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1. U.S. Missiles Strike Targets in Yemen Linked to Houthis
2. Houthis Vow to Respond After U.S. Leads Strikes in Yemen: Live Updates
3. Who Are the Houthis and Why Is the U.S. Attacking Them?
4. U.S.-led coalition strikes Iran-aligned Houthi militants in Yemen
5. U.S.-Led Yemen Strikes Heighten Risk of Broader Middle East Conflict
6. It's On Against the Houthis by Mick Ryan
7. Pentagon fell short in tracking $1 billion in Ukraine aid, IG finds
8. Ukraine gives “unprecedented” access to information on donated weapons - Pentagon
9. Pentagon Flags Tracking Issues in Weapons for Ukraine, Denies Evidence of Misuse
10. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 11, 2024
11. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 11, 2024
12. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 11, 2024
13. Interview with Dave Eubank at Free Burma Rangers
14. Inside Biden's decision to strike the Houthis
15. Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Coalition Strikes in Houthi-Controlled Areas of Yemen
16. DOD Releases First-Ever National Defense Industrial Strategy
17. Pentagon’s first industrial strategy calls for ‘generational’ change
18. Ukraine and Russia say they want the war to end. But military and political experts say they're nowhere near peace talks
19. IDF bolsters security for civilians returning to border communities
20. Houthis continue attacks in Red Sea despite warning from coalition
21. The long war: Israel won’t cease firing until Iran’s Hezbollah does
22. The Gaza War as Seen from Southeast Asia
23. Conflict Resolution is not Always Possible
24. Understanding China’s Approach to Deterrence
25. Dems rip Biden for launching Houthi strikes without congressional approval
26. Can China Swing Taiwan’s Elections?
27. The Right Way to Regulate AI
28. Soldiers build nuke-detecting backpack
29. 4 ways China is trying to interfere in Taiwan’s presidential election
30. Army civilian accused of bilking $100 million to fund luxury lifestyle
31. Does the Marine Corps Need Course Correction? Congress Wants to Know
1. U.S. Missiles Strike Targets in Yemen Linked to Houthis
About time.
U.S. Missiles Strike Targets in Yemen Linked to Houthis - The New York Times
By Eric Schmitt and Helene Cooper
Reporting from Washington
Jan. 11, 2024
nytimes.com · by Helene Cooper · January 12, 2024
The American-led strikes came in response to more than two dozen Houthi drone and missile attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea since the Israel-Hamas war began.
Newly recruited Houthi fighters on Thursday in Sana, Yemen.Credit…Khaled Abdullah/Reuters
By Eric Schmitt and Helene Cooper
reporting from Washington
Jan. 11, 2024Updated 7:24 p.m. ET
The United States and a handful of its allies on Thursday carried out military strikes against more than a dozen targets in Yemen controlled by the Iranian-backed Houthi militia, U.S. officials said, in an expansion of the war in the Middle East that the Biden administration had sought to avoid for three months.
The American-led air and naval strikes came in response to more than two dozen Houthi drone and missile attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea since November, and after warnings to the Houthis in the past week from the Biden administration and several international allies of serious “consequences” if the salvos did not stop.
But the Houthis defied that ultimatum, vowing to continue their attacks in what they say is a protest against Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. On Tuesday, American and British warships intercepted one of the largest barrages of Houthi drone and missile strikes yet, an assault that U.S. and other Western military officials said was the last straw.
Britain joined the United States in the strikes against the Houthi targets, the U.S. officials said, as fighter jets from bases in the region and off the aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower bombed targets.At least one Navy submarine fired Tomahawk cruise missiles, the officials said.
The Netherlands, Australia, Canada and Bahrain also were expected to participate, providing logistics, intelligence and other support, according to U.S. officials. They spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters.
The American-led strikes on Thursday hit radars, missiles and drone launch sites, and weapons storage areas, according to a U.S. official, who said President Biden had approved the retaliatory assault.
It was unclear whether the allied strikes would deter the Houthis from continuing their attacks, which have forced some of the world’s largest shipping companies to reroute vessels away from the Red Sea, creating delays and extra costs felt around the world through higher prices for oil and other imported goods.
The Houthis — whose military capabilities were honed by more than eight years of fighting against a Saudi-led coalition — have greeted the prospect of war with the United States with open delight. On Wednesday, before the strike, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the militia’s leader, threatened to meet an American attack with a fierce response.
“We, the Yemeni people, are not among those who are afraid of America,” he said in a televised speech. “We are comfortable with a direct confrontation with the Americans.”
Some American allies in the Middle East, including the Gulf nations of Qatar and Oman, had raised concerns that strikes against the Houthis could spiral out of control and drag the region into a deeper conflict with other Iranian proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Tehran-backed militias in Syria and Iraq.
“We never see a military action as a resolution,” Qatar’s prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, said in a news conference on Sunday, stressing that Qatar would prefer to see a diplomatic solution bring an end to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
Administration officials have sought to separate the Houthi attacks from the conflict in Gaza, and to cast as illegitimate Houthi claims that they are acting to support the Palestinians. The officials are emphasizing that difference so that they can try to contain a wider war even as they ramp up their specific response to the Houthi attacks.
Houthi officials say that the sole goal of their attacks is to force Israel to halt its military campaign and to allow the free flow of aid into Gaza. They claim they pose no threat to global shipping.
For the Biden administration, the decision to finally strike back at the Houthis was three months in coming. Despite the barrage of attacks from the Iranian-backed militant group in the past months, the administration had hesitated to respond militarily for a number of reasons.
Mr. Biden and his top aides have been loath to take steps that could draw the United States into a wider war in the region, which was destabilized when Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, killing 1,200 people and igniting the current war, according to Israeli officials. The Israeli military response has so far killed more than 23,000 people in Gaza, according to health authorities there.
There was a fear that strikes on Yemen could escalate into a tit-for-tat between American naval vessels and the Houthis and even draw Iran further into the conflict, officials said. On Thursday, Iran’s navy seized a vessel loaded with crude oil off the coast of Oman.
Top Biden aides also had been reluctant to feed the narrative that the Yemeni militia group had become so important as to warrant U.S. military retaliation. Several administration officials said that the United States was also wary of disrupting the tenuous truce in Yemen.
The Houthis, a tribal group, have taken over much of northern Yemen since they stormed its capital in 2014, effectively winning a war against the Saudi-led coalition that spent years trying to rout them. They have built their ideology around opposition to Israel and the United States, and often draw parallels between the American-made bombs that were used to pummel Yemen and those sent to Israel and used in Gaza.
“They offer bombs to kill the Palestinian people,” Mr. al-Houthi said in his speech. “Does that not provoke us? Does that not increase our determination in our legitimate stance?”
Hundreds of thousands of people have died in airstrikes and fighting in Yemen, as well as from disease and hunger, since the conflict there began. A truce negotiated in 2022 has largely held even without a formal agreement.
Last month, the Pentagon established a multinational naval task force to protect commercial ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The effort, called Operation Prosperity Guardian, includes Britain, Canada, France and Bahrain — the only regional ally to join. But the effort wasn’t enough to stop the Houthi attacks.
U.S. and other Western officials said the continuing attacks by the Houthis left them little choice but to respond, and they will hold the Houthis responsible for the attacks.
“We’re going to do everything we have to do to protect shipping in the Red Sea,” the U.S. national security spokesman, John Kirby, said at a news conference on Wednesday.
The strikes came after weeks of consulting with allies. On Wednesday, Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was on the phone with his British counterpart, Adm. Sir Tony Radakin, to discuss the strikes, defense officials said.
In a statement, General Brown’s office said that he “reiterated the U.S. desire to work with all nations who share an interest in upholding the principle of freedom of navigation and ensuring safe passage for global shipping.”
The strikes Thursday night were the biggest U.S. attack against the Houthis in nearly a decade. In 2016, the United States struck three Houthi missile sites with Tomahawk cruise missiles after the Houthis fired on Navy and commercial vessels. The Houthis’ attacks stopped afterward.
Vivian Nereim contributed reporting from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades.
is a Pentagon correspondent. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent.
nytimes.com · by Helene Cooper · January 12, 2024
2. Houthis Vow to Respond After U.S. Leads Strikes in Yemen: Live Updates
And it is this vow to respond and the fear of "escalation" that has deterred us from acting until now. We have to get this done and stop the Houthis from continuing attacks.
Houthis Vow to Respond After U.S. Leads Strikes in Yemen: Live Updates - The New York Times
nytimes.com · by Victoria Kim · January 12, 2024
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Jan. 12, 2024, 5:43 a.m. ET
Thomas Fuller and Victoria Kim
Iranian-backed Houthi forces and their allies on Friday condemned American-led military strikes in Yemen and vowed to respond, as the Middle East went on alert for retaliatory attacks that could expand the conflict in the region.
The United States and a handful of its allies carried out the air and naval strikes early Friday against more than a dozen targets in Yemen linked with the Houthi militia. The strikes were a sharp escalation of American action against Houthi drone and missile attacks in the crucial commercial shipping lanes of the Red Sea, which the militia has said are in support of Palestinians under Israeli bombardment in Gaza.
Jan. 12, 2024, 6:16 a.m. ET
Vivian Nereim
The foreign ministry of Oman — a close U.S. ally that mediates between the Houthis and international parties — said that it was following the strikes in Yemen “with deep concern,” adding that “it is impossible not to denounce that an allied country resorted to this military action, while meanwhile, Israel is continuing to exceed all bounds in its bombardment, brutal war and siege on Gaza without any consequence.”
Jan. 12, 2024, 5:58 a.m. ET
Vivian Nereim
Scholars who study the Houthis warned that the strikes were highly unlikely to deter the militia, which has welcomed the prospect of a confrontation with the United States with open delight. “They hope to see an expanded regional war and they are eager to be on the frontlines,” said Hannah Porter, a senior research officer on Yemen at ARK Group, a U.K. firm that works in international development.
Jan. 12, 2024, 4:40 a.m. ET
Yahya Sarea, a Houthi military spokesman, said that a total of 73 strikes had targeted the Yemeni capital, Sana, and four other regions, killing at least five fighters and injuring six others.
Jan. 12, 2024, 4:18 a.m. ET
Patrick Kingsley
At the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Israel’s lawyers have just begun their response to the accusation, presented yesterday by a South African delegation, that Israel intends to commit genocide against the Palestinians through its invasion of Gaza.
Credit…Thilo Schmuelgen/Reuters
Jan. 12, 2024, 3:44 a.m. ET
Hezbollah, the powerful Lebanese militant group, condemned the strikes on Houthi targets, calling them “blatant American-British aggression.”
Jan. 12, 2024, 3:41 a.m. ET
Raja Abdulrahim
Reporting from Jerusalem
In an interview with Al Jazeera, Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdul Salam said the Houthi forces would respond soon to overnight airstrikes carried out by the U.S. and Britain on Houthi targets across parts of Yemen. “It’s not possible for us not to respond to these operations,” he said.
Jan. 12, 2024, 3:41 a.m. ET
Raja Abdulrahim
Reporting from Jerusalem
He maintained that the Houthis would continue to target Israeli ships and those heading to Israel in the Red and Arabian Seas as a way to continue to support Palestinians and Gaza. “Now the response no doubt is going to be wider,” he said.
Jan. 12, 2024, 3:33 a.m. ET
Raja Abdulrahim
Reporting from Jerusalem
A Houthi spokesman, Mohammed Abdul Salam, said on social media that there was no justification for the strikes in Yemen and that it would continue to target “Israeli ships or those heading to the ports of occupied Palestine.”
Jan. 12, 2024, 2:34 a.m. ET
Hamas, the armed Palestinian group that controls Gaza, condemned the U.S. and British strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. In a statement Friday morning, the group called the strikes “an uncalculated act of terrorism” and blatant aggression against Yemeni sovereignty.
Jan. 12, 2024, 2:34 a.m. ET
Raja Abdulrahim
Reporting from Jerusalem
Hamas added that the strikes were a threat to the region’s security and said that it would hold the United States and Britian responsible for the security repercussions.
Jan. 12, 2024, 1:28 a.m. ET
Karoun Demirjian
A photograph released on Friday by the U.S. Central Command said to show a missile launched from a warship during the U.S.-led operation against targets in Yemen.Credit…U.S. Central Command, via Reuters
U.S. lawmakers on both sides of the aisle welcomed the U.S. strikes on Houthi targets and called them necessary and proportional. Some of them on Thursday called the U.S. response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea overdue, while others urged caution to avoid escalation into a broader regional war.
Leading Republican senators urged the Biden administration to continue taking tough action against Iran and its proxies, which include the Houthis of Yemen.
Jan. 12, 2024, 1:25 a.m. ET
Farnaz Fassihi
In December we wrote that Iran considered the Houthis the best suited of its proxy militia to escalate the fronts against Israel. The Houthis are strategically located to upend international shipping and are not accountable to any local government or international power. Houthis emerged as a predictable wild card that could spread the war and drag the U.S. directly into conflict. Read the full article.
Jan. 12, 2024, 12:41 a.m. ET
Farnaz Fassihi
Iran condemned the strikes in Yemen on Friday, calling them a violation of Yemen’s sovereignty and of international laws and norms, according to state media. “These arbitrary attacks will have no result other than causing instability and insecurity in the region, said Nasser Kanaani, the spokesman for Iran’s foreign ministry, state media reported. “We ask the international community to react responsibly to these aggressions.”
Jan. 12, 2024, 12:41 a.m. ET
Farnaz Fassihi
Iran backs and supports the Houthis and considers them a key member of its network in the region.
Jan. 12, 2024, 12:36 a.m. ET
Oil futures rose nearly 2 percent after the U.S.-led strikes on Houthi targets over concerns that a military escalation could constrain supply. Prices of Brent Crude, the international oil benchmark, rose 1.8 percent to $78.80 a barrel during Asian trading hours. Oil prices have been sliding since reaching a high above $90 a barrel in late September.
Jan. 12, 2024, 12:23 a.m. ET
Farnaz Fassihi
Russia has requested an emergency Security Council meeting on Friday to discuss the U.S.-led strikes in Yemen, according to a diplomat from France, which holds the rotating Council presidency this month. The session is scheduled for Friday afternoon and will be closed consultations, according to the diplomats.
Jan. 12, 2024, 12:23 a.m. ET
Farnaz Fassihi
The Security Council passed a resolution on Wednesday, with Russia and China abstaining from the vote, demanding that the Houthi militia halt attacks on commercial and trade ships in the Red Sea.
Jan. 11, 2024, 11:31 p.m. ET
Victoria Kim
A joint statement from 10 nations, including the United States and Britain, said the strikes were carried out “in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense,” and were based on a consensus expressed by dozens of nations at the U.N. Security Council. The statement was also signed by Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea.
Jan. 11, 2024, 10:57 p.m. ET
Victoria Kim
The strikes on Houthi targets were launched at 2:30 a.m. local time, the U.S. Central Command said in posts on the social media site X. Early on Thursday, the Iran-backed militia fired an antiship ballistic missile into the Gulf of Aden leading into the Red Sea, the 27th attack since mid-November, according to the Central Command.
On Jan. 11 at 2:30 a.m. (Sanaa time), U.S. Central Command forces, in coordination with the United Kingdom, and support from Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and Bahrain conducted joint strikes on Houthi targets to degrade their capability to continue their illegal and… pic.twitter.com/bR8biMolSx
— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) January 12, 2024
US CENTCOM Statement on 27th Houthi attack on commercial shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden
On Jan. 11 at approximately 2 a.m. (Sanaa time), the Iranian-backed Houthis fired an anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen into international shipping lanes in… pic.twitter.com/MDdjM1yCpV
— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) January 11, 2024
Jan. 11, 2024, 10:57 p.m. ET
Victoria Kim
Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla, who oversees the command, said in a statement that the attacks by the Houthi militants, with the support of Iran, are responsible for the attacks on international shipping that have affected 55 countries.
Jan. 11, 2024, 10:35 p.m. ET
Videos verified by The New York Times show several large explosions in the vicinity of Hudaydah International Airport in Yemen. One of the videos appears to show the driver of a car encountering the blasts unexpectedly. Inside the car, a clock displays the time as 2:31 a.m., which closely aligns with early reports of when the attacks took place.
Jan. 11, 2024, 10:28 p.m. ET
Victoria Kim
Saudi Arabia said it was closely monitoring the strikes “with great concern” and called for restraint and avoidance of regional escalation, according to the official Saudi Press Agency. The kingdom led a coalition that spent years trying defeat the Houthis in northern Yemen.
Jan. 11, 2024, 10:21 p.m. ET
Stephen Castle
Britain joined the United States in the attack against Houthi sites. “The United Kingdom will always stand up for freedom of navigation and the free flow of trade,” Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said in a statement.
Jan. 11, 2024, 8:29 p.m. ET
Peter Baker
reporting from Washington
Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of Britain, left, and President Biden in Lithuania last year for a NATO summit.Credit…Pool photo by Paul Ellis
President Biden, who has sought for three months to avoid escalating the war in the Middle East, said on Thursday night that he ordered the strikes in Yemen only after being provoked by “reckless attacks” that have endangered American and other mariners and threatened freedom of navigation in an important part of the world.
In a written statement issued after the strikes, Mr. Biden detailed the “unprecedented Houthi attacks” that had affected the interests of 50 nations and endangered crews from more than 20 countries since the Hamas terrorist attack of Oct. 7. More than 2,000 ships have been forced to divert thousands of miles to avoid the Red Sea, causing weeks of delays in shipping, he said.
3. Who Are the Houthis and Why Is the U.S. Attacking Them?
On the off chance someone is not familiar with them.
The question is why did we wait so long to attack them?
Who Are the Houthis and Why Is the U.S. Attacking Them?
The Iranian-backed rebel group has launched dozens of attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea since the war between Israel and Hamas started.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/11/world/middleeast/houthi-yemen-red-sea-attacks.html
Newly recruited Houthi fighters march past a large image of their leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, in December.Credit...Yahya Arhab/EPA, via Shutterstock
By Gaya Gupta
- Published Jan. 11, 2024Updated Jan. 12, 2024, 12:34 a.m. ET
Since mid-November, the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group backed by Iran, have launched dozens of attacks on ships sailing through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, a crucial shipping route through which 12 percent of world trade passes.
The United States and a handful of allies, including Britain, struck back, carrying out missile strikes on Houthi targets inside Yemen early Friday local time and thrusting the rebels and their long-running armed struggle further into the limelight.
The attack on Houthi bases came a day after the United Nations Security Council voted to condemn “in the strongest terms” at least two dozen attacks carried out by the Houthis on merchant and commercial vessels, which it said had impeded global commerce and undermined navigational freedom.
Here’s a primer on the Houthis, their relationship with Hamas and the attacks in the Red Sea.
Who are the Houthis?
The Houthis, led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, are an Iran-backed group of Shiite rebels who have been fighting Yemen’s government for about two decades and now control the country’s northwest and its capital, Sana.
They have built their ideology around opposition to Israel and the United States, seeing themselves as part of the Iranian-led “axis of resistance,” along with Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Their leaders often draw parallels between the American-made bombs used to pummel their forces in Yemen and the arms sent to Israel and used in Gaza.
In 2014, a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia intervened to try to restore the country’s original government after the Houthis seized the capital, starting a civil war that has killed hundreds of thousands.
Image
Models of Houthi-made drones on display in Sana, Yemen, on Wednesday.Credit...Yahya Arhab/EPA, via Shutterstock
Last April, talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia raised hopes for a peace deal that would potentially recognize the Houthis’ right to govern northern Yemen.
Once a group of poorly organized rebels, the Houthis have bolstered their arsenal in recent years, and it now includes cruise and ballistic missiles and long-range drones. Analysts credit this expansion to support from Iran, which has supplied militias across the Middle East to expand its own influence.
Why are they attacking ships in the Red Sea?
When the Israeli-Hamas war started on Oct. 7, the Houthis declared their support for Hamas and said they would target any ship traveling to Israel or leaving it.
Yahya Sarea, a Houthi spokesman, has said frequently that the group is attacking ships to protest the “killing, destruction and siege” in Gaza and to stand in solidarity with the Palestinian people.
The Gazan authorities say that more than 23,000 people, most of them civilians, have been killed in the Israeli bombing campaign and ground offensive that started after Hamas carried out cross-border raids and massacred, the Israeli authorities say, about 1,200 people.
Since November, the Houthis have launched 27 attacks with drones and missiles on vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden that they claim are heading toward or leaving Israeli ports. The latest was on Thursday at 2 a.m., when a missile landed near a commercial vessel, the U.S. military said.
Perhaps the most audacious Houthi operation came on Nov. 19, when gunmen hijacked a vessel named the Galaxy Leader and took it to a Yemeni port, holding its 25 crew members, mainly Filipinos, captive.
Image
Yahya Sarea, a Houthi spokesman, making a statement on Wednesday.Credit...Yahya Arhab/EPA, via Shutterstock
How are the attacks affecting countries around the world?
Speaking to reporters in Bahrain on Wednesday, the American secretary of state, Antony J. Blinken, warned that continued Houthi attacks in the Red Sea could disrupt supply chains and in turn increase costs for everyday goods. The Houthis’ attacks have affected ships tied to more than 40 countries, he said.
The world’s biggest container companies, MSC and Maersk, have said they are avoiding the region, and shipping companies are left with difficult options.
Rerouting vessels around Africa adds an extra 4,000 miles and 10 days to shipping routes, and requires more fuel. But continuing to use the Red Sea would raise insurance premiums. Either option would bruise an already fragile global economy.
Image
A seized ship, the Galaxy Leader, could be seen off the Yemeni coast in December.Credit...Khaled Abdullah/Reuters
What has the U.S. been doing to stop the Houthi attacks?
The Biden administration repeatedly condemned Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and assembled a naval task force to try keep them in check.
The task force, called Operation Prosperity Guardian, brought together the United States, Britain and other allies and has been patrolling the Red Sea to, in Mr. Blinken’s words, “preserve freedom of navigation” and “freedom of shipping.”
Image
Antony J. Blinken, the U.S. secretary of state, on a plane headed toward Bahrain on Wednesday.Credit...Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters
Bahrain is the only Middle Eastern country that agreed to participate. Even though many countries in the region depend on trade that goes through the Red Sea, many do not want to be associated with the United States, Israel’s closest ally, analysts say.
U.S. and British warships have intercepted some Houthi missiles and drones before they reached their targets. On Wednesday, American fighter jets from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Dwight D. Eisenhower, along with four other warships, intercepted 18 drones, two anti-ship cruise missiles and one anti-ship ballistic missile, Central Command said in a statement.
On Dec. 31, U.S. Navy helicopters sank three Houthi boats that were attacking a commercial freighter.
Ben Hubbard, Peter Eavis, Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt and Keith Bradsher contributed reporting.
Gaya Gupta is a reporting fellow on the Live team at The Times. More about Gaya Gupta
4. U.S.-led coalition strikes Iran-aligned Houthi militants in Yemen
The key point:
The operation follows a surge in attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea that have wreaked havoc on the global economy
U.S.-led coalition strikes Iran-aligned Houthi militants in Yemen
The operation follows a surge in attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea that have wreaked havoc on the global economy
By Alex Horton, Dan Lamothe, Missy Ryan and Abigail Hauslohner
Updated January 12, 2024 at 12:21 a.m. EST|Published January 11, 2024 at 7:07 p.m. EST
The Washington Post · by Alex Horton · January 12, 2024
U.S. and coalition forces struck Iran-aligned Houthi militants in Yemen on Thursday, a dramatic escalation after the group ignored warnings from the Biden administration and other governments to stop attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea.
The operation follows weeks of hostility as the Houthis, protesting Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, have disrupted global trade by making the vital waterway a dangerous place for ships to transit. The group, which functions as the de-facto government in parts of Yemen, has carried out numerous attacks since November, officials have said, leading to repeated distress calls and routine altercations with U.S. and partner nations’ warships dispatched to the region in response.
Senior U.S. officials have blamed Iran for having “aided and abetted” the crisis, saying the Houthis would be incapable of threatening the shipping route if not for Tehran’s technological and intelligence support.
Israel-Gaza war
(Oded Balilty/AP)
South Africa will present its arguments Thursday to the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of committing genocide against the Palestinian people in Gaza. Here’s what to know about the case.
For context: Understand what’s behind the Israel-Gaza war.
End of carousel
Thursday’s strikes will almost certainly heighten tensions across the Middle East, which has seen widening violence since Hamas, another entity aligned with Iran, carried out a stunning cross-border attack on Israel in October. The ensuing war in Gaza has left the Biden administration deeply worried that a strong military response to the Houthis would invite further escalation by Tehran.
Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria have stepped up their targeting of U.S. forces deployed in both countries. American troops have absorbed at least 131 attacks since Oct. 17, according to Pentagon data. The U.S. administration has retaliated with occasional airstrikes, including last week’s killing of a militia leader in Baghdad, but it had up to now withheld a forceful response against the Houthis.
An incident Tuesday marked a turning point, officials said. U.S. and British forces shot down 18 one-way attack drones, two cruise missiles and one ballistic missile that had been launched as dozens of merchant ships moved through the Red Sea, according to U.S. Central Command. The onslaught was repulsed by a combination of warships and fighter jets.
A U.S. official, speaking on the condition of anonymity due to the issue’s sensitivity, characterized the encounter as complex and brazen.
“These attacks are a threat to international norms, U.S. interests, and maritime trade. Their actions defy international law and destabilize the region, benefiting no one,” the official said.
Thursday’s operation was preceded by a statement, signed by 13 countries, demanding the Houthis cease their attacks or be held accountable.
At a moment when its strong support for Israel’s campaign against Hamas has put the United States at odds with numerous global partners, the Biden administration has attempted to enlist allied nations in intensifying pressure on the Houthis and to frame that effort as an international campaign.
While the United States conducted a years-long air campaign against al Qaeda militants in Yemen, it has mostly avoided military action against the Houthis, who took power in the capital Sanaa in late 2014. The U.S. Navy did launch missiles at radar sites in Yemen in 2016 following missile attacks on American vessels.
The Houthi takeover ignited a prolonged civil war in Yemen that eventually drew in forces from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and took a grisly toll on Yemeni civilians. U.S. and U.N. officials have conducted a years-long diplomatic effort to halt that conflict but have been unable to broker a political agreement between the warring Yemeni parties.
The violence has subsided substantially since a ceasefire, now expired, took effect in 2022.
Rep. Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.), vice chair of the House Armed Services intelligence and special operations subcommittee, said the volume and complexity of Houthi activity “has made very clear to me that we need to reestablish deterrence.” That is done, she added, “by striking back at them, and you do it in a precision way, and we do everything we can to minimize civilian casualties.”
Some analysts were doubtful the operation would have the intended effect of curbing the Red Sea attacks.
“The Houthis win by taking a U.S. strike, no matter how heavy, and showing that they can keep going with the shipping attacks,” said Michael Knights, a scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “The Houthis are high on their successes and will not be easy to deter. They are having the time of their lives, standing up to a superpower who probably cannot deter them.”
Others have said a strong response was necessary. Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, a retired general who led U.S. Central Command before retiring in 2022, said earlier this week that it was important to inflict “pain” on the militants responsible.
“And that means you’ve got to strike targets in Yemen that are important to the Houthis,” he said.
The Biden administration’s effort to build an international consensus against the Houthi violence was strengthened Wednesday when the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution voicing strong condemnation of the attacks. The resolution, which was sponsored by the United States and Japan, was approved 11 in favor and zero against, with abstentions by Russia, China, Algeria and Mozambique.
Tehran itself also has pursued aggressive action. Earlier Thursday, the Iranian navy seized a Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker in the Gulf of Oman while it was en route to Turkey, the U.S. Navy said. The crew’s status is unknown. Iran now holds five ships and 90 crew members “hostage,” officials said.
The Washington Post · by Alex Horton · January 12, 2024
5. U.S.-Led Yemen Strikes Heighten Risk of Broader Middle East Conflict
And this is what is constraining us - we have been self deterring up to this point.
U.S.-Led Yemen Strikes Heighten Risk of Broader Middle East Conflict
Iran-backed Houthi rebels warn they will retaliate, pledge to continue attacks on shipping
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-led-yemen-strikes-heighten-risk-of-broader-middle-east-conflict-aedb0006?mod=hp_lead_pos2
By Thomas Grove
Follow and Stephen Kalin
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Jan. 12, 2024 5:49 am ET
The Houthis have used their arsenal of missiles and drones to launch successive attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes. PHOTO: OSAMAH YAHYA/ZUMA PRESS
Yemen’s Houthi rebels responded defiantly to U.S.-led strikes against them Friday, saying the attacks had failed to cause significant damage and that they remained undeterred from launching more attacks in the region.
The strikes—and fresh promises of retaliation—threaten to escalate monthslong violence in the Middle East into a broader conflict and turn the Red Sea into a new flashpoint between Washington and the various Iran-backed groups arrayed across the region.
“Our response to the American-British aggression is inevitably coming; this isn’t going to deter us,” said Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdul Salam. Attacks in the Red Sea, primarily on shipping lanes, would continue in solidarity with Gaza following Israel’s invasion, he added.
The strikes, conducted by U.S. and British forces and supported by Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands, targeted radar and air defense systems as well as storage and launch sites for the Houthis’ cruise and ballistic missiles, according to U.S. Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East. The Houthis have used their arsenal, with the assistance of Iranian intelligence, to launch successive attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes.
An aircraft takes off to conduct strikes against targets in Yemen, in a screengrab from a handout video released U.S. Central Command. PHOTO: US CENTRAL COMMAND VIA X/REUTERS
The Houthis said the U.S.-led forces had conducted 73 strikes that killed five and injured six militants, but said damage to their infrastructure was limited, much of which had been stored underground ahead of the strikes which had been telegraphed days in advance.
The strikes came after months of Houthi attacks on international sea lanes which forced global shippers to reroute around Africa to avoid passing through the Suez Canal. One of the largest strikes came on Tuesday during Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to the Middle East and after a warning by the U.S. that continued attacks would carry consequences.
The Houthis, a political movement and militia whose ideology is part of the Zaidi offshoot of Shiite Islam, have been waging a prolonged fight for dominance with the internationally recognized Yemeni government. They initially launched attacks on Israel after the beginning of its Gaza offensive. After failing to penetrate Israel’s air-defense systems they turned to other targets, primarily international shipping lanes, including those in and out of the Suez Canal. Iran supports them with arms, munitions and intelligence, but says it doesn’t control their actions.
Smoke rises after an airstrike near San’a, Yemen. PHOTO: WANG SHANG/ZUMA PRESS
Groups backed by Tehran have been increasingly active against Israeli and U.S. targets following Israel’s invasion of Gaza. Some 23,500 Palestinians, mostly women and children, have been killed in Gaza since hostilities began, according to Palestinian health authorities. The figures don’t distinguish between civilians and combatants. The conflict was sparked by a Hamas-led Oct. 7 attack on southern Israel, in which Israeli officials say militants killed 1,200 people.
House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul said the strikes on Yemen were necessary to push back against Iranian aggression.
“Tonight, with these strikes, which are being directly enabled by Iran, we are beginning to restore deterrence,” he said in a statement.
However, some have doubted the strikes’ ability to meaningfully degrade Houthi capabilities. An effective cease-fire between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, which has supported the ousted Yemeni government, has allowed the group to stockpile missiles and ammunition.
Mohammed Albasha, senior Yemen analyst at the Virginia-based research firm Navanti Group, said that as the aftermath of the strikes was unfolding, initial assessments from social media suggested secondary explosions. That indicates ammunition detonation at targeted sites potentially including caves and tunnel networks built by former Yemeni governments, he said.
“If the strikes successfully targeted drone and missile manufacturing facilities, it could temporarily hinder Houthi capabilities,” said Albasha. “However, given their adaptability and quick recovery demonstrated throughout the prolonged conflict, the impact may be short-term.”
The launchpads for drones and missiles are less sophisticated and can easily be replaced, he added.
Gregory Gause, a Middle East expert at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government, said the strikes were necessary to deter the Houthis and their Iranian backers.
“If there’s one thing a great power has to do, it’s protect the sea lanes,” he said. “If you want the Iranians to restrain them, there has to be some repercussions to what they’re doing.”
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, walking, has been visiting the region as part of a diplomatic tour. PHOTO: EVELYN HOCKSTEIN/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Gause said the Houthi response wouldn’t be immediate and predicted that the Iranians would try to get the group to dial down their activities. “I think the Iranians are probing what can we get away with,” he said.
The economic effects of the Houthi attacks are slowly growing and, for now, mainly affecting Europe. Danish shipper
A.P. Moller-Maersk has already rerouted its ships and Tesla said Friday it would halt production at its Berlin factory for two weeks as the Red Sea violence has hit its supply chains. Shipping executives said the strikes would prompt shippers to keep away from the Red Sea for now until there is clarity about whether the route is safe or not.
“Last night’s event highlighted that the area is still far from providing a safe passage for international shipping,” said Peter Sand, Chief Analyst at Norwegian shipping pricing company Xeneta. He said he expected diversions and extra costs to remain throughout January at least. “It will get worse before it gets better. But I think it’s also fair to say that the endgame has begun,” Sand said.
Christopher Long, intelligence director at British maritime security company Neptune P2P Group, said “there will be a period of 24 to 72 hours where shipping will take a hiatus…Longer-term, it will depend on the Houthis” and if Iran resupplies them with drones and missiles.
A ship that was seized by Houthi fighters in November, beside a smaller vessel, near a Yemeni port. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Benoit Faucon and Saleh al-Batati contributed to this article.
Write to Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com and Stephen Kalin at stephen.kalin@wsj.com
6. It's On Against the Houthis by Mick Ryan
A wise warning. Never assume your enemy is a pushover. But this means we must not tiptoe around the problem. We must sustain decisive action until the necessary objectives are achieved..
Excerpts:
In his statement in the wake of these attacks, President Biden notes that “I will not hesitate to direct further measures to protect our people and the free flow of international commerce as necessary.” We are clearly in the early days of what could be a more significant campaign. The U.S. is obviously prepared for subsequent military action against the Houthis should they continue to attack shipping and other targets across the Middle East.
We should beware. The Houthis have demonstrated significant resilience and military capability until this point. We should not assume they will be a pushover in this new conflict.
It's On Against the Houthis
The U.S. leads strikes against the Houthi intelligence-strike complex
mickryan.substack.com · by Mick Ryan
A Royal Air Force strike aircraft on the way to hit Houthi targets (Source: DefenceHQ at Twitter / X)
With the war in Gaza nearing its 100th day, the Houthi assaults on vessels in the Red Sea underscore the intricate nature of this conflict and the need to carefully contain it and prevent its escalation beyond its current boundaries.
Dr. Scott Romaniuk & Professor Christian Kaunert
Geopolitical Monitor
Today, a U.S.-led force conducted a range of military strikes against targets in Houthi controlled areas designed to degrade their ability to interdict maritime trade in the Bab-El-Mandeb region of the vital red Sea trading route. As a the media release from the U.S. Department of Defense notes, “this action is intended to disrupt and degrade the Houthis' capabilities to endanger mariners and threaten global trade in one of the world's most critical waterways.”
For weeks, the Houthis had engaged in an escalated campaign of missile, drone and surface attacks against shipping in the region. As the map below shows, this was a comprehensive campaign which exploited the war in Gaza to attack shipping and send missiles towards Israel.
Source: Damian Symon at @Detresfa_
According to a report in the Washington Post, the attacks comprised of “a consortium of military aircraft and naval assets, including submarines…They took out Houthi air defenses before targeting radars and facilities used to store and launch unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.”
The Houthis were certainly warned. In a joint statement from the governments of the United States, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and the United Kingdom on 3 January, they stated that:
We call for the immediate end of these illegal attacks and release of unlawfully detained vessels and crews. The Houthis will bear the responsibility of the consequences should they continue to threaten lives, the global economy, and free flow of commerce in the region’s critical waterways.
There is still considerable ambiguity about this strike campaign. We are yet to understand how comprehensive or how successful the initial strikes have been. And we are yet to see whether this is a one off, or part of a much broader campaign against the Houthis.
At this early stage, there are several issues which are worth considering.
1. Single Strike or Extended Campaign? The strikes conducted today will have had an impact on the Houthi missile capability, including their ability to collect intelligence and targetting data. But it is very unlikely that a single strike will significantly change the situation. Despite the precision of modern weapon systems, not every target is found before strikes such as this, and not every target will have been effectively neutralised. While battle damage assessment will already be underway by U.S. military, we should assume that follow up strikes will be needed.
One of the key lessons from recent conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine is that there are no magic bullets in war, and conflicts are no longer decided in a single engagement. The Houthis have a significant quantity of missiles, drones and other weapon systems. Potentially, the neutralisation of the Houthi capability or will to interdict shipping routes might require a strike campaign over days (or weeks).
2. What Are The Strategic Objectives? The U.S. and its partners had little choice but to conduct these strikes. Its actions to peacefully resolve the situation had not succeeded, there was a need to ‘re-establish deterrence’ against the interdiction of maritime trade in a vital international trading route. Despite this, the strategic objectives of the U.S. and its partners will be important. As the Biden administration has demonstrated in Ukraine and Gaza, it is very cautious about escalation.
This mindset will impact how expansive the strategic aims of the new campaign against the Houthis are. With major conflicts raging in Ukraine and Gaza, and significant tensions likely after Taiwan’s elections, Western governments will be hopeful that this situation with the Houthis can be resolved quickly. Therefore they are likely to have limited strategic aims. This is unlikely to be the start of a major initiative to dismantle the Houthis.
Therefore the question of whether this is just a few limited strikes in the hope the Houthis negotiate and stop the strikes, or a longer series of strikes or part of something more significant, is pertinent. The answer will provide insights into the strategic aims of the U.S. While the U.S. will hope for the former, it needs to be prepared for the latter. And, it is unlikely that the U.S. Navy is prepared for anything other than a short term commitment in the region, given the likelihood of increased tensions in the Western Pacific in the wake of the election in Taiwan tomorrow.
3. Messaging Iran. Undoubtedly, part of the rationale for the strikes is also sending a message to Iran. Iran is the backer for Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis (the bad ‘H’s), and the U.S. will also be hoping that these strikes send a message to Iran to back off. However, this is unlikely. Recent U.S. strikes across the region against other Iranian proxies have not had a major impact on Iranian operations to support its terrorist brothers and their operations across the region.
4. Tackling the Iran Problem. At some point, the West may have to address the Iran threat directly rather than attacking its proxies. While this is not an immediate prospect, Iran may actually force the West into a confrontation if it continues its support for enhanced attacks by its proxy forces against Israel, the U.S. and other nations. Ultimately, Iran is the backer for almost all the terrorist organisations that are causing instability in the middle east at present.
5. How will the Houthis react? It is probably unlikely that these strikes will cause the Houthis to back down, at least immediately. They might respond by further attacks against civilian and military vessels, expand the attacks (for example by using sea mines as well as missiles and drones) or even conduct attacks against Saudi oil infrastructure as they have in the past.
The Houthis are also almost certain to use information warfare, claiming the strikes killed innocent civilians, to turn opinion in the Middle East against the US and UK.
Initial indications are that the Houthis are not backing down just yet. The Houthi deputy foreign minister, Hussein al-Ezzi stated after the strikes that the U.S. and the U.K. would face “severe repercussions” for what he termed a blatant act of aggression. CNN reports al-Ezzi describing how:
Our country was subjected to a massive aggressive attack by American and British ships, submarines, and warplanes, and America and Britain will undoubtedly have to prepare to pay a heavy price and bear all the dire consequences of this blatant aggression.
6. How Will The Region React? The Houthis are hardly winning a popularity contest in the region. They have attacked targets in Saudi Arabia and have grown increasingly indiscriminate in their attacks on civilian shipping in the crucial Red Sea trade route. it will be interesting to see how regional nations react, and how this influences Houthi and U.S. decision-making about their responses and future actions.
It’s Not Over Yet
In his statement in the wake of these attacks, President Biden notes that “I will not hesitate to direct further measures to protect our people and the free flow of international commerce as necessary.” We are clearly in the early days of what could be a more significant campaign. The U.S. is obviously prepared for subsequent military action against the Houthis should they continue to attack shipping and other targets across the Middle East.
We should beware. The Houthis have demonstrated significant resilience and military capability until this point. We should not assume they will be a pushover in this new conflict.
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mickryan.substack.com · by Mick Ryan
7. Pentagon fell short in tracking $1 billion in Ukraine aid, IG finds
This will not help get aid packages through Congress.
Pentagon fell short in tracking $1 billion in Ukraine aid, IG finds
Defense News · by Bryant Harris · January 11, 2024
WASHINGTON ― The Defense Department has not fully complied with enhanced tracking requirements for roughly $1 billion worth of equipment sent to Ukraine, a Pentagon Inspector General report released Thursday found.
Most of the improperly tracked equipment is night vision devices, but the list also includes drones as well as missiles. The report did not find any instances of misuse or diversion of the U.S. equipment, as Pentagon Inspector General Robert Storch noted such an assessment would “fall beyond the scope of this project.”
“While there has been significant improvement in the delinquency rate for inventorying this sensitive equipment, persistent gaps as identified in our evaluation may correlate with an inability to maintain complete accountability for this critical U.S. security assistance,” Storch said in a statement.
The Pentagon released enhanced end-use monitoring guidance in December 2022. About $1.7 billion worth of equipment sent to Ukraine falls under these guidelines. The report found that $1 billion of this amount did not live up to these standards, with equipment not properly bar-code scanned and entered into the appropriate database within the required 90-day timeframe.
According to the Pentagon Inspector General, Defense Department compliance on tracking this equipment has improved, with delinquency falling by 27% from February to June 2023.
Still, the Inspector General report notes “significant personnel limitations and accountability challenges remain.”
It recommends the Defense Department improve inventory procedures for equipment that requires enhanced tracking and bettering “the accuracy and completeness” of its database, among other measures.
At the Pentagon press briefing Thursday, Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder said there were no credible signs American aid is being used illegally.
The Defense Department is taking steps to better track its equipment, include using handheld scanners to scan barcodes and working with partners to monitor inventory, Ryder said.
“The Ukrainians have offered unprecedented access to information as it relates to the equipment that we’re providing,” he said.
In addition, Ryder said the Pentagon continues to see Ukraine use American aid on the battlefield, despite Russian “disinformation to the contrary.”
The Inspector General report comes at a sensitive time for Ukraine, with the fate of continued U.S. assistance to the war-torn country uncertain.
President Joe Biden’s $61 billion request to Congress for additional military and economic support to Ukraine has stalled on Capitol Hill, with Republicans demanding a series of unrelated immigration policy changes to advance the package. The Pentagon notified Congress in December it is using the last $1 billion it has on hand to replenish U.S. equipment for Ukraine.
Congress has passed a cumulative $113 billion in Ukraine economic and security aid since Russia’s invasion.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is pushing for additional air defenses to ward off Russian missile barrages. He has previously told Congress Kyiv will lose the war without additional aid.
About Bryant Harris and Noah Robertson
Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.
Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.
8. Ukraine gives “unprecedented” access to information on donated weapons - Pentagon
Ukraine gives “unprecedented” access to information on donated weapons - Pentagon
ukrinform.net
This was stated by Pentagon spokesman General Pat Ryder, Ukrinform's own correspondent reports.
"It is important to point out as well that the Ukrainians have offered unprecedented access to information as it relates to the equipment that we’re providing. So they are fully understanding and supportive of our need to ensure that we can account for the items that are accountable," said the representative of the U.S. Department of Defense.
This is how he responded to a request to comment on the latest report by the U.S. Defense Department Inspector General about the alleged unaccounted for about 40,000 units of American weapons provided to Ukraine.
In this context, the spokesman for the Pentagon emphasized that there is currently "no credible evidence of illicit diversion of U.S.-provided advanced conventional weapons from Ukraine."
At the same time, he pointed to cases of disinformation spread by Russia, circulating a completely opposite narrative.
Ryder noted that the Armed Forces of Ukraine employing capabilities provided by the U.S. “effectively”.
As Ukrinform reported earlier, the U.S. State Department denied claims of the weapons that the U.S. provides to Ukraine potentially falling into the wrong hands.
ukrinform.net
9. Pentagon Flags Tracking Issues in Weapons for Ukraine, Denies Evidence of Misuse
Pentagon Flags Tracking Issues in Weapons for Ukraine, Denies Evidence of Misuse
The report estimated a $1bn potential loss for high-risk items sent to Ukraine, out of a $1.69bn total in weapons. Yet, the Pentagon maintains no evidence of illicit diversion of military aid to Kyiv.
by Kyiv Post | January 12, 2024, 10:24 am
kyivpost.com
The report estimated a $1bn potential loss for high-risk items sent to Ukraine, out of a $1.69bn total in weapons. Yet, the Pentagon maintains no evidence of illicit diversion of military aid to Kyiv.
by Kyiv Post | January 12, 2024, 10:24 am
This January 6, 2015 aerial photo shows the Pentagon building in Washington, DC. AFP PHOTO / FREDERIC WALLOIS (Photo by FREDERIC WALLOIS / AFP)
A recent Pentagon report reveals that over $1 billion worth of military equipment, including shoulder-fired missiles, kamikaze drones, and night-vision goggles, sent by the United States to Ukraine has not been adequately tracked by American officials.
The findings, released by the Defense Department’s inspector general, raise concerns about these weapons’ potential theft or smuggling and definitely provide fodder for Republican politicians who oppose additional aid for Kyiv.
Still, the Pentagon said there is no evidence that military assistance provided to Kyiv has been illicitly diverted. The report rather highlights a failure in tracking and accountability.
“There remains no credible evidence of illicit diversion of US-provided advanced conventional weapons from Ukraine,” Pentagon spokesperson Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder told journalists Thursday.
The weapons, considered sensitive and attractive to arms smugglers, were supposed to be closely monitored, given their battlefield impact, but American officials failed to do it adequately.
The quantity of weapons assessed in the report is just a tiny portion of the approximately $50 billion worth of military equipment that the United States has supplied to Ukraine since 2014.
The report didn’t specify the number, but it estimated a potential loss of about $1 billion for high-risk items sent to Ukraine, out of a total of $1.69 billion in weapons.
By June, the latest data available, the US supplied Ukraine with 10,000 Javelin anti-tank missiles, 2,500 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, 750 kamikaze drones, 430 air-to-air missiles, and 23,000 night-vision goggles.
Other Topics of Interest
The new funds will assist with the procurement of thousands of military drones for Ukraine, including surveillance, long-range attack and sea drones.
However, up to 60 percent of these were labelled “delinquent” due to delays in tracking databases or omissions after leaving US military stockpiles.
The shortfall can be explained by factors including the “limited number of US personnel at logistics hubs in a partner nation and in Ukraine,” and restrictions on the movement of monitoring personnel in the country, the statement said.
When a serial number inventory is conducted, officials view the item and write down or scan its barcode, then update that information in a database, according to an official from the inspector general’s office.
Efforts to improve accountability include providing Ukrainian troops with handheld barcode scanners, allowing instant transmission of serial numbers to American databases.
However, only ten scanners have been provided, none of which are on the front lines.
Still, the report notes that Ukrainian military officials were more diligent than their American counterparts in tracking equipment.
In a specific instance, out of a selection of 303 equipment pieces sent to Ukraine from February 2022 to March 2023, the report revealed that American officials could verify 47 during their passage through logistics centers in Poland. Additionally, only 15 were recorded as arriving in Ukraine.
In contrast, Ukrainian officials demonstrated better diligence by successfully accounting for 73 pieces of equipment, indicating a more meticulous approach to inventory updates.
Washington has spearheaded the push for international support for Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, forging a coalition to back the country and coordinating tens of billions of dollars in aid that has helped Kyiv’s forces push Moscow’s troops back.
While US authorities have authorization to withdraw more military equipment for Ukraine from American stockpiles, “we don’t have the funds available to us to replenish those stocks,” Ryder said.
Republicans have refused to authorize new budget outlays for Ukraine unless Democrats first agree to sweeping, tough new measures to curb illegal immigration and tighten the asylum process.
kyivpost.com
10. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 11, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024
Key Takeaways:
- The reported concentration of the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force in Ukraine and ongoing Russian force generation efforts appear to allow Russian forces to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine.
- Russia’s ability to conduct operational level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to maintain the overall tempo of their localized offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the near term, but it is unclear if Russian forces will be able to conduct effective rotations in the long term or in the event of intensified Russian offensive efforts or a significant Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.
- Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian efforts to expand Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) have yet to fulfill operational requirements in Ukraine and that munitions shortages will continue to prompt Russia to source supplies from abroad.
- Freezing temperatures in Ukraine are likely constraining operations along the front but will likely create more favorable terrain for mechanized maneuver warfare as the ground freezes in the coming weeks.
- Latvia and Estonia announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on January 11.
- Russia may be setting information conditions for future escalations against Latvia by threatening to punish Latvia for closing a likely base of Russian informational influence in Latvia.
- European Commission (EC) Defense Industry Spokesperson Johanna Bernsel clarified on January 11 that European Union (EU) member states will be able to produce a million shells per year by spring 2024 but that the delivery of the shells to Ukraine will depend on individual member states.
- The US Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspector General published a report on January 11 that states that the failure to document certain aid provided to Ukraine in a timely manner is largely due to DoD limitations but that does not suggest that any of the material aid has been misappropriated.
- Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk announced on January 11 that the Verkhovna Rada withdrew a draft law on mobilization for revisions after discussions between Ukrainian legislators and political and military leadership.
- A Ukrainian official indicated that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) may struggle to compensate for the loss of base infrastructure after allocating naval assets away from the BSF’s main base of Sevastopol in occupied Crimea.
- Ukrainian and Russian forces continued positional engagements along the entire front.
- Kremlin newswire TASS reported on January 10 that Russian forces will deploy additional aircraft and vessels and increase the production of hypersonic Kinzhal and Zircon missiles in 2024.
- The Belarusian Ministry of Emergency Situations stated on January 10 that it sponsored a trip for 35 Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Mogilev for the New Year holiday during which soldiers taught children “the basics of life safety” and how to behave in “extreme situations.”
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 11, 2024
Jan 11, 2024 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 11, 2024
Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 11, 2024, 7:25pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on January 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The reported concentration of the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force in Ukraine and ongoing Russian force generation efforts appear to allow Russian forces to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on January 11 that Russian forces have 462,000 personnel in Ukraine and that this represents the entire land component of the Russian military.[1] Skibitskyi stated that most Russian units in Ukraine are manned at between 92 and 95 percent of their intended end strength and that the size of the Russian grouping in Ukraine allows Russian forces to conduct rotations throughout the theater.[2] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces withdraw units that are at 50 percent or less of their intended end strength to rear areas and return them to the front following recovery and replenishment.[3] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on January 11 that the Russian military has successfully replenished Russian forces in Ukraine through an ongoing crypto-mobilization effort that generated over 500,000 new personnel in 2023.[4]
ISW previously observed routine Russian struggles to conduct operational level rotations from the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 through Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive.[5] The apparent Russian ability to generate forces at a rate equal to Russian losses likely provides Russian forces the ability to replenish units that the Russian command has withdrawn from the line due to degradation and later return these replenished units to the front.[6] Russian forces maintain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine, and the absence of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations likely removes pressure on operational deployments that had previously partially restrained the Russians‘ ability to conduct rotations.[7] Russian forces have not seized the battlefield initiative in Kherson Oblast, however, and appear to be degrading units and formations operating near the Ukrainian bridgehead on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River without making apparent efforts to conduct operational level rotations (although they do appear to conduct tactical-level rotations).[8] Russian forces have conducted several regroupings during localized offensive operations in the Avdiivka, Bakhmut, Lyman, and Kupyansk directions since early October 2023, which likely provided Russian forces time to conduct the rotations Skibitskyi described.[9] ISW has not observed widespread Russian complaints about a lack of rotations throughout the theater since summer 2023, and the overall tempo of Russian operations is consistent with Skibitskyi’s reporting.[10]
Russia’s ability to conduct operational level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to maintain the overall tempo of their localized offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the near term, but it is unclear if Russian forces will be able to conduct effective rotations in the long term or in the event of intensified Russian offensive efforts or a significant Ukrainian counteroffensive operation. Russian operational rotations in principle mitigate the degradation of attacking Russian forces that over time could cause Russian offensive efforts to culminate. Several other operational factors have previously contributed to the culmination of Russian offensive efforts in Ukraine, but constraints on available manpower and combat effective formations have often been a primary factor.[11] Russian forces are largely conducting infantry-heavy assaults in Ukraine with assault groups that do not necessarily require large amounts of equipment or high levels of training.[12] The Russian force generation apparatus appears to be replenishing losses in Ukraine with poorly trained and relatively combat ineffective personnel whom the Russian command has deemed to be sufficient for routine attritional frontal assaults.[13] These assaults have yet to result in more than marginal Russian gains in Ukraine since early October 2023, and it is unlikely that Russian forces can continue them indefinitely in a way that will allow the Russians to convert tactical successes into operationally significant results. Successful Russian operational-level offensives in Ukraine will require the Russian command to commit relatively combat effective and well-equipped units and formations to offensive operations at scale, and it is unclear if replenishment through these Russian operational rotations will suffice to maintain these units’ combat capabilities. Overall Russian combat capabilities in Ukraine may still degrade over time, therefore, despite the rotations, hindering the Russian military’s ability to sustain several significant offensive operations at once.
The Russian military may also incur losses greater than Russia’s ability to generate new forces if the Russian command decides to intensify offensive efforts in Ukraine, thereby limiting the manpower available to replenish degraded units and formations. The intensification of Russian offensive efforts would commit more elements to the frontline and place pressure on the number of available forces that could assume control over a degraded unit’s area of responsibility while that unit underwent rest and restoration. It is unclear if the current Russian crypto-mobilization campaign, which relies heavily on volunteer recruitment and the coercive mobilization of convicts and migrants, would be able to provide the increased number of personnel required to conduct rotations during an intensified Russian offensive effort.[14]
Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian efforts to expand Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) have yet to fulfill operational requirements in Ukraine and that munitions shortages will continue to prompt Russia to source supplies from abroad. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce two million rounds of 122mm and 152mm shells annually, which resulted in a deficit of 500,000 shells in 2023 and will likely result in a similar deficit in 2024.[15] Skibitskyi stated that Russia plans to increase its ammunition production in 2024 but lacks the necessary components, qualified personnel, and production capabilities.[16] Skibitskyi noted that Russia has previously purchased shells from Belarus, Iran, and North Korea and assessed that Russia will likely seek to procure additional shells from abroad in 2024 and beyond.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on January 11 that Russia will use any "pause” or temporary ceasefire agreement to stockpile drones, artillery, and missiles and address its large materiel shortages ahead of future aggression against Ukraine.[18] Zelensky added that Russia is currently negotiating the acquisition of additional missiles and ammunition from other countries and noted that Russia has already received more than one million shells from North Korea.[19] Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin also confirmed recent Western reports that Russian forces have already launched at least one North Korean missile against Ukraine.[20]
Politico, citing a report by the Kyiv School of Economics and Yermak-McFaul International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, reported on January 11 that despite Western sanctions, Russia imported $8.77 billion worth of goods and components necessary to produce missiles, drones, armored vehicles, and other military equipment between January and October 2023.[21] The report states that Russia’s capacity to manufacture missiles and drones appears to have increased in 2023 despite Western sanctions, and Politico stated that Russia increased its production of missiles to 115 per month by the end of 2023.[22] The report noted that sanctions have strained Russia’s supply chains and have caused “unparalleled losses” in Russia’s overall production of military aviation and equipment, however.[23]
Ukrainian and Western sources have previously reported on Russia‘s sanctions evasion schemes to acquire foreign components and noted that Russia’s reliance on foreign components has constrained Russia’s domestic production of aircraft, missiles, and drones.[24] An unnamed Russian drone manufacturer also drew Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attention to the fact that a “large percentage” of electronics, particularly drones, produced in Russia require foreign components during a campaign event in Russia’s Far Eastern Federal District on January 11, prompting Putin to acknowledge the importance of this issue and the need to address Russia’s reliance on foreign components.[25] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s current missile and drone reserves and production rates likely do not allow Russian forces to conduct regular large-scale missile strikes, but likely do allow for more consistent drone strikes due to Russia’s ability to produce drones at a much higher rate (roughly 1,400 Shahed-136/131 drones between February and October 2023).[26] The Russian government is likely attempting to develop domestic substitutions for foreign components to sustain and even increase its domestic drone and missile production despite Western sanctions.
Freezing temperatures in Ukraine are likely constraining operations along the front but will likely create more favorable terrain for mechanized maneuver warfare as the ground freezes in the coming weeks. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are using fewer loitering munitions in the Kupyansk direction due to cold weather.[27] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on January 11 that Russian forces did not launch as many drones against Ukraine in the past two nights because ice can freeze drones.[28] A Ukrainian officer in a brigade operating near Bakhmut stated on January 10 that the temperature drops to –18 Celsius (about –1 Fahrenheit) at night, making it “impossible” for personnel to stay at observation posts for more than a few hours.[29] The officer reported that the intensity of Russian infantry assaults decreased in the Bakhmut direction likely due to the freezing temperatures.[30] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the freezing temperatures coupled with the potential for deep snow may limit maneuverability but that the frozen ground will improve “cross-country movement” throughout January and into February.[31] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely try to sustain or intensify localized offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in an attempt to seize and retain the initiative regardless of winter weather and terrain conditions.
Latvia and Estonia announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on January 11. Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics stated that Latvia will provide a new aid package to Ukraine, which includes howitzers, 155mm ammunition, anti-tank weapons, rockets, grenades, all-terrain vehicles, helicopters, drones, and other equipment.[32] Estonian President Alar Karis stated that Estonia will provide a military aid package worth 1.2 billion euros (about $1.32 billion) in 2024 to 2027, amounting to 0.25 percent of Estonia’s annual GDP.[33] The Ukrainian Ministry of Strategic Industry and the Estonian Defense and Aerospace Industry Association signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at supporting the development and production of drones and electronic warfare systems.[34]
Russia may be setting information conditions for future escalations against Latvia by threatening to punish Latvia for closing a likely base of Russian informational influence in Latvia. The Latvian parliament adopted a bill on January 11 to transfer the “Moscow House” business and cultural center in Riga, owned by the Russian government, to Latvian state ownership in order to “guarantee Latvia’s security.”[35] The Latvian parliament reported that the Russian government has been using the “Moscow House” to support Russian influence operations in Latvia.[36] The Russian Embassy in Latvia responded to the transfer by claiming that this “hostility” will result in ”serious consequences.”[37] The Russian Embassy in Latvia also accused the Latvian government of systematically oppressing “Russian speakers“ in Latvia due to a recent Latvian law requiring Russian citizens with Latvian residence permits to pass a Latvian language exam.[38] The Russian accusation likely deliberately equates all Russian speakers in Latvia with Russian citizens residing in Latvia in an attempt to exacerbate tensions between local Russian speakers and ethnic Russians and Latvian speakers. Russian officials have been increasingly asserting Russia’s right to protect “compatriots abroad,” intentionally loosely defined as ethnic Russians and Russian speakers and not limited to Russian citizens. Russia may be setting conditions aimed at destabilizing Latvia by exacerbating linguistic tensions and framing itself as a protector of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers.
European Commission (EC) Defense Industry Spokesperson Johanna Bernsel clarified on January 11 that European Union (EU) member states will be able to produce a million shells per year by spring 2024 but that the delivery of the shells to Ukraine will depend on individual member states.[39] Bernsel stated that there are no updates on whether EU member states will deliver the promised one million artillery shells to Ukraine by spring 2024. EU Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton stated on January 10 that the EU will be able to supply Ukraine with the one million artillery shells by spring 2024.[40]
The US Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspector General published a report on January 11 that states that the failure to document certain aid provided to Ukraine in a timely manner is largely due to DoD limitations but that does not suggest that any of the material aid has been misappropriated.[41] The report stated that the DoD’s Office of Defense Cooperation–Ukraine (ODC-Ukraine) failed to adequately inventory defense articles within the 90 days required by law due to manpower shortages, the absence of protocols for maintaining a monitoring database in a hostile environment until December 2022, and a lack of internal controls for validating data in the database. DoD Inspector General Robert Storch noted that this report does not mean that these inventories are “not there” or “not being used,“ and the report noted that Ukrainian forces do provide “raw” numbers to the ODC-Ukraine and that Ukraine is working to implement a system better utilizing the serial numbers.[42] The report also stated that Ukraine has conducted inventories that have not been uploaded to the designated database.[43] The report noted that while the DoD’s delinquency rate – the rate of US-provided defense articles for Ukraine not properly documented within 90 days of arrival – is still not in compliance with federal regulations, revised protocols for both the DoD and Ukrainian personnel contributed to an improved delinquency rate from February 10, 2023 to June 2, 2023. The report noted that the “diversion” of US military assistance from the Ukrainian military is outside the scope of its report, and that the report offers no evidence that any of the US defense articles allocated to Ukraine have been misused.
The DoD Office of the Inspector General’s report places the onus for ensuring compliance with the DoD’s reporting standards on the ODC-Ukraine, and Ukraine’s struggle to implement these standards appears to be related to manpower and logistics issues rather than malign intent.[44] The Office of the Inspector General’s report noted that Ukrainian personnel only have 10 barcode scanners to record serial numbers - none of which are on the front line - and that Ukrainian personnel sometimes struggle to report losses within the required 90 days due to the serial numbers becoming lost or unreadable from use and battle damage. The report also stated that Ukraine occasionally did not provide written reports of losses in a timely manner due to a difference between Ukraine’s and the DoD’s loss classification standards. The report noted that ODC-Ukraine lacks enough personnel at logistics hubs to ensure compliance with DoD reporting standards due to significant personnel limitations.
Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk announced on January 11 that the Verkhovna Rada withdrew a draft law on mobilization for revisions after discussions between Ukrainian legislators and political and military leadership.[45] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is prepared to introduce a new version of the draft law that accounts for various unspecified proposals and emphasized the importance of rotations and leave for Ukrainian servicemen.[46] ISW previously reported on several provisions made in the now returned draft law, and it is currently unclear what provisions will be made in the new version.[47]
A Ukrainian official indicated that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) may struggle to compensate for the loss of base infrastructure after allocating naval assets away from the BSF’s main base of Sevastopol in occupied Crimea.[48] Ukrainian Navy Commander Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa stated to Ukrainska Pravda in an interview published on January 11 that the Russian naval base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, is a poorer base than Sevastopol due to its vulnerability to poor weather conditions and a lack of nearby airfields, large repair facilities, or weapons storage facilities. Neizhpapa noted that Ukrainian strikes have forced Russian forces to reduce their use of Sevastopol as a main naval base, as ISW has recently observed.[49] Neizhpapa stated that Ukrainian strikes are compelling Russian forces to disperse their naval assets to ports in Novorossisyk and in Russian-backed separatist Abkhazia and that Russian forces are also reducing their use of the port of Feodosia, Crimea.[50]
Key Takeaways:
- The reported concentration of the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force in Ukraine and ongoing Russian force generation efforts appear to allow Russian forces to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine.
- Russia’s ability to conduct operational level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to maintain the overall tempo of their localized offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the near term, but it is unclear if Russian forces will be able to conduct effective rotations in the long term or in the event of intensified Russian offensive efforts or a significant Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.
- Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian efforts to expand Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) have yet to fulfill operational requirements in Ukraine and that munitions shortages will continue to prompt Russia to source supplies from abroad.
- Freezing temperatures in Ukraine are likely constraining operations along the front but will likely create more favorable terrain for mechanized maneuver warfare as the ground freezes in the coming weeks.
- Latvia and Estonia announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on January 11.
- Russia may be setting information conditions for future escalations against Latvia by threatening to punish Latvia for closing a likely base of Russian informational influence in Latvia.
- European Commission (EC) Defense Industry Spokesperson Johanna Bernsel clarified on January 11 that European Union (EU) member states will be able to produce a million shells per year by spring 2024 but that the delivery of the shells to Ukraine will depend on individual member states.
- The US Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspector General published a report on January 11 that states that the failure to document certain aid provided to Ukraine in a timely manner is largely due to DoD limitations but that does not suggest that any of the material aid has been misappropriated.
- Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk announced on January 11 that the Verkhovna Rada withdrew a draft law on mobilization for revisions after discussions between Ukrainian legislators and political and military leadership.
- A Ukrainian official indicated that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) may struggle to compensate for the loss of base infrastructure after allocating naval assets away from the BSF’s main base of Sevastopol in occupied Crimea.
- Ukrainian and Russian forces continued positional engagements along the entire front.
- Kremlin newswire TASS reported on January 10 that Russian forces will deploy additional aircraft and vessels and increase the production of hypersonic Kinzhal and Zircon missiles in 2024.
- The Belarusian Ministry of Emergency Situations stated on January 10 that it sponsored a trip for 35 Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Mogilev for the New Year holiday during which soldiers taught children “the basics of life safety” and how to behave in “extreme situations.”
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on January 11 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked near Orlyanka (southeast of Kupyansk) and liberated 1.7 square kilometers of territory, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[51] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman; southwest of Svatove near Makiivka and Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Yampolivka; southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area.[52] Elements of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) are reportedly operating near Terny and the Luhansk People’s Republic’s (LNR) 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[53]
Ukrainian officials and sources continue to report that Russian forces are intensifying localized offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and are preparing to intensify operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on January 11 that Russian forces have become more active in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka, and Ukrainian Grounds Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi emphasized that Russian forces are intensifying efforts in the area while sustaining high personnel losses.[54] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces appears to be preparing for the next stage of the Russian offensive effort towards Kupyansk.[55] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have concentrated elements of the 25th and 138th Motorized Rifle Brigades (both of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Western Military District [WMD]) along the Synkivka-Petropavlivka line northeast of Kupyansk, elements of the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army, WMD) along the Vilshana-Petropavlivka line east of Kupyansk, elements of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army) along the Pershotravneve-Pishchane line northeast of Kupyansk, and elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army’s 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 47th and 4th Tank Divisions along the Yahidne-Ivanivka line southwest of Kupyansk.[56] Mashovets stated that Russian demining groups are actively operating in the Yahidne-Ivanivka area and are likely preparing passages for assault groups.[57] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have transferred 1,000 to 1,200 personnel to elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division and the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade in the past week to replenish losses.[58] Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are similarly transferring assault groups from Russian territory to the Lyman direction and are clearing routes through minefields in the area.[59] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may intensify efforts to capture Kupyansk in the coming weeks and that the Russian grouping in the area is better able to conduct an offensive effort than Russian forces elsewhere in Ukraine are.[60] Intensified Russian offensive operations in the Lyman direction or Russian tactical actions elsewhere in northeastern Ukraine will likely aim to draw and fix Ukrainian forces away from the Kupyansk direction.[61]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Siversk. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced along a rail line north of Vesele (southeast of Siversk).[62] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are transferring unspecified assault companies to the Siversk direction in preparation to resume attacks in the area.[63]
Positional fighting continued near Bakhmut on January 11 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional fighting northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Khromove; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivika and Andriivka.[64] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and unspecified Russian “Volunteer Corps” units continue to operate near Bakhmut.[65]
Positional fighting continued in the Avdiivka area on January 11, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional fighting continued near Avdiivka and the Coke Plant in northwestern Avdiivka; northwest of Avdiivka near Stepove and Novobakhmutivka; west of Avdiivka near Sieverne; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[66]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed on January 11 that Russian forces are preparing for another attempt at a “decisive assault” against Avdiivka by trying to bypass Avdiivka from the north but that Russian forces will struggle to do so.[67] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) and the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) will likely try to attack between Stepove and the Avdiivka Coke Plant to ultimately cut the O0542 (Avdiivka-Orlivka) highway west of Avdiivka. Mashovets stated that this plan is doubtful as previous Russian attacks against the plant have been unsuccessful. ISW has observed no indications to suggest that Russian forces would be able to make operationally significant advances near Avdiivka if they conducted a new wave of intensified ground assaults in the near term.
Russian forces reportedly recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on January 10 that Russian forces advanced 400 meters deep along a four-kilometer-wide front south of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City) after attacking the settlement’s flank instead of conducting frontal assaults.[68] Other milbloggers reiterated similar claims that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) advanced two kilometers in the Novomykhailivka area.[69] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Marinka and southwest of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka.[70] Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) continue operating near Marinka.[71]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) on January 11, but there were no confirmed changes to the front line in this area.[72] Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) reportedly continue to operate near Staromayorske.[73]
Ukrainian and Russian forces continued positional engagements in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 11, but there were no confirmed changes to the front line in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured several unspecified Ukrainian positions near Nesteryanka (northwest of Robotyne) and advanced near Robotyne.[74] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued near Robotyne and Verbove (west of Robotyne).[75] Another prominent Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) forces are conducting armored assaults near Verbove.[76] Elements of the Russian 7th VDV Division, including the 108th VDV Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[77]
Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on January 11, particularly near Krynky.[78] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk reported that the intensity of infantry assaults in the Kherson direction has decreased because there are fewer Russian Storm-Z assault units in the area and a higher concentration of Russian naval infantry and VDV units that do not conduct consistent attritional assaults as they consider themselves “elite.”[79] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted ballistic missile strikes against populated areas in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast on January 9 and 11 and possibly used an Iskander missile in the January 11 strike.[80]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Kremlin newswire TASS reported on January 10 that Russian forces will deploy additional aircraft and vessels and increase the production of hypersonic Kinzhal and Zircon missiles in 2024.[81] TASS reported that Russian forces will receive two Tu-150M strategic missile carriers, the Knyaz Pozharsky Borei-A class nuclear submarine, three submarines of unspecified types, and 13 surface ships in 2024.[82] TASS also stated that Russian forces plan to make the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system operational in 2024.[83]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Russian forces are reportedly testing a new loitering munition optical guidance system in Ukraine. Russian drone manufacturer Center for Integrated Unmanned Solutions (TsBR) General Director Dmitri Kuzyakin told Kremlin newswire TASS in an article published on January 11 that Russian forces began testing a new loitering munitions that can switch to an “aerial homing torpedo mode.”[84] Kuzyakin claimed that the “aerial homing torpedo mode” allows first-person view (FPV) drone pilots to manually identify the target and then turn on the “aerial homing torpedo mode” after which the drone will automatically strike the target.[85] Kuzyakin claimed that “aerial homing torpedo mode” will allow FPV drone pilots to remain further away from enemy positions.[86] A Ukrainian military analyst stated on January 6 that he observed Russian forces using drones with automatic target acquisition in an unspecified area of the front and described the drone as more accurate, less reliant on human pilots, and more resilient against electronic warfare (EW) systems.[87] ISW cannot confirm if the Ukrainian military analyst observed the TsBR drone.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
The Belarusian Ministry of Emergency Situations stated on January 10 that it sponsored a trip for 35 Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Mogilev Oblast for the New Year holiday during which soldiers taught children “the basics of life safety” and how to behave in “extreme situations.”[88] ISW has previously observed reports of Belarusian involvement in the forced deportation of Ukrainian minors to Russia and Belarus.[89]
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on January 11 that Ukrainian missile strikes using Western-provided missiles against “Russian territory” could justify Russia’s use of nuclear weapons.[90] Medvedev’s statement aims to discourage the continued Western provision of military aid to Ukraine. Medvedev is a notably nationalist and extreme voice in the Russian government and his January 11 claim is consistent with his previous statements.[91]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
Union State Secretary of State Dmitri Mezentsev stated on January 11 that Russia and Belarus will consider a decree on implementing the Union State Treaty through 2026 at the next Supreme State Council meeting.[92] Mezentsev stated that the decree includes proposals to implement scientific and technological cooperation, improve transport infrastructure, and support the implementation of 28 existing Union State programs.[93]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
11. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 11, 2024
I am sure we will read about the attacks on the Houthis in tonight's update. Keep in mind the information cut off for the update is 2pm yesterday.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-11-2024
Key Takeaways:
- Israeli forces continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
- The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khan Younis.
- Hamas and other unspecified Palestinian political factions discussed the state of the Israel-Hamas war in an “emergency national meeting,” which may signal that Palestinian political factions are considering re-opening indirect talks with Israel after talks froze on January 2.
- Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 11 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
-
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a rocket attack targeting US forces at al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province, Syria.[1]
- Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stated that the Iraqi federal government will announce a start date soon for talks to remove US forces from Iraq during an interview with Saudi-owned al Arabiya.
- Houthi Spokesperson Mohammad Abdulsalam rejected United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2722 and announced that the Houthis will continue to target Israeli ships in the Red Sea.
- An online shipping tracker organization reported that the IRGC spy ship Behshad, which provides the Houthis with real-time intelligence has left the Red Sea and is en route to Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, Iran.
IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 11, 2024
Jan 11, 2024 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Iran Update, January 11, 2024
Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.
Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Key Takeaways:
- Israeli forces continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
- The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khan Younis.
- Hamas and other unspecified Palestinian political factions discussed the state of the Israel-Hamas war in an “emergency national meeting,” which may signal that Palestinian political factions are considering re-opening indirect talks with Israel after talks froze on January 2.
- Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 11 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
-
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a rocket attack targeting US forces at al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province, Syria.[1]
- Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stated that the Iraqi federal government will announce a start date soon for talks to remove US forces from Iraq during an interview with Saudi-owned al Arabiya.
- Houthi Spokesperson Mohammad Abdulsalam rejected United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2722 and announced that the Houthis will continue to target Israeli ships in the Red Sea.
- An online shipping tracker organization reported that the IRGC spy ship Behshad, which provides the Houthis with real-time intelligence has left the Red Sea and is en route to Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, Iran.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
- Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.
Palestinian militias claimed several attacks in the northern Gaza Strip on January 11. The military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Quds Brigades, claimed to fire tandem-charge anti-tank rockets at an Israeli tank in Jabalia City. The group also said that it shot down an Israeli tactical reconnaissance drone in the same area.[2] A Palestinian journalist reported on January 9 that Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters clashed in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood bordering Jabalia City as Israeli forces “repositioned” in Gaza City.[3] Palestinian militias conducted nearly daily attacks targeting Israeli forces throughout December in Jabalia City, Jabalia refugee camp, and Sheikh Radwan.[4] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on January 6 that it had “dismantled” the 12 Hamas battalions in the northern Gaza Strip.[5] Palestinian militias operating in the northern Gaza Strip remain capable of disrupting Israeli operations there, however.
The al Quds Brigades claimed on January 11 that its fighters returned from the front lines in Jabalia City and reported that they fired anti-tank rockets at Israeli armor and clashed at close range with Israeli ground forces.[6] The inability of these fighters to communicate with higher headquarters until returning to rear areas indicates that their commanders may be unable to transmit orders to fighters that are engaged with Israeli forces. Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) military wing, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, have similarly reported that their fighters resumed contact with their command after returning from the front lines in the northern Gaza Strip.[7]
Israeli forces continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on January 11. The Golani Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters in the Maghazi area.[8] A Yiftach Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) unit killed Palestinian fighters operating near a school in Maghazi that Palestinian fighters used for military activity.[9] The al Qassem Brigades conducted a multi-stage attack in Nuseirat targeting Israeli armor on January 11. The al Qassem Brigades first targeted Israeli armor with anti-tank rockets before mortaring the Israeli quick reaction force that responded to the initial engagement.[10] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades acknowledged the group’s military media commander was killed by an Israeli airstrike in Deir al Balah on January 11.[11]
The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 11. Israeli forces published footage of a tunnel system in Khan Younis that connects to an extensive underground network.[12] The IDF said that the tunnel is in the heart of a civilian area and cost Hamas hundreds of thousands of dollars to construct.[13] Israeli ground, engineering, and special operating forces (SOF) are leading the effort to locate and destroy tunnels in Khan Younis.[14] The IDF has located over 300 tunnel shafts and destroyed 100 of them.[15] Palestinian militias use the tunnels to conduct hit-and-run attacks targeting Israeli forces and to store weapons. The IDF Givati Brigade directed several airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis who were planting improvised explosive devices, observing Israeli forces, and exiting buildings where Israeli forces had found weapons.[16] The IDF 4th Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) engaged Palestinian fighters who previously fired anti-tank rockets at IDF forces.[17]
Palestinian militias continued to attempt to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis city and sectors south and east of the city on January 11. The al Qassem Brigades claimed that it detonated a Shawaz explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting an Israeli bulldozer east of Khan Younis City.[18] The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades conducted a combined attack on an Israeli command center east of Khan Younis City.[19] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah—published a video compilation on January 11 that showed its forces firing rockets and mortars at Israeli forces east of Khan Younis and in the central city area.[20] The al Qassem Brigades targeted an Israeli bulldozer surrounded by ground forces with an anti-tank IED and an anti-personnel IED south of Khan Younis City.[21] Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in southern Khan Younis on January 8.[22]
Hamas and other unspecified Palestinian political factions discussed the state of the Israel-Hamas war in an “emergency national meeting” on January 11.[23] The meetings and the statement that the parties issued afterward may signal that Palestinian political factions are considering re-opening indirect talks with Israel after talks froze on January 2.[24] The factions emphasized their continued unity and responded to Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s four-pronged security and governance plan for the Gaza Strip floated on January 4 that would place a US-led multinational task force in charge of “running civil affairs and the economic rehabilitation” in the strip.[25] The Palestinian factions emphasized that the governance of the Gaza Strip is a Palestinian issue. The factions said that this meant Israel and its supporters cannot ”impose guardianship” over the Palestinian people.[26] The Palestinian political factions last issued a joint statement on post-war plans and stipulations on December 27, which was before indirect talks between Israel and Hamas froze.[27]
The al Quds Brigades fired mortars from the Gaza Strip targeting Kissufim in southern Israel on January 11.[28] The number of indirect fire attacks conducted daily by Palestinian militias has decreased significantly since early December, which is consistent with the assessed degradation of their indirect fire capacity.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there
Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces in seven locations across the West Bank.[29] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed small arms clashes and IED attacks targeting Israeli forces during Israeli raids in Qalqilya and Jaba, south of Jenin on January 11.[30] The IDF stated that it killed a senior PIJ operative during the Jaba raids.[31] The al Quds Brigades separately claimed small arms clashes targeting Israeli forces in Jenin.[32] Other unspecified Palestinian fighters detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces during the Jenin raid.[33] Palestinian fighters threw explosives targeting an Israeli settlement near Hebron.[34]
Hamas called for Palestinians to march on the al Aqsa Mosque on January 12.[35] Hamas stated that this protest would challenge Israel’s restrictions on the number of people allowed to perform Friday prayers at the al Aqsa Mosque since October 7.[36] Hamas separately called for marches in solidarity with Gaza January 12-14.[37]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
- Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel
Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 11 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 11.[38] This number of attacks is consistent with daily attack rates in northern Israel during the past week. The IDF said that unspecified fighters fired 10 rockets from Lebanon into Kiriyat Shmona and that Israeli forces shot down three of the rockets.[39] A video of the attacks shows rockets damaging buildings in the town.[40] LH claimed the attack, adding that it launched dozens of rockets on Kiriyat Shmona in retaliation for an Israeli strike that killed two paramedics in Lebanon.[41] Unspecified fighters conducted anti-tank guided missile attacks targeting Israeli forces in Metulla and Adamit.[42] The IDF conducted multiple strikes on LH military infrastructure in southern Lebanon on January 11.[43]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
- Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts
A member of the Iraqi Sovereignty Alliance, Youssef al Sabaawi, told Iraqi media on January 10 that the Iraqi parliament has reduced the list of potential candidates to replace former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi to three individuals.[44] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court issued a ruling to remove Halbousi from Parliament in November 2023.[45] CTP-ISW assessed that the court removed Halbousi as part of Iranian-backed efforts to reduce US influence in Iraq.[46] The Council of Representatives will vote for a new speaker on January 13.[47] Sabaawi told Iraqi media that the following individuals are among the three candidates most likely to become parliament speaker:
-
Mahmoud al Mashhadani: Mashhadani was elected to the Council of Representatives in 2005 as a member of the Iraqi Accord Front, also known as Tawafuq.[48] Mashhadani co-founded the Iraqi National Dialogue Council (INDC), a Sunni political party.[49] Mashhadani served as parliament speaker between April 2006 and December 2008 under former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and reportedly has a strong relationship with Maliki.[50] Maliki heads the State of Law Coalition. Iraqis elected Mashhadani as an MP representing Baghdad Governorate in October 2021.[51] Mashhadani is currently part of the Sunni-dominated Azm Alliance, which is headed by Muthanna al Samarrai.[52] The Shia Coordination Framework supports Samarrai.[53] Samarrai supports Mashhadani to become parliament speaker.[54] The Azm Alliance won 14 seats in the October 2021 parliamentary elections.[55] An individual needs an absolute majority (50 percent plus 1) of votes to become parliament speaker.[56]
-
Salem al Issawi: Issawi was a member of the Anbar Governorate Council between 2010 and 2014.[57] Issawi is a member of US-sanctioned and Iran-linked businessman Khamis al Khanjar’s Sovereignty Alliance[58] He is also a member of the Leadership Alliance, which includes both the Sovereignty Alliance and Halbousi’s National Progress Alliance.[59] Khanjar—who is a longtime rival of Halbousi—supports Issawi.[60] Issawi served in the Council of Representatives between 2014-2018.[61] Former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi reportedly prevented Issawi from obtaining a seat in parliament in 2018 although he was a winner in the 2018 elections.[62] Issawi has been a representative for Fallujah, Anbar Province, in the Council of Representatives since 2021 and is a member of the Integrity Committee.[63]
Iraqi media reported that a third likely candidate to replace Halbousi is Shaalan al Karim.[64] Karim is the head of the Albu Issa tribe, an important Sunni Arab tribe in Iraq.[65] Karim was born in Samarra, Salah al Din Province, and heads Halbousi’s National Progress Alliance in this province.[66] Iraqi state media reported on January 11 that Halbousi supports Karim to become parliament speaker.[67]
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a rocket attack targeting US forces at al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province, Syria, on January 11.[68]
Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stated that the Iraqi federal government will announce a start date soon for talks to remove US forces from Iraq during an interview with Saudi-owned al Arabiya on January 11.[69] Hussein described both Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and US self-defense strikes on these militias as “unacceptable.” Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on January 5 the formation of a committee to facilitate the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. US forces are deployed in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government to fight ISIS.[70]
Houthi Spokesperson Mohammad Abdulsalam rejected United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2722 and announced that the Houthis will continue to target Israeli ships in the Red Sea.[71] The UNSC passed Resolution 2722 on January 10. The resolution demands that the Houthis cease all attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea.[72] Abdulsalam claimed that there is no threat to international navigation in the Red Sea. The Houthi movement claims that it is only targeting Israeli-owned or Israel-bound vessels.[73] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted ships with no connection to Israel.
The resolution also condemned unspecified actors for violating UNSC Resolution 2216 by directly or indirectly supplying military materiel and/or personnel to the Houthi Movement.[74] US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken reported that Iran has provided technology, equipment, intelligence, and information to the Houthis for attacks targeting shipping in the Red Sea.[75] Blinken said that the Houthis have conducted “hundreds” of attacks in the Red Sea since November 2023. CTP-ISW assessed on December 31 that this Houthi campaign is part of a wider regional escalation by Iran and its so-called Axis of Resistance which is intended to support Iranian strategic objectives in the region.[76]
The Artesh Navy seized the Greek-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged Saint Nikolas crude oil tanker in the Gulf of Oman on January 11.[77] Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled media said that the seizure was a retaliation against the United States after the US Navy seized the same tanker and then offloaded the ship’s Iranian crude oil in April and August 2023.[78] The Saint Nikolas was formerly known as the Suez Rajan. The United States seized the Suez Rajan in April 2023 and offloaded its oil in August 2023 to enforce US unilateral sanctions on Iranian oil exports.[79] Senior Iranian military officials vowed in July and September 2023 that Iran would retaliate against the United States after the US Navy seized and offloaded Iranian oil from the tanker in April and August 2023.[80] The Artesh and IRGC navies seized several commercial tankers in the Persian Gulf from April to July 2023 in response to the US seizure. These seizures caused a US military buildup in and around the Persian Gulf during the same period.[81] CTP assessed in August 2023 that the Iranian regime may seize additional commercial vessels in response to the US Navy’s seizure of the Suez Rajan.[82]
An online shipping tracker organization reported that the IRGC spy ship Behshad has left the Red Sea and is en route to Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, Iran on January 11.[83] The Behshad is an IRGC intelligence gathering ship stationed off the Dahlak archipelago in the Red Sea.[84] The Wall Street Journal reported on December 22, 2023 that the Behshad provides the Houthis with real-time intelligence, which enables the Houthis to target ships that have gone silent to avoid detection.[85] Western media and officials also said that the IRGC is helping the Houthi forces plan and execute the movement’s drone and missile attacks on ships in the Red Sea.[86] The IRGC has likely used the Behshad and its predecessor, the Saviz, to provide new systems and intelligence to the Houthis to facilitate Houthi operations in the Red Sea prior to this round of escalation.[87] Iran and the IRGC have also hosted and trained Houthi military forces.[88]
The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence provided a detailed report on January 11 covering the ISKP fighters who conducted the January 3 Kerman attack.[89] Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi claimed that the Ministry thwarted “thousands” of operations like the ISKP attack in Kerman.[90] The Intelligence Ministry claimed a Tajik national was the main planner of the attack. The ministry claimed that local smugglers helped the ISKP-affiliated individual enter Iran illegally on December 19 from Iran’s southeastern border. The Intelligence Ministry further claimed that one of the suicide bombers was an Israeli national with Tajik citizenship, which is a continuation of Iran’s information effort to link Israel and the Islamic State.
The Intelligence Ministry also linked the ISKP terror attack in Kerman to Afghanistan. The Ministry claimed that ISKP trained one of the attackers at an ISKP training camp in Badakhshan Province, Afghanistan. Badakhshan borders Tajikistan. CTP-ISW previously assessed that ISKP established a support zone in Badakhshan Province.[91] CTP-ISW previously assessed that ISKP terrorist attacks inside Iran will likely exacerbate tensions between Iran and the Afghan Taliban.[92]
12. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 11, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-11-2024
Key Takeaways
- PRC high-altitude balloon flights through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) have become a daily occurrence and are likely part of a CCP effort to test Taiwan’s responses and wear down its threat awareness.
- Taiwan arrested an independent legislative candidate on suspicion of accepting money from the CCP to run for office.
- The CCP threatened further economic punitive measures against Taiwan related to the cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).
- The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command conducted air and naval exercises in the South China Sea from January 3 to 5.
- The December purges of top PLA military and defense industry officials reflect Xi Jinping’s fears of disloyalty in the military and show that the anti-corruption campaign has not yet succeeded in rooting out endemic corruption in the military.
- A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries.
- The Times of Israel reported that Israeli Defense Forces encountered “vast quantities of weapons manufactured by China” in Gaza.
CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, JANUARY 11, 2024
Jan 11, 2024 - ISW Press
China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 11, 2024
Authors: Daniel Shats and Nils Peterson of the Institute for the Study of War
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: January 9 at 5pm ET
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
- PRC high-altitude balloon flights through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) have become a daily occurrence and are likely part of a CCP effort to test Taiwan’s responses and wear down its threat awareness.
- Taiwan arrested an independent legislative candidate on suspicion of accepting money from the CCP to run for office.
- The CCP threatened further economic punitive measures against Taiwan related to the cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).
- The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command conducted air and naval exercises in the South China Sea from January 3 to 5.
- The December purges of top PLA military and defense industry officials reflect Xi Jinping’s fears of disloyalty in the military and show that the anti-corruption campaign has not yet succeeded in rooting out endemic corruption in the military.
- A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries.
- The Times of Israel reported that Israeli Defense Forces encountered “vast quantities of weapons manufactured by China” in Gaza.
Taiwan
Taiwan’s three presidential candidates are making their last appeals for votes before the January 13 presidential election. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-te urged voters to “choose the right road” and not reverse eight years of progress by the Tsai Ing-wen administration. Lai and the DPP also continued past messaging of protecting Taiwan’s democracy against CCP interference. Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih and the KMT heavily promoted an appeal for all anti-DPP voters to strategically concentrate their votes on him because he is the candidate most likely to defeat Lai. The KMT also continued criticizing the DPP for alleged corruption and incompetence. Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je continued to criticize both major parties and promote his economics-focused “Third Way” campaign.
DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te, vice-presidential candidate Hsiao Bi-khim, and President Tsai Ing-wen campaigned together and emphasized a message of not “turning back time” on progress made during the eight years of the Tsai administration. They warned of negative consequences if voters allowed the KMT to win the presidency or a legislative majority. The consequences they noted include the obstruction of defense spending, a reduction of Taiwan’s economic competitiveness, and a return to the unratified Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) that sparked mass student protests in 2014.[1]
Taiwanese media reported that many viewers commented that a recent viral DPP campaign ad resonated with them. The January 2 campaign ad, which features Lai, Tsai, and Hsiao on a road trip, received over 10 million views across social media platforms by January 5. The video showed Tsai and Lai casually chatting and joking in the car as Tsai drove around. Near the end, Tsai handed the keys to Lai and got out, telling him he was a better driver than her. The trip continued with Lai driving and his running mate Hsiao as a passenger.[2] Lai, Hsiao, and Tsai continued using the ad’s theme of “choosing the right road for Taiwan” as a motif in campaign events throughout the week.[3]
KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih, vice-presidential candidate Hsiao Bi-khim, party chairman Eric Chu, and top-ranked legislator-at-large nominee Han Kuo-yu attempted to secure more backing from voters who support the opposition. The KMT officials repeatedly called on supporters of TPP candidate Ko Wen-je and former independent candidate Terry Gou to strategically concentrate their votes on Hou.[4] They argued that Hou was the candidate most likely to defeat the incumbent DPP. Hou was in second place behind Lai in most polls since the November 25 candidate registration. He consistently hovered around 29% support in a weighted average of polls, compared to Lai at around 34% and Ko at around 22%. Hou and Jaw also repeatedly said that Ko and Gou would be included in discussions of their Cabinet composition if they won the election.[5] The KMT candidates also continued to attack the DPP for allegedly corrupt and ineffective governance and for creating “panic” over PRC election interference to discredit its political opponents.[6]
Ko and Gou have not been receptive to the KMT’s appeal to consolidate the opposition, however. Ko claimed that the KMT lacks integrity and that its offer to include him in its cabinet was a “trick” to promote strategic voting.[7] Terry Gou continued not responding to calls from Hou or Jaw.[8] Ko did not call on Terry Gou to endorse him but said “true friends” did not need to force each other. The president of a Gou support organization endorsed Ko and claimed that most former Gou supporters now supported Ko despite efforts by Hou’s campaign to win over Gou supporters and Gou’s previous attempts to unite the opposition against Lai.[9]
TPP presidential candidate and chairman Ko Wen-je and vice-presidential candidate Cynthia Wu Hsin-ying continued to emphasize that economic issues as central to their “Third Way” campaign. Ko published an article in The Economist in which he argued that the two dominant parties were overly focused on the “unification or independence” debate even though he claimed 90% of Taiwanese citizens supposedly support the “status quo.” He laid out broad policy proposals for “pragmatic” and “rational” domestic and international policies, listing economic development as first among them.[10] He also criticized the DPP administration for failing to construct promised social housing units.[11]
There have not been any new polls about the Taiwan election since Taiwan’s Central Election Commission instituted a “polling blackout” beginning on January 3. The final Taiwan News Poll of Polls, released on January 2, showed Lai in first place in a weighted aggregate of polls from the previous 15 days. At the time, Lai had 35.3% support, Hou had 28.7%, and Ko had 24%.[12]
PRC high-altitude balloon flights through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) have become a daily occurrence and are likely part of a CCP effort to test Taiwan’s responses and wear down its threat awareness. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported eleven PRC high-altitude balloons that floated over or around Taiwan since January 3. This number included three balloons on January 3, one on January 4, two on January 5, one on January 6, three on January 7, four on January 8, and one on January 9. At least five of the balloons flew directly over the island of Taiwan. The MND detected the balloons at altitudes ranging from 15,000 to 33,000 feet.[13] The MND first reported a PRC balloon among its daily updates of PRC violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ on December 8 and has since reported them with high frequency throughout late December and every day of 2024 so far.[14]
An MND press statement on January 6 said the balloons posed a “serious threat” to international air routes and condemned the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) “disregard for the safety of passengers.” It assessed that the main purpose of the balloons is to carry out gray-zone harassment and “cognitive operations” to harm the morale of the Taiwanese people.[15] Retired Taiwanese Army Major General Ko Yung-sen echoed this perspective, saying that the balloons were part of PLA “gray zone” operations intended to normalize the PRC’s territorial claims over the Taiwan Strait and reduce Taiwanese people’s threat awareness.[16] Colonel Wang Chia-chun, who is the deputy head of the MND’s joint operations planning section, said that the CCP wanted Taiwan to shoot down the balloons, but MND would not waste ammunition attempting to do so.[17] MND previously assessed that the balloons were harmless weather balloons.[18]
The PRC has normalized daily air and naval activities around Taiwan, including near-daily aerial crossings of the median line in the Taiwan Strait, since 2020.[19] Taiwan does not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ violations, but it does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed. The high frequency of ADIZ violations drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. The PRC’s daily balloon flights around Taiwan in 2024, including an increasing number of balloons flying directly above the island, indicate that it is trying to normalize these activities as well. Taiwan’s MND’s statements on the balloon flights and its unprecedented inclusion of the balloons in its daily maps of ADIZ violations starting in December show that Taiwan considers the balloons a part of the PRC’s broader coercion campaign.
The CCP has not issued an official explanation for the increase in balloons that have passed over Taiwan since early December. Two articles in the PRC’s state-owned Global Times on January 4 cited unnamed “experts” who claimed the PRC balloons over Taiwan were weather balloons that drifted unintentionally and said they should not be “sensationalized.”[20] ISW cannot confirm the nature of the balloons themselves, but the trend of balloons flying first near Taiwan, then directly over Taiwan in increasing numbers and frequency closer to Taiwan’s election is unlikely to be the result of natural weather patterns.
Taiwan arrested an independent legislative candidate on suspicion of accepting money from the CCP to run for office. Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) said on January 5 that it arrested independent legislative candidate for the city of Taoyuan Ma Chih-wei on suspicion of colluding with the CCP. Prosecutors said that Ma had received over 1 million NTD (over $32,000) in cryptocurrency and US dollars from a source in the PRC through money transfer apps, such as Tether. The money was intended to fund a run for a legislative seat in Taoyuan. Ma was formerly the spokesperson for the Taoyuan office of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). She failed to secure her party’s nomination for the legislative seat and continued to run as an independent, however. Ma made trips to the PRC in April, May, October, and December 2023, including a trip in May to partake in a Mazu religious pilgrimage and meet with CCP contacts together with the current chairman of the TPP’s Taoyuan Office Huang Cheng-chun.[21] Prosecutors also accused Ma of passing information about intelligence officials and classified information about her legislative race to PRC contacts.[22]
Trips to the PRC by Taiwanese politicians have been a frequent source of controversy during the last few months of the Taiwanese election. A Keelung borough warden on January 9 became the first borough warden to be indicted for allegedly leading a CCP-funded group trip to the PRC, where participants were encouraged to support certain legislative candidates in Taiwan. A borough warden is a type of local official below the municipal level. Taipei prosecutors had previously questioned 41 borough wardens in December over similar trips they made to the PRC.[23]
The CCP threatened further economic punitive measures against Taiwan related to the cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The PRC’s Ministry of Commerce said on January 9 that it was “studying” additional measures to suspend tariff concessions for certain Taiwanese products under ECFA because Taiwanese authorities had “not taken any effective measures to ease trade restrictions.” Targeted industries may include agriculture, fishing, machinery, auto parts, and textiles.[24] The PRC previously announced on December 15 that Taiwan had violated its commitments under ECFA by imposing “trade barriers” on trade with the PRC.[25] On December 21 it announced it would end tariff restrictions on 12 chemical products originating in Taiwan.[26] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said on January 9 that the PRC had ignored Taiwanese proposals to negotiate trade disputes within the framework of ECFA because it was determined to interfere in Taiwan’s election. The MAC issued its “strongest condemnation” of the CCP and said the CCP’s methods would not succeed in intimidating Taiwanese people and forcing them to submit.[27]
The CCP’s threat of additional economic punishment for Taiwan conflicts with the party’s simultaneous measures to promote cross-strait economic integration, however. On January 8, the PRC Ministry of Commerce, Taiwan Affairs Office, National Development and Reform Commission, and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology jointly released new guidelines to help the PRC’s Fujian Province deepen economic integration with Taiwan. The guidelines said Fujian would establish an institutional system and regulatory model conducive to cross-strait integrated development, including encouragement for Taiwanese businesses to explore the Chinese market.[28] The CCP Central Committee previously announced in September 2023 that Fujian would be built into a “demonstration zone” for cross-strait integrated development.[29] A January 8 Global Times article said the measures were meant to boost Taiwanese business confidence in the PRC and to demonstrate “goodwill” toward Taiwan in alleged contrast with actions by Taiwan’s DPP administration.[30] The CCP’s policies to promote economic integration with Taiwan are part of a long-term effort to increase PRC influence over Taiwan. In the short term, these measures may serve as a “carrot” to incentivize Taiwanese businessmen to support the KMT in pairing with the “stick” of threatening economic “retaliation” to punish the DPP.
China
The People’s Liberation Army Southern Theater Command conducted air and naval exercises in the South China Sea from January 3 to 5.[31] The exercises were in response to joint Philippines-United States operations in the South China Sea from January 3 to 4, which the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson led.[32] These operations occurred in the wake of CCP harassment of Philippine ships near Philippine-controlled territory since December. Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels attempted to thwart Philippine supply missions near the Second Thomas Shoal by firing water cannons and acoustic weapons at Philippine government ships delivering supplies on December 9 and 10, for example. A CCG vessel also rammed a Philippine ship near Second Thomas Shoal.[33] The PRC MFA inaccurately framed the Philippines as the instigator on December 25 by stating that it “provocatively violated relevant waters in the South China Sea, spread false information, and colluded with external forces to undermine peace and stability in the South China Sea.”[34] The PRC MFA repeated this language on January 4 by claiming that US-Philippine naval activities “hinder the management and control of maritime situations and disputes.”[35]
The December purges of top PLA military and defense industry officials reflect Xi Jinping’s fears of disloyalty in the military and show the anti-corruption campaign has not yet succeeded in rooting out endemic corruption in the military. Bloomberg reported that United States intelligence assessments attribute the purges of top military and defense industry officials in late December to graft that resulted in missiles filled with water and missile silos with improper lids.[36] PLA Navy Lt. Col. Yao Cheng, who defected to the United States in 2016, stated that widespread misappropriation of the equipment budget for events such as dinners was common during his time in the PLA.[37] This shows that the extent of corruption before Xi’s 2015-2016 PLA reforms stretched beyond the military leadership to the officer cadre. The December 2023 purges demonstrate that those reforms did not eliminate lower-level corruption because the purged PLA leadership were burgeoning leaders a decade ago.
Compacts of Free Association
A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[38] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[39] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[40] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[41] Deputy Secretary of State nominee Kurt Campbell stated during his Senate confirmation hearing on December 7 that “if we don’t get it [COFA funding] you can expect that literally the next day Chinese diplomats — military and other folks — will be on the plane…trying to secure a better deal for China.”[42] The US House of Representatives Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party also called for renewing the COFAs in a mid-December report.[43] President Biden signed the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act into law on December 22, but it did not include COFA funding.[44] Funding the COFAs is a key part of the US Pacific Partnership Strategy to “fulfill our [United States] historical commitments and strengthen our enduring relationships with the full Pacific Islands region, including our special relationship with the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia.”[45] Palau’s President, Surangel Whipps Jr, expressed concern in a December 27 interview with ABC Australia over the lack of Congressional-approved funding for the COFA agreement, in part because the 2010 Palau Compact Review Agreement was not funded by the US Congress until 2018.[46]
These three island countries control key sea lanes that provide a secure route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the US territory of Guam and the state of Hawaii. Palau and the Marshall Islands are 2 of the 13 countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[47]
The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these vital Pacific Island countries. For example, this funding loss would cause severe financial pressure in Palau because COFA funding accounts for $36.9 million of the national government’s annual $124.2 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[48] This is an economic vulnerability that the CCP could partially fill by encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in Palau. The CCP cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[49] The reversal of this CCP policy would provide the party with economic leverage to wield over Palau in the event of future policy disagreements. The expansion of the CCP’s economic influence in Palau would also provide the party a leverage point to coerce the countries into switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC aims to coerce countries into switching diplomatic recognition to falsely argue that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China rather than a legitimate country named the Republic of China.
The loss of COFA funding would also exacerbate the CCP narrative put forth by the propaganda outlet Global Times that the United States only cares about Palau for security reasons rather than mutually beneficial cooperation. [50] The Palau Senate passed a resolution in November rejecting the permanent deployment of a US Patriot missile defense battery.[51] This was the first instance of lawmakers challenging President Surangel Whipps Jr’s request for the United States to construct an over-the-horizon radar system in Palau.[52] In a December 27 interview with ABC Australia, Whipps tied this Palau Senate resolution to a narrative among unspecified portions of Palau that the United States actions were not in the best interests of Palau, as seen by the repeated delay in COFA funding.[53] The associated fiscal challenges that Palau faces without COFA funding buttresses the CCP’s narrative, which in turn creates hurdles for deploying mutually beneficial United States defense resources to the country.
The loss of COFA funding would also provide the CCP an opportunity to expand influence efforts targeting Micronesian political elites. The CCP has completed infrastructure projects throughout the country, such as houses for the country’s president, vice president, speakers of congress, and chief justice.[54] Axios reported that former Micronesian officials confirmed receiving gifts from the PRC, such as money, while on official state visits to the country.[55] The lack of COFA funding would exacerbate the appeal of CCP monetary gifts or infrastructure projects that target the Micronesian political elite. Micronesian President Wesley Simina also stated in late November that his country would be at a “fiscal cliff” without US Congressional approval of COFA funding. This would mean that “we [Micronesia] will have to find different sources of funding… and that’s not out there available immediately.”[56] The loss of COFA funding would also provide opportunities for external powers such as the CCP to enhance their economic influence in the country by filling these funding gaps.
The COFA funding also makes up $35.2 million of the Marshall Islands national government's annual $173.9 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[57] The loss of COFA funding would expose the country to similar severe fiscal challenges as Palau and Micronesia.
PRC in the Middle East
The Times of Israel reported that Israeli Defense Forces encountered “vast quantities of weapons manufactured by China” in Gaza.[59] Business Insider reported that the weapons included items, such as assault rifles and grenade launchers. An unspecified Israeli intelligence source expressed concern over the technological sophistication of the uncovered weaponry and communications technology because it is “stuff that Hamas didn’t have before, with very sophisticated explosives which have never been found before and especially on such a large scale.” [60] It remains unclear whether the PRC knowingly supplied the weapons to Hamas or if the group acquired these weapons via a third party.
The PRC is currently pursuing a diplomatic line of effort that aims to supplant US influence with Arab states by proposing what it claims to be a more inclusive and cooperative regional security framework.[61] This involves portraying Washington as a self-interested and destabilizing influence in the region while simultaneously positioning Beijing as an altruistic and unbiased actor.[62] The use of Chinese weapons by Hamas contributes to undercutting this narrative, regardless of whether Beijing knowingly supplied these items.
The CCP is balancing in Yemen by financially supporting the Republic of Yemen and avoiding condemning the Houthis. The Charge d'affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Yemen Shao Zheng held a meeting with Director of the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yemen al-Qadir in Riyadh on January 7.[63] The meeting comes in the aftermath of a December 7 “economic and technical cooperation agreement” between the Republic of Yemen and the People’s Republic of China.[64] The Republic of Yemen is a separate political entity from the Houthi Movement, which ISW and CTP have assessed is attacking shipping in the Red Sea as part of a broader regional escalation strategy led by Iran.[65] The CCP meeting with the Republic of Yemen official allows the PRC to claim it supports stability and economic development in the region.
PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin instead called on January 4 for all parties to “play a constructive and responsible role” in keeping the Red Sea safe.[66] The CCP avoided condemning Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. The absent condemnation of the Houthis reflects the PRC aiming to avoid antagonizing Iran.
13. Interview with Dave Eubank at Free Burma Rangers
If you would like to know what is happening on the ground in Burma, what the Free Burma Rangers are doing in Burmas as well as Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, etc, and if you want to listen to a very good human interest story about a former Ranger and Green Beret turned missionary with his entire family doing the Lord's work, I strongly recommend taking 39 minutes to listen this podcast with Dave Eubank that is hosted by Dr. Lumpy Lumbaca.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuvSLzH17B0
Interview with Dave Eubank at Free Burma Rangers
44 views Jan 11, 2024
In this edition of the DKI APCSS CTGo! Podcast series, Dr. Lumpy Lumbaca talks with Dave Eubank, founder of Free Burma Rangers (FBR). They discuss the mission and experiences of FBR in Burma and Iraq, the current fighting taking place across Myanmar, and thoughts on peace and reconciliation should resistance forces prevail. More information on FBR can be found at https://www.freeburmarangers.org/
Transcript
Follow along using the transcript.
Show transcript
14. Inside Biden's decision to strike the Houthis
Inside Biden's decision to strike the Houthis
By LARA SELIGMAN and LAUREN EGAN
01/11/2024 10:28 PM EST
Updated: 01/11/2024 10:49 PM EST
Politico
Inside Biden’s decision to strike the Houthis
The administration had been under pressure to respond to the Iran-backed attacks.
The president made clear in a Thursday night statement that the latest attacks had crossed a red line. | Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP
01/11/2024 10:28 PM EST
Updated: 01/11/2024 10:49 PM EST
President Joe Biden was still on his holiday getaway in St. Croix when he spoke with his national security team on the first morning of 2024. The Iran-backed Houthis had launched yet another attack on international shipping in the Red Sea, and the president was ready to discuss the possibility of a military response.
The president’s guidance was twofold. On the diplomatic front, he directed his team to push harder for a United Nations resolution to condemn the attacks. On the military side, he ordered the Pentagon to develop options to strike back at the Houthis.
That New Year’s Day meeting ultimately resulted in the U.S. and its allies launching a massive assault on Houthi targets in Yemen 10 days later on Thursday in retaliation for the group’s repeated missile and drone attacks on commercial shipping in international waters since November.
American and British fighter jets, along with U.S. warships and submarines, bombarded Houthi military sites across Yemen, focusing on launch and storage sites for drones, cruise and ballistic missiles. Among the vessels taking part was the USS Florida, a guided-missile submarine that fires Tomahawk cruise missiles, according to a person familiar. F/A-18 Super Hornets from the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower were also involved.
The fact that Biden did not order the retaliatory strikes for more than a week after directing his team to draw up military options was in line with his well-known desire to exhaust diplomatic options and avoid dragging the United States into another Middle East war. But the president made clear in a Thursday night statement that the latest attacks had crossed a red line.
“Today’s defensive action follows this extensive diplomatic campaign and Houthi rebels’ escalating attacks against commercial vessels,” Biden said. “These targeted strikes are a clear message that the United States and our partners will not tolerate attacks on our personnel or allow hostile actors to imperil freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most critical commercial routes.”
This account is based on comments by a senior administration official and a senior military official, both of whom were granted anonymity to provide sensitive details shortly after the operation.
The Thursday strikes ended weeks of growing pressure on Biden to respond militarily to the Houthi attacks. The U.S. military had drawn up more forceful options as early as the first week of December, but at that point, senior Biden officials agreed that striking the Houthis directly was not the best course.
U.S. officials had been worried that hitting the Houthis, who say the attacks on commercial ships are a demonstration of support for the Palestinians, would provoke Iran into its own response and risk widening the Israel-Hamas war into a regional conflict.
During the Jan. 1 meeting, Biden directed his team to issue a final warning statement, together with international partners, before taking military action.
Unknown to the other national security leaders, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin had just undergone surgery to treat prostate cancer 10 days earlier. Later on Jan. 1, he would be taken in an ambulance to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center for complications from that procedure. Austin’s doctors concluded his symptoms stemmed from a urinary tract infection and transferred him to the intensive care unit for further treatment.
From Jan. 2 until Jan. 5, Austin’s deputy, Kathleen Hicks, was effectively in charge of the Pentagon while on vacation in Puerto Rico. The rest of Biden’s national security team were not made aware of Austin’s hospitalization until Thursday. Since resuming his full duties on Jan. 5, Austin has continued to call in to meetings from his hospital bed.
On Jan. 3, the U.S. and 13 other countries issued a statement warning that the Houthis would bear the full “consequences” of any further attacks against commercial vessels. But that did little to deter the Houthis.
On Tuesday, the Houthis launched their largest and most brazen attack yet, marking a turning point for U.S. officials. The group launched a volley of drones and missiles targeting U.S. commercial and military ships. U.S. and U.K. naval forces shot down nearly 20 drones and three missiles, preventing the severe damage the Houthis had intended.
In the wake of the attack, Biden convened his national security team for another meeting that day. Hunkered down at the White House with no public obligations on his schedule, Biden was again presented with military options. At the end of the meeting, Biden decided it was time to move forward. He instructed Austin, still working from the hospital, to carry out the strikes.
The operation took time to coordinate because the other nations involved wanted to understand the legal basis for the strikes, a senior DOD official said, along with precisely what the U.S. was asking them to contribute.
The U.S. forces were joined by four Royal Air Force Typhoons, supported by a Voyager aerial tanker, according to a statement from the U.K. Ministry of Defense. The jets used Paveway IV guided bombs to launch precision strikes on two Houthi facilities: a site at Bani in northwestern Yemen used to launch drones and an airfield at Abbs that used to launch cruise missiles and drones over the Red Sea.
Both U.S. and U.K. officials said the strikes were designed to minimize risks to civilians.
“Early indications are that the Houthis’ ability to threaten merchant shipping has taken a blow, and our commitment to protecting the sea-lanes, through which some 15 percent of the world’s shipping passes and which is vital to the global economy, has been amply demonstrated,” according to the statement.
U.S. officials said while they have not yet seen a Houthi response to the attacks, they are prepared for that outcome.
“We will not be surprised to see some sort of response,” said the senior administration official.
Paul McLeary and Alexander Ward contributed to this report.
POLITICO
Politico
15. Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Coalition Strikes in Houthi-Controlled Areas of Yemen
Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Coalition Strikes in Houthi-Controlled Areas of Yemen
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In light of the illegal, dangerous, and destabilizing Iranian-backed Houthi attacks against U.S. and international vessels and commercial vessels from many countries lawfully transiting the Red Sea, today the militaries of the United States and the United Kingdom, with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands, conducted strikes against military targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. This action is intended to disrupt and degrade the Houthis' capabilities to endanger mariners and threaten global trade in one of the world's most critical waterways. Today's coalition action sends a clear message to the Houthis that they will bear further costs if they do not end their illegal attacks.
Today's strikes targeted sites associated with the Houthis' unmanned aerial vehicle, ballistic and cruise missile, and coastal radar and air surveillance capabilities. The United States maintains its right to self-defense and, if necessary, we will take follow-on actions to protect U.S. forces.
Since November 19, the Houthis have launched more than two dozen attacks on vessels, including commercial vessels, creating an international challenge that demands collective action. Today, a coalition of countries committed to upholding the rules-based international order demonstrated our shared commitment to defending U.S. and international vessels and commercial vessels exercising navigational rights and freedoms from illegal and unjustifiable attacks.
We will not hesitate to defend our forces, the global economy, and the free flow of legitimate commerce in one of the world's vital waterways.
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16. DOD Releases First-Ever National Defense Industrial Strategy
The full NDIS and a fact sheet are available at: https://www.businessdefense.gov/NDIS.html
DOD Releases First-Ever National Defense Industrial Strategy
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National Defense Industrial Strategy Briefing
Dr. Laura D. Taylor-Kale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, and Ms. Halimah Najieb-Locke, (Acting) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, brief the media regarding DOD’s new National Defense Industrial Strategy at the Pentagon. Jan. 11, 2024
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The Department of Defense today released its inaugural National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS), which will guide the Department's engagement, policy development, and investment in the industrial base over the next three to five years. Taking its lead from the National Defense Strategy (NDS), this strategy will catalyze generational change from the existing defense industrial base to a more robust, resilient, and dynamic modernized defense industrial ecosystem.
"The current and future strategic environment demands immediate, comprehensive, and decisive action to strengthen and modernize our defense industrial base ecosystem so it delivers at speed and scale for our warfighters," Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said. "DoD's first-ever National Defense Industrial Strategy will help ensure we build the modern defense industrial and innovation ecosystem that's required to defend America, our allies and partners, and our interests in the 21st century."
"We are proud to release this ground-breaking strategy," said Dr. William A. LaPlante, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, added. "The NDIS recognizes that America's economic security and national security are mutually reinforcing and, ultimately the nation's military strength cannot be untethered from our overall industrial strength. We must act now to build on recent progress and ensure we have the capacity to produce at speed and scale."
While the NDS identifies risk to the industrial base, it also guides the Department to solutions. Recognizing that the defense industrial base must provide the required capabilities at the speed and scale necessary for the U.S. military to engage and prevail in a near-peer conflict, the NDIS strategy calls out challenges, solutions, and risks of failure concisely. The strategy offers a strategic vision and path along four strategic priorities: resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, flexible acquisition, and economic deterrence. This proposed pathway to modernize the defense industrial ecosystem also recognizes that this effort cannot be a Department of Defense-only solution, repeatedly emphasizing cooperation and coordination between the entire U.S. government, private industry, and international allies and partners.
The full NDIS and a fact sheet are available at: https://www.businessdefense.gov/NDIS.html
About the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy (OASD(IBP))
The OASD(IBP) works with domestic and international partners to forge and sustain a robust, secure, and resilient industrial base enabling the warfighter, now and in the future.
National Defense Strategy industrial base
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17. Pentagon’s first industrial strategy calls for ‘generational’ change
Pentagon’s first industrial strategy calls for ‘generational’ change
Defense News · by Noah Robertson · January 11, 2024
Editor’s note: This story has been updated to include information from Pentagon officials.
WASHINGTON — America’s defense industry needs “generational” change to keep pace with competitors like Russia and China.
This is the Pentagon’s assessment in its first-ever National Defense Industrial Strategy, arriving at a moment of extreme demand. The U.S. is supporting partners threatened abroad — including Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan — forcing careful management of American aid and readiness.
“This strategy is about balancing the tension points,” said Halimah Najieb-Locke, the Pentagon’s acting deputy for industrial base policy, in a briefing with reporters.
The document is a self-described “call to action,” with almost 50 pages of recommendations to build a “fully capable 21st century” defense sector. It features the Pentagon’s most up to date thinking on the health of its suppliers, stretched thin after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the disruptive COVID-19 pandemic. America still builds the best weapons in the world, the strategy says, but that alone isn’t enough in a more competitive world.
The U.S. “must have the capacity to produce those capabilities at speed and scale to maximize our advantage,” it says.
That advantage may be narrowing in part because of America’s main competitor. In the last 30 years, the document says, China “became the global industrial powerhouse in many key areas — from shipbuilding to critical minerals to microelectronics.” China’s capacity, the document says, in some cases surpasses that of America and its allies in Asia and Europe.
Still, Cynthia Cook, a defense industry expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank, is only part of what’s motivating this work.
“I would not say that that’s the entire purpose ... behind the strategy,” she said.
Instead, Cook said, the document is meant to be the summit of more than six years of Pentagon work. Former President Donald Trump ordered the Defense Department to review its industrial base early in his term, leading to a report issued in 2018. Since then, more reviews have followed, including one on supplier competitiveness.
“All of these factors together make it fairly clear that it’s time for a rethink of how the department manages industry,” said Cook. “Without a strategy, it’s going to be one-offs here and there.”
The document is split into four sections, focusing on supply chains, workforce, Pentagon acquisition and the American economy overall. There are more than two dozen recommendations, which include diversifying the Defense Department’s suppliers, training more workers for industry-related careers, increasing commercial acquisitions and sharing more technology with U.S. partners.
Neither the problems nor the remedies listed are new. They aren’t meant to be, said Cook. The value of the strategy, she said, is its ability to coordinate industrial base work across the Pentagon, including in the services.
“Part of this strategy is really marshaling a lot of what we’ve already been doing within the department,” said Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy Laura D. Taylor-Kale, also speaking at the briefing.
Specifically, she referenced a map of the supply chains for 110 different weapons systems the Pentagon has been developing since November. This map, added Najieb-Locke, will help find links further down the supply chain that are particularly brittle — whether due to approaching obsolescence or being a single point of failure.
Speaking at the Reagan National Defense Forum in December, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante said the document is also meant to be a broader signal to industry.
Najieb-Locke elaborated on that point Thursday. On one end, the strategy is meant to signal longer-term commitment to its current suppliers by putting the department’s goals in writing. On the other, it affirms that the Pentagon needs to work more with non-traditional companies, particularly those in the innovation space.
“We’re answering the industry’s call for consistent demand signal by organizing ourselves and targeting our efforts,” she said.
Despite that, some former defense officials and analysts who spoke with Defense News were skeptical of the strategy’s value. Heidi Peters, a defense industry expert at the RAND Corporation think tank, questioned why there needed to be a new strategy when the Pentagon already publishes so much literature on industry.
David Berteau, president of the Professional Services Council, which represents government contractors, said the strategy was a good “first step,” but he wants to see more attention paid to sustaining systems rather than just buying them.
Even more, Berteau said he was focused on how the strategy would be implemented, something he said is “more important than the strategy itself.”
While reshaping the defense industry may take a generation, the document said, it has shorter-term goals for the next three to five years. The Pentagon expects to publish an unclassified implementation plan in February — and a classified one later in March, said the officials briefing Thursday.
The classified plan will focus on many of the existing authorities the Pentagon has, such as the Defense Production Act, which Taylor-Kale said are “underutilized.”
The implementation plan will feature a list of priorities and metrics to gauge the strategy’s success, said Najieb-Locke. One of those priorities in the next five years is to create a faster and more stable supply of “long lead items,” which slow production, she said. To do so, she added, the department will have to better track its lower-tier suppliers, who sometimes don’t even know their work is supporting the Pentagon.
That need makes it more important for the Defense Department to continue speaking with partners across the government and in industry, Taylor-Kale said.
“We’re not going to come out of our our offices, so to speak, talk to people in and then go back in and shut the door,” she said. “We’re continuing the conversation.”
About Noah Robertson
Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.
18. Ukraine and Russia say they want the war to end. But military and political experts say they're nowhere near peace talks
What is the acceptable, durable political arrangement that will satisfy the interests of both countries? Assuming they want to negotiate a peace.
Ukraine and Russia say they want the war to end. But military and political experts say they're nowhere near peace talks
KEY POINTS
- Ukraine is set to pitch its peace plan for ending the war with Russia to allied national security advisors in Switzerland on Sunday.
- Government officials will meet in the ski resort of Davos ahead of the World Economic Forum, which begins Monday.
- Kyiv hopes that, by winning over international partners to support its 10-point “Peace Formula,” pressure will be piled on Russia to concede to Kyiv’s prerequisites for the cessation of hostilities.
- Military experts say neither Russia nor Ukraine is ready for peace talks yet, however.
CNBC · by Holly Ellyatt · January 12, 2024
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits soldiers at the Kupiansk front line on Nov. 30, 2023, in Kharkiv, Ukraine.
Ukrainian Presidency | Anadolu | Getty Images
Ukraine is set to pitch its peace plan for ending the war with Russia to allied national security advisors in Switzerland on Sunday, as officials gather in the ski resort of Davos ahead of the World Economic Forum.
It's not the first time Ukraine has presented its 10-point "Peace Formula" but the hope in Kyiv is that, by winning over international partners to support its plan, pressure will be piled on Russia to concede to Kyiv's conditions for the cessation of hostilities.
Russia has been absent from gatherings focused on the peace proposals and criticized recent talks in Malta in October, describing them as anti-Russian and counterproductive. Russia's ally China, seen to be one of the few countries that could influence Moscow's position on Ukraine, also skipped the talks.
Whether the latest peace-focused summit can bear any fruit is uncertain. Political and military experts say that with the war in a very much active phase, and with neither side having the upper hand in the conflict, peace plans and future talks are "wishful thinking" at this time.
"Some people are suggesting that we might have gotten to the point where there is no more that can be achieved on the battlefield and so the only option is to sit down and negotiate. I think that's wishful thinking," Sam Greene, a professor in Russian politics at King's College London, told CNBC.
"It is true that the battlefield isn't moving very far in one direction or the other but the reality is that there's a lot going on on the battlefield that's keeping it exactly where it is ... There's a lot of fighting going on. That indicates that both sides feel there is more that they can achieve, and need to achieve, on the battlefield."
No sign of political resolution
The priorities in Ukraine's peace formula are the withdrawal of all Russian troops from its territory, and the complete restoration of its territorial integrity before Russia's invasion almost two years ago — and before its annexation of Crimea in 2014. The release of all Ukrainian prisoners, nuclear safety and food and energy security are also elements of the plan.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is set to use the backdrop of the annual economic forum in Davos to galvanize support for his peace formula as the war hurtles toward its second anniversary.
A Ukrainian tank destroyed by artillery shelling on Dec. 31, 2023, in Avdiivka, Ukraine.
Pierre Crom | Getty Images News | Getty Images
Ukraine's Western partners have reaffirmed their support for Kyiv but the outlook for continuing military aid looks shaky in both the U.S. and Europe. The forthcoming U.S. presidential election could also change attitudes toward Ukraine and stymie funding.
Concerns are growing over just how much more aid Ukraine will need to change the dial in the war after a highly anticipated counteroffensive failed to meet expectations. Fighting remains intense in southern and eastern Ukraine, where Russian units are deeply entrenched, preventing Ukraine's forces from making significant advances.
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'Highly unlikely' that the West can provide enough aid for Ukraine: Expert
Squawk Box Asia
Meanwhile, both sides continue to pursue offensive operations at a great cost to their personnel, with several hundred thousand troops on both sides estimated by U.S. intelligence to have been killed or wounded.
Political and military experts stress that most wars end with some kind of diplomacy and negotiations, and an eventual political solution, whether the participants like it or not. They note that neither Russia nor Ukraine seems to be at a point where a political resolution is palatable, however.
"You never want to go to the negotiation table without having the upper hand in a conflict," retired Army Lt. Gen. Stephen Twitty, former deputy commander of the U.S. European Command, told CNBC.
"Because if you go with the upper hand, you're able to dictate and control what comes out of the negotiations. In this case, neither side has the upper hand."
For Twitty, Ukraine's disappointing counteroffensive last summer was a missed opportunity. He noted that "had the Ukrainians breached the obstacle [defensive] belt and cut Russia's land bridge [to Crimea] over the summer, they would have definitely had the upper hand."
Russian President Vladimir Putin making a speech at the second Eurasian Economic Forum on May 24, 2023, in Moscow, Russia.
Contributor | Getty Images
"The challenge for Ukraine is to make it seem like Russia cannot achieve its aims militarily and so it comes to any negotiations, if and when they happen, from a position of relative strength," Sam Cranny-Evans, defense analyst at the Royal United Services Institute defense think tank, told CNBC.
"[But] if Putin feels like the Russian armed forces can still deliver the political goals that he's set, then there's not a lot of impetus to negotiate, or the mindset that he'll come to negotiations with will be very hard."
CNBC has contacted the Kremlin for comment on this story and is awaiting a response.
'Red lines' firmly drawn
Both Russia and Ukraine have repeatedly said they want the war to end — but on their terms. Even the prospect of a ceasefire is a thorny subject, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warning Thursday that a ceasefire now would only give Russia the chance to regroup and replenish its units and weapons stocks.
"Talking about a ceasefire in Ukraine, it would not constitute peace. It would not mean the war would stop. It also provides no opportunity for political dialogue," Zelenskyy said on a visit to Estonia.
For its part, the Kremlin said in December that it saw no current basis for peace talks, and called Kyiv's peace plan an "absurd process" as it excluded Russia.
Even if talks were to take place, the obstacles to peace are significant, with neither side willing to abandon so-called "red lines" made clear early on in the war during ill-fated peace talks brokered by Belarus and Turkey.
Two years of brutal warfare and pseudo-political territorial consolidation by Russia since those early negotiations have hardened both sides' positions, with little room for compromise.
One big stumbling block in any potential peace talks now is their respective positions on territorial integrity. Russia's self-declared "annexation" of four Ukrainian regions — Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson — in September 2022, and its subsequent "Russification" of those territories, makes it difficult to imagine Moscow relinquishing in any peace talks what it has proclaimed as "Russian territory."
Russia holds elections in illegally occupied parts of Ukraine, including Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.
Anadolu Agency | Getty Images
For Ukraine, accepting the loss of those regions would be tantamount to a Russian victory, and an acceptance of the possibility that Russia could seize more of Ukraine in future.
Geopolitical risk analyst and Europe, Russia & CIS expert Mario Bikarski, said "asking Ukraine to formally cede territory will be very politically unpopular, first of all Ukraine for obvious reasons, but also among Western countries, because that will undermine the fundamentals of international law."
"It will be a really difficult thing to ask Ukraine to do because then you basically say that your own sovereignty can be subject to change under pressure. And that is I don't think this is something that many countries will want to do. It is a difficult situation," he said. "With the current circumstances, there is no workable solution in sight that can appeal to both sides."
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, center, is escorted by Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., left, and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., to his meeting on military aid with U.S. Senators in the U.S. Capitol on Tuesday, December 12, 2023.
Bill Clark | Cq-roll Call, Inc. | Getty Images
While Ukraine's international partners have vowed to continue supporting Ukraine militarily, pressure is slowly starting to mount on Kyiv that a diplomatic solution to the war must be found — although Zelenskyy insisted this week that there was no international pressure on Ukraine to stop fighting.
Ceding territory would be unthinkable for Ukraine's leadership, a former diplomat told CNBC.
"I know that a lot of people believe that ... Ukraine is going to have to negotiate and they're going to have to give up some territory. But honestly, I don't see how Zelenskyy can do that and remain as president, he would be ousted if he agreed to give away territory," said Kurt Volker, former U.S. ambassador to NATO.
CNBC · by Holly Ellyatt · January 12, 2024
19. IDF bolsters security for civilians returning to border communities
Excerpt:
In general, Israel’s borders were relatively quiet on the morning of January 10, with no sirens in the north or south. If this situation continues, residents might be willing to consider a return to border communities. However, the presence of Hezbollah at the northern border has been a constant concern, and Israel’s leaders have demanded that Hezbollah retreat from the border fence and end its threats. The IDF has said it will continue to act accordingly against to address this threat in the north: “An IDF fighter jet struck terrorist infrastructure and a military compound in the area of Labbouneh in southern Lebanon. In addition, an IDF fighter jet struck a military command center in the area of Kfarchouba overnight,” the IDF said on January 10. In Gaza. The IDF continued to operate in the central Gaza strip and Khan Younis to uncover weapons and dismantle terrorist infrastructure.
IDF bolsters security for civilians returning to border communities
January 10, 2024 | FDD's Long War Journal
Seth J. Frantzman
Adjunct Fellow
fdd.org · by hhanes · January 10, 2024
More than three months after Hamas attacked Israel, most residents of border communities affected by the attack still have yet to return. This is a domestic challenge for Israel, including the Ministry of Defense, in terms of investing in security for the border communities and figuring out a plan to get civilians back home. In addition to the communities affected near the Gaza border, there are also 80,000 people who were evacuated in October from communities along the northern border due to Hezbollah attacks. Hezbollah has escalated attacks in the last week, targeting IDF Northern Command in Safed and an important base on Mount Meron. The deeper strikes by Hezbollah illustrate a growing threat — rather than a reduced threat — in northern Israel.
According to a joint statement by the Israel Ministry of Defense and the Israel Defense Forces on January 9, the IDF and the Ministry have begun distributing more firearms and equipment to security teams in local communities. These teams are made up of local residents who often serve in the IDF reserves or have combat experience. In one form or another, they have been a key method of defending Israeli border communities go as far back as the 1950s. However, these squads of volunteers do not always have access to rifles — or enough rifles — depending on their distance from the border and the local security situation. Prior to October 7, the security situation on the border was assessed to be one where a status quo of relative quiet would continue. In the wake of the attack, there has been a large increase in Israelis applying for gun licenses as well as either joining existing or organizing new local community security teams.
The statement from the Ministry and IDF showed rifles and equipment being provided to residents of northern communities: “During the coming weeks, the placing of containers in the Northern Command and the distribution of the equipment to the standby classes in other localities will be completed,” the statement said. This means providing communities with storage facilities where the security volunteers can access and distribute rifles in a time of emergency. The IDF and Ministry said they are also conducting a similar distribution of firearms and necessary equipment to local units in communities near Gaza. In many cases in communities impacted on October 7, select residents who were members of local security teams remained in their communities while the rest of the residents went to stay in hotels. Those who remained perform guard duties, monitoring the abandoned communities and coordinating with the IDF and other security forces.
“Each settlement will receive weapons, ceramic vests and helmets purchased and tested to the highest standards,” the IDF said on January 9. “In addition, further medical and logistical equipment will also be distributed.” In addition training is being provided.
“As part of the ongoing effort to strengthen the defense line in the north, we have begun to carry out a significant part of the process of equipping the standby [units] in the sector. The members of the standby units demonstrate great steadfastness and resilience, and we are proud to stand together with them in the defense of the northern border of the State of Israel,” said Brigadier General (Res.) Alon Friedman.
In general, Israel’s borders were relatively quiet on the morning of January 10, with no sirens in the north or south. If this situation continues, residents might be willing to consider a return to border communities. However, the presence of Hezbollah at the northern border has been a constant concern, and Israel’s leaders have demanded that Hezbollah retreat from the border fence and end its threats. The IDF has said it will continue to act accordingly against to address this threat in the north: “An IDF fighter jet struck terrorist infrastructure and a military compound in the area of Labbouneh in southern Lebanon. In addition, an IDF fighter jet struck a military command center in the area of Kfarchouba overnight,” the IDF said on January 10. In Gaza. The IDF continued to operate in the central Gaza strip and Khan Younis to uncover weapons and dismantle terrorist infrastructure.
Reporting from Israel, Seth J. Frantzman is an adjunct fellow at FDD and a contributor to FDD’s Long War Journal. He is the acting news editor and senior Middle East correspondent and analyst at The Jerusalem Post.
Read in FDD's Long War Journal
fdd.org · by hhanes · January 10, 2024
20. Houthis continue attacks in Red Sea despite warning from coalition
They have been warned (and now attacked - what is next?).
Houthis continue attacks in Red Sea despite warning from coalition
fdd.org · by hhanes · January 10, 2024
January 10, 2024 | FDD's Long War Journal
Houthis continue attacks in Red Sea despite warning from coalition
Joe Truzman
Senior Research Analyst at FDD's Long War Journal
Bill Roggio
Senior Fellow and Editor of FDD's Long War Journal
The Iran-backed Houthis continue to target commercial shipping in the Red Sea despite a week-old warning from a U.S.-led international coalition to halt the strikes. The coalition has yet to take action against Houthi provocations.
In the latest attack on Tuesday, the Houthis fired “18 OWA UAVs [one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles], two anti-ship cruise missiles, and one anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen into the Southern Red Sea, towards international shipping lanes where dozens of merchant vessels were transiting,” U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reported.
None of the Houthi weapons systems struck their targets as they were “shot down by a combined effort of F/A-18s from USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), USS Gravely (DDG 107), USS Laboon (DDG 58), USS Mason (DDG 87), and the United Kingdom’s HMS Diamond (D34),” CENTCOM stated.
The U.S. military is expending millions of dollar in missiles to shoot down rudimentary drones that cost thousands of dollars to produce.
One other attack on shipping was reported by CENTCOM since an international coalition issued a warning to the Houthis to cease attacks one week ago. On Jan. 6, the USS Laboon shot down a drone “in self-defense,” CENTCOM reported. The Houthis have launched 26 attacks on international shipping since Nov. 19, according to CENTCOM.
The strongly-worded warning has done nothing to deter the Houthis from wreaking chaos in the Red Sea. On Jan. 3, on international coalition of 13 countries said that the Houthis with “will bear the responsibility of the consequences” if the militia continues to attack ships passing through the Red Sea and the Bab al Mandeb Strait, one of the most important shipping lanes in the world. However, the U.S. stopped short of directly acknowledging Iran’s role in the attacks, since Iran supports the Houthis and aids in directing them.
There has been no military response to the successful Houthi and Iranian efforts to disrupt traffic passing through the Red Sea, the Bab al Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal. More than 12 percent of the world’s shipping and 30 percent of cargo vessels pass through these vital waterways, according to CENTCOM. The Houthi attacks have severely impacted global trade. An estimated “95 percent of the container ships that normally transit the Red Sea and Suez Canal are rerouting around the tip of South Africa,” said Mike Shuler, the editor of gCaptain reported.
One month after the Houthis began their attacks on shipping, the U.S. formed a coalition of 11 countries, called Operation Prosperity Guardian, on Dec. 18 in an effort to counter the Houthis threat. However, Operation Prosperity Guardian was a defensive coalition in nature and designed only to escort ships through the dangerous waters of the Red Sea and the Bab Al Mandeb. The Houthis did not flinch and continued to attack both commercial vessels and U.S., U.K., and French warships.
The Houthis, a Shia militia which formed in the 1990s and seized the capital of Sana’a in 2014, are part of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, which seeks to aid Hamas in its fight again Israel. The Houthis are also belligerent to the U.S. for the latter’s support of Saudi Arabia and the UAE for interfering in Yemen’s ongoing civil war.
Joe Truzman is a research analyst at FDD’s Long War Journal focused primarily on Palestinian militant groups and Hezbollah. Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD’s Long War Journal.
Read in FDD's Long War Journal
fdd.org · by hhanes · January 10, 2024
21. The long war: Israel won’t cease firing until Iran’s Hezbollah does
The long war: Israel won’t cease firing until Iran’s Hezbollah does
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/jan/9/long-war-israel-wont-cease-firing-until-irans-hezb/
By Clifford D. May - - Tuesday, January 9, 2024
OPINION:
The war Hamas launched against Israel on Oct. 7 is unlikely to end soon.
Hamas is still firing missiles. It still has snipers in schools and mosques and trigger-pullers blending in with civilians on Gaza’s streets.
Its two top military commanders, Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, are believed to have surrounded themselves with hostages deep in the elaborate tunnel network constructed over the years since the Israelis withdrew from Gaza.
But Israel is changing the way it fights. The first phase was an air campaign targeting buildings in which — and under which — Hamas had command-and-control centers and armories.
In the second phase, Israeli infantry engaged in grueling urban combat.
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The third phase is to be less intense. Elite units will conduct special operations. More tunnels will be destroyed. Attempts to rescue hostages will continue.
The goal remains unchanged: to cripple Hamas’ military and governing capabilities.
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One senior Hamas leader was killed last week, but not in Gaza. Salih al-Arouri was conducting a meeting in a high-rise building in a Beirut suburb. According to the Lebanon24 news website, a missile eliminated him and his deputies. No one else in the building was hurt.
While Jerusalem has not claimed responsibility, David Barnea, chief of the Mossad, Israel‘s national intelligence agency, has pledged that all those involved in planning or carrying out the atrocities of Oct. 7 will face justice.
On Oct. 8, Lebanon-based Hezbollah, the most valued foreign legion of Iran’s rulers, began firing rockets into northern Israel, causing close to 100,000 Israelis to flee their cities, villages and farms.
Hezbollah is capable of such aggression due to failed diplomacy. Under U.N. Resolution 1701, the Israelis agreed to a cease-fire in the Second Lebanon War of 2006. In exchange, southern Lebanon was to become “free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon.”
Hezbollah went on to install as many as 200,000 missiles in southern Lebanese mosques, schools and hospitals, while both the Lebanese Armed Forces and U.N. forces charged with enforcing 1701 watched with bovine passivity.
Israel is now demanding the belated implementation of U.N. Resolution 1701 so that Israeli civilians can feel safe enough to return to their homes.
“There is a short window of time for diplomatic understandings, which we prefer,” Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told Biden administration envoy Amos Hochstein last week. “We will not tolerate the threats posed by the Iranian proxy Hezbollah, and we will ensure the security of our citizens.”
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah responded: “If the enemy thinks of waging a war on Lebanon, we will fight without restraint, without rules, without limits and without restrictions.” As you may have inferred, Hezbollah has never been punctilious about rules, limits and restrictions.
With one war simmering and another brewing, debates have nevertheless begun about what should happen in Gaza the “day after.”
Last week, Mr. Gallant presented to the U.S. a plan not approved by Israel’s coalition government, which, though united on the necessity of defeating Hamas and Hezbollah, remains divided on other issues.
Under this plan, “Hamas will not rule Gaza, and Israel will not rule Gaza.” But the Israel Defense Forces would retain “operational freedom of action and take necessary steps to ensure no terror resurgence.”
Responsibility to restore basic government services would be taken on by Palestinian civil servants regarded as more technocratic than ideological. Israel’s Defense Ministry reportedly has a list of such people.
The Biden administration, however, is insisting that a “revitalized Palestinian Authority” be given a leading role. How such revitalization might be achieved remains unclear.
Between 2006 and 2007, Hamas fought a civil war to force the Palestinian Authority out of Gaza. Since then, the Palestinian Authority has governed only the West Bank, and by no means effectively.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was elected to a single four-year term that began in 2005. He has remained in office ever since, not bothering to ask Palestinians for their vote a second time.
In November, Mr. Abbas celebrated his 88th birthday. A December poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 90% of Palestinians want him to resign.
An idea from the IDF and the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service, would involve empowering traditional Palestinian leaders in Gaza, the heads of tribes and clans whom Hamas stripped of any authority, often through violence.
No one expects such figures to sing “Kumbaya” with the Israelis. But they might prefer to put their energies and added aid from the international donor community into rebuilding Gaza rather than preparing for another round of slaughtering, torturing, raping, and baby-stealing, leading to another catastrophic war.
Yahya R. Sarraj, the Hamas-appointed mayor of Gaza City, last month published an essay in The New York Times, lamenting the destruction of his hometown’s “intricately designed Rashad al-Shawa Cultural Center,” its theater, its public library, its zoo, its “Children’s Happiness Center,” its “squares, mosques, churches and parks,” and its seafront, which includes “a promenade” and “recreation areas.”
He didn’t address how it’s possible that the Gaza he describes is so dramatically different from the picture painted by Israel’s enemies: a territory under “occupation” (despite the 2005 withdrawal of every Israeli farmer and soldier); “blockaded” (despite the huge quantity of weapons Hamas managed to import); with Gazans subjected to Israeli “genocide” (even as the population has burgeoned); an unlivable “open-air prison” (in the words of the U.N.).
“Why can’t we live in peace and have open borders and free trade?” the mayor asked at the end of his essay.
I’ll answer: You can, Mr. Sarraj, if new leaders in Gaza are willing to nonviolently coexist alongside Israelis rather than exterminate Israelis. That outcome, I hope you understand, can come about only after Hamas is defeated.
• Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a columnist for The Washington Times.
22. The Gaza War as Seen from Southeast Asia
Conclusion:
All of the Southeast Asian countries responded predictably to October 7, from the hostility to Israel in Malaysia to the support for Israel in Singapore and the Philippines. The one possible surprise may be Indonesia, where growing Islamist movements, funded from the Gulf, may be gradually changing the country’s political orientation. Widespread political-level support for Hamas may be an early sign of this evolving shift in the biggest and most important country in Southeast Asia.
The Gaza War as Seen from Southeast Asia
by Colin Rubenstein, Michael Shannon January 2024
jstribune.com · by elad · January 2024
The Hamas onslaught upon Israel on October 7 and the resulting military response by Israel prompted a wide range of responses across Southeast Asia. Some are motivated by political and religious ideology, particularly in Muslim-majority nations, and others by pragmatism, self-interest and established relationships.
Indonesia
In Indonesia, numerous leaders expressed support and admiration for the Hamas terror attacks in the immediate wake of October 7. Hopes in Israel for improved ties with Indonesia look likely to be sidelined for some time.
This forthright support for Hamas surprised long-time Indonesia watchers. Unlike Malaysia, Indonesia has always referred to a two-state solution when backing the Palestinian cause. Though Israel and Indonesia lack formal diplomatic relations, Indonesian tourists visit Israel and Israelis have in the past done business with and visited Indonesia.
Moreover, Jakarta seeks to play a role in international politics commensurate with its status as the world’s largest Muslim-majority country and its growing economic clout. It also seeks to export the moderate brand of Islam which most Indonesians practise. Top leaders in Jakarta have thus long been eager to play some sort of positive role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking – which requires having a relationship with Israel.
A growing trend against ties with Israel was already present before the Hamas attack on October 7. In the lead up to Indonesian general elections scheduled for February 2024, leaders from the ruling party publicly objected to the participation of Israeli sportsmen in two international sporting events scheduled to take place in Indonesia – which cost the country the rights to host both events.
President Joko Widodo’s response to October 7 was to urge an end to the bloodshed, adding, “The root cause of the conflict, which is the occupation of Palestinian land by Israel, must be resolved immediately in accordance with the parameters that have been agreed upon by the UN.”
Meanwhile, Indonesia’s former vice president Jusuf Kalla described the Hamas attacks as an “extraordinary act carried out in the name of freedom and independence,” while Fadli Zion, Chairman of the Gerindra Party of presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, compared Hamas to Indonesian groups that fought the Dutch for independence.
The Ulema Council of Indonesia said the October 7 terrorist assault was a reaction to the “arbitrary actions” of Israeli authorities “who have systematically undermined the sovereignty of the Palestinian people and nation. Combined with the numerous violations of various agreements by the Israeli authorities, it is evident that Israel must pay a heavy price. Hamas’ significant attack serves as a reckoning for Israel, and Israel will have to bear the consequences on its own,” said the Ulema Council’s Foreign Relations Chairman Sudarnoto Abdul Hakim in a press statement.
Malaysians burn pictures of Israeli President Isaac Herzog and the Israeli flag at a protest outside the US embassy in Kuala Lumpur, October 20, 2023. Photo credit: REUTERS/Hasnoor Hussain.
Malaysia
Malaysia is one of Hamas’ key international backers, alongside Iran, Turkey and Qatar.
Malaysia has hosted Hamas leaders Khaled Mashal and Ismail Haniyeh, while former PM Najib Razak met Hamas leaders in Gaza in 2013. Hamas operatives have made Malaysia a key base.
US analyst James Dorsey, writing in Modern Diplomacy, noted that the Kuala Lumpur-based Palestinian Cultural Organisation Malaysia, which organises well-attended public events, also serves as Hamas’ unofficial embassy for public outreach and fundraising.
Palestinian engineer Fadi Mohamed al-Batsh, allegedly a key player in Hamas’ rocket and drone development, was assassinated by suspected Israeli operatives in Kuala Lumpur in April 2018. Media reports said that al-Batsh may have been negotiating an arms deal with North Korea.
In 2014, the Israeli military said that a captured Hamas commander had told Israel’s domestic intelligence service that he was one of ten fighters who trained in Malaysia in the use of motor-powered hang gliders – an ominous portent in light of the October 7 attacks.
Malaysian politics have long been suffused with anti-Zionism as well as antisemitism. Virtually every election features candidates accusing their opponents of being secretly allied with Jews and Zionists.
Malaysia’s immediate response to Hamas’ attacks on October 7 was to reiterate its “solidarity with the struggles of the Palestinian people.” In a post on X (Twitter), Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said, “The confiscation of land and property belonging to the Palestinian people is done relentlessly by the Zionists. As a result of this injustice, hundreds of innocent lives were sacrificed.”
After Friday prayers on Oct. 13 in Kuala Lumpur, a crowd of around 15,000 assembled to condemn Israel. According to the Malay Mail, protesters wore keffiyehs and held aloft placards reading Israel cuak (“Israel is frightened”). The usually rancorous Malay politics gave way to rare unanimity, with a diverse array of prominent politicians in attendance from former prime ministers Muhyiddin Yassin and Mahathir Mohamad to the ethnic Chinese-oriented Democratic Action Party.
American diplomatic pressure on Malaysia to label Hamas a terrorist group has been rebuffed. Congress’s passage on November 1 of a bill to impose sanctions on countries financially supporting Hamas prompted a comment from PM Anwar. Conceding that trade could take a hit if Washington were to sanction Kuala Lumpur under the proposed bill, Anwar said, “We will continue our relationship with Hamas and we do not view Hamas as a terrorist organisation.”
Meanwhile, calls for boycotts against companies with alleged links to Israel have been strong on social media platforms. High profile targets are American food franchises – McDonalds, Starbucks, and Pizza Hut – due to the US Government’s pro-Israel stance.
The ride-hailing company Grab Malaysia also became a target of the boycotts after screenshots of several Instagram stories posted by Chloe Tong – the wife of Grab CEO Anthony Tan – circulated on social media. Ms. Tong had said that she had fallen “completely in love” with Israel because of her past visits there.
Thai hostages who were freed from Hamas speak to media after arriving at Bangkok, Novemver 30, 2023. Photo credit: uki Sato / The Yomiuri Shimbun via Reuters Connect.
Thailand
Among foreign countries, Thailand was the most directly affected in terms of lives lost and number of nationals taken hostage. An estimated 30,000 Thais live in Israel, many working as farm labourers. Hamas gunmen killed 29 Thais on October 7 and seized 31 as hostages.
The Thai foreign ministry responded by simply calling upon “all parties involved to refrain from any actions that would further escalate tensions and [condemned] any use of violence and indiscriminate attacks.”
The new Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin went further to denounce Hamas as “inhumane” while extending his “deepest condolences to the government and people of Israel.”
His later televised comment, that if he were Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu he would turn Gaza into “the world’s biggest cemetery,” drew criticism from Muslim leaders in the nation’s south.
Subsequently Thailand remained quiet about the war and focused on getting their hostages released via Iranian intervention.
The Thai Government appointed House Speaker Wan Muhamad Noor Matha, a prominent Muslim politician allied with the government, to run its mission to liberate the hostages. Saiyid Sulaiman Husaini, the influential leader of a Thai Shi’ite Association, then organised a trip to Tehran on October 27 for Wan Noor’s advisors. During that visit Thailand was given assurances from Hamas that Thai hostages would be released as soon as a truce was declared. On October 31, the Thai Foreign Minister visited Qatar meeting with his Qatari and Iranian counterparts.
During the week-long pause in the fighting between Nov. 24 and Dec. 1, 23 Thai hostages were released separately from the Israelis released as part of the deal. Eight Thais are believed to be still held as hostages.
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Photo credit: Kyodo via Reuters Connect.
The Philippines
Like Thailand, the Philippines was directly affected by the Hamas attack. There are approximately 40,000 Filipinos in Israel. Three were killed by Hamas on October 7, while 20 others were rescued by Israeli forces, Philippines officials said.
At the political level, the Philippines’ long history of support for the Jewish state was reflected in the words of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr: “My heart is heavy upon hearing confirmation of the deaths of two Filipinos in Israel. The Philippines condemns these killings and stands firmly against the ongoing terror and violence.”
Following the release of a hostage by Hamas on Nov. 24, Marcos said, “I salute the work of the Philippine Foreign Service in securing his release, and once again thank the State of Qatar for their invaluable assistance in making [Jimmy Pacheco’s] release possible.” The final remaining Filipino hostage was released on November 28.
Vietnam
Vietnam said after October 7 that it was “profoundly concerned by the Hamas attack.” Despite its increasing economic ties with Israel, Hanoi has taken a stance similar to that of Beijing and Moscow: not condemning the Hamas massacre of October 7 and simply calling for an end to the violence.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in Singapore, February 2017. Photo credit: REUTERS/Edgar Su.
Singapore
Long-time Israeli ally Singapore strongly condemned Hamas. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong wrote to Israeli PM Netanyahu on October 8, saying that he was “deeply saddened by the tragic loss of so many Israeli lives” as a result of Hamas’ terrorist attacks. “On behalf of the Government of Singapore, I extend our heartfelt condolences to the government and people of Israel, especially the families of the victims, and wish the injured a speedy recovery. I am confident that Israel will remain strong and united to overcome the difficult challenges ahead.”
Singaporean Law and Home Affairs Minister K Shanmugam said on Oct. 12, “Hamas’ attack on Israel – attacking and massacring civilians is a massive terrorist attack. The kidnapping and unjustified murder of children – the acts of cruelty are shocking and horrifying. And this extreme violence must be condemned in clear, unequivocal terms. These atrocities cannot be justified by any rationale whatsoever, whether of fundamental problems or historical grievances.”
Public discussion in Singapore has focused largely on the threat to Singaporean security and harmony from the Gaza war. On November 6, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong warned about terrorist groups in the region using the war to radicalise more individuals, and about a rise in offensive remarks or actions targeting members of the Jewish or Muslim communities in Singapore. He also warned that some Singaporeans have in recent years been detained after falling for pro-Hamas narratives to the extent that they wanted to take up arms overseas, and there has been a recent “three-fold” increase in “regional internet traffic on extremist sites.”
Conclusion
All of the Southeast Asian countries responded predictably to October 7, from the hostility to Israel in Malaysia to the support for Israel in Singapore and the Philippines. The one possible surprise may be Indonesia, where growing Islamist movements, funded from the Gulf, may be gradually changing the country’s political orientation. Widespread political-level support for Hamas may be an early sign of this evolving shift in the biggest and most important country in Southeast Asia.
jstribune.com · by elad · January 2024
23. Conflict Resolution is not Always Possible
Excerpts:
To be sure, the reality of around four hundred and fifty thousand Israelis living in the West Bank does not render any solution of the conflict easier. However, Israel evacuated completely its inhabitants from the Gaza Strip in 2005, and that did not help in bringing a resolution of the conflict any nearer. The Hamas and Islamic Jihad want the Israeli population out of Israel itself. Around 15% of the population in Algeria in 1962 were of French origin. Ultimately, that did not prevent an agreement between France and the FLN. Contrary to the Palestinian-Arab case, the FLN did not want the French population out of France itself.
In a sense, Israelis fear a repetition of the Sudetenland and the international community hope for a repetition of Algeria. Of course, Israel is more resolute than Czechoslovakia was in 1938 and the United States is a more steadfast ally of Israel than Britain and France were of Czechoslovakia in 1938. On the other hand, as already mentioned, contrary to the Palestinian Arabs the FLN had limited objectives rendering possible a resolution of its conflict with France.
The late Israeli Prime Minister and President, Shimon Peres, was once asked, “Where is the Israeli de Gaulle?” His reply was, “Where is the Palestinian de Gaulle?”
Perhaps, in the best of cases, what can be expected to emerge eventually is a scenario in which the conflict is moderated, rather than solved, similarly to what occurred between Egypt and Israel between 1974 and 1977. In the light of the way the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has evolved so far, such a scenario would be like a dream-come-true.
Conflict Resolution is not Always Possible
By Yoav J. Tenembaum
January 12, 2024
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/01/12/conflict_resolution_is_not_always_possible_1004509.html?mc_cid=d2c26eae90&mc_eid=70bf478f36
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat waves goodbye before departing Ben Gurion Airport on November 21, 1977 (Miki Tzarfati/GPO archive)
The Day after 10/7 and the Gaza War in Historical Perspective
There is a widespread notion that international conflicts are usually susceptible to peaceful resolution. If only the underlying causes of the conflict are addressed, with good will and perseverance, international conflicts can be solved peacefully. Unfortunately, that is not always the case.
There are many protracted, ongoing conflicts in the international system. For instance, Britain and Argentina are engaged in an international conflict over the Falklands-Malvinas Islands in the South Atlantic since 1833, and India and Pakistan are at loggerheads over the status of Kashmir since 1947.
In order for an international conflict to be solved peacefully, the two sides involved have to recognize the right to exist of the other. Certainly, mutual recognition is not a guarantee for solving an international conflict. Britain, and Argentina, as well as India and Pakistan, recognize each other, but are still involved in conflict. Rather, mutual recognition is a prerequisite for solving peacefully an international conflict.
Peace between Egypt and Israel, for example, became possible only after the Egyptians consented to recognize openly and explicitly Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign state in 1977. The ensuing negotiations revolved around boundaries, security measures and the delineation of a diplomatic framework to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
To be sure, prior to 1977, Egypt and Israel had reached two interim agreements in the wake of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 thanks to the mediating efforts of the United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Thus, the conflict between Egypt and Israel moderated even before Egypt was ready to recognize Israel’s right to exist. In this context, one should distinguish between an explicit and an implicit recognition. By signing these two interim agreements, Egypt implicitly recognized Israel as a sovereign entity, but it did not recognize its right to exist as such. Only when Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, paid an official visit to Israel in November 1977, did he announce openly and explicitly that Egypt welcomed Israel as an integral part of the region with which it wished to live in peace. Official, de jure recognition occurred when a peace agreement was signed in Washington D.C. in March 1979.
Sometimes, two countries may recognize each other, have a conflict ostensibly about boundaries or minority rights, and yet one side may conceal its final objective to destroy the other side. For instance, Nazi Germany had a conflict with Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland, an area that was an integral part of the sovereign territory of Czechoslovakia, mostly inhabited by a German-speaking population. The conflict was transformed by Germany into an international crisis in 1938. In order to avert war, Britain and France agreed to cede the Sudetenland to Germany, hoping this would solve the crisis and end the conflict. As it turned out, the crisis was solved, but the conflict did not end. Germany’s aim went much beyond the Sudetenland. In March 1939, Germany invaded what remained of Czechoslovakia, thus putting an end to its sovereign, independent existence.
Germany’s objective did not change from 1938 to 1939, only the means to achieve it did.
Thus, international conflicts can be resolved not only if the two sides involved recognize each other, but if their respective objective does not entail the eventual destruction of the other.
The conflict between France and the Front de Liberation National (FLN) in Algeria, for instance, was finally settled in 1962 once French President Charles de Gaulle agreed to withdraw from Algeria and recognize an independent Algeria. Of course, he knew that the FLN’s objective was not to destroy France as a sovereign entity, but only to establish an independent state in Algeria. He realized that the conflict would be over once France withdrew from Algeria.
That is not the case with regard to Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. To begin with, the Palestinian Arabs are divided between the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. The Hamas and the Islamic Jihad call openly and explicitly for the destruction of Israel. The Palestinian Authority (PA) officially agrees to the so-called two-states solution. Indeed, the Oslo Accords of 1993, which led to the establishment of the PA, entail a mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). However, past rejections by the PA of proposals advanced by the U.S. and Israel to end the conflict without advancing concrete counter-proposals, its advocacy of the so-called right of return, which would imply the peaceful destruction of Israel as a Jewish state, and its system of education, which promotes a vile anti-Israeli credo, raise some question marks as to its final objective. In addition, the latest opinion polls conducted in the PA-ruled West Bank show that the overwhelming majority of Palestinian Arabs support the Hamas and the massacres carried out in Israel on 7 October.
Another difference between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the conflict between France and the FLN has to do with geography. The Mediterranean Sea separated between France and Algeria, affording the French a wide margin of security. The mountains of the West Bank overlook the major residential areas of Israel, and Gaza, as we have witnessed, is next door to Israeli civilian centers.
A further impediment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs is the Iranian regime’s strategy to encircle Israel with mortal enemies bent on its destruction. The massacres carried out by Hamas and Islamic Jihad on 7 October are only a morbid hors d’oeuvres of what awaits Israel if Iran and its regional allies had their way. This has already altered the way Israelis delineate their national security parameters: No technological devices can ever replace soldiers on the ground; no international guarantee can ever replace Israel’s security forces. Israel needs defensible borders from which it can defend its civilian population, rather than secure borders, a pale and ambiguous term, often used in international resolutions (see, for instance, UN Security Council Resolution 242, which has become the legal basis for Arab-Israeli peace).
To be sure, the reality of around four hundred and fifty thousand Israelis living in the West Bank does not render any solution of the conflict easier. However, Israel evacuated completely its inhabitants from the Gaza Strip in 2005, and that did not help in bringing a resolution of the conflict any nearer. The Hamas and Islamic Jihad want the Israeli population out of Israel itself. Around 15% of the population in Algeria in 1962 were of French origin. Ultimately, that did not prevent an agreement between France and the FLN. Contrary to the Palestinian-Arab case, the FLN did not want the French population out of France itself.
In a sense, Israelis fear a repetition of the Sudetenland and the international community hope for a repetition of Algeria. Of course, Israel is more resolute than Czechoslovakia was in 1938 and the United States is a more steadfast ally of Israel than Britain and France were of Czechoslovakia in 1938. On the other hand, as already mentioned, contrary to the Palestinian Arabs the FLN had limited objectives rendering possible a resolution of its conflict with France.
The late Israeli Prime Minister and President, Shimon Peres, was once asked, “Where is the Israeli de Gaulle?” His reply was, “Where is the Palestinian de Gaulle?”
Perhaps, in the best of cases, what can be expected to emerge eventually is a scenario in which the conflict is moderated, rather than solved, similarly to what occurred between Egypt and Israel between 1974 and 1977. In the light of the way the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has evolved so far, such a scenario would be like a dream-come-true.
Yoav J. Tenembaum is a lecturer in International Relations at Tel Aviv University, Israel. He holds a doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University and a master’s degree in international relations from Cambridge University. His book, "Historical Perspective and International Relations" has just been published by Troubador in the U.K.
24. Understanding China’s Approach to Deterrence
Conclusion:
China’s conception and practice of deterrence thus presents a difficult picture for external observers to both decipher and predict future Chinese behavior. Key elements of China’s deterrence thinking such as “war control” suggest the PLA may have a higher willingness to probe and test adversary “red lines” in pursuit of seizing the initiative early in a crisis so as achieve strategic or operational advantage that can be leveraged to induce concession from adversaries. Yet, at the same time, China’s compellence efforts may deliver increasingly diminishing returns as adversaries recognize that the imposition of costs are forthcoming regardless of whether they accede to or resist coercion. External observers can only hope that recognition of this fact may induce greater caution in Beijing.
Understanding China’s Approach to Deterrence
thediplomat.com
China’s approach to deterrence involves compelling as well as dissuading, and is intertwined with the idea of “war control.”
By Michael Clarke
January 09, 2024
Credit: Depositphotos
The era of great power “strategic competition” has seen deterrence as both a concept and operational objective return to a place of pre-eminence in national defense and strategic policy not seen since the end of the Cold War.
While much attention has been given to the technological advances of China’s military – which the United States military openly terms its “pacing challenge” – relatively less attention has been paid to the concepts and strategies that may animate the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s capabilities. The Pentagon’s latest annual assessment, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” for example, noted that General Secretary Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in October 2022 set a goal for the PLA to “build a strong strategic deterrent system” based on development of both “traditional nuclear deterrent force building” and “the construction of conventional strategic deterrent forces” – but without further examination of how China currently conceives of deterrence.
Given China’s escalation of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait over the past year and the recent step-up in incidents in the South China Sea, it is more important than ever to examine and understand how China conceives of and practices forms of coercion like deterrence. An examination of authoritative and semi-authoritative Chinese sources on PLA strategy and doctrine reveals a number of things: that China conceives of and practices deterrence in a distinct manner that combines dissuasive and compellent forms of coercion; that deterrence is explicitly framed as an instrument for the achievement of politico-military objectives; and that PLA doctrine envisages a sequential application of deterrent and compellent postures across a peacetime-crisis-war spectrum.
Chinese Thinking on Deterrence
Recent Chinese actions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea underline the fact that international politics “takes place in a gray region involving no-peace and no-war wherein the threat of violence – more than its mere application – is the critical variable for an understanding of interstate relations and crises.”
This “power to hurt,” as Thomas Schelling phrased it, stands at the core of strategies of coercion. This primarily takes two forms: deterrence and compellence. The former uses the threat of violence to prevent an actor from undertaking a course of action they otherwise might take absent the threat, and the latter uses the threat of violence to make an actor undertake an action they would prefer not to. The object of deterrence is thus dissuasion – i.e., a threat “intended to keep an adversary from doing something,” while that of compellence concerns the use of threats “to make an adversary do something.”
Most Western theorists have posited two further distinctions between deterrence and compellence. The first concerns the relationship between threat and the use of force. The threat is usually seen as sufficient for deterrence but insufficient for compellence, which requires both the threat and the exemplary use of force to succeed. The second is the question of who has the initiative in the practice of each concept. Deterrence, as Schelling memorably put it, “involves setting the stage – by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation – and waiting,” while compellence “involves initiating an action that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds… To compel one gets up enough momentum to make the other act to avoid collision.”
In summary, deterrence is a “coercive strategy designed to prevent a target from changing its behavior,” where a deterrer issues deterrent threats “because it believes a target is about to, or will eventually, change its behavior in ways that hurt the coercer’s interests.” Compellence, conversely, is a coercive strategy based on the imposition of costs through “either threat or action” until the target changes its behavior in ways specified by the coercer.
How do these Western understandings of deterrence and compellence relate to the Chinese case?
Most immediately, as the Heritage Foundation’s Dean Cheng has argued, the Chinese term most often translated into English as deterrence, 威慑, “embodies both dissuasion and coercion.” Authoritative documents, such as the Science of Military Strategy (SMS) compendiums published biennially by the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, illustrate this linkage in Chinese thinking with the most recent edition, from 2020, asserting that deterrence has two functions: “to stop the other party from doing what they want to do through deterrence” (i.e. dissuasion) and “to use deterrence to coerce the other party to do what they must do” (i.e. compellence).
Chinese understandings of the concept also frame it explicitly as an instrument rather than as an objective of policy. The focus is not “deterring action in one or another domain, but in securing the larger Chinese strategic objective,” such as preventing Taiwan from declaring independence or obtaining acquiescence for Chinese claims to the South China Sea.
Therefore, deterrence is conceived of not as a static activity, but one that has phases of application across peacetime, crisis, and war. The 2013 SMS, for example, detailed that during peacetime the objective is to employ “a normalized deterrence posture to force an opponent to not dare to act lightly or rashly” based on “low-intensity military activities,” such as holding military exercises, “displaying advanced weapons,” and diplomatically asserting China’s “strategic bottom line.” This is suggestive of the notion of “general deterrence,” where “arms and warnings are a contribution to the broad context of international politics” in which the core objective “is to manage the context so that for an opponent it will appear basically unattractive to resort to force.”
However, the 2013 SMS stated that in crisis situations the PLA will adopt “a high intensity deterrence posture, to show a strong resolve of willingness to fight and powerful actual strength, to force an opponent to promptly reverse course.” The cognate of this in Western understandings is arguably “immediate deterrence,” which is concerned with “the relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it.”
The distinction between these, as Lawrence Freedman noted, ultimately concerns “the degree of strategic engagement between deterrer and deterred” wherein immediate deterrence “involves an active effort to deter in the course of a crisis when the efficiency of any threats will soon be revealed in adversary behavior” and general deterrence “is altogether more relaxed, requiring merely the conveyance of a sense of risk to a potential adversary to ensure that active hostilities are never seriously considered.”
Where the Chinese approach departs from this concerns the operation of deterrence in the space between crisis and war. If war does break out, the objective, the 2013 SMS and 2020 SMS noted, becomes “war control” (战争控制). “War control” has been equated with notions of escalation management or control. Yet another possibility is suggested by analysis of the treatment of this term in the 2013 SMS and 2020 SMS documents. Here, “war control” is in fact to be used “within the opportunity between total war and total peace. The outbreak of war is a condition which makes war control possible. Preventing war is not among its imperatives.” As such, it is a warfighting concept.
The 2013 SMS provided a snapshot of the essence of “war control” when it noted that it means “grasping the war’s initiative, to be able to adjust and control the war goals, means, scales, tempos, time opportunities, and scope, and to strive to obtain a favorable war conclusion, at a relatively small price.” By picking “the timing for the start of the war” and surprising the enemy by attacking “where they are least prepared,” China can “seize the battlefield initiative, paralyze the enemy’s war command, and give shock to the enemy’s will” and thus “achieve victory even before the fighting starts.”
The 2020 SMS chapter on “war control” provides further detail by identifying three necessary stages for its successful employment: the “control of war techniques” (i.e. deliberate control of escalation through gray zone-conventional-nuclear capabilities); control of the pace, rhythm and intensity of conflict (i.e. centrality of shifting from defensive to offensive operations at the outbreak of conflict); and the ability to “proactively end the war” (i.e. an “escalate to de-escalate” approach).
This suggests three major implications.
First, the focus on “war control” is informed by China’s historical conflict behavior, where Beijing has had a “heavy preference for escalation over de-escalation to bring a conflict to an end.” This escalate-to-deescalate approach “in the early stages of conflict,” as Oriana Skylar Mastro noted, is seen as having strengthened China’s capacity to prevent “the outbreak of total war” during the Korean War, the Sino-Indian border war, and the Sino-Vietnamese War.
Second, the delineation of “war control” into distinct phases suggests it “is intended to ensure flexibility in military options so the Chinese Communist Party can realize its political ambitions and affect its desired policy without compromise” and that Chinese strategists believe that warfighting intensity can be precisely controlled.
Third, conventional capabilities are now perceived as major instruments for attaining such controllability. The 2020 SMS explicitly noted here, that “the development of high-tech conventional weapons” has not only “narrowed the gap” between their “combat effectiveness” and that of nuclear weapons but that hi-tech conventional capabilities have “higher accuracy and greater controllability.” As such conventional deterrence “is highly controllable and less risky, and generally does not lead to devastating disasters like nuclear war. It is convenient to achieve political goals and becomes a credible deterrence method.”
China’s Practice of the “Power to Hurt”
Consideration of these implications provides possible insight into future Chinese behavior in crisis and conflict scenarios. China’s evolving strategy toward Taiwan, in particular, is consistent with the double meaning of deterrence as encompassing both dissuasion and compellence in authoritative Chinese military writings. This can be seen in the dual nature of Chinese strategy, as it seeks to dissuade Washington from intervening should China choose to use force across the Taiwan Strait and simultaneously compel Taipei to accept Beijing’s concept and model of “reunification.”
To achieve the first objective (i.e. to dissuade Washington), China has sought to decisively shift the military balance between it and Taiwan, while developing capabilities to delay or deny the U.S. military access to the island and its surrounding area in the event of conflict. China’s ability to deter U.S. intervention has been based on significant investment in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including the deployment of a diverse suite of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) – such as the DF-15 and DF-16 SRBMs, the anti-ship DF-21D MRBM, and DF-26 IRBM deployed by the PLA Rocket Force brigades tasked with Taiwan contingencies.
Significantly, during the August 2022 military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, the PLA’s missile launches likely involved the DF-15 variant, which is designed for “precision strike, bunker-busting, and anti-runway operations.” Other elements of the PLA’s exercises consistent with an A2/D2 approach vis-a-vis U.S. forces were the inclusion of air and sea-based anti-submarine capabilities, such as the Y-8 surveillance/anti-submarine warfare aircraft and regular sorties of the PLA Airforce’s (PLAAF) J-11 and J-16 fighters (aircraft thought to be capable of carrying the PL-15 air-to-air missile, which is optimized to target aerial refueling and airborne early warning control aircraft across the “median line” of the Taiwan Strait). Such capabilities, as RAND analyst Mark Cozad argued, provide the PLA with “numerous options to hold at risk major U.S. bases, logistics hubs, and command and control facilities throughout the region.”
China’s desire to compel Taiwan was also on display during the exercises and was consistent with its long-term strategy toward Taiwan, which has sought to integrate a variety of diplomatic, economic, and military instruments to prevent Taipei from any deviation from Beijing’s interpretation of the “One China” principle. The exercises, and subsequent ones in April 2023, suggest that China is seeking to leverage what it sees as its growing military advantage vis-à-vis Taiwan to demonstrate the punishments and costs that it can impose should Taipei not move back toward what Beijing believes is the “bottom line” for cross-strait strait relations (in other words, acceptance of its “One China principle”).
In August 2022, this was expressed through Beijing’s imposition of a variety of economic and diplomatic sanctions backed by military exercises that directly impinged upon Taiwan’s territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, and air defense identification zone. For example, the exercises conducted off China’s Pingtan Island, at the narrowest point of the Taiwan Strait, and in the Bashi Channel, which separates waters within the First Island Chain from the Philippine Sea and the broader Pacific Ocean, demonstrated China’s capability to control these vital chokepoints in a potential quarantine or blockade of Taiwan.
That these activities are designed to signal China’s capability to impose such punishment was underlined by an analyst from the Naval Research Academy of the PLA, who asserted that the August 2022 exercises constituted a “closed encirclement posture towards Taiwan Island” where the PLA could force “a situation of closing the door and hitting dogs” in the event of conflict – a colorful turn of phrase that implies the PLA could effectively delay and/or deny U.S. forces access to Taiwan.
Conclusion
Several uncertainties remain, however, about how the deterrent and compellent elements of China’s approach may play out in a crisis.
First, the 2020 SMS envisaged the sequential application of deterrent and compellent strategies across a peacetime, crisis, and war spectrum. We may thus ask where the August 2022 and more recent April 2023 exercises lie on this spectrum. The picture here is arguably mixed. Some aspects of these exercises were consistent with the “normalized deterrence” posture – based on “low-intensity military activities” such as “displaying advanced weapons” and diplomatically asserting China’s ‘strategic bottom line” – that the 2020 SMS identified as appropriate for peacetime. Yet the scale and intensity of the exercises were suggestive of the “high intensity deterrence posture” that the 2020 SMS described as designed to demonstrate “a strong resolve of willingness to fight…to force an opponent to promptly reverse course.”
Second, China will likely find compellence to be a challenging form of coercion to effectively implement. This appears particularly so with respect to its attempted compellence of Taiwan as China’s objective – “reunification” on Beijing’s terms – abrogates the engine of coercive diplomacy. The goal of coercive diplomacy, as Tami Davis Biddle argued, “is to force the target state (or actor) to choose between conceding the disputed stake or suffering future pain that making such a concession would avert.” The coerced state “must be convinced that if it resists it will suffer, but if it concedes it will not.” However, if “it suffers either way, or if it has already suffered all it can, then it will not concede and coercion will fail.” China’s current behavior amply demonstrates to Taiwan that it will suffer regardless of whether it resists or concedes to Beijing’s coercion, thus arguably increasing Taiwan’s resolve to resist. This raises the question as to when, and under what circumstances, Beijing may reassess the utility of its use of coercion.
Finally, the concept of “war control” indicates not only that China believes coercion can be precisely calibrated, but that its crisis behavior is informed by a preference for an escalate-to-deescalate approach. This carries two possible risks: First, that China will seek to make its violations of Taiwan’s air space and territorial waters routine and thereby establish a new status quo that will enhance its ability to dictate the modes, intensity, and duration of future coercion, and, second, that a belief in the controllability of conventional escalation significantly heightens the risk of future miscalculation.
China’s conception and practice of deterrence thus presents a difficult picture for external observers to both decipher and predict future Chinese behavior. Key elements of China’s deterrence thinking such as “war control” suggest the PLA may have a higher willingness to probe and test adversary “red lines” in pursuit of seizing the initiative early in a crisis so as achieve strategic or operational advantage that can be leveraged to induce concession from adversaries. Yet, at the same time, China’s compellence efforts may deliver increasingly diminishing returns as adversaries recognize that the imposition of costs are forthcoming regardless of whether they accede to or resist coercion. External observers can only hope that recognition of this fact may induce greater caution in Beijing.
Authors
Guest Author
Michael Clarke
Dr. Michael Clarke is Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the Centre for Future Defence and National Security, Deakin University, and Adjunct Professor at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney.
thediplomat.com
25. Dems rip Biden for launching Houthi strikes without congressional approval
President Biden cannot catch a break.
Dems rip Biden for launching Houthi strikes without congressional approval
By OLIVIA ALAFRIZ
01/11/2024 08:26 PM EST
Politico
Some Republicans, meanwhile, couched their praise of the strikes in broader criticism of the administration’s foreign policy actions.
“The President needs to come to Congress before launching a strike against the Houthis in Yemen and involving us in another middle east conflict," said California Rep. Ro Khanna (center) on X. | Francis Chung/POLITICO
01/11/2024 08:26 PM EST
A group of progressive Democratic lawmakers on Thursday responded furiously to President Joe Biden’s move to launch retaliatory strikes against the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen without first seeking congressional approval.
The strikes marked the first major U.S. military response to the group’s ongoing attacks on commercial ships since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.
The Biden administration justified the joint strikes with the United Kingdom, supported by the Netherlands, Canada, Bahrain, and Australia, as conducted “in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, consistent with the UN Charter.”
Lawmakers argued that the move violated Article 1 of the Constitution, which requires military action to be authorized by Congress. Biden notified Congress but did not request its approval.
“This is an unacceptable violation of the Constitution,” Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), who chairs the Progressive Caucus, wrote on social media.
Progressives Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.) and Rep. Cori Bush (D-Mo.) echoed Jayapal, decrying “endless war” and labeling Biden’s actions unconstitutional.
“The President needs to come to Congress before launching a strike against the Houthis in Yemen and involving us in another middle east conflict. That is Article I of the Constitution. I will stand up for that regardless of whether a Democrat or Republican is in the White House,” said California Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) on X, formerly known as Twitter. Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.) retweeted Khanna.
Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) responded to Khanna’s post in agreement, writing that ”the Constitution matters, regardless of party affiliation.” Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.), also praised Khanna’s “principles” in a social media post. Rep. Chip Roy (R-Texas) said that he was open to striking Yemen, but questioned why the decision had not been made by Congress.
Rep. Mark Pocan (D-Wisc) also demanded the White House work with Congress before continuing the strikes. “The United States cannot risk getting entangled into another decades-long conflict without Congressional authorization,” he wrote in a post on social media.
Some Republicans, meanwhile, couched their praise of the strikes in broader criticism of the administration.
Senate GOP leader Mitch McConnell said in a statement that he welcomed the U.S. strikes, writing that the use of force was “overdue.”
“I am hopeful these operations mark an enduring shift in the Biden Administration’s approach to Iran and its proxies. To restore deterrence and change Iran’s calculus, Iranian leaders themselves must believe that they will pay a meaningful price unless they abandon their worldwide campaign of terror,” McConnell added.
Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member Sen. Roger Wicker, (R-Miss), said in a statement: “This strike was two months overdue, but it is a good first step toward restoring deterrence in the Red Sea. I appreciate that the administration took the advice of our regional commanders and targeted critical nodes within Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory.”
“Terrorists know only the language of force and it is about time the administration acted on that fact. This action should have been taken weeks ago,” said Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
“Biden must now act every day to end the ability of Houthi forces and all Iran-back terrorists to attack the US and our partners,” he added.
Iowa senator and veteran Joni Ernst also called the action “overdue” and wrote that “Iran-backed Houthis should never have been emboldened to wreak havoc on U.S. troops and global commerce.”
Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said he was “very supportive” of the decision, adding that “the only language radical Islamic groups understand is force. I hope the Biden Administration understands that their deterrence policy has completely failed.”
POLITICO
Politico
26. Can China Swing Taiwan’s Elections?
Conclusion:
None of these efforts have stopped China from trying to influence Taiwan’s upcoming election, nor will they stop Beijing in the future. Unless it gives up on trying to take control of the island, the CCP will always work to distort Taiwanese politics. But the island has devoted considerable time and resources into bolstering its resilience, developing a response as adaptive as Beijing’s efforts. Yes, China is coming for Taiwan’s election—but Taiwan is ready for it.
Can China Swing Taiwan’s Elections?
Beijing Is Deploying Proxies and Misinformation—and Taipei Is Fighting Back
January 12, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Kenton Thibaut · January 12, 2024
Taiwan has long been the central target of China’s influence and information operations. As part of its quest to compel the island to unify with the mainland, Beijing has now spent decades trying to swing Taiwanese voters away from candidates skeptical of the mainland and toward ones more friendly. Three days before the 2000 presidential vote, for example, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji hinted that the island risked a Chinese invasion if it elected Chen Shui-bian, who had a history of pushing for Taiwan to declare independence. In 2008, when the moderate Ma Ying-Jeou was favored to win the election, China shifted away from overt threats and toward economic inducements, negotiating directly with Taiwanese fruit farmers (traditionally opponents of Ma’s party) to reduce Chinese tariffs. In 2015, when the less pro-Beijing Tsai Ing-wen was ahead in the polls, China hit her party’s website with phishing attacks and malicious code. And during the 2018 municipal elections, China used hundreds of content farms to churn out digital disinformation designed to hurt candidates Beijing saw as less friendly.
As Taiwan gears up for its January presidential contest, it has again been subjected to a deluge of online and offline influence efforts from Beijing, which hopes to kick Tsai and her incumbent Democratic People’s Party (DPP) from power and replace them with the more pro-Beijing Kuomintang (KMT). China is placing a special emphasis on using local proxies in Taiwan—including pro-mainland Taiwanese media companies, paid influencers, and co-opted political elites—to amplify partisan narratives that stoke division in Taiwanese society and erode faith in the island’s political system. Compared with troll factories and crude spam, local proxies make it harder for Taiwanese voters and officials to separate Chinese influence from genuine domestic debate.
But although Chinese efforts to influence the election are sophisticated—and although they have challenged the Taiwanese people’s faith in their democracy—the island has responded with its own wave of innovation. The country has a network of civil society groups, such as DoubleThink Lab, that are pioneering new ways to combat foreign meddling. The government, too, has advanced anti-disinformation initiatives, and it is working hard to root out Chinese proxies. And Taiwanese voters are highly attuned to Beijing’s operations.
The government, in other words, is resilient. So are its people. They can withstand China’s assault on democracy—provided they stay aware.
BLOWING SMOKE
From the moment Taiwan became a democracy, China has tried to influence the island’s elections. But ever since then-DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen handily won the 2016 presidential contest, Beijing has accelerated its endeavors. The DPP has its roots in the Taiwanese independence movement, and so Beijing has reacted to its newfound dominance with a combination of alarm and furor. Since the Tsai era began, China has spent at least tens of millions of dollars on influence campaigns designed to bolster non-DPP candidates in Taiwan’s elections.
But despite this persistence, the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts have never proven particularly effective. The KMT’s candidates won locally in 2018 and 2022, but analyses of those elections indicate that domestic concerns—including changes to Taiwan’s pensions policy and displeasure with the DPP’s economic reforms—were responsible for influencing voter choices, rather than Chinese meddling. When foreign policy was on the line, as it was during Tsai’s 2020 reelection bid, China’s efforts went nowhere. Despite an aggressive Chinese media campaign and an onslaught of attacks from CCP-backed social media accounts, Tsai overwhelmingly won reelection.
There are many reasons for Taiwan’s resilience. One is the network of nonprofits, which help flag misleading content and spam. Another is civil society’s general success at raising public awareness about China’s tactics. During the 2022 elections, for example, China launched a heavy-handed disinformation campaign to spread rumors that the DPP was complicit in a deal to sell Taiwan’s leading semiconductor firm, TSMC, to the United States. The campaign led to widespread public rebuke, with scholars issuing a joint letter condemning China’s information operations. Prominent news outlets, including Taiwan’s Business Today, published articles that warned about disinformation and misinformation.
China has spent at least tens of millions of dollars on influence campaigns.
For the 2024 contest, the Chinese Communist Party has continued to spread misinformation. It is, in particular, using local proxies to spread partisan narratives that play on fears of rising cross-strait tensions. This anxiety is authentic to Taiwan: the KMT’s presidential candidate, Hou Yu-ih, has depicted the vote as a choice between “war and peace,” stating that the DPP’s moves to deepen ties with the United States and promote independence will lead to conflict. But to help amplify this message, the CCP has turned to Taiwanese businesses to suggest a DPP vote could lead to war. The Want-Want Group, for example, a Taiwan-based media company that receives subsidies from the Chinese government, has posted multiple videos praising the KMT and playing up the prospects of war. One proclaims, in its title, that the “DPP is ‘on the road’ to corruption, to war, and to danger.” Another accused the DPP of “quietly preparing for war” and spread a rumor that the DPP vice presidential candidate met with U.S. political operatives to discuss a Chinese-Taiwanese conflict.
Arguing that DPP politicians are too close with U.S. ones is a pastime of the CCP and its local supporters. A Taiwanese newspaper, for example, falsely reported that the United States asked Taiwan to develop biological weapons. According to the Taipai Times and Taiwanese government officials, this article was likely sourced from Chinese propaganda.
Beijing has, of course, had proxies in Taiwan for years. According to Puma Shen, a professor at National Taipei University and the former chair at DoubleThink, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office has paid for local Taiwanese officials and leaders to take luxurious trips to the mainland since at least 2019 as part of an effort to shift public opinion. In past election cycles, Taiwanese businesses with operations in China have taken money from sources linked to the Chinese Communist Party and then donated it to pro-China candidates. Such laundering helps China avoid easily being named and shamed, and when Beijing launders its ideas through proxies, it makes it more likely China’s messaging will spread. In a February post to Facebook, for example, a former KMT politician and pro-Beijing influencer spread the false claim that the United States had a plan for the “destruction of Taiwan,” citing Russian state media. The claim was both picked up by Taiwanese media and amplified by Chinese government sources.
Proxies could also help China overcome Taiwan’s defenses. In 2018, 2020, and 2022, for example, social media companies such as Meta grew adept at identifying and quickly taking down posts from suspected content farms, limiting the reach of China’s campaigns. But proxies make it trickier for social media firms to separate authentic posts from propaganda. It can make it tricky for Taiwan’s people, too.
IMMUNE RESPONSE
Will China’s tactics swing the election? Beijing does not need to persuade many voters for its efforts to succeed. The 2020 contest may have been a blowout, but based on voting numbers from that election, Beijing would have needed to sway only around 10 percent of voters to turn the KMT’s loss into a win. If the polls are correct, today’s election will be much closer.
And even if Chinese meddling does not swing the contest, it can still shape Taiwan’s politics. Sustained efforts to infiltrate Taiwan’s information environment can undermine the public’s faith in their electoral process; according to a report from the Taiwan Institute for Governance and Communication Research, for example, almost two-thirds of voters in Taiwan say that the prevalence of election disinformation has negatively affected their trust in government institutions. It is a deeply concerning statistic.
But that fact does not mean Taiwanese democracy is in jeopardy. The country’s electoral systems remain open and strong, in part because the Taiwanese public has been sensitive to perceived Chinese interference. In fact, Beijing’s attempts to coerce voters may actually strengthen the island’s democracy by spurring its civil society to keep responding. In 2018, when China was ramping up its online information operations against Taiwan, two civil society organizations established the Taiwan Fact Center to enhance media literacy and curb the effects of disinformation. Other digital innovations—like fact-checker apps for popular social media platforms in Taiwan—have sprouted up to combat China’s assaults on Taiwan’s information space.
Even if Chinese meddling does not swing the presidential election, it can still shape Taiwan’s politics.
Combating Chinese proxies can be more challenging. But Taiwan’s responses to Beijing’s meddling are getting better. Taiwanese civil society groups devoted to combating international disinformation have become leaders in their field, including by developing new AI tools. These tools can quickly scan and flag posts on social media platforms for misleading content—including content that Chinese proxies took out of context or used with incomplete information. The groups’ media literacy and social resilience programs are also focused on keeping up with the CCP’s tactics. One nonprofit organization launched in June 2022, Kuma Academy, runs training programs designed to educate the public on China’s evolving tactics to influence Taiwan’s political, social, and information space. Its classes are immensely popular, with thousands of people on the waitlist for Kuma’s monthly basic training courses.
The work of these groups is complemented by Taipei’s efforts. The island’s inaugural digital minister, Audrey Tang, has leveraged technology to improve democratic participation and keep Taiwan’s media open and accurate. In the lead-up to the election, for example, the ministry has worked with civil society organizations to leverage AI tools such as ChatGPT to create bots that flag, categorize, and debunk potentially misleading content online in almost real time. To tackle disinformation efforts more directly, Taiwan’s government set up a task force in 2023 that brings together different departments—including the Digital Affairs Ministry, the Ministry of Education, the Central Election Commission, and the Ministry of Justice—to monitor the Internet and media for signs of information manipulation surrounding the election.
Finally, Taiwan has passed laws to crack down on suspected instances of election meddling. In 2019, for instance, it enacted the Anti-Infiltration Act, which prohibits foreign entities from making political donations and bars the use of illegally procured funds for political aims. The government is now using this law to shut down Beijing’s attempts to leverage local proxies. Taipei, for example, has launched a sweeping investigation into a 2023 money-laundering scheme in which the CCP both paid and coerced Taiwanese businesses with interests in China to fund pro-Beijing candidates.
None of these efforts have stopped China from trying to influence Taiwan’s upcoming election, nor will they stop Beijing in the future. Unless it gives up on trying to take control of the island, the CCP will always work to distort Taiwanese politics. But the island has devoted considerable time and resources into bolstering its resilience, developing a response as adaptive as Beijing’s efforts. Yes, China is coming for Taiwan’s election—but Taiwan is ready for it.
KENTON THIBAUT is Senior Resident Fellow for China at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.
Foreign Affairs · by Kenton Thibaut · January 12, 2024
27. The Right Way to Regulate AI
Excerpts:
Democratic leaders must understand that disrupting and outpacing the regulatory process is part of the tech industry’s business model. Anchoring their policymaking process on fundamental democratic principles would give lawmakers and regulators a consistent benchmark against which to consider the impact of AI systems and focus attention on societal benefits, not just the hype cycle of a new product. If policymakers can congregate around a positive vision for governing AI, they will likely find that many components of regulating the technology can be done by agencies and bodies that already exist. But if countries do decide they need new agencies—such as the AI Safety Institutes now being established in the United States and the United Kingdom—they should be imagined as democratic institutions that prioritize accountability to citizens and incorporate public consultation.
Properly constructed, such agencies could be a part of a broader governance infrastructure that not only detects how AI can infringe on rights and livelihoods but also scouts out how AI can proactively enhance them—by making dangerous jobs less perilous, health care more effective, elections more reliable, education more accessible, and energy use more sustainable. Although AI systems are powerful, they remain tools made by humans, and their uses are not preordained. Their effects are not inevitable.
AI governance need not be a drag on innovation. Ask bankers if unregulated lending by a competitor is good for them. Simply put, the ballast provided by proactive governance offers stability but also provides a controlled range of motion. First, however, policymakers must acknowledge that governing AI effectively will be an exercise in returning to first principles, not just a technical and regulatory task.
The Right Way to Regulate AI
Focus on Its Possibilities, Not Its Perils
January 12, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Alondra Nelson · January 12, 2024
Artificial intelligence “is unlike anything [the U.S.] Congress has dealt with before,” Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer said in June 2023. The pace at which AI developers are producing new systems—and those systems’ potential to transform human life—means that the U.S. government should start “from scratch,” he declared, when considering how to regulate and govern AI. Legislators, however, have defied his wishes. Following OpenAI’s late 2022 unveiling of ChatGPT, proposals for how to encourage safe AI development have proliferated faster than new chatbots are being rushed to market. In March 2023, Democratic legislators proposed moratoriums on some uses of AI in surveillance. The next month, a group of bipartisan lawmakers floated a bill to prohibit autonomous AI systems from deploying nuclear weapons. In June, Schumer debuted his own AI agenda, and then in September, a bipartisan framework for AI governance was proposed by other senators promoting oversight, transparency, and data privacy.
The race to regulate is partly a response to the platitude that government may simply be too sluggish, too brittle, and too outmoded to keep up with fleet-footed new technologies. Industry leaders frequently complain that government is too slow to respond productively to developments in Silicon Valley, using this line of argument to justify objections to putting guardrails around new technologies. Responding to this critique, some government proposals encourage expeditious AI development. But other bills try to rein in AI and protect against dangerous use cases and incursions into citizens’ privacy and freedoms: the Algorithmic Accountability Act that House Democrats proposed in September 2023, for instance, mandates risk assessments before technologies are deployed. Some proposals even seek to accelerate and put the brakes on AI development at the same time.
This commendable but chaotic policy entrepreneurship risks scattering government’s focus and threatens to lead to a situation in which there is no clear governance of AI in the United States at all. It doesn’t have to be this way. A tendency to slip behind the curve of technological innovation is not an inherent weakness of government. In fact, trying to outpace government regulation is the tech industry’s deliberate strategy to circumvent oversight. Government has an irreplaceable role to play as a stabilizing force in AI development. Government does not have to be a drag on innovation: it can enable it, strategically stewarding science and technology investments to not only prevent harm but also enhance people’s lives.
From its first days, U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration has worked toward a more integrated technology policy agenda that addresses AI’s widening uses, considering competition, privacy, and bias as well as how to safeguard democracy, expand economic opportunity, and mitigate an array of risks. But AI technology is changing rapidly, and much more must be done to quickly clarify the central goal of AI governance so that policymaking is not only reactive.
AI governance should reject choice architectures that cast the future as a rigid binary—between a vision of paradise or dystopia or between a false dilemma of pursuing efficiency or ensuring equity. Safety and innovation in AI are not mutually exclusive. Because new and emerging AI technologies are so dynamic and used for so many purposes, however, they may elude conventional policy approaches. The United States does not need so many new AI policies. It needs a new kind of policymaking.
FALSE ANALOGY
To regulate AI, many policy advisers in the United States and beyond have first sought an analogy. Are AI systems more like a particle accelerator complex, a novel drug therapy, or nuclear power research? The hope is that identifying a parallel, even a loose one, can point to the existing governance strategy that should apply to AI, guiding current and future policy initiatives.
The economist Samuel Hammond, for instance, took inspiration from the massive twentieth-century U.S. effort to build and assess risks around nuclear weapons. He has proposed a Manhattan Project for AI safety, a federal research project focused on the most cataclysmic risks potentially posed by artificial intelligence. The nonprofit AI Now Institute, meanwhile, has begun to examine the viability of a regulatory agency based on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration: an FDA-like regulator of AI would prioritize public safety by focusing on prerelease scrutiny and approval of AI systems as the U.S. government does with pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and the country’s food supply.
Multilateral analogies have also been suggested. The German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence has advocated modeling AI governance on the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), the intergovernmental body that oversees fundamental scientific research in particle physics. In May 2023, Sam Altman, Greg Brockman, and Ilya Sutskever—then co-leaders at OpenAI—recommended that an AI governance framework be modeled on the International Atomic Energy Agency; in this model, the United Nations would establish an international bureaucracy to develop safety standards and an inspection regime for the most advanced AI systems.
To regulate AI, many policy advisers in the United States and beyond have first sought an analogy.
The absence of an internationally coordinated research infrastructure poses a significant challenge for AI governance. Yet even conventional multilateral paradigms predicated on nation-state membership are unlikely to produce an effective way to govern competitive, for-profit industry efforts. AI companies are already offering products to a global and diverse customer base, including public and private enterprises and everyday consumers. And none of these analogies, including the U.S. domestic ones, reflect the fact that the data that enable AI systems’ development have already become a global economic and political force. Further, all these potential models end up neglecting some critical domains on which AI will likely have a transformative impact, including health care, education, agriculture, labor, and finance.
The problem with reaching for a twentieth-century analogy is that AI simply does not resemble a twentieth-century innovation. Unlike the telephone, computing hardware, microelectronics, or many pharmaceutical products—technologies and products that evolved over years or decades—many AI systems are dynamic and constantly change; unlike the outputs of particle physics research, they can be rapidly deployed for both legitimate consumer use and illicit applications nearly as soon as they are developed. Off-the-shelf, preexisting governance models will likely be inadequate to the challenge of governing AI. And reflexive gestures toward the past may foreclose opportunities to devise inventive policy approaches that do not merely react to present challenges but anticipate future ones.
DROP AN ANCHOR
Instead of reaching to twentieth-century regulatory frameworks for guidance, policymakers must start with a different first step: asking themselves why they wish to govern AI at all. Drawing back from the task of governing AI is not an option. The past decade’s belated, disjointed, and ultimately woefully insufficient efforts to govern social media’s use of algorithmic systems are a sobering example of the consequences of passively hoping that social benefits will trickle down as an emergent property of technological development. Political leaders cannot again buy the myth—peddled by self-interested tech leaders and investors—that supporting innovation requires suspending government’s regulatory duties.
Some of the most significant challenges the world faces in the twenty-first century have arisen from the failure to properly regulate automated systems. These systems collect our data and surveil our lives. The indiscriminate use of so-called predictive algorithms and decision-making tools in health care, criminal justice, and access to housing causes unfair treatment and exacerbates existing inequities. Deep fakes on social media platforms stoke social disorder by amplifying misinformation. Technologies that went undergoverned are now hastening democratic decline, intensifying insecurity, and eroding people’s trust in institutions worldwide.
But when tackling AI governance, it is crucial for leaders to consider not only what specific threats they fear from AI but what type of society they want to build. The public debate over AI has already shown how frenzied speculation about catastrophic risks can overpower people’s ability to imagine AI’s potential benefits.
Policymakers must start with a different first step: asking themselves why they wish to govern AI at all.
Biden’s overall approach to policymaking, however, illustrates how viewing policy as an opportunity to enrich society—not just as a way to react to immediate problems—brings needed focus to government interventions. Key to this approach has been an overarching perspective that sees science, research, and innovation as offering both a value proposition and a values proposition to the American public. The administration’s signal early policy achievements leveraged targeted public funding, infrastructure investment, and technological innovation to strengthen economic opportunities and ensure American well-being.
The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, for instance, was not designed to merely curb inflation: by encouraging the production and use of advanced batteries, solar power, electric vehicles, heat pumps, and other new building technologies, it also sought to help address the climate crisis and advance environmental justice. The 2022 CHIPS and Science Act promoted the revival of U.S. innovation by backing the development of a new ecosystem of semiconductor researchers and manufacturers, incorporating new opportunities for neglected U.S. regions and communities.
Government investments in science and technology, in other words, have the potential to address economic inequality. Like building a stock portfolio, it will take time for some of these investments to yield their full benefits. However, this lodestar liberalism—anchored in values—has allowed the administration to forge bipartisan support in an otherwise fractious political milieu.
FLEXIBLE BENEFITS
The Biden administration has begun to make moves to apply the same approach to AI. In October 2022, the White House released its Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights, which was distilled from engagement with representatives of various sectors of American society, including industry, academia, and civil society. The blueprint advanced five propositions: AI systems should be safe and effective. The public should know that their data will remain private. The public should not be subjected to the use of biased algorithms. Consumers should receive notice when an AI system is in use and have the opportunity to consent to using it. And citizens should be able to loop in a human being when AI is used to make a consequential decision about their lives. The document identified specific practices to encode public benefits into policy instruments, including the auditing, assessment, “red teaming,” and monitoring of AI systems on an ongoing basis.
The blueprint was important in part because it emphasized the idea that AI governance need not start entirely from scratch. It can emerge from the same fundamental vision of the public good that the country’s founders articulated centuries ago. There is no society whose members will always share the same vision of a good future, but democratic societies are built on a basic agreement about the core values citizens cherish: in the case of the United States, these include privacy, freedom, equality, and the rule of law.
These long-standing values can—and must—still guide AI governance. When it comes to technology, policymakers too often believe that their approaches are constrained by a product’s novelty and must be subject to the views of expert creators. Lawmakers can become trapped in a false sense that specific new technologies always need specific new laws. Their instinct becomes to devise new governance paradigms for each new tech development.
Lawmakers can become trapped in a false sense that specific new technologies always need specific new laws.
This instinct is wrong. Throughout history, the United States has reinterpreted and expanded citizens’ rights and liberties, but the understanding that such entitlements and freedoms exist has been enduring. If policymakers return to first principles such as those invoked in the AI Bill of Rights when governing AI, they may also recognize that many AI applications are already subject to existing regulatory oversight.
Anchoring AI governance to a vision of the public good could diminish regulatory confusion and competition, stemming the flow of the sometimes contradictory bills lawmakers are currently producing. If it did, that would free both lawmakers and regulatory agencies to think more creatively in the areas in which policy innovation is truly needed. AI does pose unprecedented challenges demanding policy innovation. Already, the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has embarked on a different kind of policymaking when it comes to AI.
With a constitutional mandate to “fix the standard of weights and measures,” NIST determines the proper standards to measure such things as length and mass, temperature and time, light and electricity. In 2021, Congress directed NIST to develop voluntary frameworks, guidelines, and best practices to steer the development and deployment of trustworthy AI systems, including ways to test for bias in AI training data and use cases. Following consultations with industry leaders, scientists, and the public, in January 2023, NIST released its first AI Risk Management Framework 1.0. The “1.0” was meaningful. Versioning—think of Windows 2.0, 3.0, and so on—has long been commonplace in the world of software development to patch bugs, refine operations, and add improved features.
It is much less common in the world of policymaking. But NIST’s use of policy versioning will permit an agile approach to the development of standards for AI. NIST also accompanied its framework with a “playbook,” a practical guide to the document that will be updated every six months with new resources and case studies. This kind of innovation could be applied to other agencies. A more agile way of reviewing standards and policies should become a more regular part of the government’s work.
THE OLD BECOMES NEW
The AI Bill of Rights and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework became the foundations of Biden’s sweeping October 2023 Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence. Running at 111 pages, it mobilizes the executive branch to use existing guidelines, authorities, and laws, innovatively applied, to govern AI. This sweeping mandate gives many key actors homework: industry leaders must provide insight into the inner workings of their most powerful systems and watermark their products to help support information integrity. The order directed the U.S. Office of Management and Budget to issue guidance on the federal government’s own use of AI, recognizing that the government possesses extraordinary power to shape markets and industry behavior by setting rules for the procurement of AI systems and demanding transparency from AI creators.
But more must be done. AI governance needs an international component. In 2023, the European Union advanced significant new laws on AI governance, and the United Kingdom is moving to address AI regulation with what it calls a “light touch.” The African Union has a regional AI strategy, and Singapore has just released its second national AI strategy in four years.
There is a risk that the world at large will suffer from the same glut of competing proposals that bedevils AI governance in the United States. But there are preexisting multilateral mechanisms that can be used to help clarify international governance efforts: with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN members states have already agreed to shared core values that should also guide AI regulation.
Democratic leaders must understand that disrupting and outpacing the regulatory process is part of the tech industry’s business model. Anchoring their policymaking process on fundamental democratic principles would give lawmakers and regulators a consistent benchmark against which to consider the impact of AI systems and focus attention on societal benefits, not just the hype cycle of a new product. If policymakers can congregate around a positive vision for governing AI, they will likely find that many components of regulating the technology can be done by agencies and bodies that already exist. But if countries do decide they need new agencies—such as the AI Safety Institutes now being established in the United States and the United Kingdom—they should be imagined as democratic institutions that prioritize accountability to citizens and incorporate public consultation.
Properly constructed, such agencies could be a part of a broader governance infrastructure that not only detects how AI can infringe on rights and livelihoods but also scouts out how AI can proactively enhance them—by making dangerous jobs less perilous, health care more effective, elections more reliable, education more accessible, and energy use more sustainable. Although AI systems are powerful, they remain tools made by humans, and their uses are not preordained. Their effects are not inevitable.
AI governance need not be a drag on innovation. Ask bankers if unregulated lending by a competitor is good for them. Simply put, the ballast provided by proactive governance offers stability but also provides a controlled range of motion. First, however, policymakers must acknowledge that governing AI effectively will be an exercise in returning to first principles, not just a technical and regulatory task.
- ALONDRA NELSON is Harold F. Linder Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study and a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. From 2021 to 2023, she served as Acting Director and Principal Deputy Director for Science and Society at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and as Deputy Assistant to the President.
Foreign Affairs · by Alondra Nelson · January 12, 2024
28. Soldiers build nuke-detecting backpack
Soldiers build nuke-detecting backpack
armytimes.com · by Todd South · January 11, 2024
A group of soldiers built a backpack that eliminates what is typically an eight-hour wait time when transporting a mobile nuclear detector and provides onboard power and ways to analyze samples when communications go down.
The soldiers serve with the Army’s Nuclear Disablement Teams. Dubbed NDT 1 “Manhattan,” NDT 2 “Iron Maiden” and NDT 3 “Vandals,” they are based out of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland under the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) Command, according to an Army news release.
The NDTs are the Defense Department’s only nuclear disablement teams and conduct weapon of mass destruction elimination operations.
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The teams’ mobile nuclear detector must draw outside air for its internal cooling system and expel hot air to maintain the right operating temperatures.
“The challenge the NDT always had with its Ortec High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors was always the deliberate cool down period required for the equipment to be ready, typically in excess of seven hours from a complete shutdown,” said Maj. Aaron J. Heffelfinger, NDT 1 deputy team chief.
The cases that came with the detector required the device to be shut down during transport, which then meant an eight-hour cooldown period, he said.
“Time is always of the essence. The longer it takes the team to provide the gamma spectroscopy and isotopic assay results to the supported unit, the more constrained the commander becomes,” Heffelfinger said. “If we can provide that information without an 8-hour cooldown first, it can drive the decision-making process that much faster.”
Soldiers from the U.S. Army Nuclear Disablement Teams created a backpack that provides theater-level confirmation and identification of radiological materials more quickly in a tactical environment. (Maj. Steven M. Modugno/Army)
Members of the team tinkered with different ways of keeping the system cool over a six-month period, before developing the current backpack solution. They collaborated with partner organizations such as Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center at the Army’s Combat Capabilities Development Command to develop the device.
The team made the backpack a self-contained cooling unit and ensured it was able to store power with a range of battery options, said Capt. John M. Prevost, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer with NDT 2.
The Nuclear Disablement Teams worked with partner organizations, including the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C5ISR) Center from the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command. (Army)
Now the detector can run almost indefinitely and can be used anywhere the soldier can carry it, Prevost said.
And NDT soldiers can also carry the spectral analysis software in the backpack, even downrange. That allows them to conduct analysis on site if their communications are down or degraded. Previously they would need to call in support from afar for the analysis.
“This new backpack provides a protective, continuously cooling, man-packable solution for bringing our most critical detection equipment to a target,” said Prevost. “The backpack makes our most critical detection and analysis capability smaller, lighter, faster and more ruggedized for expeditionary deployments.”
About Todd South
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.
29. 4 ways China is trying to interfere in Taiwan’s presidential election
Intelligent people learn from their mistakes and wise people learn from the mistakes of others. Some of these techniques will be applied against us. Can we learn from Taiwan?
The four:
1. Sowing information chaos
2. Co-opting local officials
3. Wielding economic sticks and carrots
4. Ramping up ‘gray zone’ military intimidation
4 ways China is trying to interfere in Taiwan’s presidential election
By Lily Kuo, Pei-Lin Wu, Vic Chiang and Joseph Menn
January 11, 2024 at 5:00 a.m. EST
The Washington Post · by Lily Kuo · January 11, 2024
TAIPEI, Taiwan — Floating high-altitude balloons over the island, funding pro-Beijing social media influencers, and hosting local officials on lavish trips to China: These are among the tactics Beijing is accused of deploying to influence Taiwan’s presidential election to be held on Saturday.
For years, Taiwan — which Beijing claims is an “inalienable” part of China — has been the target of Chinese influence campaigns aimed at convincing citizens that coming under Chinese Communist Party rule is their best option. Those efforts have come to the fore ahead of what is expected to be the closest presidential and legislative race for the island democracy in decades.
Taiwanese authorities are investigating 102 cases of foreign interference related to this year’s election, according to the Supreme Prosecutors Office — the highest number since Taiwan enacted an anti-infiltration law in 2019. Many of them are related to China, which has an interest in unseating the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which it sees as promoting formal independence, and seeing a more Beijing-friendly president in office.
How these attempts fare matter beyond Taiwan. The next Taiwanese president’s stance toward Beijing will be a factor in whether China initiates conflict in the Taiwan Strait, one that could draw in the United States and neighboring countries, disrupting global shipping lanes and supplies of critical technology.
What’s more, influence tactics that prove useful in Taiwan could be replicated elsewhere. Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu warned on Tuesday: “In 2024, there are more than 40 important democratic elections in the world. If China succeeds in Taiwan, China will use that experience to interfere in the elections of other countries.”
But measuring the impact or even the presence of Chinese influence efforts is becoming more difficult. Aware that overly blunt tactics could push voters away from China’s preferred party — the Kuomintang (KMT) — and toward the DPP, which is leading in polls, China appears wary of overdoing it.
“There’s a real potential for it to backfire,” said Alexander Dukalskis, an associate professor at University College Dublin and the author of “Making the World Safe for Dictatorship.” “People don’t want to be bullied and intimidated into being told how to vote.”
The Biden administration has warned China against interfering, while Beijing has accused the DPP of “hyping up” the military threat from China for votes.
“The Chinese have been hammering away at them with so many different kinds of mechanisms, and it looks at least right now that their least favorite candidate is going to win,” said a senior U.S. administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity. “So that is an indication that the system is more resilient.”
Whether or not these measures affect the election, they can still further China’s aims in Taiwan steadily and gradually. “If I can influence 3 to 5 percent of the people, then I can influence the election result,” said Chang Chun-Hao, a professor of political science at Tunghai University in Taiwan. “And even if you don’t affect the election results, you have still furthered the unification campaign.”
These are the four main ways Beijing has been accused of trying to interfere in Taiwan’s presidential election this year:
1. Sowing information chaos
Chinese misinformation in Taiwan used to be easier to catch, with news articles or social media posts clunkily written with vocabulary used mainly in China or in simplified Chinese text instead of the traditional script used in Taiwan. Now, that campaign has been localized, and Chinese propagandists have been encouraged to amplify authentic local disputes and divisions, said Tim Niven, head of research at Taiwan’s Doublethink Lab. “It’s putting Taiwanese polarization on steroids,” he said.
In the past year, Taiwan has been awash with rumors, including that Taiwanese officials, under orders from Washington, were collecting blood samples from citizens to engineer genetic weapons against China, or that the United States pushed Taiwanese chipmaker TSMC to set up a factory in Arizona so it could abandon Taiwan and its chip supply chains.
For months, the idea that the United States is not a reliable partner, a concept known as yimeilun, or “America skepticism,” has gained traction thanks to consistent amplification by Chinese media.
Beijing’s influence campaign has also tapped networks of local Beijing-friendly content creators. Taiwanese authorities are investigating a digital media company that runs more than 20 Facebook pages with large followings and regularly criticizes the DPP.
The group’s owner was offered content and financial support by a Chinese state media journalist, according to screenshots of the conversations shared with The Washington Post by a security officer involved in the case.
The officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to share details of an ongoing investigation, said Chinese propagandists often pay Taiwanese influencers to spread narratives that undermine Taiwan’s democratic process. Sometimes the goal isn’t necessarily to support a particular candidate, but rather to disrupt the election and “make it chaotic,” he said.
2. Co-opting local officials
Over the past year, China has taken hundreds of local-level Taiwanese officials to Chinese cities. There, sway efforts have been as blatant as handing out vouchers for the streaming platform iQiyi and instructing the visitors to vote for pro-unification candidates, according to Taiwan’s prosecutors office.
These exchanges, in which Taiwanese officials are hosted in China on heavily subsidized trips, have long been seen as an avenue for grass-roots influence operations, with the expectation that they will return with a pro-China message. Taiwanese authorities are investigating 40 people in relation to these visits and potential election interference.
In other cases, the message was more subtle. Chinese officials told their Taiwanese guests to remember that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are “one family,” according to officials who went on these exchanges. In some, the Chinese hosts were careful not to say anything about the election for risk of jeopardizing these visits.
“They would say that the mainland very much hopes the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can be united and that everyone can sit down and talk,” said one village chief from the Taipei area who went on two trips to China last year. He spoke on the condition of anonymity because he is among those being investigated.
“They all want to push unification, or to infiltrate your thinking. It’s just some use more subtle methods and others use more crude methods,” he said.
3. Wielding economic sticks and carrots
Starting Jan. 1, China canceled preferential tariffs on 12 chemical compounds from Taiwan. On Tuesday, China’s Commerce Ministry said it was studying the possibility of canceling other tariff concessions for agriculture, fish, machinery, auto parts and textiles, measures that Chinese officials said would continue if the DPP maintains its “pro-independence position.”
At the same time, Beijing is dangling carrots to others that show some fealty to China. In June, Chinese authorities resumed previously banned imports of sugar apples from some companies after the mayor of Taitung, where the fruit is grown, visited China along with the KMT’s vice chairman.
In December, China said it would resume some imports of grouper after banning it in June. But only imports from six individuals and one company, whose chairman visited China the month before, will be allowed.
“The goal is telling those voters who have economic ties with China that they better vote for the candidate [Beijing] prefers,” said Chiou Yi-Hung, an associate professor of international relations at National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University.
4. Ramping up ‘gray zone’ military intimidation
China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, has increased military incursions near Taiwan over the past year to remind citizens of Beijing’s promise to “reunite” with Taiwan by force if necessary.
Ahead of the election, China appears to be using new forms of “gray zone” tactics, aggressive measures that stop short of open conflict and are meant to intimidate. Since December, China has sent at least 31 high-altitude balloons — similar to the one discovered and shot down over the United States last year — into Taiwan’s airspace. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry described the balloons as “cognitive warfare” intended to demoralize Taiwan’s 23 million people.
On Tuesday, days before polls were to open, China launched a satellite that unexpectedly crossed over southern Taiwan before entering space, according to Taiwan’s Defense Ministry. The launch prompted a rare nationwide emergency alert, whose English version mistakenly described the object in question as “a missile flyover,” alarming residents.
Menn reported from San Francisco. Ellen Nakashima in Washington contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Lily Kuo · January 11, 2024
30. Army civilian accused of bilking $100 million to fund luxury lifestyle
So yesterday I said this was unbelievable and had to be fake news. I cannot imagine anyone being able to bilk this amount of money.
But here is the link to the indictment from Justice (US Attorney's Office in the Western District of Texas): https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdtx/pr/army-civilian-employee-indicted-san-antonio-alleged-100-million-fraud-scheme
Note that the indictment is from December 6th. Why has it taken this long to make the news?
Army civilian accused of bilking $100 million to fund luxury lifestyle
armytimes.com · by Jonathan Lehrfeld · January 11, 2024
An Army civilian in Texas is facing significant prison time for an alleged scheme in which prosecutors say she stole $100 million in military funds in order to fund a lavish lifestyle.
Janet Yamanaka Mello, 57, a civilian financial program manager at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, received a 10-count indictment by a federal grand jury in December over the alleged actions. If she fails to reach a plea deal by Jan. 19, Mello would face a jury selection and trial, according to court records.
Mello allegedly used the stolen funds to amass a real estate portfolio of 31 properties, a fleet of 78 vehicles, more than $18 million in various bank accounts linked to her, and a jewelry collection, according to court records.
Some of the luxury listings include a roughly $3.1 million, eight-bedroom, 55-car garage, 58-acre estate in Maryland and an approximately $1.1 million home in San Antonio, Texas.
It’s unclear at this time whether those properties were used to store Mello’s alleged Jay Leno-esque collection of classic, expensive cars and motorcycles.
Among the alleged fleet of vehicles — many listed in court records currently cost between $100,000 and $200,000 — were a 1967 Chevrolet Camaro SS, a ‘66 Chevrolet Chevelle SS, a ‘66 Ford Mustang, a ‘54 Chevrolet Corvette and a 1935 Plymouth Sedan.
Mello must forfeit all of those assets and any other proceeds and property she allegedly obtained through criminal means.
According to the indictment, the Army civilian allegedly carried out the scheme by regularly submitting fraudulent paperwork as early as December 2016 that indicated a bogus business she controlled, named Child Health and Youth Lifelong Development, was entitled to money from the 4-H Military Partnership Grant program, a collaboration “to provide meaningful youth development opportunities for military-connected children.”
Mello allegedly “played on the trust she had developed over the years with her supervisors and co-workers to secure the necessary approvals,” according to the indictment. She is also alleged to have falsified the digital signature of one of her supervisors multiple times.
Mello is charged with five counts of mail fraud, four counts of engaging in a monetary transaction over $10,000 using criminally derived proceeds and one count of aggravated identity theft, according to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Texas.
If convicted, Mello faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for each fraud charge, up to 10 years in prison for each spending statute charge and a mandatory minimum of two years in prison for the aggravated identity theft charge.
“It is very early in the case and I expect the evidence to be extensive. We will need time to review it. I do not believe that the case will be resolved by those initial dates,” defense lawyer Albert Flores told The Messenger. Flores did not immediately respond to Military Times’ request for comment.
A spokesperson for the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Texas declined to comment as the case remains open.
About Jonathan Lehrfeld
Jonathan is a staff writer and editor of the Early Bird Brief newsletter for Military Times. Follow him on Twitter @lehrfeld_media
31. Does the Marine Corps Need Course Correction? Congress Wants to Know
Does the Marine Corps Need Course Correction? Congress Wants to Know
If so, necessary changes and funding are needed to restore lost capabilities.
thedefensepost.com · by Gary Anderson · January 12, 2024
Where does the Marine Corps go from here? This critical question has pitted retired Marines and the existing senior leadership for the last four years.
Force Design (FD) 2030, the brainchild of the former commandant General David Berger, has been loudly and persistently challenged by many senior retired general officers, former defense officials, and friends of the Corps.
Congress somewhat belatedly woke up to this intellectual civil war with this year’s National Defense Authorization Act, which mandates a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) independently evaluate FD 2030.
Candidates to Evaluate FD 2030
That is all well and good, but the question of which FFRDC will do the study is critical. There are three leading candidates: the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and RAND Corporation.
CNA’s primary funding comes from the Department of the Navy, meaning the Navy and Marine Corps. The Department also contributes directly to RAND, but not to the extent of CNA.
Of the candidates, only IDA appears to receive no direct Navy funding. It has no dog in the fight. CNA has never questioned the need for large amphibious ships, nor has RAND. It is probably unfair to ask either to take sides in this issue as it is a lose-lose proposition.
US Marines participate in the Super Garuda Shield exercise. Photo: Sgt. Andrew King/US Marine Corps
Heavily Invested
Let me be clear: I have no current affiliation with any of the candidates. I have collaborated with all in past studies and have the greatest respect for all three — but I did not fall off the turnip truck yesterday.
The Navy and the current Marine Corps senior leadership is heavily invested in FD 2030. The Marine Corps has divested billions of the assets that made the Corps a balanced, combined arms team to buy anti-ship capabilities primarily devoted to deterring or fighting a war with China.
Many in the Navy support FD 2030 because the service does not have to buy the large amphibious ships that would support the expansive landing operations the current Marine Corps leadership is trying to walk away from.
Anyone who believes they will not work hard to influence the FD 2030 study probably also believes in Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny, and the Tooth Fairy.
Unbiased and Free of Influence
In addition to the Marine Corps divestments in capabilities once considered critical to its worldwide force in readiness mission, the Navy has radically scaled back on its amphibious ship building program. All of this has been done without serious congressional oversight.
The current National Defense Authorization Act attempts to rectify that, but it can only be done properly if the mandated study is unbiased and free of influence by the existing leadership of the two naval services.
Of the three candidates, only IDA receives no major funding from the naval services. Consequently, it is the most logical organization to take on the mission.
No matter which organization receives the task to conduct the study, it should contain three major elements to be considered legitimate.
US and Philippine Marines conduct a raid rehearsal during Balikatan 22. Photo: Cpl. Jackson Dukes/US Marine CorpsIndependent War Games
The first would be a series of independent war games to determine the real issues surrounding FD 2030. General Berger and the current commandant, whose Quantico command conducted the original games, claimed that they validated FD 2030.
However, I always tell the students in my red teaming classes that wargames don’t validate anything. At best, they can identify potential problems with a plan and its assumptions. This is one of the bedrocks of war gaming theory.
If one red team playing in a single game ignores (or tries to ignore) the Marine Corps’ contribution as irrelevant to Chinese operations, it is merely a data point. If three of four red teams consider the concept irrelevant, it represents a serious issue. USMC and Navy FD 2030 advocates should play as the blue (US) team in these war games. If anyone can make the concept work, it should be them.
Anonymous Survey
Second, the input from serving Marines, particularly the field grade ranks, should be solicited. One of the primary criticisms of FD 2030 is that a cabal of very senior officers, their trusted subordinates, and selected contractors created it without significant input from the field.
Those of us who have worked on the issue for the past few years have heard anecdotal evidence that no such input was solicited, and that Marines who voice criticism do so at risk to their careers.
An anonymous survey of those expected to implement FD 2030 would reveal whether the Corps’ future leaders believe it is a good idea.
Force-Wide Analysis
Finally, an honest analysis from the combatant commanders in each theater should be required to determine whether the degree to which the divested USMC capabilities have impacted their combat readiness.
If these things can be accomplished competently within the study’s scope, it can be determined whether the Marine Corps is headed in the right direction. If not, both the administration and Congress should give the Marine Corps marching order to change direction as well as funding to restore lost capabilities now deemed necessary.
If not, it will draw cobwebs in a safe with so many other congressionally mandated studies.
Gary Anderson served as the Chief of Plans (G-5) of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force responsible for the Indo-Pacific area.
He lectures on Alternative Analysis at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.
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thedefensepost.com · by Gary Anderson · January 12, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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