Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"A sign of intelligence is an awareness of one's own ignorance."

- Niccolo Machiavelli

"You can surmount the obstacles in your path if you are determined, courageous and hard-working. Never be faint-hearted. Be resolute, but never bitter."

- Ralph Bunche

"Because whatever has happened to humanity, whatever is currently happening to humanity, it is happening to all of us. No matter how hidden the cruelty, no matter how far off the screams of pain and terror, we live in one world."

-Alice Walker

1. Top Marine general hospitalized, leaving 3-star in charge

2. Conflict by David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts review — the future of war

3. Special Operations News - October 30, 2023 | SOF News

4. The Bolduc Brief: Interoperability Failures Among Senior Military Leaders in Special Operations and the Conventional Military

5. Why urban warfare in Gaza will be bloodier than in Iraq

6. How Years of Israeli Failures on Hamas Led to a Devastating Attack

7. Patriotism’s Decline Imperils the Military

8. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 30, 2023

9. Five Facts on the Rising Intolerance in America

10. Harvard’s Double Standard on Free Speech

11. Israel tanks penetrate deep into Gaza, as Hamas hostage video emerges

12. The Primacy of Culture

13. Joe Biden’s Sweeping New Executive Order Aims to Drag the US Government Into the Age of ChatGPT

14. FACT SHEET: President Biden Issues Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence

15. Department of Defense Releases FY 2023 Military Intelligence Program Budget

16. Arming Ukraine is cheap compared to the far higher price of Russian victory

17. Iran Update, October 30, 2023

18. AI Is Already at War By Michèle A. Flournoy

19. From Einsatzgruppen to Hamas: A Historical Continuum of Mobile Mass Murder

20. Japan’s Play for Today: Too Much? Just Right? Or Never Enough?

21. US consumers keep spending despite high prices and their own gloomy outlook. Can it last?

22. Reflections on the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu | SOF News

23. White House AI exec order raises questions on future of DoD innovation

24. ODNI, Pentagon reveal FY23 intelligence budget at nearly $100 billion

25. US isn’t ready for a war of great powers

26. A Call to Action for the Intelligence Community Following Hamas Terror Attack

27. Inadequate U.S. Patriot Missile Force Size Highlighted By Middle East Crisis

1. Top Marine general hospitalized, leaving 3-star in charge

He surely needs some rest.

Top Marine general hospitalized, leaving 3-star in charge

militarytimes.com · by Irene Loewenson · October 30, 2023

The top Marine Corps general was hospitalized following a medical emergency Sunday evening, the Corps announced.

The brief statement from Marine Corps headquarters on Monday afternoon didn’t provide details on Marine Commandant Gen. Eric Smith’s condition or specify the medical emergency.

Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, deputy commandant for combat development and integration and commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, started performing the duties of commandant, according to the statement. An earlier version of the statement referred to Heckl as the acting commandant, but the Corps issued a corrected statement approximately an hour later.

The Marine Corps didn’t immediately respond to a question about what the difference was between “acting commandant” and “performing the duties of commandant.”

By law, the assistant commandant typically would be the one to take over when a commandant is unable to perform the duties of the office.

But because of the refusal by Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Alabama, to join in on providing unanimous consent to senior military nominations, there is no assistant commandant, even though the White House nominated Lt. Gen. Christopher Mahoney for the role in July. Tuberville has maintained this hold in protest of a Pentagon policy providing travel reimbursement and time off for troops seeking out-of-state abortions, which he views as illegal.

Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl answers a question Sept. 6 at the Defense News Conference in Arlington, Virginia. (Colin Demarest/C4ISRNET)

Senators have pushed through the nominations of a handful of top military leaders, including Smith, by voting on them one by one.

When Smith simultaneously was the assistant commandant and the acting commandant, he said he was sleeping approximately five hours a night because of the demands of holding two of the top jobs in the Marine Corps.

“Nobody should feel bad for me,” Smith told reporters Sept. 6 at the Defense News Conference in Arlington, Virginia, in response to a Marine Corps Times question about his schedule. “I make plenty of money, and nobody usually yells at me, so that’s good. But it is not a sustainable thing when the last thing you do is flip your computer off at 11:30 at night and you’re getting up at 5 o’clock in the morning.”

His workload hasn’t eased up since his confirmation, because of the lack of an assistant commandant, Smith told reporters Friday at the Military Reporters & Editors conference in Washington.

During the day on Sunday, Smith was at the Marine Corps Marathon in Arlington, Virginia.

Earlier on Monday afternoon, the Center for a New American Security announced it was postponing its event featuring Smith that had been scheduled for Wednesday morning.

Sen. Jack Reed, D-Rhode Island, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in a statement Monday afternoon, “I am wishing General Smith a speedy recovery. He is one of our nation’s finest and toughest leaders, and I hope he will return to full strength soon. My thoughts are with General Smith and his family.”

The Marine Corps said it would release more information on Smith’s condition “at a later time.”

Editor’s note: This story was updated Monday afternoon after with a statement from Sen. Jack Reed and the Marine Corps’ corrected information on Lt. Gen Karsten Heckl’s role.

About Irene Loewenson

Irene Loewenson is a staff reporter for Marine Corps Times. She joined Military Times as an editorial fellow in August 2022. She is a graduate of Williams College, where she was the editor-in-chief of the student newspaper.

2. Conflict by David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts review — the future of war

Excerpts:

The book sets out to do two things. First, “to show how militaries around the world have learnt – or failed to learn – from each previous war when trying to fashion the means to fight the next”. Second, “to investigate the personal qualities needed for successful strategic leadership”. In this sense, the two authors, the retired US General David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, biographer of, among others, Churchill and Napoleon, combine well.

They list four key things that successful leaders must do to win. First, they need a comprehensive grasp of the overall strategic situation in a conflict so they can craft the appropriate strategic approach; second, they must communicate these “big ideas” to all relevant parties; third, they must oversee their proper implementation; and finally, they must understand how to refine and adapt. But as the authors point out exceptional strategic leadership is “as rare as the black swan”. Well, quite.

Conflict by David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts review — the future of war

The Times · by David Patrikarakos · October 30, 2023

In the popular mind, being at war is like being pregnant: you either are or you aren’t. In fact, as David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts show, conflicts increasingly exist in a “grey zone” between outright war and peace — it’s possible for civilians to be unaware that they are at war. From Iraq to Afghanistan we fight enemies who wear no uniforms, do not march in formation and who cannot be defeated on the battlefield. In Iraq, the real war began only after Saddam Hussein’s army had officially been defeated.

Take Beijing’s behaviour in the South China Sea. Rather than physically conquer islands and force a military confrontation with the US, China uses everything from lawsuits to propaganda to foster anti-war sentiments in enemy populations. As the authors correctly observe, the wars of the future will be fought in six domains: land, sea, air, cyber, space and information, which means they will not always be visible to the naked eye.

Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine is a rigorous and thoughtful study of what has happened on battlefields over the past eight decades, rather than the wider causes or political fallout of conflict. For instance, in their study of the Yom Kippur war the authors aren’t so much interested in the bigger geopolitical picture, but in tactics and technology . On October 6, 1973 an alliance of Arab armies attacked the state of Israel and, for a time, looked like it might finally achieve its dream of “throwing the Jews into the sea”. It was a surprise attack launched on Judaism’s holiest day, and it almost succeeded. But did you know that almost as important as the element of surprise was the Sagger, “a highly lethal Soviet anti-tank guided missile with a two-mile range, that inflicted particularly serious damage on Israel’s armoured vehicles”?

Similarly, the importance of, say, the Korean War is not the political miscalculations that led to its outbreak, but that it occupies a “unique place in history” because it showed that limited conventional wars could still be fought in the new nuclear age without total escalation.

The book sets out to do two things. First, “to show how militaries around the world have learnt – or failed to learn – from each previous war when trying to fashion the means to fight the next”. Second, “to investigate the personal qualities needed for successful strategic leadership”. In this sense, the two authors, the retired US General David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, biographer of, among others, Churchill and Napoleon, combine well.

They list four key things that successful leaders must do to win. First, they need a comprehensive grasp of the overall strategic situation in a conflict so they can craft the appropriate strategic approach; second, they must communicate these “big ideas” to all relevant parties; third, they must oversee their proper implementation; and finally, they must understand how to refine and adapt. But as the authors point out exceptional strategic leadership is “as rare as the black swan”. Well, quite.

The charismatic and talented Douglas MacArthur, whose military successes bred a hubris that eventually curdled into near madness, is a cautionary tale here. As the authors drily observe, his request to use nuclear weapons because they were “merely quantitative increments to the arsenal of war” was “not picked up early enough by the Truman administration as [a sign] of his growing instability”.

Mao Zedong, conversely, while clearly one of the 20th century’s worst psychopaths, did all four things brilliantly. At the start of the Chinese civil war, the Kuomintang government had 2.6 million men under arms, whereas Mao’s communist forces had fewer than half a million, only half of whom had rifles. But by remaining agile, understanding both the strategic and tactical situations he faced, and, it appears, studying The Art of War by Sun Tzu, Mao ultimately showed the world that smaller guerrilla forces could defeat a western-backed government.

The authors’ narrow focus is an effective approach that means the book never meanders, but it can be limiting. Take Ukraine: you cannot understand what is happening on its battlefields without understanding how the practice of politics dominates them. In 2014, when Russia stole Crimea and first sent its troops into eastern Ukraine, the goal was not to defeat Kyiv on the battlefield and then force it to accept peace terms. Instead, the Kremlin wanted to carve out a space in the east where it could pump in pro-Russia narratives. The goal was to destabilise Ukraine so that it could never join the EU or Nato — a political, rather than a military goal. The Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote (in various formulations) that “war is the continuation of politics by other means”. In Ukraine it became the practice of “armed politics”.

The book takes in the end of empire, Korea and the Middle East, analysing how conflict has evolved incrementally. Where it really impresses is its informed speculation about the future of warfare. Making predictions in an age when industrial war has returned to Europe and Jeremy Corbyn once had a shot at being prime minister is generally about as serious as astrology, but the authors understand one of the key points here. Traditionally, technology that was developed in conflict paved the way for technological advances in civilian life. Now western armies are increasingly reliant on tech from civilian life, especially in fields like robotics and AI. The result is yet more blurring of the lines between war and peace.

When I began going to Ukrainian front lines almost a decade ago, the troops I met there were generally tough, grizzled men on the front because they had experience of fighting for the Soviet Union. Now I see skinny, often bespectacled IT engineers, who are among the most potent soldiers Kyiv has because they pilot drones. During the battle of Bakhmut an officer showed me how his unit bought civilian drones off the internet. They then used a 3D printer to make 6in rockets that they filled with explosive. Target it correctly and this rocket — which costs $30 to make — can take out a multimillion-dollar tank.

The effect of all this is that the Ukraine war is both futuristic and oddly analogue: drones fly over 60-year-old Soviet armour; Kalashnikovs are fired along with digitally guided anti-tank missiles. The authors understand this. “We hope to highlight just how strangely regressive is the present Russo-Ukrainian conflict,” they correctly observe. “Warfare evolves; it does not ossify. Yet it is clearly also capable of being suddenly and shockingly thrown into reverse.”

Now, I’m in Israel covering yet another conflict — once again, Arab forces are trying to throw Jews into the sea. This is the second big point about future wars: they are almost certainly going to be as numerous as in the past.

David Patrikarakos is author of War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the 21st Century (Basic)

Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine by David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, William Collins, 536pp; £26. To order a copy go to timesbookshop.co.uk. Free UK standard P&P on orders over £25. Special discount available for Times+ members

The Times · by David Patrikarakos · October 30, 2023

3. Special Operations News - October 30, 2023 | SOF News

Well curated SOF news.

Special Operations News - October 30, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · October 30, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: An Army paratrooper descends from the sky during an airborne operation over Frida drop zone in Pordenone, Italy on August 31, 2023. Army Sgt. Mariah Y. Gonzalez;

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SOF News

Two ARSOF Soldiers Arrested. A member of the 3rd Special Forces Group and a member of the 4th Psychological Operations Group have been arrested on drug charges. “Fort Liberty special operations soldiers arrested for drug possession”, Task & Purpose, October 25, 2023.

Passing of Otto Liller. A former commander of Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR) passed away at age 51. Read his biography here. He served as the SOCKOR commander from June 2019 to June 2021 at which time he was relieved by Maj. Gen. Martin.

SOCEUR Works with Spanish SOF. Green Berets with the U.S. Army’s 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) concluded a nearly two-month joint combined exchange training (JCET) with members of the Spanish Army’s Grupo Especial de Operaciones (GOE) near Alicante, Spain, July 24, 2023. “U.S. Special Operations Command Europe Partners with Spanish SOF for JCET”, DVIDS, October 25, 2023.

Event – Panel Discussion on IW and Special Warfare. Ezra Cohen, Col. (Ret.) Mark Mitchell, and Chris Miller (former acting SecDef) are the panelists who will discuss civil-military relations within the special operations community, the transition from counterterrorism to irregular warfare, and how to optimize intelligence forces and SOF for the next generation of challenges. Preparing the Department of Defense for Irregular and Special Warfare, Hudson Institute, Tuesday, 10:00 am – 11: am.

“Site 512”. The Pentagon is maintaining a base deep in Israel’s Negev desert. Learn more in “U.S. Quietly Expands Secret Military Base in Israel”, The Intercept, October 27, 2023.

Book Review – With My Shield: An Army Ranger in Somalia. James Lechner has provided his first-person account of the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia. Lechner was one of the Rangers on the ground when the mission shifted from a raid to capture Somali insurgents to the rescue of a downed helicopter’s crew. Read a review of his book by Lt. Gen. Sean MacFarland in “Warrior Pays Heavy Price in Mogadishu”, AUSA, October 27, 2023.

T-AOS. On October 19, 2023, SOF News republished a DVIDS article about the new AFSOC organization called Theater Air Operations Squadron (T-AOS). A comprehensive article about the T-AOS has been published by N.K. Cobb, an academic chair at Joint Special Operations University, entitled “T-AOS: A New Model for Competition”, AEther, Air University, October 24, 2023.

Foreign Visitors Tour AFSOC. Air Force Special Operations Command welcomed Air Attachés from 12 various allied and partner nations to Hurlburt Field, FL, October 23, 2023. “Foreign Air Attaches visit AFSOC”, DVIDS, October 24, 2023.

International SOF

Video – Royal Marines New Rifle. The British are outfitting one of their elite military units with the KS-1 assault rifle. Watch a 7-minut long video about the new rifle. Forces News, YouTube, October 27, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ee8LvSwDSEY

CANSOF in Israel? Some news reports say that Canadian special forces are now in Israel. It is reported that the members of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) are assisting the Canadian embassy in Israel with contingency planning. (CBC Lite, October 29, 2023) See also an article in Global News (Oct 29, 2023) that has identified Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) has one unit that has personnel in Israel. JTF2 is Canada’s designated hostage rescue unit. Two Canadians are presumed missing and could be hostages at this time.

UK SF on Standby. British Special Forces troops are currently in Cyprus on standby for developments in Gaza and the wider region, according to media reports in the United Kingdom. There are about 200 British nationals currently stranded in Gaza. They are also likely to take part in actions to provide safety to nationals in other parts of the Middle East. (Cyprus Mail, Oct 30, 2023)

Israeli Elite Units. Nathan Rennolds describes the elite special forces units Israel could send into Gaza to clear Hamas’ labyrinth of tunnels and rescue hostages. (Business Insider, Oct 29, 2023).

SOF History

Nick Rowe. On October 29, 1963, Captain James “Nick” Rowe was captured by the Viet Cong. He was a Special Forces officer and one of only 34 American prisoners of war to escape captivity during the Vietnam War. He would later help establish the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) program taught to high-risk military personnel. In 1989, Rowe was killed by a unit of the New People’s Army in the Philippines while serving in the U.S. Embassy in Manila. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_N._Rowe

Humbert Versace. On October 29, 1963, Captain Humbert R. Versace was captured by the Viet Cong. He was held as a prisoner of war until September 26, 1965, in the Republic of Vietnam – the day of his death while in captivity – executed by the Viet Cong. He was serving as an Intelligence Advisor while assigned to the Military Assistance Advisory Group. In 2002 he was awarded the Medal of Honor by President George W. Bush for his actions during captivity. https://www.thenmusa.org/biographies/humbert-r-versace/

Ancient SF of Egypt. The military of Ancient Egypt was quite different from how modern militaries function today. The armies of Bronze Age Egypt largely consisted of poorly armed peasants and commoners who had little in the way of training or combat experience. However, there were some elite units of the Pharoh’s army. “The Elite Special Forces of Ancient Egypt”, World Atlas.

Conflict in Israel and Gaza

War Update. The Israeli military is continuing to expand its ground operations in Gaza. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is hitting command positions with armor, artillery, and airstrikes. It is attempting to interdict the many elaborate tunnels used by Palestinian militants. (The Hill, Oct 30, 2023). Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups are still firing rockets into Israel. Fatalities on both sides are now approaching 10,000.

Hostage Update. Currently there are about 230 hostages held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Negotiations are being conducted in various forums for the release of the hostages. As many as four hostages have been released thus far. Some hostages have been tortured and killed while in Hamas captivity. There are about ten U.S. hostages in Gaza. Thailand is the foreign nation with the most hostages held by Hamas – estimated at 54.

U.S. Evacuation. The last planned U.S. chartered flight (DoS) out of Ben Gurion International Airport will take place on Tuesday, October 31. Some Americans have been successful in crossing the border into Jordan. It is estimated that 33 Americans (some are dual citizens) have died in the conflict.

Why Did Hamas Attack Israel? Rodney Synder and Moshe Nelson explain why Hamas launched its deadliest terrorist attack ever on Israel. There is a lot of speculation of the true purpose of the attacks. The authors of this article point to Iran’s hope to derail any peace negotiations with Israel with regional Arab nations and to overturn the status quo of the Palestinian – Israeli conflict. “Why Did Hamas Conduct a Terrorist Attack on Israel and Why Now?”, The Cipher Brief, October 24, 2023.

Former MARSOC Cdr in Israel. Lt. Gen. James Glynn, a former commander of Marine Forces Special Operations Command spent several days in Israel offering advice to the Israeli military. He has since returned to the United States.

References: Map Gaza Strip (2005), and more maps of Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Israel.

Ukraine Conflict

Battle for Avdiyivka. The eastern Ukrainian city of Avdiyivka (Google Maps) continues to see heavy fighting. Kyiv forces have repelled multiple Russian attacks over the past several weeks. The Russians have experienced heavy equipment and personnel losses in these attacks. “Russia and Ukraine intensify fight over Avdiivka, another ruined city”, The Washington Post, October 28, 2023. (subscription)

Interactive Map. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine by the Insitute for the Study of War and Critical Threats.

On storymaps.arcgis.com

Commentary and National Security

US Army COIN Doctrine. This article argues that the innovation of the US Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine between 2000 and 2008 was enabled by three factors. The first factor was that the relevant actors needed to have a common understanding of the need for change. Second, a consensus had to be achieved on which organizational actions should be undertaken. Last, external pressure was necessary to overcome the US Army’s inflexibility. “What helped change the US Army counterinsurgency doctrine?”, by Christopher Good, Wavel Room, October 27, 2023.

World Wide Alert for U.S. Citizens. The Department of State has issued an alert for Americans. “Due to increased tensions in various locations around the world, the potential for terrorist attacks, demonstrations or violent actions against U.S. citizens and interests, the Department of State advises U.S. citizens overseas to exercise increased caution.” “Latest Information for U.S. Citizens”, DoS, October 29, 2023.

Border Crisis. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Natural Resources United House of Representatives. Entitled “Security Our Border, Saving Our National Parks”, October 18, 2023, YouTube, 2 hours. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1xkxU5eIe8&t=3s See also “IntelBrief: The Security Implications of Historic Levels of Migration at the U.S. Southwest Border”, The Soufan Center, October 27, 2023.

Report – Citizenship and Immigration Statuses of the U.S. Foreign-Born Population, Congressional Research Service, CRS IF11806, updated October 6, 2023, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11806

Great Power Competition

Books on Russian IO. Information warfare has a unique place in Russian strategic culture. Five books provide the details. “War Books: Russia’s Information Warfare”, by T.S. Allen, Modern War Institute at West Point, October 27, 2023.

SOF and Strategic Competition. Richard Angle, Leo Blanken, and Philip Swintek collaborate on an essay about how the United States ARSOF community should transition to the new era. “Where do US Army special operations fit in a world of strategic competition?”, Atlantic Council, October 13, 2023.

Sale of US Subs to Australia – Poses a Problem. The U.S. nuclear attack submarine inventory will experience a nearly decade-long dip due to the AUKUS partnership, according to a new Congressional Budget Office analysis (CBO, PDF, 45 pgs) of U.S. naval shipbuilding. “AUKUS Sub Sale Will Cause 10-year Dip in U.S. Attack Boat Inventory, Says CBO”, USNI News, October 26, 2023.

SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.

Afghanistan

WHO Humanitarian Report. The World Health Organization has posted its September 2023 “Emergency Situation Report” for Afghanistan online. (WHO, October 30, 2023, PDF, 7 pages).

Canada Helps Afghans Relocate. Canada is on the brink of fulfilling its commitment to accept 40,000 Afghans before the end of this year. The pledge, made by Ottawa in August 2021 when the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan, was driven by concerns for the safety of Afghans who had collaborated with Canadian programs and the former Afghan government. “Canada Admits Nearly 40,000 Afghans, Willing to Take More”, Voice of America, October 25, 2023.

United Kingdom Helps Afghans Relocate from Pakistan. The UK government is to charter flights to relocate Afghan refugees living in Pakistan who have been promised UK visas, starting on Thursday. Thousands of people who worked with or for the UK government in Afghanistan and fled the Taliban are in Pakistan, waiting for relocation to the United Kingdom. “UK to charter flights for Afghan refugees stuck in Pakistan”, BBC News, October 26, 2023.

Middle East

Report – Moving the Money. Read up on how the Iranian’s have access to money around the world and how they use it to support terrorism. Clayton Thomas, a Specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, testifies before the U.S. House of Representatives. Congressional Research Service, TE10088, PDF, 10 pages, October 26, 2023. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/TE/TE10088

U.S. Troops Under Attack in ME. At least 19 U.S. troops have traumatic brain injury from rocket and drone attacks by Iranian-backed militants. One contractor was killed. The attacks are taking place in Syria and Iraq. U.S. forces have been conducting airstrikes in Syria in retaliation.

“Shiite Crescent”. Iran has surrogate forces spread across the Middle East. A “Shiite Crescent” stretches from Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and back down to the Gaza Strip. “The Proxy Forces Iran Has Assembled Across the Middle East”, by Neil MacFarquhar, The New York Times, October 27, 2023. (subscription)

Africa

Troubles in Niger. Islamist militants in Niger have significantly stepped up their attacks in the months since generals here ousted the elected president, jettisoning the counterterrorism support of French forces and throwing into doubt cooperation with the American military. “Extremist attacks escalate in Niger after coup topples American ally”, by Rachel Chason, The Washington Post, October 30, 2023. (subscription)

Exercise Flintlock 2024. U.S. Special Operations Command Africa participated in a multinational field training exercise from September 24-30, 2023, in Texel, Netherlands. In preparation for the upcoming Exercise Flintlock 2024, U.S., Netherlands, and Belgian forces assembled to conduct preventative medical training. (DVIDS, Oct 30, 2023)

SOF News Book Shop

View our selection of books about special operations forces at the SOF News Book Shop.

Books, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Book – Dead Hand. James Stejskal is the author of the new novel Dead Hand. It is the latest in his Snake Easter chronicles. Old hands from the Cold War return to duty to oppose a Russian leader’s designs on the Baltic States. Stejskal, a former Green Beret, is the author of Special Forces Berlin and a former member of Det A, so he knows a little about the Cold War. Read an interview by Deborah Kalb of James about his new book (October 27, 2023).

Publication – UK MoD’s PR Manual. The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence has published Future Joint Personnel Recovery, Joint Concept Note 3/21, July 2021. PDF, 46 pages. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1087534/20210701-JCN_3_21_Future_JPR_final_web.pdf

Podcast – Creative Problem Solving in a Special Forces Environment. Col. (Ret.) Mark Mitchell is interviewed by the West Point Center for Oral History. Mitchell discusses his formative years and time in ROTC at Marquette, his experiences as a junior officer in the 24th Infantry Division while deployed to Iraq, and his time in 5th Special Forces Group, focusing on his deployments to Afghanistan. He explains what it means to him to be a Green Beret and the priority he places on “family.” Finally, he discusses the trends he has seen in counterterrorism operations over his time in the Army. October 26, 2023, 54 minutes. https://www.westpointcoh.org/interviews/creative-problem-solving-in-a-special-forces-environment

Video – MACV SOG Veteran John Good – Talks About Time on Recon Teams. Vietnam war MACV SOG vet John Good talks about him being drafted, NVA soldiers, wire taps, snakes, and a near miss with an ARC LIGHT B-52 bombing run. He served on RT ARIZONA and RT TEXAS. MACV SOG – Interviews with Warriors, October 29, 2023, YouTube, one hour. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DUpk_ERoueM

Movie Review – Freelance. John Cena plays a former Special Forces operative who now takes on freelance security jobs overseas. (watch the trailer) Dan Kois reviews the movie in “Finally, a Movie About the Glamorous Exciting Life of a Freelancer”, Slate.com, October 27, 2023. (Editors note: I did a lot of ‘bodyguard’ work both domestically and overseas. I wouldn’t use the words ‘glamorous’ to describe it; although there was a certain degree of ‘excitement’ that punctuated long periods of boredom.)

Upcoming Events

October 30-31, 2023

34th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium

National Defense Industrial Association

November 29-30, 2023

SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium

Defense Strategies Institute

December 8, 2023

Winter Cruise

Combat Diver Association

December 8-10, 2023

2023 Civil Affairs Conference

Civil Affairs Association

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sof.news · by SOF News · October 30, 2023

4. The Bolduc Brief: Interoperability Failures Among Senior Military Leaders in Special Operations and the Conventional Military

Wow. Don Bolduc pulls no punches.

The Bolduc Brief: Interoperability Failures Among Senior Military Leaders in Special Operations and the Conventional Military

sofrep.com · by Donald Bolduc · October 30, 2023

2 hours ago

Introduction

As a result of the announcement to downsize special forces, I am writing this essay to add insight into why this decision is being considered. Nothing occurs in a vacuum, and there are always causes and effects and actions and reactions that lead to conclusions that do not make sense and seem unreasonable. https://www.newsnationnow.com/us-news/military/army-considers-big-cuts-to-special-ops-forces/

There is no doubt that the United States Army Special Forces is the world’s leader in unconventional warfare operations. Special Operations Forces have many capabilities and capacities across all the services. Each has its focus, but this is the only special operations force that has the numerous mission profiles of Special Forces. Our nation needs these mission profiles to possess a military capability suitable to conduct operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels across the operational continuum of peace through war. No other force in the military can go from combat to humanitarian operations as quickly as Special Forces.

The tactical level of SOF is the most effective. It is the strategic and operational level where senior leaders make decisions that is usually the weak point. At no time do I point my fingers at others without including my own mistakes. Although I disagreed with what I was seeing and experiencing, I could not influence those decisions. My lack of political savvy and inability to influence my senior leaders contributed to failed strategy and operational plans.

In Special Operations since 1987, the counterterrorism forces have dominated special operations. Since 2001, the counterterrorism forces have marginalized the US Army Special Forces. This takeover has, unfortunately, been at the cooperation of special forces senior leaders at the general officer level. The geniuses that created this problem, most of them now retired, replaced by their sycophant protégés to carry on, have concluded this was not a good idea and want to broaden the SOF horizons. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/02/12/after-decades-focused-on-terrorism-special-operations-is-broadening-its-horizons/

During my time as a special forces officer, commanding at all levels up to the general officer level, I saw firsthand how my leadership subordinated itself to the counterterrorism force leadership to ensure their continued promotion inside the special operations community. This has had a detrimental effect on US Army Special Forces. It negatively affected combat development, funding, force structure, reductions in direct action force structure in special forces, command and control, and assignments and promotions. The co-opting and control of US Army Special Forces began in earnest in 2005 when Special Forces Colonels and Generals began working as senior staff members and deputy commanders in Joint Special Operations Command. The assignment there, over time, became a stamp of approval for continued advancement at the senior level. Those that were not chosen or decented in any way were shown the door. The dominance of counterterrorism senior officers and civilians at USSCOM created a counterterrorism-focused command with large staffs that subordinated to US Army Special Forces. This resulted in counterterrorism becoming synonymous with all special operation force missions. In COMBATANT Commands, JSOC took over the responsibility and focus of special operations by using their national force, three-star, and funding power to co-opt special forces primacy from the Theater Special Operations Command. In addition, JSOC established liaison organizations in Washington, DC, to increase their leverage within the interagency.

Another problem is the need for more civilian oversight of the United States Special Operations Command. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict has been subordinated, in practice, to the United States Special Operations Command. This subordination of civilian oversight is detrimental to the civilian oversight role of our military. Also, the Assistant Secretary position should be an Under Secretary position. The name and function should be changed to Under Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. This would ensure civilian oversight and put special operations on the same level as the conventional military.

A Strategic and Operational Recap:

The advent of modern warfare has necessitated the seamless collaboration between special operations and conventional military units. However, despite recognizing the need for interoperability, senior military leaders in both domains have failed to address this crucial challenge effectively.

It is important to note that at the tactical level, the men and women operating in Afghanistan did their jobs with honor, dedication, and competence. This included all Special Operations Forces, Conventional Forces, and Counterterrorism Forces. Despite the lack of interoperability at the senior levels, the tactical level did a better job at figuring out how to work together. The success of our tactical units was not matched at the senior level with a sound strategy and operational plan. The senior leaders took care of themselves. Blamed the problems on their subordinates and failed to give our service members the awards they deserved.

The failure of our senior leaders in Afghanistan to work together and develop a successful strategic and operational plan resulted in higher casualties, corruption in the Afghan government, and the prolonging of the war in Afghanistan. There was no accountability at the senior levels for failure. The senior leaders in special operations and the conventional military were unable to work together, figure out a functional command structure, and develop a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan that resulted in neutralizing and defeating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

In my experience, there were two opportunities in which we could have declared military objectives were met in Afghanistan. The first came in March of 2002 after the first rotation in Afghanistan, where we had successfully established an interim government. That interim government established provincial and district Afghan leaders to govern Afghanistan. This was the international community’s opportunity to allow Afghans to govern Afghans in their traditional way. The Afghans would have successfully figured out how to work together and integrate the Taliban successfully into their governing process. The international community could have supported with money and other resources. Instead, the United States and Coalition Forces expanded their operations, including establishing a democratic government in Afghanistan, a national military army and police, and a justice system that mirrored a Western-style system. This type of nation-building was doomed to failure. It resulted in a resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda by 2005. This was encountered in Operation Medusa in Afghanistan and validates the resurgence of the Taliban. https://arsof-history.org/articles/v3n4_op_medusa_page_1.html

The second opportunity would have been in 2015-2016 had the Obama Administration not decided to change strategy in 2013. As a result of the comprehensive counterinsurgency plan that General Stanley McChrystal put in place in 2010 and General David Petraeus expanded from 2010 through 2013, we see an opportunity to transition operations in Afghanistan to the Afghan government. There were other Generals and Admirals that supported this approach as well. They were Admiral McRaven, Admiral Olson, General Rodriguez, and Lieutenant General Kearney.

Unfortunately, when General Petraeus transitioned out of Afghanistan, the incoming commander did not fully appreciate the success of the counterinsurgency strategy. In addition, there was significant political pressure by the Obama Administration to end US military involvement in Afghanistan. The political and senior military leaders decided to change the strategy and the operational plan from a bottom-up comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy to a top-down counterterrorism and conventional military operations.

Under the McChrystal and Petraeus counterinsurgency plan, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were neutralized, US casualties were at their lowest, and 90% of the rural areas were under the control of the Afghan government. General Petraeus made a decision that was unique to any commanders before him, and that was to put conventional forces subordinate to special operations. General Petraeus recognized we were operating in an unconventional warfare environment and placed special operations in the primary role.

As a result of the success of the bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy, it was assessed that by 2015-2016, the Afghan government would be able to govern their country without the presence of US military forces. By changing the strategy to a top-down counterterrorism and conventional military operations strategy in the later part of 2013, by 2016, the Taliban had resurged, Al Qaeda had resurged, ISIS had joined the fight, and the security situation in the rural areas was predominantly under the control of the Taliban. By 2019, US casualties were the highest they had been since 2013. thehill.com/policy/defense/476461-us-combat-deaths-in-Afghanistan-highest-in-years/

The Trump administration inherited an enormous strategic and operational mess in Afghanistan. The Trump administration attempted to figure out the best way to end military operations in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense’s senior leaders continued with a failed strategy. The incoming Biden Administration failed in its plan to withdraw from Afghanistan.

It is important to note that not one senior leader was held responsible for the strategic and operational failures in Afghanistan. The consequences of the failure of special operations senior leaders and conventional senior leaders in Afghanistan have been far-reaching. The prolonged conflict has resulted in the loss of countless lives, both military and civilian, as well as the squandering of significant financial resources. Moreover, the failure to achieve a stable and secure Afghanistan has allowed extremist groups to regroup and pose a continued threat to regional and global security.

Inadequate Leadership at Senior Levels:

The failure in Afghanistan can be attributed to the shortcomings of senior leaders responsible for overseeing military operations. These leaders, entrusted with formulating and executing a comprehensive strategy, often needed to catch up in their decision-making processes. Their lack of understanding of the socio-cultural complexities in Afghanistan, insufficient knowledge of counterinsurgency tactics, and an over-reliance on conventional warfare methods undermined the effectiveness of their plans. Moreover, the frequent rotation of senior leaders disrupted continuity and prevented the formulation of a coherent long-term strategy. Multiple studies by many think tanks gave the senior leaders the correct answers, but they chose to ignore them.

General Mark Milley (Retired) recently stepped down as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Inadequate Leadership and Communication:

The failure to address the interoperability problem can also be attributed to inadequate leadership and communication at the senior military level. Senior leaders must prioritize and emphasize the importance of interoperability, establishing a culture that promotes collaboration and joint operations. However, the need for effective communication channels and platforms for dialogue between senior leaders from both branches often fails to identify and address interoperability issues.

Conventional Senior Leaders: Limited Adaptability:

Conventional senior leaders, primarily trained in conventional warfare, struggled to adapt their approach to the unique challenges posed by the Afghan conflict. Their reliance on counterterrorism, large-scale military operations, and firepower failed to recognize the importance of winning the support of the Afghan people, an essential aspect of counterinsurgency warfare. The inability to effectively engage with local communities, build trust, and provide sustainable development projects further alienated the Afghan population, ultimately fueling support for insurgent groups.

Failed Strategy and Operational Plan:

The cumulative effect of the shortcomings in special operations and inadequate senior-level leadership resulted in a flawed strategy and operational plan. The absence of a clear and achievable end state, coupled with a lack of defined objectives, rendered the overall mission in Afghanistan ambiguous and unfocused. Additionally, the failure to prioritize stability, governance, and development in war-torn regions allowed insurgent groups to flourish and gain support among the disillusioned population. The absence of a comprehensive and integrated approach that addressed both the military and non-military aspects of the conflict further contributed to the failure of the strategy and operational plan.

The consequences of the failure of special operations senior leaders and conventional senior leaders in Afghanistan have been far-reaching. The prolonged conflict has resulted in the loss of countless lives, both military and civilian, as well as the squandering of significant financial resources. Moreover, the failure to achieve a stable and secure Afghanistan has allowed extremist groups to regroup and pose a continued threat to regional and global security.

Divergent Organizational Cultures:

Another significant factor contributing to the failure of solving the interoperability problem is the divergence in organizational cultures between special operations and conventional military units. Special Operation Forces (SOF) often prioritize innovation, flexibility, and adaptability due to their unique operational requirements. On the other hand, conventional military units emphasize hierarchy, adherence to standard operating procedures, and a more rigid command structure. These contrasting cultures hinder effective communication, hampering joint operations and interoperability.

In conclusion, the failure to solve the interoperability problem between senior military leaders in special operations and conventional military has hindered effective collaboration and joint operations. The lack of combined training, divergent organizational culture, and inadequate leadership and communication are key factors contributing to this failure. Only through a concerted effort to bridge the gap and prioritize interoperability can we ensure a more effective and unified military force capable of meeting the challenges of modern warfare.

Donald C. Bolduc

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Why urban warfare in Gaza will be bloodier than in Iraq

The battle against IS in Mosul offers Israel lessons—and warnings

Oct 30th 2023

The Economist

THE WAR in Gaza is exacting a brutal toll on civilians. The Hamas-run health ministry says that more than 8,000 people have died. The number of children among them, more than 3,000, exceeds the annual death toll for children in all wars in each of the preceding three years. The Economist estimates, from satellite imagery, that over a tenth of Gaza’s housing stock has been destroyed, leaving more than 280,000 people without homes to which they can return. In many ways that fits with the norm of urban warfare, which is unusually destructive. But Israel’s war in Gaza is also distinctive.

Read more on the war between Israel and Hamas.

War in built-up areas is always bloody. America’s first assault on Fallujah in 2004 killed as many as 600 civilians, or 0.2% of the population, compared with 0.3% in today’s war in Gaza. A second assault later in the year killed around 800 more and left the majority of the city’s buildings damaged. A battle for Sadr City, a suburb of Baghdad, is thought to have killed nearly 1,000 people in March and April 2008, out of a population of around 2m, not dissimilar to that of Gaza.

The largest urban battle in recent years was the assault on the city of Mosul, which had been seized by the Islamic State (IS) group, by an American-led coalition including Iraqi and Kurdish ground forces. At least 9,000 civilians were killed in Mosul during 2016-17, according to Airwars, a non-profit organisation that tracks civilian harm. That amounts to 0.6% of the population at the time. Of the buildings that were damaged, more than 80% were residential.

These cases might suggest that the war in Gaza, though destructive, is not unusually so by historical standards—at least not yet. Yet there are also key differences. The first and biggest is the status of civilians. In Mosul, IS attempted to prevent civilians from fleeing, firing at them and mining corridors out of the city. Many left nonetheless. Between October 2016 and June 2017 nearly 900,000 departed—almost half of the pre-war population. Even Russia, during its siege of Mariupol in Ukraine between February and May 2022, negotiated humanitarian pauses in which some civilians were permitted to leave. Israel has thus far rejected calls, by the European Union and others, for such pauses.

Gaza’s geography is less permissive than any of these cases. Israel has told around 1.1m civilians to evacuate from the north of Gaza, but around a third of those have remained in place. Many residents are already refugees from other places and fear that if they leave they might never be allowed to return to their homes. Those who do want to escape cannot go south to Egypt, which does not want to take responsibility for refugees and has so far refused to open its border.

Israel is still striking parts of southern Gaza, albeit in more limited fashion than the north. “Locals can’t really get away, nor can fighting really occur in open areas away from urban centres”, says Amos Fox, an expert on urban warfare who has written extensively about Mosul. “The urban fight [in Gaza] is self-contained and likely far more costly than anything we’ve seen in the past few years.” Even those civilians who have moved south face a growing humanitarian crisis. Gaza’s health-care system has capacity for only 3,500 beds, according to Médecins Sans Frontières, a humanitarian group, far short of what is needed.

In Mosul, by contrast, the World Health Organisation was able to establish trauma stabilisation points to provide urgent medical attention within 10-15 minutes of the front line, with larger field hospitals another hour away. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have a small number of “humanitarian affairs officers” embedded in its fighting units whose role it is to try and address the needs of the local population, but these are far from sufficient for dealing with the needs and scale of misery resulting from a ground offensive. Israeli politicians have said they will not send aid for civilians until all hostages are released, though officials acknowledge that may change as the offensive develops.

A second difference is the degree to which civilian and military infrastructure is intermingled in Gaza. In Iraq, IS had held Mosul for little over two years when the battle to remove them began. Even in that short time period, the group had established impressive multi-layered defences, drawing on Western military doctrine, says Rupert Jones, a retired British major-general who was deputy commander of the anti-IS coalition.

Hamas, in contrast, was founded in Gaza in 1987 and has much earlier roots there, dating back to the foundation of the welfare organisation Mujama al-Islamiya (‘Islamic Centre”) by Ahmed Yassin in 1973. For half a century it has been fully integrated into Gaza’s social fabric and has run the strip for 16 years. Its defences have been built around—and under—the territory’s civilian infrastructure. Part of the ease with which Hamas seized Gaza from Palestinian rivals in 2007 was down to the fact that its fighters were recruited from the streets.

A third difference is tactics. Israel’s armed forces say that they place considerable emphasis on civilian protection. Nonetheless, Israel’s bombardment of Gaza has been intense by historical standards. It dropped 6,000 bombs on the territory in the first six days of the war, a rate of ordnance far exceeding American and Western counter-terrorism campaigns. In Mosul, for instance, the American-led coalition dropped 7,000 over two months in the most intense period of bombing. On October 30th a former deputy commander of the IDF’s Gaza Division told the Financial Times: “When our soldiers are manoeuvring we are doing this with massive artillery, with 50 aeroplanes overhead destroying anything that moves.”

Tactics are shaped by how an army views the stakes of a war, the nature of the enemy and that of the surrounding civilians. For Israel, the war in Gaza is “existential in a way that even Mosul or Marawi weren’t”, says Anthony King of Exeter University, referring to a battle between the Philippines army and IS in 2017. Israeli officials increasingly describe Hamas as akin to IS—an enemy with whom compromise is no longer possible. Nor does the IDF have the same affinity with Palestinian civilians that Iraqi forces did with the compatriots they were liberating from IS rule.

In Mosul, Iraq’s political leadership, from the prime minister down, insisted that great emphasis be placed on civilian protection. Lieutenant-General Basim al-Tai, a senior Iraqi officer, was in charge of the humanitarian operation. “He was carrying the weight of the Mosul population on his shoulders,” says General Jones. “He cared deeply about the civilians.” Caroline Baudot, an adviser in the civilian-protection unit in the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, agrees: “the commander’s intent in Mosul was extremely clear.”

Even then, the experience of different parts of Mosul is instructive. The east of the city, viewed as the more intellectual and urbane part, suffered less damage. The old city in the west, where IS made its last stand, was viewed by Iraqi forces as more conservative and IS-friendly and emerged far worse. “The mindset in which you fight affects your planning, your conduct, and even the reconstruction,” says Ms Baudot. “If you operate on your own territory [as opposed to] in another territory you might not have the same care for civilians.”

The role of medical facilities is especially contentious. In the previous rounds of warfare, Palestinian hospitals and other civilian relief centres were marked on Israeli military maps as non-strike areas. Some were hit in past wars, but none intentionally, claims Israel. In this war, Israel has ordered the evacuation of northern Gaza, including hospitals—which it says are used as Hamas command posts. Under the laws of war, hospitals lose their special protection if they are used for military purposes. But, even then, armies can only attack them “after due warning” and “a reasonable time limit”.

Mosul, again, provides a point of comparison. IS used the city’s hospital as a stronghold. Commanders spent weeks deliberating whether it could be attacked, says General Jones, considering other options such as the use of snipers. “Slowly, over time, it became clear it was no longer a functional hospital.” Ultimately it was struck only with the approval of Iraq’s then prime minister. “I’ve never heard of any case where you have a few days to evacuate and dismantle an entire hospital,” says one veteran expert on wartime civilian harm, reflecting on the Gaza case. “It’s just not possible.”

A fourth and final difference is the nature of battlefield intelligence. At the outset of this war the IDF would have had considerable intelligence on Hamas’s infrastructure in Gaza, collected over years. But many of those targets would have been struck in the first week of the campaign. Air forces must then move to “dynamic” targeting—finding and striking targets that were not known at the start of the war and have to be developed in relatively short order. This is where most cases of civilian harm occur, says the expert.

In Mosul, local civilians, many of whom hated IS, provided a wealth of human intelligence, or HUMINT—information passed on by sources on the ground—to Iraqi forces, helping them to target IS fighters. In contrast, during the battle for Raqqa, a Syrian city held by IS, in 2017, commanders, with fewer infantry forces on the ground, were “starved of local information” and found themselves reliant on aerial surveillance, incapable of seeing inside buildings, according to a report by the RAND Corporation, a think-tank.

Israeli intelligence has already suffered one serious intelligence failure in Gaza, having missed sufficient signs of Hamas’s preparations for the attack of October 7th. It will have good electronic intelligence on the strip, aided by the phalanx of American aircraft patrolling in the eastern Mediterranean. But Hamas is likely to have the intelligence advantage on the ground, argues Mr Fox, with locals offering a steady flow of HUMINT to the group as the IDF advances. “This flips the HUMINT situation that we saw in Mosul on its head,” he says. “The IDF will have to methodically fight through better planned and prepared defences…than they otherwise would.” The result will be more civilians killed. The last three weeks have been hard on civilians in Gaza. The coming weeks could be even harder. ■

The Economist

6. How Years of Israeli Failures on Hamas Led to a Devastating Attack

Excerpts:

Despite Israel’s sophisticated technological prowess in espionage, Hamas gunmen had undergone extensive training for the assault, virtually undetected for at least a year. The fighters, who were divided into different units with specific goals, had meticulous information on Israel’s military bases and the layout of kibbutzim.

The country’s once invincible sense of security was shattered.

More than 1,400 people were killed, including many women, children and old people who were murdered systematically and brutally. Hundreds are held hostage or are still missing. Israel has responded with a ferocious bombardment campaign on Gaza, killing more than 8,000 Palestinians and wounding thousands more, according to the Hamas-run health ministry. The Israeli military on Sunday signaled a heavier assault on Gaza, saying it had expanded its ground incursion overnight.

...

Many senior officials have accepted responsibility, but Mr. Netanyahu has not. At 1 a.m. Sunday in Israel, after his office was asked for comment on this article, he posted a message on X, formerly Twitter, that repeated remarks he made to The New York Times and blamed the military and intelligence services for failing to provide him with any warning on Hamas.

“Under no circumstances and at no stage was Prime Minister Netanyahu warned of war intentions on the part of Hamas,” the post read in Hebrew. “On the contrary, the assessment of the entire security echelon, including the head of military intelligence and the head of Shin Bet, was that Hamas was deterred and was seeking an arrangement.”

In the resulting furor, Benny Gantz, a member of his war cabinet, publicly rebuked Mr. Netanyahu, saying that “leadership means displaying responsibility,” and urged the prime minister to retract the post. It was later deleted, and Mr. Netanyahu apologized in a new one.

How Years of Israeli Failures on Hamas Led to a Devastating Attack

Israeli officials completely underestimated the magnitude of the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas, shattering the country’s once invincible sense of security.

By Ronen Bergman, Mark Mazzetti and Maria Abi-Habib

Ronen Bergman reported from Tel Aviv and the Gaza-Israel border, Mark Mazzetti from Washington and Maria Abi-Habib from London.

Published Oct. 29, 2023
Updated Oct. 30, 2023, 4:31 p.m. ET

nytimes.com · by Maria Abi-Habib · October 29, 2023

It was 3 a.m. on Oct. 7, and Ronen Bar, the head of Israel’s domestic security service, still could not determine if what he was seeing was just another Hamas military exercise.

At the headquarters of his service, Shin Bet, officials had spent hours monitoring Hamas activity in the Gaza Strip, which was unusually active for the middle of the night. Israeli intelligence and national security officials, who had convinced themselves that Hamas had no interest in going to war, initially assumed it was just a nighttime exercise.

Their judgment that night might have been different had they been listening to traffic on the hand-held radios of Hamas militants. But Unit 8200, Israel’s signals intelligence agency, had stopped eavesdropping on those networks a year earlier because they saw it as a waste of effort.

As time passed that night, Mr. Bar thought that Hamas might attempt a small-scale assault. He discussed his concerns with Israel’s top generals and ordered the “Tequila” team — a group of elite counterterrorism forces — to deploy to Israel’s southern border.

Until nearly the start of the attack, nobody believed the situation was serious enough to wake up Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, according to three Israeli defense officials.

Within hours, the Tequila troops were embroiled in a battle with thousands of Hamas gunmen who penetrated Israel’s vaunted border fence, sped in trucks and on motorbikes into southern Israel and attacked villages and military bases.

The most powerful military force in the Middle East had not only completely underestimated the magnitude of the attack, it had totally failed in its intelligence-gathering efforts, mostly due to hubris and the mistaken assumption that Hamas was a threat contained.

Despite Israel’s sophisticated technological prowess in espionage, Hamas gunmen had undergone extensive training for the assault, virtually undetected for at least a year. The fighters, who were divided into different units with specific goals, had meticulous information on Israel’s military bases and the layout of kibbutzim.

The country’s once invincible sense of security was shattered.

More than 1,400 people were killed, including many women, children and old people who were murdered systematically and brutally. Hundreds are held hostage or are still missing. Israel has responded with a ferocious bombardment campaign on Gaza, killing more than 8,000 Palestinians and wounding thousands more, according to the Hamas-run health ministry. The Israeli military on Sunday signaled a heavier assault on Gaza, saying it had expanded its ground incursion overnight.

Palestinian children in Gaza City as Israel carries out airstrikes after the Hamas attacks.Credit...Samar Abu Elouf for The New York Times

Israeli officials have promised a full investigation into what went wrong.

Even before that inquiry, it is clear the attacks were possible because of a cascade of failures over recent years — not hours, days or weeks. A New York Times examination, based on dozens of interviews with Israeli, Arab, European and American officials, as well as a review of Israeli government documents and evidence collected since the Oct. 7 raid, shows that:

Israeli security officials spent months trying to warn Mr. Netanyahu that the political turmoil caused by his domestic policies was weakening the country’s security and emboldening Israel’s enemies. The prime minister continued to push those policies. On one day in July he even refused to meet a senior general who came to deliver a threat warning based on classified intelligence, according to Israeli officials.
Israeli officials misjudged the threat posed by Hamas for years, and more critically in the run-up to the attack. The official assessment of Israeli military intelligence and the National Security Council since May 2021 was that Hamas had no interest in launching an attack from Gaza that might invite a devastating response from Israel, according to five people familiar with the assessments who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive details. Instead, Israeli intelligence assessed that Hamas was trying to foment violence against Israelis in the West Bank, which is controlled by its rival, the Palestinian Authority.
The belief by Mr. Netanyahu and top Israeli security officials that Iran and Hezbollah, its most powerful proxy force, presented the gravest threat to Israel diverted attention and resources away from countering Hamas. In late September, senior Israeli officials told The Times they were concerned that Israel might be attacked in the coming weeks or months on several fronts by Iran-backed militia groups, but made no mention of Hamas initiating a war with Israel from the Gaza Strip.
American spy agencies in recent years had largely stopped collecting intelligence on Hamas and its plans, believing the group was a regional threat that Israel was managing.

Overall, arrogance among Israeli political and security officials convinced them that the country’s military and technological superiority to Hamas would keep the terrorist group in check.

“They were able to trick our collection, our analysis, our conclusions and our strategic understanding,” Eyal Hulata, Israel’s national security adviser from 2021 until early this year, said during a discussion last week in Washington sponsored by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a think tank.

“I don’t think there was anyone who was involved with affairs with Gaza that shouldn’t ask themselves how and where they were also part of this massive failure,” he added.

Many senior officials have accepted responsibility, but Mr. Netanyahu has not. At 1 a.m. Sunday in Israel, after his office was asked for comment on this article, he posted a message on X, formerly Twitter, that repeated remarks he made to The New York Times and blamed the military and intelligence services for failing to provide him with any warning on Hamas.

“Under no circumstances and at no stage was Prime Minister Netanyahu warned of war intentions on the part of Hamas,” the post read in Hebrew. “On the contrary, the assessment of the entire security echelon, including the head of military intelligence and the head of Shin Bet, was that Hamas was deterred and was seeking an arrangement.”

In the resulting furor, Benny Gantz, a member of his war cabinet, publicly rebuked Mr. Netanyahu, saying that “leadership means displaying responsibility,” and urged the prime minister to retract the post. It was later deleted, and Mr. Netanyahu apologized in a new one.

On Sunday, Shin Bet promised a thorough investigation after the war. The I.D.F. declined to comment.

The last time Israelis’ collective belief in their country’s security was similarly devastated was 50 years earlier, at the start of the Yom Kippur War, when Israel was caught off guard by an assault by Egyptian and Syrian forces. In an echo of that attack, Hamas succeeded because Israeli officials made many of the same mistakes that were made in 1973.

The Yom Kippur War was “a classic example of how intelligence fails when the policy and intelligence communities build a feedback loop that reinforces their prejudices and blinds them to changes in the threat environment,” Bruce Riedel, a former top Middle East analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, wrote in a 2017 research paper about the 1973 war.

In an interview this month, Mr. Riedel said that Mr. Netanyahu was reaping the consequences of focusing on Iran as the existential threat to Israel while largely ignoring an enemy in his backyard.

“Bibi’s message to Israelis has been that the real threat is Iran,” he said, using Mr. Netanyahu’s nickname. “That with the occupation of the West Bank and the siege of Gaza, the Palestinian issue is no longer a threat to Israel’s security. All of those assumptions were shattered on Oct. 7.”

Ignored Warnings

On July 24, two senior Israeli generals arrived at the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, to deliver urgent warnings to Israeli lawmakers, according to three Israeli defense officials.

The Knesset was scheduled that day to give final approval to one of Mr. Netanyahu’s attempts to curb the power of Israel’s judiciary — an effort that had convulsed Israeli society, ignited massive street protests and led to large-scale resignations from the military reserves.

A growing portion of the Air Force’s operational pilots was threatening to refuse to report to duty if the legislation passed.

In the briefcase of one of the generals, Aharon Haliva, the head of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Military Intelligence Directorate, were highly classified documents detailing a judgment by intelligence officials that the political turmoil was emboldening Israel’s enemies. One document stated that the leaders of what Israeli officials call the “axis of resistance” — Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad — believed this was a moment of Israeli weakness and a time to strike.

Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, according to one of the documents, said that it was necessary to prepare for a major war.

General Haliva was ready to tell the coalition leaders that the political turmoil was creating an opportunity for Israel’s enemies to attack, particularly if there were more resignations in the military. Only two members of the Knesset came to hear his briefing.

The legislation passed overwhelmingly.

Separately, Gen. Herzi Halevi, the military’s chief of staff, tried to deliver the same warnings to Mr. Netanyahu. The prime minister refused to meet him, the officials said. Mr. Netanyahu’s office did not respond to a request for comment about this meeting.

The generals’ warnings were in large part based on a series of provocations on Israel’s northern border.

In February and March, Hezbollah had sent explosive-laden drones toward Israeli gas rigs. In March, a militant climbed over the border fence from Lebanon into Israel, carrying several powerful bombs, weapons, phones and an electric bike on which he traveled to a major northern intersection. He then used a powerful charge, apparently trying to blow up a bus.

On May 21, Hezbollah staged for apparently the first time war games at one of its training sites in Aaramta in south Lebanon. Hezbollah launched rockets and flew drones that dropped explosives on a simulated Israeli settlement.

Israeli officials believed that Hezbollah was leading the planning for a coordinated attack against Israel, but not one that would prompt an all-out war.

The officials’ concerns grew through August and September, and General Halevi went public with his concerns.

“We must be more prepared than ever for a multi-arena and extensive military conflict,” he said at a military ceremony on Sept. 11, just weeks before the attack.

Mr. Netanyahu’s allies went on Israeli television and condemned General Halevi for sowing panic.

In a series of meetings, Shin Bet gave similar warnings to senior Israeli officials as General Halevi. Eventually, Mr. Bar also went public.

“From the investigations we are doing we can say today that the political instability and the growing division are a shot of encouragement to the countries of the axis of evil, the terrorist organizations and the individual threats,” Mr. Bar said in a speech.

Mr. Netanyahu’s government also ignored warnings from Israel’s neighbors. As the custodian of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, Jordan has traditionally been an important mediator between Palestinians and Israel’s government on the Aqsa Mosque compound, the third most holy site in Islam. The mosque compound has seen repeated raids by Israeli forces over the years, and Hamas has said that it launched this month’s attack in part as retaliation for those acts.

But Jordan found that when Mr. Netanyahu formed a government late last year, the most far right in recent history, it was less receptive to their warnings that the incidents at the Aqsa Mosque compound was stirring up sentiment inside Palestinian territories that could boil over into violence, according to two Arab officials with knowledge of the relationship.

The Wrong Focus

While security and intelligence officials were right about a coming attack, their intense focus on Hezbollah and Iran had a tragic effect: Far less attention was paid to the threats from Gaza. Since Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 and Hamas’s evolution from a purely guerrilla organization into the governing power of Gaza in 2007, Hamas had only periodic skirmishes with the Israeli military.

Under four different prime ministers, Israel repeatedly decided that reoccupying Gaza and crushing Hamas would cost too many lives and do too much damage to Israel’s international reputation.

Israel knew that Hamas, which Iran supports with funding, training and weapons, was growing stronger over time. But officials thought they could contain Hamas with an extensive network of human spies, sophisticated surveillance tools that would deliver early warnings of an attack and border fortifications to deter a Hamas ground assault. They also relied on the Iron Dome air defense system for intercepting rockets and missiles launched from Gaza.

The strategy, confirmed by multiple Israeli officials, bore some fruit. Over the years, Israel’s investment in penetrating Hamas’s inner circle in Gaza allowed Israel to uncover the group’s attack plans and occasionally led to assassinations of Hamas leaders.

Strengthening Hamas

Publicly, Mr. Netanyahu used blunt rhetoric about Hamas. His election slogan in 2008 was “Strong Against Hamas,” and in one campaign video at the time he pledged: “We will not stop the I.D.F. We will finish the job. We will topple the terror regime of Hamas.”

Over time, however, he came to see Hamas as a way to balance power against the Palestinian Authority, which has administrative control over the West Bank and has long sought a peace agreement in Israel in exchange for a Palestinian state.

Mr. Netanyahu told aides over the years that a feeble Palestinian Authority lowered the pressure on him to make concessions to Palestinians in negotiations, according to several former Israeli officials and people close to Mr. Netanyahu. An official in Mr. Netanyahu’s office, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, denied this had been the prime minister’s policy.

But there is no question that Israeli officials viewed Hamas as a regional threat, not a global terrorist organization like Hezbollah or the Islamic State. This view was shared in Washington, and American intelligence agencies dedicated few resources to collecting information on the group.

Some parts of the American government even believed that Hamas operatives could be recruited as sources of information about terrorist groups considered more urgent priorities in Washington.

Jonathan Schanzer, a former Treasury Department official and now the senior vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, recalled a meeting he had in 2015 with American intelligence and law enforcement officials about suspected Hamas operatives inside the United States.

During the meeting, he recalled, the officials told him they were trying to turn the Hamas operatives into “assets” in the fight against the Islamic State.

The Invincibility of the Wall

Israeli officials firmly believed that “The Barrier” — a nearly 40-mile-long reinforced concrete wall above and below ground, completed in 2021 — would hermetically seal off Gaza. There was also a surveillance system at the border based almost exclusively on cameras, sensors and remote-operated “sight-shooter” systems, four senior Israeli military officers told The Times.

Senior Israeli military officials believed that the combination of remote surveillance and machine-gun systems with the formidable wall would make it almost impossible to infiltrate Israel, and thus reduce the need for a large number of soldiers to be stationed at the bases.

But Hamas’s attack exposed the fragility of that technology. The group used explosive drones that damaged the cellular antennas and the remote firing systems that protected the fence between Gaza and Israel.

To get around Israel’s powerful surveillance technology, Hamas fighters also appeared to enforce strict discipline among the group’s ranks to not discuss its activities on mobile phones. This allowed them to pull off the attack without detection, one European official said.

The group most likely divided its fighters into smaller cells, each probably only trained for a specific objective. That way, the rank and file did not understand the scale of the attacks they were preparing for and could not give away the operation if caught, a European official said, based on his analysis of how the attack unfolded and from the videos the group disseminated from the operation.

Hamas may have learned such operational discipline from Hezbollah, which has long confused Israeli forces on the battlefield by dividing its fighters into smaller units of friends or relatives, according to Lebanese officials with ties to the group. If the fighters speak openly on cellphones to coordinate military operations, Lebanese officials with ties to the group said, part of their code is to speak in childhood memories — for example, asking to meet up in a field where they once played together.

Hamas claimed that 35 drones took part in the opening strike, including the Zawari, an explosive-laden drone.

“We started receiving messages that there was a raid on every reporting line,” testified one soldier, who was at the Gaza Division base on the day of the invasion, in a conversation with the “Hamakom Hachi Ham Bagehinom” (“The Hottest Place in Hell”) website.

“On every reporting line, swarms of terrorists were coming in,” the soldier added. “The forces did not have time to come and stop it. There were swarms of terrorists, something psychotic, and we were simply told that our only choice was to take our feet and flee for our lives.”

In a conversation with military investigators two weeks after the attack, soldiers who survived the assault testified that the Hamas training was so precise that they damaged a row of cameras and communication systems so that “all our screens turned off in almost the exact same second.” The result of all this was a near total blindness on the morning of the attack.

After the fighting had stopped, Israeli soldiers found hand-held radios on the dead bodies of some of the Hamas militants — the same radios that Israeli intelligence officials had decided a year ago were no longer worth monitoring.

Farnaz Fassihi contributed reporting from New York, and Eileen Sullivan from Washington.

nytimes.com · by Maria Abi-Habib · October 29, 2023

7. Patriotism’s Decline Imperils the Military

I remember attending the pre-command course at Fort Leavenworth in 1999. The Commanders and Command Sergeants Major were complaining to the CSA, General Shinseki, asking why the Army could not recruit based on a patriotic message like the Marine Corps. He told us that the Marine Corps could do that because of their small size. They could recruit the patriots. The Army, requiring much higher numbers, according to all the marketing analysis conducted for the Army, could not base recruiting solely on patriotism. It had to appeal to other characteristics.

Excerpts:

To solidify its traditional support, the military needs to end its naive attempt to lure young liberals by featuring drag queens, rainbow bullets representing “pride,” and anime depicting the military as a refuge from childhood trauma. As Bud Light and other companies have discovered, running woke campaigns risks losing core customers.

Internally, the military has to roll back divisive policies that challenge traditional military values. For decades, it was common to hear from senior officers and noncommissioned officers that troops were all just shades of green. Colin Powell said that “race, color, background, income meant nothing” in his Army. In the past few years, however, the Pentagon has mimicked the social changes sweeping through the academy. The Pentagon’s diversity, equity and inclusion policies—and the proliferation of DEI officers throughout the ranks—have heightened individualism and rendered obsolete the principle that the U.S. military is a colorblind meritocracy.

By contrast, the Marine Corps exceeded its 2022 recruiting goals by sticking to its traditional recruiting model. The Marines focused on recruiting those eager to serve, emphasizing team over self and discipline instead of rose gardens. One result is that Latinos will comprise 25% of enlisted recruits. The traditional ethos of duty, honor and country remains the basis for our ethnically diverse military, a distinct American advantage.

Patriotism’s Decline Imperils the Military

Trying to appeal to woke young people will only make the recruitment problem more severe.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/patriotisms-decline-imperils-the-military-c58dc652?mod=opinion_lead_pos9

By Owen West and Kevin Wallsten

Oct. 30, 2023 3:27 pm ET

Military recruits raise their right hands as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reads the oath of enlistment at Fort George G. Meade in Fort Meade, Md. July 5. PHOTO: ANNA MONEYMAKER/GETTY IMAGES

The divisiveness of American politics has undermined our military in a way the Pentagon doesn’t understand or refuses to acknowledge. To attract Generation Z recruits after President Biden’s election, the military changed its marketing strategy. Starting in 2021, the military released advertisements emphasizing individualism and diversity over assimilation into a cohesive force with shared martial values. The Army called its campaign “a distinct departure” from traditional recruiting.

Yet the military’s recruitment crisis has only grown worse. Generals blame an increasingly overweight, overmedicated and undereducated youth pool. Those factors have contributed for years, but here’s the essential problem now: Young white Democrats have lost faith in their country and are rejecting military service.

The data are clear, but the Pentagon hasn’t dealt with the glaring political gap. One of the oldest and most reliable youth polls, Monitoring the Future, has for decades shown only small differences in the propensity to serve. As recently as 2015, 19% of young white male Democrats wanted to serve, compared with 20% of blacks, Latinos and white Republicans.

No more. By 2021 white Democrats had plunged to 3%, about one-fourth the level among black and Latino men, and one-eighth that of white Republicans. That’s a loss of about 45,000 young men interested in serving. The total recruiting gap across the Army, Navy and Air Force combined is about 30,000 people.

Why did this happen? Because American patriotism is dissolving. Yet Gen Z has been wrongly categorized as monolithically unpatriotic. In fact, beneath its dismal headline is a political divergence. Only 12% of Democrats 18 to 24 are “extremely proud” to be Americans, compared with 42% of Republicans in the same age bracket. If you’re not proud of your country, you won’t fight for it. Wokeism has driven young left-leaning whites away from the military.

Reinvigorating patriotism among Democrats starts with the president; the military has no cure for societal divisiveness. But the military can’t afford to lose the citizens who are most loyal to it—extended military families, which produce 80% of recruits. There are clear warnings that military families are questioning the values of the institution. In 2021, 65% of teens in military households said they wanted to serve. One year later, that figure was 44%. Further alienating this cohort would be catastrophic, necessitating a limited draft to plug holes.

To solidify its traditional support, the military needs to end its naive attempt to lure young liberals by featuring drag queens, rainbow bullets representing “pride,” and anime depicting the military as a refuge from childhood trauma. As Bud Light and other companies have discovered, running woke campaigns risks losing core customers.

Internally, the military has to roll back divisive policies that challenge traditional military values. For decades, it was common to hear from senior officers and noncommissioned officers that troops were all just shades of green. Colin Powell said that “race, color, background, income meant nothing” in his Army. In the past few years, however, the Pentagon has mimicked the social changes sweeping through the academy. The Pentagon’s diversity, equity and inclusion policies—and the proliferation of DEI officers throughout the ranks—have heightened individualism and rendered obsolete the principle that the U.S. military is a colorblind meritocracy.

By contrast, the Marine Corps exceeded its 2022 recruiting goals by sticking to its traditional recruiting model. The Marines focused on recruiting those eager to serve, emphasizing team over self and discipline instead of rose gardens. One result is that Latinos will comprise 25% of enlisted recruits. The traditional ethos of duty, honor and country remains the basis for our ethnically diverse military, a distinct American advantage.

Mr. West served as an assistant defense secretary, 2017-19. Mr. Wallsten is a professor of political science at California State University, Long Beach.

WSJ Opinion: Harvard and UFL's Contrasting Responses to Israel Attacks

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 30, 2023

Oct 30, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 30, 2023

Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 30, 2023, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3:00pm ET on October 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian officials announced that Russian law enforcement suppressed the antisemitic riots in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan on October 30. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) stated that employees of the MVD and other law enforcement agencies suppressed mass riots in Makhachkala and restored order at the local airport after identifying over 150 participants and detaining 60 rioters.[1] The MVD also claimed that rioters injured at least nine police officers and that searches for other rioters are ongoing. Dagestan Head Sergey Melikov claimed that he personally inspected the Makhachkala airport, which sustained minor damage, and claimed that the MVD and Rosgvardia used physical force as a last resort in hopes of calming the mob with reason.[2] Russian sources claimed that rioters threw stones at law enforcement and that officers responded by firing guns into the air.[3] Melikov stated that unspecified foreign actors, including pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels, are attempting to destabilize the region and claimed that the Telegram channel that published the rumors of the arrival of “Israeli refugees” in Dagestan was managed from Ukrainian territory.[4]

Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to the October 29 antisemitic demonstrations in Dagestan by accusing Ukraine of trying to “instigate pogroms in Russia” under Western guidance.[5] Putin claimed during a meeting with members of the Russian Security Council on October 30 that demonstrations in Makhachkala “were inspired, among other things, through social networks, from Ukraine’s territory by Western intelligence services.” Putin added that the West is trying to use regional conflicts to break Russia from within, and tasked regional authorities with undertaking “firm, timely and clear actions to protect the constitutional system of Russia, the rights and freedoms of [Russian] citizens, interethnic and interreligious harmony.” Putin did not specify which measures Russia will undertake to resolve interreligious conflicts and antisemitism in Russia, however. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov did not comment on the measures that could be taken against the demonstrators.[6] Kremlin officials largely reiterated similar statements prior to Putin’s speech and refrained from directly condemning the rioters, and the Kremlin’s narrative about foreign involvement in the riots is likely an attempt to deflect from the international criticism of antisemitism and growing animosity towards ethnic and religious minorities in Russia.[7]

A minority of Russian officials directly condemned rioters and regional authorities for ignoring antisemitic attitudes in Dagestan. Melikov stated that rioters betrayed Russian servicemen fighting in Ukraine by “playing for the enemy” and noted that he was ashamed about the riots.[8] Russian State Duma Deputy Vasiliy Vlasov criticized Dagestani authorities for ignoring antisemitic attitudes and unrest that lasted for three days.[9] Vlasov added that unnamed regional officials should be dismissed from their positions for failing to preempt the riots in time.

The October 29 riots in Dagestan highlight the growing radicalization and factionalism of Russian society resulting from the hyper-nationalist ideologies that the war in Ukraine has empowered. Director of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Janis Sarts stated that events in Makhachkala represent some of the manifestations of the radicalization of the Russian society resulting from the war in Ukraine and the surrounding media environment.[10] Sarts stated that Russian media has been inciting hatred against Ukrainians, the West, and Israel and observed that many deceased Russian servicemen who had fought in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine hailed from Dagestan. A Russian milblogger similarly implied that the Kremlin’s efforts to blame the riots on foreign psychological and information operations allow Russian officials to avoid responsibility for enabling the strengthening of radical sentiments among Russian Muslim populations.[11] ISW has previously assessed that the hyper-nationalist ideologies espoused by the Kremlin as the justifications for the war are having domestic ramifications for Russia, particularly in ethnic minority communities.[12]

Unidentified Russian soldiers reportedly murdered a Ukrainian family in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast, further highlighting a threatening environment of violence that is pervasive throughout the occupied areas of Ukraine. Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on October 29 that Russian troops killed nine civilians, including two young children, in their home in Volnovakha overnight and suggested that Chechen units may have committed the murders because the family refused to shelter Chechen forces in their house.[13] Several Ukrainian sources and a prominent Russian insider source reported that forensic evidence indicates that well-prepared and well-equipped military personnel likely perpetrated the attack.[14] Attacks on civilians hors de combat (in rear areas far removed from active combat zones) by representatives of an occupying power constitute a clear violation of multiple international legal norms and very likely rise to the level of a war crime or crime against humanity.[15]

Several Russian commentators exploited the circumstances of the tragedy in Volnovakha to accuse Ukraine of trying to stoke interethnic tensions within the Russian information space. One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian sources first reported that “Kadyrov’s men” (in reference to Chechen troops) committed the murders and linked the issue to the October 29 riots in Dagestan.[16] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Chechen forces are not deployed anywhere near Volnovakha and accused the Ukrainian information space of trying to use Chechens as a “trigger” to further destabilize Russia.[17] The fixation on the Ukrainian accusation rather than on the atrocity itself, the need to hold the perpetrators accountable, or the unprofessionalism and indiscipline of soldiers committing such crimes suggests that these Russian commentators are very concerned about inter-ethnic tensions in Russia and the Russian armed forces.

Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30. Geolocated footage posted on October 30 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced northeast of Kurdyumivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[18] Additional geolocated footage from October 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces have marginally advanced west of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive actions near Bakhmut and offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[20]

Russian forces continue to use “Storm-Z” assault units predominantly made up of prisoner recruits in highly attritional infantry-led frontal assaults. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated on October 30 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct “meat assaults” (colloquial jargon for infantry-led frontal assaults) near Avdiivka and are training “Storm-Z” assault units for future assaults without equipment.[21] A Russian milblogger reportedly serving in the Avdiivka direction claimed that “meat assaults” are when Russian infantry forces attack without artillery support to suppress Ukrainian firing positions.[22] The milblogger claimed that when two Russian regiments conduct ”meat assaults” side by side, the seam between the areas of responsibility of both regiments remains unsecured and vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks. Another Russian milblogger claimed that “Storm-Z” assault detachments in the Avdiivka direction and on Bakhmut’s southern flank are often destroyed after a few days of active operations and on average lose between 40-70 percent of their personnel.[23] The milblogger criticized the Russian military’s poor training of “Storm-Z” units and the unwillingness of superior officers to consider the proposals of “Storm-Z” commanders when assigning them combat missions. The milblogger stated that “Storm-Z” units are often introduced into battle before conducting reconnaissance or establishing connections with neighboring units and typically struggle to evacuate their wounded without artillery cover, leading to higher losses. Both milbloggers noted the lack of proper artillery support for Russian attacks and counterattacks.[24] One milblogger stated that these factors contribute to “Storm-Z” units being turned into “trash” before achieving any significant results.[25] ISW has frequently reported on the ineffectiveness of “Storm-Z” units.[26]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted the allegedly cooperative nature of the Russian-Chinese relationship at the 10th Beijing Xiangshan Forum on October 30. Shoigu labeled the Russian-Chinese relationship as a “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction” and stated that Russia and China consider each other “priority partners.”[27] Shoigu claimed that the confidential contacts between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping play a “special role” in maintaining the “traditionally friendly relations” between the two states.[28] Shoigu highlighted Russia’s cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and noted Russia’s desire to increase military and military-technical cooperation with states in the Asian-Pacific region.[29] Despite Shoigu’s characterizations of the Russian-Chinese partnership, the majority of his speech focused not on Russia’s relationship with China, but rather on the alleged threats of the West, NATO, and the war in Ukraine, likely in an attempt to paint a picture of a world hostile to Moscow and Beijing.[30] ISW continues to assess that China has reservations concerning the Kremlin’s desired ”no limits partnership” between the two states.[31]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 29 to 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 30 that Russian forces launched 12 Shahed 131/136 drones, two Kh-59 missiles, and four Iskander missiles against Ukraine and that Ukrainian air defenses downed all the Shahed drones and the Kh-59s.[32] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command stated that Russian Iskander missiles struck port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are beginning to use several new “smart” glide bombs – the FAB-250, FAB-500, and FAB-1500.[34] The milblogger claimed that the new glide bombs have laser and satellite guidance, making the accuracy of their impact radius as small as 5 meters, compared to conventional air bombs with an accurate impact radius of 50 meters. The bombs reportedly have a strike range of 200 kilometers. The milblogger claimed that Russian FAB-250 bombs weigh 250 kilograms, hold an explosive weight of 99 kilograms, have a damage radius of 120 meters, and can destroy manpower, equipment, and light fortifications. Russian FAB-500 bombs reportedly weigh 500 kilograms, hold an explosive weight of 150 kilograms, have a damage radius of 250 meters, and can destroy headquarters, warehouses, and concrete and reinforced concrete objects. Russian FAB-1500 bombs weigh 1550 kilograms, hold an explosive weight of 675 kilograms, have a damage radius of 500 meters, and can destroy underground bunkers up to 20 meters in depth and penetrate up to 3 meters of reinforced concrete. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces can arm Su-34, Su-30, and Su-35 aircraft with the new glide bombs.

Key Takeaways:

Russian officials announced that Russian law enforcement suppressed antisemitic riots in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan on October 30. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to the October 29 antisemitic demonstrations in Dagestan by accusing Ukraine of trying to “instigate pogroms in Russia” under Western guidance.
A minority of Russian officials directly condemned rioters and regional authorities for ignoring antisemitic attitudes in Dagestan.
The October 29 riots in Dagestan highlight the growing radicalization and factionalism of Russian society resulting from the hyper-nationalist ideologies that the war in Ukraine has empowered.
Unidentified Russian soldiers reportedly murdered a Ukrainian family in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast, further highlighting a threatening environment of violence that is pervasive throughout occupied areas of Ukraine. Several Russian commentators exploited the circumstances of the tragedy in Volnovakha to accuse Ukraine of trying to stoke interethnic tensions within the Russian information space.
Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30.
Russian forces continue to use "Storm-Z" assault units predominantly made up of prisoner recruits in highly attritional infantry-led frontal assaults.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted the allegedly cooperative nature of the Russian-Chinese relationship at the 10th Beijing Xiangshan Forum on October 30.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30 and advanced in some areas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 30 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage posted on October 30 indicates that Russian troops marginally advanced towards Torske (about 8km southwest of Kreminna).[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka (7km northeast of Kupyansk) and Ivanivka (20km southwest of Kupyansk) and southeast of Terny (15km northwest of Kreminna).[36] Ukrainian "Steel Cordon" border guard assault brigade spokesperson Ivan Shevstov stated that the most active part of the Kupyansk front is near Synkivka and Ivanivka, and that Russian forces are using groups of between 10 and 30 people in attacks towards Kupyansk.[37] Shevstov noted that Russian forces continue efforts to occupy the left bank of the Oskil River.[38] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces, including airborne (VDV) elements, advanced towards Kupyansk and near Kreminna.[39] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov posted footage purportedly of the "AMURA" group of Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz striking Ukrainian positions in the Serebryanske forest area southwest of Kreminna.[40]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna area on October 30 and made limited advances. One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked and regained several positions near Raihorodka (12km west of Svatove).[41] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled several Ukrainian attacks in the Kupyansk and Kreminna areas.[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on October 30 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage posted on October 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Kurdyumivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[43] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces continue offensive actions south of Bakhmut and are inflicting losses on Russian troops in the area.[44] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance beyond the railway line between Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (8km southwest of Bakhmut).[45] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces managed to advance beyond the railway line south of Andriivka and consolidate new positions.[46]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut on October 30 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops unsuccessfully attempted to restore lost positions near Andriivka and Klishchiivka.[47] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces have "significantly strengthened their group" near Bakhmut and switched from defensive actions to being more "active."[48] ISW cannot independently verify a substantial change in the composition of Russian forces near Bakhmut at this time, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that positional fighting is ongoing northwest of Bakhmut near Berkhivka (on the northwestern outskirts of Bakhmut), Vasyukivka (12km north of Bakhmut), and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut).[49]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed counterattacks near Avdiivka on October 30. Ukrainian military sources noted on October 30 that Ukrainian forces shot down another Russian Su-25 in the Avdiivka direction on October 30, making it the sixth plane shot down in this direction since October 10.[50]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Avdiivka on October 30 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage posted on October 30 shows a Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system operating in Novoselivka Druha (5km northeast of Avdiivka), confirming that Russian forces occupy the settlement.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the "Khimik" micro-district south of Avdiivka, made gains near Berdychi (7km northwest of Bakhmut), and captured a quarry near Sieverne (5km directly west of Avdiivka).[52] Ukrainian military observer Konstantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces are conducting a "tactical regrouping" in the Avdiivka area that will likely last less than a day before Russian forces resume attacks on the settlement.[53] Mashovets reiterated his assessment that the units involved in this grouping are mainly elements of the 1st Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Army Corps and the 41st Combined Arms Army (Central Military District).[54] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun similarly noted that Russian forces are trying to compensate for equipment losses near Avdiivka and preparing to employ heavy infantry-led frontal assaults on Ukrainian positions.[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled unsuccessful Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka, Novokalynove (10km northwest of Avdiivka), Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka), Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka).[56]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks west or southwest of Donetsk City on October 30.

Russian forces continued ground attacks west and southwest of Donetsk City on October 30 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian attacks near Marinka, Novomykhailivka (20km southwest of Donetsk City), and south of Vuhledar (25km southwest of Donetsk City).[57] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Novomykhailivka.[58] A Russian milblogger highlighted the activities of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, Eastern Military District) in the Novomykhailivka area.[59]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 30.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 30 but did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[60] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces attacked north of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and near Novodonetske (12km southeast of Veylka Novosilka) and Novomayorske (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) on October 29.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued from October 27-29 for control of the Hrusheva Gully northeast of Pryyutne, following numerous claims from other Russian sources about Russian advances in the area on October 25 and 26.[62]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30 and made a confirmed gain. Geolocated footage published on October 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[63] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on October 29 and 30 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked northwest of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne) and near Kopani (7km northwest of Robotyne), Robotyne, and Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne).[64]

Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne.[65]

Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces control central Krynky (30km east of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River), and one prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally expanded their zone of control west of Krynky.[66] Geolocated footage published on October 30 confirms that Russian forces hold positions in forest areas east of Krynky.[67] Multiple Russian sources, including a Wagner Group-affiliated channel, complained about Russian forces’ lack of counterbattery, electronic warfare (EW), and command and control capabilities in the Kherson direction, particularly near Krynky.[68]

Russian forces continued airstrikes against the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 30. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces used 37 KAB guided bombs to strike the west bank of Kherson Oblast.[69]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a mixed series of strikes targeting occupied Crimea on October 29-30. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down eight Storm Shadow missiles targeting Crimea.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian air defenses also shot down two Neptune anti-ship missiles and three drones targeting Sevastopol.[71] The milblogger also claimed that Russian air defenses failed to shoot down two Ukrainian ATACMS missiles near Olenivka near Cape Tarkhanhut but that the missiles did not cause any damage.[72] A Russian insider source claimed that the alleged Ukrainian ATACMS strike damaged vehicles and radar systems near Olenivka and killed or wounded more than 20 Russian servicemen.[73] The insider source also claimed that Russian officials did not report on the Ukrainian ATACMS strike but chose to instead issue statements about the downing of Storm Shadow missiles and drones.[74] ISW has not observed either visual confirmation or confirmation from Ukrainian officials of the Ukrainian ATACMS strike, however.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 20 that Russian forces are attempting to recruit Ukrainian criminals who were convicted of crimes before 2014 to serve in the Russian military.[75] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that the Donetsk and Luhansk occupation administrations have created lists of criminals who were convicted before 2014 and are currently serving sentences in prisons in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and are attempting to coerce these criminals into serving in the Russian military.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Occupation authorities continued to forcibly deport Ukrainian civilians to Russia and forcibly militarize them. Luhansk Oblast occupation head Leonid Pasechnik stated on October 30 that occupation authorities have sent 270 residents of occupied Luhansk Oblast, including 169 children, to Sochi, Krasnodar Krai to “improve their health” and “temporarily forget about the war.”[76] Pasechnik stated that occupation authorities sent another group, likely including children, to Sochi on the weekend of October 28-29. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on October 29 that 1,400 students from Kherson Oblast colleges and universities will visit the “sights and places of military glory” in Russia as part of the “More than a Trip” program in the near future.[77]

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 30 that Russian authorities are attempting to employ demobilized Russian servicemen in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[78] Local occupation administrations are reportedly concerned about crime and other poor behavior committed by demobilized Russian servicemen and are creating a base of local employers willing to hire the veterans.

Russian occupation authorities announced the modernization of vehicle checkpoints along the border between Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Russian Transportation Ministry stated on October 25 that Russian and occupation authorities installed autonomous vehicle detection systems at 10 border checkpoints between Russia and occupied Ukraine.[79] The system collects information about the location and classification of vehicles at checkpoints and transmits the information to the Russian Transportation Ministry’s situation center. The system also collects information on the wait times at the various checkpoints and provides live updates to a website available to the public. The Russian Transportation Ministry advertised the new system to simplify and speed up travel through border checkpoints, although it is also a mechanism for further control over travel between Russia and occupied Ukraine and for collecting personal data on Ukrainian civilians.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated boilerplate Kremlin narratives about the Ukrainian counteroffensive, perceived Western aggression towards Russia, and alarmist nuclear rhetoric intended to undermine Western support for Ukraine during a speech at the Beijing Xiangshan Forum on October 30.[80] Shoigu claimed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has suffered implausible casualties, reporting that the Ukrainian military has lost over 90,000 wounded and killed personnel, almost 600 tanks, and around 1,900 armored vehicles.[81] Shoigu claimed that NATO expansion disregarded Russia’s right to ensure its own security and that the West’s continued escalation with Russia could lead to a direct clash between nuclear powers.[82] Shoigu reiterated that there have been no changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine and that Russia will only use a nuclear weapon in response to an enemy nuclear strike or against an ”existential threat” to Russia.[83]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin met with Iranian Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi on the sidelines of the Xiangshan Forum on October 30.[84] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that Khrenin and Safavi discussed issues of bilateral military cooperation.

Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev stated that Belarusian forces only have about 1,800 servicemen operating along the entire Belarusian-Ukrainian international border.[85] Nayev stated that the rest of the Belarusian units are located in the Belarusian rear.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

9. Five Facts on the Rising Intolerance in America

One of the fundamental problems is intolerance.

Some very troubling statistics.

Five Facts on the Rising Intolerance in America

https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2023/10/30/five_facts_on_the_rising_intolerance_in_america_989448.html

By No Labels

October 30, 2023

In a nation that prides itself on the ideals of freedom and democracy, America faces a troubling trend: the rise of intolerance from both ends of the political spectrum.

Here are Five Facts on the rising intolerance in America.

Antisemitism and racism are surging among the left and right.

Across the nation, the number of documented antisemitic incidents reached a new record in 2022, while most Black Americans believe racism will get worse in their lifetimes. Helping drive these concerning trends are political forces on the far left and right. Local chapters of the far-left Democratic Socialists of America have been condemned for celebrating Hamas and its recent attack on Israeli civilians. Meanwhile, federal law enforcement officials have identified far-right white nationalist groups like the Proud Boys as “the biggest domestic terrorism threat to the country,” and the Proud Boys have also hosted far-right members of Congress at speaking events.

Only 58 percent of Americans believe tolerance is an important value.

According to Wall Street Journal survey, only 58 percent of Americans consider tolerance an important value, which is 22 percentage points lower than just four years ago.

A growing number of voters feel the two parties have become too extreme.

It's not just a few individuals or outlier groups that feel disaffected by the current political parties. There is a growing perception among the American electorate that both major political parties have become too extreme. A 2022 CNN poll found that about half of American voters think so. When parties move toward extremes, they leave behind a large swath of moderates who feel politically homeless.

An estimated 41 percent of Democrats and 38 percent of Republicans say that violence is acceptable to prevent the other party from achieving their goals.

This finding came from a recent University of Virginia poll that shows just how divisive our politics have become. Other findings from the poll show that 41 percent of Republicans and 30 percent of Democrats would support red and blue states seceding to form their own separate countries. According to the poll, 31 percent of Republicans and 21 percent of Democrats say that “the ends justify the means and any action taken by my preferred political party is acceptable if it achieves our goals.” And 31 percent of Republicans and 24 percent of Democrats think “democracy is no longer a viable system, and America should explore alternative forms of government to ensure stability and progress.”

Roughly 40 percent of Americans believe a civil war is possible within the next decade, according to polling by YouGov and the Economist.

Rachel Kleinfeld, a civil conflict expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told The Guardian that she didn’t think war would break out in the United States, but couldn’t rule it out entirely: “Countries with democracies and governments as strong as America’s do not fall into civil war. But if our institutions weaken, the story could be different.”

10. Harvard’s Double Standard on Free Speech

Although apparently misattributed to Voltaire these words are most important (regardless of who said them - and we should all be trying to live by these ideals, because they are American and universal ideals.

Quotes tagged as "misattributed-to-voltaire" Showing 1-3 of 3

“I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”

― S.G. Tallentyre, The Friends of Voltaire

“In that case the current orthodoxy happens to be challenged, and so the principle of free speech lapses. Now, when one demands liberty of speech and of the press, one is not demanding absolute liberty. There always must be, or at any rate there always will be, some degree of censorship, so long as organised societies endure. But freedom, as Rosa Luxembourg [sic] said, is ‘freedom for the other fellow’. The same principle is contained in the famous words of Voltaire: ‘I detest what you say; I will defend to the death your right to say it.’ If the intellectual liberty which without a doubt has been one of the distinguishing marks of western civilisation means anything at all, it means that everyone shall have the right to say and to print what he believes to be the truth, provided only that it does not harm the rest of the community in some quite unmistakable way.”

― George Orwell, Animal Farm / 1984

“Tolerance, which is one form of love of neighbor, must manifest itself not only in our personal relations, but also in the arena of society as well. In the world of opinion and politics, tolerance is that virtue by which liberated minds conquer the evils of bigotry and hatred. Tolerance implies more than forbearance or the passive enduring of ideas different from our own. Properly conceived, tolerance is the positive and cordial effort to understand another’s beliefs, practices, and habits without necessarily sharing or accepting them. Tolerance quickens our appreciation and increases our respect for our neighbor’s point of view. It goes even further; it assumes a militant aspect when the rights of an opponent are assailed. Voltaire’s dictum, “I do not agree with a word that you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it,” is for all ages and places the perfect utterance of the tolerant ideal.”

― Joshua Loth Liebman

Harvard’s Double Standard on Free Speech

At the university, you’re free to excuse Hamas’s atrocities, but don’t dare say anything that offends leftists.

City Journal · by John Tierney · October 29, 2023

At the university, you’re free to excuse Hamas’s atrocities, but don’t dare say anything that offends leftists.

/ Eye on the News

Oct 29 2023

After Harvard student groups blamed Israel for Hamas’s atrocities, the global backlash was so fierce that the university’s president, Claudine Gay, released a video statement that in some ways proved even more puzzling. “Our university rejects the harassment or intimidation of individuals based on their beliefs,” she said. “And our university embraces a commitment to free expression. That commitment extends even to views that many of us find objectionable, even outrageous.”

Really?

This was news to the scholars with unpopular views at Harvard who have been sanctioned by administrators, boycotted by students, and slandered by the Crimson student newspaper. And it was certainly news to anyone who follows the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression’s annual analyses of threats to free speech on campus.

In this year’s FIRE report, Harvard’s speech climate didn’t merely rank dead last among those of the 248 participating colleges. It was also the first school that FIRE has given an “Abysmal” rating for its speech climate, scoring it zero on the 100-point scale (even that was a generous upgrade, as its actual composite score was -10). That dismal distinction made headlines last month across the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—but not on the Harvard campus. The Crimson didn’t even publish an article in its news section, much less an editorial; Gay didn’t make a statement, either.

Once upon a time, journalists and scholars on both the left and right were staunchly devoted to free speech and academic freedom, if only out of self-interest. Liberals like Nat Hentoff of the Village Voice defended the rights of Klansmen and Nazis because they knew the First Amendment was their profession’s paramount principle. But in the past decade, that bipartisan devotion has been disappearing, particularly at elite colleges. Harvard’s journalists and scholars adopted the principles that Hentoff criticized in the title of one of his books: free speech for me, but not for thee.

Leftists are free to stir controversy without fear of punishment from Gay and other administrators, and they can count on the Crimson to defend them. Jewish groups on campus were outraged last year when the Palestine Solidarity Committee’s annual spring event, Israeli Apartheid Week, featured lurid murals accusing “Zionists” of being “racists” and “white supremacists.” The Crimson’s editorial board promptly declared itself “proudly supportive” of the murals and the international BDS (Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions) campaign to make Israel a pariah state. When that editorial stirred further outrage and accusations of anti-Semitism, the Crimson’s president issued a statement proclaiming the newspaper’s commitment to “freedom of expression.”

But that commitment vanishes when the campus’s leftist majority gets angry. The targets of their anger have received, at best, no support from the Harvard administration or the Crimson. At worst, those voices find themselves denounced, investigated, disinvited, or punished by administrators, and they have endured the Crimson’s outrageous campaigns to silence, sanction, and banish them.

Harvard’s abysmal rating is based partly on a series of censorship incidents at the school and partly on its students’ answers to questions in a national survey of 55,000 students. At Harvard, three-quarters of students didn’t feel comfortable publicly disagreeing with their professor on a controversial topic. Seventy percent said that it was acceptable to shout down a speaker, and 30 percent said that using violence to stop a speech was acceptable.

The dismal rating is also based on Harvard’s refusal to adopt a strict policy guaranteeing free speech, like that drawn up by the University of Chicago and adopted by other colleges. Harvard’s guidelines promise free speech but exempt speech that is not “civil” or that shows “grave disrespect for the dignity of others.” Those vague loopholes have enabled a double standard: you’re free to issue public statements vilifying Israel and to put up murals in Harvard Yard no matter how gravely they disrespect Jews, but don’t dare offend progressives with your research findings, political views, or even isolated comments in an interview or blog post.

One incident contributing to Harvard’s record-low FIRE score was its treatment of David Kane, who taught a data-science class in the government department. When Kane invited Charles Murray, the libertarian scholar (and Harvard alumnus) to give an online lecture in 2020, the Crimson started a campaign against both men. It ran a series of articles making evidence-free assertions that Murray’s research was “widely discredited” and airing accusations from activists and a Harvard professor that his work was “racist pseudoscience.”

Gay, then the dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, was featured in an article headlined “Ahead of Speaker Event, FAS Dean Gay Says Charles Murray’s Work Lacks Academic Merit.” A dean responsible for protecting academic freedom should not, of course, participate in such a smear.

Murray is one of the nation’s most influential researchers, publishing more than a dozen books; his work has been cited tens of thousands of times in academic literature. Gay is a political scientist whose C.V. lists 11 articles and who had the unusual distinction of winning tenure without publishing a book, as David Randall of the National Association of Scholars wrote when Gay was named Harvard’s president last year. He noted that all the articles published in Gay’s career roughly equaled the output in a single year of the economist Lawrence Summers, the former Harvard president who lost his job after he offended feminists by accurately describing differences in genetic variability between the sexes.

The Crimson’s coverage of Kane’s invitation to Murray mobilized students to retaliate against Kane by searching a blog that he had run for nearly two decades to discuss issues at his alma mater, Williams College. The students accused Kane, who’d been a campaign donor to Barack Obama and was married to an Asian woman, of “racism” for having written that many black students would not gain admission without Williams’s affirmative-action program, and of “white supremacy” for having argued on free-speech grounds that Williams should not punish a student for putting up an “Identity Europa” decal.

The student paper escalated the campaign against Kane by scouring hundreds of thousands of words on his blog to quote more posts (out of context), mostly ignoring his explanations. In two editorials branding him a racist, the Crimson urged white students to boycott the class and demanded that Kane be fired. Gay announced that the school was investigating the complaints against Kane, who was temporarily removed from teaching the data-science class and reassigned to another class the next semester. At the end of year, when Kane’s department chair tried to renew Kane’s contract for a fourth year, the dean of the Social Sciences Department, Larry Bobo, forbade him from being rehired. When Kane was hired at another college in 2022, the Crimson ran yet another editorial excoriating him.

Murray summed up the treatment of Kane in a tweet: “What toxic, vicious places elite universities have become. The parallels between the mindset of these students and the Red Guards are scary accurate.”

Another incident contributing to Harvard’s last-place ranking was a department’s decision last year to disinvite philosopher Devin Buckley after learning that she belonged to a feminist group that opposed incarcerating biological males in women’s prisons or allowing them on women’s sports teams. The English Department had invited Buckley to lecture on an unrelated topic, British Romanticism, but then canceled the invitation on the grounds that Buckley was “trans-exclusionary.” The disinvitation attracted national attention—but no reaction from the Harvard administration, and no articles or editorials in the Crimson.

The paper’s editors sprang into action, though, during a particularly ugly censorship campaign in 2021 against J. Mark Ramseyer, a professor of Japanese studies at Harvard Law School. The Crimson targeted Ramseyer for his academic article challenging a leftist narrative about the Korean “comfort women” who worked in private brothels licensed by the Japanese military for its soldiers during World War II. Those women had become internationally renowned in the 1990s as victims of sex slavery after a memoir and a sensational series of newspaper articles in Japan that told of Japanese soldiers dragooning some from their homes at gunpoint. The memoir was later exposed as a fabrication, and the newspaper articles were retracted.

Ramseyer’s article, which had been accepted at the International Review of Law and Economics, discussed the contracts negotiated between the brothel operators and the comfort women and their families. It was an economic analysis comparing the wartime contracts’ payments, incentives, and requirements with those in peacetime contracts at brothels (which were then legally licensed in Japan and Korea). But the notion that any of those women could have been prostitutes rather than sex slaves was taboo among some scholars at Harvard and other universities, who started a petition to prevent the article from being published.

The Crimson not only endorsed the petition but also called for Ramseyer to face “real repercussions” from the Harvard administration, as his “monstruous creation” did “not fall under the protection of academic freedom.” The editorial described his article, which cited dozens of scholarly works and historical documents, as “misinformation” with “no basis in reality.” Calling on the Harvard administration to condemn Ramseyer formally and “refute” his article, the editors wrote, “[w]e must recognize when ideas are dangerous and factually incorrect, then shut them down accordingly.”

The petition campaign delayed the publication of Ramseyer’s article, but the journal eventually published it after other scholars’ reviewed his work and Ramseyer provided a 65-page, point-by-point rebuttal of his academic critics. The Crimson responded with an editorial headlined, “Ramseyer’s Refutal Isn’t Worth Our Time.” Refusing to address any of his arguments or evidence, the editorial declared that Ramseyer’s “opinions were incorrect last year, remain incorrect today, and add nothing to legitimate scholarly debate.” The editors once again called on the administration to condemn his work. That didn’t happen, but during the yearlong campaign against him by students and faculty, Ramseyer says, “Harvard did not support me in the least.”

Carole Hooven felt similarly isolated during the ordeal that drove her out of the Human Evolutionary Biology Department, where she had taught a popular lecture course on hormones and behavior for two decades. Her troubles began in 2021 after she published T, a book about testosterone and sex differences. Asked during an interview on Fox News about the pressure at medical schools to avoid the terms “male” and “female,” she said that it was important to respect people’s gender identities and use their preferred pronouns, but that med students should be taught that just two biological sexes exist. For this, Hooven was denounced by the director of her department’s diversity and inclusion task force, a graduate student who tweeted that she was “appalled and frustrated” by Hooven’s “transphobic and harmful” remarks. More attacks followed, including another department chair circulating an email accusing her of being transphobic. After the Harvard Graduate Student Union issued a statement denouncing her, Hooven was unable to find any graduate student willing to be a teaching assistant in her undergraduate course.

“I felt as if I had the plague,” Hooven said. “I couldn’t teach my lecture course anymore because it had too many students for me to handle without graduate assistants. Administrators didn’t give me public support and basically told me to keep my mouth shut and stop causing problems. Colleagues stopped talking to me. It just became untenable.” She was 57 and had planned on remaining in the department for at least another decade but decided her only option was to take early retirement.

Students, of course, have every right to express their views and criticize professors, but universities are under no obligation to cater to their demands. When more than 100 students at the University of Chicago demanded in 2020 that a climatologist be denounced and forbidden from teaching because he had criticized affirmative-action policies, Robert Zimmer, then the university’s president, made no attempt to address their specific accusations and demands. Instead, he issued a simple statement reiterating the university’s free-speech principle that scholars were free to criticize policies “without being subject to discipline, reprimand or other form of punishment.” And that was that.

At Harvard, by contrast, such controversies rage on, because administrators and professors cower to students, particularly on racial and sexual issues. One illustrative incident was the school’s treatment in 2021 of Kit Parker, who, together with students in his engineering class, had been analyzing data from a police program to reduce gang violence in Springfield, Massachusetts. Black, white, and Hispanic leaders in Springfield had praised the program, but any work with police departments became controversial at Harvard after the death of George Floyd in 2020. More than a dozen campus groups (including the Harvard Alliance Against Campus Cops) called for the engineering class to be cancelled (for, among other alleged sins, its failure to include an “analysis of structural racism”). Harvard bowed to their wishes, and the Crimson published an editorial hailing the “rightful cancellation” of this “immoral” class.

When Harvard started searching for a new president last year, nearly 250 students, professors, and alumni petitioned the search committee to choose a candidate who “actively affirms the importance of free speech.” Gay was obviously not the candidate they had in mind, as Harvard alumnus Francis Merton complained on his Manhattan Contrarian blog after her appointment: “The picture emerges of Gay as the enforcer-in-chief of wokist orthodoxy at Harvard.” Gay’s signature achievement as dean: a series of initiatives to expand the diversity bureaucracy and promote “an effective and active culture of anti-racism.”

In 2019, near the height of the #MeToo era, Gay sided with students demanding that Ronald Sullivan, a law professor, be removed from his position as dean of Winthrop House because he had joined the defense team for Harvey Weinstein. Sullivan wrote a 1,200-word defense of his participation, stressing the need to protect the right to counsel for unpopular defendants, but Gay told the Crimson that his response was “insufficient,” and he was subsequently removed from his post at Winthrop House.

Gay was involved in the controversial sanctions imposed on the economist Roland Fryer (now a Manhattan Institute fellow) after he was accused of sexual harassment, according to Rob Montz, who argued in Quillette and in a documentary that Fryer was singled out for disproportionate punishment because his much-celebrated research into education and policing had challenged progressive dogma on racism. Most of the accusations against Fryer were rejected during a lengthy investigation, which concluded that he had made harsh comments and inappropriate sex-tinged jokes in his laboratory but had never touched or made a pass at anyone, as Stuart Taylor reported in RealClearInvestigations. The investigators’ initial recommendation was that Fryer undergo remedial training, but a group of Harvard administrators insisted on harsher punishment. Two of them were Gay and another dean, Bobo, according to Montz, who wrote that Gay “reportedly went so far as to ask Harvard’s president to revoke Fryer’s tenure.” That did not occur, but Harvard suspended Fryer without pay for two years and shut down his lab. When he returned to Harvard in 2021, the university forbade him to work with graduate students. Even that wasn’t punishment enough for the Crimson, which greeted his return to campus with an editorial lamenting that he hadn’t been permanently banished.

One encouraging development at Harvard occurred in April, when psychologist Steven Pinker and psychobiologist Bertha Madras announced that faculty members were forming the Council on Academic Freedom at Harvard. Citing the cases of “disinvitation, sanctioning, harassment, public shaming, and threats of firing and boycotts,” they promised to support colleagues “threatened or slandered for a scholarly opinion,” and to advocate for new policies protecting academic freedom. “When activists are shouting into an administrator’s ear,” they wrote, “we will speak calmly but vigorously into the other one.”

Will anyone listen? The council’s members are a minority on campus (less than 150 of the more than 2,000 faculty members) and face plenty of resistance—including, as usual, from the Crimson, which greeted the new group with an editorial that would have made Nat Hentoff weep. It began by declaring the Crimson a “steady supporter” of free speech—because “any other stance would be hypocritical” for journalists—but then explained that this freedom didn’t apply to scholars accused of “racism, sexism, or transphobia.” The editorial repeated the baseless slanders against the victims of the Crimson’s previous inquisitions and concluded, “Academic freedom requires academic value; factually incorrect opinions, no matter how reviled, cannot lay claim to such protections.”

With leftist students now being pilloried for their statements on Israel, however, perhaps others on campus are rediscovering the virtues of tolerance. Shortly after Gay’s statement supporting the students’ free-speech rights, the Crimson published another defense of the students’ rights, written by three professors. One of the authors, Ryan Enos, a professor in the government department, made news in the Crimson two years ago by urging Harvard’s president to consider “barring or removing people from our community” who were guilty of “encouraging violence” at the Capitol on January 6—a group he defined rather broadly. Enos asked the president to decide whether any veterans of the Trump administration should ever be allowed to join the Kennedy School, and suggested a candidate for immediate banishment: Alan Dershowitz, an emeritus professor at the law school, who had offered to defend Trump in an impeachment trial.

In the recent op-ed, Enos and his coauthors took a different view of free speech and violence. Yes, they wrote, the students were “misguided” to absolve Hamas of blame for its atrocities, but “reasonable people can debate the roots of violence and conflict,” and “no one should be punished for dissenting views.” Unfortunately, the rest of the op-ed consisted mainly of demands that faculty members, politicians, and business leaders refrain from even criticizing these students’ views. That’s not quite how the First Amendment works. The professors seemed as oblivious as ever to Harvard’s double standard for free speech, particularly in their closing line: “If thoughtful discourse cannot prosper here, where can it?”

Actually, just about anywhere else.

John Tierney is a contributing editor of City Journal and coauthor of The Power of Bad: How the Negativity Effect Rules Us and How We Can Rule It.

Photo by JOSEPH PREZIOSO/AFP via Getty Images

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Also by John Tierney

City Journal · by John Tierney · October 29, 2023

11. Israel tanks penetrate deep into Gaza, as Hamas hostage video emerges

Israel tanks penetrate deep into Gaza, as Hamas hostage video emerges

By Miriam Berger, Hajar Harb and William Booth

Updated October 30, 2023 at 4:01 p.m. EDT|Published October 30, 2023 at 12:12 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Miriam Berger · October 30, 2023

TEL AVIV — Moving quickly overnight, Israeli tanks and soldiers entered the outskirts of Gaza City on Monday, reaching the main highway that goes north and south through the 25-mile-long enclave. The forces were so close to the city that those ground troops called in airstrikes on Hamas targets.

A string of incidents Monday shows evidence of the deepest penetration of Gaza by Israeli ground forces since they began incursions three days ago, as a relentless bombing campaign continues, with the military confirming that combined infantry, armor and engineering forces are all inside Gaza’s borders.

Israel-Gaza war

Israeli attacks have killed at least 8,000 people in Gaza and the Israel Defense Forces has “expanded” its operations in the Gaza Strip in recent days, adding troops and armored tanks. Follow live updates and understand what’s behind the war between Israel and Hamas.

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Hamas, the militant group that controls the besieged enclave, also released a chilling video of three of its hostages delivering a harsh statement addressed to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, with one woman almost screaming at the Israeli leader, “Free, free us now. Free their civilians, free their prisoners, free us, free us all, let us return to our families now. Now! Now! Now!”

Earlier in the day, dramatic video footage taken by Palestinian journalists and geolocated by The Washington Post showed a white sedan traveling on the highway toward the Netzarim junction, where there were Israeli tanks. As it was executing a slow U-turn, the car exploded. (Netzarim was an Israeli agricultural settlement whose last residents were evicted by Israeli soldiers in 2005 during their pullout from the Gaza Strip.)

Israeli military spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari declined to comment on the incident on the highway on Monday, but told a news conference that Israel has “expanded the activity of our forces and additional forces entered the strip, including infantry, armored corps, combat engineering and artillery corps.”

“There is also direct contact between our forces on the ground and terrorists as the fighting continues inside the Gaza Strip,” Hagari said.

In other signs of a deeper incursion into Gaza, the Israel Defense Forces told journalists that Israeli troops spotted “an antitank missile launching post in the area of the al-Azhar University, and guided a fighter jet to strike them.”

The university campus is located just south of Gaza City. Social media reports from Gaza said Israeli troops were in the area.

Earlier, IDF soldiers hoisted an Israeli flag atop a beachside hotel north of Gaza City.

Until now, short video clips released by the IDF mostly show tanks and troops operating on the periphery of Gaza, mainly in farmlands and the edges of urban areas.

There are only two main roads connecting north and south in Gaza. One of them runs along the exposed coast and the other is Salah al-Din road, the main artery. Salah al-Din is an ancient road, traversed by the armies of Alexander the Great, the Romans and Napoleon.

Journalist Bashar Talib told The Post by phone that he was at al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital in central Gaza when around 8:30 a.m. local time he and a colleague, Youssef Saifi, left and headed north to Gaza City. They traveled along the Salah al-Din highway, as other routes have been battered by Israeli bombardments.

“We were surprised by the presence of an Israeli tank and bulldozer on the Salah al-Din road at the Netzarim junction,” Talib said. He and Saifi immediately stopped their car and started to turn around.

“During our withdrawal,” Talib said, he saw “a civilian car. … In the front was an old man and in the back sat a woman with children.”

The Israeli tank “directly targeted” them, he said. Saifi, a cameraman for Al Araby TV, posted a video of the encounter online.

“I felt in extreme danger, and I had never faced this situation before,” Talib said. “The scene was terrifying. I saw pillars of flame rising.”

Talib said three people were killed and an unknown number injured. All casualties were taken to al-Aqsa Hospital, where spokesman Mohammed Haj confirmed the deaths of three people in the blast.

In a statement, Hamas spokesperson Salama Maarouf said several Israeli tanks and a bulldozer moved on to the road from an agricultural area and targeted more than one vehicle before Hamas fighters “forced them to retreat.”

But Maarouf also appeared to play down the presence of Israeli troops, saying, “There was absolutely no ground advance in residential areas” by Israeli troops, who have “currently no presence” on Salah al-Din road, he said.

Previously, Hamas has encouraged people not to leave the north.

Hamas also released footage Monday that appeared to show three Israeli hostages delivering a statement to Netanyahu, whom they address by his nickname “Bibi.”

The video shows three women, in clean dresses, sitting on plastic chairs in a tiled room. One of the women reads what appears to be a prewritten statement that is strongly critical of the Israeli prime minister, with another of the women repeating some words and shaking her head in agreement at the conclusion of the video.

The three hostages are not visibly injured in the video. It is not clear when the video was made, though one of the hostages said it was 23 days after Oct. 7.

The names of the hostages were not included in the video, but Israel’s Channel 13 reported that all were from the Nir Oz kibbutz. The families of the women had asked that the video not be shown, Channel 13 reported.

The Israeli prime minister’s office called the video “cruel psychological propaganda” and in a statement, Netanyahu said they were doing everything they could to bring the hostages home. “Our hearts go out to you and the rest of the hostages.”

Harb reported from London and Booth reported from Jerusalem.

The Washington Post · by Miriam Berger · October 30, 2023

12. The Primacy of Culture

The Primacy of Culture

Why changing the law is not enough to defeat left-wing capture.

https://christopherrufo.com/p/the-primacy-of-culture

CHRISTOPHER F. RUFO

OCT 27, 2023

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157

The editors at Aporia magazine have published an essay comparing my book America’s Cultural Revolution, which argues that cultural and institutional capture are at the heart of the radical Left’s rise to power, to Richard Hanania’s book The Origins of Woke, which argues that civil rights law is the key mechanism for explaining the rise of left-wing identity politics.

Aporia’s Sasha Ivanov writes:

Juxtaposing the two books helps to answer a fundamental question: how do we change society—through political or institutional/cultural capture? Obviously, both approaches are needed; after all, the left took both approaches. But at this moment of leftist hegemony, where should the right focus its efforts? In science there is a distinction between ultimate and proximate causes; if politics is downstream of culture, as the late Andrew Breitbart used to say, then efforts should be concentrated on the ultimate cause, culture. But if civil rights law is the ultimate cause of woke culture, then just changing legislation will be enough. . . .

If Hanania is right, then abolishing wokeness is simply a matter of taking over the government . . . and passing the right laws. Effects will then trickle down to the culture in the space of a few decades. But if Rufo is right, then what’s required is a painstakingly long process of intellectual and political activism: the anti-woke crowd need to actually start caring enough to sacrifice their barbecues and become committed activists.

To an extent, my argument is that this is a “both/and” scenario. The radical Left captured America’s institutions through cultural conquest as well as using civil rights law as a powerful mechanism for formalizing its rule. The solution to this problem, logic would seem to dictate, will require countering both approaches. But the question that Ivanov raises is one of emphasis and centrality: which is the proximate cause, and which is the ultimate cause?

We can discern the relative weight of “culture versus law” by conducting a simple thought experiment: If we could instantly abolish one of these conditions, which would be more effective? That is, would we remove the cultural elements of left-wing radicalism—the ideology, the language, the activists within the institutions—or would we remove the provisions of civil rights law that have enabled its bureaucratization?

I believe the answer is clearly the former. As Ivanov notes, Hanania himself writes that “the text of civil rights law is actually quite innocuous, and it was only through judicial and bureaucratic activism that such law became a tool of social engineering.” In other words, civil rights law, and especially its interpretation, is dependent on the culture that surrounds it. Activists shape the conceptions, detach them from their original intentions, and apply them ideologically as a matter of policy. The legal text becomes nothing more than a justification for and an instrument of the broader cultural war.

This is an unhappy conclusion for the Right. To stop the advance of left-wing radicalism will require more than winning elections and changing laws; it will require deep cultural and institutional change, led by, in Ivanov’s words, “a community of people who are ready to fight for their ideals, and who command power.”

What do you think? What is the “ultimate cause of woke”: culture, law, or something else?

13. Joe Biden’s Sweeping New Executive Order Aims to Drag the US Government Into the Age of ChatGPT

Excerpts:

This is the first executive order of the Biden presidency solely focused on artificial intelligence, and it follows two by former president Trump, in 2019 and 2020. So far, government agencies have a spotty record of complying with them.

The 2019 order focused on investments in AI research and development. A December 2020 executive order and the Advancing American AI Act passed last year require federal agencies to annually disclose an inventory of algorithms in use. But a Stanford Law School study found a pattern of inconsistent compliance, warning of a national AI “capacity gap.” If Biden’s new order, the most ambitious presidential directive on the technology to date, works as intended, it will significantly expand that capacity.

KHARI JOHNSON BUSINESSOCT 30, 2023 5:00 AM

Joe Biden’s Sweeping New Executive Order Aims to Drag the US Government Into the Age of ChatGPT

President Joe Biden issued a wide-ranging executive order on artificial intelligence with measures to boost US tech talent and prevent AI from being used to threaten national security.

Wired · · October 30, 2023

Joe Biden wants the US government to make wider use of artificial intelligence—and to keep commercial AI on a tighter leash. Those are two prominent themes of a sprawling executive order Biden will sign today, which issues dozens of directives for federal agencies to complete within the next year, on topics ranging from national security and immigration to housing and healthcare.

The order places reporting requirements on companies developing powerful AI technology, such as that behind OpenAI's ChatGPT. Biden will use the Defense Production Act, a law that can compel businesses to take actions in the interest of national security, to require the makers of large AI models to report key information to the government, including when they are training a new model and what cybersecurity protections they have.

That will include disclosing results of so-called red teaming exercises, intended to reveal vulnerabilities in AI models, such as those that can be used to evade controls that prevent malicious use cases such as generating malware. The goal is to monitor the potential threats AI technology can pose to national security, public health, and the economy.

Another part of the order requires companies that acquire, develop, or possess large-scale computing clusters, essential to training the most powerful AI systems, to report their activity to the federal government. This rule is intended to help the government understand which entities, including those from nations competing with the US, have strong AI capabilities.

The executive order also directs the Department of Energy to evaluate how AI outputs can contribute to biological or chemical attacks, or cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. The UK government included the possibility of advanced AI enabling biological and chemical attacks in a report last week on potential threats posed by the technology.

White House deputy chief of staff Bruce Reed, who is chair of a newly formed White House AI Council to ensure compliance with the order, calls it “the strongest set of actions any government in the world has ever taken on AI safety, security, and trust.”

Help Wanted

The measures in Biden's executive order aimed at powering up US government AI include the creation of a dedicated job portal hosted at AI.gov to draw more experts and researchers familiar with the technology into government. Another initiative asks for a new training program to produce 500 AI researchers by 2025.

Divyansh Kaushik, an associate director at policy research group the Federation of American Scientists, who helped draft portions of the executive order, says those could be among the most influential pieces. “People often forget that talent is the biggest bottleneck in the federal government,” he says.

Kaushik also welcomes the way Biden’s order demands changes to immigration policy to make it easier for AI talent to come to the US. A plan to allow immigrant workers to renew their visas inside the US, for example, could remove the need for hundreds of thousands of STEM students to travel to their home countries for in-person interviews.

Although the US has a majority of the world’s top AI talent today, only 20 percent of them received undergraduate degrees in the US, Kaushik says, indicating that many are immigrants. He says it’s in the US interest to make it easier for AI experts to come from overseas, to compete against other destinations such as China, Canada, or the UK.

Biden’s new executive order acknowledges that AI projects can be harmful to citizens if not carefully implemented, singling out the potential for discrimination and other unintended effects in housing and healthcare. The order calls for the White House’s Office of Management and Budget to develop guides and tools to help government employees who purchase AI services from private companies make good choices.

Suresh Venkatasubramanian, director of the Center for Technological Responsibility, Reimagination, and Redesign at Brown University, says those rules could be impactful. Within the federal government, procurement is “number one on everyone's agenda because everyone understands that is the way to effect change,” he says. He previously helped the White House assemble an AI Bill of Rights for federal agencies issued by Biden last year.

However, Venkatasubramanian says some of the most critical government use cases for AI in the US will largely go unaffected by the new executive order. Biden’s directives apply to federal agencies, but much AI used in criminal justice and policing is deployed by state and local law enforcement. False positives from AI-powered technology like ShotSpotter gunshot detection and face recognition have led to false arrests, and police departments currently use predictive policing software that doesn’t work as advertised.

To force state agencies to also adopt the standards in the executive order, Venkatasubramanian says federal lawmakers could make compliance a condition of funding for state and local law enforcement agencies.

This is the first executive order of the Biden presidency solely focused on artificial intelligence, and it follows two by former president Trump, in 2019 and 2020. So far, government agencies have a spotty record of complying with them.

The 2019 order focused on investments in AI research and development. A December 2020 executive order and the Advancing American AI Act passed last year require federal agencies to annually disclose an inventory of algorithms in use. But a Stanford Law School study found a pattern of inconsistent compliance, warning of a national AI “capacity gap.” If Biden’s new order, the most ambitious presidential directive on the technology to date, works as intended, it will significantly expand that capacity.

Wired · by Condé Nast · October 30, 2023

14. FACT SHEET: President Biden Issues Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence

FACT SHEET: President Biden Issues Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · October 30, 2023

Today, President Biden is issuing a landmark Executive Order to ensure that America leads the way in seizing the promise and managing the risks of artificial intelligence (AI). The Executive Order establishes new standards for AI safety and security, protects Americans’ privacy, advances equity and civil rights, stands up for consumers and workers, promotes innovation and competition, advances American leadership around the world, and more.

As part of the Biden-Harris Administration’s comprehensive strategy for responsible innovation, the Executive Order builds on previous actions the President has taken, including work that led to voluntary commitments from 15 leading companies to drive safe, secure, and trustworthy development of AI.

The Executive Order directs the following actions:

New Standards for AI Safety and Security

As AI’s capabilities grow, so do its implications for Americans’ safety and security. With this Executive Order, the President directs the most sweeping actions ever taken to protect Americans from the potential risks of AI systems:

Require that developers of the most powerful AI systems share their safety test results and other critical information with the U.S. government. In accordance with the Defense Production Act, the Order will require that companies developing any foundation model that poses a serious risk to national security, national economic security, or national public health and safety must notify the federal government when training the model, and must share the results of all red-team safety tests. These measures will ensure AI systems are safe, secure, and trustworthy before companies make them public.
Develop standards, tools, and tests to help ensure that AI systems are safe, secure, and trustworthy. The National Institute of Standards and Technology will set the rigorous standards for extensive red-team testing to ensure safety before public release. The Department of Homeland Security will apply those standards to critical infrastructure sectors and establish the AI Safety and Security Board. The Departments of Energy and Homeland Security will also address AI systems’ threats to critical infrastructure, as well as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and cybersecurity risks. Together, these are the most significant actions ever taken by any government to advance the field of AI safety.
Protect against the risks of using AI to engineer dangerous biological materials by developing strong new standards for biological synthesis screening. Agencies that fund life-science projects will establish these standards as a condition of federal funding, creating powerful incentives to ensure appropriate screening and manage risks potentially made worse by AI.
Protect Americans from AI-enabled fraud and deception by establishing standards and best practices for detecting AI-generated content and authenticating official content. The Department of Commerce will develop guidance for content authentication and watermarking to clearly label AI-generated content. Federal agencies will use these tools to make it easy for Americans to know that the communications they receive from their government are authentic—and set an example for the private sector and governments around the world.
Establish an advanced cybersecurity program to develop AI tools to find and fix vulnerabilities in critical software, building on the Biden-Harris Administration’s ongoing AI Cyber Challenge. Together, these efforts will harness AI’s potentially game-changing cyber capabilities to make software and networks more secure.
Order the development of a National Security Memorandum that directs further actions on AI and security, to be developed by the National Security Council and White House Chief of Staff. This document will ensure that the United States military and intelligence community use AI safely, ethically, and effectively in their missions, and will direct actions to counter adversaries’ military use of AI.

Protecting Americans’ Privacy

Without safeguards, AI can put Americans’ privacy further at risk. AI not only makes it easier to extract, identify, and exploit personal data, but it also heightens incentives to do so because companies use data to train AI systems. To better protect Americans’ privacy, including from the risks posed by AI, the President calls on Congress to pass bipartisan data privacy legislation to protect all Americans, especially kids, and directs the following actions:

Protect Americans’ privacy by prioritizing federal support for accelerating the development and use of privacy-preserving techniques—including ones that use cutting-edge AI and that let AI systems be trained while preserving the privacy of the training data.
Strengthen privacy-preserving research and technologies, such as cryptographic tools that preserve individuals’ privacy, by funding a Research Coordination Network to advance rapid breakthroughs and development. The National Science Foundation will also work with this network to promote the adoption of leading-edge privacy-preserving technologies by federal agencies.
Evaluate how agencies collect and use commercially available information—including information they procure from data brokers—and strengthen privacy guidance for federal agencies to account for AI risks. This work will focus in particular on commercially available information containing personally identifiable data.
Develop guidelines for federal agencies to evaluate the effectiveness of privacy-preserving techniques, including those used in AI systems. These guidelines will advance agency efforts to protect Americans’ data.

Advancing Equity and Civil Rights

Irresponsible uses of AI can lead to and deepen discrimination, bias, and other abuses in justice, healthcare, and housing. The Biden-Harris Administration has already taken action by publishing the Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights and issuing an Executive Order directing agencies to combat algorithmic discrimination, while enforcing existing authorities to protect people’s rights and safety. To ensure that AI advances equity and civil rights, the President directs the following additional actions:

Provide clear guidance to landlords, Federal benefits programs, and federal contractors to keep AI algorithms from being used to exacerbate discrimination.
Address algorithmic discrimination through training, technical assistance, and coordination between the Department of Justice and Federal civil rights offices on best practices for investigating and prosecuting civil rights violations related to AI.
Ensure fairness throughout the criminal justice system by developing best practices on the use of AI in sentencing, parole and probation, pretrial release and detention, risk assessments, surveillance, crime forecasting and predictive policing, and forensic analysis.

Standing Up for Consumers, Patients, and Students

AI can bring real benefits to consumers—for example, by making products better, cheaper, and more widely available. But AI also raises the risk of injuring, misleading, or otherwise harming Americans. To protect consumers while ensuring that AI can make Americans better off, the President directs the following actions:

Advance the responsible use of AI in healthcare and the development of affordable and life-saving drugs. The Department of Health and Human Services will also establish a safety program to receive reports of—and act to remedy – harms or unsafe healthcare practices involving AI.
Shape AI’s potential to transform education by creating resources to support educators deploying AI-enabled educational tools, such as personalized tutoring in schools.

Supporting Workers

AI is changing America’s jobs and workplaces, offering both the promise of improved productivity but also the dangers of increased workplace surveillance, bias, and job displacement. To mitigate these risks, support workers’ ability to bargain collectively, and invest in workforce training and development that is accessible to all, the President directs the following actions:

Develop principles and best practices to mitigate the harms and maximize the benefits of AI for workers by addressing job displacement; labor standards; workplace equity, health, and safety; and data collection. These principles and best practices will benefit workers by providing guidance to prevent employers from undercompensating workers, evaluating job applications unfairly, or impinging on workers’ ability to organize.
Produce a report on AI’s potential labor-market impacts, and study and identify options for strengthening federal support for workers facing labor disruptions, including from AI.

Promoting Innovation and Competition

America already leads in AI innovation—more AI startups raised first-time capital in the United States last year than in the next seven countries combined. The Executive Order ensures that we continue to lead the way in innovation and competition through the following actions:

Catalyze AI research across the United States through a pilot of the National AI Research Resource—a tool that will provide AI researchers and students access to key AI resources and data—and expanded grants for AI research in vital areas like healthcare and climate change.
Promote a fair, open, and competitive AI ecosystem by providing small developers and entrepreneurs access to technical assistance and resources, helping small businesses commercialize AI breakthroughs, and encouraging the Federal Trade Commission to exercise its authorities.
Use existing authorities to expand the ability of highly skilled immigrants and nonimmigrants with expertise in critical areas to study, stay, and work in the United States by modernizing and streamlining visa criteria, interviews, and reviews.

Advancing American Leadership Abroad

AI’s challenges and opportunities are global. The Biden-Harris Administration will continue working with other nations to support safe, secure, and trustworthy deployment and use of AI worldwide. To that end, the President directs the following actions:

Expand bilateral, multilateral, and multistakeholder engagements to collaborate on AI. The State Department, in collaboration, with the Commerce Department will lead an effort to establish robust international frameworks for harnessing AI’s benefits and managing its risks and ensuring safety. In addition, this week, Vice President Harris will speak at the UK Summit on AI Safety, hosted by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.
Accelerate development and implementation of vital AI standards with international partners and in standards organizations, ensuring that the technology is safe, secure, trustworthy, and interoperable.
Promote the safe, responsible, and rights-affirming development and deployment of AI abroad to solve global challenges, such as advancing sustainable development and mitigating dangers to critical infrastructure.

Ensuring Responsible and Effective Government Use of AI

AI can help government deliver better results for the American people. It can expand agencies’ capacity to regulate, govern, and disburse benefits, and it can cut costs and enhance the security of government systems. However, use of AI can pose risks, such as discrimination and unsafe decisions. To ensure the responsible government deployment of AI and modernize federal AI infrastructure, the President directs the following actions:

Issue guidance for agencies’ use of AI, including clear standards to protect rights and safety, improve AI procurement, and strengthen AI deployment.
Help agencies acquire specified AI products and services faster, more cheaply, and more effectively through more rapid and efficient contracting.
Accelerate the rapid hiring of AI professionals as part of a government-wide AI talent surge led by the Office of Personnel Management, U.S. Digital Service, U.S. Digital Corps, and Presidential Innovation Fellowship. Agencies will provide AI training for employees at all levels in relevant fields.

As we advance this agenda at home, the Administration will work with allies and partners abroad on a strong international framework to govern the development and use of AI. The Administration has already consulted widely on AI governance frameworks over the past several months—engaging with Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, the UAE, and the UK. The actions taken today support and complement Japan’s leadership of the G-7 Hiroshima Process, the UK Summit on AI Safety, India’s leadership as Chair of the Global Partnership on AI, and ongoing discussions at the United Nations.

The actions that President Biden directed today are vital steps forward in the U.S.’s approach on safe, secure, and trustworthy AI. More action will be required, and the Administration will continue to work with Congress to pursue bipartisan legislation to help America lead the way in responsible innovation.

For more on the Biden-Harris Administration’s work to advance AI, and for opportunities to join the Federal AI workforce, visit AI.gov.

###

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · October 30, 2023

15. Department of Defense Releases FY 2023 Military Intelligence Program Budget

This is he only number we can about the budget: $27.9 billion

Department of Defense Releases FY 2023 Military Intelligence Program Budget

defense.gov

Release

Immediate Release

Oct. 30, 2023 |×

The Department of Defense released today the Military Intelligence Program appropriated top line budget for FY 2023. The total MIP budget was $27.9 billion and is aligned to support the National Defense Strategy.

The department has determined that releasing this top line figure does not jeopardize any classified activities within the MIP. No other MIP budget figures or program details will be released, as they remain classified for national security reasons.

budget reform National Defense Strategy

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16. Arming Ukraine is cheap compared to the far higher price of Russian victory

Excerpts:

While the direct financial and security costs of a Russian victory in Ukraine are already alarming, the geopolitical price would be even greater. The recent escalation in Israel is a direct consequence of the West’s indecisive response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. If Putin’s invasion is seen to succeed, other authoritarians will be encouraged and international instability will spread even further. The entire world will face decades of insecurity marked by mounting militarism, mutual suspicion, and multiplying acts of international aggression. The opportunity cost to the global economy will be measured in the tens of trillions.

None of this is inevitable. On the contrary, it can all be avoided by providing Ukraine with the tools to defeat Russia. The Ukrainians are ready and able to do the fighting themselves; all they ask is for their international partners to stop dithering and deliver the necessary weapons without delay.

Opponents of continued military aid to Ukraine often say it is too expensive. In reality, it is infinitely cheaper than the alternative. They also claim supporting Ukraine risks provoking World War III, but in truth, nothing is more likely to provoke Putin than Western weakness.

With his genocidal invasion of Ukraine, the Russian dictator has burned his last remaining bridges and is now completely committed to confrontation with the West. He will not stop until he is stopped. The longer Western leaders delay, the higher the price they will pay.

Arming Ukraine is cheap compared to the far higher price of Russian victory

atlanticcouncil.org · by Peter Dickinson · October 26, 2023

Filter Results

How much longer can the West afford to continue supporting Ukraine? As Russia’s invasion enters its twenty-first month, this is the question growing numbers are now asking in Washington DC and other Western capitals.

Concerns over mounting expenses are understandable but shortsighted. While Ukraine has so far received hundreds of billions of dollars in military aid, this figure pales into relative insignificance when compared to the far higher price the international community will have to pay in the event of a Russian victory.

A wide range of Western politicians and commentators have already made the case for the cost-effectiveness of funding the Ukrainian war effort, with many noting the dramatic reduction in Russia’s military potential as a result of crippling losses suffered in Ukraine. In May 2023, US Senator Lindsey Graham described American military aid to Ukraine as “the best money we’ve ever spent.”

US Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell has recently echoed Senator Graham’s sentiments. “No Americans are getting killed in Ukraine. We’re rebuilding our industrial base. The Ukrainians are destroying the army of one of our biggest rivals. I have a hard time finding anything wrong with that,” he commented on October 20.

McConnell’s arguments are certainly persuasive. However, in order to fully appreciate the true value of continued support for Ukraine, it is necessary to contemplate what would happen if Western military aid came to an end and Vladimir Putin succeeded in subjugating the country.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The most immediate costs of a Russian victory would be felt by the Ukrainian population, of course. With much or all of Ukraine under Russian control, the war crimes already witnessed in occupied areas of the country would multiply. Tens of thousands would be executed or imprisoned, while millions would be subjected to forced deportation. These horrors would create major humanitarian challenges for the wider European community, with a massive new wave of Ukrainian refugees flooding across the border into the EU.

Vindicated and emboldened by victory in Ukraine, Putin would almost certainly seek to go further. The Russian dictator has already made clear that he sees the reconquest of Ukraine as part of a broader mission to correct the perceived injustice of the Soviet collapse and the fall of “historical Russia.” His next targets would most likely be Moldova, Armenia, and the countries of Central Asia. If the West proves unwilling or unable to stop Russia in Ukraine, there will be little to deter further aggression against smaller and more vulnerable former Soviet republics.

With NATO discredited by the fall of Ukraine, Putin would then be tempted to test the resolve of the alliance in a more fundamental manner by threatening the Baltic states. Would a demoralized and divided NATO go to war with a resurgent Russia over an isolated incident on the Estonian or Latvian border? If not, Putin would exploit this weakness. Failure to defend the territorial integrity of a NATO member state would spark the rapid unraveling of the entire alliance, plunging the whole of Europe into chaos.

Even if the worst case scenario of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO could be avoided, a Russian victory in Ukraine would inevitably oblige Western leaders to boost defense spending to levels not witnessed since the end of the Cold War. This would require sums far in excess of the money currently being allocated to Ukraine. Outgoing US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Mark Milley recently warned that a Russian victory in Ukraine would lead to a potential “doubling” of defense budgets. Others have suggested the cost would be much higher, noting the need to establish and indefinitely maintain a dramatically increased military presence in Central and Eastern Europe.

While the direct financial and security costs of a Russian victory in Ukraine are already alarming, the geopolitical price would be even greater. The recent escalation in Israel is a direct consequence of the West’s indecisive response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. If Putin’s invasion is seen to succeed, other authoritarians will be encouraged and international instability will spread even further. The entire world will face decades of insecurity marked by mounting militarism, mutual suspicion, and multiplying acts of international aggression. The opportunity cost to the global economy will be measured in the tens of trillions.

None of this is inevitable. On the contrary, it can all be avoided by providing Ukraine with the tools to defeat Russia. The Ukrainians are ready and able to do the fighting themselves; all they ask is for their international partners to stop dithering and deliver the necessary weapons without delay.

Opponents of continued military aid to Ukraine often say it is too expensive. In reality, it is infinitely cheaper than the alternative. They also claim supporting Ukraine risks provoking World War III, but in truth, nothing is more likely to provoke Putin than Western weakness.

With his genocidal invasion of Ukraine, the Russian dictator has burned his last remaining bridges and is now completely committed to confrontation with the West. He will not stop until he is stopped. The longer Western leaders delay, the higher the price they will pay.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

17. Iran Update, October 30, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-30-2023

IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 30, 2023

Oct 30, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, October 30, 2023

Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Key Takeaways:

Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted indirect fire attacks into Israel at a rate consistent with the rate observed on October 29.
Israeli forces conducted a route clearance operation moving from near Juhor ad Dik to the Salah al Din road in the Gaza Strip before withdrawing.
Israeli forces conducted an extensive operation targeting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaders and infrastructure in Jenin. CTP-ISW has recorded noteworthy Palestinian militant activity around Jenin in recent months.
CTP-ISW recorded three additional clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces.
Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted 10 attacks into Israel.
LH leader Hassan Nasrallah is scheduled to give a speech on Friday, November 3, according to LH media. This planned speech is noteworthy given that Nasrallah has not yet made a public statement on the Israel-Hamas war.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for two separate rocket attacks targeting US forces stationed in Iraq and Syria.
Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser and former IRGC Commander Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi met with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin on the sidelines of the 10th Common Security and Lasting Peace forum in Beijing.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted indirect fire attacks into Israel on October 30 at a rate consistent with the rate observed on October 29. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for eight indirect fire attacks.[1] Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for another eight indirect fire attacks.[2]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Israeli Ground Operations in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces conducted a route clearance operation moving from near Juhor ad Dik to the Salah al Din road in the Gaza Strip before withdrawing.[3] Israeli forces, including at least one bulldozer and other armor, held a position on the Salah al Din road on October 30.[4] Israeli forces withdrew after a brief period.[5] Palestinian sources and the IDF reported that Palestinian fighters engaged IDF armor east of Zaytoun neighborhood, which is just west of Salah al Din road.[6] The Salah al Din road is an important north-south thoroughfare running through the entirety of the strip. This Israeli operation is consistent with Israeli military experts’ characterization of IDF tactics, which involve small IDF units taking “limited areas” before following up with additional ground forces and armor.[7]

Palestinian media, Hamas, and Axis of Resistance media claimed that the al Qassem Brigades and National Resistance Brigades engaged IDF forces in the northwestern Gaza Strip on October 30. The National Resistance Brigades is the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Hamas claimed that the al Qassem Brigades used mortars, snipers, anti-tank fire, and machine guns to target IDF units moving northwest of Beit Lahia.[8] The National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli vehicles attempting to enter the strip in the northwest, according to the reports’ claims.[9] The al Qassem Brigades also used anti-tank fire and machine guns against IDF forces in the northwestern Gaza Strip on October 30.[10]

Hamas is continuing its information operation claiming that the Palestinian militants are defeating the IDF and thwarting the IDF’s plan.[11] The IDF is intentionally moving slowly to take “limited areas” with small forces before following them up with additional ground forces.[12]

Israeli special operations forces and Shin Bet personnel rescued IDF Private Uri Magidish on October 29 during a ground operation in the Gaza Strip.[13] The Israeli defense minister said that Israel planned the operation for “days” and that the operation was held in a “relatively remote area in the northern Gaza Strip.”[14]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces conducted an extensive operation targeting Hamas and PIJ leaders and infrastructure in Jenin on October 30.[15] The raid is part of the Israeli effort to degrade Hamas and PIJ capabilities in the West Bank. Israeli media reported the operation killed senior PIJ commander and founder of the Jenin Battalion Wiam Iyad Hanon.[16] The Jenin Battalion is an amalgamation of militia groups based in Jenin but most heavily associated with PIJ.[17] CTP-ISW recorded two claims of Palestinian militants using IEDs in Jenin on October 30.[18] PIJ claimed that the IEDs damaged Israeli armored vehicles.[19] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the claims of damage or causalities caused by the IED attacks.

CTP-ISW has recorded noteworthy Palestinian militant activity around Jenin in recent months. PIJ stated on October 13 that the group is prioritizing attacking Israeli forces and infrastructure around Jenin.[20] PIJ’s branch in Jenin separately announced in July 2023 that they have explosively formed penetrators (EFP), which are an Iranian-designed explosive device that Iranian-backed militias—with Iranian direction—used extensively against US forces in Iraq.[21]

CTP-ISW recorded three additional clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces on October 30.[22] The IDF stated it arrested 38 Hamas members and 13 other militants while confiscating weapons across the West Bank.[23] CTP-ISW recorded a single anti-Israel demonstration in Ramallah compared to three the day prior.[24] It is noteworthy that there has been no significant inflection in anti-Israel activity in the West Bank since the IDF began ground operations into the Gaza Strip on October 27.

Shin Bet warned the Israeli government that continued settler attacks could lead to an eruption of violence in the West Bank, according to Israeli media.[25] Shin Bet head Ronen Bar warned on October 30 that an increase in Israeli settlers attacking Palestinians risks harming the war effort. US administration officials have also expressed concern over rising settler violence.[26]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 10 attacks into Israel. Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed an infiltration into Hanita, northern Israel, and later acknowledged that two PIJ militants died during the operation.[27] LH claimed three anti-tank guided missile attacks on IDF positions in northeastern Israel on October 30.[28] Unidentified militants conducted seven mortar and rocket attacks into northern Israel.[29] The IDF continues to conduct airstrikes and artillery attacks targeting militants who are attempting to launch indirect fire into northern Israel.[30]

The PIJ attack is especially noteworthy given the closeness of the group to Iran and LH. Tehran and LH have provided various forms of support, including funding and military equipment and training, to PIJ for decades.[31] LH almost certainly permits Palestinian militant groups, such as PIJ, to conduct attacks from southern Lebanon given the extent to which LH controls the area and coordinates with the other Iranian-backed groups operating there.

A Syrian Arab Army (SAA) unit fired two rockets into the Golan Heights on October 29, according to local Syrian media.[32] The report claimed that the rockets landed in an open field. The IDF conducted airstrikes against the SAA 112th Brigade near Nawa, southern Syria, shortly after the rocket fire.[33]

LH leader Hassan Nasrallah is scheduled to give a speech on Friday, November 3, according to LH media.[34] This planned speech is noteworthy given that Nasrallah has not yet made a public statement on the Israel-Hamas war. Nasrallah’s only major appearance since the war began was him attending a coordination and planning meeting with senior Hamas and PIJ leaders in Beirut on October 25.[35]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for two separate rocket attacks targeting US forces stationed in Iraq and Syria on October 30.[36] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed responsibility for 26 attacks on US forces in the Middle East since October 18.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a rocket attack targeting Conoco Mission Support Site on October 30.[37] This is the third attack on this location that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed since October 18. Syria-based al Sharqiya News reported that the group launched the attack from a neighborhood within Deir ez Zor City controlled by Iranian-backed militias.[38]
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a rocket attack on Ain al Asad airbase on October 30.[39] This is the eighth attack on Ain al Asad airbase that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed since October 18.

UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported on October 30 that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani is coordinating Axis of Resistance activities against Israel from a joint operations center in Beirut.[40] Ghaani traveled to Beirut on October 20 where he has since been stationed and met and coordinated with LH and Palestinian militia leaders, according to the report.[41] Ghaani previously visited Syria to direct Iranian-affiliated militias to prepare to open a second front against Israel on October 15, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[42]

Syria-based, anti-Iran news outlet Eye of Euphrates released a report detailing the various Iranian-backed militias responsible for conducting attacks on US forces in the Middle East since October 18.[43] The article reported that the most senior IRGC Commander in Syria, Hajj Askar, has coordinated all attacks on US forces in Syria with the local IRGC commanders in eastern Syria through a joint operations room based in Sayyida Zainab, Rif Dimashq Province. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this report, although it is consistent with CTP-ISW’s previous reporting.

Eye of Euphrates reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah (KH) and Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) were responsible for conducting at least one of the one-way drone strikes targeting al Tanf Garrison in eastern Syria. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, of which KH and AAH are both members, has claimed responsibility for two one-way drone attacks on Al Tanf Garrison since October 18.[44]
Eye of Euphrates reported that the leader of the Iranian-affiliated Akidat militia, Hashem al Sattem, armed and directed Iranian sleeper cells active in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-held territory to conduct strikes on US forces stationed at al Omar oil field. CTP-ISW previously reported on Iranian efforts to establish sleeper cells in SDF-held territory and warned that these cells possessed the capabilities to target US forces in eastern Syria.[45] CTP-ISW has recorded at least one attack targeting US forces stationed at al Omar oil field since October 18.[46]
The article explained that Iranian-backed Syrian Hezbollah militants, led by Mohammad Amin Hussein al Raja and Tariq al Mayouf, and the Iranian-affiliated Sons of Jazira and Euphrates, led by Nawaf Ragheb al Bashir, conducted rocket attacks targeting US forces stationed at Conoco. According to Eye of Euphrates, the militants carried out attacks from Mazloum and Marat in Deir ez Zor Province. CTP-ISW has recorded two attacks targeting US forces stationed at Conoco Mission Support Site since October 18.[47]

Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Vahid Jalal Zadeh discussed the Israel-Hamas war with Russian parliamentarians in Moscow on October 30.[48] Jalal Zadeh met with the following individuals:

Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairman Leonid Slutsky
Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrey Kartapolov
Russian State Duma member Alexander Babakov
Russian Federation Council Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Kostantin Kosachev

Jalal Zadeh called on Russia to cooperate with Iran to stop Israeli “crimes” against Palestinians.[49] Jalal Zadeh’s visit to Moscow follows Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani’s October 26-27 visit to Moscow, in which he met with senior Hamas and Russian officials.[50] Jalal Zadeh will travel to Turkey after concluding his trip to Russia.

Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser and former IRGC Commander Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi met with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin on the sidelines of the 10th Common Security and Lasting Peace Forum in Beijing on October 30.[51] Iranian state media reported that the two officials discussed unspecified military cooperation.[52] Khrenin previously traveled to Tehran on July 31 to August 1 to discuss defense industry cooperation, establishing military attaches between Belarus and Iran, and conducting joint exercises. Khrenin met with Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri and Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani during the visit. [53] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Khrenin may have discussed establishing Shahed one-way attack drone factories in Belarus to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[54]

Iranian state media separately reported that Safavi will meet with other unspecified commanders and officials attending the forum to improve cultural, economic, and political ties.[55] Safavi stated that he seeks to represent the “voice of the oppressed people of Gaza” during his meetings and speech at the forum.

18. AI Is Already at War By Michèle A. Flournoy

The next SECDEF?

Excerpts:

But the national security apparatus cannot afford to be reckless, either. Without proper safeguards, AI models could cause all kinds of unintended harm. Rogue systems could even kill U.S. troops or unarmed civilians in or near areas of combat. The United States therefore finds itself facing a conundrum. The stakes of slowing AI down are unacceptably high, but so are the stakes of racing ahead without needed precautions.

U.S. policymakers appear to understand this paradox. Congressional leaders know that if they were to regulate AI with too heavy a hand, they could prompt the best AI innovators to leave the United States to work where there are fewer restrictions, and the United States would then fall behind its competitors. But both Democratic and Republican policymakers also know that some regulation and oversight is essential to ensuring that AI adoption is safe and responsible. The House of Representatives and the Senate are holding sessions to educate their members and scheduling hearings to get advice from experts. These efforts to build bipartisan consensus before legislating should be applauded.

Yet understanding the problem is just the first step. To solve it—to balance the need for speed with the need for safety—policymakers will have to implement better approaches to accelerating adoption as well as ensuring safety. Otherwise, Americans risk being caught in a world of both spiraling AI dangers and declining U.S. power and influence.

AI Is Already at War

How Artificial Intelligence Will Transform the Military

By Michèle A. Flournoy

November/December 2023

Published on October 24, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Michèle A. Flournoy · October 24, 2023

In 2002, a special operations team practiced raiding a safehouse. The team silently approached a two-story building, built for military training, where a fictitious terrorist leader was hiding. One soldier crept up to an open window and tossed in a small drone piloted by artificial intelligence. The AI drone began flying autonomously through the building, room by room, beaming footage from its camera directly to the commander’s handheld tablet outside. In just a few minutes, the team had full situational awareness of the interior of the building. It knew which rooms were empty, which were occupied by sleeping family members, and where the primary target was. The team entered the building knowing exactly where to go, reducing the risk for each member. The drill was a success: had it been real, the team would have killed the terrorist leader.

The AI-piloted quadcopter, designed by Shield AI (where I was an adviser), has since been used in real-world operations. It is just one of the many ways that AI is beginning to reshape U.S. national security. The U.S. military is using AI to optimize everything from equipment maintenance to budgetary decisions. Intelligence analysts are relying on AI to quickly scan mountains of information to identify relevant patterns that enable them to make better judgments and to make them faster. In the future, Americans can expect AI to change how the United States and its adversaries fight on the battlefield, as well. In short, AI has sparked a security revolution—one that is just starting to unfold.

As AI has burst into the public consciousness, some researchers, worried about AI’s dangers, have called for a pause on development. But stopping American AI progress is impossible: the mathematical foundations of AI are ubiquitous, the human skills to create AI models have widely proliferated, and the drivers of AI research and development—both human creativity and commercial gain—are very powerful. Trying to stop progress would also be a mistake. China is working hard to surpass the United States in AI, particularly when it comes to military applications. If it succeeds, Beijing would then possess a much more powerful military, one potentially able to increase the tempo and effect of its operations beyond what the United States can match. China’s ability to use cyber and electronic warfare against U.S. networks and critical infrastructure would also be dangerously enhanced. Put simply, the Pentagon needs to accelerate—not slow—its adoption of responsible AI. If it doesn’t, Washington could lose the military superiority that underwrites the interests of the United States, the security of its allies and partners, and the rules-based international order.

Acceleration, however, is easier said than done. The United States may lead the world when it comes to artificial intelligence research and development, but the U.S. government still struggles to adopt innovative technologies such as AI with speed and at scale. It does not employ enough professionals with the technical expertise needed to test, evaluate, procure, and manage AI products. It is still building the data and computer infrastructure necessary to support large AI models. It lacks the flexible funding required to quickly take the most promising AI prototypes and scale them across agencies. And it has yet to build up the testing and evaluation processes and platforms needed to ensure that any AI integrated into military systems is safe, secure, and trusted. When AI plays a role in the use of force, the bar for safety and reliability must remain very high.

Politicians and defense officials are aware of these issues. Congressional leaders are paying close attention to AI, and they are discussing how they can regulate the industry and yet keep it globally competitive. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has issued a policy framework for AI to expedite its responsible and safe adoption by the Defense Department. The essential effort to simultaneously foster AI and put guardrails around its use—aims that are seemingly in tension—is underway.

But Congress has yet to act, and the implementation of the Pentagon’s AI framework is still very much a work in progress. Although the creation of a Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office at the Defense Department was an important milestone, Congress has yet to provide this office with the resources it needs to drive responsible AI adoption across the defense establishment. To ensure that AI defense applications are both safe and successful, the Pentagon will need to further bolster AI guardrails, add new technical staff, and develop new ways of testing and procuring AI. Time is of the essence, and the stakes are too high for the United States to fall behind.

HERE AND NOW

Even as policies and regulations are still being written, AI is already transforming U.S. security. The U.S. Air Force, for example, is beginning to use AI to help it allocate resources and to predict how a single decision can reshape its program and budget. If air force leaders, for example, add another squadron of F-35s, their AI-enabled resource allocation platform can immediately highlight not only the direct costs of the decision but also its effects on personnel, bases, aircraft availability, and other important domains.

Similarly, the military is beginning to use AI models in the maintenance of complex weapons systems, from ships to fighter jets. AI programs can now collect data from a platform’s sensors and predict when and what kind of maintenance will maximize its readiness and longevity while minimizing costs.

These maintenance insights are tremendously helpful, and they are just the beginning of what predictive AI can do. The U.S. intelligence community and several U.S. combatant commands—the joint military commands with operational responsibility for a particular region or function—are using AI to sift through reams of classified and unclassified data to identify patterns of behavior and forecast future international events. In the intelligence community, AI helped analysts predict Russia’s invasion of Ukraine months in advance, enabling the United States to warn the world and deny Russian President Vladimir Putin the element of surprise. At U.S. Strategic Command, AI developed by Rhombus Power (where I am an adviser) is being used to help warn officials about the movement of nuclear-armed missiles that often evaded detection in the past.

Predictive AI could also give Washington a better understanding of what its potential adversaries might be thinking, especially leaders in Beijing. Unlike during the height of the Cold War, when there were legions of experts on Soviet decision-making, the United States is still figuring out how China’s leadership translates policy into specific actions. The intelligence community could, for instance, develop a large language model that would ingest all available writings and speeches by Chinese leaders, as well as U.S. intelligence reports about these figures, and then emulate how Chinese President Xi Jinping might decide to execute stated policy. Analysts could ask the model specific questions—“Under what circumstances would President Xi be willing to use force against Taiwan?”—and anticipate potential responses based on a wealth of data from more sources than any human being could ever quickly synthesize. They could even ask the model to map out how a crisis might unfold and how different decisions would shape the outcome. The resulting insights could be useful in informing analysts and policymakers, provided the training sets were transparent (meaning they cite the sources of data underlying key judgments) and trusted (not prone to “hallucinations”—inexplicable inferences made by AI).

AI has sparked a security revolution that is just starting to unfold.

Intelligence officers are already using AI daily to sift through thousands of pictures and videos. In the past, analysts had to watch thousands of hours of full-motion video to find and tag objects of interest, whether a concentration of tanks or dispersed mobile missiles. But with AI, developers can train a model to examine all this material and identify only the objects the analyst is looking for—usually in a matter of seconds or minutes. The analyst can also set the AI model to send an alert whenever a new object of interest is found in a given geographic area. These “computer vision” tools enable analysts to spend more time doing what only humans can do: applying their expertise and judgment to assess the meaning and implications of what AI discovers. As these models become more accurate and trusted, they have the potential to help U.S. commanders on the ground make critical operational decisions much faster than an adversary can respond, giving U.S. forces a tremendous—perhaps even decisive—advantage.

AI could support military operations in other ways, as well. For instance, if an adversary were to jam or attack U.S. command, control, and communications networks, AI could enable a smart switching and routing agent that would redirect the flow of information between sensors, decision-makers, and shooters to make sure they stay connected and can maintain situational awareness. Having these capabilities will be critical to ensuring that Washington and its allies can make better decisions faster than their adversaries, even in the thick of combat.

AI could further help U.S. and allied forces by amplifying the work of individual service members in the field. Some AI applications currently in development allow a single human operator to control multiple unmanned systems, such as a swarm of drones in the air, on the water, or undersea. For example, a fighter pilot could use a swarm of flying drones to confuse or overwhelm an adversary’s radar and air defense system. A submarine commander could use undersea unmanned vehicles to conduct reconnaissance in a heavily defended area or to hunt for undersea mines that threaten U.S. and allied ships. The Pentagon recently announced its Replicator drone program, which promises to field thousands of small, smart, low-cost, expendable, autonomous systems within the next two years.

In a conflict with China over Taiwan, this human-machine teaming could be critical. If Beijing decides to use force to claim the island, China will have the advantage of fighting in its own backyard, allowing it to mass forces more easily. The United States, meanwhile, will be sending its units long distances and in far fewer numbers. If the U.S. military can augment its manned platforms such as fighters, bombers, ships, and submarines with large numbers of relatively cheap unmanned systems, it could compensate somewhat for this comparative disadvantage and greatly complicate the Chinese military’s operations.

PLAY IT RIGHT

Beijing, of course, has no intention of ceding technological dominance to Washington. It is working hard to develop its own advanced AI military applications. China is investing heavily in many of the same AI use cases as the United States—such as surveillance, target identification, and drone swarms. The difference is that it may not be bound by the same ethical constraints as the United States and its allies, particularly when it comes to using fully autonomous weapons systems.

In the race for technological supremacy, China has some obvious advantages. Unlike Washington, Beijing can dictate its country’s economic priorities and allocate whatever resources it deems necessary to meet AI targets. China’s national security policy encourages Chinese hackers, officials, and employees to steal Western intellectual property, and Beijing is unabashed in trying to recruit leading Western technologists to work with Chinese institutions. Because China has a policy of “civil-military fusion,” which eliminates barriers between its civilian and military sectors, the People’s Liberation Army can draw on the work of Chinese experts and companies whenever it likes. And by 2025, China will churn out nearly twice as many Ph.D. candidates in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics as the United States does, flooding China’s economy with talented computer scientists in particular.

But the United States has its own unique strengths. The country’s market-based economy and more open political system give developers room to be creative. It has unrivaled innovation ecosystems in Silicon Valley, the Austin metropolitan area, the Massachusetts Route 128 corridor, and elsewhere. The United States also has a vibrant venture capital and private equity ecosystem that draws incomparable domestic and international investment. It is home to many of the world’s leading universities, allowing it to attract and retain some of the world’s best tech talent. Indeed, half the startups in Silicon Valley have at least one founder who is an immigrant. Even among those who lament China’s rapid AI progress, few, if any, would trade the United States’ hand for China’s. But almost all of them would agree the United States needs to play its hand better to win.

To do so, the Defense Department and the intelligence community will have to invest more in accelerating AI adoption. They can start by building common digital infrastructure systems that share the same standards to ensure interoperability. The infrastructure would include cloud-based technologies and services; common data standards; validated data sets; shared access to secure software stacks; sophisticated tools for the testing, evaluation, and validation of AI models; and secure application programming interfaces that control who gets access to what information at various levels of classification. The goal would be to give developers the data, algorithms, tools, and compute power—or high-speed computing power—they need to create, test, validate, and use new AI tools.

A U.S. soldier wearing a data display system, Camp Pendleton, California, March 2018

Rhita Daniel / U.S. Marine Corps / Reuters

Those tools will only be as good as the people who operate them, of course, and right now, the Defense Department does not have a digitally adept workforce. Few people on staff understand enough about AI to properly govern its use, to test and evaluate AI tools to ensure they meet the Pentagon’s “responsible AI” standards, or to assess which AI models best meet the needs of the military or the Defense Department—one of the world’s largest enterprises.

To attract more AI talent and to make better use of the tech workforce it already has, the Defense Department will need to improve how it recruits and manages digitally skilled employees. The Pentagon can start by following the advice of the National Security Commission on AI and establish a digital corps (modeled on the Army Medical Corps) to organize, train, and equip technologists. In addition, all the existing military service academies should start teaching the basics of AI, and the Pentagon should also establish a U.S. digital service academy that would educate and train aspiring civilian technologists, offering them a free college education in exchange for a commitment to serve in government for at least five years after graduating. Finally, the Defense Department should create a digital reserve corps in which tech workers from across the United States could volunteer, part time, to serve their country.

The Pentagon, however, will never be able to attract as many AI experts as the private sector. The defense establishment must therefore improve how it leverages outside talent. For starters, the Defense Department should deepen its conversations with technology companies and the computer science departments of leading universities. It should also reduce some of the outdated barriers to tech firms doing business with the government. To do so, defense officials must rethink how they buy software-based products and services, including AI. Instead of taking years to develop a fixed set of highly specific requirements—as the department does when procuring military hardware—it should quickly identify the specific problems it is trying to solve and the common standards that any proposed solutions must meet and then allow companies to offer solutions in a competitive bidding process. It should also make sure that the people who will actually use the specific AI tools are able to provide feedback as models are being developed and tested.

In fact, the Pentagon should create a dedicated career path for acquisition professionals who want to specialize in AI and other commercially driven technologies. Most of the Defense Department’s current acquisition corps have been trained to buy complex weapons systems, such as submarines, missiles, and jets, which requires paying meticulous attention to whether contractors meet rigid specifications, cost requirements, and scheduled milestones. As a result, most of these professionals are (understandably) highly risk averse—they are neither trained nor incentivized to buy rapidly developing commercial technologies or to disrupt an existing multiyear acquisition program to integrate a more effective new technology. The Pentagon should therefore create a new cohort of acquisition experts who are specifically trained to buy these kinds of systems. This cadre should be considered the Green Berets of the acquisition force, and its members should be rewarded and promoted based on their ability to quickly deliver and scale needed commercial technologies, such as AI.

Beijing has no intention of ceding technological dominance to Washington.

Although internal reforms will help the Pentagon accelerate progress, defense officials will also need sustained congressional support to keep pace with their Chinese counterparts. To that end, Congress should give the Defense Department more flexible funding that allows it to optimally manage AI programs. Most of the Pentagon’s appropriations are fixed: when Congress funds a program, the department cannot simply redirect the money to something else. But AI is evolving so fast, and in so many different directions, that defense officials need more reprogramming authorities and more flexible funding so they can quickly move money out of underperforming projects and reinvest it in more promising ones, giving Congress appropriate notice. This approach is critical to enabling the Pentagon to adopt AI with more agility and speed.

Congress should simultaneously provide the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office with bridge funding to help promising AI pilot projects cross the so-called valley of death—the difficult period between when a project demonstrates success and when the department is ready to make it a full-scale program of record. The U.S. military simply cannot afford to delay the adoption of a critical AI tool that emerges in 2023 until the 2025 budget or later.

The United States will also need to continue attracting the best tech talent in the world, including by reforming elements of the U.S. immigration system. Science and technology students and workers may want to come to and stay in the United States, but byzantine immigration rules make it impossible for many of them to do so. Educational visas, for instance, do not let foreign students stay in the United States for more than three years after graduation. The resulting dynamic is perverse: U.S. institutions train many of the world’s best tech experts, only to send them away. Many of them are Chinese and return to China.

In addition, congressionally imposed caps on H-1B visas—the visa the United States most commonly offers to skilled workers—mean that the country can bring in only a small percentage of people who apply. For example, from the 758,994 eligible electronic registrations received during the 2023 H-1B lottery, only 110,791 people were selected (or less than 15 percent). In short, the United States is keeping out much-needed foreign talent that would willingly and meaningfully contribute to the country’s ability to compete in AI and other critical technologies.

HIGH RISK, HIGH REWARD

AI is indispensable to the United States’ future security. But it also poses major risks. AI is already accelerating the spread of disinformation online and facilitating inadvertent discrimination in hiring. Computer scientists have argued that it could enable automated cyberattacks at “machine speeds,” as well. Chemists have shown that AI can synthesize chemical weapons, and biologists have expressed concern that it could be used to design new pathogens or bioweapons. The risks are severe enough that even AI industry leaders have expressed alarm. In May 2023, the heads of almost every major U.S. AI lab signed a letter warning that their inventions could pose an existential threat to humanity.

Indeed, national security is the realm of human activity where the risks of AI are most profound. AI models could, for example, misidentify people or objects as targets, resulting in unintended death and destruction during conflict. Black box AI models—ones whose reasoning cannot be adequately understood or explained—might lead military planners to make hazardous decisions. This risk would be most acute if AI developed for one situation were applied to another without enough testing and oversight. What might be perfectly rational and responsible in one situation might be irrational and dangerous in another.

The risks do not stem just from poorly designed or carelessly used systems. The United States could be fastidious in developing and implementing AI, only for its adversaries to find ways to corrupt U.S. data, prompting systems to go haywire. For example, if an adversary were able to spoof an AI-enabled computer vision tool into targeting a civilian vehicle instead of a military one, it could cause the United States to inadvertently harm civilians in a conflict zone, undermining U.S. credibility and moral authority. An adversary could also corrupt data in ways that would degrade the performance of an AI-enabled weapon system or that could cause it to shut down.

The Pentagon is aware of these risks, and in February 2020, it issued a set of ethical principles governing how AI should be used. One principle called on the department’s personnel to exercise judgment and care in developing, deploying, and using AI capabilities. Another said the Defense Department will try to “minimize unintended bias in AI capabilities.” A third called for ensuring that all AI is made and used in ways that can be understood and explained—with data and methodologies that are transparent and auditable. And defense leaders have directed their employees to make sure that AI systems are rigorously tested for their safety, security, and effectiveness; that AI systems are assigned to clearly defined uses; and that AI systems can be disengaged or deactivated if they exhibit unintended behavior.

A drone flying above Ein Shemer, Israel, July 2023

Amir Cohen / Reuters

For autonomous and semiautonomous weapons, the Defense Department has issued even more specific guidance. Pentagon leaders have directed commanders and operators to use careful judgment over AI-enabled weapons, including by ensuring that these weapons are used in ways that are consistent with the parameters of the model’s training and with the rules of engagement for the operation in which the AI is being deployed. The Defense Department’s rules also stipulate that commanders use AI in accordance with the laws of war. For example, any AI-enabled weapon must be discriminate, able to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants on the battlefield, and able to avoid deliberately targeting the latter. The Pentagon has also forbidden the use of AI in its nuclear command-and-control systems, and it has urged other nuclear powers to do the same.

Among the U.S. defense community’s leadership, these “responsible AI” rules have achieved great consensus. But putting them into practice is no small challenge—especially given the size of the United States’ defense apparatus. The Pentagon has started the process by creating a high-level governance body, beginning to establish data and digital infrastructure to support a variety of AI applications; building out the testing, evaluation, and validation capabilities needed to ensure compliance with the Defense Department’s AI principles; and increasing AI awareness across the department. This implementation process is still in its infancy. But the policy framework provides a sound basis on which to build.

Still, the Pentagon would be wise to further strengthen these guidelines. For example, defense officials should require that all AI vendors give the Defense Department full transparency into the origins of data they use in their training sets. In addition, the department should make sure that the behavior of any AI model it adopts is explainable (fully understood by its users and developers), without stifling innovation. It can do so by strengthening how it tests, evaluates, and verifies systems. The department should also scale and broaden the work done by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency—one of the entities responsible for developing emerging technologies for the military—on making sure that AI tools are explainable and responsible by design. The department’s ethical principles, in other words, should be treated as required traits that shape how defense AI models are designed from the start.

U.S. institutions train many of the world’s best tech experts, only to send them away.

But the U.S. defense community will not be able to speed AI adoption unless the public believes it will use AI in ways that are effective, responsible, ethical, and lawful. Otherwise, the first time an AI application leads to a very bad decision or serious unintended consequences on the battlefield, warfighters are unlikely to trust it, and policymakers and lawmakers are likely to suspend or prohibit its use. The Defense Department must therefore increase its investment in the research and development of AI safety and security. It must be transparent about what it will and will not use AI to do. And the Pentagon should consider making its vendors put guardrails on how they develop AI. If a company wants to provide AI to the military, for example, the Defense Department could require it to meet rigorous data protection and cybersecurity standards. By doing so, the Pentagon could help make AI safer, not just for the armed forces, but for everyone.

The United States, of course, cannot singlehandedly make sure that AI is developed and used responsibly. Other countries—including competitors—will also have to adopt policy guardrails and norms. The world took a valuable first step when, in November 2021, 193 countries approved a global agreement on the ethics of artificial intelligence—the world’s first. It includes the principle that countries must guarantee human oversight of and agency over all AI.

Although this agreement is an important foundation, the United States should seek out venues to discuss AI with its potential adversaries, especially China, just as it found ways to talk about nuclear weapons and other forms of arms control with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. To succeed, Washington will also have to work closely with its allies and partners to make sure they are all on the same page. Countries that agree on a set of AI norms should be willing to threaten violators with severe costs, including multilateral economic sanctions, expulsion from international forums, and legal action to hold perpetrators responsible for damage. Actors that violate AI rules, for instance, could be indicted in a U.S. federal court, as five Chinese hackers were in 2014 for launching cyberattacks on U.S. companies. States that violate these rules could face potential retaliation for any harm done—including, in extreme cases, military action.

THE NEED FOR RESPONSIBLE SPEED

In the world of microelectronics, experts often talk about Moore’s law: the principle that the number of transistors on chips doubles every two years, resulting in exponentially more capable devices. The law helps explain the rapid rise of so many technological innovations, including smartphones and search engines.

Within national security, AI progress has created another kind of Moore’s law. Whichever military first masters organizing, incorporating, and institutionalizing the use of data and AI into its operations in the coming years will reap exponential advances, giving it remarkable advantages over its foes. The first adopter of AI at scale is likely to have a faster decision cycle and better information on which to base decisions. Its networks are likely to be more resilient when under attack, preserving its ability to maintain situational awareness, defend its forces, engage targets effectively, and protect the integrity of its command, control, and communications. It will also be able to control swarms of unmanned systems in the air, on the water, and under the sea to confuse and overwhelm an adversary. The United States cannot afford to fall behind.

But the national security apparatus cannot afford to be reckless, either. Without proper safeguards, AI models could cause all kinds of unintended harm. Rogue systems could even kill U.S. troops or unarmed civilians in or near areas of combat. The United States therefore finds itself facing a conundrum. The stakes of slowing AI down are unacceptably high, but so are the stakes of racing ahead without needed precautions.

U.S. policymakers appear to understand this paradox. Congressional leaders know that if they were to regulate AI with too heavy a hand, they could prompt the best AI innovators to leave the United States to work where there are fewer restrictions, and the United States would then fall behind its competitors. But both Democratic and Republican policymakers also know that some regulation and oversight is essential to ensuring that AI adoption is safe and responsible. The House of Representatives and the Senate are holding sessions to educate their members and scheduling hearings to get advice from experts. These efforts to build bipartisan consensus before legislating should be applauded.

Yet understanding the problem is just the first step. To solve it—to balance the need for speed with the need for safety—policymakers will have to implement better approaches to accelerating adoption as well as ensuring safety. Otherwise, Americans risk being caught in a world of both spiraling AI dangers and declining U.S. power and influence.

MICHÈLE A. FLOURNOY is Co-Founder and Managing Partner of WestExec Advisors and Chair of the Center for a New American Security. She served as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from 2009 to 2012.
MORE BY MICHÈLE A. FLOURNOY

Foreign Affairs · by Michèle A. Flournoy · October 24, 2023

19. From Einsatzgruppen to Hamas: A Historical Continuum of Mobile Mass Murder

Conclusion:

The global community cannot ignore the savagery and professionalism of the mass murders that took place Oct. 7. Even within the complex geopolitical context that dictates relationships between Israelis and Palestinians, the world should stand united against the genocidal terrorism that was visited on Israel that day. A failure to call out violence and atrocities deliberately targeted at civilians—in contravention of any international laws of war or indeed moral and ethical standards—will have devastating consequences for future conflicts around the world. In addition, terrorism in recent years had been relegated by the United States and other Western countries to a less pressing priority. This had been implemented in 2018 by the new National Defense Strategy. Competition between great powers took precedence to the effect that threats from groups like Hamas, which did not directly affect the United States, were ignored. But just as ISIS nearly a decade changed the nature of contemporary terrorism, through its sheer barbarity and savagery, the Oct. 7 attacks provide fresh evidence of a changing terrorist calculus concerning the wanton targeting of civilians that threatens to gain validation by a moral equivalency that celebrates terrorism and mass murder as “resistance” and a necessary corrective to the West’s colonial legacy. Throughout history, terrorism has reflected the ethos and mores of the audience to whom the violence is meant to appeal. The attacks thus mark a dangerous watershed in the potential acceptance of terrorism and mass killing as legitimate political discourse.

From Einsatzgruppen to Hamas: A Historical Continuum of Mobile Mass Murder - Irregular Warfare Initiative

October 31, 2023 by Bruce Hoffman, C. William Vardy, Jacob Ware

irregularwarfare.org · by Bruce Hoffman, C. William Vardy, Jacob Ware · October 31, 2023

Even as the latest war between Israel and Hamas approaches its one-month anniversary, the full scale of the atrocities suffered by Israelis living close to the border with the Gaza Strip is still becoming clear: entire families executed in their homes and safe rooms, babies and children slain, women raped, and men killed, with the survivors dragged into captivity. The 1,400 Israelis slain in the Oct. 7 attack have been widely compared to the 3,000 people who perished on 9/11. Proportionately, the Hamas attack is worse: per capita, it would be as if 40,000 people lost their lives when the World Trade Center towers fell. More Jews in fact were killed Oct. 7, 2023 than on any other day since the end of the Holocaust.

This not coincidental. Hamas’ deliberate attack on Israeli civilians was designed to maximize death and destruction, intending not just to terrorize the population but ethnically cleanse the land of Jews, as dictated by the group’s founding covenant. The savagery of the assaults is perhaps matched only by the professional determination of the perpetrators to systematically murder their way through the towns, villages, and collective farms bordering Gaza. A particularly gruesome method seems to have been repeated in each community: teams of fast-moving terrorists arrive at dawn and kill en masse, taunting, torturing, and abusing their victims.

The original attack began early on Oct. 7, with an assault force of an estimated 1,500 members of either Hamas or Palestine Islamic Jihad attacking the kibbutzes of southwest Israel. Describing the bloodshed at kibbutz Kfar Azza, an Israeli major general related how “They burned the apartments, then they shoot the babies, they cut their heads.” More than 100 died in just this community alone, around a quarter of the kibbutz’ population. At the Supernova music festival near kibbutz Re’im, the carnage was even worse. Concertgoers were hunted down even as they fled the campgrounds; terrorist teams blocked the roads surrounding the site and laid in wait to murder all those who futilely fled in their direction.

Other terrorists used paragliders to fly across the border into Israel, with killing teams descending far beyond the frontier. The carnage was then shamelessly shared on social media by Hamas thereby allowing viewers from around the world to both witness the bloodshed in real-time and thus experience the horror felt by the victims.

In the carnage that ensued that day, Hamas had adopted some of the same heinous tactics and mass murder methods that the Nazis had used to slaughter Jews. From 1941 onward, some 3,000 members of the elite Waffen-SS Einsatzgruppen (“Special Action Groups”) swept through Eastern Europe, executing an estimated 1.5 million Jews. Although mass slaughter of civilians has been a fixture of warfare since biblical times, technological advances in weaponry, communications, and more precise intelligence facilitated a rapidity of lethality that was without precedent. Indeed, the Einsatzgruppen provided the first modern example of organized, nomadic, ethnic killing squads systematically eliminating their victims. These mobile extermination units were highly mechanized, lightly outfitted, and designed to operate independently from traditional supply lines. They were dispersed across considerable distances, traversing regions far from the frontlines: with the sole objective of identifying and eliminating all the Jews encountered on their path. This process always began with adult men, who were most likely to attempt resistance, thus leaving more vulnerable and therefore compliant groups consisting primarily of women and girls, who provided opportunities for sexual abuse before they were cast aside and cruelly executed.

From this procedure, a blueprint for mechanized ethnic cleansing emerged. It can be summarized as entailing five basic steps. First, small, specialized units of lightly equipped and highly autonomous fighters are dispatched into a given territory with the express objective of exterminating local populations of the targeted ethnicity. Upon arrival, these units work with indigenous sympathizers as necessary, to identify victims. These victims are then herded by selection teams, are separated by gender, and then have all property appropriated. Next, a location is prepared or adapted for mass execution, which is then carried out. Finally, the victims’ bodies are buried—usually in an effort to obfuscate the act of killing. The cycle then begins anew. Indeed, its success was predicated on the roving mass murders being kept secret—so that the hapless Jewish residents of these areas were unaware of the fate awaiting them. Hamas’ approach Oct. 7 was completely different in this key respect. Hamas wanted the world to see their depredations—in fact in real time—and demonstrably reveled in their slaughter. The murderous Einsatzgruppen killing teams, by comparison, took less evident pleasure in their grim task than their modern-day Palestinian counterparts did.

Seven decades later after World War II, these tactics dramatically resurfaced with the emergence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Embracing the same methods used by the Germans during World War II, ISIS was nearly unique among terrorist groups in its often gleeful brutality and interest in enslaving civilians generally, and religious minorities, deemed heretics, specifically. While exact numbers remain elusive, tens of thousands of Yezidis, Chaldeans, Kurds, Shi’a, and Christians, among others, were systematically targeted for execution or enslavement by rapid, mechanized units of highly mobile, lightly equipped ISIS terrorists.

Like the Einsatzgruppen, these units mostly operated autonomously and deliberately avoided combat with enemy forces so they could concentrate on their mission of mass murder. Just as the Einsatzgruppen relied on locals to identify their targets, ISIS used this knowledge to compile detailed logs of potential victims within hours of arrival. In Mosul, then a city of around 1.5 million, this was accomplished in 72 hours based on information gleaned from local informants. Having been identified and their places of residences raided, ISIS’s victims were then herded at gunpoint into large buildings like wedding halls or high schools, separated by gender, and deprived of food or water to break their resistance. Meanwhile, other ISIS fighters scouted suitable areas with existing gorges or trenches that could be expanded or prepared to bury the bodies. Victims were subsequently transported to the site, where summary mass execution, almost always with small arms fire, commenced. Unlike the Einsatzgruppen, these killings were not conducted with cold efficiency, but with a deep religious fervor—rendering the killing a sacramental, almost transcendent act. The ISIS fighters would then move on to the next town. As of 2018, more than 200 of such mass burial sites have been identified, though this number is likely to grow as investigation continues. Again, although mass murder of civilians by terrorists or other irregular forces is hardly unique in history, the speed and efficiency with which determined killers can accomplish their tasks in the 20th and 21st centuries is a distinctly modern phenomenon.

A lesson of the serial depredations of ISIS was that terrorist organizations with genocidal intentions understand that small, mobile, and independent groups of executioners can inflict unimaginable harm to communities simply using small arms. In addition, by maintaining both their mobility and operational independence, these teams could kill more people more efficiently. The Einsatzgruppen killing methodology has thus been resurrected as a blueprint for genocide in the modern age. No longer reliant on concentration camps, swiftly moving groups of autonomous fighters can instead themselves effectively carry out campaigns of mass murder. Indeed, Einsatzgruppen tactics have been adopted in Ukraine, where Russian forces committed a massacre in the town of Bucha, murdering up to 458 civilians, including children and hostages killed with their hands tied, both in plain view and in specially-designated execution chambers.

Hamas adopted Einsatzgruppen tactics when it struck Israel Oct. 7. This should not have been surprising, since their genocidal intentions were spelled out long ago in the 1988 Hamas covenant, Article 7 declaring that “The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.” The language is eerily similar to that issued by one of the German Nazis charged with cleansing Poland of Jews, Hans Frank. “The more that die the better; hitting them represents a victory for our Reich. The Jews should feel that we’ve arrived. […] We will crush these Jews wherever we can,” Frank proclaimed in 1939.

The Hamas attacks differed from these prior examples in four key respects. First, identification of the victims was not an issue, since any Israelis, or indeed other foreigners, the terrorists encountered were a target. Second, Hamas did not completely control the territory when the massacre took place. Accordingly, elements of previous genocides—including separation of men and women and preparation of burial grounds—were not possible. Time was not on the terrorists’ side and they therefore set about their work with a macabre alacrity. Hamas’ environment, however, was target-rich, allowing them to kill at will. Third, Hamas broadcast their brutal attacks on social media, clearly wishing to involve the world in their atrocities. At least one fighter even called his parents on WhatsApp to brag about his having killed ten Jews. “Look how many I killed with my own hands!” he exclaimed. “Your son killed Jews!” Fourth, Hamas’s strategic goal appears to be provocation—an attempt to goad Israel into an overwhelming military reaction that in turn would lead to mass casualties among Palestinians living in Gaza and thus lead to condemnation and vituperation of the killing that would consolidate Israel’s further isolation by the world.

Einsatzgruppen-style killings are mercifully relatively rare. The sheer barbarity and scale of the murder they inspire require a complete erosion of moral sensibilities, achieved only by those blinded totally by genocidal hate or divinely driven by religious fervor. But given Hamas’s spectacular tactical success and ability to evade Israeli intelligence, they may now become more common, a reality that carries grave counterterrorism implications for government and intelligence agencies charged with protecting their citizens. Israel, for instance, will likely forever change, militarizing its communities and seriously strengthening its borders against future such incursions.

The global community cannot ignore the savagery and professionalism of the mass murders that took place Oct. 7. Even within the complex geopolitical context that dictates relationships between Israelis and Palestinians, the world should stand united against the genocidal terrorism that was visited on Israel that day. A failure to call out violence and atrocities deliberately targeted at civilians—in contravention of any international laws of war or indeed moral and ethical standards—will have devastating consequences for future conflicts around the world. In addition, terrorism in recent years had been relegated by the United States and other Western countries to a less pressing priority. This had been implemented in 2018 by the new National Defense Strategy. Competition between great powers took precedence to the effect that threats from groups like Hamas, which did not directly affect the United States, were ignored. But just as ISIS nearly a decade changed the nature of contemporary terrorism, through its sheer barbarity and savagery, the Oct. 7 attacks provide fresh evidence of a changing terrorist calculus concerning the wanton targeting of civilians that threatens to gain validation by a moral equivalency that celebrates terrorism and mass murder as “resistance” and a necessary corrective to the West’s colonial legacy. Throughout history, terrorism has reflected the ethos and mores of the audience to whom the violence is meant to appeal. The attacks thus mark a dangerous watershed in the potential acceptance of terrorism and mass killing as legitimate political discourse.

A German-language version of this article appeared in Tachles.

Bruce Hoffman is senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at the Council of Foreign Relations and a professor at Georgetown University. He is the author of Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 1917–1947. Jacob Ware is a research fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and DeSales University. Together, they are the authors of the forthcoming God, Guns, and Sedition: Far-Right Terrorism in America. C. William Vardy is a graduate of Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and an independent terrorism researcher. He is, most recently, the author of Concrete Inferno: Terror and Torture under Brazil’s Military Regime, 1964-1985.

Lead image: Soviet POWs covering a mass grave after the Babi Yar massacre, October 1, 1941. (Johannes Hähle, Public Domain)

The Irregular Warfare Implications of the Israel-Hamas Conflict
In the immediate aftermath of Hamas’ devastating surprise assault on Israel this past weekend, it is tempting to focus exclusively on the horrific carnage and wanton destruction on both sides…

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irregularwarfare.org · by Bruce Hoffman, C. William Vardy, Jacob Ware · October 31, 2023

20. Japan’s Play for Today: Too Much? Just Right? Or Never Enough?

Conclusion:

Collectively, let me end with two basic conclusions. First, Japan’s efforts deserve much credit. As noted above, the government is pushing ahead on a broad array of initiatives meant to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces’ deterrent power across multiple domains. Importantly, this was done on Tokyo’s own initiative. If successful, it promises to result in much more lethal and technologically advanced Self-Defense Forces. At the same time, and my second point, as positive as this is, we need to temper our expectations. Japan is attempting to do a lot of very impressive things with new technologies and capabilities that it either does not field or, in some instances, do not yet exist. There are bound to be limits in manpower, resources, capacity, or capabilities that will ultimately place limits on what the end point of Japan’s buildup ultimately looks like.

Japan’s Play for Today: Too Much? Just Right? Or Never Enough? - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Jeffrey W. Hornung · October 31, 2023

The United States — and its allies — cannot continue in their security endeavors in the way they have heretofore. Business as usual will not lead to success. My RAND colleagues and I published these findings in Inflection Point, which warned that in today’s dynamic security environment, in which the capabilities of U.S. adversaries are changing and the nature of warfare is rapidly evolving, policymakers risk the nation’s security if they fail to understand and better prepare for future challenges.

One of the countries in our study — and an increasingly critical U.S. ally — was Japan. Like the United States, Japan needs to look critically at its defense strategy, capabilities, and posture or risk facing considerable threats in its future. The Japanese government is already in the midst of this critical reassessment. In December 2022, the Kishida Fumio administration released three landmark strategic documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Plan. Collectively, these represent change for Japan and its security policies. One of the most important aspects was the announcement that Tokyo would increase defense spending by nearly 60 percent over five years.

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Christopher Johnstone and I wrote for War on the Rocks in January that these changes are very significant, but clear prioritization for how these resources will be used will be critical for success. With Japan’s second year defense budget request published in August, analysts can analyze Japan’s efforts to ask whether it is on the right track. I believe that Japan is making important progress, but possible challenges are expected in key areas where more — or different — lines of effort are needed.

Defense Priorities

August’s budget request (thus far only published in Japanese) represents the second year of Japan’s defense efforts outlined in December. The expenditures in this year’s budget, which totaled 6.6 trillion yen (about $50 billion, an increase of 27.4 percent over the previous year), represented a solid start to addressing some key vulnerabilities and gaps in Japan’s defense structure. This included efforts that are continued in this year’s budget request, providing insight into Japan’s commitment to these efforts as well as a better understanding of where it is heading. Like this year’s current budget, the defense budget request for next year is compartmentalized into seven main lines of effort and includes some notable items that continue, or build on, the current defense budget.

Standoff defense capabilities: This includes the acquisition of advanced Type-12 missiles, Joint Strike Missiles for Japan’s F-35A, and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles; development of hypersonic missiles and hypervelocity projectiles; and the installation of Tomahawk launching capabilities aboard Maritime Self-Defense Force ships in preparation for the introduction of Tomahawk missiles.

Integrated air and missile defense capabilities: In addition to critical upgrades to the automatic warning and control network called Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment, this category includes continued upgrades to the different variants of the Self-Defense Force’s fixed position system radar arrays; the joint U.S.-Japanese development of a glide phase interceptor; and the construction of two Aegis system-equipped vessels, the solution to the 2020 cancellation of Japan’s Aegis Ashore system.

Unmanned defense capabilities: The budget includes specific line items for the acquisition and study/development of unmanned capabilities in all domains except ground platforms, which were in this year’s budget. This includes unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vessels, and unmanned underwater vessels. The intention, per the request, appears to be spread across several mission sets: intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, mine-clearing, combat support, targeting, and transportation.

Cross-domain operation capabilities: Notable efforts include the strengthening of space domain awareness; acquisition of a satellite constellation to improve detection and tracking of hypersonic glide vehicles; strengthening cyber defenses and protection of information systems; and the acquisition and/or development of improvements in the Self-Defense Force’s communications and radar jamming capabilities, electronic protection capabilities (i.e. upgrades to F-15s), and enhanced electronic warfare support capabilities (i.e. acquire one RC-2 aircraft). These efforts are accompanied by additions to traditional domains of ground, sea, and air, such as 19 Type 16 maneuver combat vehicles, 16 Type 19 155 mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers, three P-1 aircraft, 15 F-35A/B jets, and the construction of two new multi-mission stealth frigates and one new supply ship.

Command-and-control and intelligence-related functions: The main area, detailed in a separate part of the document, is the creation of a Permanent Joint Headquarters. Other notable efforts include capabilities to strengthen intelligence/analysis functions and respond to information warfare, as well as to expand the number of defense attaches overseas.

Mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection: The focus is heavily on lift, such as the creation of a Marine Transport Group, acquisition of three watercraft and 33 helicopters, and funding private-sector maritime transport capacity projects.

Sustainability and resiliency: This broad array of initiatives includes securing other types of munitions not included in the standoff missile category, like the AIM-120 air-to-air missile or ASM-3A air-to-ship missile; dedicating resources to equipment maintenance; putting command units underground to protect against electromagnetic pulse attacks; and reinforcing facilities and maintenance of munition depots.

Strengths and Challenges

Taken as a whole, Japan’s intentions for next year appear to be a good news story, building upon the efforts laid out in the current defense budget. First, Japan is investing in diverse capabilities across domains. Not only are there new platforms or upgrades to existing platforms in the Self-Defense Force’s traditional domains, but a concerted effort to bolster its capabilities in the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, continuing efforts that Japan has made over the past five years. Collectively, to the extent that it can adequately train in areas that are often constrained out of concerns with obtaining local consent, the Self-Defense Forces continue to become a more lethal force capable of fighting in what is likely to be a contested air and maritime conflict as well as in new domains.

Second, Japan’s push into standoff capabilities complicates things for an adversary wishing to strike Japan. The government’s weighing of the merits of developing such a capability goes back decades in Diet interpellations, but its concrete moves toward acquiring the actual capability are new and openly welcomed by the United States. And while total planned stockpiles are understandably not in the public domain, the focus on increasing both the types and the amounts of munitions — particularly as a first line of effort — signals the Japanese government’s seriousness about missiles.

Third, Japan’s focus on command-and-control improvements, as well as efforts to improve sustainability and resiliency, are areas that have long suffered from neglect. Some of the areas Japan is looking to invest in will make it more difficult for an adversary to take the Self-Defense Forces out of a fight early in a campaign. Similarly, the establishment of a Permanent Joint Headquarters holds the promise of streamlining operational command to the extent that component stovepipes can be mitigated. If done, it could thereby contribute to better jointness among Japan’s three defense services as well as better interoperability with the United States as that headquarters learns to work closely with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Finally, Japan’s interest in unmanned assets has the potential to expand problem sets for an adversary that, depending on the final scale of Japan’s unmanned arsenal, could force an adversary to stretch its critical platforms and munitions in its prosecution of Self-Defense Forces targets.

In all these areas, Japan deserves a tremendous amount of credit for the focus on moving forward on areas that have long suffered in stagnation.

At the same time, now that we can see the details for the second year of funding, there are areas that could prove to be insufficiently funded for Japan’s defense needs if not addressed in future defense budgets. Despite the overall jump in defense spending and increased focus on production and acquisition, the budget allocations for standoff defense capabilities, unmanned capabilities, and initiatives in space and cyber actually decrease in the new budget request. While it is unfair to judge the entirety of Japan’s defense efforts based on the first two years of proposed spending, these cuts are curious based on stated intentions.

Second, despite the focus on integrated air and missile defense and sustainability and resiliency, there appears to be no mention of increasing the number of hardened fighter shelters nor any mention of provisioning fuel bladders or expeditionary shelters. Ensuring that the Self-Defense Forces can stay in the fight past the first volley will require absorbing the first hit and being able to flexibly disperse to secure shelters or austere locations with prepositioned fuel and supplies.

Similarly, while lift capabilities are getting attention in the budget request, there is no focus on heavy lift capabilities in either the air or sea domains (last year included two landing craft utility ships and two C-2 transport aircraft). Instead, the budget request is for small lift platforms and a reliance on civilian ships. In a conflict where all Self-Defense Forces lift assets will experience attrition and civilian ships will not sail to active combat zones, the need to steadily resupply forces on outlying islands with large-scale munitions and materiel, troops, and oversized equipment, as well as help evacuate citizens from islands close to the conflict, will place a heavy strain on the Self-Defense Forces’ current fixed-wing airlift (C-130 and C-2) and three sealift assets (i.e., the Ōsumi class).

Finally, with standoff defense capabilities, which have garnered a lot of popular attention, the focus on increasing its stockpiles with diverse systems is a positive development. But when adversaries have fairly robust missile defense systems and hundreds of bases in which to disperse, Japan’s missile endeavors meant to deter adversaries will either require an extremely large number of missiles or a larger stockpile of missiles that can fly faster and stealthier than envisaged under its current plans.

There are also some items in the Ministry of Defense’s budget request that are questionable from the standpoint of bandwidth and resources. Start with standoff missile capabilities. Although the budget request never explicitly says that Japan wants an independent kill chain, like the current budget, the document includes graphics of a satellite constellation being used for detecting and targeting purposes. This suggests that Japan may be seeking to acquire an independent kill chain. If true, this promises to drain a lot of resources that could otherwise be dedicated to stockpiling and upgrading munition depots. Another item, tucked deep in the document, is an effort to establish a new research facility akin to America’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or Defense Innovation Unit to strengthen Japan’s ability to create defense innovations and groundbreaking equipment. While the intention is understandable, at a time when the establishment of a Permanent Joint Headquarters is likely to absorb a lot of attention and resources — not to mention finite manpower — moving to establish a new organization to research cutting-edge technology may strain Japan’s efforts elsewhere. This is particularly the case when considering that Japan’s defense industries may not have the capacity to meet what is demanded of them.

Finally, the decision to procure two Aegis system-equipped vessels may make political sense, but operationally may not be the best use of finite resources. Two ships are likely not enough to provide the additional ballistic missile defense coverage that Japan sought after canceling the Aegis Ashore option. This is because typical naval operational practices see one ship in deployment while a second one is in maintenance and a third one is exercising or getting ready to relieve the first. Similarly, bad weather on the high seas may limit the effectiveness of the ships. Manpower shortages in the Maritime Self-Defense Force may also impact any single ship’s readiness.

One final observation about the budget request has to do with several items that appear overly ambitious. Consider first the focus on unmanned assets. While Japan’s move into unmanned assets is a positive development, it is arguably a rapid one, considering that the legal infrastructure for unmanned aerial vehicles was not put into place until 2015. Still, if runway-independent platforms can make use of Japan’s 6,000-plus islands, the rate at which the Ministry of Defense is looking to build its unmanned fleet may be unrealistic. Currently, Japan operates three Global Hawks for overland intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Acquiring these took years. The budget request contains 47 unmanned aerial vehicles while the unmanned underwater vessels and unmanned surface vessels are being studied. This suggests that Japan is looking to drastically increase the number of unmanned platforms to operate in all domains. Regardless of whether these platforms are intended to deliver weapons, in addition to the time it will take to develop/procure/deploy them, creating the concepts and doctrines necessary to integrate these assets into the existing force is likely to take years. Based on how long it took to introduce the three Global Hawks (roughly eight years), it is unclear how quickly the Self-Defense Forces can move forward with absorbing the scale set out in the budget.

A similar situation is at work in the space and cyber plans. While acquiring space domain awareness capabilities may be realistically possible in the near term, deploying an entire satellite constellation for the purpose of hypersonic glide vehicle detection and tracking seems to be dramatic jump from where Japan is today. After all, despite announcing the authorization to develop the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System in 2002, it was not fully operational until 2018. Likewise, given ongoing media reports about information security concerns and breaches, establishing things like a cloud computing system to integrate and standardize the systems of the Self-Defense Forces to enable unified cyber security measures may be more challenging than recognized. Finally, the budget request includes utilizing artificial intelligence for various measures, including responses to information warfare, information collection and analysis functions, and even for use for unmanned aircraft working with manned aircraft in combat support roles. While the use of artificial intelligence is steadily increasing, it is unlikely that Japan will be able to integrate it into its defense network on such an extensive scale within a few years.

Defense Industrial Base Concerns

Layered on top of this, and underexamined, is the overarching question of whether Japan’s defense industries have the capacity to do all this. The sharp decline of market participants in Japan over the past two decades, the high cost of business, and limited options for exporting abroad have collectively challenged the industry’s growth. While Japan is a robust Foreign Military Sales purchaser, I would assume the government expects Japanese companies are going to be major players in implementing the defense budget to prevent further hollowing-out. But, as a Foreign Policy article has argued, defense-related sales in Japan account for only 4 percent of the total sales of major Japanese manufacturers and, in 2020, defense-related procurement from domestic manufacturers made up less than 1 percent of Japan’s total industrial production value. When we compare these facts with the vast scale of what the Ministry of Defense wants, it is hard to not ask whether the existing industrial base is up to the task. After all, not only does Japan lack a national prime contractor, Japan’s major private defense providers, such as Mitsubishi or Kawasaki, appear reluctant to change their business models to devote more of their existing capacity to defense production.

And what about the capability? Arguably there are several items in the budget that Japan’s defense industry has never demonstrated an ability to do before, such as setting up an innovation organization or integrating artificial intelligence into defense programs to be used for defense operations. Just recently Japan gave up on developing an indigenously built next-generation fighter in favor of an international partnership. When looking at the more high-tech items in the budget request, is there a risk that the Ministry of Defense could be devoting money to things industry cannot accomplish?

Given questions about both capacity and capability, Japan’s government may be confronted with a choice: rely on domestic industry, which has limited capacity and may struggle to develop the high-tech capabilities that are sought; or rely on Foreign Military Sales and other foreign purchases or partnerships to obtain the high-end capabilities but, due to the yen’s declining value, drive up costs and likely dilute the end results of Japan’s desired defense buildup.

Conclusion

Collectively, let me end with two basic conclusions. First, Japan’s efforts deserve much credit. As noted above, the government is pushing ahead on a broad array of initiatives meant to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces’ deterrent power across multiple domains. Importantly, this was done on Tokyo’s own initiative. If successful, it promises to result in much more lethal and technologically advanced Self-Defense Forces. At the same time, and my second point, as positive as this is, we need to temper our expectations. Japan is attempting to do a lot of very impressive things with new technologies and capabilities that it either does not field or, in some instances, do not yet exist. There are bound to be limits in manpower, resources, capacity, or capabilities that will ultimately place limits on what the end point of Japan’s buildup ultimately looks like.

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Jeffrey Hornung is a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor in the Asian Studies program at Georgetown University.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Jeffrey W. Hornung · October 31, 2023

21. US consumers keep spending despite high prices and their own gloomy outlook. Can it last?

There are some real paradoxes: Many lament our "poor" economy, yet there is this type of data. Most think the economy is in decline yet an unscientific survey on 28 OCT by Smerconish gave these results:

October 28, 2023

Are you better off now than you were four years ago? (Percentage of 48,184 votes)

69.48% -

Yes

30.52% -

https://www.smerconish.com/daily-poll/past-poll-results/

US consumers keep spending despite high prices and their own gloomy outlook. Can it last?

BY CHRISTOPHER RUGABER AND ANNE D’INNOCENZIO

Updated 5:41 PM EDT, October 30, 2023

AP · by CHRISTOPHER RUGABER · October 30, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — A flow of recent data from the U.S. government has made one thing strikingly clear: A surge in consumer spending is fueling strong growth, demonstrating a resilience that has confounded economists, Federal Reserve officials and even the sour sentiments that Americans themselves have expressed in opinion polls.

Spending by consumers rose by a brisk 0.4% in September the government said Friday — even after adjusting for inflation and even as Americans face ever-higher borrowing costs.

Economists caution that such vigorous spending isn’t likely to continue in the coming months. Many households have been pulling money from a shrinking pool of savings. Others have been turning increasingly to credit cards. And the additional savings that tens of millions of households amassed during the pandemic — from stimulus aid and reduced opportunities to travel, dine out and visit entertainment venues — are nearly depleted, economists say.

Still, the truth is no one knows where things go from here, given the unusual nature of the post-pandemic economy. The “death of the consumer” and an ensuing recession have been forecast by most economists for at least a year. So far, not only is no recession in sight but consumers as a whole appear to be in robust health. Spending might cool in the coming months, yet it’s far from clear it will collapse.

On Thursday, the government said the economy accelerated at a 4.9% annual rate in the July-September quarter, the fastest such rate since 2021, on the back of a jump in Americans’ spending. People spent on used cars and restaurant meals, airfares and hotel rooms. Much of it, even after adjusting for higher prices, was for discretionary items that suggested that many people feel confident in their finances and job security.

The durability of that spending has caught the attention of Fed officials, who have signaled that they will keep their key interest rate unchanged when they meet this week. But they’ve also made clear that they are monitoring the economic data for any sign that inflation could reignite and require further rate hikes.

“I have been consistently surprised at the resilience of consumer spending,” Christopher Waller, an influential member of the Fed’s board, said in a speech this month.

In the meantime, businesses, especially those in the sprawling service sector, are benefiting from what still appears to be pent-up demand, likely driven by higher-income earners, after the restrictions of the pandemic. Last week, Royal Caribbean Group reported robust quarterly earnings. Travelers crowded their cruise ships and spent more even as the company raised prices.

“The acceleration of consumer spending on experiences (has) propelled us towards another outstanding quarter,” said CEO Jason Liberty. “Looking ahead, we see accelerating demand.”

So what’s behind the outsize gains, so far? Economists point to several drivers: Sturdy hiring and low unemployment, along with healthy finances for most households emerging from the pandemic. Wealthier households, in particular, have enjoyed substantial growth in home values and stock portfolios, which are likely juicing their spending.

Steady hiring has sent the unemployment rate down to a near-five-decade low of 3.8% and lifted to a record high the proportion of women in their prime working years — ages 25 through 54 — who are employed. Measures of layoffs are near historical lows. More jobs mean more income, which generally means more spending.

“We continue to believe that you shouldn’t bet against the consumer until actual job losses are on the horizon,” said Tim Duy, chief U.S. economist at SGH Macro Advisers.

In the July-September quarter, Americans ramped up spending on durable goods — furniture, appliances, jewelry and luggage — that people typically cut back on if they’re worried about their jobs or the economy.

With inflation slowing — it’s at a still-high 3.7%, down from a peak of 9.1% in June 2022 — average wages are starting to outpace price gains. By some measures, wage growth hasn’t yet fully offset the inflation surge that began in 2021. But since late last year, pay has risen faster than prices, likely fueling some spending.

In many lower-paying industries, like hotels, restaurants and warehouses, companies have struggled to find and keep workers and have raised pay accordingly. Julia Pollak, chief economist at ZipRecruiter, calculates that for the lowest-paid 10% of workers, wages have jumped 25% since the first quarter of 2020, when the pandemic began. That’s well ahead of the 18% increase in prices over that time.

And most households started 2023 in better shape than they were in before the pandemic erupted, according to a report from the Fed. The net worth of the median household — the midpoint between the richest and poorest — jumped 37% from 2019 through 2022 as home prices shot higher and the stock market rose. That was the biggest surge on records dating back more than 30 years.

Most of the savings that Americans have accumulated in the past three years have flowed to the wealthiest households, who have splurged on travel and other experiences. Typically, economists say, the wealthiest one-fifth of Americans account for about two-fifths of all spending.

The net worth of the richest one-tenth of households leaped by $28 trillion — or about one-third — from the first quarter of 2020 to the second quarter of 2023, according to the Fed. The poorer one-half of Americans gained a bigger percentage increase but in total dollars much less, from about $2 trillion to $3.6 trillion. (Those figures aren’t adjusted for inflation.)

“When wealth is growing by the amount that it has been the past three years ... I do think that it’s playing a larger role in this spending strength than maybe we thought it would,” said Sarah Wolfe, U.S. economist at Morgan Stanley.

Small-business owners like Bret Csencsitz, managing partner of Gotham Restaurant in New York City, can attest to that. High-dollar spending by middle-age customers has helped replace many of his older patrons who moved out of the city during COVID. These customers, who typically work in technology and finance, are buying $150 to $200 bottles of wine and spending a little over $200 on steak for two.

The average per-person check is up over 20% to roughly $145 compared with the pre-pandemic days, he added, and he has had groups of up to 60 people holding dinners at his restaurant.

“People are back,” he said. “There’s more energy.”

Aditya Bhave, senior economist at Bank of America, noted that the spending isn’t all driven by the affluent. Spending on the bank’s credit and debit cards by households with incomes below $50,000 has risen faster than spending by higher-earning clients.

Some Americans, while keeping a close watch on their finances, still feel they have room to indulge themselves. Consider Valerie Zaffina, a 74-year-old retired teacher who was picking up a piece of jewelry last week at a Kohl’s store in Ramsey, New Jersey. She said she and her husband live on fixed incomes and are cautious spenders.

But Zaffina has nevertheless decided on one big splurge — about $5,000 to decorate her rental apartment, including a $2,500 couch and a $600 rug. It’s her first major decorating project in 18 years.

“I had kind of a frustrating year, and I wanted to do something for myself,” she said. “So, yeah, I’m redecorating. I’m in the throes of that, but I’m sticking to a budget.”

Many analysts still warn of a new crop of headwinds facing consumers and the economy. Nearly 30 million student loan borrowers had to start paying their loans this month, for example. And government dysfunction in Washington could lead to a government shutdown next month.

A report Friday showed that while inflation-adjusted income fell last month along with the savings rate, consumers still ramped up their spending. That trend, economists say, is unsustainable.

Even so, those challenges may not prove as damaging as feared. Student loan payments, for example, jumped even before an Oct. 1 deadline for resuming them, Bhave noted. And few borrowers appear to have taken advantage of a 12-month grace period the Biden administration put in place, suggesting that most borrowers can afford to resume paying the money back — at least for now.

And executives at Visa, which reported strong earnings and a surge of spending by their U.S. credit card customers overseas in the third quarter, have also downplayed the likely impact of student loan repayments.

The company isn’t “factoring in any impacts” from loan repayments “because we’ve yet to see any meaningful impact,” said Visa’s chief financial officer, Christopher Suh. “Consumer spending across all segments from high to low has remained stable since March.”

“There’s a lot of gloom and doom,” around the consumer, Bhave said. “And yet the data keep surprising to the upside.”

___

D’Innocenzio reported from New York.

CHRISTOPHER RUGABER

Chris Rugaber covers the economy and the Federal Reserve

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ANNE D’INNOCENZIO

Retail writer_ trends, consumer economy & hourly workers

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AP · by CHRISTOPHER RUGABER · October 30, 2023

22. Reflections on the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu | SOF News

Excerpts:

Can we continue to learn from small wars that provide strategically painful lessons from long ago? With the U.S. military now primarily focused on large scale combat operations in Europe and the Pacific, do small wars like Somalia still matter?

We think so. If the global competition during the first Cold War should be judged by the number of proxy wars it promulgated, then we need to pay attention now – not after we are deeply embedded in another armed intervention. Thinking through the externalities of a coming second Cold War as China, Russia, and the United States compete for their interests will help us campaign in competition and avoid conflicts like UNOSOM II in the future.

Reflections on the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu | SOF News

sof.news · by Guest · October 31, 2023

By Michael A. Marra and Brett D. Weigle.

October 3, 2023, marked the somber 30th anniversary of the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia – another tragic event in another “small war” waged far away from United States soil in a nation few American citizens could find on a map. On that fateful day, U.S. forces serving as part of the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) incurred 17 killed and 85 wounded in action in addition to an estimated 1,500 Somali casualties. [1] What was meant to be a routine special operations raid to capture several warlord leaders resulted in a bloody all-day firefight that coined the phrase “Blackhawk down” for future difficult interventions. Ironically, this battle was the culmination of a years-long United Nations effort to rectify a complex catastrophe of environmental, political, and social upheaval in Somalia.

Beginning in early 1992, the first UN effort, UNOSOM I, was unable to suppress the warlords to deliver humanitarian aid. In April 1992, the UN Security Council created the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led by the United States with the authority to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” [2] UNITAF accomplished this mission by early 1993 and was replaced by UNOSOM II in May with a new mandate. The establishing UN Security Council resolution included language about the importance of “a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions.” [3] This additional mandate departed from the initial UNITAF task of feeding a starving population by providing security for food distribution; instead, this expanded mission led to the raids by special operations forces that culminated in the Battle of Mogadishu. The United Nations and the United States unwillingly were drawn into conflict. How can such good intentions go so horribly wrong?

Can we continue to learn from small wars that provide strategically painful lessons from long ago? With the U.S. military now primarily focused on large scale combat operations in Europe and the Pacific, do small wars like Somalia still matter?

We think so. If the global competition during the first Cold War should be judged by the number of proxy wars it promulgated, then we need to pay attention now – not after we are deeply embedded in another armed intervention. Thinking through the externalities of a coming second Cold War as China, Russia, and the United States compete for their interests will help us campaign in competition and avoid conflicts like UNOSOM II in the future.

Chinese and Russian influence have spread across the Maghreb, the Sahel, and other regions of Africa; for example, China builds infrastructure projects under its Belt and Road Initiative while the Wagner Group’s military involvement destabilizes Libya, Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan. [4] Seeing this, we understand the struggle for power and influence is an ongoing effort with no “end state,” only a “next state.” As coups and civil wars erupt along these fault lines in Africa, we will be tempted to intervene to preserve our investments and influence via diplomatic, development, and defense efforts. With U.S. military and civilian personnel currently stationed in several African fragile states, American policymakers and planners have a responsibility to continually assess our level of involvement and subsequent risk to U.S. personnel and national prestige.

The full history and internal political machinations of Somalia are well-documented elsewhere, and not the focus of this offering. [5] Rather, our argument concerns the strategic and operational aspects of the decisions to intervene and enforce a peace that was fiercely resisted by the very people the United States was trying to assist. We offer several reflections on lessons civilian and military leaders can learn from this small war for future interventions, since the application of military power to achieve national policies is a matter of supreme political judgement. Far different from other endeavors, failure in war has repercussions that reverberate through decades.

Somalia, like numerous hot spots around the world, is burdened by instability, environmental stress, and deep social fissures leading to violence for many decades. From the infamous Battle of Mogadishu thirty years ago to the present day, Somalia has ranked first or second since 2008 on the Fragile States Index published by the Fund for Peace. [6] In 2023 alone, the U.S. military flew at least 14 airstrikes in Somalia and one special operations mission that killed Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) leader Bilal al-Sudani, according to Jeff Schogol writing in Task and Purpose. [7] Despite billions of dollars of assistance invested for decades in Somalia, there is a frustrating paucity of progress. The United States alone provided $818 million in humanitarian and military aid in FY2020 and $792 million to date in 2023, according to the Department of State. [8]

These eight lessons from Somalia are as relevant now as they were three decades ago.

Strategy is more difficult than policy or tactics. This intervention in 1993 required an overall strategy, not just a contingency plan. The value of the U.S. national security interest was never clearly defined; was this something we were going to pay for, fight for, kill for, or die for? It clearly ranked as a peripheral national interest but at times the United States acted as though Somalia’s situation were a vital interest. [9] A lack of deep and broad thinking on the “next state” of Somalia after the initial intervention created a “mission creep” due to lack of vision regarding where the operation was going after initial successes in stopping the worst of the famine. While the crisis did need immediate attention to save lives, U.S. policymakers and planners must think through their strategy to ensure all elements of national power are engaged when mapping how we want to help a nation reach its desired future state. After the United States forces departed in 1994, Somalia has struggled to defeat various insurgent groups that threaten the functioning of a Somali central government. [10].

It is more difficult to make peace than it is to make war. Peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and peacekeeping between factions in the same nation is complex, costly, and often contested. Somalia is still in desperate need of a lasting peace so that the rebuilding of society can begin in earnest. There is still a level of unacceptable violence in Somalia that belies the efforts of peacemakers. As the United States engages in African places of unrest, we must admit we will eventually favor one side over another, creating the appearance of partisanship. In areas of fractured societies where multiple groups are contesting for power, the danger of siding with one may mean unifying the remainder against the intervening force – as we saw on the streets of Mogadishu in 1993.

“Resistance = Means × Will” is an enduring axiom. While irregular Somali warlord forces had little training, inadequate equipment, and no real communications gear, their will compensated for their lack of means by multiplying their power of resistance. They were a worthy adversary who inflicted deep costs on U.S. military forces on 3 October 1993. While “will” is extremely hard to measure from afar, it is easy to recognize, and these highly motivated Somali warlords and foot soldiers were a dangerous adversary.

The enemy, regardless of size, gets a vote. Despite our highly motivated soldiers and aviators, exquisite plans, and special operations capabilities, the Somalis fought back hard. Irregular forces stymied our best efforts that day, and on other occasions before UNISOM II departed Somalia in 1994. The enemy always gets a vote, and when they are fighting at home, they have many advantages.

Friction during intervention is unavoidable. Going into complex catastrophes like Somalia requires adaptation because the myriad problems cannot all be anticipated. However, the United States must understand the strong African antipathy to unilateral Western interventions and must seek coalition partners with regional familiarity. Operating in a strong coalition, preferably with the full backing of the United Nations or African Union, is the right approach in Africa. As a corollary, coalition timelines must be more realistic – and that inevitably means longer. The United States must be careful to avoid unnecessary friction by the imposition of rigid timelines on a fluid environment. Speaking in terms of “years” instead of “months” is a smart way to telegraph U.S. commitment and ease friction.

Strategic history punishes good intentions. The turbulent and bloody history of Somalia was well known in 1993, yet the successful 1991 Persian Gulf War may have given false confidence to U.S. Central Command planners that UNITAF would also accomplish its mission according to plan. Having the best intentions for the entire Somali population was simply not enough to overcome the factions who did not appreciate the presence of foreign troops in their cities and villages.

Tragedy happens even in small wars. As the intervention bloomed into a shooting war, the number of civilian and military casualties soared. Firefights between UNISOM II soldiers and Somali fighters—or indiscriminate fires by warlords and rebels—inevitably caught civilians in crossfire. While American combatants survived most wounds during the Battle of Mogadishu, civilian casualties were not that fortunate. In recognition that this tragedy will most certainly recur, in 2022 the Department of Defense implemented its Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan. [11]

War is always a gamble – even a “small war.” We witnessed in Somalia a minor military operation that captured the headlines of every major newspaper and lead every television news program in the world. Suddenly, the risk of a small raid in a small war looked like a failed gamble by the United States in an intervention that seemed difficult to exit. A tactical operation was magnified into strategic consequences by flashing images and first-person descriptions delivered within hours of the event. Wars, even small ones, do not always go the way they are planned, and almost never adhere to sequential and compact timelines on PowerPoint slide shows.

In today’s increasingly fraught global security environment [12], we must acknowledge the hard lessons learned from past small wars like Somalia—lessons whose tuition was paid with blood and treasure. The nature of small wars will not change their root causes, and motivations of external actors to intervene will remain noble. However, the character of a U.S. response need not copy our experience in Somalia in 1992–1994.

*********

Illustration credit: “On the Alert,” Jeffrey Manuszak, 1994, reference [1], p. 17.

[1] Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, December 2002), 19,

https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-81-1/cmhPub_70-81-1.pdf

[2] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), April 24, 1992, para. 3, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/794.

[3] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 814 (1993), March 26, 1993, para. 7, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/814.

[4] Alex Vines and Jon Wallace, “China-Africa relations,” Explainer, Chatham House, January 18, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/01/china-africa-relations; Joseph Siegle, “Inflection Point for Africa-Russia Relations after Prigozhin’s Death,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 6, 2023, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/‌inflection-point-for-africa-russia-relations-after-prigozhins-death/.

[5] For example, see “Somalia profile – Timeline,” BBC News, January 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632.

[6] Fund for Peace, “Fragile States Index,” accessed September 9, 2023, https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/.

[7] Jeff Schogol, “US airstrike in Somalia kills 13 al-Shabab fighters,” Africa News, Task and Purpose, August 28, 2023, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-airstrike-somalia-13-fighters-killed/; Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “US airstrikes in Somalia,” Long War Journal, accessed September 9, 2023, https://www.longwarjournal.org/us-airstrikes-in-the-long-war; Lloyd J. Austin III, “Statement on Somalia Operation,” press release, Department of Defense, January 26, 2023, https://www.defense.‌gov/‌‌‌‌‌News/Releases/Release/Article/3279923/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-somalia-operation/.

[8] Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Somalia (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 27, 2023), 2, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155

[9] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategy, Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 25, 2018), p. vii, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf

[10] For example, see Adam Abdelmoula, “Somalia is on the path of recovery, but real challenges remain,” Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, United Nations Somalia, December 21, 2021, accessed October 28, 2023, https://somalia.un.org/en/166388-somalia-path-recovery-real-challenges-remain; Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping,” International Security 31(3) (2007): 74–106, doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.74

[11] Lloyd J. Austin III, “Department of Defense Releases Memorandum on Improving Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response,” press release, Department of Defense, January 27, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2914764/department-of-defense-releases-memorandum-on-improving-civilian-harm-mitigation/

[12] National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, March 2021), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home.

*********

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

About the Authors

Professor Michael A. Marra, Colonel (retired), U.S. Air Force, is a veteran of conflicts in Central America, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Liberia, and served in major operations including Desert Shield/Storm/Calm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom as a commander, staff officer and aviator. He is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Army War College in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations.

Dr. Brett D. Weigle is a retired U.S. Army logistics Colonel. He worked in joint, multinational, and Army command and staff positions in the United States, Bahrain, Germany, Turkey (NATO), Spain (NATO), North Macedonia (NATO), and twice in Korea. He is a veteran of Operations RESTORE HOPE (UNITAF) in Somalia (1992–1993) and JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia (1995–1996). He is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Army War College in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations.

sof.news · by Guest · October 31, 2023

23. White House AI exec order raises questions on future of DoD innovation

Excerpts:

Kitchen said that although there seems to be an “intended alignment” between today’s EO and DoD’s own AI policies, like the Responsible AI Strategy and Implementation Pathway, there will be “some inevitable disjunctions that will have to get worked out.”

“My read is [that] the administration understands that and is trying … not to put undue burden on the industry, while at the same time trying to meaningfully address the very real concerns,” he said. “Industry and government are definitely going to disagree about where those lines should be drawn, but I do interpret the executive order as a general good faith effort to begin that conversation.”

White House AI exec order raises questions on future of DoD innovation - Breaking Defense

"What's really going to matter is how these various departments and agencies actually start building the rules and interpreting the guidance that they received in the executive order," Klon Kitchen of Beacon Global Strategies told Breaking Defense.

breakingdefense.com · by Jaspreet Gill · October 30, 2023

Artificial intelligence concept. Brain over a circuit board. HUD future technology digital background (Getty images)

WASHINGTON — A new artificial intelligence executive order signed by President Joe Biden today is being hailed by the administration as one of the “most significant actions ever taken by any government to advance the field of AI safety” in order to “ensure that America leads the way” in managing risks posed by the technology.

But new regulations on how the commercial world develops AI could have an impact on how the Defense Department and industry collaborate moving forward, with a lot of unknown effects that will need to be worked out.

“I think the biggest implication for DoD is how this will impact acquisition because…anybody who’s developing AI models and wanting to do business with the DoD is going to have to adhere to these new standards,” Klon Kitchen, the head of the global technology policy practice at Beacon Global Strategies, told Breaking Defense today.

“The executive order has some pretty extensive requirements for anyone who’s developing or deploying dual-use models,” he added. “So all the major contractors and integrators and that kind of thing are going to have pretty significant reporting requirements associated with their frontier models.”

Though the text of the “Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence” executive order has not yet been made publicly available, a fact sheet from the White House lays out its key tenets. Notably, the executive order directs “that developers of the most powerful AI systems share their safety test results and other critical information with the U.S. government” and that federal agencies will also be issued guidance for their use of AI.

Kitchen said that although there seems to be an “intended alignment” between today’s EO and DoD’s own AI policies, like the Responsible AI Strategy and Implementation Pathway, there will be “some inevitable disjunctions that will have to get worked out.”

“My read is [that] the administration understands that and is trying … not to put undue burden on the industry, while at the same time trying to meaningfully address the very real concerns,” he said. “Industry and government are definitely going to disagree about where those lines should be drawn, but I do interpret the executive order as a general good faith effort to begin that conversation.”

According to the fact sheet, the National Institute of Standards and Technologies will develop standards for making sure AI is secure, and federal agencies like the Departments of Homeland Security and Energy will address the impact of AI threats to critical infrastructure. In a statement, Eric Fanning, the head of the Aerospace Industries Association trade group, said his organization is “closely assessing” the document.

The fact sheet also says the National Security Council and White House chief of staff will develop a national security memorandum that lays out further actions related to AI and the White House will “establish an advanced cybersecurity program to develop AI tools to find and fix vulnerabilities in critical software, building on the Biden-Harris Administration’s ongoing AI Cyber Challenge.”

In a statement, Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and co-chair of the Senate Cybersecurity Caucus, said “many” of the sections in the executive order “just scratch the surface.”

“Other areas overlap pending bipartisan legislation, such as the provision related to national security use of AI, which duplicates some of the work in the past two Intel Authorization Acts related to AI governance,” Warner. “While this is a good step forward, we need additional legislative measures, and I will continue to work diligently to ensure that we prioritize security, combat bias and harmful misuse, and responsibly roll out technologies.”

In a statement, Paul Scharre, executive vice president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security, said the requirement for companies to notify the government when training AI models and NIST’s red-teaming standards requirements are two of many “significant” steps being taken to advance AI safety.

“Together, these steps will ensure that the most powerful AI systems are rigorously tested to ensure they are safe before public deployment,” he said. “As AI labs continue to train ever-more-powerful AI systems, these are vital steps to ensure that AI development proceeds safely.”

According to Kitchen, “what’s really going to matter is how these various departments and agencies actually start building the rules and interpreting the guidance that they received in the executive order.”

“So I think the EO will provoke a lot of questions from industry, but it will be the individual agencies and departments who actually start to answer those questions,” he said.

24. ODNI, Pentagon reveal FY23 intelligence budget at nearly $100 billion

Ah... Two number $71.7 billion and $26.6 billion

ODNI, Pentagon reveal FY23 intelligence budget at nearly $100 billion - Breaking Defense

The National Intelligence Program was budgeted for $71.7 billion while the Military Intelligence Program was funded at some $26.6 billion in fiscal 2023.

breakingdefense.com · by Lee Ferran · October 30, 2023

U.S. Navy Seaman Justice Bryan stands watch aboard the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) in the Persian Gulf Aug. 28, 2014. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Brian Stephens/Released)

WASHINGTON — The US budgeted just shy of $100 billion for intelligence-gathering in fiscal 2023, a nearly $10 billion jump over FY22, according to newly released figures from the Director of National Intelligence and the Pentagon.

In separate announcements today, the ODNI revealed Congress had provided $71.7 billion for the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and the Defense Department said $27.9 billion had been appropriated for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), totaling $99.6 billion. For FY22, the combined total was $89.8 billion.

The FY23 NIP was over $3 billion more than the ODNI had requested, and the MIP came in $1 billion more than the DoD ask. For FY24, ODNI wants $72.4 billion for the NIP, and DoD wants $29.3 billion for the MIP.

According to past figures released by ODNI, intelligence budget requests and appropriations have been on fairly steady rise since a dip from 2012 to 2015, which ODNI has blamed partly on sequestration.

The requested and appropriated National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program budgets since 2007, based on ODNI figures. (Breaking Defense)

Beyond that, details for both programs are scarce as the intelligence chief is not obligated to make any figures beyond the topline public and, according to a 2022 congressional report [PDF], no statute requires the disclosure of the MIP at all, though it’s routinely been done since 2010.

The NIP, overseen by the ODNI, is dedicated to gathering strategic intelligence for policymakers and covers the CIA, NSA and other broad-strokes intelligence-gathering organizations, including military organizations like the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, according to a January congressional report [PDF]. The NIP also funds some of the most closely held operations, Sensitive Compartmented Information programs, “throughout the intelligence community.”

The MIP, by contrast, is overseen by the Pentagon and “funds defense intelligence activities intended to support operational and tactical level intelligence priorities supporting defense operations.” (The IC’s 18 members include nine DoD “components,” including intelligence arms of each service, and nine non-DoD components, like the CIA, DEA, FBI and the intelligence unit of the Treasury.)

But the congressional report notes that the NIP and MIP do not make up the total of US spending on intelligence, and don’t account for some “intelligence-gathering entities that support a department-specific mission [and] use department funds” in the sprawling national security community. Nor does the MIP cover certain platforms involved in intelligence, like some drone programs, if intelligence-gathering is not the system’s primary activity.

breakingdefense.com · by Lee Ferran · October 30, 2023

25. US isn’t ready for a war of great powers

Excerpts:

Deterrence in Europe and Asia requires permanent stationing — not the rotational presence that has been a stop-gap measure to avoid hard choices. If NATO is to survive as a viable alliance, deterrence and collective territorial defense in Europe must be the new focus.

Additionally, in Asia, bilateral security guarantees and regional efforts to stabilize the area need to be buttressed by U.S. and allied deployment. As we enter a period of protracted systemic instability, preserving these two regional balances from imploding into an all-out great power war will be the difference between peace and wider conflict, which could morph into a global conflagration.

For that, America needs to revisit how it builds up its armed forces and weapons. A case in point: Last year, the U.S. Army came up 25 percent short on recruitment, and this year, enlistments missed the target yet again. The Navy also failed to meet its recruitment goals, and manning U.S. ships is increasingly becoming a challenge.

The U.S. thus needs to move beyond its current reactive pronouncements about “defending the rules-based order” and convey to the public what’s really at stake. It needs to stop talking about “great power competition” and instead ask what “winning” this conflict between democracies and dictatorships would actually look like; what a geostrategic map favoring its interests and the interests of other democracies would look like.

The U.S. also has to decide which geopolitical hubs are critical to its homeland security and the continued prosperity of its citizens. It needs to bring national security priorities back into economic policy decision-making, relearning what earlier generations knew and we seem to have forgotten over the past 30 years — that one cannot be dependent on their adversary for the essentials needed to sustain society, and then expect to prevail should that adversary choose to go to war. Reshoring critical supply chains and creating redundancies in our supply system through “friend-shoring” is no longer a matter of re-debating globalization. It is a vital national security priority for both the U.S. and its allies.

US isn’t ready for a war of great powers

Politico · by Andrew A. Michta · October 31, 2023

From Across the Pond

America’s adversaries are preparing for wider conflict — to prevent war, it needs to do so as well.

The lessons to be learned from Ukraine, and now Israel, are that the U.S. and its allies must reconsider how their militaries are built | Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images

October 31, 2023 4:00 am CET

Press play to listen to this article

Voiced by artificial intelligence.

Andrew A. Michta is senior fellow and director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

United States President Joe Biden’s recent Oval Office address marked a key moment in the deepening competition between America and its allies on the one hand, and the axis of dictatorships coalescing around Russia, China, Iran and North Korea on the other.

The speech effectively merged the war in Ukraine and the wider war brewing in the Middle East into two theaters of the same conflict. And should Hezbollah now also attack, it will present the U.S. and its allies with a significantly expanded theater, straining military resources yet again.

At the same time, Taiwan seems even more likely to emerge as a third sphere of conflict in the next few years — or perhaps even sooner. And Beijing has been boosting its military at scale — the People’s Liberation Army Navy is already numerically greater than the U.S. Navy, while its land forces and nuclear forces are growing apace.

Meanwhile, regardless of how long the war in Ukraine lasts, Russia’s busy expanding its armor production — including the recovery of damaged equipment from the battlefield — while running a wartime production system at home. Moscow has shown it understands mass; and after a year and a half, the Russian army is now capable of fighting and mobilizing at the same time, with the goal of expanding its ranks to 1.5 million.

To put it simply, America’s adversaries are preparing for war. And yet, in Washington, national security debates rarely begin with the basic recognition that China and Russia are building their militaries not to deter but to attack. This should now be the starting point of every conversation on U.S. and allied defense spending.

The massive expenditure on weapons, munitions and human life in Ukraine ought to be a wake-up call. And the U.S. needs to start asking whether its all-volunteer force model is up to the task of generating the military capabilities it needs — especially when it comes to trained reserves.

But this isn’t just a U.S. problem — the professional all-volunteer force model has become dominant across the West. And given the new realities we’re confronting in Europe and Asia, it’s time to rethink. We must recognize that the current numbers of men and women in uniform are simply not up to the task. The West’s armies, navies and air forces are simply too small to respond both in the Atlantic and the Pacific — the two interconnected theaters that will define the outcome of any future global conflict.

The solution here isn’t to “pivot to Asia” — it’s to rebuild Western forces with the requisite redundancies in reserves. Essentially, in this increasingly unstable world, it’s imperative that the U.S. increase its defense spending and rethink what it spends money on and how it generates its forces.

Both China and Russia, and now increasingly Iran, have upended the notion that peaceful competition will play itself out in a globalized economic framework, and Washington needs to wake up to this reality.

Deterrence in Europe and Asia requires permanent stationing — not the rotational presence that has been a stop-gap measure to avoid hard choices. If NATO is to survive as a viable alliance, deterrence and collective territorial defense in Europe must be the new focus.

Additionally, in Asia, bilateral security guarantees and regional efforts to stabilize the area need to be buttressed by U.S. and allied deployment. As we enter a period of protracted systemic instability, preserving these two regional balances from imploding into an all-out great power war will be the difference between peace and wider conflict, which could morph into a global conflagration.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken with China’s President Xi Jinping Leah Millis/AFP via Getty Images

For that, America needs to revisit how it builds up its armed forces and weapons. A case in point: Last year, the U.S. Army came up 25 percent short on recruitment, and this year, enlistments missed the target yet again. The Navy also failed to meet its recruitment goals, and manning U.S. ships is increasingly becoming a challenge.

The U.S. thus needs to move beyond its current reactive pronouncements about “defending the rules-based order” and convey to the public what’s really at stake. It needs to stop talking about “great power competition” and instead ask what “winning” this conflict between democracies and dictatorships would actually look like; what a geostrategic map favoring its interests and the interests of other democracies would look like.

The U.S. also has to decide which geopolitical hubs are critical to its homeland security and the continued prosperity of its citizens. It needs to bring national security priorities back into economic policy decision-making, relearning what earlier generations knew and we seem to have forgotten over the past 30 years — that one cannot be dependent on their adversary for the essentials needed to sustain society, and then expect to prevail should that adversary choose to go to war. Reshoring critical supply chains and creating redundancies in our supply system through “friend-shoring” is no longer a matter of re-debating globalization. It is a vital national security priority for both the U.S. and its allies.

Should the U.S. be forced into a war, there will be no time to compensate for deficiencies or stockpile weapons and ammunition. The lessons to be learned from Ukraine, and now Israel, are that the U.S. and its allies must reconsider how their militaries are built, so that there’s a path forward to field a large force with the requisite mass — should a national emergency require it.

We need a new sense of urgency about the threat we are faced with, and we need to act now.

A Call to Action for the Intelligence Community Following Hamas Terror Attack

OCTOBER 30TH, 2023 BY CHARLIE ALLEN CHRIS WILLIAMS | 0 COMMENTS

thecipherbrief.com · · October 30, 2023

OPINION — The October 7 massacre perpetrated against innocent Israelis, Americans and other foreign nationals by the terrorist group Hamas and enabled by its primary patron Iran represents a failure for U.S. intelligence.

This is not the first time the Intelligence Community (IC) has been surprised, nor will it be the last.

Given the scope of the Hamas attacks and the regional and global implications, this failure has been compared with al Qaeda’s attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, as well as the Egyptian-Syrian attacks on Israel in October 1973.

In response to previous intelligence shortcomings, detailed post-mortem assessments were conducted to understand what happened and recommend remedial actions. For example, most Americans are familiar with the report of the national commission to investigate the 9/11 attacks. Decades earlier, then-Director of Central Intelligence William Colby commissioned a multi-agency assessment of the performance of the IC before the October 1973 attacks on Israel.

Declassified in 2009, that post-mortem concluded that intelligence on Egypt’s plans and capabilities had been “plentiful, ominous, and often accurate.” While some analysts considered the idea that Egypt might attack, IC analysts ultimately judged there would be no attack. As the assessment stated, the IC’s conclusions “were – quite simply, obviously, and starkly – wrong.”

Now, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Avril Haines should direct two separate after-action reviews. One review should assess the performance of individual IC organizations. Here, each IC agency director should be tasked to review their organization’s performance by determining what relevant information was collected, the analytic perspective(s) adopted and their basis, when and how that information was shared internally and externally, and what else might have been done to sound the alarm of the impending Hamas attacks.

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A second assessment should be conducted by knowledgeable outsiders with full access to all relevant data. That independent review team should look across the various agencies to assess broader IC-wide collection and analytic challenges that precluded timely and effective warning of the Hamas attacks and also make actionable recommendations.

The results of both reviews should be shared with the DNI and her staff as well as with members of the National Security Council and the Congressional intelligence and defense oversight committees.

In addition to these reviews, the attacks should spur DNI Haines to reverse two decisions made by her predecessors.

First, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning position should be reestablished. The purpose of this position, first established by DCI Stansfield Turner, was “to avoid surprise to the President, the National Security Council, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of major importance… The warning mission will give highest priority to warning of an attack on the U.S. or its allies”. Clearly, now is the time to resurrect the NIO for Warning position and the DNI should appoint a highly respected intelligence official in this position with the resources to effectively carry out a rejuvenated IC-wide warning function.

Second, the Foreign Denial and Deception Committee (FDDC) should be reconstituted. The absence of a dedicated IC cadre focused on adversary strategic and tactical denial and deception (D&D) may have contributed to the lack of timely and effective warning of Hamas’ plans and operations. A few hours of annual D&D training for select IC analysts is insufficient to inculcate a keen understanding of adversary D&D tactics, techniques and procedures or their impact on IC collection and analysis. Resurrection of a robust FDDC with a strong leader appointed by the DNI will yield benefits as the U.S. faces increasingly sophisticated threats from China, Russia, North Korea, Iran and their proxies, each of which is well practiced in the art of deception.

Some will argue that now – with ongoing hostilities – is not the time to conduct detailed reviews of the IC’s performance. We strongly disagree.

Similar reviews were conducted in parallel with on-going military operations following the Egyptian-Syrian attacks, al Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11, and numerous other incidents. Stated simply, the sooner we understand how and why the IC got it wrong, the sooner we can implement much-needed remedial measures.

The actions recommended herein may not eliminate the risk of strategic or tactical surprise in the future, but they will assist the IC in deciphering adversaries’ on-going, sophisticated efforts to deny the US and our friends and allies, information about their growing capabilities and nefarious plots.

We must learn from our mistakes and better position America’s absolutely vital intelligence services for future crises and conflicts.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to [email protected] for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

thecipherbrief.com · by Suzanne Kelly · October 30, 2023

27. Inadequate U.S. Patriot Missile Force Size Highlighted By Middle East Crisis

It is more than a high demand low density asset. It is a "no density" asset. Like the SOF truth, you cannot create sufficient Patriot units after crises occur.

We are paying now for decisions on priorities made years, if not decades ago.

Inadequate U.S. Patriot Missile Force Size Highlighted By Middle East Crisis

There are not enough Patriot batteries to go around, especially if a crisis in the Pacific were to break out.

JOSEPH TREVITHICK, TYLER ROGOWAY

PUBLISHED OCT 30, 2023 7:00 PM EDT

thedrive.com · by Joseph Trevithick, Tyler Rogoway · October 30, 2023

A significant portion of the U.S. Army's Patriot surface-to-air missile force have been or are in the process of being deployed to the Middle East in response to the ongoing Israel-Gaza crisis. This is in addition to many other obligations around the globe. Though this reflects the immense ability of the U.S. military to project power worldwide, it also underscores the stark limitations of its existing ground-based air and missile defense capacity.

Concerns about what this means for the prospect of adequately defending U.S. forces deployed overseas, as well as the U.S. homeland, is something senior U.S. military leaders, as well as The War Zone, have been drawing attention to for some time.

A battery assigned to 1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment, display their patriot radar and antenna mast group during table gunnery training exercise on Kadena Air Base in Japan, Oct. 19, 2017. (U.S. Army Photo by Capt. Adan Cazarez)

Since the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas launched its unprecedented attacks on southern Israel on October 7, the U.S. military has announced the deployment of a slew of forces to the Middle East, including two aircraft carrier strike groups, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and multiple squadrons of U.S. Air Force combat jets. A senior U.S. defense official confirmed to The War Zone and other outlets today that two full Patriot battalions are among other additional Army air and missile defenses that have also been rushing to the region. U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder, the Pentagon's top spokesperson had said last week that the Patriot units would come from Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg) in North Carolina and Fort Sill in Oklahoma.

The Army has also been in the process of sending a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery from Fort Bliss in Texas and Avenger short-range air defense systems from Fort Liberty to the Middle East in the past week. Online flight tracking data has shown U.S. Air Force cargo aircraft flying sorties that look to show at least some of these deployments. This is part of a larger ongoing U.S. airbridge that has been delivering military aid to Israel, as well as moving personnel and materiel to other locations in the Middle East. The operation comes in response to growing concerns that the Israel-Gaza conflict will spill over elsewhere in the region involving heavily armed Iranian proxy groups, as well as Iran itself.

The Army's two Patriot battalions may not look like much of a contribution at first glance, but the service only has 17 of them in total.

Each battalion has a headquarters element and between three and five firing batteries. Each battery can have up to eight trailer-mounted launchers, as well as an AN/MPQ-65 multifunction phased array radar and requisite fire control, communications, and other support equipment. The latest generation of Patriot launchers can be loaded with a mix of different interceptors optimized for various, including cruise missiles and drones flying at lower altitudes and certain types of ballistic missiles in the terminal stages of their flight. You can read more about the capabilities of the different available interceptors here.

A graphic showing the typical composition of a Patriot surface-to-air missile battery. Army via GlobalSecurity.org

A graphic showing examples of different Patriot launcher loadouts. Lockheed Martin

Of the 17 battalions the Army has, two are dedicated training units that are not available for deployment. In addition, at least four of the Army's remaining Patriot battalions are in Germany, Japan, and South Korea. Other Patriot units have been deployed elsewhere in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, in the past, as well.

So, the pair of battalions that have been tasked to deploy to the Middle East represent just over 13 percent of the Army's total deployable Patriots and at least around 20 percent of those systems, and possibly more, that aren't already on station elsewhere outside the United States.

It is also worth noting that the single THAAD battery that is part of the Army air and missile defense package being sent to the Middle East is one of just seven of those units active today. Two more are also deployed outside of the continental United States, one in South Korea and one on the U.S. island of Guam in the Western Pacific. The Army is currently hoping to field an eighth THAAD battery by 2025.

A US Army THAAD launcher in Israel during an exercise in 2019. USAF

The Army is not blind to the issues at play here or their seriousness, especially when it comes to Patriot.

"The Army senior leaders — from the secretary [of the Army to] the chief [of staff] — they recognize the demands on the Patriot force," Lt. Gen. Daniel Karbler, head of U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, told reporters at the 2023 Space and Missile Defense Symposium back in August, according to Defense News. "We are addressing that through increasing our Patriot units that are out there."

Members of an Army Patriot unit train somewhere in the Middle East in 2010. US Army

Karbler did not offer details at the time about what the target size for the Army's Patriot force is now and when the service might reach that goal. He did however cite recruiting challenges that make it difficult to stand up new Army air and missile defense units, which are compounded by the global demand for those capabilities.

“Many times, soldiers go for six months and get extended to nine months," Karbler said at this year's Space and Missile Defense Symposium, according to Breaking Defense. "Many times, they deploy for nine months and extend to 12 months [and] sometimes they think they’re going for a year to get extended … into 15 months."

In 2021, the U.S. military notably withdrew Patriot batteries from Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as a THAAD battery from Saudi Arabia. This was ostensibly done to try to free up some of those assets for potential deployment elsewhere, including the Pacific region, if necessary.

In recent years, senior U.S. officials have also highlighted the growing need for Patriot and other surface-to-air missile systems to help defend the homeland in the face of growing potential threats, especially from China and Russia. There is now even talk about the possibility of having air defense systems permanently or semi-permanently deployed domestically, something that has not been the case outside of the Washington, D.C. area since the Cold War.

Elements of a Patriot battery seen deployed at Easterwood Airport in College Station, Texas during an exercise in 2020. Reader Submission

In the meantime, the size of the Army's existing air and missile defense arsenal imposes real limits on what it can and cannot offer in terms of air and missile defenses in response to crises and other contingencies.

In the current context, additional air and missile defenses are an important part of U.S. government efforts to deter Iran and its proxies from further escalating strikes on Israel or American forces across the Middle East, which could lead to a wider war. Many Iranian-backed groups in the region, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, have the ability to target their opponents in many different countries using long-range missiles and drones.

The U.S. Navy's Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Carney shooting down four land-attack cruise missiles and 19 drones that the Houthis had launched on October 19, which may have been headed for Israel, highlighted these threats and the potential for spillover.

USS Carney engages Houthi missiles and drones in the Red Sea on October 19, 2023. USN

These fears have also been underscored by near-constant rocket and drone attacks from Iranian-backed groups aimed at facilities hosting American forces in Iraq and Syria. Those incidents, which are still continuing, prompted U.S. retaliatory airstrikes on a pair of Iranian-linked facilities in Syria near the Iraqi border last week.

Iran has, of course, also demonstrated its willingness to openly target U.S. forces directly over the years. This includes ballistic missile strikes in 2020 aimed at bases in Iraq hosting American personnel in retaliation for the U.S. targeted killing of General Qasem Soleimani, then head of the Quds Force, the external operations arm of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). That incident, which injured dozens of U.S. service members, but thankfully did not lead to any fatalities, had also prompted significant controversy surrounding the question of why Patriots and other air and missile defenses were not in position beforehand. In 2018, the Pentagon had directed the withdrawal of Patriot units in the region to free them up for use elsewhere, including in the Pacific, just like it did again three years later.

Other U.S. allies or partners in the Middle East have reason now to be concerned about getting directly swept up in current events, too. Though the U.S. military has not said where the Army air and missile defense units are headed, Jordanian Army spokesperson Brigadier General Mustafa Hiyari confirmed on state television earlier today that his country was among those that had asked for the deployment of Patriot systems.

Jordan's Muwaffaq Salti Air Base is a major staging location for U.S. airpower and a critical intrathreater transit hub for American forces, and has been in especially heavy use since the current Israel-Gaza conflict erupted. A Patriot battery is likely desired to protect this shared air base.

The forward operating base in At Tanf in Syria, which sits in a tri-border region opposite northeastern Jordan and southwestern Iraq, has been a top target of attacks from Iranian-backed proxies, as well. It has come under sporadic attack for the better part of a decade, but in recent weeks, it has been the focus of drone and rocket strikes. A Patriot battery located across the border near the border in Jordan could cover At Tanf as a contingency against wider-scale attacks should the conflict erupt throughout the reason. A shield against Iranian ballistic missiles would be of particular need.

Regardless, the current tasking for Patriot batteries, which is already consuming the better part of half the available force, pales in comparison to what a major crisis in the Pacific would demand. U.S. and allied forces in this vast theater would be facing an unprecedented set of threats in the air, with long-range drones, cruise missiles, and especially ballistic missiles, as well as hypersonic weapons, putting locales at risk over vast areas.

The distributed model of basing that the U.S. military is pursuing only complicates this further as far more patriot batteries would be needed to cover forward-operating forces. This is a huge departure from the more centralized concept of basing operations that has existed for decades and that the Patriot force is tailored for now. Even major military facilities and population centers far from the front will be at risk of attacks, including asymmetric ones such as from drones. As already noted, the homeland will not be safe in such a conflict, either, and ground-based air defenses will be needed, although they are unlikely to be available.

Then there is Russia and America's NATO commitment to contend with should what is already a very precarious situation become even more so.

There is simply not nearly enough capacity in the Patriot system force structure to come close to meeting these needs, let alone dealing with combat attrition on top of them. The Patriot system is in massive international demand, including in Ukraine, and with backorders running deep and being only likely to grow even deeper in the near term, this could present additional challenges for the Army.

The Army may also seek to acquire a successor to Patriot and the service is already in the process of upgrading its existing system, including through the addition of new Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) radars. However, these are long-term efforts that don't address critical shortfalls now.

Altogether, it is no surprise that additional Army air and missile defense assets are among forces the U.S. military has sent to the Middle East to bolster its posture amid the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict. At the same time, it shows just how in-demand these capabilities are and how quickly they can become stretched beyond their existing capacity.

Considering the threats that are growing, especially in Asia, this is a major problem.

Howard Altman contributed to this report.

Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

thedrive.com · by Joseph Trevithick, Tyler Rogoway · October 30, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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Failed Strategy and Operational Plan:

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