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Quotes of the Day:
“The Soviet invasion caught U.S. policymakers by surprise, and President Carter was not happy about it. Right up to the invasion, the CIA's view was that the Soviets wouldn't go in. As the former Director of Central intelligence Robert Gates would later write, “CIA’s Soviet analysts just couldn't believe that the Soviets actually would invade… They saw all the reasons why it would be foolish for the Soviets to do so… [and] thought that the Soviet leaders thought as they did.” The same error was made by U.S. officials before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in in 1990, and, reportedly, by some senior officials in the Biden White House in the summer, and fall of 2021 before Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Each of these moves was telegraphed in advance. The moral of the story is that when dictators tell you what they're going to do, believe them.
– Michael G Vickers, By All Means Available: Memoirs of a Life and Intelligence, Special Operations, and Strategy
Some say, the world will end in fire,
Some say in ice.
From what I've tasted of desire,
I hold with those who favor fire.
But if I had to perish twice
I think I know enough of hate
To say that for destruction ice
Is also great
And would suffice.
- Robert Frost
“I have no right to call myself one who knows. I was one who six, and I still am, but I no longer seek in. The stars are in the books; I'm beginning to hear the teachings of my blood pulsing within me. My story isn't pleasant, it's not sweet and harmonious like the invented stories; it tastes a Foley in bewilderment, of madness and dream, like the life of all people who no longer want to lie to themselves.”
- Hermann Hesse
1. Reading between the lines of the new North Korea intelligence estimate
2. Yoon names new unification minister, Olympic gold medalist for vice culture minister
3. FM voices hope for envisioned Yoon-Biden-Kishida summit to serve as 'another turning point' in 3-way cooperation
4. Yoon vows to create bigger opportunities through S. Korea-U.S. alliance
5. North Korea’s Cyber Strategy
6. SPECIAL/Elite defections a warning to Kim Jong Un: North Korean defector
7. South Korea picks outspoken critic of North's rights record as unification minister
8. DMZ War and lessons from Cold War
9. Risks of comparing Korea, Vietnam
10. Nuclear consultative group likely to meet soon: Envoy
11. ‘Squid Game,’ Netflix’s Most-Watched Show, Completes Casting for Second Season
12. Why North Korea Is Sitting on the Story of the Revolt in Russia
13. Did North Korea Just Threaten to Start a War?
1. Reading between the lines of the new North Korea intelligence estimate
Very useful and important analysis from the previous NIO, Markus Garlauskas.
The reason for releasing this NIE is surely to attack the enemy's strategy (as Sun Tzu would have us do) as well as provide the foundation for policy and strategy and importantly to help the American people understand the complex threat of north Korea and the Kim family regime. I commend the Biden administration for releasing this NIE.
As I have often written, we need to recognize the regime's strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it, and attack it with superior information and a political warfare strategy.
This is my summary of the regime's objectives and strategy:
· Imperative: Align assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime:
o Political warfare to subvert the ROK and split the ROK/US Alliance.
o Blackmail diplomacy to coerce political and economic concessions.
o Development of advanced warfighting capabilities to support political warfare and blackmail diplomacy and prepare to unify the peninsula by force.
o Understand KJU fears the people more than the ROK/US CFC
The NIE affirms the above. And more importantly it provides an estimate that supports a new proposed strategy that is found here (the basis of which is a superior political warfare strategy).
National Strategy for Countering North Korea
https://nipp.org/information_series/robert-joseph-robert-collins-joseph-detrani-nicholas-eberstadt-olivia-enos-david-maxwell-and-greg-scarlatoiu-national-strategy-for-countering-north-korea-no-545-january-23-2023/
Reading between the lines of the new North Korea intelligence estimate
By Markus Garlauskas
atlanticcouncil.org · by jcookson · June 28, 2023
June 22 marked a watershed moment for analysis of North Korea. For the first time in over a decade, the US intelligence community publicly released a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on North Korea, titled “North Korea: Scenarios for Leveraging Nuclear Weapons Through 2030.” Completed in January 2023, this NIE is more than thirty years more recent than all the previously released North Korea NIEs, which date back to the 1980s or before.
The new NIE lays out three pathways through 2030 for how North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s strategy could evolve as his nuclear weapons capabilities improve. The NIE concludes that the by far most likely pathway is for Kim to leverage his nuclear capability for “coercion, potentially including non-nuclear lethal attacks, aimed at advancing the North’s goals.” It also delineates two additional low-likelihood pathways: North Korea could employ an offensive strategy to dominate the Korean Peninsula through the use of force, or it could turn to a defensive strategy, in which nuclear weapons are used solely as a deterrent. According to the estimate, Kim is most likely to continue pursuing coercion because he will be “confident that his growing nuclear capabilities will deter any unacceptable retaliation or consequences” but that he would not actually attack with them unless he “believes his regime is in peril.”
As a former National Intelligence Officer for North Korea who led the development of NIEs, I see this document as monumental in my particular niche, but some additional context is needed to understand why. Since the 1950s, NIEs have been the US intelligence community’s most authoritative written judgments on national security issues, developed through a collaborative process led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s National Intelligence Council (NIC) and its predecessor organizations. This new NIE is a tantalizing glimpse of the US intelligence community’s larger strategic intelligence picture on North Korea, even as it necessarily represents only the tip of the iceberg of a much longer classified document.
What is perhaps most remarkable about the latest NIE is that it highlights very recent key intelligence community judgments about North Korea. This is a major and unusual step, given that this practice was largely halted after the declassification of key judgments in the 2007 NIE on Iran’s nuclear program caused a number of public controversies. It also marks a change from how the intelligence community has generally approached public assessments of North Korea. Though US intelligence leaders have openly described North Korea as a “hard target,” they have generally been guarded in their assessments of Pyongyang’s capabilities and how they know what they know. With a few exceptions (many of them during the “fire and fury” period of 2017) most of the intelligence community’s publicly released assessments have been small portions of the larger Annual Threat Assessment provided to Congress.
Given this history, and the fact that the NIE does not address the possibility that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons, it could have been withheld on the unfair grounds that it could be interpreted as an implicit rebuttal to the longstanding US policy of negotiating the denuclearization of North Korea. It is therefore a testament to the sincerity of Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines’s commitment to transparency that this NIE was released.
Even with its notable and welcome transparency, however, it does not give a full picture of the strategic North Korea nuclear challenge. There are (at least) three areas that are worth adding to the discussion.
First, China. The NIE’s analysis related to Beijing is guarded and subtle, particularly compared to how much intelligence leaders openly focus on the threat. While Washington publicly and loudly grapples with the premise that the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will likely be in a heightened state of military confrontation or outright war over Taiwan before 2030, these key judgments do not explicitly address the possibility, much less explore the massive implications this has for Korea. The declassified NIE does warn, among other factors, that an offensive strategy would “become more likely” if Kim believed he could “maintain China’s support” or “if [Kim] concluded that [an] international crisis presented a last chance to accomplish revisionist goals.” As current National Intelligence Officer Sydney Seiler acknowledged to me last week, the need to consider North Korea’s potential to escalate during a Taiwan crisis is a “no brainer.” That the key judgments omit this subject is neither surprising nor troubling to me as a former NIO. I know how hard it is to keep this document’s scope manageable and the challenges of considering hypotheticals piled upon hypotheticals. However, readers should keep in mind that the risk of North Korea using its nuclear weapons, or taking the offensive in general, could be much greater in the event of a US-PRC conflict.
Second, South Korea. Specifically, it is important to recognize Seoul’s potential to field its own nuclear arms. If Kim pursues a strategy of coercion, as the NIE judges he most likely will, and “may be willing to take greater conventional military risks, believing that nuclear weapons will deter an unacceptably strong US or South Korean response,” the value of South Korean nuclear capability to counter such threats would fuel the already-strong South Korean public sentiment for the country to acquire nuclear weapons. It would, however, be impolitic to warn that April’s Washington Declaration, wherein South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol pledged to forgo nuclear weapons, may not last beyond the end of his constitutional single term in 2027. The window between a decision for nuclear weapons and operational capability would be a logical time for a preventive attack, a concrete example of the general “now or never crisis” the NIE cites as a driver for an offensive.
Third, military and policy prescriptions. These are outside the remit of the NIC and violate intelligence analysis tradecraft standards, so it makes sense that they are not included in the NIE. However, several logical strategic-level policy and military recommendations could be derived from this estimate’s judgments. At least three come to mind immediately:
- First, the United States should not politically recognize North Korea as a de facto or de jure legitimately nuclear-armed state in the hope that this would lead it to be a defensively focused “responsible” power, given how unlikely this is to happen.
- Second, the United States and South Korea should ensure that their primary efforts in deterrence of North Korea are focused on the most likely threat. US and allied efforts at deterrence should not be content with just deterring an “all-out” military offensive or nuclear strikes. They should also counter as much as possible the sort of incremental creeping coercive escalation that could either fatally undermine the security of South Korea and the US position in the region over time or could spin out of control into an escalating conflict.
- Third, the United States and South Korea should recognize that, though it is not the most likely scenario, they must be prepared to fight a nuclear war with North Korea. Washington and Seoul must contend with the unpleasant reality that there is a plausible set of conditions, particularly in the context of a hypothetical US-PRC war or a South Korean decision for nuclear arms, that could lead North Korea to undertake an offensive use of nuclear weapons.
Though this NIE is neither the first nor the last word on the implications of North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities, it is a huge step forward for public and classified policy debates. The NIE provides the intellectual foundation to prepare for a long struggle with an increasingly well-armed and coercive North Korea, instead of abandoning the principle of denuclearizing North Korea in a vain attempt to secure peace or embarking on the reckless path of embracing preventive war in fear that Kim will strike first. The NIE demarcates the field in which the United States and its allies must be prepared to play a high-stakes game—a contest in which the PRC’s aggression and South Korea’s own nuclear weapons could have game-changing consequences.
Markus Garlauskas served as the national intelligence officer for North Korea, leading the US intelligence community’s strategic analysis of North Korea from 2014 to 2020. He is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security of the Atlantic Council, and tweets at @Mister_G_2.
2. Yoon names new unification minister, Olympic gold medalist for vice culture minister
Kim Young Ho is a good man and the right person for the job. I was able to listen to him his unification advisory council earlier this month and I was very impressed with his unification vision and the planning that they have been conducting.
(2nd LD) Yoon names new unification minister, Olympic gold medalist for vice culture minister | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · June 29, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with Yoon's instructions to new vice ministers)
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, June 29 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol on Thursday named a new unification minister and an Olympic weightlifting gold medalist for vice culture minister in a reshuffle also affecting one other ministerial post and 11 other vice ministers, his chief of staff said.
Kim Yung-ho, a professor of political science and diplomacy at Sungshin Women's University, was tapped to lead the Unification Ministry, while Jang Mi-ran, winner of the 2008 Olympic gold in the women's over 75-kilogram category, was named second vice minister of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, Kim Dae-ki said during a press briefing.
Kim Yung-ho, nominee for unification minister, speaks to reporters at the presidential office in Seoul on June 29, 2023. (Yonhap)
Kim Hong-il, a lawyer and former chief of the Busan High Prosecutors Office, was named chief of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, a ministerial post.
Ambassador to Vietnam Oh Young-ju was named second vice foreign minister, while Ambassador to Thailand Moon Seoung-hyun was named vice unification minister.
The other affected positions were vice ministers of the ministries of finance, science, agriculture, environment, labor, land, oceans and SMEs.
Kim Wan-sub, chief of the budget office of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, was named second vice finance minister, while Cho Seong-kyung, presidential secretary for science and technology, was named first vice minister of the Ministry of Science and ICT.
Han Hoon, chief of Statistics Korea, was tapped for vice minister of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, while Lim Sang-jun, presidential secretary for national agenda, was named vice minister of the Ministry of Environment.
Yoon also picked Lee Sung-hee, a researcher at the Korea Labor Institute, for vice minister of the Ministry of Employment and Labor, and Kim Oh-jin, presidential secretary for general affairs, for first vice minister of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. Baek Won-kug, presidential secretary for land, infrastructure and transport, was named its second vice minister.
Kim Hong-il, nominee for chief of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, speaks to reporters at the presidential office in Seoul on June 29, 2023. (Yonhap)
Meanwhile, Park Sung-hoon, presidential secretary for national planning, was named vice minister of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, while Oh Kee-woong, planning and coordination chief at the Ministry of SMEs and Startups, was named its vice minister.
The reshuffle also saw the nomination of Kim Chae-hwan, a former professor of Seoul Cyber University, as president of the National Human Resources Development Institute.
"I will do my best to handle the North Korean nuclear issue with principles and build a foundation for improving South-North relations," Kim Yung-ho, the unification minister nominee, told reporters at the same briefing, adding he will do his best to form a public consensus on ways to achieve a peaceful reunification rooted in the basic order of liberal democracy. His appointment is subject to a parliamentary confirmation hearing.
Kim Hong-il, nominee for anti-corruption chief, said he will work to quickly stabilize the commission and focus on its proper roles of preventing corruption and promoting people's rights and interests in order to win the people's trust.
This photo, provided by the presidential office, shows Jang Mi-ran, winner of the 2008 Olympic gold in the women's over 75-kilogram category and a professor at Yong In University. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Earlier Thursday, Yoon met with the presidential secretaries transitioning to their new roles and instructed them to "boldly fight" against "predatory cartels with vested rights," according to senior presidential secretary for press affairs Kim Eun-hye.
Yoon was referring to the corrupt behavior of some public officials who seek only to serve their own interests.
"Corrupt cartels with vested rights are always packaged nicely on the surface," he was quoted as saying. "Public officials who turn a blind eye to them or hold hands with them should be strictly punished without mercy."
Yoon added that those who work with only the people's interests in mind should be evaluated highly and recognized.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · June 29, 2023
3. FM voices hope for envisioned Yoon-Biden-Kishida summit to serve as 'another turning point' in 3-way cooperation
Yes, this will be a positive turning point.
This will serve to undo the Chinese demand of the "Three Nos" made to former President Moon in 2017 - no additional THAAD deployment, no integrated missile defense, and no trilateral alliance. We are now finalizing the permanent stationing of THAAD (after completion of the environmental impact analysis), and we have made great strides in integrated missile defense, and while not (yet) an alliance, we have vastly improved trilateral cooperation. China has only itself and Kim Jong Un to blame for this with both making strategic miscalculations about alliances in Northeast Asia.
FM voices hope for envisioned Yoon-Biden-Kishida summit to serve as 'another turning point' in 3-way cooperation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · June 29, 2023
SEOUL, June 29 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Park Jin on Thursday expressed hope for an envisioned trilateral summit between South Korea, the United States and Japan this year to serve as "another turning point" in three-way cooperation.
"I expect that the upcoming trilateral summit between South Korea, the United States and Japan, which will be held again soon at the invitation of the U.S., will become another turning point in the cooperation among the three countries," Park said in a keynote speech delivered at a peace forum co-hosted by Yonhap News Agency and the unification ministry in Seoul.
Foreign Minister Park Jin delivers a keynote address during a forum at a Seoul hotel on June 29, 2023, to discuss geopolitical situations on the Korean Peninsula, as the South Korea-U.S. alliance marks its 70th anniversary. The symposium was co-hosted by Yonhap News Agency and the Ministry of Unification. (Yonhap)
Park was referring to the invitation that U.S. President Joe Biden offered during a trilateral meeting with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the margins of the Group of Seven summit in Hiroshima, Japan, last month.
The minister stressed that cooperation between the three countries was also being strengthened to "effectively address not only the threat posed by North Korea but also regional and global challenges."
On the Seoul-Washington alliance, which celebrates its 70th anniversary this year, Park anticipated the scope of cooperation to expand further as the two countries work to establish an "open, mutually beneficial and inclusive Indo-Pacific region and international order."
Park praised Yoon's state visit to the U.S. in April as a significant occasion that "deeply ingrained the history and values of the alliance" and further deepened the personal trust between Yoon and Biden.
odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · June 29, 2023
4. Yoon vows to create bigger opportunities through S. Korea-U.S. alliance
The rock-solid ROK/US Alliance that extends beyond the Korean peninsula.
Yoon vows to create bigger opportunities through S. Korea-U.S. alliance | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · June 29, 2023
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, June 29 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol vowed Thursday to create bigger opportunities for future generations by further supporting the South Korea-U.S. alliance.
Yoon made the remark in a speech read by Unification Minister Kwon Young-se at a peace symposium co-hosted by Yonhap News Agency and the unification ministry.
"The government will do its best to provide support so that the South Korea-U.S. alliance, which has been the central axis of today's brilliant growth and prosperity, leads to bigger opportunities for future generations," he said.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) and U.S. President Joe Biden shake hands during an official welcoming ceremony at the White House in Washington, in this file photo taken April 26, 2023. (Yonhap)
"In that regard, we must teach our future generations the value and meaning of the South Korea-U.S. alliance so that they are properly aware," he said, noting the important role of both the government and the press.
The annual forum was held at Lotte Hotel in central Seoul under the main theme of "70 Years of the ROK-U.S. Alliance: the Present and Future of the Korean Peninsula." ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's formal name.
Yoon recounted the shared history of sacrifice during the 1950-53 Korean War, the birth of the alliance in its aftermath, and South Korea's rise from one of the poorest countries in the world, with an income per capita of US$67, to a "global pivotal state" contributing to freedom, peace and prosperity.
"The South Korea-U.S. alliance, which marks its 70th anniversary this year, has developed into a global comprehensive strategic alliance," he said.
Citing his summit with U.S. President Joe Biden during his state visit to Washington in April, he said the alliance has expanded to comprise the five "pillars" of security, industry, science and technology, culture and information.
"As cooperation in the five areas expands and synergy is created, we will realize a South Korea-U.S. alliance that moves forward toward the future and acts," Yoon said.
"As a value alliance and a just alliance that contributes to world peace and prosperity, the South Korea-U.S. alliance will build firm peace on the Korean Peninsula and gather the strength to expand freedom, peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region," he added.
Unification Minister Kwon Young-se reads a congratulatory message on behalf of President Yoon Suk Yeol during the opening ceremony of a forum at a hotel in Seoul on June 29, 2023, to discuss the geopolitical situation on the Korean Peninsula, as the South Korea-U.S. alliance marks its 70th anniversary. The symposium was co-hosted by Yonhap News Agency and the Ministry of Unification. (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · June 29, 2023
5. North Korea’s Cyber Strategy
The 21 page report can be downloaded here: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-nk-2023-0622.pdf
Conclusion:
Overall, North Korea's cyber strategy is focused on information collection, financial theft, and espionage. The regime has developed a considerable cyber capability and targets various industries globally. However, destructive cyberattacks are rare, and the regime continues to invest in training cyber operators to further its strategic goals.
And the all putr[ose sword of cyber it is critical to provide funds for eh tregime's nuclear and missile programs as well as to being prepared to support future warfighting capabilities.
North Korea’s Cyber Strategy | Recorded Future
recordedfuture.com
New research by Recorded Future’s Insikt Group examines North Korea’s cyber strategy. Despite the ever-increasing number of cyberattacks publicly attributed to North Korea, the regime does not publish an official cyber-strategy doctrine. North Korea's cyber strategy is focused on aggressive information collection and financial theft operations to support its goals of maintaining the Kim family dynasty and unifying the Korean peninsula under its leadership. The regime conducts information collection to gain insights into the thinking of its adversaries and to access technology that can provide an advantage during times of conflict. Financial theft is used to fund the regime's activities, including its nuclear and missile programs. Despite its centralized leadership system, North Korea creatively targets a wide range of industries across different countries.
A quantitative analysis of 273 cyberattacks attributed to North Korean state-sponsored threat actors reveals that the regime primarily engages in cyber espionage and financial theft activities. While it has the capability to conduct disruptive or destructive cyberattacks, it rarely does so. South Korea and the United States are the most common targets, but North Korean threat actors have a global reach, targeting entities in at least 29 countries. Cryptocurrency heists are on the rise, but espionage remains the primary goal of North Korean cyberattacks.
Breakdown of industry verticals of victims grouped by North Korean state-sponsored threat actors
North Korea's cyber strategy is part of its larger asymmetric strategy to achieve the perpetuation of the regime and the unification of the Korean peninsula. The regime has invested in STEM education and nurtures talented individuals in computer science. Students are sent to domestic and international institutions for further education and exposure to technology not easily accessible in North Korea due to sanctions. The regime also deploys IT workers for online services and freelance platforms, which may overlap with cyber operators.
The report presents a comprehensive analysis of cyberattacks attributed to North Korean state-sponsored threat actors. It examines the threat actor groups involved, their targets, purpose of the attacks, and geographical distribution. Kimsuky is the most common threat group, followed by Lazarus Group and APT37. The data set covers attacks from 2009 to 2023, with a significant increase in the number of reported cyberattacks from 2016 onwards. Kimsuky's activity has seen a dramatic increase in recent years.
Overall, North Korea's cyber strategy is focused on information collection, financial theft, and espionage. The regime has developed a considerable cyber capability and targets various industries globally. However, destructive cyberattacks are rare, and the regime continues to invest in training cyber operators to further its strategic goals.
To read the entire analysis with endnotes, click here to download the report as a PDF.
recordedfuture.com
6. SPECIAL/Elite defections a warning to Kim Jong Un: North Korean defector
When Kim Kwang Jin speaks, I listen.
At the link is an infographic summarizing Dr. Kim's career.
There is important analysis in the article from Dr. Kim.
Excerpt:
Now, more than 10 years into Kim Jong Un's rule, although the internal governance structure has changed, it still remains fraught with pitfalls for his rule, Kim Kwang Jin told CNA.
SPECIAL/Elite defections a warning to Kim Jong Un: North Korean defector
https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202306280019
06/28/2023 08:31 PM
Kim Kwang Jin, a former North Korea diplomat posted in Singapore before defecting to South Korea in 2003. CNA photo June 28, 2023
[Editor's Note: This is part one of a three-part series that shares the views of defectors from North Korea as the country becomes increasingly isolated. The series includes interviews with two defectors and an expert on North Korea, which will be published in the coming days.]
Seoul, June 28 (CNA) Defections by members of North Korea's elite class, who generally have no trouble meeting their basic needs, are a warning to the Kim Jong Un regime and catching the South Korean government's attention, a North Korean defector told CNA recently.
There are waves of North Korean diplomatic defections every three to five years when those diplomats' stints abroad end and they have to return home, said Kim Kwang Jin, who himself was posted in Singapore before defecting to South Korea in 2003.
But the reasons behind the defections have evolved over time, and the more recent motivations paint a troubling picture for the regime's future.
"In the past, people who defected did it mostly because of life and death situations, but now the incentives have become more diverse, with the most important one being that North Korea has no hope and no future," Kim said.
In recent years, news of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) diplomats defecting or attempting to do so has surfaced in Europe and other places in the world, and it is the defection of these elites that should have Kim Jong Un worried, Kim said.
The phenomenon, he said, signaled the severity of the North Korean regime's problems to the extent that it insisted on launching missile tests and taking provocative action even when the country was in dire straits during the COVID-19 pandemic.
"After living overseas for seven to eight years, they know everything they need to know. Going back is like spending a lifetime with their families in a prison. Many people must be struggling with whether to leave (defect)," Kim said about his former colleagues.
"I hope they don't hesitate and come to contribute to facilitate the reunification (of North and South) and a better future for North Korea," Kim said in an interview with a CNA reporter.
Kim once worked for the DPRK government's overseas banking operations in Singapore to manage a slush fund, known as the "revolutionary fund," for then leader Kim Jong Il.
He decided to fly with his family to South Korea in 2003 when he was summoned to return on suspicion of leaking the regime's information to foreign nationals.
Time for a new approach
Kim currently leads the Center for North Korea Human Rights at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), a think tank run by South Korea's National Intelligence Service.
In his position, he has been able to see how the engagement policy championed by the administration of former South Korean President Moon Jae-in failed to rein in North Korea's weapons development, leading him to call for a new approach by the international community to deal with the regime.
The Moon administration had hoped to persuade North Korea to pursue denuclearization by holding seminars and other diplomatic negotiations, but the policy was proved wrong, he said.
"The policy backfired. North Korea's nuclear weapons have only been strengthened," Kim Kwang Jin said. "It is doubtful, to say the least, that there is even a 1 percent chance of North Korea being willing to denuclearize."
Over the past 20 years since his defection, Kim Kwang Jin said he has consistently upheld the view that denuclearization is not possible for North Korea.
"The current instability and provocative behavior of North Korea is the result of the North Korean regime, not the choice of the North Korean people," he said, and he advocated a harder line in dealing with the regime because it has shown no willingness to cooperate on denuclearization.
The goal, Kim said, should be to bring about societal change and ultimately regime change, which could involve cutting off sources of income for North Korea's government and strengthening sanctions, including banning exports of gasoline.
It might also mean pressing the regime to lift restrictions on access to the internet, food, and freedom of expression, Kim said, because "human rights are the Achilles' heel of North Korea."
Preaching human rights in North Korea is not only consistent with universal values, it is also critical to facilitate a shake-up of the hereditary legitimacy of North Korea regime, he said.
"Other than admonishing the North Korean regime, we must also let people in North Korea know that they have the right to live a better life," he said, though Kim acknowledged the difficulty in achieving that because it will require Beijing's help.
China blocking change
Kim Kwang Jin called on the international community to continue to keep tabs on North Korea by documenting the situation in the country, urging China to recognize the status of North Korean refugees, and rescuing female North Korean trafficking victims, among other things.
"There is a lot that needs to be done," he said.
China and Russia, North Korea's traditional allies, have worked against ongoing efforts by Seoul, however, to urge the international community to eliminate North Korea's sources of illegal income derived from technology and intelligence theft by hackers, he said.
"The main reason for China's lack of cooperation is primarily influenced by the U.S.-China rivalry. China does not want to change the current situation on the Korean Peninsula and is unlikely to participate in oppressive actions against North Korea," he said.
Moscow is not likely to actively participate in international sanctions against Pyongyang either because Russia has relied on North Korea for military backing for its invasion of Ukraine, which has led to closer bilateral relations, he said.
Beijing has more influence over Pyongyang than Moscow because China accounts for 90 percent of North Korea's foreign trade and is where North Korea dispatches its people to earn money and send remittances to help with its foreign exchange reserves, he said.
"If China took action, it would strengthen the severity of the sanctions," he said.
Complicating matters for countries trying to influence North Korea from the outside on denuclearization or human rights, Kim Kwang Jin argued, were the internal maneuverings at the top of the government.
Interviewed in the early years of Kim Jong Un's rule, which began in 2011, Kim Kwang Jin predicted then that his regime would be much more fragile than the reigns of his father and grandfather.
The execution of his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, in 2013, and the assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, in 2017 both demonstrated the significant challenges Kim Jong Un faced in consolidating power, Kim Kwang Jin has said in previous interviews.
Now, more than 10 years into Kim Jong Un's rule, although the internal governance structure has changed, it still remains fraught with pitfalls for his rule, Kim Kwang Jin told CNA.
CNA video (in Korean with Chinese subtitles)
Citing Jo Yong Won, secretary of the Organization and Guidance Department of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), Kim Kwang Jin observed that the close confidant of Kim Jong Un might pose a challenge to Kim Jong Un's rule in the future.
Seen as second-in-command of the WPK, Jo Yong Won has portrayed himself as a "low-key" party official, but he is "very ambitious," Kim Kwang Jin said.
Meanwhile, the fact that Kim Jong Un's sister, Kim Yo Jong, and his daughter, Kim Ju Ae, emerged publicly one after another as the faces of the North Korea regime were also indicative of the instability of Kim Jong Un's grip on power, Kim Kwang Jin observed.
By giving prominence to Kim Yo Jong in the same way as his father did to elevate his aunt, Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Jong Un was aiming to craft an authoritarian image of himself similar to that of his father, helping to consolidate his power, Kim Kwang Jin said.
Kim Kyong Hui held key positions in the WPK, including being a Central Political Bureau member, and also played an important role in the early years of Kim Jong Un's rule.
But she has rarely appeared in public since the execution of her husband, Jang Song Thaek, in 2013.
The appearance of Kim Ju Ae in the political sphere may be a response to rumors of Kim Jong Un having health issues or an attempt to prevent the excessive power of Kim Yo Jong.
Under such circumstances, Kim Jong Un has pinned his hopes on his achievements in nuclear development because he believes that only success on weapons and missile technology can stabilize his regime, according to Kim Kwang Jin.
(By Ariel Liao and Shih Hsiu-chuan)
Enditem/ls
> Chinese Version
7. South Korea picks outspoken critic of North's rights record as unification minister
I believe that Professor Kim will support a human rights upfront approach, an information campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unification Koea.
South Korea picks outspoken critic of North's rights record as unification minister
By CUE The Straits Times2 min
June 29, 2023
View Original
The nomination of Professor Kim Yung-ho as South Korea's unification minister is likely to add strain to ties between the two Koreas. PHOTO: REUTERS
SEOUL - South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol on Thursday picked a conservative scholar and an outspoken critic of North Korea’s human rights record as the country’s new unification minister handling relations with Pyongyang in a cabinet reshuffle.
The nomination of Kim Yung-ho, a political science professor at Sungshin Women’s University, comes as Mr Yoon has been seeking to shine a spotlight on human rights abuses in North Korea and as tensions on the Korean peninsula have spiked.
Mr Yoon said in March the international community should have better knowledge about the situation in the North.
Mr Kim, 63, served as a presidential secretary for unification and a human rights envoy under the conservative Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations.
The nomination is likely to add strain to ties between the two Koreas. North Korea has long rejected criticism of its rights conditions as part of a plot to overthrow its rulers.
Prof Kim Yung-ho said in a 2019 column that the path to unification would open when North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s “regime is overthrown and North Korea is liberated”.
“I will do my best to resolve North Korea’s nuclear issue with a principled approach and build the foundation to improve inter-Korean relations,” Prof Kim told reporters after the appointment was announced.
Prof Kim is the right person to pursue a “principle-based” and consistent North Korea policy, said Yoon’s chief of staff Kim Dae-ki.
The unification ministry’s role ranges from cross-border dialogue and exchanges to studying human rights abuses in North Korea and helping defectors resettle in the South.
But the ministry has seen its standing change along with relations between the neighbours. The two Koreas remain technically at war under an armistice on the 1950-53 Korean War.
Nuclear-armed North Korea has since early last year been testing weapons, including its biggest intercontinental ballistic missile, ramping up tensions with the South and its main ally, the United States.
Thursday’s cabinet shake-up also included a replacement for the head of the anti-corruption and civil rights commission, a ministerial post.
There was also a string of vice-ministerial posts, including the appointment of 2008 Olympic gold medallist weightlifter Jang Mi-ran as the second vice-minister of culture and sports.
Ministerial appointees are subject to parliamentary hearings but a formal approval is not required. REUTERS
8. DMZ War and lessons from Cold War
See also LTG Dan Bolger's monograph at Leavenworth:
Scenes from an unfinished war: low-intensity conflict in Korea, 1966-1969.
Major Daniel p. Bolger
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16040coll3/id/26/
DMZ War and lessons from Cold War
The Korea Times · June 29, 2023
By Chun In-bum
Seventy years ago, the Korean War was halted by an armistice, and South Koreans enjoyed a standard of peace and stability that enabled them to achieve both political freedom and remarkable economic development. During the 70 intervening years, there have been serious challenges to the stability and security of Korea ― but perhaps none as serious as the DMZ War in the late 1960s, although history has paid little attention to this conflict or to those who made the ultimate sacrifice.
A recent article appearing on HistoryNet, written by John D. Howard, details the North Korean infiltration of 1968, the sole purpose of which was to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee. In doing so, Howard opened a page in history that has been described as "the second Korean conflict that has drifted into obscurity, a curious episode, a footnote to the Vietnam era."
Military historians now refer to this conflict as the DMZ War, denoting the military conflict that raged along the Korean DMZ from 1966-69, exploding briefly again in the summer of 1970 before finally subsiding ― in which an aggressive North Korea attempted to take advantage of South Korea's relative poverty and political instability, along with America's increasing military commitment in Vietnam, to foment an insurgency in the South, drive the Americans from the peninsula and unify Korea by force.
Since taking power, North Korean dictator Kim Il-sung had become obsessed with uniting the two Koreas under communist rule, and he turned to unconventional warfare to destabilize South Korea, initially setting 1966 as the campaign start date. By late 1966, however, the United States was completely immersed in Vietnam, where its military commitment already exceeded 300,000 and was increasing steadily.
Fearful that events in Korea would jeopardize support for the Vietnam War, the United States downplayed the conflict unfolding in the Korean DMZ. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III took command of all United Nations forces in Korea on Sept. 1, 1966, and his charter from the Secretary of Defense contained explicit instructions not to adversely affect the Vietnam effort.
This resulted in the suppression of all news involving threats from North Korea. Information about North Korean military hostilities became classified and was kept from both the media and the public of the U.S. and South Korea. In addition, the theater was in a poor state of readiness. Most U.S. helicopters had been sent to Vietnam, and modernization plans for Korea were on hold. Shortages of spare parts had left many vehicles non-operational.
The beginning of armed hostilities can be traced to a speech given by Kim Il-sung in October 1966 ― which acted as the starting gun for a North Korean campaign of nighttime forays across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), firefights along the barrier fence, the attempted ambush of U.S. patrols and nonstop attempts to infiltrate North Korean agents. These armed provocations across the DMZ by the North Koreans specifically targeted U.S. forces ― as part of Kim Il-sung's scheme to drive a wedge between the Americans and their South Korean hosts.
1967 saw a sevenfold increase in firefights, with 150 occurring in the U.S. sector alone. Sixteen GIs were killed and 51 were seriously wounded. The ROK Army suffered more grievously with 115 killed in action and 243 wounded. A total of 228 North Korean soldiers were killed.
The DMZ War reached its peak when a North Korean military offensive was launched in January 1968 ― occurring in tandem with North Vietnam's Tet Offensive. A North Korean commando unit penetrated a U.S.-controlled sector of the DMZ, cut their way through the barrier fence, assembled in the mountains south of the DMZ, donned the uniforms of a South Korean Army unit and made their way to Seoul with the objective of assassinating President Park Chung-hee.
They made it to within a couple of hundred meters of the Blue House before being discovered, prompting a firefight in the streets of Seoul. A few days later, North Korea seized the USS Pueblo in neutral waters, imprisoning its captain and crew and holding them hostage for the following 11 months.
Finally, on April 15, 1969, a U.S. Navy EC-121M aircraft on a reconnaissance mission was shot down by a North Korean MiG-21 over the East Sea. All 31 Americans (30 sailors and 1 Marine) on board were killed, constituting the largest single loss of U.S. aircrew during the Cold War era.
Official casualty figures for the U.S. and South Korea during the DMZ War were as follows: 299 killed and 550 wounded for South Korea, and 106 killed, 111 wounded and 83 captured (USS Pueblo) for the U.S.
In the fall of 1969, the communist dictator ordered a decrease in offensive activity and purged the NKPA leadership. In the end, Kim's attempts were unsuccessful, and the DMZ War was largely forgotten ― until being brought to light recently by the surviving members of the U.S. Army's Second Infantry Division. We, who enjoy the fruits of their sacrifice, must not forget that freedom is not free.
Chun In-bum served as a lieutenant general of the ROK Army and commander of Special Forces Korea.
The Korea Times · June 29, 2023
9. Risks of comparing Korea, Vietnam
north Korea wants a partial "comparison" to north Vietnam. It wants to execute a political warfare strategy that will lead to negotiations and the withdrawal of US forces (e.g., 1973 Paris Accords). Then it will wait until the political conditions are right in the US. Then it will attack the South to unify it just as North Vietnam did in 1975. When people tout the Vietnam Model as one for north zKorea the above scenario is what north Korea wants while we tout the turn of Vietnam from communism to a semi capitalist society and forget that the transition to capitalism could not take place until the north dominated the South (though the use of violence)
Risks of comparing Korea, Vietnam
The Korea Times · June 29, 2023
By Donald Kirk
The legacy of history is unpredictable, erratic, sometimes generous, more often capricious and jeering.
If anybody had told me, when I was a journalist in "South" Vietnam five or six decades ago, visiting the marine press center in Da Nang, the large port city on Vietnam's central coast, that someday a U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier would make a port call, I would have assumed the forecast was based on the U.S. winning the war.
For sure, one would not have imagined that one of America's biggest warships would be welcome if "North" Vietnam were to defeat "South" Vietnam. What could be more ridiculous than the notion of an American aircraft carrier arriving in Da Nang with the full authority and blessing of the Communist rulers of a united Vietnam? I would have shrugged off such an impossible prospect as a ridiculous joke.
But what do you know, the USS Ronald Reagan showed up in Da Nang on a courtesy call intended to show the enduring friendship of the Americans and the Vietnamese, under the thumb of the Communist victors in Hanoi. There it is, as the GIs used to say, in an expression of fatalism, boredom and acceptance of the war as they came to know it in those days when the Americans knew they were not fighting to win.
The turnaround in the sentiments of Vietnam's Communist rulers owes its origins to one overwhelming concern: The fear that China will attempt to hold sway over the whole country as in bygone centuries. Fiercely though they fought the French, the Americans and the American-armed-and-advised "South" Vietnamese, the "North" Vietnamese were always waiting for their showdown with the real imperial masters, the Chinese.
Never mind that the Chinese had armed and equipped the "North" Vietnamese for their anti-colonial and anti-imperial wars. The leaders in Hanoi could never stand for having to bow before them. They are not at all willing for the Chinese to tell them what to do, and they are extremely unhappy about Chinese claims to natural gas and oil deposits beneath the South China Sea.
No, latter-day Vietnam would rather not risk a war with China after a nasty border conflict in early 1979 that ended with the Chinese declaring a victory and going home. Hanoi believes its troops taught the Chinese a lesson. Would the outlook of the American-backed Saigon regime have been much different? Had the Americans and their one-time southern allies fought off the North Vietnamese, it's safe to assume America's friends in Saigon would have been as authoritarian as the government that now rules all of Vietnam from Hanoi.
The fate of Vietnam leads to comparisons with Korea. Scholars have been predicting the demise of the North Korean regime for years, but it never seems to happen even though the North again faces the pestilence of poverty, hunger, and disease. The situation may not be as dire as it was in the 1990s when two million North Koreans are believed to have died, but Kim Jong-un's refusal to back down on his nuclear-and-missile program must be taking a toll. The man will not stop wasting money on costly weapons that by any reasonable standard he cannot afford.
One wonders, 50 or so years from now, how the North-South drama will have played out. Even if Kim dies of diseases associated with obesity, no one dares predict the fall of the Kim dynasty. If he is finally unable to rule, he still has a powerful younger sister, and he has also nurtured an inner circle of high-ranking party leaders who may feud with one another but will agree on the need to perpetuate his legacy.
Prophesying Korea's future is as risky as it would have been to try and predict that of Vietnam. As a correspondent. I visited American aircraft carriers off the coast, where warplanes were catapulting off the decks on bombing missions over "North" and "South" Vietnam, where the North Vietnamese had established base complexes in the jungles, and also bombing portions of the Ho Chi Minh trail network over which Hanoi was shipping men and supplies into the South.
These days several hundred thousand Koreans are in Vietnam, to which South Korea sent a total of 300,000 troops at the behest of the Americans during the Vietnam War. No one could have predicted the presence of so many South Koreans in Vietnam after reports of massacres by South Korean troops.
Nor would anyone be so bold as to predict a happy ending in the perpetual contest for control over both Koreas.
Donald Kirk (www.donaldkirk.com) covers the North-South confrontation from both Washington and Seoul.
The Korea Times · June 29, 2023
10. Nuclear consultative group likely to meet soon: Envoy
A lot of work to be done.
Thursday
June 29, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Nuclear consultative group likely to meet soon: Envoy
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/06/29/national/diplomacy/Korea-United-States-Nuclear-Consultative-Group/20230629175051216.html
Korean Ambassador to the United States Cho Hyun-dong speaks during a press conference with reporters in Washington on Wednesday. [NEWS1]
The inaugural meeting of a new Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) between South Korea and the United States will likely be held soon amid continued concerns over North Korea's threats, according to Seoul's top diplomat to Washington on Wednesday.
"In a situation where North Korea has declared it will launch a second reconnaissance satellite after the failed launch in May, South Korea and the United States are sharing related trends and coming up with countermeasures," Korean Ambassador to the United States U.S. Cho Hyun-dong told reporters in a briefing at the Korean Cultural Center in Washington.
"The discussions for the first meeting of the NCG between South Korea and the United States, through the Washington Declaration in April, are making progress in the face of North Korean threats."
This comes amid Seoul officials indicating that the first NCG meeting can take place as early as next month.
On April 26, President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden signed the Washington Declaration during their bilateral summit which created the NCG, a planned consultative body of officials from both countries designed to strengthen extended deterrence against threats from North Korea through enhanced dialogue and information sharing on nuclear strategy.
The two countries' National Security Councils (NSC) are expected to play a leading role in the final coordination ahead of the meeting likely to be held in July.
Cho said the two countries are holding close discussions on international issues around the clock, such as the recent rebellion in Russia by the Wagner mercenary group and North Korean provocations, noting that there is "strategic communication and discussions" between South Korea and the United States on such major issues.
He said that the Korean Embassy in Washington, the White House NSC, and the U.S. State Department "communicated and discussed issues closely 24-7, regardless of weekdays or holidays."
The South Korean government is closely communicating with the United States on the Russia situation as it is likely to affect the arms trade between North Korea and the Wagner Group.
This comes amid expectations that the leaders of South Korea, Japan and the United States could meet as early as this summer in Washington.
Cho said such a trilateral summit in Washington, as proposed by Biden, "is also being pursued."
In a brief trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Group of 7, or G7, Summit in Hiroshima in May, Biden invited Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to Washington for another three-way summit.
If this meeting comes about, it will be the first time that the three countries would be gathered for a standalone trilateral summit rather than as a pull-aside meeting on the sidelines of other multilateral events. It is expected that the North Korean nuclear issue will be one of the main agenda in such a trilateral summit.
Although Tokyo's participation in Seoul and Washington's NCG, or the possibility of forming a separate extended deterrence consultative body among the three countries has been raised, officials said there have been no detailed discussions on this issue yet.
Kurt Campbell, the U.S. NSC Indo-Pacific coordinator, likewise referred Biden's invitation for a trilateral summit in a video message to a peace forum hosted by the Korean Unification Ministry and Yonhap News Agency in Seoul on Thursday.
Such a meeting, he said, will "celebrate the remarkable progress that's been made in the bilateral relationship between Japan and South Korea" and be an opportunity to "see what steps we can take to make sure we lock that progress in" and review areas of possible trilateral cooperation going forward.
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
11. ‘Squid Game,’ Netflix’s Most-Watched Show, Completes Casting for Second Season
‘Squid Game,’ Netflix’s Most-Watched Show, Completes Casting for Second Season
As growth falters, the U.S. streaming service seeks another global viewership bump from the South Korean dystopian drama
By Jiyoung Sohn
Follow
June 29, 2023 6:48 am ET
https://www.wsj.com/articles/squid-game-netflixs-most-watched-show-completes-casting-for-second-season-b5dfc54c?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1
Returning cast members include Lee Jung-jae, whose ‘Squid Game’ work netted him an Emmy award as best actor in a drama series. PHOTO: NO JUHAN/NETFLIX/EVERETT COLLECTION
SEOUL—Let the do-or-die games begin, again.
The South Korean dystopian drama “Squid Game” announced the cast for its second season, with much riding on a repeat success for Netflix’s most-watched show ever.
On Thursday, Netflix NFLX 3.06%increase; green up pointing triangle unveiled eight new members of the cast, a mix of locally well-known actors and K-pop singers. The U.S. streaming service didn’t specify when the new season would premiere, but said the full cast gathered for the first table read this week.
“Squid Game” surprised both Netflix executives and the largely South Korean cast when it became a global phenomenon in the fall of 2021. The show revolves around a competition in which 456 debt-ridden contestants chase a single cash prize of about $40 million by playing traditional Korean children’s games on a secluded island. The dystopian element: Losers die.
Netflix earlier announced the return of four original cast members, including Lee Jung-jae, who won an Emmy award for the best actor in a drama series, in his role as game participant Seong Gi-hun. Also returning are Lee Byung-hun, who played the masked Front Man overseeing the competition; Wi Ha-jun, who played a police detective; and Gong Yoo, whose character charmed and manipulated strangers into playing the game.
Doubling down on South Korean shows has become a key tactic for Netflix, seeking to keep viewers content and profits healthy at a challenging time. Last year it posted its first drop in subscribers in a decade. In response, Netflix has launched a lower-priced, ad-supported tier to its streaming service and begun to limit password sharing.
’Squid Game’ racked up 14 Emmy nominations and six wins. PHOTO: RINGO CHIU/REUTERS
Shows like “Squid Game,” which hit No. 1 in more than 90 countries, have demonstrated Korean content’s crossover appeal—ever more important as Netflix strives to create hit franchises that retain current subscribers and tempt new ones. South Korean shows have become regulars in the ranks of Netflix’s most-watched non-English-language shows globally. The chart toppers include “The Glory,” a revenge drama about school bullying, and “Extraordinary Attorney Woo,” about a lawyer on the autism spectrum.
The number of hours that Netflix users spent watching South Korean shows and films rose sixfold from 2019 to 2022, the company said. And among Netflix’s more than 230 million subscribers, 60% had watched at least one South Korean show as of last year.
Netflix said in April it would invest $2.5 billion in South Korea over the next four years to produce TV series, films and reality shows, after having invested more than $7 billion since 2016.
“It’s been an amazing partnership between the Korean creative community and Netflix,” Netflix CEO Ted Sarandos said during a press conference in Seoul this month. “But I believe we’re just scratching the surface of what’s possible. It’s why Netflix is investing for the long term.”
Netflix has backed many K-dramas with the biggest budgets and turned their actors, actresses and creators into global celebrities.
But some South Korean content creators have called for more sharing of successful shows’ profits, echoing concerns central to the Hollywood writers’ strike. Byun Seung-min, whose Climax Studio has produced hits including “Hellbound” and “D.P.” for Netflix, hit the theme at the same press conference where Sarandos spoke.
“South Korean creators have various concerns, including around profit distribution,” said Byun, Climax’s CEO. “We hope [Netflix] can work together on ways to expand profits.”
Sarandos, who was on a panel with Byun, said Netflix is committed to “mutual growth” with the South Korean content industry and reiterated that the streaming giant compensates creators and production studios at the “very top of the market” to best support their projects.
“Squid Game” creator Hwang Dong-hyuk had spent a decade unsuccessfully pitching the idea to local studios, which called it too grotesque and too unrealistic. The show made history last year as the first non-English-language series nominated for an Emmy Award in a major category. It racked up 14 Emmy nominations and won six awards—including one for Hwang as best director.
Not returning to the cast is O Yeong-su, who made history as the first South Korean actor to win a Golden Globe Award as best supporting actor in television for his work as Oh Il-nam or Player 001. The 78-year-old is on trial in South Korea after being indicted last year on charges of sexual misconduct, which he has denied. Lawyers representing O declined to comment.
Write to Jiyoung Sohn at jiyoung.sohn@wsj.com
Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
12. Why North Korea Is Sitting on the Story of the Revolt in Russia
Remember that Kim Jong Un fears the Korean people more than he fears the ROK/US alliance and the US military,
Why North Korea Is Sitting on the Story of the Revolt in Russia
nysun.com2 min
June 28, 2023
View Original
The South Korean press has reported that the North may have been shipping munitions via the Wagner Group.
If there’s one story that North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, would prefer to hide from his people, it’s that of a massive revolt against an entrenched regime.
The North Korean press has yet to report on the short-lived defiance of the Wagner Group in Russia, but Pyongyang’s Korean Central News Agency did reveal its worries in a four-sentence dispatch that it’s repeated several times in recent days.
In a meeting with the Russian ambassador to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK, the North’s vice foreign minister, Im Chon-il, left no doubt of the North’s subservience to Moscow — and whom it supported in any contest with Russia’s President Putin.
“During the talk,” said KCNA, in the English version of the story, Mr. Kim “expressed firm belief that the recent armed rebellion in Russia would be successfully put down in conformity with the aspiration and will of the Russian people.”
The DPRK, he promised, “will strongly support any option and decision by the Russian leadership.”
With those words, North Korea betrayed the same fears that it’s conveyed in carefully guarded mentions over the years of events ranging from the Arab Spring more than a decade ago to revolutions and revolts in eastern Europe.
These tidings go unreported in the North’s state press until they’re widely known via broadcasts from South Korea, America and elsewhere that North Koreans may listen to surreptitiously, at the risk of arrest, torture and imprisonment. At some point the news gets around, and Pyongyang’s propaganda machine goes to work.
In the case of Russia, the choice was rooted in basic needs. North Korea depends on food — notably wheat — that it imports for its impoverished people, as well as oil and natural gas, which it also gets from China.
In return, as the State Department has charged, North Korea has shipped rockets and missiles to Russia. Products move back and forth across the North’s extremely brief border with Russia — 11 miles across the Tumen River and another 12 miles at sea.
North Korea did not make a huge point of its support for Mr. Putin. Why let people know something really serious was going on? Still, the KCNA reported that Mr. Im had “expressed conviction that the strong Russian army and people would surely overcome trials and ordeals and heroically emerge victorious in the special military operation against Ukraine.”
North Korea’s relations with Russia — and with the Wagner Group — may be still more complicated. The South Korean press has reported that the North may have been shipping munitions via the Wagner Group.
“All this suggests that North Korea was keen to take advantage of the war, first, by selling Russia weapons during the conflict and then by taking part in its reconstruction,” reports the Korea Times in Seoul. That plan may have been “seriously — perhaps fatally — disrupted after the head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, initiated an open military rebellion,” said the paper.
An expert with the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, Cho Han-bum, is quoted as saying it’s “very possible that North Korea made several deals with the group.” According to Mr. Cho, “cancellations of the deals would cause immediate damage to the regime.”
13. Did North Korea Just Threaten to Start a War?
Did North Korea Just Threaten to Start a War?
19fortyfive.com · by Maya Carlin · June 27, 2023
North Korea threatens nuclear war? Over the weekend, Pyongyang held a massive rally in protest of America’s involvement on the Korean peninsula. Kim Jong Un’s regime blames the U.S. for its “desperate efforts to ignite a nuclear war.”
On Monday, the North Korean government released a report detailing how any military conflict would culminate in a “thermonuclear war unprecedented in the world.” According to several state-run media outlets, more than 100,000 North Koreans participated in the demonstrations, some changing slogans pledging a “war of revenge” against America.
What Is North Korea Doing?
Washington, Seoul, and other allies have collaborated for decades in attempts to thwart Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions.
However, these efforts have largely failed, and North Korea has been ramping up dangerous launches and other hostile behavior in recent years. Last month, North Korea unsuccessfully attempted to launch a military spy satellite to monitor the
U.S. Analysts believe this weekend’s protests could be a lead up to a secondary launch attempt.
Kim Jung Un’s regime published its anti-U.S. report via its Institute for American Studies. In addition to condemning U.S. arms transfers to Seoul, the report denounced continued joint military exercises in the region, “espionage,” and fueling hostilities on the peninsula.
In early June, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and his Japanese and South Korean counterparts met to discuss the increased nuclear and missile threats from North Korea.
The three officials also reaffirmed their commitments to carry out maritime joint drills and to strengthen “trilateral responses to the DPRK’s nuclear and missile threats and deterring against those threats, including anti-submarine exercises and missile defense exercises.”
North Korea has launched over 100 missile tests since 2022
Just two weeks later, Pyongyang launched two short-range ballistic missiles toward the waters between the Korean peninsula and Japan. This launch was reportedly in response to American-South Korean-Japanese cooperation, which Kim Jung Un’s regime views as a threat.
The missiles landed in Japan’s “exclusive economic zone,” a clear provocation according to Tokyo. Over the years, Pyongyang has worked to expand its arms arsenal. The regime has succeeded in upgrading its solid-fuel ballistic missiles that can also make mid-air maneuvers.
Additionally, a New York Times report detailed how Pyongyang is also expanding its cruise missiles program, submarine-launched missiles and underwater drones. Kim Jung Un’s regime claims that these new weapons could be nuclear-armed.
Since the start of 2022, North Korea is believed to have test-fired at least 100 missiles. Some of its launches, however, have not been successful. On May 31, Pyongyang launched a long-range rocket carrying its first spy satellite. Almost immediately, the rocket crashed off the Korean Peninsula’s west coast.
Perhaps Pyongyang is making up for the public failed launch by continuing to provoke its perceived “enemies.”
Sunday marked the anniversary of the start of the Korean War, which begun on June 25, 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea.
Pyongyang had hoped its military spy satellite launch could set off celebrations and will likely conduct a secondary launch in the imminent future to make up for its failure.
Maya Carlin, a Senior Editor for 19FortyFive, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.
From 19FortyFive
A Russian Submarine Accidently ‘Destroyed Itself’
Did Ukraine Just Win the War?
Total Massacre’: Ukraine Footage Shows Russian Cruise Missile Shipment Attacked
19fortyfive.com · by Maya Carlin · June 27, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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