Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Everyone gets the experience. Some get the lesson."

- T.S. Eliot

"It is dangerous to be right in matters where established men are wrong."

- Voltaire

"Beware of over concern for money, or position, or glory. Someday you will meet a man who cares for none of these things. Then you will know how poor you are."

- Rudyard Kipling

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2023

2. Plot Thickens: Russian Generals Supported Wagner Mutiny but Backed Out – US Intelligence

3. Russian Turmoil Shows a Forever War in Ukraine Hurts Putin

4. Taiwan tracks pair of Russian warships off island’s eastern coast

5. ‘Build Allied’: 4 steps to increase industrial capacity and resilience

6. Wagner’s Prigozhin Planned to Capture Russian Military Leaders

7. Is the Law Coming for Erik Prince at Last?

8. Something Was Messing With Earth’s Axis. The Answer Has to Do With Us.

9. Updating America's Asia strategy | Brookings

10. China has its eyes on Okinawa

11. Air Advisors take it to the Edge

12. In Brief: Prigozhin's Mutiny - War on the Rocks

13. US joint forces lack a ‘common goal’ for the future, says top Marine

14. Marine Corps considering changes to how it allocates officer jobs

15. Gender Neutral Standards, Return to Old Fitness Test: Congress' Dueling Ideas for the Army

16. The Beginning of the End for Putin?

17. America, China, and the Virtue of Low Expectations

18. Mongolia’s Ulaanbaatar Dialogue Emphasizes the Significance of Cooperation in Northeast Asia

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2023

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to present Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as corrupt and a liar to destroy his reputation among Wagner personnel and within Russian society.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s account of his mediation between Putin and Prigozhin on June 24-25 in tandem with Putin’s June 26 speech indicates that Putin promised Lukashenko and Prigozhin that Prigozhin and the Wagner Group would have “security guarantees” in Belarus.
Lukashenko likely seeks to use the Wagner Group in Belarus to buy maneuvering space to balance against the Kremlin campaign to absorb Belarus via the Union State and likely seeks to closely control any Wagner Group forces that move into Belarus.
Lukashenko also announced on June 27 that Belarus had received an unspecified number of Russian nuclear weapons on a previous date – a development that Lukashenko may also use to balance against the Kremlin’s campaign to absorb Belarus via the Union State.
The ongoing Putin-Lukashenko-Prigozhin powerplay is not yet over and will continue to have short-term and long-term consequences that may benefit Ukraine.
The Kremlin campaign to destroy Prigozhin’s reputation and possibly dissolve the Wagner Group’s Ukraine force decreases the probability of Putin announcing a new round of reserve mobilization in the near term.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least four sectors of the front and reportedly made gains on June 27.
Russian President Vladimir Putin identified the Ukrainian main counteroffensive effort on June 27, possibly signaling his own defensive priority.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks northwest of Svatove and south of Kreminna.
Ukrainian officials are signaling that Ukrainian forces are capitalizing on the armed rebellion in Russia and intensifying counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area as of June 27.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts’ administrative border area.
Russian milbloggers expressed concern at Ukrainian attempts to advance south of Kherson City.
Russian officials expressed varied opinions on the future of private military companies (PMCs) in response to the armed rebellion.
The UN reported that Russia has detained hundreds of Ukrainian civilians since the start of the war in Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 27, 2023

Jun 27, 2023 - Press ISW

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2023

George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 27, 2023, 8:50 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on June 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to present Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as corrupt and a liar to destroy his reputation among Wagner personnel and within Russian society. Putin implied on June 27 that “the owner of Concord company” (the Concord company is the parent company of Prigozhin’s catering company) lied about the Wagner Group private military company’s (PMC) independence from the Kremlin and the lack of state compensation for Wagner personnel.[1]Putin publicly claimed for the first time since Wagner’s founding that the Kremlin “fully funds” and “fully supplies” the Wagner PMC and claimed that the Kremlin made various payments to Wagner personnel and their families from Russia’s federal budget. Putin added that “the owner of the Concord Company” received 80 billion rubles (about $936 million) between May 2022 and May 2023 for delivering and catering food to the Russian military, and that the Kremlin will investigate whether the company stole anything during its work for the Kremlin. Putin was clearly referring to Prigozhin, who is the owner of the Concord Company Group and previously worked as Putin’s personal caterer, but Putin continues to refuse to say Prigozhin’s name.[2] Putin’s insinuation that the Kremlin will investigate the Concord Company may be preparation to justify the Kremlin’s confiscation of Prigozhin’s assets via corruption charges.

Putin is rhetorically separating Prigozhin from the Wagner PMC and is deliberately depriving Prigozhin of the title of Wagner financier to undermine his role in the Wagner PMC. The Kremlin launched an ongoing domestic information campaign in Russia to forgive Wagner fighters and commanders in an effort to lure Wagner personnel to sign contacts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[3] The deliberate effort to separate Prigozhin from the Wagner Group is likely intended to set informational conditions so that the Kremlin can accuse Prigozhin of corruption or conspiring with Ukraine or the West and alienate Prigozhin from Wagner personnel whom the Kremlin seeks to retain to fight in Ukraine as part of the regular Russian military.[4] Prigozhin had built his personal brand on criticizing the Russian military command and bureaucrats for corruption and ties to Western countries, and Putin is likely attempting to shatter Prigozhin’s populist appeal by accusing him of the same sins.

Putin has likely decided that he cannot directly eliminate Prigozhin without making him a martyr at this time. Prigozhin still retains some support within Russian society and the Russian regular forces, and the Kremlin will need to ensure that these groups become disillusioned with Prigozhin to effectively deprive him of his popular support in Russia. Prigozhin campaigned for military command changes by accusing the Russian MoD of mistreating regular Russian military personnel in combat – a message that likely appealed to many servicemen and their families disillusioned with mobilization, casualties, supply shortages, and great loss of life with little to show for it. The Kremlin needs to separate Prigozhin’s cause from his persona, lest an attack on Prigozhin be perceived as a Kremlin attack on his popular narrative and his stated objectives of punishing the criminally incompetent Russian MoD leadership. The Kremlin will likely continue to attack Prigozhin’s character to break Prigozhin’s popular support, discourage Wagner personnel from following him to Belarus, and destroy his financial power.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s account of his mediation between Putin and Prigozhin on June 24-25 in tandem with Putin’s June 26 speech indicates that Putin promised Lukashenko and Prigozhin that Prigozhin and the Wagner Group would have “security guarantees” in Belarus. Lukashenko indicated on June 27 that Putin “promised” both Lukashenko and Prigozhin that Prigozhin and the Wagner Group would enjoy unspecified “security guarantees” in Belarus.[5] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officially dropped charges against Prigozhin on June 27.[6] Lukashenko has thus likely managed to secure a degree of safe haven for Prigozhin in Belarus at this time. This is a change in ISW’s June 26 assessment that the offer of safe haven in Belarus was likely a trap.[7] ISW has altered its assessment based on the pattern created by Putin’s and Lukashenko’s speeches.

It is unclear whether Prigozhin’s safety will survive Putin’s effort to destroy Prigozhin’s reputation, however, especially since the threat of corruption investigations against Prigozhin opens the possibility of new charges against Prigozhin that Putin’s promise presumably does not cover. Putin thus likely decided to destroy Prigozhin’s reputation and possibly strip him of his financial resources for offenses technically independent of the armed rebellion while abstaining from punishing Prigozhin directly for the rebellion.

Lukashenko likely seeks to use the Wagner Group in Belarus to buy maneuvering space to balance against the Kremlin campaign to absorb Belarus via the Union State. Lukashenko described at length how he inserted himself into the Putin-Prigozhin conflict in a way that - if Lukashenko’s account is true - demonstrates that Lukashenko is a politically savvy actor capable of exercising influence within the upper echelons of Russian politics. Lukashenko described how he managed to broker the deal between Putin and a livid Prigozhin, who refused to answer Putin’s phone calls, by skillfully engaging both parties directly and through Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Russian FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov.[8] Lukashenko’s elaborate account suggests that Lukashenko successfully mediated a crisis within Putin‘s own inner circle that Putin could not.[9] Lukashenko intervened to mediate likely in part to signal to Putin and other senior Kremlin officials that Moscow should not trifle with Lukashenko and that Lukashenko has the ability to operate successfully and independently within Russian politics. Lukashenko’s boasting about his ability to manipulate power brokers within Putin’s innermost circle is humiliating for Putin, whether or not it is true. The fact that Putin has not challenged Lukashenko’s presentation of events and has in fact publicly thanked Lukashenko is even more humiliating.

Lukashenko likely seeks to closely control any Wagner Group forces that move into Belarus. Lukashenko stressed that the Wagner Group will not open recruitment centers in Belarus as it did in Russia but that Belarusians - and presumably other nationals- will be allowed to join the Wagner Group in Belarus.[10] Lukashenko’s description suggests that the Wagner Group will primarily act as a training and advisory partner for the Belarusian military. Lukashenko stated that Wagner forces have more training than the Belarusian military and that the Belarusian military could benefit from the Wagner Group’s extensive combat experience.[11] Lukashenko denied claims that Belarusian authorities have already begun establishing field camps for Wagner Group fighters but said Belarus would create camps if Wagner requested them.[12]

Lukashenko may seek to use the Wagner Group in Belarus to reduce the Belarusian military’s accumulated structural dependency on the Russian military for higher operational functions. Lukashenko may seek to use the Wagner Group to help rebuild lost capability within the Belarusian military that the Belarusian military largely delegated to the Russian Western Military District. The Belarusian military’s dissolution of its unified ground command in 2011 effectively subordinated Belarus’ military to the Western Military District.[13] Belarus has no recent experience in conducting large-scale operations or organizing exercises above the battalion level. Belarus’ main source of knowledge and experience for higher operational activity is from Russian-organized exercises, such as the recurring Zapad, Union Shield, and Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises.[14] The Wagner Group has experience conducting combined arms operations with formations larger than the combat services of the Belarusian military.[15] It is unclear how successful this assessed effort may be, however. The Belarusian military’s operational subordination to the Russian General Staff has been a de facto reality for many years, and reversing such deep institutional linkages will be difficult, if even possible. Russia’s new regime stability crisis may provide novel opportunities for Minsk, nonetheless.

Lukashenko also announced on June 27 that Belarus had received an unspecified number of Russian nuclear weapons on a previous date – a development that Lukashenko may also use to balance against the Kremlin’s campaign to absorb Belarus via the Union State. Belarusian opposition railway workers claimed on June 27 that Russian nuclear weapons will be delivered to the base of the 2631st Missile and Air Ammunition Storage Base in Prudok, Vitebsk Oblast.[16] Lukashenko observed on June 27 that nobody has gone to war with a nuclear power and insinuated that Belarus will use nuclear weapons if a hostile state attacks Belarus.[17] This development is more interesting for how Lukashenko may use the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus to posture against Russia than because of any threat nuclear weapons in Belarus pose to NATO or Ukraine. Lukashenko may use the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus in tandem with a new Wagner Group presence in Belarus to argue that Belarus has a new capacity to defend itself independent of Russia and that additional Russian basing in Belarus is therefore unnecessary. An indicator of this course of action will be whether Lukashenko allows more Russian military personnel to train at Belarusian training grounds. Ukrainian officials stated that there were approximately 1,000 Russian military personnel in Belarus as of early June 2023 – a sharp decrease from spring 2023 when Ukrainian officials reported that about 9,000-10,000 Russian troops were in Belarus as of March 30.[18] Another indicator would be an explicit promise or rejection of permanent Russian ground forces bases in Belarus.

The ongoing Putin-Lukashenko-Prigozhin powerplay is not yet over and will continue to have short-term and long-term consequences that may benefit Ukraine. Director of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) Viktor Zolotov announced on June 27 that Rosgvardia will receive heavy weapons and tanks.[19] The announcement indicates that the Kremlin is attempting to address regime security issues that transpired during Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24 – such as Russia’s security forces’ inability or unwillingness to repel a mechanized drive on Moscow. The transfer of heavy military equipment to Rosgvardia for internal security will tie up weapons that could otherwise be used in Ukraine. The Russian MoD also announced on June 27 preparations to transfer the Wagner Group’s heavy military equipment to unspecified elements of the Russian Armed Forces.[20] This transfer will deprive Wagner forces of organic heavy mechanized equipment and suggests that the Russian MoD seeks to dissolve previously separate Wagner units, atomize Wagner Group fighters, and integrate them into regular Russian units to minimize the risk of any repeated Wagner-driven mutiny attempts. The announced transfer of Wagner’s equipment to MoD elements also suggests that Wagner forces are unlikely to imminently deploy to reinforce frontlines in Ukraine before undergoing reorganization.

It remains unclear whether the Russian MoD will dissolve Wagner detachments and reassign Wagner personnel to pre-existing regular units. Such a drastic reorganization would be tantamount to the dissolution of the Wagner Group in Ukraine as a distinct organizational entity and would eliminate the unique combat power that the Wagner Group developed for itself in Ukraine. A Russian MoD decision to maintain separate Wagner units within the MoD structure would pose stability risks when subordinating previously independent and overindulged Wagner forces under the MoD highly bureaucratic military command. Separate Wagner forces would likely continue to pose an internal threat to Russia due to their dissatisfaction with the Russian military command – the reason why Wagner forces followed Prigozhin into the armed rebellion in the first place.

The Kremlin campaign to destroy Prigozhin’s reputation and possibly dissolve the Wagner Group’s Ukraine force decreases the probability of Putin announcing a new round of reserve mobilization in the near term. The Russian MoD will be preoccupied with subordinating Wagner forces if many of them elect to sign contracts with the MoD. Putin, who is a cautious decisionmaker and has clearly signaled his concern for his regime, is also unlikely to aggravate Russian society with a highly unpopular mobilization announcement on the heels of the armed rebellion. The Kremlin’s response to the aftermath of Prigozhin’s armed rebellion points to more advantageous conditions for Ukraine compared with the pre-June 24 situation.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least four sectors of the front and reportedly made gains on June 27. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces advanced in all active sectors of the front from Donetsk to Zaporizhia oblasts.[21] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks near and south of Kreminna.[22] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the northern and southern flanks of Bakhmut.[23] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev stated that Ukrainian forces conducted successful offensive operations south of Velyka Novosilka near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts administrative border and south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[24] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks south and southeast of Velyka Novosilka, and one prominent milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made further gains south of Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) after capturing the settlement on June 26.[25] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks south of Orikhiv to regain lost positions.[26]

Russian President Vladimir Putin identified the Ukrainian main counteroffensive effort on June 27, possibly signaling his own defensive priority. Putin claimed that Ukraine considers the Orikhiv direction in western Zaporizhia Oblast as “the main direction of attack.”[27] ISW offers no assessment of the accuracy of Putin’s statement or of which sector Ukraine has prioritized or plans to prioritize as the main counteroffensive effort. Putin may have instead identified the sector of the front that he perceives as most critical to hold, however. ISW has observed the most extensive Russian defensive fortifications erected in the western Zaporizhia Oblast south of Orikhiv.

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to present Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as corrupt and a liar to destroy his reputation among Wagner personnel and within Russian society.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s account of his mediation between Putin and Prigozhin on June 24-25 in tandem with Putin’s June 26 speech indicates that Putin promised Lukashenko and Prigozhin that Prigozhin and the Wagner Group would have “security guarantees” in Belarus.
Lukashenko likely seeks to use the Wagner Group in Belarus to buy maneuvering space to balance against the Kremlin campaign to absorb Belarus via the Union State and likely seeks to closely control any Wagner Group forces that move into Belarus.
Lukashenko also announced on June 27 that Belarus had received an unspecified number of Russian nuclear weapons on a previous date – a development that Lukashenko may also use to balance against the Kremlin’s campaign to absorb Belarus via the Union State.
The ongoing Putin-Lukashenko-Prigozhin powerplay is not yet over and will continue to have short-term and long-term consequences that may benefit Ukraine.
The Kremlin campaign to destroy Prigozhin’s reputation and possibly dissolve the Wagner Group’s Ukraine force decreases the probability of Putin announcing a new round of reserve mobilization in the near term.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least four sectors of the front and reportedly made gains on June 27.
Russian President Vladimir Putin identified the Ukrainian main counteroffensive effort on June 27, possibly signaling his own defensive priority.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks northwest of Svatove and south of Kreminna.
Ukrainian officials are signaling that Ukrainian forces are capitalizing on the armed rebellion in Russia and intensifying counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area as of June 27.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts’ administrative border area.
Russian milbloggers expressed concern at Ukrainian attempts to advance south of Kherson City.
Russian officials expressed varied opinions on the future of private military companies (PMCs) in response to the armed rebellion.
The UN reported that Russia has detained hundreds of Ukrainian civilians since the start of the war in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks northwest of Svatove and south of Kreminna on June 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 76th Air Assault (VDV) Division continue advancing in the Kreminna forest area.[29] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted failed ground attacks near Vesele (30km south of Kreminna) and Rozdolivka (32km southwest of Kreminna).[30] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian ground attacks in an unspecified area in the Lyman direction, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian officials are signaling that Ukrainian forces are capitalizing on the armed rebellion in Russia and intensifying counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area as of June 27. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces considered the Wagner Group-Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) conflict when planning operations in eastern Ukraine. Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces have conducted counteroffensive operations and made advances on the flanks of Bakhmut for the fourth consecutive day.[32] Malyar stated that the Bakhmut situation is complex because Russian forces occupy extensive fortifications in the city, and that Ukrainian forces will advance more slowly. The Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces have the battlefield initiative in the Bakhmut area.[33] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev stated that Ukrainian forces continue offensive operations in the Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Kurdyumivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut), and Pivnichne (20km southwest of Bakhmut) areas on Bakhmut’s flanks.[34] A prominent Russian milblogger characterized the Russian military situation north of Soledar as ”grave” and stated that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking towards Yakovlivka (14km northeast of Bakhmut).[35]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Kurdyumivka.[36]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks and advanced in the Bakhmut area as of June 27. Geolocated footage posted on June 27 indicates that Russian forces likely reduced Ukrainian tactical gains near Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut) as of June 27, though it is unclear when Russian forces made these gains.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched unsuccessful ground attacks from their positions in Berkhivka and Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), as well as in the direction of Mynkivka (13km northeast of Bakhmut).[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut) and Ivanivske.[39]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Pervomaiske (6km southwest of Avdiivka) and Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City).[40] Russian state media outlet RT claimed that Russian forces in Marinka are making gradual advances and that advancing Russian infantry occasionally order artillery strikes against Ukrainian positions 15 to 20 meters away from their own positions.[41]

Ukrainian forces have reportedly made marginal advances in areas that Russian proxy forces have occupied since 2014. The UK MoD reported that Ukrainian forces have made marginal advances east of Krasnohorivka (immediately west of Donetsk City) as of June 27, the first reported instance of Ukrainian forces recapturing territory occupied before 2014.[42] ISW has not observed independent confirmation of Ukrainian forces recapturing long-occupied territory, however. The UK MoD assessed that recent Ukrainian attacks have likely overstretched Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Chechen forces operating in Donetsk Oblast.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts’ administrative border area on June 27. Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andrii Kovalev stated that Ukrainian forces conducted successful counteroffensive operations in the Novodarivka-Pryyutne (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the Eastern Group of Forces repelled three Ukrainian attacks in the Velyka Novosilka area.[45] A Russian source reported that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Novodonetske (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[46] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian forces repelled four Ukrainian attacks near Rivnopil (9km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[47] Russian sources claimed that heavy fighting is ongoing near the Vremivka salient and warned that if Ukrainian forces advanced further, they will likely be able to cut off the Vremivka salient.[48] A Russian milblogger expressed concern that Ukrainian forces are preparing for further offensives in the south Donetsk direction despite bad weather.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the Rivnopil direction.[50] Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian unit near Storozheve (3km south of Velyka Novosilka).[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Novodarivka (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[52] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged Ukrainian liberation of Rivnopil and claimed that Ukrainian forces made additional gains in the Rivnopil area.[53]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia on June 27. Kovalev stated that Ukrainian forces conducted successful counteroffensive operations in the Novodanylivka-Robotyne (Orikhiv) direction.[54] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces stopped a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv).[55] Rogov claimed that Russian forces stopped a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group in the Myrne (17km southwest of Orikhiv) area.[56] Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces renewed attacks near Robotyne to regain control of the previously liberated Ukrainian positions north of the settlement that Russian forces recaptured on June 26.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv) remains in the contested ”grey zone” and that positional fighting is ongoing near the settlement. Geolocated footage published on June 27, however, shows the Russian 429thMotorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) striking Ukrainian positions in Pyatykhakty.[58] Rogov published footage on June 27 that purportedly shows elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) operating near Robotyne.[59]

Russian milbloggers expressed concern at Ukrainian attempts to advance south of Kherson City. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to expand their "bridgehead” near the Antonivsky Bridge on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[60] ISW currently makes no assessment on the extent to which Ukrainian forces have established a bridgehead in this area, noting only that we assess that Ukrainian forces have established and hold positions of some sort on the east (left) bank. Geolocated footage posted on June 26 showed Russian armored personnel carriers, reportedly from the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault (VDV) Division, operating near the Antonivsky Bridge.[61] Another milblogger noted that Russian VDV elements struck Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky Bridge with missiles and used a Russian TOS-1 thermobaric artillery system on the night of June 26.[62] The milblogger claimed that the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam is providing Ukrainian forces with freedom of movement but that Russian forces continue to repel Ukrainian advances.[63] The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged that Russian forces conducted airstrikes in the Oleshky area, which may suggest that Ukrainian forces are conducting some operations in the area.[64]

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to target Crimea with drones. A Russian milblogger claimed Russian air defenses destroyed a Ukrainian drone carrying explosives near Dzhankoi.[65]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials expressed varied opinions on the future of private military companies (PMCs) in response to the armed rebellion. Russian State Duma deputy and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party Leonid Slutsky called for the creation of a contract army of “at least seven million military and civilian personnel” and claimed that Russia does not need “PMCs or their analogues.”[66] Russian opposition news outlet SOTA reported that Russian authorities considered legalizing PMCs after the armed rebellion, likely in an effort to regulate them.[67] PMCs remain illegal under Russian law despite Russian President Vladimir Putin announcing on June 27 that the Russian government fully funded and equipped the Wagner Group.[68]

Russian occupation officials continue to forcibly recruit Ukrainians in occupied territories into the Russian military. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Administration Head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed that 1,500 Ukrainians have registered for military service at 44 military registration offices across occupied Zaporizhia Oblast as of June 27.[69] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian officials force civilians to register to serve in the Russian military or in “illegal” irregular formations.[70]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russia has detained hundreds of Ukrainian civilians since the start of the war in Ukraine. The UN found that Russian authorities arbitrarily detained 864 civilians and executed 77 civilians between February 2022 and May 2023 and that Russian law enforcement and forces subjected many detainees to torture and maltreatment.[71] The UN found that Ukrainian authorities arbitrarily detained 75 individuals, and the UN did not report that Ukrainian authorities had executed civilians. The UN also expressed concern that Russian authorities are not conducting investigations into arbitrary detention or torture, while the Ukrainian government has conducted criminal investigations into and convicted perpetrators of arbitrary civilian detentions.

Russian authorities continue efforts to eradicate Ukrainian identity in youth and consolidate social control over occupied areas by coercing minors into helping the Russian military. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets reported that Russian occupation authorities are attempting to militarize and indoctrinate minors through militarized education platforms, patriotic recreation camps, and military-patriotic youth movements such as the Russian Young Army Cadets National Movement (Yunarmiya), to participate in the war. Lubinets stated that Russian authorities are coercing the minors into informing on Ukrainian positions and spotting for artillery units.[72] Ukrainian Deputy Prosecutor General Viktoria Lytvynova reported that Russian forces also recruited minors into setting up roadblocks.

Ukrainian partisans targeted a rear Russian logistics line in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Ukrainian partisans damaged a railway track in Kirovskyi Raion in occupied Crimea on June 27.[73] Russian occupation officials reported the damage to the railway but did not specify who caused the damage, and Russia’s Crimean Railway claimed that “unauthorized individuals” caused the damage.[74]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Plot Thickens: Russian Generals Supported Wagner Mutiny but Backed Out – US Intelligence

Plot Thickens: Russian Generals Supported Wagner Mutiny but Backed Out – US Intelligence

kyivpost.com

Speculation continues as to why Prigozhin embarked on his “March for Justice” at the weekend, what prompted it, why it failed and who knew - some answers may now be forthcoming.

by Kyiv Post | June 28, 2023, 12:31 pm

In this picture taken on November 3, 2021 Sergei Surovikin (r), commander of Russia's Aerospace Forces, and Sergei Gerasimov (l), attend a meeting of Russian President with top military officials in Sochi. AFP.

Reports are appearing, in The New York Times and elsewhere, that senior Russian military officers may have known about chief of the Wagner mercenary force chief Yevgeny Prigozhin’s plans in advance and may have indicated they would support him or may have actually helped plan it.

US Intelligence agencies believe that General Sergei Surovikin, the deputy commander of Russia’s military operations in Ukraine may have supported Wagner’s move as a precursor to the removal of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov.

Surovikin, who the Russian media gave the sobriquet “General Armageddon” because of his “scorched earth” tactics in Syria, was appointed head of operations in Ukraine in October.

However, shortly after taking over in November, he humiliatingly had to withdraw his troops from the southern Ukrainian city of Kherson. In January, in a sign that Putin had lost faith in Surovikin’s leadership, he was replaced by Gerasimov. Surovikin, who is also commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces supporting operations in Ukraine, remained as deputy.

Prigozhin and others, such as Igor Girkin a staunchly pro-war Russian milblogger and war criminal, made no secret of their disdain for Russia’s military leaders and blamed them for the failure of Putin’s “special military operation”. It is suspected that Surovikin shared that view, and it was suggested that, because of this, he may well have helped plan Mr. Prigozhin’s actions last weekend, an accusation that US Intelligence is said to be investigating.

The New York Times reported that American intelligence officials also said there were signs that other Russian generals may have been informed of Wagner’s plans and expressed sympathy for their grievances.

They highlight the fact that the first deputy head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Vladimir Alekseyev condemned Wagner’s rebellion, but just hours later, Prigozhin moved unopposed into the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don and Alekseyev was filmed speaking with him in the city.

Michael McFaul, a former US ambassador to Russia, said: “Think of how easy it was to take Rostov. There are armed guards everywhere in Russia, and suddenly, there’s no one around to do anything?”

Independent experts as well as US and allied officials are reported in The Times that they believe Prigozhin may have been led to believe that a large part of Russia’s army would rally to his side as he headed for Moscow. It was the fact that such support did not materialize that he turned back less than 200 kilometers from Moscow, rather than his claim that he had made his point and wanted to avoid any more bloodshed.

Analysts feel that Putin knowing, or at least suspecting, that there was some sort of conspiracy between Prigozhin, Surovikin and other generals, has decided to “sweep it under the carpet.” This may explain his acceptance of the deal that would allow the Wagner rebels, including Prigozhin, to choose exile rather than be tried for treason, as called for by most of the Kremlin and Russia’s media hawks.

Commentators feel that the fact that US leaders have largely failed to comment on the rebellion, other than to say it was an internal Russian issue, is intended to avoid reinforcing Putin’s narrative that Prigozhin was, in some way, acting on the orders or under the direction of the West.

It is the general assessment among the US and UK intelligence communities that, if Wagner’s uprising did have support or the approval of Surovikin and others, it reveals that the breakdown in the relationship between Russian generals and Putin’s top two military commanders, Gerasimov and Shoigu, was becoming ever more serious.

It is known that the Russian president doesn’t like remove personnel that he trusts, even when they fail. That may explain why Shoigu and, more critically, Surovikin are still in post. However, if there was a link between Surovikin, Prigozhin and others and that was to be proved and become public, Putin would have no option but to act. The loss of “General Armageddon” to the occupying forces would be beneficial to Ukraine in the conduct of its war.

Stop Press

A Report has appeared on the “Ukraine” Telegram channel, quoting the Russian rosZMI media channel that Surovikin was arrested on the evening of June 27 and is detained in the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center along with his deputy, Colonel-General Andriy Yudin.

Kyiv Post was unable to verify this at this time and is investigating.

kyivpost.com

3. Russian Turmoil Shows a Forever War in Ukraine Hurts Putin

Excerpts:

Ukrainian determination to continue the fight against the Russian invaders remains sky-high—from front-line troops to public opinion to the government in Kyiv. But Ukraine’s ability to sustain its war effort hinges on the continued flow of arms and money from the West.

Many European officials are nervous about domestic politics in the U.S., where Donald Trump has been tapping opposition among some Republican voters to the Biden administration’s policy of sending Ukraine billions of dollars in financial and military aid.

If Trump wins the Republican nomination and the November 2024 presidential election, “then the game changes again. We can expect the worst” for Ukraine, said Heisbourg, voicing a widespread concern in Europe. “But Trump is one thing, Congress is another.”

An abrupt curtailment of U.S. aid is “a low-probability event,” said William Taylor, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, a federal research institution in Washington.

“The remarkable thing is how stable U.S. support has been, on a bipartisan basis,” Taylor said, pointing to the staunchly pro-Kyiv positions of senior Republicans in Congress.

Three-quarters of Americans believe a Ukrainian victory is important for the U.S. and 59% support military aid, according to a survey by the Ronald Reagan Institute in Washington released on Sunday.

Contrary to some perceptions in Europe, Taylor said there was no indication that the Biden administration wants Ukraine to settle or de-escalate the war by next year so that it isn’t an issue in the U.S. presidential campaign. “If Ukraine succeeds, that would be a big win for Biden. Politically, he’s in.”

Russian Turmoil Shows a Forever War in Ukraine Hurts Putin

Putin bet he had more staying power than the West, but his Ukrainian quagmire now poses clear risks for Russia’s political stability

By Marcus WalkerFollow | Photographs by Manu Brabo for The Wall Street Journal

Updated June 27, 2023 3:28 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-turmoil-shows-a-forever-war-in-ukraine-hurts-putin-5cbb8738?mod=hp_lead_pos2&utm

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine strategy has rested on a big assumption: that his autocratic government could outlast Western democracies, whose leaders are more beholden to public opinion, in a long and costly war.

The Wagner mutiny shows a military quagmire threatens Moscow’s strongman leader, too.

Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to have lost his feud with Russia’s military chiefs. But his weekend march on Moscow exposed the brittleness of Putin’s political system since the Russian invasion of Ukraine turned into a bloody slog, destroying large parts of the armed forces.

Putin himself on Saturday invoked the specter of 1917, when army mutinies during World War I undermined the czarist regime and led to revolution. “Intrigues, squabbles and politicking behind the backs of the army and the nation turned into the greatest turmoil, the destruction of the army and the collapse of the state,” he said in a televised address, vowing not to suffer the fate of Czar Nicholas II.

Putin’s authority has been damaged by his inability to crush the mutiny. Russia’s regular army mostly stayed on the sidelines while Wagner troops headed for the capital. A negotiated deal left the rebellion’s leaders free, although facing exile in Belarus.

Taiwan tracks pair of Russian warships off island’s eastern coast

Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · June 28, 2023

Taiwanese troops patrol the southern end of the island, Jan. 12, 2023. (Seth Robson/Stars and Stripes)

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Taiwan scrambled aircraft and dispatched ships late Tuesday to monitor the passage of two Russian warships off its eastern coast, according to the island’s Ministry of National Defense.

Two Russian frigates traveled northward along the coast toward the East China Sea around 11 p.m. Tuesday, the ministry said in a news release Tuesday. It did not specify how far offshore the ships were.

In response, Taiwan’s military used “joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance methods” and “dispatched mission aircraft, ships and shore-mounted missile systems to closely monitor” the Russian vessels, according to the release.

The ships continued on course and left Taiwan’s “response area” southeast of Suao, a city on the island’s northeastern edge that is also home to a logistics support naval base, according to the Defense Ministry.

While Taiwan reports near-daily activity from the Chinese military off its western coast in the Taiwan Strait — 49 Chinese aircraft and 20 ships have been reported in the waterway since Sunday — Russian activity is less common.

The warships’ passage comes less than a week after the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary outfit, organized a brief, two-day rebellion against the Russian government that began Friday with the group taking over military headquarters in Rostov-on-Don and concluded Saturday after they stood down and withdrew from the city.

It also comes just over a week after Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Beijing to meet with high-level Chinese officials, including President Xi Jinping, which Blinken described as “candid and constructive” but failed to secure the United States’ top priority of renewed communication between the two countries’ militaries.

Beijing considers Taiwan, a functionally independent democracy, to be a breakaway province and aims to reunite it with the mainland.

China and Russia remain close allies, with the two countries regularly coordinating military exercises together, although Beijing has not openly endorsed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Alex Wilson

Alex Wilson covers the U.S. Navy and other services from Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan. Originally from Knoxville, Tenn., he holds a journalism degree from the University of North Florida. He previously covered crime and the military in Key West, Fla., and business in Jacksonville, Fla.

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Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · June 28, 2023

5. ‘Build Allied’: 4 steps to increase industrial capacity and resilience

Shouldn't Korea and Japan be part of a "Build Allied" approach?

Excerpts:

Unfortunately, while U.S. forces have operated and shared intelligence with close allies for decades, vigorous international industrial collaboration has regularly foundered on the shoals of obstacles such as export controls, technology security and foreign disclosure processes, aspects of the defense acquisition system, and “Buy America” sentiments.

George Mason’s Baroni Center for Government Contracting has recently published a report that lays out a path for a “Build Allied” approach that truly moves the needle for the U.S. and our allies. Four broad sets of actions are needed to achieve this “Build Allied” vision.

...

First, the Department of Defense should make international industrial collaboration a central component of the defense acquisition system.

...

Second, Congress and the administration should focus on overcoming technology transfer and other obstacles.

...

... the third set of actions: making the tangible domestic industrial base benefits of international industrial collaboration more widely known across the government contracting community.

...

Fourth, the DoD should focus on scaling efforts like the Defense Exportability Features program to increase the effectiveness of international industrial collaboration

‘Build Allied’: 4 steps to increase industrial capacity and resilience

Defense News · by Jerry McGinn and Michael Roche · June 27, 2023

Combat in Ukraine and the results of Asia-Pacific theater wargames have exposed the existential need for greater capacity in our defense-industrial base. Increasing U.S. production is a critical part of the solution, but it is not the only part. As illustrated by ongoing U.S. and allied efforts to scour the world for 155mm ammunition to support Ukrainian forces, engaging the industrial capacity of American partners and allies is an essential, mutually beneficial and cost-effective way to increase industrial capacity and resilience. That’s why we need to adopt a “Build Allied” approach for current and future contingencies.

Here’s how we can do that.

The 2022 National Defense Strategy references allies and partners 32 ,times including the imperative of that cooperation to build “enduring advantages” in the joint force. Recent versions have articulated similar objectives, but today’s environment has become incredibly strong with robust administration leadership, bipartisan congressional support and increased allied defense investment to address defense-industrial capacity shortfalls.

There are a significant number of vehicles such as the Australia, United Kingdom and United States partnership known as AUKUS; the national technology and industrial base; reciprocal defense procurement memorandums of understanding, or RDP MOU; and others to enable robust industrial collaboration.

Unfortunately, while U.S. forces have operated and shared intelligence with close allies for decades, vigorous international industrial collaboration has regularly foundered on the shoals of obstacles such as export controls, technology security and foreign disclosure processes, aspects of the defense acquisition system, and “Buy America” sentiments.

George Mason’s Baroni Center for Government Contracting has recently published a report that lays out a path for a “Build Allied” approach that truly moves the needle for the U.S. and our allies. Four broad sets of actions are needed to achieve this “Build Allied” vision.

First, the Department of Defense should make international industrial collaboration a central component of the defense acquisition system. Senior-level guidance and actions are critical to help drive this increased prioritization from requirements development through contract awards and into sustainment.

The department needs, for example, to reduce the 18-month backlog in getting approved Foreign Military Sales cases on contract and to facilitate the early involvement of allied and partner companies in DoD programs, which will spur greater capacity to support U.S. national security interests across the globe.

Second, Congress and the administration should focus on overcoming technology transfer and other obstacles. After repeated failed efforts over the past two decades, Congress should grant Australia and the United Kingdom waivers to International Traffic in Arms Regulations for classified and unclassified programs, which will be critical for the success of AUKUS and similar efforts.

It is heartening to see recent administration testimony and House Foreign Affairs Committee deliberations supportive of these types of legislative changes to the Arms Export Control Act. Congress should also increase eligibility from Canada to all national technology and industrial base countries for Defense Production Act Title III industrial base projects. The administration’s recent legislative proposal to add Australia and the U.K. as domestic sources under the DPA is a great step in this regard.

Some criticism of this DPA change underscores the importance of the third set of actions: making the tangible domestic industrial base benefits of international industrial collaboration more widely known across the government contracting community. The DoD or Congress should request a study assessing the impact of the 28 RDP MOU countries’ contributions to the U.S. defense-industrial base. This would increase awareness of the benefits of RDP MOUs and quantify the counterproductive nature of additional Buy America legislation. Our collective effort should instead be laser-focused on reducing industrial base vulnerabilities coming from China; there is more than enough work to be done on that front.

Fourth, the DoD should focus on scaling efforts like the Defense Exportability Features program to increase the effectiveness of international industrial collaboration. While the DEF program has had modest success in building in defense exportability for programs like the Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar, it has continually struggled for funding and attention. Building off the 2022 Ukraine supplemental reprogramming for the DEF program, the DoD and Congress should work to increase the program’s base annual funding to $50 million to focus on capabilities for the pacing China challenge.

To face today’s security challenges, we must accelerate international industrial collaboration to build industrial base capacity and resilience. The recently announced FMS Tiger Team recommendations are critical components of that effort, but we also need system-level efforts that promote and foster a broad mosaic of programs across the entire spectrum of U.S. and allied defense acquisition needs. While many of the building blocks are in place, acting on our report’s recommendations is essential to gain the speed and scale necessary for a successful “Build Allied” approach, which will ultimately be a win-win proposition for the United States as well as our allies and partners.

Jerry McGinn, the executive director of the Greg and Camille Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University, previously served as a senior U.S. Defense Department acquisition official. Michael Roche is a visiting fellow at the center and a professor at the Defense Acquisition University.

6. Wagner’s Prigozhin Planned to Capture Russian Military Leaders

Wagner’s Prigozhin Planned to Capture Russian Military Leaders

Western intelligence officials say Russian domestic intelligence agency learned of plot in advance

By Bojan Pancevski

June 28, 2023 7:32 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/wagners-prigozhin-planned-to-capture-russian-military-leaders-805345cf?mod=hp_lead_pos1

Yevgeny Prigozhin called off an armed march on Moscow over the weekend. PHOTO: PRIGOZHIN PRESS SERVICE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin planned to capture Russia’s military leadership as part of last weekend’s mutiny, Western officials said, and he accelerated his plans after the country’s domestic intelligence agency became aware of the plot.

The plot’s premature launch was among the factors that could explain its ultimate failure after 36 hours, when Prigozhin called off an armed march on Moscow that had initially faced little resistance.

Prigozhin originally intended to capture Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of Russia’s general staff, during a visit to a southern region that borders Ukraine that the two were planning. But the Federal Security Service, or FSB, found out about the plan two days before it was to be executed, according to Western officials.

Gen. Viktor Zolotov, commander of the National Guard of Russia, a domestic military force that reports directly to President Vladimir Putin, also said authorities knew about Prigozhin’s intentions before he launched his attempt.

“Specific leaks about preparations for a rebellion that would begin between June 22-25 were leaked from Prigozhin’s camp,” Zolotov told state media on Tuesday.

Western intelligence agencies also found out early about the plans by Prigozhin, Putin’s former confidant, by analyzing electronic communications intercepts and satellite imagery, according to a person familiar with the findings. Western officials said they believe the original plot had a good chance of success but failed after the conspiracy was leaked, forcing Prigozhin to improvise an alternative plan.

Putin Praises Russian Security Forces: 'You Stopped a Civil War'

Is the Law Coming for Erik Prince at Last?

The MAGA mercenary lord faces a subpoena from federal investigators and an indictment from a small Austrian city—here’s why this matters.

ANN MARLOWE

JUN 12, 2023

plus.thebulwark.com · by Ann Marlowe

Erik Prince, chairman of the Prince Group, LLC and Blackwater USA, holds up a picture showing the affect of a car bomb while testifying during a House Oversight and Government Reform Committee hearing on October 2, 2007. (Photo by Mark Wilson/Getty Images)

ERIK PRINCE—THE COFOUNDER of the controversial private military contractor Blackwater—is one of several right-wing figures recently subpoenaed by federal prosecutors investigating a scheme to spy on progressive groups in Wyoming before the 2020 election. Meanwhile, in an unrelated development largely unnoted in the American press, Prince was indicted with four other individuals in Austria on April 20 for exporting war materials without a license back in 2014 and 2015.

Let’s turn to the Austrian news first. The indictment accuses Prince of using an aircraft-customizing company in which he then held a controlling interest, the Wiener Neustadt-based Airborne Technologies, to retrofit two American cropdusters that were then to be shipped illegally overseas.

The charges overlap 2021 United Nations allegations that Prince had in 2019 violated the U.N. arms embargo on Libya in an aborted operation called Project Opus, financed by the United Arab Emirates to the tune of $80 million in support of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, head of one of the two perpetually contesting governments in Libya. Project Opus concerned several modified aircraft—both helicopters and fixed-wing planes—including the two mentioned in the Austrian case, which were extensively militarized:

Project Opus also involved plans for high-value-target killings by Prince’s mercenaries, including Libyans who were EU citizens. Yes, that’s right: an American planning to murder foreigners with whom we were not at war.

The prosecution has a whiff of David and Goliath about it: Prince is a rich man with high political connections around the world, and although he has been accused of wrongdoing for decades, he has never been sanctioned or convicted of anything. Wiener Neustadt, the jurisdiction of his indictment, has just 50,000 or so inhabitants. The city was flattened by Allied bombs in World War II because a local factory made fighter aircraft, so it stands to reason that the people who live there now might have a particular attentiveness to what Prince was doing in their midst.

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In fact, prosecutors have tried to bring a case on the export charges since 2018 only to be refused by higher authorities. Perhaps a 2019 effort was stymied by Prince’s closeness to Donald Trump’s White House—Prince represented the incoming president in secret overseas meetings in the weeks before the 2017 inauguration (more on this shortly), and Prince’s sister Betsy DeVos was Trump’s secretary of education. Or perhaps the prosecution was slowed by the Austrian government, since Airborne Technologies, which is partly owned by the Austrian government, does work for some European governments—in which case, the fact that the prosecution is now proceeding suggests that it might now have the tacit approval of the Austrian state.

PRINCE, 54, IS THE BAD-BOY ex-Navy SEAL with chiseled good looks who has played soldier and spy on his inherited wealth, starting Blackwater in 1997 after leaving the Navy. He is most notorious for Blackwater employees’ 2007 Nisour Square massacre of 17 Iraqi civilians, ending in a deferred prosecution agreement and eventually a pardon for the Blackwater mercenaries by Donald Trump.

The Pentagon establishment’s hatred of mercenaries—together with what a friend of mine who knows Prince calls greed and ineptitude—have so far kept him from doing as much harm as he might. A lowlight from the last half-decade: In 2018, Prince offered his services to the U.S. government to privatize the war in Afghanistan. He called himself the Elon Musk of the privatization of war, which would be accurate if Musk employees left a trail of bodies behind them and were financed by China. In August 2021 Prince offered evacuations from Kabul at $6,500 a head. The need for evacuations was mainly from Afghans who had worked for the United States, and American veterans were at the time (and still today) desperately trying to arrange for free; it apparently did not occur to Prince that it would be more seemly for him to do likewise.

Overseas, Prince is one of the prices we pay for letting some spaces remain more or less ungoverned; at home, he’s eager to undermine the res publica by privatizing functions that are usually governmental for good reason, like peacekeeping and warfighting. His former employees include Michael Simmons, aka Michael Greene, an Oath Keeper indicted for his involvement in the January 6th insurrection. Both here and abroad, Prince’s alliances are with crooks like Steve Bannon: He supported Bannon’s fraudulent private funding of a border wall, which led to a federal trial that ended with Trump’s pardon of Bannon, though he faces state charges in 2024. Prince also donated around $150,000 to a pro-Trump PAC that made substantial payments to Bannon’s data-stealing company, Cambridge Analytica.

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The federal investigation in Wyoming in which Prince was recently subpoenaed arises out of such right-wing connections. Two years ago, the New York Times first exposed a “political infiltration operation” in which Democratic and liberal groups in Wyoming had been duped into hiring conservatives who allegedly spied on them from 2018 to 2020. Prince was reportedly central to the partnership that launched the operation; he had thought of making a primary run for U.S. Senate in 2017 in Wyoming and went to great lengths to establish the appearance of residency. Several other figures involved have also recently received federal subpoenas, including Susan Gore, a wacky heir of the Gore-Tex fortune who allegedly bankrolled the scheme, and former British spy Richard Seddon, who had worked at the right-wing group Project Veritas and had reportedly also arranged to spy on the Trump administration’s supposed internal enemies.

ALTHOUGH PRINCE IS A SELF-PROCLAIMED patriot, he has long suckled at the teat of authoritarian countries like China and the United Arab Emirates whose interests are not those of the United States or the West more generally. Giving him a chunk of governmental work to privatize means getting someone else’s foreign policy along with it—and they might be more canny than he is.

For example, Prince’s Hong Kong-based Frontier Services Group, specializing in aiding the Chinese with security and logistics in African nations, is partly owned by a Chinese state-owned investment fund, CITIC (Prince resigned as CEO in 2021 but retains stock). FSG has operated in South Sudan, including an unsuccessful effort to sell the nascent government the same two planes modified by Airborne in 2014 and later meant for Haftar. (Blackwater was fined by the U.S. State Department for violations in South Sudan.)

In China itself, FSG boasts of having trained five thousand Chinese soldiers, and it set up a training school in Xinjiang, the restive region known for central government repression of the Uyghur minority.

Erik Prince is hardly alone on the MAGA right in preaching ultra-patriotism while practicing something altogether different for profit. He shares this hypocrisy with Donald Trump and Jared Kushner, and many of their associates, like Tom Barrack, Elliott Broidy, and George Nader. Consider the mysterious January 2017 “Seychelles meeting” organized by UAE ruler Mohammed bin Zayed (“MBZ”) with a Russian banker. (I unpacked Prince’s participation in the meeting in this 2018 article.) Was it an effort to establish a back channel for Trump to the Kremlin? Barrack, the chair of Trump’s inaugural committee, and Broidy, a top Republican fundraiser, were both subsequently prosecuted for allegedly being unregistered foreign agents; Barrack was acquitted, Broidy convicted. (Nader, MAGA’s favorite pedophile, was convicted for campaign finance violations.)

Prince’s ties to the UAE have been widely reported. They began in the aftermath of the Nisour Square massacre, with Prince offering his services in 2009 to ruler MBZ to create a palace guard—to protect him from any local Arab Spring—and a force that fought in the horrific civil war in Yemen. He became a trusted MBZ pilot fish.

And in Libya, it was the UAE policy of supporting Field Marshal Haftar that Prince was executing. Prince was working under the indulgent eye of the Trump administration in 2019, so Project Opus was barely concealed. According to a 2021 article when Opus was exposed by the U.N. report, its mercenaries “had offices, bank accounts and shell companies in the Emirates.” The United States could have shut all this down with a phone call; the UAE is a titular ally. Insiders say the CIA in fact made that call, stopping the planes.

Prince faces up to five years in prison if he is extradited and convicted; you cannot be tried in absentia in Austria. So wish those plucky Austrian prosecutors luck.

Pass this article along to your friends.

plus.thebulwark.com · by Ann Marlowe

8. Something Was Messing With Earth’s Axis. The Answer Has to Do With Us.

And now for something completely different. An interesting development.

Excerpts:

In time, researchers came to a startling realization about what had happened. Accelerated melting of the polar ice sheets and mountain glaciers had changed the way mass was distributed around the planet enough to influence its spin.

Now, some of the same scientists have identified another factor that’s had the same kind of effect: colossal quantities of water pumped out of the ground for crops and households.

Something Was Messing With Earth’s Axis. The Answer Has to Do With Us.

The New York Times · by Raymond Zhong · June 28, 2023

Scientists knew the planet’s centerline could move. But it took a sharp turn sometime around the start of the 2000s.

Though you can’t feel it, Earth’s rotation is nowhere near as smooth as that of the globe on your desk.Credit...Norman Kuring, NASA/GSFC/Suomi NPP

June 28, 2023, 5:13 a.m. ET

Around the turn of the millennium, Earth’s spin started going off-kilter, and nobody could quite say why.

For decades, scientists had been watching the average position of our planet’s rotational axis, the imaginary rod around which it turns, gently wander south, away from the geographic North Pole and toward Canada. Suddenly, though, it made a sharp turn and started heading east.

In time, researchers came to a startling realization about what had happened. Accelerated melting of the polar ice sheets and mountain glaciers had changed the way mass was distributed around the planet enough to influence its spin.

Now, some of the same scientists have identified another factor that’s had the same kind of effect: colossal quantities of water pumped out of the ground for crops and households.

“Wow,” Ki-Weon Seo, who led the research behind the latest discovery, recalled thinking when his calculations showed a strong link between groundwater extraction and the drifting of Earth’s axis. It was a “big surprise,” said Dr. Seo, a geophysicist at Seoul National University.

Water experts have long warned of the consequences of groundwater overuse, particularly as water from underground aquifers becomes an increasingly vital resource in drought-stressed areas like the American West. When water is pumped out of the ground but not replenished, the land can sink, damaging homes and infrastructure and also shrinking the amount of underground space that can hold water thereafter.

Between 1960 and 2000, worldwide groundwater depletion more than doubled, to about 75 trillion gallons a year, scientists estimate. Since then, satellites that measure variations in Earth’s gravity have revealed the staggering extent to which groundwater supplies have declined in particular regions, including India and the Central Valley of California.

“I’m not surprised that it would have an effect” on Earth’s spin, said Matthew Rodell, an earth scientist at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. But “it’s impressive they were able to tease that out of the data,” Dr. Rodell said, referring to the authors of the new research, which was published this month in the journal Geophysical Research Letters. “And that the observations they have of the polar motion are precise enough to see that effect.”

Pumped groundwater pouring into an irrigation ditch in Fabens, Texas.Credit...Max Whittaker for The New York Times

Earth’s axis hasn’t been wandering enough to affect the seasons, which are determined by the planet’s tilt. But fine patterns and variations in the planet’s spin matter hugely to the satellite-based navigation systems that guide planes, missiles and map apps. This has helped motivate researchers to try to understand why the axis moves and where it might be headed next.

You can’t feel it, but our planet’s rotation is nowhere near as smooth as that of the globe on your desk.

As it moves through space, Earth wobbles like a poorly-thrown Frisbee. This is partly because it bulges at the Equator and partly because air masses are constantly whirling through the atmosphere and water is sloshing around in the oceans, pulling the planet ever-so-slightly this way and that.

And then, there’s that wandering axis.

One main cause is that Earth’s crust and mantle are springing back after being covered for millenniums by gigantic ice sheets, rebounding like a mattress unburdened of a sleeper. This has been steadily changing the balance of mass around the planet.

More recently, the balance has also been altered by factors more closely linked to human activity and the global climate. These include the melting of mountain glaciers and the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, changes in soil moisture, and our impounding of water behind dams.

Another big factor, according to the study by Dr. Seo and his colleagues, is groundwater depletion. In terms of the effect on Earth’s axis, pumping up water from underground was second in magnitude, between 1993 and 2010, only to the post-glacier adjustment of the planet’s crust, the study found.

Other forces might also be pulling Earth’s axis in its new direction but aren’t yet fully understood, said Clark R. Wilson, a geophysicist at the University of Texas at Austin and another author of the study. “It’s possible, for example, there’s something in Earth’s fluid core that’s going on, that’s contributing as well,” he said.

Even so, the latest discovery points to new possibilities for using information about Earth’s spin to study the climate, Dr. Wilson said.

Because scientists have collected highly precise data on the position of Earth’s axis during much of the 20th century, they might be able to use it to understand shifts in groundwater use that took place before the most modern and reliable data became available.

It is a possibility Dr. Seo says he has already begun to explore.

Raymond Zhong is a climate reporter. He joined The Times in 2017 and was part of the team that won the 2021 Pulitzer Prize in public service for coverage of the coronavirus pandemic. @zhonggg

The New York Times · by Raymond Zhong · June 28, 2023

9. Updating America's Asia strategy | Brookings

Long read that covers a lot of important ground.

Updating America's Asia strategy | Brookings

The Brookings Institution

China’s rapid growth in economic power, military strength, and diplomatic influence has sparked concerns in Washington and elsewhere about whether China is on a trajectory to become the dominant power in Asia, displacing the United States from its post-World War II leadership role in the region. This has generated worry about whether a more Sino-centric Asia would generate illiberal tailwinds in the international system. It also has led to misgivings about whether a more dominant China would seek to curtail American access to Asia, the engine of the global economy in the coming century, thereby diminishing America’s long-term competitiveness.

In the face of these risks, the United States and its partners have been advancing a concerted strategy to build a more densely integrated web of relationships in the region. Through a combination of partnerships, alliances, issue-specific groupings, and formalized structures, countries in the region have begun cohering to hedge against risks from China.

Even so, China continues to grow its military, strengthen its central position in the regional economy, and make diplomatic inroads across the region. Meanwhile, there is a latent perception in parts of Asia that the United States is failing to meet the moment. This assessment is most pronounced on trade issues, where the United States finds itself on the outside of the region’s two main trade agreements, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

To evaluate the merits of these anxieties and identify potential policy remedies, Ryan Hass, Bruce Jones, and Mireya Solís convened 10 Brookings scholars for a written dialogue on steps the United States could take to strengthen its overall strategy in Asia. These experts, drawn from a range of disciplines, were asked to offer recommendations on regional economic strategy, diplomatic strategy, and security strategy.

The following are a few key takeaways from the exchanges that included David Dollar, Patricia Kim, Tanvi Madan, Joshua P. Meltzer, Chris Meserole, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Eswar Prasad, Melanie W. Sisson, Tom Stefanick, and Andrew Yeo:

China is coordinating economic, military, and diplomatic tools in pursuit of regional leadership in Asia. In the face of this formidable challenge, the United States cannot afford to do more of the same and expect to sustain a favorable balance of power.
Efforts to frame great power competition in existential or ideological terms (e.g., as a battle between democracies versus autocracies) damage America’s appeal in Asia.
The United States is at its best in Asia when it is advancing a positive agenda that generates shared economic growth, durable security, and tangible benefits to the livelihoods of people in the region. This must be accompanied by, not act as a substitute for, strengthening our deterrent posture in the region.
As the United States shifts its economic policy emphasis from promoting free trade to pursuing partnerships around specific issues such as supply chain resiliency and protection of sensitive technology, Washington faces a risk of being perceived as overdoing its defensive anti-China measures and underdelivering on an affirmative strategy to promote shared economic growth.
The U.S. economic agenda will have greater purchase if it focuses on protecting the central role of the U.S. dollar, distributing the benefits of America’s technological strengths, leading efforts to address developing country debt, and keeping open the future possibility of returning to regional trade groupings.
On security issues, incremental adjustments and step increases in America’s force posture in the region are insufficient for the growing challenges China poses to regional stability.
The United States should hasten the employment of large numbers of small, survivable platforms; prioritize advances in undersea warfare capabilities; and diversify means of communication in crises.
Coalitional strength will be key for the United States and its partners to preserve a favorable balance of power in Asia. To foster greater cohesion among allies and partners, the United States may need to temper some of its public rhetoric on China and adopt an approach that better aligns with key partners in how they characterize the nature of the China challenge and plans for addressing it. Talking loudly and carrying a too-small stick has never been a recipe for effective deterrence.

Regional economic security

The United States has a compelling interest in shaping the rulebook structuring economic exchange in the most dynamic region in the world.

Mireya Solís:

The stakes of U.S. economic strategy in Asia could not be higher. American economic influence looms large, and the region is key to American prosperity. As noted in the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, two-way trade amounted to $1.75 trillion in 2020 and the United States is the lead investor in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the top exporter of services to the region. The United States has a compelling interest in shaping the rulebook structuring economic exchange in the most dynamic region in the world; especially at a time when China’s clout in advancing its own vision of regional integration is highly influential. Moreover, the United States’ ability to deliver a positive agenda for shared economic growth will be the yardstick by which America’s staying power is measured.

The Indo-Pacific is the center of gravity for U.S. undertakings on reducing over-dependence on China, strengthening resilience in critical supply chains, and protecting sensitive technologies. None of these goals are achievable, however, without partner buy-in. Nimble regional economic diplomacy is essential.

There is a risk, however, that the United States may underwhelm in its economic engagement efforts and overdo its defensive economic measures. The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017 marked a turning point with Republican and Democratic administrations alike moving away from comprehensive trade agreements centered on the benefits of expanded market access. In its stead, the Biden administration has launched negotiations for an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to codify fair trade standards, supply chain resilience, green infrastructure, and anti-corruption. No tariff liberalization is on offer. By negotiating IPEF as an executive agreement, it will only take the pen of this president to enact a deal reached, and of a future one to dissolve it.

Prominent features of the new U.S. economic strategy include: invoking national security to regulate international economic transactions, a greater tendency to resort to tariffs to fight China’s technology practices; the novel use of extraterritoriality in export controls to restrict the supply of advanced chips that could bolster Chinese weapons programs; and a revival of industrial policy. The new industrial policy subsidies come with heavy strings in the form of domestic content requirements and restrictions on future expansion in China.

Asia continues to believe in the promise of free trade agreements, having brokered two of the largest trade agreements in the world (CPTPP and RCEP) in the last five years. China, already a member of RCEP, is knocking on the door of CPTPP while showing no intention of reinvigorating market-oriented reforms. The slowdown of the Chinese economy, Beijing’s more frequent resort to economic coercion, and the fractured discussions on a more proactive Chinese role in addressing developing countries’ debt problems also cast a shadow on China’s international leadership.

Much is at stake, and much is uncertain about the competition to shape Asia’s economic future. What, then, is the best course of action for the United States to secure the mantle of economic leadership — both to advance its domestic goals and to offer growth and economic security to this consequential region?

DAVID DOLLAR:

The withdrawal of the United States from the TTP and the unwillingness of both political parties to entertain new multilateral trade agreements is a significant weakness in our Asian diplomacy. This stance is viewed by most of our Asian partners as a turn toward isolationism and an opening for China. But this is unlikely to change before 2028 so it is a diplomatic handicap that the United States has to live with. Even with this handicap, however, there is much that the United States can do to promote a prosperous, integrated Indo-Pacific and to be appreciated for it.

First, it is important to maintain the primacy of the U.S. dollar, not just because that is a benefit to us, but more importantly, because it is the foundation of Indo-Pacific prosperity. The priority tasks in the short run are to bring down U.S. dollar inflation without a major global recession. If America fails in either task, countries in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere will suffer and U.S. soft power will be undercut.

Second, the United States needs to show more urgency in dealing with developing countries’ debt problems. We need innovative approaches, like the Brady Plan (in which multilateral lending agencies worked with commercial banks to restructure and reduce developing countries’ debt) in an earlier decade. The United States can drive this through its dominant shareholding at the International Monetary Fund. A successful plan will need buy-in from China so this will require the two biggest economies to work closely together.

Third, and arguably most important, the United States needs to follow through on its ambitious plans to reduce carbon use and limit global climate change. Ideally, the United States would reduce the protectionism that has been included in the incentives for de-carbonization and work closely with the developing world, including China and India, to promote clean technologies.

JOSHUA P. MELTZER:

U.S. economic engagement is undergoing a major reform, with less emphasis on traditional trade agreements and further reductions in tariffs. Instead, Washington is now focusing on how to build economic partnerships across key areas such as more resilient supply chains, expanding access to clean energy and infrastructure, and cooperation on minimum tax rates.

That said, this new economic agenda is hamstrung by three key issues. One is that the Indo-Pacific countries continue to embrace trade agreements and the importance of commitments on tariffs that can stabilize access to the large U.S. market. Second, Washington’s turn away from trade agreements has come across as being driven more by U.S. domestic politics than a convincing case that this new approach will deliver better outcomes for the region. And third, the U.S. shift to what National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan calls a “modern American industrial strategy” has led governments and business leaders to question whether this new form of international economic cooperation will deliver benefits for the United States as well as its allies and partners.

To its credit, the Biden administration has started to address these issues. The administration has negotiated critical mineral deals with Japan and the European Union to expand access to tax credits under the Inflation Reduction Act. In speeches last Month by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Sullivan, both addressed ways that the United States would compete with China and concentrate its industrial strategy. But more is needed.

ESWAR PRASAD:

As in many other countries, national security considerations are driving the United States toward policies that resemble industrial policy and also have a tinge of trade protectionism in various guises. The Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act aims to boost green technologies by deploying subsidies and tax breaks to incentivize the domestic production of electric vehicles and renewable energy components. The CHIPS and Science Act provides similar incentives to semiconductor firms to set up manufacturing facilities in the United States and bans outsourcing to “China and other countries of concern.”

It is not just such “countries of concern” but even traditional U.S. allies in Europe and Asia that are feeling threatened by these actions. Rising domestic opposition to globalization could end up hurting U.S. economic and strategic influence, especially at a time when China is attempting to actively grow its sphere of influence. Countries in Asia will find it harder to resist the economic, and eventually political, embrace of China if the United States does not show a strong commitment to deeper engagement in the region through closer trade and financial integration.

The IPEF represents an attempt by the Biden administration to maintain U.S. influence in Asia without initiating a trade deal that risks getting tangled up in domestic politics. This can be seen as a useful step. However, it is unlikely that an agreement to standardize trading rules and practices without any benefits in terms of market access will gain much traction or help in any substantive way to counter China’s growing economic and geopolitical clout in the Asian region.

At a minimum, and even within the restricted parameters implied by “friend-shoring,” the United States needs to engage much more actively in fostering stronger economic, trade, and financial relationships with India and other countries in the region. This is necessary for attaining multiple objectives, from increasing the resilience of supply chains to maintaining U.S. influence in the region. A better strategy to make simultaneous progress in these areas is essential for keeping the United States relevant in Asia.

CHRIS MESEROLE:

The White House has walked a tightrope on trade in East Asia recently, particularly when it comes to balancing economic interests with national security concerns. At the core of that balancing act is what National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has termed a “small yard, high fence” strategy: namely, targeting export controls and other instruments in a way that narrowly restricts China’s access to key strategic technologies like advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, but allows for the bulk of trade between China and the United States and its partners in the region to continue unimpeded.

By some measures, the approach is working. U.S.-China trade hit an all-time high in 2022 even as China’s semiconductor industry faced severe disruptions. However, that success comes at a significant financial cost for South Korea and Japan in particular, both of whom will find it difficult to replace the profits lost by withdrawing high-end products and equipment from the Chinese market.

As those losses mount, so too will concerns that perhaps the fence is too high, or the yard is too large. To get ahead of that pressure, the White House will need to clarify to its partners in the region what its strategy will be as China inevitably adapts to it. Further, the administration must weigh additional export controls and licensing regimes. The White House has brought along key partners so far, but their support may prove temporary if the yard starts to grow.

Solís:

Thank you, David, Chris, Eswar, and Josh for a very rich conversation on U.S. economic strategy in Asia. I think there are some important takeaways worth highlighting. For one, many of you alluded to the underlying sources of strength in U.S. economic leadership: the centrality of the dollar to the regional and global economy, the technological lead of U.S. firms in chip design, the influence of the United States through the International Monetary Fund to address developing country debt, and the allure of a vast domestic market now seriously undertaking a green transition. You also pointed out ways in which the United States can improve its foreign economic policy in Asia: toning down the protectionism and onshoring requirements, assuring our partners in Asia that export controls will remain targeted and focused, ensuring IPEF can produce meaningful economic benefits, and using economic engagement tools for broad outreach to the developing world, including India. The recent framing of the China challenge as one of de-risking, and not decoupling, holds promise as it can solidify cooperation amongst like-minded countries. I would add one more suggestion for the United States to up its game in regional economic diplomacy: to leave the door open for potential future engagement in comprehensive trade agreements.

Diplomatic strategy

RYAN HASS:

On the merits, America’s diplomatic strategy in Asia is sound and is making meaningful gains. The Biden administration signaled in its National Security Strategy that the United States “has a vital interest in realizing a region that is open, interconnected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.” This affirmative vision has appeal in the region, largely because it reflects the aspirations of the region’s young, dynamic population.

The Lowy Institute’s 2023 Asia Power Index provides empirical evidence of America’s strong leadership standing in the region. The United States widened its lead in overall national power over China for the second straight year. The findings from the Asia Power Index now suggest “China may never tip the balance of power decisively in its favor and supplant the United States.”

And yet, there is a stubborn perception in many countries across the region that China is the ascendant power and that the United States is anxiously seeking to thwart China’s rise. This impression is particularly pronounced in Southeast Asia, though it is not limited to that subregion. According to the widely watched “State of Southeast Asia: 2023 Survey Report” conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, China is perceived by a considerable margin as the most influential and strategic power in Southeast Asia, followed by the United States.

Based on years of observations and interactions with regional diplomats and think tank experts, I am certain that China works hard to feed this perception of itself as the resident rising power laboring to shield the region from America’s power-seeking predations. Beijing seeks to present itself to the region as the defender of regional stability. It argues that Washington is working to militarize the region, carve it into blocs, and provoke tensions to serve America’s ends. It feeds the region’s fears of American abandonment by stoking anxieties about the United States as an unreliable, self-interested power that elected Donald Trump, exited the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and cut and ran in Afghanistan, just as it did previously in Vietnam. Chinese officials also promote the notion that power transition theory is the cause of America’s animosity toward China’s rise. In other words, America is a declining power seeking to harm China’s rise to protect its privileged leadership position in the region and beyond, consequences for Asia be damned.

In diplomacy, as in life, perceptions matter. And the uncomfortable reality is that however unfair and empirically disprovable China’s claims seem, they hold traction in many countries across the region. In the face of China’s efforts to erode the legitimacy of American leadership in Asia, what more can the United States do to align its efforts with the aspirations of people in the region? Where are the opportunities for America to enhance its contributions to the region’s success? How can the United States strengthen its standing as regional leader, both now and in the future?

PATRICIA M. KIM:

The United States faces several acute perception challenges in Asia today:

First, there is a persistent perception that the United States is recklessly decoupling with China and forcing its allies to do the same, while advancing industrial policies at home that privilege U.S. economic interests and disregard the interests of its partners. The initial protests and concern around the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act among Asian and European allies are two recent examples. While the need for states to de-risk trade, diversify supply chains, and boost home-grown industries has become accepted wisdom not just in the United States but around the world, U.S. counterparts — including its friends, rivals, and those in-between — must be reassured that the United States is not adopting measures to shore up its own national security and economic interests at the expense of global economic stability and prosperity.

To address such concerns, the United States should thoughtfully set principles and parameters for economic de-risking to help allay concerns in the region. Treasury Secretary Yellen’s nuanced speech on the U.S.-China economic relationship in April was a good start. Too often, the United States’ promise to consult and coordinate with is allies is perceived as a one-way street that involves Washington informing its partners of policies coming down the pike. Genuine recognition of the diverse security and economic priorities of allies and partners, and the extension of mutual benefits, are critical for credibly signaling that the United States seeks for all states to rise together.

Another perception challenge the United States faces, particularly in Southeast Asia, is the view that Washington is exacerbating instability as it takes steps to counter Beijing’s aggressive behavior. To be sure, mistrust and threat perceptions of China are high across Asia, and the United States’ role as a regional security provider and counterbalancing force to China’s growing military might is deeply appreciated throughout the region. But a fine balance exists between enhancing deterrence and intensifying an action-reaction cycle with China.

Nowhere is this truer than in the Taiwan Strait, where Beijing and Taipei, as well as Washington, have been at odds for decades. The United States must lead with a carefully considered approach to flashpoints like the Taiwan Strait. To counter the perception challenge that the United States is contributing to instability in the region, Washington must demonstrate a steadfast commitment to diplomacy with China, which is vital for clearly communicating warnings and assurances to decisionmakers in Beijing. Diplomacy is also necessary for improving the overall bilateral relationship, which in turn can reduce the risks of conflict and the odds for overheated nationalism to sway decisionmaking in both countries. Keeping the door open to diplomacy when the other side is unwilling to engage can be a frustrating exercise. But at the very least, doing so can signal to the world that the United States is not the primary obstacle to a more constructive relationship with China.

Finally, given America’s four-year political cycles, there are perennial concerns about the continuity of the United States’ Asia policies and the strength of its commitment to its allies and partners. This anxiety is set to increase as the American political system enters a new presidential election cycle. Expressions of an enduring, bipartisan commitment to U.S. alliances, as well as to newer partnerships like the Quad and AUKUS (regardless of which administration they originated in), by leaders and candidates from both parties, can go a long way in reassuring allies and partners of the United States’ staying power in the region.

Our partners in Asia do not want to “de-couple” from China, nor to have to choose between the two superpowers.

DOLLAR:

The Lowy Institute’s top ranking for the United States on its Asia Power Index depends on a very high score for defense networks, well beyond what China has. But the United States seriously lags behind China on economic relations, and as a result, the overall U.S. lead is modest. I think that this accurately captures the success of the Biden administration in rebuilding America’s security alliances in Asia (and Europe too), but also reflects the administration’s lack of attention to economic relations in the Indo-Pacific.

There is a widespread perception that the United States is turning inward, dropping out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and adding protectionist measures to its legislation to rebuild infrastructure and promote clean technologies. Probably most serious is the sense that the United States is launching a new Cold War, aimed at containing China. Our partners in Asia do not want to “de-couple” from China, nor to have to choose between the two superpowers.

In this environment, Yellen’s speech in April was a welcome voice of reason. It made clear that the United States will take measures to strengthen national security, but these will not be aimed at keeping China down. In fact, the speech welcomed more economic engagement with China and also highlighted the importance of China and the United States working together on global challenges such as inflation, developing country debt, and climate change. The speech was well received in Asia. Even so, there is still a lingering skepticism, partly because so many voices from both political parties continue to use the language of containment.

The challenge, then, for the United States is to follow through on this vision and to provide evidence to the skeptics that the United States can live with a successful China, provided that it plays by the rules and contributes to solving global problems to a degree consistent with its great power status.

TANVI MADAN:

I’m cautious about talking about an “Asian” view. There is a diverse range of perceptions of U.S. power, presence, and strategy across the Indo-Pacific. Australian, Indian, and Japanese views on the American approach in the region are not necessarily the same as those of Southeast Asian countries. Even within Southeast Asia, there’s a spectrum of views. Given this diversity, Washington will have to customize its objectives and its diplomatic approach — in some cases, the focus will be increasing alignment, in others on keeping countries non-aligned, and in yet others, to limit or manage differences.

With regard to its more like-minded or aligned allies and partners, the United States should continue to deepen its consultations, coordination, and collaboration to ensure a favorable balance of power and influence in the region. With key partners, bilaterally and through minilateral groups such as the Quad, it should also deliver on promises to be a regional solutions provider. Washington should, for example, be responsive to the imperatives of Indo-Pacific countries, whether that is the quest for quality infrastructure or the need to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing or vis-à-vis climate, health, economic security, and digital connectivity. Across these lines of effort, building resilience and local capacities will be crucial, not least as an investment in their futures but also to stress that the United States is not increasing these countries’ dependencies but rather enhancing their independence. Offering choices is a better diplomatic proposition than forcing choices.

Countries in the Indo-Pacific want solutions, but they also want stability. Therefore, as Pattie says, it is important for Washington to highlight its outreach efforts to China whether in terms of tempering rhetoric or attempting to establish guardrails and crisis communication mechanisms. Simultaneously, however, the United States should also be more active about taking on Chinese claims that it is the United States that is causing instability in the region. It can do so by shedding light on Beijing’s lack of response to American outreach, combating Chinese (and Russian) disinformation about U.S. intentions and activities, and highlighting China’s provocative or assertive steps in the region. And when Beijing does challenge regional countries through the threat of the use of force or coercion, Washington will need to be prepared to help regional countries deal with that pressure.

A final word on narratives: whatever its resonance within the United States, a democracy vs. authoritarianism framing will be of limited utility — if not serve as an obstacle — in the region. A better way is to show through deeds and words that democracy delivers the goods — including, for instance, high-quality vaccines and more transparent development financing.

HASS:

There is a lot of wisdom in Pattie, David, and Tanvi’s observations and recommendations. Their contributions lead me to the following suggestions for adjustments the Biden administration can take to strengthen its hand in influencing the direction of events in Asia.

First, Washington needs to become more assertive in advancing its own narrative in the region, rather than ceding space for Beijing to define events. Part of this work requires more aggressively rebutting China’s efforts to paint the United States as unreliable and as the source of rising regional tensions. America didn’t build artificial islands in the South China Sea. It didn’t draw blood along the Sino-Indian border. It didn’t intensify military pressure against Taiwan. It also did not escalate tensions in the East China Sea or practice economic coercion against South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping has been discontinuous with its development-first posture over the past four decades. China appears fine being feared but not loved.

Washington and its partners also need to puncture Beijing’s preferred myth that China is the future leader of Asia. China wants to benefit from the shadow of the future by presenting itself as the engine of economic growth and the ascendant regional power. While I am skeptical of suggestions that China’s power is peaking, it does seem to be plateauing. As the Lowy Asia Power Index concluded, “a Sino-centric century is in arrested development.”

In this regard, China likely will follow every other major power of the past century save one that sought to assert a sphere of influence over a region. Every country that has attempted to assert dominance over its peripheral region over the past century has failed. The only exception to the rule has been America’s role in Latin America. Hegemony is hard to achieve and even harder to sustain.

Puncturing perceptions of Beijing’s unbreakable ascent will only take Washington so far, though. The United States and its partners also need to out-deliver Beijing in addressing the region’s top priorities. To do so effectively, the United States and its partners will need to strengthen coordination so that each actor can play to its strengths. For example, Japan and Korea are good at building overseas infrastructure, but America is not. Washington can have a greater impact by focusing its contributions on areas of comparative advantage such as health, education, and climate mitigation and response. It also can amplify its efforts by concentrating contributions in strategically significant countries, such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, rather than spreading its contributions thinly across the region.

In other words, tight coordination with partners and ruthless prioritization are the keys to out-delivering Beijing in the provision of public goods for the region. This should be an achievable outcome, particularly as Beijing’s spigot for overseas development projects tightens and China shifts instead to elevating initiatives that are more rhetorical than substantive, such as the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative.

The region needs to see more of America’s leaders, diplomats, and economic officials and relatively fewer of its military leaders.

Additionally, the United States needs to shift the complexion of its public profile in Asia. The region needs to see more of America’s leaders, diplomats, and economic officials and relatively fewer of its military leaders. When Indo-Pacific Commander John Aquilino is the most recognizable public official in the region, it plays into Beijing’s preferred framing of the United States seeking to militarize Asia and draw it into blocs. It would be far better for leaders and experts to grow familiar with Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo and U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Powers.

Ultimately, even with a meager regional trade agenda, the United States and its partners still have a strong hand to play. No country wants to be subordinate to Chinese hegemony. Every country wants space and freedom to pursue its interests as they define them. The more Washington works with its partners to deliver on the region’s requirements, the better of a position it will put itself in to preserve a favorable balance of power in the world’s most consequential region.

Regional security strategy

BRUCE JONES:

Over the past decade-plus, China has emerged as both the clear second-highest defense spender in the world and a genuine peer competitor in the domains of surface naval power, air defense, long-range missiles, and some advanced military technologies — and in a subset of these, perhaps already outpaced the United States. Facing the near-to-mid-term possibility of an acute Taiwan crisis and the enduring reality of a long-term challenge, the United States is confronted by the need both to sprint toward near-term gains in deterrence and long-term, sustained capabilities for deterrence and defense. Even while the United States provides support to Ukraine and Europe in pushing back Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and that challenge to European security and stability, there is a clear sense of urgency in responding to China’s military build-up and its military-technological gains. But in key domains, like shipbuilding, we’re starting from a comparatively low base as we slowly — too slowly — pivot in defense terms from tackling non-state actors in the wider Middle East to grappling with a genuine peer competitor in the Western Pacific (while keeping a close eye on Russia’s still-capable navy). Important initiatives like the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) alliance and deeper engagement with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan, United States) will pay dividends, but the gap between need and capacity is still real.

What concrete steps can the United States take to improve its deterrent posture and its defenses vis-à-vis China, and/or vis-à-vis a deepening China/Russia concert? Where are there short-term gains to be made in collaboration with the Asian allies and partners? And how much does it matter to bring key European allies along in the Indo-Pacific realm?

ANDREW YEO:

The Biden administration elevated the concept of integrated deterrence — coordinating across government agencies and with other friendly countries — in its National Defense Strategy. However, more needs to be done to address the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing capabilities and its willingness to use coercion within the first island chain (a chain of islands running from Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia). To boost deterrence, greater discussion is needed among U.S. allies and partners regarding potential contingencies in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and with maritime disputes more generally.

In particular, how and to what degree will allies that currently support U.S. force posture — including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia — coordinate or cooperate with Washington in a Taiwan Strait contingency? Or equally important, what are the limits of their support for Taiwan’s defense? For instance, South Korea may be wary of deploying a large part of its navy, or anxious about seeing U.S. fighter jets flying sorties out of Osan Air Base to Taiwan, if such actions weaken deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and enable North Korea to exploit vulnerabilities.

In a South China Sea contingency, how will like-minded allies and partners support one another should the Chinese Coast Guard or PLA Navy vessels coerce Philippine ships? Will the United States and Japan commit any forces on behalf of the Philippine Navy under recently strengthened defense ties between the Marcos government and Washington and Tokyo?

Not all countries feel comfortable discussing such hypothetical scenarios. Joint planning for potential contingencies also creates the danger of building self-fulfilling prophecies. However, from the perspective of integrated deterrence, and given the heightened state of U.S.-China competition and minimal off-ramps in the near term, the United States and its allies would be better served holding more earnest multilateral conversations about what each party will or will not do, should conflict erupt.

JONES:

As Andrew noted, the issue of the first island chain is particularly important. At a recent Brookings event, Japanese Councilor Rui Matsukawa suggested intensifying maritime cooperation between the nations of the first island chain. That could be a useful additional element, intensifying allied and partner collaboration in the maritime and naval space of the Western Pacific.

MICHAEL E. O’HANLON:

Indeed, and to cope with the Chinese naval buildup, the United States needs to accelerate its modernization plans. As I recently argued with Dave Ochmanek, that should include:

Large numbers of small, unmanned aircraft that do not need runways, being launched from mobile trailers and recovered by parachute, that can use inexpensive sensors to look for Chinese ships and aircraft. Automatic target recognition algorithms on these drones could identify targets, sorting the wheat from the chaff and then directing incoming weapons to the most lucrative targets.
Up to several dozen large, unmanned underwater vehicles that can loiter in the western Pacific, able to launch missiles that would deploy sea mines or directly attack ships in the vicinity of Taiwan.
Sufficient stocks of standoff anti-ship missiles to allow the Air Force’s bomber fleet to conduct several days’ worth of intensive attacks against China’s fleet.
Greater diversification of America’s satellite fleet, to avoid dependence on large vulnerable individual satellites for purposes of reconnaissance and communication.

MESEROLE:

As Mike said, diversifying the satellite fleet is key. In acute scenarios, the United States will need to move quickly to ensure reliable internet and telecommunications access with Taiwan. Partly this means fortifying subsea cables into Taiwan, but even more, it means focusing on space. If the war in Ukraine has illustrated anything, it’s how vital reliable low-latency satellite internet is on a battlefield between adversaries with comparable electromagnetic warfare capabilities. Yet Ukraine’s experience with Starlink also demonstrates the vulnerability that comes with relying on a single corporate provider for satellite internet. In any armed conflict with China, a country in which Elon Musk has far greater business operations and interests than in Russia, it’s not hard to envision scenarios where the PLA knocks out Taiwan’s domestic telecommunications networks while Musk geofences access to Starlink in areas strategically significant to Beijing. The United States and its allies need to develop an alternative technology that is as robust and performant as Starlink, yet subject to sovereign rather than corporate interests.

TOM STEFANICK:

The near-term challenges of deterring China from using force to blockade or occupy Taiwan rest primarily with the people of Taiwan. Taipei has taken some important steps that demonstrate the will of the Taiwanese people to defend themselves. Compulsory military service for males will increase from four months to one year beginning in 2024, and Taiwan’s defense budget has been increasing. These are important steps that demonstrate the will of the Taiwanese people to defend themselves. The Taiwanese themselves will determine what kinds of personal and societal costs they are willing to accept in the future to make themselves resilient against military pressure from China while continuing to benefit from economic ties with the mainland.

Another issue is geography. In an acute military crisis with China, Taiwan will need to prevent China from capturing a substantial part of the island despite the fact that Chinese bases are only 100 miles away. If the United States and its allies are to provide logistical and military support to Taiwan in such a crisis, it will take days. Long-range weapons from the United States and its allies will be much faster to arrive, but they will require accurate targeting information about the location and identity of ships and aircraft. China is likely to develop the means to greatly complicate the United States’ ability to track and identify targets in the Taiwan Strait from remote locations. The most reliable targeting and defense will be from the shores of Taiwan itself. Chris Meserole highlights the potential for losing communications with allies from Taiwan. Mike O’Hanlon’s suggestion below addresses this need for localized sensing, tracking, and robust defenses that can respond quickly and without reliance on real-time targeting information arriving from outside Taiwan.

O’HANLON:

For Taiwan’s self-defense forces, several priorities are evident: smart mines; anti-ship missiles deliverable from mobile launchers; highly mobile, short-range air defense missile systems; and distributed reconnaissance and communications systems that allow defenders along the shoreline to operate in small, autonomous cells and call in strikes even if their central command and control networks are attacked.

Careful wargaming and analysis show that the United States cannot be certain it would prevail in a militarized conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

MELANIE W. SISSON:

China has succeeded in making the PLA capable of contesting the combined militaries of the United States and the government of Taiwan in the event of a fight over that island’s status. Careful wargaming and analysis show that the United States cannot be certain it would prevail in a militarized conflict in the Taiwan Strait. It is unrealistic to imagine that the United States can respond to this reality by seeking to re-establish the military dominance that it enjoyed during prior periods. Mike, Chris, and Tom make sensible suggestions about how to ensure that China appreciates the military costs any use of force against Taiwan would impose. But it is not only an attack on Taiwan with which the United States is concerned; the PLA (and its affiliated maritime militia) regularly behaves in ways that threaten the interests of the United States and its regional allies and partners, and the U.S. Department of Defense must be prepared to detect and deter these forms of aggression without increasing the risk of war.

The department’s smartest investments to enhance deterrence will therefore take advantage of advances in automation, sensing, data capture, processing, and analysis that offer efficient means through which to persistently monitor regional activity in all domains. The sensitivity and reliability of such surveillance can enable the Department of Defense to establish a baseline against which to identify and assess deviations in PLA activity, differentiating meaningful signals — indications and warnings — from standard noise.

These same means can be used to increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to influence PLA behavior. Technology now affords the Department of Defense an opportunity to create feedback loops — to test and assess PLA responses to its U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic actions. Associating U.S. behavior with PLA reactions can reveal sensitivity to different types of U.S. policy behavior and to particular geographies, resources, and relationships. Such experimentation can provide insight into China’s values and motivations and can generate information about its defensive options and operational procedures. The United States can use these findings to avoid activity that might precipitate an unwanted crisis; to purposefully intensify or relax a threat to Chinese interests with high confidence that the deterring or reassuring signal will be interpreted as intended; and to prepare for any likely response.

JONES:

As the Department of Defense seeks to innovate, it must remember that America’s technology and capacity advantage in submarine warfare is a crucial deterrent to any Chinese offensive move. It follows that retaining that advantage must be a high priority. The AUKUS plans provide for a modest expansion of U.S. and allied submarine capacity, as well as an expanded pool of funds for the submarine industrial base. All to the good, but very soon the pace of Chinese submarine development — combined with intensified activity by Russia’s still-potent submarine fleet — will strain American capacity. We will not keep pace absent an expansion of the number of shipyards and the pool of personnel available for shipbuilding and maintenance; that will require an intensified public-private partnership between the Navy, the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration, the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, and key shipbuilding firms — both U.S. and allied. To sustain the advantage over time is not just a matter of more ships, though. It also requires an intensification of effort in the oceanographic sciences, especially in the deep-sea domain — where China is investing heavily in dual-use science and mapping. Here too, intensified collaboration with allies and partners can be a “force” multiplier. The second pillar of AUKUS provides a good starting point for this, and U.S. strategy should actively encourage a wider consortium of actors that can associate themselves with Pillar II — making this the kernel of a wider naval technology “alliance” for the region.

About the Authors

David Dollar

Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Global Economy and Development, John L. Thornton China Center

Ryan Hass

Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center

Bruce Jones

Director – Project on International Order and Strategy

Patricia M. Kim

David M. Rubenstein Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center

Tanvi Madan

Director – The India Project

Joshua P. Meltzer

Senior Fellow – Global Economy and Development

Chris Meserole

Director – Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technology Initiative

Michael E. O’Hanlon

Director of Research – Foreign Policy

Eswar Prasad

Senior Fellow – Global Economy and Development

Melanie W. Sisson

Fellow – Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology

Mireya Solís

Director – Center for East Asia Policy Studies

Tom Stefanick

Visiting Fellow – Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology

Andrew Yeo

Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies

Acknowledgments

Editorial: Adam Lammon

Web design: Rachel Slattery

The Brookings Institution

10. China has its eyes on Okinawa

Excerpts:

June Teufel Dreyer, a specialist on both China and Japan at the University of Miami, sees a familiar pattern. When China wants to make a controversial claim, it may first get mentioned at a low-key conference, she explains, then cited in a government document or media report, followed by a reference from a senior official. “It’s a way to create a fait accompli by inches,” says Ms Dreyer.

In the case of the Ryukyu Islands, the inferences made by Chinese commentators extend to other territorial disputes. Japan’s claim to the Senkakus is based in part on its assertion that they had long ago been administered from the Ryukyus. But some observers think all the bluster is actually related to Taiwan.

Last year Japan, citing concerns about a conflict over Taiwan, announced that it would boost its military capabilities in the Ryukyu Islands, expanding bases and adding troops. The island of Okinawa (which is part of the Ryukyu chain) is already home to several American military facilities. China may see its Ryukyu boom as a way of signalling its displeasure. But it is unlikely to dissuade Japan from beefing up the Ryukyus’ defences. Quite the opposite

China has its eyes on Okinawa

As if the country isn’t involved in enough territorial disputes

The Economist

Jun 22nd 2023 | BEIJING

When Xi Jinping strolled around the national archives in Beijing earlier this month, it seemed like a routine tour. China’s supreme leader commented on various items that piqued his interest, such as ancient scripts engraved on animal bone and an astronomical map from the Song dynasty (960–1279). But his remarks about a manuscript from the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) received the most attention. It described old ties between the Chinese province of Fujian and the independent Ryukyu kingdom, a collection of islands that was later annexed by Japan and turned into Okinawa prefecture. The book, said a staffer, “plays an important political role”. Mr Xi responded that, having served as a senior official in Fujian, he was aware of the “deep” history of the exchanges.

Listen to this story.Enjoy more audio and podcasts on iOS or Android.

That may not seem like much of a statement. The Chinese government has never asserted a claim to the Ryukyu Islands. But for years a collection of Chinese scholars, analysts and military officials have questioned Japanese rule there, with some arguing that the islands’ inhabitants paid tribute to Chinese emperors long before they recognised Japan’s authority. So it is curious that Mr Xi’s comments were reported on the front page of the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party. Some observers think it was meant to send a message to Japan.

That was the idea a decade ago, during the first “Ryukyu boom”, as some scholars now call it. Back then, China and Japan were sparring over five East China Sea islets, which Japan controls and calls the Senkakus, but which China claims and calls the Diaoyus. As tensions rose, Chinese commentators also began pressing the Ryukyu issue in state-run media. Analysts believe they were allowed—and perhaps encouraged—to mouth off in order to strengthen China’s bargaining position and to make clear to Japan that nationalist sentiment was strong in China.

Today there are signs of a new Ryukyu boom. Days after Mr Xi made his comments, a state-television report in the southern city of Shenzhen raised many of the same questions about the islands and quoted Chinese specialists who stopped just short of denying Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa prefecture. They spoke of China’s benevolent role in the early history of the Ryukyus, contrasting it with descriptions of Japanese bullying.

June Teufel Dreyer, a specialist on both China and Japan at the University of Miami, sees a familiar pattern. When China wants to make a controversial claim, it may first get mentioned at a low-key conference, she explains, then cited in a government document or media report, followed by a reference from a senior official. “It’s a way to create a fait accompli by inches,” says Ms Dreyer.

In the case of the Ryukyu Islands, the inferences made by Chinese commentators extend to other territorial disputes. Japan’s claim to the Senkakus is based in part on its assertion that they had long ago been administered from the Ryukyus. But some observers think all the bluster is actually related to Taiwan.

Last year Japan, citing concerns about a conflict over Taiwan, announced that it would boost its military capabilities in the Ryukyu Islands, expanding bases and adding troops. The island of Okinawa (which is part of the Ryukyu chain) is already home to several American military facilities. China may see its Ryukyu boom as a way of signalling its displeasure. But it is unlikely to dissuade Japan from beefing up the Ryukyus’ defences. Quite the opposite. ■

Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world.

This article appeared in the China section of the print edition under the headline "Eyes on Okinawa"

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11. Air Advisors take it to the Edge

Air Advisors take it to the Edge

dvidshub.net

Photo By Master Sgt. Rafael Rosa | U.S. Airmen assigned to the 156th Security Operations Squadron, prepare to carry a...... read more

Photo By Master Sgt. Rafael Rosa | U.S. Airmen assigned to the 156th Security Operations Squadron, prepare to carry a simulated distressed person to receive medical care during the Advisor Edge exercise at Roosevelt Roads, Ceiba, Puerto Rico, June 8, 2023. Advisor Edge was a multi-unit exercise with the integration of government agencies, where participant units tested air advising skills and strengthened partnerships through unique challenges, allowing burden sharing in combat with partner nations. (U.S. Air National Guard photo by Master Sgt. Rafael D. Rosa) | View Image Page

CAROLINA, PUERTO RICO

06.21.2023

Story by Airman 1st Class Victoria Jewett

156th Wing

CEIBA, Puerto Rico — Several units and service branches partnered with Puerto Rico government and local agencies to conduct Advisor Edge 2023, a multi-unit exercise focused on maximizing capabilities and interoperability with partner nations, executed in San Juan, Aguadilla, and Ceiba, Puerto Rico from June 1-8.

The joint exercise was created by Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) specialists assigned to the 156th Tactical Advisory Squadron, the 818th Mobility Support Advisory Squadron and the 571st Mobility Support Advisory Squadron, where participant units tested air advising skills to strengthen partnerships and overcome unique challenges, allowing burden sharing during peacetime, as well as wartime.

“Advisor Edge 2023 was specifically designed to test, train, and exercise Air Advisor readiness to adjust from peacetime operations, to Air Advisor operations across the continuum of conflict, from competition with our pacing challenge to a regional human-caused crisis or natural disaster, to include large scale combat operations during a conflict,” said Lt. Col. Brian Broekemeier the 156th TAS commander. “This exercise challenged our teams to adapt, and provided us the opportunity to test and evaluate some new team designs and communications equipment to get us ready to operate where and when we’re needed.”

The air advisory squadrons developed and aligned tactics, training, and procedures to shape future adaptation where they operated by, with, and through a simulated partner nation in scenarios of competition, crisis, and conflict.

“This exercise provided an unparalleled opportunity to focus on how we need to train, organize, equip, and sustain Air Advisors for operations in more austere and higher threat environments,” said Broekemeier. “If a crisis or conflict happens, other elements of U.S. forces will have to fight to get to the fight; we’ll already be there, side-by-side with our allies and partners to sustain integration during unified operations.”

Air Advisor teams demonstrated operational and tactical integration with a capable, trained and willing foreign security force, supporting U.S. and allied objectives through the familiarization of common operating areas such as cargo handling, airfield operations, marshaling, fuels, airfield assessment and communications.

“This exercise was a great opportunity to practice and demonstrate how Air Advisors can use partnerships to achieve objectives in places with minimal U.S. presence,” said U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Gregory Marti, a SERE specialist with the 156th TAS. “In this scenario we have created a mutually beneficial relationship with a simulated partner nation to train, evaluate and utilize their air mobility capability throughout the spectrum of peacetime, crisis and conflict.”

The support of the Puerto Rico National Guard Army Aviation, U.S. Coast Guard, Puerto Rico Police Department, Fuerzas Unidas de Rápida Acción (FURA), Ceiba airport, as well as all other units and agencies involved ensured a successful training experience.

“We could not have built this elaborate scenario that included simulated U.S. partnerships, without building our own real-world partnerships with all the Advisor Edge supporting entities here in Puerto Rico,” said Marti. “It really was a win-win for everyone, being that all the organizations got some solid training value out of their participation, we hope to work alongside them in the future.”

Air Advisors help build global air, space, and cyber partnerships with counterparts in foreign security forces and apply their Air Force expertise to assess, train, educate, advise, assist, and equip partner nations, providing an effective and strategic response to rapidly evolving situations.

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12. In Brief: Prigozhin's Mutiny - War on the Rocks

In Brief: Prigozhin's Mutiny - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Michael Kofman · June 28, 2023

This is a free edition of our members-only newsletter, In Brief, where each week we ask three experts to weigh in on a key issue or event. To receive more exclusive content like this, sign up to become a War on the Rocks member today.

***

This weekend, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Russian mercenary Wagner Group, led a mutiny against the Russian military. From Friday night into Saturday, Wagner forces managed to capture the city of Rostov and marched toward Moscow until, on Saturday night, they agreed to stand down after striking a deal with the Russian government. According to Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Prigozhin will be banished to Belarus and charges against him will be dropped; Wagner fighters who participated in the attempted mutiny will not be prosecuted, and those who did not participate will be offered contracts with the Defense Ministry. The situation is still developing, however, and much remains unclear about the fate of the Wagner Group. We asked four experts to tell us more.

US joint forces lack a ‘common goal’ for the future, says top Marine

marinecorpstimes.com · by Jaime Moore-Carrillo · June 28, 2023

The U.S. military branches need to establish a concerted development plan if they hope to effectively modernize, the Marine Corps’ outgoing commandant said during a symposium speech Tuesday morning.

“I think the speed of the joint force and a common goal in the future is what’s lacking right now,” Gen. David Berger said from the exhibition hall of the Walter E. Washington Convention Center in downtown Washington. “And we also don’t have the speed, the velocity to get us there.”

Berger’s address headlined the first day of Modern Day Marine, an annual three-day exposition showcasing the Corps’ latest gadgets and end goals. The commandant, set to retire mid-July, spent much of his speech touting his branch’s progress on Force Design 2030, a sweeping revamping of Marine structure, strategy and capability.

“Marines are leading the joint force in innovation, modernization, and that’s exactly what you would expect Marines to be doing,” Berger said.

Next commandant says he will accelerate Marine Corps’ transformation

Gen. Eric Smith said global threats demand that the Corps move even faster with its overhaul.

Berger debuted his new vision for the Marine Corps in March 2020 to a mixture of criticism and celebration.

The plan reimagines the Corps as a trimmed-down, expeditionary force geared for the fast-paced amphibious combat that, U.S. military minds suspect, would be the focal point of a conflict in the Pacific.

Leaders from other branches have echoed Berger’s calls for greater coordination among the joint force: the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Space Force and National Guard.

“The current environment requires the joint force to strengthen and integrate deterrence across domains, theaters, and the spectrum of conflict,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley wrote in the Joint Chief’s 2022 National Military Strategy.

Other military branches have unveiled similar modernization initiatives; for many, improving joint force collaboration is a stated priority.

The Army published an “Army Modernization Strategy” in 2021. The plans detailed in the document are, according to its authors, “interdependent and require corresponding updates to global force posture, facilities, and policies to ensure the Army’s modernization efforts remain synchronized over time and with the rest of the Joint Force.”

The Navy’s 2022 “Navigation Plan”— and its corresponding Force Design 2045 plan — highlighted its plans to coordinate with the Marine Corps on developing littoral combat units and other initiatives to “support Marines in contested areas.”

Future Marine operations will hinge on effective cooperation with assets and teams from the Navy, Berger stressed, as the Corps focuses again on being a “naval force.”

A corollary “Joint Force Design” plan that “says this is where we need to be five, six or seven years into the future,” Berger said, would help facilitate this alignment.

“I think what would help would be a common aim point,” he added. “But I’m not here to judge the other services.”

About Jaime Moore-Carrillo

Jaime Moore-Carrillo is an editorial fellow for Military Times and Defense News. A Boston native, Jaime graduated with degrees in international affairs, history, and Arabic from Georgetown University, where he served as a senior editor for the school's student-run paper, The Hoya.

14. Marine Corps considering changes to how it allocates officer jobs

Marine Corps considering changes to how it allocates officer jobs

marinecorpstimes.com · by Irene Loewenson · June 27, 2023

WASHINGTON — The Marine Corps is mulling some alternatives to its system of matching new officers with military occupational specialties. But it appears changes, if any, aren’t coming soon.

Second lieutenants at Quantico, Virginia’s The Basic School, the training course for new Marine officers, get divided into thirds based on performance in the six-month course, as has been policy for decades.

Those in the top of each third get first pick at receiving their preferred military occupational specialties, Brig. Gen. Farrell Sullivan explained at the Modern Day Marine conference Tuesday in Washington.

Civilian or prior-enlisted experience and individual suitability also come into play, according to the Marine handbook on military occupational specialties for officers. Some specialties have particular requirements like normal color vision, U.S. citizenship or heightened physical standards.

Here’s what’s in the Corps’ new training and education plan

New ranges, tougher swimming. Inside the Corps' new training blueprint.

By Jonathan Lehrfeld and Irene Loewenson

The Corps’ Training and Education 2030 planning document, released in January, tasked Training Command leaders with analyzing whether the policy based on thirds makes sense.

“What evidence or analysis supports the continuation of the quality spread model for MOS selection used at TBS?” the document reads. “Are we discouraging achievement and performance by giving preference to Marines in the top of the bottom third of the class over Marines in the bottom of the top third?”

Sullivan said Tuesday, “I’m not sure what an alternate process would be that would be more effective than what we’ve done up to this point. But we’re looking at that, because we were tasked to look at that.”

Before 1977, new officers were allocated jobs based solely on lineal standing at The Basic School. The switch to the thirds system was meant to ensure that each occupational field “received a fair share of the most competitive lieutenants,” according to the handbook on job allocations.

These days, although nearly 95% of Marine officers receive one of their top five choices, only approximately 44% receive their first choice, according to the handbook.

Maj. John Bailey’s 2021 master’s thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School found a “modest, but positive, statistically significant relationship” between job preference received and performance.

Bailey suggested The Basic School follow the lead of the U.S. Military Academy, which assigns Army officers to jobs more holistically, incorporating the desires of the occupational fields’ leadership and the officers’ specific skills.

About Irene Loewenson

Irene Loewenson is a staff reporter for Marine Corps Times. She joined Military Times as an editorial fellow in August 2022. She is a graduate of Williams College, where she was the editor-in-chief of the student newspaper.

15. Gender Neutral Standards, Return to Old Fitness Test: Congress' Dueling Ideas for the Army

Gender Neutral Standards, Return to Old Fitness Test: Congress' Dueling Ideas for the Army

military.com · by Steve Beynon · June 27, 2023

Both chambers of Congress have competing ideas to reinvent the Army's new fitness test, an ongoing effort by legislators to alter fitness standards for the service that only last year received their first major update in decades.

As part of the draft of the must-pass National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA, which directs policy and funds the Pentagon, the House Armed Services Committee introduced an amendment for the Army to implement gender-neutral standards for soldiers serving in combat arms.

It's a move that Army senior leaders and the rank and file would likely welcome. Some service planners behind the scenes were unhappy with the introduction of the Army Combat Fitness Test, or ACFT, last year, which ended up having different standards for men and women. Others argue grading women on the same scale as men while relying on those scores for promotions would be unfair.

Army planners were already looking into adjusting standards for combat jobs, including gender-neutral standards. One service official told Military.com, on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, that one idea was adjusting minimum passing standards for frontline roles, making the current pass rate for 17- to 21-year-old men the blanket minimum for men and women in combat arms.

The job codes that would see higher and gender-neutral ACFT standards if the House's proposal passes would be: 11A, 11B, 11C, 12A, 12B, 13A, 13F, 18A, 18B, 18C, 18D, 18E, 18F, 18Z, 19A, 19D; as well as 25C and 68W assigned to infantry, cavalry and engineer line companies, and brigade combat teams. Those jobs cover infantry, field artillery, engineer, special forces and cavalry fields.

The draft NDAA is in the early stages and will go through a long series of negotiations between each chamber on Capitol Hill and key stakeholders, including the Army, before heading to President Joe Biden's desk for signature.

Military.com reported on Monday that the Senate's version of the draft NDAA includes a provision to revert the Army back to its old test, the Army Physical Fitness Test, or APFT. That idea drew ire from Sergeant Major of the Army Michael Grinston, the service's top enlisted leader. Grinston said that idea "doesn't make sense" after the Army spent a decade developing the ACFT -- a test that is broadly seen as a much better assessment of fitness.

A previous version of the ACFT in a pilot program in 2019 initially graded soldiers based on their jobs, though test developers told Military.com that quickly became problematic in situations where soldiers did not have a combat arms job but were assigned to a line unit or vice versa.

The ACFT was created to replace the prior fitness test, which had been in use since the 1980s and only measured push-ups, sit-ups and a timed two-mile run. The Army sought a new test around 2010 after years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan spurred a desire for a more comprehensive test.

The ACFT was tested in a trial period in 2019 and became the Army's test of record in October. The test consists of six events, including a deadlift, hand-release push-ups, a plank, a timed two-mile run; an event which soldiers sprint and switch between carrying 40-pound kettlebells and dragging a 90-pound sled for time, and an event in which soldiers throw a 10-pound medicine ball as far as they can.

-- Steve Beynon can be reached at Steve.Beynon@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @StevenBeynon.

military.com · by Steve Beynon · June 27, 2023

16. The Beginning of the End for Putin?

Excerpts:

Prigozhin’s mutiny has already inspired a spate of historical analogies. Perhaps this is Russia in 1905, the small revolution before the big one. Or perhaps it is Russia in February 1917, under political duress because of a war, as Putin himself alluded to. Maybe it is the Soviet Union in 1991, making Putin into a version of Gorbachev, someone destined to lose an empire.

A better analogy places Prigozhin in the role of Stenka Razin, a rebel against tsarist power who mustered an army of peasants and attempted to march on Moscow from southern Russia in 1670–71. Razin was eventually apprehended and quartered on Red Square. But he became a fixture of Russian political folklore. He had revealed weakness in the tsarist government of his time, and in the centuries to come, others took inspiration from his story. For Russia’s autocrats, it holds a clear lesson: even an unsuccessful rebellion plants the seed for future attempts.

The Beginning of the End for Putin?

Prigozhin’s Rebellion Ended Quickly, but It Spells Trouble for the Kremlin

By Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage

June 27, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage · June 27, 2023

Russia’s war against Ukraine has destroyed the mystique of Russian President Vladimir Putin as an untouchable autocrat. Before February 24, 2022, Putin may have looked unscrupulous and aggressive, but through his military moves in Syria, Crimea, and beyond, he could seem like a capable strategist. Then, in one stroke, he showed his ineptitude by invading a country that posed no threat to Russia and by witnessing failure after failure in his military enterprise—the latest of which is the short-lived armed rebellion the mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin carried out this weekend, which has just undermined Putin’s autocrat mystique.

Putin abetted the rise of Prigozhin and ignored the warning signs about Wagner, Prigozhin’s out-of-control private military company. As the Russian military struggled in Ukraine, Prigozhin’s star rose, reaching a high point when Wagner took the city of Bakhmut for Russia in May. Prigozhin exploited the last remaining uncensored political space in Russia—the social media app Telegram—to address the Russian public. For months, he had been openly plotting a coup: carrying out public spats with the leadership of Russia’s military forces, offering populist critiques of the war effort, and casting doubt on Putin’s official justifications for the war that Putin himself has articulated. And yet Moscow was nevertheless taken by surprise when Prigozhin asked his soldiers to rise up and join a rebellion against the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Putin’s hubris and indecisiveness have been the story of the war. They are now the story of domestic Russian politics. Whatever Prigozhin’s motives and intentions may be, his rebellion has exposed an acute vulnerability of Putin’s regime: its contempt for the common man. Putin was too clever to let the war affect Moscow and St. Petersburg or to let it adversely affect the elite populations of these cities. Yet his very cleverness imposed a war of choice on the country’s nonelite populations. They have been dragged into a horrific colonial struggle, and when Moscow has not been reckless with their lives, it has often been callous. Many soldiers still have no idea what they are fighting and dying for. Prigozhin came to speak for these men. He has no political movement behind him and no discernible ideology. But by directly contradicting government propaganda, he highlighted the miserable situation at the front and the visible aloofness of an out-of-touch Putin, who enjoys hearing from the Ministry of Defense about Russian military glory.

If Putin’s contempt and the anger of Russian soldiers converge and come to symbolize the country Putin rules, the Kremlin is in real trouble even without a coup in the works. Prigozhin’s mutiny may be the first major challenge to the Putin regime, but it will not be the last. His rebellion is likely to be followed by heightened repression in Russia. A nervous leader who inelegantly survived a domestic coup is more dangerous than a wartime autocrat who believes himself to be secure at home.

For the West, there is little to do apart from letting this political drama—which has some of the trappings of a farce—play out in Russia. The West has no interest in preserving the Putinist status quo, but neither should it seek a sudden toppling of the Putin regime. For the West, upheaval in Russia may matter mostly for what it signifies in Ukraine, where the potential for instability in Russia may open fresh military options. Apart from exploiting these options in tandem with Kyiv, the West can do little more than start bracing itself for instability within and beyond Russia’s borders.

A HOUSE OF CARDS?

The irony of the Prigozhin insurgency is that it originated in Putin’s efforts to “coup proof” his regime. The foundation for Putin’s power has been a pro-Putin—or at least quiescent—Russian population. On top of this solid foundation, there have always been rival factions among the elites and security services, which Putin played off against each other.

To keep this structure together, Putin has had to forestall popular discontent and keep the political elite in line. He preferred to work with men he had known from his KGB days in the 1980s and his days in the St. Petersburg government in the 1990s, which served as the launching point for his political career. These men were loyal because they could enjoy wealth and power only with Putin at the helm. A greater risk to Putin were those who had gained access to the security services and the military yet were not longtime Putin cronies. They had to be supervised and controlled through machinations so constant that they became routine. Other countries have a stock market that goes up and down. The Kremlin has an internal stock market, in which the political fortunes of the mighty rise and fall.

At first, the war continued this routine. Military leaders were shuffled in and out of positions in part because the war was not going well and in part because Putin had to make sure that no Napoleon could emerge from among the generals and challenge him. Putin pitted Wagner and the Russian Ministry of Defense against one another, seeing which could achieve better results in Ukraine and seeking to check the power of the army and the minister of defense. Prigozhin counterbalanced the military high command, and he did what he was asked to do—taking the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, for example, which to date remains Russia’s biggest battlefield success in the last year. Prigozhin’s efficiency put pressure on the highly inefficient Russian military.

Putin could stand above it all as he had for years, the chess master expertly moving pieces. Or so it seemed, until someone came along and threw over the chessboard.

WATCH THE THRONE, WATCH YOUR BACK

The events of the past three days portend a dark future for Russia. In a few short hours, Prigozhin’s armed rebellion generated enormous chaos. The war has stretched Russian state capacity thin, and the revolt has stretched it still further, presenting Moscow with a new domestic challenge. For years, the Kremlin has devised ways to head off a liberal, urban revolution. But it turned out the greater threat was an illiberal revolution: a highly militarized populist uprising driven not by cosmopolitan reformers but by Russian nationalists. The top-down nationalism cultivated in the war could cut against the Putin regime, and Prigozhin may not be the last of his kind.

Prigozhin has proven that the fortress of Putinism can be assaulted. During this very brief rebellion, elites’ expressions of loyalty to Putin were near uniform, but they were remarkably flat. Other, cannier actors might learn from Prigozhin, melding his populism with a political program that has some purchase beyond mutinous mercenaries and that might attract a cadre within the Russian elite. The elites in question would not be among the intelligentsia or the business world. They would be connected to the security services. Their motivations might be the spoils of power, a perception of Putin’s weakness, or a fear of a coming purge. If Putin seems destined to be toppled, then there is an incentive to be the one who topples him—or at least to be close to that person. There is a comparable disincentive to wait, especially if Putin is bent on exacting revenge. Were a Night of the Long Knives to play out among Russian elites, it could consolidate powerful figures behind a plan to oust Putin.

Prigozhin’s rapid advance on Moscow could inspire other potential warlords or a string of disruptive political entrepreneurs seeking local advantage, none strong enough to unseat the tsar in Moscow but each eager to chip away at the power and prestige of the state. The consequences could paralyze the government and weaken Russia’s military position in Ukraine. Over time, Prigozhin went from criticism of the war’s execution to criticism of the war’s purpose. What has now been said in the open—that a botched war may be an existential threat to Russia’s pride but not to Russia itself—cannot be unsaid.

PREPARE FOR THE WORST

Putin and his cronies might try to pin Prigozhin’s rebellion on outsiders. But even for a regime that has mastered the art of blaming the West, this would be a stretch. Washington has next to no leverage in domestic Russian politics, and it is not 1991, when President George H. W. Bush traveled to Ukraine and in his famed “chicken Kyiv” speech recommended that the revolution go slow. Instability within Russia is not something that the United States can turn on or turn off. It can, however, be used to good effect on the battlefields of Ukraine. What will follow this rebellion is an interlude of distraction, recrimination, and uncertainty, as Putin deals not only with the logistics of getting things back to normal but also with the humiliation he has just been dealt and the revenge he is likely to pursue. None of this will pass quickly.

Although Ukraine launched a long-awaited counteroffensive in recent weeks, it has not had a major military advance since November 2022. In many places, Russian soldiers are dug in, and the counteroffensive has so far been slow going. Poised to attack Russian positions, Ukraine has high morale, an array of committed backers, and a clear strategic course. Without political instability, Russia’s military position in Ukraine is intrinsically precarious. With political instability, it might collapse.

Putin’s near-death experience amounts to a paradox for the United States and its allies. His regime represents an immense security problem for Europe, and his exit from the international stage, whenever it comes, will not be mourned. Yet a post-Putin Russia, which could come much sooner than had commonly been expected just a week ago, would call for great caution and careful planning.

Instability in Russia is unlikely to stay within Russia.

While hoping for the best, which would be an end to the war in Ukraine and a less authoritarian Russia, it makes sense to plan for the worst: a Russian leader more radical than Putin and more overtly right-wing and reactionary, someone perhaps with more military experience than Putin ever had, someone who has been shaped by the brutality of war. In February 2022, Putin opted for a criminal war. It would be poetic justice for him to be the political victim of this war, but his successor cannot help but be the child of this war, and wars produce troubled children.

The United States and its allies will have to manage and mitigate the consequences of instability in Russia. In all scenarios, the West will need to seek transparency about the control of Russian nuclear weapons and the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, signaling that it has no intention and no desire to threaten the existence of the Russian state. At the same time, the West must send a strong message of deterrence, focusing on the protection of NATO and its partners. Instability in Russia is unlikely to stay in Russia. It could spread across the region, from Armenia to Belarus.

Prigozhin’s mutiny has already inspired a spate of historical analogies. Perhaps this is Russia in 1905, the small revolution before the big one. Or perhaps it is Russia in February 1917, under political duress because of a war, as Putin himself alluded to. Maybe it is the Soviet Union in 1991, making Putin into a version of Gorbachev, someone destined to lose an empire.

A better analogy places Prigozhin in the role of Stenka Razin, a rebel against tsarist power who mustered an army of peasants and attempted to march on Moscow from southern Russia in 1670–71. Razin was eventually apprehended and quartered on Red Square. But he became a fixture of Russian political folklore. He had revealed weakness in the tsarist government of his time, and in the centuries to come, others took inspiration from his story. For Russia’s autocrats, it holds a clear lesson: even an unsuccessful rebellion plants the seed for future attempts.

LIANA FIX is a Fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations.

MICHAEL KIMMAGE is Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Non-Resident Senior Associate in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). From 2014 to 2016, he served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, where he held the Russia/Ukraine portfolio.

Foreign Affairs · by Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage · June 27, 2023

17. America, China, and the Virtue of Low Expectations

Excerpts:

For the Biden administration, a pursuit of diplomacy to moderate tensions and shape a shared agenda with China will doubtless elicit charges of appeasement from critics in Congress. The White House knows this. Even so, there are several reasons for Biden and his staff to tune out the reactionary voices and forge ahead with efforts to advance specific goals. First, the politics of the 2024 U.S. presidential race have shifted with former President Donald Trump’s mounting legal challenges. Even as Trump’s legal path remains unclear, it is reasonable to expect that these issues will be consuming for him and for other Republican presidential candidates, who will be induced to either defend him or distance themselves from him.

Second, when viewed in a global context, the U.S. economy is performing strongly. American companies are continuing to drive innovation, including in generative artificial intelligence. The unemployment rate is low. The country has consolidated its position as an energy superpower. Its financial system is central to the global economy, with the dollar firmly in place as the world’s reserve currency. U.S. demographics—despite recent data showing an aging population—are also healthy in comparison with those of much of the developed world, especially China’s. These strengths allow the Biden administration to be more proactive, confident, and moderate in tone in its diplomacy with Beijing, even as it maintains a highly competitive underlying China strategy.

Third, U.S. allies want Washington to keep the door open to diplomacy, even when Beijing is unwilling to walk through that door. By persisting in its pursuit of a more durable relationship with China, the United States can signal to the world that it does not pose an obstacle to more stable major power relations. This in turn, will open space for U.S. partners to coordinate more comprehensively with Washington on specific concerns relating to China, since doing so will no longer be seen as signing on to an anti-China coalition.

Of course, there are hundreds of ways in which these efforts could founder. But the Biden administration has put itself in a strong position by investing at home and strengthening coordination with allies abroad and can now afford to explore efforts with Beijing to lower the risk of conflict, shrink space for miscalculation, and elicit greater Chinese contributions to global challenges. And if the administration is able to patiently, persistently build contacts and advance a modest agenda in an understated way, tamping down expectations of major progress, it may stand a greater chance of success.

America, China, and the Virtue of Low Expectations

How Modest Goals and Active Diplomacy Can Redirect the Relationship

By Ryan Hass

June 28, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Ryan Hass · June 28, 2023

In the days since U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s highly anticipated visit to Beijing this month, many commentators have lamented the paltry results of the trip. Although it was the first visit to China by a U.S. secretary of state in five years and Blinken was even accorded an audience with Chinese President Xi Jinping, the trip did not yield any major breakthroughs or changes in relations between the two countries. Nor were there signs that either side was altering its basic strategic assessment of the other.

Yet the lack of dramatic breakthroughs or grand gestures may be precisely the point. By now, it is clear that there will not be any reset or major thaw in United States-China relations in the coming months. Neither side will forgo competitive actions or reduce efforts to shore up defenses against the other. Instead, this period will demand what former Secretary of State George Shultz referred to as “constant gardening”: both sides will need to develop contacts and clarify mutual intentions with the patient knowledge that such efforts will put both sides in a stronger position to manage stresses and explore opportunities for common cause on narrow areas of shared concern.

Rather than stirring unreasonable hopes of a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, then, the modest framing of the Blinken trip could offer an effective template for dealing with Beijing in the months to come. For the Biden administration, keeping expectations low—even as it works to reduce risk of conflict and search for a shared agenda with China—will be crucial in breaking the downward trajectory of relations between Washington and Beijing.

LESS IS MORE

At present, the U.S.-Chinese relationship is neither improving nor deteriorating. Nor is it locked into a preset or linear trajectory. The relationship is in an exploratory period. This means that although prospects for a major breakthrough are slim, Biden and Xi can take advantage of contacts to give direction to the relationship. They will have occasions to meet this fall when they attend the G-20 summit in New Delhi in September and the gathering of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders in San Francisco in November. These dialogues will be teed up by a series of exchanges between the two leaders’ key advisers, including, on the U.S. side, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, and John Kerry, the special presidential envoy for climate.

To take maximum advantage of these contacts, Washington must have clarity about its objectives and a plan for achieving them. Among the measures of strategic success for the United States this fall would be a reduction in the risk of conflict, a shared commitment on both sides to shrink the space for strategic miscalculation, and an increase in Chinese contributions to addressing global challenges. Such an outcome would strengthen Washington’s ability to manage inescapable competition with Beijing without conflict, and it would bring tangible benefits for health and prosperity in the United States.

Even amid renewed contacts, progress is far from inevitable.

Arriving at a more durable and productive bilateral relationship would serve both countries’ long-term interests. Even amid renewed contacts, however, such progress is far from inevitable. To move toward more functional relations, Washington and Beijing will need to build a shared agenda that adds common purpose to an otherwise strained relationship. And they will need to avoid several pitfalls.

Above all, the two sides will need to set the bar low. Unrealistic expectations will be the enemy of progress. For example, neither side is going to acknowledge the errors of its ways and take corrective actions to remedy the downward spiral in relations. There will not be any meeting of the minds on principles to guide relations or on a common framework for describing the nature of the relationship. There will not be a full reopening of military-to-military channels of communication. If expectations to the contrary get built and then go unmet, it will embolden opponents of direct diplomacy in both countries, leading them to accuse their leaders of getting caught in an engagement trap: critics will charge that Beijing and Washington are getting locked into an interminable series of bilateral meetings that have become a substitute for actions to strengthen defenses against the other. Such a scenario would bring louder calls in Washington to discard diplomacy with Beijing altogether and instead pursue a strictly punitive agenda to arrest China’s overall development.

AVOID HISTORY

Even if Washington and Beijing successfully manage expectations, other possible pitfalls lie ahead. It is foreseeable that each side will take actions in the coming months that may frustrate the other side. China’s leaders are currently focused on hardening their country against Western pressure, just as U.S. policymakers are accelerating efforts to limit their country’s vulnerabilities relating to China. The true test will be whether policymakers will be able to manage those stressors through careful diplomacy, or induce retaliation.

Moreover, the U.S. government and the Chinese leadership will not be friendly toward each other any time soon. The two sides have differing political and economic frameworks and competing global visions. At the same time, there is no permanence in international relations. Past adversaries of the United States, such as Japan and Germany, are now its closest partners. Leaders in both Washington and Beijing must remain modest about their ability to forecast the future. In other words, neither side should foreclose the possibility of a future shift in relations, however unimaginable it seems now.

To avoid strategic miscalculation, American and Chinese leaders will need to resist the temptation to reach for historical analogies to make sense of the current moment. At present, there are no forces driving the relationship toward a “Guns of August” moment, in which diplomatic blunders and misguided assumptions about the opposing side led to the catastrophic outbreak of war in 1914. Similarly, the United States and China are not testing each other through proxy wars or similar such tests of will in a repeat of the early years of the Cold War.

There is no historical parallel to the current dynamic between China and the United States. The world is confronted with heightened tensions between two nuclear-armed, heavily militarized major powers who simultaneously share deep economic, environmental, and social interdependencies. A series of decisions by leaders in both countries have led the relationship to this state of growing rivalry, just as decisions by leaders in both countries will determine the direction of relations going forward.

Xi’s big bet on Russia as a bulwark against Western pressure looks less promising now.

In the current political climate, each leader may be tempted to use the other to gain political advantage at home. In February, Biden taunted Xi during his State of the Union address, arguing that no leader would want to trade places with the Chinese leader because of the scale of the problems that China confronts. And just days after Blinken’s visit this month, Biden described Xi at a political fundraiser as a “dictator” who had been unaware that a spy balloon was traversing the United States before it was shot down, a comment that caused purposeless friction with Beijing. In turn, Xi has deflected Chinese anger about mounting domestic problems by blaming the United States and its partners for seeking to “contain, encircle, and suppress” China. If the bilateral relationship remains hostage to domestic political requirements in both countries, there will be a low ceiling for how much progress is possible in forging a more durable relationship.

To avoid this pitfall, both Biden and Xi will need to gain confidence in their understanding of the other’s requirements. In practice, this means recognizing that Xi has his own imperatives for seeking to lower tension with the United States without appearing to compromise or soften his stance toward Washington in the process. Xi is facing sagging economic growth, a real estate crisis, mounting local government debt, rising youth unemployment and declining productivity at home and tighter coordination between the United States and a large majority of developed countries on issues relating to China. Xi’s big bet on Russia as a bulwark against Western pressure also looks less promising in light of the recent rebellion by Wagner forces. If Putin’s standing unravels from within, it could cause China to seek to reduce strategic stress with the United States, so long as Washington avoids actions that could be perceived by Beijing as exploiting its growing vulnerabilities.

In other words, now is an inopportune time for Xi to provide an impetus to the United States and its partners to ratchet up economic, technological, or financial pressure on his country. Biden, likewise, is entering a political season in which he will want to demonstrate competent management of U.S. competition with China. This would allow him to contrast his administration favorably with that of his presumptive presidential opponent in the 2024 U.S. presidential election.

Finally, U.S. and Chinese policymakers need to avoid getting bogged down in debates over “guardrails” and principles for managing the relationship. Xi believes that China can survive by seeking security through struggle and risks perishing if it seeks security through compromise. Against this backdrop, any American pursuit of Chinese assurances that U.S. military forces can safely operate near China’s shores would willfully disregard the incentives that Chinese officials face to limit that access. If American officials want to lower risk, they should instead offer concrete proposals around issues requiring reciprocal restraint, such as proposing that neither country should ever allow a system guided by artificial intelligence to launch a nuclear warhead. It would serve both sides’ interests to build toward an international norm in which decisions on a nuclear launch reside only in the hands of humans.

DIFFERENT RATIONALES, SHARED ENDS

It will also be imperative for the two sides to develop a common agenda that could give purpose to their relationship. Such efforts would not offset or balance the competitive dynamics between China and the United States, which are longstanding and structural. But identifying and acting upon shared interests would broaden the relationship beyond the current narrow focus on areas of contestation. For example, both countries benefit from peace and stability in the Middle East and a reduction of threats emanating from the region. They have a shared interest in preventing Iran from achieving nuclear breakout. Both Washington and Beijing also benefit from energy and food security, each for its own reasons: China is the world’s largest importer of fuel and food, and the United States is struggling to bring down stubbornly high inflation.

Leaders in Washington and Beijing also understand that the war in Ukraine will not end on the battlefield and that the country’s postwar needs will be immense. Given its unique leverage with Moscow, Beijing would be likely to play a role in any peace process, including as a guarantor of any comprehensive cease-fire agreement or cessation of hostilities. China would also likely be called upon to contribute to Ukraine’s rebuilding.

For Washington, the point is simply to leverage Xi’s craving for recognition as a world leader.

Of course, Beijing’s motivations for engaging with the West on Ukraine may be driven more by a desire to improve relations with Europe than with the United States. That is fine. For Washington, the point is simply to leverage Xi’s craving for recognition as a world leader to nudge China into shouldering a greater burden in addressing major global challenges. If China acts to bolster stability in the Middle East, as it did this spring in the deal it mediated between Iran and Saudi Arabia, or to enhance global food and energy security or to push for a just and durable peace in Ukraine, it will be taking actions that serve its own interests. Notably, all of these issues are ones in which Beijing’s interests diverge from Moscow’s.

Washington and Beijing also have mutual incentives to coordinate with each other broadly on global macroeconomics and to address the debt troubles of developing countries. For any debt relief plan for developing countries to be credible, it will require a buy-in from the world’s two largest economies. China’s leaders respect Yellen’s expertise and insights and will welcome her in Beijing.

PROACTIVE PATIENCE

For the Biden administration, a pursuit of diplomacy to moderate tensions and shape a shared agenda with China will doubtless elicit charges of appeasement from critics in Congress. The White House knows this. Even so, there are several reasons for Biden and his staff to tune out the reactionary voices and forge ahead with efforts to advance specific goals. First, the politics of the 2024 U.S. presidential race have shifted with former President Donald Trump’s mounting legal challenges. Even as Trump’s legal path remains unclear, it is reasonable to expect that these issues will be consuming for him and for other Republican presidential candidates, who will be induced to either defend him or distance themselves from him.

Second, when viewed in a global context, the U.S. economy is performing strongly. American companies are continuing to drive innovation, including in generative artificial intelligence. The unemployment rate is low. The country has consolidated its position as an energy superpower. Its financial system is central to the global economy, with the dollar firmly in place as the world’s reserve currency. U.S. demographics—despite recent data showing an aging population—are also healthy in comparison with those of much of the developed world, especially China’s. These strengths allow the Biden administration to be more proactive, confident, and moderate in tone in its diplomacy with Beijing, even as it maintains a highly competitive underlying China strategy.

Third, U.S. allies want Washington to keep the door open to diplomacy, even when Beijing is unwilling to walk through that door. By persisting in its pursuit of a more durable relationship with China, the United States can signal to the world that it does not pose an obstacle to more stable major power relations. This in turn, will open space for U.S. partners to coordinate more comprehensively with Washington on specific concerns relating to China, since doing so will no longer be seen as signing on to an anti-China coalition.

Of course, there are hundreds of ways in which these efforts could founder. But the Biden administration has put itself in a strong position by investing at home and strengthening coordination with allies abroad and can now afford to explore efforts with Beijing to lower the risk of conflict, shrink space for miscalculation, and elicit greater Chinese contributions to global challenges. And if the administration is able to patiently, persistently build contacts and advance a modest agenda in an understated way, tamping down expectations of major progress, it may stand a greater chance of success.

RYAN HASS is a Senior Fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and the Michael H. Armacost Chair in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. From 2013 to 2017, he served as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the U.S. National Security Council.

Foreign Affairs · by Ryan Hass · June 28, 2023

18. Mongolia’s Ulaanbaatar Dialogue Emphasizes the Significance of Cooperation in Northeast Asia

Mongolia’s Ulaanbaatar Dialogue Emphasizes the Significance of Cooperation in Northeast Asia

The country’s government wants to see the annual dialogue become the region’s most prominent confidence-building mechanism.

thediplomat.com · by Bolor Lkhaajav · June 28, 2023

Mongolia hosted the Eighth Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security (UBD) in Ulaanbaatar from June 15 to 16. Given the increasing uncertainties in international affairs today, this year’s conference emphasized the significance of dialogue and cooperation, which is a critical mechanism in confidence-building measures.

According to the Office of the Foreign Ministry of Mongolia, participants from 30 countries and more than 180 international and national delegates and government representatives attended the 2023 UBD. That includes high-level representatives such as Nakamitsu Izumi, the United Nations’ under-secretary-general and high representative for disarmament affairs; Kim Gunn, the United States’ special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs; and Seyfullah Hacimuftuoglu, secretary general of Turkey’s National Security Council.

In her opening remarks, Mongolia’s Foreign Minister Battsetseg Batmunkh noted that Mongolia “has a long-standing and proud tradition of supporting multilateral cooperation efforts.” She added, “The UB Dialogue provides a vital opportunity for participants to exchange views on some of the most important issues currently facing the international community.”

Since its first international conference in 2014, the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue has expanded, involving more diverse profiled participants to enrich the dialogues and the perspectives on regional and global issues such as disarmament, arms control, energy connectivity, and the significance of confidence-building measures, especially concerning conflicting parties.

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Northeast Asia has an increasing significance in regional and global security matters due to the number of nuclear weapons states and their role in maintaining both regional and global peace and security. Amid increasing tensions – whether between China and the U.S., the two Koreas, or China and Taiwan – the region’s defense expenditures continue to rise. That includes efforts by regional nuclear powers to build up their arsenals.

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As Nakamitsu stated in her presentation at the UBD, “There has been a disturbing trend of regional nuclear-armed States increasing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines, contrary to decades of efforts by the international community to reduce and eliminate nuclear risks.”

For Mongolia, this there is an increasingly pressing need to support peaceful solutions to many of the region’s protracted security issues. The UBD serves as confidence-building measure (CBM) to help bring contesting parties into conversation with each other.

In support of Mongolia’s UBD initiative, Izumi stated, “As the confidence-building measures take effect over time, they can stabilize bilateral and regional relationships, and help clarify shared security interests, further opening the space for trust and cooperation. Ultimately CBMs can serve as a baseline for the pursuit of legally binding measures and agreements on arms control and disarmament.”

This year’s UBD also included a session jointly organized by the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia and the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, which created a platform for youth representatives to share their views and recommendations on regional peace and security with policymakers.

Mongolia’s Ulaanbaatar Dialogue is an important, consistent mechanism that seeks to strengthen understanding between actors, observers, and states that have historically been hostile toward each other. As geopolitical issues deepen and states are vulnerable to hostilities, whether historical or contemporary, it is important to hold open dialogues and present opportunities to challenge assumptions and presumptions. The UBD aspires to do just that.

Northeast Asia is a particular tense region in the security realm. With global powers and U.S. rivals such as Russia and China, U.S. allies Japan and South Korea, and nuclear-obsessed North Korea all in the region, there is no shortage of potential flashpoints. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, coupled with the Wagner Group’s recent high-profile fallout with Russian President Vladimir Putin, imposes further stress on the already complex and interrelated security dilemmas in Northeast Asia.

For Mongolia, a democracy that is uncomfortably positioned between two nuclear powers and increasingly authoritarian states, the stakes are high. But so are its ambitions: Mongolia wants to see Ulaanbaatar become the region’s most prominent confidence-building mechanism. In May, Mongolia, South Korea, and the United States launched a trilateral meeting in support of maintaining a dialogue with North Korea. Ulaanbaatar’s diplomatic ties with Pyongyang are crucial in such efforts.

While international dialogues and multilateral round-table discussions open certain avenues of peace, Mongolia believes that the actual cooperation and the formulation of policies remain dependent on bilateral ties, diplomacy, and negotiation between states.

GUEST AUTHOR

Bolor Lkhaajav

Bolor Lkhaajav is a researcher specializing in Mongolia, China, Russia, Japan, East Asia, and the Americas. She holds an M.A. in Asia-Pacific Studies from the University of San Francisco.

thediplomat.com · by Bolor Lkhaajav · June 28, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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