Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Learn what is to be taken seriously and laugh at the rest."

- Hermann Hesse

"Honor to the soldier and sailor everywhere, who bravely bears his country's cause. Honor, also, to the citizen who cares for his brother in the field and serves, as he best can, the same cause."

- Abraham Lincoln

"A nation which makes the final sacrifice for life and freedom does not get beaten."

- Kemal Ataturk

1. Special Forces vs special operations forces — what's the difference?

2. Mark Milley: Constitutional Hero or Military Rogue?

3. A Bold Challenge to Chinese Aggression Succeeded. What Does That Mean?

4. Patriot missile plan stirs debate in Palau

5. AI’s Present Matters More Than Its Imagined Future

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 4, 2023

7. U.S. Weaves Web of Intelligence Partnerships Across Asia to Counter China

8. US provocatively points new nuke-tipped missile at China

9. US making 'third neighbor' moves on Mongolia

10. US tightens intelligence links with Asia to combat Chinese cyberattacks

11. The Australian Army and the transformation of US land forces in the Indo-Pacific

12. How China is fighting in the grey zone against Taiwan

13. Welcome to the ‘unhinged’ global order

14. Old Lessons for New Maritime Statecraft

15. March of the Four–Stars: The Role of Retired Generals and Admirals in the Arms Industry

16. The U.S. Military and Its Future: Size the Force to Match the Nation’s Willingness to Provide Servicemen

17. THE INVASION OF UKRAINE REVIVED NATO. IS IT ENOUGH?

18. Ukraine develops 'invisibility cloak' to protect soldiers from thermal imagery

19. Law as Force in Hybrid Warfare

20. A Wartime Election in Ukraine? It’s a Political Hot Potato.

21. Marine Officer explains why Gen Z won't join the military

1. Special Forces vs special operations forces — what's the difference?

I was about to criticize this article and say stop tilting at windmills (because I have tilted at a lot of SOF/SF windmills). I stopped trying to explain the differences when I was told by journalists that special forces is used generically in the media to describe all types of what we in the US would call special operations forces from the Rangers to SEALS as well as foreign special operations forces such as the SAS, Spetsnaz, etc. I was told this was the journalistic standard and not to fight it.

However, before making that critique I decided to do a little research and I looked up the term Special Forces in the Associated Press style guide expecting to find what I thought was the common practice that I was told. However, here is the excerpt for special forces in the AP Style Guide. Perhaps all of us who have been correcting the misuse of Special Forces have

special forces

Do not use interchangeably with special operations forces. Capitalize when referring specifically to the U.S. Army Special Forces, also known as Green Berets. Others, such as Navy SEALs or Army Rangers, should be called special operations forces.

https://www.apstylebook.com/ap_stylebook/special-forces

That said, I think special forces (lower case) could still be used as a generic term. Only when capitalized does Special Forces refer to the Green Berets which in the US we know are the only Special Forces. But it does seem to imply that if you use special forces in the lower case it could be applied generically to all forces that are not regular forces.

Special Forces vs special operations forces — what's the difference?

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · October 4, 2023

Special operations forces (SOF) and Special Forces have been confused for years. Despite news agencies having more access to information about the military than ever before, they often screw up the difference between ‘special operations,’ ‘SOF,’ ‘operators,’ and ‘Special Forces.’

For decades, images of operators entering compounds in the middle of the night to silently take out a terrorist leader or engage in intense battles in the mountains of Afghanistan have appeared on America’s televisions, social media feeds, and newspapers, and we understand that it can be confusing to tell these highly trained service members apart. Each term means something different though. A few are all-encompassing while others are not — like Special Forces. So who’s who?

Special operations forces

Special operations forces (SOF), or more simply referred to as special operations, refers to all units assigned under the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which includes U.S. Naval Special Warfare, Air Force Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations Command, and Marine Special Operations Command.

That means everyone from Air Force Combat Controllers to Navy SEALs to Army Rangers are referred to as special operations. Of course, there are other secretive units under the SOCOM umbrella, and they are considered SOF, too.

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Recon Marines are highly trained and are often called on to perform the toughest missions, but because they are not in SOCOM, they are not considered SOF. Instead, they fall under the Fleet Marine Force.

Though its name may not sound like special operations, the Army’s Civil Affairs units play an important role in the SOF community. As “persuasive and diplomatic negotiators,” the Army describes the Civil Affairs mission as reducing instability within crisis zones by better connecting U.S. interests with the host country’s needs and its military.

Special Forces

Whereas special operations forces is the generic term for all, well, SOF, Special Forces is a proper noun that refers to a very specific unit in SOCOM. Comprised of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 10th, 19th, and 20th Special Forces Groups, you can identify Special Forces soldiers by their distinctive green beret. No one else in the U.S. military is called Special Forces.

Special Forces soldiers are considered the premiere experts in unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, with a history dating back to Nazi-occupied Norway in the early 1940s. The green beret was authorized for the Special Forces uniform in 1961. They’ve participated in every American conflict since then, from the central highlands of Vietnam to riding into Afghanistan on horseback after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

To join the Special Forces ranks, Army soldiers must pass the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) course and the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC), both hosted by the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. SFAS and SFQC make up the 1.5-year-long pipeline that a soldier must endure to earn the right to don the green beret and hold an 18-series military occupational specialty.

So, it’s all pretty clear, right? Special operations forces (SOF) is a generic term for all units under the SOCOM umbrella, while Special Forces is a specific SOF unit in the U.S. Army.

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Joshua Skovlund

Joshua Skovlund is a staff writer for Task & Purpose and a former U.S. Army forward observer. He has been covering the military, veterans, and first responders for over three years, reporting on assignment from Ukraine during the opening salvo of the Russian invasion, multinational military exercises in Germany, and during the 2020 civil unrest in Minneapolis. His previous bylines include Coffee or Die Magazine and Outdoor Life. Contact the author here.

special operations forces

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · October 4, 2023

2. Mark Milley: Constitutional Hero or Military Rogue?

Retired General Mark Milley's legacy is that he will be the subject of civil-military relations and officer ethics in PME leadership classes for decades to come.

Mark Milley: Constitutional Hero or Military Rogue?

19fortyfive.com · by Ted Galen Carpenter · October 4, 2023

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, has received widespread praise for the sentiments he expressed at the farewell ceremony on September 29, marking his retirement. The dominant narrative quickly emerged that he had provided a vigorous defense of democracy, emphasized that the military would always revere the Constitution, and delivered an implicit rebuke to former President Donald Trump. Several passages in his speech support that conclusion, but Milley’s conduct as JCS chairman also should create some uneasiness.

He asserted that the Constitution should be the moral “North Star” for everyone who serves in the military. “We are unique among the world’s militaries. We don’t take an oath to a country. We don’t take an oath to a tribe. We don’t take an oath to a religion. We don’t take an oath to a king or a queen or to a tyrant or a dictator.” In an unsubtle swipe at Trump, Milley added: “And we don’t take an oath to a wannabe dictator. We don’t take an oath to an individual.” Instead, “we take an oath to the Constitution, and we take an oath to the idea that is America, and we’re willing to die to protect it”

Noble sentiments indeed, but as with most such statements, the devil is in the details.

Milley’s actions during the final months of Trump’s presidency confirmed that not only was he prepared to disobey the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, but also to instruct subordinates not to obey such orders unless he confirmed them. He has openly admitted doing so. Such conduct is very problematic in terms of the Constitution and could be fatally disruptive to the chain of command in a crisis.

Complex Situation

This is a highly complex issue. We certainly do not want high-level military officers robotically obeying flagrantly illegal or unconstitutional orders. Their own oaths to the Constitution preclude them from doing so, which was Milley’s implicit message.

But there is a key question about the proper response. Resigning and then going public with warnings about the president’s allegedly unconstitutional actions certainly would be both warranted and noble. Staying on in a powerful post but acting as a political or ideological fifth columnist to undermine the president’s authority is decidedly less so. The elected president is the military’s commander-in-chief; neither Milley nor any other officer has been given that status.

We face two worrisome dangers. One is an attempt by an elected president or prime minister to stage an executive coup to remain in power. That is the threat that Milley and his admirers stress, and there are multiple examples worldwide that confirm the danger. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Sr., declared martial law in 1972 and proceeded to extinguish his country’s democratic system. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega has waged a slow-motion coup to do the same. Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez set in motion a similar process, which his successor as president, Nicolas Maduro, has largely completed. Critics charge that Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is systematically undermining democracy in his country and achieving dictatorial powers.

However, there is a far greater number of cases – literally dozens – in which a country’s military elite ousted an elected government. Indeed, there has been a wave of such episodes throughout sub-Saharan Africa in the past few years, most recently in Niger. Worse, most of the perpetrators have been military officers that the United States trained. Presumably, they received the same training and respect for elected civilian leaders that Gen. Milley and his colleagues received.

Historical Coups

This is not a new problem nor is it confined to fragile Third World democracies. South Korea had two coups (1960 and 1980) that U.S.-trained and equipped troops executed. Worse, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea in 1980 clearly sympathized with the leaders of the new junta, asserting that Koreans were “like lemmings” and needed a strong leader. Democratic European countries have not been immune from the danger that rogue militaries pose either. Greece’s military overthrew that country’s elected government in 1967 and maintained extraordinarily brutal rule into 1974. Chile’s military, with not only Washington’s blessing but its assistance, overthrew the elected leftist president, Salvador Allende. This list barely scratches the surface.

The shocking abundance of such episodes suggests that we must not be casual about the highest-ranking military officer in the United States deciding that it was appropriate to disobey or undermine the orders of the elected president. I have little doubt that Gen. Milley is deeply committed to the Constitution and was sincere regarding his fears about Donald Trump’s ambitions. Nevertheless, he effectively anointed himself as the sole judge of which presidential orders were constitutional and which ones were not. Such an attitude has the potential to be profoundly dangerous. One of Milley’s successors may be tempted to do the same simply because he believes that his judgment is much superior to the president’s.

Americans do not think that they have to worry about the emergence of a rogue military, given the long-standing respect for the Constitution and democratic civilian governance. However, a powerful standing military, except during the existential crises of the Civil War and the two world wars, is relatively new in the United States. That situation has been the norm only since the end of the 1940s. We incur a grave risk if we allow generals to decide which presidential orders they can defy without resigning. Mark Milley leaves behind a decidedly mixed legacy. We should all ponder that ambivalence and not mindlessly cheer his retirement comments.

About the Author

Ted Galen Carpenter is a contributing editor at 19FortyFive, a senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute and a senior fellow at the Libertarian Institute. He also held various senior policy posts during a 37-year career at the Cato Institute. Dr. Carpenter is the author of 13 books and more than 1,200 articles on international affairs. His latest book is Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (2022)

19fortyfive.com · by Ted Galen Carpenter · October 4, 2023

3. A Bold Challenge to Chinese Aggression Succeeded. What Does That Mean?

Excerpts:

The area where China placed its floating barrier is 124 nautical miles from the Philippines, well within Manila’s EEZ. It is 350 nautical miles from the closest internationally recognized strip of Chinese territory—well outside Beijing’s EEZ.

When President Marcos, who is popularly known as “Bongbong,” ran for president of the Philippines in 2022, he promised to crack down on China’s aggression. (His father, who died in 1989, was the country’s kleptocrat-dictator from 1965 until he was deposed in 1986.) Bongbong’s predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, reveled in anti-American politics, rebelling against Washington’s onetime colonial rule, and cozied up to China, tolerating all manner of Beijing’s incursions until just before leaving office, when, after 200 Chinese ships sailed into the Philippines’ EEZ, he vowed to run a “suicide mission” into China’s harbors—a clearly empty threat.

A Bold Challenge to Chinese Aggression Succeeded. What Does That Mean?

Slate · by Fred Kaplan · October 4, 2023

A Philippine Coast Guard diver cuts a rope to the floating barrier. Photo illustration by Slate. Photo by Philippine Coast Guard/handout via Reuters.

When the Philippine Coast Guard removed a Chinese barrier in a contested stretch of the South China Sea last week, some observers feared it might light a fuse to war. It didn’t—and it’s worth examining why it didn’t, because we may soon see similar challenges to China’s dominance in the region.

Initial reports of the removal—which happened on the orders of the Philippines’ President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.—cited worries that Chinese President Xi Jinping might react with some escalatory counteraction. But, so far anyway, he has not.

Marcos’ action was legally and morally proper. The Chinese barrier clearly violated international law and blocked the movement of Philippine fishing boats. Still, Manila has rarely—and, in the past decade, has never—challenged Beijing’s territorial claims so boldly. It’s an open question whether Xi will now double down on his claims or settle into a more “rules-based” coexistence.

After the Philippine Coast Guard cut the rope that held the barrier in place, a commentator and former military officer in Beijing, Song Zhongping, denounced the move as “a serious threat to China’s national sovereignty and security,” adding, “China must take decisive measures to put an end to the Philippines’ provocation.”

However, a spokesman for China’s foreign minister was less bellicose, saying merely, “We advise the Philippines not to cause provocation and cause trouble.” The barrier was carted away.

China’s disputes—not only with the Philippines but with most other countries in the area—have been going on since the end of World War II, when Beijing’s rulers drew an “11-dash line” delineating almost the entire South China Sea as its territory. (When the Communist Party took over China in 1949 and the former rulers retreated to Taiwan, this was revised to a nine-dash line.) The claims, from all parties, intensified in 1969, when a geological survey first discovered “substantial energy deposits” in the sea.

Still, few took any of this as a source of danger—for one thing, China had few resources to back up its position—until 1996, when three Chinese naval vessels engaged a Philippines gunboat in a 90-minute battle over Capones Island in the Mischief Reef, part of the Spratly Islands chain, about 100 small islands claimed by Manila.

President Bill Clinton helped mediate a stand-down, then signed the U.S.–China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, which established a forum to discuss these sorts of disputes, while also reviving a U.S. military treaty with the Philippines. Tensions calmed further in 2002, when China and 10 Asia-Pacific countries signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.

Still, China kept pressing its claims, blocking other countries’ fishing boats and impeding maritime passageways generally. At the same time, though, Chinese economic growth was beginning to boom; U.S. firms were finding investment too lucrative to let some complaints about unfair trade practices or improper incursions across obscure maritime borders get in the way.

When Barack Obama became president in 2009, he announced a desire to pivot from the ancient squabbles of the Middle East to the more vital challenges and opportunities of Pacific Asia. Part of this meant trying to lure China into the international economy, hoping the benefits of its inclusion would help make it a good global citizen; part of it also meant containing China from persistently violating the rules. Or as Obama later put it in his memoir, he “settled on a strategy to thread the needle between too tough and not tough enough.”

As part of this needle-threading, at a 2010 conference in Hanoi, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterated U.S. neutrality on sovereign matters in the South China Sea but also affirmed America’s interest in the “open access to Asia’s maritime commons”—a statement that Beijing took as a rebuke to its territorial claims.

In 2013, the Philippines formally submitted its complaint about the Spratly Islands to an arbitration court in the Hague, citing the definition of proper maritime borders in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Though the U.N. had passed the law in 1994, this was the first claim to be adjudicated under its authority. (The U.S. never ratified the treaty and, as a result, has stayed out of these disputes, though it has backed its allies’ positions and criticized China’s.)

In July 2016, the Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines, saying the nine-dash line was illegal. China ignored the ruling. In fact, in the months leading up to the decision, China started building artificial islands throughout the contested areas of the South China Sea. It then built military bases on those islands, then transported bomber aircraft and missiles to the bases. The idea, as a former senior China analyst in the CIA told me, was to “create facts on the ground” which no mere ruling from the Hague could displace.

Manila’s severing of China’s floating barrier last week—the significance of the action—should be viewed in the context of this broader militarization.

Under the rules of the Law of the Sea, a nation’s territory extends 12 nautical miles beyond its coast, but its Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ—the area where it has legal jurisdiction over maritime resources—extends to 200 nautical miles. (A nautical mile is about 1,852 meters.)

The area where China placed its floating barrier is 124 nautical miles from the Philippines, well within Manila’s EEZ. It is 350 nautical miles from the closest internationally recognized strip of Chinese territory—well outside Beijing’s EEZ.

When President Marcos, who is popularly known as “Bongbong,” ran for president of the Philippines in 2022, he promised to crack down on China’s aggression. (His father, who died in 1989, was the country’s kleptocrat-dictator from 1965 until he was deposed in 1986.) Bongbong’s predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, reveled in anti-American politics, rebelling against Washington’s onetime colonial rule, and cozied up to China, tolerating all manner of Beijing’s incursions until just before leaving office, when, after 200 Chinese ships sailed into the Philippines’ EEZ, he vowed to run a “suicide mission” into China’s harbors—a clearly empty threat.

Related From Slate

Fred Kaplan

Biden’s Delicate Dance With China

Marcos Jr. probably could not have done something so bold as cut loose a Chinese barrier without first renewing the strong ties to Washington. (It is not known whether President Joe Biden encouraged or even knew about the action ahead of time, but Biden has stepped up U.S. military cooperation with the Philippines.) President Donald Trump tried to reverse China’s unfair trade practices in a way that previous presidents hadn’t, but he did nothing about its territorial assertions (or about its more serious economic malpractice—intellectual property theft).

Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, told me in an email last week, “U.S. support is giving Manila the confidence to confront China in ways they haven’t been willing to in the past.”

This U.S. support may be giving Xi second thoughts about asserting China’s claims as brazenly as he has in the past. Biden and Xi are likely to hold a private face-to-face meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit next month in San Francisco. Both leaders are seeking ways to deal with their myriad interests—some conflicting, some converging—in ways that avoid either war or capitulation. What happens between now and then in the South China Sea may affect the tone and substance of that meeting. What happens at the meeting will certainly affect the tone and substance of future maneuverings in the South China Sea.

Slate · by Fred Kaplan · October 4, 2023

4. Patriot missile plan stirs debate in Palau

Patriot missile plan stirs debate in Palau

Palau President Whipps said a U.S. missile defense system would be for security not aggression.

By L.N. Reklai for BenarNews

2023.10.04

Koror, Palau

rfa.org

Stationing a U.S. missile system in Palau would be for security not aggression as the Pacific island country’s close relationship with the United States means it is already a target of possible attack, President Surangel Whipps has said amidst local criticism of the proposal.

Whipps, at a press conference on Wednesday, said Palau needs the same protection as Guam, a U.S. territory in the north Pacific that has a Patriot missile system to protect it from attacks. Whipps floated the idea of an air-defense system for Palau in an interview with Japan’s Nikkei Asia that coincided with the U.S.-Pacific islands leaders summit in Washington last week.

“We are already a target. The targets are the radar sites, the port, the airport and the facilities that the United States can use in times of conflict,” said Whipps. “So we are just saying, if we are already a target, make sure our country is defended and defended with the best defenses possible.”

Patriot is the U.S. army’s main air and missile defense system and is capable of bringing down ballistic and cruise missiles as well as aircraft. It is used in 18 countries, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Palau and its neighbors the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands comprise hundreds of islands spread over a vast expanse of ocean in the northwest Pacific. They have among the world’s largest exclusive economic zones and militarily strategic seas near East Asia, a region of potential flashpoints in the intensifying China-U.S. competition.

All three delegate their defense to the U.S. and over the next two decades could receive more than $7 billion of financial and economic assistance from Washington under so-called compacts of free association, subject to Congressional approval.

Palau President Surangel Whipps (center) speaks at a press conference in Koror, Palau on Oct. 4, 2023. Credit: L.N. Reklai/BenarNews

The U.S. Army has previously carried out live fire tests of a Patriot missile system in Palau, the most recent in July at the country’s international airport and in 2022 during Valiant Shield exercises, according to DVIDS, a U.S. military news service.

The U.S. is building an over-the-horizon radar in Palau that it hopes to complete in 2026 and recently strengthened maritime security ties with a new agreement that allows the U.S. Coast Guard to enforce regulations in Palau’s exclusive economic zone without a Palauan officer present.

The possibility of a permanent air defense missile system in Palau has raised concerns among some figures in the country.

Former President Johnson Toribiong said the Palau traditional leaders and elected leaders should be consulted.

“It is necessary because, in that process, the people of Palau will be well informed about the nature of the Patriot Defense System, its impacts on our natural and social environments, and whether Palau may become a potential target of the preemptive strike or return fire in time of military conflict,” said Toribiong.

A MIM-104 Patriot missile is pictured on its way to intercepting a drone target at Roman Tmetuchl International Airport, Palau during a live-fire test on July 17, 2023. Credit: ZaBarr Jones/U.S. Army

Hokkons Baules, president of Palau’s Senate, said U.S. interests rather than Palau’s are served by a military buildup in the country.

“This is a U.S. interest matter, the Indo-Pacific,” he said. “We senators believe Palau has no enemies. And we believe the U.S. should only step in when there is conflict. This build-up is U.S. interest, not ours.”

Whipps said the July test of the missile system was to assess the process of it being deployed from Guam in a time of threat.

He said a national leadership meeting believed that the three-hour deployment time was too long and senators at the meeting had recommended a permanent installation. Baules said the Senate as a whole has not made that recommendation.

“Some people say it makes us a target, but I say presence is deterrence,” Whipps said.

BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization.

rfa.org

5. AI’s Present Matters More Than Its Imagined Future

Excerpt:

The truth is, “AI” does not exist. The technology may be real, but the term itself is air. More specifically, it’s the heated breath of anyone with a seat across from the people with the authority to set the rules. AI can be the enthused pitch of a marketing executive. Or it can be the exhausted sigh of someone tired and perhaps confused about how minute engineering decisions could upend their entire life. As lawmakers finally start to make moves on AI, we all have a choice about whom we listen to.

AI’s Present Matters More Than Its Imagined Future

Let’s not spend too much time daydreaming.

By Inioluwa Deborah Raji

The Atlantic · by Inioluwa Deborah Raji · October 4, 2023

Last month, I found myself in a particular seat. A few places to my left was Elon Musk. Down the table to my right sat Bill Gates. Across the room sat Satya Nadella, Microsoft’s CEO, and not too far to his left was Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google. At the other end of the table sat Sam Altman, the head of OpenAI, the company responsible for ChatGPT.

We had all arrived that morning for the inaugural meeting of Senate Leader Chuck Schumer’s AI Insight Forum—the first of a set of events with an ambitious objective: to accelerate a bipartisan path toward meaningful artificial-intelligence legislation. The crowd included senators, tech executives, civil-society representatives, and me—a UC Berkeley computer-science researcher tasked with bringing years of academic findings on AI accountability to the table.

I’m still unsure of what was achieved in that room. So much of the discussion was focused on concerns and promises outside the periphery—the most extreme dangers and benefits of AI—rather than on adopting a clear-eyed understanding of the here and now. Speculation about the future of AI is fine as long as we don’t spend all of our time daydreaming. But that’s precisely what’s happening as American lawmakers scramble into the realm of tangible AI rule-making.

Read: AI doomerism is a decoy

Understandably, part of the difficulty in establishing concreteness in conversations about AI stems from the broad use of the term AI itself. It’s one of those umbrella marketing terms that you can tilt to the left to catch the sun from the east or tilt to the right to shield from slanted rainfall. According to the taxonomy of legislative efforts from Congress itself, AI encompasses simple risk assessments and facial-recognition tools. It swallows systems responsible for automated decisions and deepfake political images. It covers every recommendation system buried in an online platform, as well as every verbose and vacuous chatbot. An “AI” model simply implies a data-destined path from input to output, any situation where what you get is related to what you give not through the careful consideration of a human being but by the not-always-so-careful calculations of a computer.

As with any other business buzzword, the term AI is leveraged heavily in the technology’s advertising. At the forum, executives extolled its superpowers. AI could transform education. AI could soon cure cancer. AI was touted as a possible solution to poverty and to world hunger. It could supercharge the productivity of the modern employee and revolutionize the workforce. As is commonly the case, these almost-fantastical benefits were paired with notions of grave, far-out dangers. Some attendees invoked the risk of malicious actors using AI to manufacture bioweapons or precipitate nuclear war, especially if models were to become freely available via open source. Musk called AI a “double-edged sword,” an incredible alien technology that would be so powerful that it could cause immediate disaster if it were ever to find its way into the wrong hands.

Schumer’s AI meeting was closed to the press, so the actual transcript of what occurred that day is not public. As the attendees spilled out, everyone wanted to know: “What happened?” But what some were really asking was: What did Musk and Altman say? Following the meeting, some senators criticized the closed-door nature of the conversation. Schumer, meanwhile, echoed many of the tech executives’ points in praising the meeting’s success.

AI absolutely is powerful, and it absolutely is dangerous. But as these perspectives reverberate throughout committee hearings, government advisory boards, press releases, and lobbying memos, it only becomes clearer that focusing on just a subset of influential corporate voices is an inherently limited approach. The world is so much simpler when context is contrived or even extrapolated, rather than observed. Without taking seriously a different kind of experiential expertise, we risk underestimating the effects that AI is already having on everyone. I should know: In academic circles, I encounter discourse that is equally removed, whether in the form of richly vocabularied social and legal theories or dense mathematical equations and code repositories. With words or symbols, many researchers, too, speak in general terms and about invented use cases. Data sets are often disembodied from context or meaning, and still chronically underdocumented. The benchmarks we rely on to evaluate how AI models perform tend to be completely disconnected from real-world applications and consequences.

The safety of millions of Americans requires a much more grounded perspective. At some point in Schumer’s forum, Laura MacCleery, a representative of the Latino-advocacy group UnidosUS, shared a story from her experience with prior tech efforts to help education: a dead computer monitor in her low-income school district being used as a doorstop. Similar anecdotes from other civil-rights organizations and from labor-union leaders reminded me of the situation’s complexity. Sure, AI can help with poverty, but it is also leaving people vulnerable to financial scams. AI can advance cancer research, but it still struggles to produce meaningful outcomes in health care. AI can increase productivity in workplaces, but the “new AI workforce” also involves the precarious labor of AI raters and rampant piracy.

Read: What have humans just unleashed?

A product doesn’t always work as expected in the wild. In recent years, I’ve read with awe reports of AI systems revealing themselves to be not mythical, sentient, and unstoppable, but grounded, fragile, and fickle. A pregnant Black woman, Porcha Woodruff, was arrested after a false facial-recognition match. Brian Russell spent years clearing his name from an algorithm’s false accusation of unemployment fraud. Tammy Dobbs, an elderly woman with cerebral palsy, lost 24 hours of home care each week due to algorithmic troubles. Davone Jackson reported that he was locked out of the low-income housing his family needed to escape homelessness because of a false flag from an automated tenant-screening tool.

“They didn’t ask for this,” Fabian Rogers, a tenant organizer in Brooklyn, once told me. The residents in his public-housing building were in a dispute with their landlord over the use of facial recognition in a new security system. “The hardest part about all this is to take someone with a kid, thinking about rent and affording groceries, coming back from a long day of work, and tell them that they should care about any of this,” he said.

I’ve begun to understand what Rogers meant. No serious policy deliberation happened on the day of Schumer’s inaugural forum. No corporate secrets were spilled. It was a day of softball questions and prepared statements. In my years of advocacy and research, I have often found myself on similar advisory panels, notching hours indoors surrounded by capital-D decision-makers while peeking out a conference-room window at the enviable green visible through the slit between beige curtains. As usual, we spent the whole day shifting around slightly, all caught inside the same kind of cushioned, swiveling office chair.

The truth is, “AI” does not exist. The technology may be real, but the term itself is air. More specifically, it’s the heated breath of anyone with a seat across from the people with the authority to set the rules. AI can be the enthused pitch of a marketing executive. Or it can be the exhausted sigh of someone tired and perhaps confused about how minute engineering decisions could upend their entire life. As lawmakers finally start to make moves on AI, we all have a choice about whom we listen to.

The Atlantic · by Inioluwa Deborah Raji · October 4, 2023

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 4, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2023

Key Takeaways:

The Russian military recently transferred several Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels from the port in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea to the port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, likely in an effort to protect them from continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in occupied Crimea.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced on October 4.
Autumn and winter weather conditions will slow but not stop Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
The Kremlin is likely intensifying its use of tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repression and tighten control of the information space.
CNN reported on October 4 that the US will transfer seized Iranian weapons and ammunition rounds to Ukraine.
Russian sources continue to speculate about the current role of former Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander and Wagner Group-affiliate Army General Sergei Surovikin after the Wagner rebellion, further highlighting his continued relevance in the Russian information space.
The European Union (EU) is reportedly preparing for negotiations on Ukraine’s EU accession that will take place in December.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made limited gains near Kreminna.
Russian authorities continue efforts to collect information about Russian citizens for future conscription and enlistment cycles.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin is reportedly heavily involved in Russian infrastructure projects in occupied Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 4, 2023

Oct 4, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 4, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 4, 2023, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on October 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military recently transferred several Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels from the port in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea to the port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, likely in an effort to protect them from continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in occupied Crimea. Satellite imagery published on October 1 and 3 shows that Russian forces transferred at least 10 vessels from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk.[1] The satellite imagery reportedly shows that Russian forces recently moved the Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen frigates, three diesel submarines, five landing ships, and several small missile ships.[2] Satellite imagery taken on October 2 shows four Russian landing ships and one Kilo-class submarine remaining in Sevastopol.[3] Satellite imagery from October 2 shows a Project 22160 patrol ship reportedly for the first time in the port of Feodosia in eastern Crimea, suggesting that Russian forces may be moving BSF elements away from Sevastopol to bases further in the Russian rear.[4] A Russian think tank, the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, claimed on October 3 that the BSF vessels’ movements from occupied Sevastopol to Novorossiysk were routine, however.[5] Russian forces may be temporarily moving some vessels to Novorossiysk following multiple strikes on BSF assets in and near Sevastopol but will likely continue to use Sevastopol’s port, which remains the BSF’s base. Former Norwegian Navy officer and independent OSINT analyst Thord Are Iversen observed on October 4 that Russian vessel deployments have usually intensified following Ukrainian strikes but ultimately returned to normal patterns.[6] ISW will explore the implications of Ukrainian strikes on the BSF in a forthcoming special edition.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced on October 4. Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks towards the rail line between Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and the Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success near these settlements.[7] Geolocated footage published on October 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced east of Novoprokopivka (5km southeast of Robotyne) in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and the Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial success west of Robotyne.[8] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced up to a Russian trench line on the Robotyne-Kopani line (5km northwest of Robotyne).[9]

Autumn and winter weather conditions will slow but not stop Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on October 3 that good weather will last for another six to eight weeks before weather will impact both Ukrainian and Russian operations.[10] ISW has previously observed that seasonal heavy rain and resulting mud in the autumn will slow ground movements on both sides, and that the autumn rain and mud are usually less intense than spring conditions.[11] Hardening ground during the winter freeze will likely enable the tempo of combat operations to increase, however, and Ukrainian officials have expressed their intent to continue counteroffensive operations into late 2023 and exploit cold weather conditions.[12] ISW has frequently assessed that offensive operations will continue through the winter season and has observed the continuation of combat activities throughout the fall mud season of 2022, winter season of 2022–2023, and spring mud season of 2023.[13]

The Kremlin is likely intensifying its use of tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repression and tighten control of the information space. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on October 4 that the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office requested that Russian social media platform VKontakte (VK) begin blocking posts from relatives of mobilized servicemen calling for their loved ones to return home.[14] Vazhnye Istorii noted that VK is hiding posts with several hashtags pertaining to the treatment or return of mobilized servicemen and that several posts in group chats have reportedly disappeared.[15] The Prosecutor General is likely able to impose this form of censorship under the existing law that concerns “unreliable” information about Russian operations in Ukraine.[16] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) additionally proposed a draft resolution on October 3 that would expand the list of personal and geolocation data that “organizers of information dissemination” (ORIs) are required to store and provide to law enforcement bodies upon request.[17] The FSB’s October 3 proposal notably follows its recent backing of amendments that would allow it unrestricted access to user data of Russian internet, banking, and telecom companies.[18] Some Russian opposition outlets notably suggested that this apparent expansion of digital authoritarianism may be increasingly based on the restrictive Chinese model. One Russian opposition source, later amplified by an insider source, claimed that the Russian State Social University is developing and testing a social rating system for Russians based on the Chinese model and that the intended generated social scores will link to personal data that government entities and banks will have access to.[19] ISW has recently reported on previous instances of the Kremlin’s efforts to expand digital authoritarianism to surveil the Russian information space, likely to consolidate power and increase information space oversight prior to the 2024 presidential elections.[20]

CNN reported on October 4 that the US will transfer seized Iranian weapons and ammunition rounds to Ukraine.[21] CNN cited US officials saying that the US intends to transfer “thousands” of such weapons to alleviate some equipment shortages that Ukraine is facing. US Central Command (CENTCOM) noted that the US obtained the weapons through a Department of Justice civil forfeiture claim against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on July 20, 2023, and that the US has already transferred one million rounds of small-arms ammunition to Ukraine as of Monday, October 2.

Russian sources continue to speculate about the current role of former Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander and Wagner Group–affiliate Army General Sergei Surovikin after the Wagner rebellion, further highlighting his continued relevance in the Russian information space. Some Russian sources amplified footage on October 3 and 4 allegedly of Surovikin and his family outside a church near Moscow on October 3.[22] This speculation comes after prior speculation of Surovikin allegedly appearing in various African countries on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[23] Russian news outlet Novye Izvestia claimed that Surovikin denied to comment to journalists who approached him near the church.[24]

The European Union (EU) is reportedly preparing for negotiations on Ukraine’s EU accession that will take place in December. Politico reported on October 4, citing three unnamed diplomats, that EU leaders are preparing to begin formal talks with Kyiv on Ukraine’s accession to the EU as early as December of this year.[25] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba reported on October 4 that he and Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom spoke about Ukraine’s EU integration and are working bilaterally to opening talks about Ukraine’s accession by the end of the year.[26]

Key Takeaways:

The Russian military recently transferred several Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels from the port in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea to the port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, likely in an effort to protect them from continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in occupied Crimea.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced on October 4.
Autumn and winter weather conditions will slow but not stop Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
The Kremlin is likely intensifying its use of tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repression and tighten control of the information space.
CNN reported on October 4 that the US will transfer seized Iranian weapons and ammunition rounds to Ukraine.
Russian sources continue to speculate about the current role of former Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander and Wagner Group-affiliate Army General Sergei Surovikin after the Wagner rebellion, further highlighting his continued relevance in the Russian information space.
The European Union (EU) is reportedly preparing for negotiations on Ukraine’s EU accession that will take place in December.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made limited gains near Kreminna.
Russian authorities continue efforts to collect information about Russian citizens for future conscription and enlistment cycles.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin is reportedly heavily involved in Russian infrastructure projects in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukranian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a limited Russian attack north of Zybyne (3km south of the Kharkiv Oblast-Russian border) on October 4, likely in reference to a limited cross-border raid originating from Belgorod Oblast.[27]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 4 and marginally advanced. Geolocated footage published on October 3 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced east of Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces repelled five Russian attacks east of Makiivka in Luhansk Oblast and northwest of Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna) in Donetsk Oblast.[29] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Makiivka but did not specify an outcome.[30] A Russian source amplified claims that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Svatove.[31] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults against Ukrainian positions near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) on October 3.[32] The milblogger also claimed that Russian air strikes destroyed at least five bridges across the Oskil River in the Kupyansk area in recent weeks and impacted Ukrainian logistics.[33] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov published footage on October 4 claiming to show the Chechen Spetsnaz “Aida” group, reportedly under the command of the deputy commander of the Chechen “Akhmat” formations, operating in the Kreminna direction.[34]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area.[35] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks along the Hryhorivka-Novodruzhesk (10km south to 10km southeast of Kreminna) line, Vovchoyarivka-Ivano-Darivka (23km south to 24km southeast of Kreminna) line, and the Pereizne-Berestove (30km southwest to 30km south of Kreminna) line over the past week.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut area and reportedly advanced on October 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assaults south of Bakhmut and achieved partial success near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[37] A correspondent of Kremlin-sponsored outlet Izvestia claimed that Ukrainian forces hold positions within 40 meters of the rail line near Klishchiivka.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces resumed armored assaults near Klishchiivka and Andriivka towards the railway line and that fighting is ongoing in contested “gray zones” northeast and southwest of Andriivka.[39] Russian military officials claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Andriivka and Klishchiivka.[40] Some milbloggers claimed that Russian aviation, including helicopters, and artillery are firing on Ukrainian forces in an attempt to stymie the attacks.[41]

Russian forces continued limited counterattacks near Bakhmut but did not advance on October 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to recapture lost positions near Hryhorivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka.[42] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Andriivka on October 3 and 4.[43] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage of an unspecified element of the 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division operating in the Soledar direction.[44]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and marginally advanced on October 4. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured a contested “gray zone” near Nevelske (directly west of Donetsk City) and are now within 2km of a crossroads in Pisky (6km east of Nevelske).[45] Russian military officials claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka), Nevelske, and Krasnohorivka (unclear if in reference to the Krasnohorivka 8km northwest of Avdiivka or directly west of Donetsk City).[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not advance on October 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka, Lastochkyne (6km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also continued attacks near Stepne (14km south of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[48]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited and unsuccessful ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces remain active in forest areas northwest of Pryyutne, where they are constantly trying to restore lost positions.[50]

Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and reportedly regained some positions on October 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack near Zolota Nyva (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[51] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces have the initiative in this area of the front and are counterattacking near Pryyutne, Zavitne Bazhannia (13km south of Velyka Novosilka), and Staromayorske.[52] Another milblogger claimed that unspecified Russian Spetsnaz elements are successfully pushing Ukrainian forces back from positions near Pryyutne, and another milblogger claimed that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) have been advancing in forest areas east of Urozhaine (10km south of Velyka Novosilka) since the end of September.[53]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 4 and made confirmed gains. Geolocated footage posted on October 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces have marginally advanced along a small local road east of Novoprokopivka (about 5km southeast of Robotyne).[54] Additional geolocated footage posted on October 4 confirms that Ukrainian forces hold positions near a trench system that lies along the T0408 Orikhiv-Tokmak route between Robotyne and Novoprokopivka.[55] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian forces were partially successful during offensive operations west of Robotyne.[56] Russian milbloggers noted that Ukrainian forces have increased the intensity of attacks along the Robotyne-Kopani line (about 5km northwest of Robotyne), and some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced towards some Russian defensive trenches on this line over the past day.[57] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks near Verbove (10km east of Robotyne) and Novoprokopivka.[58]

Russian forces continued counterattacking in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 4 and reportedly regained some positions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forced attacked near Robotyne and Verbove.[59] Several Russian sources claimed that Russian airborne (VDV) elements managed to push Ukrainian forces back around 2km near Verbove on October 4.[60] A Russian milblogger posted graphic footage of a paratrooper detachment of the 7th VDV division reportedly clearing a captured Ukrainian stronghold somewhere between Robotyne and Verbove.[61]

Ukrainian special agents reportedly conducted a landing in occupied Crimea on the night of October 3-4. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted footage on October 4 purportedly showing GUR special agents landing in an unspecified area of Crimea and inflicting fire damage on Russian forces in the area.[62] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated that the special forces landed on Crimea, attacked Russian forces, and retreated after completing their task.[63] The Russian MoD responded to the landing and claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) aircraft repelled a Ukrainian group that was travelling towards Cape Tarkhankut (the northwestern tip of the Crimean Peninsula) on high-speed boats and jet skis.[64] Russian milbloggers responded to the attack and claimed that Ukrainian forces suffered losses while fighting Russian troops whereas no Russian forces died.[65]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities continue efforts to collect information about Russian citizens for future conscription and enlistment cycles. Russian State Duma Committee on Defense Chairman Andrei Kartapolov announced on October 4 that the Russian government will require private clinics and other organizations to provide information about Russian citizens to military registration and enlistment offices.[66] Kartapolov stated that the Russian tax service, Federal Service for the Supervision of Education and Science (Rosobrnadzor), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and other unspecified organizations will also be responsible for providing data to military registration and enlistment offices. Kartapolov stated that this will “remove excess burden” from military registration and enlistment offices and help avoid mistakes when sending out summonses during conscription cycles. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News noted that Rosobrnadzor will collect student information from schools and universities and then submit that information to an electronic database for military registration and enlistment offices.[67]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will issue military service certificates of participation to former Wagner Group personnel who fought in the war in Ukraine. Russian Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation Chairwoman Anna Tsivileva announced on October 4 that the Russian MoD has formed a special commission to issue military service certificates to Wagner personnel.[68] Tsivileva stated that the Russian MoD created the commission ”now that issues have finally been resolved regarding Wagner,” likely in reference to ongoing efforts by the Kremlin and Russian MoD to subsume Wagner following the June 24 armed rebellion.[69] Tsivileva stated that the commission will provide the documentation to coordinators who will distribute the documents to Wagner personnel throughout Russia, so that the servicemen do not have to travel to “St. Petersburg, Moscow, or the MoD.” A Wagner-affiliated source claimed that the Russian MoD has previously withheld military service certificates from personnel who served in Ukraine with irregular formations or private military companies (PMC), like Wagner.[70]

Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on October 4 that Russian military registration and enlistment offices in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast have begun sending military summonses to local residents.[71]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin is reportedly heavily involved in Russian infrastructure projects in occupied Ukraine. Russian opposition news outlet Meduza reported on October 4 that Khusnullin plays a key role in distributing construction contracts to build infrastructure in occupied Ukraine.[72] Unnamed sources close to the Russian presidential administration and government told Meduza that Khusnullin has become “one of Putin’s favorite subordinates.”[73] Meduza reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin was not interested in “peaceful affairs” or domestic Russian issues during the first months of the war but that Khusnullin began traveling to occupied areas and started Russian government projects to begin infrastructure restoration.[74] Meduza noted that Khusnullin has repeatedly reported “positive news” to Putin about infrastructure repairs in occupied Ukraine, accompanied Putin to occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast in March 2023, and been publicly praised by Putin multiple times.[75]

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to forcibly indoctrinate Ukrainian youth into Russian culture and identity through the establishment of military-patriotic educational facilities. Yevpatoria city administration occupation head Elena Demidova announced on October 1 that Russian occupation officials opened the new “Avangard” center for military and patriotic education in the “Gagarin” children’s health camp in occupied Yevpatoria, Crimea.[76] The “Avangard” center reportedly accepted its first group of 100 ninth-through-eleventh grade students to learn basic Russian military training and participate in “patriotic leisure activities” from October 1 to 6.[77]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

7. U.S. Weaves Web of Intelligence Partnerships Across Asia to Counter China

Excerpts:

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment on the relationships. A White House spokesperson said the US cooperation in the region includes sharing information but declined to comment on specific relationships. India’s Ministry of External Affairs declined to comment. The South Korean, Japanese, Australian, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments did not respond to requests for comment.

China’s increasing assertiveness in the region, combined with leadership changes in some capitals, has made countries such as South Korea and the Philippines more willing to cooperate of late, the U.S. officials said. Some partners in the region also hope the ties will provide some security in the event Donald Trump wins the U.S. presidential election next year. The closer links are already delivering results, the officials noted.

Late last year, India was able to repel a Chinese military incursion in the Himalayas thanks to strengthened intelligence-sharing with the U.S. military, according to U.S. News & World Report. In May 2022, the Quad countries announced a pact that provides data from commercial satellites to countries across the Pacific, allowing them to track the activities of China’s maritime militia, as well as smuggling and illegal fishing.

U.S. Weaves Web of Intelligence Partnerships Across Asia to Counter China

TIME · by Peter Martin and Jenny Leonard / Bloomberg · October 5, 2023

The U.S. is deepening intelligence cooperation with countries across Asia as it looks to counter Beijing’s sophisticated spying apparatus and blunt Chinese cyber attacks.

The Biden administration has developed a set of separate but overlapping partnerships in Asia, including an intelligence-sharing arrangement with the “Quad” grouping of the U.S., India, Japan and Australia, according to U.S. officials who asked not to be identified discussing matters that aren’t public.

The web of relationships also includes trilateral partnerships among the U.S., Japan and South Korea, and one encompassing the U.S., Japan and the Philippines, the officials said.

The push also involves strengthened bilateral sharing of information with Japan, India and Vietnam, according to the officials, who added that a major focus of these relationships is boosting resilience to Chinese offensive operations online.

These new and strengthened partnerships, known formally as intelligence liaison relationships, are in part aimed at reducing the growing power of China’s spy apparatus, which a recent U.K. parliamentary report described as the world’s largest. The administration effort is part of a broader drive to deepen links across the region amid growing alarm at the threat from Beijing.

“Intelligence liaison can serve as an important force multiplier,” said Daniel Byman, a specialist on the topic at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “It can expand overall collection as different countries will have access to different secrets in different parts of the world.”

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment on the relationships. A White House spokesperson said the US cooperation in the region includes sharing information but declined to comment on specific relationships. India’s Ministry of External Affairs declined to comment. The South Korean, Japanese, Australian, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments did not respond to requests for comment.

China’s increasing assertiveness in the region, combined with leadership changes in some capitals, has made countries such as South Korea and the Philippines more willing to cooperate of late, the U.S. officials said. Some partners in the region also hope the ties will provide some security in the event Donald Trump wins the U.S. presidential election next year. The closer links are already delivering results, the officials noted.

Late last year, India was able to repel a Chinese military incursion in the Himalayas thanks to strengthened intelligence-sharing with the U.S. military, according to U.S. News & World Report. In May 2022, the Quad countries announced a pact that provides data from commercial satellites to countries across the Pacific, allowing them to track the activities of China’s maritime militia, as well as smuggling and illegal fishing.

Deepened ties with Japan in this area come after what Washington sees as a quiet push by Tokyo to resolve longstanding U.S. concerns about its ability to keep a secret, U.S. officials said. In May, the U.S. Space Force announced the delivery of sensitive satellite-tracking equipment to Japan.

In a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Wednesday, Japan’s defense minister Minoru Kihara vowed to carry out a drastic upgrade of information protection and cyber security capabilities with American help, according to a readout from the Japanese Defense Ministry.

Still, obstacles remain — not least because of questions about the U.S.’s own ability to keep a secret. In April, the Justice Department charged 21-year-old National Guard airman, Jack Teixeira, with illegally disseminating classified information, including sensitive battlefield data about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and revelations that the U.S. eavesdropped on allies such as South Korea.

The partnerships will complement the “Five Eyes” arrangement that has long been the cornerstone of U.S. intelligence partnerships. That informal network consisting of the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand has shifted its focus to China in recent years, but its exclusive English-speaking membership limits its reach and relevance in Asia.

Five Eyes countries have been sharing secret information for decades through intimate networks of officials that permeate their intelligence, defense and foreign ministries. Asia’s emerging spy pacts are much newer and will likely take time to rival the Five Eyes.

“The Five Eyes’ dominance is pretty established, but when you start to work on different problems you get different priorities,” Byman said. “As we shift to China, then countries like Japan and South Korea become more important, alongside Five Eyes partners in the region like Australia and New Zealand.”

—With assistance from Sudhi Ranjan Sen.

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8. US provocatively points new nuke-tipped missile at China

Excerpts:

The AGM-181A’s development could also have profound implications for global nuclear non-proliferation by contradicting the spirit, objectives and disarmament provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

While the AGM-181A LRSO per se is not a nuclear weapon, its development as a nuclear delivery system could also raise concerns about potential violations of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Additionally, amid ongoing nuclear arsenal modernization programs and uncertain statuses of other key treaties like New START, the AGM-181A LRSO’s development could further complicate and dangerously jeopardize diplomatic efforts between nuclear-armed states amid rising tensions in what some see as a budding new cold war.

US provocatively points new nuke-tipped missile at China

AGM-181A cruise missile bolsters US air-based nuclear deterrent and aims to give China pause on Taiwan and in South China Sea

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · October 5, 2023

The US has just tested a new type of nuclear-tipped air launch cruise missile, reaffirming the viability of the air-based leg of its nuclear triad against evolving threats from near-peer adversaries China and Russia with profound implications for regional stability and global non-proliferation norms.

This month, The Warzone reported that the US Air Force had conducted nine flight tests of its future nuclear-tipped AGM-181A Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) cruise missile prototypes, including one test with a mock nuclear warhead.

The Warzone notes that the milestones were reported in a 2022 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) released last month, with the tests aiming to gauge the missile’s stealthy capabilities.

The report mentions the US Air Force has selected Raytheon to develop the AGM-181A LRSO missile, which will replace the AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). The missile is part of the Long Range Strike family and has reportedly undergone nine successful major flight tests, demonstrating its high survivability with a stealthy airframe.

The Warzone says the Pentagon’s 2022 acquisition report classified all nine test events as flight tests, but not all involved independent missile flights. It notes that captive carry sorties were conducted for safety and that four powered-flight tests were deemed successful, including a Controlled Test Mission (CTM-1) test demonstrating the design’s maturity, manufacturing processes and navigation system performance.

The Warzone report also says that the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has revealed that the first powered flight test of an AGM-181A LRSO Cruise Missile with a W80-4 nuclear warhead launched from a B-52 bomber was conducted, with a decision about low-rate initial production expected in 2027.

The AGM-181A LRSO with the variable yield W80-4 warhead may be crucial for the US to fill a perceived nuclear deterrence gap resulting from the downsizing of its nuclear arsenal after the previous Cold War while its near-peer adversaries, China and Russia, continued to develop tactical nuclear weapons.

In a January 2021 article for The Heritage Foundation, Patty-Jane Geller mentions that the US AGM-86B ALCM has been upgraded to be operational until 2030, 38 years beyond its intended lifetime.

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Geller notes that Russia and China’s improving air defense systems make penetrating hostile airspace increasingly prohibitive and that continuing to use the AGM-86B instead of developing the AGM-181A LRSO would send a signal to adversaries that the US lacks a modern and capable air-launched nuclear cruise missile capability.

US Air Force missiles on display. Image: US Air Force

Geller also notes that the US Air Force must maintain a credible air-based nuclear deterrent, mentioning that with the AGM-86B ALCM retiring soon, the AGM-181A LRSO is the only solution to keep the B-52H nuclear-capable.

She also says that while the US Air Force has committed to ordering at least 100 B-21 Raiders to replace B-2 and B-1 bombers, only a stealthy cruise missile such as the AGM-181A LRSO can hold specific targets at risk. In addition, she says that the LRSO will ensure the B-21’s stealth technology remains effective against evolving military technology and advanced air defenses.

Geller also mentions that the AGM-181A LRSO program allows bombers to train on multiple targets while standing off from enemy air defenses, thereby contributing to the credibility of US deterrence.

Such capability, Geller notes, allows the US president to deter an adversary from attacking first and respond proportionately to an adversary’s limited use of nuclear weapons. That flexibility, she says, makes air defense more complicated for US adversaries, forcing them to plan for incoming cruise missiles from multiple attack vectors.

Moreover, Geller says that the AGM-181A LRSO reduces risk to bombers and personnel, thus increasing the credibility of deterrence as adversaries will be less convinced of US willingness to send people flying into air defenses than if the US can launch safely from friendly territory.

The development of the AGM-181A LRSO may spark a proportionate nuclear response from China and Russia, which could entail strategic-level cooperation to increase their respective nuclear arsenals, sparking a renewed nuclear arms race with the US.

In March 2023, Asia Times reported that Russia plans to provide China with fast breeder nuclear reactor technology, allowing Beijing to significantly grow its nuclear arsenal and tip the global nuclear bomb balance.

An agreement was announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue the development of fast breeder nuclear reactors that are specifically designed for the production of plutonium, which can be used in nuclear weapons.

In December 2022, Russia’s Rosatom transferred 25 tons of highly enriched uranium to China’s CFR-600 nuclear reactor. US officials and military planners believe the reactor will help China increase its nuclear arsenal from 400 warheads to 1,500 by 2035.

However, China denies this and claims the reactor is part of its civilian power grid and will be installed toward the aim of becoming the world’s top nuclear energy generator.

Russia has shifted its approach towards China due to the Western sanctions imposed after its military invasion of Ukraine. Despite long-term concerns about China’s potential threat in Russia’s Far East, Moscow has provided it with nuclear technology to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the West.

China is growing its nuclear arsenal to improve the likelihood that its arsenal will survive in the event of a war with the US. China can strengthen its second-strike capability by having a more extensive and more varied nuclear arsenal. This project puts China in a better position to use its nuclear weapons as a coercive tool and employ them if necessary.

America’s development of the AGM-181A LRSO also has profound implications for regional military strategies and strategic-level deterrence.

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For one, the AGM-181A LRSO missile could be crucial in deterring or responding to aggressive actions in the Taiwan Strait, where China has been conducting military exercises and missile tests. The presence of a stealthy, long-range missile like the AGM-181A LRSO could discourage such drills and tests. Moreover, the AGM-181A LRSO’s ability to penetrate advanced missile defenses would be critical in a conflict.

In the South China Sea, tensions are also running high due to territorial disputes and China’s recent militarization of artificial islands. The AGM-181A LRSO could serve as a deterrent in this theater as well. The 181A LRSO’s long range could allow it to strike from distances beyond the reach of enemy defenses, which could help maintain freedom of navigation in the contested waters.

China’s military installations in the South China Sea could be a target of new AGM-181A LRSOs. Photo: Asia Times files / EyePress / Digital Globe

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · October 5, 2023

9. US making 'third neighbor' moves on Mongolia

Mongolia is a fascinating country with a lot of important potential. I have been spending this week with the former Mongolian Ambassador to the UN who runs the Blue Banner NGO which among other peace building efforts supports a free and unified Korea.

Excerpts:

In the short-to-medium term, Beijing will remain a strong economic partner for Mongolia as an immediate neighbor and a top investment source for Mongolian copper ore, coal briquettes and iron ore.

But Mongolia is now a candidate for the Minerals Security Partnership, an initiative with 14 countries – mostly Western – that aims to bolster sustainable investment in critical minerals’ mining, processing and recycling.

Mongolia must ensure that its foreign policy remains flexible and diversified to support its economic and social development.

US making 'third neighbor' moves on Mongolia

US dangling economic overtures in bid to balance neighboring China and Russia’s influence over resource-rich nation

asiatimes.com · by Bolor Lkhaajav · October 5, 2023

Mongolian Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene visited Washington DC on the invitation of US Vice President Kamala Harris in August 2023. The high-level bilateral meeting envisages a deepening of US-Mongolia economic relations in diverse sectors such as critical minerals, aviation and trade.

As global powers continue to race for partnerships and resources, Mongolia’s natural resources are valuable and critical for its national economy.

The incumbent government’s strategy to attract investment revolves around capitalizing on the critical minerals with immediate neighbors Russia and China, as well as “third neighbor” partners like the United States, South Korea, France and other developed nations.

The United States and Mongolia established a strategic partnership in 2019 during the administrations of former presidents Donald Trump and Battulga Khaltmaa. President Joe Biden’s administration further committed to strengthening the United States’ long-term position in the Indo-Pacific, which includes Mongolia.

The US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Mongolia’s third neighbor foreign policy provide a robust foundation for the two countries to strengthen Mongolia’s democratic institutions, economic diversity and civil society. The Biden administration’s courting of Ulaanbaatar indicates a growing US interest in boosting economic ties, amid its tensions with Moscow and Beijing.

The high-level meetings between Mongolian and US leaders provide the working mechanism of Mongolia’s third neighbor foreign policy. The changing geopolitical environment in Northeast Asia remains a challenge for Ulaanbaatar’s economic endeavors.

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Collegial relationships with global partners – including immediate neighbors Russia and China, and the United States – are the cornerstone of Ulaanbaatar’s foreign policy. So Mongolia must be vigilant, stable and flexible with its third neighbour’s pursuits.

Given Mongolia’s geographical constraint of being landlocked between two major US adversaries – Russia and China – strengthening strategic partnership with Washington requires flexibility and a systematic diplomatic approach to accelerate economic collaboration.

Construction at the Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mining project in Mongolia. The US has the nation’s mineral resources in its sights. Photo: Brücke-Osteuropa / Creative Commons

In 2018, before establishing the strategic partnership, the US Congress proposed the Mongolia Third Neighbor Trade Act. The bill was reintroduced to Congress in 2019 and 2021, adding to delays. If approved, Mongolia’s high-quality cashmere and textiles could be exported to the United States duty-free.

Another effort to improve Mongolia’s legal environment for trade is the signing of the US-Mongolia Transparency Agreement in 2017. This 2017 trade agreement represented the first stand-alone agreement on international trade and investment transparency signed by the United States.

In the past, the United States has only ever negotiated transparency commitments as a part of broader agreements. Negotiating a stand-alone agreement with Mongolia concretely builds on cooperation between the United States and Mongolia and makes it possible for economic activities to accelerate.

The bilateral trading relationship continues to flourish, with Mongolia’s exports to the United States increasing at an annualized rate of 1.84% between 1995 and 2021. Even so, Washington still requires more action from the Mongolian government.

In January 2023, US Ambassador to Mongolia Richard Buangan stated his concern to the American Chamber of Commerce in Mongolia on the country’s opaque legislative processes and investment climate that remains “unattractive for investors and challenging for importers and exporters.”

To deepen US–Mongolia economic ties, the US Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment Jose W Fernandez met with senior government officials and other stakeholders in Ulaanbaatar in June 2023.

On a later visit to Washington, Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene also signed the US–Mongolia Open Skies Agreement into implementation. The US Department of Transportation noted that “the Agreement will facilitate greater air connectivity between the United States and Mongolia and will provide the legal framework for nonstop passenger flights.”

Mongolia is now the 132nd US Open Skies partner. In addition, Mongolia received its first Boeing 787 Dreamliner in August 2023 and will be starting a direct flight from San Francisco to Ulaanbaatar.

But Mongolia will still need to strengthen and accelerate economic ties with Moscow and Beijing via bilateral and trilateral channels, such as the Russia–Mongolia–China Economic Corridor. Other trilateral meetings also serve as an important economic gateway, such as the US–Mongolia–South Korea or the US–Mongolia–Japan partnerships.

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From a geopolitical standpoint, as the Russia-Ukraine war and US-China trade tensions continue to destabilize the region and the world, small states like Mongolia often face a conundrum. Maintaining a balanced approach is necessary for continuing Mongolia’s historical connectivity of comprehensive strategic partnerships with Moscow and Beijing.

A Mongolian man holds a protest banner in the shape of the Chinese flag which reads “Respect your constitution” during a protest against China’s plan to introduce Mandarin-only classes at schools in the Chinese province of Inner Mongolia, at Sukhbaatar Square in Ulaanbaatar, the capital of Mongolia on September 15, 2020. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Byambasureb Byamba-ochir

In the short-to-medium term, Beijing will remain a strong economic partner for Mongolia as an immediate neighbor and a top investment source for Mongolian copper ore, coal briquettes and iron ore.

But Mongolia is now a candidate for the Minerals Security Partnership, an initiative with 14 countries – mostly Western – that aims to bolster sustainable investment in critical minerals’ mining, processing and recycling.

Mongolia must ensure that its foreign policy remains flexible and diversified to support its economic and social development.

Bolor Lkhaajav is Researcher specializing in Mongolia, China, Russia, Japan, East Asia and the Americas.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

asiatimes.com · by Bolor Lkhaajav · October 5, 2023

10. US tightens intelligence links with Asia to combat Chinese cyberattacks

US tightens intelligence links with Asia to combat Chinese cyberattacks

The push involves strengthened bilateral and trilateral sharing of information with a host of countries including Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines
This new partnerships are in part aimed at reducing the growing power of Beijing’s spy apparatus

Bloomberg

+ FOLLOWPublished: 10:25am, 5 Oct, 2023

By Bloomberg South China Morning Post3 min

October 4, 2023

View Original

The US is deepening intelligence cooperation with countries across Asia as it looks to counter Beijing’s sophisticated spying apparatus and blunt Chinese cyberattacks.

The Biden administration has developed a set of separate but overlapping partnerships in Asia, including an intelligence-sharing arrangement with the “ Quad” grouping of the US, India, Japan and Australia, according to US officials who asked not to be identified discussing matters that aren’t public.

The web of relationships also includes trilateral partnerships among the US, Japan and South Korea, and one encompassing the US, Japan and the Philippines, the officials said.

This new and strengthened partnerships, known formally as intelligence liaison relationships, are in part aimed at reducing the growing power of China’s spy apparatus, which a recent UK parliamentary report described as the world’s largest. The administration effort is part of a broader drive to deepen links across the region amid growing alarm at the threat from Beijing.

How ‘big winner’ Vietnam walks the US-China rivalry diplomatic tightrope

“Intelligence liaison can serve as an important force multiplier,” said Daniel Byman, a specialist on the topic at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “It can expand overall collection as different countries will have access to different secrets in different parts of the world.”

India’s Ministry of External Affairs declined to comment. The South Korean, Japanese, Australian, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments did not respond to requests for comment.

China’s increasing assertiveness in the region, combined with leadership changes in some capitals, has made countries such as South Korea and the Philippines more willing to cooperate of late, the US officials said. Some partners in the region also hope the ties will provide some security in the event Donald Trump wins the US presidential election next year. The closer links are already delivering results, the officials noted.

Late last year, India was able to repel a Chinese military incursion in the Himalayas thanks to strengthened intelligence-sharing with the US military, according to US News & World Report. In May 2022, the Quad countries announced a pact that provides data from commercial satellites to countries across the Pacific, allowing them to track the activities of China’s maritime militia, as well as smuggling and illegal fishing.

Deepened ties with Japan in this area come after what Washington sees as a quiet push by Tokyo to resolve long-standing US concerns about its ability to keep a secret, US officials said. In May, the US Space Force announced the delivery of sensitive satellite-tracking equipment to Japan.

Still, obstacles remain – not least because of questions about the US’s own ability to keep a secret. In April, the Justice Department charged 21-year-old National Guard airman, Jack Teixeira, with illegally disseminating classified information, including sensitive battlefield data about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and revelations that the US eavesdropped on allies such as South Korea.

‘Embarrassing’ US leak sparks spying concerns in South Korea

The partnerships will complement the “Five Eyes” arrangement that has long been the cornerstone of US intelligence partnerships. That informal network consisting of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand has shifted its focus to China in recent years, but its exclusive English-speaking membership limits its reach and relevance in Asia.

Five Eyes countries have been sharing secret information for decades through intimate networks of officials that permeate their intelligence, defence and foreign ministries. Asia’s emerging spy pacts are much newer and will likely take time to rival the Five Eyes.

11. The Australian Army and the transformation of US land forces in the Indo-Pacific

Excerpts:

Littoral manoeuvre and logistics training is another priority area where the Australian Army could further cooperate with US land forces. Australia’s amphibious force will expand over the next decade with the addition of new medium and heavy littoral manoeuvre vessels through Project Land 8710. From 2024, the planned Australian Army littoral lift groups will support training and operations in the Northern Territory, northern Queensland and southeast Queensland could benefit from exercising with US marine littoral regiments in simulated expeditionary advance base operations or missions tailored to Australia’s national defence and strategic interests.

Australia’s efforts to build an integrated maritime strategic construct could also benefit from increased local training in maritime operations with the Japan Self-Defense Forces and with the new US Army watercraft systems capabilities in our northern approaches. Indeed, the US–Australia–Japan minilateral relationship offers many opportunities for expanded exercises and deployments now that the Japan–Australia reciprocal access agreement is in effect.

Most importantly, Washington’s interest in forward-basing more of its strike assets in Australia is now underpinned by a pressing need for the ADF to enact a strategy of denial in our immediate region. Positioning a full US Army brigade combat team equipment set in northern Australia, for example, would support both US and Australian national interests and additional actions to deter China from escalating to armed conflict. This avenue might not be a decisive factor in Beijing’s strategic calculus on its own, but it’s a natural fit with Australia’s defence strategy and could bolster the capacity of an integrated ADF to respond in the event of a regional crisis involving the US and China.

...

Amid increasing uncertainty, it’s paramount that the Australian Army, the US Army and the US Marine Corps expand their patterns of cooperation and prioritise the development of a shared understanding of coalition activity. This work should be mutually reinforcing and constitute part of Australia’s approach to managing risks and threats and balancing its contributions to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

The Australian Army and the transformation of US land forces in the Indo-Pacific | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Marcus Schultz · October 4, 2023

The re-emergence of great-power competition and a deteriorating strategic environment are forcing the US Army to rethink not just its approach to land warfare but also its future role alongside the US Marine Corps in key regions around the globe. Nowhere is this transformation more apparent and meaningful than in the Indo-Pacific, where the People’s Republic of China poses the most acute challenges.

A new ASPI report, US land power in the Indo-Pacific: opportunities for the Australian Army, released today, finds that the implementation of the US Army’s multi-domain operations doctrine and reorganisation is driving a greater emphasis on joint exercises and ensuring there are no gaps in defence cooperation among allies and partners in deterring Chinese aggression.

The concept of multi-domain operations is not new. It’s partly an evolution of previous conceptual frameworks such as AirLand battle, full-spectrum operations and unified land operations, requiring the employment of long-range fires and non-kinetic capabilities against enemy air and missile defences. It aims to ensure that US forces can expand the battlespace and achieve mission success without an assured ability to dominate in each individual domain.

The codification of the doctrine is designed to position the US Army as the key force that joint force commanders need to hold critical terrain, signal America’s commitment to allies and partners, and defeat adversaries in close combat. This shift has advanced the use of multi-domain taskforces to address these functions at scale.

Multi-domain taskforces are an integral part of the US Army’s push to build coalitions as a means to complicate China’s decision-making and minimise China’s advantage of compact lines of manoeuvre, communications and logistics. As US Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told an audience in Washington in March, the branch intends to commit more combat-credible forces to the region and establish theatre distribution centres in Guam and potentially Australia, Japan and the Philippines. If these efforts are successful, the US Army will be able to support other forces by providing logistical hubs in the region.

US Army Pacific, America’s theatre army for the Indo-Pacific, is contributing to concepts for strategic competition with China through two primary campaigning activities. The first involves conducting in-theatre sustainment rehearsals to increase joint readiness and enhance allied and partner capacity to deny human and geographical terrain to an adversary. The second effort involves establishing pre-positioned stocks and leveraging security force assistance brigade operations to test for security cooperation continuity with partner countries that currently don’t host US land forces. These developments hold important insights for key US allies, including Australia and Japan.

Australia’s new unifying strategic approach to national defence and the high degree of convergence this has with US defence strategy offer a timely window of opportunity for the Australian Army to work more closely with US land forces.

The ongoing optimisation of the Australian Army for long-range strike, missile defence and littoral lift creates opportunities for deepening the US–Australia alliance in the land domain, particularly as the heightened focus on the immediate region implies that Australia’s land-force contributions will be in archipelagic Southeast Asia and of an increasingly maritime and amphibious quality.

Australia’s defence strategy rightly prioritises national defence, but this does raise questions about the capacity of an integrated Australian Defence Force to meet the future strategic needs of the alliance. Given that neither the US nor Australia can deter China alone, it’s important that the Australian defence establishment and military leaders consider how a transformed and multi-domain-capable Australian Army should work with US land forces to deter conflict during competition and crisis.

One option is for Australia and the US to investigate ways to jointly employ, deploy and logistically support long-range hypersonic weapon systems in Australia. Expanding on the two nations’ successful cooperation on the development and testing of hypersonics would send a purposeful signal to Beijing that Australia possesses a deterrent capability at a range to defend its northern approaches and support US military operations in the South China Sea and East Asia. This would likely instil greater doubt in the minds of China’s military leaders about the attendant risks of aggression and likelihood of a collective response.

Littoral manoeuvre and logistics training is another priority area where the Australian Army could further cooperate with US land forces. Australia’s amphibious force will expand over the next decade with the addition of new medium and heavy littoral manoeuvre vessels through Project Land 8710. From 2024, the planned Australian Army littoral lift groups will support training and operations in the Northern Territory, northern Queensland and southeast Queensland could benefit from exercising with US marine littoral regiments in simulated expeditionary advance base operations or missions tailored to Australia’s national defence and strategic interests.

Australia’s efforts to build an integrated maritime strategic construct could also benefit from increased local training in maritime operations with the Japan Self-Defense Forces and with the new US Army watercraft systems capabilities in our northern approaches. Indeed, the US–Australia–Japan minilateral relationship offers many opportunities for expanded exercises and deployments now that the Japan–Australia reciprocal access agreement is in effect.

Most importantly, Washington’s interest in forward-basing more of its strike assets in Australia is now underpinned by a pressing need for the ADF to enact a strategy of denial in our immediate region. Positioning a full US Army brigade combat team equipment set in northern Australia, for example, would support both US and Australian national interests and additional actions to deter China from escalating to armed conflict. This avenue might not be a decisive factor in Beijing’s strategic calculus on its own, but it’s a natural fit with Australia’s defence strategy and could bolster the capacity of an integrated ADF to respond in the event of a regional crisis involving the US and China.

Amid increasing uncertainty, it’s paramount that the Australian Army, the US Army and the US Marine Corps expand their patterns of cooperation and prioritise the development of a shared understanding of coalition activity. This work should be mutually reinforcing and constitute part of Australia’s approach to managing risks and threats and balancing its contributions to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Marcus Schultz · October 4, 2023

12. How China is fighting in the grey zone against Taiwan

Excerpts:

What is China trying to achieve?

Grey zone warfare tactics are aimed at weakening an adversary over a prolonged period - and that is exactly what China is trying to do with Taiwan, observers say.

By regularly crossing Taiwan's ADIZ, Beijing is testing how far Taipei will go to reinforce it, says Alessio Patalano, a professor of war and strategy in East Asia at King's College in London.

The ADIZ is self-declared and technically counts as international airspace, but governments use it to monitor foreign aircraft.

Taiwan has routinely scrambled fighter jets to warn off Chinese aircraft in its ADIZ - a response that can strain Taiwan's resources in the long run, Prof Patalano said.

But that's not the only goal - or benefit. For one, the drills allow China to test its own capabilities such as force co-ordination and surveillance, according to analysts. And two they fit China's pattern of normalising increasing levels of military pressure on Taiwan to test the latter's defences and international support for the island.

How China is fighting in the grey zone against Taiwan - BBC News

BBC

By Joel Guinto
BBC News

4 October 2023

Image source, Reuters

Image caption,

China has ramped up military drills such as this one in April where fighter jets flew near Taiwan

When Taiwan raised the alarm last month over a record number of Chinese fighter jets crossing the unofficial border between them, Beijing said that line did not exist.

The 103 fighter jets that China flew near Taiwan - 40 of which entered the island's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) - were yet another escalation in Chinese war games.

Beijing, which has long claimed Taiwan, has in the past year repeatedly rehearsed encircling the self-ruled island with fighter jets and navy ships. The military drills have taken an especially menacing turn in light of China's vows to "reunite" with Taiwan.

So far, the manoeuvres have fallen short of an invasion and stayed within a grey zone, which is military speak for tactics that fall between war and peace.

But Taiwan is now a tinderbox in what has become a volatile US-China relationship - and analysts say grey zone tactics are part of Beijing's strategy to control Taipei without firing a single shot.

What is China trying to achieve?

Grey zone warfare tactics are aimed at weakening an adversary over a prolonged period - and that is exactly what China is trying to do with Taiwan, observers say.

By regularly crossing Taiwan's ADIZ, Beijing is testing how far Taipei will go to reinforce it, says Alessio Patalano, a professor of war and strategy in East Asia at King's College in London.

The ADIZ is self-declared and technically counts as international airspace, but governments use it to monitor foreign aircraft.

Taiwan has routinely scrambled fighter jets to warn off Chinese aircraft in its ADIZ - a response that can strain Taiwan's resources in the long run, Prof Patalano said.

But that's not the only goal - or benefit. For one, the drills allow China to test its own capabilities such as force co-ordination and surveillance, according to analysts. And two they fit China's pattern of normalising increasing levels of military pressure on Taiwan to test the latter's defences and international support for the island.

Image source, Getty Images

Image caption,

China showed off its J-20 stealth fighter jets in an air show this year

"This normalisation may one day serve to mask the first moves of a real attack, making it difficult for Taiwan and [its chief ally] the United States to prepare accordingly," said David Gitter, a non-resident fellow at the US-based National Bureau of Asian Research.

Beijing's moves also reset the baseline to deny Taiwan's assertion that it has a border with China in the Taiwan Strait, the body of water that lies between the island and the Chinese mainland.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said "there is no so-called median line" in the strait when asked about Taiwan's reaction to the September drills.

"It also serves to numb Taiwan's public to the threat posed by such a force, which may undermine political support for a more dedicated Taiwanese military preparation for the possibility of war," Mr Gitter said.

Most analysts agree that Taiwan's military - a shrunken army, outnumbered navy and old artillery - would be no match against a far more powerful China. Many Taiwanese seem to agree as well, judging by a survey last year by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation which found that a little over half of them think China will win if it goes to war - only a third believe Taiwan will win.

And yet appetite for a larger defence budget appears to be weak. Nearly half of Taiwanese people think the current spend is sufficient while a third think it's already too much, according to a recent survey by the University of Nottingham.

When does China deploy grey zone tactics?

China often holds military drills in response to high-level political exchanges between Taiwan and the US, which it considers as provocations.

These have grown larger and more frequent since then US Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Beijing responded with week-long drills that included four days of live-fire exercises, followed by anti-submarine attack and sea raid rehearsals.

Then in April, after Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen met then US Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, China practised "sealing off" Taiwan in so-called joint sword drills with its Shandong aircraft carrier in action.

China even flew jets to Taiwan's Pacific coast on the east, suggesting that it was practicing strikes from that direction, instead of west, which faces mainland China. Increasingly, China appears to be rehearsing a blockade of Taiwan. But Pentagon officials say it is unlikely to succeed as this would buy time for Taipei's allies to mobilise themselves.

September's drills also followed a visit by Taiwan's vice-president William Lai to the US. Taipei warned of drills after China called Mr Lai, a frontrunner in January's presidential election, a "troublemaker" for flying to the US.

Some analysts also believe China was trying to project strength following rumours about its missing defence minister Li Shangfu.

The tactics are also not exclusive to the standoff with Taiwan. China employs similar measures to claim almost the entire South China Sea, which could be key to taking control of Taiwan.

The waters host a multi-billion-dollar shipping lane and are believed to hold vast oil and gas reserves. Beijing has built large structures over reefs in disputed waters where Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei have rival claims. It has also deployed coast guard and militia ships to block Philippine security and fishing vessels in these waters despite an international tribunal ruling that Beijing's claims have no legal basis.

Could these grey zone tactics escalate?

The drills have led to an increasingly militarised region - be it in the waters around Taiwan, or in the skies above.

The US and its allies have also stepped up their military exercises in the South China Sea. Just this week, the US and the Philippines kicked off yet another round.

Even if neither side has the intention to provoke, observers fear that the build-up of warships and fighter planes has heightened the chances of a costly miscalculation. The two countries' militaries also no longer communicate directly - although the US says it is trying to revive the hotline, which would help defuse any unplanned escalation.

Image source, Getty Images

Image caption,

Taiwanese vice-president William Lai is the frontrunner in January's election

Despite resuming high-level dialogue with the US, China has shown no signs of backing down on Taiwan.

The record incursions in September show that such manoeuvres will proceed as part of Chinese President Xi Jinping's policies, even without "foreign triggers", Mr Gitter said. Mr Xi recently said he "will never promise to give up the use of force" and that Taiwan "must and will be" united with China.

But observers say China has to walk a tightrope in the coming months because flexing its muscle too much could also pave the way for Mr Lai, who it sees as a pro-Taiwan-independence candidate, to win in January's crucial election.

Next year is also when Beijing is putting into service its new Fujian aircraft carrier, its most advanced yet, which Taipei says will enhance China's ability to seal off the Taiwan Strait.

China's military drills will only get bigger and more frequent, Mr Gitter said.

"We can expect these numbers to creep ever upwards until they perhaps even approach levels one might see in a real attack," he said.

Additional reporting by Ian Tang from BBC Monitoring

BBC

13. Welcome to the ‘unhinged’ global order

Excerpts:

After all, if, despite being a blatant breach of international law and the UN charter, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine hasn’t caused any meaningful reform to yet take place, what will?

Indeed, the fact that the broader international community is relatively ambivalent about holding Russia to account for its ongoing atrocities in Ukraine is a testament to Russia’s and China’s efforts to dilute multilateral institutions and create an alternative world order that’s more accommodating of autocracies.

Confronted with these dynamics, the international community stands at a pivotal juncture. The decisions made now will determine the trajectory of the global order for decades to come. As Guterres said in his opening address, the international community is presented with a stark choice: reform and rally behind a renewed vision of multilateralism, crafted collaboratively to meet the multifaceted existential challenges of our times; or continue to pursue self-interest above all else, and prepare for a rupture.

By the looks of things, in this rapidly changing landscape marked by division and lack of consensus, we must steel ourselves for what lies ahead: an era of ‘unhinged’ global disorder.

Welcome to the ‘unhinged’ global order | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Mercedes Page · October 4, 2023

As the curtains fell on the UN’s annual high-level meetings last week, the world was left with an unsettling message: the international order is crumbling, and no one can agree on what comes next.

The focus of the week—the one time of the year that most of the world’s leaders are all in the same place—was meant to be on urgently accelerating global action on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Yet, against a backdrop of intensifying geopolitical tensions, the war in Ukraine, coups in Africa, the escalating climate crisis and the ongoing pandemic, a different theme emerged: the fracturing and fragmenting of the global order, and the urgent need to reform the United Nations before it’s too late.

Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s opening address to the UN General Assembly was both a rallying cry and a stark warning: ‘Our world is becoming unhinged. Geopolitical tensions are rising. Global challenges are mounting. And we seem incapable of coming together to respond.’

Describing a world rapidly moving towards multipolarity while lamenting that global governance is ‘stuck in time’, Guterres warned that the world is heading for a ‘great fracture’. Urging the renewal of multilateral institutions based on 21st-century realities, he left no illusions about what will happen if this doesn’t happen: ‘It is reform or rupture.’

Unsurprisingly, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky echoed this in a powerful address to a special UN Security Council high-level open debate later in the week. He warned that the gridlock over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the UN meant that humankind could no longer pin any hopes on it to maintain peace and security. He then called for meaningful reform—including on the use of the veto in the UN Security Council.

It’s a sentiment shared by Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong. In her address to the UN Security Council, she called for urgent reform, including ‘constraints on the use of the veto’. She condemned Russia’s use of its position as a permanent member of the Security Council to veto any action ‘as a flagrant violation of the UN charter’, and later told the media that ‘across many issues, the UN system is falling short of where we want it to be and where the world needs it to be, but what we want to do is to work with others to ensure that the United Nations evolves’.

While the existence of the veto prevents any Security Council action from being taken against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine (or against the other four permanent members), the UN charter more broadly—by design—makes any reform of the UN incredibly difficult and extremely unlikely. And given that US President Joe Biden was the only leader of a P5 country to actually show up to the UN for leaders’ week, it’s not clear that even Western countries like the UK and France are committed to the UN—the bedrock of the international system since World War II.

Where does all this leave a multipolar world teetering on the brink? With the existing order already so divided, how do we reimagine and agree on a global system that can meet the challenges of the 21st century?

After all, if, despite being a blatant breach of international law and the UN charter, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine hasn’t caused any meaningful reform to yet take place, what will?

Indeed, the fact that the broader international community is relatively ambivalent about holding Russia to account for its ongoing atrocities in Ukraine is a testament to Russia’s and China’s efforts to dilute multilateral institutions and create an alternative world order that’s more accommodating of autocracies.

Confronted with these dynamics, the international community stands at a pivotal juncture. The decisions made now will determine the trajectory of the global order for decades to come. As Guterres said in his opening address, the international community is presented with a stark choice: reform and rally behind a renewed vision of multilateralism, crafted collaboratively to meet the multifaceted existential challenges of our times; or continue to pursue self-interest above all else, and prepare for a rupture.

By the looks of things, in this rapidly changing landscape marked by division and lack of consensus, we must steel ourselves for what lies ahead: an era of ‘unhinged’ global disorder.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Mercedes Page · October 4, 2023

14. Old Lessons for New Maritime Statecraft

Excerpts:

The Navy and Marine Corps’ activities in the wider world were also fundamental to how the interwar services saw their missions. The protection of American lives and property overseas seems an obvious starting point then, as it is now. Additionally, the Navy looked to support American interests in global competition, from freedom of navigation to other efforts to support American commerce. Visiting foreign ports, making worldwide cruises, and developing international relationships were all part of a naval diplomacy and a robust global presence. Moreover, to accomplish these tasks effectively, the Department of the Navy called for full cooperation “with other departments of the Government,” making maritime statecraft a whole-of-government issue long before the term was coined.

As Washington enters an era of great power competition, it can gain valuable insights from the Navy’s interwar success in conducting peacetime operations while still preparing for war. This means thinking about, talking about, actively developing new doctrines for, and understanding how to plan the complex needs of the peacetime missions of the Navy and Marine Corps.

Old Lessons for New Maritime Statecraft - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by BJ Armstrong · October 5, 2023

From the onset of the Cold War through the 1980s, then from the “unipolar moment” through the long wars of the 21st century, the U.S. Navy operated with the same congressionally mandated mission. Despite major changes in the world, Congress did not see fit to adjust the Navy’s formal mission as defined in Title 10 of the U.S. Code in 1956. This was a mission focused solely on fighting or being ready to fight wars, and this focus profoundly shaped the naval services.

But now, amidst a much-discussed shift toward great power competition, the Navy is finally receiving a new mission. In December 2022, Congress passed and President Joseph Biden signed the James Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act. Section 913 of the act fundamentally adjusted the responsibilities of the U.S. Navy. Not only is the service responsible for fighting the nation’s wars on and from the sea, but it also is now responsible for “the peacetime promotion of the national security interests and prosperity of the United States.” This creates the opportunity for what Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro has called a “new maritime statecraft.” But this will only be successful if the Navy engages with an open and deep discussion of the operations, doctrines, fleet architecture, and strategies needed to execute its responsibilities in both war and peace.

The Many Missions of the Interwar Navy

Despite the significance of the recent change and the dramatic increase in the Navy’s global responsibilities that it suggests, there has been little discussion of it either from official Navy sources or in the national security community more widely. Perhaps one reason for this is that they are still trying to understand it. With this in mind, it is valuable to turn to the history of the formal mission, or missions, of the U.S. Navy, particularly, the years between World War I and World War II when the U.S. Navy executed peacetime missions.

Become a Member

In 1956, Congress passed and President Dwight Eisenhower signed the law containing the missions of the American military services in Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Previously, though, the tasks to be performed by those armed services had largely been left up to the executive branch. In the interwar years, it became common for the secretary of the Navy to define the missions of the Navy and Marine Corps themselves and elucidate those missions in their annual report that was submitted to Congress via the president.

In 1920, as demobilization plans were under way after World War I, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels wrote that “the American Navy has from its inception been a force for peace and righteousness.” Looking to the aftermath of the war, Daniels saw the Navy as a key diplomatic and economic actor “in the front rank of the champions of justice and healing.”

Acting on this vision, the U.S. Navy redeployed and remained engaged across the world. In the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, American naval forces worked with the U.S. Food Administration and nongovernmental organizations like the Red Cross to deliver food aid in famine-stricken parts of Europe. Coordinating warehouses, port facilities, and security for both U.S. government and nongovernmental aid, the same forces helped evacuate civilians as Soviet forces invaded south into Ukraine during the Russian Revolution They also conducted humanitarian operations to protect civilians during the rise of the Turkish Republic. In the Pacific, the U.S. Navy conducted maritime security patrols and protected American citizens and business interests in the region. As civil war engulfed China and warlords threatened the safety of Americans and Chinese civilians, the U.S. Navy began protecting river traffic on the Yangtze.

Regardless of the political party in control of the White House, these kinds of peacetime deployments became the norm throughout the two decades between the world wars. When the former Republican Congressman Edwin Denby was appointed to be Secretary of the Navy by President Warren Harding, he wrote, “[t]he Navy’s functions in time of peace are not confined solely to the activities connected with its primary mission — preparation and readiness to act in the defense of the Nation.” In 1922, Denby began to put together an explicit naval policy and set of missions for the fleet. At the end of the year, he reported to the president and Congress that the Navy Department had formally adopted a “fundamental” naval policy and that the “Navy of the United States should be maintained in sufficient strength to support its policies and its commerce, and to guard its continental and overseas possessions.” This remained the core of American naval policy through the Calvin Coolidge administration.

Denby was forced to resign during the Teapot Dome scandal, but as his successor Curtis Wilbur approached the end of his time as secretary, he introduced a formal list of missions of the fleet. Wilbur’s list began with the “maintenance of battle efficiency,” or the readiness of the fleet for war. However, that was followed by “protection of American interests in disturbed areas, cultivation of friendly relations with foreign peoples,” and finally “close cooperation between the Department State and the Navy” in order to effect the peacetime missions. There was an interagency element to these missions, and it was integrated to provide deterrence. Adams’ list was almost exactly the same, adjusting only the phrasing of the first missions by adding the euphemism “in case of national emergency,” reinforcing the core belief in a balance between the readiness for war and peacetime responsibilities across presidential administrations.

For the remainder of the Hoover administration and into the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, the Navy’s mission statements continued to emphasize peacetime responsibilities that sometimes varied in verbiage but rarely in intent. Providing aid and assistance to countries in need joined the list in 1930, the precursor to what late 20th- and early 21st-century naval policymakers and strategists would call humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In 1933, when Claude Swanson took the helm of the department, he charged the Navy to “cooperate fully with other departments of the Federal Government and with the States,” thereby recognizing that American maritime power was a whole-of-government concern. Swanson returned to an idea that had been presented at the start of the Harding administration: the creation of a formal “Naval Policy” of the United States. In doing so, he adopted language directly from Secretary Denby’s statement a decade earlier, emphasizing the role of supporting the country’s “national policies and commerce.”

The Roosevelt administration policy eventually became more specific, enumerating a list of 14 tasks. The first four elements or missions focused on the creation of a fleet with “maximum battle strength” and a Marine Corps ready “to provide expeditionary forces in immediate readiness,” with “war efficiency the object of all development and training.” These tasks, however, were followed by 10 additional missions that focused on the peacetime responsibilities of the Department of the Navy. These included the protection of American lives and property overseas, the development of American commerce, deployments to “cultivate friendly international relations,” and extension of the task “to encourage civil industries and activities useful in war.” In the years from the start of Roosevelt’s presidency through the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, Swanson’s annual messages to the president and Congress continued to highlight these 14 tasks, equally balancing them between the wartime and peacetime responsibilities and highlighting for America’s elected representatives that naval forces had many important missions.

Of course, mission statements devised by military staffs do not always match up with the execution or the operations of their forces. But my research confirms that between the World Wars, maritime statecraft was central to how the Navy operated and what the nation expected of it. Reading the secretary’s annual reports from 1920 to 1939 alongside the operational reports of the chief of naval operations and the commandant of the Marine Corps for those years reveals that the Navy and Marine Corps were enormously busy conducting operations around the globe. They protected American citizens and American commerce from the Pacific to the Mediterranean to the waters of Latin America. They cooperated with American business interests overseas and conducted naval diplomacy and collaborated with the State Department and nongovernmental organizations. They helped defuse rebellions, organized elections, and conducted humanitarian relief operations after natural disasters across the world — while engaging in some considerably uglier behavior as well.

Readiness for War and a Mission for Peace

The conventional narrative of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps in the interwar years is the story of the development of the fighting doctrines and technologies that would be used to help defeat the Axis powers in the coming war. This narrative is valuable, and talented historians have focused on it and given us important insights. This narrative remains a popular one in naval professional writing in the 21st century as well.

By returning to the Navy Department’s annual messages and operational reports of the interwar years, we can see that the narrative of doctrine and technology is accurate but incomplete. The Navy and Marine Corps were directly engaged in maritime statecraft and peacetime missions a century ago. As today’s sea services work to implement the mission change ordered by Congress and the president, returning to the years of the Roaring ’20s and 1930s offers a starting point for discussion.

Under Secretary Denby, the U.S. Navy was tasked with becoming the world leader in naval technology, ships, and weapons. The Navy also considered the collaboration with industry and the inspection of all naval facilities and material as part of the mission, looking for a brutally honest assessment of the fleet and the support it needed. And the Navy actively tasked itself with “encouraging” civil industries and activities as well as developing plans for industrial mobilization. They also worked to actively improve their “system of progressive education” for the officer corps and sailors. These were important elements in the 1930s, but they remain critical to the debates and discussions over readiness today. Reflecting on these might lead to consideration of the success of the “Get Real, Get Better” program, the “Education for Seapower” effort, and the adoption of foreign naval designs and weapons.

The Navy and Marine Corps’ activities in the wider world were also fundamental to how the interwar services saw their missions. The protection of American lives and property overseas seems an obvious starting point then, as it is now. Additionally, the Navy looked to support American interests in global competition, from freedom of navigation to other efforts to support American commerce. Visiting foreign ports, making worldwide cruises, and developing international relationships were all part of a naval diplomacy and a robust global presence. Moreover, to accomplish these tasks effectively, the Department of the Navy called for full cooperation “with other departments of the Government,” making maritime statecraft a whole-of-government issue long before the term was coined.

As Washington enters an era of great power competition, it can gain valuable insights from the Navy’s interwar success in conducting peacetime operations while still preparing for war. This means thinking about, talking about, actively developing new doctrines for, and understanding how to plan the complex needs of the peacetime missions of the Navy and Marine Corps.

Become a Member

Captain B.J. Armstrong, PhD, is currently serving as Admiral Jay Johnson Professor of Leadership and Ethics and associate professor of war studies and naval history in the history department at the U.S. Naval Academy. His new books Naval Presence and the Interwar U.S. Navy and Marine Corps: Forward Deployment, Crisis Response, and the Tyranny of History, and 21st-Century Mahan, Revised and Expanded: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era were published this past summer. Opinions expressed in his article are offered in his personal and academic capacity and do not reflect the positions or policies of the U.S. Naval Academy, the Department of Defense, or any other agency.

Image: United States Navy

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by BJ Armstrong · October 5, 2023

15. March of the Four–Stars: The Role of Retired Generals and Admirals in the Arms Industry

See the table of 4 stars at the link. https://quincyinst.org/report/march-of-the-four-stars-the-role-of-retired-generals-and-admirals-in-the-arms-industry/?utm

Okay, but what really is the problem? A couple of anecdotes (e.g., Mattis and Cartwright) does not seem to indicate a widespread problem. I wonder what would happen if none of these 4 stars went to work in any of the capacities outlined in the report. Would these companies fare better or worse? Would our national security fare better or worse?

Excerpts:

The revolving door is a problem because it creates the appearance — and in some cases the reality — of conflicts of interest in the making of defense policy and in the shaping of the size and composition of the Pentagon budget. The role of top military officials is particularly troubling, given their greater clout in the military and the government more broadly than most other revolving door hires. Their influence over policy and budget issues can tilt the scales towards a more militarized foreign policy.

There is also the potential for military officials to favor companies they are supposed to oversee while they are still in government, with the goal of landing a lucrative position with them upon retirement. As Senator Elizabeth Warren (D–MA) put it, “When government officials cash in on their public service by lobbying, advising, or serving as board members and executives for the companies they used to regulate, it undermines public officials’ integrity and casts doubt on the fairness of government contracting.”

Official government tracking of post–government employment of retired four–stars and other senior government officials with national security responsibilities is insufficient, but even under current rules a number of concerning cases have been uncovered.

March of the Four–Stars: The Role of Retired Generals and Admirals in the Arms Industry - Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

quincyinst.org · by William D. Hartung · October 4, 2023

This piece was co-written by Dillon Fisher, Democratizing Foreign Policy Program Intern.

Executive Summary

The revolving door between the U.S. government and the arms industry, which involves hundreds of senior Pentagon officials and military officers every year, generates the appearance — and in some cases the reality — of conflicts of interest in the making of defense policy and in the shaping of the size and composition of the Pentagon budget.

This report looks at the post–government employment records of a subset of the larger flow of “revolvers”: four–star generals and admirals who retired between June 2018 and July 2023. Among the findings are the following:

• 26 of 32 four–star officers who retired after June 2018 — over 80 percent — went to work for the arms industry as board members, advisors, executives, consultants, lobbyists, or members of financial institutions that invest in the defense sector.

• The biggest category of post–retirement employment for four–stars, by far, was as board members or advisors for small and medium–sized arms contractors, with 15 choosing that option. This compares to five who became board members, advisors or executives for one of the top 10 arms contractors.

• Five retired four–stars became arms industry consultants, five became lobbyists for weapons companies, and four joined financial firms that make significant investments in the defense sector.

This brief recommends a number of measures designed to limit undue influence and potential conflicts of interest on the part of retired four–star generals and other retired Pentagon officials and military officers who pass through the revolving door.

• Bar four–star officers from working for firms that receive $1 billion or more in Pentagon contracts per year.

• Extend “cooling off” periods before retired Pentagon officials and military officers can go to work on behalf of the arms industry.

• Increase transparency over post–government employment and activities on the part of retired Pentagon and military officials working on behalf of arms contractors, including reporting on their interactions with Congress and the executive branch.

The most comprehensive current proposal to address the revolving door issue is Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Department of Defense Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act.

The bill would encompass many of the recommendations put forward in this report.

Introduction

This brief documents the extent to which recently retired four–star generals and admirals have gone to work as lobbyists, executives, board members, consultants, or financiers of the arms industry upon leaving government service. It covers the period from June 2018 through July 2023.

The role of generals and admirals in the arms industry is part of the larger problem of the revolving door, in which hundreds of senior Pentagon and military officials go to work for major Pentagon contractors every year, using their contacts with former colleagues to wield influence on behalf of their corporate employers and clients. A 2021 report by the Government Accountability Office found that over 1,700 senior government and military officials — including generals, admirals, and top acquisition officers — went to work for one or more of the top 14 weapons contractors between 2014–19, for an average of over 300 per year.

This report looks in greater detail at a smaller number of “revolvers,” focusing only on four–star generals and admirals.The revolving door is a problem because it creates the appearance — and in some cases the reality — of conflicts of interest in the making of defense policy and in the shaping of the size and composition of the Pentagon budget. The role of top military officials is particularly troubling, given their greater clout in the military and the government more broadly than most other revolving door hires. Their influence over policy and budget issues can tilt the scales towards a more militarized foreign policy.

The revolving door is a problem because it creates the appearance — and in some cases the reality — of conflicts of interest in the making of defense policy and in the shaping of the size and composition of the Pentagon budget.

There is also the potential for military officials to favor companies they are supposed to oversee while they are still in government, with the goal of landing a lucrative position with them upon retirement. As Senator Elizabeth Warren (D–MA) put it, “When government officials cash in on their public service by lobbying, advising, or serving as board members and executives for the companies they used to regulate, it undermines public officials’ integrity and casts doubt on the fairness of government contracting.”

Official government tracking of post–government employment of retired four–stars and other senior government officials with national security responsibilities is insufficient, but even under current rules a number of concerning cases have been uncovered.

For example, as the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) has noted in its path breaking report “Brass Parachutes,” while he was in the service, General James E. Cartwright advocated vigorously for the JLENS, a surveillance balloon notorious for an incident in which it broke free from its moorings and floated 160 miles off course.

Cartwright blocked the Army from canceling the program in 2010, then joined the board of JLENS’s producer, Raytheon, after retiring as vice–chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.In another prominent case, General James Mattis went to bat for the blood testing firm Theranos while he was serving as Commander of the U.S. Central Command, then joined the company’s board upon leaving government service. Mattis pressed the Army to buy and utilize Theranos equipment, as he acknowledged in an email to Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes uncovered by the Washington Post: “I’ve met with my various folks and we’re kicking this into overdrive to try to field your lab in the near term.”

After Mattis left the military to join the Theranos board, he defended the company’s practices — even as it was marketing a product that did not work, with false claims that included denying charges that it was out of compliance with Food and Drug Administration requirements.

Mattis later claimed that, despite being a board member, he was not informed of the limitations of the Theranos devices while he was serving at the company for compensation of $150,000 per year. In 2018, Holmes was indicted on charges of wire fraud for allegedly perpetrating a “multi–million dollar scheme to defraud investors, doctors, and patients.” The Securities and Exchange Commission described Theranos as an “elaborate, years–long fraud” in which Holmes “exaggerated or made false statements about the company’s technology, business, and financial performance.”Retired military officers were also prominently involved in a lobbying effort that prevented the Navy from divesting itself of multiple copies of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), which the service had determined were not relevant to the most important challenges facing the Navy and would, if retained, result in a service that was “less capable, less lethal, and less ready.”

The LCS is also plagued with technical problems that were described in detail in a New York Times investigation of the campaign to save the ship from retirement.The role of ex–Navy officers in the campaign to save the LCS was described in detail by Danielle Brian, Executive Director of the Project on Government Oversight, in her April 2023 Congressional testimony.

Among the retired Navy officials spearheading the effort to block the retirement of the LCS was a retired Navy veteran, Timothy Spratto, who served as general manager of BAE Systems’ shipyard in Jacksonville, Florida, where the littoral combat ships are serviced. Before joining BAE, Spratto served as Assistant Chief of Staff, Material Readiness and Assessments, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic.Another key player in the effort to save the LCS was retired Rear Admiral James A. Murdoch, who served as program executive officer for the littoral combat ship program from 2011–14 before leaving government service to become the international business development director for ship and aviation systems at Lockheed Martin, one of the prime contractors for the Freedom–class Littoral Combat Ships.

Also involved in the successful lobbying effort was retired Captain Tony Parisi, who worked on the General Dynamics team that trains crews to run the LCS, and wrote an op–ed in 2022 for Real Clear Defense titled “Don’t Give Up the Ship.” The work of these former military officers resulted in the procurement and continued deployment of flawed ships that cost taxpayers billions of dollars and put crew members at risk.More consistent and detailed reporting on post–government activities of military officers who go to work in the arms industry would likely uncover many other incidents similar to the ones described above.

Proponents of the revolving door argue that the expertise ex–military officers bring to the arms industry can improve its performance and ability to produce systems relevant to the needs of the warfighter. This is belied by the fact that — according to a study by Senator Elizabeth Warren’s office — over 90 percent of senior government officials who go into the arms industry serve as lobbyists.

Their job is to promote projects and practices that boost the bottom lines of their new employers, not weigh in on how the firms carry out their government–funded projects, for good or ill. To the extent that there is expertise in the military sector that can make contractors more effective, it can be transmitted without hiring a majority of retiring senior officials as lobbyists (see detailed recommendations, below).Over 90 percent of senior government officials who go into the arms industry serve as lobbyists.

One overall finding of this report is that the nature of the revolving door has shifted. Not only do retired officers join the boards of major contractors like Lockheed Martin or the ranks of lobbyists at major firms that include weapons contractors as clients, but they set up their own consulting firms, work as advisors to defense startups, and join firms that finance arms companies. There are many routes available for former military officials to seek work in the arms sector. In the sections that follow we provide details on post–government employment of recent four–star retirees and recommendations for curbing their influence over decisions on Pentagon spending and policy.

Cashing in: The march of the generals (and admirals)

The vast majority of retired four–star generals and admirals who have left government service in the past five years have gone on to work for the arms industry. Of the 32 four–star officers who retired between 2018–23, at least 26 went to work for the arms industry as board members, advisors, consultants, lobbyists, or financiers. Many of the military retirees also went to work for industry–funded think tanks and advocacy groups, but for the purposes of this report these connections are not counted as involving work for the arms industry. (see appendix for details).

Of the 32 four–star officers who retired between 2018–23, at least 26 went to work for the arms industry as board members, advisors, consultants, lobbyists, or financiers.

The breakdown of what types of arms industry related jobs were taken by retired four–stars is below. Many of the retired officials had multiple connections to the weapons sector.

• Six went to work as board members or executives for one of the Pentagon’s top 10 contractors, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics, and BAE Systems.

• Six started their own defense consulting firms or joined an existing consulting firm.

• Fifteen became advisors or board members for small or medium–sized weapons contractors.

• Five went to work for lobbying firms that have clients in the arms industry.

• Four went to work for financial firms with major investments in the arms sector.

One notable exception to the rule is retired General Arnold Bunch, former Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command. Bunch has assumed the role of director of Tennessee Hamblen County school system, covering the county school district he grew up in.

Among the most prominent four–stars who have gone through the revolving door are former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, who joined the board of Lockheed Martin five months after leaving the military; General Mike Murray, former head of the U.S. Army Futures Command, who went on the boards of three defense tech firms — Capewell, Hypori, and Vita Inclinata; General Terrence O’Shaugnessy, former head of the U.S. Northern Command, who is now a senior advisor to Elon Musk at SpaceX, a firm that launches military satellites and produces the Starlink system, a dual use system which among other things has been used to supply internet service to Ukrainian troops in their war against Russia’s invasion of their country; General Richard D. Clarke, former Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, who joined the boards of General Dynamics, defense tech firm Shift5, and drone maker General Atomics; and General John W. Raymond, former head of the U.S. Space Command, who went on to be a managing partner at Cerberus Capital Management, which invests heavily in cutting edge technologies with applications in the defense and aerospace sectors.

Retired Four-Star Generals and Admirals Moving to Work in the Arms Industry, 2018 to 2023

Recommendations for reform

Restrictions on post–government employment involving both top military brass and senior Pentagon officials should be tightened to avoid the appearance or reality of conflicts of interest, along the lines outlined below.

Bar flag officers from working for any arms contractor receiving more than $1 billion per year from the Pentagon: Given their greater levels of power and influence and broad contacts within the government at large, top generals and admirals should be barred from working for major weapons contractors upon leaving government employment. And as set out below, their ability to work on behalf of the arms industry in other forms should be subject to an extended “cooling off” period.

Extend cooling off periods: When it comes to the revolving door, time is the enemy of influence. A substantial cooling off period moving from the Pentagon or Congress to the arms industry would mean that key contacts with former colleagues would be less useful as personnel in the executive branch turn over. And potential “revolvers” might be more likely to find employment outside of the defense sector in the meantime. Cooling off periods for all relevant national–security related positions should be at least four years, extended from the current norm of one to two years.

Improve transparency: Lists of former military and Pentagon officials who have gone to work in the arms industry should be compiled and made publicly available. In addition, contractors who employ former government officials should be required to report on their activities on a regular basis, including any contacts with relevant government officials and any materials developed in efforts to influence those officials.

Expand the definition of lobbying activity: As national political reporter Isaac Arnsdorf noted in a 2016 investigative piece for Politico, efforts to avoid lobbying restrictions have created “an entire class of professional influencers who operate in the shadows” as “policy advisers, strategic consultants, trade association chiefs, corporate government relations executives, [and] affiliates of agenda–driven research institutes.”

Current law does not require any of those influencers to register as lobbyists. Congress should review the full range of activities carried out on behalf of arms corporations and expand the definition of what qualifies as lobbying activity subject to government regulation as appropriate.The most comprehensive current proposal to address the revolving door issue is Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Department of Defense Ethics and Anti-corruption Act.

The bill would encompass many of the recommendations put forward above, including imposing a four–year ban on arms contractors from hiring DoD officials and preventing them from hiring former DoD employees who managed their contracts. The Act would also require defense contractors to provide detailed information to the Pentagon on former senior DoD officials they have hired, among other provisions.Appendix: four-star generals and admirals with post–government employment in the arms sector, 2018–23

This section covers the post–retirement activities of four–star generals and admirals who retired between January 2018 and July 2023. Four–stars who left government service more recently, such as former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, who retired in September, are not included. As noted above, connections that count as work in the arms sector for purposes of this issue brief include serving as board members, advisors, lobbyists or consultants for arms firms, or in firms involved in financing weapons companies.

Former Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, United Nations Command, and U.S.–ROK Combined Forces Command: Robert B. Abrams

Army General Robert Abrams retired as Commander, U.S. Forces Korea on August 31, 2021, after almost 40 years of service.

Following his retirement, in September 2021, Abrams founded Robert B. “Abe” Abrams, LLC, an advisory and consulting firm. The company does not have an official website, but is registered in North Topsail Beach, North Carolina. Since January 2022 Abrams has also served on the Board of Advisors for NOCTEM Health, a company that provides clinicians with the best sleep–care for their patients. Since January 2023, he has acted as a senior advisor to the CEO and Board of Vaya Space. Vaya Space calls itself the “green rocket launch company,” with the goal of revolutionizing space and removing plastics from our planet. The firm has significant business in the arms sector. According to its website Vaya Space offers ready–now transformative capabilities for strategic and tactical surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), insensitive munitions, rapid satellite replenishment, and other applications.Former Commandant of the Marine Corps: David H. Berger

General David H. Berger retired as Commandant of the Marine Corps on July 10, 2023.

As of this writing we have not found information on Berger’s employment in the civilian sector following his retirement.Former Commander, U.S. Army Pacific: Robert Brooks Brown

Army General Robert Brooks Brown retired in September 2019 following 38 years of service. Brown was a Distinguished Fellow at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) before becoming president and CEO of the organization in October 2021.

The AUSA is a “nonprofit education and professional development association” that supports the Army’s soldiers, families, and civilian employees. In addition to advocating on personnel issues, AUSA also lobbies for higher spending on new weapons systems and an expansion of the defense industrial base. AUSA is funded in part by a group of “national partners” comprised of hundreds of weapons contractors, large and small, including major contractors like Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman. AUSA also provides a convening function for bringing together representatives of the arms industry and the federal government. For example, the organization’s annual meeting provides an opportunity for scores of arms contractors to promote their wares to an audience that includes both individuals involved in procurement of weapons systems and those who can advocate for them with key players in Congress and the executive branch.Perhaps most importantly, AUSA has an extensive government relations department that vigorously lobbies the U.S. government to spend more on the Pentagon in general and the Army in particular. Among items on its priority agenda for 2023 are “support Army unfunded priorities” — the Army “wish lists” that call for spending on items not included in the Pentagon’s official budget request. In recent years, wish lists have been used by Pentagon budget boosters in Congress as a rationale to add tens of billions of dollars to the Pentagon budget beyond what the department asked for. Other AUSA priorities include accelerating the development and procurement of new weapons systems and expanding the defense industrial base.

Former Commander, Air Force Materiel Command: Arnold W. Bunch, Jr.

General Arnold Bunch retired as Commander, Air Force Materiel Command on June 13, 2022, following 38 years of service.

He has deviated from the path taken by his fellow high–ranking retirees by going into the education sector. Bunch has become director of Tennessee Hamblen County school system, the two districts he grew up in. While admitting during his public interview that he lacked a background in education, his experience in handling 81,000 people under his command at Wright–Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio was enough to sway the school board.Former Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa & Commander, Allied Joint Forces Command: Robert P. Burke

Admiral Robert P. Burke retired from the Navy on June 27, 2023, after nearly 40 years of service.

Burke has since joined the Center for Human Capital Innovation, a strategic human capital consulting firm, as a senior vice president. The Center for Human Capital Innovation works with private, non–profit, and federal government sectors to improve organizational performance. Clients include the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Army, the Department of Homeland Security, and Lockheed Martin.Former Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command: Richard D. Clarke

Army General Richard D. Clarke retired as Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command in August 2022 after nearly 40 years of service.

On February 3, 2023, Clarke was elected to the Board of Directors of General Dynamics. General Dynamics is a leading global defense and aerospace company and is one of the Pentagon’s biggest contractors. Additionally, on March 7, 2023, Clarke accepted a position on the Board of Directors of Shift5, a “technology company that unlocks fleet and weapon system onboard data to achieve operational readiness, lethality, and survivability.” Shift5 has a demonstrated record of employing retired high–ranking military officers on its Board of Directors as well as its Board of Advisors.Also beginning in March 2023, Clarke began as a strategic advisor to Institutional Venture Partners and Human Capital, both based in the San Francisco Bay Area.

Institutional Venture Partners is a venture capital and private equity firm, as is Human Capital, according to the LinkedIn profiles of both companies. Among other firms, Human Capital is an investor in Anduril, a major defense technology company. Clarke is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council, working on issues pertaining to Forward Defense with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. According to his Atlantic Council biography, Clarke sits on the board of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, a producer of unmanned aerial vehicles.Former Commander, Army Materiel Command: Edward Daley

Army General Edward Daley retired as commander, Army Materiel Command, on May 1, 2023, following 36 years of service.

In June 2023, Daley joined the Roosevelt Group as a senior advisor. The Roosevelt Group is self–described as “honest brokers between Capitol Hill, the Pentagon, and the broader U.S. government” in executing “government relations strategies based on trusted information, subject matter expertise, and values connections.” The group is a lobbying and advocacy firm, focusing on a number of areas: aerospace and defense; military installations and communities; climate and development; biotechnology and research; budget and appropriations; advanced technologies; transportation and infrastructure; and homeland security.Former Commander, Indo-Pacific Command: Philip S. Davidson

Navy Admiral Philip S. Davidson retired on April 30, 2021, as Commander, Indo–Pacific Command.

In November 2021, he founded Davidson Strategies LLC. He also serves on the board of drone–maker AeroVironment and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment.Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joseph F. Dunford

Retired U.S. Marine Corps General Joseph F. Dunford served as the 19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before his successor, General Mark Milley, assumed the position. Dunford retired in September 2019, having reached 40 years of service with the Marine Corps.

A few months later, on February 10, 2020, Dunford joined Lockheed Martin’s Board of Directors.

In this role, he serves as the Chairman of the Classified Business and Security Committee, which assists “the Board of Directors in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities relating to the Corporation’s classified business activities and the security of personnel, data, and facilities.” Dunford is also a member of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee, which makes recommendations to the Board of Directors regarding corporate governance and related oversight responsibilities.In addition to his role at Lockheed Martin, Dunford joined Liberty Strategic Capital in February 2022 as a senior managing director/partner and as a member of the firm’s investment committee.

Liberty Strategic Capital is a private equity firm focusing on global technology investment with a strong emphasis on cybersecurity, and is led by former Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin.Former Commander, Southern Command: Craig S. Faller

Navy Admiral Craig S. Faller retired in January 2022 as Commander, U.S. Southern Command.

On June 16, 2022, Sigma Defense Systems appointed Faller to its board of advisors.

Sigma Defense Systems LLC is a technology company that provides the Department of Defense with systems and services in integration, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Additionally, on October 24, 2022, Viken Detection announced that Faller had been appointed to its Board of Directors. Viken Detection is a company that provides security imaging and material identification equipment to help public safety inspection professionals working to counter drug trafficking, terrorism, and human trafficking.Former Commander, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command and Former Chancellor, Army University: Paul E. Funk II

Army General Paul E. Funk II retired as commander, Training and Doctrine Command on September 9, 2022.

In November 2022, Funk founded Paul Funk Leadership Consulting, LLC, which does not have an official website but is based in Bell, Texas.Former Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command: Michael X. Garrett

Army General Michael X. Garrett retired as commanding general of the U.S. Army Forces Command on July 8, 2022, following 38 years of service.

In June 2023, Garrett was elected to the board of directors of Textron, Inc., a “multi–industry company that leverages its global network of aircraft, defense, industrial and finance businesses to provide customers with innovative solutions and services.” Textron ranked 47th on the Pentagon’s top 100 contractor list for fiscal year 2022, receiving a total of $1 billion in prime contracts. Garrett also serves as a distinguished Senior Fellow on National Security at the Middle East Institute, where he contributes to work on defense, military affairs, large–scale combat operations, U.S. security policy, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and more.Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force: David L. Goldfein

Former General David L. Goldfein retired as Chief of Staff of the Air Force on August 6, 2020, following 37 years of service.

Goldfein has since joined WestExec Advisors, a strategic advisory firm offering geopolitical and policy expertise to clients. On January 14, 2021, Goldfein became a senior advisor to Blackstone Investment Group. Goldfein’s role within Blackstone’s portfolio also extends to his position as a member on the Board of Directors of Draken International, LLC. Draken International is a Blackstone portfolio company that provides contract electrical warfare and fighter aircraft for military and defense industry customers — including the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.K. Ministry of Defense. Blackstone owns a majority share of Draken International. Additionally, on March 8, 2023, Goldfein joined the National Security Advisory Board of Shield Capital, a San Francisco–based venture firm that invests in defense and space startups. Shield Capital is led by former Pentagon and Defense Innovation Unit officials, and has a portfolio of companies focusing on artificial intelligence, autonomy, cybersecurity, and space. The defense and space contractor L3Harris is also reportedly a strategic investor in Shield Capital.83Goldfein is also a distinguished visiting fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution,

as well as a senior fellow with the Johns Hopkins Advanced Physics Laboratory. Johns Hopkins is a major recipient of Pentagon funding, to the tune of $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2022.Former Commander, U.S. Air Forces Europe-Africa & Commander, Allied Air Command: Jeffrey L. Harrigian

General Jeff Harrigian retired from the Air Force in July 2022.

Harrigian joined Lockheed Martin, one of the nation’s largest defense contractors, as Vice President for Strategic Campaigns in December 2022.Former Commander, Air Combat Command: James M. Holmes

Air Force General James “Mike” Holmes retired in October 2020 after nearly 40 years of service.

In November 2020, Holmes joined the Roosevelt Group as a senior advisor. As mentioned above, the Roosevelt Group is a Washington, D.C.–based lobbying and consulting firm that represents clients such as Honeywell International, a defense contractor. Beginning in February 2021, Holmes was appointed Chairman of the Board of Directors for Red 6. Red 6 is an augmented reality company that currently works with the Air Force to fulfill training needs, according to NBC News.Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: John E. Hyten

Former Air Force General John Hyten retired as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on November 19, 2021. His educational and career experience focused on engineering and acquisition in addition to space operations.

On June 15, 2022, Hyten joined Blue Origin, a commercial space company that develops “reusable launch vehicles that are safe, low cost, and serve the needs of all civil, commercial, and defense customers,” as a Strategic Advisor. So far, Blue Origin has received hundreds of millions of dollars in Pentagon funding to “invest in rocket development and infrastructure required to compete for national security space launch contracts.” Most recently, the company signed an agreement with the U.S. Space Systems Command that opens the door for Blue Origin’s new rocket — still in development — to compete for launching military satellites.Former Chief of the National Guard Bureau: Joseph L. Lengyel

Air Force General Joseph L. Lengyel retired as Chief of the National Guard Bureau on August 28, 2020, after 38 years of service.

In June 2021, he joined the Board of Directors of the Space Force Association, whose mission is to “achieve superior national spacepower by shaping a Space Force that provides credible deterrence in competition, dominant capability in combat, and professional services for all partners.” Lengyel is also an Executive in Residence at the University of Texas, San Antonio. He contributes some time as a mentor specializing in defense for new startups at Capital Factory in Austin, Texas.Lengyel joined RAIN Defense + AI as an advisor in July 2022.

RAIN Defense + AI is “an invitation–only global business hub for the Defense + AI Ecosystem.” The company works to provide a knowledge platform about the intersection of defense and artificial intelligence by sourcing all the relevant data. RAIN’s board of advisors includes more than one retired high–ranking military official. In January 2022, Lengyel also joined the Board of Advisors for Lulius Innovation. Lulius Innovation is a veteran–owned company that focuses on software development and technology consulting.Immediately following his retirement, in September 2020, Lengyel created and began working as the President/CEO of Omega Bluebird Group, LLC.

According to Lengyel’s LinkedIn profile description, Omega Bluebird Group provides “service, advice, and consulting at the operational and strategic level…assessment and development of multi-functional organizations…,” and employs experts in “defense, crisis management, assessment and development of partnerships for success.” The company has no official website, but reportedly is based out of Bulverde, Texas.Former Vice Chief of Naval Operations: William K. Lescher

Admiral William “Bill” Lescher retired as Vice Chief of Naval Operations on September 2, 2022, after 42 years of service.

In January 2023, Lescher joined Red Cell Partners as a senior advisor. Red Cell Partners is “an incubation firm building and investing in rapidly scalable technology–led companies that are bringing revolutionary advancements to marketing in national security and healthcare.” Lescher also joined DEFCON AI, a Red Cell Partners portfolio company, as a strategic advisor. DEFCON AI, which is involved in “building next generation tools for the modern military mobility environment.”Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army: Joseph M. Martin

Former General Joseph M. Martin retired as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on July 1, 2022, following 37 years of service.

Following his retirement, Martin joined the Client Advisory Board of Valiant, a “global government services contractor” providing a “diverse range of vital, comprehensive services to defense, aerospace, national security, and intelligence partners.” Additionally, in August 2022, Martin created Joe Martin and Associates, LLC, a leadership development company based out of Dallas–Fort Worth, Texas.Former Commander, U.S. Central Command: Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

Former Marine Corps General Kenneth F. McKenzie retired as Commander, U.S. Central Command on April 1, 2022, following 42 years of service.

Beginning in June 2022, McKenzie assumed the role of Executive Director of the then–brand new Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida. The institute is designed to place Florida at the forefront of addressing defense, economic, and related issues. McKenzie also took over leadership of Cyber Florida, which seeks to form partnerships between cybersecurity experts and military installations to assist, when needed, in homeland cybersecurity defense initiatives.Former Commander, U.S. Transportation Command: Maryanne Miller

Air Force General Maryanne Miller retired as Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, on August 20, 2020, following 39 years of service.

She was the only female four–star leader in the Pentagon during her time in service.123 Miller was also the first Air Force Reserve officer to achieve the rank of general, and the first woman to serve as Chief of the Air Force Reserve. On May 24, 2021, Miller was elected to the Board of Directors of the Bristow Group, a worldwide aviation solutions company that specializes in vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft for search and rescue, firefighting, military support, and other services.Miller also joined the board of advisors at New Vista Capital,

otherwise known as New Vista Acquisition Corporation, following her retirement. According to Bloomberg, the company aims to acquire businesses and assets via mergers, capital stock exchange, asset acquisition, stock purchase, and/or reorganization. Additionally, according to her Council on Criminal Justice biography, Miller acts as an advisor to Freedom Lift Innovations — which produces “optionally piloted helicopters” for military and civilian customers – and Aerolane130 — a logistics and air transport firm that has both military and civilian customers.Former Commander, U.S. Army Futures Command: John M. “Mike” Murray

Army General Mike Murray retired as commander of U.S. Army Futures Command on December 6, 2021, after nearly 40 years of service.

On May 10, 2022, Murray joined the Board of Directors of Vita Inclinata as a Strategic Advisor. Vita Inclinata is a developer and producer of precision aerospace and industrial stabilization devices.On June 14, 2022, Murray joined the Board of Advisors of Capewell, a global leader in engineering aviation and life support solutions.

Capewell is a leading designer, manufacturer, and distributor of safety, tactical, parachute, and aerial delivery products, which are then largely distributed to the defense, public safety, and law enforcement communities. Also in June 2022, Murray joined Hypori on its Board of Directors. Hypori is a SaaS company that works with government agencies — including the U.S. Army — and businesses to protect data and prevent data leakage.137 It is a service–disabled veteran–owned business based in Reston, Virginia.Former Commander, Northern Command: Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy

Air Force General Terrence “Shags” O’Shaughnessy retired as Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command in August 2020 following 34 years of service.

Since his retirement, O’Shaughnessy has assumed the position of Vice President of Special Programs for SpaceX, as well as Senior Advisor to Elon Musk on matters regarding SpaceX. SpaceX has a growing role as a military contractor, both in launching military satellites and in the production of dual use systems like Starlink, which has supplied internet services to the Ukrainian military in its fight against Russia’s invasion of their country. The Special Programs sector of SpaceX focuses on leveraging the company’s commercial technology for government applications.Former Commander, U.S. Space Command: John W. Raymond

Space Force General John W. Raymond relinquished command of U.S. Space Command in August 2020.

He retained his role as Chief of Space Operations until November 2022, when he retired following 38 years of service in the U.S. military. On April 19, 2023, Raymond joined Axiom Space as a strategic advisor and member of the board. A Houston–based company, Axiom is a leader in commercial human spaceflight and is the manufacturer of the world’s first commercial space station. Axiom is also currently the only private company that has the privilege of connecting its modules to the International Space Station. The company has also recently been awarded a contract to pursue the development of upgraded spacesuits for the ISS.In May 2023, Raymond joined Cerberus Capital Management as a senior managing director of the company’s supply chain and strategic opportunities platform.

In this role, he is to provide “strategic guidance on a portfolio of investments in technology, aerospace, and defense modernization areas.” Cerberus Capital Management’s investments span a wide range of relevant industries linked to the defense industrial base, such as: semiconductors and microelectronics; artificial intelligence and machine learning; electrification; cybersecurity; autonomy and transportation; aerospace and defense; and biotech.Former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command: Charles A. Richard

Navy Admiral Charles Richard served as Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, leaving active duty military service in January 2023.

He is now the James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor at the Miller Center, a public policy institute based at the University of Virginia.Former Chief of Naval Operations: John M. Richardson

Admiral John Richardson retired as Chief of Naval Operations on August 22, 2019, after 37 years of service.

Since his retirement, Richardson has been invited to join several organizations, the first being an October 2019 selection to the Board of Directors of Boeing — specifically, the Aerospace Safety Committee. The Aerospace Safety Committee is responsible for the direct oversight of all aerospace products. Richardson has also since been placed on the Special Programs Committee at Boeing, which exists “to review on a periodic basis those programs of the company which for purposes of national security have been designated as classified by the United States government.” Boeing was the Pentagon’s sixth largest contractor in Fiscal Year 2022, with total prime contract awards of $14.8 billion.Additionally, Richardson joined the Board of Directors for Exelon Corporation in 2019.

Exelon is a leading energy provider in the United States, providing millions of Americans with electric and gas services.In 2022, Richardson joined the Board of Directors for Constellation Energy, the nation’s largest producer of carbon–free energy that works to provide sustainable solutions to homes, businesses, and public-sector customers in the United States.Richardson joined the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory as a senior fellow on November 13, 2019. Johns Hopkins is a major recipient of Pentagon funding, with over $1.2 billion in prime contract awards in fiscal year 2022 alone, as mentioned above.

On February 26, 2020, Richardson was elected to the Board of Directors of the Center for New American Security, a major recipient of funding from weapons contractors.

Additionally, on December 17, 2020, Richardson was selected to join the Board of Directors of BWX Technologies, Inc. BWX Technologies is a leading supplier of nuclear reactors and fuel to the U.S. Navy and provides services and products to support the operation of nuclear warhead facilities.Former Commander, Cyber Command and Head of National Security Agency: Michael S. Rogers

Former Admiral Michael Rogers retired in June 2018 after 37 years of service, four of which were dedicated to leading both Cyber Command and the National Security Agency.

He has since joined the Board of Directors of the U.S. Naval Institute, an independent forum dedicated to the understanding of sea power and other critical security issues. In July 2019, Rogers joined the Brunswick Group, a lobbying and public relations firm, as a senior advisor. Rogers assists the Brunswick Group in areas of cyber security, privacy, geopolitics, technology, and intelligence. Rogers acts as a senior advisor at the McCrary Institute for Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Security at Auburn University, his alma mater.Rogers also joined Quantum Xchange’s Board of Directors. Quantum Xchange is a “policy-based enterprise cryptographic management platform” that works to provide data security for private and government clients.

Rogers was brought on in December 2022 to advise the company in its adoption of Phio TX, the “groundbreaking enterprise cryptography management platform and key delivery system used by commercial enterprises, government agencies, and their partners.”Former Commandant of the Coast Guard: Karl L. Schultz

Admiral Karl Schultz retired as Commandant of the Coast Guard on June 1, 2022.

Since his retirement, Schultz has guest authored for the Brookings Institution, but as of this writing we could not identify whether he has secured post–government employment. He has been the subject of controversy since leaving government service, accused of covering up a decades–long investigation into sexual abuse within the Coast Guard Academy in Connecticut.Former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps: Gary L. Thomas

Marine Corps General Gary Thomas retired as Assistant Commandant on October 19, 2021.

Immediately following his retirement, Thomas joined the Board of Directors of Draken International, the previously mentioned Blackstone portfolio company. Thomas was named Chairman of the Board of the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation on January 1, 2022. He also became CEO of Paradigm MedSolutions, LLC in April 2023. Paradigm MedSolutions works with businesses and governments to “bring products and services to the marketplace through [their] robust network of medical and business professionals.” The company works with the Pentagon, Tricare, and the Veterans Administration, and helps producers and manufacturers navigate the government arena.Former Commander, Africa Command: Stephen Townsend

Former Army General Stephen J. Townsend retired as Commander, Africa Command in August 2022.

Two months later, in October 2022, Townsend created an independent consulting firm called SJ Townsend & Associates, LLC, for which he acts as board member, consultant, and speaker.Beginning in March 2023, Townsend joined the Advisory Board of Fortem Technologies, a leading company in “airspace awareness, security, and defense for detecting and defeating dangerous drones.”

In May 2023, he became a board member at Archer Aviation, a commercial company that has partnered with United Airlines and the United States Air Force. On August 1, 2023, it became public that Archer Aviation booked a $142 million contract with the Air Force to build electric vertical takeoff and landing aircraft.In June 2023, Townsend joined Phoenix Defense as a board member. Phoenix Defense Group consists of multiple companies “strategically aligned” to deliver “products, services, and expertise including engineering, software, simulation, IT, and manufacturing” to the defense, aerospace, and other critical industries.

Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander, Europe Command: Tod D. Wolters

Air Force General Tod D. Wolters retired in 2022 following 40 years of service. Wolters now acts as a senior advisor for Jones Group International (JGI), which he joined on July 26, 2023.

Jones Group International is a strategic advisory firm that serves foreign and military clients. JGI was founded and is currently chaired by retired Marine Corps General James L. Jones, who is under some scrutiny related to his employment as a security consultant/advisor to the governments of Saudi Arabia and Libya. Wolters is expected to bring his expertise on the security landscape of Europe to JGI.Wolters also serves as a consultant with Northrop Grumman.

His employment as a Senior Security Consultant with Northrop Grumman began in January 2023.Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force: Stephen W. Wilson

General Stephen Wilson retired as Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force on November 13, 2020, after 39 years of service.

On August 27, 2021, defense and aerospace company BAE Systems, Inc. announced the appointment of Wilson to its Board of Directors. According to the Project on Government Oversight, BAE Systems, Inc. is one of several suppliers of the B–21 program and supports two legs of the U.S. nuclear triad (sea–based and ground–based ballistic missiles). In Fiscal Year 2022, BAE Systems was the 11th largest Pentagon contractor, receiving awards worth $5.1 billion.

quincyinst.org · by William D. Hartung · October 4, 2023

16. The U.S. Military and Its Future: Size the Force to Match the Nation’s Willingness to Provide Servicemen

Quite an outline of all the problems.

The U.S. Military and Its Future: Size the Force to Match the Nation’s Willingness to Provide Servicemen | Defense.info

10/03/2023By James Durso

defense.info · by Robbin Laird · October 3, 2023

Next year, the U.S. military will spend an unprecedented $900 billion dollars of the taxpayers’ money but it continues to fail to interest young Americans in military service.

“Gen Z is unpatriotic!” and won’t join the military we’re told, but are they really?

If so, why?

It’s partly poor health and an inability to pass the qualifying physical exam, which has nothing to do with patriotism, but also an increase in mental health disorders and more common casual drug use. These are problems the military can’t fix, and the Pentagon will probably try more money and social media outreach on the latest China-owned short video app but that’s a band-aid fix, not a real solution.

Zoomers may be wary of American institutions, but they are not alone in that regard as it is a long-term trend in the U.S. A 2022 Gallup poll found, “Americans are less confident in major U.S. institutions than they were a year ago, with significant declines for 11 of the 16 institutions tested and no improvements for any.”

And considering how the military and national security establishment has performed since 9-11, what do they have to be patriotic about?

The country has been at war their whole lives, and for no discernable reason other than bureaucratic momentum and President George W. Bush’s vacuous claim about the motives of the 9-11 attackers: “They hate our freedoms.”

Since the 9-11 attacks, which no official was disciplined for, the country started a war based on a lie (Iraq) and suffered a humiliating loss (Afghanistan). The U.S. green lighted the NATO attack on the internationally-recognized government of Libya that caused an ongoing civil war and a refugee surge that upended politics in Europe, and may be partly to blame for the deaths caused by the recent flood.

U.S. officials knew things were going badly in Afghanistan but lied to the American people that NATO forces were “turning the corner” almost up to the day of the livestreamed retreat from Kabul.

The Southern border is no more, and the biggest threats to America are the national debt and drug addiction, not Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.

Either U.S. leaders are unable to recognize real problems or they are gaslighting Americans while they try to improvise their way out of problems they helped create.

The military’s problems weren’t cooked up in the Kremlin, they are home grown.

To start, there is a plague of sexual assault in the ranks. According to the Pentagon, “the Department received 8,942 reports of sexual assault involving Service members as victims and/or subjects in Fiscal Year 2022, an increase of 1 percent from the 8,866 received in Fiscal Year 2021,” but at least the risk of sexual assault is no better or worse than in the civilian population, so there’s that.

However a 2022 Pentagon briefing disclosed that “Sixty percent of female service members also did not trust that the military would ensure their safety after reporting a sexual assault” so the real number of sexual assaults is likely under reported.

The suicide rate is likewise a blot on the services.

The suicide rate for young service members in 2020 was over double the rate for young civilians, and higher than all other groups in the civilian population, according to the Pentagon and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

In September, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin directed actions to reduce the suicide rate, but it may not be a problem the military alone can solve. That said, it’s not the news a parent wants to hear when their child says he’s thinking of enlisting.

But there are some problems the Pentagon can control and there it is failing.

The military has been under pressure due to the substandard condition of its privatized family housing. And to add to that, just last month, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that many barracks (that house unmarried soldiers) are unsatisfactory, with broken heating and air conditioning, doors and windows that don’t lock, and are infested by mold and rodents. In one macabre case, GAO was told “service members are responsible for cleaning biological waste that may remain in a barracks room after a suicide.”

In 2022, Navy Times reported that the Navy-run barracks at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center – the President’s hospital – lacked hot water and air conditioning, and may rooms had no locks on the doors. One building hadn’t had hot water since 2015. On a ship underway when the hot water goes out the Commanding Officer is immediately notified and it becomes a priority task for the ship’s Engineer.

While the Pentagon is supervising an all-hands effort to reduce suicides it has taken its hands off the wheel on housing for single soldiers. Why? Because it’s a bureaucracy that only reacts to bad headlines and congressional pressure. Then there is the “tough it out” aspect of military culture that normalizes dysfunctional practices when everyone knows they are wrong.

GAO helpfully published a follow-on report of recommended fixes to the barracks problem, but the military shouldn’t need to be told by a bunch of civilian auditors how to fix the barracks, however that’s where we are today.

And the military isn’t just failing to satisfactorily house its troops, its failing to properly feed them, too.

In August, Military.com reported that at Fort Hood, Texas, only two of the ten dining halls were open and those for reduced hours. The Army blamed a shortage of military cooks, but most every dining hall uses contractor cooks, so the real cause is either bad contract administration or the service isn’t paying enough to get better help.

The Army scrambled to open more dining halls, but this is a service-wide issue that may be linked to a 2016 project to reduce the number of dining halls and update food delivery to the troops but efforts like this often fall of the radar when the immediate financial savings are pocketed and the leadership’s attention wanders.

The “woke stuff” has been blamed for the recruiting crisis and it is definitely one of the causes, but the military’s inability to ensure the safety and welfare of its people will do more damage than transgender bathrooms.

There are fewer young Americans eligible to serve, due to physical fitness standards and prohibitions on drug use, and only 9% of 16-21 year old Americans have an interest in putting on the uniform.

And when the Pentagon asked young Americans, “What would be the main reason(s) why you would NOT consider joining the U.S. Military?” 70% replied “Possibility of physical injury/death” and 65% replied “Possibility of PTSD or other emotional/psychological issues.”

Those distressing numbers are likely due to the epidemics of suicide and sexual, and promotion of “wounded warrior” charities has probably made more prospective recruits aware of the severe injuries they may suffer. In short, is the GI Bill worth losing your legs?

And those potential recruits may be on to something: a recent report published by the Journal of the American College of Surgeons says that in a war against a near peer adversary, i.e., Russia or China, U.S. troops will suffer injuries more severe than those in Iraq or Afghanistan, that is “multiple high-velocity penetrating injuries, barotrauma, and blunt injuries from being thrown during the explosion, and traumatic brain injuries.”

In addition, U.S. forces won’t command air superiority so evacuation from the battlefield will be difficult if it is even possible.

The U.S. Army War College recently published a study that predicts a war with China (over some chip foundries in Taiwan) will see a casualty rate of 3,600 per day. At that rate, the U.S. would surpass the casualties in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in two weeks. The college opined that it may be time to consider “a move toward partial conscription [the draft].”

The military has traditionally relied on military families to provide recruits for the services, but the Secretary of the Army isn’t helping matters by declaring she wants to avoid relying on a “warrior caste” of families with a military tradition. It’s good that she wants to broaden interest in military service but not clever if it will discourage the ready pool of volunteers before she has alternates signed up.

However, that “warrior caste” problem may be solving itself as veterans are less and less likely to recommend military service to their kids.

We’ve all been told, “Live within your means.”

The reluctance of young Americans to enlist is a silent vote against putting their life and limb at the disposal of the Pentagon and a national security class that is always eager for someone else’s kids to fight in service of the “rules-based international order.”

We saw these guys in Iraq and they later resurfaced in Afghanistan: the toadies, wranglers, and intriguers who never seem to run out of at-bats no matter how many times they strike out.

Fewer enlistees may also shape Defense Department choices and recommendations to the President.

An undermanned Pentagon may feel it must take more risk in the early stage of a conflict to make gains before casualties pile up, but a riskier strategy may cause the other side to escalate, making a negotiated resolution harder to achieve.

On the other hand, a fully-manned military may make the brass think they have the support of all Americans when it really may because of a bad economy (which always helps enlistments).

Here’s a crazy idea for the Pentagon: size the force (and thus the strategy) to match the nation’s willingness to provide servicemen.

Just kidding!

Then-Vietnam war protester John Kerry said, “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?”

Well, we know the names of the last thirteen men and women who died for America’s mistakes in Afghanistan, and so do many young Americans who may look at their sacrifice as a foolish mistake, not an example of selfless service.

There is a lot the Pentagon can do to make young Americans interested in military service, but first it must:

End the military’s epidemics of suicide and sexual assault, instead of hyping the nuisance of those right-wing extremists in the ranks who never showed up despite Secretary of Defense Austin’s extremism “stand down” and General Milley’s fascination with “white rage.”
Stop lying and start learning from your mistakes. It’s OK, guys; everyone knows we lost in Afghanistan.

After America’s defeat in Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff, boldly started the 20-year project of rebuilding the Army which was near collapse and haunted by defeat but also wracked by the social disruption of the 1960s.

The U.S. Army War College has published a study of the Iraq campaign, but are the services using efforts like this to reflect, publicly acknowledge their mistakes, eliminate weak programs, and, most importantly, promote the officers who can fight the next war, not the guys who did well in the last war?

Fix the housing, messing, and the other unglamorous base support functions that are less fun the buying the next major weapon system that will fail to live up to expectations, such as the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship.

The military leadership must prove it is worthy of the men and women it leads, and someday it may resemble what it aspires to be.

And the sooner it gets started the sooner it may have the military the country needs for deterrence and winning future conflicts.

James Durso (@james_durso) is a regular commentator on foreign policy and national security matters. Mr. Durso served in the U.S. Navy for 20 years and has worked in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

Featured photo: Indianapolis, Indiana, USA – May 26, 2018, Members of the US Military carrying the American flag marching down the street during the Indy 500 Parade

Credit: Dreamstime

defense.info · by Robbin Laird · October 3, 2023

17. THE INVASION OF UKRAINE REVIVED NATO. IS IT ENOUGH?

Excepts:

As the threat perception begins to widen between eastern and western NATO members, it is pertinent to look at what might come next for the alliance should the war in Ukraine stagnate into a long-term conflict. Divergent threat perceptions of NATO’s main adversary on its eastern border will only be exacerbated as western NATO publics lose interest in the crisis, as has become evident in the United States with political leaders debating hotly about the subject. Subsequently, heads of state will view the war as less of a pressing foreign policy issue.

Despite pushback from a couple of member states, it is without a doubt that the military aid that NATO has sent Ukraine has made a difference in the war. While support for Ukraine is still going strong past the first anniversary of the invasion, it remains to be seen how long NATO countries can keep giving aid at the current rate without losing interest. NATO is not in jeopardy of dissolving anytime soon; Russia’s renewed aggression has seen to that. Neither will NATO contribute enough aid to strike a decisive blow to end the war in Ukraine. However, it is possible that, soon enough, divergent threat perceptions among NATO members will cause the alliance to lose its focus. Going once more from crisis to crisis, unable to unify itself against any single threat, will eventually jeopardize NATO’s existence.

THE INVASION OF UKRAINE REVIVED NATO. IS IT ENOUGH?

JUSTIN LUCE OCTOBER 5, 2023 6 MIN READ

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/ukraine-revived-nato/

NATO allies’ divergent threat perceptions will soon become apparent again, and the longer the Ukraine war drags on, the less unified NATO will be on the subject.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has an identity crisis. The alliance can come together and act decisively when it needs to, but there are too many countries that have too many divergent interests to keep NATO from unifying for prolonged periods of time. The alliance lost its original purpose from the post-Cold War era, but the second Russian invasion of Ukraine (like the Balkans crises of the 1990s) stimulated NATO into a semi-unified response. However, NATO allies’ divergent threat perceptions will soon become apparentagain,and the longer the Ukraine war drags on, the less unified NATO will be on the subject.

Europe’s post-World War II geopolitical landscape spawned NATO out of necessity. The war devastated Western Europe. The Soviet Union cast a big shadow across a divided Germany, and the United States wanted to retain influence on the continent without directly challenging the USSR. To select Western European countries, Canada, and the United States, a collective security alliance to deter the Soviet Union would secure Western European liberty. Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949. Since then, NATO has attempted to preserve the security of its members against any potential threat, whether state-sponsored aggression or terrorism, both inside and outside the European continent. However, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, NATO has not faced an existential crisis for almost 30 years—not until the recently renewed Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. At the same time, member states’ foreign policies have increasingly diverged from each other.

In the “unipolar moment,” when NATO’s major power, the United States, was considered the lone superpower after the Cold War, the alliance no longer faced a unifying threat on its eastern border. It looked elsewhere to justify its existence, intervening in Bosnia and Kosovo in 1992 and 1999, respectively, as NATO increasingly involved itself in out-of-area operations to ensure stability and well-being in Europe. NATO-led or -assisted operations and missions such as Resolute Support and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, Iraqi Security Forces’ training, Libyan civilian protection, assisting the African Union in Sudan, Pakistan earthquake relief, Republic of Macedonia security intervention, counterterrorism, and counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa, among others, signaled NATO’s preoccupation with out-of-area operations in the post-Cold War era. It shifted attention away from NATO’s territorial threats to global stability and well-being. As a result, the European Council on Foreign Relations found in 2006 that in the 26 European member states, there were less than two million combined military personnel, yet only roughly 30% of them were deployable beyond national borders. The lack of an existential threat coupled with little incentive to generate deployment-ready troops had left Europe in a lax security situation leading into the 21st century.

Alongside NATO’s preoccupation with out-of-area operations was a diverging threat perception that member states faced in the post-Cold War era. With the existential threat that the Soviet Union posed on the European continent, it was useful enough for NATO member states to cooperate on security matters and to benefit from shared defense resources. However, once the Soviet Union dissolved, no overarching threat kept the Alliance together. While NATO did find some purpose in out-of-area operations, there is no unified threat perception among the allies. For example, the current foreign policy and security documents of eastern NATO members Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, who joined the alliance after the Cold War, identify Russia as a top security priority. Western European allies do not. Factors such as geographical proximity, shared history, relative size, and ease of troop movement between Russia and selected eastern NATO Allies’ states have rightly instilled in them a more intense wariness of Russia than is felt among Allies who lack such factors. In contrast, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, little more than half of the alliance members perceived Russia as a serious threat to their country and to Europe. When NATO agreed to rotate military personnel into the Baltic states and Poland in 2017, only 15 out of the then-28 member states contributed troops. Many Balkan and Central European allies abstained, likely out of interest in protecting their own states rather than sending troops abroad. As such, before Russia’s recent Ukraine invasion, a divergent threat perception among NATO states prevented a concentrated effort in Eastern Europe to dissuade Russia from any bolder action than it had already taken in 2008 in Georgia, and in 2014 in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.

Yet, while NATO has seemingly unified in the face of the Russian invasion, comparisons of support to Ukraine imply that a diverging threat perception of Russia remains between NATO’s eastern and western members.

Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine was a watershed moment for NATO. The alliance had to decide whether to intervene on behalf of a non-member country against a militarily powerful, nuclear-capable adversary. The divergent threat perception prominent before Russia’s invasion lessened considerably—almost overnight. Within the member countries, there were unanimous cries for an immediate end to all hostilities. While not physically intervening in the war on Ukraine’s behalf thus far, NATO has delivered an estimated 150 billion euros worth of aid to Ukraine, as well as significant military equipment and training, since the war began. Additionally, 25 member states are now among the top 37 countries contributing to Ukraine’s survival. Yet, while NATO has seemingly unified in the face of the Russian invasion, comparisons of support to Ukraine imply that a diverging threat perception of Russia remains between NATO’s eastern and western members.

Though the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have relatively small economies, they are contributing 1.1% (€310 million), 1.24% (€390 million), and 0.93% (€490 million) of their GDPs, respectively, to support Ukraine. Poland follows them closely with 0.64% (€3.52 billion) of its GDP. By comparison, western NATO countries, such as the UK, Germany, and France, only contribute 0.38% (€9.82 billion), 0.21% (€7.37 billion), and 0.07% (€1.74 billion) of their respective GDPs. While the smaller economies of the eastern NATO members are contributing a significantly smaller euro amount, the fact that the percentage of their contributions relative to their GDPs is nearly three times that of western countries hints that a disproportionate threat perception still divides NATO.

As the threat perception begins to widen between eastern and western NATO members, it is pertinent to look at what might come next for the alliance should the war in Ukraine stagnate into a long-term conflict. Divergent threat perceptions of NATO’s main adversary on its eastern border will only be exacerbated as western NATO publics lose interest in the crisis, as has become evident in the United States with political leaders debating hotly about the subject. Subsequently, heads of state will view the war as less of a pressing foreign policy issue.

Despite pushback from a couple of member states, it is without a doubt that the military aid that NATO has sent Ukraine has made a difference in the war. While support for Ukraine is still going strong past the first anniversary of the invasion, it remains to be seen how long NATO countries can keep giving aid at the current rate without losing interest. NATO is not in jeopardy of dissolving anytime soon; Russia’s renewed aggression has seen to that. Neither will NATO contribute enough aid to strike a decisive blow to end the war in Ukraine. However, it is possible that, soon enough, divergent threat perceptions among NATO members will cause the alliance to lose its focus. Going once more from crisis to crisis, unable to unify itself against any single threat, will eventually jeopardize NATO’s existence.

Justin Luce is a captain in the U.S. Army.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: The very first NATO Summit, Paris, 16 December 1957

Photo Credit: U.S. Army NATO

18. Ukraine develops 'invisibility cloak' to protect soldiers from thermal imagery

An image at the link: https://kyivindependent.com/ukrainian-invisibility-cloak-will-cover-soldiers-from-thermal-imagery/

Ukraine develops 'invisibility cloak' to protect soldiers from thermal imagery

https://kyivindependent.com/ukrainian-invisibility-cloak-will-cover-soldiers-from-thermal-imagery/

by Dominic Culverwell

October 4, 2023 9:47 PM

2 min read

A finished sample of the "invisibility cloak" hides one of the three soldiers in a video published by Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. (Fedorov/Telegram)

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Ukrainian developers are looking to bring science-fiction to life with an "invisibility cloak," a lightweight overcoat able to hide soldiers from Russian thermal imagery, Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced on Oct. 4.

The "cloak" blocks heat radiation, rendering Ukrainian snipers and special forces teams invisible to thermal imagery scopes and cameras, including drones, when working at night.

The technology is already being tested in the field, according to Fedorov.

“The 'invisibility cloak' is just one of the developments that will help save the lives of our military at the frontline,” the minister wrote.

This isn't the first "invisibility cloak” to be developed. Canadian company Hyperstealth Biotechnology produced a similar design in 2019. But instead of blocking heat radiation, the Canadian design bends, or refracts, light.

The technology was developed under the Brave1 defense initiative. Fedorov called for more submissions to the platform to bolster Ukraine’s battlefield capabilities and enhance its military technology sector.

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Ukraine Business Roundup

Kyiv launched Brave1 in April 2023 to facilitate and fund Ukraine’s growing defense tech industry as well as attract investors.

Participants can submit ideas to the initiative that could benefit Ukraine’s military. After thorough reviews, Brave1 provides successful ideas with grants ranging from $5,000 to $30,000.

Over 500 defense tech developments are registered on the platform.

Ukraine's Digital Transformation Ministry is one of the initiative's co-founders and has pushed to introduce revolutionary technology on the battlefield.

One of Brave1's priorities is developing unmanned robotics systems including unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to help front-line troops during assaults, the Kyiv Independent reported in September.

Ukraine's defense and security sector is expected to expand in the coming years. President Volodymyr Zelensky said he envisions Ukraine as a global leader in the sector during an interview with journalist Natalia Moseychuk in August 2023.

Last year, the Economy Ministry pinpointed military tech as one of the four key pillars in Ukraine’s economic recovery alongside agriculture, metallurgy, and IT.

19. Law as Force in Hybrid Warfare

Excerpts:

The term lawfare was formally created and defined by Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF (retired) in 2001 as:

“…a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective.”

Dunlap’s definition of lawfare emphasizes the purpose of legal warfare as a military and not political object as noted by Clausewitz. This author submits a more precise definition of lawfare consistent with the nature of hybrid warfare and Clausewitz’s observations of war as follows:

“Employing the rule of law and its instruments and institutions as force to augment or replace physical force to serve a national interest or achieve a political/geopolitical end.”

By this definition, lawfare replaces or supplements violence as force and uses institutions and mechanisms of law to achieve political objectives.

Lawfare in most instances focuses on the use of international law and domestic laws and regulations, including its instruments and institutions, to restrict a geopolitical rival’s freedom to operate both militarily and geopolitically in certain domains. Lawfare has been and continues to be exercised in multiple domains by states, non-governmental organizations, and non-state actors. Lawfare had been applied by state actors before the term was coined, and they have continued to employ it after its creation. Consider the following examples:

Law as Force in Hybrid Warfare - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Michael Listner · October 5, 2023

The Westphalian paradigm of warfare exists in the belief in the dichotomy between open war with stretches of peace in between. This Western perspective of warfare is traditionally linked to conflicts employing force through kinetic means to achieve military objectives, and by extension, political objectives. The existence of nuclear weapons and the specter of nuclear war has made this either/or approach to war and peace more tenuous and gives greater leverage to periods of unpeace where states continue to pursue their national interests in place of, or in preparation for, future kinetic conflict. The present great-power competition with the People’s Republic of China and to a lesser extent the Russian Federation has made irregular warfare and gray zone operations useful tools in today’s complex geopolitical environment where long-established means of typifying force through physical means as enunciated by Clausewitz is not always a viable option. It is in this setting that hybrid warfare and its implements become significant. This article will discuss hybrid warfare and how the United States can use its advantage in legal resources through the creation of a special team of legal professionals to engage in the hybrid warfare environment.

Origins of hybrid warfare

The clearest articulation of hybrid warfare can be found by one of its most prolific practitioners: the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army. Xu Sanfei, the editor of Military Forum and a senior editor in the theory department of Liberation Army News, explains that hybrid warfare

“…refers to an act of war that is conducted at the strategic level; that comprehensively employs political, economic, military, diplomatic, public opinion, legal, and other such means; whose boundaries are blurrier, whose forces are more diverse, whose form is more mixed, whose regulation and control is more flexible, and whose objectives are more concealed.”

This approach was integrated into the Three Warfares policy (三种战法) by the Chinese Communist Party in 2003, to be employed as doctrine by the People’s Liberation Army. The Three Warfares doctrine applies at its core the teaching of Sun Tzu:

“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”

“To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”

In other words, the objective of the Three Warfares is to achieve the ultimate objective of war identified by Clausewitz: the compulsory submission of the enemy, without violence or physical force. The Three Warfares doctrine achieves this through psychological warfare to affect an adversary’s decision-making process; media warfare to enact continuing influence on an adversary’s attitudes and perceptions; and legal warfare to exploit both domestic and international legal systems to achieve commercial and political objectives and ultimately compulsory subjugation of the enemy.

Law as a tool of hybrid warfare

The term lawfare was first coined in 2001, although the history of the concept dates back to the 17th century with Hugo Grotius, known as the progenitor of international law. The first known exercise of legal warfare is exemplified in Grotius’ legal work Mare Liberum, which was published in 1609.

The term lawfare was formally created and defined by Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF (retired) in 2001 as:

“…a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective.”

Dunlap’s definition of lawfare emphasizes the purpose of legal warfare as a military and not political object as noted by Clausewitz. This author submits a more precise definition of lawfare consistent with the nature of hybrid warfare and Clausewitz’s observations of war as follows:

“Employing the rule of law and its instruments and institutions as force to augment or replace physical force to serve a national interest or achieve a political/geopolitical end.”

By this definition, lawfare replaces or supplements violence as force and uses institutions and mechanisms of law to achieve political objectives.

Lawfare in most instances focuses on the use of international law and domestic laws and regulations, including its instruments and institutions, to restrict a geopolitical rival’s freedom to operate both militarily and geopolitically in certain domains. Lawfare has been and continues to be exercised in multiple domains by states, non-governmental organizations, and non-state actors. Lawfare had been applied by state actors before the term was coined, and they have continued to employ it after its creation. Consider the following examples:

The Soviet Union exercised lawfare during the Cold War and prior to launch of Sputnik-1. It asserted the Soviet Union possessed unlimited sovereignty to all space, including outer space, above its physical territory in an attempt to create customary international law to that end. After the launch of Sputnik-1 the Eisenhower administration used the event as an opportunity to successfully use lawfare to counter the Soviet Union’s narrative and achieve its policy goal of creating a norm of customary law recognizing free access to outer space without the threat of physical force.
China has been utilizing lawfare in combination with other aspects of the Three Warfares in the “ten-dash line” region of the South China Sea and other parts of the maritime domain. The People’s Republic of China, through the People’s Liberation Army applies the Three Warfares doctrine, including lawfare, to justify its occupation and to rewrite international law to support its claims of sovereignty in the region to the detriment of existing international law, including the right to free access in the maritime domain.
China continues to utilize the Three Warfares, including lawfare, to annex Taiwan. It utilizes the facets of the Three Warfares, including lawfare, to create messaging and customary international law about the legal status of Taiwan to facilitate its annexation to China. It does so through physical acts, including blockading Taiwan and challenging Taiwan’s airspace. China may also be engaged in an ongoing lawfare action related to the legal status of satellites launched by and for Taiwan.
The United States executed a lawfare operation at the Conference of Disarmament on August 14, 2018, calling out both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China for their continued testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities. The delegate from the United States noted the continued development and testing of these capabilities by both, while they also rail against the United States and its “weaponization” of outer space and its refusal to support or sign the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). The lawfare effort by the United States effectively derailed the “space weapon” agenda of both states.
Two non-governmental organizations exercised lawfare when they asserted India’s destructive test of an anti-satellite capability violated a “taboo” or norms on such testing even though no such norms exist.
China employed a lawfare operation against the US in the United Nations when it filed a notification on December 6, 2021, with the UN Secretary General. The notification invoked Article V of the Outer Space Treaty and alleged that on two occasions Starlink satellites belonging to Space X and registered to the United States nearly collided with China’s space station. China used the occasion to lament not only a non-governmental space actor but also to admonish the United States in an international body with one of the possible outcomes to influence international laws, norms, and host country business regulations governing space to disadvantage a United States non-governmental space actor and the Starlink system itself. The United States rebutted the complaint on January 28, 2022.
The Russian Federation announced on February 21, 2023 it was suspending its obligations under the New START agreement, which it had agreed to extend with the United States through February 4, 2026. The United States announced on June 21, 2023, that it was employing legal counter measures in response to Russia’s actions.

The ability and willingness of the United States to employ hybrid warfare is and will continue to be essential in offering policymakers options to counter hybrid warfare tactics and strategies of the China and other geopolitical adversaries. It will also play a critical role in addressing and preempting geopolitical events where physical force is not an option. This reality necessitates the political will to recognize the existence of hybrid warfare activities, enable capabilities outside of conventional legal and policy thinking, and require specialists who operate outside of mainstream government and political circles to not only think outside of the box, but think without a box.

Tiger teams for special legal operations

A tiger team is a specialized, cross-functional team that is formed to investigate, provide creative options, and solve a specific problem or critical issue. The term “tiger team” was originated by the military but became prominent when NASA formed a tiger team to address the incident involving Apollo 13 as well as other NASA endeavors. A special legal warfare tiger team could be commissioned to counter and preemptively employ hybrid warfare tactics in furtherance of US national interests in great power competition where gray zone operations are preferred over kinetic methods.

A special legal warfare tiger team would consist of at least five subject matter experts dealing with outer space, maritime, cyberspace, operational law, and national security law. The team would be formed under a “clean room” approach where members are compartmentalized and anonymous to each other. The members would meet and deliberate in a non-localized, secure virtual environment at separate undisclosed locations. Members of the team would be enlisted as contractors and not employees of the federal government or members of the armed forces. The members would preferably have little to no experience within the federal government and would be apolitical so as to mitigate dogmatic bias to the greatest extent possible. The special legal warfare tiger team would potentially operate under the authority of a Cabinet-level official — either the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, or another designated official.

The special legal warfare tiger team would make use of creative legal specialists outside of the mainstream political and government environment to foster a flexible and agile approach when formulating policy recommendations to geopolitical issues and problems. The team would have the flexibility and freedom from ideological influence to take a clean sheet approach to postulate innovative lawfare and hybrid warfare tactics and strategies. Autonomy from political and ideological influence would permit the special legal warfare tiger team to address geopolitical problems and offer strategies that might otherwise be disregarded or considered unviable options in traditional political and government brainstorming sessions.

An example of how a special legal warfare tiger team might provide legal and policy alternatives to address international incidents can be seen in the United States’ response to Russia’s intercept of one of its defunct signal intelligence satellites using a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon on November 15, 2021. The United States responded to this event with messaging that the intercept was a “test” consistent with Russia’s narrative. Because the nature of the incident was characterized as a “test,” the US government, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was unable to find legal recourse as the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit the testing of weapons in outer space. This messaging limited the US response to finger-wagging over the creation of orbital debris, the “weaponization of outer space,” and the effect of the “test” on long-term sustainability. This messaging also preempted the United States from carrying out further lawfare operations that could have been used to the political advantage of the US in international forums.

Alternatively, a special legal warfare tiger team, outside of mainstream political influence and taking a clean-sheet approach to the problem, could have dismissed the messaging of the intercept as a test. Alternatively, the special legal warfare tiger team could have advised policy makers to adopt political messaging asserting the intercept was a “demonstration” of an anti-satellite weapon capability and capacity instead of a test, further advising policy makers that as a demonstration of an anti-satellite weapon capability, Russia used outer space in an aggressive, non-peaceful manner—giving the US leverage to assert Russia’s action was inconsistent with and a technical violation of the “peaceful purposes” provision in the preamble of the Outer Space Treaty.

The special legal warfare tiger team could further advise the Department of State be directed to use this messaging to mount a lawfare operation in the United Nations. This operation, which would have been carried out by the US Ambassador to the United Nations, would have called into question Russia’s actions and its compliance with the letter and the spirit of international law. The United States would have also been enabled to call a special session of the United Nations Security Council where the US could admonish the Russian Federation and place the People’s Republic of China in the awkward position of defending an ally by using its veto power to defeat any resolution denouncing Russia.

Utilizing law as force

Western contemporary strategic thinking may dismiss the potential of the concept of a special legal warfare tiger team and the legitimacy of lawfare and hybrid warfare in general. Nonetheless, the role of hybrid warfare in great power competition should not be rejected outright as it is a reality that geopolitical adversaries, particularly the People’s Republic of China, recognize and will continue to exploit against the United States and the West.

A legal tiger team would offer policymakers and warfighters alternatives to physical force to achieve political objectives that might not be recommended or considered through established approaches. Most of all, special legal warfare tiger teams could give the United States superiority in the lawfare and hybrid warfare environment.

Law is an adversarial pursuit, and it is not just a tool in hybrid warfare: it is force. The United States should take advantage of this reality given it benefits from the largest per capita population of legal professionals in the world and engage select legal professionals to deliver novel lawfare recommendations and operations in the current hybrid warfare environment to meet or preempt geopolitical challenges facing the United States.

Michael J. Listner is a licensed attorney in the State of New Hampshire and the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions. He is a subject matter expert and practitioner in outer space law, outer space policy and lawfare strategy and the author and editor of the space law and policy briefing-letter, The Précis.

Image caption: JUPITER-C EXPLORER 1 Launches Jan. 31, 1959. After Russia’s launch of Sputnik-1 in October 1957 the launch of Sputnik-1 the Eisenhower administration used the event as an opportunity to successfully use lawfare to counter the Soviet Union’s narrative and achieve its policy goal of creating a norm of customary law recognizing free access to outer space without the threat of physical force. (Courtesy NASA)

20. A Wartime Election in Ukraine? It’s a Political Hot Potato.

A Wartime Election in Ukraine? It’s a Political Hot Potato.

By Andrew E. Kramer

Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine

Oct. 5, 2023

Updated 7:31 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Andrew E. Kramer · October 5, 2023

In normal circumstances, President Volodymyr Zelensky would be running for re-election next spring. Analysts say an election is unlikely, but the prospect is causing some anxiety in Kyiv.

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, center, Charles Michel, president of the European Council, left, and Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, during a summit in February.Credit...Emile Ducke for The New York Times

Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine

Oct. 5, 2023, 12:01 a.m. ET

It might seem like a huge distraction at the height of a full-scale war, not to mention a logistical nightmare: holding a presidential election as Russian missiles fly into the Ukrainian capital and artillery assaults reduce whole towns to ruins.

But President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has not ruled it out. His five-year term ends in several months, and if not for the war, he would be preparing to either step down or campaign for a second term.

Analysts consider the possibility of wartime balloting a long shot, and under martial law, elections in Ukraine are suspended. Still, there is talk among Kyiv’s political class that Mr. Zelensky might seek a vote, with far-reaching implications for his government, the war and political opponents, who worry he will lock in a new term in an environment when competitive elections are all but impossible.

The debate over an election comes against the backdrop of mounting pressure on Ukraine to show to Western donors Ukraine’s good governance credentials, which Mr. Zelensky has touted. Opponents say a one-sided wartime election could weaken that effort.

A petition opposing a wartime election has drawn signatures from 114 prominent Ukrainian civil society activists.

A new electoral mandate could strengthen Mr. Zelensky’s hand in any decision about whether to commit to an extended fight, or insulate him if eventual settlement talks with Russia dent his popularity and hurt his chances of re-election later.

Mr. Zelensky has said he favors elections, but only if international monitors can certify them as free, fair and inclusive, and he has outlined multiple obstacles to holding a vote. Political opponents have been more categorical in rejecting elections, which before the Russian invasion were scheduled for March and April next year, saying the war was creating too much turmoil to properly conduct a vote.

Serhiy Prytula, who runs a charity in support of the war effort, ranks high among the most respected leaders in the country.Credit...Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times

“The first step is victory; the second step is everything else,” including a revival of domestic politics in Ukraine, said Serhiy Prytula, an opposition figure and the director of a charity assisting the military. Opinion surveys regularly rank him in the top three most respected leaders in the country, along with Mr. Zelensky and the commander of the military commander, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny.

Mr. Prytula, a former comedic actor, had set up an exploratory committee to run for Parliament before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, following the path from show business to politics taken by Mr. Zelensky, who had played a president in a television series before winning the presidency in 2019. For now, Mr. Prytula has halted all political activity during the war. The office he had rented for the parliamentary run is now a headquarters of the charity.

The Biden administration and European governments supporting Ukraine militarily have not weighed in publicly on an election. But the idea garnered wider attention when Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, said the country should go ahead with a vote despite the war.

“You must also do two things at the same time,” Mr. Graham said on a visit to Kyiv in August. “I want this country to have free and fair elections, even when it’s under attack.”

To hold elections, Ukraine would have to lift, at least temporarily, martial law in the case of a vote for Parliament or amend the law in the case of a vote for president.

In a photo provided by the Ukrainian government, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, center, attended a ceremony in July. He is seen as a prospective challenger to Mr. Zelensky in future elections.Credit...Agence France-Presse, via Ukrainian Presidential Press Service

Mr. Zelensky has cited as a major obstacle the need to ensure that Ukrainians living under Russian occupation can vote without retribution. “We are ready,” he told a conference in Kyiv last month. “It’s not a question of democracy. This is exclusively an issue of security.”

The Ukrainian leader has said online voting might be a solution.

Among the states of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine is the country with the largest population to have succeeded in transferring power democratically. Its criminal justice system has been riddled with corruption, and the privatization of state property has been mismanaged, but elections had been consistently deemed free and fair by international monitors. Ukrainians have elected six presidents since gaining independence in 1991.

“Ukraine’s commitment to democracy is not in question, and being forced to postpone elections due to war doesn’t change this,” said Peter Erben, the Ukraine director of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, a pro-democracy group funded by Western governments.

Ukrainian politics have revolved around parties formed by prominent personalities rather than policy positions. There is Fatherland, led by Yulia Tymoshenko, the most prominent woman in Ukrainian politics; the Punch, led by Vitali Klitschko, the mayor of Kyiv and a former boxer; the Voice, led by Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, a rock star; and Mr. Zelensky’s Servant of the People party, named for a TV show.

Senator Lindsey Graham visited Kyiv in May. He returned in August and spoke about potential elections.

Military veterans are widely expected to play an outsize role in Ukrainian politics when elections resume, as voters and as candidates who could challenge the current political class.

Holding an election before the war ends could lock in seats for parties in Parliament now, including Mr. Zelensky’s, while soldiers are still serving in the military and unable to run for office.

“A scheduled election isn’t necessary for our democracy,” said Olha Aivazovska, the director of OPORA, a Ukrainian civil society group that monitors elections. There is no means now for refugees, frontline soldiers and residents of occupied territory to vote, she said.

An election in “the hot phase of the war” would almost certainly undermine, not reinforce, Mr. Zelensky’s legitimacy, she said.

Even those who favor an election cite concerns about a potential consolidation of power. Oleg Soskin, an economist and adviser to a former Ukrainian president, has called for elections despite the war, warning that Mr. Zelensky could otherwise usurp authority under martial law. But that is an outlying view in Kyiv. Most of Mr. Zelensky’s political opponents have refrained from being overly critical of him during the war, but they say a vote now would be unfair.

Kyiv’s mayor, Vitali Klitschko, center, and his brother Vladimir Klitschko, left, visiting a residential area after shelling in 2022.Credit...Roman Pilipey/EPA, via Shutterstock

“I understand the government wants to maintain its position while ratings are high,” said Dmytro Razumkov, a former chairman of Parliament in the political opposition. Mr. Zelensky’s chances of victory, he said, “will almost certainly be lower after the end of the war.”

An election now would only weaken Ukraine as politicians campaigned, competing with and criticizing one another, said Volodymyr Ariev, a member of Parliament from the opposition European Solidarity party. He has advocated for Mr. Zelensky to form a national unity government that would include members of the opposition.

“It jeopardizes the unity of society,” he added.

Public opinion surveys have consistently suggested that a prospective challenger to Mr. Zelensky in future elections could be the commander of his army, General Zaluzhny. As a serving military officer, he is barred from participating in an election during the war.

Dmytro Razumkov, former chairman of Ukraine’s Parliament, in his office on Wednesday.Credit...Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times

Mr. Zelensky still consistently leads in surveys of leaders whom Ukrainians trust. A recent poll by United Ukraine, a nonpartisan research group, showed 91 percent of Ukrainians trusted Mr. Zelensky, 87 percent trusted General Zaluzhny, and 81 percent trusted Mr. Prytula.

Polls have also shown high support for Mr. Klitschko, the mayor of Kyiv; Vitaly Kim, the head of the civil military administration in the southern region of Mykolaiv; and Oleksiy Danilov, the secretary of Ukraine’s national security council.

Mr. Prytula’s charity has boosted his national stature during the war. It draws donations from millions of Ukrainians to provide drones, body armor, rifle scopes and other supplies to the army at a time when activities supporting the army are immensely popular domestically.

Mr. Prytula said he was focused solely on keeping Ukrainians united behind the war effort. Holding an election now, he said, would be pointless because Mr. Zelensky would all but certainly win.

“He is No. 1,” he said. “Our society supports him.”

Maria Varenikova contributed reporting.

Andrew E. Kramer is the Times bureau chief in Kyiv. He was part of a team that won the 2017 Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting for a series on Russia’s covert projection of power. More about Andrew E. Kramer

The New York Times · by Andrew E. Kramer · October 5, 2023

21. Marine Officer explains why Gen Z won't join the military

Excerpts:

Most importantly, the military was able to attract him, a talented, educated 25-year-old man who could have done anything. Knowing why he, a member of the military’s key target demographic, decided to join the Marine Corps is probably the most unique insight of all.

Weiss breaks down what he believes are 21 key issues across four distinct areas that are the core problems keeping Gen Z and the military apart. He then backs up his reasoning with painstaking research with "the intention of diagnosing and solving a real and serious issue facing our nation," he writes.

There are a few issues he addresses that other generations would expect about Gen Z, such as the power of social media influencers. The U.S. military, he says, can counter that with influencers of their own. Another sticking point is the military pay structure: everyone gets paid the same regardless of performance. This is a generation that watches peers gain followers and influence (and thus more money) through performance. The military, he says, could introduce performance bonus pay.

Marine Officer explains why Gen Z won't join the military

wearethemighty.com · by Team Mighty · October 3, 2023

The youth of today seems to have zero interest in joining the military and the military can’t seem to figure out why that is. They’ve done studies, conducted polls and the Army even knows that Gen Z has some serious misconceptions about the military. Despite a $4 billion investment in marketing to Gen Z, the combined branches of the military will miss their recruiting goals by nearly 19,000 in 2023.

Many people in the military and in government believe the recruiting crisis is a serious national security risk, but the military itself just keeps falling short of reaching (or appealing to) Americans born after 1997 – so-called Generation Z. But one Marine officer, a lieutenant and a member of that generation, has written a book detailing what he believes are problems and solutions, and presents research to back it up.

Lt. Matthew Weiss took it upon himself to research and write “We Don't Want You, Uncle Sam: Examining the Military Recruiting Crisis with Generation Z." As a member of Gen Z with a background working for the defense technology firm Anduril Industries, he saw how companies jockey to attract and retain young talent coming from anywhere in the country. He also earned a bachelor’s degree and master’s degree from the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School before joining the Corps.

Most importantly, the military was able to attract him, a talented, educated 25-year-old man who could have done anything. Knowing why he, a member of the military’s key target demographic, decided to join the Marine Corps is probably the most unique insight of all.

Weiss breaks down what he believes are 21 key issues across four distinct areas that are the core problems keeping Gen Z and the military apart. He then backs up his reasoning with painstaking research with "the intention of diagnosing and solving a real and serious issue facing our nation," he writes.

We Don't Want YOU, Uncle Sam: Examining the Military Recruiting Crisis with Generation Z book cover.

There are a few issues he addresses that other generations would expect about Gen Z, such as the power of social media influencers. The U.S. military, he says, can counter that with influencers of their own. Another sticking point is the military pay structure: everyone gets paid the same regardless of performance. This is a generation that watches peers gain followers and influence (and thus more money) through performance. The military, he says, could introduce performance bonus pay.

On the other hand, there are problems and solutions that may not be as obvious, according to the book. These kinds of problems and solutions could be the key because the military is uniquely suited to address them. First off, Generation Z needs a calling, one they strive for and work toward. It needs to be larger than life, bigger than themselves.

What better place to answer that calling than the U.S. military?

Moreover, this is a generation that is constantly receiving updates, pings and dings from their phone. It’s beginning to have a negative effect on them, and they crave time away from the screens and sounds of their daily life to go out and do something “unplugged” and reset. The military can offer this time spent doing real-world responsibility-bearing activities like no other institution, so all is not lost.

For a full rundown on what the United States military can do to appeal to its youngest generation of military-age Americans, check out “We Don't Want You, Uncle Sam: Examining the Military Recruiting Crisis with Generation Z” – on sale now in both paperback and on Amazon Kindle e-readers.

wearethemighty.com · by Team Mighty · October 3, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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