Apologies for the first misfire with no text

Quotes of the Day:

“Wealth among traditional people is measured by having enough to give away.” 

- Robin Wall Kimmerer Braiding Sweetgrass

"It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligence, but the one most responsive to change."

- Charles Darwin

"Hate: It has caused a lot of problems in the world, but it has not solved one yet."

- Maya Angelou

1. United Nations Day 24 October

2. The Army wants to see more ‘creativity’ from special operations forces

3. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 23, 2023

4. Iran Update, October 23, 2023

5. After Hamas Attacks, Terror Threats Are on the Rise

6. IntelBrief: Iran’s Role in Mideast Crisis Widens Rift with the West

7. Ukrainian spies with deep ties to CIA wage shadow war against Russia

8. Pentagon rushes defenses and advisers to Middle East as Israel's ground assault in Gaza looms

9. Is Israel's Iron Dome missile defense system ironclad?

10. Joseph Nye says China, U.S. need to "power with" rather than "power over" other countries

11. Michael Pillsbury defends One China Policy in Beijing, slams Pompeo's proposal to formally recognize Taiwan

12. SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium (Nov 2023) | SOF News

13. Freed Israeli hostage says Hamas treated her well after initial violence

14. IntelBrief: What Follows Hamas in Gaza?

15. America Must Find a Way to Ensure Israel Crushes Hamas without Destroying Gaza

16. U.S. Strategic Posture ‘Insufficient’ for Future Threat, Report Finds

17. With Their Soldiers Poised to Attack, Israelis Try to Decipher the Delay

18. Pentagon outlines multiple Chinese attack plans for Taiwan

19.  US defense department to send delegation to Xiangshan forum

20. Army may add electronic warfare training as early as boot camp

21. Not all in China’s military view Taiwan, the West as primary threat

22. China Dismisses Defense Minister Amid Swirl of Speculation

23. China’s top diplomat to visit D.C. amid tensions over South China Sea, Israel

24. Elite Universities Face Donor Revolt Over Mideast Conflict

25. How China Could Turn Crisis to Catastrophe

26. Beijing Stages Charm Offensive to Pave Way for Xi Trip

27. The Enemies of Freedom Are Deadlier Than Ever

28. Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Through the Lens of Civil War

1. United Nations Day 24 October

Today is United Nations Day.

What goes unrecognized is that a member of the Office of Strategic Services, a great American, Dr. Ralph Bunche, drafted the UN Charter. This was one of the many examples of a small organization punching well above its weight making unquantifiable and unforeseen contributions. We can learn a lot from the OSS.

1950 - Ralph Bunche, United Nations mediator in Palestine during the 1948 conflict between the Arabs and Jews

https://www.un.org/en/about-us/nobel-peace-prize/ralph-bunche-1950

United Nations Day | United Nations

https://www.un.org/en/observances/un-day

un.org · by United Nations

A symbol of hope for global unity

United Nations Day, on 24 October, marks the anniversary of the entry into force in 1945 of the UN Charter. With the ratification of this founding document by the majority of its signatories, including the five permanent members of the Security Council, the United Nations officially came into being.

There is no other global organization with the legitimacy, convening power and normative impact of the United Nations. No other global organization gives hope to so many people for a better world and can deliver the future we want. Today, the urgency for all countries to come together, to fulfil the promise of the nations united, has rarely been greater.

UN Day, celebrated every year, offers the opportunity to amplify our common agenda and reaffirm the purposes and principles of the UN Charter that have guided us for the past 78 years.

UN Day Concert 2023

Date: Tuesday, 24 October, 6:30 - 8 p.m. (ET)

How to watch: Watch the UN Day concert LIVE on UN Web TV and on the official UN YouTube Channel.

Concert programme (PDF)

In commemoration of United Nations Day, a concert featuring the Environmental Symphony: The Movement and world-renowned cellist Michael Fitzpatrick will be held in the General Assembly Hall on Tuesday, 24 October.

This year’s UN Day Concert, on the theme of The Frontlines of Climate Action, is sponsored by the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Tonga to the United Nations with support from PVBLIC Foundation’s Family Offices for Sustainable Development (FOSD).

The theme of the UN Day Concert reinforces Secretary-General António Guterres’ call for “faster, bolder climate action”, and intends to galvanize world leaders ahead of the COP28 climate conference in Dubai later in the year, and next year’s International Conference on Small Island Developing States in Antigua and Barbuda.

Hymn to the United Nations

Get inspired by this revived W.H. Auden’s Hymn to the United Nations. "Let music for peace Be the paradigm, For peace means to change At the right time, As the World-Clock, Goes Tick and Tock. So may the story Of our human city Presently move Like music, when Begotten notes New notes beget, Making the flowing Of time a growing".

How it all started

In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by a majority of signatories. Watch history in the making with this footage from the UN archives !

Why do we mark International Days?

International days and weeks are occasions to educate the public on issues of concern, to mobilize political will and resources to address global problems, and to celebrate and reinforce achievements of humanity. The existence of international days predates the establishment of the United Nations, but the UN has embraced them as a powerful advocacy tool. We also mark other UN observances.

un.org · by United Nations

2. The Army wants to see more ‘creativity’ from special operations forces

Two points:

First, we must recall Churchill:  'Gentlemen, we have run out of money; now we have to think’

Second, if we want to be creative we need to return to fundamental SF and SOF philosophies that come from our roots in the OSS. Now that we have to think, we should take this opportunity to recreate SOF in its foundational image (no we will never recombine with the intelligence community but that does not mean we cannot have a symbiotic relationship with it).

While we are moving forward with creative initiatives such as the "Triad" (Cyber, Space, and SOF) the last time that I recall we conducted some creative reorganization was when we reorganized the 4th battalion in the five active duty SF groups when we could not fully man a line MTOE battalion. We adopted OSS-like  philosophies (e.g., Jedburghs).  

We should also recall the late Colin Gray's writings about SOF and irregular warfare:

3-10-1999

Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations Succeed?

Colin S. Gray

"When the hour of crisis comes, remember that 40 selected men can shake the world." -- Yasotay (Mongol warlord)[1]

The frequently quoted words of Yasotay penetrate to the core of the strategic utility of special operations forces. That utility reposes most essentially in two qualities, economy of force and expansion of strategic choice.[2] In the most general of terms, special operations forces (SOF) offer the prospect of a favorably disproportionate return on military investment. Moreover, SOF provide the possibility of a range of precisely conducted military activities more extensive than that reliably feasible for regular warriors conducting regular operations.[3] Whether or not SOF--or others nominally competent to carry out special operations--can fulfill the strategic promise just suggested may be analyzed usefully in terms of a historically based assessment of conditions for success and failure: that is the mission for this article.

 ...

Very small forces engaged in high-risk operations of war cannot afford weak links in people or equipment. The compensation of additional mass is not available to SOF; quality is key. For SOF, more does not mean better. Resisting a mindless growth in the size of SOF, in parallel with the no-less-important need to resist inappropriate missions, or "mission creep," is essential for maintaining the quality of this military instrument.[43]

SOF require coordination with conventional operations, or with the activities of the police. It was a strength of the Soviet conduct of its war with Germany that they coordinated partisan and Spetsnaz activities with the relevant "Fronts" and field armies. The finest hour of the SAS and the OSS came in France in June 1944, when raiders, often working in conjunction with the French Resistance, turned large segments of the German rear into "bandit country."[44] For negative examples, the French in Indochina demonstrated how not to coordinate regular and irregular forces, while the United States was bound to fail to coordinate special forces and regular operations in Vietnam because it lacked both a clear political aim and--necessarily--an overall strategy of victory.

There are few conflicts wherein SOF do not need coordination with either regular military units or the police. In most cases the quality of cooperation is critical to the outcome of the conflict.

https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol29/iss1/4/

I will be quoting from Colin Gray's1999 article in the coming days. I suggest anyone concerned with SOF (re-)read it. One last quote from Professor Gray:

Special Operations Forces as a Strategic Asset[48]

Truly it has been said that if you focus upon details, none of your errors will be small. But it is the details which both point the way to appropriate principles and translate theory into practice. We can identify in a general way the conditions that favor success in special operations. Ideas about conditions for success, however, require historical specificity for applicability: type of conflict, character of missions, time, and adversaries. The conditions specified in this article as tending to promote success in the conduct of special operations can be stated as recommendations for policy. Special operations forces need:

to fit the demands of policy

a tolerant political and strategic culture

political and military patrons who understand their strategic value to be assigned feasible objectives

to be directed by a strategically functioning defense establishment flexibility of mind, and particularly an unconventional mentality to provide unique strategic services

to find and exploit enemy vulnerabilities technological assistance

tactical competence (preferably tactical excellence) a reputation for effectiveness

-a willingness to learn from history

These are not trivial conditions, but the potential benefits to national security of a first-class SOF instrument are not trivial either.

The Army wants to see more ‘creativity’ from special operations forces

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · October 23, 2023

Above all else, the commander of 1st Special Forces Command says he wants to see creativity out of the Army’s special operators — he thinks it’s what will provide them with an edge in the next fight in light of the rapid tactical innovations occurring on Ukraine’s battlefield.

Brig. Gen. Lawrence ”Gil” Ferguson, who spoke with Army Times, is a firm believer in an oft-repeated special operations truism: people are more important than hardware.

“Technology is not going to win the next fight,” he said. “The side that applies new technology with the most creativity and audacity is going to win.”

The one-star — who is currently impacted by Sen. Tommy Tuberville’s blanket hold on general officer promotions — knows what outside-the-box thinking and experience look like, because he embodies it.

Ferguson, who attended the Air Force Academy, departed the active duty Army after a brief tour as an infantry officer in the early 1990s, according to his hometown newspaper. He earned a graduate degree and taught at a Jackson, Mississippi prep school before earning his Special Forces tab as a National Guard officer assigned to the 20th Special Forces Group. He then returned to active duty with 7th Special Forces Group in late 2001.

“Creativity is a major component of what we’re looking for in the people that we recruit,” Ferguson said when asked about how to foster technological innovation at the small unit level. But in order to reap the benefits, he added, “We encourage a culture of creativity and innovation within the command.”

Ferguson eschews the traditional delineations between the Army special ops community’s three components — Special Forces, psychological operations and civil affairs — in favor of a synchronized approach that lets the talents of each group reinforce the others on the battlefield or when working with friendly nations before the next war begins.

As an example, he pointed at the success that Ukraine’s government has had combining effective irregular warfare operations with inspiring public messaging and stable governance in communities just behind the front lines. Although American and other NATO forces have played a role in preparing Ukraine for resistance (which Army Times detailed in the invasion’s first weeks), Ferguson noted that the willpower of the embattled country’s leaders and citizens has validated many key special operations concepts.

RELATED

How the US and Europe helped Ukraine prep for insurgency

Ukraine is one of several countries in Eastern Europe and Scandinavia that have implemented portions of the Resistance Operating Concept into their national defense plans.

Amid arguments on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon over possible troop reductions to Army special operations (about which the one-star general declined to speak), Ferguson said that force structure may come to align with his integrated capabilities philosophy in the years ahead, too.

“We’re taking a hard look right now at our force structure and whether or not we need to make some changes, [though] we haven’t decided anything,” Ferguson said. “We’re continuing to test a variety of different ways to make sure we’re integrated to the best extent possible.”

He suggested that some of the changes under consideration may be tailored to specific regions of the globe.

“In some places, just based off the context of the environment, it’s easier to integrate than others,” Ferguson said, adding that the changes will come “as the operating environment’s going to require into the future.”

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army. He focuses on investigations, personnel concerns and military justice. Davis, also a Guard veteran, was a finalist in the 2023 Livingston Awards for his work with The Texas Tribune investigating the National Guard's border missions. He studied history at Vanderbilt and UNC-Chapel Hill.

3. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 23, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Russia's domestic production of artillery shells, supplemented by increased ammunition imports from North Korea, will likely allow Russian forces to sustain sufficient rates of artillery fire in Ukraine in 2024, albeit at a relatively lower level than during 2022.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka and made confirmed advances northeast of Avdiivka.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back from some newly captured positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast but noted that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence on the east bank.
• Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 22 to 23.
• Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bakhmut on October 23 amid continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian government appears to be emphasizing defense spending over social programs in the 2024 federal budget despite contrary messaging intended to reassure the Russian populace.
• Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on October 22 that the first group of Ukrainian pilots will begin training with instructors on F-16 fighter jets “in the near future.”
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, south of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made confirmed gains in some areas.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu met with Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matvienko and the Federation Committee on Defense and Security on October 23.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 23, 2023

Oct 23, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 23, 2023

Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark

October 23, 2023, 5:15pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia's domestic production of artillery shells, supplemented by increased ammunition imports from North Korea, will likely allow Russian forces to sustain sufficient rates of artillery fire in Ukraine in 2024, albeit at a relatively lower level than during 2022. Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Head Colonel Ants Kiviselg stated on October 20 that Russia still has around four million artillery shells remaining, which Russian forces can use for "low intensity" warfare for an additional year.[1] Kiviselg noted that there are reports that North Korea has shipped up to 1,000 containers of ammunition to Russia, each containing between 300-500 pieces of artillery ammunition.[2] Kiviselg estimated that North Korea may have therefore provided between 300,000-500,000 pieces of ammunition to Russia, which can last up to one month at the current daily rate of consumption of around 10,000 shells a day.[3] Ukrainian military analyst Colonel Petro Chernyk reported on October 23 that Russian forces are currently firing between 10,000-15,000 shells a day, significantly lower than rates of fire in summer 2022 of 45,000-80,000 shells per day.[4] However, Western sources and satellite imagery have confirmed that North Korean deliveries, likely mostly comprised of artillery shells, have drastically increased since Russian and North Korean authorities likely began more official military-technical cooperation in September, as ISW previously reported, and North Korea is likely to provide further deliveries.[5] Based on Western estimates of Russian artillery production capacity and continued North Korean artillery exports, Russia will likely be able to maintain generally sufficient rates of fire in the foreseeable future. While an overall decrease in Russian fire rates could impede the ability of Russian forces to conduct large scale offensive operations, Russian forces are unlikely to face widespread shortages which would chronically undermine defensive operations, and the drop in the rate of fire will not inherently provide Ukrainian forces an advantage. The degree to which Ukraine’s international partners sustain Ukraine’s ability to sustain an effective weight of fire relative to Russian forces will be a key determiner of respective capabilities in 2024.

Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 13 Shahed-131/136 drones, one unspecified drone, and one Kh-59 cruise missile and that Ukrainian forces destroyed all targets.[6] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces conducted nine airstrikes using an unspecified number of Kh-31 anti-radar air-to-surface missiles.[7] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command also reported that Ukrainian forces shot down nine Shahed drones that Russian forces aimed at port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[8] Russian forces have routinely targeted port and grain infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that Russia will likely renew strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the fall and winter.[9] Russia will likely continue to target Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure in an attempt to disrupt Ukrainian grain exports as Russia tries to expand its own grain exports, most recently through a 2.7 trillion-ruble (about $26.5 billion) grain contract with China signed on October 17.[10]

Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bakhmut on October 23 amid continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced across the railway line north of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), confirming prior statements by the Ukrainian General Staff and Russian milbloggers.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[12]

The Russian government appears to be emphasizing defense spending over social programs in the 2024 federal budget despite contrary messaging intended to reassure the Russian populace. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on October 23 that the Russian government’s proposed 2024 budget includes a 68 percent increase in planned defense spending compared to 2023, increasing defense spending to six percent of Russian GDP.[13] The UK MoD noted that the Russian government will likely spend more money on payments and healthcare costs for wounded servicemen, a large portion of whom will likely require lifelong medical care, and for families of Russian servicemen killed in combat. The UK MoD stated that consistently heightened military spending will likely contribute to greater inflation within Russia. The UK MoD added that the Russian government has not proposed increased civilian education or healthcare spending in the 2024 budget, effectively cutting those budgets considering inflation rates. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov notably claimed on October 16 that the Russian 2024-2026 draft budget is “not a military budget” during a State Duma Budget and Tax Committee meeting.[14] Siluanov added that the fulfillment of social obligations is one of the highest priority areas of the Russian federal budget, 30.5 percent of which is allocated to social issues. Siluanov’s statement indicates that Russian authorities still feel the need to downplay increased defense spending ahead of the March 2024 Russian presidential elections due to concerns about how the Russian population views this issue and the war in Ukraine as a whole. ISW previously reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly intends to discuss the war in Ukraine as little as possible in political messaging leading up to the presidential election.[15] Russian authorities may increasingly highlight social spending over defense spending as the presidential election draws closer, despite the reality of increased defense spending.

Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on October 22 that the first group of Ukrainian pilots will begin training with instructors on F-16 fighter jets “in the near future.”[16] The pilots are currently training on F-16 simulators. Politico reported on October 13 that an unnamed US official stated that the pilots’ training may be accelerated due to Ukrainian forces’ urgent need for fighter jets.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia's domestic production of artillery shells, supplemented by increased ammunition imports from North Korea, will likely allow Russian forces to sustain sufficient rates of artillery fire in Ukraine in 2024, albeit at a relatively lower level than during 2022.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka and made confirmed advances northeast of Avdiivka.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back from some newly captured positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast but noted that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence on the east bank.
• Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 22 to 23.
• Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bakhmut on October 23 amid continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian government appears to be emphasizing defense spending over social programs in the 2024 federal budget despite contrary messaging intended to reassure the Russian populace.
• Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on October 22 that the first group of Ukrainian pilots will begin training with instructors on F-16 fighter jets “in the near future.”
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, south of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made confirmed gains in some areas.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu met with Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matvienko and the Federation Committee on Defense and Security on October 23.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk on October 23 and made a limited confirmed advance. Geolocated footage published on October 22 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced southeast of Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are slowly advancing toward Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk).[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Synkivka and Ivanivka.[20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division) and 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division) both of the 1st Guards Tank Army attacked near Ivanivka and Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[21] Mashovets stated that elements of the 138th and 25th Motorized Rifle Brigades (both of the 6th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) unsuccessfully attacked near Synkivka.[22] Ukrainian “Steel Cordon” Border Guards Assault Brigade Spokesperson Ivan Shevtsov stated that Russian forces have changed their tactics and are conducting assaults with groups of up to 30 personnel without equipment in the Kupyansk direction, while Russian forces attack with 30 to 50 personnel using heavy equipment in the Lyman direction.[23]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Kupyansk on October 23. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka and Ivanivka.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Petropavlivka.[25]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 23 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are 600 meters away from Makiivka (20km southwest of Svatove), although ISW can only confirm that Russian forces hold positions within 2km from Svatove at their closest point.[26] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made limited advances in the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna) in the past week.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Nadiya (15km west of Svatove) and the Serebryanske forest area.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing in the Siversk direction (19km south of Kreminna).[29]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked along the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 23. The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled attacks near Nadiya, Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove), Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna), Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna) and in the Svyato-Pokrovske direction (23km southwest of Kreminna).[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on October 23 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on October 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced across the railway northeast of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), confirming prior statements made by both the Ukrainian General Staff and Russian milbloggers since October 18.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions south of Bakhmut.[32] Russian sources continued to contest the fact that Ukrainian forces crossed the railway line and claimed on October 22 and 23 that Ukrainian unsuccessfully attempted to cross the railway near Klishchiivka, whereas other Russian milbloggers claimed on October 23 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces away from the railway near Klishchiivka and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[33] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked near Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) and in the direction of Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[34] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Bohdanivka.[35] The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks and struck Ukrainian personnel and equipment concentration areas near the Berkhivka reservoir (about 2km northwest of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka and in the Soledar direction northeast of Bakhmut.[36]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Bohdanivka, Khromove, Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Druzhba (18km southwest of Bakhmut).[37] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces attacked east of Klishchiivka, near Andriivka and Khromove, and in the direction of Bohdanivka.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 22 that Russian forces persistently attacked near Klishchiivka and Andriivka in the past week but struggled to push Ukrainian forces back from the railway due to Ukrainian control of the heights in the area.[39] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on October 23 that elements of the Russian 1428th Territorial Defense Motorized Rifle Regiment, 83rd Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade, and 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps) are operating near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[40] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]), 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 2nd LNR Army Corps, and Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz forces are operating near Andriivka and that elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps, Western Military District) and Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz forces are operating in the Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut) direction.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are operating east of Khromove.[42]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka and made confirmed advances on October 23. Geolocated footage published on October 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced southwest of Krasnohorivka (5km northeast of Avdiivka).[43] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have advanced almost two kilometers in the Avdiivka area in the past few days.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka) and to the railway line north of the waste heap area northwest of Avdiivka.[45] A Ukrainian source stated that the waste heap is a contested “gray zone,” and a Russian milblogger claimed on October 22 that Russian forces are unable to take control of the waste heap due to heavy Ukrainian artillery fire.[46] Another Russian milblogger claimed on October 22 that Russian forces broke through to the waste heap and railway near Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka) and pushed Ukrainian forces back near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka) and Spartak (4km south of Avdiivka) in the past week.[47] A Ukrainian source stated on October 23 that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] 1st Army Corps), 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (DNR 1st Army Corps), and 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District), advanced near Optyne (4km south of Avdiivka) and Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade and 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the DNR 1st Army Corps) pushed Ukrainian forces 200 meters back near Opytne (4km south of Avdiivka) and that elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (DNR 1st Army Corps) gained a foothold west of Krasnohorivka.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Stepove, Novokalynove (7km north of Avdiivka), Sieverne, and south of Avdiivka.[50] Ukrainian sources, including the Ukrainian General Staff, reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Keramik (10km northwest of Avdiivka), Stepove, Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Opytne, Pervomaiske, and south of the Tsarska Okhota restaurant south of Avdiivka.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian MoD-controlled “Redut” private military company (PMC) are operating in the Avdiivka area.[52] A Ukrainian source stated that Russian forces are forming assault groups, including elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division and the 1st Army Corps.[53] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army) were also redeployed from the Lyman direction to the Avdiivka area.[54]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Avdiivka on October 23 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. Russian sources claimed on October 22 and 23 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near the waste heap northwest of Avdiivka, Pisky (8km southwest of Donetsk City), Vodyane, Opytne, and Pervomaiske.[55] A Russian milblogger continued to deny claims of Ukrainian advances near Pisky and Opytne on October 23.[56] Another Russian milblogger claimed on October 22 that Ukrainian forces advanced near Pisky in the past week.[57]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City on October 23 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Nevelske (directly west of Donetsk City) and attacked near Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City) and in Marinka.[58] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka, Nevelske, Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional battles are ongoing near Marinka, Novomykhailivka, and Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[60]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City on October 23.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast area on October 23 and made confirmed gains. Geolocated footage posted on October 22 shows that Russian forces have marginally advanced north of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and advanced nearly 3 kilometers near Pryytune, although the available geolocated footage only confirms that Russian forces have advanced less than a kilometer in the area.[62] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces attempted to improve their tactical positions near Novodonetske (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), Novomayorske (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), and Urozhaine (10km south of Velyka Novosilka).[63] A Russian milblogger posted footage purportedly of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) operating near Novomayorske.[64] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Zolota Nyva and Prechystivka, 11km and 18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka respectively.[65]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 23 and reportedly made a limited advance. One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian attacks forced Russian troops out of some positions near Novodonetske.[66] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces stopped a Ukrainian troop rotation near Novomayorske.[67]

Russian forces conducted counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 23 and reportedly restored some lost positions. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Robotyne, Verbove (10km east of Robotyne), and southeast of Mala Tokmachka (10km northeast of Robotyne).[68] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian forces launched a counterattack near Verbove and retook several strongholds.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked northwest of Robotyne and near Verbove.[70] The Russian MoD posted footage of the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division operating a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system near Verbove.[71]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 23 but did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops are continuing offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia) direction.[72] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Robotyne.[73] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched attacks on the Robotyne-Verbove line and northwest of Robotyne towards Kopani (5km northwest of Robotyne), but that Russian forces repelled the attacks.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that localized and positional attacks are ongoing west of Robotyne in the Zherebryanky-Pyatykhatky sector of the front.[75]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back from some newly captured Ukrainian positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast but noted that Ukrainian forces still maintain a presence on the east bank. Two prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and pushed Ukrainian troops back from positions in Krynky (30km east of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[76] Geolocated footage posted on October 23 confirms that Ukrainian forces advanced to positions north of Pidstepne (20km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River).[77] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate on the east bank between Krynky and Pidstepne and warned that Ukrainian troops hope to break through the Pidstepne-Pishchanivka line towards Oleshky (5km directly southeast of Kherson City).[78] Ukrainian military observer Konstantyn Mashovets noted that Russian forces appear to be constructing a "mobile tactical reserve" group comprised of motorized rifle units and battalions of various private military companies (PMCs) in the Oleshky area to quickly deploy small groups into contested areas on the east bank.[79] Mashovets also reported that Russia is laterally redeploying elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) away from the western Zaporizhia direction to Kherson Oblast, indicating that the Russian command sees Ukrainian actions on the east bank as a substantial threat.[80]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu met with Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matvienko and the Federation Committee on Defense and Security on October 23.[81] Shoigu and the senators discussed the “most pressing issues of supporting” the war in Ukraine, including fulfilling budgetary targets weapons and equipment supply, supporting Russian servicemen and their families, and other unspecified legislative initiatives. Shoigu emphasized the importance of Russian defense-industrial base (DIB) enterprises in meeting the needs of the Russian military.

Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor stated on October 23 that occupation authorities are mobilizing full-time university students in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[82] Lysohor stated that occupation authorities forced students from the Donbas State Technical University in occupied Alchevsk, Luhansk Oblast to take academic leave to serve with the Russian military.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 23 that occupation police are searching occupied Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast for up to 60 Russian servicemen who reportedly deserted their posts.[83]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 23 that occupation collaborators, university administrators, and members of pro-Kremlin organizations are forcing civilians to donate blood in occupied Donetsk Oblast, likely to transfuse into wounded Russian servicemen fighting near Avdiivka.[84]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian authorities are increasing the number of convictions and intensifying punishments for individuals found guilty of spreading "false information" about or "discrediting" the Russian military. Russian news outlet Kommersant reported on October 23 that Russian courts convicted 21 people of spreading false information about the Russian military in the first six months of 2023 in comparison to 14 total convictions in 2022.[85] Kommersant also noted that Russian courts imprisoned eight people in 2023 for spreading false information about the Russian military, whereas Russian courts only imprisoned two people on the same charge in 2022.[86] Kommersant reported that Russian courts fined and convicted three people of discrediting the Russian military in 2022, whereas Russian courts have convicted 15 people on the same charge and sentenced two of them to imprisonment in 2023.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 23 that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers accused the Belarusian defense-industrial base (DIB) of disrupting the supply of equipment to the Russian military.[88] Russian authorities are reportedly concerned that Belarus is prioritizing supplying materiel to other countries, such as Iran, and are demanding Belarusian DIB companies prioritize Russia.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

4. Iran Update, October 23, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-23-2023

Key Takeaways:

1. Palestinian militias continued attacks at their usual rate from the Gaza Strip into Israel while IDF airstrikes targeted Palestinian militant groups affiliated with Hamas in Gaza.
2. Militants in southern Lebanon and Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets. The IDF also intercepted two drones traveling from Lebanese territory north of Haifa.
3. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—may have expanded the locations of its attacks against US forces in Syria.

IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 23, 2023

Oct 23, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, October 23, 2023

Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Kathyrn Tyson, Ashka Jhaveri, Brian Carter, and Johanna Moore 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Key Takeaways:

1. Palestinian militias continued attacks at their usual rate from the Gaza Strip into Israel while IDF airstrikes targeted Palestinian militant groups affiliated with Hamas in Gaza.
2. Militants in southern Lebanon and Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets. The IDF also intercepted two drones traveling from Lebanese territory north of Haifa.
3. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—may have expanded the locations of its attacks against US forces in Syria.

Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias continued attacks at their usual rate from the Gaza Strip into Israel on October 23. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for six direct and indirect fire attacks, including two drone attacks, on IDF military positions in southern Israel.[1] Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for another five mortar and rocket attacks.[2] The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—claimed mortar fire targeting IDF units.[3]

Hamas is trying to use hostages as leverage to allow humanitarian aid and fuel into the Gaza Strip. Hamas claimed that it released two elderly hostages for humanitarian reasons after mediation from Egypt on October 23.[4] Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal said Hamas would release civilian hostages if Israel reduced its airstrikes into the Gaza Strip.[5] The Wall Street Journal reported that negotiations over releasing a group of 50 hostages broke down after Israel demanded that Hamas release all hostages as a prerequisite for permitting fuel to enter the Gaza Strip.[6] Hamas could use fuel and other aid supplies to support its efforts to defend against an IDF ground operation. Hamas still holds more than 200 hostages.[7] Hamas spokesman Abdul Latif al Qanou framed a possible IDF ground invasion into the Gaza Strip as an opportunity to kill and capture IDF soldiers on October 23.[8]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

IDF Major General Michael Edelstein stated that Israel has evidence of Iranian involvement in Hamas’ October 7 attack.[9] Edelstein stated that Iran assisted Hamas with training in the Gaza Strip but refused to elaborate further.[10] Iranian officials have invited Hamas militants to training camps in Iran in addition to assisting the group in manufacturing missiles and rockets.[11] Iran has developed smuggling routes across the Levant to transfer weapons and rocket manufacturing material to Hamas and evade Israeli interdiction. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran would likely provide material and financial support to its proxies to fight Israel rather than get directly involved in the Israel-Hamas war.[12]

IDF airstrikes continue to target Palestinian militias allied with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade announced on October 23 that the commander of its Rafah Brigade died during the ongoing war with Israel.[13] IDF airstrikes previously killed a commander affiliated with Saraya al Quds and the head of the military wing of the Popular Resistance Committee in Rafah on October 12 and 19, respectively.[14] CTP-ISW previously reported on October 21 that the IDF faces a loose coalition of Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza Strip—rather than just Hamas.[15]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Hamas’s efforts to expand the war to the West Bank remain mostly unsuccessful. CTP-ISW only recorded one demonstration on October 23 after a high of 11 demonstrations on October 20.[16] The rate of clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces in the West Bank is consistent with the number of clashes on October 22, after the rate dropped by half from October 21 to 22.[17] CTP-ISW recorded nine distinct clashes.[18]

Palestinian militants ambushed Israeli forces in response to Israeli raids against Palestinian militants. Tulkarm Brigades fighters used improvised explosive devices (IED) and small arms to attack Israeli forces in Tulkarm during an Israeli ground operation.[19] Other Palestinian militants fired small arms targeting Israeli forces during raids in Bethlehem and Jazloum IDP camp.[20]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and marches in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted nine attacks as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets. LH claimed responsibility for attacking four IDF positions along the northern Israeli border.[21] Attacks on Israeli towns and military positions continued along the entire border and into the disputed Sheeba Farms.

The IDF intercepted a drone traveling from Lebanese territory north of Haifa.[22] CTP-ISW has observed nine instances of drones flying into northern Israeli territory and three in Haifa Province since October 7. It is unclear whether any of the drones are armed or meant for surveillance. Haifa is one the most critical business centers of Israel and the port handles nearly 50 percent of Israel's freight volume.[23] Independent analysts have noted that Iran is especially interested in threatening the petrochemical facilities in Haifa given that the spread of fumes could maximize casualties.[24] The IDF furthermore maintains several military sites in the vicinity of Haifa.[25]

The LH-affiliated Lebanese Resistance Brigades announced the death of two of its members during unspecified duties for the first time since October 7.[26] The Lebanese Army, in coordination with the UNIFIL, retrieved the bodies from the outskirts of Kfarshouba north of Shebaa Farms.[27] LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah proclaimed the creation of the brigade in 1997. The group enlisted primarily non-Shia Lebanese with a shared commitment to Lebanon and its unity and national defense.[28] Several Iranian-backed militias, including Hamas and PIJ, are participating in the attack campaign against Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. LH almost certainly permits attacks from southern Lebanon given the extent to which LH controls southern Lebanon and coordinates with the other Iranian-backed groups operating there.

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance of Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—expanded the locations of its attacks against US forces in Syria on October 23. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed two one-way drone attacks targeting US forces in Syria, marking the sixth consecutive day of attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq has claimed 11 drone and rocket attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria since October 18. These attacks are part of the Iranian-led effort to deter the United States from providing meaningful support to Israel, as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[29]

• The Islamic Resistance of Iraq claimed that it fired two drones targeting US forces at the al Tanf Garrison and al Rukban camp in eastern Syria on October 23.[30] The Islamic Resistance of Iraq last targeted al Tanf Garrison on October 19.[31] The group said that the drones “hit their targets” and released a video of the attack.[32] US Pentagon Press Secretary Pat Ryder confirmed that there was an attempted drone attack on al Tanf Garrison that did not cause any injuries to US personnel.[33] Ryder said that US defense systems at al Tanf Garrison intercepted two drones, possibly referring to the attack on al Rukban.[34] Al Tanf Garrison is approximately 18 kilometers from al Rukban.
• The Islamic Resistance of Iraq claimed a one-way drone attack targeting US forces at al Malikiyah military base in northeastern Syria on October 23.[35] This attack marks the first time the Islamic Resistance of Iraq claimed that it targeted US forces at al Malikiyah. The group said that the drones “hit their targets.” US Pentagon Press Secretary Pat Ryder did not confirm the attack on Malikiyah but said that the United States is still conducting a “comprehensive overview” of the October 23 drone attacks.[36]

Hundreds of Iranian-backed foreign fighters have deployed to border areas with Israel, according to a report from the anti-Syrian regime outlet Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) on October 23. Unspecified SOHR sources said that hundreds of Iranian-backed fighters from Iraq, Syria, and the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division have deployed to the border areas near the Golan Heights along the southwestern Syrian border since October 21.[37] CTP-ISW has tracked the movement of Iranian-backed militants to southwestern Syria since the war began on October 7.[38]

Iranian officials and media are continuing their attempts to deter an Israeli ground operation into the Gaza Strip while also attempting to reassure their domestic and Axis of Resistance audiences that such an operation will fail. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency outlined the “significant challenges” that Israel will face in conducting a ground operation into the Gaza Strip, highlighting Hamas’ anti-tank capabilities.[39] Iranian state media similarly argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s senior advisers fear Hamas and further outlined several “challenges” facing Israeli ground operations into the strip, including declining public support, weakened relations with the Arab world, a high military death toll, and the potential for a geographic expansion of the conflict.[40] IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi similarly warned that Israel would suffer a “disgraceful” defeat at the hands of the Palestinian resistance were it to enter the Gaza Strip during an interview IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency.[41]

• Israeli, anti-regime, and Axis of Resistance-affiliated media reported that Fadavi warned that Iran would conduct missile strikes on Haifa “if necessary.”[42] Iranian state media did not report this aspect of Fadavi’s statements, concealing the direct Iranian threat to Israel. This is consistent with CTP-ISW's previous assessment that Iran seeks to avoid a direct confrontation with Israel and would likely provide material and financial support to its proxies rather than get directly involved in the Israel-Hamas war.[43]
• Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to strike Haifa and Tel Aviv during previous periods of tension with Israel. President Ebrahim Raisi, for example, threatened in April 2023 to “destroy” the two Israeli cities were Israel to provoke Iran.[44]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is continuing to engage in political coordination with Palestinian militia leaders. Abdollahian held separate telephone conversations with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh and PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah on October 22.[45] Abdollahian discussed Iranian efforts to support Palestine and halt Israeli “crimes” in the Gaza Strip—consistent with previous Iranian official rhetoric since October 13.[46] Both Abdollahian and the Palestinian militia leaders condemned US support for Israel—also consistent with their previous rhetoric since October 13. Abdollahian met with senior Hamas officials, including Haniyeh, in Doha between October 14 and 15.[47] Abdollahian visited Qatar after concluding a diplomatic tour of Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.[48] CTP-ISW assessed that the tour was part of an Iranian effort to coordinate politically with senior leaders of Axis of Resistance vis-à-vis the Israel-Hamas war.[49]

Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani discussed the October 22 Israeli strikes on the Damascus and Aleppo international airports with his Syrian counterpart Lieutenant General Ali Mahmoud Abbas on October 23.[50] Ashtiani argued that Israel seeks to send a message that it is capable of delivering serious military responses on all fronts to cover up its actual “fragility.” Ashtiani also argued that Israel is committing “political suicide” by conducting its attacks on the Gaza Strip—consistent with previous Iranian rhetoric since October 13.[51]

5. After Hamas Attacks, Terror Threats Are on the Rise

Excerpts:

The broader impact of the Hamas attacks—even before a potentially escalating regional war—is the possibility that terrorist groups around the world will try to match the spectacular carnage that Hamas pulled off earlier this month, which had a death toll equivalent to multiple Sept. 11 attacks on a per capita basis in a small country such as Israel. The need for terror outfits to raise their own game is what will make them even more dangerous, said Hans-Jakob Schindler, the senior director of the Counter Extremism Project.

In Europe, most eyes turn to the Islamic State, which has been the common denominator in many arrests on the continent over the past year. “It is clearly trying to show its relevance,” Schindler said. The Islamic State morphed out of Al Qaeda’s Iraqi branch in the mid-2000s, declaring a caliphate across territory in Iraq and Syria in 2014, until it was pulverized by joint U.S., Russian, and Kurdish military operations.

The South Asian franchise, called the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K), has largely been driven out of Afghanistan by the Taliban, who regard it as a strategic competitor and have cooperated with the Biden administration, security sources said, to track down and kill operatives inside Afghanistan’s borders.

But it has had a huge impact in neighboring Pakistan, where it bombed a pro-Taliban rally in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on July 31, killing at least 54 people. Schindler, of the Counter Extremism Project, said the emergence of Islamic State (IS) and IS-K operatives in Europe should sound an alarm for security and intelligence services, as the Hamas attacks could portend a rise in militant activity across the world, as the 9/11 atrocities did in the years that followed.

“Hamas dominates everything now, and that’s not good for IS,” he said. “If you’re not in the news, no one is going to give you money.”

After Hamas Attacks, Terror Threats Are on the Rise

Terror groups compete for funds and thrive on attention. That makes the world a much more dangerous place after Oct. 7.

ODonnell-Lynne-foreign-policy-columnistLynne O’Donnell

By Lynne O’Donnell, a columnist at Foreign Policy and an Australian journalist and author.

Foreign Policy · by Lynne O’Donnell · October 23, 2023

In the weeks since the atrocities committed by Hamas in Israel on Oct. 7, there’s been an alarming uptick in terrorist activity in Europe, with Western intelligence chiefs warning that Islamist extremists, jihadis, and antisemites, inspired by Hamas’s bold attack, could be looking for new ways to attack Western targets. Groups affiliated with al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Taliban, and based across Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, will likely try to demonstrate their own capabilities to secure attention in a crowded field. After all, terror groups need the publicity of high-profile attacks to attract recruits, cash, weapons, and protection.

The intelligence chiefs of the Five Eyes partners—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—met last week at a conference in California organized by the FBI, and they issued a joint warning that the threat of domestic attacks has risen as a direct result of the unfolding crisis in the Middle East.

“We have seen an increase in reported threats, but vigilance is heightened right now just because of the fluid and volatile environment in the Middle East and the way in which that could spin out in the U.S.,” Christopher Wray, the FBI chief, told 60 Minutes. The spy chiefs said that lone actors radicalized online, organized terrorist groups, state actors such as Iran, and far-right and neo-Nazi groups could become more active. “Make no mistake, this is a dangerous time,” Wray said.

The intelligence chiefs’ warning coincided with tightened security in Europe and elsewhere following a series of incidents linked to Islamist extremism. The Islamic State claimed responsibility after two Swedish football fans were killed in Brussels by a man, later shot dead by police, who was allegedly enraged by Quran burnings in Sweden. Italian authorities arrested two men accused of recruiting for the Islamic State. Gunmen with alleged links to the organization attacked and killed two tourists and their safari guide in Uganda. France deployed the military and raised the terrorist threat level to “urgent” after a teacher was stabbed to death and three others were injured by a Chechen man believed to be a radical Islamist. In Berlin, petrol bombs were thrown at a synagogue. The U.S. State Department issued a worldwide travel warning.

Hamas, after its surprisingly successful and deadly attack on Israeli villages, is for now on top of the terrorism tree. It adheres to an extreme ideology that blends Islamism with Palestinian nationalism, dedicated to the destruction of Israel; its “preferred methods include suicide bombings, rocket and mortar attacks, shootings, and kidnappings,” according to the the New York- and Berlin-based Counter Extremism Project.

The militant group has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan; however, the United Nations has refrained from classifying it as such. Hamas receives ample funding from Iran, which also provides military support, and has used its substantial financial resources to build grassroots support, winning the first (and so far last) elections in Gaza in 2006. In addition, Qatar provides money to Gaza for energy and humanitarian aid, which some analysts allege helps Hamas maintain its support among Palestinians in Gaza.

But the influence of the Taliban is never far away. Analysts said it was their victory in Afghanistan in 2021 that has emboldened extremists across the globe, and the group has restored Afghanistan to the terror-safe haven it was before the 2001 U.S. invasion. Mohammad Moheq, an Islamic studies scholar and the editor in chief of the daily newspaper Hasht-e-Subh (known in English as 8AM), said that Afghanistan is an integral part of the radical Islamist narrative. The ultimate goal, he said, is “fighting in Palestine and removing Israel.”

Since retaking control, the Taliban have overhauled the education system, transforming schools into religious madrassas where boys are drilled in extremist ideology that includes anti-Israel rhetoric taught by radical mullahs, Moheq said. Al Qaeda figures from Arab states are deployed to training camps to drill recruits in military and ideological instruction. “The result of the Taliban controlling Afghanistan is providing the best opportunity to produce a new generation, and train and educate a new generation of extremist fighters,” said Moheq, who was an ambassador to Egypt and a presidential advisor before the Afghan republic collapsed.

The U.N. Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team has identified a large number of extremist groups that fought alongside the Taliban and now enjoy their protection in Afghanistan, including old al Qaeda, which is again active, running ministries, safe houses, and training camps.

Al Qaeda and Hamas leaders were among the first to congratulate the Taliban on their victory in 2021 and pledge allegiance to the Taliban’s supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh telephoned Abdul Ghani Baradar, a senior Taliban leader and now Afghanistan’s acting deputy prime minister, to tell him that the end of the U.S. “occupation” was “a prelude to the demise of all occupation forces, foremost of which is the Israeli occupation of Palestine.”

Afghan Peace Watch, an independent research organization, reported that U.S. arms arms left behind in the 2021 retreat have turned up in the Gaza Strip, India’s Kashmir region, and Pakistan. The chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Mike McCaul, told CNN he’d “seen indications that the Taliban wants to come to liberate Jerusalem, in their words, to fight the Zionists.” Moheq said that he believes more than 100 Taliban gunmen have already been dispatched to Gaza.

The broader impact of the Hamas attacks—even before a potentially escalating regional war—is the possibility that terrorist groups around the world will try to match the spectacular carnage that Hamas pulled off earlier this month, which had a death toll equivalent to multiple Sept. 11 attacks on a per capita basis in a small country such as Israel. The need for terror outfits to raise their own game is what will make them even more dangerous, said Hans-Jakob Schindler, the senior director of the Counter Extremism Project.

In Europe, most eyes turn to the Islamic State, which has been the common denominator in many arrests on the continent over the past year. “It is clearly trying to show its relevance,” Schindler said. The Islamic State morphed out of Al Qaeda’s Iraqi branch in the mid-2000s, declaring a caliphate across territory in Iraq and Syria in 2014, until it was pulverized by joint U.S., Russian, and Kurdish military operations.

The South Asian franchise, called the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K), has largely been driven out of Afghanistan by the Taliban, who regard it as a strategic competitor and have cooperated with the Biden administration, security sources said, to track down and kill operatives inside Afghanistan’s borders.

But it has had a huge impact in neighboring Pakistan, where it bombed a pro-Taliban rally in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on July 31, killing at least 54 people. Schindler, of the Counter Extremism Project, said the emergence of Islamic State (IS) and IS-K operatives in Europe should sound an alarm for security and intelligence services, as the Hamas attacks could portend a rise in militant activity across the world, as the 9/11 atrocities did in the years that followed.

“Hamas dominates everything now, and that’s not good for IS,” he said. “If you’re not in the news, no one is going to give you money.”

Correction, Oct. 23, 2023: This article was updated to clarify the nature of Qatar’s financial relationship with Gaza and Hamas.

Foreign Policy · by Lynne O’Donnell · October 23, 2023

6. IntelBrief: Iran’s Role in Mideast Crisis Widens Rift with the West

IntelBrief: Iran’s Role in Mideast Crisis Widens Rift with the West - The Soufan Center

thesoufancenter.org · by Michaela Millender · October 23, 2023

October 23, 2023

AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

Bottom Line Up Front

• Iran’s prospects to de-escalate tensions with the United States and its allies have dissipated with Tehran’s threats to intervene directly in the Hamas-Israel crisis.
• Iran’s regional allies have conducted several attacks on U.S. and Israeli targets in sympathy with Hamas and the Palestinians and may escalate further in the coming days, depending on what happens next in Gaza.
• Iran’s threats and the actions of its regional allies have brought Tehran close to actual conflict with Israel and increased the chances that the United States could also intervene.
• Iran’s support for the Hamas attack on Israel has already cost Tehran sanctions relief and will likely cause the United States and its European allies to take additional economic and diplomatic measures against Iran in the coming weeks.

Iran’s role in the October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas, a close ally of Tehran, continues to be contested, but there is no dispute that Iran set the stage for the Hamas attack by arming, training, and advising the group over several decades. Iran provided Hamas with the rocket and missile technology that Hamas has used to launch many thousands of strikes on Israeli cities during and since the October 7 Hamas incursion. As Israel prepares to invade the Gaza Strip to try to remove Hamas from power there, the crisis has continued to expand with low-level but increasingly frequent cross-border combat between Israel and Iran’s main ally, Lebanese Hezbollah, and attacks on U.S. and Israeli targets by Iran’s regional allies in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. During October 18-20, Iran-backed Shia militia groups rocketed two bases in Iraq where U.S. forces are deployed in support of the Baghdad government; pro-Iranian elements have attacked bases in Syria from which U.S. forces operate against Islamic State (ISIS); and Houthi militia fighters in Yemen launched three Iran-supplied land-attack cruise missiles toward Israel. The missiles, as well as several armed drones, were intercepted by the U.S.-guided missile destroyer U.S.S. Carney deployed in the northern Red Sea, preventing the weapons from reaching Israel. It is not clear whether Iranian leaders instigated any of the attacks by Iran-backed groups, but the rocket and missile launches dovetail with direct threats by Iranian officials. Iran has formally communicated to U.S. and allied officials through United Nations channels that Iran would be forced to intervene against Israel if the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launch a ground invasion of Gaza. Most observers agree that Iran’s intervention would most likely take the form of instigating its regional allies, including in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, to conduct additional attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets – rather than a military action by Iranian forces themselves.

The Iranian threats of intervention, as well as the attacks conducted by Iran-backed armed factions, come despite explicit U.S. warnings to Tehran not to escalate the crisis. In numerous public statements, U.S. President Joe Biden, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin have said that if any regional actor is contemplating expanding the conflict, the U.S. message to that actor is “Don’t.” To back up that threat, U.S. officials have sent one additional carrier strike group to the eastern Mediterranean and extended the deployment of another, and sent additional ships, advanced combat aircraft, and a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU, comprised of approximately 2,000 Marines) to the region. Although the U.S. deployments have not deterred Iran’s regional allies from firing rockets and missiles at U.S. facilities, the U.S. force deployments might yet succeed in dissuading Iranian leaders from more direct Iranian intervention, such as the firing of Iran’s large arsenal of medium-range ballistic missiles (Shahab-3 and Shahab-3 variants) at Israeli territory. U.S. deployments might also deter Hezbollah from entering the conflict in full force.

The actions and statements of Iran and its regional proxies have, to date, been mostly intercepted or otherwise caused little harm but still might bring the United States and Iran into sustained, direct armed conflict. Even though U.S. officials have stated that they do not seek conflict with Iran, Iran’s support for Hamas and its apparent willingness to expand the fighting has shifted the political calculus in Washington and in European capitals towards a harder line on Tehran. Some prominent members of the U.S. Congress have cited Iran’s close relationship with Hamas – which is one key pillar of Iran’s “axis of resistance” – to argue for U.S. military strikes on Iranian oil fields and other targets. Others suggest adopted legislation to formally authorize the use of U.S. military force against Iran, the passage of which would authorize U.S. officials to undertake pre-emptive rather than purely retaliatory military action against Iran.

Despite the risks of conflict, Iranian leaders view the crisis as a success for Iranian policy. Iran’s leading role as a regional opponent of Israel has been buoyed by the large demonstrations in support of the Palestinians that have occurred throughout the region. And, the attack has, at least for now, forestalled any further moves toward normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel – a pact that would further isolate Iran within the region. Iranian leaders are also cognizant of the renewed international focus on the military strength of its key ally, Hezbollah, which is widely assessed as able to overwhelm Israeli rocket and missile defenses were it to bring to bear the full force of its arsenal on Israel. Iranian regime leaders also hope that their expressions of strength on behalf of the Palestinians will cow the youth, women, intellectuals, and others in Iran who have constituted the vanguard of increasingly frequent and progressively more intense unrest against the regime over the past few years.

At the same time, Iran’s stance and actions pose new challenges for Iran’s leaders. The regime’s domestic and regional image will suffer if Israel enters the Gaza Strip and Tehran’s responses are weak, ineffective, or defeated by U.S. and/or Israeli countermeasures. Other than Hezbollah, Iran’s regional allies have, to date, been unable to cause significant damage to their U.S. or Israeli targets or meaningfully affect the course of the crisis. If Israel succeeds in removing Hamas from power in Gaza, Iran’s axis of resistance would lose a major member, and Iran’s regional strategy could be set back considerably. There is also the potential for Israel to escalate its “shadow war” against Iran, which to date has consisted of covert operations against Iranian nuclear facilities and scientists, cyberattacks, and other activities. And Iran’s global allies, particularly Russia, are consumed with their own challenges. Moscow is currently dealing with its faltering war effort in Ukraine and is likely both unwilling and unable to come to Tehran’s defense should significant conflict erupt between the United States and Iran.

Furthermore, the heightened tensions have derailed the prospects for any follow-through from the U.S.-Iran prisoner swap in September, which many experts saw as paving the way for additional de-escalation on nuclear and regional issues. In light of the hardening position toward Tehran in Washington and in European capitals, there are virtually no prospects for revival of the 2021-2022 multilateral talks to restore the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA) that the Trump Administration exited in 2018. Iran’s position in the Mideast crisis has also cost it the use of $6 billion in Iranian oil proceeds transferred from South Korean banks to Qatari banks under the prisoner swap. Several days after the Hamas attack, U.S. and Qatari officials agreed to freeze the use of those Iranian assets, at least temporarily – a decision sure to add to the already substantial strains on Iran’s budget. Along with that asset freeze, calls have grown in Washington and in European capitals for additional sanctions against Tehran, including tighter enforcement of U.S.-led sanctions on the purchase of Iranian oil by China – which is overwhelmingly the largest buyer of Iranian crude. Regionally, Iran’s position in the crisis has also likely instilled new doubts among the Gulf leaders over the benefits of forging de-escalation agreements with Iran in the interests of promoting regional stability. The Gulf state members of OPEC roundly rejected Tehran’s suggestion that the Islamic world initiate an embargo on oil exports to Tel Aviv. On the other hand, little noticed during the Mideast crisis was the October 18 expiration of the UN ban on the transfer to or from Iran of missile and armed drone technology. Russia cited the lapse of the ban as justifying new purchases from Tehran of the armed drones that Moscow has used against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.

thesoufancenter.org · by Michaela Millender · October 23, 2023

7. Ukrainian spies with deep ties to CIA wage shadow war against Russia

Excerpts:

Some of the GUR’s newest recruits were transfers from the SBU, officials said, drawn to a rival service flush with new authorities and resources. Among them was Vasyl Burba, who had managed SBU Fifth Directorate operations before joining the GUR and serving as agency director from 2016 to 2020. Burba became such a close ally of the CIA — and perceived Moscow target — that when he was forced from his job after President Volodymyr Zelensky’s election the agency provided him an armored vehicle, officials said. Burba declined to comment for this article.

The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art surveillance and electronic eavesdropping systems, officials said. They included mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also software tools used to exploit the cellphones of Kremlin officials visiting occupied territory from Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems, officials said, but everything gleaned was shared with the Americans.

Concerned that the GUR’s aging facilities were likely compromised by Russian intelligence, the CIA paid for new headquarters buildings for the GUR’s “spetsnaz” paramilitary division and a separate directorate responsible for electronic espionage.

The new capabilities were transformative, officials said.

“In one day we could intercept 250,000 to 300,000 separate communications” from Russian military and FSB units, said a former senior GUR official. “There was so much information that we couldn’t manage it ourselves.”

Troves of data were relayed through the new CIA-built facility back to Washington, where they were scrutinized by CIA and NSA analysts, officials said.

Ukrainian spies with deep ties to CIA wage shadow war against Russia

By Greg Miller

 and 

Isabelle Khurshudyan

October 23, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Greg Miller · October 23, 2023

October 23, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

KYIV — The cluttered car carrying a mother and her 12-year-old daughter seemed barely worth the attention of Russian security officials as it approached a border checkpoint. But the least conspicuous piece of luggage — a crate for a cat — was part of an elaborate, lethal plot. Ukrainian operatives had installed a hidden compartment in the pet carrier, according to security officials with knowledge of the operation, and used it to conceal components of a bomb.

Four weeks later, the device detonated just outside Moscow in an SUV being driven by the daughter of a Russian nationalist who had urged his country to “kill, kill, kill” Ukrainians, an explosion signaling that the heart of Russia would not be spared the carnage of war.

The operation was orchestrated by Ukraine’s domestic security service, the SBU, according to officials who provided details, including the use of the pet crate, that have not been previously disclosed. The August 2022 attack is part of a raging shadow war in which Ukraine’s spy services have also twice bombed the bridge connecting Russia to occupied Crimea, piloted drones into the roof of the Kremlin and blown holes in the hulls of Russian naval vessels in the Black Sea.

These operations have been cast as extreme measures Ukraine was forced to adopt in response to Russia’s invasion last year. In reality, they represent capabilities that Ukraine’s spy agencies have developed over nearly a decade — since Russia first seized Ukrainian territory in 2014 — a period during which the services also forged deep new bonds with the CIA.

The missions have involved elite teams of Ukrainian operatives drawn from directorates that were formed, trained and equipped in close partnership with the CIA, according to current and former Ukrainian and U.S. officials. Since 2015, the CIA has spent tens of millions of dollars to transform Ukraine’s Soviet-formed services into potent allies against Moscow, officials said. The agency has provided Ukraine with advanced surveillance systems, trained recruits at sites in Ukraine as well as the United States, built new headquarters for departments in Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, and shared intelligence on a scale that would have been unimaginable before Russia illegally annexed Crimea and fomented a separatist war in eastern Ukraine. The CIA maintains a significant presence in Kyiv, officials said.

The extent of the CIA’s involvement with Ukraine’s security services has not previously been disclosed. U.S. intelligence officials stressed that the agency has had no involvement in targeted killing operations by Ukrainian agencies, and that its work has focused on bolstering those services’ abilities to gather intelligence on a dangerous adversary. A senior intelligence official said that “any potential operational concerns have been conveyed clearly to the Ukrainian services.”

Many of Ukraine’s clandestine operations have had clear military objectives and contributed to the country’s defense. The car bombing that killed Daria Dugina, however, underscored Ukraine’s embrace of what officials in Kyiv refer to as “liquidations” as a weapon of war. Over the past 20 months, the SBU and its military counterpart, the GUR, have carried out dozens of assassinations against Russian officials in occupied territories, alleged Ukrainian collaborators, military officers behind the front lines and prominent war supporters deep inside Russia. Those killed include a former Russian submarine commander jogging in a park in the southern Russian city of Krasnodar and a militant blogger at a cafe in St. Petersburg, according to Ukrainian and Western officials.

Ukraine’s affinity for lethal operations has complicated its collaboration with the CIA, raising concerns about agency complicity and creating unease among some officials in Kyiv and Washington.

Even those who see such lethal missions as defensible in wartime question the utility of certain strikes and decisions that led to the targeting of civilians including Dugina or her father, Alexander Dugin — who officials acknowledge was the intended mark — rather than Russians more directly linked to the war.

“We have too many enemies who are more important to neutralize,” said a high-ranking Ukraine security official. “People who launch missiles. People who committed atrocities in Bucha.” Killing the daughter of a pro-war firebrand is “very cynical,” the official said.

Others cited broader concerns about Ukraine’s cutthroat tactics that may seem justified now — especially against a country accused of widespread war atrocities — but could later prove difficult to rein in.

“We are seeing the birth of a set of intelligence services that are like Mossad in the 1970s,” said a former senior CIA official, referring to the Israeli spy service long accused of carrying out assassinations in other countries. Ukraine’s proficiency at such operations “has risks for Russia,” the official said, “but it carries broader risks as well.”

“If Ukraine’s intelligence operations become even bolder — targeting Russians in third countries, for example — you could imagine how that might cause rifts with partners and come into serious tension with Ukraine’s broader strategic goals,” the official said. Among those goals is membership in NATO and the European Union.

This article is based on interviews with more than two dozen current and former Ukrainian, U.S. and Western intelligence and security officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity citing security concerns as well as the sensitivity of the subject. The pressure on Kyiv to score victories against Russia and find ways to deter further aggression create incentives to exaggerate the record and capabilities of Ukraine’s services. The Post vetted key details with multiple sources including Western officials with access to independent streams of intelligence.

The CIA declined to comment.

CIA-Ukraine partnership

SBU and GUR officials describe their expanding operational roles as the result of extraordinary circumstances. “All targets hit by the SBU are completely legal,” the agency’s director, Vasyl Malyuk, said in a statement provided to The Post. The statement did not specifically address targeted killings but Malyuk, who met with top CIA and other U.S. officials in Washington last month, said Ukraine “does everything to ensure that fair punishment will ‘catch up’ with all traitors, war criminals and collaborators.”

Current and former U.S. and Ukrainian officials said both sides have sought to maintain a careful distance between the CIA and the lethal operations carried out by its partners in Kyiv. CIA officials have voiced objections after some operations, officials said, but the agency has not withdrawn support.

“We never involved our international partners in covert operations, especially behind the front lines,” a former senior Ukrainian security official said. SBU and GUR operatives were not accompanied by CIA counterparts. Ukraine avoided using weapons or equipment that could be traced to U.S. sources, and even covert funding streams were segregated.

“We had a lot of restrictions about working with the Ukrainians operationally,” said a former U.S. intelligence official. The emphasis was “more on secure communications and tradecraft,” and pursuing new streams of intelligence inside Russia “rather than ‘here’s how you blow up a mayor.’ I never got the sense that we were that involved in designing their ops.”

Even so, officials acknowledged that boundaries were occasionally blurred. CIA officers in Kyiv were made aware of some of Ukraine’s more ambitious plans for strikes. In some cases, including the bombing of the Kerch Bridge, U.S. officials registered concerns.

Ukraine’s spies developed their own lines about which operations to discuss and which to keep under wraps. “There were some things that maybe we wouldn’t talk about” with CIA counterparts, said a second Ukraine security official involved in such missions. He said crossing those boundaries would lead to a terse reply from Americans: “We don’t want any part of that.”

The CIA’s deep partnership with Ukraine, which persisted even when the country became embroiled in the impeachment scandal surrounding President Donald Trump, represents a dramatic turn for agencies that spent decades on opposing sides of the Cold War. In part because of that legacy, officials said, it was only last year that the CIA removed Ukraine from the agency’s “non-fraternization” list of countries regarded as such security risks that contact with their nationals for agency employees is forbidden without advance permission.

The CIA-Ukraine collaboration took root in the aftermath of 2014 political protests that prompted Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych to flee the country, followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its arming of separatists in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.

The initial phases of cooperation were tentative, officials said, given concerns on both sides that Ukraine’s services were still heavily penetrated by the FSB — the Russian agency that is the main successor to the KGB. To manage that security risk, the CIA worked with the SBU to create an entirely new directorate, officials said, one that would focus on so-called “active measures” operations against Russia and be insulated from other SBU departments.

The new unit was prosaically dubbed the “Fifth Directorate” to distinguish it from the four long-standing units of the SBU. A sixth directorate has since been added, officials said, to work with Britain’s MI6 spy agency.

Training sites were located outside Kyiv where handpicked recruits were instructed by CIA personnel, officials said. The plan was to form units “capable of operating behind front lines and working as covert groups,” said a Ukrainian official involved in the effort.

The agency provided secure communications gear, eavesdropping equipment that allowed Ukraine to intercept Russian phone calls and emails, and even furnished disguises and separatist uniforms enabling operatives to more easily slip into occupied towns.

The early missions focused on recruiting informants among Russia’s proxy forces as well as cyber and electronic eavesdropping measures, officials said. The SBU also began mounting sabotage operations and missions to capture separatist leaders and Ukrainian collaborators, some of whom were taken to secret detention sites.

But the operations soon took a lethal turn. Over one three-year stretch, at least half a dozen Russian operatives, high-ranking separatist commanders or collaborators were killed in violence that was often attributed to internal score-settling but in reality was the work of the SBU, Ukraine officials said.

Among those killed was Yevgeny Zhilin, the leader of a pro-Russian militant group in eastern Ukraine, who was gunned down in 2016 in a Moscow restaurant. A year later, a rebel commander known as ‘Givi’ was killed in Donetsk as part of an operation in which a woman who accused him of rape was enlisted to plant a bomb at his side, according to a former official involved in the mission.

Ukrainian officials said the country’s turn to more lethal methods was driven by Russian aggression, atrocities attributed to its proxies and desperation to find ways to weaken a more powerful adversary. Many also cited Russia’s own alleged history of conducting assassinations in Kyiv.

“Because of this hybrid war we faced an absolutely new reality,” said Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, a member of Ukraine’s parliament who served as SBU director in 2015, when the Fifth Directorate was created. “We were forced to train our people in a different way.”

He declined to elaborate.

Transforming Ukrainian military intelligence

Even while helping to build the SBU’s new directorate, the CIA embarked on a far more ambitious project with Ukraine’s military intelligence service.

With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the SBU and had a narrower focus on espionage and active measures operations against Russia. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from Soviet times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence.

“We calculated that GUR was a smaller and more nimble organization where we could have more impact,” said a former U.S. intelligence official who worked in Ukraine. “GUR was our little baby. We gave them all new equipment and training.” GUR officers “were young guys not Soviet-era KGB generals,” the official said, “while the SBU was too big to reform.”

Even recent developments have seemed to validate such concerns. Former SBU director Ivan Bakanov was forced out of the job last year amid criticism that the agency wasn’t moving aggressively enough against internal traitors. The SBU also discovered last year that Russian-made modems were still being used in the agency’s networks, prompting a scramble to unplug them.

From 2015 on, the CIA embarked on such an extensive transformation of the GUR that within several years “we had kind of rebuilt it from scratch,” the former U.S. intelligence official said. One of the main architects of the effort, who served as CIA station chief in Kyiv, now runs the Ukraine Task Force at CIA headquarters.

The GUR began recruiting operatives for its own new active measures department, officials said. At sites in Ukraine and, later, the United States, GUR operatives were trained on skills ranging from clandestine maneuvers behind enemy lines to weapons platforms and explosives. U.S. officials said the training was aimed at helping Ukrainian operatives protect themselves in dangerous Russian-controlled environments rather than inflicting harm on Russian targets.

Some of the GUR’s newest recruits were transfers from the SBU, officials said, drawn to a rival service flush with new authorities and resources. Among them was Vasyl Burba, who had managed SBU Fifth Directorate operations before joining the GUR and serving as agency director from 2016 to 2020. Burba became such a close ally of the CIA — and perceived Moscow target — that when he was forced from his job after President Volodymyr Zelensky’s election the agency provided him an armored vehicle, officials said. Burba declined to comment for this article.

The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art surveillance and electronic eavesdropping systems, officials said. They included mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also software tools used to exploit the cellphones of Kremlin officials visiting occupied territory from Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems, officials said, but everything gleaned was shared with the Americans.

Concerned that the GUR’s aging facilities were likely compromised by Russian intelligence, the CIA paid for new headquarters buildings for the GUR’s “spetsnaz” paramilitary division and a separate directorate responsible for electronic espionage.

The new capabilities were transformative, officials said.

“In one day we could intercept 250,000 to 300,000 separate communications” from Russian military and FSB units, said a former senior GUR official. “There was so much information that we couldn’t manage it ourselves.”

Troves of data were relayed through the new CIA-built facility back to Washington, where they were scrutinized by CIA and NSA analysts, officials said.

“We were giving them the ability — through us — to collect on” Russian targets, the former GUR official said. Asked about the magnitude of the CIA investments, the official said: “It was millions of dollars.”

In time, the GUR had also developed networks of sources in Russia’s security apparatus, including the FSB unit responsible for operations in Ukraine. In a measure of U.S.-Ukraine trust, officials said, the CIA was permitted to have direct contact with agents recruited and run by Ukrainian intelligence.

The resulting intelligence windfall was largely hidden from public view, with intermittent exceptions. The SBU began posting incriminating or embarrassing communications intercepts, including one in which Russian commanders were captured discussing their country’s culpability in the 2014 shoot-down of a Malaysian Airlines passenger jet.

Even so, officials said the intelligence obtained through the U.S.-Ukraine cooperation had its limits. The Biden administration’s prescient warnings about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s determination to topple the Kyiv government, for example, were based primarily on separate streams of intelligence Ukraine wasn’t privy to initially.

In some ways, officials said, Ukraine’s own collection efforts fed the skepticism that Zelensky and others had about Putin’s plans because they were eavesdropping on military and FSB units that themselves were not informed until the eve of the war. “They were getting an accurate picture from people who were also in the dark,” one U.S. official said.

Targeting Moscow with drones

Russian forces never succeeded in taking Kyiv. But both GUR structures that the CIA funded were among dozens of key installations targeted in Russian strikes in the war’s first days, according to officials who said the facilities survived and continue to function.

Ukraine’s new intelligence capabilities proved valuable from the start of the war. The SBU, for example, obtained intelligence on high-value Russian targets, enabling strikes that killed several commanders and narrowly missed Russia’s top-ranked officer, Valery Gerasimov.

Over the past year, the security services’ missions have increasingly centered on targets not only behind enemy lines but well into Russia.

For the SBU, no target has been a higher priority than the Kerch Bridge that connects the Russian mainland to the annexed Crimean Peninsula. The bridge is a key military corridor and also carries such symbolic significance to Putin that he presided over its inauguration in 2018.

The SBU has hit the bridge twice over the past year, including an October 2022 bombing that killed five people and put a gaping hole in westbound traffic lanes.

Zelensky initially denied Ukrainian responsibility. But SBU director Malyuk described the operation in extraordinary detail in an interview earlier this year, acknowledging that his service had placed a powerful explosive inside a truck hauling industrial-size rolls of cellophane.

Like other SBU plots, the operation involved unwitting accomplices, including the truck driver killed in the explosion. “We went through seven circles of hell keeping so many people in the dark,” Malyuk said in an interview about the operation, which he said hinged on the susceptibility of “ordinary Russian smugglers.”

U.S. officials who had been notified in advance raised concerns about the attack, officials said, fearing Russian escalation. Those misgivings had presumably dissipated by the time the SBU launched a second strike on the bridge nine months later using naval drones that were developed as part of a top secret operation involving the CIA and other Western intelligence services.

Malyuk’s highly public account of the operation defies typical intelligence tradecraft but serves Kyiv’s need to claim successes and reflects an emerging rivalry with the GUR. Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, has made a habit of touting his agency’s achievements and taunting Moscow.

The two services overlap operationally to some degree, though officials said the SBU tends to pursue more complex missions with longer lead-times while the GUR tends to work at a faster tempo. Ukraine officials denied that either agency was directly involved in the September 2022 attack on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in the Baltic Sea, though U.S. and other Western intelligence agencies have concluded that Ukraine was linked to the plot.

The GUR has used its own fleet of drones to launch dozens of attacks on Russian soil, including strikes that have penetrated Russian air defenses to hit buildings in Moscow. Among them was a May 2023 operation that briefly set fire to a section of roof in the Kremlin.

Those strikes have involved both long-range drones launched from Ukrainian territory, as well as teams of operatives and partisans working inside Russia, officials said. Motors for some drones were purchased from Chinese suppliers with private funding that couldn’t be traced to Ukrainian sources, according to an official who said he was involved in the transactions.

Assassinations in Russia

GUR has also ventured into assassinations, officials said.

In July, a former Russian submarine commander, Stanislav Rzhitsky, was shot four times in the chest and back in Krasnodar where he reportedly worked as a military recruiting officer. Rzhitsky, 42, was known to use the fitness app Strava to record his daily running routes, a practice that may have exposed his location.

The GUR issued a coy statement deflecting responsibility but citing precise details about the circumstances of Rzhitsky’s death, noting that “due to heavy rain the park was deserted” and there were no witnesses. Officials in Kyiv confirmed the GUR was responsible.

Even while acknowledging responsibility for such actions, Ukrainian officials claim the moral high ground against Russia. The SBU and GUR have sought to avoid harm to innocent bystanders even in lethal operations, officials said, while Russia’s scorched-earth raids and indiscriminate strikes have killed or injured thousands of civilians.

Security officials said that no major operation by the SBU or GUR proceeds without clearance — tacit or otherwise — from Zelensky. A spokesperson for Zelensky did not respond to requests for comment.

Skeptics nevertheless worry Ukraine’s use of targeted killings and drone strikes on Moscow high-rises help neither its cause against Russia nor its longer-term aspirations to join NATO and the E.U.

A senior Ukrainian official who worked closely with Western governments coordinating support for Ukraine said that attacks on noncombatants and bombings of Moscow buildings feed Putin’s false narrative that Ukraine posed a growing danger to ordinary Russians. “It plays into his lies that Ukrainians are coming for them,” the official said.

That view appears to be in the minority. Others see the attacks as boosting morale among besieged Ukrainians and achieving a degree of vigilante accountability for alleged Russian war crimes that many Ukrainians are skeptical will ever lead to adequate sanctions from the United Nations and international courts.

The car bombing that killed Dugina last year continues to stand out as one of the more extreme cases of lethal revenge — one that not only targeted noncombatants but involved a Ukrainian woman and a presumably unwitting pre-teenage girl.

Russian authorities had barely finished clearing the debris when the FSB identified Natalia Vovk, 42, as the principal suspect. She had entered Russia from Estonia in July, according to the FSB, took an apartment in the same complex as Dugina, and spent weeks conducting surveillance before slipping back into Estonia with her daughter after the explosion occurred.

The FSB also identified an alleged accomplice who Russia alleged had provided Kazakh license plates for Vovk to use on her vehicle, a Mini Cooper, while traveling in Russia; helped assemble the explosive; and fled to Estonia before the attack.

Ukraine authorities said Vovk was motivated in part by Russia’s siege of her home city, Mariupol. They declined to comment on the nature of her relationship to the SBU or her current whereabouts.

The attack was intended to kill Dugin as he and his daughter departed a cultural festival where the pro-war ideologue, sometimes branded as “Putin’s brain,” had delivered a lecture. The two were expected to travel together, but Dugin stepped into a different vehicle. Vovk also attended the festival, according to the FSB.

At the time, Ukraine vigorously denounced involvement in the attack. “Ukraine has absolutely nothing to do with this, because we are not a criminal state like Russia, or a terrorist one at that,” said Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Zelensky.

Officials acknowledged in recent interviews in Kyiv, however, that those denials were false. They confirmed that the SBU planned and executed the operation, and said that while Dugin may have been the principal target, his daughter — also a vocal supporter of the invasion — was no innocent victim.

“She is the daughter of the father of Russian propaganda,” a security official said. The car bombing and other operations inside Russia are “about narrative,” showing enemies of Ukraine that “punishment is imminent even for those who think they are untouchable.”

Shane Harris in Washington and Mary Ilyushina in Riga, Latvia, contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Greg Miller · October 23, 2023

8. Pentagon rushes defenses and advisers to Middle East as Israel's ground assault in Gaza looms

Excerpts:

One of the officers leading the assistance is Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James Glynn, who previously helped lead special operations forces against the Islamic State and served in Fallujah, Iraq, during some of the most heated urban combat there, according to a U.S. official who was not authorized to discuss Glynn’s role and spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Glynn will also be advising on how to mitigate civilian casualties in urban warfare, the official said

...

The military team is one of many fast-moving pieces the Pentagon is getting in place to try and prevent the already intense conflict between Israel and Hamas from becoming a wider war. It also is trying to protect U.S. personnel, who in the last few days have come under repeated attacks that the Pentagon has said were likely endorsed by Iran.

Kirby said Iran was “in some cases actively facilitating these attacks and spurring on others who may want to exploit the conflict for their own good, or for that of Iran. We know that Iran’s goal is to maintain some level of deniability here. But we’re not going to allow them to do that.”

Pentagon rushes defenses and advisers to Middle East as Israel's ground assault in Gaza looms

AP · by AAMER MADHANI · October 23, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Pentagon has sent military advisers, including a Marine Corps general versed in urban warfare, to Israel to aid in its war planning and is speeding multiple sophisticated air defense systems to the Middle East days ahead of an anticipated ground assault into Gaza.

One of the officers leading the assistance is Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James Glynn, who previously helped lead special operations forces against the Islamic State and served in Fallujah, Iraq, during some of the most heated urban combat there, according to a U.S. official who was not authorized to discuss Glynn’s role and spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Glynn will also be advising on how to mitigate civilian casualties in urban warfare, the official said.

Israel is preparing a large-scale ground operation in an environment in which Hamas militants have had years to prepare tunnel networks and set traps throughout northern Gaza’s dense urban blocks. Glynn and the other military officers who are advising Israel “have experience that is appropriate to the sorts of operations that Israel is conducting,” National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Monday. The advisers will not be engaged in the fighting, the unidentified U.S. official said.

The military team is one of many fast-moving pieces the Pentagon is getting in place to try and prevent the already intense conflict between Israel and Hamas from becoming a wider war. It also is trying to protect U.S. personnel, who in the last few days have come under repeated attacks that the Pentagon has said were likely endorsed by Iran.

Kirby said Iran was “in some cases actively facilitating these attacks and spurring on others who may want to exploit the conflict for their own good, or for that of Iran. We know that Iran’s goal is to maintain some level of deniability here. But we’re not going to allow them to do that.”

The White House said President Joe Biden spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Monday to update him on “U.S. support for Israel and ongoing efforts at regional deterrence, to include new U.S. military deployments.”

On Monday, the U.S. military garrison at an-Tanf, Syria, came under attack again, this time by two drones. The drones were shot down and no injuries were reported. It was the latest episode of more than a half-dozen times in the last week that U.S. military locations in the Middle East had come under rocket or drone attack since a deadly blast at a Gaza hospital.

Last Thursday the destroyer USS Carney shot down four land-attack cruise missiles launched from Yemen that the Pentagon has said were potentially headed toward Israel.

In response, over the weekend the Pentagon announced it was sending multiple Patriot missile defense system battalions and a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system to the Middle East, as well as repositioning the Eisenhower strike group to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. The ship had previously been en route to the Eastern Mediterranean.

The shift means that the Navy will have a carrier strike group off the shore of Israel — the Ford carrier strike group — and another, the Eisenhower, potentially maneuvered to defend U.S. forces and Israel from the Red Sea or the Gulf of Oman.

“We’re going to continue to do what we need to do to protect and safeguard our forces and take all necessary measures,” Ryder said. “No one wants to see a wider regional conflict. But we will not hesitate to protect our forces.”

The U.S. has also advised Israeli officials to consider a delay in any ground assault, saying it would give more time to allow the U.S. to work with its regional partners to release more hostages, according to a U.S. official familiar with Biden administration thinking on the matter. The official, who requested anonymity to discuss the private discussions, said it was unclear how much the argument will “move the needle” on Israeli thinking.

The official noted that with the help of Qatar mediating with Hamas, the U.S. was able to win the release of two captives, Judith and Natalie Raanan. The process that led to their release — just two of more than 200 people in Israel who were taken hostage in the Oct. 7 attacks — started soon after the Hamas operation. The official noted arranging for the release of the Raanans took longer to come together than many people realized.

Asked during a brief exchange with reporters at the White House on Monday if the U.S. would be supportive of a ceasefire-for-hostage deal, Biden replied, “We should have those hostages released and then we can talk.”

During his phone call with Netanyahu, Biden also “reaffirmed his commitment to ongoing efforts to secure the release of all the remaining hostages taken by Hamas — including Americans — and to provide for safe passage for U.S. citizens and other civilians in Gaza,” the White House said.

The International Committee of the Red Cross said Monday that Hamas had released two more hostages. They were identified by Israeli media as Yocheved Lifshitz and Nurit Cooper of the Israeli kibbutz of Nir Oz.

Glynn’s assignment to Israel was first reported by Axios.

___ Find more of AP’s coverage at https://apnews.com/hub/israel-hamas-war

AP · by AAMER MADHANI · October 23, 2023

9. Is Israel's Iron Dome missile defense system ironclad?

There is no such thing as an ironclad defense. But every effort toward that helps.

Is Israel's Iron Dome missile defense system ironclad?

BY JULIA FRANKEL

Updated 4:27 AM EDT, October 24, 2023

AP · October 24, 2023

JERUSALEM (AP) — Since Israel activated the Iron Dome in 2011, the cutting-edge rocket-defense system has intercepted thousands of rockets fired from the Gaza Strip.

The system has given residents a sense of security, and Israelis can often be seen watching the projectiles flying through the skies and destroying their targets overhead.

But the current war with Gaza’s militant Hamas group might be its stiffest challenge yet.

In just two weeks, Hamas has fired 7,000 rockets toward Israel, according to the Israeli military. That is more than any of the previous four wars fought between Israel and Hamas since the militant group seized power in Gaza in 2007.

On Oct. 7 alone, the first day of fighting, Hamas launched at least 2,000 rockets, according to data from West Point. Lebanon’s militant Hezbollah group has also fired hundreds of rockets along Israel’s northern front since the fighting began.

Most of the rockets have been intercepted. But some have managed to get through, killing at least 11 people and hitting buildings as far away as Tel Aviv, according to Israeli officials.

Here is a look at the accomplishments — and limitations — of the Iron Dome.

HOW DOES THE IRON DOME WORK?

The Iron Dome is a series of batteries that use radars to detect incoming short-range rockets and intercept them.

Each battery has three or four launchers, 20 missiles, and a radar, according to Raytheon, the U.S. defense giant that co-produces the system with Israel’s Rafael Defense Systems.

FILE - Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system fires to intercept a rocket launched from the Gaza Strip towards Israel, near Ashkelon, Israel, Thursday, May 11, 2023. (AP Photo/Ariel Schalit, File)

Once the radar detects a rocket, the system determines whether the rocket is headed toward a populated area.

If so, it launches a missile to intercept and destroy the rocket. If the system determines the rocket is headed to an open area or into the sea, it is allowed to land, thus conserving missiles. According to the military, all interceptions occur in Israeli airspace.

The military declined to comment on how many Iron Dome batteries are currently deployed. But as of 2021, Israel had 10 batteries scattered around the country, each able to defend a territory of 60 square miles (155 square kilometers), according to Raytheon.

The Iron Dome is part of a larger multi-layer air-defense system that includes the Arrow, which intercepts long-range ballistic missiles, and also David’s Sling, which intercepts medium-range missiles such as those believed to be possessed by Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Both systems, like the Iron Dome, were jointly developed with the United States. Israel is also developing a laser-based system called the Iron Beam that it says will be able to intercept rockets and other short-range threats at a fraction of the cost of the Iron Dome. Israel says that system, developed with U.S. funding, has not yet been deployed.

HOW ACCURATE IS THE IRON DOME?

It is roughly 90% effective, according to Rafael.

But it can get overwhelmed if a mass barrage of rockets is fired, allowing some to slip through.

While it has performed well so far, the risk could be raised if Hezbollah enters the war. Hezbollah has an estimated 150,000 rockets and missiles.

HOW EXPENSIVE IS THE SYSTEM?

Each missile costs an estimated $40,000 to $50,000, according to the Institute for National Security Studies, a Tel Aviv think tank.

The U.S. has invested heavily in the system, helping with development costs and replenishing it during times of fighting.

President Joe Biden has said he will ask Congress for $14.3 billion in military aid for Israel. The majority of that would help with air and missile defense systems, according to the White House.

“We’re surging additional military assistance, including ammunition and interceptors to replenish Iron Dome,” Biden said.

___

Find more of AP’s coverage at https://apnews.com/hub/israel-hamas-war

AP · October 24, 2023

10. Joseph Nye says China, U.S. need to "power with" rather than "power over" other countries

Note the organizers and location. Michael Pillsbury's remarks at the same conference follow in the next message.

Joseph Nye says China, U.S. need to "power with" rather than "power over" other countries

ZICHEN WANG

, 

JIA YUXUAN

, AND 

SHANGJUN YANG

OCT 23, 2023

ccgupdate.substack.com · by Zichen Wang

The following is the transcript of Joseph Nye's speech at the 8th China Global Think Tank Innovation Forum in Beijing on Monday, October 23, 2023. The forum is co-organized by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC).

In a session moderated by Henry Huiyao Wang, the Founder and President of the CCG, the Father of Soft Power believes the current world order is not analogous to a Cold War or multipolarity, drawing on transnational interdependence and shared challenges as grounds for "power with" instead of "power over".

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[BEGINS]

Thank you very much, Henry. And my congratulations to you on gathering such a distinguished group of think tanks because while we have common problems in the world, having ways to understand how each other analyzes problems is crucial. And so my congratulations to your contribution to this.

Our topic is global order, world order. Norms matter, but norms in their extent which they affect global order depend on the underlying structure of power. After the World War II, we created the United Nations, but the distribution of power in the world was bipolar between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And that distribution of power basically paralyzed the UN in many of its functions. So we have to have a clear understanding of the distribution of power if we're going to have an understanding of our capacity to do anything about the common problems that we face. We'd all like to wish for a better world, but without an understanding of the power that underlies it, our wishes cannot be fulfilled.

Now, it's very common to talk about the world becoming multipolar. I think we confuse ourselves when we use that terminology. If one looks at the world today in terms of the distribution of power, we really should use the analogy of a three-dimensional chess game. At the top level, let's say, of military power, there's only one country which has global military power projection capabilities -and that's the U.S.

In the middle level, the middle board of economic power, the world is multipolar and has been for two decades: U.S., China, Europe, Japan, basically, these are roughly equal powers. But if you go to the third board, the bottom board of transnational relations of things that cross borders, outside the control of governments, it makes no sense at all to talk about multipolarity or bipolarity or unipolarity. This is a totally different world, and yet this is where many of our problems come from.

So how do you think about the world today? Some people say, well, the world is entering a new Cold War between the U.S. and China. You have the era of great power competition replacing the era of engagement. But I think that metaphor of the Cold War also misleads us. If you look back at the real Cold War, you'll notice that there was [inaudible] military interdependence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but almost no economic interdependence and very little social interaction. Whereas if you look at the relationship between the United States and China today, there's enormous economic interdependence, half $1 trillion worth of trade. And there's also social interdependence - at one point before COVID, there was something like 300,000 Chinese students studying in American universities.

But something else is interesting about the world today, which is the rise of what I call ecological interdependence, issues like pandemics and climate change, which were not major problems during the real Cold War. And therefore, we need a strategy which is much more subtle than a Cold War strategy of containment if we're going to deal with the problems we face.

Take, for example, the transnational problem of COVID, which we've all just experienced. I would argue that different countries did differently in terms of their capacity. But I think the United States and China were both failures. Each of our countries lost over a million people. And if you think about that, that's more people than have been killed in all wars in the United States behavior since 1945. So it's something which is not been handled well. And it's also something of great importance. And it's something which may come back. I mean, we may not have seen the last major pandemic. In that sense, we have to develop ways of cooperating on this. Take, for example, the fact that on the SARS epidemic, in the early 2000s, the U.S. and China cooperated very well with transnational networks of scientists who were able to share information and to stop the spread of the virus almost immediately, so the number of deaths was relatively small with thousands. And compress that with the competition between the U.S. and China on COVID, and you'll see why I regard both countries as failures.

In that sense, we have to think about how do we do two things at the same time which seem mutually contradictory, which is compete, which we're going to see in U.S.-China relationships in terms of great power issues, but cooperate at the same time to deal with these transnational threats. It's very hard for countries to encompass two contradictory thoughts at the same time. But we're going to have to learn to do it. We can't wish away the competition, but we can wish away the transnational threats.

How would you describe this situation then? At Aspen Strategy Group this summer, Secretary of State Blinken used the terminology "competitive coexistence", former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has called it "managed competition". The point that we have to learn is to think of both of these terms at the same time and not focus simply on one or the other. In that sense, if we think about competitive coexistence, we have to realize on the transnational issues, this third board of the three dimensional chess board of power that I mentioned. One has to imagine not just power over other countries, but power with other countries. These issues, the transnational issues, cannot be solved by exerting power over other countries. You have to have power with other countries.

I've given you the example of COVID where essentially the U.S. and China failed to act with each other adequately. But another equally important problem is climate change. If you think about the damage that will be done to Chinese agriculture by the drying up of the Himalayan glaciers and rivers, or you think about the damage that will be done to Miami or New York by a sea level rise of six feet. This is much larger than many wars. And yet scientists tell us that this is plausible, that it could happen. So the idea that we have to cooperate on climate change strikes me as another example of "power with" rather than "power over". There are other transnational threats that we have to think about. Proliferation, for example, of weapons of mass destruction. We've had some degree of success on nuclear non-proliferation. But we now have a new problem, which is Artificial Intelligence applied to military affairs. And this is, again, going to require some cooperation in an area where President Xi and President Biden should be in discussion, as well as the economic issues that they'll discuss when they meet at APEC in November.

So my message is that think tanks should be careful, not to be captured by historical metaphors that mislead. I would argue that multi polarity is one. I would argue that cold war is another. Instead, we have to think of how do we reconcile both competition and cooperation at the same time. Because if we fail to do that, we're going to all suffer, not just the US and China, but the world climate and the world economy. Those are my thoughts about where I think think tanks should focus.

[ENDS]

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At the same event, Michael Pillsbury, the “leading authority on China” according to Donald Trump, talked about the all-important One China Policy.

Pekingnology

Michael Pillsbury defends One China Policy in Beijing, slams Pompeo's proposal to formally recognize Taiwan

The following is the transcript of Michael Pillsbury's speech at the 8th China Global Think Tank Innovation Forum in Beijing on Monday, October 23, 2023. The forum is co-organized by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC…

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15 hours ago · 13 likes · Zichen Wang and Jia Yuxuan

ccgupdate.substack.com · by Zichen Wang

11. Michael Pillsbury defends One China Policy in Beijing, slams Pompeo's proposal to formally recognize Taiwan

Michael Pillsbury defends One China Policy in Beijing, slams Pompeo's proposal to formally recognize Taiwan

ZICHEN WANG

 AND 

JIA YUXUAN

OCT 23, 2023

pekingnology.com · by Zichen Wang

The following is the transcript of Michael Pillsbury's speech at the 8th China Global Think Tank Innovation Forum in Beijing on Monday, October 23, 2023. The forum is co-organized by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC).

Michael Pillsbury is Senior Fellow for China Strategy at The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. Former U.S. President Donald Trump said Pillsbury was “The leading authority on China” in September 2018.

[BEGINS]

One of the worst crises in US-China relations happened when Joe Nye and I were in the Pentagon, 1995, 1996. China fired missiles over or near Taiwan. Very much upset our Secretary of Defense. And slowly, this crisis was healed or completed. And it resulted in the President Clinton going to visit China. And some cooperative agreements began.

So 有一个教训 the lesson I draw from that is even when we get into a US-China crisis, there's still optimistically, there's usually a way out. Sometimes it's the role of think tanks. I have been a fan and admirer of Henry [Huiyao Wang] and Mabel [Lu Miao] coming to America so often that they know the exact differences, the debate, between the different American, let's say, top ten think tanks.

One time I saw the schedule of Henry and Mabel visiting the US, I think it was 14 think tanks in 2 days, and you and your wife you knew exactly the differences between Hudson Institute, and Heritage, and Brookings, Carnegie. It's very impressive. I don't think we have an American, maybe Joe Nye had somebody at Harvard who can do this. But think tanks have a special role to be optimistic to identify the problems, but then try to think of solutions or at least a channel for dialogue. And Henry was a channel for dialogue with President Trump on the trade talks. People as economists at CCG, and Professor Chen [Wenling] here and others had specific ideas: China will agree to this in the trade talks, and not that. And this was outside regular channels, but very helpful.

Now I only have one or two points to make today. One is I'm deviating from the role of a think tank person to be optimistic. I'm relatively pessimistic that relations between US and China and our friends on both sides, Chinese friends, American friends - the situation is getting worse 越来越恶化. It's not a time for optimism. Some of the reasons are lack of communication. No Congressional delegation came here for four years until Chuck Schumer and his bipartisan delegation. By their account, there's a lot of argument going on. The meeting with Xi Jinping was not an optimistic meeting.

There were up to 50 channels in US-China relations between government departments until President Trump cut them all off - cut them all off, his first year. So you would think President Biden would restore all the channels. How many people think Biden restored all the channels that Trump cut off? Put your hand up? Biden at first restored no channels, and now it's roughly five. And there are very thin discussions between 部长, between cabinet ministers.

Secondly, the One China principle, or the One China policy, used to be the foundation - China called it 政治基础 (political foundation) of the US-China relations. Now, recently, the PLA [People's Liberation Army], I think correctly - Joe [Nye], correctly - PLA said "America is distorting and stretching beyond belief the one China principle". Right now, this week, House and Senate are discussing a proposal, with strong bipartisan support, to put American weapons and ammunition on Taiwan, to station them there permanently, then to set up a strategy group between the American Pentagon and Taiwan's military to do joint military planning, then to continue the American special forces troops already placed on Taiwan two years ago. This should not be happening. The One China policy or principle should not be violated. The Heritage Foundation recently published a study about a new Cold War with China. We explicitly said we support continuing the One China Policy, but our fellow conservative think tank Hudson Institute Henry used to visit - now it's been sanctioned - Hudson Institute's position, they sent 我们以前的国务卿 (our former Secretary of State) Pompeo, he flew to Taipei 两次 two times, proposed diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. This never happened in the last 50 years. So I can give you a long list. There's actually quite a long list. Both sides have 红线 red lines. Each side has been crossing these red lines in the last few years. So I hope I'm wrong. I hope all think tanks who came today will be optimistic and come up with some solutions. But just to make a list, Henry, of the conflicts, 我们必须避免的冲突 (the conflicts we have to avoid) we need a good list of what are the conflicts that think tanks could be innovative about. 我讲完了，谢谢，各位。 (I'm done talking, thank you.)

[ENDS]

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Note: The "Joe" Pillsbury referred to was Joseph Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus and former Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, who also attended and spoke at the forum.

CCG Update

October 23-24: World think tankers gather in Beijing

2023 China Think Tank Innovation Forum Oct.23-24,2023 Organized by: Center for China and Globalization (CCG) Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) Supported by: Academy of Contemporary China and World Studies (ACCWS…

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2 days ago · 5 likes · CCG Update

pekingnology.com · by Zichen Wang

12. SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium (Nov 2023) | SOF News

SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium (Nov 2023) | SOF News

sof.news · by Guest · October 24, 2023

Defense Strategies Institute is proud to announce the 12th Annual SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium, occurring this November 29-30 in Tampa, FL. The 2023 Symposium will convene senior leaders and decision makers across the SOF community, regional combatant commands, DoD, nonprofits, and industry to discuss the complexities and multifaceted nature of special operations in the 21st century.

SOF will continue to play an increasingly important role in competition with countries such as China, Russia, and Iran, particularly in irregular warfare. The Symposium will highlight the latest developments across U.S. combatant commands in the realm of special operations and irregular warfare. The integration of intelligence gathering, analysis, and technology in irregular warfare scenarios will be a focal point of discussion. Senior level speakers will delve into a diverse array of topics, addressing the growing importance of information warfare and cyber operations of emerging technologies in irregular warfare contexts.

Speakers.

– Maj. Gen. Michael Martin, USAF, Director, Operations, USSOCOM

– MG Patrick Roberson, USA, Deputy Commanding General, USASOC

– Todd Breasseale, SES, Office of Information Operations, SO/LIC

– William Innes, SES, Deputy Director, Acquisition, USSOCOM

– Tom Searle, PhD, Course Director, Joint Special Operations University

– Col. Rhea Pritchett, USA, PEO Digital Applications, SOF AT&L

Topics.

– Empowering Special Operations: Leading in an Era of Complex Warfare

– Transforming the SOF Enterprise to Achieve the Goals of the NDS

– Harnessing the Power of Information in Modern Warfare

– Developing the AFSOC Force of the Future by Modernizing Capabilities in Contested Environments

– Navigating the 21st Century Battlefield: Adversarial AI and Emerging Tech as a Cyber IW Operation

– Bolstering Deterrence Measures within NATO to Counter the Evolving Challenge of Hybrid Warfare

Info. DSI is now welcoming Sponsors and Exhibitors for the forum. To learn more please contact Amanda Delgado at adelgado@dsigroup.org. Active military and government and state personnel attend complimentary. Those interested in participating in the SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium can visit Defense Strategies Institute’s website at https://sof.dsigroup.org/. Anyone interested in learning more or sending questions contact Erica Noreika at enoreika@dsigroup.org, 201-896-7802.

Contact

Defense Strategies Institute

Erica Noreika

201-896-7802

https://sof.dsigroup.org/

sof.news · by Guest · October 24, 2023

13. Freed Israeli hostage says Hamas treated her well after initial violence

Freed Israeli hostage says Hamas treated her well after initial violence

Reuters

TEL AVIV, Oct 24 (Reuters) - An elderly Israeli hostage who was released by Hamas overnight said she had been beaten by militants as she was taken into Gaza on Oct. 7, but was then treated well during her two-week captivity in the Palestinian enclave.

Yocheved Lifshitz, 85, was one of two women freed late on Monday, leaving around 220 hostages still in the hands of Hamas.

"I've been through hell, we didn't think or know we would get to this situation," she told reporters, seated in a wheelchair outside the Tel Aviv hospital where she was taken following her release.

Looking frail, Lifshitz said she had been put on a motorbike and driven from her kibbutz into nearby Gaza.

Yocheved Lifshitz, 85, an Israeli grandmother who was held hostage in Gaza, speaks to members of the press after being released by Hamas militants, at Ichilov Hospital in Tel Aviv, Israel October 24, 2023. REUTERS/Janis Laizans Acquire Licensing Rights

"When I was on the bike, my head was on one side and the rest of my body on the other side. The young men hit me on the way. They didn't break my ribs but it was painful and I had difficulty breathing."

Once in Gaza, she said her captors took her into tunnels that she compared to a spider's web, and treated her well.

Lifshitz said a doctor had visited her and made sure she and other hostages received the same sort of medicines they had been taking in Israel.

She said the Israeli military had not taken the threat of Hamas seriously enough, and that the costly security fence meant to keep militants out "didn't help at all".

Reporting by Henriette Chacar; Editing by Crispian Balmer and Kevin Liffey

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Reuters

14. IntelBrief: What Follows Hamas in Gaza?

IntelBrief: What Follows Hamas in Gaza? - The Soufan Center

thesoufancenter.org · by Michaela Millender · October 24, 2023

October 24, 2023

AP Photo/Ariel Schalit

Bottom Line Up Front

• Israel plans to remove Hamas from power in the Gaza Strip but plans for the long-term governance of the territory are yet undefined and fraught with significant challenges.
• Israel seeks to avoid a renewed occupation of the Gaza Strip and to cede responsibility for its security and welfare to the Arab states.
• Most experts agree that the optimal solution is for Palestinians to govern the Gaza Strip, but the Palestinian Authority that controls the West Bank remains unpopular, and there are several challenges to its legitimacy.
• It is likely that Hamas, or its derivatives or offshoots, will form an insurgent campaign to regain power or disrupt whatever governing authority is set up in Gaza.

On October 20, Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant outlined Israel’s plan for the removal of Hamas from power in the Gaza Strip and for the security and governance of the territory in the immediate aftermath. The third phase of Israel’s plan, according to Gallant - presumably to be enacted after Hamas is ousted from control - is to create a new “security regime” for Gaza. However, neither he nor any other Israeli officials have specified what entities or bodies might ultimately assume control of the area. All Israeli leaders have stated clearly that Israel does not intend to resume an occupation of the territory. Israel ceded control of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority in 2005, opting to wall the territory off with tight border controls and other defensive security measures. However, the United Nations still considers the territory as Israel-occupied from an international legal point of view. Tel Aviv is responsible for providing utilities to Gaza's residents and controls the borders in and out of the area. Israeli leaders undoubtedly calculate that governing Gaza directly after uprooting Hamas would subject Israel to unending insurgency and unrest, taking Israeli forces and resources away from the other fronts, including the northern border with Lebanon. There, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) face off with the well-armed Iranian ally, Lebanese Hezbollah. Since the crisis began, Israeli leaders have reportedly stated that the Gaza Strip should ultimately become the “responsibility” of the Arab states, without specifying precisely what a longer-term role of the Arab world in Gaza would look like in practice. Presumably, if an Israeli-Palestinian political solution were reached in which a Palestinian state is formed, the Gaza Strip would become a part of that new state.

Most observers agree that, as an end stage, the Palestinian Authority (PA), which still runs the civil administration of the West Bank, is the most viable longer-term successor to Hamas as the governing authority in Gaza. It is difficult to envision any other option that would garner acceptance from the Palestinian population writ large or from Arab states. During his October 18 trip to the region, U.S. President Joe Biden reportedly planned to meet with Jordan’s King Abdullah and PA President Mahmoud Abbas in Amman to discuss an eventual PA assumption of authority in Gaza, but the meeting was canceled after a deadly explosion destroyed part of a Gaza hospital. The PA was in charge in Gaza until 2007, when Hamas, after triumphing in the 2006 legislative elections there, forcibly expelled PA security forces and administrators from the territory. However, the PA has not successfully addressed the problems that led PA members to fare poorly in the 2006 elections – a perception of corrupt rule and failure to produce Israeli concessions in negotiations on a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Moreover, it is not clear that a restoration of PA authority in Gaza produced by the Israeli military’s forcible expulsion of Hamas that, in the process, killed thousands of Palestinian citizens, would be viewed as legitimate by the population in Gaza. And it is unlikely to envision, at any time in the foreseeable future, elections in Gaza that might help determine the leadership preferences of the Gazan population. The moves by several Arab states to normalize relations with Israel without extracting significant Israeli concessions for the Palestinians have served to undermine the PA further. In recent years, Hamas has gained influence in the West Bank, whereas the PA has not appeared to gain adherents in Gaza.

The PA’s crisis of political legitimacy has prompted some experts and international diplomats to suggest that, for an interim period at least, the United Nations might assume a limited and circumscribed mandate for governing Gaza. A precedent exists for UN-backed interim governance, for example, in Kosovo. In Libya, the United Nations supports a governing body based in Tripoli – one of two rival administrations contending for power over the country. It is possible to envision that a group of Arab and outside powers and institutions, including the United States, the European Union (EU), or a smaller grouping of European powers, in concert with the United Nations, could jointly develop a plan to transfer control of Gaza to a UN-backed body and, ultimately, the Palestinian Authority. Whether a joint force could be assembled to secure Gaza during the transition and which countries, if any, would be willing to contribute troops and/or security forces is likely to be the subject of considerable discussion among major stakeholders.

International discussions of a post-Hamas governing authority in Gaza cannot be divorced from the circumstances under which Hamas might be displaced. Removing Hamas’ military and administrative infrastructure from Gaza does not eliminate the ideological fervor for Hamas that has taken root there and which has a level of support among not only Palestinians in Gaza but also in the West Bank and throughout the broader Arab world. An Israeli defeat of Hamas in Gaza will not necessarily remove all Hamas fighters or activists from the territory, and some will remain active underground. It is likely that Hamas fighters who remain in the territory, coupled with supporters among the Gaza population, will conduct a long-term insurgency against any successor governing authority there. Any force or authority, possibly including a restored PA administration in Gaza, faces the prospect of an unending battle with Hamas for control of Gaza and for the future of the Palestinian people more generally. It is likely that, if elections are held in Gaza at some point, Hamas members, or independents loyal to Hamas, might compete and win seats in any governing or legislative body there. Based on its charter and its history, Hamas and other hardliners are sure to oppose any concessions to Israel that a restored PA authority might support in future final status negotiations with Israel.

Yet, if Hamas is defeated by Israel, some enduring benefits might accrue to the Gazan and broader Palestinian population, to Israel, and to the region. An ousted Hamas, even if it remains active as an insurgent group, will likely have difficulty receiving weapons from Iran or other willing suppliers. Its rocket and other arms manufacturing capabilities will be under pressure of discovery and dismantlement by a successor governing authority, although, as previous long-running conflicts have demonstrated, putting a terrorist or insurgent group’s arms beyond use is a massive challenge. Divisions within Hamas are likely to widen if it is ousted as the governing authority in Gaza – some Hamas leaders who have been amenable to possible negotiations on a final status agreement with Israel might be strengthened. Accordingly, Hamas’ militant hardliners who have repeatedly refused to consider recognizing Israel could be marginalized. Still, a forcible removal of Hamas from power by Israel puts Gaza and its population into uncharted territory. A post-Hamas situation in Gaza is likely to consume significant attention from U.S., European, UN, Arab, and other global diplomats for years, perhaps decades to come.

thesoufancenter.org · by Michaela Millender · October 24, 2023

15. America Must Find a Way to Ensure Israel Crushes Hamas without Destroying Gaza

I suppose this is why we deployed Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James Glynn to assist in this area (https://apnews.com/article/israel-military-iran-navy-gaza-1a906598be5baccc614897768b1824a8?)

But can Israel "restore deterrence?" I saw a comment on social media that asked how can you deter someone who is more committed to the death of Jews than protecting their own lives?

Conclusion:

Something analogous must happen now: Israel must be allowed to win militarily in Gaza while giving way to an eventual two-state solution in the West Bank. This is the reality. The Biden Administration, in short, must allow the Israeli military some running room now but then immediately bring pressure to bear on it later. Rarely has such tough love been so challenging to accomplish.

America Must Find a Way to Ensure Israel Crushes Hamas without Destroying Gaza

America needs to find the sweet spot between allowing Israel to restore deterrence without completely flattening Gaza.

The National Interest · by Robert D. Kaplan · October 23, 2023

I agree with Richard Haass that the United States needs to find the sweet spot between allowing Israel to restore deterrence without completely flattening Gaza.

That is harder than it sounds. A ceasefire now would undermine the Israeli state’s reputation for protecting Israeli lives. 1,400 Israelis have been murdered in the most gruesome circumstances, and a further 200 or so taken hostage. No state can allow that to happen on its watch without exacting revenge—not for revenge’s sake, but for making it clear to the perpetrators and their backers that this will not again be tolerated under any circumstances. Whatever they may say publicly, the various Arab leaders will respect Israel less if Israel does not restore deterrence by force. This will not be pretty, as Hamas hides its leaders and fighters among civilians in places like schools and hospitals.

The upshot will be civilian casualties that will enrage the Arab street, no matter how careful Israel is to minimize such casualties. Enraging the Arab street could have consequences. Relatively moderate rulers may be politically undermined, further weakening their ability to do business with Israel.

This is particularly the case in an age of social media when graphic images of suffering civilians in Gaza can stir deep emotions among the Arab public. That is why while the United States must allow Israel the right to restore deterrence, it must later pressure Israel not to conquer Gaza altogether. The problem with conquering Gaza is the day after. Israel should not want to rule Gaza, and finding moderate Palestinian leaders to do so will be extremely difficult since they will be seen as puppets of Israel. Israel withdrew from Gaza nearly two decades ago precisely because it found it impossible to rule Gaza.

With a bigger population and diminishing natural resources, the situation there has only gotten more difficult. Because of this conundrum, the United States will have to pressure both Israel and its neighbors to accept a new reality that denies Gaza to Hamas and protects Israeli security. There may be no way to accomplish this without a new Israeli government willing to accept some sort of a two-state solution. In the course of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Nixon Administration allowed Israel to exact revenge and restore deterrence but then pivoted by fashioning a diplomatic process in which Israel ceded territory it had conquered in the 1967 Six Day War.

Something analogous must happen now: Israel must be allowed to win militarily in Gaza while giving way to an eventual two-state solution in the West Bank. This is the reality. The Biden Administration, in short, must allow the Israeli military some running room now but then immediately bring pressure to bear on it later. Rarely has such tough love been so challenging to accomplish.

Robert D. Kaplan is the Robert Strausz-Hupé Chair in Geopolitics at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is the bestselling author of twenty-one books on foreign affairs and travel translated into many languages, including The Good American, The Revenge of Geography, Asia’s Cauldron, Monsoon, The Coming Anarchy, and Balkan Ghosts. For three decades, he reported on foreign affairs for The Atlantic. He was a member of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board and the U. S. Navy’s Executive Panel. Foreign Policy magazine twice named him one of the world’s “Top 100 Global Thinkers.”

Image: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Robert D. Kaplan · October 23, 2023

16. U.S. Strategic Posture ‘Insufficient’ for Future Threat, Report Finds

Excerpts:

Rose Gottemoeller, commissioner and Hoover Institute research fellow, said some may read the report as an embrace of nuclear warfighting, and an “escalate to deescalate” strategy.

“I think this is total nonsense,” she said. “We clearly express here as a commission a preference to continue to focus on our conventional force posture. Yes, we spend a lot of time talking about nuclear force posture … but we also focused on the need to build up our conventional capabilities as well.”

Lastly, the panel emphasized the importance of allies and partners.

“Strong allies and partners are essential and make us all stronger together,” Creedon said.

Gottemoeller called their role “exceptional,” and that the commission recognized their “importance overall to the security of the United States of America.”

Heinrichs added that both the United States and its allies and partners have long benefited from the stability and order of the systems of alliances and sovereignty of nations.

U.S. Strategic Posture ‘Insufficient’ for Future Threat, Report Finds

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Laura Heckmann

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

JUST IN: U.S. Strategic Posture Called ‘Insufficient’ for Future Threats

10/23/2023

By

iStock illustration

A report from the U.S. Strategic Posture Commission released this month found the United States’ current nuclear forces are not sufficient for future threats posed by China and Russia.

The nation is on the cusp of a “fundamentally different global setting for which we did not plan and we are not well prepared,” Madelyn Creedon, the commission chair of the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and Brookings Institute nonresident senior fellow, said during a Hudson Institute panel discussion Oct. 23.

Rebeccah Heinrichs, a commissioner and Hudson Institute senior fellow, called the difference between the last report in 2009 and the commission’s current findings “dramatic,” including how optimistic the commissioners were 14 years ago about the direction of the threats facing the United States.

“We are facing two nuclear peers and that is unprecedented,” Creedon said. “And so the nation must act now and with a sense of urgency. Steps need to be taken again now to enable both near and longer term decisions.”

The nearly 150-page report offered 81 recommendations, but the panel highlighted, among others, a need to bolster conventional forces and address a dwindling nuclear workforce.

The report’s timeframe examined the last 14 years since the 2009 report with a focus on 2027 to 2035, and the transition phase stretching from present to 2027.

Creedon called out five assumptions she said underpin the report: Russia and China will continue to grow their nuclear arsenals, a ‘one major war’ construct is no longer viable, the foundational tenants of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy remain valid, strong allies and partners are essential, and the U.S. deterrent must be credible.

The United States needs to prepare for the possibility of a two-theater conflict, she said, “even if one of the conflicts is opportunistic. The U.S. defense and nuclear strategy must be implemented to effectively deter and defeat if deterrence fails simultaneous aggression in two theaters.”

According to the report, that makes the execution of the nuclear modernization programs of record “urgent,” which includes the replacement of all U.S. nuclear delivery systems, modernization of their warheads, comprehensive modernization of U.S. nuclear command, control and communications, and recapitalizing the nuclear enterprise infrastructure.

While recognizing the imperative of the modernization strategy, the report also found it wasn’t enough. Avoiding specific numbers, the report recommended increases in the planned number of deployed Long-Range Standoff Weapons, B-21 bombers and Columbia-class submarines.

“We … feel that the currently planned number of Columbia-class submarines is insufficient,” Marshall Billingslea, commissioner and Hudson Institute senior fellow, said during the panel. Current plans call for 12 of the new subs with the first to be delivered in 2031.

He also said a third shipyard is needed to build up capacity.

“We will need to both increase plant production as well as a third shipyard in order to accomplish that,” he said, also noting that the report recommends the current ballistic missile Ohio-class submarines “will need to be extended longer than originally planned.” The report pays “a lot of attention” to the submarine force, “and it’s not in a good place right now,” he added.

The report also touches on the larger submarine industrial base, “and it’s not just the Columbia class,” Creedon said. “It’s also the Virginia-class submarines that, at the moment, are way behind schedule.”

The industrial base that supports both the Defense Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration “is out of date, unusable, or in some case, literally falling down,” Creedon said, adding that both departments are struggling with supply chain issues and “neither have enough capacity to meet future requirements.”

Workforce and supply chains need to be considered, Heinrichs said. “If we’re not doing that, then really all of this is impossible. Or very, very difficult to do.”

Another highlight was the need for increased conventional forces. “Without conventional forces to deter regional wars, the use of nuclear weapons regionally becomes more likely,” Creedon said. “And without significant conventional increases, the U.S. will need to rely more on nuclear weapons, increasing their role, not decreasing their role, as we have sought for years to achieve.”

Rose Gottemoeller, commissioner and Hoover Institute research fellow, said some may read the report as an embrace of nuclear warfighting, and an “escalate to deescalate” strategy.

“I think this is total nonsense,” she said. “We clearly express here as a commission a preference to continue to focus on our conventional force posture. Yes, we spend a lot of time talking about nuclear force posture … but we also focused on the need to build up our conventional capabilities as well.”

Lastly, the panel emphasized the importance of allies and partners.

“Strong allies and partners are essential and make us all stronger together,” Creedon said.

Gottemoeller called their role “exceptional,” and that the commission recognized their “importance overall to the security of the United States of America.”

Heinrichs added that both the United States and its allies and partners have long benefited from the stability and order of the systems of alliances and sovereignty of nations.

“We literally cannot win a long Cold War against the Chinese without our allies,” she said. “They have advantages that we can cooperate with and take advantage of.”

Topics: International

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Laura Heckmann

17. With Their Soldiers Poised to Attack, Israelis Try to Decipher the Delay

Excerpts:

So pervasive is the pall of infighting, paralysis and chaos that Mr. Netanyahu, his defense minister, Yoav Gallant — whom Mr. Netanyahu tried to fire in March — and the military chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, issued an unusual wartime statement on Monday evening assuring a traumatized public that the three were “working in close and full cooperation, around the clock, to lead the state of Israel to a decisive victory,” and professing “total and mutual trust” among them.

Then they appeared together ahead of a security meeting and made more statements — without giving any hint of the timing of a ground invasion.

The show of unity came a day after Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, the chief military spokesman, said in a televised briefing that the army was awaiting a green light from the political echelon to invade Gaza.

With the initial urgency for a ground invasion appearing to have waned, supporters of Mr. Netanyahu have begun a campaign to put on the brakes, spreading a slick, anonymously produced video on social media calling for soldiers’ lives to come first by allowing extra time for the air force to destroy Hamas’s treacherous tunnel system before troops enter Gaza.

Some commentators said that could mean never, since it would likely be impossible to destroy all the tunnels from the air.

With Their Soldiers Poised to Attack, Israelis Try to Decipher the Delay

nytimes.com · by Isabel Kershner · October 23, 2023

Israeli soldiers cleaning the barrel of the tank on Saturday.Credit...Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times

For 17 days, Israeli ground troops and tanks have been on standby, idling in the dusty fields around Gaza. Their stated mission: to invade the Palestinian coastal enclave and destroy the military capabilities of Hamas, the armed Islamist group, and its ability to rule there.

More than two weeks after hundreds of Hamas gunmen surged across the border into Israel, killing more than 1,400 people, most of them civilians, and taking more than 220 hostages back to Gaza, many Israelis have been asking what the government is waiting for.

Various explanations have been put forward.

The United States has been pressuring Israel to hold off to allow more time for hostage negotiations and aid deliveries, and for more U.S. military assets to be deployed to the region. The Israeli news media is filled with reports of differences within the government and between the political leadership and the military. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, long viewed as cautious about military adventures, is thought to be still deciding when — or if — to go ahead.

So pervasive is the pall of infighting, paralysis and chaos that Mr. Netanyahu, his defense minister, Yoav Gallant — whom Mr. Netanyahu tried to fire in March — and the military chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, issued an unusual wartime statement on Monday evening assuring a traumatized public that the three were “working in close and full cooperation, around the clock, to lead the state of Israel to a decisive victory,” and professing “total and mutual trust” among them.

Then they appeared together ahead of a security meeting and made more statements — without giving any hint of the timing of a ground invasion.

The show of unity came a day after Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, the chief military spokesman, said in a televised briefing that the army was awaiting a green light from the political echelon to invade Gaza.

With the initial urgency for a ground invasion appearing to have waned, supporters of Mr. Netanyahu have begun a campaign to put on the brakes, spreading a slick, anonymously produced video on social media calling for soldiers’ lives to come first by allowing extra time for the air force to destroy Hamas’s treacherous tunnel system before troops enter Gaza.

Some commentators said that could mean never, since it would likely be impossible to destroy all the tunnels from the air.

Experts say that the Israeli government and military are struggling with competing considerations and real dilemmas.

“It’s a delicate balance between the advantage of letting the air force do what they do best, and how long you can delay the ground offensive,” said Ehud Yaari, an Israel-based fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The more tunnels the air force destroys, he said, “the easier it will be for the forces on the ground.”

Beyond that, Mr. Yaari said, Israel has been using the time to expand its roster of targets in Gaza by gathering more intelligence and interrogating the scores of Hamas operatives who were captured in Israeli territory.

There are risks to waiting, however.

As the days pass, Israel may encounter an erosion of international support for its actions, as the Palestinian death toll rises and a humanitarian crisis grows still worse in the besieged enclave.

Then there is the morale of the soldiers and reservists being kept in limbo to consider, as well as the impact on the Israeli economy and the state-funded evacuation of tens of thousands of Israelis from the border areas around Gaza and in the far north, where cross-border skirmishes between Israel and Hezbollah, the heavily armed Lebanese Shiite organization, have been intensifying.

“This is not something that can go on and on endlessly,” Mr. Yaari said of the waiting game and the fighting still to come.

The Israeli military, caught off guard by the Oct. 7 attacks, released a statement of its own on Monday evening saying its conscripts and reservists were “conducting a variety of training exercises in order to improve the forces’ readiness and capabilities for ground operations” in Gaza, perhaps in an effort to bring the military more in line with the government in the eyes of the public.

Israel has also been trying to assess the chances of Hezbollah setting off a full-blown conflagration on the northern front once the Israeli military is bogged down in Gaza, or even a broader conflict involving Iran and its proxies in the region.

Mr. Netanyahu came into this crisis at a low point in his career, fighting corruption charges in court as his far-right and religiously ultraconservative government sought to curb the powers of the judiciary, spurring months of mass protests in the deeply divided country.

He has since brought political rivals into his government to bolster public confidence and has formed a small war cabinet that includes more experienced and professional decision makers.

Still, there is bad blood between the senior members. In March, Mr. Netanyahu fired Mr. Gallant, the defense minister, after he openly criticized the government’s judicial overhaul plan. He reinstated the defense minister weeks later under intense public pressure.

Benny Gantz, the leader of a centrist party and a former military chief who left the opposition to join the war cabinet, has his own unhappy history with Mr. Netanyahu, who reneged on a power-sharing agreement with him in 2020.

“He was always risk-averse,” Amos Harel, the military affairs analyst for the left-leaning Haaretz newspaper, said in an interview of Mr. Netanyahu, who has been in power for 16 years altogether. “He is in the worst place in his political life, and going into Gaza is the biggest strategic gamble ever,” he added.

Recent opinion polls have shown that the Israeli public has far more faith in its army than in the government. There is a consensus among Israelis after the atrocities of Oct. 7 that they will not feel safe until the threat of Hamas is removed from their doorstep, even if the details of how to achieve that remain vague.

On a recent weekday, Itai Indig, an English teacher, was staging a one-man protest opposite the military and Defense Ministry headquarters in Tel Aviv, with a homemade sign with a caricature depicting President Biden pressing Israel’s leaders into submission. The American president, he suggested, had nixed a ground invasion.

“Biden is now running our cabinet,” Mr. Indig fumed. “If we don’t go into Gaza now, it will be 10 times worse the next time.”

A passer-by, Elisheva Picker, stopped to argue with him. “To go in now will mean so many more dead,” she said. “And what about the hostages?”

Many Israelis dread a ground invasion but view it as inevitable.

Mr. Harel said the shock of Oct. 7 had heightened public tolerance for the prospect of Israeli soldiers coming home in coffins. “People are more willing to risk a massive military operation, even if it means an unusual number of casualties,” he said.

“On the other hand,” Mr. Harel said, “I’m not sure they could stomach another failure.”

Our Coverage of the Israel-Hamas War

• A Looming Invasion: The Biden administration has advised Israel to delay a ground invasion of Gaza, hoping to buy time for hostage negotiations and to allow more humanitarian aid to reach Palestinians, according to U.S. officials.
• Smashed Assumptions: The sudden and unexpected terror attack by Hamas in Israel has been a crushing blow to a host of assumptions that have defined the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for years. Here are four paradigms now in shatters.
• Risking a Wide War: As Israeli forces massed along the border with Gaza, escalating clashes on Israel’s northern border with Lebanon, as well as strikes in Syria and in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, intensified fears of a widening regional conflict.
• Hostages: Two Americans held captive in Gaza by Hamas, a woman and her teenage daughter, were released on Oct. 20, nearly two weeks after they were taken hostage along with 200 others during terrorist raids in southern Israel that ignited the war.
• Humanitarian Aid: After days of diplomatic wrangling, the first trucks carrying food, water and medical supplies crossed into Gaza, in an attempt to stem the growing humanitarian crisis in the enclave.
• Evacuation of Gaza: As Israel prepared to invade the Gaza Strip, it told 1.1 million people in the northern part of the territory to head south for their own safety. But as strikes later intensified in southern cities, few safe options remained.

The Conflict’s Global Reach

• A Threat for Global Growth: As the conflict roils the markets, worries are growing about how much the turmoil could cost the global economy.
• In the United States: President Biden delivered remarks on the wars between Israel and Hamas, and Ukraine and Russia, in a prime-time address that called for military and economic aid to Israel and Ukraine in the interest of global stability and national security.
• Fury in the Middle East: Amid widespread protests in the region, the carnage in Gaza has unified the Arab world and brought a new outpouring of support for the Palestinian quest for a state.
• Cultural Events: Multiple events highlighting Palestinian culture, society and politics, including at the Frankfurt Book Fair, have been called off or put on hold since the war began.

nytimes.com · by Isabel Kershner · October 23, 2023

18. Pentagon outlines multiple Chinese attack plans for Taiwan

Excerpts:

“The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains,” the annual assessment concludes.

One new weapons system near Taiwan disclosed in the report is a long-range multiple rocket artillery system that was tested during war games held near Taiwan in August 2022. Military analyst Tom Shugart said the new rocket system allows the PLA to target the entire island of Taiwan from areas along the Chinese mainland coast.

“This means the PLA [army] can hit those key spots with much larger numbers of rockets, requiring less help from the PLA [air force] or the PLA [rocket force] and saving those services’ munitions for targets further afield,” Mr. Shugart, with the Center for New American Security said in a post on social media. “It’s just one of a number of invasion-related capabilities the PLA practiced using.”

...

According to the report, China now has an estimated 420,000 troops near Taiwan, an increase of 4,000 troops from last year. By comparison, Taiwan’s armed forces consist of 89,000 troops.

PLA naval forces near Taiwan also grew with the addition of an amphibious assault ship to the two existing cross-strait assault ships. Added warships near Taiwan included two cruisers, and six destroyers, that were added to the existing force three cruisers, and 24 destroyers.

Air forces added to the area include 50 fighters for a force of 750 jets and 50 bombers for a force of 300 bombers. Air transports near Taiwan increased by 20 aircraft for a total of 40 planes used for intelligence collection, airborne warning and control and surveillance.

Chinese rocket forces that likely would be used in a conflict over Taiwan also grew sharply over the past year, the report said. The number of intercontinental-range missiles grew from 300 to 350 missiles, and intermediate-range missiles were doubled from 250 to 500, the report said.

Medium-range missiles, those with ranges of between 620 and 1,800 miles also increased with the fielding of 500 additional missiles to a total force of 1,000 missiles.

Short-range missiles also increased from 600 last year to 1,000 today, and ground-launched cruise missile forces added 50 new launchers for its 300 land-attack missiles.

Pentagon outlines multiple Chinese attack plans for Taiwan

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

By - The Washington Times - Monday, October 23, 2023

China’s military is building up forces for an attack on Taiwan that could take place in the coming years as part of a campaign by President Xi Jinping for “national rejuvenation,” according to the latest Pentagon’s annual report on the Chinese military.

The report, based on declassified intelligence from the Defense Intelligence Agency, military and other spy services, provides the most detailed U.S. government assessment made public to date of Chinese plans for military action against the self-ruled, democratic island Beijing claims as its territory.

China “continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan” while asserting it seeks a peaceful solution to cross-strait ties, the report noted.

China increased political and military pressure on Taiwan last year that continued this year with stepped-up provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, the report said.

“The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains,” the annual assessment concludes.

One new weapons system near Taiwan disclosed in the report is a long-range multiple rocket artillery system that was tested during war games held near Taiwan in August 2022. Military analyst Tom Shugart said the new rocket system allows the PLA to target the entire island of Taiwan from areas along the Chinese mainland coast.

“This means the PLA [army] can hit those key spots with much larger numbers of rockets, requiring less help from the PLA [air force] or the PLA [rocket force] and saving those services’ munitions for targets further afield,” Mr. Shugart, with the Center for New American Security said in a post on social media. “It’s just one of a number of invasion-related capabilities the PLA practiced using.”

The People’s Liberation Army is planning a range of operations, including cyberattacks, a naval blockade around Taiwan and multiple types of “kinetic” military attacks. The goal of the operations would be to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification with the mainland, or to compel Taiwanese leaders to negotiate on Beijing’s terms.

Deterring the U.S.

A key element of PLA strategy is to deter anticipated U.S. military intervention on behalf of Taiwan.

The failure to prevent U.S. entry into a future Taiwan conflict would result in a “limited war of short duration” designed to delay or defeat U.S. and allied military intervention.

President Biden has said several times that U.S. military forces would intervene to defend Taiwan against a Chinese military attack, a flat statement that the White House insists does not represent a shift in official U.S. policy.

The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act requires the president to notify Congress of threats to Taiwan, and states that “the president and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.”

The Pentagon report said in the event of a protracted war over Taiwan, the PLA might escalate the conflict with major cyberattacks, attacks against satellites, or “nuclear activities” designed to win. It may also seek just to fight to a stalemate and seek a political settlement.

The report lists several options likely being offered to Mr. Xi singly or in combination, with varying degrees of risk for the ruling Chinese Communist Party.

Beijing’s leaders regard taking over Taiwan, which broke with the mainland when Nationalist forces fled to the island in 1949 after China‘s civil war, as central to Mr. Xi’s ideology-driven program of national rejuvenation.

A key part of the rejuvenation campaign is to take Taiwan by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the CCP. Rejuvenation is also based on Mr. Xi’s vision for China becoming a superpower, a status that he has said requires a “full reunification.”

Tensions remain high across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait.

Adm. John Aquilino, commander of the Indo Pacific Command, said recently that China is studying conflicts in both Ukraine and Israel for lessons that might apply to designs for a military move against Taiwan.

U.S. forces in the region include two aircraft carrier strike groups and other military forces tasked with two missions, Adm. Aquilino said — to deter China from attacking Taiwan or to defeat and win a war if deterrence fails.

“The PLA practiced elements of each of these military options during its August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the United States,” the new Pentagon report said.

The first option would be a PLA air and maritime blockade designed to cut off vital imports to Taiwan and force Taipei to capitulate. The joint blockade would use large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands close to the mainland coast.

The PLA air and naval forces would conduct blockade operations for weeks or months if needed, and electronic warfare, networks and other information warfare would be used to isolate Taiwan and control an international narrative about the conflict.

A second option would involve the limited use of force or coercive options including disruptive, punitive, or lethal military attacks in a small-scale operation. That operation would be backed by overt and clandestine economic and political operations to shape global views and undermine Taiwan authorities’ legitimacy.

As during a blockade, the PLA would use computer network attacks along with limited military strikes on political, military, and economic infrastructure in Taiwan. The objective: create fear in Taiwan and degrade popular confidence in the government.

In limited operations, the plans call for PLA special operations commandos to infiltrate Taiwan and carry out sabotage attacks on infrastructure or leadership targets.

A third option outlined in the report would deploy major warplane and missile attacks. This option calls for using precision missile and airstrikes on key targets such as government facilities. Military targets will include strikes on air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets and communications facilities.

Fourth, the PLA is planning an amphibious invasion along the lines set forth in previous military writings.

“The most prominent of these, the joint island landing campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for [electronic warfare], logistics, air and naval support,” the report said. The object would be to break down shore defenses on Taiwan and build up combat power on the western coast and seize key targets.

A key element of the amphibious assault would be the use of civilian car ferries, an option tested in October 2022 when seven ferries took part in military landing drills on Chinese beaches.

Practice for this option took place in August 2022, when the PLA conducted short-notice military drills to protest the visit by then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan.

The joint exercises at the time practiced PLA gaining air, maritime and information “superiority,” the report said.

“A large-scale amphibious invasion would be one of the most complicated and difficult military operations for the PLA, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support,” the report said. “It would likely strain the [Chinese] armed forces and invite a strong international response.”

Risks for Xi

The report said the difficulties that would involve the loss of large numbers of PLA forces, likely urban warfare and Taiwan counterinsurgency pose a significant political and military risk for Mr. Xi and the ruling Communist Party, the report said.

The last option for the PLA would be a campaign of small island takeovers. These PLA activities would be amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion.

Taiwan has 22 islands west of the main island, some of which were targeted by PLA artillery during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis.

“With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the [South China Sea], such as Pratas or Itu Aba,” the report said. “A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island, such as Matsu or Kinmen, is also within the PLA’s capabilities.”

Small island invasions would show PLA military capability and political resolve while making territorial gain at the same time demonstrating restraint, the report said. But the political risks for China would still be high, since the seizures would galvanize pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan and increase international opposition to Beijing.

The report said that Beijing’s calculations for an attack focus on leadership perceptions of domestic and international support for military action, the impact of sanctions following an attack, and whether the PLA invasion will achieve its objectives.

The Pentagon said Chinese forces increased their posture along the Taiwan Strait with new weapons, mobile forces and rapid strike capabilities.

Recent stepped-up training for amphibious attack shows Taiwan remains a high-priority target for the PLA, the report said. PLA army training operations last year sought to refine the military’s rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault plans designed for Taiwan attacks.

The PLA navy “is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and [anti-submarine warfare] capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war.”

Attack by air

Air power includes large numbers of advanced aircraft that can strike targets in Taiwan without refueling. The attack capability was described in the report as significant.

Missile forces are ready for attacks on leadership targets, command and control facilities, air bases and radar sites, the report said.

“As of 2023, the [PLA Rocket Force] is increasing its presence along the Taiwan Strait with new missile brigades, possibly indicating an increasing number of deployed missiles,” the report said.

The relatively new PLA strategic support force would launch electronic and cyberspace attacks against Taiwan in a conflict.

The report said Taiwan’s ability to deter a mainland attack continues to erode, although Ukraine’s success in turning back the first waves of Russia’s invasion last year prompted Taipei to explore asymmetric warfare tools to counter growing PLA power.

The island government is building war reserve stocks, improving defense industry and practicing joint operations and crisis response efforts. But the improvements “only partially address its defense challenges,” the report said, adding that the military is struggling with equipment and readiness problems.

Chinese military forces added ground, air and naval forces opposite Taiwan, according to a comparison of the deployments from last year’s report.

The forces are deployed with the eastern and southern theater commands that would be involved in what the report said would be “direct action” operations against the island.

For example, the People’s Liberation Army added one combined arms brigade near Taiwan for a total of 31 brigades each with up to 5,000 troops. The brigades include six capable of conducting amphibious operations.

According to the report, China now has an estimated 420,000 troops near Taiwan, an increase of 4,000 troops from last year. By comparison, Taiwan’s armed forces consist of 89,000 troops.

PLA naval forces near Taiwan also grew with the addition of an amphibious assault ship to the two existing cross-strait assault ships. Added warships near Taiwan included two cruisers, and six destroyers, that were added to the existing force three cruisers, and 24 destroyers.

Air forces added to the area include 50 fighters for a force of 750 jets and 50 bombers for a force of 300 bombers. Air transports near Taiwan increased by 20 aircraft for a total of 40 planes used for intelligence collection, airborne warning and control and surveillance.

Chinese rocket forces that likely would be used in a conflict over Taiwan also grew sharply over the past year, the report said. The number of intercontinental-range missiles grew from 300 to 350 missiles, and intermediate-range missiles were doubled from 250 to 500, the report said.

Medium-range missiles, those with ranges of between 620 and 1,800 miles also increased with the fielding of 500 additional missiles to a total force of 1,000 missiles.

Short-range missiles also increased from 600 last year to 1,000 today, and ground-launched cruise missile forces added 50 new launchers for its 300 land-attack missiles.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2023 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

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19. US defense department to send delegation to Xiangshan forum

A good man: "Chad Sbragia, who led the U.S. delegation in 2019 when the Xiangshan Forum was last held in person."

US defense department to send delegation to Xiangshan forum - China Daily

Reuters

BEIJING, Oct 24 (Reuters) - The U.S. defense department will send a delegation to attend China's regional security dialogue, the Xiangshan forum, state media China Daily reported on Tuesday.

The registered attendees from the U.S. sides include Xanthi Carras, the Country Director for China in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from the Department of Defense, and Chad Sbragia, who led the U.S. delegation in 2019 when the Xiangshan Forum was last held in person, according to China Daily.

More than 90 countries and international organisations have confirmed they will send delegations to the forum, which will be held in Beijing from Oct. 29-31, China Central Television reported Tuesday.

Reporting by Albee Zhang and Ryan Woo; Editing by Christian Schmollinger

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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20. Army may add electronic warfare training as early as boot camp

Fascinating. This is modern basic training (as well as advanced training throughout a soldier's career).

The Army is a learning organization. It really is a smart move to try to instill an "EW mindset" into the culture of the soldier so that they have it from the beginning. Just we we learned the 3- 5 second rush in basic training (I am up, he sees me, I am down) we need to instill the equivalent mindset for EW.

Excerpts:

According to Armstrong, combat in Ukraine is proof that all soldiers need to learn the basics of electromagnetic warfare — or EW — to not be spotted, tracked and attacked, either directly or electronically. To meet that need, the cyber school is working to bring a curriculum on electronic warfare training soldiers to every soldier that needs it, from infantry to armor to supply troops in the rear, beginning as early as boot camp.

The first step is a pilot program by the Cyber School in collaboration with Infantry, Armor, and Ranger Schools at Fort Moore. The program will look at adding EW training to basic training, Primary Military Education when soldiers learn their jobs and in combat maneuver exercises throughout their careers.

Army may add electronic warfare training as early as boot camp

From battlefield radios to Bluetooth trackers on supplies and equipment, soldiers may start training on electromagnetic warfare skills as early as basic training.

BY PATTY NIEBERG | PUBLISHED OCT 23, 2023 4:17 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg · October 23, 2023

Three basic battlefield skills all soldiers learn early in their training is to “shoot, move and communicate.” But in the modern battlefield, firing a weapon or using a radio is almost certain to light up a sensor, reveal a soldier’s location and perhaps lead to fatal consequences for units, said Maj. James Armstrong, an instructor at the U.S. Army Cyber School.

“Just like your artillery has a very big audible visual signature when it lights up, so does your radio,“ said Armstrong. “It doesn’t mean that you just turn everything off and don’t talk. It means you’ve got to be smart about how you use it.”

According to Armstrong, combat in Ukraine is proof that all soldiers need to learn the basics of electromagnetic warfare — or EW — to not be spotted, tracked and attacked, either directly or electronically. To meet that need, the cyber school is working to bring a curriculum on electronic warfare training soldiers to every soldier that needs it, from infantry to armor to supply troops in the rear, beginning as early as boot camp.

The first step is a pilot program by the Cyber School in collaboration with Infantry, Armor, and Ranger Schools at Fort Moore. The program will look at adding EW training to basic training, Primary Military Education when soldiers learn their jobs and in combat maneuver exercises throughout their careers.

The first students in the new program will be junior officers in a Captain’s Career Course at Fort Moore that began this month. Cyber officials said elements of the EW training may eventually make their way into the Army’s Ranger, infantry and armor schools.

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Along with obvious examples like battlefield radios that emit signatures on the electromagnetic spectrum, cyber-focused troops are focusing on weaknesses up and down the supply chain: supply soldiers with communications equipment that order and track supplies; Logistics troops using devices that are put onto Conex shipping containers for tracking; and medical units utilizing telemedicine communications for patients.

“The ubiquitous nature of communications, the dependencies of the electromagnetic spectrum means that we and our adversaries are at risk,” said Todd Boudreau, Deputy Commandant of the U.S. Army Cyber School. The electromagnetic spectrum includes any device that connects wirelessly like technology that uses Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular or radar.

CW5 Travis Ysen, Cyber Regimental Chief Warrant Officer said the Army’s survivability comes down to risk management. “There’s no hiding, so we got to protect ourselves through electromagnetic protection. We’ve got to manage our risk signature, Ysen said.

The plan is not to make regular soldiers into EW experts but instead help all current soldiers understand how EW threats affect their missions, Boudreau said.

The Army stood up its first electromagnetic warfare MOS in 2010, and standardized the positions in 2017 into cyber and EW-specific MOSs. Current EW soldiers are trained as 17E Electromagnetic Warfare Specialist for enlisted soldiers, 170B Electromagnetic Warfare Technician for warrant officers and 17B Cyber Electromagnetic Warfare Officer for military officers.

The Cyber School at Fort Eisenhower, Georgia is developing The Total Army Electromagnetic Warfare and Counter-EW Training and Education Strategy for teaching and training soldiers across all levels of the Army. The plan is to publish the framework in 2024.

The education push comes after the Army’s EW training waned from the lack of use in Afghanistan and Iraq. As priorities shifted, so did funding for this type of instruction, Boudreau said. Now the Army is trying to build its EW arsenal back up to compete with more technology-savvy adversaries like Russia which has demonstrated its capabilities in Ukraine with detection and targeting of Ukrainian military assets.

One of the takeaways from the war in Ukraine is the need for soldiers’ professional education to include the risks and vulnerabilities of the equipment they use, Armstrong said.

The training will also be essential for the Defense Department’s latest push to incorporate commercial off-the-shelf technology with the Replicator initiative, which aims to field thousands of cheap, reusable autonomous systems in the next two years. The Army is working with Congress on funding, systems and programs towards the new strategy, but Boudreau did not offer specific details.

EW use cases for the replicator initiative may include using commercial drones and commercial frequencies to “blend in” on the electromagnetic spectrum, he said.

“How do we hide in the noise that’s already there? Then similarly how do we disintegrate and dislocate and dissemble ourselves and capabilities across a wider physical space to make it harder, to see, to make it harder to identify,” Boudreau said.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg · October 23, 2023

21. Not all in China’s military view Taiwan, the West as primary threat

Some good information operations from China? Certainly we want to believe this.

Not all in China’s military view Taiwan, the West as primary threat

Al Jazeera English · by Frederik Kelter

In August, Chinese fighter jets took off from China’s eastern coast and roared across the Taiwan Strait to engage in military drills with Chinese warships around the self-ruled island of Taiwan.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has committed to unifying Taiwan with mainland China and the mobilisation of planes and ships is part of increasingly frequent military exercises as Beijing practises the use of force in ending Taiwan’s separateness – should it be necessary.

How prepared is Taiwan for a war with China?

A month before the exercises, Chinese leader Xi Jinping had toured the military’s regional headquarters in Nanjing and told his armed forces of their need for courage and the ability to fight.

Xi said that enhanced war planning, a strengthened command structure and stepped-up training would ensure that China’s military could not only fight but also win in a fight with Taiwan.

Taiwan is not the only rival that China considers in terms of future conflict. The West is in Beijing’s sights too.

But some members of China’s People’s Liberation Army do not share the same concerns as their country’s political leaders in terms of potential enemies, friends and relatives of members of the country’s armed forces told Al Jazeera.

“In a larger sense President Xi wants China to be prepared for a struggle against the so-called Western world,” said Christina Chen, a research fellow at the Taiwanese security think tank Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR).

‘A strong China will threaten their power’

Chinese society has witnessed a rise in nationalism and anti-Western sentiment in recent years.

Western companies have struggled in the face of new government restrictions on their business practices and the public is growing more suspicious and hostile towards foreign entities and influences.

In the military, hostility towards the West is being inculcated in recruits, too.

Song Chun* from Zhanjiang in southern China told Al Jazeera how since joining the military her cousin now believes that China must be far more aggressive towards Taiwan’s separatists and the United States.

“He also said to me that the West, and especially the United States, wants to weaken China because they are afraid that a strong China will threaten their power,” the 36-year-old said.

But the military is not monolithic. Relatives and friends of current and former members of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) told Al Jazeera that some in China’s military disagree with casting the West as Beijing’s foremost enemy and preparing the country for future conflicts that it might not win.

Selena Fu from Quanzhou in eastern China has a cousin and uncle in the military. Like many people in China, Fu said, neither of them holds hostile views towards Taiwan or Western countries.

Though such sentiments would be unwelcome among PLA leaders and the central government, the 29-year-old believes her two relatives are not alone in their positive opinions of the West nor in their scepticism that a victory would be assured should tension turn to conflict with the US.

“There are officers, like them, that also believe that if war breaks out, the Chinese military won’t win,” Fu said.

But, the Chinese military wants their officers and recruits to “believe what they tell them to believe”, she said.

Yang Zi, a PhD student at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, whose research has focused on Chinese security issues, agreed that there are differing views on strategic threats among personnel within the Chinese armed forces.

That has led Xi to initiate numerous “indoctrination campaigns” to ensure that members of the military align their thinking with the Central Military Commission’s views on external threats, Zi told Al Jazeera.

But such indoctrination campaigns have failed to align the views of officers like Fu’s uncle and cousin with those of the central leadership.

“They don’t see anyone looking to invade China, so it makes no sense that the Chinese military have to be ready to fight now,” she said.

Her uncle is stationed at a naval base in Fuzhou, and Fu describes him as someone who generally holds quite positive views of the Western world.

“And he still stays in touch with a couple of American friends that he met when he was younger,” she said.

Fu insists that her uncle’s relationship with friends in the US does not make him unpatriotic.

“He doesn’t want war to break out between America and China and he thinks the best way to do that is by maintaining relations,” she said.

China’s military ‘serves a political party, not the nation’

James Shih from Wuhan has a close friend who works with China’s military logistics as a supply coordinator.

Like Fu’s uncle and cousin, Shih’s friend does not view Western countries as a threat to China and sees it as a mistake that China cut most military engagement with Washington after then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan last year, infuriating Beijing.

According to Shih, his friend believes that China’s military would operate better and develop faster if it had access to experiences from abroad.

“He told me that a much bigger threat to China is no cooperation with the West because it will be harder for China’s military to modernise,” Shih explained.

According to Yang from Nanyang University, Xi fears that officers with such unaligned perspectives might coalesce into a faction that could challenge his hold over the Chinese military.

The PLA was, after all, founded primarily to provide unconditional military support for the CCP.

“Unlike in other countries, the Chinese military serves a political party, not the nation,” said Chen from INDSR.

The removal of the influential retired PLA Air Force General Liu Yazhou, who advocated for political reforms and cautioned against an invasion of Taiwan, illustrates Xi’s zero-tolerance stance against dissenting views, according to Yang.

Liu Yazhou was removed along with Xu Zhongbo from their leading roles in the military’s elite rocket force which oversees China’s conventional and nuclear missiles.

The following month China’s defence minister Li Shangfu disappeared from the public eye.

According to Chen, such shakeups indicate that Xi does not completely trust the Chinese armed forces. In some ways, that sentiment is mutual, according to Fu from Quanzhou.

“People in the military like my uncle and cousin do not trust that the government can lead China to victory in a potential invasion of Taiwan,” Fu said.

Shih from Wuhan agreed, noting that pressure from Beijing will only push Taiwan and the US to grow closer in the future.

In terms of adversaries, Shih’s friend in the Chinese armed forces also believes that the US has “a lot of allies and a lot more fighting experience than China”.

The US has participated in several military engagements in recent decades, while the PLA has not seen actual combat since it fought a short border war against Vietnam in 1979.

Shih’s friend does not believe that China will win if it starts a fight with Taiwan, which is supported by the US and its allies.

Fu agrees, recounting how her officer uncle once recited a quote to her from the famous Chinese general, Sun Tzu, who lived in the 6th century BC:

“If a battle can’t be won, don’t fight it.”

“My uncle believes those words apply in the Taiwan Strait today,” Fu said.

“So why prepare for a battle over Taiwan that we are going to lose?”

*The names of sources were changed to respect their requests for anonymity given the sensitivity of the topic.

Al Jazeera English · by Frederik Kelter

22. China Dismisses Defense Minister Amid Swirl of Speculation

China Dismisses Defense Minister Amid Swirl of Speculation

nytimes.com · by Chris Buckley · October 24, 2023

Gen. Li Shangfu, China’s former defense minister. Credit...Vincent Thian/Associated Press

Just four months ago, China’s defense minister, Gen. Li Shangfu, was at a forum for regional officials in Singapore, serving as the face of his country’s bold vision for reshaping Asia’s balance of power. He cast China as a force for stability and accused the United States of stirring trouble in the region, suggesting that its leaders should “mind your own business.”

Now, General Li has been dismissed after nearly two months out of public view — the latest example of China’s capricious rules of power under the strongman leader Xi Jinping.

China’s announcement on Tuesday ended some uncertainty about General Li’s professional fate but leaves open questions about whether he is being investigated for any offenses. Officials in the United States had earlier said that Chinese authorities had placed him under investigation for corruption.

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nytimes.com · by Chris Buckley · October 24, 2023

23. China’s top diplomat to visit D.C. amid tensions over South China Sea, Israel

China’s top diplomat to visit D.C. amid tensions over South China Sea, Israel

The Washington Post · by Michael Birnbaum · October 23, 2023

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will visit Washington this week, the State Department said Monday, the highest-level visit by a Chinese official since tensions spiked early this year after a Chinese spy balloon floated across American airspace.

The three days of meetings, starting Thursday, are the latest sign that Beijing is laying the groundwork for a possible visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to a summit of Asia-Pacific leaders in San Francisco next month, which would be his first trip to the United States since 2017.

It comes as the Biden administration seeks to use every lever it can to pressure Iran to hold back from the conflict between Israel and Hamas, including by encouraging Beijing, a major partner of Tehran, to use its influence.

Wang will meet with Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who visited Beijing in June as the first of a series of trips to China by cabinet secretaries this summer. He also plans to meet with national security adviser Jake Sullivan, following two days of talks in Malta in mid-September. A senior administration official declined to comment about whether Wang will also have an audience with President Biden, although that would be typical, especially after Blinken met Xi in China during his visit.

The two sides have been trying to manage tensions after a process of re-engagement began this summer, although there have been sharp detours, including when Biden called Xi a “dictator” shortly after the secretary of state returned from China. Beijing has sided with Moscow in its war against Ukraine, although it has held back from unleashing the full might of its military industry in support of the Kremlin.

China is also making major investments in its military, according to a Pentagon report released last week, including a doubling of its operational nuclear warheads by the end of the decade. The report noted a deterioration of military communications between Beijing and Washington, despite a spate of close calls between U.S. and Chinese military aircraft over the South China Sea.

Just this weekend, a Chinese Coast Guard ship collided with a Philippine resupply ship near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, where Beijing’s territorial claims have led to clashes with neighbors and Washington.

“We are in competition with China. We seek to manage that competition responsibly,” a senior administration official said, speaking to reporters on the condition of anonymity to speak candidly.

U.S. officials say they have few illusions about Chinese behavior. Xi rolled out the red carpet for Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing last week, and the senior administration official called the Chinese Coast Guard behavior “destabilizing and dangerous and irresponsible.”

Despite the rivalry with the United States, China’s economic and political influence is still crucial as Washington seeks to influence events elsewhere in the world.

Blinken called Wang earlier this month as he crisscrossed the Middle East, seeking to get China to weigh in with the Iranians to hold them back from entering the conflict in Israel and Gaza. Hezbollah, the Lebanese political and militant group that is backed by Iran, has been lobbing rockets into Israel and senior U.S. officials are deeply concerned about the prospect of a two-front war if Tehran decides to up the pressure.

China, with its significant economic ties in the Middle East, has become an increasingly important diplomatic actor in the region, brokering the recent détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. U.S. officials said they hope Beijing can use that muscle again in the service of preventing a regional war, which they fear could be triggered by a potential Israeli ground invasion into densely-populated Gaza and the significant civilian casualties that would likely result.

John Hudson contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Michael Birnbaum · October 23, 2023

24. Elite Universities Face Donor Revolt Over Mideast Conflict

Elite Universities Face Donor Revolt Over Mideast Conflict

Some wealthy alums say response to Hamas attacks was final straw after years of growing disenchantment

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/education/elite-universities-face-donor-revolt-over-mid-east-conflict-6c93662f?mod=hp_lead_pos4

By 

Rachel Louise Ensign

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Oct. 24, 2023 5:30 am ET

David Magerman was in Israel celebrating a holiday by dancing with a Torah in synagogue when Hamas attacked the country earlier this month. When his alma mater, the University of Pennsylvania, put out a statement a few days later that called the assault “horrific” but didn’t explicitly condemn Hamas, he was incensed. 

Magerman, a hedge-fund veteran turned venture capitalist who has donated millions to the school, has since cut his ties with Penn. “I was just pushed over the edge by the equivocation of the response,” he said.

Top universities such as Harvard and Penn are facing backlash from alumni angry about the schools’ reactions to the attacks and their aftermath. The alumni say their schools didn’t move quickly and forcefully enough to condemn Hamas and denounce antisemitism after the Oct. 7 attacks, and that they have done a poor job since then protecting Jewish students as on-campus tensions rise.

Some say it was the final straw after years of growing disenchantment with the schools over what they see as a leftward political shift. Many big donors have announced plans to stop giving or said they are reconsidering future gifts. 

UNIVERSITIES IN THE SPOTLIGHT

Some prominent figures who have spoken out over the response to Hamas attacks at major institutions:

Harvard University

• Leslie Wexner, retail billionaire
• Mitt Romney, Utah senator
• Seth Klarman, hedge-fund manager
• Bill Helman, venture capitalist

University of Pennsylvania

• Marc Rowan, private-equity CEO
• Jon Huntsman Jr., former Utah governor
• Ronald Lauder, cosmetics tycoon
• Dick Wolf, television producer
• Cliff Asness, hedge-fund manager
• Jonathon Jacobson, investment manager

See more...

The pullback could dent the finances of some universities that rely on big givers to fill their coffers. People giving $1 million or more made up less than 1% of donors but 57% of total donations across surveyed U.S. universities, according to a study by the Council for Advancement and Support of Education covering the fiscal year ended June 30, 2022. 

At Harvard, more than 30 student groups signed a letter laying blame for Hamas’s violence on Israel’s treatment of Palestinians over decades. University leaders, including new President Claudine Gay, wrote on Oct. 9 to the Harvard community that they were “heartbroken by the death and destruction unleashed by the attack by Hamas.” The statement attracted criticism from former Harvard President Larry Summers and others for not distancing Harvard from the student groups’ stance and for not explicitly condemning Hamas. 

On Oct. 10, Gay followed up with a note explicitly condemning “the terrorist atrocities perpetrated by Hamas” and saying student groups don’t speak for Harvard. She shared another statement via video two days later.

Retail billionaire Leslie Wexner’s foundation said it would cut financial ties with Harvard and end a program it funded at the school for Israelis. Wexner and his wife have donated more than $42 million to the Cambridge, Mass., university. 

More than 30 student groups at Harvard signed a letter laying blame for Hamas’s violence on Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. PHOTO: JOSEPH PREZIOSO/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

On Monday, a group of prominent alumni including Mitt Romney and investors Seth Klarman and Bill Helman published an open letter to Harvard criticizing the school’s leadership in what they described as an increasingly hostile environment for Harvard’s Jewish students. The group outlined steps it said the school should take, such as restricting campus protests to enrolled students and creating and making mandatory a semester-long class on critical thinking and fact-finding. “We fear that history is on the verge of repeating itself,” the letter said. 

Penn faces perhaps the biggest donor revolt. Prominent alumni such as cosmetics tycoon Ronald Lauder and 

Apollo Global Management

 chief executive Marc Rowan had already clashed with the school last month when it hosted a Palestinian literary festival they believed showed the university was tolerant of antisemitism.  

Top school officials released a statement condemning antisemitism ahead of the literary festival. Following the Hamas attacks, University President Liz Magill wrote on Oct. 10: “We are devastated by the horrific assault on Israel by Hamas that targeted civilians and the taking of hostages over the weekend.”

On Oct. 15, she issued a follow-up statement condemning Hamas.  

“When the university wants to say something, it knows how and it can say it forcefully,” Rowan, chair of the board of advisers at Penn’s Wharton School, told The Wall Street Journal. “And the university doesn’t seem to be able to find its voice with respect to antisemitism.” Rowan said he was disturbed when he saw Magill post about her dog on Instagram the weekend of the attacks. 

He said the response to the Hamas attacks was a departure from the school’s strong condemnations of the killing of George Floyd and the Supreme Court’s overturning of Roe v. Wade.  

Rowan, who has donated more than $50 million to Penn, has said he won’t give more unless Magill and Board of Trustees Chair Scott Bok step down. 

Jon Huntsman Jr. sent Magill a letter saying that his family is halting contributions. One of the most prominent buildings on campus is named after his father, businessman Jon Huntsman Sr. Lauder, after whom a university degree program is named, sent a letter saying he is reconsidering future gifts. Investor Jonathon Jacobson said he would donate $1 a year until Magill “find[s] employment elsewhere.” 

The university lost out on two donations worth more than $150 million combined in the past year over the school’s policies, Rowan said. 

Donors gave more than $1.5 billion to Penn the last two fiscal years ended in June, the school said. Annual distributions from Penn’s $20.9 billion endowment provide 17% of the university’s academic operating budget. 

Marc Rowan, who has donated more than $50 million to Penn, said he won’t give more unless the university’s president and the board of trustees chair step down. PHOTO: PHIL MCCARTEN/REUTERS

Donating to higher education has long been almost automatic for many wealthy people. “The donors we work with might see their alma mater giving as like their religious tithe,” said Mae Hong, a regional vice president at Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, which helps wealthy families plan their giving. “It’s kind of just their duty.” 

Most give to universities out of appreciation for their education, though donations can also help their children get an admissions advantage, she said. “It’s just going to be a much more complicated relationship going forward,” Hong said.   

In the past few years, dissident alumni groups have started cropping up for people who believe progressive groupthink has taken over college campuses. Several significant donors said they don’t want to force their worldviews on anyone, but that they do want college students to be exposed to a diversity of views and be able to engage in robust dialogue. 

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How much would a university’s response to world events drive your donation decisions? Join the conversation below.

“I have long been dismayed at the drift away from true freedom of thought, expression and speech at our best universities, very much including my beloved alma mater Penn,” hedge fund manager Cliff Asness wrote to Magill on Oct. 16 about his plans to stop giving. “I do not like making something like this about money—but it appears to be one of the only paths that has any hope of mattering.” 

Scott Shay donated to Northwestern University every year after earning his undergraduate degree in 1979. He stopped in 2020 after researching a book on antisemitic conspiracy theories on campus. The former chairman of 

Signature Bank

, which failed earlier this year, he now donates to the Hillel and Chabad organizations at the university instead. 

After the Hamas attacks, other donors have reached out to him saying they are reconsidering their gifts. “I’ve heard from four people within the last hour,” Shay said Friday.

Write to Rachel Louise Ensign at Rachel.Ensign@wsj.com and Juliet Chung at Juliet.Chung@wsj.com

25. How China Could Turn Crisis to Catastrophe

How China Could Turn Crisis to Catastrophe

A war over Taiwan would devastate the economies of both Asia and the globe.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-could-turn-crisis-to-catastrophe-taiwan-invasion-689c29bd?mod=Searchresults_pos3&page=1

By 

Walter Russell Mead

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Oct. 23, 2023 6:16 pm ET

A Philippine supply boat, left, and a Chinese coast guard vessel collide in the South China Sea, Oct. 22. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGE

While the world’s eyes were fixed on the unfolding horrors of the latest Middle East war, China was busy pushing the envelope in the South China Sea. On Sunday, a Chinese coast guard vessel and another Chinese ship rammed a Philippine supply boat and coast guard ship in international waters claimed by China around the Spratly Islands. The State Department gravely noted that the Chinese actions “violated international law,” but China appears unimpressed.

As readers of this column know, the most important international development on President Biden’s watch has been the erosion of America’s deterrence. The war in Ukraine and the escalating chaos and bloodshed across the Middle East demonstrate the human and economic costs when American power and policy no longer hold revisionist powers in check.

Washington’s attention is understandably fixed on the threat of a wider Middle East war. The human and economic toll would be significant, and the U.S. might be drawn into the conflict. But if the erosion of America’s deterrent power leads China and North Korea to launch wars in the Far East, it would be a greater catastrophe by orders of magnitude.

For the past two weeks I’ve been on the road—in Pearl Harbor, Tokyo and Seoul—and the American, Japanese and Korean officials and think-tankers I met with kept hammering two thoughts into my head. First, a war over Taiwan would be far more serious for the world economy than the war in Ukraine or even a wider regional war in the Middle East. Second, our margin of safety is shrinking: The power of American deterrence in the Far East is declining. While there are some favorable long-term trends, for the next few years at least, China and North Korea are likely to see more reasons to test the will and the power of the U.S. and its allies.

If China decides on forcible unification with Taiwan, it has two principal options. It can invade the island directly, or it can try to blockade it. Taiwan, which imports 97% of its energy supply and also depends on food imports, is vulnerable to such a blockade. But Taiwan would not be the only country affected. Whether China invades or blockades, the regional and global consequences would be the gravest shock to the global economy since World War II.

Regionally, the effect of closing the South China Sea and the waters around Taiwan to international trade would be calamitous. South Korea and Japan are both heavily dependent on imported fuel and food. Both economies depend on the ability of their great manufacturing companies to import raw materials and export finished goods. A suspension of maritime trade would effectively put both economies on life support, while making it difficult for tens of millions of people to heat their homes, run their cars or feed their children.

It isn’t unlikely that North Korea, seeing an opening in the global and regional chaos, would take the opportunity to attack at a time when U.S. forces would have enormous difficulty reinforcing and resupplying the South.

China would also be hit. Ships wouldn’t travel through war zones to Shanghai, Qingdao or Tianjin. The U.S. would likely, in addition to sanctions, enforce a blockade against ships seeking to supply China with goods deemed important for war.

For the rest of the world this would mean a massive supply-chain headache. From Taiwan’s semiconductors, vital for many industries and consumer products, to all the things that China, Japan and South Korea produce, the products of the Far East would vanish from inventories and store shelves. Globally, makers of the raw materials for those countries, as well as growers of such agricultural commodities as soybeans and grain, would lose access to major markets.

Even as supply-chain bottlenecks and blockages throw goods markets into turmoil, the financial consequences of the war could pose insurmountable challenges for the world’s central banks. Stocks would crash. Currencies would gyrate. Debt markets would implode as sovereign borrowers like China and Japan faced wartime conditions and corporations dependent on Asian economies struggled to manage their debts.

Lulled into complacency by a long era of peace, most of us have yet to appreciate fully the dangers we face. Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the Hamas attack on Israel should have made clear that we live in an era when the unthinkable can happen overnight. These days, we must not only learn to think about the unthinkable, in nuclear strategist Herman Kahn’s phrase. We also need to prepare for it.

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Speaking in Tel Aviv on Oct. 22, 2023, a bipartisan delegation of U.S. senators detailed how the elimination of islamic terrorist organization, Hamas, would lead to a more stable future in the region—not just for the Jewish people, but Palestinians too. Images: AP/Reuters Composite: Mark Kelly

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the October 24, 2023, print edition as 'How China Could Turn Crisis to Catastrophe'.

26. Beijing Stages Charm Offensive to Pave Way for Xi Trip

Beijing Stages Charm Offensive to Pave Way for Xi Trip

Whirlwind of meetings, events precede expected San Francisco summit with Biden; Yao Ming goes to New York

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/beijing-stages-charm-offensive-to-pave-way-for-xi-trip-94eaf1a5?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

By 

James T. Areddy

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Updated Oct. 23, 2023 6:17 pm ET

China appears to be preparing the way for what would be Xi Jinping’s first U.S. trip since 2017. PHOTO: EDGAR SU/REUTERS

China hasn’t said yet whether its leader, Xi Jinping, will accept President Biden’s invitation to visit the U.S. next month, but Beijing is gearing up an American charm offensive that appears designed to prepare the way for what would be Xi’s first U.S. trip in six-and-a-half years.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to meet U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Washington later this week, Biden administration officials said Monday. Other people briefed on the plans said Wang’s role includes preparing for a Xi-Biden summit.

Also this week, a delegation of Chinese business, cultural and sports figures, like basketball star Yao Ming, is due in New York for a series of public engagements. That follows an uptick in academic exchanges and Vice President Han Zheng’s efforts to drum up investment into China when he attended the United Nations General Assembly in September.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s role in Washington includes preparing for a Xi-Biden summit, say people briefed on the plans. PHOTO: MARK R CRISTINO/SHUTTERSTOCK

The administration officials who confirmed Wang’s Washington visit declined to say if a summit is in the works. They said Blinken’s talks will center on the Middle East, Ukraine, fentanyl, North Korea, and the East and South China seas, including recent action by China’s military in the skies and seas in that region that the U.S. considers provocations.

Asked if China’s envoy would meet Biden, as Blinken did with Xi during a visit to Beijing in June, the officials said they didn’t have any scheduling information to offer.

China’s embassy in Washington said it couldn’t comment on agendas but said the Chinese and U.S. leaders agreed on the importance of people-to-people exchanges. 

“For the past several weeks I’ve seen the Chinese side gearing up” for an expected U.S. visit by Xi, said Daniel Russel, a vice president for international security and diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute. 

Russel, a former senior State Department official, said it is typical of Beijing to dispatch academics, former officials and other envoys to warm the atmosphere and tap U.S. sentiment ahead of summits. He has had a number of such meetings in recent weeks. “They want the environment Xi Jinping enters to be less highly charged,” Russel said.

A group of nongovernmental representatives of both nations held four hours of virtual talks on Thursday organized by the Asia Society, which included a senior Chinese Communist Party official, Liu Jianchao, who heads its international liaison department.

China’s Xinhua News Agency termed Thursday’s talks as “Track 1.5”—meaning quasiofficial—and said they were “candid and constructive exchanges focusing on strengthening communication and cooperation, managing conflicts and differences, and jointly exploring the correct way for China and the United States to get along in the new era.”

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Russian President Vladimir Putin said there would be ‘close foreign policy coordination’ with China during a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. President Putin’s spokesperson said the two leaders would discuss the Israel-Hamas conflict. Photo: Sergey Guneev/Sputnik/Kremlin Po/Shutterstock

One participant on the U.S. side said the Asia Society talks compared favorably with a more testy tone during some recent bilateral engagements, which often featured U.S. complaints about treatment of business in China and what the person termed Chinese “haranguing” about U.S. policy.

The pickup in bilateral talks appears to signal Xi’s interest in accepting Biden’s invitation to attend next month’s leadership summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping set for San Francisco, talk participants said. 

Xi this month told visiting Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer there are “a thousand reasons” for the U.S. and China to cooperate.

Despite the pre-summit niceties, Xi himself has sent other strong signals that suggest a limited appetite for a fundamental reset in relations. Most notably, Beijing last week offered a red-carpet reception for Russian President Vladimir Putin. 

Xi’s appearance at APEC has been in doubt in part because of the meeting’s location in San Francisco, a hotbed of political activism with large Chinese and Tibetan populations that Beijing officials fear could stage embarrassing protests. Beijing was rattled earlier this month, when a man with a Chinese name drove a sedan into the lobby of China’s visa office in San Francisco, where police shot him dead.

Xi last set foot in the U.S. in April 2017, when he visited then-President Donald Trump in Florida. Biden hasn’t traveled to China as president. Xi and Biden met in Indonesia last November in a bid to halt a slide in relations, though a Chinese balloon’s path over the U.S. weeks later soured the mood. 

Xi Jinping met this month with visiting Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and told him there are ‘a thousand reasons’ for the U.S. and China to cooperate. PHOTO: POOL/REUTERS

Disputes between the nations cover a multitude of sectors, from trade to the military. Biden has called Xi a “dictator” and warns that “China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order,” while Xi this year accused the U.S. of leading a program of “all-round containment, encirclement and suppression against us.” 

Scott Kennedy, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says the impetus for some of the academic exchanges he has been involved in recent months—in both Beijing and Washington—isn’t necessarily an impending Xi visit, though he nevertheless expects one to go ahead. Instead, he said the resumption of dialogue also reflects a broader desire in China, for example at universities, to signal a return to normalcy following the Covid-19 pandemic and amid the country’s powerful economic slowdown. “The governments have facilitated and allowed what we’ve done, but it isn’t their initiative,” Kennedy said.

Even without a possible summit looming, protocol suggests China is overdue to dispatch senior envoys to the U.S. Four members of Biden’s inner circle have paid official visits to China since June, including Secretary of State Blinken, who is expected to host Wang. Wang most recently visited the U.S. in September 2022, to attend U.N. meetings. China’s commerce minister paid a brief visit to Washington in May. 

He Lifeng, Xi’s top economic-policy aide, is also planning on a trip to the U.S. to meet with senior administration officials including Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, according to people close to Beijing. Dates haven’t been completed, the people said, so He may meet his American counterparts on the sidelines of the San Francisco APEC gathering. 

“There has certainly been a pickup in activity ahead of the Xi-Biden summit,” said Michael Froman, president of the New York based Council on Foreign Relations. While Froman said there is little sign in the talks he has been engaged in that Biden and Xi can produce agreements, as leaders have at past summits, “the meeting itself is the most important deliverable.”

Xi’s tremendous power over Chinese policy means it is positive when the two leaders speak, according to Matthew Pottinger, who was deputy national security adviser in the Trump administration. 

Still, Pottinger is less supportive of lower-level interactions, including the kind of economic working groups of finance and commerce formed after the recent Biden administration visits to China, he told a panel convened last week by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he chairs the China department. 

China promotes such dialogues, Pottinger said, because they pull the U.S. toward a “tyranny of a calendar,” where American officials avoid China policy changes that might spoil the atmosphere for the next talks. 

Beijing is also putting forward recognizable citizens in ways that appear designed to attract U.S. media attention, like Yao, who played eight seasons for the NBA’s Houston Rockets and will be part of a 30-strong delegation of Chinese banking, business and cultural figures, according to China’s consulate in New York.

Yao will headline a New York gala this week to honor American statesman Henry Kissinger along with China’s new ambassador to the U.S., Xie Feng, being hosted by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, a New York-based organization that promotes bilateral ties and has been involved in a number of recent nongovernment so-called Track 2 dialogues.

In its invitation, the organization said Yao will “discuss the importance of U.S.-China sports diplomacy and the unique role of sport in fostering people-to-people understanding” along with his former Houston Rockets teammate Tracy McGrady.

—Lingling Wei and Liyan Qi contributed to this article.

Write to James T. Areddy at James.Areddy@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the October 24, 2023, print edition as 'China Looks to Charm U.S. to Pave Way for Xi Trip'.

27. The Enemies of Freedom Are Deadlier Than Ever

Yes, we must not be complacent. But tell me what ideals and ideas are superior to ours? And what ideas and ideals are worth fighting for more than ours?

The Enemies of Freedom Are Deadlier Than Ever

Western liberal ideas aren’t guaranteed to prevail, and comforting myths breed complacency.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-enemies-of-freedom-are-deadlier-than-ever-1808f108?mod=Searchresults_pos4&page=1

By 

Gerard Baker

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Oct. 23, 2023 1:15 pm ET

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks in Tehran, Oct. 17. PHOTO: IRANIAN SUPREME LEADER'S OFFICE/ZUMA PRESS

Central to the West’s idea of its modern historic supremacy has been the comforting myth that we have prevailed because of the superiority of our ideas.

Might in the end can’t overcome right, we think. The brute force of tyranny and totalitarian terror can succeed for a while—even a long while—but eventually, the human yearning for freedom and justice has an inescapable logic. It is not so much that right will always overcome might, as that being “right” confers on us a power that is mightier than any dictator could ever muster.

This is a geopolitical version of Whiggish history, the idea that the world is evolving on some great hidden trajectory toward liberty, democracy and enlightenment. “The arc of the moral universe . . . bends toward justice,” as Martin Luther King Jr. put it.

But what if it doesn’t?

Looking back, not only to the last century or two but to earlier epochs, history can seem more like a random walk through periods of progress and retreat, light and darkness, civilization and tyranny, than a straight arrow aimed at freedom and peace.

In the 16th century, more than 2,000 years after the citizens of Athens had been meeting to make policy, spend public money and elect leaders in the form of government that gave us the word “democracy,” the city and its residents cowered under the heel of a distant ruler, a subjugated outpost of a vast foreign empire.

The Roman Republic may not have been democratic in our understanding of the term, but its constitutional order and many of its institutions served as templates for the modern American republic. Yet it was soon enough replaced by imperial rule that, while it retained the trappings of republicanism, was for centuries a personal autocracy that was in turn eventually replaced by barbarous chaos.

You could argue that the almost innate sense we have that justice and freedom will prevail in the end is merely the most recent example of winners’ history: that the world as it exists is the product of the military and strategic victory of the U.S. and its allies in World War II and the Cold War. We won. So in our telling of the story we insist that there was something inevitable about the ultimate righteous triumph of freedom. Our confidence is so complete we even declare that history is over.

But history is alive and well, and as unpredictable as ever. It turns on hinges. Time, chance and the application of human genius or folly can—for long periods—supersede vast impersonal forces. If Adolf Hitler hadn’t invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, there’s a reasonable chance that most of Europe would today be preparing to celebrate the centenary of the thousand-year reich (though when you witness the anti-Semitic demonstrations across European cities taking place right now, you could be forgiven for wondering whether many of those countries didn’t embrace some Nazi values after all).

The impact of the so-called soft power the U.S. exercised during the Cold War was critical to our success—and in that sense the idea that values, as well as simple force, can be historically determinative isn’t wholly wrong.

But the power of our example would never have been enough without the example of our power. In the absence of sustained military commitments, strategic engagement and repeated sacrifice, there was nothing guaranteed about the victory of our ideas.

We need to remember that truth as we survey the world today. Not since the worst days of the Cold War, perhaps not since the 1930s, have we faced such a combination of threats to our freedom and prosperity, to our very existence. A touching faith in the supposed universality of our ideals and the inevitable rightness of our cause won’t save us.

A modern de facto alliance of tyrannies—we might call it an axis of evil opportunism—advances across the globe. China, Russia, Iran—and you can probably add, if only because of the sheer malevolent volatility of its leader and its possession of weapons of unfathomable destruction—North Korea.

They don’t see the triumph of the West and its values. They see a weakened and declining West, an America at odds with itself over its identity and its leadership in the world, a nation enfeebled by deepening self-doubt, widening division, widespread mistrust, timid leadership, institutional paralysis and soaring debt. They see, as we have seen this last week, a culture—in the media, educational institutions, public discourse—that increasingly does their work for them, willfully propagating falsehoods that advance their cause, always eager to attribute evil to us and not to our enemies.

If there is one benefit we can draw from the atrocities we have witnessed by Iran’s proxy Hamas in Israel this month it is this: It is a heart-stopping reminder of what is at stake, a brutal warning that we take for granted what we have earned and what we have fought for at our own peril.

It isn’t our values and our ideas that may ensure we prevail in this struggle, but the terrifying recognition of how fragile those values and ideas are.

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Wonder Land: For Hamas in Israel and Putin in Ukraine, killing the innocent is now part of the plan. Images: AP/Zuma Press Composite: Mark Kelly

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the October 24, 2023, print edition as 'The Enemies of Freedom Are Deadlier Than Ever'.

28. Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Through the Lens of Civil War

Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Through the Lens of Civil War - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Michael Skjelderup, Mukhtar Ainashe · October 24, 2023

Editor’s Note: This article is adapted from “Counterinsurgency as order-making: refining the concepts of insurgency and counterinsurgency in light of the Somali Civil War,” published in Small Wars and Insurgencies.

Civil war is a complex, messy and intensely political phenomenon whereby established orders are challenged and new ones produced. The scholarly undertaking to understand, explain and at times predict such messes is difficult at best, yet the prevalence and impact of the former, current and future civil wars compel us to do our best. In this quest, the academic literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency, which quickly lost popularity after US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan has nevertheless provided vital insights into and knowledge about why insurgencies emerge, how they endure and how they end, and how governments succeed or fail in defeating them.

However, the insurgency and counterinsurgency discourse are dominated by concepts that are too narrow and isolated from the burgeoning literature on the wider phenomenon of civil war within which insurgency and counterinsurgency occur. Rather than accounting for the complex political processes and wide range of forces and actors that shape conflict dynamics, the dominant insurgency and counterinsurgency debate tends to reduce highly messy contexts to the often false dichotomy of insurgents and counterinsurgents, usually understood as the state versus one or more violent non-state actor. In reality, governments and violent non-state actors are only some of a conglomerate of other actors, institutions and forces shaping conflict dynamics. The recognized governments themselves may even be the ones challenging order exercised by a ‘non-state’ armed group, or they may cooperate with one or more non-state challengers in some areas while fighting them in others. The identity of the challenger (‘the insurgent’) and the ones consolidating established order (‘the counterinsurgent’) may fluctuate considerably throughout the same conflict.

In our recent article in Small Wars and Insurgencies, we argue that orthodox reductionist concepts and assumptions underpinning the dominant insurgency and counterinsurgency discourse provide limited value in understanding the complexities of civil wars. Building on recent critical literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency, we propose a refined conceptualization of both terms. Instead of conceptualizing insurgency and counterinsurgency as peculiar forms of war, strategies or sets of guerilla tactics, we follow Jaqueline Hazelton and understand insurgency and counterinsurgency as elements of violent order-making. Thus, insurgency and counterinsurgency are, in our view, comprehensive processes of organized challenge to and consolidation of established political order within the context of civil war. By emphasizing the politics of order-making, the dynamics of violence are foremost seen through the lens of domestic power competition, whereby the intensity of violence and identities of insurgent and counterinsurgent largely follow the dynamics of elite competition and the effects of elite bargaining on the ground. To illustrate our argument, we draw on the highly complex landscape of the ongoing civil war in southern Somalia.

Counterinsurgency as order-making

Criticism of the orthodox insurgency and counterinsurgency discourse that reemerged in the US in the mid-2000s is old news. But the view that insurgency is a distinct kind of war, and that counterinsurgency is the remedy to cure the problem, still dominates discourse. We instead embrace the works of Jaquelin Hazelton, David Ucko and other critics and offer a refined view of the concepts.

According to Hazelton, insurgency and counterinsurgency are primarily a domestic political process of violent state-building. While international actors and states may intervene in intra-state conflicts, political order largely arises from domestic elite efforts to triumph in violent political rivalry. Contrary to the assumptions of the orthodox counterinsurgency discourse, Hazelton stresses that elite groups rule to protect their own interests, not those of the populace. Once elites have determined through violent competition which of them will dominate the rest, and at what cost to which actors, political stability will follow – as long as the elite bargain holds.

Hazelton’s conceptualization has, in our view, several theoretical implications. First, ‘insurgency’ must first be understood as an element of violent domestic state-building processes in the form of the actors striving to seize or transform the dominant political order. Second, it does not distinguish between the weak and the strong or reduce counterinsurgency to a specific type of strategy or tactic which, as previously noted, may fluctuate throughout the same conflict. Third, it emphasizes the political nature of violent struggle. How the authorities decide to manage challenges to existing order largely depends on the dynamics on the ground. For example, it may be that authorities are focused more on other issues than on fighting the insurgents, such as accommodating local elite groups. It may even be the case that the authorities care little about insurgent violence and atrocities against civilian communities as long as the mechanisms upholding their power position remain in place. In what Ucko terms rural “localized insurgencies,” the violent challenger may thrive on the periphery, controlling considerable territories and populations, if their activity remains below a certain threshold and is not seen as a direct threat to the incumbent state’s elites. Or the opposite may be the case: the established authorities, feeling threatened, are willing to crush the insurgents by any means possible, as in the case of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.

Counterinsurgency and civil war

One can study insurgency as a phenomenon independent from civil war. However, given a broad understanding of civil war as a “situation where a government faces a violent challenge by one or more rebel actors over some articulated goal of political change,” most visible insurgencies and counterinsurgencies operate within the larger context and complexities of civil war. Thus, research on insurgency/counterinsurgency will benefit from the extensive civil war literature and rich debates on political violence more broadly. For example, where orthodox counterinsurgency discourse treats ‘the population’ as an aggregated and oversimplified category, to be won over by coercion and/or provision of governance and socioeconomic reforms, a quickly growing body of literature within civil war studies demonstrates the multifaceted roles of civilian communities.

Recent civil war literature also suggests the dichotomy between non-state and state may be unclear and even unnecessary for meaningful analysis. There may well be cases where the internationally recognized government is the one that challenges the established order in territories ruled by non-state authorities. Likewise, studying counterinsurgency calls for exploring the actors, institutions and forces striving to safe-guard the status quo within the wider context of civil war. Recognized governments, non-state armed groups, non-combatants, criminal organizations, intervening organizations and states etc. all play into these processes in various ways, some spurring change, others striving to defend established order. Instead of focusing solely on how a government with or without external support moves on to defeat its non-state challenger(s), in line with orthodox views, studies of counterinsurgency now become a broad effort to grasp how established forms of order in civil conflicts may or may not withstand armed challenge, including political and military strategies applied by the dominant players, be it states or non-state groups.

Civil war in southern Somalia

The new conceptualization highlights the complex political processes surrounding elite competition, where outright fighting between established authorities and one or more opponents may be only one, and perhaps a less important, manifestation of the ongoing contest for dominance. In southern Somalia, where state authority has been essentially absent since the downfall of the dictator Siyad Barre in January 1991, lasting authority has not been the rule. Authority and order have been continually co-produced and reproduced by a wide variety of actors and institutions contesting dominance. The ones consolidating established order (the ”counterinsurgents”) and the ones challenging it (the “insurgents”) have varied extensively over time within a “mosaic of power,” or a multiplicity of political power structures coexisting within one national space in which strategy and tactics applied by the actors have changed according to developments in the conflict dynamics.

Despite massive international support in the form of international aid, political and military assistance, and several military interventions, Somalia still comprises a mosaic of power and is far from a central state in the Weberian sense of the term. The most successful actor, in terms of controlling territory and populations, has been the militant Islamist group al-Shabaab. The group established a brutal, yet largely functional proto-state in most of South-Central Somalia between 2008 and 2011 under a central leadership and comparatively sophisticated bureaucracy. Al-Shabaab still dominates large rural areas in southern Somalia.

In the recognized Somali federal member states, the struggle between militant Islamists and provincial governments is still visible and the power balance of the contesting parties has varied extensively over time. While the military threat from the Islamists may be obvious the provinces’ political elite, often political (and sometimes military) struggles with the federal government in Mogadishu and/or opposition by key local political rivals may be existential and largely overshadow military initiatives. For international partners pursuing a military approach to defeat al-Shabaab, lack of local initiatives and military progress against militant Islamists may be frustrating. Yet, seen through the lens of counterinsurgency as order-making, it may make sense for the provincial governments to deprioritize military operations against al-Shabaab. If the group is not deemed an immediate and existential threat to the established elites’ power position, the local authorities are best served by focusing their attention and resources elsewhere. For provincial government elites, it may be far more pressing to forge and maintain local alliances and keep the federal government in Mogadishu at bay than to fight al-Shabaab through a costly military campaign. In Somalia’s southernmost member state, Jubaland, al-Shabaab is indeed the immediate military challenge to the local government within its province. However, the survival of the current elite constellation in Kismayo is primarily a political concern. As long as Jubaland continues to enjoy military support from Kenya, the Jubaland government’s objective is at least threefold. One, to meet the interests of its established power base, which centers on support from an alliance of Ogadeen clan elites and other key clan elites in the south. Two, to negotiate and partly counter elements from opposing elite groups, especially those of the large Marehan clan group in the Gedo province, the northernmost province of Jubaland. Three, to counter the federal government and central elite groups in Mogadishu, which strive to project their central powers throughout the entire federal state and, not least, to expand their revenue base to include the strategic harbor in Kismayo, Jubaland’s capital. The current Jubaland President, Ahmed Madobe, has few incentives to focus on the military campaign against al-Shabaab. If Madobe pushes al-Shabaab further out of its remaining strongholds, he may lose more politically than he would gain, despite tactical successes against al-Shabaab on the battlefield. Elite groups in newly conquered areas, hosting a wide range of non-Ogadeen clan groups as well as historically traditional intra-Ogadeen rivals, may strengthen or alter established alliances unfavorable to the current Jubaland government. For Ahmed Madobe and his elite alliance, counterinsurgency is thus exercised through political maneuvering and cooptation, not primarily through the gun nor the popular support of the people.

The ambiguities and politics of civil war

In southern Somalia, the actor or alliances of actors who constitute established authority (the counterinsurgent) and the challenger (the insurgent) have constantly fluctuated. In such contexts, the labels of state and non-state often give limited analytic meaning. The story of current Jubaland President, Ahmed Madobe, is illustrative. Previously an Islamist commander fighting alongside al-Shabaab, Ahmed Madobe later clashed with al-Shabaab and took the lead as a clan-based militia commander, until he managed to ally with Ethiopia and Kenya, finally ending up as selected President in the newly formed federal member state. The stateness of Jubaland, in contrast to the quite centralized al-Shabaab, may not be analytically obvious. While the categories of state and non-state carry political and moral weight in constructing our sense of reality through discourse, reasonable analysis of conflict dynamics and patterns should strive for a more nuanced understanding.

We support the strand of literature that propagates the political nature of war. Any intervention into highly political civil war contexts influence a wide range of dynamics and relationships, which are often difficult, if not impossible, for outsiders to fully understand. Nevertheless, we hope that viewing counterinsurgency through the lens of domestic order-making, may serve as a starting point to move beyond reductionist and static categories as well ideas about pre-defined solutions.

Michael W. Skjelderup has published several peer-reviewed articles on Somalia, insurgency, counterinsurgency and rebel governance. In 2021, he receieved a PhD in International Environment and Development Studies, Ås, Norway, on rebel governance and insurgency in southern Somalia. He has travelled extensively on the Horn of Africa. Field trips to Kismayo, Mogadishu, and Nairobi make up a major part of his research effort.

Mukhtar Ainashe has been engaged with the Somali conflict and politics for years and has held advisory roles within the Somali government and for non-governmental organizations. He holds an MA and MPhil and has previously co-authored articles conflict dynamics in southern Somalia.

Photo caption: AMISOM special forces soldiers outside Somalia Parliament building after foiling an attack by Al-Shabaab on 24th May 2014/AMISOM public affairs