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Quotes of the Day:
“Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties.”
- John Milton
"The most radical revolutionary will become a conservative the day after the revolution."
- Hannah Arendt
"If asked for a brief explanation, I would say that the existential vacuum derives from the following conditions. Unlike an animal, man is not told by drives and instincts what he must do. And in contrast to man in former times, he is no longer told by traditions and values what he should do. Now, knowing neither what he must do nor what he should do, he sometimes does not even know what he basically wishes to do. Instead, he wishes to do what other people do - which is conformism - or he does what other people wish him to do - which is totalitarianism."
- Dr. Viktor E. Frankl
1. UN Security Council to meet on rights abuses in North Korea
2. Past & Contemporary Dynamics of Gendered Defection Among North Koreans
3. North Korea punishes women for wearing shorts, declaring them ‘capitalist fashion’
4. S. Korea voices hopes for 'smooth' resolution of frozen Iranian assets
5. U.S. remains concerned about N. Korean provocations, will work with allies to ensure peace: Pentagon
6. N. Korea put on alert against Typhoon Khanun; minor damage reported
7. North to reopen borders 'soon,' tour agency says
8. Rights groups call for UN action to protect North Korean escapees in China
9. Troubled World Scout Jamboree wraps up with K-pop concert
10. Another Washington Declaration: US Nuclear Weapons on the Korean Peninsula
11. Between Myth and Reality: Examining the Practicalities of North Korean State Collapse
12. Jeju cherry trees: force for peace
1. UN Security Council to meet on rights abuses in North Korea
It has been 6 years since the last public human rights meeting at the UNSC. This is an opportunity to highlight north Korean human rights abuses and measure the impact of the UN Commission of Inquiry. Of course there will be no UNSC resolution because China and Russia will veto it. One of the major issues to be addressed will be all the Koreans from the north who are being held in Chinese detention facilities waiting to be forcibly repatriated to the north (where they await certain torture and in some cases death). China is complicit in north Korean human rights abuses.
This is surely part of the ROK and US human rights upfront approach. We need a sustained effort on north Korean human rights.
This will be an excellent opportunity for our new special representative for north Korean human rights, Ambassador Julie Turner .
We should keep in mind that Kim Jong Un denies the human rights of the Korean people in the north in order to remain in power. He fears the Korean people more than the combined militaries of the ROK and US.
Lastly we need to highlight the resources that are deliberately diverted from the people to fund the regime's nuclear and missile programs. Some $560 million was spent on missile tests in 2022 while the people needed $417 million for food.
UN Security Council to meet on rights abuses in North Korea
Reuters · by Michelle Nichols
UNITED NATIONS, Aug 10 (Reuters) - The United Nations Security Council will meet publicly to discuss human rights abuses in North Korea next week, a move requested by the United States, Albania and Japan that is likely to anger Pyongyang and face opposition from China and Russia.
It will be the first formal public meeting of the 15-member council on the issue since 2017.
North Korea has repeatedly rejected accusations of abuses and blames sanctions for a dire humanitarian situation. Since 2006 it has been under U.N. sanctions over its ballistic missiles and nuclear programs, but there are aid exemptions.
"It is long overdue," said U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield, reading a joint statement by the United States, Albania, Japan and South Korea.
"We know the government's human rights abuses and violations facilitate the advancement of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs,” she said.
The council would meet on Aug. 17 and be briefed by U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK, Elizabeth Salmón, said Thomas-Greenfield.
China and Russia object to the issue being raised in the council, which is charged with maintaining international peace and security. They say rights issues should be confined to other bodies such as the U.N. Human Rights Council or General Assembly.
China and Russia could call a procedural vote next week, but a senior U.S. official said they were confident they have the minimum nine votes needed hold the meeting. Vetoes do not apply on procedural issues.
In March, the United States accused China of attempting to hide North Korea's atrocities from the world by blocking the webcast of an informal meeting of Security Council members on accusations of human rights abuses by Pyongyang.
The council has held annual formal meetings on the issue for the past three years, but behind closed doors. Between 2014 and 2017 the council held annual public meetings on human rights abuses in North Korea.
In 2018 it did not discuss the issue amid since-failed efforts by North Korea leader Kim Jong Un and then U.S. President Donald Trump to work toward Pyongyang's denuclearization.
Then the following year the United States instead convened a meeting on the threat of escalation by North Korea amid growing tensions between Pyongyang and Washington.
A landmark 2014 U.N. report on North Korean human rights concluded that North Korean security chiefs - and possibly leader Kim himself - should face justice for overseeing a state-controlled system of Nazi-style atrocities. The United States sanctioned Kim in 2016 for human rights abuses.
Reporting by Michelle Nichols; Editing by Alex Richardson
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Michelle Nichols
2. Past & Contemporary Dynamics of Gendered Defection Among North Koreans
Excerpts:
The decision to escape from North Korea must be examined from multiple perspectives, including structural factors, economic changes, the power of women’s economic contribution, regional mobility, and the pull factor resulting from the gender imbalance in China.
During and shortly after the famine of the 1990s, gendered defection directly reflected institutionalized gender separation within North Korea. Economic devastation pushed North Korean women, mostly from North Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces, to go to China to seek economic opportunities or to achieve their personal aspirations. However, upon arriving in China, North Korean women were often lured into sex trafficking networks through fraud and deception. Moreover, the gendered defection of North Koreans must be understood with reference to the gender imbalance in China. It is in this context that many North Korean women were sold to poor rural Chinese men.
In recent years, escapes from North Korea have been more closely related to family ties and social networks. The latter includes NGOs and religious organizations. Overall, the number of escapees has drastically dropped over the past couple of years.
To rescue North Korean women in China who have fallen victim to trafficking, more NGOs and international humanitarian organizations must pay attention to these issues as serious violations of human rights. The international community must pressure China to take responsibility for and assist trafficked North Korean women. China can take tangible steps, such as providing them with a legal basis for staying in China and facilitating humanitarian protection. For North Koreans who newly escape to China, the Chinese government should create a new category of asylum seekers and allow a temporary immigration status instead forcibly repatriating them.
https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/past-contemporary-dynamics-of-gendered-defection-among-north-koreans
8/10/2023
0 Comments
By Elizabeth Jean H. Kim, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research
The demographics of North Korean escapees reveals a notable gender gap between men and women.[1] Previous studies have already addressed how gender roles have influenced individuals’ decision to escape North Korea since the great famine in the late 1990s. However, the question of “What causes North Korean women to escape in much larger numbers than men?” requires further explanation.
This article examines the gendered defection of North Koreans. Given my first-hand experiences as a North Korean refugee and hope to be a scholar of North Korean human rights issues, I am focusing on this research on how the gendered defection of North Koreans is related to structural factors and economic developments, including the rise of market activity during and after the famine of the 1990s. I also emphasize the pull factor of the gender imbalance in China, which led to the large-scale trafficking of North Korean women. Lastly, I argue that escapes from North Korea in recent years have been primarily influenced by family ties and social networks, sometimes involving escapees who have already resettled in South Korea.
Structural Factors
North Korea’s socialist system structurally segregates gender. Men are required to serve in the military for ten years, starting at the age of 17. During high school, all of my male classmates registered and took regular physical examinations under the local military mobilization department. After graduating, the majority entered military service. Only a few of my male classmates were waived from the military requirements, including those with physical disabilities, those who enrolled in college after being identified for their academic talent, and those with “unfavorable” family backgrounds due to guilt-by-association.
On the other hand, only three of my female classmates—those over 5.2 feet (158 cm) tall—were qualified to serve in the military for eight years. Although I was also qualified for military service, I enrolled in college instead. Due to chronic malnutrition and forced labor from a very young age, the average height of North Korean women is smaller than South Korean women. According to a 2016 study, the difference is 3.3cm (162.3 cm vs. 159cm).[2]
While North Korean men are tightly controlled under the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in the public sphere, North Korean women mostly remain in the domestic sphere. If girls do not qualify for military recruitment or college enrollment, they automatically became members of the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League in workplaces and institutions, including textile factories and farms. Once these women get married, they are transferred from the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League to the Women’s Union, an official organization that is used for mobilizing North Korean women. Women remain members of the Women’s Union for life.
Past Defections and the Impact of Marketization
After the collapse of the socialist system and Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, the public distribution system no longer provided enough goods or necessities for North Koreans.[3] The Kim Jong-il regime proclaimed the “Military First” ideology to reinforce national security. The regime continually recruited North Korean men into the military. Meanwhile, the KWP and the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League strictly controlled men who were disqualified from military service by making them work at industrialized facilities with almost no pay.
At the time, my father’s official monthly salary was very low. We could barely buy 2 lb of pork, despite his relatively high position in a government-assigned job. My mom did not even calculate his salary in our family finances. Instead, we considered it as “free money.” One escapee I talked to told me that he had been a dam repairman in Ryanggang Province. He received 1,400 North Korean won per month for his work. “There was nothing I could do with this money, maybe I could buy 0.2 kilograms of rice,” he recalled. This reveals a glimpse of just how low official salaries were at the time. They were not enough for male North Korean workers to provide for their family’s basic needs. Instead, women sustained their families through economic activity at local markets, smuggling, developing private farms, and cultivating herbs.
This economic activity had a direct influence on migration patterns. Female escapees who lived near the Chinese border (North Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces) were more likely to escape due to the emergence of new economic activity. North Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces are the focal points of illegal trade with China. According to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, almost 80% of the 24,389 female North Korean escapees who have resettled in South Korea are from these two provinces.[4]
During my nearly two-year confinement in a refugee camp during my journey to the United States, I met many female escapees from North Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces. I was familiar with their northern accent, and I quickly noticed details about their background. Some were from the same town near the border with China, and some even went to the same school before leaving North Korea. Most of them left their hometown to seek economic opportunities or to pursue their personal aspirations for a better life, but they became victims of human trafficking in China. I also met female North Korean escapees from Pyongan Province. One of these women, P, had been born and raised in Pyongyang. After the public distribution system collapsed, however, she went to her aunt’s house in Musan County in North Hamgyong Province to make a living through smuggling. However, a woman in her aunt’s neighborhood approached her to suggest going to China to make money, luring her into sex trafficking and forced marriage with a Chinese man.
During and immediately after the famine of the 1990s, fraud and lack of awareness also contributed to gendered defection. Living in a confined, overcrowded room in dire conditions with insufficient food at the refugee camp, I built rapport with many female North Korean refugees. I observed that the majority of North Korean women, especially those who escaped in the late 1990s and early 2000s, were tricked by their neighbors, friends, and sometimes even relatives into going to China, where they became victims of human trafficking. This has also been documented by researchers. For example, one North Korean escapee went to China with her friend and her friend’s father to try and find her two sisters, who had already escaped to China and had been forced to marry Chinese men. However, after crossing the Tumen River, her friend’s father sold her to a Chinese man instead.[5]
After the famine, China became North Korea’s most significant trade partner. Chinese companies collected natural resources from North Korea, like wood, medicinal herbs, and mineral resources. Those who live near the border with China rely on exchanging natural resources and other trade to make a living. One such North Korean escapee, C, went to collect blueberries near Baekdu Mountain with her friends, but ended up reaching a Chinese village by accident. “I did not know how to go back home,” she told me. Lacking information or reliable social networks, North Korean women who arrive in China often become victims of trafficking. According to one estimate, approximately 70% to 80% of North Korean women who cross into China fall victim to human trafficking.[6]
Pull Factors
Gendered North Korean defection is directly reflected in pull factors on the Chinese side. The gender imbalance resulting from decades of enforcing the “one-child policy,” combined with traditional gender norms, created a “demand” for North Korean women, who are sold into marriage and kept in captivity.
In contrast, the pull factor of North Korean men to China is relatively low. North Korean men find work on hidden farms or in the lumber industry in northern China through an underground labor market. They are severely exploited by their Korean-Chinese employers.
Mr. C, who joined our group of escapees in Shenyang after being released from a long-term prison labor facility in North Korea, said that he crossed the border into China to earn money to support his family. Once he arrived in China, he connected with his friend, who was already working in a lumber facility in Changchun. The living and working conditions there were horrific. Even worse, his employer was unwilling to pay the North Korean workers and reported them to the police. The workers were subsequently repatriated to North Korea. Another male escapee pointed out to me that “we knew that we would not be welcome in China even if we escaped there, and there is nothing we can really do.”
Contemporary Trends
In recent years, escapes from North Korea are more likely to be related to social networks and human capital. Even after Kim Jong-un further tightened border security upon coming to power, there was still a gender imbalance among escapees who arrived in South Korea.
The number of North Korean women who escaped to South Korea after living in China is relatively higher than those who directly crossed the border from North Korea. NGOs and South Korean missionaries play an important role here. I was rescued by a South Korean missionary organization while I was in China. With their help and protection, I successfully reached out to a third country where I could claim my status as a refugee. In my group, six out of eight had been rescued by the same organization from China, and only two had recently left North Korea with help from family members who had already resettled in South Korea. I learned in the refugee camp that there were large numbers of female North Korean escapees who had been rescued by NGOs and mission organizations, many of them from China.
Nevertheless, the gender gap among escapees has shrunk since 2021 due to the regime’s COVID-19 restrictions. The small number of escapees who arrived during the pandemic could do so thanks to the help of family members and other social networks, making it easier to navigate their journey to South Korea. It is likely that these recent escapees had been trapped in China for a while, and could sustain themselves with the support of family members who were already living in South Korea.
By contrast, it is now difficult for North Korean women in China to escape unless they have family members or relatives who can help. Due to advanced surveillance technology and restrictions on movement, there are greater risks in rescuing North Korean women from China. Moreover, the cost is much higher than before. In the case of K, a female escapee who arrived in South Korea in 2020, both of her parents had already been living in South Korea for a decade. With her parents’ support, K was successfully rescued from North Korea and arrived in South Korea in the middle of the pandemic.
Concluding Remarks
The decision to escape from North Korea must be examined from multiple perspectives, including structural factors, economic changes, the power of women’s economic contribution, regional mobility, and the pull factor resulting from the gender imbalance in China.
During and shortly after the famine of the 1990s, gendered defection directly reflected institutionalized gender separation within North Korea. Economic devastation pushed North Korean women, mostly from North Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces, to go to China to seek economic opportunities or to achieve their personal aspirations. However, upon arriving in China, North Korean women were often lured into sex trafficking networks through fraud and deception. Moreover, the gendered defection of North Koreans must be understood with reference to the gender imbalance in China. It is in this context that many North Korean women were sold to poor rural Chinese men.
In recent years, escapes from North Korea have been more closely related to family ties and social networks. The latter includes NGOs and religious organizations. Overall, the number of escapees has drastically dropped over the past couple of years.
To rescue North Korean women in China who have fallen victim to trafficking, more NGOs and international humanitarian organizations must pay attention to these issues as serious violations of human rights. The international community must pressure China to take responsibility for and assist trafficked North Korean women. China can take tangible steps, such as providing them with a legal basis for staying in China and facilitating humanitarian protection. For North Koreans who newly escape to China, the Chinese government should create a new category of asylum seekers and allow a temporary immigration status instead forcibly repatriating them.
Elizabeth Jean H. Kim (pseudonym) is a North Korean refugee student who studied Sociology and International Relations at the University of Southern California.
[1] Ministry of Unification, “Number of North Korean Defectors Entering South Korea,” accessed August 8, 2023. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.
[2] Cho Eun-ah, “韓여성 키 162㎝… 100년새 20㎝ ‘폭풍 성장’ 세계 1위” [South Korean Women are 162cm on Average – 20cm Growth over the Past 100 Years], Dong-A Ilbo, July 27, 2016. https://www.donga.com/news/Society/article/all/20160727/79419892/1.
[3] Fyodor Tertitskiy, “Let them eat rice: North Korea’s public distribution system,” NK News, October 29, 2015. https://www.nknews.org/2015/10/let-them-eat-rice-north-koreas-public-distribution-system/.
[4] Ministry of Unification, “Policy on North Korean Defectors,” accessed August 8, 2023. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/.
[5] Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2009), 33. https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Lives_for_Sale.pdf.
[6] Ahn So-young, “국제법률단체 ‘탈북 여성들 중국 동북3성에서 성착취…국제사회 대응 시급’” [The Sexual Exploitation of North Korean Women in Northeastern China Requires Urgent International Attention, says NGO], VOA Korea, March 27, 2023. https://www.voakorea.com/a/7024247.html.
3. North Korea punishes women for wearing shorts, declaring them ‘capitalist fashion’
The patriarchy of the regime.
And just another example of how the regime abuses the people due to its fear of the people armed with information from the outside world. And of course fashions indicate the amount of information that is getting into the north.
But this is a key point. It is the women in the north who have the resilience for survival. It is almost as if the regime wants to to cause the total collapse of society under its iron hand.
Excerpts:
Most families in North Korea depend on women as the breadwinner. Men must report to their government-assigned jobs, where their salaries are nowhere near enough to live on, so families get by on the income of side businesses, which fall to the women to run.
Given the huge responsibility that falls on them, citizens are angry that the government won’t let them wear what they want in hot weather, the resident said.
“The residents complain about authorities, who confine and terrorize these women who are responsible for their families’ livelihood, making them spend all day in the police station just because they wore shorts.”
North Korea punishes women for wearing shorts, declaring them ‘capitalist fashion’
Men can continue to wear shorts as they please, but women must maintain ‘socialist etiquette.’
By Son Hyemin for RFA Korean
2023.08.10
rfa.org
North Korea is punishing women who try to beat the summer heat by wearing shorts, with authorities saying shorts with a length above the knee are an infiltration of capitalist fashion – but only if the wearer is female, residents in the country told Radio Free Asia.
The latest campaign against “anti-socialist behavior” is yet another example of Pyongyang enforcing its vaguely written Rejection of Reactionary Thought and Culture Act, which it passed in 2020 with the intent of eliminating activities deemed to be South Korean, foreign or capitalist cultural practices.
While violators of the law are often citizens caught watching and distributing South Korean and Western media, it has also been used to crack down on window tinting, speaking and texting using South Korean slang or word spellings, teaching youth how to dance, or changing their hair color and wearing unapproved clothing styles.
Severe punishments for what would never be considered a crime outside of North Korea have included long prison sentences and even execution.
Though the law technically applies to both men and women, the current crackdown only targets women who wear shorts.
The move to stop women from showing off too much skin below the knee is meant to preserve the tradition of socialist etiquette and lifestyle, a resident of the northwestern province of North Pyongan told RFA’s Korean Service Tuesday on condition of anonymity to speak freely.
“As more and more women wear shorts in the cities, including here in Sinuiju, the authorities are writing them up for violations of dress etiquette,” she said. “Yesterday, a police patrol arrested 10 women in the marketplace for wearing shorts. They had to write a statement of self-criticism and sign a document saying they would face legal consequences if they were caught wearing shorts again.
Women’s burden
Most families in North Korea depend on women as the breadwinner. Men must report to their government-assigned jobs, where their salaries are nowhere near enough to live on, so families get by on the income of side businesses, which fall to the women to run.
Given the huge responsibility that falls on them, citizens are angry that the government won’t let them wear what they want in hot weather, the resident said.
“The residents complain about authorities, who confine and terrorize these women who are responsible for their families’ livelihood, making them spend all day in the police station just because they wore shorts.”
A resident of South Pyongan province, north of the capital Pyongyang, told RFA on condition of anonymity for safety reasons that more women are wearing shorts in public this summer due to a heat wave.
“In response, the authorities are stopping women who wear shorts on the streets, saying that it is not in line with socialist tradition and lifestyle,” she said.
It was not the first time that police arrested women for their fashion choices, the South Pyongan resident said.
“A few years ago, they were cracking down on wide-legged skirt pants, saying they were Japanese fashion,” she said. “Many women are complaining, asking why men can wear shorts and women can’t. They are saying that the authorities are discriminating against us.”
The shorts ban for women is not the first time North Korea has applied the rules differently across genders.
Last month, RFA reported that North Korea enacted a public smoking ban for all citizens, but authorities only punished female smokers. Residents in that report pointed out the double standard, noting that the country’s leader Kim Jong Un is often pictured in state media with a lit cigarette.
Translated by Leejin J. Chung. Edited by Eugene Whong.
rfa.org
4. S. Korea voices hopes for 'smooth' resolution of frozen Iranian assets
The ROK is caught up in the Iran issue.
S. Korea voices hopes for 'smooth' resolution of frozen Iranian assets | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · August 11, 2023
SEOUL, Aug. 11 (Yonhap) -- South Korea neither confirmed nor denied media reports Friday on the apparent transfer of Iranian funds frozen here under U.S. sanctions but expressed hopes for a "smooth" resolution of the issue, a major thorn in the country's relations with Tehran.
Earlier, media outlets reported the United States had reached a deal with Iran to release five of its detained citizens and unlock around US$6 billion of Iranian assets frozen in South Korea.
"We have nothing to confirm at this point," a foreign ministry official told reporters. "The government has engaged in close consultation with relevant countries, including the U.S. and Iran, to address the issue of the frozen funds, and we hope this matter can be resolved smoothly."
Citing a source, Iran's state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported the Iranian funds in South Korea have been changed into euros in a bank in Switzerland.
Relations between Seoul and Tehran have frayed due to $7 billion in Iranian funds locked in two Korean banks under U.S. sanctions, which were reimposed after then U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from a 2015 nuclear deal in 2018. Tehran has long called on Seoul to release the funds.
Tensions between the U.S. and Iran have posed a tricky diplomatic challenge to South Korea, which has been striving to strengthen its treaty alliance with Washington and its economic partnership with the Islamic republic.
This undated file image, provided by Yonhap News TV, shows the flags of the United States and Iran. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · August 11, 2023
5. U.S. remains concerned about N. Korean provocations, will work with allies to ensure peace: Pentagon
An information campaign is the best tool for before, during, and after provocations.
U.S. remains concerned about N. Korean provocations, will work with allies to ensure peace: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Duk-Kun Byun · August 11, 2023
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Aug. 10 (Yonhap) -- The United States remains concerned about potential provocations by North Korea, a Pentagon spokesperson said Thursday, after the recalcitrant country noted that it may soon launch a space rocket.
North Korea unsuccessfully launched a space launch vehicle carrying what it claimed to be its first military reconnaissance satellite in late May.
The U.S. strongly condemned the failed launch, noting that space launch vehicles use the same technologies used in ballistic missiles, which the North is prohibited from using or developing under multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Department of Defense Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder is seen speaking during a daily press briefing at the Pentagon in Washington on Aug. 10, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)
"We have been very clear about our concerns when it comes to provocations and potential provocations by the DPRK," Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said when asked about North Korea's possible launch of another space launch in the near future.
DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name. The country said earlier this week that it may launch satellites "at any time."
"I am not going to, again, speculate or talk about any potential future actions by the DPRK," the Pentagon spokesperson told a daily press briefing when asked about the North's latest threat.
"We have been and will remain in close contact with our Republic of Korea and Japanese allies to ensure that we have a common understanding of the situation in the region and that we can continue to work together to ensure peace and stability," he added, referring to South Korea by its official name.
The defense department spokesperson also reaffirmed U.S. commitment to extended deterrence when asked, saying, "We are going to continue to have South Korea's back when it comes to defense.'
bdk@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Duk-Kun Byun · August 11, 2023
6. N. Korea put on alert against Typhoon Khanun; minor damage reported
Due to the poor infrastructure and the reduced vegetation in north Korea due to excessive scavenging for food by the people (as well as poor national agricultural policies), a typhoon could inflict much worse damage in the north than in the South (all other things being equal).
(LEAD) N. Korea put on alert against Typhoon Khanun; minor damage reported | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · August 11, 2023
(ATTN: ADDS details on inter-border dam water release in last six paras)
SEOUL, Aug. 11 (Yonhap) -- North Korea appeared to be on alert early Friday, airing rare overnight weather forecasts for Typhoon Khanun as it headed north after arriving on the Korean Peninsula the previous day.
Khanun plowed through South Korea for 16 hours Thursday and dissipated after reaching the vicinity of Pyongyang around 6 a.m. Friday, according to Seoul's weather agency.
This photo, captured from footage of North Korea's Central TV on Aug. 11, 2023, shows a special weather forecast on Typhoon Khanun. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The North's official Korean Central TV aired news alerts late into the night in a rare overnight broadcast. It also ran a nighttime weather program when Typhoon Bavi hit the country in 2020.
North Korea has apparently suffered minor damage from Khanun, which only resulted in broken tree branches, according to the state media.
The North had called for all-out efforts to minimize the potential damage from Khanun, saying the country's economy could be dealt a blow should it lack preparation.
North Korea is seen as vulnerable to natural disasters due to its lack of infrastructure. In the past, heavy rains left thousands of people displaced in the impoverished country.
This photo, captured from footage of North Korea's Central TV on Aug. 11, 2023, shows a special weather forecast on Typhoon Khanun. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
North Korea, meanwhile, has continued to release water from the Hwanggang Dam near the inter-Korean border for over a month without giving prior notice to Seoul, the unification ministry said Friday.
The ministry earlier requested that the North give prior notice if it releases water from the dam on concerns that an unannounced discharge of a large amount of water during the seasonal monsoon season could cause damage to border areas.
"It has been found that North Korea has left some of the floodgates open at the moment," Kim In-ae, the ministry's deputy spokesperson, told a press briefing. "The North is believed to have adjusted the water level by opening the floodgates since June 30, when the monsoon season began."
Kim said that the opening of the floodgates does not indicate that the North is "intentionally" releasing water to incur damage to the South, but it "goes against the spirit of the inter-Korean agreement."
In October 2009, North Korea agreed to notify the South in advance of its water release plans, following an accident that killed six South Koreans after water was discharged from the dam without notice.
But last year, North Korea released water from the dam unannounced, prompting the ministry to express regret over the discharge.
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · August 11, 2023
7. North to reopen borders 'soon,' tour agency says
What about trade?
And will the thousands of Koreans in Chinese detention facilities be forcibly repatriated to the north?
Friday
August 11, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Published: 11 Aug. 2023, 11:28
Updated: 11 Aug. 2023, 13:19
North to reopen borders 'soon,' tour agency says
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2023-08-11/national/northKorea/North-to-reopen-borders-soon-tour-company/1844823
The Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge, which spans the Yalu River and links Sinuiju, North Korea, with Dandong, China, is seen in this photograph taken in April 2014. [YONHAP]
North Korea will "soon" reopen its borders for the first time in over three years to its own nationals, a company that organizes tours inside the hermetic regime said Friday.
In an announcement on its website, Koryo Tours said it "received the official news on Thursday that North Korea is expected to officially open its border again very soon."
The company said it received news of the border reopening from North Korean sources.
But Koryo Tours noted that the initial phase of the country's reopening "is for North Korean citizens only."
Pyongyang implemented one of the strictest border closures in the world in response to the spread of Covid-19 in neighboring China in early 2020.
With few exceptions, the North has refused entry to anyone not already inside the country when the pandemic began, including its own workers, businesspeople, students and diplomats.
Koryo Tours said it expects the North's border reopening will first apply to the regime's own citizens before being "expanded soon afterwards," with entry into the North "likely" being extended to diplomats and staff from non-governmental organizations before applying to tourists.
Koryo Tours also said it expects North Koreans "to return home by train," given that international flights to Pyongyang have not yet resumed.
While the border reopening would allow North Koreans who were stranded abroad during the pandemic to return home, it also raises the specter of repatriation for defectors from China.
China does not recognize North Korean defectors as refugees but classifies them as economic migrants and subjects them to deportation back to the North, where they often face severe punishment.
Due to the North's border closures, China has not been able to repatriate captured defectors.
But activists and human rights groups warned the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China in June that almost 2,000 North Koreans held in detention centers in China could be forcibly repatriated once the North opens its borders.
Hanna Song, director of the Seoul-based Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), showed the commission satellite images of construction at Chinese detention facilities near the border that could potentially expand their capacity to hold more North Korean defectors caught in China.
She said the current number of North Koreans held in detention centers in China is likely between 600 and 2,000.
In a statement to the commission, Suzanne Scholte, president of the Virginia-based human rights advocacy Defense Forum Foundation, said, "There are credible rumors that the North Korea-China border will reopen soon" and that China's "first export" to North Korea could be "the nearly 2,000 North Korean children, women and men" who are currently detained.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
8. Rights groups call for UN action to protect North Korean escapees in China
Human rights up front. And China must be held accountable for its complicity in north Korean crimes against humanity.
Rights groups call for UN action to protect North Korean escapees in China
The Korea Times · August 11, 2023
This March file photo, taken in the Chinese city of Dandong, shows two bridges connecting North Korea and China. Human rights groups on Friday called for the OHCHR to take action to protect North Korean refugees in China as North Korea is expected to lift COVID-19 border restrictions to resume Beijing's forcible repatriation of escapees. Korea Times photo by Cho Young-bin
OHCHR accused of keeping silent on repatriation issue for sake of Beijing
By Jung Min-ho
Human rights activists called for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to take immediate action to protect North Korean refugees in China amid signs of the resumption of Beijing's forcible repatriation of escapees.
In a joint statement, Friday, Transitional Justice Working Group and 11 other groups said the lives of as many as 2,000 North Koreans are now at stake as Pyongyang is expected to lift its COVID-19 border restrictions soon ahead of the Hangzhou Asian Games, which are scheduled to take place from Sept. 23 to Oct. 8.
In a serious accusation, the groups also claimed that the OHCHR remains deliberately silent on the issue out of fear of irritating Beijing.
"It is important to hold China accountable for these grave human rights violations … This is particularly urgent as North Korea may lift the self-imposed COVID-19 border restrictions ahead of the 2023 Hangzhou Asian Games," the statement said.
"Given this background, the OHCHR's silence on China's grave human rights violations against North Korean refugees and the aiding and abetting of crimes against humanity in North Korea through arbitrary detention and forcible repatriation is difficult to understand or justify."
According to the groups, the OHCHR's Seoul office has yet to officially express its concerns about the looming resumption of deportations, and has not provided a reason for its refusal to send officials to events organized for the issue.
Speaking to The Korea Times, a rights advocate said that OHCHR Seoul officials' reluctance could be a direct result of the caution being taken toward China within its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, where the U.N. body went through a tense period with Beijing after its 2022 report on rights issues in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
The advocate said that the OHCHR's reports on the repatriation issue in recent years have shown a problematic pattern, in which it avoids mentioning China by name directly.
"The most recent 2023 report takes the OHCHR's reluctance to name China to a new level," the statement said. "According to the OHCHR, 'Interviewees who had been trafficked into neighboring countries reported living in fear that if their origins were discovered, they would be repatriated and imprisoned.' It is not difficult to see that 'the neighboring state' is the OHCHR's jargon for China."
The fate awaiting those deported by China is no secret: years of incarceration in political prison camps, torture or worse. Seoul has long asked Beijing to give them the option of returning to North Korea or allowing them to head to the South.
Despite its diplomatic efforts, however, Beijing has maintained the policy of treating North Koreans crossing into China as illegal migrants rather than refugees.
In a message to U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk, the groups called on him to hold China accountable for its human rights violations as he promised to do during his speech marking the 30th anniversary of the World Conference on Human Rights in June.
"You proclaimed that 'We have championed the rights of children, of indigenous peoples, of minorities, of older people, of people with disabilities as well as of migrants and refugees. All while holding the world's most powerful to account,'" the statement said.
"(The) OHCHR must end the blatant, casual politicization of the issue if it is to champion the rights of North Korean escapees facing arbitrary detention, human trafficking, deportation and other grave violations and abuses in China."
The Korea Times · August 11, 2023
9. Troubled World Scout Jamboree wraps up with K-pop concert
Troubled World Scout Jamboree wraps up with K-pop concert
The Korea Times · August 11, 2023
U.K. Scouts visit the War Memorial of Korea in Seoul, Friday. Yonhap
Questions remain over who should be held responsible for Jamboree fiasco
By Jun Ji-hye
The 25th World Scout Jamboree that kicked off on Aug. 1 in Saemangeum, a reclaimed tidal flat in North Jeolla Province, is set to close its much-troubled 12-day run on Saturday.
The closing ceremony and K-pop concert scheduled for Friday night at Seoul World Cup Stadium marked the last official scheduled event of the world's largest international youth camp, according to the organizing committee.
Over 40,000 Scouts and adult volunteers will then head to their home countries or stay a few more days in Korea to participate in further tours and cultural programs.
Before the start of the quadrennial event, all of the related parties, including the organizing committee, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and the provincial office of North Jeolla Province, said they were fully prepared to host the global youth event. Expectations were that the event would serve as an opportunity to showcase Korea's culture and advanced technologies to the world.
But it was not long before international outcry from participants and their parents overseas became widely heard. The extent of the poor planning and unpleasant conditions became widely known within its first two days, during which hundreds of participants suffered heat-related illnesses amid the scorching heat wave gripping the country.
Complaints also mounted over shortages of sanitary facilities as well as sanitation problems.
As a result, the 4,400-member U.K. delegation announced on Aug. 4 its decision to exit the campsite, citing health risks posed to the teenagers. The 1,500-member U.S. delegation and the participants from Singapore followed suit shortly after.
The central government has since taken an active part in the management of the event, expressing its willingness to continue the event and complete it successfully. President Yoon Suk Yeol called for all-out efforts to ensure sanitation at the campsite and asked for special care against any further problems, such as food poisoning amid the continued heat wave.
Despite such efforts, all remaining participants at the campsite ― about 37,000 ― began leaving the Jamboree venue on Tuesday, four days ahead of their initial schedule due to safety concerns posed by Typhoon Khanun that passed through the Korean Peninsula on Thursday.
Pallets used to keep Scouts' tents off the wet ground remain stacked at the waterlogged venue of the 25th World Scout Jamboree in Saemangeum, North Jeolla Province, Friday, a day after Typhoon Khanun passed through the province. YonhapThe participants were scattered throughout 128 lodgings in Seoul and seven other regions across the country and have continued participating in alternative programs offered by regional governments.
The government then turned to K-pop's global popularity as its remaining hope. To change the minds of the Jamboree participants disappointed by the fiasco and restore the country's reputation as a reliable host for large-scale international events, it plans to hold the "K-Pop Super Live" concert featuring a total of 19 K-pop acts, including NewJeans, IVE and NCT Dream, following the closing ceremony.
"Scouts from the U.S., U.K and Singapore who left the campsite early are also set to participate in the closing ceremony and K-pop concert," the organizing committee said in a release before the ceremony.
"We created a seven-minute video clip showing some 40,000 Scouts pitching their tents at the Jamboree venue at the beginning and being eventually relocated to eight other regions due to the typhoon. We expect this will offer the participants a chance to feel a sense of accomplishment as they have overcome difficulties together."
What went wrong
The ruling People Power Party (PPP) vowed, also on Friday, to find out where the responsibility for the Jamboree fiasco lies.
"We will examine the lack of preparations and other problems raised during the event as soon as possible, as many people have been concerned about the topic," PPP floor leader Yun Jae-ok said during a party meeting at the National Assembly.
The party has pointed its finger at the North Jeolla Province government as well as the Buan County office, claiming that they ruined the event even with large budgets allocated.
The party said it will inspect for careless management of finances by these local governments.
Still, the party acknowledged that the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family ― which holds the main authority among the central government organizations ― is not immune from accountability, either.
"Nobody can deny the fact that the gender ministry was not ready for the event," PPP Chairman Rep. Kim Gi-hyeon said.
Interior and Safety Minister Lee Sang-min, left, and Gender Equality and Family Minister Kim Hyun-sook attend a government emergency response meeting on the 25th World Scout Jamboree at the Government Complex in Seoul, Friday.
Yonhap
Rep. Ahn Cheol-soo, a third-term lawmaker of the PPP, stressed that President Yoon should dismiss one of the ministers who is believed to assume the biggest responsibility. Interior and Safety Minister Lee Sang-min, Gender Equality and Family Minister Kim Hyun-sook and Culture Minister Park Bo-gyoon are co-chairs of the organizing committee.
"The government should hold a responsible minister in check, if it wants to reduce the possibility of various lawsuits to be filed by those who were disappointed by the event," Ahn said.
The Korea Times · August 11, 2023
10. Another Washington Declaration: US Nuclear Weapons on the Korean Peninsula
Excerpts:
The surfacing of the Kentucky and Michigan appear to be just the beginning of the increased deployments and military cooperation mentioned in the Washington Declaration. On June 30, 2023, US nuclear-capable bombers overflew the Korean peninsula in a joint exercise with the South Korean Air Force and, on July 18, 2023, the United States and South Korea convened the inaugural Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meeting to discuss deterrence and defense cooperation.
...
For South Korea however, while these assets may provide the public the security guarantees and reassurances they have sought, South Korea is also accepting a larger role in the US nuclear mission in Asia. That growing role raises the cost for adversaries, but also for South Korea. America’s rotation of strategic forces in Korea serves a dual purpose: (1) reaffirm US commitment to defending Korea, and (2) remind adversaries of the cost of an attack on South Korea. However, in the event of a wider conflict, South Korea is a more valuable target for adversaries targeting American forces. America does base its forces extensively in Korea, with nearly 30,000 service members on the peninsula. If American forces do not operate from Korean soil, Korea may be exempt from being dragged into a conflict. Despite this, with US strategic forces docking in Korean ports and on Korean airfields, an adversary may decide a strike of sufficient value on these forces or their ability to operate may outweigh the risk of bringing Korea into a conflict.
...
China and North Korea have both condemned the Washington Declaration as many expected. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson noted, “What the US has done stokes bloc confrontation, undermines the nuclear non-proliferation system and hurts the strategic interest of other countries. It has also increased tensions on the peninsula and jeopardized regional peace and stability.” Meanwhile, Kim Yo-Jong, Kim Jong-Un’s sister, avowed more provocative displays of its military might.
Both of these messages, while expected, have only underscored the rationale in Washington and Seoul. From a South Korean view, this looks like China ignoring significant and real concerns about the North Korean missile regime once again. Up north, Pyongyang is repeating the same rhetoric as before, but now must be ever more cognizant of the American nuclear enterprise that looms over their heads and off their coasts. If anything, these public messages have only reaffirmed the necessity of US commitments to South Korea. For South Korea and the United States, this agreement makes positive progress in defending South Korea, enhancing US partnerships in the region, and preventing a potential widespread proliferation event. While the full extent of the deal is yet to materialize, it may be the start of a significant change to the US force posture on the Korean Peninsula and is worth watching closely in the coming years.
Another Washington Declaration: US Nuclear Weapons on the Korean Peninsula - Foreign Policy Research Institute
fpri.org · by Joseph Su
Bottom Line
- On July 18, the USS Kentucky docked in South Korea, marking the first visit by a potentially nuclear-armed US submarine since the 1980s on the heels of North Korean missile launches.
- After North Korea conducted a record amount of missile tests in 2022, South Korea has become increasingly worried about the nuclear threat and sought further nuclear security guarantees with the United States, signing the Washington Declaration to increase deployments of US strategic assets on the peninsula.
- While South Korea will not develop nuclear capabilities for now, the growing threats in the region mean the possibility cannot be ruled out, and the United States must provide more assurance than ever to deter North Korea and prevent further proliferation in East Asia.
Sending Kentucky to Korea
On July 18, 2023, the USS Kentucky, an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine, docked in Busan, South Korea. The USS Kentucky is one of 14 Ohio-class submarines tasked with conducting nuclear deterrence patrols and carries up to 20 Trident II D5 nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. This visit marks the first port call by a nuclear-capable submarine since the 1980s and the 1991 decision to withdraw US nuclear forces from the Korean Peninsula.
This visit follows the recent June 16 port call by the USS Michigan, one of four conventionally-armed variants of the Ohio-class. That visit came on the heels of recent North Korean missile tests in protest of US-South Korea live-fire military drills, which were aimed at countering a potential North Korean attack.
These visits are significant due to their historically invisible presence due to their immense sensitivity and importance in US national security; however, the deployment is a very clear show of force meant for audiences in Pyongyang as tensions ramp up on the Korean peninsula.
Michigan and Kentucky: Arms and Armament
The USS Michigan is one of four Ohio-class subs to undergo conversion to a non-nuclear conventionally armed cruise-missile submarine (SSGN) capable of carrying 154 Tomahawk missiles or sixty-six Navy SEALs which can launch from the first two missile tubes to conduct special operations missions. Even without nuclear weapons, USS Michigan is formidable given its payload of 154 Tomahawk missiles is 15% of the entire 2,300 that have ever been fired in combat since its induction in 1983.
The USS Kentucky is an Ohio-class submarine that joined the fleet in 1983 and continues to carry the United States’ nuclear forces at sea. Equipped with 20 launch tubes for the Trident II D5 missile which carries on average four nuclear warheads per missile, a single Ohio submarine could carry a nuclear payload 1,100 times more powerful than the two bombs combined that were dropped in 1945, even abiding by treaty limitations.
More Nukes, Less Nukes, the Same Nukes?
According to the CSIS database of North Korean provocations, since 2022, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has conducted 53 unique missile launches with roughly 123 ballistic and cruise missiles lifting off from across the Korean peninsula. In 2022, North Korea conducted record missile tests, more than doubling their previous peak in 2017 which coincided with an underground nuclear test in the same year. While 2023 is not on track to meet that pace as of now, there was a notable uptick in launches towards the end of the year in 2022 which, if repeated, may indicate a new norm. Additionally, North Korea has made significant progress in all aspects in its missile programs from reliability, survivability, fueling, and diversification. In April, North Korea successfully test-launched its first solid-fueled ICBM simplifying maintenance and supporting infrastructure for its nuclear forces. These advances do not metaphorically “change the game” however they do note the growing threat and tangible advancement of the North Korean missile program.
These tests provoked a strong reaction in South Korea and Washington alike. In Korea, according to a Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll, 71% of South Koreans now support nuclear weapons on their territory, including domestic development. In January of 2023, President Yoon told officials in the Defense and Foreign Affairs ministries that if the threat posed by North Korea “gets worse,” it is possible that “our country will introduce tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own.” He further said that if the decision were made to develop nuclear weapons, Seoul could build them “pretty quickly, given our scientific and technological capabilities.”
These missile tests have also reignited the debate in Korea about whether Washington would honor its security guarantees if South Korea were to be attacked. This is a question that decision-makers under the US nuclear umbrella in Korea are questioning more seriously as China and North Korea are rapidly modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals.
Back in April, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol traveled to the United States to meet with President Biden. At the forefront of this visit was the North Korean missile tests and rising tensions between the two nations on the thirty-eighth parallel.
As a result, the United States and South Korea agreed to a litany of measures aimed at strengthening deterrence and increasing military cooperation. Under the new Washington Declaration, the United States committed to enhancing deployments of strategic assets, and “in particular US nuclear-capable platforms.” In return, South Korea has agreed to not develop its own nuclear weapons sating Washington’s fears of a wider proliferation event. Additionally, they committed to expanding military communications, exercises, and education across all spectrums as well as adding Japan to military exercises as the United States seeks to bolster its alliances and aid President Yoon’s push to mend Korean-Japanese relations.
The surfacing of the Kentucky and Michigan appear to be just the beginning of the increased deployments and military cooperation mentioned in the Washington Declaration. On June 30, 2023, US nuclear-capable bombers overflew the Korean peninsula in a joint exercise with the South Korean Air Force and, on July 18, 2023, the United States and South Korea convened the inaugural Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meeting to discuss deterrence and defense cooperation.
What Does It Mean for the United States and Korea?
For the United States, these new commitments are increasingly important as the US government seeks to strengthen its alliances and forces in Asia to manage potential Chinese and North Korean threats. The recent agreements tangibly expand upon this goal through its commitments to larger multilateral military exercises, longstanding policy against nuclear proliferation, and strategic force rotations which align with the US government’s increased investments and strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Current US alliances in Asia remain heavily bilateral, with longstanding US allies historically refusing to cooperate even with a shared partner. The most notable example is South Korea and Japan, two of America’s strongest allies which have staunchly opposed integration due to longstanding issues of colonization and wartime crimes spanning hundreds of years. However, given recent security issues, South Korean President Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida have made efforts to bury old wounds and make diplomatic progress between the two nations.
With two major US allies beginning to warm up to each other, the United States is able to form a stronger coalition in Asia if a security event were to break out. This would not only ease communication between the partners helping to coordinate efforts but also allow the partners to develop common responses, permit joint-military operations, and unity in crisis time. Furthermore, as the US military further commits assets to the Indo-Pacific, the increased capabilities that US strategic assets provide align with the DOD’s larger mission of deterring China, and protecting its interests in the region.
For South Korea however, while these assets may provide the public the security guarantees and reassurances they have sought, South Korea is also accepting a larger role in the US nuclear mission in Asia. That growing role raises the cost for adversaries, but also for South Korea. America’s rotation of strategic forces in Korea serves a dual purpose: (1) reaffirm US commitment to defending Korea, and (2) remind adversaries of the cost of an attack on South Korea. However, in the event of a wider conflict, South Korea is a more valuable target for adversaries targeting American forces. America does base its forces extensively in Korea, with nearly 30,000 service members on the peninsula. If American forces do not operate from Korean soil, Korea may be exempt from being dragged into a conflict. Despite this, with US strategic forces docking in Korean ports and on Korean airfields, an adversary may decide a strike of sufficient value on these forces or their ability to operate may outweigh the risk of bringing Korea into a conflict.
The Next Decade
In the near term, expect to see a surge of US deployments of strategic assets to the Korean peninsula, such as the surfacing of Ohio-class submarines and the overflight of B-52 bombers. If the situation deteriorates further and missile tests continue at an increased pace, then deployments of more advanced assets may follow in greater numbers. In the longer term, if the North Korean situation continues to deteriorate, then South Korea may be one of the first overseas hosts of new US B-21 bombers and Columbia-class submarines, both of which will carry the newest generation of US strategic power. Alternatively, the public and government may once again call for an indigenous nuclear capability despite the cost of straining their relationship with the United States. However, if missile tests taper off, and the public cries fall silent, a more regular routine of US assets in Korea may return.
As of now, South Korea will not develop its own indigenous nuclear capabilities. Doing so would severely fray ties with the United States, invite international condemnation, and further spiral the North Korean crisis. However, the United States must continue to be flexible with its deterrence posture to reassure South Korea that its extended deterrence commitments remain credible and the United States must clearly communicate what steps it is willing and able to take. As of now, it appears the United States and South Korea are step-in-step and both parties are satisfied, however, a severe crisis may tip the scales in ways the alliance cannot yet predict.
China and North Korea have both condemned the Washington Declaration as many expected. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson noted, “What the US has done stokes bloc confrontation, undermines the nuclear non-proliferation system and hurts the strategic interest of other countries. It has also increased tensions on the peninsula and jeopardized regional peace and stability.” Meanwhile, Kim Yo-Jong, Kim Jong-Un’s sister, avowed more provocative displays of its military might.
Both of these messages, while expected, have only underscored the rationale in Washington and Seoul. From a South Korean view, this looks like China ignoring significant and real concerns about the North Korean missile regime once again. Up north, Pyongyang is repeating the same rhetoric as before, but now must be ever more cognizant of the American nuclear enterprise that looms over their heads and off their coasts. If anything, these public messages have only reaffirmed the necessity of US commitments to South Korea. For South Korea and the United States, this agreement makes positive progress in defending South Korea, enhancing US partnerships in the region, and preventing a potential widespread proliferation event. While the full extent of the deal is yet to materialize, it may be the start of a significant change to the US force posture on the Korean Peninsula and is worth watching closely in the coming years.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.
fpri.org · by Joseph Su
11. Between Myth and Reality: Examining the Practicalities of North Korean State Collapse
An interesting application of theory to the north Korean problem. I would point out that state collapse and regime collapse are not the same. As long as the regime can maintain power and continue to rule through the party, the state will survive.
Regime Collapse: loss of central governing effectiveness by the party combined with loss of coherency and support of the military
Conclusion:
State collapse is theoretically possible in North Korea, as it is in any other nation. However, North Korea’s susceptibility to collapse may be higher compared to other countries, given its relatively low score on de Corral and Schwarz’s Degree of Statehood scale, which categorizes it as a fragile/weak state.36 Nevertheless, the design, structure, and proven resilience of the North Korean party-state make state collapse highly unlikely. Over the decades, North Korea has demonstrated its ability to withstand various forms of strain and pressure, both internal and external, that could have crippled a less resilient state. Despite economic hardships, humanitarian disasters, international isolation, and factional infighting, the North Korean party-state has remained intact. Its key strengths, despite its many weaknesses, have allowed it to endure in the face of such challenges. Therefore, any scenario leading to a North Korean state collapse would have to involve unprecedented events that pose a direct threat to the structural integrity of the party-state, surpassing anything witnessed in North Korean history thus far.
If a North Korean state collapse were to occur, it would not likely be triggered by a humanitarian disaster or economic underperformance. Public dissatisfaction with the regime or international pressure, isolation, and sanctions would also not be the direct causes. The party-state is expected to be strong enough to withstand these pressures and overcome them.
A collapse of the North Korean state would be the culmination of a highly unlikely and increasingly extreme series of events. It would likely stem from a sudden and unforeseen power shift or attempted power shift at the highest levels of leadership. However, the unique characteristics of the North Korean party-state add complexity to the situation. A viable alternative that possesses the power and support necessary to successfully challenge and remove the supreme leader would also be capable of maintaining control over the party-state. In other words, the more successful the coup, the less likely a collapse becomes.
To trigger a collapse, the leadership shift would need to result in extreme divisions, violence, and factional infighting among the North Korean elites, reaching the level of a large-scale civil war that engulfs the party-state. Among the possibilities, a launched but unsuccessful attempt to force a leadership change in North Korea, with multiple powerful and armed factions vying for supremacy, appears to be the most plausible scenario for creating the conditions that lead to the failure and collapse of the North Korean party-state.
However, even this most likely collapse scenario remains highly improbable due to the inherent strengths of the North Korean party-state. While North Korea certainly has weaknesses and shares certain characteristics with failed and collapsed states, considering it doomed or highly likely to collapse would be a misunderstanding and a significant underestimation of the strengths and structural integrity of the North Korean party-state. Although planning for such a scenario should continue, North Korean policy should not hinge on the expectation of an imminent collapse unless there are verifiable indications that question the structural integrity of the party-state and its various apparatuses. In the unique case of North Korea, if a collapse were to occur, it would likely be the result of a civil war rather than the cause of it. States do not simply collapse, and North Korea is no exception.
Between Myth and Reality: Examining the Practicalities of North Korean State Collapse
airuniversity.af.edu · July 31, 2023
- Published
- By Capt Shaquille H. James, USAF
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs --
View PDF version here.
Abstract
This article critically examines the likelihood of a collapse in the North Korean regime by drawing insights from three comprehensive inputs. Through a diverse range of perspectives, it provides a thorough analysis of the vulnerabilities and resilience of the North Korean party-state. By exploring intricate dynamics within North Korea, including internal power shifts, factional infighting, and historical precedents, this article sheds light on the complexities of the regime’s political landscape. While acknowledging inherent uncertainties, it assesses the regime’s structural integrity and proven resiliency, challenging common assumptions of an imminent collapse. The article underscores the regime’s ability to withstand internal and external pressures and initiates a discussion on the role of external actors and their potential impact. By presenting contrasting viewpoints and addressing key factors, this article offers a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the likelihood of a state collapse in North Korea.
***
The potential collapse of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK) is a complex and poorly understood topic, yet it holds significant implications for North Korea policy. Despite the gravity of a collapse and its consequences, there is a dearth of research focusing on the specific details of a North Korean state collapse. While policy papers discuss the potential aftermath and offer brief descriptions of collapse scenarios, there is a lack of comprehensive understanding regarding the conditions, extent, and feasibility of a collapse. Furthermore, limited research exists on the vulnerability of the DPRK to trends and circumstances that historically lead to state collapse. This knowledge gap calls for an exploration into the enigmatic concept of North Korean state collapse, emphasizing the need for a deeper understanding of its intricacies and the factors contributing to its likelihood.
Given the alarming potential consequences of a state collapse in North Korea and its continued consideration in policy making, there is a pressing need for a focused examination of the characteristics and feasibility of such an event. This article begins by reviewing the historical context of collapse within North Korea policy and assessing the current ramifications of a North Korean collapse. It then explores the intricate structure of the North Korean party-state, comparing and contrasting common themes and contributing factors of state collapse with the inherent characteristics and mitigating factors specific to North Korea. The analysis pursues three main objectives: identifying common trends of state collapse applicable to North Korea, evaluating the overall vulnerability of the North Korean party-state to collapse, and delineating the realistic circumstances under which a collapse could occur, considering North Korea’s unique circumstances and insights from the collapse of other states. The findings demonstrate that while the risks associated with a collapse in North Korea are significant, the research and examples from recent decades, coupled with the resilience of the North Korean party-state, suggest that a collapse is highly unlikely, albeit not entirely impossible. Among various scenarios, an attempted forcible change in leadership leading to unprecedented division and civil war emerges as the most plausible, albeit highly impractical. Therefore, while contingency planning for a potential catastrophic collapse should continue, future North Korea policy should not hinge on the notion that such a collapse is imminent, inevitable, or even probable, as it is far from certain.
State Collapse and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
The COVID-19 era has brought immense hardship and adversity to the DPRK. Since being the first country to completely seal its borders in January 2020, North Korea has witnessed a further deterioration of its already fragile domestic situation. Even Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un acknowledged these difficulties in speeches delivered in 2020 and 2021, a departure from the norm.1 Observers from the Washington-based think tank 38 North, among others, have noted the particularly challenging circumstances faced by North Korea during the pandemic, with food security reaching its worst level since the Arduous March of the 1990s.2 The visible signs of increased economic hardship and severe food insecurity have once again raised concerns about the potential collapse of the North Korean state.3
This is not the first time that the concept of state collapse in North Korea has emerged. During the Arduous March of the 1990s, a period marked by severe economic and humanitarian crises resulting in widespread starvation, the fear of a collapse was palpable.4 In fact, the United States, while engaging in denuclearization negotiations, operated on the assumption that a collapse was imminent. Despite these concerns, a collapse did not materialize, but the belief in its likelihood influenced US policy toward North Korea.
In 2011, with the death of Kim Jong-il and the succession of his young and untested son, Kim Jong-un, as the leader, concerns about instability and collapse resurfaced. Kim Jong-un had only three years to prepare for his ascension, unlike his father who had a much longer transition period. At that time, some experts considered a North Korean collapse a “reasonable probability.”5 In fact, during military exercises in the spring of 2013, US and ROK forces conducted scenarios to prepare for such an event, primarily focused on the security of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, including its nuclear arsenal.6 The concern for North Korea’s domestic stability seemed secondary in these plans.7
Beyond the nuclear aspect, there are substantial reasons to be deeply concerned about the possibility of state collapse in North Korea. Despite the end of the Arduous March, the country continues to grapple with severe scarcity. With a GDP of around USD 27 billion in 2021—approximately 60 times smaller than that of South Korea—North Korea faces economic stagnation and mismanagement, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Kim regime’s stringent anti-COVID measures.8 According to UN data, North Korea has consistently failed to produce enough food domestically to feed its population since 1995, relying heavily on external assistance.9 The result is a population that is, overall, quite food insecure, with research by the World Food Programme finding high rates of malnutrition among the population.10 This has resulted in widespread food insecurity and high rates of malnutrition, with the average height of North Koreans significantly lower than their South Korean counterparts.
Considering North Korea’s dire human rights situation, extensive system of political prison camps, and the additional strain caused by anti-COVID-19 measures, a collapse in the country could trigger a colossal humanitarian crisis among the already vulnerable population, potentially leading to mass refugee flows and widespread starvation.
Moreover, North Korea boasts the world’s fourth-largest military, with approximately 1.3 million personnel.11 Despite its size, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) faces similar humanitarian and food security issues as the rest of the population, with reports suggesting that some conscripts must resort to stealing food from civilians to survive.12 In a state collapse scenario, the breakdown of command, control, and discipline within the KPA could pose significant security and humanitarian challenges for any force attempting to stabilize North Korea.
Even in the absence of a complete collapse of military discipline, the loss of effective and verifiable command and control (C2) in North Korea, especially concerning their nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, could pose a significant WMD threat to the entire region.
Therefore, there is substantial cause for concern regarding the possibility of a collapse in North Korea. However, the question of how a North Korean collapse might manifest remains unanswered.
Challenges Posed by Unknown Variables and Information Scarcity
North Korea, one of the most secretive states on the planet, has historically maintained its secretive nature. Consequently, analyzing North Korea presents challenges due to limited information availability and unpredictable variables. For instance, the country’s susceptibility to state failure can vary based on its humanitarian, social, and political dispositions, among other factors. Ascertaining North Korea’s internal stability at any given time proves notoriously difficult, lacking a reliable degree of certainty. Despite assuming a period of relative calm and reduced tensions with the US-ROK alliance for the purpose of this examination, North Korea’s actual disposition can deviate from this assumption at any moment. In fact, one could plausibly argue that, due to the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea’s current vulnerability to state failure exceeds normal levels, though the extent of this vulnerability remains undetermined.
Moreover, North Korea’s control of information hinders a thorough under-standing of its ability to withstand collapse. While it is common knowledge that North Korea possesses an extensive state security apparatus and that Kim Jong-un is surrounded by personal bodyguards, specific details such as the total number of personnel dedicated to state security, the exact number of bodyguards protecting Kim Jong-un, or the presence of discontent among these personnel—all of which could be pivotal in a state collapse scenario—remain undisclosed. This lack of information also impacts other analytical aspects, including the attitudes of regime elites, the loyalty of the military leadership, and internal contingency plans in the event of attempted forcible power changes. Ultimately, despite focusing on a relatively “normal” version of North Korea, the existence of unknowable variables and information gaps necessitates acknowledging the presence of uncertainty in the findings of this analysis.
How and Why Nations Fail and Collapse
Discussions about the consequences and potential responses to North Korean collapse scenarios often overshadow an important topic: the level of vulnerability of North Korea to collapse and the circumstances under which it may or may not occur. While North Korea has not yet experienced collapse, there is substantial research available on the broader subject of state collapse.
The concepts of state failure and state collapse are complex and encompass various definitions and research examples. While the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, they represent distinct, albeit interconnected, phenomena. According to research by Miguel de Corral and Rolf Schwarz, states can be cate-gorized into five groups, with weak/fragile states and failed states representing the second weakest and weakest categories, respectively.13
Robert Rotberg defines a failed state as “a polity that is no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world,” despite maintaining international recognition.14 Failed states are typically characterized by internal conflicts, loss of territorial control, regimes that exploit their own citizens, flawed institutions, deteriorated infrastructure, and rampant corruption.15 While civil war and intense violence often accompany failed states, the presence of violence is not a prerequisite for state failure. Additionally, a state can fail in certain aspects while continuing to function in others. Examples of failed states include Sudan, Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko, Afghanistan under the Taliban, Sierra Leone under Siaka Stevens, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.16
In contrast to failed states, collapsed states exhibit a breakdown of structure, legitimate authority (legitimate power), law, and political order, requiring their reconstitution in some form, be it old or new. According to William Zartman, state collapse is “a situation where structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new.”17 Zartman further emphasizes that state collapse involves the dis-integration of both governmental superstructure and social infrastructure, with civil society being unable to rebound, fill positions, restore faith, support the government, or rally around a successor.18 In the context of a failed state, Rotberg defines a collapsed state as “a rare and extreme version of a failed state” where there exists a vacuum of state authority, rather than simply weak state authority.19 Hence, state collapse and failure are not mutually exclusive but rather exist along a continuum. States do not collapse abruptly; instead, they first experience faltering and failure before reaching an extreme level of failure known as collapse. Therefore, it is possible to find examples of states that have both failed and collapsed and transitioned between these categories.20 Using this definition, examples of collapsed states include Somalia, Bosnia, Lebanon, and Afghanistan in the 1980s, as well as Nigeria and Sierra Leone in the 1990s.21
While not all failed states collapse, failed and failing states are more susceptible to collapse due to the underlying characteristics that contribute to their failure. It is crucial to note that states do not simply collapse unexpectedly; collapse is the result of a long series of extreme circumstances. These circumstances give rise to trends that, while not universally applicable, are commonly observed in states that fail and collapse. Therefore, when evaluating the likelihood of a country’s failure and, ultimately, collapse, it is important to identify indicators of state failure, assess the extent of their manifestation, and consider the potential for the situation to further deteriorate into complete collapse.
The North Korean Party-State
The North Korean party-state is a complex governmental structure that intricate-ly integrates the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) into all aspects of state governance. While some elements of the DPRK governmental structure exist on paper in other countries, certain interpretations of common themes, such as a state constitution, a ruling party, and a representative assembly, manifest differently in North Korea. One notable example is the role of the KWP in the functioning of the North Korean state. Unlike Western liberal democracies, where the party and the state are separate entities, no such distinction exists in North Korea. According to Article 11 of the DPRK constitution, all activities in the DPRK are conducted under the leadership of the KWP.22 A broad interpretation of this clause suggests that, regardless of the formal structure of the DPRK government, the KWP serves as the supreme governing body within the country. The structure of the state and its organs are dependent on the will of the party. In contrast to other forms of government where parties operate within the framework of the state, the opposite is true in North Korea: the state operates within the confines of the party. This is even evident in the DPRK constitution itself, which, unlike in other nations where the constitution is the supreme law of the land, reflects the KWP’s will and derives its legitimacy from its association with the party. The design of the North Korean government revolves around the direct leadership of the KWP and relies solely on the party’s presence for its functioning. Essentially, in North Korea, the party is the state, and the state belongs to the party.
The KWP employs various mechanisms to maintain firm party control over state organs. For instance, a crucial requirement for becoming a government official in North Korea is to become a member of the KWP. In principle, KWP membership entails demonstrating sufficient loyalty and allegiance to the North Korean party-state. This criterion extends beyond an individual’s own actions and may also encompass the actions and history of their family members. In North Korea, the songbun system categorizes individuals into several groups primarily based on loyalty. The three main categories are the core class, the wavering class, and the hostile class.23 The core class comprises individuals considered sufficiently loyal to the Kim regime, either through their own conduct or the conduct of their family members. The wavering class consists of individuals whose loyalty is in question, while the hostile class comprises those seen as politically irredeemable.24 Members of the hostile class face significant challenges in securing meaningful employment or becoming party members due to their songbun classification. On the other hand, members of the core class and some individuals in the wavering class have greater opportunities to join the party and subsequently pursue government positions, with those possessing the highest songbun enjoying the chance to attain high-ranking positions. Through this relatively straightforward loyalty assessment, the North Korean party-state ensures that government officials possess a certain degree of loyalty to the party before assuming their roles within the state.
In addition to ensuring party loyalty among party-state officials, the KWP also employs various mechanisms to maintain control over the population. These mechanisms include a vast state security apparatus, strict control over information, resources, and weapons, human rights violations, and indoctrination. An essential component of indoctrination is the utilization of Mass Organizations. In North Korea, party-sponsored Mass Organizations exist at nearly every level of society, serving as a means to engage the general populace in political activities, foster “class consciousness,” and instill socialist ideology into the mission and responsibilities of the working people.25 However, mass organizations also serve additional purposes geared toward state control. While the populace becomes politically involved through these organizations, they also provide a means for the party to observe and surveil average North Koreans at the individual level. This arrangement allows the party to integrate itself into the everyday lives of North Koreans and assess party and state loyalty among the population using an embedded state mechanism.
Ultimately, the organization of the North Korean party-state results in a totalitarian apparatus that is extensive, tightly woven, highly robust, far-reaching, and unchallenged. The levers of power extend into the highest levels of leadership and the military, with political officers stationed at every level, and even into individual households, where inminban (people’s units) monitor and, if necessary, control the actions of households. While the North Korean government may encounter practical challenges, it is by no means politically weak.26 Most state functions are geared toward the preservation of the party-state, even at the expense of other essential state functions. The outcome is a North Korean state that exhibits weaknesses in certain areas, remarkable strength in others, and an undeniable extensive reach.
Applying the Concept of Collapse to North Korea
When comparing the North Korean party-state to the definitions, examples, perceptions, and common trends of state failure and collapse, interesting observations can emerge. Some descriptions of a failed state would categorize North Korea as either a failed or failing state, a viewpoint shared by certain observers.27 However, other definitions portray North Korea as a weak state rather than a failed or failing one.28
In the case of North Korea, it is crucial to consider the specific context when applying the general descriptors of failing, failed, and collapsed states. For instance, failed states are often characterized by high levels of corruption, deteriorating infrastructure, and flawed state institutions, among other indicators. While some of these traits can be observed in North Korea, not all of them apply easily. For instance, failed states are typically associated with limited or no control over their borders and parts of their recognized territory. In the case of North Korea, the government maintains effective and uncontested control over its entire recognized territory, including a clearly demarcated and monitored border with China and Russia.29 While defections and smuggling occur across this border, it would be inaccurate to suggest that North Korea lacks border control in the same way as truly failed and collapsed states. The strict border controls implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic further demonstrate the central government’s ability to exercise control in this aspect, indicating a strengthening of their border management.
By examining these nuances, it becomes evident that while North Korea may exhibit weaknesses as a state, it does not align entirely with the characteristics of a failed or collapsed state. The specific circumstances surrounding the North Korean party-state warrant a careful analysis that goes beyond general definitions and takes into account the country’s unique dynamics and control mechanisms.
A significant trend observed in failed and collapsed states is the presence of a viable alternative to the nominal leadership. Whether it manifests as a rival political faction, a tribal or religious minority, a military junta, or a rebel group, a viable alternative typically emerges when the state loses control over territory or people. In some cases, this alternative may even possess enough strength to forcefully challenge the nominal leadership, as seen in military coups. However, for such a scenario to unfold, a viable alternative must first exist. Currently, in North Korea, there are no evident viable alternatives. There are no rebel groups, genuine rival political parties or factions, or tribal divisions within the country. Almost all forms of power—political, cultural, societal, economic, and military—are consolidated within the KWP. Therefore, there is no clear mechanism by which power could be wrested away from the KWP, and it remains uncertain whether an alternative could emerge in the event of a sudden power vacuum.
However, this does not imply that the appearance of a viable alternative is impossible. Similar to other failed and collapsed states, the North Korean military theoretically presents a potential source of a viable alternative. Nonetheless, the KPA also has a defined role within the framework of the KWP. The KPA is an integral part of the party and, despite its significance as a powerful organ, it ultimately operates under the party’s authority.30 This dynamic persisted even during the era of songun politics under Kim Jong-il, where the KPA and national defense held prominence in North Korean state policy.31 Despite the perceived political influence the KPA might have gained during this era, in reality, it possesses limited political capital within the party-state. This is particularly evident in the post-songun era, given Kim Jong-un’s subsequent purges of military ranks.32 While the KPA remains a potential option as a viable alternative in North Korea, its status as a party-aligned entity with limited political capital diminishes the likelihood of its successful transition to a capable alternative, although it cannot be ruled out entirely.
When considering the possibility of North Korean state failure, it is important to consider external pressures. For decades, North Korea has faced international sanctions and the smuggling of USBs containing foreign media, among other pressures, which clearly aim to undermine the party’s control over the state. Despite the government’s efforts to isolate the country due to COVID-19, North Korea continues to experience international sanctions, information smuggling campaigns, and other external pressures. Theoretically, if applied effectively, these external pressures could weaken and ultimately cause strong aspects of the party-state to fail. However, while there is evidence suggesting that some pressures have influenced North Korean behavior, there is no clear evidence regarding the impact of external pressures on the stability of the regime or its key organs. Furthermore, even if there were some effects on the regime, they did not lead to state collapse. It is evident that the North Korean party-state, by design, is highly resistant to external pressures.
It is plausible that external sources of pressure, such as China, the US-ROK alliance, or the United Nations, could exert more pressure than the state can withstand. For instance, China could decide to cut off oil and electricity supplies to North Korea, severely compromising a fundamental function of the state. However, such heavy-handed tactics are unlikely and fall beyond the scope of this examination. These tactics have the potential to cripple any country, not exclusively North Korea. Furthermore, considering North Korea’s historical resilience to external pressures and the narrative of victimhood propagated by the state, employing more forceful measures may weaken the state initially but ultimately result in a “rally around the flag” effect, reinforcing the state’s victim narrative and enhancing social cohesion, thereby reducing the likelihood of state failure. In conclusion, while a sufficient amount of external pressure could push the North Korean party-state towards failure, it would not reflect the state’s inherent vulnerability to collapse, but rather the extreme measures that could destabilize any state. Given the low probability of such measures being implemented and the current ineffectiveness of existing external pressures in generating internal instability, it can be inferred that, within reasonable bounds, external pressures are currently unlikely to result in the collapse of the North Korean state.
The North Korean Version of “Collapse”
North Korea can be characterized as a weak state with a strong central government that maintains a monopoly on political power and the use of force within the country. In some instances throughout its history, it has shown signs of transitioning into and out of the failed state category, such as during the retreat to the Yalu River in the Korean War, the Arduous March, and possibly during the peak of the COVID-19 lockdown. However, even in these circumstances, the North Korean party-state did not fail in critical categories that are essential for retaining state power. These categories ensured that the North Korean state, despite shortcomings in certain areas, maintained legitimacy, control over loyalty, power, violence, and C2 of the armed forces and WMDs. The party-state’s resilience and strength have arguably prevented North Korea from descending into a full-fledged failed or collapsed state, even during challenging times.
When assessing the possibility of a collapse of the North Korean state, it becomes crucial to consider the factors that could impose significant stress and disruption on the party-state, compromising its demonstrated resilience. Given the robust nature of the party-state, any stressors capable of inducing a collapse would need to exert tremendous and targeted strain on the structure of the party-state itself.
At the outset, certain options can be ruled out. The stability of the party-state was not compromised despite the severe strain endured during the Arduous March, which involved famine, mass deaths, and mass defections. Therefore, this event can be dismissed as a catalyst for collapse.33 Similarly, the likelihood of a people’s revolt is extremely low. The party-state’s effective means of crushing any uprising, coupled with political indoctrination, a vast security apparatus, and information control, make initiating and succeeding in a revolt highly challenging, if not impossible.34 Economic hardship, despite being a persistent issue in North Korea for decades, has not posed a significant threat to the party-state’s power, thus ruling out its potential to cause a collapse.
However, there remains one distinct possibility that sets itself apart from the rest. Many scenarios depicting a collapse of North Korea commonly feature one central trend: a sudden and unexpected change in the supreme leadership of the DPRK. Given that the DPRK government revolves around a unitary and totalitarian leadership structure, the abrupt removal of this leadership unit could lead to the emergence of various factions competing for power. This internal conflict could pose a substantial threat to the structural integrity of the party-state.
However, for this scenario to unfold, the infighting among the core leadership must reach an exceptionally intense and violent level, surpassing the ideological disagreements witnessed in the years following Kim Jong-un’s ascension to power. During that period, numerous high-ranking party-state officials were purged, banished, or executed, yet the party-state continued to function relatively normally. If conflict among the top leadership is to jeopardize the party-state, it would have to be on an unprecedented scale, encompassing a broad scope and exhibiting extreme violence unlike anything seen in North Korean history.
Two main possibilities exist for a sudden change in North Korea’s supreme leadership: the sudden death of the supreme leader or the ousting of the supreme leader. While either scenario could potentially lead to factional infighting, the ousting of the supreme leader presents a greater likelihood of instigating the instability required to compromise the party-state. Although Kim Jong-un currently lacks a clearly designated successor, there is some evidence to suggest that his sister, Kim Yo-jong, has been groomed to assume his position in the event of his incapacitation.35 While such a swift transfer of power is unprecedented in North Korean history, Kim Yo-jong, having been present during her brother’s rise to power, is likely familiar with the potentially brutal methods required to maintain her leadership. In a sudden death scenario, where a viable alternative may not have had sufficient time to emerge, any opposition to Kim Yo-jong would likely be scattered, if it exists at all. Although not impossible, factional infighting following a sudden death is unlikely to generate the level of stress necessary to compromise the party-state.
An ousting scenario presents a distinct set of circumstances. In the event of an ousting, whether through the arrest or assassination of the supreme leader, a viable alternative will have emerged. The size and scope of this alternative are challenging to predict, but it must possess sufficient strength to evade or gain support from the state security apparatus, overcome or receive assistance from the Supreme Guard Command (Kim Jong-un’s personal guards), and gain unauthorized and hostile access to the supreme leader. Any faction accomplishing these feats becomes a de facto viable alternative to the nominal state leadership, although the situation grows increasingly complex from that point forward.
Nevertheless, a successful ousting of the supreme leadership does not automatically result in the collapse of the party-state. In fact, a robust, cunning, supported, and powerful viable alternative that successfully removes the North Korean supreme leader is likely capable of maintaining nominal control over the rest of the party-state in their absence. They can utilize the same levers of power, whether institutional or improvised, that the previous regime employed. While the successful ousting of the supreme leader is a recurring theme in North Korean collapse scenarios, it does not guarantee the collapse of the state.
However, there is a caveat to this theory. It is important to consider scenarios in which attempts to oust the supreme leader are unsuccessful. As mentioned earlier, internal violence and civil war are common trends in failing and collapsing nations. A successful attempt by a robust and capable viable alternative could lead to a relatively smooth transition of power away from the Kim family, resembling some military coups in the developing world. On the other hand, a failed attempt by the same viable alternative could result in the suppression of the alternative faction, or it could ignite a significant conflict between the faction and those loyal to the still-powerful and living supreme leader. This situation could serve as a catalyst for a civil war, extending beyond the highest echelons of North Korean state power and descending into a widespread and violent conflict. In an extreme scenario, such a civil war could compromise the very foundation of the party-state and, if the key competencies of the party-state collectively fail, lead to the collapse of the state.
This scenario, however, remains highly improbable and lacks substantial historical precedent in North Korea. Nonetheless, if the North Korean party-state were to collapse, it would require an unprecedented and highly unlikely sequence of events. A sudden and significant shift in power at the highest levels of leadership, accompanied by internal conflict and division that escalates to the point of civil war, would exert immense pressure on the functioning capacity of the party-state. This strain would surpass any challenges the government has encountered thus far in its history and could potentially lead to its collapse, albeit with extremely low probability.
Conclusion
State collapse is theoretically possible in North Korea, as it is in any other nation. However, North Korea’s susceptibility to collapse may be higher compared to other countries, given its relatively low score on de Corral and Schwarz’s Degree of Statehood scale, which categorizes it as a fragile/weak state.36 Nevertheless, the design, structure, and proven resilience of the North Korean party-state make state collapse highly unlikely. Over the decades, North Korea has demonstrated its ability to withstand various forms of strain and pressure, both internal and external, that could have crippled a less resilient state. Despite economic hardships, humanitarian disasters, international isolation, and factional infighting, the North Korean party-state has remained intact. Its key strengths, despite its many weaknesses, have allowed it to endure in the face of such challenges. Therefore, any scenario leading to a North Korean state collapse would have to involve unprecedented events that pose a direct threat to the structural integrity of the party-state, surpassing anything witnessed in North Korean history thus far.
If a North Korean state collapse were to occur, it would not likely be triggered by a humanitarian disaster or economic underperformance. Public dissatisfaction with the regime or international pressure, isolation, and sanctions would also not be the direct causes. The party-state is expected to be strong enough to withstand these pressures and overcome them.
A collapse of the North Korean state would be the culmination of a highly unlikely and increasingly extreme series of events. It would likely stem from a sudden and unforeseen power shift or attempted power shift at the highest levels of leadership. However, the unique characteristics of the North Korean party-state add complexity to the situation. A viable alternative that possesses the power and support necessary to successfully challenge and remove the supreme leader would also be capable of maintaining control over the party-state. In other words, the more successful the coup, the less likely a collapse becomes.
To trigger a collapse, the leadership shift would need to result in extreme divisions, violence, and factional infighting among the North Korean elites, reaching the level of a large-scale civil war that engulfs the party-state. Among the possibilities, a launched but unsuccessful attempt to force a leadership change in North Korea, with multiple powerful and armed factions vying for supremacy, appears to be the most plausible scenario for creating the conditions that lead to the failure and collapse of the North Korean party-state.
However, even this most likely collapse scenario remains highly improbable due to the inherent strengths of the North Korean party-state. While North Korea certainly has weaknesses and shares certain characteristics with failed and collapsed states, considering it doomed or highly likely to collapse would be a misunderstanding and a significant underestimation of the strengths and structural integrity of the North Korean party-state. Although planning for such a scenario should continue, North Korean policy should not hinge on the expectation of an imminent collapse unless there are verifiable indications that question the structural integrity of the party-state and its various apparatuses. In the unique case of North Korea, if a collapse were to occur, it would likely be the result of a civil war rather than the cause of it. States do not simply collapse, and North Korea is no exception.
Capt Shaquille H. James, USAF
Captain James is currently an ICBM operator assigned to the 91st Missile Wing. He earned a BA in linguistics from Georgetown University and a Certificate in Asian Studies from the Georgetown University Asian Studies Department.
Notes
1 “North Korea: COVID-19 Used As Pretext To Seal Border,” Human Rights Watch, 17 November 2022, https://www.hrw.org/; and Sang-hun Choe, “North Korea’s Leader Had Big Economic Plans. He Admits They’ve Failed,” New York Times, 19 August 19 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/.
2 Lucas Rengifo-Keller, “Food Insecurity in North Korea Is At It’s Worst Since The 1990s Famine,” 38 North, 19 January 2023, https://www.38north.org/.
3 So Yong Jong, “Yanggang Province Family Found Dead After Prolonged Bout Of Starvation,” DailyNK, 12 December 2022, https://www.dailynk.com/.
4 Bruce W. Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013), 51.
5 Bennett, North Korean Collapse, 14.
6 Ingersoll, “US Army Planning.”
7 Jena McGregor, “North Korea’s Leadership Transition From Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Eun,” Washington Post, 20 December 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.
8 “Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2021,” The Bank of Korea, 27 July 2022, https://www.bok.or.kr/; and “GDP (Current US$) – Korea, Rep.,” World Bank, 2021, https://data.worldbank.org/.
9 Rengifo-Keller, “Food Insecurity in North Korea.”
10 “WFP DPR Korea Country Brief,” World Food Programme, December, 2021.
11 North Korea Military Power. A Growing Regional And Global Threat (Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2021), 36.
12 North Korea Military Power, 36; Hyun-min An, et al, Prisoners in Military Uniform (Seoul: The Database Center For North Korean Human Rights, 2022), 102.
13 Miguel de Corral and Rolf Schwarz, “States Do Not Just Fail and Collapse,” Democracy and Security 7, no. 3 (July–September 2011), 213.
14 Robert Rotberg, State Failure And State Weakness In A Time Of Terror (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 6; and Corral and Schwarz, “States Do Not Just Fail,” 224.
15 Rotberg, “Failed States,” 6–8.
16 Rotberg, “Failed States,” 6–10.
17 William I. Zartman, Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 1, 7–8.
18 Zartman, Collapsed States, 1, 7–8.
19 Rotberg, “Failed States,” 10.
20 Rotberg, “Failed States,” 10.
21 Rotberg, “Failed States,” 9.
22 DPRK Constitution, Chap. 1, Art. 5.
23 Robert Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun. North Korea’s Social Classification System (Washington: The Committee For Human Rights in North Korea, 2012), 4–7.
24 Collins, Marked for Life, 4–7.
25 Kim Jong-il, Giving Priority to Ideological Work Is Essential for Accomplishing Socialism (1995), 36.
26 Collins, Pyongyang Republic, 128–29
27 Bennett, North Korean Collapse, 13; and John Lee, “North Korea Is A Failed State,” NK News, 21 April 2016, https://www.nknews.org/.
28 Corral and Schwarz, “States Do Not Just Fail,” 213.
29 This definition of recognized territory ignores the de-facto territorial dispute with South Korea and utilizes the Northern Half of Korea verbiage found in the DPRK Socialist Constitution.
30 Jongseok Woo, “Songun Politics and the Political Weakness of the Military In North Korea; An Institutional Account,” Problems of Post Communist 63, no. 4 (2016), 255.
31 Woo, “Songun Politics,” 255.
32 Woo, “Songun Politics,” 254.
33 Jeongmin Kim, “Starvation in North Korea Not Severe Enough to Pose Threat to Kim Jong Un: NIS,” NK News, 8 March 2023, https://www.nknews.org/.
34 Francis Grice, “The Improbability of Popular Rebellion in Kim Jong-un’s North Korea and Policy Alternatives for the USA,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 4, no. 3 (December 2017): 276–80.
35 Chris Steinitz, Ken Gause, and Elizabeth Yang, “Does Kim Jong Un Have a Succession Plan?,” 38 North, 1 May 2020, https://www.38north.org/.
36 Corral and Schwarz, “States Do Not Just Fail,” 213.
airuniversity.af.edu · July 31, 2023
12. Jeju cherry trees: force for peace
Some interesting history from Don Kirk that was unknown to me.
Jeju cherry trees: force for peace
The Korea Times · August 10, 2023
By Donald Kirk
Australian anthropologist Grant McCall had a vision for peace that extended from the south Pacific to the Korean Peninsula. A symbol of his quest for goodwill and tranquility in Korea was the Jeju King Cherry tree. And his dream of the way to pursue peace was to plant some of them in and around the resort area of Wonsan on North Korea's southeastern coast.
Grant's dream was no doubt impossible while the North's leader, Kim Jong-un, insisted on engaging in rhetorical threats and ordering missile tests. Still, Grant was optimistic. Why not, he suggested, run cruise boats from that new base on Jeju's southern coast all the way up the east coast to the port of Wonsan, where Kim is ordering the construction of a much-enlarged tourist complex not far from his own palatial home by the harbor?
Grant's notion seemed whimsical, if not farcical, but the long-range future of North-South relations is unpredictable. Might Grant's dream come true 10 or 20 or more years from now? Don't rule it out. In the twists and turns of modern Korean history, we've had no end of surprises, not all bad. Sadly, Grant will never know. He died shortly after a Zoom conference at which I read, and enlarged on, a statement by him about those cherry trees.
"The Jeju King Cherry tree, also known as Wangbeotnamu, is a symbol of peace, nutrition and sweetness," Grant wrote. "Previously it was thought to be the same as the Japanese cherry tree, but they are genetically distinct." Like those famous Jeju tangerines, King Cherries "thrive on the slopes of Mount Halla, a dramatic symbol of Jeju World Peace Island."
Grant sought to distinguish between the Jeju King Cherry tree and "the more common Japanese Yoshino Cherry tree." A study, he wrote, had revealed in 2011 that cherry trees planted at American University in Washington were Yoshino trees of the sort the Japanese in 1912 had presented to the U.S. and planted around the tidal basin of the Potomac River in Washington.
The story, however, does not stop there. Louis Goodman, retired dean of American University's School of International Service, points out that in 1943 Syngman Rhee planted four Yoshino cherry trees on the AU campus.
Rhee, who returned to South Korea with the blessing of the victorious Gen. Douglas MacArthur after the Japanese surrender of 1945, "declared that Japanese assertions that Yoshinos were Japanese were incorrect," Goodman has told me. "Since then, with the cooperation of the Korean Forestry Service, a grove of these trees has been planted on our campus and, in 2011 a replacement for one of the original four (which had died) was gifted to AU by Korea's Ambassador Han Duck-soo."
Goodman elaborated on the origin and heritage of the cherry trees in a lengthy article tracing the history of the controversy. The article quotes the AU student newspaper, The Eagle, as reporting "considerable attention" at the original planting focusing on what to call them.
Since the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, according to the paper, "attempts have been made to use several different names," the most successful of which had been "Oriental Blossoms." AU President Paul F. Douglass was reported as stating that the Koreans "had furnished proof that the trees were really of Korean origin and should rightfully be known as Korean Cherry Trees."
Considerable scientific research has focused on the differences between Yoshino and King Cherry trees, and a "Korean garden" now adorns the AU campus. Ko Chang-hoon, professor emeritus at Jeju University and a driving force behind the movement to promote the significance of the cherry trees, quotes Ambassador Han, dedicating the garden in 2011, as saying he hoped visitors would "truly feel the landscape of Korea." It would, he said, serve as "a reminder and inspiration to the future generations of Koreans and Americans of the bonds" between Korea and the U.S.
Researchers at the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Korea Forest Research Institute "confirmed that the trees, like those on the Tidal Basin, shared genetic material with the wild cherry trees of Jeju Island," according to Ko. "Although Americans had long assumed the trees were of Japanese origin," said Ko, "it turned out they were from Jeju."
If only Grant McCall had lived, he would be calling for another momentous show of appreciation for the Jeju King Cherry tree: the planting of groves in North Korea. Appropriately, the first such grove should be named for Grant in memory of his dedication to the Jeju World Peace Island bio-diplomacy initiative. Or, as Ko Chang-hoon suggests, Wangbeotnamu Diplomacy and International Peace ― the Wangbeotnamu and the Nonviolence Movement.
Donald Kirk, www.donaldkirk.com, author of "Okinawa and Jeju: Bases of Discontent," covers the confrontation of forces in Asia from Washington and Seoul.
The Korea Times · August 10, 2023
13.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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