminate Hamas, which is consistent with Israel’s stated objectives.
Hamas and Israel completed the sixth swap of hostages in the Gaza Strip for Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners on November 29 in accordance with their humanitarian pause agreement.
The US destroyer USS Carney shot down a Houthi drone launched from Yemen on November 29.
An Iranian drone conducted “unsafe and unprofessional actions" near US aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Persian Gulf on November 28.
Saudi Arabia offered to increase investments in the Iranian economy if Iran reins in its proxies and prevents the Israel-Hamas war from turning into a regional conflict, according to Arab and Western officials.
The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, al Quds Brigades, and unspecified Palestinian fighters conducted small arms clashes and IED attacks against Israeli forces during Israeli raids in Jenin.
Lebanese Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed militias did not conduct any attacks into northern Israel on November 29.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli officials and international mediators expect that the humanitarian pause with Hamas will be extended. The current pause in fighting between Israel and Hamas lasts until November 30. An anonymous senior Israeli official told the Washington Post that Israel expects the pause to continue for another two to three days after November 30.[1] The Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesperson told CNN on November 29 that they are “very optimistic” that an extension will be announced in the coming hours.[2] The New York Times reported that top officials from Qatar, Egypt, Israel, and the United States are discussing extending the pause to allow for further hostages/prisoner exchanges. Anonymous senior Egyptian officials told the Wall Street Journal that Hamas leaders said that Hamas would agree to an additional four-day extension of the truce, according to Egyptian and Qatari mediators.[3] An unnamed Israeli official said that Israel is willing to discuss the release of Israeli soldiers held hostage in the Gaza Strip when Hamas has released the remaining 27 women and children hostages.[4] Hamas said that it is open to releasing young male hostages in exchange for senior Palestinian prisoners as part of a longer-term ceasefire.[5] Participants at the negotiations said that Mossad Director David Barnea listened to a host of proposals—including a permanent cease-fire—without giving a firm no.[6] An anonymous “official familiar with the matter” told Israeli media that Israel is not willing to extend the current ceasefire beyond December 3, however.[7]

The New York Times reported on November 29 that international mediators are hoping that short-term pauses will pave the way for a longer-term cease-fire to end the war.[8] One of the mediators said the longer the pause lasts, the harder it will be for Israel to restart its offensive and extend it to the southern Gaza Strip.[9] A permanent ceasefire would prevent Israel from completing its stated objectives in the Israel-Hamas war, which are the destruction of Hamas’ military and governance capabilities.[10] The United States and European Union have also expressed support for these objectives, which a permanent ceasefire would block.[11]

Israel is insisting that it will continue operations in the Gaza Strip to eliminate Hamas, which is consistent with Israel’s stated objectives. The IDF Chief of Staff approved plans on November 29 for IDF combat operations in the Gaza Strip after the end of the truce agreement.[12] Israeli Prime Minister Benajmin Netanyahu said there is no scenario in which Israel does not resume fighting in the Gaza Strip.[13] Netanyahu reiterated Israel’s objectives in the Gaza Strip. He said that Israel aims to "eliminate Hamas, return all hostages to Israel, and ensure that Gaza will never again go back to being a threat to the state of Israel.”[14] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Israeli forces will continue ground operations “very soon.”[15] Senior Israeli army officials stressed that for Israel to complete its objective of defeating Hamas, Israeli forces must eliminate Hamas leadership and destroy Hamas infrastructure in Khan Younis and Rafah.[16] Israeli media reported that the IDF expects to use aggressive tactics in its assault on Khan Younis.[17]

Senior Israeli army officials told Israeli media that its forces have spent the past week investigating Hamas military capabilities.[18] The IDF has mapped Hamas’ underground infrastructure and collected intelligence from computers and communication systems in preparation for ground maneuvers in the center and south of the Gaza Strip.[19] The officials noted that the bulk of weapons smuggling to the Gaza Strip has occurred through the Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings.[20]

Hamas and Israel completed the sixth swap of hostages in the Gaza Strip for Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners on November 29 in accordance with their humanitarian pause agreement. The IDF reported that the Red Cross said that 10 Israeli hostages and four Thai hostages are on their way to Israel.[21] CNN reported that Hamas released an Israeli American dual citizen.[22]

The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—released two Russian citizens as a sign of appreciation for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s support for Palestine.[23] The al Qassem Brigades previously cited Putin’s support for Palestine as its reason for releasing a Russian citizen on November 26.[24] Hamas Political Bureau member Musa Abu Marzouk said that the release is not part of the hostage/prisoner swap agreement with Israel.[25] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that the two hostages were transferred to Israel on November 29.[26]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov posted footage on November 29 purportedly showing 50 Palestinian refugees from the Gaza Strip arriving in Chechnya.[27] (NOTE: This text also appeared in the Institute for the Study of War’s November 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment) Kadyrov claimed that the Gazan refugees will stay at the "Gorny Klyuch” children’s health camp in Shalinsky Raion, Chechnya and that an additional 100 Gazan refugees will arrive in Chechnya on November 30.[28] Kadyrov’s claims reflect the Kremlin’s shift to a much more anti-Israel position in the Israel-Hamas war, as well as Kadyrov‘s desire to show unwavering support for Russian President Vladimir Putin.[29] ISW cannot independently verify the footage or any of Kadyrov’s claims, however.

The al Qassem Brigades said three Israeli hostages died due to Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.[30] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said Hamas is responsible for the security of all hostages in the Gaza Strip.[31] Israel is examining the reliability of the al Qassem Brigades’ claim.[32]

Senior Israeli army officials said Israel controls 45% of the Gaza Strip.[33] CTP-ISW assesses that Israel has cleared 48% of the northern Gaza Strip north of Wadi Gaza. Israel has declared the area north of Wadi Gaza "a war zone.”[34] It is not clear that the Israeli officials are using the same doctrinal terms and definitions as does CTP-ISW.

China proposed a peace plan for the Middle East that is tantamount to Israeli defeat. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented a four-point plan for Middle East peace to the UN Security Council. The plan aims in part to revitalize the political prospects for the two-state solution.[35] Wang told the council that there needs to be a lasting cease-fire and that those held hostage should be released, although he offered no specifics.[36] Wang said Palestinians' right to statehood and "right to return” has long been ignored.[37] The Chinese proposal does not address the future governance of Gaza, specifically whether Hamas should be allowed to continue ruling the enclave, or the demilitarization of Gaza, nor does it address Israeli concerns about their own security against future attacks such as the October 7 assault.

The United States delivered humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and plans to continue similar shipments after the humanitarian pause ends. US Central Command confirmed on November 28 that it supported USAID efforts to increase the flow of assistance into the Gaza Strip.[38] Two US senior officials told reporters that the United States expects the increased levels of humanitarian aid and fuel entering the Gaza Strip will continue after the pause ends.[39] The United Nations continued to operate in the Gaza Strip, including in the northern Gaza Strip, on November 29.[40]

NOTE: The IDF has said that its forces are stationed along ceasefire lines across the Gaza Strip during the pause in fighting. CTP-ISW's map of Israeli clearing operations shows reported Israeli clearing operations and the claimed furthest Israeli advances. CTP-ISW will not be mapping the shift in Israeli operating areas during the humanitarian pause.

CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity inside the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on November 29.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters conducted 22 attacks against Israeli forces in the West Bank on November 29.[41] This attack rate is more than double the average daily attack rate since November 21. The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, al Quds Brigades, and unspecified Palestinian fighters fired small arms at Israeli forces at least 18 times in the West Bank.[42] Palestinian fighters also detonated four IEDs targeting Israeli forces across the West Bank.[43] West Bank residents participated in two anti-Israel demonstrations in Hebron and Nablus.[44]

The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, al Quds Brigades, and unspecified Palestinian fighters conducted small arms clashes and IED attacks against Israeli forces during Israeli raids in Jenin. The IDF said that it conducted a drone strike targeting Palestinian fighters who fired at Israeli forces in the Jenin refugee camp.[45] The IDF killed two Palestinian fighters, including a commander in the Jenin Battalion of the al Quds Brigades, during hours of fighting between the IDF and Palestinian fighters in the camp.[46] The IDF said the commander carried out shooting attacks, supplied vehicles for attacks, and "promoted" other attacks.[47] The IDF also said the commander killed two Israeli civilians and four IDF soldiers in attacks in May and June.[48] Hamas condemned the Israeli operations in Jenin and called on West Bank residents and fighters to escalate "all forms of resistance" in the West Bank.[49] The IDF separately arrested five Hamas fighters in Hebron.[50]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and other Iranian-backed militias did not conduct any attacks into northern Israel on November 29.

Israeli forces fired warning shots at a “suspicious vehicle” approaching the Israel-Lebanon border near the Israeli town of Malikiyah on November 29, according to the IDF.[51] The Lebanese National News Agency said that Israeli forces fired small arms targeting a combined Lebanese Armed Forces-UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol near Houla, southern Lebanon.[52] UNIFIL told CNN that Israeli forces fired a “burst of machine gun fire” at a UNIFIL vehicle in the same area.[53]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The US destroyer USS Carney shot down a Houthi drone launched from Yemen on November 29.[54] Houthi President Mahdi al Mashaat warned on November 29 that any US escalation towards the Houthis will not change the group’s position towards the Israel-Hamas war.[55]

Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS) Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai praised Iraqi resistance groups’ support for Palestinians in a statement on November 29.[56] Walai published the statement in commemoration of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People. Walai praised Iraqi resistance groups for “confusing” supporters of Israel and “relieving the burden” on Palestinian militants. Walai reiterated KSS’s opposition to US and Israeli “arrogance” and “crimes” against Palestinians.

An Iranian drone conducted “unsafe and unprofessional actions" near US aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Persian Gulf on November 28.[57] US Naval Forces Central Command reported that the drone came within 1,500 yards of the Eisenhower and that Iran ignored multiple hails and warnings. IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri called on the US Navy to “behave rationally” in the Persian Gulf in an interview with Iranian state TV on November 26.[58] CTP-ISW recently assessed that the IRGC may have conducted a one-way drone attack on an Israeli-owned, Malta-flagged freighter in the Persian Gulf on November 24.[59]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei discussed the Israel-Hamas war with Basij members in Tehran on November 29.[60] Khamenei claimed that Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel created a “new political geography” in the Middle East and diminished US power and influence in the region. Khamenei also discussed “American failures” in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria in recent years. Khamenei falsely claimed, for example, that the United States previously tried to destroy LH, but that LH became “more than ten times stronger” after the 2006 Lebanon war with Israel.

Saudi Arabia offered to increase investments in the Iranian economy if Iran reins in its proxies and prevents the Israel-Hamas war from turning into a regional conflict, according to Arab and Western officials.[61] The officials told Bloomberg that Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman discussed “the possibility of deeper engagement” during their meeting on the sidelines of the joint Arab League-Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) conference in Jeddah on November 11. Bloomberg reported that Saudi Arabia is simultaneously working with the United States to prevent Iran from exploiting the Israel-Hamas war to strengthen its Axis of Resistance.

7. Retired Lt. Gen. Julius Becton Dies

RIP, General.

RETIRED LT. GEN. JULIUS BECTON DIES

https://www.ausa.org/news/retired-lt-gen-julius-becton-dies?utm

Photo by: AUSA/Luc Dunn

Wed, 11/29/2023 - 11:18

Retired Lt. Gen. Julius Becton Jr., a longtime member of the Association of the U.S. Army’s Board of Directors and a recipient of the George Catlett Marshall Medal, AUSA’s highest award, died Nov. 28. He was 97.

Becton joined AUSA’s Board of Directors in 1994 and served for 13 years. In 2007, he was presented the Marshall Medal “for his numerous and consequential accomplishments over a lifetime of service as a soldier, leader, educator, administrator, mentor and role model,” according to the award citation.

Born June 29, 1926, in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, Becton first volunteered for Army service in 1944 with a desire to become a pilot. When astigmatism knocked him out of contention for flight school, he applied and qualified for Officer Candidate School.

Becton became a second lieutenant in 1945 with the all-Black 93rd Infantry Division and served in the Pacific at the end of World War II. In 1946, he transferred from active duty to the Army Reserve but re-entered active service in 1948. “I decided I really liked soldiering,” Becton said in 2017 during a Black History Month commemoration at AUSA headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.

Over the next 35 years, Becton “with great distinction … led America’s soldiers in combat in Korea and Vietnam, and in Cold War operations,” according to the Marshall Medal citation. His key assignments included commanding the 1st Cavalry Division, the Army Operations Test and Evaluation Agency and VII Corps in Germany during the Cold War.

Becton’s final assignment before retiring from the Army in 1983 was deputy commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command. His awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, Purple Heart with Oak Leaf Cluster and the Combat Infantryman Badge with star for service in Korea and Vietnam.

“I enjoyed being a soldier; I enjoyed being around soldiers,” Becton said of his nearly 40 years of service.

From 1984 to 1985, Becton was director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in the U.S. Agency for International Development. In 1985, he was appointed by President Ronald Reagan to be director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency—the first Black person to hold that position.

After leaving government service in 1989, Becton became president of his alma mater, Prairie View A&M University in Texas, “where he launched a new era of fiscal and academic accountability,” according to the Marshall Medal citation. In 1994, he returned to Virginia for his second retirement, but shortly thereafter accepted an appointment as superintendent of the Washington, D.C., school system, the citation says.

During the 2017 event at AUSA, retired Gen. Carter Ham, former AUSA president and CEO, described Becton as “a man who has lived through extraordinary change and service.”

“You’ve reminded us how far we have come as an Army and a nation,” Ham said. “You have made this great country stronger.”

8. “Digging ourselves out of a hole.” Some thoughts on the current recruiting crisis

Wed, 11/29/2023 - 10:17pm

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/digging-ourselves-out-hole-some-thoughts-current-recruiting-crisis

“Digging ourselves out of a hole.”

Some thoughts on the current recruiting crisis

Martin N. Stanton

Overview: In the past year we have been bombarded by stories about the military – particularly the Army, experiencing a recruiting crisis that has caused major shortfalls in manning the force. There are various reasons given for this recruiting shortfall. From pushback against the “woke” military by traditional military families to non-participation by normally liberal/progressive communities, the impact of the Afghan debacle and the mismanaged “Global War On Terror” (GWOT) conflicts of the first two decades of the 21st century to highly publicized veteran’s issues (suicide etc.), the involuntary separation of thousands of servicemembers who were reticent to take the COVID vaccine, changing demographics, competitive pay scales in the civilian workplace and cumbersome recruiting processes, the causes given for the recruiting crisis are legion and likely all true to some extent.

The recruiting crisis we find ourselves in is a “Perfect Storm” resulting from the confluence of three major issues: First - a loss of public confidence in the military’s leadership, next-sclerotic recruiting processes and finally - a limited variety in terms of service offered that does not appeal to the modern workforce. To overcome recruiting shortfalls and rebuild the force we are going to have to overcome each of these. We have to dig our way out of this hole.

Rebuild Trust with the Public: The military used to enjoy high approval ratings with the American public. It does not do so now. (Although it is rated higher than politicians and the media, the fact that the military currently enjoys only a 60% approval rating is a precipitous fall in public confidence). The last few years have not been good for the military’s image. Some of this comes from bad feelings leftover from the chaotic finale in Afghanistan. Defeat seldom inspires people. This is especially true when the whole multi-decades effort seems ill thought out in retrospect. Add to that the disconnected nature of today’s military and political senior leaders and their very publicized tone-deaf decisions (the COVID shots discharges were especially disastrous) and it’s not hard to see that watching this cavalcade of failure has impacted the eagerness of the potential recruits. In many ways the military’s senior leadership has lost the trust of the American people from whom the ranks of their forces are drawn. This is the kind of trust that takes years (decades) to rebuild. but we must start somewhere. Here are some thoughts:

Do a better job with strategic advice to civilian leadership: This is a long lead time project but the time to start it is now. Our strategic performance since 9-11 has been abysmal. Much of this can be laid at the doorstep of senior civilian leadership in multiple administrations but who gives that civilian leadership military advice? We kept the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns going with vague/indefinable end-states and hope as a method to achieve them. GEN G.C Marshall would have pushed back against such strategic malpractice but the senior leaders of the 21st century weren’t up to the task. They ignored the fact that although our military is a volunteer military it is still a citizen military. Citizens (and their families) don’t appreciate their lives and personal sacrifices expended in ill thought out open-ended military adventures. The current recruiting crisis is a shot-over-the-bow to our nation’s senior military leaders, the recruiting pool isn’t up for another 20-year road-to-nowhere that ends in defeat. Do better.

Take better care of the servicemembers we have: Fairly or unfairly the military has recently acquired a reputation for not taking care of its people the way it used to. We can find money to pay for Transgender surgery but cannot seem to get rid of black mold in the barracks. There’s a lot of complaint on social media by servicemembers and ex – service members about bad conditions and uncaring chains of command. A perfect example of this is a recent social media post by an E-4 about to ETS from the 82nd Airborne complaining that he is being made to pay for gear his chain of command directed him to leave behind during the Kabul evacuation. We obviously only see one side of the story in this young soldier’s post, but having been involved in the Kabul evacuation I can see this occurring (especially if the chain of command isn’t aggressive about insuring proper loss accountability is done as soon as possible after the directed abandonment). At any rate the complaint, unanswered by the Army, is another black eye that everyone on social media can see. Things like this, the suicide epidemic and the COVID shot fiasco all contribute to a growing sense amongst the population of potential recruits (and their families and influencers) that something is not right within the military. Word-of-mouth advertising from servicemembers who leave the military with a positive impression can be an incentive to potential recruits, conversely stories of bad living conditions and neglectful chains of command can be a powerful disincentive. Given the prevalence of social media, we have a vested interest in insuring our servicemembers are well taken care of. At the end of the day keeping barracks in proper repair and taking care of soldiers isn’t that hard. That we have acquired a reputation for not doing so is, again, a direct reflection on the military’s senior leadership.

Improve soldier pay – particularly for enlisted and NCO ranks: Hand-in-hand with taking better care of service members is paying them more in line with what the civilian job market pays. A young person who can make more at Amazon in an entry level job than he/she can in the military has less incentive to join. Combine this with the “recruiting poison” stories of soldiers who must go on food stamps to feed their families and non-comparable pay is yet another way it seems the nation’s leadership has broken faith with its troops. Come up with all the charts showing how all the “bennies” provided equate to X-more amount of money per month you want to, that E-3 taking home less than his high school buddy working at Home Depot isn’t interested.

Reaffirm the social contract with the Guard/Reserve components: The forever GWOT with its near continuous activations of National Guard and Reserve components damaged the social contract that the Guard/Reserve would only be activated in times of true national emergency. These continuous activations made it hard for individuals to maintain their civilian careers and had a negative impact on Guard Reserve retention. At present it is far too easy to use the Total Force for operations that are not well thought out and ratified at the proper political level. It needs to be codified into law that the “Active” force is the only force deployed to combat operations outside CONUS short of a formal declaration of war. That the Guard and Reserve be only activated on declaration of national emergency (IE Activate but not deploy outside CONUS short of a declaration of war – not for political stunts like Capitol security in 2021) and the IRR is not activated until after war is declared. Having these things codified into law would go a long way towards taking the “forever war” syndrome away from Reserve components service and might encourage more recruits.

Invest more in Veterans services: The US has several generations of men and women who have served in the GWOT and are suffering from the impacts of their service. We should not discount the impact that observing family or community members who are veterans not receiving adequate help has on the recruiting base. Effective, responsive veteran’s services are a strategic force sustainment issue in a volunteer military. We need to approach it in that manner.

Re-evaluate, Simplify and Streamline our recruiting processes: Despite the undoubted impact of the Afghan debacle and bad publicity over a myriad of issues, to a certain degree, the Army is in a recruiting crisis of its own making. It’s recruiting process is too time consuming, is burdened by too many disqualifications on potential recruits and has a cumbersome exception to policy process.

It's not all bad news, the Army seems to have tackled the physical fitness disqualification issue by establishing pre-enlistment PT programs that get recruits into better shape. This can’t do anything but help but in isolation it’s not going to solve the problem. In a similar fashion to the causes of the recruiting crisis the solutions to the recruiting crisis are multiple and complimentary. No one change will move the dial that much, but numerous positive changes might move it sufficiently. Here are some suggestions for recruiting the forces going forward:

Re-evaluate our standards for acceptance: A frequently quoted statistic in stories about the recruiting crisis is only 25% of the people between 18 and 30 can even qualify to get into the military. This says more about our standards than it does about the population of America. You recruit from the population you have, not the population you wish you had. We need to recognize that the population of people we recruit from is significantly different than it was even thirty years ago. A far higher percentage of young people have been prescribed disqualifying medications, larger percentages of them are out of shape….etc.…etc. Our insistence on keeping the same standards means that the population of perfectly acceptable recruits is smaller. Interestingly the Army had the same problem in WW2 – competing with the massively expanding Naval services for quality inductees. Its solution was to lower standards for induction and accept additional attrition in training in order to man the force. It cost more, but it got the job done. The same dynamic is true today.

Review current list of disqualifications – eliminate as many as possible: We can considerably expand the number of potential candidates by judiciously removing disqualifications that have piled up on the recruiting process gradually over the years – like barnacles on a boat. The sheer number of disqualifications from service is a major hinderance in meeting recruiting goals. We need to review all current disqualifications with a jaundiced eye. Especially those medical ones that deal with prescription drugs for ADD or depression. The youth of today are overprescribed for these drugs. Example - the fact that a person took anti-depressants briefly should not require that person to wait a whole year before being able to enlist. A shorter time-period (or a simple evaluation by a psychologist on contract to the recruiting command) would likely suffice in most cases.

Empower lower-level recruiters with waiver authority: re-emphasize interviews and officer/NCO judgment. For the remaining disqualifications – make all but a few waiverable and SIMPLIFY the waiver process. We lose too many recruits while they are waiting for their waiver papers to make it through the approval process. Give recruiting company and battalion commanders waiver authority. We need to trust the judgment of the men and women who run our recruiting stations. Facilitate access to psychological and physical examiners that can work with these recruiters to make an informed recruiting decision. Bring back the individual interview and assessment by the recruiter as a major determinant as to whether to recruit an individual. Bottom Line – expand field recruiter authority to make the enlistment call and give waivers.

Re-Engage with the traditional high recruiting states: The South and the Mid-West are the traditional localities for recruiting, increase emphasis there. Re-engage with community and veteran leaders about recommending service. Be frank about what the military is doing to improve servicemember care and other hot-button issues that suppress recruiting. Stress military service as a stepping-stone to a more productive life (Skills, discipline GI Bill etc.). Specifically in places like rural areas hard hit by the Fentanyl epidemic, emphasize with community leaders that military service is a way to save / salvage young people and give them direction in life.

Stop placing emphasis on low recruit producing populations; The military must welcome qualified recruits from all segments of society. However, we must be smart about how many recruiting dollars we spend to specifically go after segments of society that do not typically enlist. The famous cartoon ad featuring a sergeant whose parents were in a same-sex marriage was (at best) a well-intentioned effort to expand outside the traditional recruiting base. How many recruits did it produce?

Re-engage with the criminal justice system: It’s easier than ever for a young person to run afoul of the law these days. Isolated examples of criminal behavior should not be a discriminator except in the most serious violent felony cases. There’s a lot of salvageable first offenders out there. Allow recruiters to work with local law enforcement and judiciary to interview and recruit likely candidates from the criminal justice system (with the recruiter having the final say as to who is – or isn’t, a worthy candidate). Once again, make the waiver process QUICK and simple.

Expand/modify high school programs. Change high school ROTC to High School RTC (Readiness Training Corps). Make the emphasis on physical training and preparation of the student for service. Teach Service Values as well as life/adult skills such as checkbook/credit management. Make the program attractive to even military skeptical students and parents. Make it a requirement for schools to get federal funds.

Expand option for Enlistment and BCT in the summer between Junior and senior years of HS: The services should run special BCT Classes in the summer for enlistees who join in their junior year (with their parent’s permission). Extend enlistment to those Juniors who are age 16 ½ and older (The younger members of their school Cohort who will graduate at age 17 ½ - again with their parent’s permission). Servicemembers who complete BCT and return to HS for their senior year can be further trained by reservist guard units in their community or by the RTC cadre/contractors. After graduation they would go to complete advanced MOS training and either assimilate into the regular force or return to assigned Guard/Reserve units.

Develop more flexible options for service – especially in the reserve components: The military has also been slow to recognize changes in the 21st century workplace and in the very nature of “work” in America that most young people experience today. It’s recruiting model and terms of service are largely a legacy of the Cold War Army I first enlisted in back in the 1970s. We have to be a lot more flexible in the terms of service options we offer to today’s population of potential recruits. Here are some ideas:

Reduce time-in-service requirements for as many MOS as possible: Four years is just too long for many young people to commit to. The requirement for four years costs us recruits. We should look at bringing back three or even two-year enlistments. This would create additional personnel turbulence and training costs, but it could help fill slots that are currently empty. Combine the shorter term of active service with longer IRR commitment. (IE two years active and six IRR). As stated earlier, tie IRR involuntary recall conditions to Formal Declaration of War (Vice any kind of lesser “emergency”) to overcome sceptics disillusioned by Reserve / Guard misuse during the GWOT.

Make service in the IRR pay. Give incentive pay of $100-$200 per month to IRR members who can show up once a year for a week’s refresher training and pass the PT test. Fit in other incentives that make sense (voluntary training participation points in exchange for re-imbursement). In the scheme of the defense budget 2-3 Billion dollars annually in exchange for 2-400K (relatively) fit IRR members that could be subject to recall in time of declared war would be a bargain.

Make direct recruitment into the IRR an option: We could also expand the IIR by allowing people to enlist directly into it directly, go through BCT (but not be given further specific MOS training) and then revert to IIR status to serve the full eight years. Apply the conditions of IIR service as described earlier (IE only activated in event of declared war... etc.). In the event of declared war these soldiers could be activated, sent to a quick refresher period and the appropriate AIT and then integrated into units. This form of enlistment would also give us a pool of (relatively) ready manpower available in time of war. Enlistment for straight to-IIR service could also serve as a halfway house for those young people uncertain about commitment to a full enlistment term of active duty. It would be a vehicle for those IIR enlistees who develop an interest in serving further an easy way to integrate into the Active or drilling Reserve/Guard force (IE apply for change of status – go to AIT and integrate into new unit). Limit IIR service as a junior enlistee without assigned MOS to a max of 8 years – at the conclusion of which the servicemember either options into further MOS training and integration into a Guard/Reserve unit (or the Regular Army) or receives an honorable release from the IIR. Guarantee that individuals who complete IIR service in this manner will be exempt from a future involuntary recall or draft.

Make Basic Training / AIT in home state an option for Guard/Reserve enlistees. There is a population of people who are working successfully that might be interested in Guard/Reserve service but who cannot leave work for the normal period of initial training currently required. Make it a recruiting option for Guard and Reserve units to train their new people entirely in home states at the armory or the state training area (Like they used to before WW2). The Canadian military allows reserve units to train their new recruits at the unit in home station (normally the local armory) two weekend drills a month plus summer training periods. This would allow people to keep their civilian jobs while going through basic and AIT. For example, new recruits in the Florida Army National Guard could train at Camp Blanding one summer and do additional training at weekend drills (and online for some classroom items) then finish BCT the next summer. From there they could do specific MOS training and qualification at drills and over subsequent summers. The six months of OSUT currently required are just too long for a person who has a good paying civilian job to commit to. This option would provide for those who would like to serve but don’t currently have a vehicle to.

Expand the age limits for enlistment: There are plenty of people in their mid -30s to early 50s who are in superb physical condition and who would (in many cases) bring significant civilian skills to the Army. We need to open enlistment to these people as well. National Guard and Reserve (Both drilling unit and IIR) should especially be given flexibility to recruit from this cohort. Mandatory retirement age should also be automatically extended out to 62 in certain non-combat MOS and policies instated that allow for individual review for requested extension to age 62 in all MOS.

Expand direct transition - Civilian Skills Integration: Make it easier to join for people already qualified in a complex civilian skill (medical, cyber, maintenance, engineering …. etc.). Develop a list of direct commission/enlistment skills that can be sent to abbreviated basic training and military familiarization courses and then integrated into units where their skill is needed. The reserve components especially should be given maximum flexibility to recruit these people.

Summary: The military has dug itself into a recruiting hole over the past few years through a series of unfortunate events and bad decisions. We need to re-evaluate our performance at the senior leadership levels and do better. We also have to understand that many of the recruiting problems we have today are self-inflicted. The US had an Army of over 8 million men in uniform during WW2 with a much smaller population. The standards for acceptance for service then were not as high as they are now, but they got the job done. There’s a huge population out there in the US and the force we need to man is a fraction of the size it was in the early 1940s. There’s no reason we can’t do this, but we have to change the way we do business. Hopefully some of the suggestions I have outlined will do this.

The next (and more difficult) question is: “What kind of force do we need?” But that’s another paper.

About the Author(s)

Martin Stanton

Martin Stanton is a retired Army officer currently residing in Florida. The opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect any official DOD or USG position.

9. How to Avoid Defeat in Ukraine

Excerpts:

There still are ways for the West to prevail. Mr. Putin’s global networks of influence can be destroyed. We can break Wagner’s power in Africa, disrupt Russia’s activities in Syria, and squeeze Iran to block its cooperation with Moscow. We can step up our military aid to tip the balance against Russia in Ukraine.

Funding failure isn’t a plan. Congress should continue to fund Ukraine, but it must also insist on the policy changes that would make American strategy coherent again.

How to Avoid Defeat in Ukraine

For starters, step up military aid and break Putin’s global networks of influence.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-avoid-defeat-in-ukraine-russia-u-s-foreign-policy-military-aid-weapons-war-d86db15f

By Walter Russell Mead

Nov. 27, 2023 1:24 pm ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin in Minsk, Belarus, Nov. 23. PHOTO: VALERY SHARIFULIN/ZUMA PRESS

The German tabloid “Bild” said the quiet part out loud. President Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the well-sourced newspaper reported, plan to force Ukraine into peace talks next year by denying it the weapons needed to win.

This creates a dilemma for those who know that Ukraine’s fate matters deeply to the U.S., but who can also see that Team Biden is more interested in avoiding confrontation with Russia than in defeating it. To oppose aid to Ukraine is to ensure a Russian victory, but funding Mr. Biden’s approach will do little to prevent one—and will further erode public support for America’s global engagement.

Having failed to deter Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine in the first place, the Biden administration badly overestimated the effect of Western sanctions on Russia. Once it was clear that sanctions wouldn’t force Russia to end the war, and after several failed efforts to tempt Russia with “off ramps,” Team Biden cooked up Plan Stalemate. The West would dribble out enough aid to help Ukraine survive, but not enough to help it win. Ultimately, the Ukrainians would lose hope of victory and offer Mr. Putin a compromise peace. The White House would spin this as a glorious triumph for democracy and the rule of law.

Some will criticize this as a cynical strategy, but the real problem is that it is naive. Mr. Biden seems to be clinging to the idea that Mr. Putin can be appeased—parked, if you prefer—by reasonable concessions. And so, the White House thinks, if Ukraine offers reasonable terms, Russia will gladly accept them.

But what if, when Mr. Putin senses weakness, he doubles down? What if a few thousand square miles of Ukrainian territory matter less to him than inflicting a humiliating defeat on the Biden administration and demonstrating the weakness of the West?

Mr. Putin has recovered from his early stumbles in Ukraine. Russia has more than doubled its forces there since the war began. Despite early setbacks, Russia has developed capabilities and tactics that have improved its troops’ effectiveness on the battlefield. The unconventional (if morally repugnant) decision to send released prisoners to fight in such places as Bakhmut and Avdiivka means that Russia was able to degrade some of Ukraine’s best combat units while preserving its own best units for battle elsewhere.

Russia has increased weapons production and is now manufacturing ammunition an estimated seven times faster than the West. It has mitigated the effect of Western sanctions. It is strengthening military and strategic links with Iran, and thanks to Iranian protégé Hamas, Western attention has shifted from Ukraine toward the Middle East.

Let’s say that six months from now the Biden strategy brings Ukraine to the bargaining table. At that point, support for more war funding would be even lower in the U.S. and Europe than it is now. Ukraine would be even more divided and war-weary than it is now. President Volodymyr Zelensky’s political position at home would grow weaker. Under those circumstances, why would Mr. Putin give President Biden a face-saving exit from a war Mr. Biden doesn’t think he can win?

We are back to the Obama follies. In 2014, President Obama failed to deter Russia from violating the United Nations Charter and its own pledged word by invading the territory of a neighbor whose security the U.S. had committed to support in the Budapest Memorandum. Mr. Obama failed to fight back against the invasion, and he then failed to develop a program of sanctions and counter-pressure that would have prevented Russia from consolidating its winnings in Crimea and the Donbas.

Sophomorically mocking Mitt Romney’s sage warnings about Mr. Putin, supinely whispering sweet nothings about more flexibility after the election into the ears of then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, and passively accepting Russia’s murderous and strategically fateful venture into Syria, President Obama taught Mr. Putin contempt for the West.

Mr. Putin largely rested on his laurels during the Trump administration, but once Mr. Biden brought a host of ex-Obama officials back to the White House, the Russian leader moved back into high gear. Until Team Biden fully shakes off the vacuous platitudes of Obama-era groupthink, the administration will continue its flailing and failing in the face of the empowered and emboldened Russia Mr. Obama left to his successors.

There still are ways for the West to prevail. Mr. Putin’s global networks of influence can be destroyed. We can break Wagner’s power in Africa, disrupt Russia’s activities in Syria, and squeeze Iran to block its cooperation with Moscow. We can step up our military aid to tip the balance against Russia in Ukraine.

Funding failure isn’t a plan. Congress should continue to fund Ukraine, but it must also insist on the policy changes that would make American strategy coherent again.

WSJ Opinion: Killing Civilians: The New Normal

Henry Kissinger, America’s most influential diplomat, dies at 100

His polarizing years as the nation’s top diplomat reordered U.S. relations around the world.

Henry Kissinger in 2011. “Kissinger personified human complexity — his characteristics ranging from brilliance and wit to sensitivity, melancholy, abrasiveness and savagery," one author wrote. | Stephen Voss/Redux

By David Cohen

11/29/2023 08:54 PM EST

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/11/29/henry-kissinger-diplomat-nobel-obituary-031478

Henry Kissinger, a ruthless practitioner of the art of realpolitik who had an outsize impact on global events and who won a premature Nobel Peace Prize for ending a war that kept going, has died.

A cunning, erudite strategist whose transformative diplomatic efforts helped to reshape the world, Kissinger was 100.

His death Wednesday was announced by his consulting firm. No cause was given.

The former secretary of State will be forever connected with President Richard M. Nixon, particularly for their efforts in three areas: getting America out of the Vietnam War, opening diplomatic relations with China and reducing tensions with the Soviet Union. For decades thereafter, Kissinger’s work with Nixon and President Gerald Ford earned him the role of the Republican Party’s elder statesman when it came to foreign policy.

“The Middle American professional politician and the German-born Harvard professor,” wrote George C. Herring in “America’s Longest War” of Nixon and Kissinger, “could hardly have been more different in background, but they shared a love of power and a burning ambition to mold a fluid world in a way that would establish their place in history. Loners and outsiders in their own professions, they were perhaps naturally drawn to each other.”

In 1973, Kissinger shared a Nobel Peace Prize with Le Duc Tho, his North Vietnamese counterpart, for hammering out an agreement to end the Vietnam War. The accord, which was signed Jan. 27, 1973, had “brought a wave of joy and hope for peace over the entire world,” the Nobel committee said.

However, Tho declined to accept the prize, saying peace was not yet a reality, and the war rapidly flared up again, minus the American troops.

More significant in the long term was Nixon’s “opening” of China; Kissinger helped establish relations with communist government there. The duo also focused on “detente,” an effort to improve relations with the Soviet Union. These developments came about as Nixon and Kissinger played the two Communist superpowers off each other, a tactic that also helped extricate America from the quagmire in Vietnam.

“Our objective,” Kissinger once wrote, “was to purge our foreign policy of all sentimentality.”

Nixon and Kissinger saw nearly all international issues through a Cold War prism, so their efforts, for instance, to end the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East turned into a high-stakes poker game involving the Soviets. The 1971 India-Pakistan war set off similar calculations about superpower relations.

Political developments in South America and Africa — often in places most Americans couldn’t find on a map — also attracted their interest and involvement. Every crisis was assessed, every triumph leveraged. Lethal force was often part of the equation.

“Kissinger personified human complexity — his characteristics ranging from brilliance and wit to sensitivity, melancholy, abrasiveness and savagery,” Stanley Karnow wrote in “Vietnam: A History.” “As he adapted to Nixon’s court, with its arcane and unsavory intrigues, he was able to acquire a talent for duplicity.”

Mostly untainted by the Watergate scandal that toppled Nixon, Kissinger continued to wield influence in the waning days of the administration. “You have saved this country, Mr. President,” he was heard telling Nixon in an April 1973 White House tape. “The history books will show that, when no one will know what Watergate means.”

Nixon resigned in August 1974, but Kissinger remained in office.

“He is, so far as this American is concerned,” said Ford in awarding him a Presidential Medal of Freedom in early 1977, “the greatest Secretary of State in the history of our Republic. His superb record of achievement is unsurpassed in the annals of American history.”

Heinz Alfred Kissinger was born May 27, 1923, in Germany to an Orthodox Jewish family. He fled in 1938 for New York to escape the Nazi persecution of Jews, picking up a new first name and later becoming both an American citizen and American soldier.

In World War II, his knowledge of Germany landed him a role as a counterintelligence officer in the Army, working with Fritz Kraemer, a fellow refugee who became his mentor. After the war, Kissinger was given a significant role in the occupation of Germany.

Kissinger went on to attend Harvard University and then teach there, gaining attention with a 1957 book, “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.” He also served as a consultant to Presidents Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, and he was part of Johnson’s early efforts to bring the North Vietnamese into negotiations. In 1968, he was advising Republican presidential candidate Nelson Rockefeller, but Rockefeller was defeated by Nixon, whom Kissinger initially had little respect for.

“Nixon’s nomination drove him to despondency,” Karnow wrote. “The country, he feared, was about to be taken over by an anti-Communist fanatic. Over the next few weeks, however, ambition spurred him to reconsider. He began to ingratiate himself with the Nixon camp.”

Weeks after the November election, Nixon brought Kissinger in as national security adviser.

Kissinger and his chief military aide, Gen. Alexander Haig, took charge of Nixon’s power center on foreign policy, allowing Nixon to routinely bypass Secretary of State William Rogers and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird — and the career professionals working for them. Diplomatic niceties were adhered to only when they served Kissinger’s aims.

“After Nixon made it clear to Anatoly Dobyrnin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, that he should work through Kissinger, the two men met regularly in Kissinger’s office without anyone else being present,” wrote Margaret MacMillan in “Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World. “Dobyrnin entered and left the White House by the service entrance. In time, a private telephone linked Kissinger’s office directly to the Soviet embassy.”

Having boxed him out, Kissinger eventually supplanted Rogers. In September 1973, Kissinger, without surrendering the duties of national security adviser, became secretary of State. By the time Kissinger was overwhelmingly confirmed to that post, author Ray Locker wrote in “Haig’s Coup,” “most senators saw Kissinger as the island of stability in the roiling seas of the Nixon administration.”

Nixon distrusted the Eastern establishment (particularly Ivy Leaguers of the Jewish faith), but he made an exception for Kissinger, who would tolerate Nixon’s rants about the “flabby soft bastards” and “sipping martini crowd” of places like Kissinger’s Harvard. The two men weren’t friends, but they were partners. “Our differences made the partnership work,” Nixon wrote in his memoirs.

“Nixon and Kissinger viewed themselves as principled realists,” John A. Farrell wrote in “Richard Nixon: The Life,” as opposed to “dreamy” idealists in the mold of President Woodrow Wilson.

Together, they treated the world like an elaborate chess board that needed to be played skillfully. Everything was linked.

“The result,” Herring wrote in his study of the Vietnam War, “was a foreign policy that was sometimes bold and imaginative in conception, sometimes crude and improvised, sometimes brilliant in execution, sometimes bungling; a policy dedicated to the noble goal of a ‘generation of peace,’ but frequently ruthless and cynical in the use of military power.”

When he became president in January 1969, Nixon inherited the brutal, formless mess that was the Vietnam War. The turbulence it had generated in the United States was one of the main reasons Nixon had been elected over Vice President Hubert Humphrey.

“No sooner was he installed in the White House,” Karnow wrote, “than Kissinger directed his staff to canvass American officials in Washington and Saigon for their appraisals of the prospects for Vietnam.”

In working to extricate the U.S. from Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger combined extended negotiations in Paris with tactics designed to intimidate North Vietnam during difficult points in the talks. Those included conducting massive bombing raids (“War by tantrum,” as James Reston of the New York Times dubbed it) and hinting at the possibility that Nixon was irrational enough to use nuclear weapons, the so-called “madman theory.”

The aim behind this cutthroat behavior was to bring America’s troops home without suffering an outright defeat or diminishing the nation’s superpower status — “peace with honor.”

At times, Kissinger secretly negotiated with North Vietnam without the presence of anyone from South Vietnam, reflecting his fatalistic and ultimately accurate view that America’s partner in combat could only be propped up so long. The U.S. State Department was also excluded.

“The only problem is to prevent the collapse in ’72,” Kissinger told Nixon at one point, a cold-blooded calculation about South Vietnam meant to ensure that Nixon’s re-election prospects were not destroyed by a North Vietnamese victory. The war could not be won, but neither could it be lost — at least not right away.

Fighting continued until the Paris Peace Accords of January 1973. America’s troops came home at long last, and so did U.S. prisoners of war, but combat soon resumed. By the end of 1975, all of Vietnam was ruled by communists, as were neighboring Laos and Cambodia (which Nixon had invaded in the spring of 1970, with Kissinger’s backing).

Efforts in China turned out better: Nixon’s surprise visit in February 1972 was set up by a series of calculated moves. Foremost among them were Kissinger’s secret visit in July 1971— the first by a U.S. government official since Mao Zedong seized power in 1949 — and a follow-up Kissinger visit in October.

Kissinger’s first visit was, Farrell wrote, “the stuff of thrillers.” While in Pakistan, Kissinger feigned illness and went to the airport in disguise, leaving even his clothes behind as he secretly flew to Beijing.

“We have come to the People’s Republic of China with an open mind and an open heart,” Kissinger told Zhou Enlai, China’s prime minister, in their meeting July 9, 1971. The two men spoke about Taiwan, Vietnam and Korea — Asia’s hot spots. Two days later, Kissinger sent a prearranged signal to Nixon that the meeting was a success — the word “Eureka.”

According to MacMillan, Kissinger told the American ambassador in Pakistan as he headed home: “I got everything I wanted. It was a total success on my part. I did a beautiful job.”

Months later, Kissinger joined Nixon in visiting China and meeting with Mao, its ailing supreme leader. On that trip, Kissinger painstakingly negotiated a joint communique that set the tone for future relations. Years later, Kissinger wrote: “For both sides, necessity dictated that a rapprochement occur.”

When relations were established, the power dynamic of the Cold War shifted dramatically. The Soviet Union came to fear a new U.S.-China partnership, leading to Nixon-Kissinger breakthroughs with Leonid Brezhnev’s stagnating Soviet regime on arms control and trade.

“We were quite convinced that once we were in contact with Beijing, the diplomacy between Washington and Moscow would become unfrozen,” Kissinger said in a 1983 interview, who added: “We would seize the opportunity.”

This Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy served to shake up the dynamics of relationships around the globe, after a long period of superpower stalemate. Remaking the world required the ability to conduct drawn-out negotiations and in-depth geopolitical analysis, as well as to understand the limitations of any diplomat’s knowledge. Those were Kissinger’s strengths.

“The superpowers,” he later wrote, “often behave like two heavily armed blind men feeling their way around a room, each believing himself in mortal peril from the other, whom he assumes to have perfect vision. Each side should know that frequently uncertainty, compromise, and incoherence are the essence of policymaking.”

In September 1973, with the help of the United States, Chilean President Salvador Allende was ousted by the military. A Marxist, Allende had been democratically elected, but Nixon — urged on by Kissinger — feared that example might be contagious. Allende ended up dead, and Gen. Augusto Pinochet launched a bloody regime.

One of Kissinger’s most telling quotes came amid discussion over the situation: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.” (That quote is sometimes rendered with stupidity in place of irresponsibility, but the scorn for democratic processes remains intact.)

During that era, Kissinger became an unlikely celebrity whose name and image were evoked in many different ways.

His name commonly popped up in situations that required delicate diplomacy. So it was that when the general manager of the NFL’s Philadelphia Eagles wanted to convey how complicated things were in his office, Jim Murray said he “had the most Henry Kissinger-type job of anybody I know in my position.” To be a “Kissinger” or “Dr. Kissinger” in that era was to be the person in your workplace, organization, school or rock band who was always trying to keep the peace. There is no current equivalent.

Kissinger was known to hobnob with celebrities at such New York night spots as Studio 54, often in the company of famous women. John Belushi (“I’m a really, really fat roly-poly diplomat”) and future Sen. Al Franken portrayed him during the early years of NBC’s “Saturday Night Live,“ and Kissinger appeared on such TV shows as “The Dean Martin Celebrity Roast.”

The 1976 Peter Sellers comedy “The Pink Panther Strikes Again” featured a German-accented secretary of state with bushy eyebrows who was clearly Kissinger. And Woody Allen made a fake TV documentary mocking Kissinger called “Men of Crisis: The Harvey Wallinger Story,” though PBS got cold feet and shelved it.

The sports world also claimed him.

In 1975, Kissinger threw out the first pitch at baseball’s annual All-Star Game. A year later, the master of shuttle diplomacy was named an honorary member of the Harlem Globetrotters, that basketball team’s first-ever such honoree. The owners of the New York Cosmos used his diplomatic skills (and lifelong affection for soccer) to help recruit soccer superstar Pele from Brazil.

Kissinger’s eagerness to be in the public eye often led to jibes about his ego.

“Everything pompous that you could possibly want to say about him, he says about himself first,” quipped broadcaster Barbara Walters when Kissinger was an unlikely selection in 1980 as “man of the year” by New York’s Friars Club, an organization generally focused on having comedians make fun of other comedians.

Others held Kissinger in contempt, particularly those who had worked to end the Vietnam War.

“For more than four decades,” Weather Underground co-founder Mark Rudd said, “I’ve harbored the faint hope that Kissinger would be indicted for war crimes in having planned and prosecuted the mass murder of hundreds of thousands in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Chile, and other countries.”

In particular, Kissinger was criticized for his advocacy of using bombing raids and other lethal tactics as diplomatic leverage.

“The drama of any air raid on a civilian population, a gesture in diplomacy to a man like Henry Kissinger, is about the inhumanity of many of man’s inventions to man,” novelist Kurt Vonnegut wrote in 1994.

Fellow novelist Joseph Heller devoted part of 1979’s “Good as Gold” to the efforts of his protagonist, Bruce Gold, to write a book demolishing Kissinger’s image.

“In Gold’s conservative opinion,” wrote Heller, “Kissinger would not be recalled in history as a Bismarck, Metternich or Castlereagh but as an odious schlump who made war gladly and did not often exude much of that legendary sympathy for weakness and suffering with which Jews regularly were credited.”

Kissinger’s Jewishness was an essential aspect of his image and often seemed to factor in America’s complex relationship with Israel. He was the first Jewish person to serve as U.S. secretary of state.

“No Jew in modern times has yielded greater power on the world stage,” wrote J.J. Goldberg in “Jewish Power,” a 1996 book.

But he had sharp critics within the Jewish community. He helped marshal the Nixon administration’s unsuccessful opposition to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, legislation designed to force the Soviet Union to improve treatment of its persecuted Jewish citizens.

His complicated balancing act during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel, came under intense scrutiny. Israeli military hero Moshe Dayan complained that Kissinger exchanged “the security of Israel for the good graces of the oil countries.”

After Ford lost the 1976 presidential election to Jimmy Carter, Kissinger moved on to a career as a consultant and lecturer on international affairs.

President Ronald Reagan subsequently appointed him to chair the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. It was one of many boards and commissions he would serve on; for instance, when Elizabeth Holmes wanted to enhance the credibility of her over-hyped Silicon Valley startup Theranos, she brought in Kissinger and George Shultz for a double dose of prestige.

Kissinger was a prolific author, with a career capped by his three volumes of White House memoirs: “White House Years,” “Years of Upheaval,” and “Years of Renewal.” A 2011 book, “On China,” discussed his role in the opening of China.

He could also always be counted on to offer informed commentary, either on TV or in print. Kissinger’s approach to the practical applications of American power never changed very much; he always attempted to cut through conventional rhetoric to find what he perceived as deeper truths about what the United States needed to do in each new situation.

“The management of a balance of power,” he said in a 1993 interview, “is a permanent undertaking, not an exertion that has a foreseeable end.” In that same interview, he said: “History knows no resting places and no plateaus.”

Through the years, he was frequently called upon to lend an air of authority on global affairs to would-be candidates. In February 2015, Michael Crowley noted that many presidential hopefuls still considered it something of a necessity to pay a visit to Kissinger.

“Candidates running for president like to be seen with or described as having talked to Kissinger,” one expert said, “because they think it sends a message that they themselves are serious about foreign policy.”

He also remained an unconventional thinker. In discussing his 2022 book “Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy” with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, Kissinger offered a distinctly differently opinion on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aims in waging war against Ukraine.

“You can interpret it in one of two ways,” he said of Putin. “The way it is generally interpreted — I know almost no exception — is that he wanted to reconstruct the empire.”

“But you can also interpret it as a recognition of growing Russian relative weakness, that the domestic situation is not evolving very rapidly, and, here, the West is approaching via Ukraine. ... I interpret it to myself as much as a last act to show that there were limits to what Russia could tolerate.”

In July 2023 at the age of 100, he returned to China, where he was an honored guest. Chinese leader Xi Jinping hosted him in the same building where Zhou had met him 52 years earlier.

“China and the United States’ relations will forever be linked to the name ‘Kissinger,’” Xi said.

11. Henry Kissinger, War Criminal Beloved by America's Ruling Class, Finally Dies

What a headline and article. I have no words.

From the Rolling Stone.

Henry Kissinger, War Criminal Beloved by America's Ruling Class, Finally Dies

The infamy of Nixon's foreign-policy architect sits, eternally, beside that of history's worst mass murderers. A deeper shame attaches to the country that celebrates him

BY SPENCER ACKERMAN

NOVEMBER 29, 2023

Rolling Stone · by Spencer Ackerman · November 30, 2023

Henry Kissinger died on Wednesday at his home in Connecticut, his consulting firm said in a statement. The notorious war criminal was 100.

Measuring purely by confirmed kills, the worst mass murderer ever executed by the United States was the white supremacist terrorist Timothy McVeigh. On April 19, 1995, McVeigh detonated a massive bomb at the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, including 19 children. The government killed McVeigh by lethal injection in June 2001. Whatever hesitation a state execution provokes, even over a man such as McVeigh — necessary questions about the legitimacy of killing even an unrepentant soldier of white supremacy — his death provided a measure of closure to the mother of one of his victims. “It’s a period at the end of a sentence,” said Kathleen Treanor, whose 4-year old McVeigh killed.

McVeigh, who in his own psychotic way thought he was saving America, never remotely killed on the scale of Kissinger, the most revered American grand strategist of the second half of the 20th century.

The Yale University historian Greg Grandin, author of the biography Kissinger’s Shadow, estimates that Kissinger’s actions from 1969 through 1976, a period of eight brief years when Kissinger made Richard Nixon’s and then Gerald Ford’s foreign policy as national security adviser and secretary of state, meant the end of between three and four million people. That includes “crimes of commission,” he explained, as in Cambodia and Chile, and omission, like greenlighting Indonesia’s bloodshed in East Timor; Pakistan’s bloodshed in Bangladesh; and the inauguration of an American tradition of using and then abandoning the Kurds.

“The Cubans say there is no evil that lasts a hundred years, and Kissinger is making a run to prove them wrong,” Grandin told Rolling Stone not long before Kissinger died. “There is no doubt he’ll be hailed as a geopolitical grand strategist, even though he bungled most crises, leading to escalation. He’ll get credit for opening to China, but that was De Gaulle’s original idea and initiative. He’ll be praised for detente, and that was a success, but he undermined his own legacy by aligning with the neocons. And of course, he’ll get off scot free from Watergate, even though his obsession with Daniel Ellsberg really drove the crime.”

No infamy will find Kissinger on a day like today. Instead, in a demonstration of why he was able to kill so many people and get away with it, the day of his passage will be a solemn one in Congress and – shamefully, since Kissinger had reporters like CBS’ Marvin Kalb and the New York Times‘ Hendrick Smith wiretapped – newsrooms. Kissinger, a refugee from the Nazis who became a pedigreed member of the “Eastern Establishment” Nixon hated, was a practitioner of American greatness, and so the press lionized him as the cold-blooded genius who restored America’s prestige from the agony of Vietnam.

Not once in the half-century that followed Kissinger’s departure from power did the millions the United States killed matter for his reputation, except to confirm a ruthlessness that pundits occasionally find thrilling. America, like every empire, champions its state murderers. The only time I was ever in the same room as Henry Kissinger was at a 2015 national-security conference at West Point. He was surrounded by fawning Army officers and ex-officials basking in the presence of a statesman.

Seymour Hersh, the investigative reporter who was the most prominent exception to the fawning coverage of Kissinger, watched journalistic deference take shape as soon as Kissinger entered the White House in 1969. “His social comings and goings could make or break a Washington party,” Hersh wrote in his biography The Price of Power. Reporters like the Times’ James Reston were eager participants in what Hersh called “an implicit shakedown scheme” – that is, access journalism – “in which reporters who got inside information in turn protected Kissinger by not divulging either the full consequences of his acts or his own connection to them.” Kissinger’s approach to the press was his approach to Nixon: sniveling obsequiousness. (Although Kissinger could vent frustration on reporters that he never could on his boss.) Hersh quotes H.R. Haldeman, Nixon’s chief of staff, remarking that Kissinger was the “hawk of hawks” inside the White House, but “touching glasses at a party with his liberal friends, the belligerent Kissinger would suddenly become a dove.”

Reviewing one of Kissinger’s litany of books, Hillary Clinton in 2014 said Kissinger, “a friend” whose counsel she relied upon as secretary of state, possessed “a conviction that we, and President Obama, share: a belief in the indispensability of continued American leadership in service of a just and liberal order.” Kissinger told USA Today within days that Clinton, presumed then to be a president-in-waiting, “ran the State Department in the most effective way that I’ve ever seen.” The same story noticed a photograph autographed by Obama thanking Kissinger for his “continued leadership.”

It’s always valuable to hear the reverent tones with which American elites speak of their monsters. When the Kissingers of the world pass, their humanity, their purpose, their sacrifices are foremost in the minds of the respectable. American elites recoiled in disgust when Iranians in great numbers took to the streets to honor one of their monsters, Qassem Soleimani, after a U.S. drone strike executed the Iranian external-security chief in January 2020. Soleimani, whom the United States declared to be a terrorist and killed as such, killed far more people than Timothy McVeigh. But even if we attribute to him all the deaths in the Syrian Civil War, never in Soleimani’s wildest dreams could he kill as many people as Henry Kissinger. Nor did Soleimani get to date Jill St. John, who played Bond girl Tiffany Case in Diamonds Are Forever.

KISSINGER’S ASCENT OCCURRED THROUGH AN OBSCENITY THAT TIME CANNOT DIMINISH. In 1968, Lyndon Johnson agreed to peace negotiations with the North Vietnamese in tacit recognition of the nightmare he, building on the works of his two immediate predecessors, brought to life in Vietnam. Kissinger, an influential Cold War defense intellectual at Harvard, had access to members of the diplomatic delegation to the Paris talks. He used it to feed information from the negotiations to Richard Nixon’s presidential campaign – a campaign whose defeated GOP rival, David Rockefeller, Kissinger advised; and despite Kissinger’s closer political ties to the coterie around Hubert Humphrey, Nixon’s Democratic rival.

Nixon ran for president claiming to have a secret plan to end the war. His advisers told Hersh they were deeply afraid that Johnson and Hanoi would reach an accord before the election. It would save lives in Vietnam, American and Vietnamese, but it would undermine Nixon’s hopes of exploiting the explosion in domestic antiwar sentiment. Nixon gratefully took what Kissinger gave him to make the U.S.’ proxy regime in Saigon, whose regime peace would destabilize, more intransigent. No agreement was reached until 1973, and the war ended in American humiliation with Hanoi’s 1975 victory.

“It took some balls to give us those tips,” Richard Allen, a foreign-policy researcher on the Nixon campaign, later reflected to Hersh. After all, it was “a pretty dangerous thing for [Kissinger] to be screwing around with the national security.”

Every single person who died in Vietnam between autumn 1968 and the Fall of Saigon – and all who died in Laos, and Cambodia, where Nixon and Kissinger secretly expanded the war within months of taking office; as well as all who died in the aftermath, like the Cambodian genocide their destabilization set into motion – died because of Henry Kissinger. We will never know what might have been, the question Kissinger’s apologists, and those in the U.S. foreign-policy elite who have stood in or who imagine themselves standing in Kissinger’s shoes, insist upon when explaining away his crimes. We can only know what actually happened. What actually happened was that Kissinger materially sabotaged the only chance for an end to the war in 1968 as a hedged bet to ensure he would achieve power in Nixon’s administration or Humphrey’s. A true tally will probably never be known of everyone who died so Kissinger could be national security adviser.

Once in the White House, Nixon and Kissinger found themselves without leverage to produce a peace accord with Hanoi. In the hopes of manufacturing one, they came up with the “Madman Theory,” the idea that North Vietnam would negotiate peace after they came to believe Nixon was adventurous and bloodthirsty enough to risk anything. In February 1969, weeks after taking office, and lasting through April 1970, U.S. warplanes secretly dropped 110,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia. By summer 1969, according to a colonel on the Joint Staff, Kissinger – who had no constitutional role in the military chain of command – was personally selecting bombing targets. “Not only was Henry carefully screening the raids, he was reading the raw intelligence,” Col. Ray B. Sitton told Hersh for The Price of Power. A second phase of bombing continued until August 1973, five months after the final U.S. combat troops withdrew from Vietnam. By then, U.S. bombs had killed an estimated 100,000 people out of a population of only 700,000. The final phase of the bombing, which occurred after the Paris Peace Accords mandated U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, was its most intense, an act of cruel vengeance from a thwarted superpower.

Cambodia, like Laos before it, was a formally neutral country, meaning that bombing it was an illegal aggression under the United Nations Charter. But beyond the control of Prince Sihanouk, the North Vietnamese used Cambodian territory for the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a weapons pipeline not unlike the one America is currently operating for Ukraine. In April 1970, following a coup by American client Col. Lon Nol that overthrew Sihanouk, Nixon ordered U.S. troops in Vietnam to invade Cambodia outright. In the air or on the ground, they were unable to destroy the trail, only human beings. Those who survived reacted. “Sometimes the bombs fell and hit the little children, and their fathers would be all for the Khmer Rouge,” a former Khmer Rouge cadre told historian Ben Kiernan, founder of Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program.

Nixon and Kissinger’s failure in Cambodia prompted in 1971 the U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, another failure. Kissinger later blamed defeat on the U.S.’ clients, rather than, say, people like himself. “In retrospect, I have come to doubt whether the South Vietnamese ever really understood what we were trying to accomplish,” Kissinger wrote in his memoirs.

At the time, the secret bombing of Cambodia was a startling offense that prompted substantial political backlash when it became public. One of the articles of impeachment against Nixon prepared by the House Judiciary Committee in 1974 held that bombing Cambodia was a constitutional usurpation of Congress’ war powers. But on July 30, the committee ended up rejecting the article, 26 votes to 12, and it never became part of the coalescing impeachment effort that stopped with Nixon’s resignation.

Forty years later, and likely as a consequence, U.S. presidents routinely bomb countries the U.S. is not at war with. They provide the barest minimum of disclosure that the bombs have fallen, and often not even that. When the U.S.’ declared wars fail, as they did in Iraq and Afghanistan, their architects and stewards blame the client militaries and governments that they propped up. They cover their troop withdrawals with futile bombing campaigns that kill people so American statesmen can save face. Whether he realized it or not, when President Biden in July 2021 blamed the Afghans for losing the Afghanistan war – “the Afghan military collapsed, sometimes without trying to fight” was a typical line – he was reaching for Nixon and Kissinger’s template.

KISSINGER PLAYED A ROLE IN THE DEATHS OF SO MANY DIFFERENT PEOPLES that treating each with due consideration requires writing a book. Here is one example among many of the sort of carnage Kissinger inflicted indirectly rather than by edict. In 1971, the Pakistani government waged a campaign of genocide to suppress the independence movement in what would become Bangladesh. Pakistan’s Yahya Khan, an architect of the genocide, was valuable to Nixon’s ambitions of restoring diplomatic relations with China. So the U.S. let Khan’s forces rape and murder at least 300,000 people and perhaps three million. “We can’t allow a friend of ours and China’s to get screwed in a conflict with a friend of India’s,” Nixon quoted Kissinger shrugging.

That perspective typified Kissinger. The Cold War was a geopolitical balance amongst two great powers. The purpose of Cold War statecraft was to maximize American freedom of action to inflict Washington’s will on the world – a zero-sum contest that meant restricting the ability of the Soviet Union to inflict Moscow’s – without the destabilization, or outright armageddon, that would result from pursuing a final defeat of the Soviets. That last part explains much right-wing hostility toward Kissinger. Kissinger represented anticommunism without ideological zeal. He was an energetic, even relentless practitioner of the Cold War, the theater of anticommunist conflict. But like George Kennan before him, Kissinger thought viewing the Cold War in ideological terms missed the point. The point was American geopolitical dominance, something measured in impunity and achieved by any means necessary. That permitted Nixon and Kissinger the creativity to reopen China, something Nixon would have demagogued anyone else for attempting.

Reopening China was by far the greatest achievement of Nixon’s foreign policy. It was the rare geopolitical initiative where Kissinger was a mere facilitator. Sy Hersh, in The Price of Power, calls Nixon “the grand theoretician” of rapprochement with Beijing, with Kissinger Nixon’s “occasional operative.” Kissinger’s dramatic, secret July 1971 trip to Beijing in advance of Nixon’s visit probably renders that description parsimonious. But, writes Hersh, “there is no evidence that Kissinger seriously considered the question of an American-Chinese rapprochement before his appointment as Nixon’s national security adviser.” Once it happened, Kissinger became an overnight celebrity, the sort of person destined to be shrouded in myth and apology.

Kissinger might not have been motivated by hatred of communism. But he was a reactionary who empowered and enabled the sort of reactionaries for whom anticommunism was a respectable channel for America’s racist and exploitative socio-economic traditions. His chief aide on the National Security Council was a rabid anticommunist militarist, Army Col. Alexander Haig, a future secretary of state for Ronald Reagan. When Kissinger came under attack from neoconservatives and others on the right who couldn’t tolerate detente with the Soviets and rapprochement with the Chinese, neither he nor they recognized that both of them were driven by the Cold War forces that Kissinger stoked when convenient.

Most important of all the reactionaries was Nixon, without whom Kissinger would have lacked power, and from whom Kissinger would withstand any indignity.

Nixon was one of the original Cold War demagogues, the men who never hesitated to identify communism with Black people and the “Eastern Establishment” liberals who postured as allies. His escalation in Vietnam, along with the secret bombing in Cambodia he revealed in a televised address, prompted a resurgence of the antiwar movement. Nixon exploited the mass protests by contrasting them with the “silent majority” of loyal Americans. Instead of ending the war, as he had campaigned on doing, and silencing or co-opting the antiwar movement in the process, Nixon inflamed a culture war to distract from it. It was an echo of his infamous “Southern Strategy” to harness for the Republican Party the electoral benefits of white backlash to the civil rights movement.

Nixon was not subtle about who he meant by the Eastern Establishment. When the media seized upon the U.S. massacre at My Lai, Nixon remarked, “It’s those dirty rotten Jews from New York who are behind it.” Nixon’s White House counsel, John Erlichman, recalled Nixon talking about “Jewish traitors” in front of Kissinger, including “Jews at Harvard.” Kissinger would assure the boss he was one of the good ones. “Well, Mr. President,” Erlichman quoted him responding, “there are Jews and Jews.”

Kissinger maintained his standing in part by savaging the Eastern Establishment from which he emerged. It was not entirely cynical. Kissinger shared with Nixon a contempt for the “defeatism” and “pessimism” of those who flinched at the unsavory Vietnam War they once supported. He rationalized his purges of the NSC bureaucracy and his marginalization of the State Department – measures that made him indispensable to foreign policy, and to Nixon – as protecting American power from those who lacked the confidence to wield it. It is revealing that amongst those who make U.S. foreign policy, Kissinger’s perspective is not considered ideological.

Kissinger’s consolidation of bureaucratic control was punitive and paranoid. He used the fear of internal leaks to get the FBI to wiretap his staff and the journalists he suspected of receiving their information. Yet the Eastern Establishmentarians around Kissinger, on his staff or in the press, followed him like a puppy seeking an ear scratch. His coldblooded American exceptionalism was the perfect tone for speaking to a shaken ruling class. Anthony Lake, who would go on to become national security adviser to Bill Clinton, finally quit in May 1970, alongside his colleague Roger Morris. Their breaking points were the Vietnam escalation, Nixon’s alcoholism and the surreptitious White House wiretaps that Nixon also pursued to enforce loyalty. But Lake and Morris opted not to go public. “I consider the failure to do so to be the biggest failure of my life,” Morris told Sy Hersh for The Price of Power. “We didn’t do so on the single calculation that it would destroy Henry.” Weeks later, Kissinger, via Haig, had the FBI wiretap Lake.

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, KISSINGER DESTROYED. But in Chile, he helped build a template for the world in which we currently live.

On September 4, 1970, Chileans elected the democratic socialist Salvador Allende president. Allende’s program was more than redistributionist. It demanded reparation from the U.S. for exploiting it. Chile is rich in copper, and by the mid-1960s, 80 percent of its copper production was controlled by American corporations, particularly the firms Anaconda Copper and Kennecott. When Allende nationalized mining assets held by the two companies, Allende informed them he would deduct estimated “excess profit” from a compensatory package he was willing to pay the firms. It was this sort of unacceptable policy that prompted Kissinger to remark, during an intelligence meeting about two months before Allende’s election, “I don’t see why we need to stand idly by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”

Kissinger meant that there must never be an example of a country in America’s sphere of influence delivering socialism through the ballot. “Henry saw Allende as being a far more serious threat than Castro,” Kissinger staffer Morris told Hersh. “Allende was a living example of democratic social reform in Latin America.”

Kissinger and the CIA had decided to overthrow Allende just days after Allende’s election. Upon learning what was in motion, the U.S. ambassador in Santiago, Edward Korry, who was second to none in opposing Allende, cabled Kissinger that “to actively encourage a coup could lead us to a Bay of Pigs failure.” An “apoplectic Kissinger” told Korry to stay out of the way, according to Tim Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes: The History of The CIA. When the CIA failed at what Korry termed a Rube Goldberg gambit to get the Chilean Congress to stop Allende from taking office – that’s right, the CIA tried a January 6 in Chile – Haig urged his boss to purge “the key left-wing dominated slots” in the agency.

Korry was wrong in the end. Kissinger’s policy of overthrowing Allende – “Why not support extremists?” he spitballed in a December 1970 White House meeting with the CIA’s covert-operations chief, Tom Karamessines – paid off on September 11, 1973, when a military junta took power, prompting Allende’s suicide. He would be among the first of 3,200 Chileans to die violently under the 17-year regime of Augusto Pinochet and his Caravana de la Muerte, to say nothing of the tens of thousands tortured and imprisoned. “In the Eisenhower period, we would be heroes,” Kissinger told Nixon in a telephone conversation days after the coup, and the same week he denied at his Senate confirmation hearings that the U.S. played any role in it.

The coup was only the beginning. Within two years, Pinochet’s regime invited Milton Friedman, Arnold Harberger and other economists from the University of Chicago to advise them. Chile pioneered the implementation of their agenda: severe government budgetary austerity; relentless assaults on organized labor; privatization of state assets, including health care and public pensions; layoffs of government employees; abolition of wages and price controls; and deregulation of capital markets. “Multinationals were not only granted the right to repatriate 100 percent of their profits but given guaranteed exchange rates to help them do so,” Grandin writes in his book Empire’s Workshop. European and American bankers flocked to Chile before its 1982 economic collapse. The World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank loaned Pinochet $3.1 billion between 1976 and 1986. As Corey Robin has documented, Friedrich von Hayek’s neoliberal Mont Pelerin Society held a 1981 meeting in the very city where the junta plotted the replacement of democratic socialism with a harbinger of today’s global economic order.

Pinochet’s torture chambers were the maternity ward of neoliberalism, a baby delivered bloody and screaming by Henry Kissinger. This was the “just and liberal world order” Clinton considered Kissinger’s life work.

He was no less foundational in pushing the frontiers of where American military power could operate. It turned out the secret bombing of Cambodia and Laos, which lasted years, represented a template. When Nixon in 1970 revealed the secret bombings, it was a step too far even for Thomas Schelling, one of the Pentagon’s favorite defense academics, who called them “sickening.” As Greg Grandin writes in Kissinger’s Shadow, the Cambridge-to-Washington set was not prepared in 1970 to accept that the U.S. had the right to destroy an enemy “safe haven” in a country it was not at war with and to do it all in secret, thereby shielding a war from basic public scrutiny. After 9/11, those assertions became accepted, foundational pillars of a War on Terror permitting four presidents to bomb, for 20 years, Pakistanis, Yemenis, Somalis, Libyans, Syrians and others.

Kissinger met with Pinochet in Santiago in June 1976. It was a time of rising U.S. congressional anger at Pinochet’s reign of terror. Kissinger informed the general that he was obliged to make an anodyne criticism of Pinochet to forestall adverse legislation. “My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world,” Kissinger said, according to a declassified cable, “and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government which was going Communist.” Three months later, U.S. diplomats warned Kissinger about Operation Condor, an international campaign of right-wing assassinations pursued by the anticommunist regimes of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay. Kissinger “has instructed that no further action be taken on this matter,” according to a September 16, 1976 cable. Five days later, a car bomb emplaced by Pinochet’s agents detonated along Washington D.C.’s Embassy Row, killing Orlando Letelier, Allende’s foreign minister, and his American co-worker, Ronni Moffitt.

In 1999, Pinochet was arrested in London through an effort by Baltazar Garzon, a Spanish judge investigating Operation Condor. Kissinger urged the British not to extradite the general. “I would be very happy if Pinochet was allowed home,” he told an interviewer. “This episode has gone on long enough and all my sympathies are with him.” Two years later, the administration of George W. Bush responded contemptuously to the Chilean Supreme Court’s efforts to compel Kissinger to testify. “It is unjust and ridiculous that a distinguished servant of this country should be harassed by foreign courts in this way,” an official told the Daily Telegraph. The paper noted that Kissinger was an “informal adviser” to Bush, as he was to many presidents.

The Bush administration’s declaration of protection for Kissinger, coupled with his rejection of the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court, extinguished a glimmer of hope that Kissinger would someday join Pinochet under arrest. It was always a fantasy. The international architecture that the U.S. and its allies established after World War II, shorthanded today as the “rules-based international order,” somehow never gets around to applying the same pressure on a hegemonic United States as it applies to U.S.-hostile or defiant powers. It reflects the organizing principle of American exceptionalism: America acts; it is not acted upon. Henry Kissinger was a supreme architect of the rules-based international order.

In that regard, Kissinger was singular but was by no means unique. Kissinger built upon foundations constructed by Henry Morgenthau, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Paul Nitze, the Dulles brothers, the Bundy brothers, JFK – you could go back to Albert Thayer Mahan and Teddy Roosevelt if you wanted; or James Monroe; or, depending on how fundamental you think empire is to America, 1619. He and Nixon chose to escalate in Vietnam and pursue the destruction of Cambodia. But the Pentagon Papers showed that the Vietnam War was the result of compounding decisions made in the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The Vietnamese guerilla and justice minister Truong Nhu Tang writes in his Viet Cong Memoir that Kissinger, whose intellect he praises, “inherited a conceptual framework from his American and French predecessors…that led him to disaster.”

Kissinger and Nixon turned that into Watergate – as Grandin pointed out earlier in this story, Watergate began with a demand for vengeance on Daniel Ellsberg, the anti-Kissinger, for leaking the Pentagon Papers. Watergate was a grim demonstration, for neither the first nor the last time, that the crimes America commits abroad have a dialectical relationship with the crimes that America commits at home. Infamy has as many fathers as victory.

That, ultimately, is why Kissinger died a celebrity, with the wealth necessary to get taken in by Theranos. It is why Roger Morris and Anthony Lake opted against telling the country that the commander-in-chief was an alcoholic who was secretly surveilling his real and imagined critics. Whatever Kissinger’s origins, whatever rants about Jewboys he had to endure, Kissinger was an exemplar of the self-confident geopolitical potency that America’s elites, whatever they might personally think of Henry Kissinger, want America to make the world respect. When the Roger Morrises and Anthony Lakes and Hillary Clintons see Henry Kissinger, they see, despite what they will rotely and euphemistically acknowledge as his flaws, themselves as they wish to be.

Kissinger lived for over half a century in the world he had made. He was its hubris: he could see that the Iraq war would be a disaster, but he went along with it anyway, declaring: “the case for removing Iraq’s capacity of mass destruction is extremely strong.” Kissinger’s calculation, expressed in the noblest possible way, is that acceptance of an impending disaster is the price of influencing and hence mitigating it. His accomodation to the inevitability of political decisions he thought were folly hearkened back to his 1968 embrace of Nixon. What were the lives of Vietnamese, Cambodians or Iraqis compared to Kissinger’s opportunity to help shape history?

But Iraq, and the broader War on Terror that Kissinger wanted expanded lest it “pete[r] out into an intelligence operation while the rest of the region gradually slides back to the pre-9/11 pattern,” presaged the world Kissinger made coming apart at the foundations. The man who repositioned U.S. foreign policy as a wedge between Russia and China lived long enough to see the February 4 Declaration uniting Moscow and Beijing. The reactionary forces he encouraged at home and abroad are showing the world that the rules-based international order is about capitalism, not democracy.

Whatever bitterness Kissinger, in his final days, experienced over the erosion of his enterprise is little comfort to his millions of victims. America denied them the closure Kathleen Treanor experienced when America, declaring justice, ended Timothy McVeigh.

Rolling Stone · by Spencer Ackerman · November 30, 2023

12. Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence

Excerpts:

Some policymakers and analysts make the mistake of conflating assurances with appeasement or outright capitulation. This is wrong-headed. Alongside credible threats, credible assurances are an integral part of deterrence. Given the dramatic ongoing modernization of the Chinese military and China’s increasing assertiveness, the United States needs to strengthen its military posture in East Asia and assist in improving Taiwan’s defensive capabilities and helping the island withstand a potential blockade. The United States will need cooperation from regional allies to make necessary adjustments in its military posture. But failure to provide assurances to Beijing about the purpose of such adjustments will reduce the likelihood of allied cooperation—and make China harder to deter.

Many might argue that assurances would signal weakness and invite Chinese aggression. On the contrary, these assurances would help strengthen a deterrence strategy that includes reinforcing the U.S. military presence in East Asia and hardening Taiwan’s defense. It is precisely because tough measures are needed that it is imperative that Washington and Taipei accompany them with productive diplomatic ones, assuring Beijing that it will not be punished if it forgoes the use of force.

Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence

Why America Must Reassure, Not Just Threaten, China

By Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen

November 30, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen · November 30, 2023

The growing might of China’s military and its increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan have made deterrence in the Taiwan Strait a tougher challenge than ever before. It is incumbent on the United States to support Taiwan’s efforts to develop a defensive “porcupine strategy.” Washington can help Taiwan’s military stockpile and train with coastal defense and air defense weapons, field a robust civil defense force, and create strategic reserves of critical materials such as food and fuel to deter and, if necessary, defeat an invasion or blockade of the island. The U.S. military should also better prepare to cope with China’s expanding arsenal of missiles that pose a threat to U.S. regional bases and even aircraft carriers by creating a stronger, more agile, and more geographically dispersed military presence in the region.

But deterrence is not just a matter of weapons in arsenals, boots on the ground, planes in the air, ships at sea, or strategies on the planning table. Signaling a credible military threat is only part of a successful strategy of deterrence. It also takes assurances to keep potential adversaries at bay. A threatened state has little incentive to avoid war if it fears the unacceptable consequences of not fighting. As the Nobel Prize–winning economist Thomas Schelling wrote years ago, “‘One more step and I shoot’ can be a deterrent threat only if accompanied by the implicit assurance, ‘And if you stop, I won’t.’”

In truth, the more powerful and credible one’s threat of military action, the more important and the more difficult it is to credibly assure the potential adversary. The three parties involved in the Taiwan Strait are not providing one another with sufficient assurances. For example, to enhance deterrence, Washington must make clear that it opposes any unilateral change to the status quo, not only an attempt by Beijing to compel unification but also a political move by Taipei to pursue independence. And as the United States works with Taiwan to strengthen its security, it must avoid giving the impression that it is moving toward restoring formal diplomatic relations or a defense alliance with the island. Combined with a conditional and credible threat of a military response by the United States and Taiwan to the use of force, such assurances will help prevent a war.

Ill-advised statements made in the past by former and current U.S. officials suggesting that the United States should formally recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state or restore a clear alliance commitment to defend the island would, if adopted, undercut assurances and weaken deterrence as surely as would a lack of military readiness. U.S. military threats will lose their potency if Chinese leaders believe that the United States will take advantage of their restraint to promote Taiwan’s formal independence or to prevent unification under any circumstances, even if it were to result from peaceful, uncoerced negotiation. Beijing may determine that refraining from an attack would mean it would forever lose the possibility of unification or would allow the United States to restore something akin to a defense alliance with Taiwan. And if China comes to that conclusion, then Washington’s focus on beefing up military power in the region may still fail to prevent a war.

DAMNED IF THEY DO, DAMNED IF THEY DON’T

Although the logic of deterrence through brute strength is intuitively appealing, both theory and history show that the threat of punishment fails to deter if it is not paired with assurances that those same military capabilities will not be used to in some way hurt the other side. “The purpose of combining conditional assurances with conditional threats,” the political scientist Reid Pauly has noted, is to “present a choice; one that does not lead the target to believe they are ‘damned if they do, and damned if they don’t.’”

For effective deterrence, both threats and assurances must be credible. As the scholars Matthew Cebul, Allan Dafoe, and Nuno Monteiro have noted, “Power boosts the credibility of threats but undermines that of assurances.” This dynamic is what political scientists have long described as the security dilemma. To issue credible threats and assurances simultaneously, leaders must cultivate “a reputation for restraint in the face of compliance” rather than simply a reputation for unconditionally inflicting punishment. And it is precisely because the United States should bolster and diversify its military presence in the region and help strengthen Taiwan’s defenses that it must also provide clearer and more persistently conveyed assurances.

Beijing, Taipei, and Washington are all focused on demonstrating resolve and building convincing wartime capabilities to signal their preparedness and willingness to use force. Beijing hopes to prevent Taiwan from further consolidating its separation from the mainland, while Taipei and Washington hope to deter Beijing from attacking Taiwan to force unification. Yet all three parties have neglected corresponding efforts to signal to one another that these military preparations are not meant to alter the status quo or to preclude the prospect of an eventual peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences. To be sure, leaders on all sides have, to some extent, continued to offer assurances to one another. Senior Biden administration officials have reaffirmed that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence; Chinese leaders have reiterated that “peaceful reunification” remains their preferred option (although they tend to regard coercive efforts, short of war, as still peaceful); and leaders in Taipei have refrained from pushing for formal independence. Unfortunately, officials in all three capitals have also expanded the scope of what they believe are legitimate measures to signal resolve in response to perceived threats, fueling a potentially dangerous spiral of actions and reactions. Beijing, Taipei, and Washington have not reiterated key statements that once made an eventual peaceful resolution at least conceivable. Such assurances were never meant to promote a near-term resolution or to specify the details of any eventual resolution; they were meant to convey that there still might be peaceful ways of settling cross-strait differences.

For instance, Beijing’s proposals regarding the governance of a future Taiwan unified with the mainland have grown less generous over time. The “one country, two systems” offer that Beijing made in a 1993 white paper included allowing the island to “have its own administrative and legislative powers, an independent judiciary, and the right of adjudication” as well as “its own party, political, military, economic, and financial affairs,” and a pledge that Beijing would not send troops or administrative personnel to be stationed in Taiwan. The former assurance disappeared in China’s 2000 white paper on the topic, and the latter was removed in its 2022 iteration. “One country, two systems” was never a popular concept in Taiwan, and it has become even less so now that Beijing has tightened its hold on Hong Kong, where it had pioneered the approach. Combined with increasingly aggressive and frequent Chinese military operations near Taiwan, the failure to offer more attractive options for Taiwan’s future only makes Beijing seem both more threatening and less trustworthy.

Military threats alone may fail to prevent a war over Taiwan.

As for Taiwan, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party has a long tradition of supporting independence, but since 1999 it has ceased calling for the creation of a Republic of Taiwan and instead maintains that Taiwan, formally known as the Republic of China, is already an independent sovereign state. The current DPP president, Tsai Ing-wen, has refrained from seeking formal independence and has sought to alleviate Beijing’s worst fears, adhering to her 2016 pledge to act in accordance with the Republic of China’s constitution, which defines China as including both sides of the strait. At the same time, she has refused to accept the “1992 Consensus,” an alleged understanding between representatives of Beijing and the KMT (Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party) that mainland China and Taiwan belong to one and the same country even as they disagreed about whether that country was the Republic of China or the People’s Republic of China.

DPP members and many scholars dispute that such a consensus ever existed. Still, Beijing accuses Tsai of altering the status quo by failing to accept the 1992 consensus, which her rivals in the KMT continue to endorse. And although she has resisted pressure from radicals in her own party to pursue measures that would likely be interpreted in Beijing as moves in the direction of independence—such as ceasing to use the Republic of China national anthem or insisting on the use of the moniker “Taiwan” rather than “Chinese Taipei” at international sporting events—Tsai has allowed the teaching of Taiwan’s history separate from the history of China in high schools.

And questions remain about the sustainability of Taiwan’s restraint in the future. The current DPP vice president and front-runner in the presidential election scheduled for January 13, 2024, Lai Ching-te, has in the past advocated for independence more stridently than Tsai, describing himself in 2017 as a “political worker for Taiwan independence.” More recently in July 2023, Lai told supporters at a campaign event that his party’s ambition is to have a sitting president of Taiwan “enter the White House,” which implies his goal is to upgrade Taiwan’s relationship with the United States, raising alarm in Beijing and prompting a request for clarification from Washington.

As for the United States, the Biden administration has regularly reiterated that it “does not support Taiwan independence” and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. These statements are consistent with the traditional U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” in which the United States avoids specifying under what conditions it would intervene in a cross-strait conflict and thereby does not give a green light to independence advocates in Taiwan or provoke Beijing by appearing to restore the U.S. alliance commitment to Taiwan. But the credibility of those statements has been called into question by Biden’s repeated insistence that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if attacked because it made a commitment to do so, even though the United States has not had a formal obligation to defend Taiwan since it abrogated the alliance with Taipei in 1979 as a precondition to normalizing diplomatic relations with Beijing. Biden administration officials have also noticeably failed to confirm that the United States would accept any peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences achieved through negotiations and without coercion. The Biden administration’s omission of this assurance has increased Beijing’s suspicions that Washington would never accept any form of cross-strait integration, even if achieved through nonviolent means. So have statements by Ely Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific affairs, that Taiwan is “located at a critical node within the First Island Chain” in the Western Pacific, implying that the island is strategically indispensable to the defense of U.S. allies and thus no form of unification would be acceptable to the United States.

Chinese officials no doubt perceive Washington’s efforts to strengthen ties with Taiwan and pursue a stronger military posture in the region as a serious demonstration of resolve. But U.S. actions, paired with the rhetoric of American officials, have also raised fears in Beijing that the United States seeks to “use Taiwan to contain China,” as China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi charged at a press conference in August 2022, and to restore something akin to the alliance that existed with Taipei before 1979. Some analysts in Beijing fear that recent U.S. attempts to reopen high-level diplomatic channels with Beijing merely mask continued efforts to weaken China and prevent even peaceful unification from ever occurring. Such fears are exacerbated by statements by members of the U.S. Congress, former senior officials, and leading scholars who call for everything from restoring official relations with Taiwan to resurrecting the U.S. alliance with it to stationing large numbers of U.S. forces on the island.

DOUBTS AND FEARS IN THE STRAIT

To shore up peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, all sides must recognize that credible assurance is essential for effective deterrence. Credible assurance is not a reward or a carrot. It is a guarantee that a threat is fully conditional on the behavior of its target. Such assurances are not the same as trust-building measures, which are incremental compromises made in a gradual and reciprocal manner. By contrast, an assurance does not have to be reciprocated, as it is not a concession or an effort to build trust. It can and should be made unilaterally to strengthen deterrence, as long as it does not weaken the credibility or capacity to respond to perceived threats. On its own, a credible assurance would strengthen deterrence. If reciprocated, it could, over time, build trust among the parties and reduce tensions.

Beijing has long threatened to adopt “nonpeaceful” means if Taipei appears to be pursuing permanent separation or formal independence. But the Chinese military buildup and intense military drills near Taiwan have fueled fears that Beijing is shifting from a policy of deterring any pursuit of independence by Taiwan to compelling unification through coercion or military force. As these doubts and suspicions multiply, all sides will lose the incentive to avoid provocative moves. When Beijing fails to reassure Taipei that its military preparations are not a harbinger of a coming attack, it undercuts incentives for people in Taiwan to support moderation by its political leaders. The lack of credible Chinese assurances also strengthens the hand of American politicians and commentators who want to scrap strategic ambiguity, upgrade ties with Taiwan from unofficial to official relations, and restore defense commitments to the island akin to those that obtained before 1979.

To strengthen the credibility of Beijing’s commitment to a peaceful process, China should dial back its military operations near Taiwan. Having used such operations to register displeasure with U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, Chinese air and naval exercises should be reset to the two-decade practice of tacitly observing the Taiwan Strait centerline. Beijing also codified into a 2005 law its right to use force against Taiwan if it perceives that peaceful unification is no longer possible. The vague conditions and implied impatience of such a threat have failed to convince people in Taiwan that the island will not be attacked as long as they do not attempt to permanently separate from China. Without such an assurance, Taipei has less reason to refrain from pursuing unilateral changes in the status quo. China should revise this language to incorporate the assurance that as long as Taiwan does not pursue formal independence, Beijing will not use force. If Beijing’s leaders truly prefer peaceful unification with Taiwan, as they continue to claim, they should keep the door open to precisely that outcome.

Biden and Xi in Woodside, California, November 2023

Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

For its part, Taiwan must accompany needed measures to bolster its defense with credible assurances to Beijing that as long as the Chinese military refrains from attacking Taiwan, Taipei will not pursue independence or permanent separation. Taiwan should refrain from potentially provocative actions, such as holding a referendum to change its official name, the Republic of China, or revising its territorial claims to exclude mainland China—changes that would indicate a declaration of formal independence. Regardless of who is elected Taiwan’s next president, Taipei will need to convincingly reassure Beijing that it has no intention of fundamentally altering the status quo. But the need for such guarantees will grow in the event of the victory of Lai, the DPP candidate; Chinese officials deeply mistrust him since he has endorsed the pursuit of formal independence for Taiwan in the past. The pledge that Lai made, in an October 2023 speech in Taipei at a dinner attended by nearly 100 foreign dignitaries and guests, to maintain Tsai’s cross-strait policy, with its emphasis on refusing both to bow to Chinese pressure and to provoke Beijing, is a good start. If elected, Lai could use his inaugural address to reaffirm the commitments Tsai made in her inaugural speech in 2016 to conduct cross-strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China’s constitution and the 1992 act governing relations between the two sides of the strait, Taipei’s law on how the island should manage relations with Beijing.

As Taiwan strengthens its military deterrent—including by increasing its ability to withstand a blockade and to defeat an invading Chinese force—it must also implement additional measures to reinforce the credibility of its assurances. In August, Lai took a step in the right direction when he made his stance on the naming question clear: “President Tsai has used the term Republic of China (Taiwan) to describe our country. I will continue to do so in the future.” This and other statements provide China with rhetorical assurance, but because his party’s 1991 charter still calls for the creation of a “Republic of Taiwan” and a new constitution, doubts persist in Beijing about his willingness to hold to this position as president. If he wins the election, Lai should consider revisiting a proposal made by DPP legislators in 2014 to suspend the independence clause in the 1991 party charter, a nonbinding and reversible step that would give any rhetorical commitment to the status quo more weight and credibility. Such a step could also be part of a gradual, reciprocal process to reduce tensions and build trust, as advocated by Richard Bush, the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan.

Just as the United States must not rule out the possibility of an eventual peaceful integration of the two sides of the strait (as long as such a move has the assent of the people of Taiwan), Taipei should also not take actions that would permanently foreclose that outcome. To deter war, Taiwan must allow leaders in Beijing to believe that peaceful unification remains possible.

DISCRETION AND DISCIPLINE

As the third party to this dispute, the United States must also think carefully about its mix of threats and assurances. Its priority is to prevent the Chinese military from attacking Taiwan, but deterrence will not work if Beijing does not believe U.S. assurances. For instance, it is in the United States’ interest for China to remain hopeful that sometime in the future it might be able to resolve its differences with Taiwan without resorting to violence. China would have to persuade Taiwan’s public of the merits of some form of peaceful integration—a hard sell, but not impossible given China’s economic clout and the possibility that a more attractive government may someday emerge in Beijing. To the extent that Washington can influence Chinese President Xi Jinping’s thinking on this crucial issue, it should do so; the United States should avoid making statements or taking actions that could lead Beijing to conclude that unification can only be achieved through force.

Consistent with its “one China” policy of not supporting an independent Taiwan or seeking to restore a formal alliance with Taipei, the U.S. government should not use in its official communications symbols of Taiwan’s sovereignty, such as the flag of the Republic of China, or refer to Taiwan as either a country or an ally, as the Trump administration did in a 2019 Defense Department report. If U.S. officials do so inadvertently, such as when U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken referred to Taiwan as a country on two occasions in 2021, a correction should be swiftly issued. An example of the laudable handling of such a blunder was the White House’s admission that it made an “honest mistake” after including the image of the Republic of China flag in a tweet about the United States supplying COVID-19 vaccines to Taiwan that same year. And since Beijing fears that Taiwan may merely be a pawn in a wider American game of containment, U.S. officials should not imply that Taiwan is a strategic asset essential to U.S. national security.

The Biden administration insists that it has made no changes to the “one China” policy. But Biden’s remarks have repeatedly broken with strategic ambiguity and mischaracterized U.S. policy. During an August 2021 interview with ABC News, Biden stated, incorrectly, that the United States has a treaty commitment to defend Taiwan, comparing the U.S. “sacred commitment” to the pledges it has made to Japan and South Korea. In the most egregious misstatement of U.S. policy on Taiwan to date, Biden told reporters in November 2021 that Taiwan “is independent” and “makes its own decisions,” a description that contravenes long-standing U.S. policy that does not recognize Taiwan as an independent, sovereign state.

Washington’s actions and rhetoric have raised fears in Beijing.

These statements do far more to undermine deterrence than they do to bolster it. Beijing has long anticipated that Washington will intervene if China tries to force unification. The Taiwan Relations Act, a law Congress passed in 1979 to define the now informal relations between Washington and Taipei after the normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing, states that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes,” would be considered a “threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” The U.S. commitment to Taiwan does not need further clarification or beefing up, and certainly no U.S. official should invoke or even suggest anything akin to a restoration of a formal alliance. Such an unqualified commitment to Taiwan could be seen on both sides of the strait as a green light for more strident pro-independence voices in Taiwan to pursue a formal separation from China.

The U.S. government should provide a comprehensive and high-level statement laying out its “one China” policy and explaining why Taiwan matters to the United States in language that is comprehensible to the American people, beyond the rote repetition of the U.S. “one China” policy as comprising the Taiwan Relations Act; the three U.S.-China joint communiques in 1972, 1979, and 1982; and the Six Assurances that the Reagan administration gave to Taipei in 1982. A more complete statement, such as a speech by the national security adviser or the secretary of state, should restate the positions that Biden has reportedly made clear to Xi, including that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence, opposes any unilateral change to the status quo by either side, does not pursue a “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” policy, and does not seek to use Taiwan as part of a strategy to contain China or embolden Taipei to push for independence. Such a statement should include the assurance provided by prior administrations that the United States will accept any outcome reached peacefully by both sides and that has the assent of the people of Taiwan.

Until recently, no Biden administration official had publicly called for the resumption of cross-strait dialogue to reduce misunderstandings and manage problems, a position that was central to U.S. policy before the Trump administration. It is welcome that American Institute in Taiwan Chair Laura Rosenberger, in a roundtable with the media in Taipei in October 2023, said that the United States supports cross-strait dialogue and called on Beijing to start a dialogue with Taiwan. Even though Beijing is responsible for the breakdown of cross-strait dialogue, the failure of the United States to encourage a return to talks has been interpreted by Beijing as further evidence that Washington does not want the two sides of the strait to settle their disputes. If Beijing believes that Washington does not truly want cross-strait tensions to be resolved, it will be much harder for the United States to deter an attack on Taiwan.

U.S. officials should also work to ensure that Taiwan does not upset the status quo. Taiwan has laudably begun to strengthen its defenses under Tsai, but her administration has also tactfully refrained from pushing pro-independence initiatives. That marks a departure from her DPP predecessor as president, Chen Shui-bian, who held a referendum in 2008 on pursuing membership in the United Nations under the name Taiwan, rather than the Republic of China, which was rightly interpreted by both Beijing and Washington as a ploy to promote independence. Since the UN is an international institution for which statehood is a requirement for membership, to apply under the name Taiwan instead of the Republic of China would assert the full sovereign separation of the island. If a future government of Taiwan or key political figures appear to be promoting such a change in the status quo, U.S. officials should voice concerns in private, in public, or both. The United States should never coordinate its Taiwan policy with Beijing, but if a rebuke to Taiwan about unilateral efforts to assert independence is delivered only privately, Washington should inform Beijing of that admonition through diplomatic channels so that American assurances remain credible.

Taiwanese troops in Taichung, Taiwan, November 2023

Ann Wang / Reuters

The United States could be more transparent about the parameters of its “unofficial relationship” with Taipei, including self-imposed limits on visits to Taiwan by the U.S. president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. Taiwan’s president and vice president have long been permitted to make transit visits through the United States en route to other countries, but they do not visit Washington. Such transits are private, unofficial, and arranged for the “safety, comfort, convenience, and dignity of the traveler,” according to the U.S. State Department. As such, these transits should not be occasions for large-scale, public, politically charged events. Following this precedent and acting consistently will make more believable the U.S. position that the United States is not treating Taiwan as it would a sovereign, independent state.

U.S. officials, including members of Congress, should refrain from making statements that are inconsistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. Resolutions calling for the United States to recognize Taiwan as an independent sovereign state or provide an unconditional defense commitment ironically weaken deterrence by suggesting Washington intends to restore the alliance with Taipei that it abrogated in 1979. Legislation should focus on helping Taiwan defend itself and on bolstering U.S. military capabilities in East Asia in ways that are consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, while avoiding symbolic actions that do nothing to strengthen Taiwan or U.S. forces but could undermine the credibility of U.S. assurances to China.

Just as the executive branch does not send the holders of the top four positions in the U.S. government to Taiwan, similarly, as a matter of policy, Congress should not send to Taiwan the president of the Senate (who is also the vice president of the United States), the Senate president pro tempore, or the Speaker of the House. There are sufficient informal channels for these officials to give and receive messages from Taiwan and to support Taiwan without providing a convenient occasion for Beijing to ratchet up military pressure while blaming Washington and Taipei for sparking tensions. Such expressions of U.S. support for Taiwan are counterproductive as they only make the island less secure.

TRUE DETERRENCE

Some policymakers and analysts make the mistake of conflating assurances with appeasement or outright capitulation. This is wrong-headed. Alongside credible threats, credible assurances are an integral part of deterrence. Given the dramatic ongoing modernization of the Chinese military and China’s increasing assertiveness, the United States needs to strengthen its military posture in East Asia and assist in improving Taiwan’s defensive capabilities and helping the island withstand a potential blockade. The United States will need cooperation from regional allies to make necessary adjustments in its military posture. But failure to provide assurances to Beijing about the purpose of such adjustments will reduce the likelihood of allied cooperation—and make China harder to deter.

Many might argue that assurances would signal weakness and invite Chinese aggression. On the contrary, these assurances would help strengthen a deterrence strategy that includes reinforcing the U.S. military presence in East Asia and hardening Taiwan’s defense. It is precisely because tough measures are needed that it is imperative that Washington and Taipei accompany them with productive diplomatic ones, assuring Beijing that it will not be punished if it forgoes the use of force.

BONNIE S. GLASER is Managing Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
JESSICA CHEN WEISS is the Michael J. Zak Professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Cornell University, a Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis, and a former member of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff.
THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN is James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and a Senior Adviser at the U.S. State Department’s China Coordination Office. The views expressed here are his own.
MORE BY BONNIE S. GLASER MORE BY JESSICA CHEN WEISS MORE BY THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN

Foreign Affairs · by Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen · November 30, 2023

13. Moscow’s Search for Foreign Recruits Reveals Its Growing Desperation

Conclusion:

The good news is that the history of foreign recruitment indicates Putin is feeling the heat and does not expect conditions to improve any time soon. For a Ukrainian government seeking to sustain its counteroffensive and keep Western allies engaged supplying necessary military aid, these developments are a positive indicator.

But there is also cause for caution. Cornered creatures can easily turn nasty. We know that leaders feeling under the gun at home and abroad will sometimes prolong even a losing or costly war in hopes of staying in office — a ploy known as gambling for resurrection. In such a context, migrants and other foreigners in Russia could easily become cannon fodder for a government that is beyond all care of international cost or censure.

Moscow’s Search for Foreign Recruits Reveals Its Growing Desperation - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Elizabeth M.F. Grasmeder · November 30, 2023

Last month, Ukrainian researchers and Politico correspondents revealed that they had identified nearly 200 Cubans who had joined the Russian military in recent weeks, with enlistees ranging in age between 19 and 69. In interviews, Cuban recruits reported a range of Russian tactics to secure new personnel. Many in particular cited monetary incentives and the prospect of Russian citizenship — an attractive draw for young men in a country beset by food insecurity and joblessness.

Other Cuban enlistees tell darker stories. Some have shared experiences of being lured to Russia under false pretenses, such as arriving for a job as a driver and being drafted for the frontlines instead. Subsequent reports out of Havana suggest more Cuban nationals have been forced or deceived into service than these revelations suggest. In September, the Cuban government went public with an announcement that it had identified and disrupted a human trafficking network amassing recruits for Russia’s war effort. While the Kremlin remained silent on Havana’s announcement, it signed a new trade and economic cooperation deal with Cuba in November — a move that could smooth ruffled feathers and potentially pave the way for continued recruitment in the future.

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These are not isolated or anomalous developments. Rather, Moscow’s search for foreign recruits provides useful clues about the health of Vladimir Putin’s regime, his confidence, and his views on Russia’s war effort — all suggesting the strongman’s fortunes are looking more and more desperate.

Scrambling for Support

Evidence of Moscow’s desperation goes far beyond a few hundred Cuban enlistees. In fact, Russia has made recurrent and likely growing use of foreign recruits during its war. More than a year ago, Moscow used legal maneuvers to ensure it could conscript Ukrainians caught in annexed territory. According to accounts provided to The Telegraph, Russia appears to have given its Ukrainian conscripts a lose-lose choice: fight, or be imprisoned.

Russia’s recruitment abroad has not been solely coercive. Months into the war, Putin publicly lent his approval to foreign recruitment and soon approached the Syrian government for manpower. Almost immediately, Damascus responded by appealing directly to veterans in its army to join the conflict in Ukraine. The Kremlin has made similar moves in the past year to amass volunteers and veterans from Central Asia, Libya, and Serbia. In recent weeks, hundreds of volunteers from Colombia and Nepal — including seasoned military veterans — have been similarly enticed to don Russian uniforms in the face of limited economic prospects in their home countries.

Other reports indicate authorities have sought to mobilize foreigners already within Russia’s lawful borders. During the exodus of Russians early in the war, citizens of former Soviet republics working in Russia also took flight. Some returned home with stories of having been offered expedited Russian citizenship in exchange for service. Among those who subsequently did enlist, recruits report having pocketed hefty bonuses as an incentive to serve. Other accounts suggest Russian authorities have also looked to foreign exchange students as enlistees, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa.

The Domestic Politics of Foreign Recruitment

How often do states look abroad for soldiers, and what does it tell us when they do? Modern governments have consistently recruited foreigners for combat troops over the past two centuries, and the practice is only growing. States generally recruit foreigners in the face of one of two pressures: external territorial threats that amplify their needs for combat troops on one hand, and domestic factors that make expanded citizen enlistment politically perilous on the other. When governments face political and security pressures simultaneously, this type of recruitment becomes especially likely.

I have examined more than 230 cases over the past 200 years in which governments have recruited “legionnaires.” Much like members of France’s famous fighting unit, legionnaires are soldiers who enlist in the military of a country in which they are not citizens and thus are different from other types of individuals who join conflicts abroad. Unlike “foreign fighters” — a term scholars and policymakers use for individuals who join a terrorist group abroad — legionnaires are members of a state’s armed forces. And unlike private military contractors (who can be either citizens or foreigners), legionnaires work for the state directly by virtue of their membership in the military. There is no firm or company between them and the chain of command. Indeed, one of the reasons legionnaires are so attractive, especially for governments in need of combat troops, is that the state controls them directly and can determine how they are used just like any citizen-recruit.

Modern states generally recruit legionnaires in one of two instances. Some, like Ukraine, are facing invasion or fear the prospect of conquest. Those states often call the international community to their aid in their darkest hours, and when they recruit legionnaires, it represents a government’s determination to go for broke in fending off the worst imaginable catastrophe. For these states, legionnaires are an opportunity to bolster a defensive front without the lag or politicking that can slow the responsiveness of allies. And as Ukraine has found, enlisting foreigners can also be an attractive means by which to rally global support to one’s cause.

Then there is a second camp of states, like Putin’s Russia. These are the countries that enlist legionnaires because of the pressures and dangers of domestic politics. That’s where things get really interesting.

When domestic dynamics drive legionnaire recruitment, leaders pursue these policies for fear that further expanding citizen enlistment risks creating an untenable danger to their futures in office. When statesmen lead countries with a recent history of insurgencies, attempted or successful coups, politicized ethnolinguistic divides, or severe labor shortages (let alone a combination of those factors), they tend to wonder whether new citizen-recruits or conscripts are truly loyal, or whether their futures in office could be in jeopardy. When coupled with the carnage of a war going poorly, leaders face internal political disaster if they expand citizen enlistment.

Given Wagner’s recent coup attempt and the citizen pushback Russia has already experienced in attempting to staff its ranks, the Kremlin has good reason to doubt the reliability and commitment of its national troops. That is precisely where legionnaires like Russia’s Cuban recruits come in: they represent an effort by a government to close the gap between the combat troops it needs on the battlefield and the citizen-soldiers it believes it can safely mobilize without creating a coup, election loss, or uprising at home.

Putin’s Prognosis

With roughly 300,000 casualties so far, Russia’s foreign recruitment only seems to be gaining speed. Indeed, since June — a tough month for Putin marked by the start of Ukraine’s counteroffensive and Yevgeny Prigozhin’s coup attempt — Russia has redoubled its appeals for volunteers from neighboring countries

Against this backdrop, British Defense Intelligence warned in September that the Kremlin is now eying the roughly six million migrant workers within Russia as an untapped manpower source for the frontline. Local press reports indicate that some migrants are already being rounded up and pressed into service — a trend with dark parallels to Germany’s frantic mobilizations of foreign laborers in the last months of World War II. This trend is especially alarming because, as my research indicates, once countries start using coercive tactics to bring foreigners into service, they tend to expand those activities quickly.

London’s analysis of the drivers of Russian policies suggests that Putin’s regime is feeling many of the same pressures that I have identified as leading to expanded legionnaire recruitment in other wars: “Russia likely wishes to avoid further unpopular domestic mobilisation measures in the run up to the 2024 Presidential elections. Exploiting foreign nationals allows the Kremlin to acquire additional personnel for its war effort in the face of mounting casualties.”

Between Wagner’s recent rebellion and the recruitment issues that have plagued Russia’s citizen mobilizations since the war’s earlier days, history indicates that Putin is feeling backed into a corner. Even as opinion polls show nearly 70 percent of Russians support the government’s “special operations” in Ukraine, citizen enlistment has continued to lag far behind the numbers Moscow needs to sustain the war — even despite an advertising blitz seeking to entice more citizens into service. At the same time, the Kremlin is seeking to prevent the reoccurrence of any challenges to Putin’s rule, including reportedly by nationalizing remaining Wagner fighters and bringing them under the state’s direct control.

But while these initiatives may help on the margins in reassuring Putin of his personal security, they do not resolve the thorny issue that has only grown sharper during Russia’s campaign: where to get the people, willing or otherwise, to sustain the conflict. With Putin’s narrowing confidence and room to maneuver in mobilizing citizens, foreigners inside and outside of Russia may be among the Kremlin’s few remaining options. By enlisting legionnaires, Putin not only gains new troops for a grinding conflict in Ukraine, he also may amass soldiers he can use to help protect against a threat from elites in the future.

To be sure, details on Russia’s recruitment of foreigners have been scarce. It appears that so far only a handful of thousands of noncitizens have been inducted into Moscow’s war effort, and sparse details on these policies make it challenging to identify trends in Russia’s efforts. But even modest recruitment measures, when coupled with the elaborate methods Moscow has used to secure those added troops, tell a story that belies the Kremlin’s efforts to exude confidence about the trajectory of the war. Russia has slashed foreigners’ service contracts from five years to a brief one-year tour, and in some instances offers payment that not only matches but exceeds those Russian citizens receive. That Russia is taking such extraordinary steps, especially if their return has only been modest, show the high political stakes driving Moscow to look beyond its citizenry for soldiers.

Conclusion

The good news is that the history of foreign recruitment indicates Putin is feeling the heat and does not expect conditions to improve any time soon. For a Ukrainian government seeking to sustain its counteroffensive and keep Western allies engaged supplying necessary military aid, these developments are a positive indicator.

But there is also cause for caution. Cornered creatures can easily turn nasty. We know that leaders feeling under the gun at home and abroad will sometimes prolong even a losing or costly war in hopes of staying in office — a ploy known as gambling for resurrection. In such a context, migrants and other foreigners in Russia could easily become cannon fodder for a government that is beyond all care of international cost or censure.

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Elizabeth M.F. Grasmeder, Ph.D. is an adjunct professor of national security at Duke University, 2022–23 fellow at West Point’s Modern War Institute, and senior foreign policy analyst in the U.S. government. Her article in International Security on why states recruit foreign legionnaires won best article awards from the American Political Science Association and International Studies Association, and she is completing a book project on the topic. Her research has also been published by or featured in War on the Rocks, Foreign Affairs, The Washington Post, The Economist, Lawfare, Semafor, and Al-Ahram. She can be reached at elizabeth.grasmeder@duke.edu or at BlueSky/X(Twitter) handle emfgrasmeder. The views expressed here are entirely her own and do not reflect those of the U.S. government.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Elizabeth M.F. Grasmeder · November 30, 2023

14. 78-Country Map Rebuffs Claim That US 'Not at War'

Map at the link below.

The 15 page report references can be access in PDF at this link: https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2023/US-CounterterrorismOperations_2021-2023.pdf

78-Country Map Rebuffs Claim That US 'Not at War'

"Taken altogether, this map's data highlights that the expansive global counterterrorism apparatus grinds ever onwards," says a Costs of War Project report.

https://www.commondreams.org/news/joe-biden-war-on-terror

JESSICA CORBETT

Nov 29, 2023

"We're not at war."

That's what U.S. House Budget Committee Chair Jodey Arrington (R-Texas) claimed during a Wednesday hearing about controversial legislation backed by Republicans and right-wing Democrats that would create a so-called fiscal commission for the U.S. debt.

Making some on-the-fly additions to his prepared remarks, Arrington said, "120% debt to GDP—this is the highest level of indebtedness in the history of our country surpassing World War II and we're not at war, we're in relative peace and prosperity."

And yet, a report published Wednesday by the Costs of War Project at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs shows that since 2021, the U.S. military has conducted counterterrorism operations—including training and assistance, military exercises, combat and detention, and air and drone strikes—in at least 78 countries.

"The war launched by the United States government in response to the 9/11 terror attacks continues," states the report, authored by project co-director Stephanie Savell. "This map is a snapshot of today's global military and civilian operations that evolved from President George W. Bush's 'Global War on Terror,' launched in 2001, and continued through and beyond the U.S. military's official withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. This war on terror continues under President Joe Biden."

The United States conducted air and drone strikes against militants in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and likely Yemen, according to the report. U.S. forces also "engaged in combat and detention, using force on the ground against militants/terrorism suspects" in those five countries plus Cuba, Kenya, Mali, and the United Arab Emirates.

The publication also identifies 30 countries where the United States "conducted formal, named military exercises to project

force locally and rehearse scenarios of combating 'terrorists' or 'violent extremist organizations," and 73 nations where the U.S. government "trained and/or assisted military, police, and/or border patrol forces."

As the report details:

Many U.S. military operations are not included here—notably, those aimed at what U.S. officials and media identify as the military threat posed by Russia and China, the focus of much current U.S. foreign policy. Nor does this map include the military bases that have housed counterterrorism operations. Further, it does not include counterterrorism-related arms sales to foreign governments, all deployments of U.S. special operations forces, or all Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations. Also excluded are "military information support operations (MISO)," or "psychological operations," which the U.S. military carries out in many countries on the map and beyond, such as in Iran. All of these are significant elements of the bigger picture of U.S. counterterrorism strategy but beyond the scope of the map's data set.

USA Today exclusively reported on the new map. Citing the Pentagon and David Vine, an anthropologist and U.S military expert at American University, the newspaper noted that "there are up to 800 U.S. military bases overseas," and "the Biden administration signed an agreement in June that will bring six new U.S. military bases to Papua New Guinea."

The Costs of War Project report points out that "there are a few notable differences in comparing the current data with the previous version of the map, which covered activities between 2018 through 2020 under President Donald Trump's administration." Differences include that the number of nations hit with U.S. airstrikes decreased while the tally of countries where U.S. service members engaged in ground combat rose by one—the UAE.

"Overall, though the total number of countries has decreased slightly, from 85 to 78 total countries, the United States counterterrorism footprint remains remarkably similar," the report stresses. "Taken altogether, this map's data highlights that the expansive global counterterrorism apparatus grinds ever onwards. This contrasts starkly with claims or assumptions on the part of the U.S. public and policymakers that the so-called 'War on Terror' is over."

The report comes as Congress considers how much more military aid—if any—to provide Ukraine, which has been battling a Russian invasion since February 2022, and Israel, which launched a war on the Gaza Strip in retaliation for a Hamas-led attack on October 7.

"Today, in the current geopolitical context of the Middle East, the U.S. counterterrorism machinery is like a spark, ready to ignite," Savell wrote Wednesday in a related opinion piece for Newsweek. "The U.S. footprint in the region does not only make U.S. forces sitting ducks—it also threatens to dramatically escalate the current war on Gaza. Research has shown that having U.S. troops at the ready in so many places actually makes the chances of the U.S. waging aggressive, offensive wars far more likely."

"It is time for the U.S. to think deeply about the costs of overseas counterterrorism and to admit it has been a failure, underlaid by structural racism," she argued. "It is time to truly end the post-9/11 war era."

Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.

JESSICA CORBETT

Jessica Corbett is a senior editor and staff writer for Common Dreams.Full Bio >

15. Poll finds strong support for arming Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan

It seems like these different polls are all over the map. Perhaps we will see a story tomorrow about another poll that provides the opposite results on support.

Poll finds strong support for arming Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · November 30, 2023

WASHINGTON ― An annual poll commissioned by the Ronald Reagan Institute found strong public support for arming Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, as Congress negotiates a path forward on President Joe Biden’s $106 billion supplemental spending request to arm all three security partners in the weeks ahead.

The Reagan National Defense Survey, conducted by Beacon Research and Shaw & Co., polled 2,506 U.S. adults between Oct. 27 and Nov. 5 on national security issues. The Reagan Institute released the results on Thursday ahead of its annual National Defense Forum on Saturday.

“Despite kind of a media narrative or what you might expect watching the debate on Ukraine aid in the U.S. Congress, there is not waning support for Ukraine,” said Rachel Hoff, the policy director at the Reagan Institute. “In fact, there is steady and strong consistent support for Ukraine.”

“A plurality of Republicans, a majority of Democrats, support continued U.S. military assistance to Ukraine,” she said.

The poll found that 59% of respondents support U.S. military aid for Ukraine while 30% oppose it.

Support for arming Ukraine jumps even higher – up to 67% – when respondents are asked the question couched in the Reagan doctrine promising to support allies against aggressors.

“Framing security assistance to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan in this context generates higher levels of support—both overall and among partisan subgroups— than when asked outside of this context,” notes a Reagan Institute summary accompanying the poll.

For instance, the poll found 56% of respondents support and 28% oppose sending military equipment to Taiwan. As in the case with Ukraine, support for arming Taiwan jumped to 65% when the question was prefaced with a line stating “The U.S. has historically provided security assistance to help its allies and friends defend themselves if they are willing to fight aggression against their own countries.”

The poll only asked about arming Israel in the context of the Reagan doctrine, and found that 71% of respondents supported military aid for the U.S. ally while 23% opposed it.

A CBS News/YouGov poll conducted over an overlapping timeframe also found majority support for arming Ukraine and Israel. That poll found 53% of respondents favored sending weapons to Ukraine and 55% support arming Israel.

But a Reuters/IPSOS poll conducted later in November found that only 41% of respondents backed arming Ukraine with 32% opposed it. That same poll found 31% of respondents in favor of arming Israel with 43% opposed.

And an August CNN poll found that 55% of respondents opposed Congress passing another Ukraine package, though that question included both economic and military support for Kyiv.

Still, the Reagan Institute survey found that support for arming Ukraine has remained remarkably consistent with the two prior polls it conducted in June 2023 and November 2022, even when asked outside of the context of the Reagan doctrine.

Biden submitted his $106 billion supplemental spending request to Congress shortly after Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel. It asks for $44.4 billion to continue arming Ukraine, $14.3 billion in additional military aid for Israel and $2 billion in Foreign Military Financing for Indo-Pacific security partners, including Taiwan.

Congress is currently negotiating the package, but the debate has become complicated amid Republican demands for policy changes on the U.S. southern border, growing House GOP opposition to Ukraine assistance and a push among some Democrats to condition Israel military aid.

Aside from foreign military aid, the Reagan Institute poll found that 77% of respondents favored increased military spending while 20% opposed it. The May debt ceiling agreement caps fiscal 2024 base defense budget at $886 billion, a 3.3% increase over FY23 in line with Biden’s military spending request that nonetheless excludes his $106 billion supplemental package Congress is debating.

The Reagan Institute poll also found that 67% of respondents were concerned that congressional budget cuts could reduce military capabilities while 29% remained unconcerned. If Congress does not pass full FY24 appropriations legislation, the debt ceiling agreement stipulates that a full year continuing resolution will go into effect funding the military with a 1% cut from FY23 levels.

The poll also added a new question this year gauging public support for U.S. military action in Mexico to counter drug cartels. It found only 41% of respondents favored U.S. military intervention in Mexico while 46% oppose it.

The majority of Republican presidential candidates, including frontrunner former President Donald Trump, have proposed using the U.S. military to attack drug cartels in Mexico.

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

16. US Air Force Osprey crashes off southern Japan, at least 1 dead

We have to hold out hope for the rest of the crew.

Excerpts:

Japanese Vice Defense Minister Hiroyuki Miyazawa said it had attempted an emergency sea landing and quoted the U.S. military as saying its pilot “did everything possible until the last minute.”

Yokota Air Base is home to U.S. Forces Japan and Fifth Air Force, the service’s organization focused on joint operations with Japan. Six CV-22 Ospreys have been deployed at Yokota, including the one that crashed.

The U.S. military owns hundreds of Ospreys across the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. The Air Force manages a fraction of the inventory at 52 airframes.

Last year, Air Force Special Operations Command ordered a temporary stand-down of its Osprey fleet following back-to-back safety incidents in which the Osprey’s clutch momentarily slipped and then re-engaged, leading to an uneven distribution of power to its massive rotors. The problem can cause the aircraft to lurch dangerously.

Two such problems, known as hard clutch engagements, happened in a six-week period that summer, along with two others that occurred since 2017, the Air Force said in August 2022. The Marine Corps and Navy have reported similar clutch slips, and each service has worked to address the issue in their aircraft.

The MV-22 Osprey, the Marine Corps variant, has been at the center of a series of deadly crashes in recent years, though a Corps spokesman said in July 2022 the aircraft’s rate of mishaps per flight hours was near the average mishap rate for the overall Marine aviation fleet.

US Air Force Osprey crashes off southern Japan, at least 1 dead

militarytimes.com · by Rachel Cohen · November 29, 2023

Editor’s note: This is a developing story and will be updated as more information becomes available.

A rescue effort is underway to save the crew of a U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey that crashed Wednesday during a training mission off the southern coast of Japan, U.S. and Japanese officials said.

One airman who was recovered from the ocean has been pronounced dead, according to Japan’s coast guard. The U.S. Air Force said the cause of the crash and the conditions of seven other troops who were aboard the tiltrotor aircraft remain unknown.

The crew belongs to the Air Force’s 353rd Special Operations Wing at Yokota Air Base outside Tokyo, Air Force Special Operations Command confirmed in a release. Names of those killed in the accident will be withheld until their families are notified.

A Japan's coast guard vessel conducts search and rescue operation around the site where a U.S. military Osprey aircraft was believed to crash in the sea off Yakushima Island, Kagoshima prefecture, southern Japan Wednesday, Nov. 29, 2023. (Kyodo News via AP)

Four fatal Osprey crashes, including Wednesday’s mishap, have claimed the lives of at least 13 American troops in the past two years. This is the first fatal incident involving an Air Force-owned CV-22 since 2010.

The crash also marks the second deadly U.S. special operations mission this month, after five soldiers died Nov. 10 in a MH-60 Black Hawk helicopter crash in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.

The Osprey is a hybrid aircraft that takes off and lands like a helicopter, but during flight it can rotate its propellers forward and cruise much faster like an airplane. While the U.S. Marine Corps flies most of the Ospreys based in Japan, the Air Force also has some deployed there for special operations transport and supply missions around the Pacific.

In Okinawa, where about half of the 50,000 American troops in Japan are based, Gov. Denny Tamaki told reporters Wednesday that he would ask the U.S. military to suspend all Osprey flights in Japan.

Neither the Air Force nor the Marine Corps immediately answered Wednesday whether they would ground their fleets.

Japanese coast guard spokesperson Kazuo Ogawa said the coast guard received an emergency call Wednesday afternoon from a fishing boat near the crash site off Yakushima, an island south of Kagoshima on the southern main island of Kyushu.

Coast guard aircraft and patrol boats found one male crew member, who was later pronounced dead by a doctor at a nearby port, Ogawa said. They also found gray debris believed to be from the aircraft and an empty inflatable life raft in an area about 0.6 miles off the eastern coast of Yakushima, he said.

The coast guard said it planned to continue searching through the night.

Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno said the Osprey disappeared from radar a few minutes before the coast guard received the emergency call. The aircraft requested an emergency landing at the Yakushima airport about five minutes before it was lost from radar, NHK public television and other news outlets reported.

NHK quoted a Yakushima resident as saying he saw the aircraft turned upside down, with fire coming from one of its engines, and then an explosion before it fell to the sea.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said he planned to seek a further explanation from the U.S. military, but he declined to say whether he would seek a temporary suspension of Osprey operations in Japan.

Ogawa said the aircraft had departed from the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in Yamaguchi prefecture and crashed on its way to Kadena Air Base on Okinawa.

Japanese Vice Defense Minister Hiroyuki Miyazawa said it had attempted an emergency sea landing and quoted the U.S. military as saying its pilot “did everything possible until the last minute.”

Yokota Air Base is home to U.S. Forces Japan and Fifth Air Force, the service’s organization focused on joint operations with Japan. Six CV-22 Ospreys have been deployed at Yokota, including the one that crashed.

The U.S. military owns hundreds of Ospreys across the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. The Air Force manages a fraction of the inventory at 52 airframes.

Last year, Air Force Special Operations Command ordered a temporary stand-down of its Osprey fleet following back-to-back safety incidents in which the Osprey’s clutch momentarily slipped and then re-engaged, leading to an uneven distribution of power to its massive rotors. The problem can cause the aircraft to lurch dangerously.

Two such problems, known as hard clutch engagements, happened in a six-week period that summer, along with two others that occurred since 2017, the Air Force said in August 2022. The Marine Corps and Navy have reported similar clutch slips, and each service has worked to address the issue in their aircraft.

The MV-22 Osprey, the Marine Corps variant, has been at the center of a series of deadly crashes in recent years, though a Corps spokesman said in July 2022 the aircraft’s rate of mishaps per flight hours was near the average mishap rate for the overall Marine aviation fleet.

In March 2022, four Marines were killed in Norway in an Osprey crash that the Marine Corps ultimately attributed to pilot error.

In June of the same year, five Marines were killed when their Osprey crashed in southern California. The service later said the mishap was caused by a hard clutch engagement on both sides of the aircraft.

In August 2023, an MV-22 crashed in northern Australia, killing three Marines. The incident is under investigation.

Nonfatal incidents continue to bedevil the fleet as well. In September, three Okinawa-based Marine Corps Ospreys were forced to land in Japan after cockpit warnings prompted pilots to divert from their scheduled flight paths.

And in October, an MV-22 carrying four Marines experienced a hard landing during a training event in Nevada. The Marine Corps’ initial assessment found the mishap, which injured one Marine, likely hadn’t resulted from mechanical issues, a Marine spokesman said.

Despite the series of mishaps, the military has reiterated its commitment to the Osprey.

“We’re very confident in the mitigation steps that we’ve done,” Air Force Special Operations Command boss Lt. Gen. Tony Bauernfeind said of mechanical concerns in September.

The CV-22 is “answering a long-held requirement that no other capability can answer in the special operations community,” he said.

Marine Corps Times staff reporter Irene Loewenson and Associated Press reporter Tara Copp contributed to this story.

About Rachel S. Cohen

Rachel Cohen is the editor of Air Force Times. She joined the publication as its senior reporter in March 2021. Her work has appeared in the Washington Post, the Frederick News-Post (Md.), Air and Space Forces Magazine, Inside Defense, Inside Health Policy and elsewhere.

17. Rather than play another year, Utah State QB Levi Williams plans for Navy SEAL training

Rather than play another year, Utah State QB Levi Williams plans for Navy SEAL training

https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2023/11/29/utah-state-qb-levi-williams-navy-seal-training/71747371007/?utm

Jordan Mendoza

USA TODAY

0:06

As college football players decide whether they will enter the transfer portal or enter the NFL draft, Utah State quarterback Levi Williams is opting for a different route: enter Navy SEAL training.

With one year of eligibility left, Williams revealed his goal of becoming a Navy SEAL rather than stay another year on the Utah radio station KSL 97.5. He said it took "a lot of thought and consideration" to reach his decision, but plans to apply for the training.

"I love football and it’s so great, but I knew that eventually it was going to come to an end," Williams said. "Just based with the timeline with the training and stuff, it just kind of works out perfectly that it ends this year. My mom, she was Army. My grandparents, they were Navy and Army, so it kind of runs in the family. I just want to be in a spot where I can protect this great country where we get to play football."

Williams announced his decision just a few days after his big performance against New Mexico led to the Aggies becoming bowl eligible. He accounted for 351 yards of total offense and five touchdowns in the 44-41 double overtime win to get Utah State to six wins this season. He was also named the Mountain West offensive player of the week.

After beginning his the first three seasons of his college career at Wyoming, Williams transferred to Utah State in 2022. The signal-caller began the season as the team's third-string quarterback and had sporadic appearances this year, but the game against the Lobos was his first start due to injuries.

The junior quarterback plans to take a SEAL qualifying fitness test after the season. It is a rigorous test that features a 500-yard swim, maximum push-ups, pull-ups, and curl-ups done in separate two-minute intervals, and a 1.5-mile run. The individual time for either the swim or the run cannot exceed 12 ½ minutes.

Williams said he has begun training for the test and "got a really good score" the last time he attempted it. He also mentioned how the goal of Navy SEALs appealed to him in his decision.

"What I love about their ethos and their motto is that no one guy is better than the other. It takes all of them to complete a mission," Williams said. "To have the ability to possibly be part of that brotherhood in that would be a great honor."

Utah State will learn what bowl game it will play in on Sunday, which Williams plans to play in what will be his final game. With the selection process coming in February, Williams will hope to be graduated as a SEAL in summer 2024.

Contributing: Associated Press

18. Opinion | Ukraine aid’s best-kept secret: Most of the money stays in the U.S.A.

Some interesting facts.

Opinion | Ukraine aid’s best-kept secret: Most of the money stays in the U.S.A.

By Marc A. Thiessen

Columnist

November 29, 2023 at 12:04 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Marc A. Thiessen · November 29, 2023

Columnist|

November 29, 2023 at 12:04 p.m. EST

Here is the best-kept secret about U.S. military aid to Ukraine: Most of the money is being spent here in the United States. That’s right: Funds that lawmakers approve to arm Ukraine are not going directly to Ukraine but being used stateside to build new weapons or to replace weapons sent to Kyiv from U.S. stockpiles. Of the $68 billion in military and related assistance Congress has approved since Russia invaded Ukraine, almost 90 percent is going to Americans, one analysis found.

But you wouldn’t know that from the actions of some U.S. lawmakers. When Ohio Sen. J.D. Vance (R) joined a United Auto Workers picket line in October at the Jeep assembly plant in Toledo, he said he wanted to “show some support for the UAW workers” in his state. Yet he has not shown the same solidarity with the UAW workers in Lima, Ohio, who are churning out Abrams tanks and Stryker combat vehicles for Ukraine thanks to the military aid that Congress has approved. Vance opposes Ukraine aid, as does Rep. Jim Jordan (R), whose House district includes Lima.

Ohio voters might have expected their elected leaders to be pushing the (reluctant) Biden administration to give Ukraine more Lima-produced tanks and vehicles — or to require that more of them be included in the aid package for Ukraine that Congress will soon take up. Instead, Vance and Jordan are fighting to stop Ukraine from receiving any more union-made tanks and combat vehicles from America’s only tank factory.

It’s not just them. In all, 31 senators and House members whose states or districts benefit from funding for Ukraine have voted to oppose or restrict that aid. They include some of the most prominent anti-Ukraine voices in Congress, such as Republican Sens. Josh Hawley (Mo.), Tommy Tuberville (Ala.) and Mike Braun (Ind.), as well as Republican Reps. Matt Gaetz (Fla.), Bill Posey (Fla.), Anna Paulina Luna (Fla.) and Lance Gooden (Tex.).

At a time when both major parties are competing to win working-class votes and strengthen the U.S. manufacturing base, our military aid to Ukraine does exactly that — it is providing a major cash infusion into factories across the country that directly benefits American workers. It is also creating jobs and opportunities for local suppliers, shops, restaurants and other businesses that support the factories rolling out weapons.

Until now no one had mapped out precisely where these U.S. military aid funds are going. My American Enterprise Institute colleagues Clara Keuss, Noah Burke and I have catalogued the weapons systems being produced in the United States for Ukraine — tracing the states and congressional districts where they are being made and how senators and House members voted on the funding. We analyzed contracts and press releases and spoke to defense industry experts, diplomats and Pentagon officials to determine where U.S. tax dollars end up.

We have identified 117 production lines in at least 31 states and 71 U.S. cities where American workers are producing major weapons systems for Ukraine. For example, aid that Congress has already approved is going to, among many other places:

Simi Valley, Calif.; Fullerton, Calif.; Andover, Mass.; Forest, Miss.; and York, Pa., to build Switchblade unmanned aerial systems, radar systems and tactical vehicles.
York, Pa., and Anniston, Ala., to build Bradley infantry fighting vehicles.
Aiken, S.C.; Elgin, Okla.; Sterling Heights, Mich.; Endicott, N.Y.; York, Pa.; and Minneapolis to build Howitzers.
Peoria, Ill.; Clearwater, Palm Bay and Niceville, Fla.; Camden, Ark.; Lancaster and Grand Prairie, Tex.; Rocket Center, W.Va.; and Trenton, N.J., to build HIMARS systems.
Anniston and Huntsville, Ala., and Camden, Ark., to build parts for the Hydra-70 rocket.
Farmington, N.M.; Orlando; Tucson; and Troy, Ala., to build Javelin antitank missiles.

Many other weapons systems are being built for Ukraine in factories around our country. Nor does this list count the suppliers that provide these contractors with parts, such as plastic and computer chips, or produce smaller items for Ukraine such as cold-weather and night-vision gear, medical supplies, spare parts and millions of rounds of small-arms ammunition. As one Ukrainian official told me, “Every single state in the U.S. contributes to this effort.”

In other words, as happens with foreign military aid, our aid to Ukraine is not only creating American jobs but also reinvigorating our dangerously atrophied defense industrial base. Vance said in October that “The condition of the American defense industrial base is a national scandal. Repairing it is among our most urgent priorities.” Well, our aid to Ukraine is doing exactly that.

For example, the United States had not built a single new Stinger antiaircraft missile since 2005. The terrorists we were fighting in recent decades did not have jet fighters, so production faltered. Now, thanks to the Ukraine aid that Vance opposes, the Pentagon signed a $624.6 million contract last year to build Stinger missiles in Tucson, to replace about 1,400 sent to Ukraine. Without our Ukraine resupply effort, the Stinger production line likely would have remained dormant — perhaps until bombs started dropping in a conflict over Taiwan.

Or take the $600 million being used to build two weapons systems for Ukraine in St. Charles, Mo. One is the Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM ER), an air-launched GPS-guided weapon that converts dumb bombs into precision-guided glide bombs with a range of up to 45 miles (triple the range of the original weapon). The other is the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB), a weapon system newly developed for Ukraine that can be launched from High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and can travel 93 miles, almost double the range of current ground-launched precision munition systems.

If we were not aiding Ukraine, the United States would not be producing either of these weapons. The funding Congress has provided to manufacture both systems injects many millions of dollars into Missouri’s economy and is busying production lines for these advanced capabilities. Those systems will now be available for the United States and Taiwan should a conflict erupt with China, as well as available for Israel.

Workers in West Plains, Mo., are using Ukraine aid to build the MIM-104 Phased Array Tracking Radar for the Patriot missile system that shocked the world this year by downing Russia’s supposedly “invincible” hypersonic missile. This saved Ukrainian lives and proved in real battlefield conditions that the upgraded Patriot system might help defend against hypersonic threats from other adversaries.

Most senators would take credit for these successes. Not Hawley, who is trying to cut funding for these systems being built in his state. The same goes for Rep. Jason T. Smith, who represents Missouri’s 8th Congressional District, where the Patriot radars are built, yet has voted against such aid multiple times. Missouri’s other Republican U.S. senator, Eric Schmitt, has not yet voted on Ukraine aid but has said, “I don’t support these forever wars.” Perhaps he will support defense investments that benefit Missouri workers and strengthen our military production capacity to defend against Communist China?

Among the most shocking examples of our defense industrial base’s decline is our struggle to produce a relatively simple munition: 155-millimeter artillery shells. These shells would be in high demand in any conflict the United States fights. Ukraine is firing 6,000 to 8,000 such shells a day, and Israel is ordering them by the tens of thousands. But before Russia invaded Ukraine last year, the United States was producing fewer than 15,000 shells per month. So the Pentagon has allocated $1.5 billion to boost production by 500 percent, and is on pace to reach 100,000 per month.

Thanks to our withered defense production capacity, including a lack of machine tools, reaching that rate will take two years. Even then, the U.S. output in 2025 is likely to not match that of Russia in 2024. But were it not for our aid to Ukraine, those U.S. production increases would not be happening. Thanks to money Congress approved to arm Kyiv, shells are being assembled in Scranton and Wilkes-Barre, Pa., and in a new factory in Camden, Ark., using components (including explosives, propellant, primers, fuses and shell bodies) produced in such U.S. cities and towns as Kingsport and Cordova, Tenn.; Bristol, Pa.; Middletown, Iowa; and Coachella, Calif. A factory being built in Mesquite, Tex., is expected to produce about 20,000 shells a month and employ at least 125 workers after it comes online early next year. The president of the Mesquite Chamber of Commerce told the New York Times that lawmakers who oppose Ukraine aid are “voting against your constituents. … You’re literally saying no to the people you’re representing.” Yet Rep. Lance Gooden (R), who represents Mesquite, voted against the aid that is helping to fund the new plant in his district.

Our aid to Ukraine is not only forcing the Pentagon to rapidly increase the United States’ ability to produce weapons; it’s also modernizing the U.S. military. As retired Army Maj. Gen. John G. Ferrari, now a colleague at the American Enterprise Institute, recently pointed out, we are giving Ukraine weapons systems that are often decades old and then replacing our stockpiles with more advanced versions. “Because of the existing budget pressures on the Army, it wouldn’t be able to afford this needed modernization of equipment on its own,” Ferrari wrote in an op-ed. “By transferring weapons and gear to Ukraine, the Army would receive more modern weapons in return.”

The U.S.-led effort to arm Ukraine reinvigorates our defense production capacity in still other ways. The United States is also creating incentives for NATO allies to donate their old U.S.-produced and Soviet-era weapons systems to Ukraine by authorizing the sale of newer, modern U.S.-made systems to replace them. For example, Poland sent 250 older Soviet and German tanks to Ukraine and signed a $4.75 billion deal in April 2022 to buy 250 M1A2 Abrams replacement tanks that will be produced at the Lima, Ohio, factory. Poland subsequently made a $1.4 billion deal for additional tanks. Poland also sent its Soviet-made Mi-24 attack helicopters to Ukraine and then signed a $12 billion deal to purchase 96 Apache helicopters that will be built in Mesa, Ariz.

Efforts to arm and equip Ukraine have also dramatically boosted sales of U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets. This benefits workers at production facilities in Palmdale, Calif.; East Hartford, Conn.; Middletown, Iowa; and Fort Worth, as well as in other U.S. cities that produce parts for the jets. Finland, which finalized a $9.4 billion deal to purchase 64 F-35s, has said the new planes will allow it to donate its old F/A-18 Hornet fighters to Ukraine. Norway, which has donated old F-16 fighters to Ukraine, is purchasing 52 F-35s as well as spending $293 million to arm them with 580 StormBreaker Small Diameter Bombs made in Tucson, Ariz.,. Denmark and the Netherlands are donating 61 F-16s to Ukraine and replacing them with additional F-35s.

In all, our analysis found that there are at least 13 production lines in 10 states and 11 U.S. cities producing new American-made weapons for NATO allies to replace the equipment they have sent to Ukraine. As Mark Cancian of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has concluded, “much of the money directly supporting Ukraine is spent not abroad, but here in the United States.” This makes it “a misnomer” to call the $68 billion he calculates we have spent to arm Ukraine “aid.”

We asked for comments from the lawmakers who voted against aid that is going to their districts. “Manufacturing weapons in Ohio is good. You know what’s better? Using them for our own defense rather than sending them to a corrupt money pit in Eastern Europe,” Vance said. “There’s no question why Ukraine wants Abrams tanks … but our constituents have great concerns about seemingly unlimited taxpayer money being used to fund the war in Ukraine,” a spokesman for Jordan replied. “Alabama is right to be proud of our role in securing America’s national defense, but the United States cannot get involved in every conflict around the world,” said Tuberville. “We borrow $1 trillion every six months, and our growing national debt is our most dire national security threat,” said a spokesman for Braun. “I don’t vote for or against wars based on which congressional districts get the jobs,” Gaetz responded.

As I have pointed out, it is in the United States’ vital interests to arm Ukraine in its fight to defeat Russian aggression. Our support for Ukraine is decimating the Russian military threat to NATO, restoring deterrence with China, dissuading other nuclear powers from launching wars of aggression, and improving American military preparedness for other adversaries. The “America First” case for helping Ukraine is clear.

But if those arguments are not persuasive, then this should be: Our military aid to Ukraine is revitalizing manufacturing communities across the United States, creating good jobs here at home and restoring the United States’ capacity to produce weapons for our national defense. Helping Ukraine is the right thing to do for U.S. national security. It is also the right thing to do for American workers.

correction

An earlier version of this column misattributed a quote to a spokesman for Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio). The quote was from the senator. This version has been updated.

The Washington Post · by Marc A. Thiessen · November 29, 2023

19. Keep soldiers out of our creek, farm owners tell Fort Liberty

Rarely does anyone want to be put on the military off limits list.

Keep soldiers out of our creek, farm owners tell Fort Liberty

militarytimes.com · by Jon Simkins · November 28, 2023

Officials at Fort Liberty recently unveiled a revised index of establishments deemed off limits to base personnel due to concerns stemming from health and safety, patron behavior and unethical business practices, Army officials announced in a memo.

The list, for the most part, comprises the usual suspects known to attract the episodic interest of impressionable young misfits from neighboring locales, the North Carolina installation included. Strip clubs, an adult boutique bearing the moniker “Peaches,” unlicensed tattoo shops, spurious taverns frequented by drug dealers and gangs, and premises known for parading sex workers were all present — to the surprise of none.

And yet the aforementioned enterprises do not an eyebrow-raiser make. For that, attention can be turned toward the family owned and operated McCormick Farms, where, on numerous occasions, base personnel have reportedly trespassed and gone for a dip in the property’s creek, according to local outlet CBS 17.

Beyond apparent service member affinity for creek-based aquatics, (presumably) junior enlisted free of the daily oppressor known as Police Call have also left trash behind for the owners to pick up themselves.

So prevailing is the trespassing activity that it was the property owners themselves — not base leadership, as was the case with the other establishments included in the memo — who requested that the farm be added to the Army’s expansive catalog of thou-shalt-nots.

According to Fort Liberty’s Morale Welfare and Recreation website, the base currently “operates 5 swimming pools ... and offers a large number of aquatic classes and programs throughout the year.” Yet none apparently offer the swim qual results yielded by the ol’ McCormick tributary.

The memo, which was authored by Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board President Col. John M. Wilcox, goes on to state that military “personnel observed in off-limits establishments are in violation of a lawful order and are subject to apprehension and prosecution for violation of the UCMJ.”

Whether soldiers will remember the “no trespassing” order on those sweet, warm Carolina summers while sipping lemonade underneath a shady tree remains to be seen.

Nevertheless, McCormick Farms remembers.

Observation Post is the Military Times one-stop shop for all things off-duty. Stories may reflect author observations.

About Jon Simkins

Jon Simkins is a writer and editor for Military Times, and a USMC veteran.

20. Hamas Kills 3 Israelis at Jerusalem Bus Station; Blinken Visits as Gaza Ceasefire Extended With New Hostage Release

Hamas Kills 3 Israelis at Jerusalem Bus Station; Blinken Visits as Gaza Ceasefire Extended With New Hostage Release

Hamas' inability to hand over more hostages may bring an early end to the ceasefire, even as U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrives to talk about extending the truce.

Published 11/30/23 05:40 AM ET|Updated 21 min ago

Peter S. Green

themessenger.com · November 30, 2023

Just hours before fighting was set to resume Thursday morning, Israel and Hamas agreed to extend their ceasefire by another day, with Hamas preparing to let go eight Israeli women and children, and returning the bodies of three hostages who it says died in an Israeli air strike.

Yet even as peace was extended more people were killed on both sides in Jerusalem and the West Bank, including at least three Israelis killed at a bus stop by a pair of Hamas terrorists, and two boys and two Palestinian militants who were shot by Israeli forces in the West Bank on Tuesday night and Wednesday.

View post on Twitter

The bus stop attack in Jerusalem was caught on CCTV camera. The assailants had reportedly been previously imprisoned and released by Israel.

Meanwhile, Qatar’s foreign ministry said the ceasefire was extended on the same terms as previous days, while talks continue in Doha for a further extension.

View post on Twitter

Hamas has now said it will release eight Israeli women and children, and the bodies of three more Israelis, the Jerusalem Post reports, after initially saying it could only locate seven live captives and three dead ones.

Israeli officials said there are still at least three children and 22 women remaining in captivity in Gaza, along with 131 men.

On Wednesday, Hamas released 12 captives, including two who hold Russian citizenship, in what it said was a gesture to Russian President Vladimir Putin, a long-time Hamas ally.

Negotiators had earlier said they were hoping for a four-day extension, but Hamas said it cannot locate any further women and children to exchange. As many as 30 hostages may be in the hands of criminal gangs or other terrorist groups in Gaza, Qatari’s emir said in an interview Sunday.

As the fragile truce ticks toward expiration on Friday morning, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived in Israel, where he is meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He’s also scheduled to meet Palestinian officials in the West Bank. He’s there to discuss extending the ceasefire and increasing the flow of humanitarian aid to Israel.

Netanyahu said Wednesday in an interview posted to the social media site X, that once the ceasefire was concluded, Israel would continue to pursue the war to crush Hamas.

View post on Twitter

The shooting at a crowded bus station at the entrance to Jerusalem occurred just minutes after the new ceasefire agreement was reached. Two Palestinian men from East Jerusalem drove up to the bus station and opened fire with an M-16 rifle and a pistol, according to news reports.

Three people were killed and six were wounded, two of them seriously. Two off-duty soldiers and an armed civilian in the area returned fire, killing the two terrorists. Israel’s Shin Bet security agency said the attackers were Hamas members previously jailed for terror activity.

Opposition leader Benny Gantz, who has joined Netanyahu in Israel’s so-called War cabinet, said the Thursday morning attack in Jerusalem has only strengthened Israel’s resolve to continue its war against Hamas.

“This terror attack is further proof of our obligation to continue to fight with strength and determination against murderous terrorism, which threatens our citizens. In Jerusalem, Gaza, in Judea and Samaria, and everywhere,” Gantz wrote on X, using the biblical name for the West Bank.

View post on Twitter

Tuesday night Israeli troops killed two members of a militant group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and on Wednesday, they shot two boys, aged 9 and 15, one of whom was reportedly firing on Israeli forces with an automatic weapon.

For Blinken, this is his fourth visit to the Middle East since the October 7 attack. It comes as CIA chief Willliam Burns, and Mossad chief David Barnea, hold meetings with senior officials in Qatar to expand the pool of hostages eligible for release in conjunction with a longer cease-fire, Haaretz reports.

Ahead of his visit, Blinken said Wednesday: "We’ll discuss with Israel how it can achieve its objective of ensuring that the terrorist attacks of October 7th never happen again, while sustaining and increasing humanitarian assistance – and minimizing further suffering and casualties among Palestinian civilians."

themessenger.com · November 30, 2023

21. Is there anything to Learn from Ukraine?

Excerpts:

The Russo-Ukraine war has amplified the debate about the scale and impact of the changing character of warfare. This debate remains unsettled, even though it is undeniable that changes in technology are affecting how militaries do and will fight.

While the authors above may disagree on the extent to which we can or should be drawing lessons from the Russo-Ukraine war, they both make important points that military professionals should consider. Owen’s warning that there is little new and concern that the wrong lessons risk diverting resources provides a crucial perspective that should lead military professionals to be deliberate in their analysis and changes based on lessons from the conflict. Crombe and Nagl are certainly correct that technology is driving changes to how militaries do and will fight, a point recently made very clear by General Mark Milley, outgoing United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further study will help military professionals understand how and what they might do about it. For that reason, both are worth reading and contemplating.

History abounds with examples of professionals across many domains failing to anticipate change. Warfare, being an instrument of last resort and an inherently human endeavor, is notoriously difficult to study. Ukraine offers military professionals the opportunity to examine how old and new technologies are employed and the implications this can have for force design, development, and experimentation. Even if professionals understand modern warfare, as Owen claims, they should study this conflict to validate their understanding and avoid strategic surprise. This includes fully exploring the Russo-Ukraine conflict’s similarities and differences with anticipated conflicts and ensuring deliberate analysis of any lessons to avoid misusing what are likely to be increasingly tight resources in the future.

Military professionals have an obligation to study this conflict, but they should do so deliberately and through engagement with a broad range of perspectives. Through this type of detailed study, military professionals can prepare their minds and organizations for the fog of future war.

Is there anything to Learn from Ukraine?

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/learning-lessons-1/

CHASE METCALF NOVEMBER 30, 2023 7 MIN READ

EDITOR’S NOTE: This is the first in a four-part series of articles on how national security professionals should (and should not) approach the fraught task of learning lessons from something as complex as war. We have assembled a team of sharp minds and pens in the business to apply their varying perspectives to the question opened by the Army War College’s Chase Metcalf, how do we think about learning lessons from war? It is a fitting end to 2023 and, unfortunately, will likely be essential in 2024 as well.

Engaging with these competing viewpoints can provide military professionals with insights to help avoid strategic surprise and prepare for the future.

Studying the Russo-Ukraine conflict is critical to understanding the changing character of warfare—or is it? Respected experts debate if and how the character of warfare is changing and what lessons we can draw from the Russo-Ukraine conflict.

Recent articles by William “Wilf” Owen and by the team of Katie Crombe and John Nagl are illustrative. Writing in British Army Review, Owen takes a somewhat contrarian view, arguing that drawing lessons from incomplete information about the ongoing Russo-Ukraine conflict is problematic. Meanwhile, in Parameters, Crombe and Nagl say that the U.S. Army must “embrace the Russo-Ukraine conflict as an opportunity” to shape its education, training, and doctrine. Engaging with these competing viewpoints can provide military professionals with insights to help avoid strategic surprise and prepare for the future. But this must be done deliberately and with an open mind to avoid learning the wrong lessons from a conflict that is far from over.

Nothing New for Professionals

William Owen argues in “The False Lessons of Modern War: Why Ignorance is Not Insight” that it is problematic to “identify lessons from current or recent conflicts” when few, if any, of these should be “noteworthy” to an informed professional. Owen addresses the “myth” that warfare is becoming more lethal, argues that drones and transparency on the battlefield are not new, and notes that context matters by highlighting that Ukraine lacks equivalent training and equipment as the British Army (as well as other Western militaries). This argument is supported, at least in part, by Steve Biddle’s recent Foreign Affairs piece, “Back in the Trenches: Why New Technology Hasn’t Revolutionized Warfare in Ukraine.”

Taking an almost nihilistic stance, Owen argues that “the future is unknowable,” so observations from ongoing conflicts, absent context and analysis, lack relevance. Moreover, Owen assesses that the British Army understood contemporary warfare before Ukraine and warns that “lessons” from Ukraine, like those focused on platforms, risk diverting attention and resources from existing plans and programs. He further claims the idea that one can draw useful insights about future wars from current conflicts is not as “safe nor as historically valid as many assume.”

Strategic Inflection Point

In contrast, Crombe and Nagl, in “A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force,” note the U.S. Army faces a strategic inflection point as it transitions from 20 years of counterinsurgency operations to refocus on large-scale combat operations. The authors argue that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is an opportunity to study the changing character of warfare, and the U.S. Army must do so to inform its future education, training, and doctrine. This argument is amplified by Max Boot’s Washington Post opinion piece, “The Ukraine war is revolutionizing military technology.”

Crombe and Nagl’s article previews a forthcoming monograph examining lessons from the Russo-Ukraine war and issues for further exploration. Given Owen’s article, three issues are of particular interest: 1) an assessment that an increase in pace and precision of adversary kill chains will require changes to how the U.S. Army executes command and control; 2) that casualty levels and reconstitution requirements may drive reconceptualization of all-volunteer force; and 3) that AI and other technology will continue to accelerate the pace of conflict and potentially level the battlefield for a range of actors. Given these issues, Crombe and Nagl argue the U.S. Army must do as they did after the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict by deriving and integrating lessons from the conflict to prepare the force for future conflict.

The Truth is Somewhere in the Middle

On the surface, the authors disagree on what, if anything, can be learned from the Russo-Ukraine conflict. So, who is right? A deeper examination of the specifics illustrates that both are, at least in part.

First, let’s consider drones and transparency on the battlefield. Owen is correct in noting that drones have been employed for decades and that the transparent battlefield has been with us since at least World War I. However, as Crombe and Nagl highlight, drones and other technology have improved detection capabilities and will continue to accelerate the pace of warfare when combined with artificial intelligence. Here, Owen is looking at the components of the kill-chain while Crombe and Nagl are focused more on the combination of systems and technologies and the impact that has on the pace of warfare.

Discrete technological advances are interesting. The combination of multiple technologies with new tactics and active experimentation can upend balances of power.

Both have a point on this issue, but it is unarguable that military professionals must understand how old and new technologies are employed, individually or in combination, and the implications thereof. Given the increased scale on which drones are being used and the ability of machine learning and artificial intelligence to crunch data, it is a change similar to the development of blitzkrieg or naval airpower during the period between World War I and World War II. Discrete technological advances are interesting. The combination of multiple technologies with new tactics and active experimentation can upend balances of power. For that reason alone, military professionals must study this conflict.

A second major issue is the question of casualty rates and reconstitution. Owen uses the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict to support his assertion that the attrition of people and platforms in contemporary conflict does not come close to that of the past. Conversely, Crombe and Nagl argue that casualty rates in the Russo-Ukraine conflict and a recruiting crisis in the U.S. Army highlight a systemic vulnerability: while casualties may not be higher than in the past in absolute terms, the U.S. and Western militaries are undeniably far smaller than in the past. Additionally, America’s political willingness to deal with the anticipated casualty levels of large-scale combat operations is uncertain and even unknowable.

A third issue is the importance of context. Owen argues that Ukraine’s lack of equivalent training, doctrine, and equipment limits one’s ability to draw useful insights from the conflict. Crombe and Nagl disagree on the ability to draw lessons despite differences between Ukraine and Western militaries. Context matters, and Owen is right to highlight the differences between the Ukrainians and the British regarding training and platforms. Armies must always be sensitive to recency bias and mirroring in their analysis of conflict. However, professionals can still derive useful insights from conflicts involving different contexts through deliberate study.

So What Now?

The Russo-Ukraine war has amplified the debate about the scale and impact of the changing character of warfare. This debate remains unsettled, even though it is undeniable that changes in technology are affecting how militaries do and will fight.

While the authors above may disagree on the extent to which we can or should be drawing lessons from the Russo-Ukraine war, they both make important points that military professionals should consider. Owen’s warning that there is little new and concern that the wrong lessons risk diverting resources provides a crucial perspective that should lead military professionals to be deliberate in their analysis and changes based on lessons from the conflict. Crombe and Nagl are certainly correct that technology is driving changes to how militaries do and will fight, a point recently made very clear by General Mark Milley, outgoing United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further study will help military professionals understand how and what they might do about it. For that reason, both are worth reading and contemplating.

History abounds with examples of professionals across many domains failing to anticipate change. Warfare, being an instrument of last resort and an inherently human endeavor, is notoriously difficult to study. Ukraine offers military professionals the opportunity to examine how old and new technologies are employed and the implications this can have for force design, development, and experimentation. Even if professionals understand modern warfare, as Owen claims, they should study this conflict to validate their understanding and avoid strategic surprise. This includes fully exploring the Russo-Ukraine conflict’s similarities and differences with anticipated conflicts and ensuring deliberate analysis of any lessons to avoid misusing what are likely to be increasingly tight resources in the future.

Military professionals have an obligation to study this conflict, but they should do so deliberately and through engagement with a broad range of perspectives. Through this type of detailed study, military professionals can prepare their minds and organizations for the fog of future war.

Chase Metcalf is a colonel, an Army strategist and an instructor at the U.S. Army War College. He most recently served as Deputy Director of the Russia Strategic Initiative at the United States’ European Command.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: Caption reads; Russian reconnaissance drone “Eleron T-16” landed by Ukrainian border guards by an anti-drone gun “on Kharkiv direction”. The inset caption reads “Steel Border”

Photo Credit: Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Facebook page via Wikimedia Commons

22. The United Kingdom's Indo-Pacific Engagement

Excerpts:

The Sunak government explicitly recognizes Europe and Russia’s resurgence on the continent as an overriding security concern. That said, the administration has plainly made engagement with the Indo-Pacific an important cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s future foreign policy interests, with AUKUS acting as a defining anchor for the Atlantic-Pacific partnership emphasized in The Integrated Review Refresh 2023. To give added weight to this geostrategic alignment, in December 2022 Britain concluded a major accord with Italy and Japan — the Global Combat Programme — to deliver an operational next-generation stealth fighter jet by 2035, and, as noted, acceded to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership in July 2023. It is unlikely that Sunak’s shift to the Indo-Pacific would substantially change under a Starmer administration, which recent polls have predicted is likely to win a general election widely expected in 2024.

It is certainly doubtful there will be any move to withdraw from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which offers significant opportunities for boosting trade ties with some of the world’s most vibrant economic powerhouses — including, potentially, China, should the government’s application to join the grouping prove successful. Similarly, there is little reason to believe that the United Kingdom would choose not to foster its role as a full Association of Southeast Asian Nations dialogue partner — including lobbying for inclusion in the bloc’s Regional Forum, which Britain applied to join in June 2023 — as this opens a largely costless avenue for the country to engage Southeast Asia on a wide range of issues.

In the security realm, Labour will have a strong motivation to steadfastly support AUKUS. Australia and the United States are two of the United Kingdom’s closest allies, and far more so than major European Union players such as France and Germany. Unravelling the pact, which Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles has described as “too big to fail,” would damage two critical bilateral relationships, dent London’s esteemed “special relationship” with Washington, diminish the credibility of Britain’s global defense and strategic standing, and possibly have implications for the 77-year-old Five Eyes intelligence agreement that additionally includes Canada and New Zealand. Importantly in a March 2023 interview with Politico, Shadow Defence Secretary John Healey categorically declared Labour’s backing for AUKUS would be “absolute” and, indeed, would extend to all parts of the security and technology alliance, not just those dealing with the construction of nuclear-powered submarines.

The current Opposition also shares many of the present government’s reservations over Beijing’s increasingly belligerent behavior in the Indo-Pacific. Britain Reconnected, for instance, specifically notes that “China’s growth has been matched by greater repression at home and more assertive behavior abroad” — reflecting the same line emphasized by Prime Minister Sunak. Within this context, Lammy has confirmed Labour will carry out, for the first time, a complete audit of the United Kingdom’s relationship with China to ensure that it reflects British concerns and values.

Should Labour assume power in 2024 (or 2025, when an election has to take place), it is therefore improbable that the new government will move to significantly deviate from the Indo-Pacific engagement course that the United Kingdom has presently embarked on. While ensuring the sanctity of the Euro-Atlantic area will be the defense priority (as it is now with the ruling Conservative administration), economic and political realities mean that the latter theater will necessarily continue to be of significant importance for securing the country’s future interests.

The United Kingdom's Indo-Pacific Engagement - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Peter Chalk · November 30, 2023

Since its unprecedented departure from the European Union, the United Kingdom has progressively moved to broaden its foreign policy outlook to take account of other critical regions in the world. In 2021, the government produced an integrated review of the country’s future security, defense, and development goals and in 2023 unveiled a “refresh” of that document. Although both stress that the security and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic theater will remain a core British priority, they each give added weight to the imperative of engaging the Indo-Pacific on account of its central importance to the global economy and the increasingly bellicose behavior of the People’s Republic of China there.

The United Kingdom is also party to the trilateral AUKUS partnership with Australia and the United States. The pact aims, at least in part, to provide the three countries with advanced deterrence capabilities for pushing back against Chinese assertiveness and thereby ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific — again signifying the government’s desire to deepen its engagement with the region.

Become a Member

It is not apparent that there would be a decisive shift in the United Kingdom’s current foreign policy trajectory should Labour defeat the Conservatives in the country’s next general election widely expected in 2024. The differences between the two parties are more tonal than substantive, with each acknowledging the core importance of ensuring the United Kingdom’s interests in Europe, but accepting the growing need to expand the country’s influence farther east, particularly in light of a rapidly ascending China.

A Lot in Common

Keir Starmer, the leader of the Opposition, has consistently stressed that if elected to office, he would prioritize reconnecting with Europe to repair the damage done by the governing Conservative Party’s chaotic exit from the European Union. This general thrust dovetails with a central plank of Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy’s Britain Reconnected strategy, namely the need to rebuild strong alliances at home, which he argues have always best served the country’s national security interests. To this end, Labour has emphasized a range of policy initiatives it intends to prioritize. Among the more important are inking a new security pact with the European Union, concluding trade deals with key European allies, renegotiating a better and more robust Brexit deal with Brussels, elevating the United Kingdom’s role in developing the nascent European Political Community, remaining fully committed to the defense of Ukraine, and studiously working to become a reliable and valued member of the NATO alliance.

At first glance, such an outlook would seem to run counter to the current Rishi Sunak administration’s desire to cement a long-term commitment to the Indo-Pacific. However, there are reasons to suggest that a major reversal will not occur. Fundamentally, Labour’s priorities in Europe largely mirror those of the Conservatives, namely backing the Ukrainian government’s pugnacious drive for self-defense against Russian aggression (financially, diplomatically, and materially), supporting collective security through NATO, reinvigorating European relationships, and reifying the security of Britain and the Euro-Atlantic theater as first-order concerns. In this sense, a Starmer government’s emphasis on European defense would be a continuation of, not a departure from, the present Sunak administration’s focus.

Beyond this basic point of commonality, economic and political realities strongly suggest that a future Labour government will have an interest in furthering, rather than reeling back, the United Kingdom’s new commitment to the Indo-Pacific. The region holds considerable importance to London’s developing international defense and strategic policy beyond the Euro-Atlantic theater where vital cross-interests with key allies intersect.

No less critically, the in-waiting Starmer administration clearly recognizes that rebuilding relations with Europe and engaging the Indo-Pacific are not mutually exclusive choices. By contrast, the Labour party’s shadow government views the two policy strands as part of a broader unified effort to secure the United Kingdom at home, while simultaneously extending the country’s influence overseas — particularly in light of a geostrategic “balance sheet” that is increasingly shifting eastward. As Baron Ray Collins, who served as Labour’s general secretary between 2008 and 2011, concluded in a speech before the House of Lords on October 19, 2023: “[T]his debate is not about tilting one way or the other. Maintaining serious, long-term engagement approaches to the Indo-Pacific, through arrangements such as AUKUS, is an essential response to the shifting centre of gravity in world affairs. This will not come at the cost of our security commitments in Europe, nor mean that we can safely ignore our own neighbourhood.”

To elucidate these various considerations, it is perhaps worthwhile to examine how the United Kingdom’s current tilt to engage the Indo-Pacific will likely lay the parameters for a future Labour policy to embrace the region.

The U.K. Tilt to and Engagement with the Indo-Pacific

On March 16, 2021, the Boris Johnson administration published Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy outlining the government’s core security, defense, and foreign policy goals for the next decade. At the heart of the document is an intent to extend the United Kingdom’s international relations beyond the Euro-Atlantic area by giving more explicit focus to the Indo-Pacific theater. Articulated in the form of a “tilt,” this reorientation aims to cast post-Brexit Britain as a globally oriented power by enmeshing the country in a region that is not only home to more than half the world’s population, but that also generates the lion’s share of the planet’s gross domestic product.

In line with this objective, the Johnson administration embarked on an intensive foreign policy push to the Indo-Pacific that in the course of just 18 months saw the United Kingdom:

Dispatch the Carrier Strike Group 2021 to the region between May and Dec. 2021 (one of the largest such deployments in a decade).
Successfully lobby to become the eleventh full dialogue partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in August 2021.
Pursue final phase negotiations on acceding to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Announce the United Kingdom’s participation in the trilateral AUKUS defense and security pact in September 2021.
Co-launch the Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative in June 2022.
Open a new Singapore-based regional headquarters for British International Investment in September 2022.

Global Britain emphasized a growing emphasis on the need to engage the Indo-Pacific, acknowledging the continued fundamental importance of the Euro-Atlantic theater to the United Kingdom’s core interests, but also recognizing that the weight of the world’s geopolitical and economic power had now decisively shifted east. The document labelled China as a systemic competitor that, while not posing an immediate threat, still presented a very real challenge.

Developments in Europe during 2022 — notably Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine — together with growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific that primarily stemmed from Beijing’s increasingly coercive and belligerent behavior in the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China seas generated pressure for a reassessment of this outlook. Hence on March 13, 2023, the Sunak government produced a revised and updated version of Johnson’s Global Britain, The Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a More Contested and Volatile World. The new document reaffirms that Europe must remain the United Kingdom’s primary security and defense concern on account of Russia precipitating the largest military conflict on the continent since World War II. However, it also stresses that the Indo-Pacific necessarily demands higher elevation in London’s overall national security planning due to the region’s growing international importance politically, economically, and demographically.

The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 does not explicitly talk to the notion of a Global Britain. Rather, it refers to a multilateral Atlantic-Pacific partnership for positioning the United Kingdom’s defense, security, and economic cooperation with the Indo-Pacific, signifying a more long-term commitment to the region. In this sense, what the 2021 policy paper had previously termed as just a tilt, The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 transcended into a more permanent pillar of London’s international policy thinking.

The United Kingdom’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific reflects three broad, interrelated sets of interest: security, economic, and normative. With regard to the first, a highly combustible mix of historical and territorial disputes besets the region, including major flashpoints in the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China seas that could quickly spiral out of control. The Indo-Pacific is also the primary theater in which the geostrategic competition between the United States and China is now playing itself out. In both cases, concern with Beijing’s antagonistic behavior and how it could adversely affect British partners and the international order is a primary driver of London’s desire to give added defense focus to the region.

In the case of the second, the Indo-Pacific includes some of the world’s most dynamic economies that are critical to the United Kingdom’s overall business, financial, and commercial outlook, especially now that the country is no longer party to the European Union’s single market. It is also the geographic lynchpin of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Britain formally acceded to in July 2023, becoming the first European nation to join one of the world’s largest free trade areas. No less importantly, some of the international system’s most crucial sea lines of communication run through the Indo-Pacific, carrying the bulk of the goods, commodities, and energy supplies that fuel the global economy and contribute to London’s own fiscal and commercial prosperity.

In terms of the third, the United Kingdom sees itself as a force for good that has a vested interest in upholding democratic values and human rights in a region where both are increasingly under threat, as exemplified in places such as Myanmar, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Cambodia. In so doing, the Sunak administration aims to offer an alternative to the model of autocratic governance that China and its regional cohorts are peddling across the Indo-Pacific, namely by articulating a principles-based diplomacy that categorically supports liberal beliefs, freedoms, and attitudes.

It is here where all three interests intersect. As a maritime trading nation, the United Kingdom has an obvious interest in ensuring guaranteed rights of navigation to and from the Indo-Pacific. However, much of the Chinese government’s assertive behavior threatens that access, particularly Beijing’s efforts to enforce its sovereignty over the 90 percent of the South China Sea it claims as its own. To safeguard the former and offset the latter, Britain aims to expand its physical presence in the region to “uphold international rules and norms that underpin free trade, security and stability.” It is against this backdrop that The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 unambiguously clarifies the Sunak government’s policy for this part of the world, affirming that a central tenet of London’s approach is “to support the vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific shared by many regional partners.”

The Sunak Administration’s China Policy

In the context of an ordered and transparent Indo-Pacific, The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 fundamentally reclassifies China from a systemic competitor to an “epoch-defining challenge,” casting the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s actions in the Indo-Pacific as potentially having “greater global consequences than the conflict in Ukraine.” Reflecting this concern, the document includes a section that explicitly lays out the United Kingdom’s policy toward China, basing this on an understanding that in almost all respects, Beijing is pursuing a course that has direct implications not only for the government, but also for “the everyday lives of British people.” In so doing, and in contrast to Global Britain, The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 characterizes the People’s Republic of China as a pacing threat of growing immediate importance.

The Sunak administration’s China platform is based on two core assumptions: that it is not possible to solve any major global problem without the country’s input, and that Beijing has chosen a new “multilateralist” path that pays limited, if not scant, regard for human rights, universal freedoms, and accepted norms of behavior in the international system. To address this complex, hybrid situation, the United Kingdom aims to strike a balanced policy that on the one hand isolates, condemns, and penalizes bellicose Chinese government behavior, while on the other avoids the wholesale ostracization of the country’s leadership.

To this end, The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 lays out a multi-pronged strategy that consists of three main tiers: protect against Chinese Communist Party–sourced threats that undermine the United Kingdom’s national security interests; align with core allies to encourage or pressure Beijing into complying with and upholding its international commitments; and directly engage the Chinese government to preserve and create space for open, predictable, and practical relations. This layered approach reflects awareness of the need to resist Beijing’s assertive drive to usurp the international status quo; appreciation of the reality that China is a global player with concomitant power and influence that the United Kingdom cannot ignore; and acknowledgment of the potential economic benefits that would accrue from constructively working with a nation that, by most estimates, will account for around 20 percent of the world’s gross domestic product by 2050.

AUKUS

Three days before the release of The Integrated Review Refresh 2023, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States held a summit in San Diego, California, to flesh out and confirm the final details of the AUKUS pact. The timing of the meeting was not coincidental, as it is through this trilateral agreement that the United Kingdom intends to enact its reinvigorated strategy of long-term engagement with the Indo-Pacific.

AUKUS, itself, consists of parallel lines of effort encapsulated in two interrelated pillars. First is to support the phased development of a fully interoperable conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) for Australia that the United Kingdom will also deploy. Second is to revolutionize the defense sectors of the three partners by promoting the long-term sharing of information in the areas of AI, quantum technologies, cyber security, undersea attack modalities, hypersonic/counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic warfare.

Through these collective ventures, the three AUKUS partners aim to create a self-reinforcing ecosystem of military and scientific linkages that combine and exploit the competitive and comparative advantages of each nation to maximize the potential output of their joint capabilities. In tangible terms, the trilateral agreement has thus far mainly focused on eventuating the first pillar by meeting several key benchmarks. In reverse order from completion to commencement, these include:

The production of a highly advanced submarine — to be known as an SSN-AUKUS — that will be based on the United Kingdom’s next-generation design, while incorporating cutting-edge U.S. propulsion technology. Britain and Australia will each build a version of the vessel (BAE Systems won a £3.95 billion contract to develop the Anglo variant in October) and respectively deliver it to their navies by the late 2030s and early 2040s.
Subject to Congressional approval, starting in the early 2030s, the purchase by Australia of three American Virginia class submarines, and potentially up to two more if needed (all with at least 20 years of service life remaining), to resolve Canberra’s existing deficit in advanced undersea attack capabilities.
As early as 2027, the establishment of a forward U.S. and U.K. rotational submarine presence at HMAS Sterling near Perth to support the defense of Australian territorial waters and accelerate the human capital, physical infrastructure, and regulatory processes needed for building and supporting a sovereign nuclear-powered submarine capability. To be known as the “submarine rotational force—west,” the formation will consist of one British Astute class and up to four American Virginia class vessels.
The immediate codification of arrangements to embed Australian military and civilian personnel with American and British crews to ensure they receive the necessary training for safely using, sustaining, and regulating the SSN-AUKUS platform. Just prior to the summit in San Diego, Sunak announced a £5 billion (roughly $6 billion) increase to the United Kingdom’s defense budget, a major part of which (£3 billion) will likely go to supporting this aspect of the pact.

If these date-stamped deliverables come to fruition, AUKUS will elevate the industrial capacity of all three of its partners to produce highly capable, fully interoperable nuclear-powered submarines over the long run, potentially adding as many as twelve submarines to the combined inventories of their navies. Though this may be the ultimate goal of the pact, the immediate implicit calculus behind the agreement is that it supplies the West with a firm counterbalance to offset the Chinese government’s increasing naval presence and concerning behavior in the Indo-Pacific. More specifically, by supporting a long-range power projection capability for Australia, both Washington and London would gain a pivotal forward regional maritime footprint from which to rein in and deter a China that Sunak has said is “increasingly authoritarian at home and assertive abroad.”

Summarizing these benefits at the March 2023 San Diego summit, the three AUKUS leaders issued a joint statement affirming that the submarine plan “elevates submarines for decades to come, expands our individual and collective undersea presence in the Indo-Pacific, and contributes to global security and stability.” From the United Kingdom’s perspective, this both strengthens the government’s ability to push back against Chinese belligerence in the region (thereby reinforcing London’s engagement to this part of the world) and better positions Britain in working with Beijing when necessary (for instance, in dealing with climate change and managing bilateral economic ties).

Outlook

The Sunak government explicitly recognizes Europe and Russia’s resurgence on the continent as an overriding security concern. That said, the administration has plainly made engagement with the Indo-Pacific an important cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s future foreign policy interests, with AUKUS acting as a defining anchor for the Atlantic-Pacific partnership emphasized in The Integrated Review Refresh 2023. To give added weight to this geostrategic alignment, in December 2022 Britain concluded a major accord with Italy and Japan — the Global Combat Programme — to deliver an operational next-generation stealth fighter jet by 2035, and, as noted, acceded to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership in July 2023. It is unlikely that Sunak’s shift to the Indo-Pacific would substantially change under a Starmer administration, which recent polls have predicted is likely to win a general election widely expected in 2024.

It is certainly doubtful there will be any move to withdraw from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which offers significant opportunities for boosting trade ties with some of the world’s most vibrant economic powerhouses — including, potentially, China, should the government’s application to join the grouping prove successful. Similarly, there is little reason to believe that the United Kingdom would choose not to foster its role as a full Association of Southeast Asian Nations dialogue partner — including lobbying for inclusion in the bloc’s Regional Forum, which Britain applied to join in June 2023 — as this opens a largely costless avenue for the country to engage Southeast Asia on a wide range of issues.

In the security realm, Labour will have a strong motivation to steadfastly support AUKUS. Australia and the United States are two of the United Kingdom’s closest allies, and far more so than major European Union players such as France and Germany. Unravelling the pact, which Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles has described as “too big to fail,” would damage two critical bilateral relationships, dent London’s esteemed “special relationship” with Washington, diminish the credibility of Britain’s global defense and strategic standing, and possibly have implications for the 77-year-old Five Eyes intelligence agreement that additionally includes Canada and New Zealand. Importantly in a March 2023 interview with Politico, Shadow Defence Secretary John Healey categorically declared Labour’s backing for AUKUS would be “absolute” and, indeed, would extend to all parts of the security and technology alliance, not just those dealing with the construction of nuclear-powered submarines.

The current Opposition also shares many of the present government’s reservations over Beijing’s increasingly belligerent behavior in the Indo-Pacific. Britain Reconnected, for instance, specifically notes that “China’s growth has been matched by greater repression at home and more assertive behavior abroad” — reflecting the same line emphasized by Prime Minister Sunak. Within this context, Lammy has confirmed Labour will carry out, for the first time, a complete audit of the United Kingdom’s relationship with China to ensure that it reflects British concerns and values.

Should Labour assume power in 2024 (or 2025, when an election has to take place), it is therefore improbable that the new government will move to significantly deviate from the Indo-Pacific engagement course that the United Kingdom has presently embarked on. While ensuring the sanctity of the Euro-Atlantic area will be the defense priority (as it is now with the ruling Conservative administration), economic and political realities mean that the latter theater will necessarily continue to be of significant importance for securing the country’s future interests.

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Dr. Peter Chalk is a former senior analyst with the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA and is now a full-time consultant based out of Phoenix, AZ. He is a freelance contributor to Jane’s Intelligence Review, Associate Editor of Studies in Conflict Terrorism and serves as a Subject Matter Expert with the Institute for Security Governance in Monterey, California.

Image: The Royal Navy

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Peter Chalk · November 30, 2023

23. The Maritime Dimension to the Conflict in Israel

Excerpts:

As tragic as the current conflict is, it does not appear to be ending soon. Most attention is focused on Israeli ground operations in Gaza, the potential for escalation between the IDF and Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border, or even conflict between Iran and Israel. The possibility of an expansion of the conflict in the maritime domain, while equally likely, has received far less attention. Both Hamas and Hezbollah are capable of attacking Israeli vessels and maritime infrastructure or using the Mediterranean as a maneuver space to infiltrate their operatives or weapons into Israel. The Houthis in Yemen have already demonstrated a willingness to join the conflict by attempting to attack US naval vessels in the region and targeting Israeli-owned vessels transiting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Israel has previously faced attacks both from the sea and at sea. New uncrewed technology and the continued proliferation of anti-ship missile technology will create new opportunities for the types of attacks that have already been attempted by Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis.

More international naval forces in the Mediterranean and Red Sea may be able to deter further expansion of the conflict in the maritime domain, but ultimately it will fall to Israeli forces to secure Israel’s maritime frontier and deter attacks on Israeli vessels.

The Maritime Dimension to the Conflict in Israel - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Walker D. Mills · November 30, 2023

Editor’s note: This article is part of Project Maritime, which explores modern challenges and opportunities in the maritime dimension at the intersection of irregular warfare and strategic competition. We warmly invite your participation and engagement as we embark on this project. Please send submissions to submissions@irregularwarfare.org with the subject line “Project Maritime Submission” and follow us on X (formerly Twitter) @proj_maritime.

On July 15, 2006, during the opening days of the last major conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, four Israeli sailors were killed in a surprise attack. This attack, though, didn’t come over a border fence or through attack tunnels. Instead, Hezbollah struck an Israeli Sa’ar 5 class corvette, INS Hanit, with two anti-ship cruise missiles. At the time, Hanit was acting as the Israeli flagship and sailing about 10 miles off the coast of Southern Lebanon. The attack shocked Israeli forces because it challenged their assumption that they maintained complete control of the maritime environment around Israel. In fact, the attack may have succeeded in part because officials in the Israeli Navy did not believe that Hezbollah had the ability to attack the vessel and therefore didn’t take necessary precautions. They may have even turned off some of the ship’s early warning and self-defense systems, leaving the ship vulnerable to attack. Iran almost certainly supplied the C-802 missiles used in the attack, and Iranian advisors may have also helped plan and execute it. Despite the damage, the Hanit was quickly repaired in the Israeli port of Haifa and returned to service. But the incident demonstrated that even non-state actors without formal or well organized naval forces can threaten advanced warships and challenge the assumed maritime superiority of established navies.

In the current conflict between Israel and Hamas, coverage has focused primarily on ground combat, airstrikes in Gaza, and rocket attacks on Israel. However, the precedent of an asymmetric seaborne attack from the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah, the latest in a long history of maritime attacks on Israel, looms large. Hamas and its allies like Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen and Iran all have demonstrated the ability to carry out attacks in the maritime environment and could do so to further expand the current conflict.

Attacks at Sea

Weaker powers and non-state actors have long used asymmetric means to threaten the naval assets of a more powerful navy by attacking warships at sea or in port, or by attacking naval infrastructure ashore. In these attacks, asymmetric forces have used everything from suicide-boat terrorist attacks and mining to sophisticated, combined arms assaults to damage and sink adversary vessels and port infrastructure. These attacks can be powerfully symbolic, but they can also force difficult choices about how and where a more powerful navy is willing to employ its warships with major implications for the conflict.

The al-Qaeda attack on USS Cole in Yemen is a prime example of an attack on a vulnerable warship in port. On Oct. 12, 2000, an explosive-filled speedboat approached the ship, killing 17 sailors and causing grave damage. Iraq employed naval mines to great effect during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, during which both USS Princeton and USS Tripoli were damaged. In 2019, Iran was accused of using divers to attach limpet mines to tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz. In past years, Houthi rebels in Yemen have also fired missile at US warships and used explosives-laden drone boats and missiles to strike Saudi vessels. And just since the October 7 attacks in Israel, US warships have defeated multiple attacks by Houthi-launched drones and missiles in the Red Sea.

The most significant modern example of a force without a functional navy carrying out major attacks on a superior naval power is the ongoing conflict in between Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea. Ukrainian forces made headlines when they were able to sink the Russian Black Sea flagship Moskva, with domestically-produced Neptune anti-ship missiles, likely relying on US-supplied intelligence. The sinking of the Moskva was only the most infamous attack during a campaign to strike Russian naval vessels and maritime infrastructure, “The Battle of the Black Sea,” with a combination of missiles and locally-designed drone boats. Ukrainian forces have also attacked the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol; ships in drydock including a Kilo-class submarine, the Kerch Bridge; and even a Russian submarine commander.

While Ukraine’s own small fleet was sunk or scuttled in the opening days of the war, Ukrainian forces have been successful in contesting Russian control of the Black Sea and forcing Russian warships out of the Crimea and farther from Ukrainian waters. The attacks have, in the words of the UK Minister of State for the Armed Forces, delivered a “functional defeat of the Black Sea Fleet.” Other experts have also highlighted Ukrainian successes in the Black Sea as “major breakthroughs,” especially because they often involve innovative tactics like the employment of the locally-built “Sea Baby” drone boat. They have put the Russian fleet on the defensive, limiting its ability to strike Ukraine or support Russian offensives on land. This has then forced Russian forces to deploy more resources to protect key infrastructure instead of deploying them to the frontlines. Russia’s desire to control the Black Sea has been critical to the conflict since 2014, when Russian “little green men” seized Crimea. Crimea is host to Sevastopol, the most important naval port in the region, and home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. And the Black Sea is a critical conduit for commercial shipping for both Ukraine and Russia.

Attacks by Sea

Israel is no stranger to maritime terrorism. In 1975, terrorists used small fishing boats to land in downtown Tel Aviv where they killed several Israelis and held hostages in the Savoy Hotel. Again in 1978, terrorists landed between Haifa and Tel Aviv by boat and killed dozens of Israeli civilians. The following year in 1979, in an infamously brutal attack, a seaborne raid by Hezbollah in Nahariya killed four Israelis, including a four-year old girl whose head was smashed against rocks on the shore. Again in 1990, the Israeli military beat back an attempted terrorist attack on Tel Aviv by a force mounted in speedboats.

In the recent attacks, it appears that Hamas infiltrators also tried to enter Israel through a maritime route. Multiple video clips released by the Israeli Defense Forces purportedly show Israeli vessels firing on Hamas infiltrators attempting to use boats to cross from Gaza into Israel. In the weeks since the Oct. 7 attacks, the Israeli military claims to have thwarted an infiltration attempt by divers sent by Hamas to Southern Israel. The boats were launched from tunnels directly to the sea to help avoid detection by Israeli forces. These attacks are examples, and also a warning of what Hamas and its allies could still be planning.

On Nov. 18, Houthi rebels, allies of Hamas and another Iranian proxy, seized an Israeli-owned, vehicle cargo ship, the Galaxy Leader, transiting through the Red Sea. Videos of the Houthi seizure of the Galaxy Leader indicate that the Houthis likely have Iranian supplied training and equipment. This hijacking is a direct threat to any Israeli-owned or operated vessels transiting through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea and could easily lead to further escalation and a larger threat to all maritime traffic through a critical global chokepoint, and even without further attacks could put pressure on Israel by raising shipping and maritime insurance costs for Israeli owned or operated vessels.

Maritime terrorism is an important part of the threat landscape facing Israel and cannot be ignored. In addition to using maritime routes to infiltrate Israel itself, Hamas could carry out attacks on other targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as the Tamar Production Platform, which is visible from the Gaza strip on a clear day. Last year, the Houthis launched several drone attacks on oil terminal infrastructure in government-controlled Yemen as part of a coordinated campaign to disrupt crude exports. Hamas could also attack private or commercial vessels operating in Israeli waters or further abroad. In 1985, Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, and the same year another group seize a yacht off moored off the coast of Cyprus and killed three Israelis who were aboard.

The Threat of New Technology

New technology is changing warfare at sea, where innovation and affordable uncrewed systems are creating new dilemmas for larger navies, threatening both warships and maritime infrastructure. This can be seen most clearly in Ukraine, where Ukrainian forces have successfully designed, built, and employed semi-submerged drone boats loaded with explosives and used them to attack both Russian warships and infrastructure. These new weapons should not come as a surprise to anyone who has followed advances in the so-called “narco-submarines” used by drug smugglers to move cocaine in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. These vessels are typically manned, but use a semi-submersible design to avoid detection and carry a large payload, albeit of drugs instead of explosives.

At the same time, small uncrewed aircraft systems, or sUAS, also pose a growing threat to warships and naval infrastructure. Even a small payload, if delivered in the right place, could mission-kill a capital ship or help disable defenses. Hamas and Hezbollah have already demonstrated proficiency not only in employing but also manufacturing these weapons. Smaller warships, like patrol vessels that don’t have a robust air defense capability, are particularly vulnerable to attacks by sUAS; civilian vessels generally have no defenses. Last year the Houthis used small drones to attack a Greek ship at an oil terminal in Yemen, and an Iranian drone with explosives struck a tanker off the coast of Oman.

Both Hamas and Hezbollah have demonstrated they are more than capable of innovation in the past. The maritime environment is likely no exception. One of the ways Hamas fighters infiltrated Israel for the Oct. 7 attacks was on hang gliders; they also employed locally-designed suicide drones against IDF targets. In 2020, Hamas released a documentary featuring their divers extracting unexploded ordnance from Second World War-era sunken naval vessels to be recycled into new weapons. In 2021 a Hamas-built underwater drone was destroyed in an Israeli airstrike, causing experts to worry that there could be similar weapons waiting to be used. Fabian Hinz, a missile expert and defense analyst, warned the New York Times, “It is quite likely that Hamas has capabilities that we haven’t seen yet, but might see later.” Similar to how small uncrewed aircraft have changed land warfare by proliferating and “democratizing” airpower, uncrewed technology is promising to do the same in the maritime domain and these new technologies are within reach for both for Hamas and Hezbollah.

More Eyes, More Ears

In response to the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel’s allies deployed naval forces into the region to support deterrence, prepare for contingencies and send a clear message of support. The United States currently has one carrier strike group with several ships and dozens of aircraft in the Eastern Mediterranean, a Marine Expeditionary Unit between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and another carrier strike group near the Persian Gulf. The Royal Navy has also sent ships, aircraft and marines. Beyond their critical roles in deterrence and as a tangible demonstration of support, these vessels and their aircraft can also help “provide more situational awareness for the Israelis” according to a former commander of US Central Command. They can also take a more active role and complement Israeli air defenses. US destroyers in the Red Sea have already thwarted multiple drone and missile attacks coming from Yemen, as well as the attempted hijacking of the Israeli-owned MV Central Park. But, as more vessels are deployed to the region, the risk of miscalculation increases. During the 1967 Six-Day War, Israeli air and naval forces attacked the USS Liberty, an intelligence-gathering vessel in a case of mistaken identity. No matter how many foreign naval vessels are deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean, they present a risk to escalation in the maritime domain.

The Conflict Continues

As tragic as the current conflict is, it does not appear to be ending soon. Most attention is focused on Israeli ground operations in Gaza, the potential for escalation between the IDF and Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border, or even conflict between Iran and Israel. The possibility of an expansion of the conflict in the maritime domain, while equally likely, has received far less attention. Both Hamas and Hezbollah are capable of attacking Israeli vessels and maritime infrastructure or using the Mediterranean as a maneuver space to infiltrate their operatives or weapons into Israel. The Houthis in Yemen have already demonstrated a willingness to join the conflict by attempting to attack US naval vessels in the region and targeting Israeli-owned vessels transiting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Israel has previously faced attacks both from the sea and at sea. New uncrewed technology and the continued proliferation of anti-ship missile technology will create new opportunities for the types of attacks that have already been attempted by Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis.

More international naval forces in the Mediterranean and Red Sea may be able to deter further expansion of the conflict in the maritime domain, but ultimately it will fall to Israeli forces to secure Israel’s maritime frontier and deter attacks on Israeli vessels.

Walker D. Mills is a Marine Corps infantry officer in training to fly the MQ-9A Reaper. He holds degrees in history, international relations, and homeland security. He is a former Irregular Warfare Initiative non-resident fellow.

Main image: INS Hanit in port in 2010. Hanit was damaged in a Hezbollah attack in 2006. (Israel Defense Forces via Wikimedia Commons)

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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