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"He who is not content with what he has, would not be content with what he would like to have."

- Socrates

"Hate is too great a burden to bear. It injures the hater more than it injures the hated."

- Coretta Scott King

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- Bian Herbert

1. Imitation Is the Sincerest Form: North Korea Unveils Two Types of Copycat UAVs

2. SOF Pic of the Day: 1st Special Forces Group Conducting Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Training in Korea

3. The Demise of Diplomatic Ambiguity: Parsing South Korea’s Estrangement From China

4. N. Korean leader inspects major weapons factories: state media

5. U.S. contingent at jamboree in S. Korea departs for American military base in Pyeongtaek

6. Gov't scrambles to keep World Scout Jamboree going

7. What North Korea's counterpunches can't hide

8. Time to seek peace through diplomacy and dialogue

9. Five Korean War 'Firsts' Had Lasting Impacts

10. ‘A Tour Guide’ Examines The Fate Of One North Korean Defector

1. Imitation Is the Sincerest Form: North Korea Unveils Two Types of Copycat UAVs

Excerpts:

A political statement. North Korea clearly is trying to show its technological prowess to both domestic and international audiences by unveiling UAVs that look like top-flight US systems, a point it presumably tried to drive home by publically designating the Global Hawk-like UAV as Saetbyol-4 (to match the US RQ-4) and the Reaper like UAV as Saetbyol-9 (to match the US RQ-9). Demonstrating the fulfillment of another of the weapons development objectives of Kim Jong Un’s January 2021 Eighth Party Congress report likewise is politically important, underscoring the regime’s competence and capability and bolstering its prestige.

...

Potential worthwhile addition. Even if less capable than their US counterparts, the two new types of UAV would provide North Korea with worthwhile new capabilities compared to its previous UAVs if they are produced and deployed in sufficient numbers: at least a dozen Global Hawk-like Satetbyol-4s and at least a few dozen Reaper-like Saetbyol-9s. We do not know how long it will take for the two drones to enter operational deployment (the North Korean press saying that they “are to be furnished” for the air force suggests deployment has yet to occur), their production rates, or their intended inventory sizes.

...

But more useful in peacetime than wartime. Although US UAVs had free rein to operate over Iraq and Afghanistan, the presence of US and South Korean fighter aircraft and air defenses would make both new types of new North Korean UAV extremely vulnerable over allied airspace in both peacetime and wartime. This would even be true over North Korean airspace in wartime, given the size and sophistication of allied fighter forces and supporting capabilities relative to the North’s own air defenses.

...

Possible export product. Once its domestic requirements for the new UAVs have been fulfilled, Pyongyang is highly likely to offer the new systems for export. Although foreign demand for Reaper-like drones in particular is likely to be strong, North Korea will face problems finding markets where its unproven products can compete with established UAV suppliers. Even less savory customers are often able to obtain Reaper-like drones from China or Turkey. While there are fewer current potential suppliers of Global Hawk-like drones, there are also fewer customer countries likely to see the need for them. As with other conventional weapons, Pyongyang might try to compete on price, but it is unclear if it would be able to charge much less than other non-Western suppliers with established production lines or whether the Saetbyol-4 and -9 will be seen as sufficiently capable technologically to be worth what the North would charge for them. But one interesting possibility would be export sales to Russia, especially in light of the shortcomings of Russia’s drone industry revealed in the war with Ukraine, its purchase of Iranian drones (and drone production capability) and North Korean artillery ammunition for use in that war, and Defense Minister Shoigu’s participation in the July weapons exhibition and parade.

Imitation Is the Sincerest Form: North Korea Unveils Two Types of Copycat UAVs

https://www.38north.org/2023/08/imitation-is-the-sincerest-form-north-korea-unveils-two-types-of-copycat-uavs/

BY: VANN H. VAN DIEPEN
AUGUST 4, 2023

During an arms exhibition and military parade on July 26-27, North Korea revealed it is producing two new types of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that strongly resemble the large US Global Hawk and the medium-sized US Reaper. Pyongyang’s drone development was one of the many goals set during its Eighth Party Congress in 2021. It is not surprising that Pyongyang is able to develop these kinds of drones, given its success in developing missiles and producing light aircraft. However, while these new drones may look like US UAVs, the quality of the components hidden inside the airframes, which will determine their actual performance, is still unknown. These include: reconnaissance and targeting sensors, command and data links and engines.

There is broad agreement among outside analysts that the North’s new UAVs are highly unlikely to be as capable as those of the US. Nonetheless, Pyongyang clearly is trying to show its technological prowess by unveiling look-alike UAVs. Furthermore, even if they are less capable than their US counterparts, the two new types of UAV would provide North Korea with worthwhile new capabilities if deployed in sufficient numbers. This would allow the North enhanced intelligence collection capabilities, bolstering the assessment of “normal” allied military behavior and early warning of behaviors that might deviate from that norm. But the new drones will be more useful in peacetime than wartime, as they will be extremely vulnerable to US and South Korean fighter aircraft and air defenses.

Once its domestic requirements for the new UAVs have been fulfilled, Pyongyang is highly likely to offer the new systems for export. Although foreign demand for Reaper-like drones is likely to be strong, North Korea will face problems finding markets where its unproven products can compete with established UAV suppliers. One interesting possibility, however, would be export sales to Russia, especially in light of the shortcomings of Russia’s drone industry that have been revealed in the war with Ukraine.

Information to Date

On July 27, North Korean media reported on a visit the previous day by Kim Jong Un and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to the “Weaponry Exhibition-2023” in Pyongyang. Associated photographs showed a medium-sized UAV resembling the US MQ-9 Reaper and a large UAV resembling the US RQ-4 Global Hawk. The Reaper-like UAV had air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) similar to the US Hellfire mounted under its wings and small bombs mounted under the fuselage.

North Korea held a military parade in Pyongyang on the evening of July 27 to celebrate the 70th anniversary of what the North calls Victory Day (the signing of the Korean War armistice), with Kim, Shoigu and Chinese National People’s Congress official Li Hongzhong in attendance. According to the press coverage, “the strategic reconnaissance drone and the multi-purpose attack drone which [were] newly developed and produced and [are] to be furnished for the KPA air force made circular flights.” Associated photographs showed four of the Reaper-like UAVs (presumably the “multi-purpose attack drone”) driven by on trucks while mounting the same munitions seen at the exhibition, and the Global Hawk-like UAV (“presumably the “strategic reconnaissance drone”) flying above the parade. Previous

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The DPRK's Saetbyol-9 UAV [Morning Star-9 or 샛별-9]. (Source: Rodong Sinmun)

North Korean video released in conjunction with the parade showed both types of drones in flight and the Reaper-like drone firing ASMs while airborne. State television called the Global Hawk-like UAV the “’Saetbyol-4’ strategic reconnaissance drone” (Morning Star-4 or 샛별-4) and the Reaper-like UAV the “‘Saetbyol-9’ multi-purpose attack drone” (Morning Star-9 or 샛별-9).

Although the exhibition and parade were the first revelations of the new UAVs in North Korean media, the two UAVs had been identified previously in Western commercial imagery. The Reaper-like Saetbyol-9 was seen on September 4, 2022 imagery of Panghyon airbase, with a wingspan measuring some 20 meters (compared to 20.1 m for the US Reaper), and again on June 3, 2023 imagery. The Global Hawk-like Saetbyol-4 was seen on June 12, 2023 imagery of the same airbase, with a wingspan measuring some 35 meters (compared to 35.4 meters for the RQ-4A model Global Hawk).

In his report to the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021, Kim Jong Un referred to “the need to…conduct in real earnest the most important research to develop reconnaissance drones and other means of reconnaissance capable of precisely reconnoitring up to 500 km deep into the front”—presumably referring to the Global Hawk-like Saetbyol-4. Although Kim also referred in a different part of the report to how “the designing of various electronic weapons, unmanned striking equipment, means of reconnaissance and detection and military reconnaissance satellite were completed,” it is not clear whether he was referring to a strike UAV such as the Reaper-like Saetbyol-9. For example, at the time North Korea revealed the “Haeil” nuclear-armed unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), the same phrase was cited as relating to the UUV.

Kim Jong Un, Sergei Shoigu, and the Saetbyol-4 UAV [Morning Star-4 or 샛별-4]. (Source: Rodong Sinmun)

On May 29, 2023, Ri Pyong Chol, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, noted that “the DPRK’s military reconnaissance satellite No. 1 to be launched in June and various reconnaissance means due to be newly tested are indispensable to tracking, monitoring, discriminating, controlling and coping with in advance in real time the dangerous military acts of the U.S. and its vassal forces….” It is unclear whether the “various reconnaissance means” referred to one or both of the new UAVs.

Implications

A political statement. North Korea clearly is trying to show its technological prowess to both domestic and international audiences by unveiling UAVs that look like top-flight US systems, a point it presumably tried to drive home by publically designating the Global Hawk-like UAV as Saetbyol-4 (to match the US RQ-4) and the Reaper like UAV as Saetbyol-9 (to match the US RQ-9). Demonstrating the fulfillment of another of the weapons development objectives of Kim Jong Un’s January 2021 Eighth Party Congress report likewise is politically important, underscoring the regime’s competence and capability and bolstering its prestige.

What counts is what’s inside. Given its success in developing ballistic and cruise missiles resembling foreign systems and producing light aircraft, it is not surprising that North Korea is able to produce UAVs resembling US models—particularly given the large amounts of publicly available information on the latter. But the real capability of the new North Korean UAVs is not apparent from the available information, as the determining factors are hidden inside their airframes: the types and quality of the reconnaissance and targeting sensors, command and data links and engines used. At the same time, there is broad agreement among outside analysts that whatever such components the Saetbyol-4 and -9 use, they are highly unlikely to be as capable as those in the US UAVs, given North Korea’s much lower level of electronics and aero-engine technology and the restrictions of Western export controls.[1]

Potential worthwhile addition. Even if less capable than their US counterparts, the two new types of UAV would provide North Korea with worthwhile new capabilities compared to its previous UAVs if they are produced and deployed in sufficient numbers: at least a dozen Global Hawk-like Satetbyol-4s and at least a few dozen Reaper-like Saetbyol-9s. We do not know how long it will take for the two drones to enter operational deployment (the North Korean press saying that they “are to be furnished” for the air force suggests deployment has yet to occur), their production rates, or their intended inventory sizes.

The larger Saetbyol-4 could provide a high-altitude, long-loiter-time platform for reconnaissance sensors such as synthetic aperture radars and electronic intelligence receivers to see several hundred kilometers offshore and into South Korea from North Korean airspace, where the UAV could be commanded from the ground and relay the information it collects directly to ground stations within line of sight.
The Saetbyol-9 could provide real-time tactical intelligence along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), help target other weapons systems such as artillery and short-range ballistic missiles and engage in limited strikes against discrete targets like buildings or vehicles within 10 km or so of the UAV using Hellfire-like ASMs.

To provide these capabilities beyond line-of-sight of North Korea, the UAVs ideally would use satellite communications (satcom). Although both new types incorporate the bulbous noses their US counterparts use to house satcom antennas, we do not know if they actually carry such antennas. Moreover, North Korea has no communications satellites of its own, although it may be able to lease bandwidth on Chinese or Russian satellites. Another possibility to extend the operating distance of the new UAVs would be to operate a chain of manned aircraft or other UAVs at intervals to act as communications relays, although this would add operational complexity and wartime vulnerability.

Given the recent rhetorical emphasis by both North and South Korea on being able to engage in preemptive strikes against each other, Pyongyang could find the prospect of regular, ongoing UAV intelligence collection in peacetime up to several hundred kilometers beyond the DMZ especially useful. This would allow the North to bolster its picture of what allied activity is “normal” and to obtain early indications of departures from “normal” that it might regard as preparations for an allied attack or an activity it might decide to “preempt.” Likewise, such information also could add to the picture North Korea might use to support first strikes of its own against the South.

But more useful in peacetime than wartime. Although US UAVs had free rein to operate over Iraq and Afghanistan, the presence of US and South Korean fighter aircraft and air defenses would make both new types of new North Korean UAV extremely vulnerable over allied airspace in both peacetime and wartime. This would even be true over North Korean airspace in wartime, given the size and sophistication of allied fighter forces and supporting capabilities relative to the North’s own air defenses.

Unlike the large numbers (hundreds to thousands) of small, low-altitude drones challenging air defenses in Ukraine, the Global Hawk-like Saetbyol-4 is the size of a Boeing 737 and must operate at high altitudes to collect strategic intelligence. Even the medium-size Saetbyol-9 would be quite visible on radar, needs to operate at altitudes susceptible to air defenses in order to obtain adequate visibility of its own targets, has poor evasive capability and will likely be deployed in relatively limited numbers.

Possible export product. Once its domestic requirements for the new UAVs have been fulfilled, Pyongyang is highly likely to offer the new systems for export. Although foreign demand for Reaper-like drones in particular is likely to be strong, North Korea will face problems finding markets where its unproven products can compete with established UAV suppliers. Even less savory customers are often able to obtain Reaper-like drones from China or Turkey. While there are fewer current potential suppliers of Global Hawk-like drones, there are also fewer customer countries likely to see the need for them. As with other conventional weapons, Pyongyang might try to compete on price, but it is unclear if it would be able to charge much less than other non-Western suppliers with established production lines or whether the Saetbyol-4 and -9 will be seen as sufficiently capable technologically to be worth what the North would charge for them. But one interesting possibility would be export sales to Russia, especially in light of the shortcomings of Russia’s drone industry revealed in the war with Ukraine, its purchase of Iranian drones (and drone production capability) and North Korean artillery ammunition for use in that war, and Defense Minister Shoigu’s participation in the July weapons exhibition and parade.

[1]
For example, see Thomas Newdick and Tyler Rogoway, “North Korea Unveils Look-Alike Global Hawk, Reaper Drones,” The Drive, July 27, 2023, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/interpreting-north-koreas-look-alike-global-hawk-reaper-drones.

2. SOF Pic of the Day: 1st Special Forces Group Conducting Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Training in Korea

Video at the link: https://sofrep.com/news/sof-pic-of-the-day-1st-special-forces-group-conducting-counter-weapons-of-mass-destruction-training-in-korea/?utm

I do not think this Captain has enough experience to recall the history of ROK Special Forces. Years ago ROK SF had more detailed area studies about operational areas in the north than we did. They knew US UW doctrine better than we did (because they read all our doctrine). It was Americans over the years that forced the shift from UW to direct action and special reconnaissance. Everyone wanted to go do "commando sh*t" rather than UW.

A captain from 1st SFG said he thought the Koreans were doing a good job despite their recent shift in mission focus.

“They’ve come a long way,” he said. “Traditionally, they have not been utilized in an unconventional warfare type manner. The big challenge coming in here was to adjust their mindset to think in unconventional terms in an unconventional battlefield.”

A major from the ROK (Republic of Korea) army had this to say about their American counterparts:

“We have learned a lot from the American Special Forces by using some of their equipment and from their ability to plan an operation based off experiences they gained in real-war situations.”

SOF Pic of the Day: 1st Special Forces Group Conducting Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Training in Korea

sofrep.com · by SOFREP · August 4, 2023

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The Demise of Diplomatic Ambiguity: Parsing South Korea’s Estrangement From China

Publication: China Brief Volume: 23 Issue: 14

By: Matthew Fulco

August 4, 2023 12:58 PM Age: 2 days

jamestown.org · by Matthew Fulco · August 4, 2023

Introduction

In July, the US Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) visited South Korea for the first time since 1981. Not one, but two of the 560-foot-long warships—which carried a payload of 24 long-range Trident ballistic missiles—surfaced in South Korean waters (Korea JoongAn Daily, July 24, 2023). From Washington and Seoul’s perspective, the SSBN deployment was a pointed reminder to the mercurial North Korean regime to exercise restraint, but the symbolism of the SSBN visit was not lost on China—Pyongyang’s closest ally. For all its military modernization efforts, Beijing has no effective defense against the Ohio-class sub.

That South Korea would support the deployment of the SSBNs to its territory illustrates both its concern about rising North Korean brinkmanship and newfound willingness to risk Beijing’s ire. Indeed, after three decades of stable ties anchored in economic interdependence, major changes are afoot in the South Korea-China relationship. Compared to Japan, which also counts China as its largest trading partner, South Korea has historically been less willing to stand its ground in the face of political pressure from Beijing. On the one hand, Seoul and Beijing have no major territorial disputes, but more importantly, South Korea had previously calculated that its political deference—especially on China’s “core interests” like Taiwan—would encourage Beijing to support denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) top foreign policy objective.

For many years, South Korea handled Beijing with kid gloves, irrespective of who was in the Blue House. While the left-leaning Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) is traditionally more China-friendly, it was the conservative President Park Geun-hye who attended China’s jingoistic September 2015 military parade. After a summit between Xi Jinping and Park, both leaders made a commitment to oppose any unilateral actions that could lead to tension on the Korean Peninsula. The following day, President Park joined Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in China’s military parade. South Korea was the only US ally to attend the event (The Korea Herald, September 3, 2015).

Since then, however, the two countries have drifted apart. The catalyst for this change was Seoul’s decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system in 2017, which China views as a security threat and South Korea deems essential for self-defense. China has repeatedly demanded that South Korea dismantle its THAAD system (Xinhua, September 21, 2017). When those demands failed to bear fruit, it resorted to sanctions against South Korea (The Korea Herald, March 8, 2017). Furthermore, both China’s imposition of a draconian national security law in Hong Kong and its mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic have hurt its reputation in South Korea (The South China Morning Post, October 20, 2020). It is against this backdrop that the ROK’s anti-China sentiment has surged to an all-time high—a development that will inevitably spill over into Seoul’s foreign policy. According to a 2021 survey conducted by SisaIN, for the first time since the ROK and the PRC normalized relations in 1992, South Koreans view China even more negatively than they do Japan (SisaIN, November 29, 2021).

China’s ruling Communist Party seems oblivious to the existential threat that South Korea feels in the face of surging missile tests by North Korea. The JoongAng Daily noted in June that it takes just two minutes for a North Korean missile to hit Seoul. According to the editorial, “South Korea is technically still at war with North Korea. The government and people must not forget that” (Yonhap News Agency, June 1, 2023).

Concluding that political appeasement and economic engagement with China have failed to pay off, South Korea is taking two significant steps: strengthening its ties with its top security partner, the US, and mending fences with its former rival, Japan. The implications of Seoul’s estrangement from Beijing could have far-reaching implications for geopolitics in the broader Indo Pacific region.

An Accelerating Unwinding

Although fundamentals in the South Korea-China relationship have been shaky for several years, it is only in the past few months that tensions between the two nations have reached an impasse. It began in April when South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol told Reuters in an interview that “the Taiwan issue is not simply an issue between China and Taiwan, but, like the issue of North Korea, it is a global issue.” Yoon’s comments came in the context of discussion about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well as the heightened risk of a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula. In March, North Korea said it simulated a tactical nuclear missile attack on South Korea with a ballistic missile launch. Analysts say that the decision to test an air burst of a tactical nuclear weapon—which maximizes the warhead’s destructive power—represents a threat to attack major South Korean cities (The Korea Herald, March 20, 2023). Against this backdrop of escalating tensions, Yoon warned that a conflict in the Korean Peninsula would not just involve the two Koreas, rather it would culminate in “the entire Northeast Asia [turning] to ashes” (Reuters, April 19, 2023).

Chinese media and scholars reacted angrily to Yoon’s comments. In general, rather than acknowledge the basis for Seoul’s security concerns, CCP discourse accused the ROK of deliberately partnering with the US to “encircle” China (Global Times, September 8, 2022). As Sohu opined, “Yoon Suk-yeol’s remarks show that South Korea is increasingly taking the wrongful path of echoing the United States and dragging itself, step by step, into a dangerous situation” (Sohu, April 20, 2023). Sina accused Yoon of trying to bind Seoul’s foreign policy to the US even if it offends China, stating that “the lower Yoon kneels, the faster retribution will come” (Sina April 21, 2023). Yang Danzhi, a researcher at Renmin University’s National Security Research Institute, wrote that by “using the Taiwan issue to speak out against China,” the Yoon Suk-yeol administration is “following the United States strategically.” Along with Seoul’s rapprochement with Japan, “this undoubtedly shows that [South Korea] intends to join the dangerous trend of encircling China” (China.com.cn, April 26, 2023).

In a bid to pressure the Yoon administration, Beijing has tried to woo the South Korean opposition, whose conciliatory stance towards China generally fails to capture the views of median voters. According to the Pew Research Center’s June 2022 survey, 80 percent of South Koreans have an unfavorable view of China, among the highest that figure has ever been (Pew Research Center, June 29, 2022). During a meeting with DPJ leader Lee Jae-myung in early June, Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming urged Seoul to reject “outside interference” in its relations with China, adding that “those who bet that China will lose out [to the US] will certainly regret it later” (The South China Morning Post, June 9, 2023).

Xing’s provocative remarks resulted in him being summoned by the South Korean Foreign Ministry, which warned the ambassador that his “unreasonable and provocative remarks” could be seen as interfering in South Korea’s domestic politics. “There are diplomatic norms, and the role of an ambassador is to enhance friendship, not to spread misunderstandings,” Foreign Minister Park Jin told reporters after speaking at a forum in Seoul (Yonhap News Agency, June 9, 2023).

Anonymously citing a “key” government official, local media reported soon thereafter that South Korea was pivoting to a “hardline stance” in its relations with China following acrimonious meetings between officials from the two countries. The official said that South Korea plans to reduce its reliance on Chinese supply chains—especially battery materials—and in general de-risk from the Chinese economy (The South China Morning Post, June 13, 2013).

Fraying Economic Ties

In recent years, China has leveraged South Korea’s economic dependency to pressure Seoul into making political concessions. As a response to the installation of the THAAD missile defense system, in 2017 Beijing imposed sanctions that cost South Korea’s tourism industry an estimated $15.6 billion and devastated the Chinese branch of Korean conglomerate Lotte (The Asan Forum, May-June 2023). The company eventually withdrew from the Chinese market altogether in 2022 (The Korea Times, May 24, 2022).

China’s weaponization of economics initially appeared to achieve Beijing’s desired outcome. Shortly after taking office, then President Moon Jae-in sought to assuage China’s security concerns and get Beijing’s help with North Korea. He thus proposed the “Three Nos” policy: no additional THAAD deployment, no participation in the US’s missile defense network, and no establishment of a trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan (Hankyoreh, November 2, 2017).

Yet Moon’s hopes for Beijing to facilitate reconciliation between the two Koreas were never fulfilled. Against the backdrop of fraying relations with Washington, Beijing remained reluctant to revise its North Korea policy as it saw no strategic benefit in supporting Seoul and Washington’s denuclearization agenda. As Xi Jinping stated in a 2023 address to the National People’s Congress, “Western countries, led by the United States, have implemented all-around containment and suppression of China” (The South China Morning Post, March 7, 2023). Without its North Korean buffer, China’s vulnerability to such perceived encirclement would be much greater. At the same time, the greater the threat from Pyongyang, the more Seoul depends on US protection. It is no surprise then, that when Moon left office, relations between the two Koreas were more strained than ever.

In 2022, the effects of Northeast Asia’s shifting geopolitical winds on the South Korea-China economic relationship finally became apparent. South Korea exported more to the US last year than China for the first time since 2004. Buoyed by strong demand for Korean cars from American consumers, Korea’s exports to the US jumped 22 percent to $139.3 billion, while its exports to China fell about 10 percent to $123.2 billion due to weak semiconductor demand. Moreover, given China’s insistence on subsidizing domestic industry as part of its “Made in China 2025” industrial plan, its imports of Korean machinery and precision tools have fallen sharply in recent years (The Korea Economic Daily, June 22, 2023). “Many Chinese businesses are manufacturing intermediate goods, which we mainly export,” Bank of Korea Governor Rhee Chang-yong told lawmakers in May. “The decade-long support from the Chinese economic boom has disappeared” (The Korea Economic Daily, May 22, 2023).

Rapprochement With Japan

Ironically, as South Korea’s relations with China fray, its ties with Japan are improving dramatically. Although President Yoon vowed to boost ties with Tokyo on the campaign trail, it is easier said than done given the resistance of the Japan-skeptical DPJ. South Korea’s opposition has tried to sabotage Yoon’s efforts. After Yoon’s breakthrough summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kushida in March, DPJ leader Lee Jae-myung said it was “the most humiliating moment” in his country’s diplomatic history (Yonhap News Agency, March, 17, 2023).

Nonetheless, the rising North Korean threat—a common security concern for Tokyo and Seoul—has made the ROK-Japan rapprochement possible despite reservations from the South Korean public (The Japan Times, March 11, 2023). Japan said in late May that it would destroy any North Korean projectile that fell in its territory after Pyongyang warned of a satellite launch (The Asahi Shimbun, May 29, 2023). At the Shangri-Li Dialogue in June, the Japanese and South Korean defense ministers highlighted the importance of bolstering bilateral ties as a way of countering North Korea in their respective plenary speeches. On the event’s sidelines, the Japanese and Korean defense ministers, along with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, agreed to sync their respective missile warning data sharing systems to better track North Korean missiles (KBS World, June 3, 2023).

The trilateral security cooperation particularly rankles China. Prior to Yoon’s March visit to Japan, the Communist Party tabloid Global Times said that the purpose of the visit was “simply to discuss how to form an ironclad trilateral security alliance with the United States to better manipulate the situation on the Korean Peninsula and suppress China” (163.com, March 10, 2023). Yao Zeyu, a scholar at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) affiliated with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, says that the moves of the US, South Korea and Japan “are not conducive to promoting the peace process on the Korean Peninsula and will instead reduce opportunities for all parties to cooperate and coordinate on the North Korean nuclear issue.” When addressing the Taiwan issue, she was even less charitable, stating “What deserves even more vigilance is that the US, together with Japan and South Korea, have openly meddled in the Taiwan issue, challenged China’s red line, and raised tension in the Taiwan Strait” (CIIS, May 16, 2023).

Conclusion

At present, there are signs that both South Korea and China want to prevent bilateral relations from deteriorating further. In late June, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin said that Seoul would continue to “strengthen strategic communication to promote friendship between South Korea and China” despite the tense state of bilateral ties. Park added that he supported the view that Beijing can play a positive role in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue (Yonhap News, June 25, 2023). For its part, Beijing has responded cautiously. In an editorial, the Global Times said, “Regardless of the reason, having the willingness to improve relations is always better than exchanging harsh words, but ultimately it depends on the actions of South Korea” (Global Times, June 27, 2023).

Economic ties, meanwhile, remain significant even if they are no longer a catalyst for deepening the bilateral relationship. According to China, at a recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Detroit, the Chinese commerce minister and South Korea’s trade minister agreed to strengthen cooperation in semiconductor supply chains. Notably, South Korea has not confirmed such an agreement (The South China Morning Post, May 27, 2023).

Yet given Seoul’s and Beijing’s diverging security concerns, their bilateral relationship will likely increasingly resemble the Sino-Japanese relationship—substantial two-way trade, but with selective de-risking and irreconcilable geopolitical differences. Like Japan did a decade ago amid tension over the East China Sea islands, South Korea will deem its national security more important than any economic benefits derived from appeasing Beijing. The key difference for South Korea is that its primary security concern is North Korea, and China is a distant second—namely in the context of the Taiwan Strait. For Japan, China is the top concern, and North Korea second. Although the focus of US-South Korea-Japan trilateral security cooperation will be North Korea, the possibility of the allies coordinating on Taiwan cannot be ruled out—and will increase if Beijing ratchets up military pressure on the self-governed island democracy.

Although South Korea might have once been seen as the “weak link” among the US’s treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific—often regarded as the country most susceptible to China’s economic coercion—a gradual paradigm shift is underway in Seoul. The ROK, US, and Japan are uniting to meet the threat from China and North Korea’s strategic alignment. As its old comrade-in-arms from the Korean War, the PRC still maintains a mutual defense treaty with North Korea to this day. Rather than acknowledge its persistent role in enabling the rogue North Korean regime—and alienating Seoul—Beijing will likely continue to interpret the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral security cooperation as “suppression and containment of China.”

jamestown.org · by Matthew Fulco · August 4, 2023

4. N. Korean leader inspects major weapons factories: state media

Kim Jong Un does not look like a tough national leader in these photos.

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230806000252325?section=nk/nk

Excerpts:

Kim's field guidance at major arms factories came as South Korea and the United States plan to hold their annual summertime Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise this month.

Seoul and Washington have called the joint drills defensive, but Pyongyang has denounced them as a rehearsal for an invasion of the North.

Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies, said he cannot rule out "the possibility that it is a kind of field guidance in response to" the planned South Korea-U.S. drills.

However, Yang took note that the KCNA report stopped short of using harsh expressions against South Korea and the U.S.

(2nd LD) N. Korean leader inspects major weapons factories: state media | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Deok-Hyun Kim · August 6, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS comments, photo)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Aug. 6 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has conducted a three-day inspection of major arms factories, including those that produce shells of large-caliber multiple rocket launchers and engines of strategic cruise missiles, state media said Sunday.

The three-day inspection that wrapped up on Saturday came a week after Kim attended a massive military parade marking the 70th armistice anniversary of the Korean War on July 27 and showcasing North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missiles and drones.

Kim made the visit to the factories to "learn about the implementation of the core goal of the Party's policy on munitions industry" and set forth new goals to be carried out, such as modernizing weapons, according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

This photo, carried by the North's Korean Central News Agency on Aug. 6, 2023, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un giving field guidance at an arms factory. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Kim said it is "the most important and urgent matter in making war preparations to modernize small arms to be carried by the KPA frontline units and other units ... in keeping with the changed aspect of war," according to the KCNA. The KPA is an acronym for the North's Korean People's Army.

During his visit to the factory manufacturing engines of strategic cruise missiles and armed unmanned aerial vehicles, Kim called for "steadily increasing the performance and reliability of the engine" and "rapidly expanding its production capacity," the KCNA said.

This photo, captured from the website of the North's Korean Central News Agency on Aug. 6, 2023, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un giving field guidance at an arms factory. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Kim's field guidance at major arms factories came as South Korea and the United States plan to hold their annual summertime Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise this month.

Seoul and Washington have called the joint drills defensive, but Pyongyang has denounced them as a rehearsal for an invasion of the North.

Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies, said he cannot rule out "the possibility that it is a kind of field guidance in response to" the planned South Korea-U.S. drills.

However, Yang took note that the KCNA report stopped short of using harsh expressions against South Korea and the U.S.

mlee@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Deok-Hyun Kim · August 6, 2023

5. U.S. contingent at jamboree in S. Korea departs for American military base in Pyeongtaek

U.S. contingent at jamboree in S. Korea departs for American military base in Pyeongtaek | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · August 6, 2023

BUAN, South Korea, Aug. 6 (Yonhap) -- The United States contingent at the World Scout Jamboree under way in South Korea on Sunday departed for an American military base in Pyeongtaek, cutting short their stay amid an extreme heat wave.

Following criticism over insufficient preparations against record-high temperatures, the U.S. Scouts, comprising some 1,500 members, announced a plan to move its members from the site in the southwestern coastal area of Saemangeum to Camp Humphreys, an American military garrison 60 kilometers south of Seoul, and stay there until Friday.

Members of the United States contingent at the World Scout Jamboree under way in Saemangeum, North Jeolla Province, wait in line to board a bus headed to the American military base in Pyeongtaek on Aug. 6, 2023. (Yonhap)

Britain and Singapore have also announced their withdrawals from the global event.

Around 700 to 800 U.S. Scouts departed for Camp Humphreys on 17 buses earlier in the day, with the rest of the contingent planning to also head to the garrison in the afternoon.

Around 1,000 members of the British contingent also left from Saemangeum for Seoul in line with the contingent's decision to leave the site due to extreme weather. The British contingent, comprising some 4,400 members, started transporting its members to Seoul and nearby regions from Saturday.

The British members plan to stay in South Korea until Saturday, the closing day of the jamboree, in Seoul while participating in various cultural activities.

Organizers, meanwhile, announced that a K-pop concert at the site that had been scheduled to be held Sunday evening has been postponed to Friday over concerns of a potential surge in cases of heat-related illnesses.

Gender Equality Minister Kim Hyun-sook told a press briefing that organizers were considering the most suitable venue for the concert to ensure safety and that the show can be enjoyed in a safe and pleasant environment.

World Scout Jamboree to move forward despite US, UK withdrawal from campground

Youtube

https://youtu.be/fbo5rb9ijeg

British Scouts prepare to depart from the World Scout Jamboree in the Saemangeum reclamation area in the southwestern coastal county of Buan on Aug. 5, 2023, cutting short their stay due to a scorching heat wave. (Yonhap)

odissy@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · August 6, 2023

6. Gov't scrambles to keep World Scout Jamboree going

A challenge to Korea's soft power.

Gov't scrambles to keep World Scout Jamboree going

The Korea Times · by 2023-08-06 17:01 | Foreign Affairs · August 6, 2023

British Scouts leave the venue of the World Scout Jamboree in Buan, North Jeolla Province, Sunday, cutting short their stay due to extreme heat. Yonhap

Tourism programs being arranged for participants amid heat wave

By Jung Min-ho

The Korean authorities are scrambling to arrange indoor and tourism programs for the remaining participants at the World Scout Jamboree instead of scheduled outdoor activities as they vow to plow ahead with the event despite criticism of sloppy planning and calls to cut it short.

The central and provincial governments were busy coordinating efforts, Sunday, to revitalize the Jamboree, which was put in jeopardy after the British Scouts decided on Friday to leave the campsite at Saemangeum in Buan, North Jeolla Province, citing extreme temperatures. The Americans and Singaporeans decided to follow suit the next morning.

Their decisions and a request by the world scouting body to shorten the Jamboree, scheduled to run from Aug. 1 to 12, immediately thrust the fate of the event into question, prompting President Yoon Suk Yeol the next day to call for all-out efforts to salvage it. He told his top officials to come up with programs for the participants in collaboration with local governments in other regions.

British Scouts arrive at a hotel in Seoul, Sunday. Citing sweltering heat and other concerns, the British delegation decided to pull out of the World Scout Jamboree underway in Buan, North Jeolla Province. Newsis

Hundreds of additional workers as well as vehicles carrying cooling systems have been sent to help improve event management and facilities at Saemangeum, the reclaimed land that is the venue for the event, which had been expected to see more than 43,000 Scouts visiting from 158 countries.

A K-pop concert, originally planned at an outdoor venue there on Sunday, will be staged at Jeonju World Cup Stadium, about a 50-minute drive from the campsite, on Aug. 11 when the closing ceremony will be held. Kim Hyun-sook, minister of gender equality and co-chair of the event's organizing committee, said the decision was made to offer participants "a safer, more pleasant environment."

Local governments in other regions are moving quickly to offer support. Busan Metropolitan City said it was preparing to accommodate 10,000 Scouts until the closing of the Jamboree. Busan, which is bidding to host the World Expo 2030, has already welcomed the Swedish and Mexican Scouting delegations as part of its campaign promotion.

Officials at the Seoul Metropolitan Government are in discussion over whether it is possible to offer some parts of the Han River parks as a campground for Jamboree visitors. To welcome them, officials said they will expand the city's prescheduled entertainment programs such as "NoobCon," a pop concert by the river, and guided mountain-trekking at night.

About 1,000 of the Scouts plan to visit North Chungcheong Province, where they will spend as many as six days traveling around popular tourist spots including Cheongnamdae, once a private vacation villa used by former Korean presidents, and Mount Sobaek, one of the biggest and most popular national parks among mountain lovers.

The Jogye Order, the largest Buddhist sect in the country, is also offering a hand. It will open its 170 temple facilities and other cultural centers nationwide to accommodate the visitors.

Tents for U.S. participants are empty at the World Scout Jamboree in Buan, North Jeolla Province. Sunday. The American team has decided to pull out of the event citing health concerns. Yonhap

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has launched a team to improve communication with Jamboree delegates. Amid complaints about poor preparation for the heat and a request by the World Organization of the Scout Movement (WOSM) to shorten the event, the ministry invited diplomats from the participating countries to a briefing, in which it promised to improve the environment swiftly. Following this, members of several nations reportedly decided not to leave.

In a Sunday statement, the WOSM expressed its support for the organizing committee's bid to finish the Jamboree as planned.

"The WOSM noted the significant resources mobilized over the last 24 hours to improve the campsite's facilities and services to help the participants manage the impact of the severe heat wave affecting the country," the international governing organization said.

"Despite the challenges, participants on the campsite and those who have now moved to other locations in Korea have demonstrated true Scouting resilience, and we will continue working with the host to support them throughout their stay."

Participants gather around water taps and bottled water during the World Scout Jamboree in Buan, North Jeolla Province, Sunday. Yonhap

Despite the renewed efforts, however, worries remain, with new challenges emerging.

Kim Tae-yeon, leader of the 900th contingent of the Korea Scout Association's North Jeolla Province Council, told reporters the same day that his team decided to withdraw after the organizing committee failed to properly respond to a sexual harassment allegation there.

He accused a Thai man of following a female official into a shower room late Wednesday, a case now being investigated by police. He then said the alleged perpetrator was only given a warning and the woman received no protection.

Asked about the incident, Minister Kim said she was briefed that it was not a sexual offense and that's why the committee did not take a strong, prompt action against the man.

In another issue for the event, Typhoon Khanun is forecast to hit the country's southeastern region later this week, according to the weather agency.

Speaking to Prime Minister Han Duck-soo and co-chiefs of the committee, Yoon again called for safe and smooth management of the Jamboree.

The Korea Times · by 2023-08-06 17:01 | Foreign Affairs · August 6, 2023

7. What North Korea's counterpunches can't hide

A human rights upfront approach may have some slight moderating effect on the regime.

Excerpts:

While some may mock the usual outrage, bravado and fiery non-sequiturs from North Korea when its fragile honor is insulted, I see it as good news that North Korea responds to criticisms.

One, this report suggests that raising awareness about North Korea's human rights violations has an impact. According to refugee testimonials, the U.N.-COI report on North Korea and reports by governments and international organizations have caused North Korea's gangster state to be a bit less brutal. If it is true, for example, that the number of public executions has gone down because of increased scrutiny then it is possible that highlighting the testimonials of North Korean refugees on the international stage can have a positive effect on the lives of North Koreans.

...

North Korea keeps most of its population enslaved to the state but counterpunches with outrage and disgust at what Canada, the USA, South Korea or the U.K. did historically to minority populations or about current domestic disputes.

Defenders of North Korea and critics of South Korea may disagree with some of my points, and that is fine. We are living in freedom and have the right to disagree with one another. I occasionally run into people who have traveled to North Korea and they talk about how much they enjoyed meeting North Koreans there. I ask those people if they can, call, message, or even get on a Zoom call with their friends in North Korea.

They try to counterpunch by criticizing America and South Korea, but they will ultimately admit they can't contact their North Korean friends. No counterpunching reports from North Korea can conceal that basic violation of the freedom of association.

What North Korea's counterpunches can't hide

The Korea Times · August 6, 2023

By Casey Lartigue Jr.

On July 11, as I attended the public release of the English-language version of South Korea's report on the state of human rights in North Korea, I wondered when North Korea would issue a report on South Korea's human rights situation.

The answer came 10 days later when North Korea released a 98-page report about human rights in South Korea. That probably didn't surprise anyone aware of the information and propaganda battles on the Korean Peninsula.

Decades ago, after the South Korean government built a 98-meter-tall (more than 300 feet) flagpole on its side of the DMZ, North Korea responded with a 160-meter (more than 500 feet) flagpole.

During negotiations, North Korean military officials reportedly add inches to the legs of their chairs so they look taller than their South Korean counterparts. In 1969, officials representing both sides sat in silence for over 11 hours challenging the other side to speak first.

In 1998, peace talks in Geneva were delayed for five hours because North Korea's delegation insisted on sitting opposite the American delegation instead of facing the South Koreans. There have been other times that it seems they were playing diplomatic musical chairs without music.

So, of course, North Korea would respond to a South Korean report on its human rights record. South Korea's report on North Korea's human rights is as comprehensive as a report can be about a country that researchers can't visit. In addition to tracking information about North Korea, the report includes interviews with more than 500 North Korean refugees since 2017.

I have yet to see the North Korean counter, but I am willing to accept everything in it as the truth. Based on South Korean news reports, it sounds like the North Korean agents spent a lot of time reading South Korean tabloids, blogs and podcasts.

While some may mock the usual outrage, bravado and fiery non-sequiturs from North Korea when its fragile honor is insulted, I see it as good news that North Korea responds to criticisms.

One, this report suggests that raising awareness about North Korea's human rights violations has an impact. According to refugee testimonials, the U.N.-COI report on North Korea and reports by governments and international organizations have caused North Korea's gangster state to be a bit less brutal. If it is true, for example, that the number of public executions has gone down because of increased scrutiny then it is possible that highlighting the testimonials of North Korean refugees on the international stage can have a positive effect on the lives of North Koreans.

Two, regardless of what North Korea claims in its counter reports, one key difference is that dissidents in countries that North Korea counterpunches are free to set up blogs, podcasts, to do interviews with media, travel around the world, collaborate with others domestically or internationally and can get legal and financial assistance. On the other hand, what kind of rights do dissidents in North Korea have to criticize or fight against the state? North Korea's dissidents remain quiet when they are in the country and don't speak out until they are living in freedom in one of those countries North Korea has labeled a human rights abuser.

North Korea's government is the only voice coming out of North Korea, reminding those of us living in freedom how precious it is to be able to state our opinions.

Three, no matter what North Korea says when it counterpunches, how many North Koreans would move to Canada, the USA or South Korea to trade places with their counterparts in those countries in an Unsatisfied Citizen Exchange Program?

North Korea highlights abuses and clips from tabloids in other countries, but its border is patrolled by guards with shoot-to-kill orders and the regime has employed many cruel techniques to keep North Koreans from leaving.

North Korea keeps most of its population enslaved to the state but counterpunches with outrage and disgust at what Canada, the USA, South Korea or the U.K. did historically to minority populations or about current domestic disputes.

Defenders of North Korea and critics of South Korea may disagree with some of my points, and that is fine. We are living in freedom and have the right to disagree with one another. I occasionally run into people who have traveled to North Korea and they talk about how much they enjoyed meeting North Koreans there. I ask those people if they can, call, message, or even get on a Zoom call with their friends in North Korea.

They try to counterpunch by criticizing America and South Korea, but they will ultimately admit they can't contact their North Korean friends. No counterpunching reports from North Korea can conceal that basic violation of the freedom of association.

Casey Lartigue Jr. (CJL@alumni.harvard.edu) is co-founder with Lee Eun-koo of Freedom Speakers International (FSI) and co-author with Han Song-mi of the book "Greenlight to Freedom."

The Korea Times · August 6, 2023

8. Time to seek peace through diplomacy and dialogue

Another argument for an end of war declaration.

Time to seek peace through diplomacy and dialogue

The Korea Times · August 6, 2023

By Mitch Shin

It has been apparent that the competition between the U.S.-led alliance and the anti-U.S. coalition in the East Asia region, endangers the Korean Peninsula and may be a key area for the new Cold War.

Considering the monumental agreement signed in the six-party talks in 2005 ― which encompassed the phased denuclearization of North Korea under the support of the U.S., South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and North Korea ― it is a tragedy that the U.S. and South Korea cannot garner support from China and Russia on North Korea issues at the moment. As we witnessed the limitations of the U.S.-led alliance to resolve the North's illicit nuclear and missile threats due to the vetoes of China and Russia in the United Nations Security Council, North Korea will continue developing its advanced nuclear program with no effective check going forward.

During the 2018 Singapore Summit, then-U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un confirmed joint efforts to denuclearize North Korea while reaffirming the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, one of the biggest accomplishments then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in made during his first summit meeting with Kim. As both leaders then agreed to establish new U.S.-North Korea relations "in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity," Washington should take a more active stance, formalizing its cemented willingness to negotiate with Pyongyang under the agreements made in the past. This is the price Washington should make due to Trump's political decision to walk out of the Hanoi summit in 2019 ― which ultimately pushed North Korea to take a more hawkish position to lead the U.S. and South Korean concessions first while isolating itself even further.

The Ukraine War, which started on Feb. 24, 2022, by the Russian invasion, aggravated security concerns in regions where parties pursued different ideologies such as the two Koreas. Ironically, Russia's invasion of Ukraine rather demonstrated that dismantling nuclear arsenals is a choice that autocratic leaders should never adopt due to safety. Without clear and consolidated security guarantees, Kim would never give up his nuclear weapons even though he once showed his willingness to denuclearize his country during the peace process of the Moon administration in 2018.

Also, as Trump rejected Kim's offers to progressively denuclearize his country in exchange for the partial withdrawal of economic sanctions, it has become clear from Kim's perspective that the U.S. economic assistance and security guarantee to his country will follow up only after he dismantles all of his nuclear programs ― which could be a suicidal decision for Kim as his power comes from his nuclear programs within North Korea.

Technically, the two Koreas are still at war. The policymakers in the U.S. and South Korea have tried to set the timeline to formally end the Korean War. However, it has not been discussed seriously and deeply as other issues such as taking back the wartime operational control (OPCON) and the possible withdrawal of roughly 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea have been repeatedly dragged into discussions as major barriers.

Since the breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi Summit meeting between Trump and Kim, there has been no major momentum that Washington and Seoul can utilize to revive the stalled dialogue with Pyongyang. The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in Pyongyang imposing a complete shutdown for almost three years. The Ukraine War divided the world into two sides: the pro-U.S. and the anti-U.S. state actors. While there is no sensational diplomatic overture that can bring the North Korean leader back to the negotiating table, offering to sign the peace treaty to end the 1950-53 Korean War might be an approach that interests Kim. It could consequentially be a catalyst for constructing permanent peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula in the end. Also, it could be the starting point for the U.S., South Korea, China and North Korea to make the Korean Peninsula a buffer zone with no nuclear weapons.

The arms race has intensified on the Korean Peninsula since South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol took office in May 2022. The blame should, for sure, go to North Korea as it repeatedly launched ballistic missiles, a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions, and led the U.S. and South Korea to reinvigorate their joint military drills. To respond to the North's missile threats, it is understandable that the U.S. and South Korea hold joint military drills and deploy the U.S. strategic assets involving its aircraft career to the South's soil.

Considering the isolation of North Korea in the international community, and the conventional and asymmetrical military capabilities of North Korea, what should be noted is that Washington and Seoul's hawkish overture could give Pyongyang room to justify its illicit missile launches as an act of self-defense. In this context, it is critical for Washington and Seoul to make consistent efforts to resolve the security issues on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy, not military measures, as the costs would be greater if Pyongyang continues to develop new types of nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

In its military parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the 1950-53 Korean War Armistice on July 27, North Korea displayed its Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), new military drones which had crossed the South's air space in December 2022, and other missile weapons with the attendance of the Russian and Chinese delegations. The photo of Kim standing with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Li Hongzhong, a vice chairman of the standing committee of China's National People's Congress, implies the new Cold War can begin on the Korean Peninsula as Pyongyang is also gripping its ties with Beijing and Moscow.

Thus, if the U.S. and South Korea want to make a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula for peace and prosperity in the region, they should craft a concrete offer ending the 1950-53 Korean War to North Korea and China with no pointless delay. Putting political interests aside, it is time for all concerned countries to weigh in to make a peaceful Korean Peninsula through diplomatic means centered on dialogue.

Mitch Shin is a young fellow at The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy. Shin was an assistant editor and chief Koreas correspondent for The Diplomat, and a non-resident research fellow at The Institute for Security & Development Policy, Stockholm Korea Center.

The Korea Times · August 6, 2023

9. Five Korean War 'Firsts' Had Lasting Impacts

Five Korean War 'Firsts' Had Lasting Impacts

defense.gov · by David Vergun

The Korean War, which ended with an armistice on July 27, 1953, is sometimes referred to as the "forgotten war" or a "police action" because it was overshadowed by World War II several years earlier, and Congress never declared war on North Korea.

Memorial Statue

Flags from the United Nations, South Korea and the U.S. flags fly behind a statue depicting United Nations soldiers fending off a North Korean attack during the Korean War. The display is located outside the War Memorial of Korea in Seoul, South Korea.

Download: Full Size (4.76 MB)

Photo By: Army

VIRIN: 160604-O-D0439-001A

Despite being sometimes forgotten, the war had five unforgettable firsts.

Air Force Combat Tested

In 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act, creating a new military department, the Air Force, which had been part of the Army. The Korean War was the first major combat action of the new department.

Although the Air Force still relied on World War II-era, propeller-driven combat aircraft, the war debuted the first U.S. use of jet fighters in combat.

In Formation

Air Force F-80 Shooting Star fighter jets fly in formation during the Korean War in 1951.

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Photo By: Air Force

VIRIN: 510604-O-D0439-001A

The National Security Act also placed the War and Navy departments into the Defense Department, which was under leadership of the defense secretary.

The act created the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, as well.

United Nations Combat Tested

The United Nations Command was established on July 7, 1950, following the U.N.’s recognition of North Korean aggression against South Korea.

The command signified the world’s first attempt at collective security under the U.N. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 83 and 84 provided the legal authority for member states to restore peace on the Korean peninsula and designated the United States as the leader of the unified command.

Frank E. Petersen Jr.

During the Korean War, Frank E. Petersen Jr. become the first Black Marine Corps aviator. He also was a naval aviator during the Vietnam War and became the Marine Corps’ first Black general.

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Photo By: Marine Corps

VIRIN: 620604-O-D0439-003A

During the war and reconstruction period following the signing of the armistice, 22 nations contributed either combat forces or medical assistance to support South Korea under the U.N. flag.

Since the Korean War, forces under the U.N. have participated in multiple peacekeeping missions around the world.

Containment Policy

The Truman Doctrine, also known as the policy of containment, laid out a key tenet of Truman's foreign policy, which stipulated that the U.S. would provide political, military and economic aid to democratic countries under communist threat.

The Korean War was the first wartime test of this new policy, ending the de facto pre-World War II policy of isolationism.

Today, the U.S. still provides defensive security assistance to democracies under threat, most notably from China and Russia.

Integration of Armed Forces

The Korean War was the first war in which the military was desegregated. On July 26, 1948, Truman signed an executive order, desegregating the armed forces.

Foxhole Fighters

African Americans in the United States military served in integrated units for the first time during the Korean War.

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Photo By: Army

VIRIN: 520604-O-D0439-001A

Although African Americans had served in previous wars, they did so in mostly segregated units.

The executive order stated that "there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed forces without regard to race, color, religion or national origin."

Code of Conduct

The code of conduct is an ethics guide for the armed forces, addressing how to act honorably in combat.

Although the code didn’t exist during the Korean War, it was a result of that war because the communists tortured and tried to brainwash prisoners.

When the war was over, 21 Americans chose not to be repatriated, attesting to a degree of brainwashing effectiveness, according to a history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Korean War.

Movie Poster

Poster for the release of the 1962 film “The Manchurian Candidate” in theaters in the United States.

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Photo By: Courtesy of United Artists Corporation

VIRIN: 620604-O-D0439-001

The topic of brainwashing was relatively new to the American public until the 1959 novel "The Manchurian Candidate” was published. The plot involves a U.S. soldier who was taken prisoner during the Korean War and brainwashed. He was repatriated and became a communist sleeper agent who was later tasked with killing a U.S/ political figure.

The book was adapted to a 1962 film of the same title starring Frank Sinatra and Angela Lansbury.

In 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower enacted an executive order for the Code of Conduct. It states: "Every member of the armed forces of the United States are expected to measure up to the standards embodied in the Code of Conduct while in combat or in captivity." It is an ethics guide and a Defense Department directive consisting of six articles that address how service members should act in combat when they must evade capture, resist while being held prisoner, or escape from the enemy.

The Code of Conduct:

I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.
I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.
If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.
If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.
When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.
I will never forget that I am an American, fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.
Spotlight: Commemorating the Korean War Spotlight: Commemorating the Korean War: https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/korean-War/

defense.gov · by David Vergun

10. ‘A Tour Guide’ Examines The Fate Of One North Korean Defector

‘A Tour Guide’ Examines The Fate Of One North Korean Defector

Forbes · by Joan MacDonald · August 4, 2023

Lee Sul plays a North Korean defector in 'A Tour Guide.'

NYAFF

More than 30,000 North Korean defectors arrived in South Korea during the last few decades. Since 2012, only 30 have returned. For many defectors it’s difficult to adjust. For a few it might be impossible.

In the film Tour of Duty, North Korean defector Han-young works as a tour guide. Her command of Chinese, which she learned as a refugee in China, helps her get the job. It’s ironic that her job involves showing tourists the landmarks of a country that does not yet feel like home. Han-young, played by Lee Sul, becomes separated from her defector brother, whose South Korean dreams have not materialized. With few friends, she wonders if her life has really improved. Han-young is a fictional character, but she’s inspired by real-life experiences. It was curiosity about the lives of North Korean defectors that inspired filmmaker Kwak Eun-mi to create Tour of Duty.

“Since Korea is still divided, inter-Korean issues have always been of my interest,” said Kwak. “However, since I was neither a North Korean defector nor had any North Korean defector friends around me, I was cautious and couldn’t easily make it as a film. Then one day, right in front of the subway station where I was standing, I saw two young women in dresses that were out of season and they were enjoying themselves by taking selfies with their cell phones, talking in Korean with an unfamiliar accent. I assumed they were Chinese nationals or North Korean defectors, who spoke Hamgyeong-do dialect, and found them very impressive. I wanted to make a story about them thinking that North Korean defectors cannot be easily recognized in our daily life, but we live together all the time.”

Before making A Tour Guide, which screened at the New York Asian Film Festival, Kwak made Beneath the Wheel, her graduation thesis film, which won an audience award at the Women’s Human Rights Film Festival. For her short film, Short Film with A Hand-Written Poster, she won the Sonjae Award at the Busan International Film Festival and a Blue Dragon Film Award. Tour of Duty is her first feature-length film.

Kwak Eun-mi's first feature film is 'A Tour Guide.'

NYAFF

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“After filming the last episode of the local shoot, I came back to the motel inn, closed the door, stood alone, and I realized, ‘This is what a feature film is like.’ I had to do almost everything by myself because of budget issues when making short films. But the feature film was different in that I had to work with many staff and communicate about what I wanted to make until it was created as a single work. The fact that this communication determines the details of the long length films and the level of completion by injecting the power and the tension of the film was completely different from making short films. It took almost a year and a half to two years to work on the feature film, so I thought all the feature films that were born in the world were very much precious.”

Kwak wrote the first draft of the screenplay, researching the experience of North Korean defectors through news articles and YouTube.

“Later, I met a female North Korean defector in her early 30s, who has been defecting for 10 years, and another female North Korean defector in her 20s, who advised the North Korean language of my film,” said Kwak. “I was also able to talk with a North Korean defector during the audition. They all have different reactions and thoughts, depending on when they defected from North Korea, what the generation was, and individual tendencies, but the common feeling was that they wanted to live well here somehow.”

Defectors receive short term help from the South Korean government, but it may not always be adequate to address the longterm problems some defectors face.

“If you defect from North Korea, you will receive three months of education to adapt to society at a place called Hanawon,” said Kwak. “You can also choose to apply for various certificate training, such as driving practice, nursing care workers, and Chinese tourist interpreters who appear as Han-young’s job in the film. Even if you leave Hanawon, you can apply for a vocational education. But there’s not many places that support their settlement fund and housing costs, so it can be difficult for them to find a job and earn money for a living by themselves in the long term.”

In the film the Han-young has a “watcher,” someone who helps her adjust to South Korean society and mediates problems. High-ranking defectors may be managed by Korea’s National Intelligence Service, but most defectors are helped by such mediators, visiting with local police officers once a month. However, one police officer may manage from 30 to 50 North Korean defectors at the same time, said Kwak, which may not be enough to resolve serious problems.

Han-young asks her watcher to help her find her brother. With her brother gone and her only friend moving away, her loneliness is overwhelming. The film’s ending may leave viewers to wonder if she represents one of the 30 who returned in the last decade or one of the 9,970 defectors who eventually made a life in the south

“In the draft, I ended the scenario as characters re-entering to North Korea,” said Kwak. “But I thought it was irresponsible, although it might be intense as a story. The reason for making this film was cheering the defectors who want to live or leave here, and even encouraging strangers to live well anywhere. Therefore I thought it would be enough for the main character to just disappear with an anxious face without a smile as if she arrived at a new place.”

Kwak has always treasured films. They seemed like a friend while she was growing up.

“In Korea, on weekends, we can watch various and good foreign films in public broadcast with dubbed voices,” said Kwak. “It was a very important weekend routine for me. I especially liked Bette Midler's comedy and I still can’t forget the shock of watching My Life as a Dog directed by Lasse Hallström. I enjoyed watching Hollywood movies such as E.T., Terminator, Omen, and Nightmare when I was in elementary school.”

The director didn’t major in film at university, but after working as a scriptwriter and production manager, decided to study the subject at Korean Academy of Film Arts.

“For me, who started to make films as a movie enthusiast, the constant keywords for making short and long films are ‘women’ and ‘society.’ In the next feature film, I want to make it more cinematic and more enjoyable for the audience. I don't know how these two keywords will blend with any specific topic in the future, but my dream is to continue filming like this and to make a film that can be a friend from childhood to adolescence.”

The film aired at the 2023 New York Asian Film Festival.

Forbes · by Joan MacDonald · August 4, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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