Section 72.051 – 72.055 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, commonly referred to as “House Bill 19”, officially became law on September 1, 2021. This law amended the CRPC to provide specific procedural and evidentiary guidelines for cases arising out of commercial vehicle accidents.  The changes in the law addressed in House Bill 19 apply only to causes of action commenced on or after September 1, 2021. This change in Texas law now allows for bifurcated trials in certain commercial vehicle collision actions when: (1) the individual operating the vehicle was the defendant's employee; and (2) the defendant's employee was acting within the scope of employment. More specifically, House Bill 19 addresses the following important topics (among others): (a) bifurcated trials; (b) violation of regulatory standards; (c) direct actions against an employer; and (d) admissibility of visual depictions of all motor vehicle accidents.

A.    Bifurcated Trials

If requested by a defendant, House Bill 19 requires a bifurcated trial in a civil suit where a defendant operated a commercial motor vehicle involved in the collision or owned, leased, or otherwise held control of a commercial motor vehicle or an operator involved in the collision. The deadline for requesting a bifurcated trial must occur on or before the later of: (1) the 120^th day after the date the defendant bringing the motion files the defendant's original answer; or (2) the 30^th day after the date a claimant files a pleading adding a claim or cause of action against the defendant bringing the motion. The determination of negligence happens in two phases when a trial is bifurcated. In the first phase of trial, the jury determines liability for the defendant-driver only and the amount of compensatory damages. Direct negligence claims against the motor carrier that require a negligence finding on the driver are not presented during this phase.  In order to move onto the second phase of trial, the jury must first find that the defendant-driver was negligent in phase one.  In phase two, the jury determines the motor carrier’s direct liability and the amount of exemplary damages. 

B.    Violation of Regulatory Standards

In a civil action involving a commercial motor vehicle, failure to comply with regulations or standards on behalf of the defendant is admissible into evidence in the first phase of a bifurcated trial only if, the failure to comply with the regulation or standard was a proximate cause of the bodily injury or death for which damages are sought, and the regulation or standard is specific and governs the defendant, the defendant's employee, or the defendant's property or equipment when any of those are at issue in the action. However, it is important to note that House Bill 19 does not prevent a plaintiff from pursuing a claim for exemplary damages relating to the defendant's failure to comply with other applicable regulations or standards or from presenting evidence on that claim in the second phase of trial.

C.    Direct Actions Against an Employer – “Respondeat Superior”

An employer-defendant’s liability for damages caused by the ordinary negligence of an employee-driver shall be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior if the defendant-employer stipulates that, at the time of the accident, the defendant-driver was: (1) the defendant’s employee; and (2) acting within the scope of employment. If it is stipulated that the defendant’s employee was acting within the scope of employment and the trial is bifurcated, the plaintiff may not present evidence on an ordinary negligence claim against the defendant-employer in the first phase of the trial. In order to bifurcate the trial, the defendant must stipulate that the defendant driver was its employee (or statutory employee) and was operating the commercial motor vehicle within the course and scope of his/her employment. Admissibility of Visual Depictions of all Motor Vehicle Accidents

Expert testimony is not required for admission of evidence of a photograph or video of a vehicle or object involved in accident.  A photograph or video of a vehicle or object involved in an accident is presumed admissible, if properly authenticated of course, even if the photograph or video tends to support or refute an assertion regarding the severity of damages or injury to an object or person involved in the subject accident.

House Bill 19 presents various advantages for defendants who have had a commercial motor vehicle collision claim brought against them. For example, it requires the trier of fact to first find a defendant-employee liable before finding vicarious liability against the defendant-employer, it provides motor carriers with a timeframe to file a motion seeking a bifurcated trial, it covers an alleged failure to comply with regulations or standards, and it impacts the admissibility of photographic and video evidence.  In order to accurately evaluate the effects of House Bill 19, the Texas Department of Insurance will be required to conduct a study each biennium of the effect on premiums, deductibles, coverage, and availability of coverage for commercial automobile insurance. This is still a relatively new law, and we will continue to monitor the Courts at all levels to see how Judges are applying it.   

Conflicts Resolved

DEFENSE VERDICT SECURED IN BEXAR COUNTY!

Joanna Lippman Salinas and Miguel Bustilloz from the Fletcher Farley Shipman & Salinas Austin office secured a defense verdict following a four-day jury trial in Bexar County. The case involved a box truck striking part of a food truck and jostling the food truck owner who was inside. The food truck owner claimed injuries that included a back surgery and future neck surgery, seeking more than $300,000 in economic damages. They asked the jury for over $1 million. The jury came back and found no negligence on the part of the box truck driver and that damages from the accident were $75,000.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SECURED IN CONTENTIOUS “EXCLUSIVE REMEDY” DEFENSE CASE

Doug Fletcher and David Colley obtained summary judgment in Denton County on behalf of an out-of-state defendant/employer that provided workers’ compensation benefits to its employees in forty states, including Texas. The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, sustained work-related injuries (severe chemical burns) while using a pump to spray highly toxic chemicals into a water storage tank during cleaning operations in The Colony, Texas. The plaintiff sought and received workers’ compensation benefits from the defendant’s workers’ comp carrier and then sued the defendant, his employer, for common law negligence. When we contacted plaintiff’s counsel to request that he nonsuit the case against the defendant/employer based on the “exclusive remedy” provision of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (TWCA), counsel rebuked the request, claiming, quite assuredly, that the defendant could not avail itself of the exclusivity bar because it was not a “registered” subscriber to the TWCA, and the workers’ comp policy at issue was not “approved” by the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI). The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment based on the “exclusive remedy” provision of the TWCA, which provides as follows:

EXCLUSIVE REMEDY; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. (a) Recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers’ compensation insurance coverage or a legal beneficiary against the employer or an agent or employee of the employer for the death of or a work-related injury sustained by the employee. Tex. Lab. Code § 408.001.

“Workers’ compensation insurance coverage” is defined in the Labor Code as “an approved insurance policy to secure the payment of compensation.” Tex. Lab. Code § 401.011(44)(A). In support of its traditional motion for summary judgment and in response to the plaintiff’s cross-motion, the defendant attached an affidavit from the plaintiff’s supervisor establishing that the workers’ comp policy at issue provided workers’ comp benefits to the defendant’s employees in forty states, including Texas, applied to the workers’ comp laws of those states, contained numerous Texas amendatory endorsements approved by the TDI pursuant to the Texas Labor Code, and that the defendant had paid premiums for work-related accidents occurring in Texas, including accidents arising from water storage tank operations, the same activity plaintiff was performing at the time of the incident. Plaintiff’s lack of “subscriber” status argument fell by the wayside as counsel relied on an old section of the Administrative Code, 28 TAC § 43.5 (“Notice that Employer has Become Subscriber”), that has been superseded by the current version of the “exclusive remedy” provision (above), which now focuses on whether the employee is a “covered” employee rather than whether the employer is a subscriber. The Court granted defendant’s motion and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion. The takeaway from this case is that, even without a certificate of authority from the TDI, an out-of-state employer that procures workers’ comp insurance for its employees injured in work-related accidents in Texas is protected by the workers’ compensation laws of this state.