Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"A leader is best when people barely know he exists, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say: we did it ourselves."

- Lao Tzu

“When you hate, you generate a reciprocal hate. When individuals hate each other, the harm is finite; but when great groups of nations hate each other, the harm may be infinite and absolute. Do not fall back upon the thought that those whom you hate deserve to be hated. I do not know whether anybody deserves to be hated, but I do know that hatred of those whom we believe to be evil is not what will redeem mankind.”

- Bertrand Russell, Human Society in Ethics and Politics

"Good, better, best. Never let it rest. 'Til your good is better and your better is best."

- St. Jerome

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25, 2023

2. China throws support behind 'strategic partner' Russia after Wagner insurrection challenges Putin

3. With Russia revolt over, mercenaries' future and direction of Ukraine war remain uncertain

4. US aircraft carrier makes Da Nang port call as America looks to strengthen ties with Vietnam

5. Why Wagner Chief Prigozhin Turned Against Putin

6. Russian defense minister makes first public appearance since mercenary revolt as uncertainty swirls

7. With Wagner’s Future in Doubt, Ukraine Could Capitalize on Chaos

8. For the U.S. and NATO, a Weakened Russia Is More of a Wild Card

9. Officials question whether truce will hold in Kremlin, Wagner standoff

10. Army fires 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade commander

11. Detailed defense plans for US and allied troops remind senior Army leaders of Cold War

12. The Prigozhin roadshow isn’t over

13. Poll finds continued public support for Ukraine, Taiwan aid

14. The 2023 War On The Rocks Summer Fiction Reading List

15. The Lessons of Afghanistan: Why Countering Someone Else’s Insurgency Is So Hard

16. How Advanced Is Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation?

17. US to make India into naval logistics hub for Indo-Pac region

18. Security meltdown avoided in Moscow, but blowback from insurrection looms

19. Don’t Count the Dictators Out

20. Special Operations News Update - June 26, 2023 | SOF News

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2023

Key Takeaways

Russian sources speculated on the specifics of the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 armed rebellion, including the possible involvement of Putin’s chief of staff.
The implications of the Lukashenko-Prigozhin deal for the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also remain ambiguous.
Wagner forces continued to withdraw from positions in Rostov and on the road to Moscow to their bases on June 25, and the Kremlin’s intended structure for leveraging Wagner fighters remains unclear.
Further details emerged on the composition of the Wagner units approaching Moscow on June 24, indicating Prigozhin would likely have struggled in an active conflict in Moscow without additional support.
The Russian ultranationalist information space fractured on June 25 between those who want to move past the rebellion and those demanding solutions to the internal security flaws that the rebellion exposed.
The ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club held a pre-scheduled event in Moscow on June 25 and espoused longstanding criticisms against Putin and the Russian military leadership, suggesting that the Kremlin will not immediately begin cracking down on antagonistic ultranationalist groups in the aftermath of Prigozhin’s rebellion.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front.
Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine does not appear to have been substantially impacted by Wagner’s June 23-24 armed rebellion.
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov warned on June 23 that Russia has finished preparations for an attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
A Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempted to cross the international border into Sumy Oblast.
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Svatove, Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson Oblast.
Ukrainian officials continue to report that Russia relies on sanctions evasion schemes to acquire foreign components for weapons production.
Russian occupation authorities continue to weaponize policy regarding children to consolidate social and administrative control of occupied areas.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 25, 2023

Jun 25, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25, 2023

Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark

June 25, 2023, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on June 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian sources speculated on the specifics of the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 armed rebellion, including the possible involvement of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chief of staff. Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing unnamed internal Kremlin sources, reported that Prigozhin initially tried to get in touch with the Russian Presidential Administration midday June 24 as Wagner fighters moved north from Rostov-on-Don towards Moscow, but that Putin refused to speak with Prigozhin.[1] Meduza noted that once Prigozhin observed the lack of widespread military support for Wagner’s actions and changed his mind on Wagner’s prospects, the Kremlin turned to negotiations involving Lukashenko, Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Office Anton Vaino, and Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov. Vaino and Gryzlov’s possible involvement was not reported on June 24. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also questioned whether the deal will hold Wagner or Prigozhin accountable in any way for the deaths of at least 13 Russian airmen on June 24.[2] Prigozhin’s whereabouts cannot be verified beyond his departure from Rostov-on-Don late on June 24. Russian outlet RTVI claimed that Prigozhin’s press service told RTVI that Prigozhin “sends his regards” and will answer all questions “when he is on normal communication,” and a prominent Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel shared an AI-generated image of Prigozhin holding a finger to his lips and stating “plans love silence,” a copy of the phrase commonly used in Ukraine about operational security.[3] As ISW noted on June 24, the specifics of the deal are still unclear in the open source beyond speculation and rumor. The fallout of Wagner’s armed rebellion has not yet concluded, and it remains to be seen how the deal will be implemented, whether all involved parties will comply fully, what the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intend to do with Wagner personnel, and if Wagner fighters will cooperate - regardless of Prigozhin’s wishes.

The implications of the Lukashenko-Prigozhin deal for the leadership of the Russian MoD also remain ambiguous. Some Russian sources, including internal Kremlin sources cited by Meduza, suggested that the Kremlin may be considering changes to MoD leadership as part of the deal.[4] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov have not been seen or heard from since before Prigozhin announced the beginning of the armed rebellion on June 23. Some Russian sources suggested that Alexei Dyumin, the current governor of Tula Oblast, former security officer to Putin, and former head of Russia’s Special Operations Forces, may replace Shoigu as the Defense Minister, although ISW cannot confirm these speculations.[5] Any changes to the MoD leadership would notably represent a significant victory for Prigozhin, who justified his armed rebellion by directly accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of the deaths of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers in Ukraine.[6]

Wagner forces continued to withdraw from positions in Rostov and on the road to Moscow to their bases on June 25, and the Kremlin’s intended structure for leveraging Wagner fighters remains unclear. Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows armed Wagner forces driving south away from Moscow near Voronezh City.[7] Footage published on June 25 purportedly shows Wagner forces returning to training camps in southern Russia.[8] The fact that Wagner is returning to their training camps with military equipment indicates that the Kremlin intends to maintain at least certain elements of Wagner’s manpower rather than seek to immediately demobilize them, although the future of Wagner’s command and organizational structure are unclear. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrei Kartapolov announced on June 25 that the State Duma is working on a law that would regulate private military companies (PMCs) but emphasized that it is not necessary to ban the Wagner Group as it is “the most combat-ready unit in Russia.”[9] Kartapolov further noted that the future of the Wagner Group is undetermined and emphasized that the personnel of the Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don were “following orders of their command” and “did nothing reprehensible.”[10] Kartapolov’s efforts to absolve Wagner personnel of responsibility for taking part in an armed rebellion and separate them from Prigozhin may indicate the Russian government’s desire to continue to use Wagner personnel in some capacity, and as ISW assessed on June 24, the Russian leadership could redeploy Wagner to Ukraine or instead commit them to international missions. Russian state-affiliated news outlets reported on June 24 that the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Rozkomnadzor) blocked Prigozhin’s official press service on Russian social media site VKontakte, indicating the Kremlin’s efforts to restrict Prigozhin’s organizational actions.[11]

Further details emerged on the composition of the Wagner units approaching Moscow on June 24, indicating Prigozhin would likely have struggled in an active conflict in Moscow without additional support. Russian sources claimed on June 25 that the first Wagner column that began moving towards Moscow on June 24 consisted of 350 pieces of equipment, including nine tanks, four Tigr infantry fighting vehicles, a Grad MLRS system, and a howitzer.[12] Russian sources claimed that the three other Wagner columns that moved toward Moscow had 375, 100, and 212 pieces of equipment respectively, the majority of which were non-armored trucks, cars, and buses.[13] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 24 that the columns moving towards Moscow were comprised of 4,000 personnel with 40 to 50 pieces of equipment, including MRAPs, T-90M main battle tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, Pantsir air defense systems, and Grad MLRS systems.[14] CNN reported on June 24 that US and Western intelligence officials observed Wagner amassing equipment and ammunition for the rebellion for several weeks, indicating that the columns likely comprised Wagner‘s greatest available strength.[15] ISW cannot confirm the exact composition of the Wagner columns at this time, although current reporting suggests that Prigozhin’s force would have struggled to fully occupy Moscow or conduct prolonged engagements with elements of the Russian Armed Forces, if they deployed. ISW previously assessed that Prigozhin likely sought and failed to win military support for his rebellion, and Wagner’s move on Moscow was likely predicated on the assumption that military support would strengthen the rebellion’s forces and capabilities.[16] Prigozhin may have become more amenable to the alleged negotiations with Lukashenko as these insufficient forces drew nearer to Moscow and that time was running out to garner the necessary military support for a potential armed conflict with the MoD.

The Russian ultranationalist information space fractured on June 25 between those who want to move past the rebellion and those demanding solutions to the internal security flaws that the rebellion had exposed. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger praised all of the parties for bringing the rebellion to an end and avoiding bloodshed, ignoring the fact that Wagner forces killed at least 13 Russian pilots and airmen during the rebellion.[17] Other Russian sources continued to characterize the rebellion as solely Prigozhin’s doing and called on Russian authorities to show clemency towards the Wagner fighters who have fought for Russian interests in Ukraine.[18] A Russian milblogger specifically accused Moscow Oblast officials and the MoD of failing to stop the Wagner advance towards Moscow.[19] The milblogger questioned how the MoD would be able to respond to external incursions if it was unable to stop Wagner’s movement towards Moscow.[20] A former Russian occupation official criticized how the internal Russian structures were slow in publicly addressing the rebellion.[21] Several other Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian elites for failing to publicly support Putin and for fleeing Russia.[22] Another Russian ultranationalist bemoaned that Prigozhin’s rebellion indicated that Russia is one step closer to its final and irrevocable death.[23] A prominent milblogger asked how Russian authorities will punish those involved in the deaths of Russian servicemen, indicating that clemency for the Wagner fighters that participated in the rebellion may become a longstanding grievance for elements of the Russian military and the ultranationalist community.[24]

The ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club held a pre-scheduled event in Moscow on June 25 and espoused longstanding criticisms against Putin and the Russian military leadership, suggesting that the Kremlin will not immediately begin cracking down on antagonistic ultranationalist groups in the aftermath of Prigozhin’s rebellion.[25] The Angry Patriots Club is a pro-war social movement that aims to correct perceived issues in the war effort in Ukraine so that Russian forces can achieve victory, and the club’s members have used that mission to launch routine scathing criticisms of the MoD, the Kremlin, and Putin himself.[26] The Angry Patriots Club has also notably called for “revolution” if the Kremlin freezes the war in Ukraine or pursues negotiations.[27] Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin spoke at the live-streamed event in Moscow and delivered a set of longstanding theses on what Russia needs to do to win the war in Ukraine.[28] Girkin publicly reiterated that Putin needs to legally transfer certain presidential authorities to other parties if Putin is unwilling to assume control over the war in Ukraine as the supreme Commander-in-Chief.[29] The Angry Patriots Club had promoted the event for several weeks, and Russian officials were likely aware of it to some extent.[30] If the Kremlin intends to use Prigozhin’s rebellion as a pretext to start immediately suppressing antagonistic ultranationalists, then this event would have likely been a prime candidate to start that effort. The Kremlin likely risks Prigozhin’s armed rebellion expanding the window of acceptable anti-Kremlin criticism, particularly if the Kremlin does not intend to retaliate further against Prigozhin. The Kremlin’s continued careful response to the armed rebellion will likely prompt other Russian nationalists to test Russian official reactions to more explicitly critical rhetoric.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 25. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks around Bakhmut, along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest of Velyka Novosilka, although ISW is unable to confirm this claim.[32] Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated in an interview with Fox News published on June 25 that the main assault of the counteroffensive has not yet started.[33]

Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine does not appear to have been substantially impacted by Wagner’s June 23-24 armed rebellion. Russian and Ukrainian sources both reported that fighting continued as usual along the entire frontline, with Russian forces conducting a relatively higher number of ground attacks near Bakhmut than over the past few days.[34] Some Russian sources used the armed rebellion as a rhetorical device to preemptively exculpate Russian forces from any Ukrainian gains made on June 24 and 25.[35]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov warned on June 23 that Russia has finished preparations for an attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).[36] Budanov stated that Russian forces have mined the ZNPP’s cooling pond and have moved vehicles loaded with explosives to four of the six ZNPP power units.[37] As ISW previously assessed, intentional Russian sabotage of the ZNPP resulting in a radiological catastrophe would potentially be more detrimental to Russian forces on the southern bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir than to Ukrainian forces on the opposite bank.[38] Russia has frequently invoked threatening rhetoric surrounding the ZNPP in order to dissuade potential Ukrainian counterattacks into occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces may be disseminating information about the mining of the cooling pond and power units to discourage Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. However, Russia demonstrated a willingness to put its own troops in harm's way after the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP), so ISW cannot rule out the potential that Russian forces may be setting conditions to sabotage the ZNPP.

Key Takeaways

Russian sources speculated on the specifics of the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 armed rebellion, including the possible involvement of Putin’s chief of staff.
The implications of the Lukashenko-Prigozhin deal for the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also remain ambiguous.
Wagner forces continued to withdraw from positions in Rostov and on the road to Moscow to their bases on June 25, and the Kremlin’s intended structure for leveraging Wagner fighters remains unclear.
Further details emerged on the composition of the Wagner units approaching Moscow on June 24, indicating Prigozhin would likely have struggled in an active conflict in Moscow without additional support.
The Russian ultranationalist information space fractured on June 25 between those who want to move past the rebellion and those demanding solutions to the internal security flaws that the rebellion exposed.
The ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club held a pre-scheduled event in Moscow on June 25 and espoused longstanding criticisms against Putin and the Russian military leadership, suggesting that the Kremlin will not immediately begin cracking down on antagonistic ultranationalist groups in the aftermath of Prigozhin’s rebellion.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front.
Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine does not appear to have been substantially impacted by Wagner’s June 23-24 armed rebellion.
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov warned on June 23 that Russia has finished preparations for an attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
A Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempted to cross the international border into Sumy Oblast.
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Svatove, Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson Oblast.
Ukrainian officials continue to report that Russia relies on sanctions evasion schemes to acquire foreign components for weapons production.
Russian occupation authorities continue to weaponize policy regarding children to consolidate social and administrative control of occupied areas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group unsuccessfully tried to cross the international border into Sumy Oblast near Rodionivka on June 25.[39]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northwest of Svatove amid claims of continued Ukrainian offensives along the Kreminna-Svatove line on June 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Berestove, Kharkiv Oblast (20km northwest of Svatove).[40] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled four Ukrainian attacks near Karmazynivka (12km southwest of Svatove), Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna), and Dibrova (6km southwest of Kreminna).[41]

Russian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces struck Luhansk City with Storm Shadow cruise missiles on June 25.[42] Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows a column of smoke in the vicinity of Luhansk City.[43] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Russian air defenses operated in the area.[44] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces struck Luhansk City on June 25.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on June 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported a relatively higher number of Russian offensive operations near Bakhmut than over the past few days and stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolikvka (14km northeast) and Vesele (16km northeast); northwest of Bakhmut near Hryhorivka (10km northwest) and Minkivka (12km northwest); and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivkske (3km southwest).[45] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces took advantage of the distraction caused by Wagner Group’s armed June 23-24 rebellion and launched several counterattacks in the Bakhmut area, including southwest of Bakhmut near Kurdiumivka (12km southwest) and Klishchiivka (6km southwest); northwest of Bakhmut near Yahidne (3km northwest); and northeast of Bakhmut on the Vasyukivka-Rozdolivka line.[46] The Russian MoD claimed that units of the Southern Group of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks northwest and southwest of Bakhmut.[47] Ukraine’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade reported that it defeated elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) in the Bakhmut area and destroyed a Russian bridgehead in an unspecified area on the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal, which runs southwest of Bakhmut between Mayorsk and Kurdiumivka.[48]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 25. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions and that 13 combat clashes took place near Marinka over the past day.[49] Geolocated footage posted on June 24 and June 25 shows that Ukrainian forces have made marginal advances on the northern outskirts of Donetsk City just south of Avdiivka and between Pisky and Pervomaiske on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[50] Ukrainian 79th Air Assault Brigade spokesperson Colonel Yaroslav Chepurnyi notably reported on June 24 that Chechen “Akhmat-Vostok” elements and unspecified Russian special forces suddenly withdrew from Marinka. The details of this reported withdrawal are unclear, but some contingent of Akhmat and other special forces may have departed from Marinka to Rostov Oblast in order to guard against the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 armed rebellion.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Vuhledar area on June 25. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near the outskirts of Vuhledar (30km due east of Velyka Novosilka).[51]

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on June 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to seize lost positions near Novodarivka (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Makarivka (7km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Zolota Nyva (13km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian forces advanced near Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Priyutne (17km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[53]

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 25. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) and Novopokrovka (15km southeast of Orikhiv).[54] Russian sources claimed that neither side controls Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv), although ISW has not observed footage suggesting that Ukrainian forces have lost control of the settlement since they captured it on June 19.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are operating near Robotyne.[56]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 24 that fighting occurred between Russian airborne forces (VDV) and Ukrainian forces near the Antonivskyi Bridge (8km northeast of Kherson City).[57] Another Russian milblogger claimed on June 25 that Ukrainian forces had established positions on the east (left) bank of Antonivskyi Bridge.[58] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, and it is unclear if floodwaters have receded enough for Ukrainian or Russian forces to establish positions near this area.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian officials continue to report that Russia relies on sanctions evasion schemes to acquire foreign components for weapons production. Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky reported on Jun 25 that Russia imports these components under the guise of household goods from countries that have not joined international sanctions regimes against Russia.[59] Skibitsky also reported that Russian officials secure access to critical components by creating temporary shell joint ventures and enterprises that act as one-time conduits for imports before disappearing.[60]

A Russian miblogger claimed that Russian forces will receive new camouflage equipment for tanks deployed to Ukraine.[61] The milblogger claimed that the Kalashnikov Group’s Research Institute of Steel started supplying Russian forces with the Nakidka complex, a camouflage fabric that covers most of a tank’s hull and turret. The milblogger claimed that the Nakidka complex will further complicate detection by radar and thermal imaging devices.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to weaponize policy regarding children to consolidate social and administrative control of occupied areas. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ministry of Internal Affairs announced on June 24 that LNR authorities held a ceremony to “award” youth in occupied Krasnodon Russian passports following their 14th birthdays.[62] The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration reported that occupation authorities in Berdyansk and Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, are forcing schoolchildren to write letters to Russian soldiers.[63] The Ukrainian Resistance Center additionally noted that Russian occupation officials are using summer holidays to escalate measures to deport children from southern and eastern Ukraine to Russia under the guise of “rest and relaxation” measures.[64]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. China throws support behind 'strategic partner' Russia after Wagner insurrection challenges Putin

China must have accepted Putin's reassurances that he remains in control. I wonder what China will do if Putin is challenged again?

China throws support behind 'strategic partner' Russia after Wagner insurrection challenges Putin | CNN

CNN · by Nectar Gan · June 26, 2023

Editor’s Note: A version of this story appeared in CNN’s Meanwhile in China newsletter, a three-times-a-week update exploring what you need to know about the country’s rise and how it impacts the world. Sign up here.

Hong Kong CNN —

China has voiced support for Russia after a short-lived insurrection posed the gravest challenge to the 23-year rule of Vladimir Putin, a close partner of Chinese leader Xi Jinping in his push for a new world order and strategic alignment against the United States.

The brief mutiny by the Wagner mercenary group reverberated beyond Russia, including in neighboring China, where Xi has forged a strong rapport with fellow authoritarian Putin thanks to their mutual distrust of the West – a strategic bond that has only deepened in recent years, even after Moscow’s stumbling invasion of Ukraine.

“There’s probably some scrambling around in Beijing to figure out what this means for Putin going forward, especially if it means a more fractured Russia or a Putin who is very much weakened,” said Chong Ja Ian, an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore.

Beijing finally broke its silence late on Sunday night, backing Russia with a terse statement that brushed off the incident as “Russia’s internal affair.”

“As Russia’s friendly neighbor and comprehensive strategic partner of coordination for the new era, China supports Russia in maintaining national stability and achieving development and prosperity,” a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said in the online statement.

Beijing’s carefully crafted public comment came well after the brief and chaotic mutiny had dissipated, with warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin agreeing on Saturday to pull back his fighters in a deal with the Kremlin that would reportedly see him enter into exile in Belarus.

Fighters of Wagner private mercenary group pull out of the headquarters of the Southern Military District to return to base, in the city of Rostov-on-Don, Russia, June 24, 2023. REUTERS/Alexander Ermochenko

Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters

Moscow has stepped back from civil war with Wagner. But the danger's not over, experts warn

It also came after Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko flew to Beijing to meet with Chinese officials on Sunday, where the two sides reaffirmed their close partnership and political trust.

China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Rudenko exchanged views on “Sino-Russian relations and international and regional issues of common concern,” the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a one-line statement posted on its website, with a photo showing the pair walking side by side while smiling at the previously unannounced meeting.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry said Rudenko also held “scheduled consultations” with China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu.

“The Chinese side expressed support for the efforts of the leadership of the Russian Federation to stabilize the situation in the country in connection with the events of June 24, and reaffirmed its interest in strengthening the unity and further prosperity of Russia,” the Russian ministry said in a statement.

According to the Chinese readout, Ma told Rudenko that the mutual political trust and cooperation between China and Russia had grown continuously under the leadership of Xi and Putin. Ma also pledged to safeguard the “common interests” of both countries under what he called a “complex and grim international situation.”

Close bond

Xi, China’s most authoritarian and powerful leader in decades, has met Putin in person 40 times since coming to power in 2012 – far more than any other world leader.

In recent years, the world’s two most powerful autocratic leaders have brought their countries even closer together in an ambition to challenge what they see as a world older inflicted by “American hegemony.”

The pair declared a friendship with “no limits” in February 2022, shortly before Putin launched his war on Ukraine. Since then, China has refused to condemn the invasion and instead provided much-needed diplomatic and economic support for Russia, a position that has further soured its relations with Western nations, especially in Europe.

But as the devastating war drags on, Beijing’s costly alignment has been compounded by fears that the protracted conflict could ultimately destabilize Putin’s grip on power.

Nothing has accentuated those fears more than the extraordinary show of defiance by Wagner’s insurrection, which shattered the veneer of total control Putin has struggled to maintain more than 16 months into the invasion.

A civil war in Russia seems to have been avoided, for now, something Beijing will greet with a sigh of relief.

Internal conflict within Russia not only risks the stability of its 4,300-kilometer (2,672-mile) border with China, it would also make Moscow a less useful partner for Beijing to counter the US – or worse, it could give rise to a new regime more open to the West and less friendly to China.

Wen-Ti Sung, a political scientist with the Australian National University’s Taiwan Studies Program, said Beijing is likely worried about the weakening of Putin.

“China likely fears a domino effect: that if Russia falls, China may be next,” he said. “For China, Putinist Russia is useful cushion both geopolitically and ideologically, especially during the era of Biden administration’s ‘value-based alignment’ rhetoric.”

Social media buzzing, but state media curated

That sense of political symbiosis is palpable in Chinese discussions about the Russian upheaval, which have dominated China’s tightly controlled social media over the weekend, with many citing the Chinese idiom: “If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold”.

Chinese state media, meanwhile, sought to stress continued stability within Russia and portray Putin in a positive light, Sung said.

Videos of Wagner fighters occupying military facilities in Rostov-on-Don, home to the headquarters of Russia’s Southern Military District, and departing the city to the cheers of local residents were broadcast Saturday around the world.

But those kind of scenes were notably absent from China’s most-watched news program on state broadcaster CCTV.

Instead, the prime time program aired footage showing traffic moving calmly outside the Kremlin and tourists posing for photos near a pair of security officers, as well as a determined Putin vowing retribution for those “on a path to treason” in his national address.

On Sunday, the same prime time show displayed videos of Wagner tanks and armored vehicles retreating orderly, escorted by police vehicles.

The Wagner insurrection “contradicts the narrative of Putin as a strong leader who enjoys full support of his people, and is here for the long haul as China’s global partner of choice,” Sung said.

“If Putin’s rule is unstable, then supporting him is bad business,” he said.

Weakened grip

In recent months, Beijing has sought to portray itself as a peace broker in an effort to repair relations with Europe – but it has also continued to deepen ties with Moscow.

In March, Xi and Putin made a sweeping affirmation of their alignment across a host of issues – and shared mistrust of the United States – during the Chinese leader’s first visit to Russia since the invasion.

“Right now there are changes – the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years – and we are the ones driving these changes together,” Xi told Putin as they bid farewell at the door of the Kremlin.

Three months on, the co-driving force for Xi’s vision appears to be at his weakest in decades, after Wagner’s mutiny punctured his infallible image and exposed cracks in his rule.

MOSCOW, RUSSIA - JUNE 22: (RUSSIA OUT) Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a ceremony, marking the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow, June 22, 2023 in Moscow, Russia. Russians marks the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow on June 22, the anniversary of German Nazi's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. (Photo by Contributor/Getty Images)

Getty Images

Bizarre and chaotic 36 hours in Russia feels like the beginning of the end for Putin

Putin’s diminished status was not lost on even the most hawkish and nationalistic Chinese scholars and commentators.

“Although Russia’s nightmare came to an end temporarily yesterday, this incident will definitely hurt Russia and Putin’s image,” Jin Canrong, an international relations professor at Renmin University in Beijing, wrote Sunday on Weibo, where the Wagner insurrection was a top trending topic over the weekend.

Jin, a government adviser known for his fiercely anti-US rhetoric, described the rapid turn of events as “surreal.”

“It is very dangerous for a country to support and keep such a large non-state military group – this ‘lesion’ may break out at any time,” he wrote.

Commenting on Twitter Saturday before Prigozhin aborted his insurrection, Hu Xijin, the former editor of the nationalist Global Times, said the “armed rebellion has made the Russian political situation cross the tipping point.”

“Regardless of his outcome, Russia cannot return to the country it was before the rebellion anymore,” he said in the Tweet, which was later deleted.

CNN’s Simone McCarthy, Nathan Hodge and Xiaofei Xu contributed to reporting

CNN · by Nectar Gan · June 26, 2023

3. With Russia revolt over, mercenaries' future and direction of Ukraine war remain uncertain

Excerpts:

The Wagner forces’ largely unopposed, rapid advance also exposed vulnerabilities in Russia’s security and military forces. The mercenary soldiers were reported to have downed several helicopters and a military communications plane. The Defense Ministry has not commented.

“I honestly think that Wagner probably did more damage to Russian aerospace forces in the past day than the Ukrainian offensive has done in the past three weeks,” Michael Kofman, director of Russia studies at the CNA research group, said in a podcast.

Ukrainians hoped the Russian infighting could create opportunities for their army, which is in the early stages of a counteroffensive to take back territory seized by Russian forces.

“Putin is much diminished and the Russian military, and this is significant as far as Ukraine is concerned,” said Lord Richard Dannatt, former chief of the general staff of the British armed forces. “... Prigozhin has left the stage to go to Belarus, but is that the end of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Wagner Group?”

With Russia revolt over, mercenaries' future and direction of Ukraine war remain uncertain

AP · by The Associated Press · June 25, 2023

The rebellious mercenary soldiers who briefly took over a Russian military headquarters on an ominous march toward Moscow were gone Sunday, but the short-lived revolt has weakened President Vladimir Putin just as his forces are facing a fierce counteroffensive in Ukraine.

Under terms of the agreement that ended the crisis, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who led his Wagner troops in the failed uprising, will go into exile in Belarus but will not face prosecution.

But it was unclear what would ultimately happen to him and his forces. Few details of the deal were released either by the Kremlin or Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who brokered it. Neither Prigozhin nor Putin has been heard from, and top Russian military leaders have also remained silent.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken described the weekend’s events as “extraordinary,” recalling that 16 months ago Putin appeared poised to seize the capital of Ukraine and now he has had to defend Moscow from forces led by his onetime protege.

“I think we’ve seen more cracks emerge in the Russian façade,” Blinken said on NBC’s “Meet the Press.”

“It is too soon to tell exactly where they go and when they get there, but certainly we have all sorts of new questions that Putin is going to have to address in the weeks and months ahead.”

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It was not yet clear what the fissures opened by the 24-hour rebellion would mean for the war in Ukraine. But it resulted in some of the best forces fighting for Russia being pulled from the battlefield: the Wagner troops, who had shown their effectiveness in scoring the Kremlin’s only land victory in months, in Bakhmut, and Chechen soldiers sent to stop them on the approach to Moscow.

The Wagner forces’ largely unopposed, rapid advance also exposed vulnerabilities in Russia’s security and military forces. The mercenary soldiers were reported to have downed several helicopters and a military communications plane. The Defense Ministry has not commented.

“I honestly think that Wagner probably did more damage to Russian aerospace forces in the past day than the Ukrainian offensive has done in the past three weeks,” Michael Kofman, director of Russia studies at the CNA research group, said in a podcast.

Ukrainians hoped the Russian infighting could create opportunities for their army, which is in the early stages of a counteroffensive to take back territory seized by Russian forces.

“Putin is much diminished and the Russian military, and this is significant as far as Ukraine is concerned,” said Lord Richard Dannatt, former chief of the general staff of the British armed forces. “... Prigozhin has left the stage to go to Belarus, but is that the end of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Wagner Group?”

Under terms of the agreement that stopped Prigozhin’s advance, Wagner troops who didn’t back the revolt will be offered contracts directly with the Russian military, putting them under the control of the military brass that Prigozhin was trying to oust. A possible motivation for Prigozhin’s rebellion was the Defense Ministry’s demand, which Putin backed, that private companies sign contracts with it by July 1. Prigozhin had refused to do it.

“What we don’t know, but will discover in the next hours and days is, how many of his fighters have gone with him, because if he has gone to Belarus and kept an effective fighting force around him, then he ... presents a threat again” to Ukraine, Dannatt said.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he told U.S. President Joe Biden in a phone call on Sunday that the aborted rebellion in Russia had “exposed the weakness of Putin’s regime.”

In their lightning advance, Prigozhin’s forces on Saturday took control of two military hubs in southern Russia and got within 200 kilometers (120 miles) of Moscow before retreating.

People in Rostov-on-Don cheered Wagner troops as they departed late Saturday, a scene that played into Putin’s fear of a popular uprising. Some ran to shake hands with Prigozhin as he drove away in an SUV.

Yet the rebellion fizzled quickly, in part because Prigozhin did not have the backing he apparently expected from Russian security services. The Federal Security Services immediately called for his arrest.

“Clearly, Prigozhin lost his nerve,” retired U.S. Gen. David Petraeus, a former CIA director, said on CNN’s “State of the Union.”

“This rebellion, although it had some applause along the way, didn’t appear to be generating the kind of support that he had hoped it would.”

Rostov appeared calm Sunday morning, with only tank tracks on the roads as a reminder of the Wagner fighters.

“It all ended perfectly well, thank God. With minimal casualties, I think. Good job,” said a resident, who agreed only to provide his first name, Sergei. He said the Wagner soldiers used to be heroes to him, but not now.

In the Lipetsk region, which sits on the road to Moscow, residents appeared unfazed by the turmoil.

“They did not disrupt anything. They stood calmly on the pavement and did not approach or talk to anyone,” Milena Gorbunova told the AP.

As Wagner forces moved north toward Moscow, Russian troops armed with machine guns set up checkpoints on the outskirts. By Sunday afternoon, the troops had withdrawn and traffic had returned to normal, although Red Square remained closed to visitors. On highways leading to Moscow, crews repaired roads ripped up just hours earlier in panic.

Anchors on state-controlled television stations cast the deal ending the crisis as a show of Putin’s wisdom and aired footage of Wagner troops retreating from Rostov to the relief of local residents who feared a bloody battle for control of the city. People there who were interviewed by Channel 1 praised Putin’s handling of the crisis.

But the revolt and the deal that ended it severely dented Putin’s reputation as a leader willing to ruthlessly punish anyone who challenges his authority.

Prigozhin had demanded the ouster of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, whom Prigozhin has long criticized in withering terms for how he has conducted the war in Ukraine.

The U.S. had intelligence that Prigozhin had been building up his forces near the border with Russia for some time. That conflicts with Prigozhin’s claim that his rebellion was a response to an attack on his field camps in Ukraine on Friday by the Russian military that he said killed a large number of his men. The Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps.

U.S. Rep. Mike Turner, who chairs the House Intelligence Committee, said Prigozhin’s march on Moscow appeared to have been planned in advance.

“Now, being a military guy, he understands the logistics and really the assistance that he’s going to need to do that,” including from some Russians on the border with Ukraine who supported him, Turner said on CBS’ “Face the Nation.”

“This is something that would have had to have been planned for a significant amount of time to be executed in the manner in which it was,” he said.

___

This story has been edited to correct the spelling of Zelenskyy’s first name, to fix AP style on Belarusian and correct the name of the CNA research group.

___

Associated Press writers Danica Kirka in London, and Nomaan Merchant in Washington, contributed to this report.

___

Follow AP coverage of the war in Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine-war

AP · by The Associated Press · June 25, 2023

4. US aircraft carrier makes Da Nang port call as America looks to strengthen ties with Vietnam

Excerpts;

Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry called the Reagan’s port call part of a “normal friendly exchange for the sake of peace, stability, cooperation and development in both the region and the world.”

Vietnam needs to balance its sensitive ties with Beijing with the U.S. outreach and domestic opinion, Parameswaran said, noting that polls suggest Vietnam’s people have among the highest levels of pro-U.S. sentiment in Southeast Asia.

Based in Yokosuka, Japan, the USS Ronald Reagan is the only forward-deployed American aircraft carrier. It is due to be replaced in that role next year by the USS George Washington, also a Nimitz-class carrier.

US aircraft carrier makes Da Nang port call as America looks to strengthen ties with Vietnam

AP · by DAVID RISING · June 26, 2023

BANGKOK (AP) — A U.S. aircraft carrier and two guided missile cruisers were visiting Vietnam on Monday, a rare port call that comes as the United States and China increasingly vie for influence in Southeast Asia.

The USS Ronald Reagan, along with the guided missile cruisers USS Antietam and USS Robert Smalls, arrived in Da Nang on Sunday for the visit.

Neighboring China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner but Beijing’s sweeping maritime claims in the South China Sea have led to increasing friction with Vietnam, as well as with Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines.

The U.S., meantime, has been on a diplomatic push to strengthen economic and military ties in the Indo-Pacific region.

The aircraft carrier’s port call — only the third such visit since relations were reestablished after the end of the Vietnam war — follows visits to Vietnam this year from U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai and USAID Administrator Samantha Power.

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“Though aircraft carrier visits often spark media attention because of their highly visible nature, the broader question is how this will play into the development of ties, including Washington’s quest to upgrade relations,” Prashanth Parameswaran, a fellow with the Wilson Center’s Asia Program, wrote in a research note.

“An overly narrow focus on carrier visits can distract from the broader trend of the more comprehensive development of U.S.-Vietnam defense ties and relations more generally,” Parameswaran added.

Officers from the Ronald Reagan debarked Sunday and were greeted by Vietnamese officers after mooring in Da Nang, a port that was modernized and expanded by the United States during the war for its own use.

Capt. Daryle Cardone, the Ronald Reagan’s commanding officer, said some of the more than 5,000 sailors from the ship will volunteer at several community relations events, play sports with local athletes and take part in other cultural and professional exchanges during the visit through June 30.

“A few Reagan sailors call Vietnam home, but for most it will be their first time visiting,” Cardone said in a release from the U.S. Navy.

Washington sees Hanoi as a key part of its strategy for the region and has sought to leverage Vietnam’s traditional rivalry with its much larger neighbor China to expand U.S. influence in the region.

Japan, a strong U.S. ally, also made a port call in Vietnam last week with its largest destroyer, Izumo, following exercises in the South China Sea with the Reagan and other American ships.

China has also been reaching out in an effort to mend fences, sending a navy training ship to make its own port call in Da Nang a month ago as part of what it called a goodwill tour that also took it to Thailand, Brunei and the Philippines.

Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry called the Reagan’s port call part of a “normal friendly exchange for the sake of peace, stability, cooperation and development in both the region and the world.”

Vietnam needs to balance its sensitive ties with Beijing with the U.S. outreach and domestic opinion, Parameswaran said, noting that polls suggest Vietnam’s people have among the highest levels of pro-U.S. sentiment in Southeast Asia.

Based in Yokosuka, Japan, the USS Ronald Reagan is the only forward-deployed American aircraft carrier. It is due to be replaced in that role next year by the USS George Washington, also a Nimitz-class carrier.

AP · by DAVID RISING · June 26, 2023

5. Why Wagner Chief Prigozhin Turned Against Putin

Excerpts:

The full story behind why Prigozhin launched—then stunningly halted—his revolt isn’t yet known. But the elements include the culmination of military infighting, financial pressures and Prigozhin’s personal political ambitions, according to Russian defectors, military analysts and Western intelligence officials.

...

The uneasy truce struck on Saturday saw Wagner fighters roll out of the stronghold cities of Rostov and Voronezh which they had captured with little to no military resistance. Prigozhin himself drove out of Rostov in a black SUV, with admirers cheering him from the sides of the road.

It hasn’t been confirmed that Prigozhin has left Russia. Even if he does, he maintains an outsize base of support—not only among his fighters who have dispersed to Ukraine, Belarus and Wagner’s training base in Molkino, Russia—but also among the Russians who admire his courage for openly talking about the country’s endemic corruption.

...

The unseen tensions between Wagner and Russia’s military exploded into public view in February when Prigozhin publicly complained that the defense ministry had limited the provision of weapons and ammunition for his 50,000-strong force that had fought in Bakhmut, a small town that had become the most critical front line of the Ukraine invasion.

Wagner’s forces led Bakhmut’s capture in May, Russia’s first material advance in 10 months, but the victory came at a cost of over 20,000 Wagner lives, according to Prigozhin’s public tally. As Wagner troops raised flags in the town center, Prigozhin appeared in a video among the devastation to address Shoigu and Gerasimov directly: “Because of their whims, five times more guys than had been supposed to die have died. They will be held responsible for their actions, which in Russian are called crimes.”

The news boosted Prigozhin in his clash with the defense ministry. Putin kept switching between the two sides as military fortunes ebbed and flowed. He promoted generals who appeared to be aligned with Prigozhin, then fired them and appeared to move more decisively behind Shoigu and Gerasimov.

...

Prigozhin late Saturday night left the headquarters of the Southern Military District in Rostov, for an unknown destination. Analysts said the efforts to absorb the Wagner fighters into conventional forces and strip Prigozhin of cash and influence would now accelerate.

Analysts said Putin’s silence suggested he was focused on shoring up support among the fractured elite. One intelligence official said the president’s power had been weakened to such an extent that it had reduced the threat of nuclear conflict, since subordinates would be less likely to enact his orders.

Why Wagner Chief Prigozhin Turned Against Putin

Military infighting, financial pressures and personal political ambitions played into brash decision

By Benoit FauconFollow

, Joe ParkinsonFollow

and Thomas GroveFollow

Updated June 26, 2023 3:10 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/wagner-prigozhin-putin-mutiny-moscow-march-7072d6ea

The grainy footage announcing the insurrection appeared on the Telegram messaging site at 7:24 a.m.: Yevgeny Prigozhin had gathered two of Russia’s most senior commanders in the strategic city of Rostov-on-Don to humiliate them on camera and threaten to march his mercenary army to Moscow.

“Our men die because you treat them like meat…no ammo, no plans,” said the founder of the Wagner Group private military company, flanked by masked fighters who had seized the city’s command center. He demanded the base’s brass hand over their bosses, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov, whom he called “geriatric clowns.”

The video reverberated across the world, offering a partial explanation for the lightning insurrection that posed the gravest threat to President Vladimir Putin’s 23 years in power.

The full story behind why Prigozhin launched—then stunningly halted—his revolt isn’t yet known. But the elements include the culmination of military infighting, financial pressures and Prigozhin’s personal political ambitions, according to Russian defectors, military analysts and Western intelligence officials.

How Wagner’s Advance Unfolded Within 24 Hours

Elite Fracture

The unseen tensions between Wagner and Russia’s military exploded into public view in February when Prigozhin publicly complained that the defense ministry had limited the provision of weapons and ammunition for his 50,000-strong force that had fought in Bakhmut, a small town that had become the most critical front line of the Ukraine invasion.

Wagner’s forces led Bakhmut’s capture in May, Russia’s first material advance in 10 months, but the victory came at a cost of over 20,000 Wagner lives, according to Prigozhin’s public tally. As Wagner troops raised flags in the town center, Prigozhin appeared in a video among the devastation to address Shoigu and Gerasimov directly: “Because of their whims, five times more guys than had been supposed to die have died. They will be held responsible for their actions, which in Russian are called crimes.”

The news boosted Prigozhin in his clash with the defense ministry. Putin kept switching between the two sides as military fortunes ebbed and flowed. He promoted generals who appeared to be aligned with Prigozhin, then fired them and appeared to move more decisively behind Shoigu and Gerasimov.

Smoke rises from the direction of Bakhmut during the battle for that city in March. PHOTO: ARIS MESSINIS/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Ukrainian commanders sought to widen the divide, with Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhniy, Ukraine’s military commander-in-chief, lauding Gerasimov’s military talents, while Maj. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s GUR military intelligence, used TV interviews to compliment Prigozhin.

Wagner had shown “utmost effectiveness, unlike the Russian army, which has shown its utmost lack of effectiveness,” Budanov said, stressing that Shoigu was jealous of Prigozhin’s success.

By early June, Wagner and Russia’s regular army were behaving as if they were enemy forces.

Prigozhin said his fighters’ escape routes from Bakhmut were mined by Ministry of Defense troops. When Wagner came to clear the path, they were fired upon by the military, according to Prigozhin. Russian military officials said that wasn’t true.

In retaliation, on June 5, Wagner arrested and filmed a Russian army lieutenant colonel who said he had ordered his troops to shoot at its mercenaries. It was “due to personal hostility,” said the detained officer, his nose bloodied.

On June 10, Shoigu issued an order that openly tried to poach Prigozhin’s fighters, offering individual contracts to private volunteers directly with his ministry. “Prigozhin saw this move as an attempt at checkmate,” said one European intelligence official.

Five days later, a Russian paratrooper division showed pictures of Syrian volunteers, who long reported to Wagner, now fighting with regular forces.

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu attends a meeting with military-school graduates in Moscow on June 21. PHOTO: EGOR ALEEV/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

When Prigozhin mounted his stunning Saturday takeover of the Rostov military command post, he dispatched a 5,000-strong column led by a key commander named Dmitry Utkin, known for his tattoos of Nazi symbols, toward the capital. By then Prigozhin said Wagner’s strength had been whittled down to 25,000 men.

Wagner forces shot down six Russian helicopters and an IL-22 airborne command-center plane, killing 13 airmen, according to Russian military analysts—deaths that will not be quickly forgotten, particularly inside the Russian air force, which is commanded by Prigozhin’s onetime ally Gen. Sergei Surovikin.

Damage included bridges and roads destroyed by authorities that aimed to stop Wagner’s march, and a jet-fuel depot that was hit and burned down in the city of Voronezh.

Prigozhin late Saturday night left the headquarters of the Southern Military District in Rostov, for an unknown destination. Analysts said the efforts to absorb the Wagner fighters into conventional forces and strip Prigozhin of cash and influence would now accelerate.

Analysts said Putin’s silence suggested he was focused on shoring up support among the fractured elite. One intelligence official said the president’s power had been weakened to such an extent that it had reduced the threat of nuclear conflict, since subordinates would be less likely to enact his orders.

A photo from a highway in Moscow, posted onto Twitter by the BBC’s Russia correspondent, seemed to sum up some residents’ feelings: a car’s back window painted with large white letters in English: “WTF WAS THAT?”

Write to Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com, Joe Parkinson at joe.parkinson@wsj.com and Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com

6. Russian defense minister makes first public appearance since mercenary revolt as uncertainty swirls

Excerpts:

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made his first public appearance since the rebellion that demanded his ouster, inspecting troops in Ukraine Monday in a video aimed at projecting a sense of order, as Russian media speculated that he and other top military leaders have lost Putin’s confidence and could be replaced.

Shoigu was shown in video released by the Defense Ministry flying in a helicopter and then attending a meeting with military officers at a military headquarters in Ukraine. The video was widely shown on Russian media, including state-controlled television. It was unclear when it was filmed.

General Staff chief Gen. Valery Gerasimov, also a main target of Prigozhin’s ire, has not appeared in public.

It was unclear what would ultimately happen to Prigozhin and his forces under the deal with the Kremlin brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.

Russian defense minister makes first public appearance since mercenary revolt as uncertainty swirls

AP · by The Associated Press · June 26, 2023

After Russia’s most serious political crisis in decades, uncertainty swirled Monday about the fate of the former Putin ally who led a brief armed rebellion, his Wagner mercenary group, and the two military chiefs with whom he has clashed over the conduct of the war in Ukraine.

Also unclear were the impact on the 16-month-old invasion — and the future of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who faced the most serious challenge to his authority in more than 20 years of rule.

A feud between Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and Russia’s top military brass amid the fighting in Ukraine erupted into a mutiny that saw fighters from the mercenary group leave the front in Ukraine to seize a south Russian city and march seemingly unopposed on the capital, before turning around after less than 24 hours on Saturday.

The Kremlin said it had made a deal that the mercenary chief will move to Belarus and receive an amnesty, along with his soldiers. Yet on Monday, Russian media reported that a criminal probe against Prigozhin continued, and his whereabouts were unknown.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made his first public appearance since the rebellion that demanded his ouster, inspecting troops in Ukraine Monday in a video aimed at projecting a sense of order, as Russian media speculated that he and other top military leaders have lost Putin’s confidence and could be replaced.

Shoigu was shown in video released by the Defense Ministry flying in a helicopter and then attending a meeting with military officers at a military headquarters in Ukraine. The video was widely shown on Russian media, including state-controlled television. It was unclear when it was filmed.

General Staff chief Gen. Valery Gerasimov, also a main target of Prigozhin’s ire, has not appeared in public.

It was unclear what would ultimately happen to Prigozhin and his forces under the deal with the Kremlin brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.

The state RIA Novosti news agency cited unnamed sources in the Prosecutor General’s office as saying that the criminal case against Prigozhin hasn’t been closed, despite earlier Kremlin statements. The Interfax news agency carried a similar report.

Should the case continue, Prigozhin’s presence in Belarus — a staunch Kremlin ally — would offer little protection against arrest and extradition.

Prigozhin appeared nonchalant in some of the last footage taken during the rebellion. As Wagner’s convoy drove out of the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don after its brief occupation on Saturday, led by Prigozhin in an SUV, someone asked how he viewed the result of his revolt, according to a video posted later on Russian social media.

“It’s normal, we have cheered everyone up,” the mercenary chief responded.

Before starting the revolt, Prigozhin had blasted Shoigu and army chief Gerasimov with expletive-ridden insults for months, attacking them for failing to provide his troops with enough ammunition during the fight for the Ukrainian town of Bakhmut, the war’s longest and bloodiest battle.

Prigozhin’s rift with the top military brass dates back years further, to the Russian military intervention in Syria, where Wagner Group was also active.

Putin stood back from the rift, and Shoigu and Gerasimov remained mum, possibly reflecting uncertainty about Putin’s support. Observers said that by failing to end the feud, Putin had encouraged Prigozhin to dramatically up the stakes.

Alex Younger, former head of Britain’s MI6 intelligence agency, said it appeared that “neither side was in control” during the rebellion.

He told the BBC that Prigozhin “didn’t have a plan, he didn’t have enough people” to succeed, while Putin looked indecisive, first vowing to crush the rebels then striking a deal.

“Everyone comes out of this weaker,” Younger said.

Russian media and commentators speculated that Putin could replace Shoigu, but noted that Putin, who avoids making decisions under pressure, would likely wait before announcing a shakeup.

Some analysts saw Prigozhin’s revolt as a desperate move to save Wagner from being dismantled after an order that all private military companies sign contracts with Russia’s Defense Ministry by July 1.

Russian political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya said Prigozhin’s mutiny “wasn’t a bid for power or an attempt to overtake the Kremlin,” but a desperate move amid his escalating rift with Russia’s military leadership.

“Prigozhin was forced out of Ukraine and found himself unable to sustain Wagner the way he did before, while the state machinery was turning against him,” she wrote in a commentary om Twitter. “To top it off, Putin was ignoring him and publicly supporting his most dangerous adversaries.”

Stanovaya said that while Prigozhin could get out of crisis alive, he doesn’t have a political future in Russia under Putin.

The U.S. had intelligence that Prigozhin had been building up his forces near the border with Russia for some time, suggesting the revolt was planned in advance. That conflicts with Prigozhin’s claim that his rebellion was a response to an attack on his field camps in Ukraine on Friday by the Russian military, which he said killed a large number of his men. The Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps.

Andrei Kartapolov, the head of the defense affairs committee in the lower house of Russia’s parliament, said lawmakers were set to consider a bill that would regulate the activities of private military companies.

In remarks published Sunday, Kartapolov said it makes sense to continue use Wagner troops, calling the company “the most capable unit in Russia.”

He noted that it’s unclear whether the Wagner Group would remain as a single company or what it would be called, saying some Wagner troops could be offered contracts with the Defense Ministry.

It was not yet clear what the fissures opened by the 24-hour rebellion would mean for the war in Ukraine, where Western officials say Russia’s troops suffer low morale.

But it resulted in some of the best forces fighting for Russia being pulled from the battlefield: the Wagner troops, who had shown their effectiveness in scoring the Kremlin’s only land victory in months, in Bakhmut, and Chechen soldiers sent to stop them on the approach to Moscow.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense said Ukraine had “gained impetus” in its push around Bakhmut, making progress north and south of the town.

“There has been little evidence that Russia maintains any significant ground forces operational level reserves which could be used to reinforce against the multiple threats it is now facing in widely separated sectors,” it said in a daily assessment of the war.

U.S. President Joe Biden and leaders of several of Ukraine’s European allies discussed events in Russia over the weekend, but Western officials have been muted in their public comments.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg “the events over the weekend are an internal Russian matter.”

Speaking in Vilnius, Lithuania, he said the crisis was “yet another demonstration of the big strategic mistake that President Putin made with his illegal annexation of Crimea and the war against Ukraine.”

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, speaking to reporters before a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg, said the revolt showed that the war is “cracking Russia’s political system.”

“The monster that Putin created with Wagner, the monster is biting him now,” Borrell said. “The monster is acting against his creator.”

AP · by The Associated Press · June 26, 2023

7. With Wagner’s Future in Doubt, Ukraine Could Capitalize on Chaos

Excerpts;

For now, the uncertain status of Wagner is bound to be a relief for Ukrainian soldiers. Though the front lines in Ukraine are likely to remain unchanged in the short term, depending on how events unfold in Russia, the Ukrainian military may be able to capitalize on the chaos and weakening morale to try to make some gains, according to independent analysts and American officials.

Still, it is too soon to determine the long-term implications of the feud between Mr. Prigozhin and the Russian military establishment, American officials said. In Bakhmut, Wagner played an outsize role in the campaign to take the eastern city, Moscow’s one major battlefield victory this year, and solidified an uneasy alliance with the Russian military — only to see the partnership break once the city was captured.

With Wagner’s Future in Doubt, Ukraine Could Capitalize on Chaos

By Julian E. Barnes and Thomas Gibbons-Neff

Julian Barnes reported from Washington, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff from Kramatorsk, Ukraine.

The New York Times · by Thomas Gibbons-Neff · June 25, 2023

The group played an outsize role in the campaign to take Bakhmut, Moscow’s one major battlefield victory this year. The loss of the mercenary army could hurt Russia’s ambitions in the Ukraine war.

Members of Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, on Saturday. The organization’s uncertain status is bound to be a relief for Ukrainian soldiers.

Julian Barnes reported from Washington, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff from Kramatorsk, Ukraine.

June 25, 2023, 3:18 p.m. ET

To some Ukrainian forces, soldiers from the Wagner Group were the best-equipped fighters they had seen since Russia invaded last year. To others, it was their training that distinguished them: Ukrainian soldiers recalled battlefield stories of aggressive tactics or a sniper downing a drone with a single shot.

But after the short-lived mutiny led by the head of the group, Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, it is not clear whether Wagner will still be a fighting force on the battlefield with its fate now in question.

For now, the uncertain status of Wagner is bound to be a relief for Ukrainian soldiers. Though the front lines in Ukraine are likely to remain unchanged in the short term, depending on how events unfold in Russia, the Ukrainian military may be able to capitalize on the chaos and weakening morale to try to make some gains, according to independent analysts and American officials.

Still, it is too soon to determine the long-term implications of the feud between Mr. Prigozhin and the Russian military establishment, American officials said. In Bakhmut, Wagner played an outsize role in the campaign to take the eastern city, Moscow’s one major battlefield victory this year, and solidified an uneasy alliance with the Russian military — only to see the partnership break once the city was captured.

“The previous relationship between Wagner and the Russian government is likely over,” said Rob Lee, a senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “Even had this not happened, it was unclear if Wagner would have played the same role in this war as it had in the battle for Bakhmut.”

It is too soon to determine the long-term implications of the feud between Yevgeny V. Prigozhin and the Russian military establishment.Credit...Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters

The intense fighting in Bakhmut led to huge numbers of Russians being injured or killed in the first months of this year, American officials said. In taking the city this spring, Wagner forces showed they had learned hard lessons from fighting over the last year, improving their tactics and making it far harder for Ukraine to mount a strong defense.

Wagner’s contract fighters outpaced Ukrainian defenders by using savvy maneuvers on the ground and sending wave after wave of prisoner conscripts into the fight.

But Bakhmut was a Pyrrhic victory for Mr. Prigozhin.

The city was not a prize many in the Russian military thought was particularly important. Its strategic value was further diminished when Ukraine’s military seized high ground on Bakhmut’s periphery, preventing Russia from using the city as a staging ground for attacks that could have led Moscow to take Kramatorsk, the next city it sought to expand its control of eastern Ukraine.

What’s more, the events that unfolded during and after Bakhmut’s capture seem to have precipitated the rupture between Mr. Prigozhin and Russia’s Defense Ministry.

Mr. Prigozhin’s forces were able to take the city center only after Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, ordered the regular army to fortify Wagner’s troops to guard their flanks from attacks by the Ukrainians.

Members of Wagner Group prepared to pull out from the headquarters of the Southern Military District to return to their base in Rostov-on-Don late Saturday.

That influx of Russian troops was key to Wagner’s victory and reinforced the importance of the army. But Mr. Prigozhin may have learned a different lesson from the support he earned from Mr. Putin.

After seizing Bakhmut, the Russian Defense Ministry took steps to integrate Wagner into the broader military, which would have reduced Mr. Prigozhin’s power. When Russia forced all volunteers fighting in Ukraine to sign contracts with the ministry, it meant that Mr. Prigozhin would have had to put his forces under the control of the military, said Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“This is one of the reasons Prigozhin went mad,” Ms. Stanovaya said, “because he realized now he is out of Ukraine.”

Mr. Prigozhin became increasingly strident in his criticism of Russian military units after that, and U.S., British and Ukrainian intelligence began developing information that he might make an offensive move with his troops to force a change in the Defense Ministry. That intelligence was proved right on Friday, as Wagner troops moved to take control of a southern Russian city.

An image released by Mr. Prigozhin’s press service that it says shows fighters waving a Russian flag and a Wagner flag on a rooftop in Bakhmut, in May.Credit...Concord Press Service, via Reuters

Just as quickly, the mutiny was over the next day, ending with the announcement that Mr. Prigozhin would halt his march on Moscow and accept exile to Belarus.

The Kremlin announced that Wagner troops who did not participate in the revolt would be allowed to sign contracts with the Defense Ministry. Those that had joined the convoy would not be prosecuted. The statement suggested that Wagner in its current form would no longer exist.

Though part of Mr. Prigozhin’s mercenary cadre is likely to continue under Russian Army control, how many Wagner soldiers would be willing to fight under the ministry’s umbrella is an open question.

Ukraine will surely look to take advantage of the chaos caused by Mr. Prigozhin, but there did not seem to be any immediate defensive gaps to exploit, according to American officials and independent analysts.

And Mr. Prigozhin’s march, at least according to a preliminary analysis, did not cause any Russian units on Friday or Saturday to leave their positions in southern or eastern Ukraine to come to Moscow’s defense, American officials said. While the drama was unfolding, there was no letup in the war: Russian forces fired more than 50 missiles across Ukraine before dawn on Saturday.

An advertisement promoting service in the Wagner Group on the outskirts of St. Petersburg, Russia, on Saturday. How many Wagner soldiers would be willing to fight under the Defense Ministry’s umbrella is an open question.Credit...Anton Vaganov/Reuters

Wagner has been an incredibly important tool of Russian foreign policy, particularly in Mali, the Central African Republic, Syria and other countries. While the group will most likely be transformed under the Defense Ministry’s control, it is not certain that the Kremlin will let it fade away as an effective fighting force.

And, Mr. Prigozhin may also have some next move yet to play out.

Julian E. Barnes is a national security reporter based in Washington, covering the intelligence agencies. Before joining The Times in 2018, he wrote about security matters for The Wall Street Journal.

Thomas Gibbons-Neff is a Ukraine correspondent and a former Marine infantryman. @tmgneff

The New York Times · by Thomas Gibbons-Neff · June 25, 2023

8. For the U.S. and NATO, a Weakened Russia Is More of a Wild Card

What do you do now Lieutenant?

Have we planned for Russian instability?

I do not know Russia but I worry about us getting our hopes up that chaos and a leadership vacuum would sap the will of Russians soldiers to fight.

Excerpts:

Konrad Muzyka, president of Rochan Consulting, military analysts based in Poland, said the perception of a leadership vacuum among the troops could sap their will to keep fighting.

“If there’s chaos in the regime,” Muzyka said, “soldiers may choose their own lives over fighting for the regime.”

Beyond Ukraine, the question of how to deter an unstable Russia that is weakened but still controls vast military resources presents a puzzle for NATO planners. Western governments are for now observing events and conferring in efforts to coordinate responses—an approach that they believe has served them well since the U.S. first got indications of a looming Russian attack on Ukraine in late 2021.

“The experience of being united is paying off,” said Rosa Balfour, director of think tank Carnegie Europe. She said that until recently Western governments had differed in their views on Russia and approaches to it, with some favoring engagement and others taking a more confrontational approach. Now NATO members are moving more into alignment on a Russia strategy.

If the uprising had happened a year ago, “it would have been hugely problematic for the West,” Balfour said. Some leaders would have rejected Putin’s leadership while others would have defended him as a force for stability who should stay. Today, Balfour said, “I don’t see that happening.”

She said comments by French President Emmanuel Macron last month in Bratislava marked a turning point. At a security conference in the Slovak capital, he said Western European countries had failed to heed their eastern neighbors’ warnings about Russia’s aggression, and called for more efforts to assure Ukraine’s security.

For the U.S. and NATO, a Weakened Russia Is More of a Wild Card

Western strategists now must assess how Wagner’s mutiny impacts Putin and the battlefield in Ukraine

By Daniel Michaels

Updated June 25, 2023 4:19 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-the-u-s-and-nato-a-weakened-russia-is-more-of-a-wild-card-edf6fbe2?mod=world_lead_pos1

BRUSSELS—Turmoil in Russia presents Kyiv and its Western backers with the prospect that instability in Moscow will make the Ukraine conflict even deadlier as leaders jockey to retain power.

The U.S. and its allies will now have to grapple with a more chaotic Russia, where President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to stay in office are likely to play a growing role in his policies and actions following the Wagner paramilitary group’s aborted insurrection.

On the battlefield in Ukraine, fallout from events over the weekend could play to Ukraine’s advantage by undermining Russian troops’ effectiveness. Russian disorder could fray lines of command, disrupt control systems or sap troop morale. So far there is little sign that chaos in Moscow is filtering through to Russia’s defensive lines, Ukrainian soldiers said.

Kremlin infighting could also lead Putin to take more extreme measures in an effort to demonstrate his control. Part of the justification that Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin gave for his mutiny was bad leadership and corruption among Russia’s top military officials.

The prospect of a weakened government in Moscow becoming more dangerous is likely to prompt Ukraine to push harder for Western protection. At the same time it will increase hesitation in some Western capitals about taking steps that an embattled Russian leadership could interpret as provocative.

The short-lived revolt that Wagner paramilitary forces launched against Russia’s military establishment late Friday occurred as officials of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were finalizing plans for their annual summit in Lithuania next month.

At the gathering in Vilnius, starting July 11, leaders of NATO’s 31 members and applicant Sweden expect to approve a makeover of their defense plans, which for the first time since the Cold War will be built around scenarios for a complex, multifront shooting war in Europe.

Also on the summit agenda is the question of how to handle Ukraine’s demand for greater specificity on its eventual membership. NATO in 2008 promised Ukraine and Georgia future membership but gave no details or time frame. Kyiv and its closest backers are pushing for specifics, but the U.S., Germany and some other members have balked at promises about accession.

Ukraine is likely to become more vocal in asserting that it is acting in the West’s interests by exposing Russia’s frailty and eroding its arsenals. President Volodymyr Zelensky and other top officials argue that their sacrifice and achievements against Russia earn them NATO membership soon after the war ends.

Ukrainian soldiers fought on at the front in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region while the Wagner crisis unfolded. PHOTO: EFREM LUKATSKY/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The prospect of Putin being compelled to redouble fighting increases pressure on Kyiv, said former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert E. Hunter.

“For the Ukrainians, in addition to calculations about what to do militarily, this will obviously increase their effort at Vilnius to get more in terms of a process for joining NATO,” he said.

As a result, disputes within NATO over Ukraine’s future may become only more contentious due to Wagner’s rebellion. For many European leaders, the events reinforced a conviction that Ukraine should be in the alliance. Hunter and others who are wary of quick accession believe “this is no time to be giving Russian nationalists further reason to stand firm against Western support for Ukraine,” Hunter said.

Instead, the U.S., Germany and some other allies advocate doing more to protect Ukraine militarily and deter Russian aggression.

Wagner’s insurrection exposed weakness and indecisiveness among Russia’s armed forces and their leaders in the Kremlin. For Western strategists, that paralysis reinforces a conviction developed over the past year observing events in Ukraine that Moscow doesn’t have a top-class fighting force. Until last year, Russia was seen by many as having the world’s number-two military behind the U.S. Part of the justification that Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin gave for his mutiny was bad leadership and corruption among Russia’s top military officials.

Ukraine and its NATO backers will continue assessing how to capitalize on upheaval in Russia’s ranks to achieve gains on the battlefield.

Officials question whether truce will hold in Kremlin, Wagner standoff

Many are watching to see if Vladimir Putin sacks his military leadership — and if Yevgeniy Prigozhin remains quietly in exile

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/06/25/blinken-putin-wagner-group/

By Shane Harris, Michael Birnbaum, Greg Miller, John Hudson and Amy B Wang

Updated June 25, 2023 at 8:08 p.m. EDT|Published June 25, 2023 at 2:17 p.m. EDT

As the dust settled on the most serious challenge in decades to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority, Washington and its allies struggled to make sense of a head-spinning series of historic events that saw mercenary forces race up a highway to within 120 miles of Moscow on Saturday, then abruptly turn back after their leader, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, agreed to stand down and go to Belarus for an uncertain exile.

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On Sunday, intelligence officials and diplomats — unsure if they had just witnessed an aborted coup or a thwarted mutiny — were left to parse official Kremlin statements and re-watch blurry videos posted on Telegram, the social network that Prigozhin has used to try to convince the Russian people that the war in Ukraine has been a strategic disaster led by incompetent commanders and political sycophants.

Publicly, U.S. officials have highlighted the possible benefits to Ukraine from the chaos in Russia. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Sunday that the brief Wagner revolt, and how it was ultimately if tentatively resolved, showed “cracks in the facade” of Putin’s authoritarian leadership.

“Think about it this way: 16 months ago, Russian forces were on the doorstep of Kyiv in Ukraine, believing they would take the capital in a matter of days and erase the country from the map as an independent country. Now, what we’ve seen is Russia having to defend Moscow, its capital, against mercenaries of [Putin’s] own making,” Blinken said on NBC News’s “Meet the Press.”

“Certainly, we have all sorts of new questions that Putin is going to have to address in the weeks and months ahead,” Blinken added.

Officials in the United States and around Europe said they were unsure of what comes next and were concerned about the instability that could follow an effort by Putin’s rivals, including Prigozhin, to unseat the president at a vulnerable moment.

High on the list of questions policymakers are now putting to their intelligence analysts is whether Prigozhin has managed to shake the foundations of the Kremlin so strongly that Putin will feel compelled to sack top generals or ministers leading the war, as Prigozhin has repeatedly demanded.

Putin rules by showing strength. Russia’s crisis exposed his weakness.

More immediately, though, there’s another question: What just happened? One minute, Prigozhin had taken over a key military headquarters in the south running Russia’s war machine in Ukraine. The next, he had agreed to a truce brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who’s more accustomed to playing second fiddle to Putin than intervening between warring factions.

“Why did it calm down so quickly, and how come Putin’s puppet Lukashenko got the credit?” asked one senior European diplomat, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe private discussions. “What impact will it have on Russia’s defenses, and are there going to be any personnel changes in the military leadership?”

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, seen in a photo taken and released by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service on June 8. (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service/via AP, File)

Western officials also were unsure about what terms had been reached between Putin and Prigozhin to end the rebellion, and whether the peace would hold.

One Western intelligence official was skeptical that Prigozhin would remain quietly in Belarus, echoing speculation that he will either be killed or will continue to challenge Russia’s military establishment from abroad.

Watching the Wagner column head toward Moscow on Saturday, the official had predicted that Russian troops were unlikely to put up much resistance if they had been persuaded by his arguments that military leaders were to blame for the disastrous war. Prigozhin had said on social media that the Russian public hadn’t been told the truth about the setbacks in Ukraine, including about the extraordinarily high number of dead Russian troops. U.S. military figures have estimated casualties in the hundreds of thousands.

Bob Seely, a member of British Parliament who serves on the foreign affairs committee that has been investigating Wagner for two years, wondered if Putin feared his own military might not carry out his orders to stop Wagner forces from entering the capital. Earlier on Saturday, before the truce, Putin had described the Wagner fighters as traitors during a televised address to the nation.

“Would Putin have been able to order a lethal airstrike?” Seely asked. “Could Putin have actually killed Prigozhin on route? Or was it so bad for Putin that he couldn’t,” meaning that his grip on power was too tenuous? If Putin demanded that Russian forces attack and the answer was no, Seely said, “then Putin was in a desperate stage.”

“I can’t see this peace lasting,” Seely added, “because either Prigozhin is unstable and will continue to attack and seek to finish Putin off, or Putin will silence him in some way — financially, politically or physically.”

Yevgeniy Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner Group on a street in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, on Saturday, seen leaving an area of the headquarters of the Southern Military District. (AP)

A Ukrainian intelligence official, who was likewise unsure why Prigozhin had stood down, saw signs that the mercenary leader may not have been confident in his prospects.

“I think he miscalculated in his expectations of military support,” the Ukrainian official said, taking a different view than some of his European counterparts. The revolt Prigozhin may have hoped for in Moscow failed to materialize, the official noted.

He added that there were indications Prigozhin may even have tried to phone Putin directly but received no answer. This sent a “very strong signal” to Prigozhin, the Ukrainian official believes: Putin would not simply acquiesce to his demands.

Another senior European diplomat said that allies hope to understand what Putin will do domestically in response to the unrest, especially with respect to any next steps in the stalemate on the Ukraine war front. The diplomat joked that even as Ukraine’s Western backers raced to decipher what had occurred, Russian intelligence probably did not have much of a head start.

“I think even Russian services are scratching their heads,” the diplomat said. “We will need some time to digest and also to see where things are moving.”

On the Sunday morning talk shows, Republican and Democratic lawmakers agreed that the events had weakened Putin and strengthened the United States’ resolve to continue supporting Ukraine. Later on Sunday, President Biden spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to discuss the current counteroffensive against Russia and committed to continue U.S. support for Ukraine, the White House said in a statement.

But intelligence officials cautioned that it remains to be seen whether Prigozhin’s challenge truly weakened Putin — and if the Russian leader believes it did. U.S. and Western analysts have long described Putin as isolated, surrounded by yes-men and blind to the challenges his forces face.

The Russian intelligence agency primarily responsible for understanding Ukraine, the FSB, failed to neutralize the government in Kyiv and foment any pro-Russian opposition to disrupt Zelensky’s hold on power, The Washington Post previously reported, based on intelligence material obtained by Ukrainian and other security services.

Russia’s spies misread Ukraine and misled Kremlin as war loomed

Putin has been misguided by advisers who may now try to convince him that he won in a standoff with Prigozhin, some officials said. That may only embolden the Russian leader, even if he is not as strong as he thinks.

Officials said that, in the near term, they will watch closely for any signs that Putin may replace two of the top leaders who have been the targets of Prigozhin’s Telegram rants: Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff. Prigozhin had demanded an audience with both men as his forces marched across Russia.

Sacking the military bosses might not mean that Putin is giving in to Prigozhin, but rather that he realizes the Russian elite have lost confidence in their leadership. Prigozhin, some Western officials said, was only saying out loud what many around the Kremlin privately think.

“If Putin replaces Shoigu, it will not be because Prigozhin demanded it, but because Shoigu is weak,” the Ukrainian official said.

Who is Yevgeniy Prigozhin, Wagner chief who stirred a crisis in Russia?

As for Prigozhin’s next move, U.S. and Western officials were keenly interested in whether the rift with Putin will prompt him to distance the Russian government from Wagner and withdraw support for its extensive operations in Africa and the Middle East, where the group offers security and military assistance and tactics on campaigns to influence governments facing rebellions or instability, in return for resource contracts such as gold in regions that are too unstable to attract Western corporations.

Though Prigozhin’s company seeks to turn a profit wherever it operates, its action often advances a Kremlin agenda and undermines Western interests. For those reasons alone, some Western officials believe Putin will probably continue supporting Wagner’s operations, but recent events may set back its future potential.

“I think Wagner will have their wings curbed heavily,” said a senior European intelligence official. That may come at a cost for Putin. “Prigozhin has been the gateway for Moscow in many places in Africa, and Moscow counts on African support more than ever,” the intelligence official said. But, he acknowledged, the Russian president has more pressing concerns, such as political survival.

“Faced with last weekend’s events, issues like Russian influence in Africa have a secondary weight for Putin.”

Christopher Rowland contributed to this report.

After Russia uprising subsides, U.S., allies brace for what comes next

The Wagner crisis, explained

10. Army fires 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade commander

Excerpt:

Chung is at least the fifth Army brigade commander to be relieved of duty since October. Another 5th SFAB commander, Col. Meghann Sullivan of the 5th Brigade Engineer Battalion, is under investigation for allegedly sexually harassing subordinates.

Army fires 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade commander

armytimes.com · by Jaime Moore-Carrillo · June 23, 2023

The Army fired the commander of the 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade this week following investigations into the unit’s leadership earlier this year.

Col. Jonathan Chung was suspended from his post in April amid allegations of toxic leadership.

Maj. Gen. Donn Hill, the Commander of Security Force Assistance Command, relieved Chung of his duty Thursday due to “a loss of confidence in Col. Chung’s leadership and is based on the results of an Army Regulation 15-6 investigation,” according to an SFAC statement shared with Military Times. Col. Tony Braxton has served as the unit’s acting commander since Chung’s suspension.

Chung took the helm of 5th SFAB in July 2021. Troops under his purview reported being frequently berated and micromanaged by the commander over the course of his two-year tenure, according to an investigation published by Military.com days after his suspension. Others defended Chung’s leadership style as demanding and idiosyncratic, but not cruel.

Chung’s former brigade was one of six SFABs established by Army officials between 2017 and 2020. The brigades are designed to assist American security partners with military training. The 5th SFAB, based out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington, concentrates on the Indo-Pacific.

Chung’s legal team submitted a full rebuttal to the Army’s investigation, the ex-commander’s attorney, Jeremy Snyder, told Military Times.

“We thought we presented the greater weight of the evidence,” Snyder said. “For whatever reason, the powers that be disagreed with us, but we stand by our position that Col. Chung has served honorably and is a great leader.”

Snyder doesn’t anticipate any kind of formal reprimand for his client.

Chung is at least the fifth Army brigade commander to be relieved of duty since October. Another 5th SFAB commander, Col. Meghann Sullivan of the 5th Brigade Engineer Battalion, is under investigation for allegedly sexually harassing subordinates.

Editor’s note: This story was updated June 23, 2023, at 4:28 p.m. EST with a statement from Col. Jonathan Chung’s attorney.

About Jaime Moore-Carrillo

Jaime Moore-Carrillo is an editorial fellow for Military Times and Defense News. A Boston native, Jaime graduated with degrees in international affairs, history, and Arabic from Georgetown University, where he served as a senior editor for the school's student-run paper, The Hoya.

11. Detailed defense plans for US and allied troops remind senior Army leaders of Cold War

My first experience writing OPLANs (GDP) was as a planner for 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (places such as the Hassberg Ridge and the Bundorf Bowl come to mind). We wrote the GDP plans twice within 6 months - once for the outgoing commander and then again immediately after the new CG took command.

Detailed defense plans for US and allied troops remind senior Army leaders of Cold War

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · June 23, 2023

U.S. 2nd Cavalry Regiment soldiers fire an M777 howitzer at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, April 26, 2023. U.S. Army Europe and Africa commander Gen. Darryl A. Williams said at a European ground forces meeting in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, on June 23 that new NATO defense plans are being developed in the coming weeks that will inform how U.S. troops fight if war breaks out. (Markus Rauchenberger/U.S. Army)

STUTTGART, Germany — New allied defense plans for Europe may provide the kind of granular detail typical of the Cold War, when American troops in Germany knew what territory they would be defending if war broke out, the top U.S. Army commander in Europe said Friday.

Gen. Darryl Williams, head of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, said the coming weeks will be pivotal in bringing to fruition a NATO defense strategy that has been many months in the making.

“Once we get the regional plans in order, once we can figure out what tools we'll need to do that mission, we'll be able to determine where and when we'll have to fight,” Williams told reporters.

Williams said the plans being put in place harken back to his time as a young lieutenant in Germany during the Cold War.

“I knew where my artillery battery was going to go, what town and those sorts of things,” he said. “So we look forward to a time here very quickly, where we'll be able to get that kind of clarity to the mission sets as we go forward and fight.”

Those plans and a new NATO force model involving up to 300,000 troops operating at higher alert are expected to be approved next month when President Joe Biden and other heads of state meet for a summit in Vilnius, Lithuania.

U.S. Army Europe and Africa commander Gen. Darryl A. Williams speaks during a ceremony at Grafenwoehr, Germany, June 20, 2023. Williams said at the end of a meeting of European ground force commanders June 23 in Garmisch-Partenkirchen that the coming weeks will be pivotal in developing a new NATO defense strategy. (Markus Rauchenberger/U.S. Army)

Williams’ comments came at the end of a meeting of ground force commanders in Europe, who were gathered this week for talks in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville also was on hand.

During the meetings, the Army commanders focused on defense plans for Europe and also got updates from Ukrainian counterparts about the state of the recently launched offensive against Russian forces.

So far, Ukraine’s offensive has gone slowly as troops battle against entrenched Russian positions.

But indications are that Kyiv is poised to step up the pace of fighting as Western-trained heavy brigades begin to make their move. Those units, totaling nine brigades of some 36,000 troops, recently entered the fight, The New York Times reported Friday. Expectations are running high that those units will be a game changer for Ukraine.

Williams declined to comment on whether those units had indeed entered the battle in force. However, he said Ukraine’s military has been well-trained at the U.S. bases in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, as well as other parts of Europe.

At the Army’s training sites in Germany, breach complexes were constructed for Ukrainian forces, where they could rehearse the kinds of maneuvers needed to break through Russian positions, Williams said.

“That's exactly the sort of mission sets they're facing now,” Williams said.

Russia’s attack sparked a major training initiative to support Ukraine and also prompted the deployment of more American soldiers within NATO territory to guard against any further Russian aggression.

Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion, thousands of additional troops have rotated through Europe, many on six -to-nine-month missions away from home.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville, center, speaks during a meeting of ground force commanders in Europe, who were gathered this week for talks in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. On McConville's left is Gen. Darryl Williams, commander of U.S. Army Europe and Africa. (Twitter )

McConville said the “operations tempo” for the Army as a whole and the demands being put on soldiers are an ongoing worry.

“We're very concerned about our soldiers, their op tempo and you know, we're looking for the most efficient, effective way to posture them so they can conduct the mission,” McConville said.

The Army is looking for the right balance between rotational units, permanently based forces and making the most of forward-positioned weaponry so troops can carry out their missions quickly, McConville said.

“We're always looking at that and we're working with the theater to get the proper posture,” he said.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · June 23, 2023

12. The Prigozhin roadshow isn’t over

Conclusion:

When, for all Prigozhin’s professions of loyalty, Putin condemned the rebellion as treason that would be firmly crushed, the Wagner leader did not back down, but continued on towards Moscow. Instead of a useful alternative power centre within Putin’s regime, Prigozhin now appeared an alternative power centre to it. This dramatic Saturday roadshow simultaneously humiliated Putin, and suddenly established Prigozhin’s own position — if only for a day — as the de facto second most powerful man in Russia. His survival will now depend on whether Putin finds the risks embodied in Prigozhin, greater than the potential rewards he promises if only given the opportunity to expand his role. The feared strongman looked weak and indecisive: his court’s once-useful servant had now thrust himself forward as the empire’s powerbroker. An increasingly frail-looking Putin has no obvious successor: looking weak and helpless, he was forced to watch the opening scenes of his succession crisis playing out while still alive. Western observers cheering on the fragility of Putin’s hold on power should be careful what they wish for.

The Prigozhin roadshow isn’t over

The Wagner leader is still Russia's real powerbroker

BY ARIS ROUSSINOS

unherd.com · by Aris Roussinos · June 25, 2023

Waking up on Saturday morning, Putin must have wished he’d kept catering in-house. Only the day before, the Ukraine war seemed to be proceeding relatively well for Russia, at least by the lowered expectations of this stage in the conflict. The Ukrainian counteroffensive had made little progress in its first three weeks trying to breach Russia’s well-prepared defensive lines, and US officials were already briefing not to expect much more. The war had slipped into a tempo favourable to Russia, playing to the great strength of authoritarian systems against democracies: the ability to outlast the fickle whims and short patience of electorates and the politicians catering to them.

But the brief and spectacular rebellion of Putin’s caterer-in-chief-turned-condottiero, Yevgeny Prigozhin, seemed to suddenly upturn this calculus, highlighting the fragilities inherent in authoritarian regimes. Putin’s attempt to render Russia coup-proof by establishing multiple, rival power structures had created a striking weakness at the heart of his system. The great irony in all this was that the entire purpose of Prigozhin’s Wagner Group mercenary company was to firewall the Russian home front from the human cost of Putin’s foreign adventures, thus ensuring the stability of the regime. By the time Prigozhin’s disaffected warrior band was approaching the gates of Moscow, merrily shooting down the helicopters sent to delay their advance, the disadvantages of this approach appeared to far outweigh the benefits.

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Early Western hopes, or fears, that Prigozhin’s escapade heralded either a Kremlin coup or a civil war did not quite capture the essential nature of the events. As the political scientist and civil war theorist, Stathis Kalyvas, observed, “What is going on in Russia is no military coup. Coups tend to be launched at the center seeking to generate cascades of compliance. This is an armed rebellion launched from a peripheral stronghold”, so that it is “hard to see how it could succeed short of mass defections in the Russian military”. But equally, “this is no simple mutiny either as those tend to be local and without broader political aims”. As the political scientist Seva Gunitsky observed on Twitter, “the closer parallel is not the [1991] coup but the Russian peasant rebellions of Razin and Pugachev. The latter especially — a disaffected officer unhappy with the prosecution of a war.”

Other comparisons, from war-torn and overstretched empires, could be made. The Albanian mercenary commander, Muhammad Ali Pasha, had an ability to outcompete Western rivals and reconquer restive provinces which made him indispensable to the Ottoman empire; Prigozhin has been similarly lavishly rewarded with lucrative monopolies. Prigozhin, just like Muhammad Ali, also used his independent power base to make a strike for the imperial capital, before turning back: and Prigozhin’s dramatic weekend adventure will similarly remain one of the great what-might-have-beens of history. If Putin’s reliance on deniable and expendable mercenary companies is a product of the postmodern way of war, then it had a curiously premodern outcome.

Prigozhin’s rebellion may have been brief, but its roots were longstanding. For months, the Wagner leader had utilised his newfound celebrity status to fiercely criticise the Russian Ministry of Defence’s lacklustre prosecution of the war. Accusing his main rivals, Russia’s Defence Minister “the Tuvan degenerate”, Sergei Shoigu, and Chief of General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, of poor leadership, cowardice, corruption and betrayal, Prigozhin had claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defence had deliberately starved Wagner of ammunition, emerging as one of Russia’s fiercest nationalist critics of the “fat cats in Moscow” in a surprisingly crowded field.

But the Wagner-led capture of Bakhmut, after a gruelling year-long campaign, seemed, until this weekend, to mark the apotheosis of Prigozhin’s career. Now it had achieved its purpose, at horrific cost, Wagner seemed set to be either redeployed to its lucrative African area of operations or neutered as an independent power structure. But as Wagner forces pulled out from their positions earlier this month, they fought clashes with Russian regulars they claimed had fired on them, capturing a senior officer. The tensions Putin had permitted to escalate within his war cabinet — whether as intentional policy or sheer incompetence must remain a matter of speculation — now looked to be spiralling out of control.

When the Russian Ministry of Defence published a decree two weeks ago that volunteer militias — like many official Russian statements, it did not mention Wagner by name — would soon come under its direct control, Prigozhin reacted with fury, refusing to come under Shoigu’s command, and again highlighting the incompetence of his new notional superior. In a half-hour Telegram video of unprecedented contempt last Friday, Prigozhin faced the camera with a mug of tea, calmly explaining to his audience — including Putin — that the war was launched under false pretences, purely to enrich oligarchs and boost Shoigu’s career, and that Putin had been catastrophically misled by his own military leadership.

Then came the purported shelling by the Russian army of Wagner’s positions behind the line in eastern Ukraine, where its mercenaries had been resting after the bloody and exhausting battle for Bakhmut. “Many of our guys died,” Prigozhin thundered on Telegram, “We will make a decision on how to respond to this evil. The next move is ours.”

And so it was. Announcing in an audio message that “the evil brought by the military leadership of the country must be stopped”, Prigozhin effectively declared war on Russia’s Ministry of Defence, while maintaining his personal loyalty to Putin: like any premodern rebel, the problem was simply that the Tsar had bad advisors. His forces would depose the military leadership before returning to the front lines: the war would continue, only better run. But first, “justice in the Army will be restored. And after this, justice for the whole of Russia.” In panicked-looking videos, the two generals seen as most sympathetic to Prigozhin, Surovikin and Alexeyev pleaded for him to turn back, to no avail.

Launching his self-declared March of Justice, columns of Prigozhin’s Wagner fighters crossed the border from Ukraine, and seized the southern military command headquarters in Rostov — the nerve centre of Russia’s war, deploying on the city streets in surreal scenes. There, Prigozhin released videos claiming to have evidence that Russian casualties were three to four times higher than the Ministry of Defence were announcing, and humiliating Russia’s now-captive Deputy Defence Minister General Yunus-bek Yevkurov, chiding him that “guys are dying because you’re throwing them into the meat-grinder, without ammunition, without thought, without any plans [because] you’re just senile clowns”.

Claiming to command a 25,000 strong force, Prigozhin then sent his columns striking north along the M4 highway, bypassing major population centres such as Voronezh in a “thunder run” towards Moscow, brushing aside the attack helicopters sent to slow their advance. As Putin gave a short and unconvincing speech, effectively likening himself to Nicholas II and threatening to crush the rebellion before seemingly fleeing the capital, lightly-armed internal security forces set up checkpoints on the city’s outskirts as Moscow residents received robocalls instructing them to support their liberators. The gambit was so successful, it seemed as if it must have been long-planned.

But the denouement, when it came, seemed anticlimactic: in negotiations reportedly overseen by Belarus’s strongman, Alexander Lukashenko, Prigozhin agreed to turn his forces back, and Moscow’s newly-erected defences were dismantled. Taking the applause of crowds in Rostov– in scenes which the Kremlin will have watched with alarm — Prigozhin went off to exile in Belarus and the immediate crisis had been averted. But what does it all mean?

The opaque and diffuse nature of power in Putin’s Kremlin means that it is impossible to make any assertions or predictions with any certainty: no one watching from the outside, tracking Prigozhin’s One Day That Shook The World on social media, knew what would happen next, and it is doubtful that any of the main participants themselves knew how the warlord’s daring gambit would end. But the speed with which Wagner forces approached the capital showed that the country’s internal defences, depleted by the deployment of the vast bulk of its army to the trenches of southern and eastern Ukraine, are strikingly weak. Rostov itself, the heavily militarised hub of Russia’s war in Ukraine, was surrendered without a shot fired. The lightly-armed Rosgvardia internal defence forces seen deploying around the approaches to Moscow were designed to protect Putin’s regime from political disorder, but they would have struggled to put up much of a defence against Wagner’s hardened troops and the heavy armour they were rushing to the capital.

After initial silence, Putin’s Chechen satrap, Ramzan Kadyrov, deployed a small convoy to Rostov to confront Wagner and flew troops to buttress Moscow’s defences: true to form, they achieved little, but the sight of auxiliaries from the imperial periphery summoned to the defence of the threatened metropole was a striking one, which may be repeated in Russia’s future. But apart from sporadic and largely ineffective aerial attack, the Wagner columns met no internal resistance: whether the security forces along their way felt outmatched, or whether middle-ranking officers felt sympathetic to Prigozhin’s campaign against their leadership, or simply chose to see who would emerge strongest before committing themselves, will now be an object of intense interest — within Russia as well as abroad.

Both Shoigu and Gerasimov have, at the time of writing, been notable for their absence. Speculation is rife that the condition for Prigozhin’s standing down Wagner was their replacement. Who replaces them, if this is indeed true, will affect the outcome of the war: but it is impossible to yet say to whose advantage. The events of Saturday’s rebellion were so unexpected, and so brief, that the Ukrainians were unable to exploit them to their advantage, at least immediately. But Ukraine’s leadership, and its Western backers, unnerved by the so-far disappointing results of their counteroffensive, will take heart that Putin’s hold on power appears so brittle.

The war is imposing huge human and financial costs on both countries, but in terms of political will, Ukraine now appears by far the stronger party. Wavering Western allies will surely assess that Putin’s near-escape from disaster this weekend will alter his strategic calculus, by showing that the war’s continuation threatens the stability of his rule in ways he had not anticipated. By showing that there are real costs to Putin’s seeming strategy of waiting out Ukraine’s Western backers, the weekend’s events will increase his desire to bring the war to a swift and palatable conclusion: that may make peace talks more likely, but it may also heighten the risk of nuclear escalation, already a discussion reaching fever pitch within the Russian security establishment. In determining which of the two outcomes is most likely, the opinion of China, surely alarmed by its partner’s sudden evidence of instability, will be a major deciding factor.

With Russia and China already rivals in Central Asia, Putin will not have been pleased by the noncommittal response to his moment of crisis from his former strategic dependent in Kazakhstan. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s government only survived internal disorder through Putin’s intervention; the swift and painless execution of this mission once seemed to promise similar success in Kyiv. But already the junior partner in the alliance, reduced to a cheap source of mineral wealth for the hungry rising hegemon and a handy distraction for the West, Russia’s growing comparative weakness may alter the calculus of the strategic relationship, if not for Putin then for whoever eventually succeeds him: a permanent role as China’s Belarus is not what the war was intended to achieve.

In Belarus itself, for Lukashenko — if his role defusing the conflict does in fact reflect reality — the chance to demonstrate his utility to his Russian saviour may outweigh the inconvenience of hosting his volatile guest. But for Prigozhin, a precarious life in exile at the Minsk court of Putin’s puppet king is not an enticing prospect compared to the riches and glory that may still be attainable in Africa, if now under a tighter leash.

It is impossible to know whether Prigozhin’s weekend adventure will make him a major player in Russia’s future, or award him a death sentence: but if he wanted Putin’s attention, he certainly got it. One of the prime beneficiaries of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Prigozhin is also a fierce critic of the war’s prosecution and founding justifications. His critique of Russia’s sclerotic defence establishment, and its slow incapacity to react to events, was dramatically proved by his own actions. The former hot dog seller, previously accused of running backchannels to Ukraine’s intelligence services, is rightly vilified by the West for Wagner’s long list of human rights abuses, but he also must now look tempting as a means to pressure the Kremlin.

When, for all Prigozhin’s professions of loyalty, Putin condemned the rebellion as treason that would be firmly crushed, the Wagner leader did not back down, but continued on towards Moscow. Instead of a useful alternative power centre within Putin’s regime, Prigozhin now appeared an alternative power centre to it. This dramatic Saturday roadshow simultaneously humiliated Putin, and suddenly established Prigozhin’s own position — if only for a day — as the de facto second most powerful man in Russia. His survival will now depend on whether Putin finds the risks embodied in Prigozhin, greater than the potential rewards he promises if only given the opportunity to expand his role. The feared strongman looked weak and indecisive: his court’s once-useful servant had now thrust himself forward as the empire’s powerbroker. An increasingly frail-looking Putin has no obvious successor: looking weak and helpless, he was forced to watch the opening scenes of his succession crisis playing out while still alive. Western observers cheering on the fragility of Putin’s hold on power should be careful what they wish for.

unherd.com · by Aris Roussinos · June 25, 2023

13. Poll finds continued public support for Ukraine, Taiwan aid

Excerpts:

A majority of poll respondents — about 59% of them — support the United States sending Ukraine military aid, with about 30% opposing military aid.

Rachel Hoff, the Reagan Institute’s policy director, said in a June 23 call with reporters that represents a slight increase in support from the institute’s last poll, conducted in November 2022. That survey found that 57% of respondents supported providing Ukraine with military equipment and financial assistance, with 33% saying the U.S. should instead focus on its problems at home.

“The polling does not indicate that there’s a kind of Ukraine fatigue,” Hoff said. “There’s not decreasing levels of support for sending military aid to Ukraine. That’s remained consistent.”

...

The Reagan Institute’s poll found more than half of respondents continued to favor supporting Taiwan to discourage China from invading — but again, there were signs of softening support.

Last November, 61% of poll respondents supported increasing a U.S. military presence near Taiwan, and 58% supported selling Taiwan more arms. But in the latest poll, both responses slid to 56% and 52%, respectively.

Hoff attributed those declines to decreasing support for deterrence among Democrats, and said Republicans had grown more likely to support aid and a U.S. military presence near Taiwan.

Poll finds continued public support for Ukraine, Taiwan aid

Defense News · by Stephen Losey · June 25, 2023

WASHINGTON — A new poll on national security issues finds three-quarters of respondents believe it is important for Ukraine to win its war against Russia’s invasion, but not all of them support providing Ukraine military aid.

The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute’s first summer poll, released to the public on Sunday, also found continuing support for the United States taking a leadership role in the world, opposition to cutting defense spending — and a pronounced generational divide over whether to ban the social media app TikTok.

The Reagan Institute Summer Survey, which polled 1,254 people online and over the phone in late May and early June, found that 76% of respondents felt a Ukrainian victory was important to the United States.

That belief was held most strongly by Democratic respondents, 86% of whom agreed that a Ukrainian victory was important, and least strongly by Independents, 58% of whom agreed. Among Republicans, 71% of all respondents agreed with that statement, but support was slightly softer among respondents who said they would vote for former President Trump in the primaries.

A majority of poll respondents — about 59% of them — support the United States sending Ukraine military aid, with about 30% opposing military aid.

Rachel Hoff, the Reagan Institute’s policy director, said in a June 23 call with reporters that represents a slight increase in support from the institute’s last poll, conducted in November 2022. That survey found that 57% of respondents supported providing Ukraine with military equipment and financial assistance, with 33% saying the U.S. should instead focus on its problems at home.

“The polling does not indicate that there’s a kind of Ukraine fatigue,” Hoff said. “There’s not decreasing levels of support for sending military aid to Ukraine. That’s remained consistent.”

Of aid supporters in this summer’s poll, 37% said it was most important to stand up to Russian aggression in Ukraine to deter Moscow from invading other neighboring countries. Another 30% of military aid supporters said it is important to help protect other nations’ sovereignty and the freedom of their peoples whenever possible.

Aid opponents — 57% of them — overwhelmingly said the United States has too many of its own needs that are not being addressed to send billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine. Concerns about further provoking Russia motivated another 15% of aid opponents, and 11% expressed concerns about the depletion of the U.S.’s own weapons stockpile.

Another 11% said the most compelling reason for opposing aid to Ukraine was because corruption and embezzlement there could mean some aid would never make it to the battlefield.

When asked whether more reliable accounting measures aimed at protecting against embezzlement or corruption would make them more likely to support aid to Ukraine, more than half of respondents said it would not sway their opinion.

The poll also found people became more likely to support aid to Ukraine when they learned more about the actual costs and outcomes of the assistance. When first asked a general question about the United States’ aid to Ukraine, half of respondents said it has been worth the cost. When pollsters followed up by saying the aid has amounted to about $24 billion — or 3% of the U.S. military’s budget — while helping Ukraine hold onto about 83% of its own territory while severely degrading Russia’s military and ability to threaten NATO allies, that support rose to nearly two-thirds.

Republicans’ opinions on the cost-effectiveness of Ukraine aid grew the most after being more deeply informed about the potential benefits of that aid, from 41% to 59%. Democrats were again most supportive, and Independents the least, at 46%.

More than half of all respondents, or 56%, said European allies are not doing their fair share to assist Ukraine.

The poll did not query respondents on specific forms of aid to Ukraine, such as long-range missiles or fighter jets.

The Reagan Institute typically polls the public each November, but this year decided to hold a second poll as summer began. This survey took a much greater dive into Ukraine-related questions than previous polls.

The survey showed mixed opinions on what role the United States should play in the world — but support grew when respondents were asked about specific foreign policy principles America could foster.

Hoff said that the institute was surprised to see two-thirds of overall respondents felt the U.S. would be better served by withdrawing from international affairs and focusing more on its own problems. That included 75% of Republican respondents.

“That struck us as quite high, especially when we think about President Reagan’s legacy around global engagement and American leadership,” Hoff said. “We were encouraged to see that as we asked about the particulars of what American global engagement might look like, the answers were quite higher.”

When asked about the importance of standing up for human rights and democracy, and promoting trade and boosting the economy, about three-quarters of overall respondents expressed their support. Another 85% — including 92% of Republican respondents — said it was important to maintain a strong military. Hoff said all questions were asked at the same time.

Hoff said these results — while appearing somewhat contradictory — show that Americans still remain supportive of the country playing a leading role in the world and engaging with other nations, despite domestic challenges.

“Americans … want to do both,” Hoff said. “They seem to reject the premise of that false dichotomy that we need to withdraw and focus on problems here at home.”

The poll also found strong opposition to cutting military spending to reduce the budget deficit, with 58% of respondents opposing such cuts. Democrats were most open to defense cuts, with fewer than half expressing opposition, and 70% of Republicans were opposed to defense cuts.

The Reagan Institute’s poll found more than half of respondents continued to favor supporting Taiwan to discourage China from invading — but again, there were signs of softening support.

Last November, 61% of poll respondents supported increasing a U.S. military presence near Taiwan, and 58% supported selling Taiwan more arms. But in the latest poll, both responses slid to 56% and 52%, respectively.

Hoff attributed those declines to decreasing support for deterrence among Democrats, and said Republicans had grown more likely to support aid and a U.S. military presence near Taiwan.

Respondents were largely divided over the controversial social media app TikTok, with 40% saying it should be banned in the U.S. and 44% opposing such a ban.

TikTok is owned by ByteDance, a Chinese company that is now headquartered in Singapore. It is wildly popular with teens and young adults, who use it to create and share short, often humorous videos.

A pronounced split over TikTok emerged among respondents of different ages. Respondents who were between the ages of 18 and 29 were vehemently opposed to a ban, with only 19% in favor and 73% opposed, and 8% expressing neither opinion.

Support for a ban gradually grew with respondents’ age, with 54% of respondents over 65 saying the app should be banned, and 24% opposed. And the percentage of respondents expressing neither opinion also increased with age, reaching 22% among those 65 and older.

Congress, the U.S. military and federal agencies have already banned TikTok from government-issued mobile devices amid concerns that China could use the app to obtain private user data or try to push favorable misinformation.

ByteDance has rejected accusations that TikTok is a security threat and says it does not share data with the Chinese government, nor hold data in China. ByteDance also says it is independently run, and does not collect more user data than other social media platforms.

About Stephen Losey

Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.

14. The 2023 War On The Rocks Summer Fiction Reading List

My two recommendations below are The Moon Is Down by John Steinbeck and White Sun War by Mick Ryan.

The 2023 War On The Rocks Summer Fiction Reading List - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by WOTR Staff · June 26, 2023

If you’re like us, you probably spend much of the year reading strategy, history, biography, and commentary. Summer is a good time to reinvigorate your mind with some fiction. To that end, each year we ask the senior editors and board members of War on the Rocks and the Texas National Security Review for reading recommendations. We hope you find something to sink into and savor.

Kerry Anderson

The Silence of the Girls and The Women of Troy, Pat Barker: When reading The Iliad, did you ever wonder about the perspective of the women affected by the war? Did you ever wonder what Helen of Troy thought about the whole thing? If so, this pair of books is for you. Incredibly well written, these novels center around the character Briseis and the other women involved, such as Helen, Hecuba, Cassandra, and Andromache — all mentioned in The Iliad but lacking voice or agency. Barker’s novels finally allow these women to breathe, and her writing brings nuance and complexity to the women and men in the story.

The Syndicate Spy: A Juliet Arroway Novel, Brittany Butler. Recently released, this debut spy novel is similar to many other spy novels in that it has lots of action, sexy characters, and plot twists. What makes it different is that it’s written from a woman’s perspective, by a woman with real-life experience in intelligence operations. Set in a near-future world that has run out of oil reserves, spy Juliet Arroway fights to end an energy war while also trying to find purpose in life beyond her work. Entertaining and fun — a good beach read this summer.

Emma Ashford

A Memory Called Empire, Arkady Martine. A beautiful piece of hard sci-fi that meditates on the meaning of language, culture, war, the explicit and implicit costs of imperial conquest, and the difficult question of whether expatriates can ever truly return home, or whether they are changed forever. Anyone who ever finds themselves thinking in a language or vernacular different from the language of their birth will appreciate the themes of this book.

Schlock Mercenary, Howard Taylor. I’ve been rereading this series lately, and it remains one of my favorite works of fiction. Don’t let the fact that it’s a “webcomic” put you off: Schlock Mercenary is a genuine work of plot-driven comedic sci-fi, written in comic-book length story arcs. The main plot follows the antics of Tagon’s Toughs, a group of space mercenaries, as they blunder their way through contracts, adventures, and — occasionally — saving the galaxy. Also well worth reading for its satire on self-help aphorisms: “The Seventy Maxims of Maximally Effective Mercenaries,” which includes such gems as “A Sergeant in motion outranks a Lieutenant who doesn’t know what’s going on,” and “There is no “overkill.” There is only “open fire” and “reload.”

Benjamin Armstrong

The Sand Pebbles, Richard McKenna. While surely a recommendation that has made the War on the Rocks list in the past, this novel of the U.S. Navy’s Yangtze Patrol during the interwar years was made into a classic movie with Steve McQueen. Written by a chief petty officer, whereas most military writers come from the officer’s ranks, this book gives a deck plate and sailor’s view of what navies have done during “peacetime” and reminds us of the long history between the United States and China.

The Bridges at Toko Ri, James Michener. The U.S. Navy in the air war over Korea is often an overlooked element of an often-overlooked war. Pulitzer Prize winner James Michener embedded with a carrier task force in 1951, and this novella resulted from his time with the pilots and sailors aboard USS Essex and USS Valley Forge. With elements drawn from the history of the war, like a climactic rescue scene drawing from the heroism of Lt. John Koelsch, who was the first Navy rescue helicopter pilot awarded the Medal of Honor, this quick read is a classic of naval aviation.

Dave Barno

The Merlot Murders, Ellen Crosby. The first installment of a long-running series of murder mysteries set in Virginia wine country, this opening story most captivated me because of its unlikely heroine — a young women permanently injured in a car accident who inherits her family’s wine-growing estate on the edge of the Blue Ridge Mountains. The setting is gorgeous, wine-making aficionados will swoon, and the murders continue to mount — and are eventually solved in ways that always reveal the fascinating twists and turns of this unique region’s history and culture.

The Thursday Murder Club, Richard Osman. Set in the upscale British retirement home of Coopers Chase, four aging friends meet every Thursday in the Jigsaw Room to dissect a long-forgotten case of unsolved murder. Their unusual past careers — from MI5 agent to psychologist to union organizer — provide them not only with perceptive insights into the criminal mind, but a sprawling former network of contacts who inevitably get dragged into every case. When the cold cases turn hot and threaten the foursome, they prove amazingly resourceful — and hard to bump off.

Nora Bensahel

Damascus Station, David McCloskey. This engrossing debut novel from former CIA analyst McCloskey is a page-turner that I easily devoured in a weekend. In the early years of the recent uprising in Syria, CIA case officer Sam Joseph flies to Paris to recruit Miriam Haddad, a Syrian palace official with conflicting loyalties. The forbidden relationship that emerges between them raises their personal stakes without overwhelming the plot when they return to Syria to hunt for a dangerous killer. And War on the Rocks readers will particularly appreciate the sharp wit with which McCloskey accurately skewers the U.S. government bureaucracy — our hero may be flying off to save the world, for example, but his plea for a business-class seat is denied since his flight is less than 14 hours.

Remarkably Bright Creatures, Shelby Van Pelt. Tova Sullivan cleans the local aquarium alone at night, preferring solitude as she reflects on her teenage son’s disappearance three decades ago. Marcellus is a brilliant but bored giant Pacific octopus who regularly escapes from his tank to explore and snack on some of his neighbors. The two form an unlikely friendship, and, as the plot unfolds, Marcellus figures out what happened to Tova’s son. Marcellus narrates his own parts of the story with a deep and quiet dignity that makes him a truly unforgettable character.

Claude Berube

The Eight, Katherine Neville. This will appeal especially to readers who enjoy both contemporary thrillers and historical fiction. The Eight stands the test of time, taking place both in the 1970s and the French Revolution and centered on Charlemagne’s chess set.

Code Name November, Bill Granger. The late Bill Granger’s November Man series introduces operative Devereaux with Code Name November.

The Godwulf Manuscript, Robert B. Parker. The late Robert B. Parker’s protagonist may be familiar to those who remember actor Robert Urich in the Spenser: For Hire television series, but Parker’s Boston private detective starts in print with The Godwulf Manuscript and gets better with every book. This is perfect summer beach reading.

Nick Danforth

Arabian Nights and Days, Naguib Mahfouz. This is the second Egyptian novel I’ve read, and it’s the second one where the author seems to be unapologetically fantasizing about the assassination of corrupt police officials. Always good to see a government doing its part to foster the arts.

Soldiers of Salamis, Javier Cercas. An engaging book about the Spanish civil war set inside an entertaining book about writing a book about the Spanish civil war. If the ending slightly disappoints, the author somehow makes the disappointment feel like a vital commentary on writing itself.

Ulrike Franke

Beautiful World, Where Are You, Sally Rooney. I read somewhere that Sally Rooney is a quintessential millennial writer and that description fits perfectly. Beautiful World, Where Are You flawlessly captures the topics and language of my generation. It’s about four youngish-but-really-not-so-young-anymore people (hi, fellow millennials!) and their relationships to each other. That may not sound particularly exciting, but Rooney’s way of writing makes this an excellent read.

Project Hail Mary, Andy Weir. Andy Weir probably doesn’t need any extra advertising, but Project Hail Mary is just SO GOOD. A first-person account of finding yourself alone in a spaceship, having to save the human race with the help of an alien. Sci-fi — with a focus on the science — at its best.

Richard Fontaine

Midnight’s Children, Salman Rushdie. A sprawling, magical-realist novel set amid Indian independence, partition, and the following decades. It’s an amazing, stunning story and one of the best novels you’ll ever read.

Kafka on the Shore, Haruki Murakami. Reading a Murakami novel is a weird experience. It’s hard to know what’s going on, hard to remember much afterward, but they produce an awesome cognitive shift. If you like this one, read The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle; if you want something shorter, you could start with Norwegian Wood, A Wild Sheep Chase, or (particularly good) South of the Border, West of the Sun.

The big four novels, William Faulkner. Faulkner wrote lots of novels, but four of them are giants: The Sound and the Fury, Light in August, As I Lay Dying, and Absalom, Absalom! They are simply stunning creative and artistic achievements. If you haven’t read them, do yourself a favor and get started.

TX Hammes

The Afghan Campaign, Steven Pressfield. A fictionalized account of Alexander’s conquest of Afghanistan as seen through the eyes of a Macedonian recruit. I found Afghan Campaign particularly interesting because Alexander sets the pattern for Western generals trying to pacify Afghanistan for the next 2,000 years — successful invasion followed by repeated failed attempts to defeat the subsequent insurgency. Finally, the invading force accepts that Afghanistan is an unsolvable political problem to be managed by a negotiated withdrawal, leaving a local strongman in charge. And as a bonus, one of Alexander’s columns was ambushed repeatedly as they tried to get out to India.

Sharp’s Adventures series, Bernard Cornwell. Light read that follows the adventures of Richard Sharp from India through the Napoleonic Wars. The campaigns and battles are portrayed with historical accuracy with the notable exception of the presence of Sharp and his company of riflemen. Good introduction to the British conquest of India and the Peninsula Campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars.

Bruce Hoffman

The Postcard, Anne Berest. How were the lives of ordinary people — in this case, who happened to be Jewish — utterly shattered by the Holocaust? There are arguably few better or more immediate or compelling accounts of the succession of horrific experiences that befell European Jewry than this thinly fictionalized (mostly some imagined dialogue) book of one family’s multigenerational trauma.

A Coffin for Dimitrios, Eric Ambler. Before there was John le Carré, there was Ambler. One of the premier thriller writers of both the prewar and Cold War eras, Ambler pioneered this genre with such memorable characters as the mystery writer John Latimer, whose chance meeting with Colonel Haki, the commander of a crime squad in 1930s Istanbul, sends him on a hunt across Europe for the arch criminal Dimitrious Makropoulous.

Frank Hoffman

For years I resisted science fiction, but it’s now about the only fiction I can find time to enjoy. I totally agree with Mick Ryan and Nate Finney who wrote that “Reading fiction, especially science fiction, can nurture the imaginative mindset in the military and national security professional.” Hence, my two nominations are both first-rate military fiction, with the first from an era largely similar to today’s environment in terms of both geopolitical competition and techno-security disruptions. The second is an examination of military culture and strategy through the lens of contemporary science fiction.

The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914: Fictions of Future Warfare and of Battles Still-To-Come, I. F. Clarke, ed. A fascinating anthology of futuristic writing about the disruptive technologies of the Second Industrial Revolution. There are 16 articles written before World War I in this treasure, which include selections from famous authors such as Jack London, Arthur Conan Doyle, and Sir George Tomkyns Chesney. The latter’s Battle of Dorking stimulated a generation in this genre. This volume also includes some of the original artwork as well, illuminating how these authors viewed the character of warfare just before the calamity of 1914.

Carolyn Just

The Other Passenger, Louise Candlish. It’s a bit of a slow start for an avid mystery reader, but after the first few (short) chapters, I was hooked. And as a proud Agatha Christie devotee, I thought I had it figured out by page 100 but whew, boy, I had no idea what was going on until the last 50 pages. A page-turner for any vacation.

The Midnight Library, Matt Haig. A deeply thoughtful novel that asks, “What if?” Beautiful writing about what life’s all about. I’d take it just a few chapters at a time to enjoy the prose and the questions it may provoke.

Burak Kadercan

Memed, My Hawk, Yasar Kemal. For those who are interested in Turkish literature, Yasar Kemal’s Ince Memed series constitute a true treasure. Memed, My Hawk is the first of four novels where Kemal, one of Turkey’s most acclaimed and celebrated novelists, introduces the reader to the rough, violent, and dangerous place that rural Anatolia once was through the lenses of its main character, Memed. Memed, My Hawk is both a sophisticated social and political commentary, and a first-rate thriller as well as a hard-boiled revenge story.

The Caliban’s War, James S. A. Corey. The second of the nine novels that collectively make up the wildly popular series The Expanse, The Caliban’s War is more or less a reflection of the global politics of the 18th and 19th centuries, craftily projected into the 24th century. What makes The Caliban’s War interesting, beyond all the alien-technology-infused shenanigans, is the importance it places on colonialism for understanding great-power politics (and vice versa). While the narrative style would not excite the readers as much as the TV show that was inspired by the novel series might have, the content still delivers.

Carrie Lee

Between the Acts, Virginia Woolf. I have been going through the complete works of Virginia Woolf this year as part of a New Year’s initiative and found Between the Acts to be both refreshing and full of moments for reflection on the lives we lead, both at their most poignant and ridiculous. It is a story whose last pages should not be missed, as they in fact provide the greatest perspective and food for thought. A worthy meditation in a moment when we could all be a little more introspective and self-aware.

For Whom the Bell Tolls, Ernest Hemingway. I first read this on a trip with through Spain with my husband in 2018 but have found myself going back to it recently as we enter moments of intense and at-times violent political polarization here in the United States. An important discussion made all the more stark by Hemingway’s signature straightforward prose, about the human element of war and the sacrifices that liberty often demands.

Al Mauroni

The Silo series, Hugh Howey. This series may be of interest given that Apple TV+ has started a show based on the first book, Dust. First, be assured that if you read the book, it won’t spoil your ability to enjoy the show. While the show has the same theme and characters, the story is significantly different. The books examine the actions of a closed-system society after the unexplained collapse of society on Earth. Nearly 10,000 people continue their survival in an underground silo that abides by “the Pact” to maintain social order, but no one knows how the world ended. When a Mechanic is chosen to be the Silo’s next sheriff, her investigations into a series of deaths causes turmoil and upheavals. It’s a gripping sci-fi story that really engages the reader as the whodunit story progresses into a complex examination of how a dystopian and autocratic society might evolve and manage conflict.

Station Eleven, Emily St. John Mandel. Another postapocalyptic fiction novel that transitioned into a limited series on HBO Max, this was written by Emily St. John Mandel to examine how society manages after a pandemic nearly wipes out all human life. It’s a familiar topic to anyone who has survived the COVID-19 years and wondered, what if the outbreak had been worse? The plot of how human civilization manages after a world-ending pandemic is not new, but the sci-fi novel does a tremendously good job of character creation and linking the stories of disparate individuals who are trying to survive and rebuild a society. Again, if you’ve seen the HBO series, it’s still very much worth reading the book, which goes much more into the development of the lead character, a young woman who joins a traveling actor’s group to tour the various pockets of humanity that still exist.

David Maxwell

The Moon Is Down, John Steinbeck. With all the contemporary focus on resistance around the world, it is time to review a classic WWII novel about resistance in Europe written at the behest of William Donovan of the OSS for the people in Europe. This novel had wide-ranging effects in many countries. It was one of the most sought-after pieces of literature during the war. It provides a useful lesson on how fiction can make a significant contribution to the political warfare aspect of everything from strategic competition to large-scale combat operations. A question for all readers, policymakers, and strategists is whether similar novels, with proper cultural adaptation, could motivate those who seek freedom in the revisionist, rogue, and revolutionary powers of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea?

White Sun War, Mick Ryan. One of the best ways to imagine future wars and prepare for them is through fiction. It is even better when the novel is written by a visionary, experienced, and accomplished military leader who can meld warfighting, strategy, politics, high technology, cyber, space, and artificial intelligence into a captivating and entertaining story that can drive the reader to think critically about what the future holds. And it is even more compelling when that story is about the most dangerous and perhaps most likely future war, a Chinese-U.S. conflict over Taiwan.

Michael Mazarr

A Beautiful Blue Death (and the other 14 Charles Lenox mysteries), Charles Finch. An incredibly entertaining and elegantly written series with wonderful Victorian period details. The books are fun, engaging, and surprisingly affecting; Lenox is a supremely appealing character. Strongly recommended on audiobook — most are read by the incomparable James Langton. A magnificent listening experience.

Moonraker, Ian Fleming. Fleming’s original Bond isn’t a 21st-century kind of guy, and just about all the books use terms and phrases that are very much out of place today. But reading a few of them again, I was struck by their tight prose, powerful narrative drive, and humor, and by the fact that the original fictional Bond is very much a complex and human figure. This one is a special treat as an audiobook, as read by Bill Nighy, whose voice is as hypnotic as the story.

Doug Ollivant

Killing Commendatore, Haruki Murakami. This is Murakami’s most recent (available-in-English) novel. The perennial runner-up for the Nobel Prize, the master of “magical realism” challenges us to think differently, to release our assumptions, and accept new realities, however different they may seem. While strategists and planners must eventually return to cold and hard realities, Murakami’s corpus teaches us that at least in initial stages, it may be helpful to let ourselves see the world differently and think more freely.

The Henriad (Richard II, Henry IV Part 1, Henry IV Part 2, Henry V), William Shakespeare. “For God’s sake, let us sit upon the ground / And tell sad stories of the death of kings … / All murder’d: for within the hollow crown / That rounds the mortal temples of a king Keeps Death his court …” Virtually all of us know King Henry’s Saint Crispin’s Day speech, but far too few read, let alone absorb, the entire account that leads to that day at Agincourt.

Erin O’Brien

Another Country, James Baldwin. Part of my love for this book comes from knowing Baldwin wrote it while living in Istanbul, but mostly I read (and reread) it because it is one of the best depictions of all the beauty and ugliness of the many forms of human love and relationships ever written. Three or four reads later, my jaw still drops when reading some of Baldwin’s sentences. As someone who spends much of her time reading policy and the news, Baldwin’s prose is a welcome treat.

The Last Thing He Wanted, Joan Didion. I just finished this strange and fictional account of the Iran-Contra crisis, written by Didion in the 1990s. It’s a lesser-known Didion book, but still possesses all of her trademarks — impeccable reporting, even in fiction; whip-smart language; and some of the most accurate (fictional) observations of Washington’s machinations ever put to page. It sucks you right in — I finished it in a day.

The Book of Goose, Yiyun Li. Another recent read, but a remarkable one. A weird and winding account of two young girls creating a semi-real, semi-fictional world in postwar France. Incredible language, and a fascinating, kaleidoscopic approach to storytelling. The perfect not-so-light summer read.

4 3 2 1, Paul Auster. I read both Invisible and 4 3 2 1 by Paul Auster this year, and I was ashamed that I hadn’t read them earlier. Paul Auster — like Didion and Baldwin — has an almost unparalleled ability to depict life in 20th-century America in all of its wonder, novelty, and horror. I cannot recommend Auster enough, but 4 3 2 1 in particular will blow you away.

Emma Salisbury

Excession, Iain M. Banks. One entry into the excellent Culture series of science fiction, Excession explores how to deal with an “Outside Context Problem,” a term that Banks coined to describe an apparently dominant society suddenly encountering a far more technologically advanced entity that they cannot relate to — in this case, a perfectly black sphere that cannot be probed, appears to be older than the universe, and is attracting unwanted attention. Blending technology and grand strategy with a more human exploration of what it means to belong, Excession is a riveting and thought-provoking read.

Circe, Madeline Miller. There has been a trend in recent years for novelizations of the stories of female characters from ancient mythology, but Miller’s Circe is the best of them. Following Circe from her birth through the famous tales of the Minotaur, the Golden Fleece, and the Odyssey, Miller recasts her in a more empathetic light and moves beyond the customary view of her as the archetypal wicked witch. Exploring themes of loneliness, revenge, and guilt, Circe gives us a different perspective on a well-known figure while retaining the excitement and magic of the original myths.

Korie Schake

Mercury Pictures Presents, Anthony Marra. A beautiful story about a family rent asunder by war, about Hollywood, and the immigrant experience in mid-century America, ravishingly told by the author who brought us one of the very best novels about Russia (A Constellation of Vital Phenomena). It’s also funny: “Her great-aunts’ understanding of Catholicism was so fickle you couldn’t really call it monotheism. It was a protection racket.”

Cloud Cuckoo Land, Anthony Doerr. A fractured timeline weaving together lives: an orphaned girl and a disfigured boy in Constantinople as Christendom is conquered, an American soldier in the Korean War, a contemporary ecoterrorist, and the last survivor on a spaceship escaping an uninhabitable Earth. What ties them all together is an ancient Greek fabulist tale of the title. Dedicated to librarians, which is perfect, because the fragility of preserving learning is the theme.

Jeremy Shapiro

March of Violets, Philip Kerr. Bernie Guenther is a tough but honorable private detective in the anti-hero tradition of Philip Marlowe or Spenser. The twist is that Guenther needs to do his detecting in 1930s Nazi Germany, navigating not just the seedy underbelly of organized crime but also the gruesome overbelly of state-led political violence. March of Violets is the first of 14 books in which Guenther wrestles with the moral dilemmas of collaboration and resistance while also trying to solve a crime or two.

The Orientalist, Tom Reiss. Everybody agrees that Ali and Nino is the greatest Azerbaijani novel ever written, but no one seems to know who really wrote it. Tom Reiss tracks down the author and reveals him to be Lev Nussimbaum, an Azeri Jewish exile who pretended to be a Muslim warrior prince and became a bestselling author and biographer of Stalin and in Nazi Germany. He escaped to Italy as the Nazis cracked down only to die of a rare disease in the resort town of Positano. This is technically not fiction, but it is certainly very difficult to believe.

Lists and Contests

warontherocks.com · by WOTR Staff · June 26, 2023

15. The Lessons of Afghanistan: Why Countering Someone Else’s Insurgency Is So Hard

Only the target of an insurgency can counter the insurgency. Outside powers can provide advice and assistance but cannot conduct COIN for another country unless it wants to take on the role of an occupying power. I think that is our problem. We think we can do it for someone else which defacto undermines the legitimacy of the government that is the target of the insurgency.

The Lessons of Afghanistan: Why Countering Someone Else’s Insurgency Is So Hard - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Christian Tripodi · June 23, 2023

The withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 marked the confirmation in the minds of many not only of the end of the United States’ longest war, but also that of counterinsurgency as a relevant and useful facet of modern military thought. “Once dynamic and desired…counterinsurgency was by then toxic and often maligned. Upon its death, the topic was buried, never praised. The consensus, post-mortem, is to quickly move on.” Such sentiments have only deepened since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. But the coalition experience in Afghanistan offers important and lasting insights on matters of strategic design, partnering with local forces, organizational adaptation, and irregular warfare more broadly—issues that remain important to Western militaries today.

In new research, I highlight some of the lessons of the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan—and in particular what happens when military actors must operate amid the complexities of someone else’s civil war. This matters since future missions and tasks falling under the remit of irregular warfare, be they provision of security force assistance to local forces or more directly countering the malign influence of near-peer adversaries in distant and unstable political environments, are likely to occur in similarly complex contexts. Large-scale expeditionary COIN campaigns may not occur in the foreseeable future, but the Afghanistan war points to lessons on the entrenched assumptions that stilted Western forces’ understanding of, and influence upon, local actors. The conflict also showcases the difficulties an external intervener faces when addressing and adjusting—or simply discovering—the conflict dynamics powering violence.

COIN’s Many-Layered Map

Contemplating Sudan’s civil war in 2002, then journalist Deborah Scroggins (subsequently on the staff of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) described the difficulty of understanding the fracturing state’s plight:

You need a layered map to understand Sudan’s civil war. A surface map of political conflict, for example […] and under that a layer of religious conflict and under that a map of all the sectarian divisions within those categories; and under that a layer of ethnic division containing a multitude of clan and tribal subdivisions […] and under that a layer of economic divisions, and under that a layer of colonial divisions; and under that a layer of racial divisions […] until it would become clear that the war was…a violent ecosystem capable of generating endless new things to fight about without shedding any of the old ones.

These metaphorical “layers” apply just as readily to Afghanistan’s civil war. Indeed, COIN itself can be visualized in a similar way, as a series of ideas, assumptions, and techniques acting as a set of layers, poised to mix unevenly with those already at play on the ground.

Study of the campaign from 2008 to 2011 (arguably the period when COIN found its fullest expression in Afghanistan) allows fuller exploration of this notion. Although existing scholarship does much to explain the West’s failings in Afghanistan, many analyses tend to center blame on poor policy decisions or absent strategy. Vitally important to the military practitioner, however, is understanding the chasm between strategy and the realities of actions on the ground, as well as the roles militaries play in filling that space. Analyzing that gap in a more theoretical sense encourages military professionals to reflect upon a different set of considerations than might otherwise be the norm, perhaps presenting them with a different set of explanations as to why certain ideas and concepts fell short.

Foundations

Afghanistan had been subject to some form of insurgency or rebellion for decades prior to 9/11. The Western intervention started with a civil war to displace the state and ended in one where the West’s proto-state was itself displaced. A nuanced understanding of civil war theory, therefore, and particularly as it relates to how civilians behave in conditions of violent uncertainty, is critical to understanding how counterinsurgency worked in Afghanistan.

Acknowledging the role of civil war violence in the conflict points to a series of important considerations. Firstly, internal conflict is often driven by hyper-local grievances that are frequently impossible for outsiders to understand and seldom map to any ideological interpretation that an expeditionary counterinsurgent force brings to the fight. Second, civilian populations trapped in conditions of uncertainty generally prefer bargains with known counterparties to participating in the formal institutions of the state. Third, economic development, capacity building, and a good governance approach are unlikely to shape political allegiances without resting upon a firm foundation of selective violence and the appearance of viable long-term control. Lastly, rural populations provide a very specific set of challenges (including norms of solidarity and honor, physical isolation, and subsistence farming economies’ ability to sustain rebellion). But these considerations were never properly captured by a COIN doctrine which took its practical cues from Iraq and its intellectual cues from the fields of military history, strategic studies, and some quarters of the political science canon but never really incorporated insights from civil war scholarship.

Layer One: Counterinsurgency’s Logic of State Building

To understand why COIN failed in Afghanistan, it helps to build on Scroggins’ metaphor and think about it in terms of four layers. The first layer relates to the Clausewitzian concept of the logic and grammar of war. War’s logic can be likened to the imperatives, assumptions, or theories that shape the conceptual limits of strategy, such as the overriding purpose of a conflict or the scale of the effort to be employed. War’s grammar, on the other hand, refers to the rules and procedures that govern the use of armed forces within that war, such as military doctrine and the various principles that abound therein.

In Afghanistan, the relationship between the counterinsurgent force and the ultimate strategic rationale for its presence—between the grammar and the logic of the war—was highly problematic. The logic of the war in Afghanistan was a radical exercise in democracy promotion and state-building that primarily reflected the preferences, interests, and values of powerful external actors. Seeking to concentrate power in the center, the intervention’s infrastructure projects, government assistance, and political and economic reforms prioritized Kabul, with little attention paid to traditional social, community, and security institutions that had historically (if barely) sustained Afghan society. By concentrating political authority at the center, the West implicitly denied the importance of pre-established forms of authority in the rural periphery. This not only marginalized the latter and further exacerbated conditions already favorable to near-permanent violence but also thoroughly complicated any attempts by counterinsurgents to engage with, support, or strengthen those same periphery stakeholders as part of COIN’s bottom-up approach to state-building. In such a way the logic and grammar of war in Afghanistan pulled in opposite directions.

Layer Two: Ordering the Afghan Insurgency

The next two layers have to do with the way in which American Field Manual 3-24 influenced practitioners’ understandings of the causes and symptoms of violent political rebellion and followed this up by constructing a theory of victory to match. It is a twin process of ordering and shaping. Ordering dictated an understanding of key concepts and ideas such as insurgency and legitimacy, as well as forging a powerful conceptual link in the minds of policymakers between economic development and counterinsurgency success. The subsequent shaping process advocated actionable principles (clear, hold, build) designed to guide military actors through the process of turning their understanding into desired outcomes.

In Afghanistan the contrast between the constructed theory of COIN that practitioners came to believe, and reality, was stark. The ordering process provided an uneven and incomplete picture of insurgency in Helmand and Kandahar in particular. This daguerreotype lacked the granularity required to comprehend highly localized concerns and disputes over money, status, and power. The doctrinal imperative to foster legitimacy was not only hampered by the tension between empowering the center at the expense of the periphery, but was also, when it came to the matter of grass-roots legitimacy, deeply underspecified as to what this all meant in practical terms. It failed to prepare counterinsurgents for the phenomenon of independent micro-societies: local populations that preserved their own notions of legitimacy and who favored a reliance on local actors or customary authority to provide it. Missing too were the insights into how local populations processed these notions of legitimacy; the methods by which it could be identified, created, and maintained; and, vitally, an understanding of how it died.

The concrete impact of this could be seen in the co-option of key leaders in the form of local village elders. A concept entirely logical to the doctrinal mind—the selection of grass-roots intermediaries through which to direct information and resources, thus strengthening their communities and aiding the bottom-up process of nation building—had the opposite effect. The simplification of the social realm by outside authority eroded elders’ ability to solve conflicts by denying them the middle ground that they had traditionally occupied, and which was essential to their role as mediators and problem solvers. The Western coalition’s instrumentalization of community structures in accordance with doctrine triggered relentless targeting and assassination of elders and other customary authorities. In the process, institutions that people had relied on for centuries to mediate disputes and protect their community were gradually destroyed.

Layer Three: Shaping the Western Response

The academic David Ucko has written extensively on the concept of Clear, Hold, Build. The experience of coalition forces using the concept in Afghanistan was a sobering reminder of how reductive doctrinal principles suffer when exposed to the complexities of a population at war with itself. Quite naturally, the initial clearing process accorded to the military’s primary skillset, and the Taliban was duly pushed out of these strongholds after hard-fought battles. The ensuing attempt to build political stability on the back of tactical victory was doomed to failure, however. Faulty assumptions about the role of economic development in adjusting local political allegiances and the inability to disentangle chosen political intermediaries from the local conflict ecosystem dictated that events remained at the mercy of the original drivers of conflict. Those, particularly the toxic disputes over land rights and drug revenues and related inter- and intra- tribal rivalries, were often entirely hidden from view. Even if ascertained, they remained well beyond the jurisdiction of the counterinsurgent to address, let alone resolve.

Musa Qala, Sangin, Garmser, Marjah, and countless other examples illustrated the difficulties of applying an abstract but seductively neat doctrinal theory to Helmand’s highly responsive social and political structures. Western policymakers assumed that local drivers of conflict were known (which was often not the case) and that outsiders could easily reform dysfunctional systems (which they rarely could). What Clear-Hold-Build delivered in Afghanistan was not a theory of victory, but a lesson in how seemingly logical assumptions about how to engender peace, i.e., increase material benefits and good governance, could never satisfy the primary motivations of a population trapped in conditions of violent uncertainty. Ultimately, money and violence imposed from the outside couldn’t positively shape politics for Afghans. All that could realistically be achieved was short-term physical control of space. Once the resources for that purpose were removed, all ancillary efforts connected to economic development and the forging of local political allies came to little, if not actively contributing to further violent instability by increasing the capacity and financial depth of its beneficiaries.

Layer Four: Enacting the Response

What about the practitioners charged with translating theory into practice? How did their interests, preferences, and perspectives materially shape the encounter? The question is relevant because the broader debate over the employment of population-centric COIN in Afghanistan must account not only for difficulties in terms of its application where it was properly tried, but by extension consider the degree to which it served as an accurate portrayal of Western military behaviors in response to the problem of countering violent political rebellion.

Numerous observers note that despite its population-centric rhetoric, the coalition campaign in Afghanistan featured a relentless preference for kinetic action. Some argue that this was a bureaucratic issue: the deficit in civilian means to support the non-military components of the strategy resulted in the campaign becoming over-militarized. Regardless, the overriding preference for offensive action hinted at an alternative explanation for events, and an important one where the practice of irregular warfare is concerned.

While the bureaucratic, organizational, and cultural domains are important to understanding military behaviors over the course of the campaign, the cognitive domain constitutes an additional and important explanatory factor. COIN doctrine is comparatively abstract. It invites military professionals to accept the unwelcome prospect that their task is intimately political, and thus defined by conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. FM 3-24 attempted to counteract this with the provision of guiding principles, which in reality were a set of largely common-sense suggestions. And so in complex, ambiguous environments like Helmand or Kandahar, problems were artificially simplified and straight lines drawn where few existed. Some describe this process as a form of cognitive closure, whereby unhelpful ambiguities and uncertainties were removed to simplify understanding and thus allow positive (military) action. Others explain it as a consequence of military decision-making processes, which are highly structured and framework dependent, designed to favor reliability and speed over accuracy or environmental fit. This helps construct a certain mental script where insurgencies are interpreted as small versions of big wars, encouraging adherence to the notion that the military defeat of the enemy will pave the way for the emergence of desired political outcomes. When it becomes apparent that this is not the case and that conflict dynamics on the ground contradict such assumptions, powerful forms of organizational self-interest dictate the need to persist with the military-centric approach lest subordination to a more nuanced political approach negatively impact operational autonomy and resourcing.

Hidden Hands

Military practitioners can benefit from a more theoretical discussion of COIN’s application in Afghanistan. Not only would they gain a better understanding of the complex and varied dimensions of political rebellion on the ground, but they would grasp more fully how these factors were supplemented by “hidden hands” imposed by counterinsurgents themselves: the technocratic assumptions underpinning the state-building process; the theoretical dimensions of doctrine; and the role of military actors by and large conditioned to reject ambiguity in favor of simplicity and certainty. The interplay between these and various dimensions of the civil war in Afghanistan revealed critical weaknesses in the ability of counterinsurgents to navigate the real-world complexities of conflict in that country.

Some will continue to argue that failure in Afghanistan was primarily a consequence of poor strategy, or of failing to properly arrange and deploy the levers of national power. Such arguments are overly self-referential. They risk neglecting the agency of those subject to such measures and fail to acknowledge the way in which Afghanistan’s sociopolitical condition actively prevented core concepts from functioning as designed. Maybe the ultimate lesson was not a confirmation of Afghanistan’s status as the graveyard of empires, but proof yet again of the difficulties encountered when acting as mediators and balancers in someone else’s war. It also makes clear that external intervention in internal conflict, perhaps more than any other form of warfare, exacerbates war’s inherent tendency toward unpredictability, lack of control, and counterintuitive outcomes.

Dr. Christian Tripodi is a MWI adjunct scholar, Reader in Irregular Warfare at the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London’s School of Security Studies, and an instructor at the Joint Services Command and Staff College at the UK Defence Academy, Shrivenham. He is the author of The Unknown Enemy: Counterinsurgency and the Illusion of Control.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the authors are affiliated with, including King’s College London and the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.

16. How Advanced Is Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation?

Excerpts:

Although the overall rapid expansion of Russian-Chinese military cooperation in terms of military-technical cooperation and joint exercises that was clearly in evidence in 2014–2019 has not been as evident in the last three years, the continued frequency of security consultations and the issuance of statements reaffirming close military ties during the 2020–2022 period suggests that this lull is most likely the product of external circumstances rather than a change in the willingness of either party to continue to pursue the development of an ever-closer military relationship. If this is the case, then it is these circumstances — including Western sanctions and resource constraints faced by the Russian military as a result of its invasion of Ukraine — that will determine whether there is a renewed push to further expand the military relationship in the coming years.

In determining the trajectory of the relationship over the next three to five years, analysts should focus on the extent to which China is supplying Russia with military and dual-use technologies and how much real assistance Russia is providing to China through joint projects such as the early warning system and advanced heavy-lift helicopters. In the joint exercises and operations sphere, observers should examine whether or not China and Russia are conducting military exercises that are provocative to third-party states, such as in the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom (GIUK) gap or near U.S. territory in the Pacific, or if either undertakes missions that are primarily of importance to the other, such as joint naval activities in disputed areas of the South China Sea, near Taiwan, or in the Mediterranean or Baltic Seas. In addition, any indication that either side is willing to grant the other long-term access to its military facilities would be a sign of an appreciable advance in military cooperation and mutual trust. These actions would indicate that the two countries are potentially on the path to a deeper level of military cooperation that might create serious threats to U.S. allies and partners and greatly increase the challenge facing U.S. military planners. Evidence that Russia and China are engaging in this type of cooperation will be more significant than further ritual statements about unlimited friendship made at summit meetings.

How Advanced Is Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation? - War on the Rocks

DMITRY GORENBURG, ELIZABETH WISHNICK, PAUL SCHWARTZ, AND BRIAN WAIDELICH

warontherocks.com · by Dmitry Gorenburg · June 26, 2023

There is widespread consensus among analysts that, although Russia and China have been moving toward closer cooperation through the entire post-Soviet era, the trend has accelerated rapidly since 2014. The specter of a Russian-Chinese partnership is deeply threatening to the United States, not only because it makes U.S. military planning more challenging, but also because it raises the possibility of two formidable adversaries joining forces to counter U.S. interests and potentially working in concert to attack U.S allies.

The strategic partnership, first established in 2001, was boosted in the mid-2010s by Russian leaders’ belief that Russia needed to seek out alternative relationships to survive its sudden confrontation with the West. China was the obvious candidate because it had a suitably large economy, was friendly to Russia, and was not planning to impose sanctions in response to the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Xi Jinping’s rise to power also has contributed to a deepening of the partnership, as China under Xi shares President Vladimir Putin’s concern with regime security and the two leaders increasingly align on issues of global and regional security. Moreover, the two countries had a record of cooperation dating back to the early 1990s that could serve as a basis for expanded cooperation.

This article summarizes a CNA report that tested this proposition. To do so, we focused on measuring military cooperation, specifically on military diplomacy and other political aspects of the defense relationship, military-technical cooperation, and exercises and joint operations. Our goal is to provide an analysis of the dynamic of the cooperative relationship in the period since 2014, including a discussion of what the relationship allows the two partners to accomplish together that they cannot do alone, and what analysts can infer about where this bilateral relationship is headed.

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Using a comprehensive collection of Russian- and Chinese-language media reporting and technical articles on bilateral military ties, we analyzed key bilateral agreements and official statements, all major arms sales and other forms of military-technical cooperation, exchanges of military personnel for education and training, joint military exercises and operations, and other relevant military-to-military engagements. Our analysis primarily covers the period from 2014 to November 2022. We included earlier cooperation where relevant and also included some important developments between November 2022 and February 2023.

We adapted a scale that assesses levels of military cooperation based on seven issue areas, ranging from the establishment of mechanisms of regular consultation at the low end to the adoption of a common defense policy at the most advanced end. This methodology allowed us to not only estimate the current level of overall military cooperation between Russia and China, but also to analyze its recent course and thereby estimate its potential future trajectory. In addition, by examining components of military cooperation, we can identify specific areas where it is developing faster or slower than the overall average. This examination allows for a more fine-grained analysis of developments in Russian-Chinese military cooperation.

A Record of Uneven Growth

Russian-Chinese military cooperation has not always grown linearly. At various points, some aspects have undergone periods of rapid expansion, while others contracted. At other points, previously growing areas have in turn plateaued. This unevenness in the dynamic of cooperation growth has been most notable in military-technical cooperation and in joint exercises and operations, while the expansion of political consultations and military diplomacy has been more constant. Despite a number of rhetorical flourishes at leadership summits, after undergoing a period of rapid expansion from 2014 to 2019, Russian-Chinese military cooperation has largely plateaued in recent years. There is little evidence of continued expansion since 2020 in either military-technical cooperation or joint military activities.

Over the last two decades, Russia and China have developed well-institutionalized political and military consultation mechanisms. The most important mechanisms include numerous summits between Putin and Xi, annual bilateral security consultations between Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Russia’s National Security Council, and Yang Jiechi, the former head of the Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Policy Commission, and the semi-annual Northeast Asia security dialogue at the deputy foreign minister level. Since 2017, China and Russia have organized their military cooperation plans in five-year roadmaps, with the most recent such plan agreed to in 2021 and lasting through 2025.

The bilateral security consultation mechanisms were initially designed in 2001 to manage bilateral territorial disputes, which were resolved by 2004. The political-military agenda has since expanded considerably. Prior to 2014, the primary focus remained on developing and expanding bilateral military cooperation, including both arms sales and joint exercises. With relations with the West cratering after the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, Russia sought to expand its relationship with China. The two countries began to coordinate more broadly on security issues, including assessments of threat perceptions of the West, positions on each other’s territorial and geopolitical disputes with third countries, and efforts to expand cooperation on strategic issues, such as the development of joint missile early warning systems.

A joint statement issued following the Putin-Xi February 2022 meeting that took place just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrated increased overlap in the two sides’ security concerns. Both countries focused on the threat posed by the United States and NATO to international security in general and to their own countries in particular. Chinese officials have refused to criticize Russia’s invasion, generally blaming NATO and U.S. threats for causing the war.

Military-Technical Cooperation

Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation has varied over the decades since the end of the Cold War. After a period of extensive growth in Russian arms sales to China from 1991 to 2005, military-technical cooperation was fairly limited during the following decade because of a combination of growing Chinese self-sufficiency and Russian reluctance to share its most advanced technologies based on past Chinese reverse engineering practices. As with several other areas of military cooperation, Russian arms sales to China grew rapidly for a short time after Russia’s 2014 conflict with Ukraine. The expansion was driven in part by Russia’s willingness to break with precedent and sell China more advanced weapons systems. However, this growth has not been sustained in recent years, as China, guided by Xi’s growing emphasis on technological self-reliance, has continued to increase its self-sufficiency.

Even as arms sales have become a less significant aspect of the overall bilateral military cooperation relationship, joint technology projects have rapidly become increasingly important. The two sides have launched a variety of joint military production projects, including a heavy-lift helicopter, a new conventional submarine, enhanced cooperation on tactical missiles, and high-tech projects with potential military applications in spheres such as artificial intelligence and space systems. Most critically, Russian assistance in the development of a Chinese missile launch early warning system highlights the expansion of cooperation to strategic defense.

At the same time, when discussing purely military technology development, the partnership has remained somewhat one-sided, with little evidence of technology transfer from China to Russia. Russia has turned to China in its efforts to replace key Ukrainian and Western dual-use components, especially in areas such as optics and electronics, although these projects have been limited to some extent by sanctions. Some projects initiated after 2014, especially the purchase of Chinese marine engines, have been curtailed because Chinese equipment was found to be of insufficient quality. China has also to date refrained from overt efforts to help Russia avoid Western sanctions following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the shift from arms sales to joint projects with technology transfers suggests an increase in defense industry integration, with higher levels of mutual dependence and institutional coordination. Overall, Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation continues to operate at a high level, though there is potential for further growth if the two sides can overcome lingering concerns over issues such as reverse engineering, competition in global arms markets, reluctance to share sensitive technologies, and an enduring preference to maintain self-sufficiency in defense production.

Joint Exercises

Russia and China demonstrate a high level of cooperation in military exercises and joint operations. As with other aspects of their military cooperation, joint military exercises and operations underwent a rapid period of expansion in the mid-2010s, with increases in the frequency and global reach of joint activities and a transition to increasingly complex exercises designed to improve coordination.

Joint exercises have included efforts to integrate the use of each other’s military equipment and facilities, as well as the establishment of temporary joint command centers for the purpose of conducting specific exercises and operations. All of these activities have allowed both sides to increase trust and cooperation at the operational level. At the same time, working together with Russian forces that have experienced battlefield conditions in operations in Syria and Ukraine has helped the Chinese military to improve operationally by learning more advanced tactics and procedures, as part of its effort to compensate for its overall lack of operational experience. The exercise program has also provided symbolic benefits to both sides, allowing both China and Russia to demonstrate that they are working together against U.S. threats and efforts at “world domination.”

As with military-technical cooperation, the frequency and geography of military exercises expanded rapidly in the mid-2010s but has largely plateaued in the last three years. However, the exercises have continued to become more advanced during this period. The launch of joint air and naval patrols in 2019 and 2021, respectively, highlights an effort to move beyond exercises and into real-world operations. These patrols now occur regularly, with the sixth joint air patrol taking place earlier this month, though to date they differ little in practice from military exercises. The decrease in frequency and lack of geographic expansion of exercises since 2020 is primarily the result of constraints introduced first by the COVID-19 pandemic and later by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While the former no longer affects bilateral military activities, the latter may continue to act as a brake on the availability of Russian military assets for exercises with China.

Limits to Cooperation

Russia and China have demonstrated relatively few aspects of the advanced military cooperation practiced by the United States with its European and Asian allies, which generally occurs through the establishment of integrated military command centers, joint deployments, base sharing, and, at the highest levels, the formulation of a common defense policy. The episodic establishment of joint operation centers for specific exercises and the occasional use of each other’s military facilities remain the only cases of advanced military cooperation. Beyond that, Russia and China have not shown any indication of planning to establish permanently operating joint command structures. Apart from specific exercises, they have also generally not provided each other with access to host-nation logistics nodes, nor have they sought to negotiate agreements for basing military units or equipment on each other’s territory, either permanently or temporarily. Finally, neither side appears interested in discussing the formulation of a common defense policy at any level, even the lowest levels, such as commitments for joint fulfillment and supply. As a result, we assess that China and Russia have not reached an advanced level of defense cooperation, though they have taken some very preliminary initial steps in that direction. The table below summarizes the current state of Russian-Chinese military cooperation.

Implications

Russia and China derive significant advantages from their military cooperation. While the most significant benefits come in the form of mutual political support on the international stage, there are also clear benefits in terms of defense industrial production and improvements in operational capabilities, especially for the Chinese side. There is the political symbolism of Russia and China supporting each other in fighting against what they consider to be U.S. efforts to preserve its global hegemony. To this end, joint statements by senior leaders, such as the February 2022 announcement of a “friendship without limits” by Putin and Xi, highlight that the two countries have similar strategic positions on global issues. Although their March 2023 joint statement more clearly specified that their partnership fell short of a military alliance, the two leaders claimed to have forged a “superior” relationship that would withstand the test of time.

Concrete actions such as arms deals and major joint exercises have a strong symbolic component, showing that the two countries are working together to address global challenges and to strengthen each other’s positions in the world. These symbolic benefits are particularly important for Russia as it seeks to counter the perception that it is isolated internationally as a result of its invasion of Ukraine. After Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu met with Putin in April 2023, for example, he hailed the Russian leader’s contribution to world peace. Russia highlights the willingness of Chinese leaders to meet with Russian leaders at the highest levels, and the statements of support that are regularly issued after such meetings, as a sign that Western efforts to isolate it are failing.

On the other hand, there is a clear sense that China gains more from the defense relationship than Russia does in terms of the material benefits of military cooperation. The People’s Liberation Army has long used military exercises to learn from its Russian counterparts and to improve operationally. China could also gain strategically from potential access to Russian military facilities in the Far East, though there is little indication that Russia is willing to grant such access in the foreseeable future. The Russian military, which sees itself as more advanced in operational knowledge than its Chinese counterpart, has gained less in practical terms. At the same time, Russia’s performance over the last year in its war with Ukraine may introduce some doubts among Chinese military leaders about the quality of the Russian military, which may in turn affect the perceived utility of what the People’s Liberation Army may be able to learn from joint exercises and operations. While it is far too early to see evidence of such a shift in Chinese perceptions, it is a possibility that observers should consider going forward.

For many years, China has leaned heavily on Russian weapons exporters to help facilitate its military modernization. This assistance has been particularly critical because for most of the post-Cold War era, its defense industry lagged far behind its Russian counterpart and China was not able to purchase weapons from the West to catch up. Moreover, by assisting China principally in the maritime and aerospace domains, Russia has supplied weapons that pose a comparatively smaller threat to Russia and a comparatively larger threat to the United States. That said, Chinese dependence on Russian arms supplies is clearly waning as its defense industry becomes increasingly self-sufficient. Most of the armaments that China has in the past bought from Russia can now be produced domestically, with aircraft engines being the one major exception. On the other hand, the enactment of comprehensive Western sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of its invasion of Ukraine has increased Russian dependence on Chinese components such as electronics and on Chinese machine tools. For the most part, China has been very careful to avoid providing any equipment to Russia that might violate Western sanctions, although the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on a few Chinese companies that provided military aid and U.S. officials caution that the Chinese leadership has not fully rejected the prospect of such assistance in the future.

Although the overall rapid expansion of Russian-Chinese military cooperation in terms of military-technical cooperation and joint exercises that was clearly in evidence in 2014–2019 has not been as evident in the last three years, the continued frequency of security consultations and the issuance of statements reaffirming close military ties during the 2020–2022 period suggests that this lull is most likely the product of external circumstances rather than a change in the willingness of either party to continue to pursue the development of an ever-closer military relationship. If this is the case, then it is these circumstances — including Western sanctions and resource constraints faced by the Russian military as a result of its invasion of Ukraine — that will determine whether there is a renewed push to further expand the military relationship in the coming years.

In determining the trajectory of the relationship over the next three to five years, analysts should focus on the extent to which China is supplying Russia with military and dual-use technologies and how much real assistance Russia is providing to China through joint projects such as the early warning system and advanced heavy-lift helicopters. In the joint exercises and operations sphere, observers should examine whether or not China and Russia are conducting military exercises that are provocative to third-party states, such as in the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom (GIUK) gap or near U.S. territory in the Pacific, or if either undertakes missions that are primarily of importance to the other, such as joint naval activities in disputed areas of the South China Sea, near Taiwan, or in the Mediterranean or Baltic Seas. In addition, any indication that either side is willing to grant the other long-term access to its military facilities would be a sign of an appreciable advance in military cooperation and mutual trust. These actions would indicate that the two countries are potentially on the path to a deeper level of military cooperation that might create serious threats to U.S. allies and partners and greatly increase the challenge facing U.S. military planners. Evidence that Russia and China are engaging in this type of cooperation will be more significant than further ritual statements about unlimited friendship made at summit meetings.

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Dmitry Gorenburg is a senior research scientist in the Strategic Studies division of CNA, a not-for-profit research and analysis organization, where he has worked since 2000. He is the editor of the journals Problems of Post-Communism and Russian Politics and Law and an associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies.

Elizabeth Wishnick is an expert on Sino-Russian relations, Chinese foreign policy, and Arctic strategy in the China Studies Program at CNA. She is also a senior research scholar at Columbia’s Weatherhead East Asian Institute and a professor at Montclair State University. She is the author of China’s Risk: Oil, Water, Food and Regional Security (forthcoming) and Mending Fences: Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin. Her policy blog is at www.chinasresourcerisks.com.

Paul Schwartz is a research scientist in CNA’s Russia Studies Program, and conducts research and analysis on Russia’s military and its defense and security policy for the U.S. military and the intelligence community. He is also a non-resident senior associate in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Brian Waidelich is a research scientist in the Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Program at CNA. His research focuses on Chinese People’s Liberation Army organization and Indo-Pacific maritime and space security issues.

Image: The Kremlin

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Dmitry Gorenburg · June 26, 2023

17. US to make India into naval logistics hub for Indo-Pac region

US to make India into naval logistics hub for Indo-Pac region

The building up of Indian ship repair capability would serve to bolster allied forces operating in the Indo-Pacific region.

By Richard Thomas

naval-technology.com · by Richard Thomas · June 23, 2023

Richard Thomas

The US Navy often conducts port visits to India, with USS Shoup seen here in Chennai in 2017. Credit: US Navy/Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Maria I Alvarez

The US is seeking to assist India in developing its naval and maritime infrastructure to create an Indo-Pacific regional hub for ship repair and maintenance, following the creation of the India-US Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X) earlier this week.

Launched on 21 June against the backdrop India Prime Minister Modi’s state visit to the US, the US Department of Defense (DoD) stated that INDUS-X would serve to “vitalise” defence industrial cooperation between the two countries.

Speaking to reporters during a 22 June DoD briefing, a spokesperson stated that the strengthening defence ties between the US and India was part of a “wide-ranging strategic partnership” in which military and security cooperation would become “central to our strategic relationship”.

One aspect of this would be the creation of naval ship repair and maintenance hubs in India, which would be able to be used by US and other allies.

“[The] aim here is to make India a logistics hub for US and other partners in the Indo-Pacific region,” the DoD spokesperson said.

Adding another element to US regional support network

Far from being short of maintenance facilities in the region, the US Navy can call up on a number of allies and partners in the Indian Ocean and Pacific for ship repair and maintenance.

In the Indian Ocean region, the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, based at the US Navy Support Activity at Mina Salman in Bahrain, can utilise sites in the Kingdom or its Gulf neighbours for ship maintenance and repair. US Navy warships have previously used Jebel Ali in the UAE for mid-deployment voyage repairs.

Nearby Oman has also invested heavily in maritime drydock facilities at Duqm, on the Indian Ocean coast, which is able to accommodate commercial tankers far larger than the biggest US Navy warships, the Gerald Ford-class aircraft carriers.

The UK currently operates a land and naval domain logistics hub at Duqm drydock and has utilised the site’s facilities to conduct ship repairs and maintenance. In 2021 the forward deployed Royal Navy Type 23 frigate HMS Montrose completed an overhaul at the site.

In the Pacific region, the US Seventh Fleet, based at Yokosuka, Japan, can utilise local ship repair and maintenance facilities.

Elsewhere, the US Navy forward deploys four Littoral Combat Ships at Changi Naval Base in Singapore, where it also operates naval facilities to support its maritime assets.

In 2023, the US Navy also returned to Subic Bay in the Philippines after a multi-year hiatus following diplomatic issues between the US Government and its one-time colony.

Given this extensive network of naval maintenance and support facilities in the Indo-Pacific region, the addition of India will serve to bring additional capacity to US and allied maritime efforts, while also denying China from gaining its own footholds in the strategically located country.

Indeed, China’s own naval presence at Djibouti on the Horn of Africa, Gwadar in Pakistan, and Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, which in 2017 fell into China’s hand with the award of a 99-year lease following Colombo’s failure to repay Chinese loans, is likely a key influence in US efforts to secure access to Indian naval infrastructure.

naval-technology.com · by Richard Thomas · June 23, 2023

18. Security meltdown avoided in Moscow, but blowback from insurrection looms

Excerpts:

Mr. Putin, a notoriously clever but unforgivingly authoritarian leader, is scrambling to control the volatile Russian security establishment after 16 months of a war that has taken a deadly toll and badly damaged his image as a powerful head of state.

It was not immediately clear Sunday whether the rebellion represented the beginning of the end of Mr. Putin’s more than two-decade hold on power.

Some analysts warned that the Russian leader would attempt to seize the moment to engage in a full-throttle — if only chaotic — purge of the security establishment and sharpen an already aggressive crackdown on dissent in Russia.

...

Philip Wasielewski, who heads the institute’s Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare, said, “Prigozhin has lost his mercenary force, his fortune, and possibly his life in the indeterminate future.”

At the same time, Russia’s war in Ukraine “has lost one of its few motivated and capable fighting forces at a time such forces are desperately needed at the front,” Mr. Wasielewski said.

“Putin may appear to be in a more favorable position now that he has put down a threat to his rule.”

Security meltdown avoided in Moscow, but blowback from insurrection looms

Blinken says Wagner uprising exposed 'real cracks' in Putin regime

By Guy Taylor and Ben Wolfgang - The Washington Times - Sunday, June 25, 2023

washingtontimes.com · by Guy Taylor

By and Ben Wolfgang - The Washington Times - Sunday, June 25, 2023

Blowback from a powerful Russian mercenary group’s insurrection against the Kremlin swirled in Moscow on Sunday, laying bare the depths of an internal crisis facing President Vladimir Putin and fueling speculation that the war in Ukraine will eventually lead to his downfall.

The short-lived but intense mutiny by Wagner Group commander Yevgeny Prigozhin was the most severe challenge to Russia’s power structure since the messy aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse more than three decades ago. U.S. officials say the rebellion will likely reverberate in unpredictable ways for weeks.

Although the Wagner forces’ march toward Moscow on Saturday ended without a full-blown security meltdown, questions mounted Sunday over a deal struck between Mr. Putin and Mr. Prigozhin, a onetime protege of the Russian leader. Uncertainty grew over the future role of the paramilitary group, which the Kremlin has used as a backbone of its war in Ukraine.

Mr. Putin, a notoriously clever but unforgivingly authoritarian leader, is scrambling to control the volatile Russian security establishment after 16 months of a war that has taken a deadly toll and badly damaged his image as a powerful head of state.

It was not immediately clear Sunday whether the rebellion represented the beginning of the end of Mr. Putin’s more than two-decade hold on power.

Some analysts warned that the Russian leader would attempt to seize the moment to engage in a full-throttle — if only chaotic — purge of the security establishment and sharpen an already aggressive crackdown on dissent in Russia.

“We haven’t seen the last act …,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Sunday. “We’re in the midst of a moving picture.”

Washington is prepared “for every contingency in terms of what happens in Russia,” Mr. Blinken told CBS’s “Face the Nation.” When dealing with “a major power that has nuclear weapons, he said, that’s something that’s of concern, something we’re very focused on.”

“We haven’t seen any change in Russia’s nuclear posture,” the secretary of state said. “There hasn’t been any change in ours, but it’s something we’re going to watch very, very carefully.”

His comments underscored the uneasy international wariness since Mr. Prigozhin declared an armed rebellion against the Putin government on Friday.

The mercenary leader, with 25,000 private Russian soldiers under his command, initially said the rebellion was aimed at ousting Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the General Staff. In a video, Mr. Prigozhin accused the two of disastrous mishandling of the Ukraine invasion. He also openly questioned Mr. Putin’s rationale for the war.

By dawn Saturday, Wagner fighters had seized control of Russia’s southern military headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, a command facility that oversees all Russian military forces operating inside Ukraine. Then began a shocking and largely unhindered advance toward Moscow, where the Kremlin braced for a clash by erecting checkpoints with armored vehicles and Russian military troops on the city’s southern edge.

By Saturday afternoon, roughly 3,000 Chechen soldiers were hastily pulled from Ukraine and rushed to the Russian capital, according to state television reports in Chechnya. Work crews were reported to have quickly dug up sections of highways leading into the capital to slow the Wagner march.

The specter of chaos reverberated across global news outlets. Russian media reported that Wagner forces had downed several Russian military helicopters and a military communications plane. A handful of international outlets published unconfirmed reports that Mr. Putin had secretly fled Moscow.

A crisis was suddenly averted when Mr. Prigozhin declared that he was turning around his troops upon reaching a deal with Mr. Putin. A Kremlin spokesman confirmed the deal, saying charges against Mr. Prigozhin for mounting the rebellion would be dropped and the Wagner chief would leave Russia and go to neighboring Belarus.

By Sunday afternoon, the mercenary forces had pulled back from public view. Russian military forces had also withdrawn from Moscow, and reports said civilians were swarming into the streets and flocking to cafes.

‘Cracks’ in Putin’s armor

Mr. Blinken called the insurrection “a direct challenge to Putin’s authority” and referenced Wagner’s role for Russia in Ukraine. The mercenaries have been active in the conflict’s bloodiest and longest battles for months.

“It shows real cracks,” the secretary of state told CBS.

He said divisions emerging in the Russian military and security establishment beneath Mr. Putin is “an unfolding story.”

“But just step back for a second and put this in context,” he said. “Sixteen months ago, Russian forces were on the doorstep of Kyiv in Ukraine, thinking they’d take the city in a matter of days, thinking they would erase Ukraine from the map as an independent country. Now over this weekend, they’ve had to defend Moscow, Russia’s capital, against mercenaries of Putin’s own making.”

Mr. Prigozhin has “raised profound questions about the very premises for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the first place, saying that Ukraine or NATO did not pose a threat to Russia, which is part of Putin’s narrative,” Mr. Blinken said.

Mr. Prigozhin, 62, a former convict, has long-standing ties to Mr. Putin and has won lucrative Kremlin contracts that earned him the nickname “Putin’s chef.” In the past decade, Wagner forces have been dispatched to hot spots around the world, including Libya, Syria and several African countries, as well as Ukraine.

Regional sources said Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko negotiated the Kremlin’s sudden amnesty offer to Mr. Prigozhin. Mr. Lukashenko might have intervened to raise his stature with the Russian president.

In anticipation of a potentially disastrous security meltdown in nuclear-armed Russia, NATO braced through the weekend.

The White House said President Biden discussed the developments with the leaders of Germany, France and Britain on Saturday. Mr. Biden did not speak publicly about the developments.

China’s reaction was notably muted. The Communist Party-ruled government in Beijing, which has drawn increasingly close to Mr. Putin during the Ukraine war, offered only limited public comment.

Russian officials said China privately offered support in the face of insurrection.

“The Chinese side expressed support for the efforts of the leadership of the Russian Federation to stabilize the situation … and confirmed its interest in strengthening the cohesion and further prosperity of Russia,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said after Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko held talks with Chinese officials in Beijing.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry initially said only that Mr. Rudenko had exchanged views with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang on Chinese-Russian relations, according to Reuters, which reported that the ministry later said it supports Moscow in maintaining its national stability.

Western media devoted feverish coverage, but the English-language versions of China Daily and People’s Daily — two of the Chinese Communist Party’s primary news operations — carried hardly any mention of the developments.

China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency followed Russian state media reports and summarized the friction between Mr. Putin and Mr. Prigozhin.

China has attempted to portray itself as neutral in the Ukraine war but has dramatically increased its economic coordination with Russia, including by purchasing Russian oil and gas sanctioned by the U.S. and the European Union.

Almost a coup

Officials in Ukraine hope the Russian infighting will create opportunities for an ongoing military counteroffensive to take back territory seized by Kremlin forces.

“These events will have been of great comfort to the Ukrainian government and the military,” said Ben Barry, senior fellow for land warfare at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Ariel Cohen, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, said: “The Wagner rebellion is the most serious challenge to the Russian state’s foundations since 1993, when the Supreme Soviet rebelled against Boris Yeltsin, who brought in tanks to suppress the attempted coup.”

“Prigozhin has demonstrated just how weak the Putin regime is,” Mr. Cohen wrote in an analysis published by the think tank. Briefly on Saturday, he said, “it appeared that Putin had left Moscow and Prigozhin might enter the city and finish off a coup despite the lack of outright support from any representatives of the Russian ruling circles.”

“Many Russian leaders, including the powerful Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev refrained from criticizing Prigozhin, suggesting that he may have at least some support at the highest echelons of power,” Mr. Cohen wrote.

Andras Toth-Czifra, a fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, said it “is difficult to imagine a stable equilibrium [in Moscow] after today, even with the agreement that will theoretically see Prigozhin go into exile and Wagner tamed.”

“A lot of taboos in Russian politics have been broken,” Mr. Toth-Czifra said in comments circulated to journalists. “Putin’s own image as a firm hand has taken a hit. It is difficult to see how this toothpaste will now go back into the tube.”

Philip Wasielewski, who heads the institute’s Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare, said, “Prigozhin has lost his mercenary force, his fortune, and possibly his life in the indeterminate future.”

At the same time, Russia’s war in Ukraine “has lost one of its few motivated and capable fighting forces at a time such forces are desperately needed at the front,” Mr. Wasielewski said.

“Putin may appear to be in a more favorable position now that he has put down a threat to his rule.”

• This article is based in part on wire service reports.

• Guy Taylor can be reached at gtaylor@washingtontimes.com.

• Ben Wolfgang can be reached at bwolfgang@washingtontimes.com.

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washingtontimes.com · by Guy Taylor

19. Don’t Count the Dictators Out

Note that this was published before the insurrection in Russia (and written long before that).

Excerpts:

Confronting revolutionary governments is complicated. Hard-line strategies from regime opponents in the West often reinforce cohesion and provide autocracies with convenient scapegoats. Indeed, decades of sanctions against Cuba have arguably helped solidify and legitimize the regime founded in 1959 by Fidel Castro. Furthermore, open confrontation with a country as economically and politically powerful as China is untenable.

Yet the West is far from powerless. Although increasingly severe economic sanctions imposed on Iran since the early 2010s have not caused the regime to collapse, they have nonetheless weakened it by fueling an economic crisis, which has led to popular dissatisfaction and repeated protests over the last decade. In Russia, unprecedented sanctions have so far failed to destabilize Putin’s regime, but they have isolated him internationally, reduced Russian growth, and possibly decreased the country’s capacity to wage war in Ukraine.

Putin’s actions in Ukraine starkly illustrate the dangers of failing to confront powers that challenge international liberal norms. A desire to avoid conflict led Germany and other Western powers to accommodate Russia’s perceived geopolitical interests and pursue engagement even after Russia invaded and illegally annexed Crimea in 2014. Yet such efforts did nothing to curb Russia’s regional ambitions, and the relatively mild Western response almost certainly encouraged Putin to invade the rest of Ukraine in 2022. Today, all but a few European countries recognize the need to challenge Russia head-on.

Revolutionary autocrats and their successors present one of today’s most intractable challenges to international order. Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine despite Russia’s close ties to Europe demonstrates that economic linkage and common material interests are not sufficient to preserve the liberal world order. Democracies must instead unite and mount a defense of democratic values—providing military support for democracies under attack, as well as diplomatic and material assistance for those opposing dictatorship. Although these efforts will not topple revolutionary dictatorships in the short term, a more proactive and coordinated resistance to autocracy will better equip the West to contain and perhaps even defeat them in the long term.

Don’t Count the Dictators Out

The Underappreciated Resilience of Today’s Autocracies

By Lucan Ahmad Way

July/August 2023

Published on June 20, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism · June 20, 2023

Two thousand twenty-two was not a good year for the world’s leading autocracies. In November, Chinese President Xi Jinping confronted the largest antigovernment demonstrations since the Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989. Provoked by Beijing’s stringent “zero COVID” policies, protesters across the country made overtly political demands, calling for Xi’s resignation and an end to one-man rule. These protests erupted just when the Chinese economy was experiencing its lowest growth rate since 1976. The government responded by suddenly abandoning its zero-COVID program—a signature Xi policy—and letting the virus spread rapidly through the population. The reversal, and the estimated one million deaths that followed it, further eroded public trust in the regime.

Iran confronted even greater challenges. In September, the death of a young woman named Mahsa Amini while in police custody for “improperly” wearing her hijab sparked months of nationwide protests that targeted the heart of the regime’s revolutionary identity. Thousands of protesters in more than 100 cities called for the death of the country’s aging supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and an end to the Islamic Republic itself. At the end of the year, opposition activists organized a three-day general strike that nearly shut down the country—actions reminiscent of those that preceded the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979. Although the protests have since died down, large numbers of Iranian women continue to refuse to wear the hijab.

Russian President Vladimir Putin had perhaps the worst year of all. His invasion of Ukraine has been an utter disaster. The Russian army has been forced to abandon efforts to take Kyiv and has retreated from positions it gained earlier in eastern and southern Ukraine. The war has triggered unprecedented Western sanctions, resulted in roughly 200,000 Russian casualties—far larger than the number killed and wounded during Russia’s decadelong occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s—and caused hundreds of thousands of citizens to flee the country. Russia’s geopolitical influence is in dramatic decline. Almost overnight, Europe cut its dependence on Russian energy supplies, and Moscow has been forced to abandon efforts to influence neighboring countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

After more than a decade in which, as the journalist Anne Applebaum observed, “the bad guys” were winning, the world now seems to be turning against autocracy. Three of the biggest bad guys appear to face unprecedented challenges to their power, giving democracy the edge in the global contest with autocracy for the first time in years. But the threats to autocratic power are less significant than many hope: these three dictatorships, in particular, have hidden sources of resilience, rooted deep in their revolutionary pasts. Revolutionary origins—and in the case of Russia, the surviving legacies of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917—have helped all three governments survive economic downturns, policy disasters, and sharp drops in popularity and will likely continue to strengthen them for a long time to come. Any effective strategy for countering them requires an understanding of their true nature and unique sources of resilience.

MORE ENEMIES, MORE UNITY

Today’s most durable autocracies were born of social revolutions, which—in contrast to conventional power grabs—occur when activists backed by mass mobilization seize control and try to remake the state in order to radically transform the way people live, such as by eliminating private property or imposing religious rule. Although such revolutions have been extraordinarily rare—just 20 since 1900—the revolutionary autocracies they produced have had an enormous influence on world politics: the Cold War, the Vietnam War, Islamist terrorism, and the rise of China were all fueled by revolutionary autocracies. Today, such governments and their successors—a list that includes not just China, Iran, and Russia but also Afghanistan, Cuba, Eritrea, Rwanda, and Vietnam—present some of the most serious challenges to the U.S.-led liberal world order.

These regimes tend to be far more durable than their nonrevolutionary counterparts. Such durability results from the distinctive way they consolidate power. In contrast to many autocrats, who seek to broaden popular support and cultivate international legitimacy when they come to power, leaders of revolutionary regimes alienate large swaths of their countries’ populations and antagonize neighboring countries and world powers. The Bolsheviks sought to export communist revolutions to the rest of Europe and Asia, tried to eliminate the bourgeoisie as a class, terrorized aristocrats, seized their property, and turned over their mansions to former servants. In 1917, about 50 upper-class Russian military cadets were tied up, brought to a factory, and flung into a blast furnace. Similarly, during his struggle for power in China, Mao Zedong famously declared that “a revolution is not a dinner party” and encouraged peasants to humiliate and destroy the old landowning class. In Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini imposed strict rules on female dress, supported the seizure of American hostages, executed thousands of his opponents, and called for an Islamist revolution throughout the Persian Gulf.

At first glance, such behavior seems irrational. Attacks on powerful interests almost always cause violent conflicts that can destroy nascent revolutionary regimes. In China and Russia, such attacks helped precipitate deadly civil wars; in Iran and Vietnam, they resulted in bloody external wars. In some states, as in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge in the late 1970s, such conflicts wiped out the revolutionary regimes that started them. But what didn’t kill these regimes made them stronger. For those able to survive, ferocious struggles for power made them uniquely durable. Persistent existential threats united the regimes’ elites. Furthermore, violent conflict wiped out alternative centers of power—including other political parties and churches—ensuring weak opposition for years to come.

These early conflicts also forced the regimes to build new and powerful security forces, such as Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and Russia’s Cheka (later called the KGB), that suppressed all opposition. And since revolutionary governments created their own armed forces rather than inheriting an existing army, they could fill the military with pro-regime spies and officers, which made it much harder for soldiers and their superiors to carry out coups. Finally, because civil wars often destroyed existing economic structures, they created opportunities for authoritarian governments to penetrate deep into the economy—allowing autocrats to promote economic development without falling victim to the strong independent forces that have fostered democracy in other countries.

CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO SECURITY

From one perspective, the roots of authoritarian resilience in China might seem obvious. China is a global military and economic power with a GDP more than 43 times as large as it was in 1978. Within a generation, Chinese living standards have risen dramatically, giving families access to consumer goods they could not have imagined just a few decades ago. Even with recent COVID-19 missteps and slower growth, many Chinese citizens have clear reasons to support the one-party state.

Yet such remarkable economic achievements provide an incomplete explanation for the regime’s durability. For one thing, China’s extraordinary economic performance was only possible because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had earlier managed to unify the country. In the first half of the twentieth century, China had a weak, fragmented state akin to contemporary Afghanistan. The central government barely touched most of its territory, and large sections of the country were under the sway of competing warlords, imperial powers, criminal gangs, and secret societies. Before it could become an economic and military powerhouse, China first had to create a modern, unified state.

Second, the kind of spectacular economic development witnessed in China can be a double-edged sword for dictators trying to maintain a tight authoritarian grip. Rapid economic growth increases support for the government but can also sow the seeds of democracy. Economic development frequently threatens dictators by fostering the rise of independent sources of commercial, social, and political power that make it harder for leaders to monopolize control. Today, there are virtually no dictatorships in wealthy, developed countries. Setting aside Middle Eastern countries that draw incomes from natural resources—which generate fabulous wealth without the social changes associated with economic development—all but three of 54 countries the World Bank classifies as “high income” were ranked “free” by Freedom House in 2022. (The three outliers are Hungary, a competitive authoritarian regime, and the tiny states of Brunei and Singapore.)

Portraits of Xi and Mao, Shanghai, August 2022

Aly Song / Reuters

This pattern would seem to spell trouble for the leadership of the CCP. By bringing millions out of poverty and creating a large middle class and influential business leaders, economic development in China has the potential to generate alternative centers of power that can fuel strong demands for political change. Indeed, economic development drove democratic transitions in nearby South Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s. Observers have long predicted that economic expansion in China would similarly lead to democracy.

But the Chinese regime’s origins in violent social revolution have allowed it to overcome a history of state failure, as well as the unintended consequences of economic change. The CCP’s long and violent struggle for power between 1927 and 1949 produced the unified state necessary for rapid growth but also ensured that economic development would not generate a strong civil society. When Mao became the leader of the CCP, his insistence on combining a struggle for power with radical social change meant that during the civil war and shortly after its end, the party carried out large-scale land reform that wiped out entrenched elites and local groups that had weakened the Chinese state for so long. These measures, and the devastation of war, permitted the CCP to penetrate parts of society that had rarely been subject to direct state control before. Although China would undergo traumatic upheaval at the hands of Mao for several decades after 1949, the unification and strengthening of the Chinese state during the revolutionary struggle created the conditions for China’s eventual rise as a global economic power beginning in the 1990s.

Moreover, China’s transition to communism obliterated alternatives to the ruling party and cleared the way for totalitarian rule. The party now infiltrates every nook and cranny of Chinese society, including both foreign and domestic businesses. The pervasive presence of pro-government institutions has made it very difficult for independent forces to organize. Partly as a result, economic growth has failed to strengthen independent democratic forces the way it did in South Korea and Taiwan. Despite its wealth, China has one of the weakest civil societies in the world. Thus, in the rare instances when protests have emerged—as in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the anti-zero-COVID protests in November 2022—such efforts have been hampered by disorganization and lack of coordination. Although no authoritarian regime is invincible, China remains perhaps the most durable autocracy on the globe and can withstand strong popular discontent and economic turbulence.

TENACITY AND TURMOIL

Iran’s revolutionary leaders went to war against the world after they seized power in 1979. They immediately imposed clerical rule and nearly plunged the country into a civil war against anticlerical leftist insurgents. This instability encouraged Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to invade, leading to the brutal eight-year Iran-Iraq war. Meanwhile, the government demonized both the United States and the Soviet Union and became a major sponsor of terrorism in the region. These struggles ultimately strengthened the regime. Above all, the fights against Iraq and leftist insurgents transformed Khomeini’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), founded in 1979, from a ragtag group of ill-trained and ill-equipped street fighters into one of the most powerful security forces in the world, with about 150,000 troops that blanket the country. These conflicts also strengthened the Basij, a militia created in 1979 to defend the revolution against internal and external enemies. Members of the security forces have mainly been recruited from poor, highly religious families in the countryside. Like zealots of any religion, many believe their cause is worth any kind of sacrifice and violence.

Revolutionary ideology is not the only glue holding the Iranian regime together. As many analysts have pointed out, the IRGC is corrupt and has an enormous economic stake in the survival of the Islamic Republic. But material incentives are often not enough. In many other autocracies, members of security forces who have had a stake in the survival of the existing regime have nonetheless defected to avoid being on the losing side when the regime came under pressure. During the Arab Spring in 2011, for example, the Egyptian military deserted President Hosni Mubarak, causing him to fall from power. Security forces in Serbia similarly turned on President Slobodan Milosevic in 2000, when mass protests called for his ouster. By contrast, when the clerical regime in Iran has encountered far-reaching challenges, the IRGC and other state actors have stood behind it.

And things have gotten very tough for Iran’s leaders over the past decade. The regime has confronted repeated nationwide protests. In 2009, after incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hard-liner, appeared to steal the presidential election from the reformist challenger Mir Hussein Mousavi, hundreds of thousands of Iranians took to the streets and protested for months. Then, in the 2010s, increasingly severe international sanctions caused runaway inflation and skyrocketing poverty. Such conditions provoked repeated waves of protests across the country. In late 2019, protesters denounced Khamenei and set fire to numerous government sites, banks, gas stations, and security bases. And the huge demonstrations in the fall of 2022 gave expression to an even wider variety of grievances against the regime, including dissatisfaction over the economy, outrage over Islamic policies, and the regime’s use of violence.

Marching in front of portraits of Khomeini and Khamenei, Tehran, February 2016

Raheb Homavandi / Reuters

Yet the government has responded to each of these popular threats with the same brutality and intransigence. In 2009, the government answered protests by imprisoning and executing dissidents and holding a series of high-profile show trials of opposition activists. In 2019, police shot and killed protesters on the street. And in 2022, the Basij and the IRGC once again acted as the regime’s main line of defense, killing protesters and minors, invading schools, and making thousands of arrests.

The Iranian case illustrates the critical importance of unity at the top to authoritarian survival. Historically, dictators’ greatest threats have come not from mass protests but from political allies and subordinates in their own militaries. Unlike opposition activists, such insiders have the coercive muscle and the control over key state institutions that are needed to seize power. Given the mismatch in power between most governments and protesters, it is virtually impossible for challengers to succeed if there are no high-level defections from within the government. Indeed, successful opposition in autocracies has frequently been led by politicians who deserted the regime. In numerous countries—including Romania in 1989, Kenya in 2002, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005—dictators fell in part because their allies abandoned the ruling party en masse to join the opposition. For example, Zambia’s dictatorship disintegrated in 1991 when massive protests and economic collapse moved key government supporters to abandon the regime. As one defector explained, “Only a stupid fly . . . follows a dead body to the grave.”

Iran’s governing elite, however, has remained steadfast during similarly far-reaching economic crises and other pressures. Even reformers—insider politicians with more moderate positions on some social and political issues—have resisted breaking from the regime. At one time, opponents of clerical rule looked hopefully to figures such as Mohammad Khatami, who served as president from 1997 to 2005, and Mousavi in 2009, but these leaders refused to make a full break with the theocratic system. Indeed, a week after protests broke out in 2009, Mousavi called for a halt to demonstrations and urged supporters to remain loyal to the Islamic Republic. Such loyalty to clerical rule has helped deprive the opposition of the organization and leadership it needs to channel the country’s immense popular discontent into a more serious challenge to the regime. Thus, the recent protests were largely leaderless. Although repeated protests, popular discontent, and economic crisis clearly make the regime vulnerable, the government is unlikely to fall without cracks at the top.

PUTIN’S HIDDEN INHERITANCE

Unlike communist China and Islamist Iran, Putin’s Russia is not a revolutionary regime. The Soviet Union collapsed long ago, and Putin came to power via an election rather than by violent struggle. But Putin’s autocracy has benefited immeasurably from the legacies of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. First, the long era of Soviet totalitarian rule effectively prevented a strong civil society from taking hold. The state that emerged from the revolution wiped out or infiltrated even the most rudimentary forms of civil society, including opposition parties, trade unions, churches, and other organizations outside the reach of the state that could have provided a foundation for democracy. Although independent economic and social forces began to emerge in the late 1980s and 1990s, they remained relatively weak, partly because the most profitable sectors of the economy continued to be vulnerable to state interference. As a result, Russia’s opposition has lacked both organization and potential sources of financing.

Second, Putin’s control of Russia has been bolstered by an extensive and effective security service that can be traced directly to the political police created in 1917. It became the most powerful security force in the world, with agents in virtually every apartment block and every enterprise. Although Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev dismantled the ruling apparatus of the Communist Party, he left the KGB—where Putin began his career—largely untouched. The KGB was formally abolished in the 1990s and divided into several agencies, but its core functions and personnel were retained in what became the FSB (Federal Security Service). Today, the FSB is a bulwark of Putin’s autocracy. Far larger than such organizations in many other countries and backed by millions of informers, the FSB penetrates substantial portions of Russian media, business, and civil society. According to the scholar Kevin Riehle, in a recent study of Russian intelligence, Russia now has more security personnel per capita than it did under Soviet rule. The FSB has targeted major anti-regime leaders such as Boris Nemtsov, who was brazenly assassinated in Moscow in 2015, and more recently, Vladimir Kara-Murza and Alexei Navalny, both of whom have been imprisoned. Organized opposition is now very weak in Russia. Independent forces, weakened by 70 years of Soviet totalitarian rule, have been no match for Putin’s massive security apparatus.

Russia’s revolutionary legacy has also benefited Putin by reducing the likelihood of a military rebellion, even amid such a disastrous campaign as the war in Ukraine. Defeat on the battlefield, especially when it can be blamed on poor decisions by a country’s leader, has often sparked military coups. Indeed, Russia’s humiliation in the first months of its war led many to suggest that Putin might be overthrown by his armed forces. But as the political scientist Adam Casey has pointed out, Putin’s regime has retained the Soviet practice of infiltrating the military with counterintelligence officers. This a difficult feat in most autocracies, which tend to inherit rather than create their own militaries. But the Soviets had no such hurdle, and the revolutionary legacy has given Putin the capacity to identify potential military opposition, making it much harder for the armed forces to challenge him.

NO REVOLUTION IS FOREVER

Of course, even the most powerful revolutionary autocracies do not last forever, and China, Iran, and Russia are not invincible. The regimes in Tehran and Moscow are more vulnerable than the one in Beijing. Until now, the Iranian regime has remained cohesive despite economic crisis and popular unrest, but that does not mean it can do so indefinitely. If the economy continues to worsen and dissatisfaction grows, cracks may eventually begin to form within the regime. The potential for splits will likely increase in the medium term as the original, fanatical generation of revolutionaries who came of age during the struggle for power dies off. As in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, the younger officials who replace them may be less ideological and therefore more likely to defect in times of crisis. Furthermore, Khamenei, who is in ill health and 84 years old, has not named a successor. It is possible—albeit unlikely, given the strength of hard-line forces—that his death might catalyze divisions within the regime.

The Russian government’s vulnerability comes from the regime’s concentration of power in one man’s hands. Today, Putin rules largely unconstrained by other institutions or actors. His regime was not built on the kind of ideology that in revolutionary Iran has motivated intense loyalty and sacrifice, nor on an established ruling party such as the one in China, which would provide a source of durability beyond a single leader. Because everything depends on Putin, his eventual death or incapacity may throw the regime into disarray. It is anybody’s guess who might succeed him. Such uncertainty is common in personalist regimes. At the same time, given the balance of forces between state and society, it is unlikely that such a transition will result in democracy, at least in the near term.

The Chinese regime remains stronger than its Iranian and Russian counterparts. China’s economy is obviously in much better shape than Iran’s. And although Xi’s power is less constrained than that of his recent predecessors, his rule is far less personalized than Putin’s. Xi’s regime remains grounded in a strong and institutionalized party-state bureaucracy that has no equivalent in Russia. Certainly, China is not without its problems. In addition to low economic growth and ill-considered COVID policies, extensive corruption has in recent years led some observers to argue that the CCP is “atrophying,” “fragile,” and in a period of “late-stage decay.” Xi’s intense anticorruption campaign over the last decade has seemingly reduced, but by no means eliminated, government malfeasance. Regardless, the regime’s powerful bureaucracy, extraordinary repressive capacity, and weak civil society will likely insulate the government from future corruption scandals or other crises.

Confronting revolutionary governments is complicated. Hard-line strategies from regime opponents in the West often reinforce cohesion and provide autocracies with convenient scapegoats. Indeed, decades of sanctions against Cuba have arguably helped solidify and legitimize the regime founded in 1959 by Fidel Castro. Furthermore, open confrontation with a country as economically and politically powerful as China is untenable.

Putin inspecting a flag, Ivanovo, Russia, March 2020

Aleksey Nikolskyi / Sputnik / Reuters

Yet the West is far from powerless. Although increasingly severe economic sanctions imposed on Iran since the early 2010s have not caused the regime to collapse, they have nonetheless weakened it by fueling an economic crisis, which has led to popular dissatisfaction and repeated protests over the last decade. In Russia, unprecedented sanctions have so far failed to destabilize Putin’s regime, but they have isolated him internationally, reduced Russian growth, and possibly decreased the country’s capacity to wage war in Ukraine.

Putin’s actions in Ukraine starkly illustrate the dangers of failing to confront powers that challenge international liberal norms. A desire to avoid conflict led Germany and other Western powers to accommodate Russia’s perceived geopolitical interests and pursue engagement even after Russia invaded and illegally annexed Crimea in 2014. Yet such efforts did nothing to curb Russia’s regional ambitions, and the relatively mild Western response almost certainly encouraged Putin to invade the rest of Ukraine in 2022. Today, all but a few European countries recognize the need to challenge Russia head-on.

Revolutionary autocrats and their successors present one of today’s most intractable challenges to international order. Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine despite Russia’s close ties to Europe demonstrates that economic linkage and common material interests are not sufficient to preserve the liberal world order. Democracies must instead unite and mount a defense of democratic values—providing military support for democracies under attack, as well as diplomatic and material assistance for those opposing dictatorship. Although these efforts will not topple revolutionary dictatorships in the short term, a more proactive and coordinated resistance to autocracy will better equip the West to contain and perhaps even defeat them in the long term.

LUCAN AHMAD WAY is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto and a co-author, with Steven Levitsky, of Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism.

Foreign Affairs · by Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism · June 20, 2023

20. Special Operations News Update - June 26, 2023 | SOF News

Special Operations News Update - June 26, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · June 26, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: A U.S. special operations forces soldier practices sniper rifle marksmanship aboard an airborne Hellenic UH-H1 Iroquois “Huey” helicopter during Hellenic SOFEX ORION 23, April 28, 2023 near Megara, Greece. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Jacob Dunlap)

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SOF News

1st SF Command CCWO CoR. On June 20, 2023, Command Chief Warrant Officer Scott Gronowski relinquished responsibility to Command Chief Warrant Officer Felix “Lalo” Mosqueda. The 1st Special Forces Command Change of Responsibility for the two CW5s took place at Fort Liberty, North Carolina. CW5 Gronowski is heading to a well-earned retirement.

Dragon Challenge. Top Airmen competed in a three-day competition at Fort Cambell, Ky in events testing physical strength and technical knowledge. The Airmen came from three career fields: Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), intelligence, and Special Warfare Mission Support (SWMS). The Air Force is considering a drastic drop in its TACP force in the near future. “Airmen Compete for ‘Top TACP’ Title, as Air Force Plans Deep Cuts to Career Field”, Air and Space Forces, June 23, 2023.

Viable CT Capability. The move of the US from CT and COIN to strategic competition could be affecting the ability of the US to strike terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. National Defense University’s Kim Cragin examines the Biden administrations over-the-horizon approach and argues that its foundations are increasingly shaky. “Counterterrorism Jenga”, Lawfare Blog, June 25, 2023.

10th SFG(A) Trains With Swedish Home Guard. Members of the 10th Special Forces Group trained with Swedish forces in Lapland for several days – training the ended on 2 June 2023. In the training scenario, the Green Berets trained a ‘guerrilla force’. (DVIDS, Jun 2, 2023).

International SOF

10 Elite SOF Units. The SAS, SEALs, KSK, GIGN, and others are featured in this article. “Top 10 Most Elite Special Forces Unites: Unveiling the World’s Best Warriors”, SOFREP, June 25, 2023.

Australian SF and Body Cams. In an effort to curtail misconduct of Australian special forces in combat situations there is a recommendation that they wear ‘Big Brother’ cameras into battle. This came about as a recommendation of the Brereton Inquiry which investigated alleged war crimes committed by Australian troops in Afghanistan. (Daily Mail, Jun 18, 2023).

Philippine SF. President Marcos recognized the contributions of the Philippine Army’s Special Forces Regiment – Airborne (SFRA) in maintaining the peace and dealing with security threats in the country during a recent ceremony on June 25, 2023. It was the regiment’s 61st founding anniversary. The SFRA is considered as one of AFP’s Special Operations Forces most elite units. It specializes in air assaults, anti-guerrilla operations, CQB, COIN, CT, hostage rescue, and other missions. “Marcos hails Army’s Special Forces: You’ve been dependable sentinels for Filipinos”, Manila Bulletin, June 25, 2023. See also “61st founding anniversary of the Special Forces Regiment Airborne of the Philippine Army”, PIA.gov.ph, June 26, 2023.

SOF History

History of Army Rangers. Mac Caltrider traces the history of the U.S. Army Rangers from pre-revolutionary days to the current era. “Sua Sponte: The Fighting Spirit of the 75th Ranger Regiment”, Coffee or Die Magazine, June 20, 2023.

10th SFG(A) Activation. On June 19, 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. https://www.specialforceshistory.info/groups/10sfga.html

1st SFG(A) Activation. On June 24, 1957, the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) was activated. On of its first missions was the deployment of training teams to South Vietnam. https://www.specialforceshistory.info/groups/1sfga.html

Ukraine Conflict

Short-lived Wagner Group Revolt. Over the past several weeks the Wagner Group had been repositioning its forces from the Ukraine front lines into ‘rest and refit’ areas. Over the weekend about 25,000 personnel (according to some news reports) of the Wagner Group left Ukraine, crossed into Russia, and occupied Russia’s Southern Military District in (VOA, Jun 24, 2023) Rostov (Google Maps) for a short time beginning on Friday and early Saturday. The leader of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, threatened to advance to Moscow on a “March to Justice” to confront Russia’s military leadership and had come within 120 miles of the capital.

The Washington Post (Jun 24, 2023, subscription) reported that U.S. intelligence had learned in mid-June that an ‘armed operation’ could be attempted by the Wagner Group. One possible trigger for the mercenary group’s actions could be the June 10th Russian Defense Ministry order that all ‘volunteer’ detachments would have to sign contracts with the government by July 1st. Certainly a interesting turn of events over the past few days!

A Failed Coup. On Sunday the ‘armed action’ was called off – most likely as it didn’t gain the support needed to be successful. Prigozhin went to Belarus (or so it seems). Charges against Prigozhin (PBS, Jun 23, 2023) had been filed against Prigozhin by the Russian Federal Security Services on Friday. These charges were dropped and Wagner Group fighters given immunity on Sunday. A column of Chechen forces loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov (SOF News, June 9, 2023) threatened action against the Wagner Group. It had left Ukraine for Rostov, but then returned to Ukraine once the coup failed.

And Next? A lot of questions remain. Does Prigozhin lose control of the Wagner Group. Does the paramilitary organization get absorbed into the Russian military? Will it continue to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine? What of the Wagner Group elements in Syria, Africa, and elsewhere?

Commentary

IWC, DoD, and Congress. Has the Department of Defense lost its way in the establishment of the Irregular Warfare Center? Two U.S. Senators think so. Stalled by bureaucratic indecision, the Pentagon is operating its new center in an interim capacity that risks dangerously narrowing its field of vision. “Get Moving on That Irregular Warfare Center, DOD Leaders”, by Sen. Mark Kelly and Sen. Lindsey Graham, Defense One, June 20, 2023.

IW: The ‘Unseen’ but Constant Fight. The aspects of intelligence, irregular warfare, and political warfare are explored in this article by Philip Wasielewski. He is the Director of the FPRI’s newly established Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare. “The Constant Fight: Intelligence Activities, Irregular Warfare, and Political Warfare”, FPRI, June 20, 2023.

National Security

M10 Booker – Is It a Tank? The Army is rolling out the news that it has a new ‘combat vehicle’. The M10 Booker – formerly known as Mobile Protected Firepower – is not a light tank according to defense officials. But it certainly looks like a tank. Light tanks have historically been used to perform reconnaissance functions – but the Booker is not a recon vehicle. “The Army’s M10 Booker is a tank. Prove us wrong”, Army Times, June 21, 2023.

Competition in the Arctic. Both Russia and China are taking the opportunity to expand their ‘reach’ into the High North. Both countries are waging campaigns of influence, money, disinformation, and incremental chage to subvert cooperative frameworks and gain power projection throughout the Arctic. Lilian Alessa, Ph.D., explains in “The ‘Coldest War’ Is an Invisible One for the Arctic”, The Messenger Opinion, June 24, 2023.

DoD – Pashto Speakers – No Longer Needed? It is reported the Defense Language Institute (DLI) at Monterey, California will no longer conduct courses in Pashto. Some analysts believe this to be short-sighted; including former Green Beret Justin Sapp who was the first U.S. service member to enter Afghanistan after 9/11. “In a sign of the times, the Defense Language Institute quietly shutters its Pashto language program”, Connecting Vets – Audacy, June 20, 2023.

Meta, WhatsApp, and the Taliban. The popular messenger service that offers end-to-end encryption is increasingly being used by the Taliban to conduct government business. This puts Meta in a quandry – how to keep the vital communicatons application available to the general Afghan population while restricting its use by a sanctioned regime. ( Business Insider, Jun 18, 2023).

Wagner Group in Africa. Russian President Vladimir Putin has called the recent actions of the Wagner Group and its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin a “betrayal” that will be punished. The events of the past week could have huge implications for Africa – the paramilitary group has thousands of its mercenaries active in several African countries. But Wagner is more than a ‘security’ force; it is engaged in many business alliances and endeavors and is a force that extends Russia’s influence in Africa.

“Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: More than mercenaries”, DW, June 24, 2023.
“Wagner revolt clouds outlook for its operations in Africa”, Reuters, June 24, 2023.
“Tracking Russian Interference to Derail Democracy in Africa”, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, June 21, 2023.
Wagner Group: The Evolution of a Private Army, special report by The Soufan Center, June 2023, pdf, 44 pages.

China’s PSCs in Africa. China is expanding its influence and position in Africa. Russia’s Wagner Group has been present in Africa for years. Is China following suit? “Will China’s Private Security Companies Follow the Wanger Group’s Footsteps in Africa?”, The Diplomat, June 24, 2023.

Upcoming Events

August 5, 2023. Perdido Key, Florida

Deep Dive 2023 Combat Diver Reunion

CDF

August 12, 2023

11th Special Forces Group Reunion

Fort Meade, MD

October 16-20, 2023

SOAR XLVII

Special Operations Association

December 8, 2023

Winter Cruise

Combat Diver Association

October 2024

SFA Caribbean Cruise and Annual Convention

Special Forces Association

SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.

Books, Pubs, Videos, and Reports

Paper – The Role and Limits of Special Operations in Strategic Competition. David H. Ucko, a professor at the National Defense University, has published a report that explores the promise and limitations of special operations in this new strategic competition era. June 20, 2023. You can also watch his testimony in a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee (Feb 8, 2023). https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/figure/10.1080/03071847.2023.2219701

Military Strategy Magazine. Several interesting articles are in the latest issue. https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/

CRS Report – AUKUS Piller 2: Background and Issues for Congress. The Congressional Research Service has published a report that explains a security pact agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia to develop and field “advanced capabilities”. Pillar 2 activities have been coordinated among the three governments by means of eight working groups that address technological and function areas of undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, AI, cyber, hypersonic, electronic warfare, innovation, and info sharing. The security pact is an attempt to “promote a free and open Indo-Pacific that is secure and stable.” It is interpreted by many to counter the growth of Chinese influence and capability in the Pacific region. CRS R47599, June 20, 2023, PDF, 17 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47599

Video – Within You is the Best You. Royal Marines Commandos recruitment video, June 19, 2023, YouTube, one minute. http://A new recruitment video for the Royal Marines Commandos. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yi3syKhmUXw&t=3s

Podcasts

SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command

https://linktr.ee/sofcast

The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing

https://www.thepinelander.com/

The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command

https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA

Irregular Warfare Initiative

https://irregularwarfare.org/category/podcasts/

Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385

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sof.news · by SOF News · June 26, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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