Quotes of the Day:

"Collective fear stimulates herd instinct, and tends to produce ferocity toward those who are not regarded as members of the herd."

- Bertrand Russell

"How paramount the future is to the present when one is surrounded by children." 

- Charles Darwin

"But hen you think you're safe is precisely when you're most vulnerable."

- Seven Samurai

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment September 22, 2023

2. China Keeps Trying to Crush Them. Their Movement Keeps Growing.

3. The Art of Partisan Warfare Is Not Dead: How old Russian military theories can give new insight into resistance to occupation in Ukraine

4. Why Our Generals Can't Think

5. Half of DOD civilians would get furloughed in a shutdown, plans show

6. Gen. Randy George sworn in as 41st Army Chief of Staff

7. Ransomware gang targeting defense firms, FBI warns

8. Taiwan is using generative AI to fight Chinese disinfo

9. How small drones changed modern warfare

10. US, Japan and Philippines call out China over disputed sea tensions at UN meet

11. First Tomb Badge Awarded to Female Infantry Soldier

12. Special Ops MH-60 Seen Absolutely Crammed With Modifications

13.  Do China's recent military purges spell trouble for Xi Jinping?

14. US Ups 155mm Artillery Output to Be ‘Arsenal of Democracy’

15. Who's tracking the weapons and money the U.S. is sending to Ukraine? "60 Minutes" went to find out.

16. Exclusive Interview With Ukraine's Spy Boss From His DC Hotel Room

17. Japan’s Plan for Taiwan Contingency – Analysis

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment September 22, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces carried out drone and cruise missile strikes on occupied Crimea and significantly damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol on September 22.
• The Russian information space heavily focused its attention on the Ukrainian strike on Sevastopol on September 22.
• Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bakhmut and reportedly advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 22.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package on September 21, providing Ukraine with $325 million worth of military equipment.
• The US will reportedly soon provide long-range army tactical missile systems (ATACMS) to Ukraine.
• Russian efforts to intensify divisions between Ukraine and its Central European partners appear to have suffered a setback as Polish President Andrzej Duda reiterated the strength of Polish-Ukrainian relations on September 22.
• A Ukrainian military official swiftly denied Russian claims that Wagner Group forces are operating in occupied Kherson Oblast.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly investigating high-ranking Rosgvardia officials over their potential involvement in Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk area, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Donetsk Oblast and reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border area.
• The Russian government is reportedly planning to increase defense spending by 4.4 trillion rubles ($46 billion) in 2024.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 22, 2023

Sep 22, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 22, 2023, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:45pm ET on September 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Correction: Andrzej Duda is the President of Poland. An earlier version of this assessment incorrectly identified Duda as Poland's Prime Minister.

Ukrainian forces carried out drone and cruise missile strikes on occupied Crimea and significantly damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol on September 22. The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated that Ukrainian forces launched a successful strike on the Russian BSF Command headquarters in Sevastopol, Crimea on September 22.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces used Storm Shadow cruise missiles to conduct the strike, and social media footage of the headquarters indicates significant damage to the building.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down five Ukrainian missiles and acknowledged that the Ukrainian strike damaged a building of BSF Command headquarters.[3] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a drone strike preceding the missile strike, and the Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two Ukrainian drones on the western coast of Crimea on the morning of September 22.[4]

Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk thanked Ukrainian pilots in general when amplifying footage of the strike.[5] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces will strike more Russian military targets in Crimea in the future.[6] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated that Ukrainian forces will continue to strike Sevastopol and that the Russian BSF should destroy their own ships in order to avoid further Ukrainian strikes.[7]

The Russian information space heavily focused its attention on the Ukrainian strike on Sevastopol on September 22. One Russian milblogger complained about Russian authorities’ inability to control the spread of Ukrainian information about the consequences of the strike, and other milbloggers criticized Russian authorities and the Russian military for not retaliating sufficiently.[8] Another Russian milblogger claimed that such Ukrainian strikes on Crimea are expected as Ukraine and its Western partners consider Crimea to be Ukrainian territory.[9] Multiple Russian milbloggers claimed that Western partners helped Ukrainian forces target the BSF Command headquarters.[10]

Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bakhmut and reportedly advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 22. Geolocated footage published on September 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced southeast of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[11] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces slightly advanced north of Novoprokopivka and are currently about 800 meters away from the settlement’s outskirts, a claim that generally corresponds to ISW’s assessment of the closest approach of the Ukrainian counter-offensive to the settlement.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction, exhausting and inflicting losses on Russian forces along the entire front.[13]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package on September 21, providing Ukraine with $325 million worth of military equipment.[14] The DoD package includes AIM-9M missiles for air defense; additional ammunition for HIMARS systems; Avenger air defense systems; anti-drone machine guns; 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds, including dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM); Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; over three million rounds of small arms ammunition; light tactical vehicles; demolition munitions for obstacle clearing; and spare parts, maintenance equipment, and other field equipment.

The US will reportedly soon provide long-range army tactical missile systems (ATACMS) to Ukraine. Four unnamed US government officials told NBC News in an article published on September 22 that US President Joe Biden told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that the US would provide Ukraine with “a small number of long-range missiles.”[15] The officials did not state when the US would announce the provision of ATACMS or when the US would deliver them to Ukraine.[16] One US official told NBC News that US officials are still discussing the type of missile and the number of missiles the US would provide to Ukraine.[17] Several unnamed people familiar with ongoing deliberations on ATACMS also told the Washington Post that the Biden administration plans to provide Ukraine with a version of ATACMS armed with cluster bomblets rather than a single (unitary) warhead.[18] The Washington Post reported that cluster-armed ATACMS have a range of up to 190 miles (depending on the version) and could allow Ukraine to strike Russian military positions far into the rear.

Russian efforts to intensify divisions between Ukraine and its Central European partners appear to have suffered a setback as Polish President Andrzej Duda reiterated the strength of Polish-Ukrainian relations on September 22. Duda clarified Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morwiecki’s September 21 statement that Poland would no longer transfer weapons to Ukraine and explained that Poland would continue to fulfill weapons supplies agreements with Ukraine but would not transfer new weapons that Poland purchases for its own military.[19] Duda also stated that the potential conflict between the two countries regarding the export of Ukrainian grain along European land routes does not “significantly affect” the two countries’ relationship.[20] ISW has previously assessed that Russian strikes on Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure are part of a Russian campaign to damage Ukrainian relations with its Western neighbors, and Poland’s swift reiteration of its commitment to Ukraine indicates that this campaign is not succeeding as much as Moscow likely intends.[21]

A Ukrainian military official swiftly denied Russian claims that Wagner Group forces are operating in occupied Kherson Oblast. Several Russian sources claimed on September 22 that Wagner personnel arrived in combat areas in occupied Kherson Oblast and that assault troops are distributed across sectors of the Kherson Oblast frontline.[22] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk denied this claim on September 22 and stated that Russian sources likely disseminate such claims in order to improve Russian morale.[23] Humenyuk also stated that Chechen forces and Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) forces arrived in occupied Kherson ”a few weeks ago” in order to prevent Russian military personnel from deserting.[24] Russian milbloggers may be claiming that Wagner forces have arrived in occupied Kherson Oblast amid rumors that Wagner forces will return to hostilities in Ukraine operating alongside Rosgvardia.[25]

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly investigating high-ranking Rosgvardia officials over their potential involvement in Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24. A Russian insider source claimed on September 22 that the FSB is investigating Rosgvardia officials after Rosgvardia reportedly allowed Wagner to “hide” shells and equipment in Rosgvardia’s warehouses immediately after the Wagner rebellion and during the period of Wagner’s disarmament.[26] The source claimed that an unspecified Rosgvardia general with the first name “Roman” oversaw the storage of up to four large containers of Wagner military equipment near a Rosgvardia training ground in the area of “Kazachy Stan” (likely a settlement in an unspecified region of Russia).[27] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin likely aimed to consolidate Russia‘s internal security apparatus around Rosgvardia following the Wagner rebellion.[28] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 27 that it would prepare to transfer Wagner’s heavy military equipment to unspecified elements of the Russian military on the same day that Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov announced that Rosgvardia would receive heavy weapons and tanks.[29] The Russian government also officially transferred the “Grom” special units of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs) to the control of Rosgvardia in July.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces carried out drone and cruise missile strikes on occupied Crimea and significantly damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol on September 22.
• The Russian information space heavily focused its attention on the Ukrainian strike on Sevastopol on September 22.
• Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bakhmut and reportedly advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 22.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package on September 21, providing Ukraine with $325 million worth of military equipment.
• The US will reportedly soon provide long-range army tactical missile systems (ATACMS) to Ukraine.
• Russian efforts to intensify divisions between Ukraine and its Central European partners appear to have suffered a setback as Polish President Andrzej Duda reiterated the strength of Polish-Ukrainian relations on September 22.
• A Ukrainian military official swiftly denied Russian claims that Wagner Group forces are operating in occupied Kherson Oblast.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly investigating high-ranking Rosgvardia officials over their potential involvement in Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk area, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Donetsk Oblast and reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border area.
• The Russian government is reportedly planning to increase defense spending by 4.4 trillion rubles ($46 billion) in 2024.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk area on September 22 but did not advance. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are counterattacking in an unspecified area in the Kupyansk direction.[31] Ukrainian Severodonetsk City Administration Head Roman Vlasenko stated on September 22 that Russian forces are more actively using artillery and aviation in operations in Luhansk Oblast in order to save manpower and equipment.[32] A milblogger also noted that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) have increased their operations over the past week in an attempt to strike Ukrainian forward positions and logistics.[33]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on September 22. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting small and unsuccessful attacks near Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[35] Another Russian milblogger retracted his September 21 claim that Ukrainian forces regained previously lost positions in Novoselivske and claimed that Ukrainian forces actually conducted counterattacks in Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove).[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Bakhmut on September 22 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced southeast of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) and that Russian forces established defensive positions along the railway near the settlement.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assaults south of Bakhmut, inflicting losses on Russian manpower and equipment and consolidating newly secured positions.[39]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut on September 22 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Mynkivka (13km northeast of Bakhmut), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut), and Andriivka.[40] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash and Russian milbloggers stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces control these settlements, contrary to the visual evidence that ISW has observed. [42]Another Russian milblogger claimed on September 21 that the situation is very difficult for Russian forces along the Klishchiivka-Kurdyumivka (7-12km southwest of Bakhmut) line, particularly near Andriivka.[43] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces will not have enough manpower to defend against future Ukrainian attacks in this area unless they stop their “ill-conceived and unsupported” counterattacks.[44] Another Russian milblogger amplified footage on September 22 claiming to show elements of the Russian 57th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz operating near Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[45]

Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 22 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued to defend against Russian attacks and inflicted losses against Russian manpower and equipment in the Avdiivka direction.[46] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled four Ukrainian attacks near Vodiane (on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) and Marinka (directly southwest of Donetsk City).[47]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 22 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City), and Marinka.[48] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces assaulted Sieverne and Marinka but did not specify an outcome.[49] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recaptured another Trudovske mine ventilation shaft just south of Krasnohorivka, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued launching unsuccessful localized attacks in western Donetsk Oblast and preparing defensive positions near Mariupol on September 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Mykilske (5km southeast of Vuhledar).[51] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian forces transported “dragons teeth” fortifications equipment in the direction of Nikolske (16km northwest of Mariupol) to build a defensive line in the area that would defend Russia’s ground lines of communication (GLOCs) towards occupied Crimea.[52] Andryushchenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified Russian target in Rozivka (44km northwest of Mariupol).[53]

Ukrainian forces continued localized attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts but were reportedly unsuccessful on September 22. A Russian news aggregator claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Pryyutne (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[54] The Russian ”Vostok” Battalion claimed that the situation in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border is stable and that Ukrainian forces are not attempting to advance, however.[55]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces achieved limited territorial gains in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border area on September 22, but ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming these claims. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on September 22 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Zavitne Bazhannya (11km south of Velyka Novosilka), advanced along the Mokri Yaly River valley, and seized unspecified Ukrainian positions.[56] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces carried out successful counterattacks from Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and Novomayorske (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[57] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces cleared an unspecified area between Novodonetske and Novomayorske of Ukrainian forces.[58]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 22 and reportedly advanced north of Novoprokopivka (14km south of Orikhiv).[59] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces slightly advanced north of Novoprokopivka and are currently about 800 meters away from the settlement’s outskirts – an observation consistent with ISW’s control-of-terrain maps.[60] The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance near Verbove (18km south of Orikhiv). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive operations in the Melitopol direction, are inflicting manpower and equipment losses on Russian forces, and are forcing Russian forces to withdraw from their positions.[61] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have not broken through the “Surovikin” defense line west of Verbove and claimed that Ukrainian forces have not achieved any visible successes in the area in a month.[62]

Russian forces continued to counterattack in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 22, but did not make new territorial gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Mala Tokmachka (7km southeast of Orikhiv) and Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that both sides are heavily using artillery and drones in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[64]

Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting cross-river raids in the Dnipro River delta. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still hold positions near Dachi (10km south of Kherson City) and near the Antonivsky Bridge on the east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[65] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups operated on several islands in the delta on September 22.[66] Russian milbloggers also reamplified complaints that Russian forces lack high-speed boats to repel Ukrainian operations in the delta.[67]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian government is reportedly planning to increase defense spending by 4.4 trillion rubles ($46 billion) in 2024. Bloomberg reported on September 22 that draft plans of the Russian 2024 budget indicate that Russian defense spending will increase to 10.8 trillion rubles (about $113 billion) in 2024, up from 6.4 trillion rubles (about $67 billion) in 2023.[68] Bloomberg reported that Russia plans to spend six percent of its projected gross domestic product (GDP) on defense in 2024, compared to 3.9 percent in 2023 and 2.7 percent in 2021.[69] Bloomberg reported that classified expenditures will also rise from 6.5 trillion rubles (about $68 billion) in 2023 to 11.1 trillion rubles (about $116 billion) in 2024.[70] Bloomberg reported that the Russian government expects state revenues to increase by 22 percent in 2024 and the state deficit to decrease by 50 percent, although it is unclear how likely this outcome is considering international sanctions against Russia and the high cost of the war in Ukraine.[71]

The Russian State Duma is considering extending additional laws related to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia). Russian State Duma deputies, including Chairperson of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy Alexander Khinshtein and Chairperson of the State Duma Committee on Defense Andrei Kartapolov, introduced a bill to the Duma that would extend the law on punishing those who “discredit” and spread “fake” information about the Russian armed forces to Rosgvardia forces as well.[72] ISW previously reported that the Duma is also reportedly considering legislation that would extend Russian MoD powers and mechanisms to include volunteer formations to Rosgvardia.[73] ISW also previously reported on speculation that the Wagner Group personnel are working closely with Rosgvardia in order to rejoin the war in Ukraine.[74]

Russian authorities are expanding drone development facilities in Russia. The Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Tatarstan Roman Shaikhutdinov announced on September 22 that the Innopolis Special Economic Zone and Innopolis University have entered an agreement with the Unmanned Aircraft Systems LLC to test the drone companies’ products in Tatarstan.[75] ISW previously reported on Russian efforts to expand domestic drone development and production throughout Russia and assessed that the Russian military command may be using a large number of strike drones in Ukraine in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.[76]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to restrict the use of Ukrainian language in educational institutions in occupied Ukraine in order to Russify the occupied territories and eradicate Ukrainian culture and identity. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov demanded the punishment of schools and teachers in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast who give “unauthorized” lessons in Ukrainian, which Rogov claimed is a “non-native language” for Ukrainian students.[77]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarus reportedly continues its efforts to recruit Wagner Group personnel into a new Belarusian private military company (PMC). The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on September 22 that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko is attempting to recruit Wagner instructors in Belarus to the new Belarusian PMC “GardService” by promising Wagner personnel apartments without having to wait in the government housing queue.[78] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that the attempted recruitment of Wagner personnel is increasing social tensions among Belarusian security forces.[79]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. China Keeps Trying to Crush Them. Their Movement Keeps Growing.

This one important contribution to resistance. This is a battle for knowledge, understanding, the truth, and history in the face of authoritarian tyranny.

Resistance to totalitarian dictators is a phenomenon we need to understand. We must not take this for granted and we need experts in this "discipline." It is a critical part of irregular, unconventional, and political warfare.

Excerpts:

The rise of China’s underground history movement challenges conventional wisdom on how to view the country. The dominant way of understanding China today is that nothing happens there except a string of dystopian horrors: surveillance, cultural genocide, mindless nationalism. As someone who has written extensively about religious and political persecution, I know these problems are real. But so, too, are Chinese people with other visions. Critical voices still exist.

The persistence of China’s counterhistory movement also calls into question assumptions about the Communist Party’s ability to dominate society. Despite overwhelming odds, people inside China still publish works and make films that challenge authority. Their ideas still spread, and when problems in society reach a boiling point — as they have over the past year — it is they who are often looked to for different ways of viewing the present.

 Opinion

China Keeps Trying to Crush Them. Their Movement Keeps Growing.

Opinion | The Underground Historians Keeping the Truth Alive in China

The New York Times · by Ian Johnson · September 21, 2023

Jiang Xue, a Chinese journalist, photographed on a recent trip to New York City, traveled around China to tell the story of a forgotten publication put out by students during the Cultural Revolution.Credit...Ka-Man Tse for The New York Times

Opinion

The Underground Historians Keeping the Truth Alive in China

Jiang Xue, a Chinese journalist, photographed on a recent trip to New York City, traveled around China to tell the story of a forgotten publication put out by students during the Cultural Revolution.Credit...Ka-Man Tse for The New York Times

By

Mr. Johnson is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who spent two decades in China.

• Sept. 21, 2023

In 1959, a group of university students in the northwestern Chinese city of Tianshui embarked on a quixotic plan. China was in the midst of the Great Famine, a catastrophe caused by government policies that would kill as many as 45 million. These young people had witnessed farmers starving to death and cannibalism; they also saw how the government had brutally punished or killed people who appealed for help. They felt someone needed to do something to spread word of what was happening. They decided to publish a journal.

The students called it Spark, after a Chinese expression, “xinghuo liaoyuan,” or “a single spark can start a prairie fire.” They hand-wrote the essays onto plates and, with the help of local officials, used a mimeograph machine to run off copies.

At just eight pages, and with no photos or graphics, Spark looked primitive. But it was filled with articles that got to the heart of China’s authoritarian politics — then and now: Farmers weren’t allowed to own property, all of which belonged to the state; top leaders brooked no opposition; corruption was endemic; and even critics loyal to the regime were persecuted. The lead article on the first page set the tone:

“Why did the once progressive Communist Party become so corrupt and reactionary less than ten years after coming to power, with complaints and rebellions at home, and falling into an embarrassing situation abroad? This is because the people’s world is regarded as its private property, and all matters are managed by party members.”

There would be no second issue. Within months, 43 people associated with the magazine were arrested. Three were later executed, and the rest sentenced to years in labor camps.

Documents related to Spark, as preserved in police files.Credit...Tan Chanxue

Four of the founders of Spark: Tan Chanxue, Sun Zijun, Zhou Shanyou and Ding Hengyu.Credit...Tan Chanxue

Spark had lasted less than a year and seemed extinguished. Over the Chinese Communist Party’s nearly three-quarters of a century in power, it could have been forgotten, nothing more than one of countless small acts of outrage against the party’s unchecked powers. Instead, for many Chinese people, its story is now synonymous with resistance to one-party rule.

How? Through the efforts of China’s counterhistorians, a group of citizens united in their desire to tell the whole story of Communist Party rule, to include in China’s collective memory events like the famines of the last century and the virus outbreaks of today. One key member of this movement is a 49-year-old journalist named Jiang Xue, whose determination to tell the true story of what happened in her hometown — to not let yet another piece of China’s history get lost or distorted — helped turn Spark into a source of inspiration to those who follow in its creators’ footsteps, making it a testament to the limits of even the harshest measures to crush resistance.

Around the world, history has become a battleground for the present. Americans debate the centrality of slavery to their country’s founding. Europeans grapple with the brutality of their colonial empires. Young Africans unearth buried memories of the Nigerian civil war and the apartheid era. One could easily include Japan, Singapore, India and dozens of other countries where events that occurred before most people were born have become crucial to shaping their future.

But nowhere is this idea more potent than in China. For modern Chinese leaders, history is the key to their legitimacy: History chose the Communist Party to save China; history has determined that it has succeeded; and history blesses its continued hold on power. This history is of course written by the party, which employs armies of scribes, filmmakers, videographers and journalists to push its version of events, both recent and ancient. Through them, the party controls textbooks, movies, television documentaries, popular history magazines, even video games.

The result is a population that is often unaware of the recent past. The Great Famine of 1959-61 is still known euphemistically as “three difficult years” caused mainly by natural disasters. Discussion of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, a time when state-led violence claimed as many as two million lives, shuttered schools and sent educated people to work as laborers, is increasingly taboo. The erasure goes beyond events of last century. Even the Covid crisis has been scrubbed, with whistle-blowers turned into pro-government heroes and the harsh lockdowns now off limits in public discussion.

Eight people accused of being “counterrevolutionaries” are forced to kneel before their execution on the outskirts of Harbin in 1968.

China’s Great Famine, resulting from disastrous government policies, killed as many as 45 million people.

But a growing number of Chinese see this monopoly on the past as the root of their country’s authoritarian malaise. If people grow up thinking that the Chinese Communist Party is led by a group of meritocratic officials (instead of leaders appointed in backroom deals), that it rules China with a strict but fair civil service (instead of one lacking checks on its power) and defends national borders that have existed for centuries (instead of the inherited territories of a gunpowder empire), then they will have a hard time understanding why China is prone to purges, corruption and ethnic clashes. In short, if they believe that only the Chinese Communist Party can rule China, they will never question its right to rule.

This conviction of history’s importance is driving a national movement of underground historians that has slowly taken shape over the past 20 years. I call these people historians as a shorthand for a broad array of China’s brightest minds: university professors, independent filmmakers, underground magazine publishers, novelists, artists and journalists. Some might be thought of as dissidents, but most have one foot inside the system, where they continue to hold jobs, own property and raise families. All of them risk their careers, their futures and prison to publish clandestine journals, banned books and independent documentary films.

Underground historians have existed since the start of the People’s Republic, but for the first 50 years of Communist rule they were isolated individuals. Their articles, artworks and books were quickly seized by the security apparatus. They often did not even know of one another.

But over the past decade, I’ve accompanied these underground historians as they’ve formed a nationwide network that has survived repeated crackdowns. They share stories, heroes and common beliefs that they can now distribute relatively easily thanks to basic digital technologies, such as P.D.F.s, affordable digital cameras and laptop movie editing software. And when the government is overwhelmed by mass unrest, such as during the Covid lockdowns in late 2022, they are able to inject their ideas into the public debate.

The rise of China’s underground history movement challenges conventional wisdom on how to view the country. The dominant way of understanding China today is that nothing happens there except a string of dystopian horrors: surveillance, cultural genocide, mindless nationalism. As someone who has written extensively about religious and political persecution, I know these problems are real. But so, too, are Chinese people with other visions. Critical voices still exist.

The persistence of China’s counterhistory movement also calls into question assumptions about the Communist Party’s ability to dominate society. Despite overwhelming odds, people inside China still publish works and make films that challenge authority. Their ideas still spread, and when problems in society reach a boiling point — as they have over the past year — it is they who are often looked to for different ways of viewing the present.

Perhaps most important, the efforts of these people have allowed young Chinese to rediscover a lineage of like-minded people stretching back to the prehistory of the People’s Republic. Books that were once available only in foreign research libraries are now easily shared digitally. Stories of heroic resistance fighters are documented in films that are circulated on the sly. Where critical thinkers in China once often worked alone, they now share a powerful collective memory of Chinese people standing up to authoritarian rule.

Jiang Xue might never have felt the need to keep the memory of Spark alive if it weren’t for her own family’s story. As with many underground historians, her belief in the power of history started at home.

Jiang Xue: “How long can the common people be kept from the common knowledge they ought to have about the world?”Credit...Ka-Man Tse for The New York Times

In early 1960, during the Great Famine, Jiang Xue’s grandfather Zhang Rulin, his wife and their four children received a daily ration of one large corn bun to split among them. Zhang Rulin could see that they would starve, and so he made a decision: One of them would have to die so that the others could have enough to survive. But how to choose, and how to make the others go along with this sacrifice?

Jiang Xue tells the story the way her father did on every Chinese New Year’s Eve when she was a little girl:

“Grandfather was a just man. Every day he would take a knife and cut the bun into six equal pieces. One for each person. Each one the same. He weighed each piece on a scale. My youngest aunt — she was 1 year old — she got the same as her father. But he needed more. He was the only laborer in the family. But everyone got the same. They all survived. He starved to death. He sacrificed his life for us.”

A composite panoramic image of people threshing grain at a “re-education” camp in Heilongjiang province in 1969. During the Cultural Revolution, forced manual labor was intended to erase elitism and install socialist values.

To make sure the children learned their family history, every year Jiang Xue’s father and mother would bundle them in their winter clothes and hike up the hill behind their house for half an hour to a small plateau where her grandfather was buried. The family paid tribute, bringing food and kowtowing on the icy ground three times. Then her father would tell the story, starting each time with the words “Back when we were starving ….”

These family experiences gave Jiang Xue a skepticism toward authority that only grew after she graduated from college. Her legal name is Zhang Wenmin, but when she first started out as a journalist, she took the pen name Jiang Xue — which literally means “river snow” — from a ninth-century poem about a fisherman alone in a boat on a snowy river. The image is one of the most indelible in Chinese poetry, implying a person holding out against the odds, in a solitary pursuit that many might not understand.

She began her career at China Business News in 1998, during a magical period for media in China. Newspapers at the time were encouraged to make money and appeal to readers. Censorship still existed but was relatively lax.

In 2003, Chinese journalism seemed poised on the brink of transformation. The beating death of a migrant from another province in police custody in Guangzhou that year galvanized public intellectuals, who successfully called for the prosecution of a dozen civil servants and a rethinking of how migrants were viewed. Suddenly, it seemed that the media and civil society could effect change, even in a partially closed system like China’s. Journalists like Jiang Xue took on increasingly ambitious projects: forced evictions, corruption and environmental problems.

But slowly — maybe inevitably — the party began to push back. It regained control over newsrooms, installing more acquiescent editors. By the early 2010s, it narrowed the range of topics that could be investigated. Jiang Xue stayed at her paper until 2014, when her editors issued an order: Publish only articles that spoke positively of the government. Feeling that she was being set up to be fired, Jiang Xue quit. Thus began her work as a freelance writer.

Jiang Xue was already known as a leading voice in China’s journalism community. But now she was free from official constraints, allowing her to write articles that made her known in China and abroad as one of the country’s leading independent journalists.

One article that cemented her reputation was a 2015 piece called “A Year as a Wife,” which profiled Meng Qun, the spouse of a prominent human rights lawyer. It was a rarity, moving the focus away from the often macho world of dissent in China to the many courageous women — like herself — fighting for change.

That article, however, also firmly put her on the radar of China’s fearsome security apparatus. She detailed her challenges in a 2017 article, “Shut Up. You Look Like an Enemy of the State.” It analyzed the increasing use of digital technology to keep track of people like herself and also how ordinary people were being kept ignorant of their own history.

“If there is an intangible cage over this land, with us inside it, can it be that it is impervious to the influence of intelligence?” she wrote. “How long can the common people be kept from the common knowledge they ought to have about the world?”

The year before, she had begun to grow interested in the story of Spark. One day, a professor visiting from another city asked her if she had heard of the publication. She hadn’t and was surprised to hear that it had originated in her hometown, Tianshui. That evening, the professor did something that would have been impossible for previous generations of public intellectuals: He emailed her a 500-page P.D.F. of documents about the case, including a book of memoirs published in Hong Kong and the police confessions extracted from the students. Later, she even found love letters between two of the publication’s main writers. She was surprised that no one had written about it in depth for a general audience.

Intrigued, she called up her father. Had he heard about it as a boy? He had not, but he knew people who could help. A few days later, Jiang Xue was on a train back home to find out more. That began years of research into the magazine. She started in her hometown but the project took her across China, traveling at her own expense to track down the now-elderly students who had founded Spark, to see if their stories held any lessons for today’s China.

She was aided by other underground historians, who gave her advice and encouragement. She talked to one of China’s greatest underground documentary filmmakers, Hu Jie, who has made two films that deal with Spark. A Xi’an-based counterhistorian, Zhang Shihe, helped her edit a short film about one of her interviews. And she had long talks with Ai Xiaoming, a feminist scholar and prolific documentary filmmaker who made a six-hour film about a notorious labor camp near Jiang Xue’s hometown.

Hu Jie at his home and studio in Nanjing, amid his paintings. He has made two documentary films about Spark.Credit...Sim Chi Yin

A sketch from one of Hu Jie’s notebooks.Credit...Sim Chi Yin

In 2019, Jiang Xue’s piece on Spark appeared in the Hong Kong magazine Today. It is by far the longest and most involved article she has written, totaling over 40,000 Chinese characters, or about 28,000 words, and stands as the definitive written account of Spark and the system it challenged.

Written in the first person, the article is only partly about the past. At its heart, it is Jiang Xue’s own discovery of a forgotten chapter of her hometown’s history. In a series of vignettes, she takes us on visits with the survivors whose efforts produced Spark. In their own words, they take us back to the era of the Great Famine, and describe their efforts today to fight against official disremembering. Talking to one of the students, now in his 80s, Jiang Xue asks how often he thinks of his classmates.

“Very often.”

“You think of their voice and their smile,” she says.

“Yes.”

“The way they were when they were young.”

“Yes, I will never forget them, until the day that I disappear from this earth I won’t forget them. Because these people, they were all extremely kindhearted. They were sublime. So we should remember them. I wish that this country could draw on its historical tragedies and not repeat them. We should draw on these lessons. I hope that young people can develop a sense of justice and carry forward the virtue of having a sense of justice. People should dare to act, but not make unnecessary sacrifices.”

“It’s a pity isn’t it?” Jiang Xue asks.

“People should cherish their lives but be brave when they need to.”

Jiang Xue says that piece is the most meaningful she has done, especially because it was about her own town’s history. Her family’s Chinese New Year ritual made her understand that her grandfather had died of starvation. But it was only after she researched Spark that she realized the entire context of the famine — and most important, how some people had fought back.

The outpouring of support after publication also moved her. The article was widely circulated on the mainland in P.D.F. form. A reader in Tianshui who ran a printing business volunteered to professionally print and bind dozens of copies of the magazine so that older people could read it. Another reader in Tianshui wrote to Jiang Xue, telling her that she vividly remembered the mass rally there to condemn the students and how one of them, Tan Chanxue, had stood strong and tall during the hours of humiliation and threats. “Now I know she was a real hero!” the woman wrote.

“Spark is history,” Jiang Xue told me. “But it’s an unfinished history. The same problems the older generation faced, especially the lack of freedom of expression, is the same issue I face today. You look at Covid and all the unnecessary suffering and death, and it’s all because of a lack of freedom of expression.”

But the toll of challenging the Chinese Communist Party on its most sensitive ground — history — has been high. For years, she had to rely on her savings to get by. Her work clashed with her husband’s desire for a successful career as a researcher on religion in a government think tank. When “thought police” visited his institute and issued a warning, he asked her to stop her work. She refused and in 2021 the couple divorced.

What sustains Jiang Xue and many other underground historians is the sense of community that their movement provides. Some of her interviewees have become close friends, such as Tan Chanxue, whom she regularly visited until she died in 2018. This past June, while she was traveling in North America, she phoned Xiang Chengjian, who helped print the magazine in 1960. She calls him on every major holiday just to say hello and touch base for half an hour or so. This time it was around the Dragon Boat Festival, a particularly apt holiday because it is rooted in the story of a famous poet from antiquity who committed suicide to protest government misrule.

“Uncle Xiang,” she said over the video call, “people still care about Spark. No one has forgotten it.”

At the start of one of her articles, Jiang Xue quoted the philosopher Hannah Arendt on the relevance of the people she profiles — and her own life:

“Even in the darkest of times we have the right to expect some illumination, and that such illumination may well come less from theories and concepts than from the uncertain, flickering, and often weak light that some men and women, in their lives and their works, will kindle under almost all circumstances and shed over the time span that was given them on earth — this conviction is the inarticulate background against which these profiles were drawn. Eyes so used to darkness as ours will hardly be able to tell whether their light was the light of a candle or that of the blazing sun.”

I was struck by how the lines applied to anyone working for change in China today: Is their work pointless, or trailblazing? The light of a candle, or a blazing sun?

Arendt’s quote is especially apt because it is open-ended. It doesn’t imply that people working for change in dark times are bound to win because good always trumps evil, or some other cliché. But the implication is clear: In dark times, light is precious; it always matters.

For people who see China as hopelessly authoritarian — and this is by far the dominant view in many countries today — they will note the troubles faced by people like Jiang Xue or others involved in the counterhistory movement. Tan Hecheng, a writer from Hunan, for example, has spent decades chronicling government-ordered extrajudicial killings in one Chinese county, documenting the murders that took place at its lakes, rivers and bridges. The price, however, includes being marginalized and the constant threat of retribution. Ai Xiaoming, the filmmaker, has made numerous documentaries but is barred from leaving China. And the underground publication Remembrance has published more than 340 issues over the past 15 years, but its editors face regular harassment and police surveillance.

The underground historian Tan Hecheng stands by a tombstone for a woman killed in Dao County in August 1967 during the Cultural Revolution. Mr. Tan has documented the deaths.Credit...Sim Chi Yin

Widow’s Bridge, in Dao County, where many were beaten and tossed into the river in August 1967. Credit...Sim Chi Yin

And yet this would be a selective reading of these people’s lives and the history of this 75-year movement. Like other underground historians, Jiang Xue still writes, and her articles are still widely read in China. Others repeatedly find opportunities to make movies, edit magazines and write historical novels that challenge the state’s campaigns of disremembering. They are persecuted. Their journals or film festivals are shut down. But they return, again and again, just as they and their forebears have for 75 years.

Measuring their impact is difficult in a state like China. But anecdotally, I’ve seen their works posted and reposted again and again, especially over the past couple of years. Social media can be an echo chamber, of course, but when I lived in China during the first months of the pandemic, these counternarratives suddenly seemed to be everywhere, as Chinese people searched for different ways of understanding how authoritarianism, once again, had led to a serious challenge for the country.

I do not mean to offer false optimism but the realism of someone who has spent more than 20 years inside China since the mid-1980s, including all of the 2010s, when Xi took power and carried out his vision of a strong state. Control hasn’t been this tight since the 1970s. These are dark times. It is also true that “the internet” as people imagined it in the 1990s is easily controlled by authoritarian states, making social media more a tool of control than of freedom.

But the fact that people still resist and do so in a more coordinated form than at any time in the history of the People’s Republic seems more significant than the banal point that an authoritarian regime is authoritarian. The fact is that independent thought lives in China. It has not been crushed. China’s underground historians may be working under the shadow of a leviathan, but they’re also part of our intellectual world and part of a larger global conversation over how we approach our past and create our future.

The people doing this work are worth knowing for their own sake. They are making works of scope and ambition equal to the great writers or filmmakers of the Cold War — people like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Milan Kundera and Milos Forman. It is worth remembering that many of these giants of Eastern Bloc intellectual life had a limited impact for many decades. It was only when these countries began sliding into economic stagnation that ordinary people began to seek alternative ways of understanding the past as a way to assess the future.

The underground journal Remembrance has published more than 340 issues over the past 15 years.Credit...Ka-Man Tse for The New York Times

Some of China’s counterhistorians simply treat their work as time capsules. They know their work will probably not be freely available in China in the near future, but like generations of Chinese historians they believe that in the end justice prevails — that one day their work will matter. They want future Chinese people to know that in the 2020s, when the party seemed to have successfully turned back the clock, Chinese people inside China did not succumb to comfort or fear. They kept writing and filming. Not everyone gave in.

But many others have a shorter time horizon. They believe that for all of its power, the Chinese Communist Party is vulnerable today.

As China transitions from decades of ever-increasing prosperity to an era of slow growth and demographic challenges, many Chinese people appear eager for new ways of understanding their country. The government’s handling of the Covid pandemic — harsh lockdowns that resulted in deaths and misery, followed by a sudden easing of restrictions that left as many as a million dead in just a couple of months — punctured the party’s image of ruthless competency. VPN technology has long allowed people to bypass China’s firewall, but relatively few bothered; now many use VPNs to seek out banned sites.

For Jiang Xue, who often posts on websites blocked in China, this means new readers who are drawn to her work. She sees her articles often converted to image files, which can more easily be posted on Chinese social media because the state’s software has a harder time reading the files and picking out sensitive words and phrases.

Just after New Year’s Day 2023, a few weeks after a wave of protests across China helped force the government to drop its draconian policy of pandemic lockdowns, Jiang Xue published one of her most popular articles. She addressed the hundreds of young people who had led the protests late last year. “Because of you, the suffering that the people have endured over the past three years of the pandemic dictatorship has taken on some meaning,” she wrote. “It is by speaking out loud and clear what is in your hearts that you have won a little dignity for the beaten-down and enslaved masses.” The article was posted on a blocked site but was quickly posted and reposted on Telegram, WeChat and other platforms. She received dozens of emails and messages from people in China thanking her for her work.

Young people hold up pieces of paper to protest against censorship and China’s strict 'zero Covid’ measures on November 27, 2022 in Beijing.

As Jiang Xue pursues her calling, she is often asked if her work has any real meaning. Once while we were traveling in the mountains south of Xi’an, she told me a story about a meeting she had a few years ago in New York City. She had met a prominent journalist who left his profession, fled to the United States and was running a restaurant. He told her that her work had a moral value but practically was irrelevant. What good could she really achieve by writing about Chinese history?

As she told me the story, her eyes were downcast, and she shook her head slowly, as if defeated. But then she stopped, gathered herself and spoke with surprising finality.

“But I disagree,” she said. “It matters if you try. I want to be a normal person in an abnormal society.”

The success of people like Jiang Xue is not preordained. They will grow old, die, possibly be arrested or fade away. But if the history of this movement has taught us anything, it is that it has grown with time, despite setbacks. We can look at individual battles and see defeat. But we can also see an endless cycle of creation, of new sparks that leap off the flint of history every time it is struck.

Ian Johnson is the author of the forthcoming book “Sparks: China’s Underground Historians and Their Battle for the Future,” from which this essay was adapted.

Ian Johnson lived in China for 20 years. He won a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of the country.

The New York Times · by Ian Johnson · September 21, 2023

3. The Art of Partisan Warfare Is Not Dead: How old Russian military theories can give new insight into resistance to occupation in Ukraine

Download the 4 paper in PDFa this link: https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Insights_9_The-Art-of-Partisan-Warfare-Is-Not-Dead.pdf

September 21, 2023

The Art of Partisan Warfare Is Not Dead: How old Russian military theories can give new insight into resistance to occupation in Ukraine

Sandor Fabian, Ph.D. – IWC Chair of Engagements

Derek Jones, Col. (Ret.), US Army – IWC Subject Matter Expert

Andrew Liflyandchick – IWC Analyst

https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/insights/the-art-of-partisan-warfare-is-not-dead-how-old-russian-military-theories-can-give-new-insight-into-resistance-to-occupation-in-ukraine/

The Art of Partisan Warfare Is Not Dead: How old Russian military theories can give new insight into resistance to occupation in Ukraine

irregularwarfarecenter.org

September 21, 2023

Sandor Fabian, Ph.D. – IWC Chair of Engagements

Derek Jones, Col. (Ret.), US Army – IWC Subject Matter Expert

Andrew Liflyandchick – IWC Analyst

As part of its ongoing efforts to help scholars and practitioners understand Russia’s approach to irregular warfare (IW), the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) has translated a 33-page Russian special operations journal article, The Fundamentals of Partisan Warfare: Theory and Practice. The translation of the Russian article is now available for request on the IWC website. This Insights article is the second of a two-part series meant to introduce the Russian text and analyze the concepts contained within in the context of the current conflict in Ukraine.

For both Ukrainians and Russians, the concept of partisan warfare is not new. Both countries have long histories of using irregular warfare to resist foreign invaders. As far back as the French invasion of Russia in 1812, Lieutenant Colonel Denis Davydov, who has been immortalized by Leo Tolstoy using him as the basis for the character Denisov in War and Peace, used guerilla warfare to stymie Napoleon’s advance. During and after World War II, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) fought first against the occupation of Ukraine by Nazi Germany and then against the Soviet regime. In both Ukraine and Russia, the term partisan (Russian/Ukrainian: Партизан) has become synonymous with tales of national heroes that are still celebrated today. It should come as no surprise that the topic has become a favorite for Russian military historians and theorists, from legendary Soviet war hero Colonel Ilya Starinov to Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov, who recently provided the theoretical basis for the “special military operation” in Ukraine.

One of these Russian theorists is Oleg Ryazanov, a Lieutenant Colonel of the Spetsnaz, who, in 2008, penned his monograph on The Fundamentals of Partisan Warfare, an extensive examination of Russian tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) related to partisan warfare and special operations forces (SOF) operations. This Insights article will begin by arguing that mastering the art of partisan warfare, as described by Ryazanov, remains as relevant today as ever. Then, it will illustrate this point by drawing direct parallels between Ryazanov’s partisan warfare theories and the current conflict in Ukraine. The article will not focus on the special operations forces (SOF) portions of the Russian text. For a more in-depth analysis of those topics, please see the IWC’s previous Insights article, titled The Fall from Grace of Russian SOF: The Danger of Forgetting Lessons Learned.

It should be noted here that, unlike how they are defined in U.S. doctrine, the concepts of resistance, insurgency, counterinsurgency, guerilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion are all combined by Ryazanov under the umbrella term of “partisan warfare.” As a result, all of these concepts and more are examined in Fundamentals, with the addition of psychological operations, special operations, and unconventional warfare. To differentiate between different aspects of partisan warfare, Ryazanov uses his own terms, such as “partisan conflict” to refer to insurgencies, “partisan movement” to refer to popular resistance, and “urban partisans” to refer to underground resistance. For the sake of clarity, however, this Insights article will use U.S. military definitions to distinguish between concepts. The terms partisan warfare and irregular warfare will be used interchangeably.

Writing fifteen years ago, Ryazanov predicted that there have been “cardinal changes that have taken place in recent years in military affairs…[leading to a] new essence and nature of war in the modern world.” In his opinion, the Russian military’s focus on conventional warfare was no longer adequate to address the full spectrum of threats faced by the Russian state. A new military doctrine needed to be created that put the focus firmly on partisan (irregular) warfare as future conflicts would become increasingly irregular in nature.

In Ryazanov’s eyes, the primary adversary that Russia must prepare for was clear, and he dedicated a significant portion of his monograph to analyzing this potential foe. He states “the adversary with dominance in the air, space, sea, and information technology is NATO (and, above all, the United States). The only possibly adequate way to achieve victory in such conditions is a partisan (sabotage) war.” Yet, despite Ryazanov’s warnings, Russia has allowed itself to be mired in a protracted, large-scale war in Ukraine and has once again shifted to prioritizing conventional methods over unconventional ones. This occurred even though the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 demonstrated that the partisan warfare described by Ryazanov, such as Russia’s use of covert special operations, private military companies, and information warfare, can, given the right conditions, be used to prepare a territory for invasion while avoiding a large-scale conflict.

So, does this mean that Ryazanov was mistaken? Should nations building resiliency against invasion once again focus on large-scale combat as opposed to irregular activities? This Insights article argues that the lackluster results that the Russian military has demonstrated in Ukraine, both during its initial invasion and its subsequent occupation of Ukrainian territories, can instead be used to validate many of Ryazanov’s theories. As the Russian author puts it, “the art of partisan warfare, of course, includes its own tactical, operational, and strategic art… that disdains repetition and always surprises the enemy with unique solutions.” Those countries that succeed in preparing and incorporating the art of partisan warfare into their national defense strategies will find themselves best situated to have a strategic advantage in future conflicts. Meanwhile, those that do not account for the “surprises” and “unique solutions” that irregular warfare entails will find themselves ill-prepared to face future threats.

Several questions discussed in Fundamentals of Partisan Warfare stand out as especially relevant to the current situation in Ukraine and can serve as good starting points for further discussion on the topic. These include, but are not limited to: what tactics can an underground resistance employ when faced with a stronger foe? What factors are crucial in determining the success of a resistance movement? And, finally, is there a possibility of an insurgency occurring on Russian soil?

The Ukrainian resistance in territories currently occupied by Russia has primarily taken the form of what Ryazanov calls “urban partisans,” even though the more precise term would be an underground resistance (resistance in Ukraine has not been limited to urban areas). One of the key features of an underground resistance that distinguishes it from traditional forms of guerilla warfare is the need for members to maintain a cover identity as regular citizens. As a result, the types of resistance activities they engage in must always be balanced with the risk of exposure. According to Ryazanov, “Partisan[s]…operating in cities must achieve strictly defined objectives, limited in scope…The main objectives achieved by such detachments are as follows: the elimination of government officials, military, police, and propagandists of the ruling regime; expropriations; sabotage and diversions; providing protection for acts of civil disobedience; and intelligence.”

When analyzing the actions of the Ukrainian resistance in occupied territories, the tactics employed closely mirror those predicted by Ryazanov. Partisans (or Ukrainian SOF under the guise of partisans) have successfully engaged in sabotage attacks, with railway and highway supply lines being prime targets. The Ukrainian resistance has also taken credit for assassinations of Russian-appointed officials and Ukrainian collaborators in occupied areas, such as the assassination of a pro-Russian mayor in Luhansk region in March 2022. Finally, the partisans’ ability to provide intelligence on the positions of Russian military installations and troops has proven invaluable. This critical information is sent to the Ukrainian military for use in targeting for raids and missile strikes. It is important to note, however, that while these efforts have had an impact, they have also come at great human sacrifice, as many of these individuals conducting urban partisan or resistance operations in occupied territories get captured by Russian forces and are either deported or “disappeared.” Further refinement of resistance tradecraft in occupied territories and additional preparation time before an invasion can, given time, reduce these costs.

Compared to the subsequent mixed results of the underground resistance to the occupation, Ukraine demonstrated great competence in using traditional partisans to conduct guerilla actions during the initial invasion. Ukraine was significantly more prepared for militarized resistance to invasion since it was the primary focus of Western SOF-provided training prior to the war. However, the skills learned in traditional, military partisan training turned out to be insufficient to prepare for civilian, clandestine partisan activities. The lessons learned from the successes and failures of the Ukrainian resistance, along with the analysis of past conflicts, such as the Chechen Wars, from a Russian perspective, can help improve resilience and resistance preparations in the future.

Another salient point discussed in Ryazanov’s article is the factors that determine whether a resistance succeeds or fails. The prolific activity of the Ukrainian resistance provides a valuable case study of how, with careful planning and preparation, a nation can create the necessary groundwork for resistance to invasion and occupation. However, it also shows that for these measures to have maximum effect, they must be done years in advance. The effectiveness of resistance can also be impacted by both internal and external factors. Ryazanov identifies that, “if talking about conducting a partisan struggle against a foreign aggressor…an important factor is the results of the regular army’s combat operations on the main front and the level of preparedness of the nation to conduct a partisan conflict.” Russia’s underestimation of these two key factors in Ukraine and the inconsistent approach that it has taken to counter-resistance has led to a failure to fully quell the resistance in occupied areas, even after more than a year of occupation.

A critical mistake during Russia’s invasion was the assumption that Russian forces would be welcomed with open arms by local populations and that resistance levels to the invasion and occupation would be minimal. Instead, the Ukrainian population showed an incredible willingness to resist a stronger foe, even exceeding the expectations of some Western observers. In addition, Ukraine succeeded in halting the Russian advance and even scored some major victories, such as the retaking of the city of Kherson in November of last year. This has prevented Russia from fully focusing its forces on suppressing the resistance, and it also provides a much-needed morale boost for resistance fighters. According to Ryazanov, the Ukrainian resistance will maintain an advantage as long as the main force continues to succeed. However, this reliance also presents an important weakness for the resistance. If the main force fails to produce results on the battlefield, it might negatively impact the morale of resistance members. In turn, they might be less willing to engage in activities that have a risk of exposure, such as passing on information on Russian troop positions. Had Russian troops been successful at occupying Ukraine on a larger scale, this and other weaknesses of the Ukrainian underground elements may have proven decisive.

Discussion of the factors needed for successful resistance can also help explain why the results of resistance were so different in 2014, when Russia succeeded in its primary goal of capturing and illegally annexing Crimea and parts of the eastern Donbas region, and in 2022, when the invasion failed to achieve its primary goal of taking Kyiv. As noted by Ryazanov, the level of preparation of a nation to mount a resistance, both civil and military, plays a major role. In 2014, Russian special operators, working in the shadows, successfully created the necessary pre-conditions so that the subsequent invasion and annexation would go as smoothly as possible, with information operations being a crucial aspect. At the time, Ukraine was not fully prepared to face this strategy. However, by the time of the Russian invasion in February 2022, the situation was different. The preparations of the Ukrainian government and citizenry, the development of a legal framework for resistance, and the increased availability and effectiveness of man-portable weapons (another key factor predicted by Ryazanov), among other reasons, made Ukraine much more prepared to organize and conduct a successful resistance to invasion. In addition, professional training in resistance tactics and operations was given by NATO experts to volunteers across the country. While there were some mishaps in Ukraine’s approach, notably the lack of plans for a worst-case scenario, such as the full occupation of Ukraine or in which the Kyiv government would be eliminated or forced to leave the country, Ukraine’s preparations proved better suited for a partisan war than those of Russia. Unlike its adversary, Ukraine did not underestimate its opponent and used its past experiences from the invasion of 2014 to prepare resilience and resistance specially tailored to counter Russian aggression, including IW techniques such as information operations.

Finally, Ryazanov puts forth the possibility of a partisan conflict occurring on Russian soil, an idea that recent events have made increasingly relevant. Writing in 2008, Ryazanov fully expected that Chechnya would not be the last insurgency that Russia would face, writing:

“Yet, let us not forget the bloody experience of fighting in Chechnya. It is quite possible that this ‘low-intensity conflict’ will not be the last one on Russian territory. And this, in turn, means that it is necessary to work out scenarios such as military operations against irregular armed formations. In this case, the fight [will be] against partisan, insurgent, and other irregular armed formations, as well as against sabotage and intelligence units, and detachments of foreign army special operations forces….”

Recent events in Russia suggest that Ryazanov’s warnings may have been accurate. Groups of Russian fighters trained and supported by Ukraine, such as the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Freedom of Russia Legion, have engaged in cross-border raids from Ukraine into Russian cities. In June, the Russian private military company, Wagner Group, which fits Ryazanov’s definition of an “other irregular armed formation,” held an armed march on Moscow, albeit a short-lived one. Even though these events fall short of a full-scale insurgency, they have made the possibility of further such escalation a plausible threat, one that will likely, as Ryazanov predicted, be supported by Ukrainian intelligence and special operations forces. If such a scenario were to develop, it remains to be seen how well prepared the Russian government is to counter a major irregular threat coming from within its own borders.

In conclusion, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reinforces the importance of partisan and counter-partisan warfare as a core aspect of modern IW, whether it is in resistance to invasion and occupation or in support of insurgency/counter-insurgency operations in foreign countries. The countries that succeed in preparing and incorporating the art of partisan warfare into their national defense strategies will find themselves best situated to have a strategic advantage in future conflicts. Today, this is already being done in many NATO nations, including the Baltic States and Poland, as well as other countries such as Moldova, Georgia, Taiwan, and Mongolia. A key aspect of this preparation will be understanding historical case studies, such as the Second Chechen War, and the clues they can reveal on how aggressors such as Russia plan to conduct future irregular warfare operations. In this regard, the study of past works of Russian military thought on the subject, such as the article translated by the IWC, can prove invaluable. Through its Translations initiative, the IWC will continue to bring such documents to light for the use of policymakers, practitioners, and scholars.

irregularwarfarecenter.org

4. Why Our Generals Can't Think

I would counter and say I have been fortunate to work for many generals who can and do think and was lucky to be mentored by them (including often before they became generals as well as many who did not become generals.)

Excerpts:

Our command and staff colleges should require a program of rigorous reading of military history interspersed with periodic exercises that require the students to make sound decisions, and insist that they be able to issue clear plans and orders based on those decisions. Those who show wise and decisive decision-making capability can be identified for command-oriented tracks, while those more inclined toward staff work can be pointed in that direction.

Some will be able to do equally well and should be marked as having the potential to go much further. Others who can't do either should be culled and prevented from further promotion. This system may sound Darwinian, but we entrust the lives of our children to these people. Our kids and grandkids deserve the best we can do for them. We did not get that in Kabul.

When I was an officer candidate, our staff platoon commander, Lt. James Webb -- a highly decorated combat veteran, encouraged us to read and write about our profession and not become ignorant "lifers." He went on to become secretary of the Navy and a U.S. senator. Today, far too many ignorant lifers are senior flag officers.

PME should consist of 5 subjects tailored for the level of experience of the students:

1. History
2. Military Theory
3. Geography
4. Operational Art
5. Strategy

Thoughts on Professional Military Education: After 9-11, Iraq, and Afghanistan in the Era of Fiscal Austerity Sun, 01/01/2012 https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thoughts-professional-military-education-after-9-11-iraq-and-afghanistan-era-fiscal

Why Our Generals Can't Think | Military.com

www-military-com.cdn.ampproject.org · by 22 Sep 2023 Military.com | Gary Anderson

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

Having read Franklin Foer's account in the October issue of The Atlantic describing the disastrous evacuation of Afghanistan, I was struck by what it did not contain. Nowhere in the months leading up to the withdrawal did a senior military leader question the choice of Kabul's Karzai International Airport over the more defensible Bagram military air base.

The military chain of command knew an evacuation was imminent for months, and the Kabul airport was even more vulnerable to attack than the disastrous French position at Dien Bien Phu during the first Vietnam war. Despite that, not a single general officer, beginning with the secretary of defense -- a retired general -- raised an objection to the State Department's choice of the Kabul Airport. One of two things happened here: Either they lacked the moral courage to speak up, or they did not know. In either case, I am convinced that the deplorable state of our military professional education system lies at the root of the problem.

Related: Why Our Generals Don't Win

A misguided attempt to reform professional military education (JPME) in the 1980s led by the late Ike Skelton and other military reformers in Congress mandated that masters-level degrees be granted at all command and staff colleges, as well as a required study in "jointness." This forced all the military midlevel colleges to make room in their courses of study to accommodate the requirements of civilian academia to grant an advanced degree. What got lost in the mix was the serious study of the military profession that was formerly required.

Command and staff colleges had traditionally been the places where aspiring senior commanders really learned their trade as majors or lieutenant commanders. This used to include a serious study of military theory, history and staff planning. That is not currently the case.

Today, seminar groups are led by two instructors -- one a uniformed officer and the other an academic. There is generally no requirement that either be an expert in combined-arms combat on land, in the air, or on the sea. In some cases, they're simply not knowledgeable about the study of war.

If there is a constant in the military profession, it is that the great captains -- with the possible exception of born military geniuses such as Genghis Khan -- have been keen students of history. The greats, from Alexander to Patton, have been avid readers of history, through which they learned the patterns of conflict. War is largely immutable. Technologies change, but the nature of war largely remains the same. Even Genghis -- who was probably illiterate -- sent his aspiring commanders to study under his great subordinate Subutai, arguably one of the great strategic and operational geniuses of history. Patton could see a situation in Sicily that reminded him of a similar battle in the Second Punic War. Offering second-rate advanced degrees in national security studies or international relations is no substitute for the serious study of war. Advanced degrees can be obtained through the GI Bill.

What retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper calls recognitional decision-making cannot be taught; it must be absorbed through a thorough study of the profession. This includes the capability and moral courage to make the right decision under pressure. But there is also a need to have the wisdom to know when to say "no" to a patently stupid order or plan.

That includes the tact to convince senior civilians that there are better alternatives and the moral courage to offer to resign if an order is illegal or immoral. I firmly believe that our general officers who orchestrated the Kabul fiasco were unprepared to make those key decisions because of a lack of competent professional military education. That does not mean that we don't still produce some good generals, but my experience has been that they are largely self-taught by a rigorous process of independent professional reading. They have succeeded largely despite an ineffectual JPME system.

Our command and staff colleges should require a program of rigorous reading of military history interspersed with periodic exercises that require the students to make sound decisions, and insist that they be able to issue clear plans and orders based on those decisions. Those who show wise and decisive decision-making capability can be identified for command-oriented tracks, while those more inclined toward staff work can be pointed in that direction.

Some will be able to do equally well and should be marked as having the potential to go much further. Others who can't do either should be culled and prevented from further promotion. This system may sound Darwinian, but we entrust the lives of our children to these people. Our kids and grandkids deserve the best we can do for them. We did not get that in Kabul.

When I was an officer candidate, our staff platoon commander, Lt. James Webb -- a highly decorated combat veteran, encouraged us to read and write about our profession and not become ignorant "lifers." He went on to become secretary of the Navy and a U.S. senator. Today, far too many ignorant lifers are senior flag officers.

-- Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps officer who served as a special adviser to the deputy secretary of defense and as a civilian adviser in Iraq and Afghanistan. He lectures on Alternative Analysis at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs.

www-military-com.cdn.ampproject.org · by 22 Sep 2023 Military.com | Gary Anderson

5. Half of DOD civilians would get furloughed in a shutdown, plans show

We have met the enemy and he is us (or some in Congress)

Graphic at the link. https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2023/09/see-who-would-get-furloughed-shutdown-year/390558/

Half of DOD civilians would get furloughed in a shutdown, plans show

The Biden administration is planning to take a novel approach at some agencies.

ERIC KATZ | SEPTEMBER 22, 2023

defenseone.com · by Eric Katz

With lawmakers struggling to come up with a plan to fund the government past Sept. 30, agencies are dusting off their shutdown plans.

In conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget, every agency in government maintains a contingency plan for a lapse in appropriations. That includes exactly which work it will continue to conduct despite not receiving annual funding, as well as which employees it will require to continue working to carry it out.

The White House, through OMB, maintains some latitude in the exact consequences of a shutdown. Federal employees funded through mechanisms other than annual appropriations, as well as those necessary to protect life and property, are considered either “exempted” or “excepted” and work throughout shutdowns on only the promise of backpay. The rest of employees are sent home on furlough without pay, though, following the record-setting 35-day shutdown in 2018 and 2019, those workers are now also guaranteed backpay. Different administrations have taken varying approaches in determining who gets furloughed and who works, with the Trump administration taking an unusually aggressive approach to keeping staff at work.

Accusing its predecessors of “weaponizing” shutdowns, Trump’s OMB instructed agencies to identify “carry-forward funding” and “transfer authority” to minimize the impact of shutdowns. That led to several agencies that in prior appropriations lapses sent home the vast majority of its workforce instead furloughing very few employees, though in some cases agencies were forced to increase the number of employees it furloughed as the shutdown dragged on.

Other agencies, meanwhile, began calling employees back to the office as the lengthy shutdown caused more scenarios to crop up that the administration deemed as exempted work.

Some agencies have already started planning for those contingencies. The Justice Department, for example, noted components may call some employees back to work "if the need for their services become critical," and may "furlough others as conditions change." The Homeland Security Department is planning to recall 1,400 employees if a shutdown drags on for more than five days.

OMB declined to comment on the record on the approach the Biden administration would take this year, though preliminary public shutdown plans show it will take a similar approach in aggressively instructing employees to continue working.

In the shutdown that began in December 2018, some agencies had already received full-year appropriations and were therefore unaffected by the funding lapse. About 850,000 federal employees were affected, including around 345,000 who were furloughed. The entire federal workforce is facing the threat of a shutdown this time around, and—according to the most up-to-date plans publicly available—the Biden administration plans to furlough about 737,000, or 34%, of them.

Some of that change in overall furlough rate is due to the agencies that were unaffected in 2018, though other variances are attributable to the Biden administration taking a different approach or the availability of new funds. At the Treasury Department, for example, the Internal Revenue Service is planning, according to a document posted to its website last year but recently scrubbed, to keep its entire workforce on board during a shutdown. Funding from the Inflation Reduction Act will make that possible, the agency said. Treasury’s furlough rate is now set to be just 2%, compared to 83% when funding lapsed in 2018.

The Small Business Administration is also anticipating a different approach, projecting it will furlough just 17% of its staff in a shutdown this year compared to 65% in 2018. The Housing and Urban Development Department would send home 82% of its employees, compared to 95% in the last shutdown.

The National Science Foundation noted it will "use available carryover balances to continue daily operations," while Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator Deanne Criswell said at the White House last week it can maintain all necessary staff funded through the Disaster Relief Fund.

On the other side of the spectrum, the Environmental Protection Agency, which initially furloughed virtually none of its employees in 2018 after it identified “carry-over funds” to stay open, is planning to send home 93% of its workers. The Federal Communications Commission did not furlough any employees in 2018 but is planning to send home 82% of them this time around.

The Biden administration’s hands may be more tied than in years past.

The Government Accountability Office, which enforces the Anti-Deficiency Act, the law that governs federal spending during shutdowns, ultimately found the Trump administration acted unlawfully during the 2018-2019 funding lapse. GAO said the Interior Department violated the law when it used recreation fees collected by the National Park Service to keep parks open and continue services such as trash collection and restroom maintenance. It also faulted the Agriculture Department for disbursing Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits early during the shutdown

The Trump administration's decisions tore "at the very fabric of Congress’s constitutional power of the purse,” said GAO, which threatened fines and imprisonment for officials who acted similarly in the future.

OMB has instructed agencies across government to update their shutdown contingency plans, though many have not yet publicly posted them. Government Executive took the most recently available plans to calculate furlough data, some of which were accessed via archived versions. In some cases, OMB is in the process of reviewing newer versions of agency plans. Agencies like the Interior Department and General Services Administration are not included in the below chart, as they have not posted updated plans since the Trump administration.

OMB will inform agencies of when to tell employees whether or not they are furloughed, which would be followed by formal furlough notices once a shutdown officially begins.

defenseone.com · by Eric Katz

6. Gen. Randy George sworn in as 41st Army Chief of Staff

Very cool. Get it done with the troops in the ness hall. Probably better and more meaningful than any Pentagon ceremony!

Excerpt:

Mere hours after being confirmed by a vote in the U.S. Senate, Gen. Randy George was sworn in as the 41st Chief of Staff of the Army from more than 3,000 miles away from The Pentagon, by Secretary of the Army, Christine Wormuth.

Gen. Randy George sworn in as 41st Army Chief of Staff

By Sgt. 1st Class Michael SwordSeptember 21, 2023

https://www.army.mil/article/270160/gen_randy_george_sworn_in_as_41st_army_chief_of_staff?utm

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JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSON, Alaska — “The Secretary of the Army is going to swear in the 41st chief of our Army, and you’re going to witness it.”

Maj. Gen. Brian Eifler, commanding general of the 11th Airborne Division, delivered the news to nearly 100 Arctic Angels at the Gold Rush Inn at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Sept. 21.

“This is a big deal, a historic event,” he continued. “It’s going to happen right here in our dining facility, in the 11th Airborne Division.”

Mere hours after being confirmed by a vote in the U.S. Senate, Gen. Randy George was sworn in as the 41st Chief of Staff of the Army from more than 3,000 miles away from The Pentagon, by Secretary of the Army, Christine Wormuth.

"We are super excited that you are officially in the seat,” she said. “Have a great trip, and we look forward to seeing you when you come back.”

George, along with Sgt. Maj. of the Army Michael Weimer, are in Alaska visiting soldiers and leaders of the 11th Airborne Division at JBER and Fort Wainwright, learning more about the unique challenges they face in the Arctic, before a trip through the Indo-Pacific.

While the ceremony was untraditional, it was fitting. The Arctic requires adaptability, and while it wasn’t where these ceremonies are generally held, George was happy to be surrounded by 11th Airborne Division soldiers.

“This is the reason the Army is great,” he said. “Because of people like all of you that are in the room, and I couldn’t be more honored to do it right here in JBER with the 11th Airborne Division.”

7. Ransomware gang targeting defense firms, FBI warns

Ransomware gang targeting defense firms, FBI warns

The Snatch ransomware group has been learning from others to improve its own ploys, including data theft and double extortion, cyber authorities say.

defenseone.com · by Defense One Staff

Just_Super

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Threats

The Snatch ransomware group has been learning from others to improve its own ploys, including data theft and double extortion, cyber authorities say.

A five-year-old ransomware gang is upping its game against U.S. defense firms and other companies, the FBI and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency said Thursday.

A joint advisory says the Snatch group has been learning from others to improve its own ransomware, which locks up a victim's computers until a ransom is paid, and also allows the group to steal sensitive data and threaten to post it online, a ploy called double extortion.

The five-year old group is known for innovative and stealthly work, according to James McQuiggan, security awareness advocate at KnowBe4.

"Like many other ransomware groups, they like to dwell within the networks, soaking up as much data and intel about the organization," McQuiggan told Nextgov/FCW, a Defense One sister publication. "These actions reiterate the need for rapid threat detection and response before ransomware executes."

The group's members typically exploit weaknesses found in Remote Desktop Protocol and use compromised credentials to gain initial access to victims' networks, the advisor said. They can be patient as well; the group has been seen to wait three months after the initial break-in to start stealing data.

The advisory recommends that organizations limit users' access privileges, perform regular patching and segmentation, maintain consistent backups, regularly audit remote access tools on their networks, and review logs for execution of remote access software.

CISA and the FBI said they "strongly discourage paying ransom" and encouraged victims to report ransomware incidents to the bureau's local field offices and the cyber defense agency's reporting channel.

CISA and the FBI have previously released similar advisories warning about ransomware groups targeting software and networks used by federal agencies, including the ransomware gang known as CL0P, which exploited a vulnerability in the popular file transfer service MOVEit earlier this year.

8. Taiwan is using generative AI to fight Chinese disinfo

​Who would have thought AI is a key tool in political warfare?

Excerpts:

The U.S. intelligence community is also looking at how it can use generative artificial intelligence to raise productivity, Avril Haines, the Director of National Intelligence, said during the summit.

“We have a program called the Unity program that's supposed to do just that. It's actually focused on artificial intelligence and it's supposed to help us take the best practices and then scale them and fund the scaling to some extent,” Haines said.

But she said the United States has much more work to do to understand both the development ecosystem for such tools that are rooted in private companies and better detect how adversaries will use generative AI to attack the United States.

Haines said One fear, she said, is that new tools like generative AI are so powerful that small nations or non-state actors will be able to use them to great effect to rival the capabilities of much larger, more predictable adversaries like China. “The state actors that we typically focus on are also, yes, going to be part of what we're going to be looking at in terms of the threat. But if you've got something that's cheaply available, that's commercially available, you might also see other state actors that typically would not be engaging in these kinds of threats doing so more because it's more available to them,” she said.

Taiwan is using generative AI to fight Chinese disinfo

But LLM models will enable new adversaries as well as allies, top intelligence official warns.

PATRICK TUCKER | SEPTEMBER 22, 2023

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

Kaohsiung People wave their smartphones with the LED lights in Kaohsiung, Taiwan on December 21, 2019. Jose Lopes Amaral / NurPhoto via Getty Images

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Science & Tech

But LLM models will enable new adversaries as well as allies, top intelligence official warns.

|

September 22, 2023

• China
• Infowar
• Artificial Intelligence

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

September 22, 2023

• China
• Infowar
• Artificial Intelligence

Many U.S. observers are waiting in dread for China to attempt a military takeover of Taiwan sometime before 2027, but beneath the threshold of armed conflict, China is already attacking vital Taiwanese information streams, both physically and virtually, while the island develops new tools and techniques to resist.

In April, a Chinese fishing vessel, followed by a cargo ship, dragged their anchors east of Taiwan’s Matsu islands, severing the two communications cables that link the islands with Taiwan itself, an act of either sabotage or clumsiness that has occurred at least 27 times in just the last five years. Taiwan has said that it suspects the severings were intentional. And of course attacks on commercial and public telecommunications channels are now a common occurrence between adversarial nations, as when Russia attacked the U.S.-based satellite communications company Viasat an hour before Moscow launched its renewed war on Ukraine.

The Taiwanese government took the interruption as an opportunity to help citizens develop workarounds to continuous Chinese-caused, er, service interruptions.

“We took that as a chance to not just teach people about, you know, microwave, and also satellite [communications] backup and things like that; we also saw a lot of civil society start learning about how to set up emergency communications when the bandwidth is limited.” Audrey Tang, Taiwan’s minister of digital affairs, told audiences during the Special Competitive Studies Project Summit in Washington, D.C. on Thursday.

But various Chinese-backed actors also regularly target the Taiwanese population with coordinated messaging and influence campaigns. A 2019 report from cybersecurity company Record Future found that the Chinese government employs as many as half a million people to sway opinions on social media at home and around the world.

As Taiwan approaches a pivotal presidential election in January, Tang said that both the government and a wide network of volunteers are preparing for China to increase efforts to manipulate Taiwanese civilians. Taiwanese civil society has developed new organizations to combat it. A group called Cofacts allows users to forward dubious messages to a chatbot. Human editors check the messages, enter them into a database, and get back to the user with a verdict.

The number of volunteers to man the service and others like are few compared to the size of China’s efforts, said Tang. “The people who actually do … foreign interference nowadays coordinated with cyber attack have a lot of resources,” she said.

Enter generative AI tools such as large language models, which power some of the big breakthrough online AI tools such as ChatGPT. “This year, because gen AI is just so mailable, they just fine-tuned a language module together that can clarify such disinformation…adding back a context and things like that. So we're no longer outnumbered,” she said. It also allows the citizen-run venture to remain as such, as opposed to run by the government, which is important for its credibility. “It doesn't need dedicated hardware or resources and can be done on laptops. It is still squarely in the social sector by volunteers, which is the best place to be so that it will not be captured by any state or a capitalist apparatus.”

The U.S. intelligence community is also looking at how it can use generative artificial intelligence to raise productivity, Avril Haines, the Director of National Intelligence, said during the summit.

“We have a program called the Unity program that's supposed to do just that. It's actually focused on artificial intelligence and it's supposed to help us take the best practices and then scale them and fund the scaling to some extent,” Haines said.

But she said the United States has much more work to do to understand both the development ecosystem for such tools that are rooted in private companies and better detect how adversaries will use generative AI to attack the United States.

Haines said One fear, she said, is that new tools like generative AI are so powerful that small nations or non-state actors will be able to use them to great effect to rival the capabilities of much larger, more predictable adversaries like China. “The state actors that we typically focus on are also, yes, going to be part of what we're going to be looking at in terms of the threat. But if you've got something that's cheaply available, that's commercially available, you might also see other state actors that typically would not be engaging in these kinds of threats doing so more because it's more available to them,” she said.

9. How small drones changed modern warfare

How small drones changed modern warfare

Small drones can have a big impact.

BY JOSHUA SKOVLUND | PUBLISHED SEP 22, 2023 6:07 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · September 22, 2023

With the current ease of access to social media, war has never been more visible worldwide than it is today. Videos of small drones carrying out devastating attacks targeting Russian personnel on Ukrainian soil have permeated popular social media feeds like X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, and TikTok.

However, small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) can be complex, encompassing everything from large unmanned planes with massive payloads to small palm-sized quadcopters conducting reconnaissance in hard-to-reach areas. Small drones come in various models, from top-of-the-line drones the US Military has to quadcopters right off Amazon or your local Walmart’s shelves.

What is a small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS)?

Simply put, a sUAS is a small drone. Each drone typically has a camera, four rotors, and a remote control. Depending on the model, of which there are several different types, each drone can have variable ranges as low as 50 meters up to as far out as 20,000 meters.

The US Military has used drones of all sizes for decades for reconnaissance and surgical strikes. The types of drones many Americans saw in the news are fixed-wing Reaper or Predator-style drones capable of devastating surgical strikes on an intended target with low collateral damage.

Small drone capabilities

Drones are used throughout the battlespace for surveillance and precision attacks. In recent years, the Military has worked to make smaller drones that can be launched from the palm of a soldier’s hand to aid in looking ahead for ambushes, roadside IEDs, or several other purposes.

Depending on the quality of the drone, they can travel various distances. Flight time is typically restricted by battery life. Some of the top small drones of 2023 have a range of 18 to 600 minutes. The carrying capacity of a drone is dependent on the power-to-weight ratio. A small commercial drone can carry anywhere from .5 to 5 pounds, depending on the model.

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But small drones and their place in warfare didn’t stop with reach and carrying capacity.

MIT Technology Review reported the US Navy is working to implement drone swarm technology and tactics. This tactic entails building thousands of small drones that can flock together to overwhelm anti-aircraft defenses or apply a swarm in a multi-angle attack that would destroy a warship’s antennas, guns, and command center.

The international defense industry is in an arms race to master the small drone technology and tactics, hoping to add one more lethal tool to each country’s military.

Tabletop learning event and the threat of sUAS

The Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) held a Large-Scale Combat Operations Tabletop Learning Event from Sept. 19-20, 2023, at RAND’s Washington, D.C., office.

The event was designed to explore weaknesses and strengths in the U.S. military’s ability to counter the growing threat of sUAS, testing each command’s response to sUAS attack capabilities. U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command participated in the exercise.

Col. Glenn Henke, the Military Deputy of the JCO, described the tabletop event as each command going against four waves of small drone attacks, “Each one increasing in difficulty and complexity.” The potential threats included swarming and mass attacks.

The director of the Engineering and Applied Sciences Department and senior physical scientist at the RAND Corporation, Chris Pernin, said the tabletop event did cause some “learning” in the area of how many counter-sUAS systems are needed throughout the Military’s ranks but did not warrant any significant changes and requires further research.

Though the panel experts would not elaborate, several solutions for countering sUAS attacks were tested.

“We can say that we did look at a wide range of capabilities that could enhance the survivability of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in the future,” Pernin said.

A brief history of drones in America’s wars

The US Military first used small drones on a large scale during the Vietnam War. Drones were used to spot and aid bombings or artillery strikes, jam North Vietnamese radars, and disseminate propaganda leaflets.

As technology advanced, drones were armed and used for surgical strikes throughout Iraq and Afghanistan during the War on Terror to minimize collateral damage in populated areas while still taking out a target. The use of kinetic drone strikes increased over the years, gaining notoriety during President Barack Obama’s drone campaign, who oversaw more drone strikes in his first year as president than all of President George W. Bush’s presidency. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, 542 drone strikes were executed during Obama’s two terms including the deaths of multiple American citizens.

The Trump administration immediately implemented an increased pace of drone strikes, and outpaced the Obama administration two years into Trump’s presidency, notably using a drone strike to kill Iranian commander Qassim Suleimani outside of Baghdad International Airport. Drone strikes decreased during the Biden presidency, though the administration was heavily criticized after a botched drone strike killed 10 innocent civilians — including 7 children — during the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

But no conflict has displayed the devastating capabilities of small drones more than the war in Ukraine.

Small drones in Ukraine

Calls for donated commercial drones flooded social media after Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022. Because the internet and social media are so accessible, psychological warfare has increased in its effect on the masses. Combat footage has been regularly posted by Russia and Ukraine to show successes on the battlefield.

In line with the earliest use of small drones, videos of Ukrainian military servicemembers spotting targets for artillery strikes have been repeatedly displayed.

Zaporizhia Oblast, Ukrainian forces hit a Russian Bm-27 Uragan MRL with a drone-spotted M30A1 GMLRS rocket. pic.twitter.com/Yy5uKgY5tN

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) September 21, 2023

But more up close and personal attacks have peppered social media feeds.

The drone war has already completely covered all fronts: the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine daily during daylight hours continuously attack enemy infantry in the trenches with combat drones. Southern front. pic.twitter.com/dusYeo3bpo

— Ukraine War (@AlexeyKovalen10) November 28, 2022

Ukraine has seemingly mastered the combination of small drones and military tactics. Their capabilities vary, from precision airstrikes to detecting enemies in complicated trench networks. The Ukrainian military has used small drones to coordinate personnel and armor assets for a pinpoint attack or small units of Ukrainian special operations soldiers to avoid large enemy formations.

Although the ways small drones are used may evolve with every conflict and technological advance, it’s clear that small drones will continue to play a prominent role in 21st-century warfare.

The latest on Task & Purpose

• How a Native Alaskan became a legendary Navy SEAL
• Military secrets leaked on ‘War Thunder’ forums yet again
• US Navy decommissions another littoral combat ship, the USS Milwaukee
• Who will be the president’s top military adviser after Gen. Milley retires?
• 4,500 3rd Infantry Division soldiers deploying to Eastern Europe

taskandpurpose.com · by Joshua Skovlund · September 22, 2023

10. US, Japan and Philippines call out China over disputed sea tensions at UN meet

US, Japan and Philippines call out China over disputed sea tensions at UN meet

By Mara Cepeda The Straits Times2 min

September 22, 2023

View Original

Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo

NEW YORK – The foreign ministers of the United States, Japan and the Philippines have criticised China at the United Nations, as its ships continue to shadow Manila’s resupply missions to a remote military outpost in the disputed South China Sea.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa, and Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo on Friday held a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.

US Department of State spokesman Matthew Miller said the foreign ministers reaffirmed their commitment to promote peace and stability in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, where Beijing has competing territorial claims with the Philippines and Japan, respectively.

They zeroed in on China’s recent aggressive behaviour against the Philippines’ resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands where a handful of Filipino soldiers have been living on the decrepit World War II-era warship BRP Sierra Madre.

The ship was intentionally grounded there in 1999 to help assert the Philippines’ sovereignty claim over the area.

“The three countries will continue to call out behaviour that is inconsistent with international law, including the People’s Republic of China’s recent actions near Second Thomas Shoal that interfered with the Philippines’ lawful exercise of high seas freedom of navigation,” said Mr Miller.

The US, Japan and Philippines also agreed to continue working together “as equal and sovereign partners, for a free and open Indo-Pacific region that upholds international law”.

In August, eight Chinese vessels shadowed and fired water cannons at smaller Philippines boats on a routine resupply mission for Filipino troops at the disputed shoal.

In at least two succeeding resupply missions between August and early September, Chinese ships continued to shadow the Philippine supply vessels on the way to Second Thomas Shoal.

Beijing then accused Manila of seeking to permanently occupy the disputed shoal and insisted that the Philippines earlier promised to remove the grounded warship from the submerged reef it calls Ren’ai Jiao.

The trilateral meeting between officials from Washington, Tokyo and Manila on the UNGA sidelines came as the Philippines continues to forge stronger defence ties with military allies like the US, Japan and Australia to help counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

The increasing institutionalisation of this trilateral cooperation, along with the quadrilateral partnership with Australia, is a huge benefit for the Philippines, said Mr Gregory Poling, chief of the South-east Asia programme at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“It integrates Manila more into the regional alliance network, increases its leverage vis-a-vis China, and gives it greater say in the decision-making of Washington, Tokyo and Canberra, which is what more equal alliances are all about,” Mr Poling added.

Manila has been in talks with US, Japan and Australia on the possible conduct of joint patrols in the eastern parts of the South China Sea that lie within the Philippines’ 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone.

11. First Tomb Badge Awarded to Female Infantry Soldier

Hooah. BZ to Pfc. Jessica Kwiatkowski.

First Tomb Badge Awarded to Female Infantry Soldier

defense.gov · by Kevin M. Hymel, Arlington National Cemetery Historian

Army Pfc. Jessica Kwiatkowski made history on Sept. 18, 2023, when she became the first woman infantry soldier to earn the Guard, Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Identification Badge. Other women have earned the badge, but they have come from other career fields. Tomb Guards who earn the badge also earn the distinction of being referred to as Sentinels.

Tomb Guard

Army Pfc. Jessica Kwiatkowski, a tomb guard from the 3d U.S. Infantry Regiment, walks the mat at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Va., Aug. 2, 2023. Kwiatkowski was the subject of the viral social media video of a soldier guarding the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier during the July 29th severe storm that hit the National Capital Region.

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Photo By: Elizabeth Fraser, Army

VIRIN: 230802-A-IW468-019

Kwiatkowski stood at attention next to Spc. Gavin Glover, who also earned his badge, in the chapel of Arlington National Cemetery's Memorial Amphitheater as 1st Lt. Henry Newstrom, the commander of the Guard, congratulated them on becoming sentinels.

"You are now fully vested members of a small team that the nation trusts to do its most important ceremonial mission," he told a crowd of about 30 people.

To earn the badge, soldiers must complete five phases of testing and demonstrate a high degree of proficiency in general Army and Tomb Guard knowledge. They also must maintain the meticulous appearance of the uniforms worn by Tomb Guards while on duty; master the various guard changes and ceremonies conducted at the Tomb; and demonstrate verbal and written knowledge of over 12 different poems and 200 Arlington National Cemetery gravesites.

Guarding the Tomb

Army Pfc. Jessica Kwiatkowski and two other soldiers assigned to the 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment, known as "The Old Guard," keep watch at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Va., Aug. 2, 2023.

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At the ceremony, Kwiatkowski's and Glover's fathers pinned the badges on the right breast pockets of their uniforms. Lt. Col. Peter Vangjel, the commander of the 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment, known as "The Old Guard," explained the importance of the Tomb Guards.

"More people come to see the Tomb Guards, more people see them on television, more people walk through here every day than most other Army formations put together," he said. "They have incredible influence."

Badge Ceremony

Army Pfc. Jessica Kwiatkowski, left, and Spc. Gavin Glover, center, earn the Guard, Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Identification Badge during a ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery, Va., Sept. 18, 2023.

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Kwiatkowski, who gained the public's attention when a video of her guarding the Tomb during a severe thunderstorm went viral, remained humble about her pioneering achievement.

"I'm honestly just another Tomb Guard," she said. When asked about her life after going viral, she mentioned that Army leaders had given her a lot of support, explaining, "They tell me congratulations and keep doing the mission."

We couldn't be prouder of the @USArmyOldGuard Soldiers who watch over the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

Winds reached 60-85 mph in the DC region. This sentinel leans into it and continues marching.

Honor. https://t.co/WcGAnSl8xL

— Arlington National Cemetery (@ArlingtonNatl) July 30, 2023

Glover appreciates the rarity of his badge. "Both my parents, who are retired Army officers, have never met somebody with one," he explained. The hardest part of earning his badge, he said, was the upkeep of his various uniforms.

Both the new sentinels' parents were proud of their achievement. Kwiatkowski's mother, Lynne, brought tissues for the emotional event. "When she does something, she does it 110 percent," she said. "That's always been her since she came into this world." When asked about his daughter guarding the Tomb in the storm, Kwiatkowski's father, Jason, explained, "That's just how she is; she's always tried to attack the hardest thing possible."

Guard Duty

Army Pfc. Jessica Kwiatkowski, assigned to the 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment, known as "The Old Guard," walks the mat at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Va., Aug. 2, 2023.

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Glover's father Jim, a retired Army major, beamed with pride at his son's achievement. "It's been amazing watching his progress through the testing process and reaching these standards," he said. "I know it's going to serve him well in the Army."

Among the crowd of soldiers and Arlington National Cemetery employees was an older gentleman. Joey Spangler had been a Tomb Guard almost 45 years ago and came to the ceremony to see history. "It's a proud moment," he said. "Nothing compares to serving the Unknowns. It's something you'll keep with you for your whole life."

Experience: Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Experience: Tomb of the Unknown Soldier: https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Tomb-of-the-Unknown-Soldier/

Story: Tomb Guard Braves Storm

defense.gov · by Kevin M. Hymel, Arlington National Cemetery Historian

12. Special Ops MH-60 Seen Absolutely Crammed With Modifications

Photos at the link: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/night-stalker-mh-60-seen-absolutely-crammed-with-modifications?utm

Special Ops MH-60 Seen Absolutely Crammed With Modifications

The Army’s Night Stalker Black Hawks are loaded with sensors, defensive systems, and communications gear to take on the hardest of missions.

BY

JOSEPH TREVITHICK

|

UPDATED SEP 21, 2023 5:32 PM EDT

thedrive.com · by Joseph Trevithick · September 21, 2023

It's no secret that the MH-60M Black Hawks belonging to the U.S. Army's elite 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, also known as the Night Stalkers, are absolutely packed with specialized systems. However, newly released pictures, especially the one seen at the top of this story, give a very clear view of just how much has been added to these helicopters to help them perform critical missions under the most demanding conditions.

These pictures were taken earlier in September somewhere in the Bering Sea between Alaska and Russia. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment's (SOAR) MH-60Ms were operating there with the help of the U.S. Navy's San Antonio class amphibious warship USS John P. Murtha.

An uncropped version of the picture at the top of this story, showing a 160th SOAR MH-60M taking off from the USS John P. Murtha. USN

Black Hawks from the 160th SOAR shuttled Navy SEALs to and from the Murtha and conducted other missions as part of a larger special operations capabilities demonstration nicknamed Polar Dagger. The core objectives of this event were to show how special operations forces could help defend critical sites and otherwise support operations in the Arctic and Subarctic regions. The War Zone reported in detail about what MH-60Ms could contribute in these scenarios and the broader significance of Polar Dagger earlier this month.

A pair of MH-60Ms from the 160th SOAR come in to land on the deck of the USS John P. Murtha. USN

In the head-on photograph of the MH-60M from Polar Dagger, the things that stand out the most immediately are the helicopter's terrain-following/terrain avoidance radar on the center of the nose and its AN/ZSQ-2 sensor turret right underneath.

The terrain-following/terrain avoidance radar is an essential tool for the 160th's Black Hawks, allowing them to safely fly extremely low altitude nap-of-the-earth flight profiles, even in poor weather and at night. This helps keep the helicopters away from enemy air defenses and avoid detection in general.

The MH-60Ms that took part in Polar Dagger appear to be fitted with the AN/APQ-174 radar, which is steadily being replaced by the newer and more capable AN/APQ-187 Silent Knight radar, SKR. This radar is also being integrated onto Night Stalker MH-47G Chinook helicopters, as well as U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotors and MC-130J Commando II special operations tanker/transports.

A briefing slide with additional details about the Silent Knight radar. SOCOM

SOCOM

The AN/ZSQ-2 turret has electro-optical and infrared full-motion video cameras, as well as a laser range finder. There is also a version with a laser designator for use on MH-60M configured as heavily armed gunships, also known as Direct Action Penetrators (DAP). DAPs can be armed with laser-guided Hellfire missiles and 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) rockets, among other weaponry.

Another sensor system is also visible to the left of the AN/ZSQ-2. This is associated with the Degraded Visual Environment Pilotage System (DVEPS), which uses a combination of cameras and LIDAR, linked to a terrain database, to help the crew navigate through dust, sand, snow, fog, and other 'degraded' environments.

A close-up of the AN/ZSQ-2 turret and the sensor tied to DVEPS to the left. USN

A larger additional sensor that is part of DVEPS is not seen installed on this particular MH-60M, but the fairing for it, on the opposite side of the sensor turret, is present. The picture below shows a different 160th SOAR MH-60M with the complete DVEPS fitted.

US Army

From the front, arrays of defensive systems are also visible along the top of the helicopter's nose, above its canopy, and on struts on either side of the forward fuselage. These are a mixture of visual/infrared missile, radar, and laser warning sensors, as well as elements of active jammers and other electronic warfare systems. Additional elements of these systems are installed elsewhere along the helicopter to help provide coverage in all directions.

Another close-up highlighting the various arrays of warning sensors. USN

The warning sensors help alert the crew to incoming surface-to-air missiles and other threats, and that they are 'painted' by enemy radars or lasers. They are also linked to other self-defense systems and have the ability to automatically trigger the launch of decoy flares and radar-confusing chaff from dispensers on either side of the tail boom.

Dispensers capable of launching decoy flares and chaff can be seen on the tail boom in this picture of one of the 160th SOAR's MH-60Ms taking part in Polar Dagger. USN

The MH-60Ms from the 160th SOAR that took part in Polar Dagger were also equipped with the Army's new Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM) system. This is a directional infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) system that uses laser beams projected through a pair of turreted beam directors to blind and confuse the seekers on infrared-homing missiles. CIRCM, which is being installed on regular Army Black Hawks, as well as the service's CH-47 Chinook heavy transport and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, integrates with existing warning sensors, which it uses to cue the lasers to incoming threats.

The MH-60M's electronic warfare suite provides additional defensive capability against threats in the radiofrequency spectrum, including radar-guided missiles.

The special operations Black Hawks also have extensive communications suites, as evidenced by a plethora of antennas above and below the fuselage. In the photograph from Polar Dagger showing the MH-60M head-on, an X-shaped satellite communications antenna is notably visible on top of the fuselage right above the cockpit.

The boom holding the MH-60M inflight refueling probe, which extends out forward when in use to help keep the tanker and the trailing drogue clear of the rotor blades, is also prominently visible in the picture on the helicopter's right side.

As noted, non-special operations UH-60s in the Army are also receiving CIRCM. A limited number of the service's HH-60 medical evacuation variants, have received DVEPS, too. However, none of these other Black Hawks have the radar or other sensor capabilities, or the depth of self-protection and communications systems, as the 160ths MH-60Ms. These helicopters are the ultimate modified Black Hawk, at least that we've seen publicly. Of course, the stealth Black Hawks, which have yet to emerge officially, are understood to have a smoother outer 'shell' without the benefit of many of these modifications, relying more on their low-observable features instead.

Altogether, the new picture of the MH-60M coming into land on the USS John P. Murtha in the Bering Sea offers an especially excellent look at just how much additional capability the 160th's Black Hawks really have over other variants.

Editor's Note: The original version of this story said that the MH-60Ms that took part in Polar Dagger were fitted with the AN/APQ-187 Silent Knight radar, but it appears they are actually equipped with the older AN/APQ-174 terrain following/terrain-following/terrain avoidance radar. The two can be difficult to quickly differentiate between from what is visible, but Silent Knight has a blunter radome with a matt finish. The very latest MH-60M configuration with the SKR has even more pronounced differences in the shape of the radar housing and the top of the nose.

Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

thedrive.com · by Joseph Trevithick · September 21, 2023

13. Do China's recent military purges spell trouble for Xi Jinping?

Do China's recent military purges spell trouble for Xi Jinping?

BBC · by Menu

Image source, Getty Images

Image caption,

The officials' disappearances could be viewed as a sign of instability in Mr Xi's leadership, or a show of strength

By Tessa Wong

Asia Digital Reporter, BBC News

They were trusted and favoured by Xi Jinping. Now, they seem to be vanishing.

In recent months, the disappearances of several high-ranking Chinese officials have sparked intense speculation over whether Mr Xi is embarking on a purge, particularly of those linked to the military.

The latest person who appears to have fallen from grace is defence minister Li Shangfu, who has not been seen in public for some weeks now.

While his absence was not seen as unusual at first, scrutiny intensified when a top US diplomat pointed it out. A Reuters report later said General Li, who used to oversee arms procurement for the People's Liberation Army (PLA), was being investigated over military equipment purchases.

His "disappearance" comes weeks after two top officials in the Rocket Forces - the military arm that controls nuclear missiles - and a military court judge were removed.

Fresh rumours are now circulating that some cadres in the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) central military commission that controls the armed forces are also being investigated.

Little to no official explanation has been given for these removals, apart from "health reasons". In this void, speculation has blossomed.

The main theory is that authorities are cracking down on corruption in the PLA.

The military has been on heightened alert - in July it issued an unusual call-out asking the public for tip-offs on corruption in the past five years. Mr Xi also launched a fresh round of inspections, criss-crossing the country to make five visits to military bases since April, according to checks by BBC Monitoring.

Corruption has long been a problem in the military particularly since China began liberalising its economy in the 1970s, noted James Char, a research fellow at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University who studies the relationship between the CCP and the military.

Every year China spends more than a trillion yuan on the military with some going towards procurement transactions, which for national security reasons cannot be fully revealed. This lack of transparency is further compounded by China's one-party centralised system.

Unlike the kind of public scrutiny other countries' militaries are subjected to, China's armed forces are overseen exclusively by the CCP, pointed out Dr Char.

While Mr Xi has had some wins in tempering corruption within the armed forces and restoring its reputation to some extent, "rooting out corruption is a formidable if not impossible undertaking" as it would require "systemic redesigns which I'm afraid the authoritarian state remains averse to", Dr Char added.

"Until the CCP government is willing to put in place a proper legal system no longer sanctioned by itself, such purges will keep occurring."

Image source, Getty Images

Image caption,

General Li Shangfu has not been seen in public for weeks

But the disappearances could also be put down to a deepening paranoia in Chinese government as it navigates its tricky relationship with the US.

In July, an expanded counter-espionage law took effect in China, giving authorities greater power and reach in conducting investigations. Soon after, China's state security ministry publicly encouraged citizens to help them combat spy activities.

General Li's disappearance echoes that of foreign minister Qin Gang, whose removal in July also caused speculation to reach a fever pitch. This week, the Wall Street Journal reported Mr Qin was being investigated over an alleged extramarital affair that resulted in a child born in the US.

"Having an affair is not disqualifying in elite [Communist Party] circles, but having one with someone who may be suspected of having foreign intelligence ties and producing a child holding the passport of your key geopolitical rival, if not enemy, may now be," noted China analyst Bill Bishop.

There is also speculation that Mr Xi is acting under internal party pressure to clean out the stables, as China struggles with a slowing post-Covid economy and soaring youth unemployment. Under China's political system, Mr Xi is not only China's president but also the top leader of the military.

• How a diplomat's downfall leaves China red-faced
• The swift rise and mysterious fall of China's missing minister

Viewed one way, the disappearances are a sign of instability in Mr Xi's leadership.

Observers have homed in on the fact that General Li and Mr Qin, who were not just ministers but also occupied more elevated positions as State Councillors, were favoured by Mr Xi. Their sudden downfalls could therefore be seen as a lack of judgement by the Chinese president.

If one sees the disappearances as a political purge, then the fact that he had to enact one so soon after consolidating power at the party congress last year, where he successfully neutralised potential rival factions and stacked key committees with his allies, is a bad look.

But the other view is that it is yet another show of strength by Mr Xi.

The son of a purged CCP official, Mr Xi is famous for his public crackdowns on corruption - which also act as political purges aimed at rooting out his enemies, say observers.

Since Mao Zedong, no other Chinese leader has come close in matching the scale of Mr Xi's crackdowns. They are estimated to have netted thousands of cadres over the years, and have targeted both low-level and top officials beginning with his "tigers and flies" campaign launched shortly after he took office in 2013.

He also targeted the armed forces and by 2017 had removed more than 100 senior officers. At that time state news agency Xinhua said in an article that the figure "far exceeded the number of generals killed in wars to create the new China".

Image source, Pool

Image caption,

Mr Qin had been seen as favoured by Mr Xi

But the biggest question is over the signal the latest disappearances sends, and their ultimate impact.

Observers say they would create a climate of fear in the military and government. Though this may be the intended outcome to ensure compliance, it would also have a demoralising effect.

Years of systematically rooting out those who have fallen out of his favour and packing top posts with his followers could mean that Mr Xi has surrounded himself with yes-men. The risk of groupthink is the "real instability" of Mr Xi's leadership, as it could adversely affect China's national security and foreign policy, noted Dr Char.

The disappearances in fact have happened during a tense period in the Taiwan Strait, with China sending more warships and military jets there in recent weeks.

Any disruption in communication over foreign policy and defence diplomacy would be "especially concerning" as "accidents could happen and managing escalation could become more challenging", said Ian Chong, a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie China think tank.

Others however argue that China's military leadership is robust enough to withstand the replacement of some top officials, and point out that it has been careful to operate below the threshold of war.

Still others believe the disappearances are unlikely to have a long-term impact on Mr Xi's leadership stability. None of the cadres who have been targeted so far are part of his inner circle, pointed out Neil Thomas, an expert in Chinese elite politics with the Asia Society Policy Institute.

What most observers can agree on is that these incidents highlight the opacity of the Chinese system. "It further sharpens questions about the continuity of policy implementation and the credibility of any working-level promises or assurances," noted Dr Chong.

Ultimately, these officials' vanishing acts have fuelled a "resulting unease".

Additional reporting by BBC Monitoring.

​14. US Ups 155mm Artillery Output to Be ‘Arsenal of Democracy’

US Ups 155mm Artillery Output to Be ‘Arsenal of Democracy’

Artillery ammunition consumed in Ukraine’s artillery war has prompted the US to accelerate 155mm production and it’s about to reach a milestone – double its prewar rates.

by Kyiv Post | September 22, 2023, 4:44 pm | Comments (2)

kyivpost.com

by Kyiv Post | September 22, 2023, 4:44 pm |

155mm artillery ammunition manufacture at Scranton Army Ammunition Plant. Photo: US Army.mil

Supplying large amounts of artillery munitions to Ukraine has taught the US it needs to speed up its weapons production to be ready for future military contingencies, including provisions for its allies.

Douglas Bush, US assistant secretary for acquisition, logistics and technology for the Army told a media roundtable in August that US production of 155mm artillery shells has almost doubled from its prewar totals of 14,000 rounds a month. He said that this was only the beginning with their aim to be double again in the coming year and to hit a million rounds a year, or more than 80,000 a month, by 2025.

When questioned why it had taken so long to ramp up production rates for artillery shells, Bush said that the US Army was establishing entirely new production lines for shell bodies, the triple-base propellants that launch the projectiles and its capacity to acquire high explosives to load into shells.

“What takes the longest is acquiring and installing the machine tools and the machinery that makes the explosives and things like that,” Bush said.

Gabe Camarillo, Under Secretary of the US Army, confirmed Bush’s figures and said the Army had spent $1.45 billion on capacity building in the current financial year and had budgeted for $2.5 billion in FY23.

Marion Whicker who has responsibility for materiel life cycle management in the US Army Materiel Command said the US has a strategy to invest $18 billion on modernization of its ammunition plants in the next 15 years.

More on this topic

Sarah Ashton-Cirillo Suspended as Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Territorial Defense

The exact comments that led to her suspension are not known but it’s thought a recent spat with an anti-Ukraine Republican US senate candidate may have sparked the decision.

According to a July Defense Department statement the US has provided more than 2 million 155mm artillery shells from held stocks since Russia’s full-scale invasion, which, according to former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl, led to President Biden approving the delivery of cluster munitions to serve as a temporary solution until sufficient standard general purpose 155mm could be produced.

The need to accelerate artillery manufacture so drastically is three-fold.

Firstly, it’s to ensure that Ukraine can receive sufficient artillery munitions from the US and its NATO allies to successfully conduct its war.

Secondly, it is necessary to replace the US stocks that have already been expended.

Thirdly, there is a realization that war planners had focused too much on the type of low-intensity conflict of the lats thirty or more years and forgotten the threat from the type of general war occurring in Ukraine.

The war against Russia has shown that the stock levels currently held by the US and others is simply insufficient to sustain the actual usage rates.

In this context Bush was quoted as saying “There’s a lot of support [for ammunition].

“We’re working through our allies to help make sure Ukraine is supplied. So, it’s not all the United States, and I think that’s a success story. The United States is the arsenal of democracy, but we can have multiple arsenals in other democracies, and we have those, and they’re helping.”

The Sept. 5 edition of the defense news publication Task & Purpose said that even at the increased rates currently planned it will take years to replace and supplement 155mm artillery ammunition to the quantities needed.

It also points out that the need for such enhancement is necessary across all types of shells, rockets, and missiles that the US military badly needs now.

It says that the war in Ukraine has shown that the US “would need a gigantic amount of munitions to fight a war against China or Russia.”

​15. Who's tracking the weapons and money the U.S. is sending to Ukraine? "60 Minutes" went to find out.

Who's tracking the weapons and money the U.S. is sending to Ukraine? "60 Minutes" went to find out.

CBS News · by Holly Williams, Erin Lyall

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy went from meeting to meeting in Washington, D.C. on Thursday trying to gather support for more aid from the United States. He met with President Biden as well as senior defense officials and lawmakers as the U.S. Congress considers the White House's request to add more than $20 billion in aid to the $113 billion the U.S. has already committed to Ukraine.

"60 Minutes" has been attempting to track where the billions of dollars in U.S. cash and weaponry provided to Ukraine has gone since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February of 2022. On assignment for this week's "60 Minutes," CBS News senior foreign correspondent Holly Williams went to Ukraine to see how all the American tax dollars are being spent — and to find out if the weapons and money already provided have gone where they were supposed to go.

Watch Williams' full report this Sunday, Sept. 24, on "60 Minutes" from 7 p.m. Eastern. A preview is available at the top of this article.

Oleksandra Ustinova, an anti-corruption activist who became a member of the Ukrainian Parliament, chairs a government commission that tracks all of the military aid coming to Ukraine.

She shot video for "60 Minutes" inside what she called a top-secret warehouse storing American-made and supplied Javelin anti-tank missiles.

Ukrainian lawmaker Oleksandra Ustinova stands inside a storage facility in her country housing U.S.-supplied Javelin anti-tank missiles. CBS News

"We have online databases with the serial numbers of every American piece of weapon that your embassy has access to. They can come, type in, let's say, a Javelin or a HIMARS, and see in which brigade it is, and then go check it if they don't believe."

She said the Ukrainian government welcomes U.S. officials to go right to the front lines in the war to verify how American-supplied weaponry is being used.

It's one way, Ustinova said, that her country is trying to combat "this cancer, which is corruption, because otherwise, we're not gonna survive."

As Russia ramps up its own production and sourcing of shells and ammunition, Zelenskyy's government knows that convincing his partners in Washington of his own government's trustworthiness may indeed be an existential challenge.

CBS News · by Holly Williams, Erin Lyall

16. Exclusive Interview With Ukraine's Spy Boss From His DC Hotel Room

Exclusive Interview With Ukraine's Spy Boss From His DC Hotel Room

Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov opens up about the ongoing counteroffensive, attacks inside Russia, warnings about Abrams tank usage and much more.

BY

HOWARD ALTMAN

|

PUBLISHED SEP 22, 2023 1:19 PM EDT

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · September 22, 2023

The first time I met Kyrylo Budanov, commander of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and the mastermind of many a thorn in Russia's side, was in November 2021. He was a young brigadier general, largely unknown beyond the borders of his homeland, where he was a special operations hero who was thrice wounded fighting the Russians since 2014. We sat down on couches in the middle of a busy Washington D.C. hotel lobby and he laid out how Russia was about to attack Ukraine as visitors milled about unaware of the heady discussion taking place. His prediction, which included a battle map, would prove prophetic just three months later.

Budanov, who reached out to me last week asking if I wanted to meet up with him during an otherwise secret trip to D.C., is now one of the the world’s most famous sitting generals. He is the architect of the constant asymmetrical operations against Ukraine's great foe, Russia, and has become the subject of numerous stories, including interviews with The War Zone, and ubiquitous memes (more on that later).

A top target of Russia, it is no longer safe for him to meet in a crowded hotel lobby, so I agree to meet him in his room. Outside his door stands a burly man dressed in black, clearly security.

“Do you have a gun?” I am asked.

“No, I am a journalist,” I respond and with that, I am waived in.

Budanov greets me with a smile and a handshake. Unlike our last encounter, he is dressed not in his uniform, but in a dark blue suit, blue shirt and salmon-colored tie.

Ukrainian Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov met exclusively with The War Zone in his D.C. hotel room. (Howard Altman staff photo)

Against a sweeping vista of the U.S. capitol city seen through the huge window behind us, we sit down at a table with a bowl of fresh fruit, some untouched packs of nuts and bottles of water. For the next hour, through an interpreter, we discuss everything from his blunt assessment of the ongoing counteroffensive, attacks he helped orchestrate inside Russia, the systematic campaign against Russia's air defenses, warnings about Abrams tank usage, doubts about Prigozhin's death, what Ukraine needs from the U.S. and, of course, his favorite Budanov meme. All the while, sitting across from me, he stares that unnervingly stoic Budanov stare, the one you’ve seen in many photos.

At his request, out of concern for his security, we agree to hold the interview until after his journey to the U.S. is finally revealed through a very public visits to the Pentagon and White House with his president, new defense secretary and their contingents.

Our exclusive conversation, reported in full, has been lightly edited for clarity and context.

TWZ: It's been a while since we actually saw each other. Is this the first time you’ve been back in Washington D.C. since?

KB: Yes

TWZ: What brings you to Washington? Who you meeting with and what goals do you have for this visit? Have US officials asked you for any advice or insights?

KB: My current visit is not actually mine. It's part of a presidential visit and I'm assisting him on this trip. And surely there are meetings waiting for me with military leaders of this country as part of the presidential delegation.

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky speaks during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) at the United Nations headquarters on September 19, 2023 in New York City. (Photo by Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images)

TWZ: Is this the first time President Zelensky has asked you to come on one of these foreign trips?

KB: No.

TWZ: Can you tell me who you are meeting with?

KB: We'll have meetings within the DoD and the special services of the U.S.

TWZ: Will you meet with the CIA?

KB: (Laughs and declines to answer)

TWZ: Are you being asked by the U.S. for your insights based upon the defense that Ukraine's put up? Is the U.S. asking for your advice on how to fight a peer competitor?

KB: Thank God there's not a single place across the world that has that kind of competitor and that kind of fighting, so not war on that level of intensity. But if such recommendations are required from us, we'll gladly provide those.

Rescuers operate at the site of a missile fragments falling in Darnytskyi district of the city on September 21, 2023 in Kyiv, Ukraine. Russia launched more than 20 missiles on the capital of Ukraine, which Ukrainian Air Defense Forces say were shot down. However, fragments of the downed missiles fell in four districts of the city, in particular Darnytskyi and Holosiivskyi. At least seven people were injured. (Photo by Vitalii Nosach/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

TWZ: I want to talk a little bit about the ongoing counteroffensive. I know that you're not the general in charge of land forces, but as the eyes and ears of the Ukrainian military, what’s your assessment? Do you still believe that Ukraine will retake Crimea this year or will a counteroffensive push on until next year?

KB: Our counteroffensive operation started at the beginning of summer and is still ongoing. It hasn't stopped. And as you've rightly said I'm not the commander-in-chief of the General Staff. That is why questions about the tempo or progress of the counteroffensive operation should be addressed to the General Staff. But speaking of Crimea, you could not have missed that since the middle of August, there's been a certain intensification going on with regard to Crimea, and that might indirectly give you a hint about the answer to your question.

So first of all, the fact itself is that we're engaging the military infrastructure and military targets in occupied Crimea and the occupier’s infrastructure. If we're going deeper into strikes against the air defense system, it's more complicated here. First of all, the air defense systems themselves are very costly equipment and it takes a lot of time to produce those and Russian flags those systems because all this inventory is currently engaged in fighting against Ukraine and also in protection of Moscow. They've taken away air defenses from everywhere else.

That is why, naturally, when we engage in another and another air defense battalion of the Russian military, they need to think about where they can pull those systems from and where are they able to tolerate less defenses in other places.

Now Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov in his office in Kyiv. (Photo by Vitalii Nosach/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

The second point in engaging defenses is that we’re making those holes in the overall air defense coverage. Those holes are exploited for other things. Also, we're depleting their air defense missile stocks because those are not limitless. And from the political standpoint, we're also demonstrating the obvious inability of Russian air defense systems, which respectively makes them less lucrative on the world arms markets.

TWZ: And this is part of a coordinated campaign, it’s not just Crimea, right? You're doing this inside Russia, with the strikes on air bases and other targets and on Moscow?

KB: Let's put it like this, we have never confirmed [attacks on Moscow] officially (Budanov laughs) and I will be keeping that stance. But I can share my opinion about those strikes. All the above-mentioned factors clearly coincide with the strikes inside Russia. Especially when we're talking about the obviously decreasing demand for Russian weapons because when the whole world sees that some drones are attacking Moscow, nobody wants to buy Russian air defense systems any longer. And that is very painful for them. And it links back to additional factors which are absent when we're discussing Crimea.

One side note. There's a completely opposite situation in terms of demand on weapon systems. There's a very high demand on Ukrainian drones now. We can’t sell those now because all of them are used for warfighting, but after the war ends, this will have a lot of meaning.

Now speaking about the strikes deep into Russia, including Moscow, that are conducted by someone. There is a social side of it. Because now the Russian population and especially large Russian businesses really start to feel the impact of war. Because before that, it was just a war going on on TV. Yes, it did have some financial impact on big players, but smaller ones weren't even touched. But demonstrative strikes, such as strikes against Moscow city - the skyscraper district in Moscow - demonstrates to everyone that now it touches upon them.

A rescuer stands next to a damaged building of the Moscow International Business Center (Moskva City) following a drone attack in Moscow on August 23, 2023. A Ukrainian drone attack on Moscow damaged a building in a central business district, authorities said on August 23, in the sixth straight night of aerial attacks on Russia's capital region. (Photo by NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA/AFP via Getty Images)

Besides that, it undermines the belief of the population in an all-powerful Russian regime that is the strongest one in the world. They start asking those logical questions, like: "where's our air defenses that are supposed to protect us?" And they start blaming their authorities for that, for stealing all the money. The next aspect is strikes against critical military infrastructure. It includes oil refineries that supply fuel to the warfighting as well as the factories and plants that produce components for military equipment. So that’s the overall picture.

TWZ: Talk to me about the sabotage attack on Chkalovsky Air Field, located less than 20 miles from Moscow.

KB: Those were activities of sabotage groups.

TWZ: Are they connected to you?

KB: Of course all of those [groups] are in some kind of connection with us.

TWZ: Did you suggest that attack? Orchestrate it? Plan it?

KB: Of course. We’re assisting them, let’s put it that way.

TWZ: Did you select the target and help them figure out how to enter the base and blow up the planes?

KB: Let’s skip that one.

TWZ: What effect is being able to breach such a secure base having in Russia?

KB: The explanation here is the same because it was an attack conducted in a secure area actually inside Moscow because that airfield is within the greater Moscow [region]. It demonstrates the obvious inability of the regime to protect even its most critical and secure infrastructure. And if we're talking about airframes, of course, Russia has a lot of those but some of them, such as the Il-20, are not in big numbers available.

TWZ: Did you suggest that those particular aircraft be targeted?

KB: (Laughs) So we're going back to the spot where I didn't want to go.

TWZ: What is the military chatter you are picking up in the wake of this attack? Is there panic? Consternation?

KB: We're aware of the very negative reaction because they got the blame for it. This surely wasn't the task, but it's a side effect. And they received the blame because they were supposed to ensure security and they let those sabotage people come into that secure facility and conduct this sabotage operation.

TWZ: Who received the blame?

KB: The FSB. Besides that, of course, it's a blow against the political leaders, and military leadership of the Russian Federation because they are not able obviously to ensure proper guarding of strategic critical airfields in Moscow.

TWZ: Do you think they have a dartboard with your face on at the FSB?

KB: (Laughs) I don’t know, I haven’t been there.

TWZ: I want to return a little bit to the counteroffensive. It's obviously a big part of what's going on. And you must get tired of being asked about the pace of this. What do you tell people when they bring that up?

Ukraine is making slow but steady progress in its counteroffensive. (Photo by Roman Chop/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

KB: I'm also always referring those questions to the General Staff. They're from they're doing the fight. I'm just assisting.

TWZ: Can you talk about how this will progress into the winter? When we first met and I asked if you were concerned about fighting in the cold, you said, 'It's no problem.' So does this pending weather concern you?

KB: It’s not a problem at all. And as everyone saw last time, it's not a problem to fight in winter for both sides - for us and for Russians. It's not a pleasant thing to do, but it's not a big deal. There's one very important nuance that makes a difference between current warfighting and the previous periods of fighting. Currently, all main instances of fighting are done on foot without using any materiel. This is linked to the high saturation of artillery systems on the forefront and also portable anti-tank weapons. And that's true for both sides. Those [armored] systems are not enough to create a gap in the orbits of the enemy - to create a powerful breakthrough as in classic doctrine. But it is well enough to deter any attempt of the enemy of any side to conduct that breakthrough with materiel and convoys.

Also, there's a high level of saturation with both anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields. Anti-tank mines are making a lot of difference because when such a mine goes off on their wheels, it completely destroys the wheels and that piece of materiel is not able to move any further. Damage done to a piece of equipment is minimal but it still cannot move any longer. Those anti-tank mines are a big problem for those tracked vehicles. And a new feature that hasn't been observed anywhere before is the high number of FPV [First Person Video] suicide drones on both sides which are able to engage practically any piece of equipment.

All of those above-mentioned factors reduced the possibility of using armored equipment in practically all of the main directions to the minimum. Now that hardware is only used for evacuation or to swiftly transport infantry teams to a particular spot but it doesn't take part in the fighting.

TWZ: Given that, those 31 Abrams tanks heading to Ukraine…

KB: We’re looking forward to seeing that. We haven't seen them yet.

TWZ: Will they make a difference given all these factors and given the difficulty of maneuvering in mud?

KB: They should be used in a very tailored way for very specific, well-crafted operations because if they are used at the front line and just in a combined arms fight, they will not live very long on the battlefield. They need to be used in those breakthrough operations, but very well-prepared.

A U.S. Army M1A1 Abrams tank, photographed with mine roller mounted, as they will be delivered to Ukraine. In Grafenwoehr, the U.S. Army trains members of the Ukrainian armed forces for use on the American M1A1 Abrams tank. Photo: Matthias Merz/dpa (Photo by Matthias Merz/picture alliance via Getty Images)

TWZ: Are you confident that's going to happen? Let me step back to the situation in June near Malaya Tokmachka where there were a number of armored vehicles were destroyed.

KB: Actually there wasn't that much materiel that was destroyed. There was a lot of damaged materiel. And by now it's repaired. The number of those that were destroyed was not that high. But it's the very example we've just talked about. So if if we just deploy some battalion tank group into the battlefield somewhere, just as long as it gets under the range of artillery it will get hit.

I will share two other examples on the enemy side. Similar situations could be observed during Russian attempts to attack Vuhledar last winter. The same thing happened. They went on attack in combat convoys and there were dozens of pieces of equipment that just didn't get through. And by the way, what is peculiar about that specific operation was that it was commanded personally by Gen. [Sergei] Gerasimov, and when all that equipment was destroyed, he blamed everyone around him and just left the frontline.

I'll provide you with one more different example. It's about how Wagner units advanced. When they did manage to take Bakhmut [on May 21], they were not using armored vehicles. They were only using artillery support to infantry actions on foot. So practically they were just using infantry.

TWZ: That's expensive in terms of lives, right? Are you able to talk about the toll these kinds of attacks are taking on Ukrainian forces?

KB: Regretfully I don't possess precise numbers of our casualties. But it is completely logical that all of our casualties - both killed in action and wounded in action - went up as we shifted to offensive operations if we compare those with the previous periods. But there is still this very interesting peculiarity that even though we're on the offensive, our numbers of casualties are still lower than on the enemy’s side who are in defense.

Now Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov (C) attends the farewell ceremony for Dmytro Kotsiubailo on Independence Square on March 10, 2023 in Kyiv, Ukraine. (Photo by Yurii Stefanyak/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

But having described the overall realities of our current situation we’re smoothly coming to the conclusion that we will have to change something. The conclusion is that we'll need additional weapons systems and capabilities that could still change this balance we have today. Because looking at the situation solely from the perspective of manpower, if we compare the Ukrainian potential with Russian potential, the Russians have a lot more human resources. That is why we cannot keep on fighting just soldier on soldier. This will not deliver the results we want.

TWZ: So what do you have to do to change this?

KB: We need to resolve the issue of increasing numbers of overall artillery barrels on the battlefield. And we need longer-range weapon systems in order to engage their command posts, their logistics storages, etc., etc.

TWZ: When you meet with U.S. officials are you going to ask for [Army Tactical Missile System] ATACMS? And what are you going to say to convince them to provide ATACMS?

KB: I think that this issue will be raised.

TWZ: What’s your argument for them?

KB: My argumentation is very simple. The majority of [Russian] command posts and logistic storages are beyond the distance of 85 kilometers (about 50 miles) which is the maximum range for our current [Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) munitions] - for [M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems or] HIMARS that we have. The Russians just place command posts and other things beyond those distances so we don't have anything to reach them there. And the situation is the same with Russian aviation at the airfields. Fighting Russian aviation using air defense systems is very costly and ineffective. Aviation should be taken out at the air bases.

TWZ: Are you talking about airfields in Russia?

KB: No, we’re talking about the airfields in the occupied areas of Ukraine.

TWZ: Like those bases in Crimea.

KB: Crimea is Ukraine.

TWZ: On Tuesday, a U.S. official said the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), a replacement for ATACMS, is coming online soon and could potentially open up the availability of ATACMS for Ukraine. Do you have a sense of how many ATACMS the U.S. has that they can give you?

KB: So let's wait for the official announcements to be made. There are still different ways how this situation can turn out so let's wait for [the official announcement] but I can say conditionally that if it's 100 missiles, this won’t change the situation.

TWZ: You need thousands?

KB: At least hundreds.

TWZ: Do you think you will return to Ukraine with good news about ATACMS?

KB: I always hope for the better. We'll do everything to make that happen.

TWZ: Let me switch to the Russian side of this war. As Ukrainian forces push through that Robotyne-Verbove salient, as there's success near Bakhmut with the recent capture of Andriivka and Klischiivka, and as the Russians are trying to push through toward Kupiansk, how can the Russians man all these areas?

KB: It’s not actually like that.

TWZ: So tell me, because you know better than I do!

KB: The offensive operation in the south will continue as it's been ongoing as long as we have resources. In parallel to that, of course, are operations for the de-occupation of Bakhmut. You’ve very rightly mentioned that we recently have taken back Klischiivka, which looks like it's a very small [spot] of land, but it's important because it's on a hill overlooking the rest of the terrain.

Klischiivka, a small hamlet about two miles south of Bakhmut, sits on a tactically important high ground overlooking the city. (Google Earth image)

The next step is to cut off all the supply routes that go into Bakhmut. Practically this operation we’re following is a track really similar to the Russian one which they used to take Bakhmut. The only difference is that they still conducted those frontal attacks on the city which led to very high casualties in manpower. We won’t be doing that. We will try and envelop the city and only after it's enveloped will we be entering the city.

In this image taken from a video released by the 3rd Assault Brigade, a Ukrainian servicemen fires machine gun towards Russian positions near Andriivka, Donetsk region, Ukraine, Aug. 27, 2023. Ukrainian brigade's two-month battle to fight its way through a charred forest shows the challenges of the country's counteroffensive in the east and south. (AP Photo)

And you mentioned the Russian actions in Kupiansk. Those are just local operations that cannot be called a campaign or an offensive operation. They had certain success a few months ago but after that they were stopped at certain defense lines and there's nothing happening since.

TWZ: Is the operation in Bakhmut designed to pin down Russian forces and keep them from reinforcing the Berdiansk and Melitopol attack axes?

KB: For sure, and it has delivered the result that we wanted. For example, the Russians recently redeployed their only reserve force - the 25th Army - which was just recently raised and hasn't completed its creation. Now it's redeployed to roughly the north of Bakhmut and that's the place where it's going to be buried.

TWZ: How many forces does the 25th Army have?

KB: About 15,000 men. It’s not that much. And besides that, the threat for Russians to lose Bakhmut makes them redeploy at all times additional and additional forces to the Bakhmut area, which of course drains their resources from other directions like the south.

TWZ: Speaking of which, are the Russians able to reinforce their defense against the Burdiansk and Melitopol pushes? Are they able to bring enough troops there to prevent Ukrainian advances, given all the stresses?

KB: So we're going back to the previous question. All that they have already have been thrown into the fire. And now all the backbone of current Russian airborne troops is in defense and trying to deter the movement of our offensive groupings in the south. Before that, there were units of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade. That brigade was completely defeated, completely smashed, and now they have withdrawn being replaced by airborne troops.

TWZ: How do you protect that Robotyne-Verbove salient against a Russian incursion?

KB: You can’t invent anything new. You have to be powerful in defense, but you have to be constantly pushing forward. In this case, they will just physically be unable to fight back. So to continue the way it actually happens now across the whole of the front line.

TWZ: Will you strike the Kerch Bridge again and if so, what will Putin do?

KB: It's not a question of will we strike or won’t we strike. We're doing that regularly so we will finish it. It’s just an issue of time.

TWZ: And what will Putin do?

KB: He'll get upset once again. What can he do?

TWZ: Did you sink the Project 22160 class patrol ship Sergey Kotov with uncrewed surface vessels (USV) and do you have any pictures to show that?

KB: It is damaged. Its propeller was damaged and also it's got a hole on the backside of the body on the right. It's 50 by 100 centimeters (about 5.5 square feet). So it will be sent for repairs and this ship will spend some time in the dock.

TWZ: Can you talk about some of the weapons you've been using - the modified Neptunes, the sea drones, the UAVs?

KB: We’re using everything we have available. The list of various drones produced in Ukraine is quite large now and we're using everything we can. The Neptunes are in the process of development, which is still ongoing and they are being improved and improved. But the problem with those is that we don't have the line to produce a lot of them. So the problem is in the quantity of those available.

TWZ: So when you request a strike with a modified Neptune, what kind of targets are you looking at given the limited number?

KB: The purpose of moves with those weapon systems is to make holes in Russian air defense coverage and then to exploit that hole in the air defense coverage for other operations.

TWZ: I want to do a complete shift here. Were you guys involved with the attack on a Wagner-backed militia in Sudan? CNN reported that Ukrainians were likely involved in the attack on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) forces with FPV drones.

KB: I will only say the following: About two to three months ago I was giving an interview to one of the media, I don’t remember which specific one. I answered them back then that anywhere across the world we will be seeking and hunting down Russian military criminals, and sooner or later that time will come whenever they are. That is why we shouldn't be surprised when in any territory, something happens to Russian military criminals.

Then speaking about your specific question about Sudan, regretfully I cannot confirm or deny. I suppose it's not a big secret that there were and there still are Wagner fighters in the same way as everywhere in central Africa. Russia has led itself to a situation where it's on the verge of strategic collapse. Russia step-by-step will be gradually lose what it has won. It has paid a large price in terms of men, in terms of financial resources, everywhere across the world. The more Russia fights against us, the more it loses.

KB: I wouldn’t be in a hurry to say he’s killed.

TWZ: You think he might be alive?

KB: I just wouldn't rush with that question. I don't possess any confirmation.

TWZ: You don’t have confirmation that he’s dead yet?

KB: We don’t possess that.

TWZ: Do you trust Elon Musk?

KB: (Laughs) In what sense?

TWZ: There was the discussion over Walter Isaacson’s book excerpt and whether Musk shut off Starlink to prevent a Ukrainian attack on Sevastopol last year, or whether as he claimed he denied a request to provide it.

KB: Look, [Starlink] is a private property of a private person. Yes we really very widely use his products and services. The whole of the line of contact talks to each other to some extent using his products and services. The only thing I can say here is that without those services and products it would be a catastrophe. But it is true that he did turn off his products and services over Crimea before. But there's another side to that truth. Everybody's been aware of that.

TWZ: So he did turn it off?

KB: This specific case everybody's referring to, there was a shutdown of the coverage over Crimea, but it wasn't at that specific moment. That shutdown was for a month. There might have been some specific cases I'm not aware of. But I'm totally sure that throughout the whole first period of the war, there was no coverage at all.

TWZ: But did he ever put it on and then shut it off?

KB: There have been no problems since it's been turned on over Crimea.

TWZ: I want to get to some personal questions. Are you still living in your office with your family? What’s that like?

KB: Yes, it’s like that.

TWZ: Are you concerned about your safety? Are the Russians trying to kill you?

KB: Why don't you understand that [my wife and I are living in my office]? Why is that strange for you?

TWZ: It’s not strange, I just wanted to get your reaction….

KB: We're absolutely fine. She has been living with me since the February invasion. And she's a police officer herself. She's actually a professor at our national police academy. She's teaching legal psychology. It’s not a problem for her as it might have been for someone else.

A look at the office in Kyiv that Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov has lived in with his wife since the full-on invasion. (Photo by Serhiy Morgunov for The Washington Post via Getty Images)

TWZ: In an excerpt from his new book, Financial Times reporter Christopher Miller writes about a situation where you were in a meeting with President Zelensky, Denys Shmyhal, Ukraine’s prime minister; Valery Zaluzhny, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; Ivan Bakanov, head of the Security Service of Ukraine and then-Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov. You laid out a map and you explained what was about to happen. Can you talk about that moment and what it was like to convince your fellow leaders that the Russians were actually going to invade?

KB: It's already history and frankly, currently, I cannot recall a specific meeting you're referring to but as an intelligence chief, surely I'm reporting the information I have to the leadership of the state and all the people involved in the administration.

TWZ: Were you disappointed in not being named defense minister?

KB: Absolutely not.

TWZ: Would you even want that job?

KB: No, I love my current job.

TWZ: I read that you were attending Ostroh Academy to study political science. Are you interested in running for office?

KB: You’re wrong. I’ll explain. I’m writing my PhDs there.

TWZ: What’s your thesis?

KB: Global interaction between special services across the world, how they interact, and how they influence their domestic policies.

TWZ: Are you going to write a book after this is all over?

KB: (Laughs) I'll write my PhD first. And under the calendar plan that they've provided me with I have two years to do that.

TWZ: When we first met, you were an up-and-coming one-star general - brigadier general - but outside of Ukraine not many people had known who you were. Now you’re world famous. What do you think about the memes like the Budnov eyes and the jokes?

KB: (Laughs) I cannot influence those anyhow, what can I do about those? But some of them I need to admit surprised me (laughs). Especially after I had my haircut and there was this meme with Prigozhin’s head and mine. So it was right after his insurrection attempt in Russia and the meme was four pictures. First was mine and I said I will give you the sign. And then he is kind of asking what will be that sign and I say you'll get it. The next picture is me being bald (laughs). That was one I really kind of remember.

TWZ: Was that one of your favorites? Do you have a favorite?

KB: I like that one.

TWZ: Any message you want to give to the American public?

KB: No, I think we’ve covered everything. The only thing I can say is that Ukraine will be forever grateful for all the assistance that’s been provided to Ukraine. And the victory over the Russian Federation will be the same extent an American victory. It will be the same for Ukraine and America together. It will be our joint victory.

TWZ: When will that happen do you think?

KB: In any case it’s close.

TWZ: This year? Next year?

KB: So currently it's hard to prognose that because there are so many factors playing in and even if we go back to our offensive operation currently, in the General Staff, no one's being able to surely say for how long will that continue.

After the interview wrapped, Budanov and I have a few more minutes of small talk. Budanov agrees to some photographs and then goes back to his busy day. Meetings await at the Pentagon and White House. On Thursday, he accompanied President Zelensky to both. But despite being in Washington, he is never far removed from what is taking place back home.

Friday morning, there was a Ukrainian missile strike on the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Crimea. During a round of fact-check questions, I asked him about the GUR's role in that attack.

"We just gave some intelligence assistance," he tells me. "We always give 24/7 intel information to the General Staff."

It's the kind of assistance that has kept Kyrylo Budanov a hero in Ukraine and a wanted man to Russia.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · September 22, 2023

17. Japan’s Plan for Taiwan Contingency – Analysis

General Randy George, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army with Japan's Defense Minister Minoru Kihara. Photo Credit: Japan Ministry of Defense

Japan’s Plan for Taiwan Contingency – Analysis

https://www.eurasiareview.com/22092023-japans-plan-for-taiwan-contingency-analysis/

 September 22, 2023  0 Comments

By Dr. Rajaram Panda

When on 13 September, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida reshuffled his Cabinet, it was widely speculated that Kishida wanted to resuscitate his popular rating which had been plummeting since August, enabling him to dissolve the Cabinet and call for a snap election and also secure his position for the LDP leadership race that is going to take place in late 2024.

In the reshuffle exercise, two aspects stood out: his choice of a new foreign minister and a new defence minister; and women empowerment by inducting five female law makers in his 19 member Cabinet, the third time after Junichiro Koizumi and Sinzo Abe who too had five women ministers in their cabinets. In this commentary, the factors for replacing the foreign and defence ministers with new faces needs close scrutiny. The new foreign and defence ministers in the cabinet bring impressive, unexpected strengths to their jobs and their performance and policy directions shall be keenly watched as both are likely to chose policies different from their predecessors .

For many, the choice of Yoko Kamikawa as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minoru Kihara as Minister for Defense, as two key diplomatic and security appointments, was a surprise. These two changes hint at a major shift toward preparations for a Taiwan contingency.

Kamikawa was earlier Minister of Justice in the Abe Cabinet twice, during which she had demonstrated her mind with tough decisions, which probably impressed Kishida. She was resolute in her decision-making and ordered the executions of 16 death inmates, which also included Aum Shinrikyo leader Shoko Asahara (real name Chizuo Matsumoto). The cult had terrorized Japan with its sarin gas attacks in Matsumoto Prefecture and on subway lines in Tokyo in 1995.Thirteen people died and at least 5,800 injured in five co-ordinated attacks on three train lines. Sarin, a nerve agent was developed by the Nazis and Japan’s worst domestic experience since the end of World War II. 

Abe’s remark about Kamikawa shows she is a woman of steel with firm conviction and bold in decision-making, the virtues for an able and effective minister. Abe had remarked about Kamikawa when she was the Justice Minister in his Cabinet thus: “Previous ministers of justice would often hesitate to carry out executions or consult with me because they could not decide for themselves. Kamikawa had no such reservations. After the executions, she would report to me saying, ‘It is done.’ She is a very determined individual.”

Kishida was aware that Yoshimasa Hayashi who vacated left office for Kamikawa was renowned for his pro-China stance. Hayashi chaired the bipartisan Jaan-China Friendship Parliamentarians’ Union until he was appointed foreign minister in the Kishida Cabinet. Distrust had grown between Japan and the US as two key security partners in Asia following Hayashi’s appointment as the foreign minister by Kishida. In fact Washington was alarmed with Kishida’s choice for this very important position. It is possible that Washington’s distrust of Kishida’s choice of Hayashi as the foreign minister was the reason why it took Kishida a year and three months after assuming office before he visited Washington. 

Kishida probably realised that he must save, defend and further strengthen Japan’s ties with the US from derailment on any ground at a time when China’s belligerence towards Taiwan put the region’s security scenario at an edge. This compelled Kishida to replace Hayashi with a bit hard-liner Kamikawa in preparation for a Taiwan contingency. Kamikawa’s previous experience as Policy Planning Assistant to a US Senator gives her the necessary experience for her new role. 

The authoritarian Xi Jinping has governed China by the rule of power, though cracks are suspected in his governance model when he replaced suddenly his foreign and defence ministers for reasons unknown to the outside world. Subsequently it surfaced that Qin Gang was sacked as foreign minister and replaced by veteran Wang Li in July as the new foreign minister after a mysterious one-month absence, had an extramarital affair that resulted in the birth of a child when he was China’s top envoy in Washington from July 2021 until January 2023. By this conduct, Gang was accused of having compromised China’s national security. Such unpleasant conduct of a top official did not deter Xi to flex his military muscle towards Taiwan, which China considers a breakaway province that must be integrated, if necessary by force. That Beijing openly disregards international law with its military expansionism and spreading disinformation by intensifying propaganda is open secret. 

China has flown warplanes towards Taiwan on a regular basis in order to intimidate Taiwan with a view to bring Taiwan into submission. In the latest Chinese move, China’s military sent 103 warplanes toward Taiwan in early September within 24 hours. The previous daily record of Chinese military flights near Taiwan was 91 planes on 10 April.

Chinese warplanes fly toward the self-governing island on a near-daily basis but typically in smaller numbers. China’s incursions into Taiwan’s air space and territorial waters have increased after Sino-US ties nosedived over a host of issues. Beijing is cognizant of the fact that the US is Taiwan’s main supplier of arms and opposes any bid to change Taiwan’s status by force. Taiwan’s defence ministry called the Chinese military action “harassment” and warned that such actions could deteriorate further the current tense atmosphere. The recent Chinese actions may be an attempt to sway Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2024. Beijing leadership is uncomfortable with Taiwan’s governing Democratic Progressive Party that leans toward formal independence for the island. Against this background, it would be interesting to see if Kamikawa will employ her characteristic fortitude in dealing with China.

If this is the possible perspective of the new foreign minister, what change can one expect in Japan’s defence posture under Kihara as the new defence minister? No doubt being a security expert, and having served as a Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defense in the past, Kihara has the right credentials to deal with Japan’s security challenges more appropriately.          

Kishida attempts to prepare for the Taiwan contingency and choice of Kihara may be seen against the background that Kihara had participated in July 2023 in a tabletop simulation of contingencies involving Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands (Ishigaki City, Okinawa Ken). For the event, Kihara played the role of Minister of Defense. Diet members, former senior SDFs and other government officials also participated in the war game. 

Kihara is a leading pro-Taiwan Diet member and had been visiting Taiwan at least once a month. He was also the Secretary-General of the cross-country Japan-ROC Diet Members’ Consultative Council. He was also associated with organisations that aim to strengthen Japan-Taiwan relations. 

Leading political leaders from either side have been visiting each others’ countries. In July Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan Speaker You Si-kun (equivalent to the Speaker of the House) travelled to Yonaguni Island in Okinawa Ken by ferry. In the absence of immigration services, special measures were taken to facilitate the procedure for You’s entry to the island. The symbolism of choosing to travel by ferry cannot be missed as You wanted to send the message that opening ferry service may be considered linking Taiwan and Yonaguni. You’s visit was also reportedly intended to simulate the arrival of refugees on Yonaguni in the event of a Taiwan contingency.    

Kihara has cordial relations with Sanae Takaichi, Minister of State for Economic Security. This relationship between two important ministers should allow for smooth collaboration on policy matters regarding Taiwan. In August 2023, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense submitted an annual report on China’s military strength to the Legislative Yuan. In this the ministry warned that Xi “may push forward the process of unification with Taiwan during his mid-term (before 2027). The moot question is, notwithstanding the US response in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act binding the US to come to Taiwan’s rescue, can Kishida government respond to the tense situation in the Far East by the two key new appointments or at least prepare the stage for any future leaders who would succeed him as security priorities are clearly put in place? Xi Jinping, are you watching?

Dr. Rajaram Panda

Dr. Rajaram Panda, Former Senior Fellow at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, a think tank under the Ministry of Culture, Government of India, Former ICCR India Chair Professor, Reitaku University, Japan, and former Senior Fellow, IDSA, New Delhi E-mail: rajaram.panda@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com