Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The important thing is not to stop questioning. Curiosity has its own reason for existence. One cannot help but be in awe when he contemplates the mysteries of eternity, of life, of the marvelous structure of reality. It is enough if one tries merely to comprehend a little of this mystery each day. Never lose a holy curiosity. ... Don't stop to marvel."

- Albert Einstein from Life May 2, 1955, p.64.

"Originality does not consist in saying what no one has ever said before, but in saying exactly what you think yourself."

- James Stephen

"The most important function of education at any level is to develop the personality of the individual and the significance of his life to himself and to others. This is the basic architecture of a life; the rest is ornamentation and decoration of the structure."

- Grayson Kirk

1. America Is Running Out of Ammo

2. Daewoo Investor Eyes Purchase Of US Navy Shipbuilder

3. Trapped in Ukraine with No Victory: Putin Opened Pandora's Box

4. Retired US general breaks down why it's so hard for Ukraine to make a counteroffensive push through Russia's defenses. It's '20 kilometers of hell.'

5. NATO Agrees to Pull Ukraine Closer, but Offers No Membership Timeline

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 11, 2023

7. U.S. Government Emails Hacked in Suspected Chinese Espionage Campaign

8. Power Grids and Plumbing: The Link Between Irregular Warfare and National Critical Functions

9. How the War for Taiwan Will Be Fought—and Won

10. NATO prepared to back Ukraine in its fight against Russia — but not to extend membership

11. Opinion | How we left Afghanistan was wrong. But leaving was right.

12. China Says Its Foreign Minister Is Ill. A Senior Diplomat Will Take His Place at ASEAN Summit

13. NATO agrees to begin F-16 training program for Ukraine in August

14. What NATO Said About Ukraine: Highlights of the Alliance’s Communiqué

15. Australia's international strategy between the US and China

16. China cranks up punitive sea pressure on the Philippines

17. The Myth of Neutrality – Countries Will Have to Choose Between America and China

18. Would Prosecuting Russia Prolong the War in Ukraine?

19. US intel report casts new doubt on Wuhan lab leak theory

20. The US and India’s non-aligned alliance

21. CQ Brown decries hold on nominations in hearing to head Joint Chiefs

22. Gen. Randy George, once admonished, is now Army chief in waiting

23. Chinese hackers breach U.S. government email through Microsoft cloud

24. What the DoD Can Learn from Alleged Jack Teixeira Classified Document Leaks

25. House GOP channels America’s culture wars in Pentagon budget battle

1. America Is Running Out of Ammo

Excerpts:

House appropriators are right that readiness accounts need more money for maintenance and training, which their bill offers, and the missile tussle is an example of the risks of insufficient defense spending. The ammo shortage will require presidential leadership that is so far missing in action.

Mr. Biden could announce he’s asking Congress to fund a large expansion of U.S. weapons stocks. He could give a speech leveling to the public that deep American magazines make dictators think twice about invading a neighbor. He could explain how long-range missiles will reduce U.S. casualties in the terrible event the weapons are needed. America’s munitions shortage is a disgrace that needs urgent fixing.

America Is Running Out of Ammo

Biden admits the problem, but then why not do something about it?

https://www.wsj.com/articles/american-munitions-shortage-ukraine-joe-biden-pentagon-defense-military-congress-4e6d6576?st=jhrs731kl2ldcbx&reflink=article_email_share

By The Editorial Board

July 10, 2023 6:20 pm ET

155mm artillery shells are seen during the manufacturing process at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Scranton, Penn., Feb. 16. PHOTO: BRENDAN MCDERMID/REUTERS

President Biden is taking flak for sending cluster bombs to Ukraine, and over the weekend he blurted out the truth that both Kyiv and the U.S. are running low on firepower. So why doesn’t the Commander in Chief unveil a new national effort to expand U.S. weapons production and stocks?

“The Ukrainians are running out of ammunition,” Mr. Biden told CNN. “This is a war relating to munitions. And they’re running out of that ammunition, and we’re low on it.” The U.S. has given Kyiv more than two million 155mm artillery rounds, and the Pentagon says Ukraine is burning through 3,000 shells a day.

The U.S. is ramping up to produce more than 20,000 shells a month this year and more in 2024, the U.S. Army says. But America’s adversaries can do the math and understand the U.S. may struggle to support a long war. The Biden crowd has cited limited stocks as a reason to withhold the Army Tactical Missile System, which could help Kyiv strike deep into Russian positions. The Administration is now leaking that it might furnish the missiles as Ukraine’s summer offensive becomes a slog.

Congress’s supplemental cash for Ukraine is helping refill America’s armory, but Mr. Biden has an obligation to make sure the U.S. never goes Winchester, as the saying has it, and not only for Ukraine. The lesson applies to the long-range missiles the U.S. may need if China decides to strike Taiwan.

In a war game for control of the island that the House Select Committee on China played this year, the U.S. ran out of long-range antiship weapons in three days. Retired Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery says in most games the U.S. needs roughly 1,200 long-range antiship missiles, known as LRASMs. But U.S. inventories are in the low hundreds after years of small orders.

Mr. Biden’s budget requested money for multiyear missile buys to exploit economies of scale. But his budget deal with House Republicans cramps defense spending for 2024 and 2025, and now Congress is squabbling over the fixed pie.

The House Appropriations Committee is declining to fund bulk buying of two crucial precision weapons—the Standard Missile-6 and an air-to-air AMRAAM missile. GOP appropriator Ken Calvert told us the Pentagon didn’t show sufficient savings and that contractors are struggling to fill their orders.

Yet capricious demand from Washington is one reason the industrial base is so brittle. Some manufacturers make a part or two for multiple missiles, and these subcontractors “have been living on the thin edge of profitability,” says Mark Gunzinger of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

House appropriators are right that readiness accounts need more money for maintenance and training, which their bill offers, and the missile tussle is an example of the risks of insufficient defense spending. The ammo shortage will require presidential leadership that is so far missing in action.

Mr. Biden could announce he’s asking Congress to fund a large expansion of U.S. weapons stocks. He could give a speech leveling to the public that deep American magazines make dictators think twice about invading a neighbor. He could explain how long-range missiles will reduce U.S. casualties in the terrible event the weapons are needed. America’s munitions shortage is a disgrace that needs urgent fixing.

Daewoo Investor Eyes Purchase Of US Navy Shipbuilder

gcaptain.com · by John Konrad · July 11, 2023

150224-N-EW716-002 MOBILE, Ala. (Feb. 24, 2015) An aerial view of the future littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) during its launch sequence at the Austal USA shipyard. The launch of the Gabrielle Giffords marks an important production milestone for the littoral combat ship program. (U.S. Navy photo/Released)

John Konrad

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July 11, 2023

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by John Konrad (gCaptain) South Korean conglomerate Hanwha, valued at $42 billion, is considering a strategic acquisition of Austal, a pivotal player in the global shipbuilding industry, according to the Financial Review. Hanwha, keen to enhance its recent expansion into shipbuilding following the acquisition and renaming of Daewoo Shipbuilding to Hanwha Ocean, is particularly interested in Austal’s US operations.

Hanwha, a publicly-traded Korean conglomerate, has made significant strides in the shipbuilding sector this year. In a strategic move this May, it acquired a controlling stake of 49.3% in Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, one of South Korea’s top three shipbuilders, for an investment of $1.49 billion. Following the acquisition, Daewoo Shipbuilding underwent a rebranding, emerging under the new name of Hanwha Ocean.

Austal, an Australian company with shipyards in Western Australia and Alabama, USA, presents a compelling investment opportunity. Its anticipated contract for surveillance ship construction, valued at $3.2 billion, and its paltry market capitalization (under $1 billion) compared to other defense industry companies, make it an attractive prospect for investors. The intensifying competition with China has led to the US Navy’s desire to expand its shipbuilding efforts, further augmenting Austal’s appeal. Additionally, Austal USA’s recent strategic investment in enhancing its manufacturing capabilities by adding steel production lines to its existing aluminum manufacturing further bolsters its value proposition in the sector.

However, Austal’s US operations have recently grappled with substantial challenges. Following an extended investigation, the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged three of its maritime executives with accounting fraud. These allegations sent shockwaves through the industry.

Austal, recognized as the builder of the Independence Class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) – which have faced harsh criticism for failing to meet expectations – is implicated in systemic accounting fraud allegations. Among those charged by the Securities and Exchange Commission is Austal USA’s former Chief Executive, Craig Perciavalle. These legal actions, coupled with an unsettling insight into the daily operations at Austal’s US shipyard, could hamper its capacity to attract critical executive hires and secure future financing.

Amid these turbulent times, Hanwha’s interest in Austal surfaces when the latter is on the cusp of significant defense contracts, thanks to the AUKUS pact. This agreement commits Australia to a massive $368 billion investment over the next three decades for the procurement of eight nuclear-powered submarines. Austal does not build submarines directly but has contracts to provide production work on the US Navy’s Virginia-class and future Columbia-class nuclear-powered submarine for General Dynamics’ Electric Boat.

The Financial Review also points out that this potential move has sparked interest among other financial behemoths. New York-based JF Lehman & Company, enjoying the backing of Morgan Stanley, is preparing to lodge a bid. Cerberus Capital Management and Washington’s Arlington Capital Partners are also interested.

Should Hanwha proceed with the acquisition, it could signal a remarkable shift in the US shipbuilding industry. This could usher in greater collaboration with Korean shipbuilders who, despite losing market share to China, still reign supreme in efficiently constructing large, highly complex ships. According to several experts interviewed by gCaptain, a symbiotic partnership combining Korea’s commercial shipbuilding efficiencies with American warship funding and expertise could revitalise Naval shipbuilding, as long as it can circumvent US government red tape.

Industry Consolidation

Austal USA’s strategic location holds one more significant appeal to private equity firms. Its close proximity to the newly revitalized Alabama Shipyards could offer potential investors a significant advantage in the shipbuilding industry. Merging the operations of the two yards would provide a combined capability to construct steel and aluminum ships and would also facilitate the much-needed upgrade and repair services for the US Navy’s aging fleet. Given Alabama Shipyards’ remarkable turnaround story — from having less than a dozen employees in 2018 to a workforce of around 250 with the ability to surge to 600 as needed — the company offers not only an ample supply of skilled labor but also the capacity to undertake substantial projects. Its extensive waterfront real estate and deep-water access further bolster its potential.

By strategically capitalizing on these existing opportunities, and other promising prospects in the commercial sector — such as supplying the burgeoning workboat market through the construction of aluminum vessels, or acquiring a primary provider of Jones Act tankers to the US Navy, Overseas Shipping Group (currently undervalued with a paltry market-cap of just $322 million, which is at or below the replacement cost of a single Jones Act crude tanker) and launching a newbuild project — savvy private equity investors could forge a robust shipbuilding conglomerate that meets several of the Pentagon’s most presssing needs. This well-positioned entity would be capable of effectively addressing the rising demand in both the defense and commercial sectors.

Conclusion

The potential acquisition of Austal by Hanwha could be a transformative event in the shipbuilding industry. Despite Austal’s current challenges, its significant growth potential, marked by robust U.S. Navy and Australian submarine contracts, make it an appealing prospect. Hanwha’s acquisition could not only solidify its position in the U.S. shipbuilding sector but also ignite greater collaboration between South Korean shipbuilders – which have been loosing market share to China – and American shipbuilders – which would benefit from the technologies and processes that make Korean yards among the world’s most profitable and efficient.

Yet, the intricacies of the political, legal, and competitive environment cast a shroud of uncertainty over the outcome. This potential acquisition highlights the volatile interplay between international business and defense strategy, underscoring the challenging reality faced by the U.S. Navy. Like VT Halter before it – which also had billions in contracts and invested hundreds of millions in expansion yet sold for an astonishing low $15 million – Austal is confronted with the stark truth that new facilities, substantial U.S. Navy contracts and promising opportunities do not guarantee financial security.

3. Trapped in Ukraine with No Victory: Putin Opened Pandora's Box

Excerpts:

But there are four other possibilities (please read part one here):

Scenario 3: Indefinite Mobilization

Scenario 4: Trump will Cut Off Ukraine

Scenario 5: Europe will Tire and Dump Ukraine

Scenario 6: China Will Do…Something

None of This will Work; Russia’s Stuck

Trapped in Ukraine with No Victory: Putin Opened Pandora's Box

So there are six ways Russia might turn the war around. All are unlikely, and three rely on foreign behavior – over which Putin has little control – dramatically changing.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · July 10, 2023

In part one of this essay, I suggested that Russia has six possible pathways to victory in its war on Ukraine.

All, however, are unlikely. First, it might use nuclear coercion to scare NATO or Ukraine into a deal. But this is highly risky and has not worked to date.

Second, Russian President Vladimir Putin could start relieving his officers until he finds capable ones, as US President Abraham Lincoln famously did during the American Civil War. But officers’ political loyalty is more important to Putin than their competence, given Putin’s corrupt, gangsterish regime. So he has not done this.

But there are four other possibilities (please read part one here):

Scenario 3: Indefinite Mobilization

Operationally, it would probably be best if Putin selected more capable officers, but in lieu of that, his current strategy seems to be attrition: out-mobilizing Ukraine. This is another argument of pro-Russian apologists. Russia is big; it can fight on and on, mobilizing more and more people until Ukraine tires. This is more viable than scenarios 1 and 2, but it has obvious limits:

Is it worth militarizing and burning out the Russian economy to win one peripheral war of limited value? Russia aspires to be a great power and compete with China and the West. Fighting a quagmire war of choice indefinitely will reduce it to a middle power and a Chinese lackey

Will Russian civil society accept total mobilization for a war of choice of minor national importance? ‘Forever wars’ routinely faced broad public antipathy. Putin can repress that, but is it worth running the risk of widespread alienation, possibly revolt, just for slices of eastern Ukraine? Putin’s reliance on mercenaries, foreigners, and prisoners suggest he knows the Russian middle class will not tolerate a long war at their expense.

– Will full mobilization work if the West continues to help Ukraine? Probably not. The West’s combined GDP vastly outweighs Russia’s. It cannot keep up, and that will get worse as sanctions continue.

– Will full mobilization overcome Ukraine’s deep nationalist commitment to keep fighting? Possibly, but it would probably take a long time. We know from anti-colonial wars that nationalist, mobilized populations fighting for their independence will tolerate horrendous casualties in very unbalanced conflicts but still not give up – Vietnam (against the French and the Americans), Algeria (against the French), Afghanistan (against the Soviets and the Americans), the American Revolution (somewhat, against the British). This willingness to carry high costs characterizes Ukraine’s behavior so far too. Russia can pound Ukraine for years and keep throwing men into the meat-grinder, but there is little evidence to date that that will work. Bakhmut, where Russia tried this approach, was a pyrrhic Russian victory.

Scenario 4: Trump will Cut Off Ukraine

This is probably the most likely way Russia could win. Former US President Donald Trump pretty clearly wants a Russian victory, and Russia will likely intervene in the 2024 election to help Trump win. But US public support for helping Ukraine is still high. Congress is supportive too. Trump would have to overcome that, and he is notoriously lazy.

More importantly, Trump probably will not win re-election. He has never won the popular vote. His coalition is aging and shrinking. He lost to current-President Joe Biden in 2020, and they are both running in 2024 as basically the same people they were in 2020. So there is little reason to think the outcome will differ. Even most Republicans know this, which is why they are so anxious to find someone other than Trump to run. It is also likely that some European states would continue to support Ukraine anyway. Nor does it seem likely that Ukraine would give up, although a Trumpian withdrawal of aid would obviously make the war harder for it.

Scenario 5: Europe will Tire and Dump Ukraine

This is possible, but we have heard this talk before – remember the cold winter would have wimpy Germans begging for peace and cheap Russian gas? – and it went nowhere. By this winter, the Russian gas weapon will be much weaker. Europe will have had time to prepare.

Western opinion, especially at the elite level, continues to hold up. If anything, it is tilting further against Russia. Finland joined NATO recently, and Sweden will likely too. Even Ukrainian NATO membership is now being seriously discussed, something everyone thought was hugely risky just a year ago. Even Henry Kissinger now supports Ukrainian NATO membership after insisting last year that Ukraine should lose for the good of European stability.

Scenario 6: China Will Do…Something

This is just wish-casting from desperate Russian media hawks. China will not save Russia. It will not disrupt its vastly more important economic relationships with the West for a middle power in economic decline who cannot win a war. The conflict is happily turning Russia into a Chinese dependency, and China is buying its fossil fuels on the cheap. It is not even clear what China could do militarily to help the Russians break the stalemate.

None of This will Work; Russia’s Stuck

So there are six ways Russia might turn the war around. All are unlikely, and three rely on foreign behavior – over which Putin has little control – dramatically changing.

My own sense is that Ukraine will win the war in time by simply outlasting the Russians. That is, this war is more like an insurgency. The insurgent wins by not losing, by waiting for the aggressor to tire. At some point, the exhausted, frustrated aggressor finds it cheaper to just throw in the towel and go home. This is how the Vietnamese beat the US in the 1970s, and how the Afghan mujahidin beat the Red Army in the 1980s.

The current Ukrainian offensive may not succeed dramatically – the critics may be right – but that misses the point. Ukraine is committed; it will fight on and on. Crucially, Russia needs to do more than just hang on against Ukraine. It needs to win, decisively, to force Ukraine to bargain, to end this thing and stop the bleeding. Ukraine, by contrast, just needs to endure, which it has shown it can and will.

Operationally, this probably means Russia needs a major battlefield victory, annihilating massed Ukrainian forces and taking more territory – at least east of the Dnipro River, and, ideally, Kyiv at last. Without that, the war becomes a quagmire where a determined, if ostensibly weaker, force bleeds a larger one, until it is just not worth the cost anymore.

The resolution will be akin to the Soviet-Afghan War: Indeterminate fighting over a long period of time; no obvious turning point; a tenacious foe who just will not quit; growing dissension at home, both in the public and in the security services; worsening diplomatic isolation; worsening economic drain; growing exhaustion; withdrawal.

You can read part two here.

Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; RoberEdwinKelly.com) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan and a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · July 10, 2023

4. Retired US general breaks down why it's so hard for Ukraine to make a counteroffensive push through Russia's defenses. It's '20 kilometers of hell.'

Excerpts:

"This is 20 kilometers of hell," Kimmitt said, referring to the layers of defenses. "There is absolutely not doubt that it is probably the toughest fighting outside the cities," he said, adding that Ukraine is currently trying to find and exploit a "soft spot" in Russia's defenses.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said in late June that Ukraine's slow pace can be attributed to the general nature of warfare but warned that the counteroffensive will be "very bloody." And beyond being tasked with clearing Russia's elaborate defense lines, Ukraine has to do so without air superiority and with a limited supply of artillery, though a solution to the latter problem may soon be on its way.

"The Russians are dug in, they have thrown a lot of defense and manpower and munitions at this, and the Ukrainians have bravely, systematically been punching and pushing forward and will continue to do so," White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said last week as he announced that the Biden administration would provide Kyiv with deadly but controversial cluster munitions to help with the counteroffensive.

"The Ukrainians also have a substantial amount of capacity they have not yet committed to this fight," he added. "So, the story of this counteroffensive is far from written, and we will continue to support Ukraine along the way."

Retired US general breaks down why it's so hard for Ukraine to make a counteroffensive push through Russia's defenses. It's '20 kilometers of hell.'

Business Insider · by Jake Epstein

A M142 HIMARS launches a rocket on the Bakhmut direction on May 18, 2023 in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine.Photo by Serhii Mykhalchuk/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images

Ukraine's counteroffensive in the east and south has moved at a slow but calculated pace.
This is because Russia has built an elaborate network of defensive lines, a retired US general says.
The fortifications include rows of trenches, anti-tank traps, minefields, barbed wire, and more.

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Liberating Russian-occupied territory is a slow, calculated process, and for good reason. As one retired US general put it, Kyiv's forces needs to break through "20 kilometers of hell," which is no easy task, especially with the tools at hand.

Ukraine is several weeks into its much-anticipated counteroffensive, and its military has made small territorial gains. But it's tough fighting. Russia's troops have built layers of sophisticated and vicious defenses designed to inflict as much pain on Ukraine's advancing military as possible.

As Ukrainian forces prepared for their offensive, Russian forces spent those months readying elaborate defenses behind a sprawling front line that stretches for hundreds of miles across eastern and southern Ukraine. They consist of anti-tank ditches, barbed wire, concrete-hardened trenches, anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields, dragon's teeth anti-vehicle obstacles, and bunkers.

Ukrainian forces built up an impressive arsenal of tanks, armored vehicles, and other weaponry provided by the US and its NATO allies to deliver an armored punch through Russian fortifications. Progress, however, has not come easy, and Ukrainian officials have frequently pushed back on pessimism that the counteroffensive is not moving fast enough, arguing that a quick, sweeping counteroffensive isn't "feasible' with just the weapons it has now.

This week, retired Brigadier Gen. Mark Kimmitt, who served for decades as a US Army officer and also as deputy director of operations for Coalition Forces in Iraq, broke down why it's so difficult for Ukraine to puncture Russia's lines.

Maxar satellite imagery shows Russian dragons teeth obstacles and trenches along the beach just west of Yevpatoria, Crimea in March.Maxar Technologies

In a Wall Street Journal video that was published on Monday, Kimmitt explained how these various defenses are stacked one in front of each other and can stretch for several miles, creating as many as eight layers of dangerous fortifications that Kyiv's heavy armor — like advanced, Western-made tanks — and ground troops have to clear at costs in terms of both manpower and equipment.

"The Russians, like most countries, have what they call a 'deliberate defense,' which is a series of layered obstacles all to make sure that the Ukrainian forces are stopped as far forward as possible," Kimmitt said.

For example, he said, armored Ukrainian vehicles that try to advance get caught in anti-tank traps, exposing them to enemy fire. Infantry soldiers who pass the tank traps, meanwhile, can get bogged down by barbed wire, leaving them vulnerable to attacks. Should these forces get through, then they're faced with trenches, minefields, and dragon's teeth, which are rows of concrete spikes designed to stop vehicles in their tracks.

Even after clearing these layers, the Ukrainians could face additional lines of barbed wire and trenches, which means intense close-quarters fighting. Here, Kyiv's troops are also targets for Russian artillery, drones, aircraft, cluster munitions, and other deadly attacks.

"This is 20 kilometers of hell," Kimmitt said, referring to the layers of defenses. "There is absolutely not doubt that it is probably the toughest fighting outside the cities," he said, adding that Ukraine is currently trying to find and exploit a "soft spot" in Russia's defenses.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said in late June that Ukraine's slow pace can be attributed to the general nature of warfare but warned that the counteroffensive will be "very bloody." And beyond being tasked with clearing Russia's elaborate defense lines, Ukraine has to do so without air superiority and with a limited supply of artillery, though a solution to the latter problem may soon be on its way.

"The Russians are dug in, they have thrown a lot of defense and manpower and munitions at this, and the Ukrainians have bravely, systematically been punching and pushing forward and will continue to do so," White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said last week as he announced that the Biden administration would provide Kyiv with deadly but controversial cluster munitions to help with the counteroffensive.

"The Ukrainians also have a substantial amount of capacity they have not yet committed to this fight," he added. "So, the story of this counteroffensive is far from written, and we will continue to support Ukraine along the way."

Business Insider · by Jake Epstein

5. NATO Agrees to Pull Ukraine Closer, but Offers No Membership Timeline

I fear we may have shown some fear of Russia and that somehow someone thinks this will moderate Putin's behavior.

NATO Agrees to Pull Ukraine Closer, but Offers No Membership Timeline

In failing to offer Ukraine a clear path to joining the alliance, NATO disappoints Kyiv

By Daniel Michaels, Andrew Restuccia, Vivian Salama and Yaroslav Trofimov

Updated July 11, 2023 2:21 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-reluctance-to-letting-ukraine-join-nato-tests-alliances-unity-4c850273?mod=hp_lead_pos2

VILNIUS, Lithuania—NATO leaders declined Tuesday to offer Ukraine a clear timeline or path to join the alliance while affirming plans to extend a future invitation, a level of ambiguity that President Volodymyr Zelensky blasted as “unprecedented and absurd” as his country battles Russia.

More than 15 years after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization first offered Ukraine a promise of membership, members resisted pressure from Zelensky and his boosters in the alliance to say when and how the country would join. NATO instead offered a package of financial and political support that alliance officials said would boost Kyiv’s membership bid.

The U.S., Germany and some other NATO members have balked at giving Kyiv a timeline or checklist for joining. President Biden has said that Ukraine isn’t ready for membership and voiced concern that offering specifics on a pathway risked elevating conflict with Russia, potentially even sparking a new world war.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has called NATO an aggressor and blamed it for causing the war.

Ukrainians hail NATO membership as crucial to stopping future Russian attacks after the current hostilities end.

“NATO will give security to Ukraine, and Ukraine will make NATO stronger,” Zelensky told a cheering crowd in a rousing speech on Vilnius’s central square before attending a dinner with alliance leaders.

Earlier Tuesday, Zelensky blasted the alliance for its ambiguity regarding Ukraine’s accession. “For Russia, this means motivation to continue its terror,” he said on Twitter. “Uncertainty is weakness.”

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 11, 2023

Jul 11, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 11, 2023

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 11, 2023, 8:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:00pm ET on July 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed 131 and 136 drone strikes across Ukraine on July 11, likely in a demonstrative response to the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius and to threaten the Black Sea grain deal. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 26 of the 28 Russian Shahed 131 and 136 drones launched from the Primorsk-Akhtarsk (Krasnodar Krai) direction.[1] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces tried to strike the grain terminal in Odesa Oblast, and that two drones struck an administrative building at a port facility.[2] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces targeted port infrastructure to disrupt the Black Sea Grain deal.[3] Russia’s drone strikes on port infrastructure also coincide with the first day of the NATO summit in Vilnius and are likely intended to discourage NATO members from providing more military aid to Ukraine. Russia may be threatening the Black Sea grain deal to message the deal's original broker, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, that his recent statement of support for Ukraine’s NATO membership and the return of the five Ukrainian Azovstal commanders on July 7 has not gone unnoticed and is not appreciated by the Kremlin.[4]

Germany and France pledged to provide Ukraine more weapons systems during the first day of the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated that Germany will provide Ukraine with two Patriot air defense launchers, 40 Marder infantry fighting vehicles, 25 Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks, and five Bergepanzer 2 armored recovery vehicles over an unspecified time period.[5] France will reportedly send Ukraine Storm Shadow missiles. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that he decided to send Ukraine weapons to allow Ukrainian forces to conduct deep strikes.[6] Reuters reported that a French diplomatic source said that France will provide Ukraine with about 50 SCALP missiles (the French name for Storm Shadow missiles) with a range of 250km.[7]

A coalition of 11 states signed a memorandum with Ukraine outlining the terms for training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 aircraft at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov announced on July 11 that 11 partner states signed a memorandum on the terms for the coalition to train Ukrainian pilots on the F-16.[8] Reznikov noted that the training program may include other fighter aircraft types and expressed his thanks to Denmark and the Netherlands for their ”outstanding leadership” in the process.[9]

The Kremlin’s and Russian milbloggers’ reactions to the first day of the NATO Summit were relatively muted. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov took a predictably dim view of the NATO Summit’s first day, complaining that the summit has a ”pronounced, concentrated anti-Russian character.”[10] Peskov reiterated boilerplate rhetoric about how the West’s continued security assistance to Ukraine and Ukraine’s promised future membership in NATO would result in grave consequences.[11] Russian milbloggers expressed general discontent about new weapons deliveries to Ukraine but have not voiced any major reactions at the time of this publication.[12] The milbloggers are likely waiting to react to the main events that will occur on the summit’s second day when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will meet with US President Joe Biden and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on July 12.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attempted to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort against the backdrop of the NATO Summit. Shoigu implausibly claimed on July 11 that Ukrainian forces have lost 26,000 servicemembers and 1,244 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles since starting counteroffensive operations on June 4.[13] Shoigu also tried to present possible Ukrainian interdiction efforts in southern Ukraine as similarly ineffective by claiming that Russian air defenses have intercepted 176 HIMARS rockets and 27 Storm Shadow cruise missiles since the start of the counteroffensive.[14] ISW assesses that Russian MoD reporting on Ukrainian losses is likely highly inflated, and even Russian milbloggers have recently accused the MoD of counting strikes on already damaged and destroyed vehicles as new Ukrainian equipment losses.[15] Shoigu’s rhetoric about the Ukrainian counteroffensive notably contradicts the Kremlin’s reported media guidance instructing Russian state media not to downplay the counteroffensive or overstate Russian successes.[16] Shoigu may be increasingly ignoring established Kremlin guidance on covering the counteroffensive in a renewed effort to portray the MoD as an effective manager of the war in Ukraine following the Wagner Group’s rebellion.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 11 and made gains in some areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Berdyansk directions (Zaporizhia Oblast-Donetsk Oblast border area), and Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing counteroffensive operations around Bakhmut.[17] Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv).[18] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces established control over new positions northwest of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and advanced up to 1.5km near Rozdolivka (19km northeast of Bakhmut).[19]

A Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike reportedly killed Deputy Commander of the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Oleg Tsokov at the command post of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[20] Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian sources reported Tsokov’s death on July 11, and social media users reported that Tsokov died in a strike on a local hotel according to preliminary information.[21] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov published footage purportedly showing smoke plumes resulting from Ukrainian missile strikes on Berdyansk but did not offer any information regarding Tsokov’s death.[22] Tsokov was previously wounded during a Ukrainian strike on Svatove, Luhansk Oblast, in late September 2022 when he commanded the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District (WMD).[23] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that locals knew about Tsokov’s arrival and noted that Ukrainian forces have been systematically targeting Russian-occupied infrastructure in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblast – specifically recreation centers that Russian forces use as headquarters and command posts.[24] Ukrainian military officials have repeatedly signaled that Ukrainian forces are conducting an interdiction campaign as part of their counteroffensives to disrupt Russian logistics and command.[25] ISW has observed the 58th CAA‘s 42nd Motorized Rifle Division operating south of Orikhiv and the 58th CAA‘s 19th Motorized Rifle Division operating southwest of Orikhiv.[26] Tsokov’s presence at the reported command post of the 58th CAA suggests that he was personally overseeing the army responsible for repelling Ukrainian counteroffensives in key sectors of western Zaporizhia Oblast stretching from near Polohy (90km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) to the Kakhovka Reservoir.

Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for failing to defend against Ukrainian strikes on Russian headquarters. One milblogger claimed that Russia lacks professional military analysts who would improve the Russian military command’s decision-making processes and adequately analyze information to develop risk assessments.[27] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to underestimate Ukrainian intelligence capabilities that set conditions for the strike.[28] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger complained that Russian officers have poor operational security procedures despite knowing about the dangers of operations in occupied southern Ukraine.[29]

Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov reportedly fired Commander of the 58th CAA Major General Ivan Popov after Popov voiced his concerns over the need for troop rotations in western Zaporizhia Oblast amidst Ukrainian counteroffensives.[30] A source reportedly affiliated with the Russian security services claimed that Popov notified Gerasimov that elements of the 58th CAA – which are attempting to prevent Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast – are in need of rotation after fighting in combat for a long time and suffering significant casualties.[31] Gerasimov reportedly accused Popov of alarmism and blackmailing the Russian military command. The source added that Gerasimov dismissed Popov and sent him to forward positions after Popov threatened to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin with his complaint. Another Russian source who appears to be in contact with Russian forces in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast stated that his sources confirmed Popov’s dismissal after he raised a ”real” question about the lack of rotations in Polohy Raion on the Orikhiv frontline.[32] These reports, if true, may support ISW’s previous assessments that Russian forces lack operational reserves that would allow them to carry out rotations of personnel defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives and that Russian defensive lines may be brittle.[33]

An unknown actor killed the Krasnodar City Deputy Head for Mobilization, Captain Stanislav Rzhitsky, on July 10.[34] Russian media reported that an unknown person shot Rzhitsky several times in Krasnodar and then fled the scene.[35] The Investigative Committee of Russia posted footage of Russian authorities detaining a man in Kurban, Krasnodar Krai on July 11 on suspicion of murdering Rzhitsky.[36] A Russian citizen previously attempted to kill a Russian officer at a recruitment office in Irkutsk shortly following the start of partial mobilization in Russia in late September 2022.[37] Rzkitsky’s killing could be associated with continued discontent with mobilization, but ISW cannot definitively identify the motivation behind his killing at this time. Russian milbloggers claimed without offering evidence that Ukrainian operatives conducted the killing and compared it to previous high-profile killings of Russian ultranationalist figures in Russia.[38]

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed 131 and 136 drone strikes across Ukraine on July 11, likely in a demonstrative response to the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius and to threaten the Black Sea grain deal.
Germany and France pledged to provide Ukraine more weapons systems during the first day of the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11.
A coalition of 11 states signed a memorandum with Ukraine outlining the terms for training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 aircraft at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11.
The Kremlin’s and Russian milbloggers’ reactions to the first day of the NATO Summit were relatively muted.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attempted to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort against the backdrop of the NATO Summit.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 11 and made gains in some areas.
A Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike reportedly killed Deputy Commander of the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Oleg Tsokov at the command post of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for failing to defend against Ukrainian strikes on Russian headquarters.
Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov reportedly fired Commander of the 58th CAA Major General Ivan Popov after Popov voiced his concerns over the need for troop rotations in western Zaporizhia Oblast amidst Ukrainian counteroffensives.
An unknown actor killed the Krasnodar City Deputy Head for Mobilization, Captain Stanislav Rzhitsky, on July 10.
Russian forces are conducting offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and made territorial gains.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s northern and southern outskirts.
Russian forces launched assaults on Ukrainian positions on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka frontline.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Kremlin continues measures to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) to meet Russian military demands in Ukraine without conducting a wider economic mobilization.
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 11 that the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) is struggling to establish regional branches in occupied territories in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on July 11 and recently made territorial gains west of Kreminna. Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows Ukrainian artillery strikes against Russian forces in eastern Torske (15km west of Kreminna), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced along the Torske-Kreminna highway and entered eastern Torske.[39] Russian sources reported on July 11 that Russian elements of the Central Grouping of Forces are conducting an offensive in Luhansk Oblast along the Svatove-Kreminna line in forested areas near Kreminna and that elements of the Russian 21st Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) expelled Ukrainian forces from an unspecified height near the Zherebets River, defeated a local Ukrainian counterattack, and captured over 10 Ukrainian positions.[40] A Russian source claimed that the Ukrainian military deployed forces to reinforce Ukrainian positions near the Svatove-Kreminna line.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces in this area are conducting defensive operations and holding the line.[42]

Russian forces did not make any confirmed territorial gains in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 11. A prominent Russian milblogger reported on July 10 that there were no significant changes in the Kupyansk direction.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operation on Bakhmut’s northern and southern outskirts on July 11. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks northwest of Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to attack in the directions of Klishchiivka, Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces still control these settlements and hold a tactically significant height near Klishchiivka.[45] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing counteroffensive operations and control all heights around Bakhmut.[46] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are continuing to attack tactical heights around Klishchiivka and reduced their counteroffensive activities near Rozdolivka (19km northeast of Bakhmut) due to an unsuccessful attack.[47] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces established new positions northwest of Klishchiivka and advanced up to 1.5km near Rozdolivka .[48] A Russian source affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) claimed that BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) volunteers are operating alongside VDV elements to repel Ukrainian counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s flanks.[49]

Russian forces continued to counterattack Ukrainian positions in the Bakhmut area on July 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in the vicinity of Hryhorivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut) and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (12km northwest of Bakhmut).[50] Geolocated footage published on July 11 also showed Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian attack on the eastern outskirts of Orikhovo-Vasylivka.[51] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces successfully counterattacked Ukrainian positions in the direction of Berkhivka, while unsuccessfully counterattacking from Dubrovo-Vasylivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut).[52] Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen ”Akhmat” Spetsnaz forces are operating alongside the Luhansk People’s Republic’s (LNR) 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Army Corps, 8th Guards Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District (SMD) in the Klishchiivka area.[53]

Russian forces launched assaults on Ukrainian positions on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka frontline on July 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian offensives near Avdiivka, Pervomaiske (12km west of Avdiivka), Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka), and Sieverne (6km northwest of Avdiivka).[54] Ukrainian military officials also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian offensives near Marinka (20km southwest of Donetsk City), Pobieda (24km southwest of Donetsk City Russian forces launched assaults on Ukrainian positions on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka frontline on July 11. Novomykhailivka (27km southwest of Donetsk City), and Krasnohorivka (20km west of Donetsk City).[55] Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows that Russian infantrymen retreated following an unsuccessful assault north of Avdiivka and abandoned a wounded Russian serviceman who later committed suicide.[56] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized a new position south of Sieverne and advanced closer to the settlement.[57] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced into Ukrainian defenses near the railway area in Krasnohorivka and unsuccessfully attempted to assault dacha areas near Avdiivka. Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensives on Novomykhailivka, Marinka, and the southwestern approaches to Avdiivka.[58] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking Russian-occupied positions near Nevelske, Pervomaiske, Sieverne, Krasnohorivka, Vodyane (7km west of Avdiivka), Opytne (4km southwest of Avdiivka).[59]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts on July 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensives operations in the Berdyansk direction (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area).[60] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have established control over positions near the Hrusheva Gully (around 15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked Russian positions west of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[62] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Blahodatne (5km south of Velyka Novosilka).[63] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valery Shershen stated that Russian forces deployed Chechen ”Akhmat” forces, ”Vostok” battalion elements, and unspecified ”Storm Z” detachments to unspecified areas of Zaporizhia Oblast because of pressure from Ukrainian artillery units.[64] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that units of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Rivnopil (8km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[65]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 11. Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows Ukrainian advances northeast of Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv).[66] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces were able to advance in the Robotyne vicinity because they attacked a frontline area where Russian forces had the least number of Russian mines and fewer fortifications.[67] Several milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces focused their attack on a seam of the Russian defensive lines between the positions of the 291stMotorized Rifle Regiment and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both part of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) east of Robotyne.[68] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced into the Russian defensive lines near Robotyne to a depth of 400 meters.[69] Several milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment counterattacked Ukrainian positions along the Novodanylivka-Robotyne line (6km south to 15km south of Orikhiv).[70] Another milblogger posted footage claiming to show unspecified elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division striking Ukrainian armored vehicles near Robotyne.[71] Another milblogger amplified footage claiming to show elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations towards Zherebyanky (27km southwest of Orikhiv) and near Pyatykhatky (23km southwest of Orikhiv) but have made no significant progress.[73]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have abandoned their positions in the dacha area on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain a limited position near the Antonivsky Bridge and that two new Ukrainian groups deployed to the area on speed boats from Antonivka (9km west of Kherson City) on the night of July 10.[74] Another milblogger claimed that Russian artillery units continue to strike Ukrainian positions despite the fact that Russian command ordered Russian forces to leave their positions in the dacha area on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River on the night of July 10.[75] The milblogger claimed that the Russian command’s decision to withdraw Russian forces is ”justified and measured” due to how difficult it has been for Russian forces to defend the swampy area against continued Ukrainian shelling.[76]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues measures to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) to meet Russian military demands in Ukraine without conducting a wider economic mobilization. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated on July 11 that the amount of weapons and equipment supplied to the Russian military under the Russian state defense order has almost doubled since March 2022.[77] Shoigu claimed that the MoD increased deliveries of Orlan-10/30 reconnaissance drones by a factor of 53, deliveries of T-72 and T-90 tanks by a factor of 3.6, deliveries of Mi-28 helicopters by a factor of three, and deliveries of Ka-52 helicopters by a factor of two.[78] Shoigu did not specify what percentage of these increased deliveries came from existing stocks or from new production. Shoigu claimed that Russian enterprises have increased the production of ammunition by a factor of 10 since the start of 2022.[79] Shoigu also visited DIB facilities in the Republic of Tatarstan on July 11, including the Kamskiy Avtomobilnyy Zavod (KAMAZ) plant and a KAMAZ subsidiary Remdiesel facility in Naberezhnye Chelny.[80] Shoigu claimed that KAMAZ is ahead of schedule on fulfilling the state defense order and suggested that the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Main Armored Vehicle Department form a working group with KAMAZ to maintain vehicles on the frontline in Ukraine.[81] Shoigu visited the Kazan Helicopter Plant in Kazan, Republic of Tartarstan, and heard reports about the production of ”Ansat” light helicopters and modifications to Mi-8 helicopters.[82] Shoigu also inspected the Gorbunov Kazan Aviation Plant and claimed that the plant will produce two modernized Tu-150 strategic missile carriers by the end of 2023 in accordance with the state defense order.[83] A Russian milblogger also claimed on July 11 that the Kurganmashzavod joint stock company in Kurgan Oblast recently shipped another batch of BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles to Russian forces as part of the state defense order.[84] These claims of Russian DIB activity do not suggest an increase in efforts to mobilize the DIB, and Russia appears to be prioritizing the production of certain armaments and equipment due to DIB constraints.[85] ISW assesses that the Kremlin is unlikely to start a wider economic mobilization due to fears that such a mobilization would create further domestic economic disruptions and corresponding discontent within Russia.[86]

A Russian source claimed that former Roscosmos (state space corporation) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin is promoting a proposal to launch high-explosive aerial bombs from the Vostochny and Plesetsk cosmodromes in Amur and Arkhangelsk oblasts.[87] Russian sources claimed on July 10 that Rogozin met with Progress Rocket Space Center Regional Director Dmitry Baranov to discuss the possibility of launching Soviet FAB-500 aerial bombs with ballistic systems produced by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology.[88] Rogozin was reportedly interested in retrofitting the FAB-500 bombs to survive reentry into the atmosphere, and Baranov reportedly stated that the modification process would take six to nine months.[89] A Moscow affiliate of the Russian source claimed that a source close to Rogozin confirmed the meeting between Baranov and Rogozin and added that the two also discussed the possibility of adapting high-power volumetric detonating bombs (ODAMs) for use in ballistic strikes.[90] The source reportedly stated that dense Ukrainian air defenses prevent Russian forces from using the ODAMs extensively and that ballistic delivery systems may allow Russian forces to fire the ODAMs at a distance of 700 to 1200km.[91] Rogozin may be using former connections with the Russian aerospace field to amplify these proposals and promote himself and the ”Tsarkiye Volky“ volunteer battalion he is affiliated with, although it is unclear if Russian officials are seriously considering these proposals.[92] These proposals regardless of their seriousness are reflective of Russian concerns about their lack of long-range strike capabilities in Ukraine.

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on July 11 that Moscow municipal authorities are threatening to withdraw contracts with construction firms if the firms fail to achieve the MoD’s volunteer recruitment quotas.[93]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 11 that the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) is struggling to establish regional branches in occupied territories in Ukraine.[94] The Resistance Center reported that a lack of personnel has prevented VGTRK from establishing propaganda channels in occupied territories.[95] The Resistance Center also reported that Russian occupation officials are creating Kremlin-financed training centers to recruit young journalists to staff these regional VGTRK branches.[96]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 11 that it is preparing unspecified Belarusian training grounds to receive more unspecified Russian troops for joint training within the framework of the combined Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces in the near future.[97] The MoD stated that Russian forces in Belarus completed their previous combat training rotation in June 2023. ISW previously reported that Ukrainian officials’ assessment of the number of Russian servicemen training in Belarus increased between early June and early July after initially decreasing over spring 2023.[98]

The Belarusian MoD also reported that Belarusian forces will cooperate with unspecified Wagner Group forces for training upon the Wagner forces’ arrival in Belarus, indicating that Belarusian authorities still expect some Wagner forces to deploy to Belarus in the near future.[99] ISW previously reported that the status of the Wagner Group’s reorganization and possible redeployment to Belarus may not be clear until fall 2023.[100]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

7. U.S. Government Emails Hacked in Suspected Chinese Espionage Campaign

Unrestricted Warfare.

I posted the following at the OPM hack in 2015. It is interesting to remember that Unrestricted Warfare was published in 1999. China has told us what they are doing.

Saturday, June 6, 2015

With a series of major hacks, China builds a database on Americans

You can access an original translation of Unrestricted Warfare here: https://www.dropbox.com/s/llltfszyecpj6s6/UnrestrictedWarfare.pdf?dl=0

As you read about the Chinese hack of OPM and over 4 million government employees I think it is worth reflecting on these excerpts from the 1999 book by Chinese PLA Colonels, Unrestricted Warfare. This is from the first FBIS translation of the book that I have saved over all these years. Of course you can also buy a commercial copy of the book from Amazon. I wonder how many people have read these prescient words. Please pay attention to the highlighted words. I know many have criticized this book and those who read it and in 2004 when I was a student at the National War College I asked the visiting Chinese Defense Minister if this book was being used to inform Chinese doctrine and strategic thinking he replied that the book had bene discredited in China and for me not to believe everything I read. (though I am violating the non-attribution rule - but I will take my lumps for that when compared to what the Chinese have done to us). So while we applaud Snowden (and he applauds himself) for defending our privacy from the NSA who is protecting not only our privacy but our national security from the Chinese?

[FBIS Editor's Note: The following selections are taken from "Unrestricted Warfare," a book published in China in February 1999 which proposes tactics for developing countries, in particular China, to compensate for their military inferiority vis-à-vis the United States during a high-tech war. The selections include the table of contents, preface, afterword, and biographical information about the authors printed on the cover. The book was written by two PLA senior colonels from the younger generation of Chinese military officers and was published by the PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House in Beijing, suggesting that its release was endorsed by at least some elements of the PLA leadership. This impression was reinforced by an interview with Qiao and laudatory review of the book carried by the party youth league's official daily Zhongguo Qingnian Bao on 28 June. Published prior to the bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade, the book has recently drawn the attention of both the Chinese and Western press for its advocacy of a multitude of means, both military and particularly non-military, to strike at the United States during times of conflict. Hacking into websites, targeting financial institutions, terrorism, using the media, and conducting urban warfare are among the methods proposed. In the Zhongguo Qingnian Bao interview, Qiao was quoted as stating that "the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden." Elaborating on this idea, he asserted that strong countries would not use the same approach against weak countries because "strong countries make the rules while rising ones break them and exploit loopholes . . .The United States breaks [UN rules] and makes new ones when these rules don't suit [its purposes], but it has to observe its own rules or the whole world will not trust it." (see FBIS translation of the interview, OW2807114599) [End FBIS Editor's Note]

Everyone who has lived through the last decade of the 20th century will have a profound sense of the changes in the world. We don't believe that there is anyone who would claim that there has been any decade in history in which the changes have been greater than those of this decade. Naturally, the causes behind the enormous changes are too numerous to mention, but there are only a few reasons that people bring up repeatedly. One of those is the Gulf War. One war changed the world. Linking such a conclusion to a war which occurred one time in a limited area and which only lasted 42 days seems like something of an exaggeration. However, that is indeed what the facts are, and there is no need to enumerate one by one all the new words that began to appear after 17 January 1991. It is only necessary to cite the former Soviet Union, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, cloning, Microsoft, hackers, the Internet, the Southeast Asian financial crisis, the euro, as well as the world's final and only superpower -- the United States. These are sufficient. They pretty much constitute the main subjects on this planet for the past decade

War in the age of technological integration and globalization has eliminated the right of weapons to label war and, with regard to the new starting point, has realigned the relationship of weapons to war, while the appearance of weapons of new concepts, and particularly new concepts of weapons, has gradually blurred the face of war. Does a single "hacker" attack count as a hostile act or not? Can using financial instruments to destroy a country's economy be seen as a battle? Did CNN's broadcast of an exposed corpse of a U.S. soldier in the streets of Mogadishu shake the determination of the Americans to act as the world's policeman, thereby altering the world's strategic situation? And should an assessment of wartime actions look at the means or the results? Obviously, proceeding with the traditional definition of war in mind, there is no longer any way to answer the above questions. When we suddenly realize that all these non-war actions may be the new factors constituting future warfare, we have to come up with a new name for this new form of war: Warfare which transcends all boundaries and limits, in short: unrestricted warfare.

Mao Zedong's theory concerning "every citizen a soldier" has certainly not been in any way responsible for this tendency. The current trend does not demand extensive mobilization of the people. Quite the contrary, it merely indicates that a technological elite among the citizenry have broken down the door and barged in uninvited, making it impossible for professional soldiers with their concepts of professionalized warfare to ignore challenges that are somewhat embarrassing. Who is most likely to become the leading protagonist on the terra incognita of the next war? The first challenger to have appeared, and the most famous, is the computer "hacker." This chap, who generally has not received any military training or been engaged in any military profession, can easily impair the security of an army or a nation in a major way by simply relying on his personal technical expertise. A classic example is given in the U.S. FM100-6 Information Operations regulations. In 1994, a computer hacker in England attacked the U.S. military's Rome Air Development Center in New York State, compromising the security of 30 systems. He also hacked into more than 100 other 46 systems. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and NASA suffered damage, among others. What astounded people was not only the scale of those affected by the attack and the magnitude of the damage, but also the fact that the hacker was actually a teenager who was merely 16 years old. Naturally, an intrusion by a teenager playing a game cannot be regarded as an act of war. The problem is, how does one know for certain which damage is the result of games and which damage is the result of warfare? Which acts are individual acts by citizens and which acts represent hostile actions by non-professional warriors, or perhaps even organized hacker warfare launched by a state? In 1994, there were 230,000 security-related intrusions into U.S. DOD networks. How many of these were organized destructive acts by non-professional warriors? Perhaps there will never be any way of knowing [see Endnote 7].

More murderous than hackers--and more of a threat in the real world--are the non-state organizations, whose very mention causes the Western world to shake in its boots. These organizations, which all have a certain military flavor to a greater or lesser degree, are generally driven by some extreme creed or cause, such as: the Islamic organizations pursuing a holy war; the Caucasian militias in the U.S.; the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult; and, most recently, terrorist groups like Osama bin Ladin's, which blew up the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The various and sundry monstrous and virtually insane destructive acts by these kinds of groups are undoubtedly more likely to be the new breeding ground for contemporary wars than is the behavior of the lone ranger hacker. Moreover, when a nation state or national armed force, (which adheres to certain rules and will only use limited force to obtain a limited goal), faces off with one of these types of organizations, (which never observe any rules and which are not afraid to fight an unlimited war using unlimited means), it will often prove very difficult for the nation state or national armed force to gain the upper hand.

During the 1990's, and concurrent with the series of military actions launched by nonprofessional warriors and non-state organizations, we began to get an inkling of a non-military type of war which is prosecuted by yet another type of non-professional warrior. This person is not a hacker in the general sense of the term, and also is not a member of a quasi-military organization. Perhaps he or she is a systems analyst or a software engineer, or a financier with a 48 large amount of mobile capital or a stock speculator. He or she might even perhaps be a media mogul who controls a wide variety of media, a famous columnist or the host of a TV program. His or her philosophy of life is different from that of certain blind and inhuman terrorists. Frequently, he or she has a firmly held philosophy of life and his or her faith is by no means inferior to Osama bin Ladin's in terms of its fanaticism. Moreover, he or she does not lack the motivation or courage to enter a fight as necessary. Judging by this kind of standard, who can say that George Soros is not a financial terrorist? Precisely in the same way that modern technology is changing weapons and the battlefield, it is also at the same time blurring the concept of who the war participants are. From now on, soldiers no longer have a monopoly on war. Global terrorist activity is one of the by-products of the globalization trend that has been ushered in by technological integration. Non-professional warriors and non-state organizations are posing a greater and greater threat to sovereign nations, making these warriors and organizations more and more serious adversaries for every professional army. Compared to these adversaries, professional armies are like gigantic dinosaurs which lack strength commensurate to their size in this new age. Their adversaries, then, are rodents with great powers of survival, which can use their sharp teeth to torment the better part of the world.

U.S. Government Emails Hacked in Suspected Chinese Espionage Campaign

Hack is seen as part of a suspected cyber-espionage campaign to access data in sensitive computer networks

By Dustin Volz, Robert McMillan and Warren P. Strobel

Updated July 12, 2023 12:34 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-government-emails-hacked-in-suspected-chinese-espionage-campaign-f4fa8de6?mod=hp_lead_pos2

Hackers linked to China breached email accounts at more than two dozen organizations including some U.S. government agencies, officials and Microsoft researchers said, part of a suspected cyber-espionage campaign to access data in sensitive computer networks.

The new penetration has prompted alarm among some officials and security researchers and is being viewed as part of an espionage campaign that potentially compromised valuable information belonging to the U.S. government, according to people familiar with the matter. Senior Western intelligence officials have grown increasingly worried in recent years about the ability of Chinese hackers to orchestrate especially impressive and stealthy attacks that in some cases have been able to evade detection for years.

“Last month, U.S. government safeguards identified an intrusion in Microsoft’s cloud security, which affected unclassified systems. Officials immediately contacted Microsoft to find the source and vulnerability in their cloud service,” Adam Hodge, spokesman for the White House National Security Council, said. “We continue to hold the procurement providers of the U.S. government to a high security threshold.”

The full scope and severity of the incident, and which institutions and individuals were hacked, couldn’t be learned late Tuesday.

China has routinely denied hacking U.S. organizations and has accused the U.S. and its allies of targeting Chinese networks. China’s Washington embassy didn’t respond to emails requesting comment on Tuesday.

The hackers, dubbed Storm-0558 by Microsoft, broke into email accounts at about 25 organizations and hit consumer accounts that were likely linked to these entities, Microsoft said in a blog post published late Tuesday. The hackers took advantage of a security weakness in Microsoft’s cloud-computing environment that has now been mitigated, the company said.

“We have been working with the impacted customers and notifying them prior to going public with further details,” Microsoft said in its blog post.

The hackers gained access to victims’ email beginning on May 15 and operated in stealth for more than a month, until June 16, when Microsoft began its investigation, the company said.

U.S. cyber investigators within the Biden administration were still working to determine the potential severity of the hacking campaign. While significant, it appeared to be far narrower—and more targeted—than a Russian intelligence operation discovered in 2020 that weaponized a software from a U.S. company called SolarWinds to breach a wide raft of federal agencies and corporate networks, a person familiar with the matter said. Still, the incident was serious enough to trigger a recent briefing for congressional staff by the Biden administration, the person said.

The Biden administration has been working to ease tensions with Beijing following a series of confrontations in recent months, including over Taiwan, the Ukraine war, the U.S. discovery and shooting down of what it said was a Chinese surveillance balloon and revelations of increased Chinese intelligence cooperation with Cuba. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s visit to China last week to discuss economic relations was the second by a top Biden administration cabinet member in less than a month, following Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip there in June.

Over the past year, China-linked hackers have displayed a new level of ingenuity in targeting widely used devices from well-known brands on the edge of corporate networks to get a foothold, according to researchers at Google, a part of Alphabet.

“We’re seeing some new victims; we’re seeing the exploitation of different technologies,” said Charles Carmakal, chief technology officer with Google’s Mandiant group.

The hackers in the latest attack gained access to email systems without authorization by forging digital tokens, used to authenticate users on the internet, Microsoft said.

Based on Microsoft’s description of the hack, the technique appears to have been “very advanced,” Carmakal said. “When you use something like this on individuals, they are probably very high-value targets,” he said.

Senior U.S. officials have long viewed Beijing as a top cyber-espionage threat and for years have been alarmed at Chinese hacking groups’s success in compromising military targets and defense contractors to steal advanced military technology. U.S. intelligence agencies have observed improving tradecraft from hackers suspected of working on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party. In an annual worldwide threat assessment published earlier this year, U.S. intelligence officials said China “probably currently represents the broadest, most active, and persistent cyber espionage threat to U.S. government and private-sector networks.”

Write to Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com, Robert McMillan at robert.mcmillan@wsj.com and Warren P. Strobel at Warren.Strobel@wsj.com

8. Power Grids and Plumbing: The Link Between Irregular Warfare and National Critical Functions

Unrestricted Warfare. Subversion and Sabotage.

Threats to National Critical Functions (NCF)

Excerpts:

To take advantage of the opportunities the NCF framework provides, the IW community should engage with Cyberspace and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the National Risk Management Center. Engagement will help better understand the NCF Framework, and how NCF analysis can support their goals. As a starting point, researchers and analysts in the irregular warfare and special operations community should reach out to CISA to request a briefing on the NCF Framework, sharing of any NCF-based risk analysis products, or perhaps observe the process and tools that generate NCF-related risk analysis, such as the Suite of Tools for the Analysis of Risk. Researchers and analysts should look at how the NCF Framework can complement or supplement existing infrastructure analysis frameworks. For example, the NCF Framework could support CARVER-based analysis by helping identify critical systems, identify system-level vulnerabilities, and better assess and anticipate effects. Those insights could be incorporated into Naval Postgraduate School coursework on critical infrastructure protection, advanced courses at the U.S. Army’s Special Warfare Center and School, and Joint Special Operations University courses on national resistance, cyberspace, or operational design.

Critical infrastructure assets do not exist on their own; they support a delicate, interconnected system of functions. Shifting to a functional approach to critical infrastructure analysis can help the irregular warfare community better characterize and understand how critical infrastructure operates, depends on one another, and how sabotage or attacks can generate cascading consequences.

Power Grids and Plumbing: The Link Between Irregular Warfare and National Critical Functions

https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/power-grids-and-plumbing-the-link-between-irregular-warfare-and-national-critical-functions/

July 12, 2023 by Zak Kallenborn Leave a Comment

Zachary Kallenborn

On December 5, 2022, unknown shooters attacked two power substations in Moore County, North Carolina. Over 30,000 people lost power for days. Today, responding to power loss means far more than just lighting candles and winding up the hand-crank flashlight. In an increasingly cashless society, no power also means no access to the internet for payment processing. Tasks like purchasing food, paying bills, getting supplies, and refilling medications are also harder. In an increasingly remote work society, no power also means employees may lose computer, laptop, and internet access. Electrical power is a critical function of society on which numerous other critical functions depend.

The Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency identifies 55 such National Critical Functions, or NCFs. These are “functions of government and the private sector so vital to the United States that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.” The NCF Framework is intended to focus critical infrastructure risk analysis on the functions specific infrastructure assets provide to the broader infrastructure system. This allows for more precise understanding of infrastructure vulnerabilities, interdependencies, and chokepoints that could create national-level harms. The aim is to provide more systematic and robust assessments of critical infrastructure risk, recognizing that infrastructure is interconnected.

The irregular warfare community could use the NCF framework to generate actionable insights on the complexity and interconnectivity of critical infrastructure. A better understanding of critical infrastructure could enable more targeted sabotage operations and more effective asymmetric strikes, while helping to generate more impactful civil resistances and support partner forces and governments in protecting infrastructure from such attacks. More generally, the irregular warfare community should build and expand relationships with the critical infrastructure community, because protecting American critical infrastructure is not drastically different than protecting allied infrastructure. And better understanding how critical infrastructure operates and functions can be of great value in disrupting adversary infrastructure.

Value of the National Critical Functions

If America’s goal is to protect a government against insurgency, it’s useful to know how best to ensure that lights stay on, water runs, and food gets to the table. If America’s goal is to support an insurgency, it’s useful to know how best to switch all that off. The National Critical Functions framework enables both.

Each of the 55 NCFs break into sub-functions, sub-sub-functions, and contributing assets and components. For example, the NCF “Supply Water” could be divided into sub-functions like treat water, store water, and transport water. Specific facilities and assets enable each sub-function: a water treatment facility treats the water; a water tower stores it; and pipelines transport the water to the home. Although countries will perform each function differently, they still must perform the function. During times of drought in Mexico, for instance, water trucks called “pipas” may be the only way to get water. Water still must get to people’s homes somehow. IW practitioners could readily take the function and sub-function breakdown and map them against the specifics in their area of operation.

Critical infrastructure deep dives would also improve understanding of vulnerabilities. The critical infrastructure system is complex and dynamic. Numerous facilities, assets, processes, and personnel are linked together to provide needed services across a country. The electric grid needs not only power plants, but also substations, transmission stations, and distribution systems. Each element also requires maintenance, billing systems, control software, and personnel to operate. Personnel also need to get to work, eat, drink, and sleep. All of those operate in a larger legal and regulatory framework.

Carefully characterizing those systems and their dependencies can help identify critical chokepoints at which small disruptions can yield big bangs. For example, in 2020 a simple distributed denial of service attack on the New Zealand Exchange halted trading on the country’s financial markets for four days. The attack breached no critical data. All that happened was the website went down. However, New Zealand financial regulations require public posting of market announcements. No announcements, no trading. So, no website, no stock exchange. Knowing that vulnerability requires understanding dependencies on which the country’s financial sector relies.

A complete rendering of critical infrastructure also may highlight unexpected opportunities for malfeasance. As a former colleague liked to say, “we never think about our shit.” Literally. Plumbing is a basic staple of modern society. Folks can just flush their waste away. If the toilets don’t work, life is foul smells, physical discomfort, and overall misery. If one’s goal is to destabilize an adversary authoritarian regime, attacking water treatment plants, and encouraging plumber strikes certainly could encourage discontent. Conversely, if the American goal is to counter an insurgency, protecting the basics is a good idea too.

Better characterizing critical infrastructure can guide security assistance to appropriately protect partner infrastructure. The United States might observe that desalination plants are particularly critical to the Middle East, where 70% of desalination plants reside worldwide. American forces could assess current and future threats to the plants, and provide appropriate training, equipment, and other support to physical and cyber security forces protecting them.

Of course, critical infrastructure sectors are also deeply interconnected. During World War II, allied forces targeted German ball-bearing factories because tanks, airplanes, machine guns, submarines, and heavy artillery all needed them. The NCF Framework identifies interconnections, and, as a result, such critical vulnerabilities. For example, the same computer operating systems support most NCFs, so vulnerabilities in the operating system generate vulnerabilities across the entire infrastructure landscape. Likewise, treating the NCFs and their sub-functions as a directed network allows network analysis to identify, and analyze common functional dependencies that could result in cascading consequences if a risk manifests.

Furthermore, special warfare operators may not seek to sabotage or target a critical chokepoint, but simply to signal that they can. Special warfare operators might deep-dive into a country’s critical functions to identify areas of geographically concentrated risk. That is, relatively small geographic areas that have numerous assets, systems, or personnel critical to one or more NCF. Special warfare operators might discover that a particular city in China has a high concentration of chemical production facilities critical to commercial and defense manufacturing in an area near a major port. Non-harmful special warfare activities in the area could signal to China that the United States is aware of this vulnerability and, if conflict breaks out, is prepared to target the area with cyberattacks on the common power grid, sabotage operations against any of the targets in the area, or, in the event of a major war, bombings and other kinetic attacks.

Next Steps

To take advantage of the opportunities the NCF framework provides, the IW community should engage with Cyberspace and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the National Risk Management Center. Engagement will help better understand the NCF Framework, and how NCF analysis can support their goals. As a starting point, researchers and analysts in the irregular warfare and special operations community should reach out to CISA to request a briefing on the NCF Framework, sharing of any NCF-based risk analysis products, or perhaps observe the process and tools that generate NCF-related risk analysis, such as the Suite of Tools for the Analysis of Risk. Researchers and analysts should look at how the NCF Framework can complement or supplement existing infrastructure analysis frameworks. For example, the NCF Framework could support CARVER-based analysis by helping identify critical systems, identify system-level vulnerabilities, and better assess and anticipate effects. Those insights could be incorporated into Naval Postgraduate School coursework on critical infrastructure protection, advanced courses at the U.S. Army’s Special Warfare Center and School, and Joint Special Operations University courses on national resistance, cyberspace, or operational design.

Critical infrastructure assets do not exist on their own; they support a delicate, interconnected system of functions. Shifting to a functional approach to critical infrastructure analysis can help the irregular warfare community better characterize and understand how critical infrastructure operates, depends on one another, and how sabotage or attacks can generate cascading consequences.

Zachary Kallenborn is an adjunct fellow (Non-resident) with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Policy Fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, Research Affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), an officially proclaimed U.S. Army “Mad Scientist,” and national security consultant.

(Note: the author was contract support to the NCF team at CISA from 2019 to 2023, and the views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of CISA)

Main image: Officials from Congress, the U.S. Army and Nolin RECC wait as the power stations begin the power-down process prior to Louisville Gas & Electric cutting off power to the Fort Knox grid Oct. 24, 2018. (US Army)

9. How the War for Taiwan Will Be Fought—and Won

We can learn a lot from fiction - FICINT.

I really appreciate how the author emphasizes the human element here. I think Major General Ryan really makes that point in his book. The human domain reigns supreme in all aspects of warfare.

Excerpts;

This is not a novel for those readers seeking a sci-fi plot, particularly one where the side with the most advanced and impressive technology wins the day. White Sun War instead illustrates the fundamental human aspects of war, reminding the reader that advanced technologies and innovative employment methods do not lead to warfare sanitized of its most grisly consequences; death and destruction are intrinsic, almost inescapable characteristic of war.

White Sun War adds to the compendium of FICINT novels set in the future that enable readers not only to scan the horizon, but to explore the details of any potential conflicts that might be found there. White Sun War illustrates just one of potentially many routes in a war over Taiwan and prompts multiple questions regarding such a conflict. Namely, can the US military adapt and innovate at a speed and scale needed to counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan? Moreover, how does a military institution balance the introduction of new warfighting technologies and continue to consider the human elements of war? White Sun War is a thrilling novel that allows readers to easily imagine the pace, excitement, fear, and trepidations of those involved in the conflict, but also makes them realize the dire consequences of war.

How the War for Taiwan Will Be Fought—and Won - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Noah B. Cooper · July 11, 2023

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Mick Ryan, White Sun War: The Campaign for Taiwan (Casemate Publishers, 2023)

Is China genuinely willing to risk massive military losses, suffer international opprobrium, and heighten global tensions and the prospects for conflict for a generation to achieve its policy goal of uniting the mainland and Taiwan? This question challenges defense theorists, policymakers, and others across the US government daily. It is a vexing question in its own right, but if the answer is yes, it raises a range of even more difficult ones: What are the specific US interests in the case of a Chinese military invasion? What should US assistance to Taiwan’s defense involve? And most fundamentally, how would a war over Taiwan actually unfold?

China’s actions in the past two decades demonstrate the necessity of planning for an invasion contingency. It has militarized the South China Sea, embarked on a military modernization program designed to execute a rapid amphibious assault on Taiwan and corresponding joint fires capabilities to keep the United States and its allies at bay, and issued explicit statements from Chinese leaders testifying to nation’s goal of absorbing Taiwan into a single, unified China.

The scope of China’s activities, the risks associated with an outbreak of a major war that could pit great powers against one another, and the sheer uncertainty about the shape such a conflict would take stretch traditional planning tools to their limits. But other, less conventional tools, are available—like fiction. Mick Ryan, a retired major general in the Australian Army, provides a unique and insightful perspective on the character of such a war in his new novel, White Sun War: The Campaign for Taiwan. Ryan’s book falls into the growing genre known as “FICINT,” a term coined by his fellow military futurist and author August Cole to describe works of fiction that set out to realistically depict a future war scenario. Ryan’s exploration of a war over Taiwan is a welcome addition for those seeking to better visualize how such a war will proceed, to witness the conflict from the perspective of an array of characters, and to envisage how such a future conflict will be fought by both friendly and adversary forces alike.

Like other books in this category, Ryan presents a realistic and conceivable plot in which China, as the aggressor, attempts to initiate a surprise military action and conducts a cross-strait operation to seize Taiwan. The invasion leads to the involvement of the United States and others on the side of Taiwan’s defenders, and according to expectations, they find themselves at an operational disadvantage; as such, assurance of a US and allied victory is questionable, particularly due to the challenges stemming from attrition, logistics, and the inherent difficulties of fighting a regional war while simultaneously attempting to avoid escalatory actions. As expected, though, the war is a catastrophe for both sides, yielding massive loss of life, prompting governmental disorder, and inviting global upheaval as a conflict unfolds between the world’s largest military and economic powers.

Ryan takes the reader on an exploration of future, advanced military technologies that are beyond currently fielded capabilities but sufficiently close to them to be firmly within the realm of possibility in the coming years. For instance, AI-enabled unmanned systems team with manned systems to sense, locate, and target an adversary. Ryan also discusses combined arms not from the perspective of armor, aircraft, and ships, but rather the use of precision-guided munitions, electromagnetic warfare, and cyber weapons as maneuvering capabilities. Scenes in the novel depict friendly forces facing quantitative enemy superiority, a contested electromagnetic spectrum environment, and a loss of command and control that inhibits effective tactical actions. Calls for assistance come not from fixed-site artillery or on-call close air support, but rather from a range of cyber fires, electromagnetic attack, and long-range precision missile systems. Moreover, the seamless integration of these capabilities into operational planning suggests to the reader that such systems are the primary means to achieve decisive advantage.

Yet, while Ryan’s depiction of advanced military technologies proves intriguing, it is not the centerpiece of the story. Perhaps more importantly, through his character portrayals Ryan illustrates the human dimensions of morale and will, reminding the reader that war is a human endeavor, not solely a clash of equipment.

In this context and at a strategic level, the tactical and combined employment of manned and unmanned systems encourages the reader to consider the implications of these practices. Specifically, how does the use of a wide array of unmanned systems influence decisions to go war, particularly as the effect of mounting casualties on a democratic population becomes negligible? Rightfully, Ryan does not unpack such questions in his work—though this question and others are worthy of consideration in other forums as the use and reliance on unmanned systems continues to grow—since such analysis would bog down the pace and flow of the novel and risk obscuring the important insights it sheds on the warfighting component of this conflict scenario. Nonetheless, the book’s narrative naturally raises such questions in the minds of readers even as it maintains a strict focus on the plot points relevant to the military actions undertaken by the Chinese to land on and seize Taiwan and the inventive counteractions launched by the United States and its allies.

Interestingly, the reader may infer a degree of military parity between China and the United States, absent an explicit pronouncement of such from Ryan. This implicit equality between fighting forces is thought-provoking, as raw military power will likely not win the day. Russian performance against a smaller, less-equipped, but resilient Ukraine best exemplifies the requirement for effective leadership, preparation, adaptation, and creative operational concepts. In fact, many readers will be familiar with Ryan from his nearly daily observations of the Russia-Ukraine war, and the lessons he regularly identifies in those observations mirrors his emphasis on these nonmaterial factors throughout the novel. The background context of the ongoing war in Ukraine enriches Ryan’s story arc and reinforces the book’s proposition that an organization that exhibits an inclination for bottom-up innovation and a willingness to go beyond traditional limitations will prevail.

As Ryan sets White Sun War in a fictional future replete with autonomous fighting systems and the latest in operational concepts, he nonetheless invokes the use of plain language and shies away from the use of meaningless military and defense buzzwords, cliches, and unintelligible jargon. This approach is an invitation to readers that lack a familiarity with the vague and often confusing lexicon that dominates communication in military organizations. A reader does not require an extensive education or experience in strategy formulation, operational art and design, or military tactics to enjoy this novel. And yet this greater accessibility does not sacrifice substance. Amateur readers will be left with an understanding of the principles of war, novice readers can easily discern the warfighting frameworks of the United States and China and how each nation is attempting to achieve its military objectives, and defense experts will be encouraged to critically examine their assumptions about how a future war over Taiwan will play out.

Clear, direct, and meaningful language—as opposed to nebulous buzzwords and abstract conceptual ideas—is not only a style choice, but also a plot point of the novel. A group army commander in the People’s Liberation Army depicted in White Sun War is explicit:

Let’s just focus on finding and killing the enemy, thank you. All these fancy terms from before the war have not helped us so far. We must ensure we are truly brilliant at the basics of soldiering, shooting, supply, and command and control. It is when we are deficient in such basic parts of our profession that our forces have problems.

This quote symbolizes the simplicity of how we should view war. Too often war is presented as a mechanical, almost computational endeavor, which fails to represent accurately the essence of war. War exacts costs in lives lost, both in terms of fighting personnel and civilians, it creates animosity and everlasting struggles between people, it stunts forward progress, it denudes the environment, and, perhaps above all, war can annihilate a community causing generational impacts.

A secondary theme echoed throughout White Sun War is the all-domain character of such a conflict. Ryan pays particular attention to the space and cyber domains and devises a climax where the convergence of effects across multiple domains proves to be a key turning point in the war. Nevertheless, Ryan’s representation of the conflict does challenge the tempting assumption, based on geography, that a Taiwan Strait scenario will surely be an air and maritime conflict. The novel implicitly suggests that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is essentially a land war, and he does so quite convincingly; the reader feels the grit and grime as soldiers and marines on both sides fight through the rugged and dense urban terrain of Taiwan. More significantly, Ryan highlights a fundamental component of warfare that applies to an attempted Chinese forceful reunification of Taiwan—that the war will be won or lost by land forces on the ground.

Indeed, the novel operates under the presumption that the real-world “setting the theater” actions that the United States are undertaking today—securing basing rights and overflight privileges, establishing logistical hubs, conducting intelligence operations, and others—come to fruition and result in an ideal pre-positioning of US forces at the outset of the conflict, providing the United States and its allies some ability to overcome China’s robust antiaccess / area-denial capabilities. Absent an explicit discussion, Ryan’s depiction of the conflict reminds the reader of the necessity for preparation and the establishment of vital preconditions to achieve victory, particularly in a regional war where the tyranny of distance will challenge power projection and logistics and where the vast geographical range of operations will complicate command and control.

A theme interwoven throughout White Sun War is the importance of leadership in warfare. The author explores the challenges of leadership in war through an examination of the characters’ personal sacrifices, the consequences of their decision-making and their associated emotional strife, as well as their varying perspectives on the war. Ryan subtly yet vividly provides insight into the character’s personas, creating a compelling narrative for each, without laboring over lengthy backstories. Most interestingly, whether frontline US, Taiwanese, or Chinese soldiers, the characters exhibit common apprehensions concerning the uncertainty of war and, above all, share a common objective of fighting for something beyond themselves—a familiar theme for any military professional facing the rigors of combat.

This is not a novel for those readers seeking a sci-fi plot, particularly one where the side with the most advanced and impressive technology wins the day. White Sun War instead illustrates the fundamental human aspects of war, reminding the reader that advanced technologies and innovative employment methods do not lead to warfare sanitized of its most grisly consequences; death and destruction are intrinsic, almost inescapable characteristic of war.

White Sun War adds to the compendium of FICINT novels set in the future that enable readers not only to scan the horizon, but to explore the details of any potential conflicts that might be found there. White Sun War illustrates just one of potentially many routes in a war over Taiwan and prompts multiple questions regarding such a conflict. Namely, can the US military adapt and innovate at a speed and scale needed to counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan? Moreover, how does a military institution balance the introduction of new warfighting technologies and continue to consider the human elements of war? White Sun War is a thrilling novel that allows readers to easily imagine the pace, excitement, fear, and trepidations of those involved in the conflict, but also makes them realize the dire consequences of war.

Noah B. Cooper is an active duty US Army military intelligence officer. He received an MA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from King’s College London.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Wang Yu Ching, Office of the President of Taiwan

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Noah B. Cooper · July 11, 2023

10. NATO prepared to back Ukraine in its fight against Russia — but not to extend membership

NATO prepared to back Ukraine in its fight against Russia — but not to extend membership

AP · July 12, 2023

VILNIUS, Lithuania (AP) — NATO leaders gathered Wednesday to launch a highly symbolic new forum for ties with Ukraine, after committing to provide the country with more military assistance for fighting Russia but only vague assurances of future membership.

U.S. President Joe Biden and his NATO counterparts will sit down with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the new NATO-Ukraine Council, a permanent body where the 31 allies and Ukraine can hold consultations and call for meetings in emergency situations.

The setting is part of NATO’s effort to bring Ukraine as close as possible to the military alliance without actually joining it. On Tuesday, the leaders said in their communique summarizing the summit’s conclusions that Ukraine can join “when allies agree and conditions are met.”

The ambiguous outcome reflects the challenges of reaching consensus among the alliance’s current members while the war continues, and has left Zelenskyy disappointed even as he expressed appreciation for military hardware being promised by Group of Seven industrial nations.

Zelenskyy said Wednesday that he’s pushing to ensure Ukraine “will have this invitation when security measures will allow.”

“We want to be on the same page with everybody,” he told reporters at the summit.

Ukraine’s future membership was the most divisive and emotionally charged issue at this year’s summit.

“We have to stay outside of this war but be able to support Ukraine. We managed that very delicate balancing act for the last 17 months. It’s to the benefit of everyone that we maintain that balancing act,” Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo said Wednesday.

Latvian Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins, whose country lies on NATO’s eastern flank and has a long, troubled history with Russia, said he would have preferred more for Ukraine.

“There will always be a difference of flavor of how fast you would want to go,” he said. However, Karins added, “at the end of it, what everyone gets, including Ukraine, and what Moscow sees is we are all very united.”

Although Zelenskyy was attending the final day of the summit in Vilnius, he has been sharply critical of what he described as NATO’s “unprecedented and absurd” reluctance to set a timeline for his country’s acceptance into the alliance.

In essence, Western countries are willing to keep sending weapons to help Ukraine do the job that NATO was designed to do — hold the line against a Russian invasion — but not allow Ukraine to join its ranks and benefit from its security during the war.

Zelenskyy said in a Tuesday speech in a town square in Vilnius that he had faith in NATO, but that he would “like this faith to become confidence, confidence in the decisions that we deserve, all of us, every soldier, every citizen, every mother, every child.”

“Is that too much to ask?” he added.

Amanda Sloat, senior director of European affairs for the U.S. National Security Council, defended the summit’s decisions.

“I would agree that the communique is unprecedented, but I see that in a positive way,” she told reporters on Wednesday. Sloat noted that Ukraine will not need to submit a “membership action plan” as it seeks to join NATO, although she said “there are still governance and security sector reforms that are going to be required.” The action plan is a key step in the process that involves advice and assistance for countries seeking to join.

Symbols of support for Ukraine are common around Vilnius, where the country’s blue-and-yellow flags hang from buildings and are pasted inside windows. One sign cursed Russian President Vladimir Putin. Another urged NATO leaders to “hurry up” their assistance for Ukraine.

However, there’s been more caution inside the summit itself, especially from Biden, who has explicitly said he doesn’t think Ukraine is ready to join NATO. There are concerns that the country’s democracy is unstable and its corruption remains too deeply rooted.

Under Article 5 of the NATO charter, members are obligated to defend each other from attack, which could swiftly draw the U.S. and other nations into direct fighting with Russia.

Defining an end to hostilities is no easy task. Officials have declined to define the goal, which could suggest a negotiated ceasefire or Ukraine reclaiming all occupied territory. Either way, Putin would essentially have veto power over Ukraine’s NATO membership by prolonging the conflict.

Wednesday’s commitments will include a new G7 framework that would provide for Ukraine’s long-term security.

The British foreign ministry said the G7 would “set out how allies will support Ukraine over the coming years to end the war and deter and respond to any future attack.” The ministry added that the framework marks the first time that this many countries have agreed to a “comprehensive long-term security arrangement of this kind with another country.”

British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said in a statement that supporting Ukraine’s “progress on the pathway to NATO membership, coupled with formal, multilateral, and bilateral agreements and the overwhelming support of NATO members will send a strong signal to President Putin and return peace to Europe.”

Sloat said the commitments will show Russia “that time is not on its side.”

Although international summits are often tightly scripted, this one has seesawed between conflict and compromise.

At first leaders appeared to be deadlocked over Sweden’s bid for membership in the alliance. However, Turkey unexpectedly agreed to drop its objections on Monday, the night before the summit formally began. The deal led to boasts of success from leaders who were eager for a display of solidarity in Vilnius.

“This summit is already historic before it has started,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said.

Erdogan has not commented publicly on the deal, over Sweden’s membership, even during a Tuesday meeting with Biden where Biden referenced “the agreement you reached yesterday.”

However, Erdogan appeared eager to develop his relationship with Biden.

The Turkish president has been seeking advanced American fighter jets and a path toward membership in the European Union. The White House has expressed support for both, but publicly insisted that the issues were not related to Sweden’s membership in NATO.

___

Associated Press writers Karl Ritter and Liudas Dapkus contributed to this report.

AP · July 12, 2023

11. Opinion | How we left Afghanistan was wrong. But leaving was right.

Opinion | How we left Afghanistan was wrong. But leaving was right.

The Washington Post · by Henry Olsen · July 10, 2023

The rapid withdrawal by the United States from Afghanistan nearly two years ago was unquestionably bungled, as a recent scathing review shows. It was nevertheless the right strategic decision, as subsequent events have painfully demonstrated.

The chaotic and tragic nature of the final retreat obscures the circumstances that led to the decision to withdraw. The United States had been engaged in a war with the Taliban for roughly 20 years. The country spent nearly $838 billion on military and reconstruction efforts, yet things were at a stalemate. Washington and its Afghan and NATO allies were preventing the Taliban from gaining control of most of the nation’s cities but faced increasing pressure in the more populous countryside. This situation was still costing about $45 billion a year and the deployment of 10,000 to 15,000 U.S. military personnel.

Washington could have continued to prop up the unstable and corrupt Afghan government had it chosen to make that commitment. But it’s worth looking at what that would mean in today’s world, given everything that has transpired since.

A glance at the map shows that U.S. troops were essentially surrounded by hostile forces. To the west lies Iran, a bitter enemy. To the north are three Russian allies: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. To the east, a short border with China. All supplies to the beleaguered American troops flowed through Pakistan to the south.

This arrangement would have become increasingly difficult in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Pakistan has refused to condemn the attack, abstaining from U.N. resolutions calling for Russia’s withdrawal and proclaiming that the invasion violates the U.N. charter. Pakistan also buys Russian oil at a discounted price, despite Western sanctions. The United States clearly would not want to rely on this nation’s goodwill while leading the global effort to defeat Russian President Vladimir Putin’s army.

Heightened tensions with China also reinforce the decision to leave. Washington does not have endless amounts of ships and planes. If China does invade Taiwan, and if the United States moves to defend the island, as many expect, it will need every available piece of equipment. Washington would probably be unable to spare airlift capacity to keep Afghanistan fully supplied.

That’s assuming that the United States would still have access to Pakistani airspace. Pakistan has long-standing ties to China, which helped Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons in the 1990s and has been a major arms supplier to the country for years. China recently upped its support, selling frigates, submarines and advanced fighter jets to Pakistan in 2022. Pakistan is also heavily indebted to Beijing because of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, through which China hopes to gain land access to a Pakistani deep-water Indian Ocean port. It’s not outside the realm of possibility that Pakistan would tacitly side with China in a conflict and would deny the overflight rights of the United States to resupply troops in Afghanistan.

The U.S. withdrawal mooted that threat. U.S. and NATO troops are no longer deployed far from home and dependent on adversaries or temporizing regimes for their survival. An American president will not face the terrible choice between using scarce military resources to help save Americans in Afghanistan or using them to save Taiwan.

Ending U.S. support for Afghanistan also freed up resources for the support of Ukraine. The $45 billion a year Washington was spending on Afghan operations is roughly equivalent to the nearly $47 billion in military aid it sent Kyiv through May. Skyrocketing federal spending would be even higher but for the Afghan pullout.

None of this means that the loss of Afghanistan was a good thing. Islamist terrorists have recovered a base, and Afghans are living under a theocratic dictatorship. Tens of thousands of Afghans who fought for freedom under our command were left behind. Many Americans are rightly ashamed that we allowed this to happen.

But great powers can’t afford sentiment. They must assess risks and opportunities and make decisions based on the overall impact on national security. The growth of China and its tacit alliance with Russia and Iran over the decade before withdrawal meant that the risks of continuing the Afghan war were higher, and the benefits much lower, than they had been when the war began in 2001. In this emergent world, spending tens of billions a year to support thousands of U.S. soldiers fighting in an isolated location was simply a bad idea.

No one should be proud of how we left Afghanistan. But leaving it, the better to resist the challenges from our most dangerous foes, was the right call.

The Washington Post · by Henry Olsen · July 10, 2023

12. China Says Its Foreign Minister Is Ill. A Senior Diplomat Will Take His Place at ASEAN Summit

China Says Its Foreign Minister Is Ill. A Senior Diplomat Will Take His Place at ASEAN Summit

It’s unclear what exactly is wrong with Qin Gang, who has missed several crucial diplomatic events in the past month.

thediplomat.com · by Associated Press · July 12, 2023

Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang is unwell and the country’s senior diplomat will take his place at a two-day summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations this week in Jakarta, Indonesia, China’s Foreign Ministry said Tuesday.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin gave no details of what was ailing Qin, who has not been seen in public in more than two weeks.

“State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang is unable to attend this series of foreign ministers’ meetings due to health reasons,” Wang said at a daily briefing Tuesday.

Wang Yi, a former foreign minister and the current head of the ruling Communist Party’s Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, will represent China at the meetings Thursday and Friday, Wang Wenbin said.

Wang Yi drew controversy last week with comments saying Westerners are incapable of distinguishing among Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese, and suggesting the three countries with vastly different societies and polities form an alliance based on racial and cultural similarities.

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Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Teuku Faizasyah confirmed that Wang Yi would be attending the ASEAN meeting in Qin’s stead. Wang will attend the China-ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting, the ASEAN-China-Japan-South Korea foreign ministers’ meeting, the East Asia Summit foreign ministers’ meeting, and the ASEAN Regional Forum foreign ministers’ meeting.

The foreign ministers’ meeting is a “platform to enhance mutual trust and cooperation,” Wang Wenbin told reporters. “China hopes this meeting will help build more consensus, make political preparation for a fruitful ASEAN leaders’ summit in September, and promote regional peace, stability and prosperity.”

Qin, 57, rose to prominence as an outspoken Foreign Ministry spokesperson who popularized an aggressive in-your-face style that came to be known as “wolf warrior diplomacy,” after the name of a nationalistic Chinese movie franchise. He previously served a brief stint as China’s ambassador to the United States for just under a year and a half. Before that, Qin was head of protocol for the ministry, which put him in close contact with China’s top leader Xi Jinping. Qin is viewed as close to Xi, which earned him the promotion to China’s foreign minister despite limited experience with overseas postings.

In March, Qin warned Washington of “conflict and confrontation,” striking a combative tone amid conflicts over Taiwan, COVID-19, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. That followed an accusation by Xi that Western governments led by the U.S. wanted to encircle and suppress China.

The “wolf warrior” approach has been adopted by many senior Chinese diplomats, but has also fallen out of favor at times. One of its most famous exponents, former Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian, was transferred in January to a department overseeing land and sea borders in what was widely seen as a demotion.

Current Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Xie Feng has taken a generally upbeat tone since taking office in May, despite the relationship between the world’s two largest economies hitting a historic low.

Qin’s prolonged disappearance had begun to raise eyebrows even before the latest announcement. According to the Foreign Ministry’s website, Qin’s last public appearance was at a meeting with Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Ali Sabry in Beijing on June 25. On the same day, he also met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Rudenko Andrey Yurevich in a previously unannounced visit sparked by the Wagner Group revolt in Russia.

Since then, he has missed meetings with a number of visiting dignitaries, including Xi’s meetings with the prime ministers of New Zealand, Vietnam, and Mongolia in late June. Qin, as foreign minister, would typically be expected to sit in on such events (as he did, for example, when Palestine’s President Mahmoud Abbas visited Beijing on June 14 and Russia’s Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin visited on May 24).

China watcher Bill Bishop speculated that Qin’s mysterious absence may have been the cause of China’s decision to unilaterally cancel a visit by the EU foreign policy chief, originally scheduled for July 10.

Farther back, on June 2, Qin quietly missed the foreign minsters’ meeting of the BRICS grouping in Cape Town, South Africa. While the other members of the group – Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa – were represented by their foreign ministers, China sent Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhouxu to the event. Qin has not traveled abroad in two months, since a tour of Europe from May 8-12.

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China’s tightly-controlled, highly opaque political system and the lack of a free press frequently give way to speculation surrounding the disappearance of leading figures, as when former Chinese President Hu Jintao was guided off stage without explanation at the twice-a-decade congress of China’s ruling Communist Party. However, while personal rivalries and scandals over corruption are not uncommon, the party – at least outwardly – remains largely united behind Xi.

thediplomat.com · by Associated Press · July 12, 2023

13. NATO agrees to begin F-16 training program for Ukraine in August

NATO agrees to begin F-16 training program for Ukraine in August

BY BRAD DRESS - 07/11/23 1:08 PM ET

The Hill · · July 11, 2023

A coalition of 11 NATO countries agreed to begin an F-16 training program in Europe this August to train Ukrainian pilots on the warplanes, ending speculation about when the long-awaited training would begin.

The agreement, led by Denmark and the Netherlands, was reached Tuesday at the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. The coalition signed a memorandum of agreement for the training mission.

Ukrainian pilots will learn how to operate the fourth-generation fighter jets in Denmark while another supportive training center will be set up in Romania, according to Reuters.

Other nations in the coalition will provide financial and logistical support.

The Netherlands’s Minister of Defense, Kajsa Ollongren, said her nation will provide F-16 jets.

Belgium’s defense leader announced Brussels will provide instructors to train pilots and offer expertise on aircraft maintenance.

Kyiv has long asked for the F-16s as it has struggled against Russia’s vast air superiority in the war but has only secured Soviet-era jets such as MiG-29s from Western allies.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said the “F-16s will protect Ukraine’s skies and NATO’s Eastern Flank.”

“The Ukrainian Air Force is prepared to master them as quickly as possible,” Reznikov tweeted.

How the pandemic spurred a push to expand methadone access The wood industry releases more carbon than Russia — and we’re not counting its emissions: study

President Biden announced the F-16 training program in May but with little detail on the arrangement.

The U.S. has so far declined to offer any further details, including when training would begin and when the aircraft might arrive on the battlefield.

The training for F-16s is expected to take at least two months. Denmark’s acting Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen told reporters Tuesday they might “see results” in the beginning of next year, according to Reuters.

The Hill · by Ellen Mitchell · July 11, 2023

14. What NATO Said About Ukraine: Highlights of the Alliance’s Communiqué

What NATO Said About Ukraine: Highlights of the Alliance’s Communiqué

Ukraine’s president wanted firmer commitments about when his country could join, but NATO’s 31 members did make some new pledges to draw Kyiv closer to the alliance.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/12/world/europe/nato-ukraine-membership.html

President Biden, center, and NATO leaders at the alliance’s summit on Tuesday, in Vilnius, Lithuania.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Steven Erlanger

Published July 11, 2023
Updated July 12, 2023, 4:55 a.m. ET

After weeks of tense negotiations, NATO on Tuesday invited Ukraine to join the alliance at some unspecified point in the future, but only when allies agree that conditions are ripe and that Ukraine has met the qualifications to join.

In its communiqué, agreed to by all 31 NATO members, the alliance says that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO,” promising to continue to support the country in its war against Russia and to engage the alliance’s foreign ministers on a periodic review of Ukraine’s progress toward reaching NATO standards — both in democratization and military integration.

The wording essentially marked a victory for President Biden, who recently declared that “Ukraine isn’t ready for NATO membership.” Just hours before the communiqué was issued, Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine sharply criticized the “uncertainty” over Ukraine’s path to membership in the alliance.

Alliance leaders struggled to agree on language about how to describe a timeline and conditions for what everyone agrees will be Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO. The battle inside NATO was not over whether Ukraine would join, but how and under what conditions. Some countries wanted an immediate invitation after the war ends; other countries, like the United States, wanted to avoid any notion that entry would be automatic.

While Mr. Zelensky wanted more, NATO officials argue that he will have numerous benefits to bring home from this summit, with closer ties to NATO, a firmer commitment to membership and specific offers of longer-term financial and military help.

Asked about Mr. Zelensky’s concerns, Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary general, said that the most important thing now was to ensure that his country wins the war against Russia because “unless Ukraine prevails, there is no membership to be discussed at all.” Mr. Stoltenberg said the commitments now were different from the vague promise made in 2008 that Ukraine and Georgia would someday join the alliance, without specifying how or when.

Here are some of the alliance’s significant new commitments to Ukraine:

NATO agreed that Ukraine would not need to go through a preliminary and more time-consuming process to prepare it for an invitation to the alliance, called a Membership Action Plan. Both Sweden and Finland were also allowed to skip such a process.
The alliance is creating a NATO-Ukraine Council, a new joint body for Kyiv and the allies to deepen their relationship ahead of Ukraine’s membership. The inaugural meeting, which Mr. Zelensky is expected to attend, will take place on Wednesday in Vilnius.
The communiqué emphasized the urgent need to continue nonlethal assistance to Ukraine, extending an existing assistance program to “help rebuild the Ukrainian security and defense sector and transition Ukraine towards full interoperability with NATO.”
The document was unequivocal in condemning Russia, calling for Moscow to “completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its forces and equipment from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters.”
It also condemned Russia’s “irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive nuclear signaling,” as well as plans to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus.

Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, based in Brussels. He previously reported from London, Paris, Jerusalem, Berlin, Prague, Moscow and Bangkok. More about Steven Erlanger

15. Australia's international strategy between the US and China

I guess the former PM really does not like the US. But he is not wrong about the rules based international order. Perhaps we should reflect on that.

Excerpts:

Yet the United States does not seem to recognise the change in its position in Asia. The United States, with Australia’s support, says that it wants to preserve the so-called ‘rules-based order’. But that order is not the one enshrined in the UN Charter. Instead, it was established by the United States and was intended to serve US interests.

Understandably, China might want to make changes to the US rules-based order — changes that could readily be accommodated by the other nations in the Indo-Pacific. As Australia’s former ambassador to China Geoff Raby says: ‘An inclusive framework of norms, rules and habits of consultation which include China and of which it is an author, will be the best means of constraining bad behaviour [emphasis added]’.

But there is also the problem of the United States not always abiding by the present rules-based order. Instead, it is happy to ignore or bend rules when rules don’t suit it. For example, US trade sanctions on China have never been authorised by the World Trade Organization. But when China introduced trade sanctions on Australia, the United States quickly jumped in to replace the import market.

...

Australia can and should push back when its interests and values are challenged by China. The government is right when it says that ‘we will cooperate where we can, we will disagree where we must, and we will engage in our national interest’.

But Australia needs to work with other nations on specific issues of national interest, even where they are not like-minded in terms of adherence to liberal values, including respect for human rights. Australia’s ability to push back will be enhanced if it maintains ongoing dialogue, especially with China. For example, the renewed discussion at the ministerial level has meant that issues that offend Australian values — such as unexplained detention of Australian citizens in China, human rights matters, and press and religious freedoms — can now be raised and discussed at senior government levels.

It is clearly in Australia’s interests to work with both China and the United States. That will require Australia to work closely with the many other like-minded countries in the region, and, if necessary, be less subservient to the United States.

Australia's international strategy between the US and China | East Asia Forum

eastasiaforum.org · by Michael Keating · July 11, 2023

Author: Michael Keating, ANU

The starting point for any review of Australia’s international strategy must be an assessment of the future US–China relationship, focussing on possible threats and opportunities. A good start was made in a speech by Australian Foreign Minister, Penny Wong, in April 2023. While Wong thinks that the United States will remain ‘indispensable’, she understands that it will no longer be the dominant power in Asia.

Instead, Wong said that Australia’s national interest is to bring about a region where all countries benefit from a strategic equilibrium where no country dominates and no country is dominated. The Chinese economy overtook the US economy in 2016 based on purchasing power parity and has continued to grow much faster since. The idea that the United States can continue to dominate is not a sound basis for Australia’s international strategy.

Yet the United States does not seem to recognise the change in its position in Asia. The United States, with Australia’s support, says that it wants to preserve the so-called ‘rules-based order’. But that order is not the one enshrined in the UN Charter. Instead, it was established by the United States and was intended to serve US interests.

Understandably, China might want to make changes to the US rules-based order — changes that could readily be accommodated by the other nations in the Indo-Pacific. As Australia’s former ambassador to China Geoff Raby says: ‘An inclusive framework of norms, rules and habits of consultation which include China and of which it is an author, will be the best means of constraining bad behaviour [emphasis added]’.

But there is also the problem of the United States not always abiding by the present rules-based order. Instead, it is happy to ignore or bend rules when rules don’t suit it. For example, US trade sanctions on China have never been authorised by the World Trade Organization. But when China introduced trade sanctions on Australia, the United States quickly jumped in to replace the import market.

A multipolar system of international governance offers the only sustainable way forward. Australia should be working to encourage the United States to accept this new reality where it needs to share power.

The problem is that both Australia’s foreign and defence policies are based on a contradiction. Australia recognises the reality that it is living in a multipolar region, but it ties itself to an alliance partner that doesn’t.

The rest of the region doesn’t want to be forced to take sides. Like Australia, other regional members depend upon both major countries and share a common interest in establishing a set of ongoing governance arrangements that accommodates the reasonable demands of all member countries.

For Australia, this would represent a return to the former position where Australia was clear that it didn’t wish to take sides in the struggle for influence between the United States and China. But under former prime minister Scott Morrison, Australia was seen as a mouthpiece for the United States so often that it weakened its regional credibility.

As former Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani said, ASEAN countries want to have good relations with both the United States and China, and the wisest policy for Australia is to align itself with the ASEAN position where possible. That way, it could play a significant bridging role between Beijing and Washington. Plus, Australia could enhance its standing with other countries in the region if it played a leading role in persuading the United States to accept the reality of a multipolar region.

The key to Australia’s subservience to the United States, and its engagement in so many US wars, has been its perception that it depends upon the United States for defence. But Australia needs to identify its own interests clearly and all actions should be determined accordingly.

Right now, the most immediate threat to Australia’s sovereignty would be a US–China conflict over Taiwan. Should Australia not join the United States in defence of Taiwan, the issue might impact the AUKUS agreement and Australia’s purchase of nuclear submarines.

While many have argued that China has no intention of attacking Australia, intentions can change quickly. Hence defence forces are usually structured against an assessment of the capability of potential adversaries, and China’s capability is rising rapidly.

In that context, it is a legitimate response for Australia to buy nuclear submarines to strengthen its independent defence capability. But that equally requires that it controls the use of these submarines. If AUKUS is not compatible with Australia being able to determine and protect its long-run regional interests, then Australia should be prepared to let the agreement go.

Australia can and should push back when its interests and values are challenged by China. The government is right when it says that ‘we will cooperate where we can, we will disagree where we must, and we will engage in our national interest’.

But Australia needs to work with other nations on specific issues of national interest, even where they are not like-minded in terms of adherence to liberal values, including respect for human rights. Australia’s ability to push back will be enhanced if it maintains ongoing dialogue, especially with China. For example, the renewed discussion at the ministerial level has meant that issues that offend Australian values — such as unexplained detention of Australian citizens in China, human rights matters, and press and religious freedoms — can now be raised and discussed at senior government levels.

It is clearly in Australia’s interests to work with both China and the United States. That will require Australia to work closely with the many other like-minded countries in the region, and, if necessary, be less subservient to the United States.

Michael Keating is former Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Department of Finance and the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations. He is presently a visiting fellow at The Australian National University.

A longer version of this piece was originally published here by Pearls and Irritations.

eastasiaforum.org · by Michael Keating · July 11, 2023

16. China cranks up punitive sea pressure on the Philippines

China cranks up punitive sea pressure on the Philippines

Chinese vessels swarm Philippine-claimed Iroquois Reef in apparent tit-for-tat response to newly-enhanced military ties with the US

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · July 11, 2023

MANILA – “We believe that the world is big enough for both of our countries to thrive,” declared US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen on the conclusion of her recent high-profile to Beijing.

But while Yellen’s visit may have injected a semblance of normality into the two sides’ economic diplomacy, geopolitical tensions are still running high in the hotly contested South China Sea.

The Philippines is increasingly at the center of that superpower contest as China appears to be responding aggressively to enhanced US-Philippine defense relations under the Ferdinand Marcos Jr administration.

Crucially, those enhanced ties will allow US rotational forces access to Philippine bases geographically close to Taiwan, potentially giving the US a southern flank in any Chinese invasion of the self-governing democratic island.

Over the weekend, Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) authorities reported that nearly 50 “Chinese maritime militia” ships have been “swarming” Iroquois Reef, which is occupied and claimed by Manila.

Back in 2021, even the Beijing-friendly Duterte administration was forced to file multiple diplomatic protests due to the “continued presence of Chinese fishing vessels in [the] vicinity of Iroquois Reef.” Back then, hundreds of Chinese militia vessels also swarmed other Philippine-claimed land features, most notably the Whitsun Reef.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which says it first detected the latest Chinese militia buildup around the Iroquois Reef during an aerial patrol, also reported the presence of three Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships and two People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) vessels at the Sabina Shoal, another land feature that falls within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea.

Quietly but suddenly, the Philippines is now confronting the buildup of both Chinese conventional and paramilitary forces near or in its claimed territories in the Spratly group of islands.

“During multiple flights over Iroquois Reef in the past week, pilots observed an alarming presence of Chinese fishing vessels. The swarming of Chinese fishing vessels there is quite visible from the air,” AFP spokesman Edgard Abogado said in a statement.

Anticipating standard denials from Chinese authorities who often portray Chinese militia vessels as harmless “fishing boats”, the AFP made it clear that the Chinese fishing vessels were “anchored in groups of five to seven” without any trace of “fishing activities.”

Chinese vessels ‘swarm’ the Iroquois Reef in the South China Sea. Image: Armed Forces of the Philippines Western Command

The PCG also accused a Chinese patrol vessel of engaging in what it called a “very dangerous” maneuver by blocking two of its boats from entering the Second Thomas Shoal, which is occupied by Philippine marines.

The incident reportedly involved the PCG vessels BRP Malabrigo and BRP Malapascua during a supply ship escort mission on June 30.

Buoyed by a larger budget and personnel and emboldened by expanding cooperation with the US and other like-minded powers, the PCG is stepping up its game in response.

“I would like to assure you that the Philippine Coast Guard will also take measures to deploy our vessels in order to drive away the Chinese maritime militia from that area,” Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) spokesperson Jay Tarriela told the media.

Tarriela warned that China’s deployment of large numbers of militia vessels was part of a well-worn playbook, whereby the occupation of contested features often begins with “swarm[ing] the area for a very long period of time. If you fail to notice them, they will increase their number eventually [until they occupy the area].”

Over the past year, the PCG has adopted a proactive public diplomacy campaign whereby it consistently and publicly spotlights China’s aggressive actions in adjacent waters in order to galvanize domestic and international support.

“Once we publicize these events, the international community condemns them and various embassies criticize such activities of China. When we follow up with the deployment of our government assets, they leave immediately,” Tarriela claimed.

Indeed, international support has been building for the Philippines ahead of the seventh anniversary of its landmark arbitration award vis-à-vis China at The Hague in 2016. The ruling, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), rejected China’s nine-dash line expansive claims across the South China Sea.

In an official statement, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reached out to his new Philippine counterpart, Gilberto Teodoro, in order to show solidarity in face of what he referred to as China’s “coercive and risky” behavior.

The US defense chief, who welcomed President Marcos Jr to the Pentagon in May, underscored his country’s “ironclad” commitment to defend the Philippines in the event of armed conflict in the South China Sea as outlined under the two sides’ 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Image: Twitter

In recent months, the Pentagon has secured two major deals with its Southeast Asian ally, namely an expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), granting access to US forces across a whole host of strategically-located sites, as well as new defense guidelines under the MDT, which expands bilateral security cooperation in all areas of modern warfare.

Other key allies are making their presence felt. Just days after historic French-Philippine naval exercises in the South China Sea, the Embassy of France in Manila called for “respect for international law and the resolution of disputes through dialogue.”

“We are resolutely opposed to any use of force or threat to do so. We recall, in this regard, the arbitration award rendered under UNCLOS on the 12th of July 2016,” the embassy said in a statement.

The Philippines also secured another key major endorsement from India, which under its “non-aligned” foreign policy tradition has generally been “neutral” in its positioning on sensitive international issues such as the South China Sea disputes.

However, following their most recent bilateral strategic dialogue, the two countries underscored their commitment to double down on defense cooperation.

In a joint statement issued after a meeting between Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo and Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in New Delhi last week, the two emerging partners “underlined the need for peaceful settlement of disputes and for adherence to international law, especially the UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award on the South China Sea in this regard.”

It marked the first time that India directly supported an arbitration case decision, according to local media reports. Incensed by growing international support for Manila, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned against interference by any “third party.”

“We have [the] ability to handle it well but have to stay high-alert that South China Sea might be turned into the sea of war by the third party,” Zhou Li, a MOFA information department councilor, said in a statement over Twitter.

Li insisted that bilateral negotiations were “the only way to resolve disputes” and to ensure the South China Sea “become[s] the sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.”

“China has always resolved its disputes through negotiations,” the Chinese foreign ministry official said while rejecting “internationalization” of the South China Sea disputes in favor of “set[ting] up bilateral channels of communication to address the disputes.”

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @Richeydarian

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · July 11, 2023

17. The Myth of Neutrality – Countries Will Have to Choose Between America and China

Excerpts:

The United States should make it easy for countries to support it on the issues that matter most. Washington should begin by providing realistic alternatives to what China has on offer. U.S. threats to cut countries off from intelligence sharing if they used Huawei—which supplied an all-in-one 5G network at a lower cost than anything the West could provide—were ineffective. When Washington worked with allies to provide meaningful alternatives, however, countries began to reconsider—especially as China became more belligerent. Efforts to diversify away from Chinese supplies in areas including rare earth minerals, solar panels, and certain chemicals will be feasible only if countries have other sources available at a reasonable cost. The United States cannot provide substitutes to everything that China makes and does, and in the majority of cases it need not do so. Instead, Washington should identify the areas with the greatest national security risks and work quickly with partners to develop alternatives.

The United States should also seek, as far as it is possible, to avoid asking countries to harm their economic relationships with China. Sometimes, doing so will be unavoidable, as when Washington organizes a coalition on semiconductors or leads other governments to impose human rights sanctions on Beijing. But these coalitions should be minimally invasive. The United States will win few allies if it puts at significant risk other countries’ trade and investment with China. In winning support from friends and allies on export controls, outbound investment reviews, supply chain diversification, and technology bifurcation, less will be more.

Finally, if Washington wants countries to partner with it and stand up to Beijing, it must demonstrate greater presence and commitment. Countries may be willing to incur costs and risk Chinese retaliation by partnering with the United States—but only if Washington sides with them on other issues. A sense, however, that the United States will be absent, noncommittal, or incompetent when the going gets tough will tempt them to align with or simply acquiesce to China’s preferences. So the United States must rely on sustained diplomatic engagement, trade agreements, reiterated defense commitments, military campaigning, and extensive development aid, especially in the Indo-Pacific, to reassure those countries that doubt U.S. staying power and worry about China’s might.

Countries cannot have their cake and eat it, too. The time for choosing has arrived. Countries will have to decide whether to side, or appear to side, with Washington or Beijing. The United States, rather than reassuring capitals that no such choice is in the offing, should instead accept this reality and help foreign capitals make the right decisions.

The Myth of Neutrality

Countries Will Have to Choose Between America and China

By Richard Fontaine

July 12, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Richard Fontaine · July 12, 2023

As the U.S.-Chinese rivalry intensifies, other countries increasingly confront the dilemma of siding with either Washington or Beijing. This is not a choice that most countries wish to make. Over the past decades, foreign capitals have come to enjoy security and economic benefits from association with both the United States and China. These countries know that joining a coherent political-economic bloc would mean forgoing major benefits from their ties to the other superpower.

“The vast majority of Indo-Pacific and European countries do not want to be trapped into an impossible choice,” Josep Borrell, the EU’s top diplomat, observed at a 2022 meeting of the Brussels Indo-Pacific Forum. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., noted in 2023 that his country does not “want a world that is split into two camps [and] … where countries should choose what side they would be on.” Similar sentiments have been expressed by many leaders, including Lawrence Wong, Singapore’s deputy prime minister, and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud. The message to Washington and Beijing is clear: no country wants to be forced into a binary decision between the two powers.

The United States has hastened to reassure its allies that it feels much the same. “We’re not asking anyone to choose between the United States and China,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said at a press conference in June. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, speaking at Singapore’s Shangri-La Dialogue, insisted that Washington doesn’t “ask people to choose or countries to choose between us and another country.” John Kirby, the White House’s foreign policy spokesperson, repeated the same point in April: “We’re not asking countries to choose between the United States and China, or the West and China.”

It is true that Washington does not insist on an all-or-nothing, us-versus-them choice from even its closest partners. Given the extensive links that all countries—including the United States—have with China, attempting to forge a coherent anti-China bloc would be unlikely to succeed. Even the United States would not join such an arrangement if it required ending its economic relationship with China, which would come at a tremendous cost.

But it may not be possible for much longer for countries to simply sit on the fence. When it comes to a host of policy areas, including technology, defense, diplomacy, and trade, Washington and Beijing are, indeed, forcing others to take sides. Countries will inevitably be caught up in superpower rivalry, and they will be required to step across the line, one way or another. The U.S.-Chinese competition is an inescapable feature of today’s world, and Washington should stop pretending otherwise. Instead, it must work to make the right choices as attractive as possible.

WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?

As U.S.-Chinese competition has intensified in recent years, countries have been increasingly placed in the unenviable position of having to choose. Under former U.S. President Donald Trump, the United States exerted significant pressure on its allies to not let Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, build their 5G networks. Beijing naturally wished to secure the telecommunications deals, and multiple governments privately expressed concern that barring Huawei would anger China. In response, Washington played hardball. The Trump administration even went as far to suggest to Poland that future U.S. troop deployments might be at risk if Warsaw worked with Huawei. The U.S. government warned Germany that Washington would limit intelligence sharing if Berlin welcomed Huawei; not long after, the Chinese ambassador to Germany promised retaliation against German companies if Berlin barred Huawei. Europe’s largest economy was caught between its top two trading partners.

This dynamic continued under U.S. President Joe Biden. The administration’s 2021 CHIPS and Science Act offered some $50 billion in federal subsidies to American and foreign semiconductor manufacturers that are produced in the United States—but only if they refrain from any “significant transaction” to expand their chip-making capacity in China for ten years. Later that year, the Biden administration unilaterally imposed export controls on high-end semiconductors used in China for supercomputing. Initially, the Netherlands and Japan—the other main countries that export chip manufacturing equipment to China—were not party to the new approach. But they were soon told to match the restrictions with limits of their own. By early 2023, Japan and the Netherlands had bowed to U.S. pressure and done so.

The moves and countermoves have since continued. Months after the U.S. restrictions, Beijing retaliated against the United States by barring the use of semiconductors made by Micron, a U.S. company, in key Chinese infrastructure projects. Washington then promptly asked South Korea, whose chipmakers operate major “fabs”—chip manufacturing facilities—in China, not to backfill any supply gap. Beijing, in turn, restricted the export of key metals used in semiconductor manufacturing. Chinese state media condemned the Netherlands, one of the countries that uses the metals, as it made the announcement.

The number of unavoidable dilemmas will only rise as the U.S.-Chinese rivalry intensifies.

The zero-sum games are not limited to economic decisions. In 2021, the United States learned that China was constructing a port facility in the United Arab Emirates. The Biden administration, concerned that Beijing intended to build a military base there, pressured Abu Dhabi to stop the project. Biden reportedly warned Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed that a Chinese military presence in the UAE would damage their countries’ partnership.

Abu Dhabi halted Chinese construction, but recently, leaked documents reported in The Washington Post indicated that work on the facility has restarted. In response, U.S. Senator Chris Murphy, Democrat of Connecticut, who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s subcommittee on the Middle East, vowed to oppose the sale of armed drones to the UAE. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Bob Menendez added, “Our friends in the Gulf have to decide, particularly on the security questions, who they want to turn to. If it’s China, then I think that’s a huge problem.”

Countries across the Indo-Pacific face their own choices. In 2017, Washington offered the THAAD missile defense system to South Korea amid increasing tensions with the North. The missiles were to be stationed on land provided by the South Korean conglomerate Lotte. Beijing warned Seoul not to accept the deployment, fearing that its radar would allow the United States to track military movements inside China. Beijing insisted that it “could not understand or accept” the deployment, and China’s ambassador to Seoul warned that allowing the installation of THAAD could destroy bilateral relations. Seoul went through with the THAAD deployment, and, sure enough, Beijing retaliated. Chinese tour groups were banned from traveling to South Korea, Lotte stores in China were closed, South Korean entertainers were denied visas, and South Korean dramas were removed from China’s Internet. Some of the coercive economic measures remain in place today, but so does the missile defense system.

Washington must demonstrate greater presence and commitment.

Again and again, governments have been forced to make choices that involved real costs and which they would have preferred, had they had the option, to avoid. The number of unavoidable dilemmas will only rise as the U.S.-Chinese rivalry intensifies.

The worst dilemmas will likely revolve around the effort to separate and safeguard technology supply chains. The Biden administration has signaled its desire to outstrip China in the development and production of semiconductors, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, biomanufacturing, and clean energy technologies. To do so, Washington will need to build domestic capacity in each area and limit China’s ability to race ahead. Countries with niche capabilities will be caught between Beijing, which wants these technologies, and Washington, which wants to minimize Chinese access to them.

A similar zero-sum arithmetic will apply to Beijing’s moves to increase its international military presence beyond just the UAE. China already has a military base in Djibouti and an installation in Cambodia. It has reportedly pursued additional facilities in Equatorial Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and elsewhere. As it did in the UAE, Washington will oppose China’s aims and pressure third countries to refuse Chinese construction and deployments. This tug of war will be particularly acute in the Pacific Islands, where expanded Chinese military power could constrain U.S. naval freedom of action. Already, Washington and Beijing are competing for the loyalties of Pacific Island states, although the contest in countries like the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Papua New Guinea has thus far produced a bidding war rather than a series of forced choices.

BETTER WITH U.S.?

The United States should make it easy for countries to support it on the issues that matter most. Washington should begin by providing realistic alternatives to what China has on offer. U.S. threats to cut countries off from intelligence sharing if they used Huawei—which supplied an all-in-one 5G network at a lower cost than anything the West could provide—were ineffective. When Washington worked with allies to provide meaningful alternatives, however, countries began to reconsider—especially as China became more belligerent. Efforts to diversify away from Chinese supplies in areas including rare earth minerals, solar panels, and certain chemicals will be feasible only if countries have other sources available at a reasonable cost. The United States cannot provide substitutes to everything that China makes and does, and in the majority of cases it need not do so. Instead, Washington should identify the areas with the greatest national security risks and work quickly with partners to develop alternatives.

The United States should also seek, as far as it is possible, to avoid asking countries to harm their economic relationships with China. Sometimes, doing so will be unavoidable, as when Washington organizes a coalition on semiconductors or leads other governments to impose human rights sanctions on Beijing. But these coalitions should be minimally invasive. The United States will win few allies if it puts at significant risk other countries’ trade and investment with China. In winning support from friends and allies on export controls, outbound investment reviews, supply chain diversification, and technology bifurcation, less will be more.

Finally, if Washington wants countries to partner with it and stand up to Beijing, it must demonstrate greater presence and commitment. Countries may be willing to incur costs and risk Chinese retaliation by partnering with the United States—but only if Washington sides with them on other issues. A sense, however, that the United States will be absent, noncommittal, or incompetent when the going gets tough will tempt them to align with or simply acquiesce to China’s preferences. So the United States must rely on sustained diplomatic engagement, trade agreements, reiterated defense commitments, military campaigning, and extensive development aid, especially in the Indo-Pacific, to reassure those countries that doubt U.S. staying power and worry about China’s might.

Countries cannot have their cake and eat it, too. The time for choosing has arrived. Countries will have to decide whether to side, or appear to side, with Washington or Beijing. The United States, rather than reassuring capitals that no such choice is in the offing, should instead accept this reality and help foreign capitals make the right decisions.

RICHARD FONTAINE is the Chief Executive of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. Department of State, on the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain.

Foreign Affairs · by Richard Fontaine · July 12, 2023

18. Would Prosecuting Russia Prolong the War in Ukraine?

Excerpts;

Hamilton:

Ultimately, only an arrest warrant for the crime of aggression can tell the families of Ukrainian soldiers killed in an unlawful war that the world cares about their loss. And only an arrest warrant from an aggression tribunal would signal to the thousands of Ukrainians who fled Russia’s illegal war that the pain of their dislocation and loss of an imagined future is visible to the international community.

Finucane and Pomper conclude with a call for the status quo, urging governments to continue supporting the work of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression, which supports the European Union’s investigatory work on the crime of aggression, while holding back on doing more “until the day when the ends of peace and justice are more clearly aligned.” But such passivity will not suffice. Peace and justice do not align by magic: the international community needs to take action to create the conditions for both to be realized.

...

Finucane and Pomper :

Finally, we want to underscore the lack of global support for the idea of a tribunal, which implicates both its viability and potential legitimacy. Although Hamilton focuses on the problem of selective justice, concerns in countries in the global South about the proposed tribunal extend well beyond that. Many non-Western countries also take a dim view of pressure to pick a side in a conflict far from their shores by creating or supporting a carceral instrument directed at one of the parties, as well as the possibility that this could interfere with efforts to end a dangerous and economically damaging war. Indeed, one element of the peace proposal that a delegation of African leaders recently brought to Kyiv and Moscow was to suspend the ICC warrant for Putin’s arrest

We support accountability for international crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine—including for the crime of aggression—if that becomes practicable and does not interfere with efforts to end a war that, because of the countries involved, quite literally poses a risk to all human life. We hope this becomes possible. But, as Hamilton reminds us, peace and justice will not align themselves by magic. For exactly this reason, there is more work to do in securing peace before the most ambitious efforts at seeking justice can be responsibly pursued.

Would Prosecuting Russia Prolong the War in Ukraine?

Debating a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression

By Rebecca Hamilton; Brian Finucane and Stephen Pomper

July 12, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Rebecca Hamilton; Brian Finucane and Stephen Pomper July 12, 2023 · July 12, 2023

Do Not Delay

Rebecca Hamilton

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is calling for the creation of a special international tribunal on aggression that could hold Russian President Vladimir Putin to account for starting an illegal war in Ukraine. Although the International Criminal Court is investigating the war crimes and crimes against humanity being committed in Ukraine, it has no jurisdiction to prosecute Russian leaders for the crime of aggression. In other words, while the ICC can prosecute crimes committed during the ongoing war, it cannot prosecute the foundational crime of Russia launching its illegal war in the first place. To fill this gap, legal scholars have proposed different types of ad hoc tribunals. Ukraine and other eastern European states want to see an international tribunal backed by the UN General Assembly. The Biden administration supports the formation of what it calls “an internationalized national court,” to help Ukraine prosecute the crime of aggression.

Not everyone, though, thinks that prosecuting aggression is a good idea. In their essay, “Can Ukraine Get Justice Without Thwarting Peace?” (May 8, 2023), Brian Finucane and Stephen Pomper argue that a tribunal to prosecute Russian leaders for the crime of aggression risks a “full-on collision between the interests of peace and justice.” They claim that the “geopolitical costs and practical challenges” of such a tribunal have thus far been overlooked in the voluminous conversations on the topic. They write that a “big push to prosecute Russian leaders for starting the war signals a desire to remove Russia’s leadership, risks escalation, and would almost surely complicate diplomacy to bring the war to an end.”

But, as their analysis parenthetically concedes, these dynamics are already in play thanks to an arrest warrant for Putin, issued by the ICC on March 17. That warrant launched the very parade of diplomatic horribles that Finucane and Pomper fear an aggression tribunal could unleash. One might add that plenty of actions outside of international criminal law, including the West’s massive supply of weapons to Ukraine, present much the same risks. In short, all the escalatory concerns they fear from an aggression tribunal already exist.

Finucane and Pomper also raise the concern that a tribunal to prosecute Russian aggression would “reinforce the view of global South countries that the United States and its allies see international criminal justice institutions as a selective tool that applies only to their adversaries.” This concern is a serious one, but it can be addressed without needlessly abandoning Ukrainian victims. There is no reason why a special tribunal to hold Russian leaders accountable for the crime of aggression cannot be created while simultaneously working to broaden the international criminal justice project. Of course, this will be challenging. But settling for the status quo fails to match the moment. Instead, what is needed is for the international community to stand in solidarity with Ukraine’s call for criminal accountability in the face of Russia’s manifest violation of international law.

A WARRANT AT WORK

Finucane and Pomper write that the potential upsides to an aggression tribunal “seem more rooted in aspiration than a sober assessment of costs and benefits.” It is a conclusion they reach by way of the accurate observation that Putin, or other leaders who would be targets of an aggression prosecution, are unlikely to be brought into custody anytime soon. This, they say, means that an aggression tribunal faces a choice: conduct a trial in absentia or pursue no trial at all. This is a false binary, however, which miscasts how international criminal tribunals operate.

First, holding a trial without Putin is an unlikely option. Although some domestic jurisdictions, including Ukraine, allow such trials, they are generally frowned on at the international level because of the fair trial rights of defendants under international human rights law. Laying it out as one of two choices is largely a distraction.

Second, and more significantly, to suggest that a trial is the only action worthy of assessment here overlooks a key difference between domestic and international criminal courts. Precisely because international criminal defendants typically take years to bring into custody, the ability of international courts to issue arrest warrants takes on immense significance. The value of an arrest warrant is hard to see when using a domestic law lens, where a warrant’s primary value lies in its ability to bring a suspect into custody. A warrant from an international aggression tribunal, though, would begin its work on several levels well before its target ever enters the courtroom.

Peace and justice do not align by magic.

To begin with, an international warrant would attract global attention and help disseminate a message about how the world views unlawful conduct. Few believe that legal condemnation will deter Putin’s aggression at this point. But it is still worthwhile to signal to other would-be aggressors that the international community will not allow the crime of aggression to go unchecked.

An international arrest warrant also delegitimizes its target and creates diplomatic embarrassment that can erode a leader’s political power. For all his bluster, Sudanese President Omar al Bashir was incensed when the ICC issued an arrest warrant against him in 2009. It stung when foreign diplomats avoided inviting him to events and sidelined him from photo opportunities. Over time, international diplomatic isolation helped embolden his domestic opponents. Similarly, an international arrest warrant contributed to the domestic overthrow of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic long before he set foot in The Hague. Only after voters ousted Milosevic in favor of a leader who could fully represent them on the world stage did Serbia’s new government, reading public sentiment and under pressure to sever ties with a branded war criminal, hand Milosevic over for international prosecution. In Putin’s case, the ICC warrant provoked a months’ long diplomatic drama over whether South Africa should “un-invite” him from a summit in Johannesburg in August. Ultimately, South Africa decided to issue blanket diplomatic immunity to all leaders attending, opening the door for Putin to come. Over time, these diplomatic headaches could translate into political gains for Putin’s domestic opponents. Adding the crime of aggression to Putin’s charge sheet would strengthen these existing dynamics.

The one thing the ICC’s warrant against Putin does not (and cannot) do is acknowledge the harm suffered by the victims of aggression. These victims include both Ukrainian civilians forced to flee and the Ukrainian soldiers forced to defend their homeland. They also include, less obviously perhaps, the thousands of Russians conscripted into an illegal war. When Russia launched its war in Ukraine in February 2022, it committed a crime against a much larger pool of people than just those who have tragically suffered war crimes at the hands of Russian soldiers. To bear witness to their loss at the international level is an essential function of prosecuting the crime of aggression.

JUSTICE FOR ALL

As Finucane and Pomper rightly note, the establishment of an aggression tribunal for Ukraine, and Ukraine alone, raises the specter of selective justice, already a serious concern for those in the global South, who see the United States and its allies as wielding international criminal law only when it suits them. One response to this reality is to oppose the establishment of a tribunal. Yet this doubles down on injustice, forsaking the interests of Ukrainian victims. A better response is for the international community to support the establishment of a special tribunal, while at the same time working to expand the jurisdiction of the ICC so that it can bring aggression cases against the nationals of more states, including powerful ones, in the future.

The maximal version of this expansion would entail an amendment to the Rome Statute to enable the ICC to pursue aggression charges against anyone in its jurisdiction, just as it does for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This is the least politically viable option, since it would create the possibility of the court prosecuting nationals from the United States, China, Russia, or any other states that have not joined the court, whenever those nationals commit crimes on the territory of a state that has joined the court. Still, if the Biden administration was serious about prosecuting the crime of aggression in Ukraine, then this approach would unequivocally allay fears that international criminal justice is not just another tool for great powers to use against their adversaries.

More realistically though, even a less ambitious expansion of the court’s reach could make headway in addressing this concern about fairness. As a starting point, all states that are already part of the ICC could commit to ratifying its amendments on aggression and to refrain from adopting the opt-out provisions it offers. Such a commitment by the many Western nations that have joined the court would signal to those in the global South that their concerns about selectivity are being taken seriously.

Crucially, prosecuting Russian leaders for the crime of aggression would address the legitimate complaint that international criminal justice is overly focused on leaders from African countries. (To date, 47 out of the 52 arrest warrants issued by the ICC have been for people from African nations). A case against Putin would be the first international aggression prosecution ever considered against the head of a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, an institution that epitomizes how the most powerful states are often exempt from the rules that apply to everyone else. It would be perverse, to say the least, if this were to be the situation on which the international community finally made a stand against selective justice.

TRUE PEACE REQUIRES JUSTICE

At the heart of Finucane and Pomper’s argument is the idea that pursuing justice for Russia’s illegal war would make it even more difficult to bring the war to an end. But after decades of debate about the “peace versus justice” conundrum, one essential takeaway has emerged: over the long run, sustainable peace requires accountability, and the question of sequencing depends on the context, with the views of those most directly affected—victims and their communities—being key.

No one is more attuned to the risks facing Ukraine as it seeks to end a war it did not start than the Ukrainian government itself. For Ukraine, there is no benefit in waiting to pursue an aggression tribunal. Any Ukraine-specific downsides that will flow from establishing a tribunal, such as complicating negotiations and signaling a desire to remove Putin, are already in play thanks to the ICC arrest warrant. Many potential upsides, such as the further delegitimization of Putin’s actions and expressed solidarity with his political opponents, would come as the result of the international community coming together to establish such a tribunal.

Ultimately, only an arrest warrant for the crime of aggression can tell the families of Ukrainian soldiers killed in an unlawful war that the world cares about their loss. And only an arrest warrant from an aggression tribunal would signal to the thousands of Ukrainians who fled Russia’s illegal war that the pain of their dislocation and loss of an imagined future is visible to the international community.

Finucane and Pomper conclude with a call for the status quo, urging governments to continue supporting the work of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression, which supports the European Union’s investigatory work on the crime of aggression, while holding back on doing more “until the day when the ends of peace and justice are more clearly aligned.” But such passivity will not suffice. Peace and justice do not align by magic: the international community needs to take action to create the conditions for both to be realized.

REBECCA HAMILTON is Executive Editor of Just Security and Professor of Law at American University Washington College of Law.

Finucane and Pomper Reply

Brian Finucane and Stephen Pomper

Hamilton’s response walks through many of the standard arguments in favor of creating a new tribunal while the war continues to rage, but like much of the literature on this topic, it relies on unsupported claims. She also gives short shrift to the geopolitical context in which this and other international criminal justice efforts are pursued.

At the core of Hamilton’s rebuttal is her contention that “the escalatory concerns [we] fear from an aggression tribunal already exist” because the International Criminal Court has already issued a warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arrest on war crimes charges and because the West provides military support to Ukraine. We strongly disagree with the claim that the ICC’s action somehow inoculates the West against the risks of establishing a new tribunal.

For one thing, the ICC is an independent, formally apolitical actor with a mandate that extends well beyond the war in Ukraine. The United States (which is not an ICC member but supports some of the court’s efforts) and other Western countries can therefore separate themselves from its actions regarding Putin. That would not be the case should they move forward with the special tribunal that Hamilton and others envisage. The United States and its partners would need to launch a campaign to get the votes required at the UN General Assembly. A strong showing will be required for the court’s legitimacy and perhaps also to satisfy UN voting requirements. Assuming such a campaign succeeded (which is not guaranteed given how unpopular the idea is in the global South), both the court’s creation and its subsequent efforts could be seen by Moscow only as a U.S.-led drive toward regime change, since the tribunal’s foundational purpose would be to try Putin. Even if the United States proceeds down the path it currently prefers—creating a hybrid body in the Ukrainian judiciary—its fingerprints will be all over the court’s work, particularly if it lends judges and prosecutors to the court’s staff.

Moreover, although it is certainly true that ICC warrants already create an obstacle to any peace-making efforts, setting up a new institution will surely complicate them further. Absent a change of leadership in the Kremlin, it is virtually inconceivable that any deal with Russia could be reached without the criminal charges against Putin being dropped. Should that moment arrive, navigating the ICC warrants will be challenging enough. Negotiating the actions of a new international tribunal—operating under a separate legal framework and governed by its own institutional logic—would add further complexity, uncertainty, and delay.

Nor are we persuaded by the analogy to supplying Ukraine with weapons. The United States has calibrated its military support for Ukraine to match its war aims, helping Kyiv position itself to achieve a just and sustainable peace while forgoing direct involvement and aid that Washington considers too dangerous in terms of potential escalation. But there is no way to reconcile, much less calibrate, the creation of a tribunal that presupposes Russian regime change with U.S. war aims, which very plainly disavow that goal.

We want to underscore the lack of global support for the idea of a tribunal.

We agree with Hamilton regarding the dubious legitimacy of in absentia prosecutions, but the possibility of such trials is hardly as remote a possibility as she suggests. During a March visit to The Hague, Ukraine’s prosecutor general, Andriy Kostin, advocated for an aggression trial even if Russian leaders cannot be brought to court in person, saying “it’s important to deliver a matter of justice of international crimes even if the perpetrators are not in the dock.”

We also question Hamilton’s discussion of how prior international arrest warrants have functioned in practice. The handful of precedents she cites—such as Serbia and Sudan—are of limited relevance in predicting the consequences of threatening regime change against a country that boasts the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Moreover, although she is correct that former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir found the ICC’s warrants noisome, he remained in power for ten years following the issuance of the first one and, to this day, has not been delivered to The Hague. Meanwhile, Sudan has descended into civil war. One can debate the impact of the ICC warrants on political developments in Sudan, but it is very difficult to have a constructive discussion about the tensions between peace and justice without focusing on the specific details of this and other conflicts, as opposed to relying on broad generalizations.

The same goes for present-day Russia. Hamilton claims that an international arrest warrant “could translate into political gains for Putin’s domestic opponents.” Russian politics can be unpredictable, but there is little evidence that the ICC arrest warrant already issued has empowered a more democratic Russian opposition or is likely to do so. Indeed, as illustrated by the recent Wagner mutiny, one can envision a leadership change bringing more, rather than less, autocracy. The prospect of a Kremlin shakeup leading to chaos and state fragmentation—which, though highly remote, also came into focus during Wagner’s march on Moscow—is another scenario that seems quite undesirable given the country’s massive cache of nuclear weapons.

We respectfully question the categorical assertion that “sustainable peace requires accountability.” In some instances—generally internal armed conflicts—this may be true. It is also the case that accountability is good in its own right. But when it comes to interstate wars, comprehensive accountability has been all too rare, yet this has not necessarily precluded the cessation of fighting and rapprochement between former adversaries. For example, it is hard to imagine that U.S. or Vietnamese performance in the Vietnam War would survive a judicial scrubbing for atrocities—and yet, for better or worse, reconciliation has proceeded without it. Our point is not to compare these very different conflicts, but to point to the mismatch between Hamilton’s claim about the relationship between peace and accountability and the reality of how some conflicts are resolved.

Finally, we want to underscore the lack of global support for the idea of a tribunal, which implicates both its viability and potential legitimacy. Although Hamilton focuses on the problem of selective justice, concerns in countries in the global South about the proposed tribunal extend well beyond that. Many non-Western countries also take a dim view of pressure to pick a side in a conflict far from their shores by creating or supporting a carceral instrument directed at one of the parties, as well as the possibility that this could interfere with efforts to end a dangerous and economically damaging war. Indeed, one element of the peace proposal that a delegation of African leaders recently brought to Kyiv and Moscow was to suspend the ICC warrant for Putin’s arrest

We support accountability for international crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine—including for the crime of aggression—if that becomes practicable and does not interfere with efforts to end a war that, because of the countries involved, quite literally poses a risk to all human life. We hope this becomes possible. But, as Hamilton reminds us, peace and justice will not align themselves by magic. For exactly this reason, there is more work to do in securing peace before the most ambitious efforts at seeking justice can be responsibly pursued.

Foreign Affairs · by Rebecca Hamilton; Brian Finucane and Stephen Pomper July 12, 2023 · July 12, 2023

19. US intel report casts new doubt on Wuhan lab leak theory

US intel report casts new doubt on Wuhan lab leak theory

Agencies lean against GOP Senate committee staff who viewed training program as response to a Covid-19 biosafety problem

asiatimes.com · by ProPublica · July 12, 2023

This article was originally published by ProPublica, a Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative newsroom.

A recently declassified intelligence community report on the origin of Covid-19 has taken a benign view of biosafety training that took place at a government lab in Wuhan, China, in November 2019, not long before the pandemic began there.

The safety training for staff at the Wuhan Institute of Virology was an aspect of an interim report by the Republican oversight staff of a Senate committee that last year concluded the pandemic was “more likely than not, the result of a research-related incident.”

Last October, ProPublica and Vanity Fair delved into the inner workings of the team that produced that interim report and some outside experts’ views of its findings. Asia Times republished that story.

The intelligence report was issued in June in response to a law, passed unanimously, that required the director of national intelligence to declassify information regarding the origins of Covid-19. The report confirmed prior news accounts that the intelligence community is divided about the cause of the pandemic, but it did not provide specifics about how different agencies reached their conclusions.

While some believe the virus likely first infected a human through a research-related accident, others say it’s more likely that the contagion naturally spilled over from animal to human. The report stated that “all agencies continue to assess that both a natural and laboratory-associated origin remain plausible.”

Last year’s report by the Republican oversight staff of the Senate Health, Education, Labor & Pensions Committee pointed to November 2019 safety training at the WIV, as well as patents and procurements, as evidence of biosafety-related problems at the lab complex around the time the virus emerged in Wuhan.

Hazard suits at the high-security National Biosafety Laboratory in Wuhan. Photo: Wuhan Virology Institute

On November 19, 2019, a senior Chinese government safety official arrived at the WIV to discuss a “complex and grave situation currently facing [bio]security work,” the report said. On the same day that the official arrived, the WIV sought to procure a costly air incinerator. The following month, WIV researchers applied for a patent for an improved device to contain hazardous gases inside a biological chamber, like ones used to transport infected animals.

In contrast, the intelligence report said the November 2019 safety training appeared to be run-of-the-mill rather than a response to a biosecurity breach. “We do not know of a specific biosafety incident at the WIV that spurred the pandemic and the WIV’s biosafety training appears routine, rather than an emergency response by China’s leadership,” said the report, which was drafted by the national intelligence officer for weapons of mass destruction and proliferation and coordinated with the intelligence community.

The intelligence community agencies agreed on the underlying facts in the report but drew different conclusions from that information, according to an official familiar with the report.

The intelligence report is brief and does not mention the incinerator or device patent. It said that WIV officials in mid-2019 were “evaluating and implementing biosafety improvements, training, and procurements” in the context of Chinese biosecurity legislation.

Some WIV scientists have genetically engineered coronaviruses, the report said, but the intelligence community has no information “indicating that any WIV genetic engineering work has involved SARS-CoV-2, a close progenitor, or a backbone virus that is closely-related enough to have been the source of the pandemic.”

At the same time, the intelligence report did point to biosafety concerns. “Some WIV researchers probably did not use adequate biosafety precautions at least some of the time prior to the pandemic in handling SARS-like coronaviruses, increasing the risk of accidental exposure to viruses,” the report said.

The intelligence report confirmed previous news reports that several WIV researchers became sick in the fall of 2019, though it stated this was not proof that the scientists were infected through their work. The intelligence community “continues to assess that this information neither supports nor refutes either hypothesis of the pandemic’s origins because the researchers’ symptoms could have been caused by a number of diseases and some of the symptoms were not consistent with Covid-19,” the report stated.

The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have a four-point rating system for biolabs based on the threats posed by the infectious organisms agents allowed there. Biosafety level 4, or BSL-4, labs are the most restrictive and designed to handle the most dangerous pathogens.

According to the intelligence report, as of January 2019, WIV researchers were performing experiments with coronaviruses in BSL-2 labs, which have far fewer safeguards, despite knowing of “these virus’ ability to directly infect humans.”

“Separately, the WIV’s plan to conduct analysis of potential epidemic viruses from pangolin samples in fall 2019, suggests the researchers sought to isolate live viruses,” the intelligence report said.

While not revealing the evidence underlying its assessments, the report laid out the divisions within the intelligence community. The National Intelligence Council and “four other IC agencies” assess that the natural spillover of a virus from an infected animal is the most likely cause of the pandemic, according to the intelligence report.

The report did not name the other four intelligence agencies.

The Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan is also widely suspected to be the epicenter of the virus outbreak. Photo: RTHK

Two federal intelligence agencies — the Department of Energy and the FBI — have landed on the other side of the bitter debate over the origins of the pandemic, assessing that a laboratory-associated incident is the most likely cause of the pandemic.

The Wall Street Journal reported in February that the Department of Energy, which had previously been undecided about how the pandemic began, had come to support the lab-leak position with “low confidence” in response to new intelligence; the FBI reached its conclusion with “moderate confidence.” The intelligence report doesn’t mention the confidence levels of any agency.

While the Department of Energy and the FBI agree that the pandemic most likely resulted from a lab incident, the agencies reached the same conclusion for “different reasons,” according to the intelligence report. But the report didn’t say what those reasons were.

Although the March law required the director of national intelligence to declassify “any and all information” relating to potential links between the WIV and the origin of Covid-19, an annex to the report remains classified. According to the report, this was necessary “to protect sources and methods.”

Several Republicans were critical of the intelligence report and demanded more details. [Congressional opinion has divided along party lines, as seen in a House oversight committee hearing held on Tuesday. -Asia Times editors]

asiatimes.com · by ProPublica · July 12, 2023

20. The US and India’s non-aligned alliance

Excerpts;

The most important factor contributing to the deepening ties between the US and India is the growing number of Indian Americans, which exceeds four million. Indian Americans are disproportionately affluent, with the highest median income of any US ethnic group, including whites. They are also becoming an increasingly influential voting bloc, and their prominent roles in political fundraising, on congressional staffs and in government offices have given rise to a so-called Samosa Caucus. The US has had two governors and seven members of Congress of Indian heritage. US Vice President Kamala Harris’s mother is Indian, and former US ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley—currently running for president—is the daughter of Punjabi Sikh parents.

While their political views vary, many Indian Americans have been increasingly outspoken on issues related to India. The continuous influx of more than 150,000 Indian students to the US every year contributes to this dynamic. In addition to injecting nearly US$8 billion into the US education system and related services, these migrants ensure a constant infusion of fresh ideas and perspectives. In the long run, Indian Americans may help shape US policy on India in the same way that Jewish Americans play a role in shaping US policy on Israel.

In the past, it was often said that Pakistan was a US ally but not a friend, while India was a friend but not an ally. With the US out of Afghanistan, Pakistan has become a less significant ally. But, while India still isn’t one, owing to its insistence on strategic autonomy, even US sceptics who say the two countries’ interests are more aligned than their values concede that those interests warrant closer cooperation. Modi’s visit was one more indication of how close that cooperation has become.

The US and India’s non-aligned alliance | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Shashi Tharoor · July 10, 2023

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is riding high. His triumphant visit to Washington in June, which featured a state dinner at the White House and a rare second address to a joint session of Congress, appears to mark a new chapter in the relationship between the United States and India following a quarter-century of ups and downs.

Modi’s visit was preceded by several major breakthroughs, including the recent US–India initiative on critical and emerging technology, which seeks to foster bilateral collaboration in areas such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum computing, 5G and cybersecurity. US semiconductor manufacturer Micron Technology recently announced that it plans to invest US$825 million in a new chip assembly and testing facility in India.

The US and India have also unveiled several defence agreements, including a deal for India to acquire 30 MQ-9B Predator armed drones from the US and a separate plan to produce F414 fighter jet engines for the Indian Air Force jointly with General Electric. These deals, which the US has never extended to a country that isn’t formally an ally, highlight the intensifying bilateral defence partnership.

The transformation is striking. Throughout the Cold War, the world’s oldest democracy and its largest remained essentially estranged. America’s initial indifference towards India was evident in President Harry Truman’s reaction when Chester Bowles asked to be the US ambassador. ‘I thought India was pretty jammed with poor people and cows wandering around the streets, witch doctors and people sitting on hot coals and bathing in the Ganges,’ Truman said, ‘but I did not realize that anybody thought it was important.’

America’s preference for alliances with anti-communist regimes led the US to establish relationships with a series of increasingly Islamist dictatorships in Pakistan. Meanwhile, India’s non-aligned democracy gravitated towards the secular Soviet Union. Non-alignment wasn’t well received in the US, where John Foster Dulles, President Dwight Eisenhower’s secretary of state, famously declared that ‘neutrality between good and evil is itself evil’.

The end of the Cold War, together with the reorientation of India’s foreign policy and its integration into the global economy, led to an improvement in US–India relations, but India’s detonation of a nuclear device in 1998 triggered US-led economic sanctions. President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in 2000, his final year in office, marked a major turning point, and George W. Bush’s administration built on the momentum by signing a defence agreement with India in 2005 and a landmark accord on civil nuclear cooperation in 2008. The positive trend persisted under both Barack Obama and Donald Trump and now appears to have reached a zenith under President Joe Biden.

Today, the US seems much more willing to accommodate India’s post-colonial obsession with strategic autonomy. Whereas the Hindu nationalist Modi stands in stark contrast to his secular predecessor, Manmohan Singh, there has been remarkable bipartisan support for deepening ties by five successive US presidents and three Indian prime ministers.

This shift has been partly driven by China’s geopolitical assertiveness under President Xi Jinping, which represents a radical departure from his predecessors’ adherence to the doctrine of China’s ‘peaceful rise’. The US clearly views China as its primary adversary and has been actively pursuing regional alliances to counter its growing influence.

India has traditionally been reluctant to pick sides, but China’s repeated encroachments on its territory across the disputed Himalayan border, and its killing of 20 Indian soldiers in June 2020, have rendered neutrality untenable. While India maintains its independent posture, the recent G7 summit in Hiroshima notably included the second-ever in-person Quad summit between Biden, Modi, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. During the meeting, the four leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific.

The message to China is clear. While India maintains that it is not a US ally but a partner, it has increasingly aligned itself with the democratic West in its escalating rivalry with communist China.

But it would be a mistake to view India–US relations solely through a China lens. America and India have far more in common than is generally acknowledged: democracy, a common language and a dedication to fostering innovation and entrepreneurship. As Henry Kissinger once observed, the two countries have ‘no conflict of interest in the traditional and fundamental sense’.

The most important factor contributing to the deepening ties between the US and India is the growing number of Indian Americans, which exceeds four million. Indian Americans are disproportionately affluent, with the highest median income of any US ethnic group, including whites. They are also becoming an increasingly influential voting bloc, and their prominent roles in political fundraising, on congressional staffs and in government offices have given rise to a so-called Samosa Caucus. The US has had two governors and seven members of Congress of Indian heritage. US Vice President Kamala Harris’s mother is Indian, and former US ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley—currently running for president—is the daughter of Punjabi Sikh parents.

While their political views vary, many Indian Americans have been increasingly outspoken on issues related to India. The continuous influx of more than 150,000 Indian students to the US every year contributes to this dynamic. In addition to injecting nearly US$8 billion into the US education system and related services, these migrants ensure a constant infusion of fresh ideas and perspectives. In the long run, Indian Americans may help shape US policy on India in the same way that Jewish Americans play a role in shaping US policy on Israel.

In the past, it was often said that Pakistan was a US ally but not a friend, while India was a friend but not an ally. With the US out of Afghanistan, Pakistan has become a less significant ally. But, while India still isn’t one, owing to its insistence on strategic autonomy, even US sceptics who say the two countries’ interests are more aligned than their values concede that those interests warrant closer cooperation. Modi’s visit was one more indication of how close that cooperation has become.

Shashi Tharoor, a former UN under-secretary-general and former Indian minister of state for external affairs and minister of state for human resource development, is an MP for the Indian National Congress. He is the author, most recently, of Ambedkar: a life. This article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2023. Image: Win McNamee/Getty Images.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Shashi Tharoor · July 10, 2023

21. CQ Brown decries hold on nominations in hearing to head Joint Chiefs

Will we soon have multiple acting service chiefs and an acting Chairman?

CQ Brown decries hold on nominations in hearing to head Joint Chiefs

Defense News · by Stephen Losey · July 11, 2023

WASHINGTON — Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown avoided setting off any major fireworks during his Senate confirmation hearing Tuesday to serve as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, maintaining his reputation as a nonpartisan officer.

But he forcefully laid out the impact that a blanket Senate hold on hundreds of senior military confirmations, including his own, is having on the readiness of the joint force.

“We have strong deputies, but at the same time they don’t have the same level of experience going forward,” Brown told the Senate Armed Services Committee. “In addition to the senior officers, there’s a whole chain of events that goes down to our junior officers. And that has an impact.”

Brown said the holds on senior military officers instated by Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala., also prevents junior officers from moving up the chain of command, hindering their careers. He noted that if the Senate doesn’t promote the senior officers, they remain in their current positions, “blocking the spot for someone else.”

Additionally, he said it impacts the families of staffers and junior officers as well, preventing them for planning their futures amid uncertainty over where they’ll be based.

“Whether it’s school, whether it’s employment, whether it’s the fact that they already sold their home because they thought they were going to move and are now living in temporary quarters, that creates a challenge,” said Brown. “We will lose talent. The spouse network is alive and well, and the spouses will compare notes.”

Tuberville started a blanket hold on senior military confirmations in February, demanding that the Pentagon rescind its new policy providing paid travel leave for troops to travel to receive abortion services if they’re stationed in states where it’s no longer legal. He was not in the room when Brown outlined the impact his military holds have had.

Democratic lawmakers are reluctant to devote limited floor time to confirming otherwise non-controversial military nominees usually confirmed unanimous consent, even for senior leaders like Brown. Senate Armed Services Chairman Jack Reed, D-R.I., noted on Monday that it would take 84 days to confirm all 253 promotions held up on the Senate floor if senators did nothing but vote on them for eight hours a day.

Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., who chairs the military personnel panel, noted that Tuberville’s hold will soon affect approximately 650 military confirmations, significantly lengthening that 84-day timeline.

‘Nonpartisan’ aims as chairman

President Biden in May nominated Brown, 60, to be the nation’s next top military officer. If confirmed, he would succeed current Joint Chiefs chairman Army Gen. Mark Milley.

During his hearing, Brown was praised by most senators for his experience and leadership ability, and he appeared to have broad support on the committee.

Brown stressed to senators how important it is to maintain the military’s distance from politics in his hearing, and pledged to set a personal example of remaining nonpartisan if confirmed as chairman. Still, he could not avoid questions on several controversies that have ensnared the armed forces in recent years, including racial and diversity issues and the COVID-19 vaccine.

Brown said he would expect the rest of the force to exhibit the same nonpartisanship he promised to demonstrate — but he also asked civilian leaders not to pull the military into political debates.

“We need to stay out of politics, and stay nonpartisan, nonpolitical,” Brown said. “And at the same time, advocate that our civilian leadership not to bring us into political situations.”

A simmering debate over whether diversity and inclusion initiatives were appropriate in the military erupted late in the hearing, when Sen. Eric Schmitt, R-Mo., began his questioning of Brown by asking, “Do we have too many White officers in the Air Force?”

Schmitt criticized Brown for signing onto an Aug. 9, 2022, memo titled “Officer Source of Commission Applicant Pool Goals,” that updated the service’s racial, gender and ethnicity demographic goals for the pool of officer applicants.

That memo, which was also signed by Air Force Sec. Frank Kendall, then-Undersecretary Gina Ortiz Jones, and Space Force Chief of Space Operations Gen. Jay Raymond, called those applicant goals “aspirational,” and called for Air Education and Training Command and the U.S. Air Force Academy to come up with diversity and inclusion outreach plans to achieve those goals.

Schmitt pointed to the memo’s goal of having an applicant pool that is 67.5% White, and characterized it as saying that is what the service’s population of officers should be. This, Schmitt said, would amount to “a reduction, essentially, of about 9% of the White officers.”

Brown said the memo was on application goals, not what the actual makeup of the officer corps should be, and that the percentages were based on nationwide demographics.

The Air Force was not advocating for racial quotas, Brown told Sen. Tammy Duckworth, D-Ill., which are against the military’s policy.

During the hearing, Brown said the Air Force’s efforts to improve diversity are important to give airmen of all backgrounds a chance at excelling.

“All they want is a fair opportunity to perform,” Brown said. “And by providing that fair opportunity, they do not want to be advantaged or disadvantaged or discounted based on their background.”

In his own roles as a fighter pilot, instructor and commandant of the Air Force Weapons School, Brown said that he wanted to earn all his advancements based on his own merits, not because of his background.

“I didn’t want to be the best African-American F-16 pilot,” Brown said. “I wanted to be the best F-16 pilot.”

Recruiting challenges

At the same time, he said, the Air Force needed to make an effort to reach out to multiple populations across the nation, so they know what opportunities are out there, while not compromising on their qualifications or merit.

“Young people only aspire to be what they know about,” Brown said. “If they don’t know anything about the military, and we don’t outreach to them, we may miss some tremendous talent. But they’ve got to be qualified, because we’re a merit-based organization.”

And with the military facing serious recruiting challenges, Brown said it will be even more important for officials such as himself to “reconnect with the nation” and talk about the opportunities military service can provide.

Some Republican senators also pressed Brown on what he would do as chairman to restore to service about 8,000 troops who were kicked out of the military for refusing to get the COVID-19 vaccine.

Brown indicated an openness to allowing some of those discharged troops to reapply and return to service on a case-by-case basis, as long as the vaccine refusal was the only negative mark on their record. But he noted that, as chairman, he would not be in the chain of command to make such decisions, and could only offer his advice to leaders of the individual services.

Schmitt said allowing those troops to reapply isn’t good enough, and said they should be reinstated with rank and back pay.

Lessons from Ukraine, and modernizing

Brown also endorsed multiyear procurement as a means to bolster munitions production, pointing to the Pentagon’s fiscal 2024 budget request for multiyear authorizations to buy items like the Patriot surface-to-air guided missile system and the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System. He argued that doing so would “help provide predictability to the defense-industrial base, to their supply chains and to their workforce.”

He noted that the war in Ukraine has “exposed” underlying issues in the defense-industrial base, such as the ability to surge munitions production. Additionally, he endorsed a Pentagon plan to transfer weapons from U.S. stockpiles to Taiwan under the same authority that President Joe Biden has used to arm Ukraine.

Brown said that munitions sent to Ukraine and Taiwan “are somewhat different just based on the environment that they’re operating in, but there are some that are similar.”

Asked about lessons drawn from the Ukraine war, Brown said the conflict has highlighted the importance of air power.

“From my own perspective as an airman, the value of airpower and having watched what either side has been able to do or not do, but the value of innovative air defense and how that’s been helpful to the Ukrainians in defense of their nation,” said Brown.

He also highlighted how logistics challenges have hampered Russia’s would-be-conquest of Ukraine, and the difficulty of measuring a military’s will to fight. Additionally, he said it stressed the value of using intelligence before a crisis occurs.

In his three years as Air Force chief of staff, Brown has pushed his service to modernize and prepare for a fight against an advanced adversary such as China — an effort he dubbed Accelerate Change or Lose.

Brown reiterated the importance of modernizing to be able to meet a new threat, even if it means sacrificing one’s “own parochial interests.”

That can be a challenge, he acknowledged. But he pledged to carry that mindset into his new role heading the joint chiefs, if confirmed.

“The challenge there is having all of our service members understanding the big picture, and why this is so important, why we need to modernize, and what’s at stake,” Brown said. “Then you step away from your own parochial interests and then we do what’s best — not just for your part of the organization, but what’s best for the entire organization.”

About Stephen Losey and Bryant Harris

Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

22. Gen. Randy George, once admonished, is now Army chief in waiting

Gen. Randy George, once admonished, is now Army chief in waiting

armytimes.com · by Jen Judson · July 12, 2023

WASHINGTON — “What the hell are we doing here?”

That was the question then-Col. Randy George asked then-Lt. Col. Brad Brown when he first visited Combat Outpost Keating in Afghanistan in late 2008.

Ahead of their official deployment to Afghanistan, the two were attending a memorial service for the most recent commander of the base, who had been killed by a roadside bomb that exploded nearby, Brown recalled in an interview with Defense News. That commander wasn’t the first soldier to die there or the last.

Brown said it was clear to George the outpost, along with several others in the northeast region of the country, needed to close.

COP Keating, nestled in a valley and surrounded by insurgents roaming the mountains, relied almost entirely on support from helicopters because the single road leading to the post was difficult to access for anything larger than a Humvee.

The outpost had been named for 1st Lt. Ben Keating, who died when his vehicle fell off a cliff near the base, but closing the facility proved difficult.

Afghanistan in 2008, Brown said, “really became sort of a cyclical process where you just go, you do your time, you try not to get anybody killed and you leave and hand it over to the next guy.”

“For Randy, that wasn’t good enough,” Brown said.

George declined requests for an interview ahead of the Senate confirmation process.

“The guy that may have established that base ... as a battalion commander is now a division commander,” Brown said. “When you say, ‘Well, this is a stupid place to put a base,’ you’re effectively telling the person who did that, that was dumb, it was a mistake and everybody that fought there and died there wasted their time.”

George still wanted to move forward and eventually received approval, but in fall 2009, before it could be closed, the vulnerable outpost was nearly overrun by Taliban fighters. The attackers killed eight U.S. soldiers and four Afghan army soldiers defending the outpost.

In a 2017 Army video, George recounted how the troops “were in a very difficult position in very difficult terrain at the bottom of a mountain, basically the bottom of a hole and were attacked by more than 300 Taliban.”

After an investigation into the attack, Brown and a captain received formal reprimands, while George and a second captain received admonishments — a similar but less severe form of administrative punishment. George continued to seek to close COP Keating and other remote outposts, shuttering them by the end of his year-long deployment.

“He did everything to ensure that the people that were there got every bit of support that they could get,” Brown said. “I always felt that he was in our corner.”

Now George, the vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, is nominated to become the service’s top uniformed officer and the principal military adviser to Army Secretary Christine Wormuth. Former colleagues say he will benefit from his experience working to advocate for troops, like he did for those who defended COP Keating, as recruitment and retention are expected to take center stage.

At the same time he’ll have to manage the pressure on force structure, he is also set to face tightened budgets and a push to get dozens of key modernization programs to troops.

“He’s getting squeezed on all fronts,” said Tom Spoehr, a retired Army three-star general who is now with the Heritage Foundation. “He’s getting squeezed on manpower, is being squeezed on money and ... for the foreseeable future, there’s going to be trade-offs that need to be made.”

George is set to appear Wednesday at a confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

In your corner

George, who was born in Iowa, graduated from West Point in 1988. He began his career as an infantry officer and served in Desert Storm as a lieutenant in the 101st Airborne Division.

He initially deployed to Iraq in 2003 as deputy commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade based in Italy, and again in 2004 as the commander of the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment.

According to colleagues who saw him lead, like Brown, he quickly gained a reputation as relatable and a supporter of his troops.

Retired Lt. Gen. James Pasquarette, who worked with George multiple times in his career, told Defense News George is authentic.

“That’s what makes him connect with soldiers,” he said.

At a conference in Asadabad, Afghanistan, in late 2009, George sought common ground with the audience of Afghan leaders.

“I came from a very small, small village town like many of you find right here,” he told them, according to an Army video. “My father was a farmer, he didn’t have a lot of land. We weren’t a very wealthy family and we relied on the government to help us contribute to society. We relied on the government to help protect us and provide the right environment to raise a family.”

Gen. Randy George is shown in his 1988 West Point yearbook. (Courtesy of West Point).

While serving as a brigade commander in Afghanistan, George outfitted his entire brigade with lighter equipment, Brown said, including armor, knee pads and sleeping bags, to cope with challenging mountainous terrain.

“We were famously the first unit to go in in like non-standard boots,” Brown said.

George bought high-quality hiking boots — two pairs for every soldier in the unit — even though the shoes weren’t Army-approved, Brown said.

“It’s breaking the norms that the Army has that are so ingrained about uniformity and what’s issued,” he added.

When George was serving as I Corps commander at Joint Base Lewis McChord in Washington state during the COVID-19 pandemic, he walked the base with his wife Patty, a fellow West Point graduate, stopping people along the way to see if he could help them, Shane Pospisil, who was I Corps’ command sergeant major at the time, told Defense News.

Those conversations almost always led to action, Pospisil said; if George couldn’t solve the problem, he’d contact the person to explain why.

During this stint, George secured funding to fix the runway at the base and identified private money to open the first Defense Department Children’s Museum there, Pospisil said.

George prefers face-to-face interactions over video teleconferences or phone calls, the sergeant major noted. He often chose to walk around the base with Pospisil and other staff to discuss work rather than hash things out in the office.

His focus on respectful connection also extended to those whom he met for less-favorable reasons, according to retired Maj. Gen. Pat Donahoe. The two-star general’s retirement was delayed in 2022 due to an inspector general investigation into his social media conduct, which threatened to see his retirement pension docked.

George was the Army’s messenger about his fate, Donahoe recounted in an exclusive January interview. But rather than focusing on Donahoe’s social media policy violations, or the media controversy they caused, the once-admonished vice chief wanted to hear how the Army could improve its administrative investigation processes and modernize its approach to social media.

“He took notes through the whole 45 minutes; he was inquisitive; he wanted to understand my perspective,” Donahoe recalled, noting the “cordial and professional” interaction was their first.

Soldiers assigned to the 15th Brigade Support Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division meet with U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George on Nov. 4, 2022, at Fort Irwin, California. (Staff Sgt. Matthew Lumagui/U.S. Army)

Challenges ahead

Just as he did in closing Keating and other remote outposts in Afghanistan, George will face a series of strategic decisions if confirmed as Army chief of staff.

George would take command of an Army that has struggled in recent years to meet recruiting goals. As a result, it has reduced its end-strength numbers and its objectives even as Army officials want to see the force grow.

The Army’s planned end strength in fiscal 2024 is 452,000 active duty troops. In FY23, the Army planned for a force of 473,000. The service expected in its FY23 budget to increase its end strength back to 485,000 active duty soldiers within five years, but is now projecting 464,000 active duty troops in FY28.

War is raging on in Ukraine, and the Army continues to send weapons and equipment in large numbers as it works to rapidly replenish stock. The Army is expected to soon decide how much it will need to replenish munitions expended in the war in Ukraine to ensure the right balance of stock to support allies and partners while preparing for potential large-scale wars in the future.

And the Army is pushing hard to modernize, investing billions in over 35 new programs meant to help the service be able to fight near-peer adversaries across all domains. This modernization initiative follows years of failure to develop and procure new weapon systems and could face headwinds due to projected flat budgets and higher inflation.

His past suggests George will prioritize soldiers and their families, according to many of his former colleagues.

Recruiting and budget issues will likely be George’s biggest challenges and he’s already tackling these issues as vice chief of staff, Spoehr, the Heritage analyst, told Defense News.

George has shown he’s willing to make hard decisions, said Tony DeMartino, a retired Army colonel, who served with George multiple times throughout his career, including in Afghanistan. “The Army needs that, the Army doesn’t need to muddle along.”

It is not the first time Wormuth and George have worked together, which will be beneficial, Brown said. George collaborated on the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review Wormuth led as under secretary of defense for strategy, plans and forces. At the time, George was deputy director for regional operations and force management in the J-3.

If confirmed, George and Wormuth together will likely have to make tough decisions when it comes to how it meets ambitious modernization goals using newer tools like Army Futures Command to usher in not just new tech, but redesigned formations that make sense for evolving warfare against near-peer enemies.

Brown said he hopes George will “break the model [and] be innovative,” rather than accepting the “way we’ve always done it.”

About Jen Judson and Davis Winkie

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army. He focuses on investigations, personnel concerns and military justice. Davis, also a Guard veteran, was a finalist in the 2023 Livingston Awards for his work with The Texas Tribune investigating the National Guard's border missions. He studied history at Vanderbilt and UNC-Chapel Hill.

armytimes.com · by Jen Judson · July 12, 2023

23. Chinese hackers breach U.S. government email through Microsoft cloud

Chinese hackers breach U.S. government email through Microsoft cloud

The U.S. discovered the security problem, which affected unclassified systems, last month

By Ellen Nakashima, Joseph Menn and Shane Harris

Updated July 12, 2023 at 1:11 a.m. EDT|Published July 12, 2023 at 12:12 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · July 12, 2023

Chinese cyberspies exploited a fundamental gap in Microsoft’s cloud, enabling them to conduct a targeted hack of unclassified U.S. email accounts — a troubling vulnerability officials said was discovered by the U.S. government.

The security problem was discovered last month after the U.S. government identified a hole in Microsoft’s cloud security, which affected unclassified systems, according to the White House.

“Officials immediately contacted Microsoft to find the source and vulnerability in their cloud service,” National Security Council spokesman Adam Hodges said in a statement to The Washington Post. “We continue to hold the procurement providers of the U.S. government to a high security threshold.”

The number of U.S. email accounts believed to be affected so far is limited, and the attack appeared targeted, though an FBI investigation is ongoing, said a person familiar with the matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity. Pentagon, intelligence community and military email accounts did not appear to be affected, the person said.

Microsoft disclosed late Tuesday that it had mitigated an attack by “a China-based threat actor” that primarily targets government agencies in Western Europe and focuses on espionage and data theft.

The Redmond, Wash.-based tech giant said it began an investigation after being notified in mid-June. The probe revealed that the hackers, whom Microsoft is calling Storm-0558, gained access to email accounts affecting about 25 organizations, including government agencies.

They did this by using forged authentication tokens to access user email using an acquired Microsoft account consumer signing key, according to a blog written by Charlie Bell, Microsoft security executive vice president.

Microsoft has completed its mitigation of the attack for all customers, Bell added in the blog. U.S. officials also say they believe the incident has been contained. “There are some hard questions they have to answer,” though, said the person familiar with the matter.

This is not the first time Microsoft, the world’s largest software provider, has been found to have significant vulnerabilities in its products and services.

In 2020, Russian hackers breached U.S. government email accounts by exploiting software made by a Texas company called SolarWinds. Those hackers then exploited weaknesses in Microsoft’s system for authenticating users, using tokens that would improperly give them the same access as an administrator.

Shortly after the SolarWinds breaches were discovered, the U.S. government found that Microsoft Exchange email servers were also subject to widespread exploitation, after Chinese hackers discovered a separate flaw.

“This [latest] attack used a stolen key that Microsoft’s design failed to properly validate,” said Jason Kikta, chief information security officer at the cybersecurity firm Automox and former head of private sector partnerships at U.S. Cyber Command. “The inability to do proper validation for authentication is a habit, not an anomaly.”

Further underscoring Microsoft’s continuing security woes, the company confirmed Tuesday that its validation procedure had been manipulated to digitally sign dozens of pieces of software. And in yet a third incident, it warned that Russian actors it blames for espionage and financial crimes were exploiting a previously unknown vulnerability in its Office program.

Microsoft suggested workarounds that could be applied and touted its Defender security software as preventing the attacks but said it did not yet have a patch for the actual flaw.

After the SolarWinds hack, Microsoft President Brad Smith testified to the Senate that its code had not been vulnerable, instead blaming customers for common configuration mistakes and poor controls, including cases “where the keys to the safe and the car were left out in the open.”

Homeland Security officials complained that basic security tools, such as the ability to review logs, were available only at more expensive tiers of service.

The U.S. government has strengthened cybersecurity rules for vendors whose software and hardware it uses. Government officials want to know whether the rules were not followed or whether they need to be adjusted.

Caroline O’Donovan contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · July 12, 2023

24. What the DoD Can Learn from Alleged Jack Teixeira Classified Document Leaks

Conclusion:

A solution will require avoiding the treatment of national security leaks as "a few bad apples" and confronting the monumental societal impacts of the digital revolution exacerbated by a pandemic event. The next generation to bear the defense burden must rise to the occasion, just as those that have come before it. These Americans deserve a leadership approach committed to balancing their unique challenges with the uncompromisable duties required of them.

What the DoD Can Learn from Alleged Jack Teixeira Classified Document Leaks

military.com · by 11 Jul 2023 Military.com | By Jon Hemler · July 11, 2023

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

The April arrest of Massachusetts Air National Guardsman Jack Teixeira produced a flurry of editorials and op-eds seeking to explain the problems and possible solutions tied up in protecting national security information.

These ranged from complaints about the issue of rampant overclassification and awarding of security clearances, leadership mistakes, missed red flags, and mental health screening. And while most of those points are true, it's eerily similar to past prescriptive discussions that yielded few solutions.

It's often easier and reassuring to blame a flawed individual, but addressing institutional and systemic failings can produce better solutions. Details about Teixeira's past suggesting social isolation are tragically familiar. That narrative lacks an understanding of recent cultural shifts and environmental factors of the social media, post-pandemic generation representative of America's young adults.

Two aspects of the Teixeira leak case distinguish themselves from previous high-profile classified leaks by Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning and Reality Winner. The first is the influence of an unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. The second: Teixeira's alleged motive.

A comprehensive study of the generational and societal changes that appear to be central to this recent leak may provide answers to how our military can better address these issues and create a more inclusive and supportive culture conscious of the challenges faced by post-pandemic recruits.

Impact of COVID-19

The timing and impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent nationwide lockdowns are a striking storyline. Teixeira reportedly joined the Massachusetts Air National Guard in September 2019, before finishing high school, and graduated in spring 2020 after virtual instruction, like most of his peers across the country. Naturally, during the pandemic lockdown, Teixeira strengthened ties with members of his online Discord chat community.

That increased emphasis on an online life was true for many kids. The National Center for Education Statistics tracked that during spring 2020, 77% of American public schools moved to online remote learning and 84% of undergraduate students attended some or all their classes online. A year later, only 52% of public school students received in-person full-time education. Correspondingly, a 2019-2021 medical study found children from four to twelve years of age increased daily screen time by an average of nearly 1.5 hours per day compared to pre-pandemic levels. The study also showed these levels remained high even after pandemic restrictions were lifted.

Americans in this age group will reach military enlistment age in 2026. In addition to anecdotal evidence from educators and parents, researchers at Harvard note that pandemic-related remote learning has had a negative effect on children's emotional, social and relational development. Young Americans already of military age who went to high school online, like Jack Teixeira, themselves reported lower levels of social, emotional and academic well-being, especially those in their late teen years (10th through 12th grade). according to a 2021 study by University of Pennsylvania psychologist Angela Duckworth.

Reports indicate Teixeira exhibited loner and outlier behavior during his school career that differentiated him from other students. But we cannot fully dismiss that he was part of the American teen population that underwent massive upheaval during a critical stage of academic, social and emotional development. The research does not justify or excuse Teixeira's alleged actions, but the service branches and intelligence community cannot ignore the impacts of COVID-19. To do so is to commit a disservice to the futures of current and upcoming members of our military ranks.

Motive

Teixeira's apparent motivation to allegedly post sensitive information appears different from those of Snowden, Manning and Winner. These individuals all saw themselves as whistleblowers performing a duty to the American people by exposing secrets they felt the public needed to know. Reports from members of his Discord group say Teixeira wanted to impress and show off his access to confidential information. Kori Schake has written that his motive signals affirmation craving resulting from "emotional insecurity."

The whistleblower narrative suggests people like Snowden, Manning and Winner believed, albeit wrongfully, they were serving a greater good. Teixeira's alleged self-serving motive bucks this pattern. Instead, he appeared to be motivated by self-aggrandizement and self-importance and perhaps felt greater belonging and acceptance by friends and fellow gamers online than in his in-person interactions.

The motive shift from the whistleblower identity of the past illustrates an intricate problem in which military members could show greater allegiance to and shared identity with civilian friend groups than their unit or country. Though this is no new threat to the military's task of creating common ground, the present environment is unlike the past.

Societal and community norms have dramatically altered because of the internet and social media age. Critics point to the years surrounding 2012 as a tipping point for young adults and teens. This time corresponds to Facebook's acquisition of Instagram and the start of an era where an app-embedded smartphone was in every high schooler's pocket. Since then, studies have consistently shown the mental and emotional effects of these platforms on the well-being of developing minds. Accelerated by pandemic isolation, teens' in-person friendships and communities moved online.

A Complex Problem

Recent op-eds about the alleged Teixeira leak by retired Brig. Gen. Jack Hammond and E.M. Liddick highlight the role of mental and emotional health in national security and show the risks on both sides. Hammond notes the U.S. Surgeon General's warning about the American epidemic of loneliness and a study of mental illness prevalent among 18- to 25-year-olds and argues that those exhibiting signs of "loneliness, poor self-esteem, and grandiose narcissism" should not be approved for security clearances. Countering, Liddick argues the difficulty of defining loneliness criteria, points out generational changes in reporting statistics, and notes the risk of re-stigmatizing service members struggling with these issues.

While individuals who exhibit mentally unstable behavior should not handle sensitive information, red-flagging loneliness and low self-esteem as disqualifiers may not only stigmatize some military members but, perhaps more concerningly, disqualify a mass proportion of eligible recruits merely because they grew up in and survived a once-in-lifetime pandemic environment. The current and upcoming generation of Americans that will and must fill our military ranks as a national security necessity faced a coming-of-age development unlike any other living age group. We cannot assume all young Americans exposed to such conditions are high-risk or unqualified.

The post-pandemic environment is different. Amidst current recruiting challenges, academic fallout reaching all levels of education, and online realities that were not present a decade ago, the Defense Department must recognize reality and adjust to what comes with it. The solution is not obvious and won't be reached easily, but the military intelligence community cannot afford to miss the lessons the Teixeira case presents.

A solution will require avoiding the treatment of national security leaks as "a few bad apples" and confronting the monumental societal impacts of the digital revolution exacerbated by a pandemic event. The next generation to bear the defense burden must rise to the occasion, just as those that have come before it. These Americans deserve a leadership approach committed to balancing their unique challenges with the uncompromisable duties required of them.

-- Jon Hemler is a military and defense markets analyst with GovExec's Forecast International. He is a former naval officer, helicopter pilot, educator and civil servant, holding degrees from the U.S. Naval Academy and the Krieger School of Arts and Sciences at Johns Hopkins University. The views expressed here are strictly his own and do not represent those of Forecast International or the federal government.

military.com · by 11 Jul 2023 Military.com | By Jon Hemler · July 11, 2023

25. House GOP channels America’s culture wars in Pentagon budget battle

I think all of us should reflect on the advice to choose our battles wisely.

House GOP channels America’s culture wars in Pentagon budget battle

This year’s Pentagon policy bill faces a potentially messy partisan battle over troops’ abortion access, LGBTQ rights and the military’s efforts to promote diversity

By Abigail Hauslohner, Marianna Sotomayor and Dan Lamothe

Updated July 11, 2023 at 7:01 p.m. EDT|Published July 11, 2023 at 4:14 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Abigail Hauslohner · July 11, 2023

The Republican-led House is expected to vote this week on an $886 billion bill that aims to shape Pentagon policy next year, but its path to passage faces a potentially messy partisan battle over abortion access, LGBTQ rights, efforts to promote diversity in the military and other politically charged social issues.

The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act includes increased investment in precision missiles, warships and newer technologies like artificial intelligence and hypersonics — core bipartisan priorities as the Pentagon directs greater attention toward China. It also authorizes a 5.2 percent base pay increase for military personnel and expanded support for their families through housing improvements, and broader access to child care, health care and education benefits.

“The threat posed by China is real, and it represents the most pressing national security challenge we’ve faced in decades,” House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike D. Rogers (R-Ala.) told colleagues in remarks Tuesday. The defense bill, he added, was designed “with that underlying goal: to deter China.”

But it is the country’s intensifying culture-war battles, not any specific approach to U.S. national security, likely to attract the most vociferous debate as lawmakers consider amendments to the bill in the coming days. While it is widely considered one of the few must-pass pieces of legislation Congress takes up each year, some members and their staffers have warned that inserting contentious issues like abortion into the bill could derail the process entirely, complicating U.S. defense strategy and funding for the coming year.

House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) on Tuesday seemed to concede that the rancor surrounding some amendments could lead to delays. “We’re going to get it passed,” he said, adding, “It doesn’t have to be on a specific time.”

“It’s not how you start,” he said. “It’s how you finish.”

The Senate has yet to schedule a vote on its version of the bill. The two chambers will ultimately meet to reconcile any differences before the legislation can move to President Biden for approval. The White House has criticized aspects of the House measure, which has diverged in some key ways from the proposal that the administration sent to Congress.

The bill, approved last month by the House Armed Services Committee on a 58-1 vote, succeeds in “pushing back against the radical woke ideology being forced on our servicemen and women,” according to a summary of the legislation released last month by committee Republicans.

The House bill would ban drag shows and the teaching of critical race theory in the military while rolling back initiatives, passed by the Democratic-controlled House in previous years, meant to foster diversity and inclusion within the Defense Department. That includes eliminating the department’s chief diversity officer position and a department working group designed to counter extremism in the ranks.

Also built into the House bill is a plan to offer reinstatement to service members who defied the military’s coronavirus vaccine requirement, since repealed, and were discharged for their refusal to do as they were told. That component of the legislation “sets a dangerous precedent that not following lawful orders is an option for service members,” the Biden administration warned.

On Tuesday, the House Rules Committee began evaluating the more than 1,540 amendments that House lawmakers have sought to insert into the defense policy bill. Among the record number of proposals are scores that have little to do with defense, including efforts to change laws governing concealed firearms, environmental standards, drug penalties and immigration policy. One seeks to declare the month of July “American Pride Month” — to bolster patriotism.

Not all amendments will be debated on the House floor, but some moderate Republicans worry that the influence of three far-right lawmakers who sit on the committee — Reps. Chip Roy (R-Tex.), Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) and Ralph Norman (R-S.C.) — could prioritize the most polarizing proposals for consideration.

One amendment with more than 60 Republican co-sponsors would prohibit the Pentagon “from paying for or reimbursing expenses relating to abortion services,” the measure says. Conservatives have zeroed in on the policy, adopted in the wake of last year’s Supreme Court decision repealing the constitutional right to an abortion, that protects service members who must travel out of state to obtain the procedure.

A group of swing-district Republicans has vowed to defeat certain abortion-related amendments if they reach the House floor, said a person familiar with the matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity to disclose internal discussions. Many House Democrats have said they would not vote to pass the defense bill if it includes an amendment that repeals the policy.

In an interview, the armed services committee’s top Democrat, Rep. Adam Smith (Wash.), charged that “a few Republicans hijacked the bill to push their social agenda and their extreme MAGA agenda” — referring to “Make America Great Again,” a rallying cry among conservatives loyal to former president Donald Trump. Democrats have sought to portray “MAGA Republicans” as espousing the party’s most polarizing and dangerous views, including those concerning abortion, equality and LGBTQ rights.

“We’ve taken some steps over the four years that we were in the majority to get the Pentagon to make sure that they did a better job of recruiting and making sure that people in historically marginalized communities — primarily LGBTQ women and people of color … know that they’re welcome within the military, because historically they have not been,” Smith said, referring to Republican proposals to repeal those measures.

The country’s armed forces are facing a major recruiting challenge, Smith noted, and eliminating diversity and inclusion initiatives hinders the military’s ability to recruit talented individuals from marginalized groups.

Lawmakers also are divided — though not always along party lines — over the administration’s approach to China and Ukraine. More than 60 amendments concern U.S. policy toward China, Chinese people or Chinese entities, including some that Democrats say appear to be racist.

Republicans also submitted nearly 20 separate amendments to cut back on or eliminate U.S. security assistance to Ukraine and NATO — proposals that are also likely to stoke heated debate on the House floor.

Leading Republicans in the Armed Services Committee on Tuesday urged their Rules Committee colleagues to stick to relevant amendments, with Rogers imploring them to focus on those “that advance the security of our nation and the needs of our service members.”

In the Senate, the partisan rift over abortion access has had enormous implications for the military’s promotion process. For the past seven months, Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) has blocked military confirmations and promotions in the Senate Armed Services Committee in a bid to pressure the Pentagon to abandon its policy.

As a consequence, the Marine Corps this week witnessed the departure of its top general without a Senate-confirmed successor.

Vigorous floor debate is important, Rep. Rob Wittman (R-Va.) said in an interview Tuesday. But ultimately, “all of us need to look at getting behind a bill that ensures that our men and women of the military will have the tools they need to be the most lethal and effective fighting force in the world.”

Committee members in both parties have sought to emphasize the legislation’s bipartisan wins, including its robust funding to bolster the defense industrial base — a deepening concern as the Pentagon has raided its stocks of artillery munitions to aid Ukraine — and modernize the military by retiring outdated aircraft, ships and weapons systems while investing in the development of advanced satellites, drones and munitions.

Leigh Ann Caldwell contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Abigail Hauslohner · July 11, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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