Quotes of the Day:

"The strength of a wall is neither greater nor less than the courage of the men who defend it." 

- Genghis Khan

“Wherever the choice has had to be made between the man of reason and mad man, the world has unhesitatingly followed the madman.” 

- Aldous Huxley

"All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason." 

- Immanuel Kant

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 18, 2023

2. Why It Seems Everything We Knew About the Global Economy Is No Longer True

3. In China, Blinken Holds Talks to Restart High-Level Diplomacy

4. Biden: We won’t ‘make it easy’ for Ukraine to join NATO

5. Japan’s grand strategy as a declining power

6. Is Myanmar the Front Line of a New Cold War?

7. Will Russia’s Break With the West Be Permanent?

8. IntelBrief: UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy to be Adopted During UN “CT Week”

9. Why Nepalis Are Fighting on Both Sides of the Russia-Ukraine War

10. US reliance on China’s capital goods rules out decoupling

11. US is losing Asia’s multilateral trade game

12. Australian special forces to wear 'Big Brother' cameras into battle as part of drastic effort to expose misconduct

13. Bank of China halts transfers from Russia to EU, US, UK, and Swiss banks

14. A psychologist says she broke down in tears when she learned the horrors that 2 castrated Ukrainian soldiers endured, says report

15. Special Operations News Update - June 19, 2023 | SOF News

16. Blinken meets China's Xi Jinping in final day of high-stakes Beijing visit aimed at cooling simmering tensions

17. Moral Injury, Afghanistan, and the Path Toward Recovery

18. Pentagon’s Secret Service Trawls Social Media for Mean Tweets About Generals

19. McMaster: Blinken China trip ‘may portray a bit of weakness’

20. Secretary Antony J. Blinken And People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping Before Their Meeting

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 18, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2023

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front on June 18 and made limited territorial gains.
• Ukrainian forces may be temporarily pausing counteroffensive operations to reevaluate their tactics for future operations.
• A Wall Street Journal (WSJ) interview with Russian prisoners of war (POWs) indicates continued significant morale and command issues among frontline Russian units and the continued Russian use of “barrier forces” to shoot retreating soldiers.
• EU Internal Market Commissioner Theirry Breton announced on June 18 that the EU is accelerating arms deliveries to Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly supported select Russian milbloggers’ proposal to create a Presidential Administration working group, likely in an effort to integrate prominent milbloggers into the pro-Kremlin information space.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks north of Svatove and south of Kreminna.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to repel Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast
• Some Russian ultranationalist figures are concerned that the Russian Ministry of Defense’s efforts to formalize volunteer formations will trigger command changes and degrade combat effectiveness.
• Russian occupation officials are continuing to prioritize medical treatment for Russian military personnel in occupied Mariupol, reportedly significantly increasing the civilian mortality rate in the city.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 18, 2023

Jun 18, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 18, 2023

Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark

June 18, 2023, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2pm ET on June 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessmecnt.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front on June 18 and made limited territorial gains. Geolocated footage suggests that Ukrainian forces made limited advances within 30km south of Kreminna.[1]Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash reported that Ukrainian forces advanced more than a kilometer north of Avdiivka on the Donetsk City frontline over the past two weeks.[2] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations south, southwest, and southeast of Velyka Novosilka on the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts and made some localized advances.[3] Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and geolocated footage suggests that Ukrainian forces entered the western part of Pyatykhatky (41km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City), southwest of Orikhiv.[4] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Valeriy Shershen stated that Russian forces continue to counterattack in western Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts, and that Ukrainian forces have “a lot of work.”[5] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian forces continue to transfer personnel and heavy military equipment from around Nova Kakhovka and Kakhovka in eastern Kherson Oblast to the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline via Melitopol.[6]

Ukrainian forces may be temporarily pausing counteroffensive operations to reevaluate their tactics for future operations. Head of the Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Colonel Margo Grosberg stated on June 16 that he assesses "we won't see an offensive over the next seven days.”[7]The Wall Street Journal similarly reported on June 17 that Ukrainian forces “have mostly paused their advances in recent days” as Ukrainian command reexamines tactics.[8] These reports are consistent with ISW’s recent observations of the scale and approach of localized Ukrainian counterattacks in southern and eastern Ukraine.[9] ISW has previously noted that Ukraine has not yet committed the majority of its available forces to counteroffensive operations and has not yet launched its main effort.[10] Operational pauses are a common feature of major offensive undertakings, and this pause does not signify the end of Ukraine’s counteroffensive.

A Wall Street Journal (WSJ) interview with Russian prisoners of war (POWs) indicates continued significant morale and command issues among frontline Russian units and the continued Russian use of “barrier forces” to shoot retreating soldiers.[11]WSJ amplified the statements of three unidentified Russian POWs who voluntarily surrendered to Ukrainian forces during Ukrainian counteroffensive operations near Velyka Novosilka, on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. The POWs reported widespread fear of a Ukrainian counteroffensive among Russian forces on the frontlines. The POWs indicated that the Russian military command sees Russian conscripts and penal recruits as expendable, and claimed Russian officers order injured personnel deemed unfit for service back to the front line and use “barrier forces” to prevent penal recruits in “Storm-Z” units from retreating. Barrier forces are specialized units that threaten to shoot their own personnel either to prevent retreats or to force them to attack, and unverified social media footage recently circulated depicting Russian barrier troops shooting retreating Russian forces in Ukraine.[12] The POWs also indicated that Russian forces struggle to supply and staff their units, including struggling to crew tanks and armored vehicles.[13]The POWs expressed concern about returning to Russia in a POW exchange due to Russian laws prohibiting voluntary surrender to the enemy.

EU Internal Market Commissioner Theirry Breton announced on June 18 that the EU is accelerating arms deliveries to Ukraine. Breton referenced a pledge that the EU would supply a million high quality weapons to Ukraine over the coming year and stated that the EU is “going to step up our efforts to deliver arms and ammunition" as “this is a war of high intensity in which [high quality weapons] play a crucial role.”[14]

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly supported select Russian milbloggers’ proposal to create a Presidential Administration working group, likely in an effort to integrate prominent milbloggers into the pro-Kremlin information space. The working group would reportedly include members of the Russian presidential administration and aim to coordinate ideas on the war in Ukraine.[15] It is unclear if and how Russian milbloggers will participate in the Presidential Administration working group, however. Putin’s support of a working group to focus on war reporting suggests that Putin intends to continue to publicly engage with pro-Kremlin mobloggers in an attempt to expand his support in the ultranationalist community. The Kremlin has previously coopted prominent Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers by offering them official roles on the Russian Human Rights Council and in the Mobilization Working Group likely in exchange for amplifying pro-Kremlin rhetoric.[16]

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front on June 18 and made limited territorial gains.
• Ukrainian forces may be temporarily pausing counteroffensive operations to reevaluate their tactics for future operations.
• A Wall Street Journal (WSJ) interview with Russian prisoners of war (POWs) indicates continued significant morale and command issues among frontline Russian units and the continued Russian use of “barrier forces” to shoot retreating soldiers.
• EU Internal Market Commissioner Theirry Breton announced on June 18 that the EU is accelerating arms deliveries to Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly supported select Russian milbloggers’ proposal to create a Presidential Administration working group, likely in an effort to integrate prominent milbloggers into the pro-Kremlin information space.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks north of Svatove and south of Kreminna.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to repel Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast
• Some Russian ultranationalist figures are concerned that the Russian Ministry of Defense’s efforts to formalize volunteer formations will trigger command changes and degrade combat effectiveness.
• Russian occupation officials are continuing to prioritize medical treatment for Russian military personnel in occupied Mariupol, reportedly significantly increasing the civilian mortality rate in the city.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks north of Svatove and south of Kreminna on June 18. Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows that Ukrainian forces made limited advances near Berestove (30km south of Kreminna) and Rozdolivka (32km southwest of Kreminna).[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations near Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove), Novoselivske (19km northwest of Svatove), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[18] Footage published on June 17 and 18 purportedly shows elements of the 24th Separate Guards Spetsnaz Brigade operating along the Svatove-Kreminna line and elements of the 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating near Bilohorivka.[19]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut on June 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and Stupochky (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[20] Russian Southern Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadim Astafyev claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Mayorsk (21km southwest of Bakhmut).[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Pivnichne (20km southwest of Bakhmut).[22]

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km south of Marinka).[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks southwest of Avdiivka, near Stepove (2km north of Avdiivka), and from Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[24] Astafyev claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka).[25] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (5km north of Marinka), and Marinka.[26] Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash reported that Ukrainian forces advanced over one kilometer north of Avdiivka over the past two weeks.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued localized attacks in the Vuhledar area on June 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Vuhledar and Vodyane (6km northeast of Vuhledar).[28]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on June 18. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks: southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Novodonetske, southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and Novodarivka, and south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Urozhaine but that Russian forces still control the settlement.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) is operating near recently liberated Makarivka (6km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[31]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to repel Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 18. Numerous Russian sources claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to fight for control over Pyatykhatky (26km southeast of Orikhiv) on June 18, with many claiming that the village is currently a contested “gray zone.”[32] Geolocated footage published on June 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces reached the western part of Pyatykhatky, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces established positions on the western side of the settlement.[33] Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces liberated the entire settlement, while others claimed that Russian forces forced Ukrainian units to retreat after striking the settlement with TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems.[34] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Orikhiv, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces regained some positions near the Orikhiv-Robotyne T0408 highway.[35] The milblogger noted that Ukrainian attacks were partially successful in the Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv) direction, and another milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces advanced by 300m on the Robotyne-Pyatykhatky line.[36]

Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov revealed that the Chechen “Vostok-Akhmat” volunteer battalion is operating on the Orikhiv-western Zaporizhia Oblast frontline alongside elements of the 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District).[37] Kadyrov specified that Major Vakhy Khambulatov commands the ”Vostok-Akhmat” battalion and that Major General Ivan Popov is the commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army.[38] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian forces are deploying additional personnel and heavy military equipment from Nova Kakhovka and Kakhovka areas in eastern Kherson Oblast to the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline via Melitopol.[39]

Ukrainian forces and partisans continued to undermine Russian rear positions in southern Ukraine on June 18. Fedorov reported that Ukrainian partisans sabotaged a section of the railroad connection near Melitopol.[40] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian manpower concentration points in the Skadovsk and Kherson regions, and Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian ammunition depot in Rykove, Henichesk Raion.[41] Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces launched missile strikes against Lazurne, Skadovsk Raion and Rykove.[42] Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 80th Artic Motorized Rifle Brigade and 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (both of the Northern Fleet) struck Ukrainian military equipment located on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[43]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Some Russian ultranationalist figures are concerned that the Russian MoD’s efforts to formalize volunteer formations will trigger command changes and degrade combat effectiveness. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian MoD previously replaced the experienced commanders of Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) people’s militias with ineffective and inexperienced commanders.[44] The milbloggers claimed that the timing of the MoD’s recent order formalizing volunteer units during a Ukrainian counteroffensive is worrisome, and that the MoD may worsen these volunteer formations in the same manner the MoD worsened the DNR and LNR militias.

Some Russian commanders are reportedly withholding nongovernmental military aid from frontline units. Russian milbloggers amplified footage on June 18 showing bullet holes in vehicles that Russian military personnel purchased with their own money for military purposes.[45] The milbloggers claimed that the commander of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) - allegedly “Colonel Kutaev” - deliberately shot the vehicles likely because he did not want to Russian servicemen to accept military supplies or equipment outside of official MoD provisions. The milbloggers noted that there are Russian commanders who refuse to leverage support from nongovernmental organizations dedicated to helping supply Russian military units with equipment, drones, and vehicles.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to compete with the Russian MoD and portray Wagner as more disciplined than regular Russian forces. Prigozhin claimed that 32,000 Russian convicts completed service with Wagner and returned to Russia.[46] Prigozhin claimed that these recruits have a 0.25 percent recidivism rate and that this rate is 80 percent lower than the recidivism rate among Russian prisoners in total. The Russian MoD notably blocked Wagner’s penal colony recruitment and began its own penal recruitment efforts in winter 2023.[47] Russian President Vladimir Putin similarly claimed on June 13 that Russian convict recruits, likely referring to those recruited by the MoD, have a recidivism rate of 0.4 percent as compared to the regular recidivism rate of 40 percent, and Prigozhin is likely altering and amplifying this claimed statistic.[48] Prigozhin suggested on June 17 that Russian MoD will prevent volunteers from ever completing their military contracts after the Russian military command assumes official control over irregular formations and is likely attempting to promote Wagner forces against the backdrop of the Russian MoD’s formalization efforts.[49]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials are continuing to prioritize medical treatment for Russian military personnel in occupied Mariupol, reportedly significantly increasing the civilian mortality rate in the city. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 18 that the civilian mortality rate in Mariupol from “natural” causes significantly intensified to a peak of 400 deaths per week – 2.6 times higher than Ukraine’s national mortality rate during the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Mariupol has no functional medical system because all medical facilities are treating Russian military personnel. Russian forces have consistently used civilian medical infrastructure in occupied Ukraine for their own needs, and are struggling to compensate for the resulting shortage in available healthcare personnel and beds.[50]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Belarus continues defensive posturing along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 18 that Belarusian forces established a 1,000-kilometer-long defensive line along the international border with Ukraine.[51]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Why It Seems Everything We Knew About the Global Economy Is No Longer True

Excerpts:

Today’s sense of unease is a stark contrast with the heady triumphalism that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. It was a period when a theorist could declare that the fall of communism marked “the end of history” — that liberal democratic ideas not only vanquished rivals, but represented “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution.”

Associated economic theories about the ineluctable rise of worldwide free market capitalism took on a similar sheen of invincibility and inevitability. Open markets, hands-off government and the relentless pursuit of efficiency would offer the best route to prosperity.

It was believed that a new world where goods, money and information crisscrossed the globe would essentially sweep away the old order of Cold War conflicts and undemocratic regimes.

There was reason for optimism. During the 1990s, inflation was low while employment, wages and productivity were up. Global trade nearly doubled. Investments in developing countries surged. The stock market rose.

The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 to enforce the rules. China’s entry six years later was seen as transformative. And linking a huge market with 142 countries would irresistibly draw the Asian giant toward democracy.

China, along with South Korea, Malaysia and others, turned struggling farmers into productive urban factory workers. The furniture, toys and electronics they sold around the world generated tremendous growth.

Conclusion:

While the previous economic orthodoxy has been partly abandoned, it is not clear what will replace it. Improvisation is the order of the day. Perhaps the only assumption that can be confidently relied on now is that the path to prosperity and policy trade-offs will become murkier.

Why It Seems Everything We Knew About the Global Economy Is No Longer True

The New York Times · by Patricia Cohen · June 18, 2023

While the world’s eyes were on the pandemic, China and the war in Ukraine, the paths to prosperity and shared interests have grown murkier.

Factory workers at a Chinese company in Mexico. Communist-led China turned out to be the global economic system’s biggest beneficiary.Credit...Luis Antonio Rojas for The New York Times

By

Patricia Cohen covers the global economy and is based in London.

June 18, 2023

When the world’s business and political leaders gathered in 2018 at the annual economic forum in Davos, the mood was jubilant. Growth in every major country was on an upswing. The global economy, declared Christine Lagarde, then the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, “is in a very sweet spot.”

Five years later, the outlook has decidedly soured.

“Nearly all the economic forces that powered progress and prosperity over the last three decades are fading,” the World Bank warned in a recent analysis. “The result could be a lost decade in the making — not just for some countries or regions as has occurred in the past — but for the whole world.”

A lot has happened between then and now: A global pandemic hit; war erupted in Europe; tensions between the United States and China boiled. And inflation, thought to be safely stored away with disco album collections, returned with a vengeance.

But as the dust has settled, it has suddenly seemed as if almost everything we thought we knew about the world economy was wrong.

The economic conventions that policymakers had relied on since the Berlin Wall fell more than 30 years ago — the unfailing superiority of open markets, liberalized trade and maximum efficiency — look to be running off the rails.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, the ceaseless drive to integrate the global economy and reduce costs left health care workers without face masks and medical gloves, carmakers without semiconductors, sawmills without lumber and sneaker buyers without Nikes.

Calverton National Cemetery in New York in early 2021, where daily burials more than doubled at the height of the pandemic.Credit...Johnny Milano for The New York Times

Caring for Covid patients in Bergamo, Italy, in 2020. Cost-cutting and economic integration around the globe left health care workers scrambling for masks and other supplies when the coronavirus hit.Credit...Fabio Bucciarelli for The New York Times

The idea that trade and shared economic interests would prevent military conflicts was trampled last year under the boots of Russian soldiers in Ukraine.

And increasing bouts of extreme weather that destroyed crops, forced migrations and halted power plants has illustrated that the market’s invisible hand was not protecting the planet.

Now, as the second year of war in Ukraine grinds on and countries struggle with limp growth and persistent inflation, questions about the emerging economic playing field have taken center stage.

Globalization, seen in recent decades as unstoppable a force as gravity, is clearly evolving in unpredictable ways. The move away from an integrated world economy is accelerating. And the best way to respond is a subject of fierce debate.

Of course, challenges to the reigning economic consensus had been growing for a while.

“We saw before the pandemic began that the wealthiest countries were getting frustrated by international trade, believing — whether correctly or not — that somehow this was hurting them, their jobs and standards of living,” said Betsey Stevenson, a member of the Council of Economic Advisers during the Obama administration.

The financial meltdown in 2008 came close to tanking the global financial system. Britain pulled out of the European Union in 2016. President Donald Trump slapped tariffs on China in 2017, spurring a mini trade war.

But starting with Covid-19, the rat-a-tat series of crises exposed with startling clarity vulnerabilities that demanded attention.

As the consulting firm EY concluded in its 2023 Geostrategic Outlook, the trends behind the shift away from ever-increasing globalization “were accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic — and then they have been supercharged by the war in Ukraine.”

A view of the destruction in Bakhmut, Ukraine, in May.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Ukrainians lined up to receive humanitarian aid in Kherson last year. Trade and shared economic interests weren’t enough to prevent wars, as once thought.Credit...Lynsey Addario for The New York Times

It was the ‘end of history.’

Today’s sense of unease is a stark contrast with the heady triumphalism that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. It was a period when a theorist could declare that the fall of communism marked “the end of history” — that liberal democratic ideas not only vanquished rivals, but represented “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution.”

Associated economic theories about the ineluctable rise of worldwide free market capitalism took on a similar sheen of invincibility and inevitability. Open markets, hands-off government and the relentless pursuit of efficiency would offer the best route to prosperity.

It was believed that a new world where goods, money and information crisscrossed the globe would essentially sweep away the old order of Cold War conflicts and undemocratic regimes.

There was reason for optimism. During the 1990s, inflation was low while employment, wages and productivity were up. Global trade nearly doubled. Investments in developing countries surged. The stock market rose.

The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 to enforce the rules. China’s entry six years later was seen as transformative. And linking a huge market with 142 countries would irresistibly draw the Asian giant toward democracy.

China, along with South Korea, Malaysia and others, turned struggling farmers into productive urban factory workers. The furniture, toys and electronics they sold around the world generated tremendous growth.

China joined the World Trade Organization at a signing ceremony in 2001. Credit...Reuters

The favored economic road map helped produce fabulous wealth, lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and spur wondrous technological advances.

But there were stunning failures as well. Globalization hastened climate change and deepened inequalities.

In the United States and other advanced economies, many industrial jobs were exported to lower-wage countries, removing a springboard to the middle class.

Policymakers always knew there would be winners and losers. Still, the market was left to decide how to deploy labor, technology and capital in the belief that efficiency and growth would automatically follow. Only afterward, the thinking went, should politicians step in to redistribute gains or help those left without jobs or prospects.

Companies embarked on a worldwide scavenger hunt for low-wage workers, regardless of worker protections, environmental impact or democratic rights. They found many of them in places like Mexico, Vietnam and China.

Television, T-shirts and tacos were cheaper than ever, but many essentials like health care, housing and higher education were increasingly out of reach.

The job exodus pushed down wages at home and undercut workers’ bargaining power, spurring anti-immigrant sentiments and strengthening hard-right populist leaders like Donald Trump in the United States, Viktor Orban in Hungary and Marine Le Pen in France.

In advanced industrial giants like the United States, Britain and several European countries, political leaders turned out to be unable or unwilling to more broadly reapportion rewards and burdens.

Nor were they able to prevent damaging environmental fallout. Transporting goods around the globe increased greenhouse gas emissions. Producing for a world of consumers strained natural resources, encouraging overfishing in Southeast Asia and illegal deforestation in Brazil. And cheap production facilities polluted countries without adequate environmental standards.

It turned out that markets on their own weren’t able to automatically distribute gains fairly or spur developing countries to grow or establish democratic institutions.

Jake Sullivan, the U.S. national security adviser, said in a recent speech that a central fallacy in American economic policy had been to assume “that markets always allocate capital productively and efficiently — no matter what our competitors did, no matter how big our shared challenges grew, and no matter how many guardrails we took down.”

The proliferation of economic exchanges between nations also failed to usher in a promised democratic renaissance.

Communist-led China turned out to be the global economic system’s biggest beneficiary — and perhaps master gamesman — without embracing democratic values.

“Capitalist tools in socialist hands,” the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said in 1992, when his country was developing into the world’s factory floor. China’s astonishing growth transformed it into the world’s second largest economy and a major engine of global growth. All along, though, Beijing maintained a tight grip on its raw materials, land, capital, energy, credit and labor, as well as the movements and speech of its people.

Globalization has had enormous effects on the environment — including deforestation in Roraima State, in the Brazilian Amazon.Credit...Victor Moriyama for The New York Times

Distributing food in Johannesburg in 2020, where the pandemic caused a significant spike in the need for assistance.Credit...Joao Silva/The New York Times

Money flowed in, and poor countries paid the price.

In developing countries, the results could be dire.

The economic havoc wreaked by the pandemic combined with soaring food and fuel prices caused by the war in Ukraine have created a spate of debt crises. Rising interest rates have made those crises worse. Debts, like energy and food, are often priced in dollars on the world market, so when U.S. rates go up, debt payments get more expensive.

The cycle of loans and bailouts, though, has deeper roots.

Poorer nations were pressured to lift all restrictions on capital moving in and out of the country. The argument was that money, like goods, should flow freely among nations. Allowing governments, businesses and individuals to borrow from foreign lenders would finance industrial development and key infrastructure.

“Financial globalization was supposed to usher in an era of robust growth and fiscal stability in the developing world,” said Jayati Ghosh, an economist at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. But “it ended up doing the opposite.”

Some loans — whether from private lenders or institutions like the World Bank — didn’t produce enough returns to pay off the debt. Others were poured into speculative schemes, half-baked proposals, vanity projects or corrupt officials’ bank accounts. And debtors remained at the mercy of rising interest rates that swelled the size of debt payments in a heartbeat.

Over the years, reckless lending, asset bubbles, currency fluctuations and official mismanagement led to boom-and-bust cycles in Asia, Russia, Latin America and elsewhere. In Sri Lanka, extravagant projects undertaken by the government, from ports to cricket stadiums, helped drive the country into bankruptcy last year as citizens scavenged for food and the central bank, in a barter arrangement, paid for Iranian oil with tea leaves.

It’s a “Ponzi scheme,” Ms. Ghosh said.

Private lenders who got spooked that they would not be repaid abruptly cut off the flow of money, leaving countries in the lurch.

And the mandated austerity that accompanied bailouts from the International Monetary Fund, which compelled overextended governments to slash spending, often brought widespread misery by cutting public assistance, pensions, education and health care.

Even I.M.F. economists acknowledged in 2016 that instead of delivering growth, such policies “increased inequality, in turn jeopardizing durable expansion.”

Disenchantment with the West’s style of lending gave China the opportunity to become an aggressive creditor in countries like Argentina, Mongolia, Egypt and Suriname.

A market in Buenos Aires. China has become an aggressive creditor to countries like Argentina. Credit...Sarah Pabst for The New York Times

Self-reliance replaces cheap imports.

While the collapse of the Soviet Union cleared the way for the domination of free-market orthodoxy, the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation has now decisively unmoored it.

The story of the international economy today, said Henry Farrell, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, is about “how geopolitics is gobbling up hyperglobalization.”

Old-world style great power politics accomplished what the threat of catastrophic climate collapse, seething social unrest and widening inequality could not: It upended assumptions about the global economic order.

Josep Borrell, the European Union’s head of foreign affairs and security policy, put it bluntly in a speech 10 months after the invasion of Ukraine: “We have decoupled the sources of our prosperity from the sources of our security.” Europe got cheap energy from Russia and cheap manufactured goods from China. “This is a world that is no longer there,” he said.

Supply-chain chokeholds stemming from the pandemic and subsequent recovery had already underscored the fragility of a globally sourced economy. As political tensions over the war grew, policymakers quickly added self-reliance and strength to the goals of growth and efficiency.

“Our supply chains are not secure, and they’re not resilient,” Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen said last spring. Trade relationships should be built around “trusted partners,” she said, even if it means “a somewhat higher level of cost, a somewhat less efficient system.”

“It was naïve to think that markets are just about efficiency and that they’re not also about power,” said Abraham Newman, a co-author with Mr. Farrell of “Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy.”

Economic networks, by their very nature, create power imbalances and pressure points because countries have varying capabilities, resources and vulnerabilities.

Russia, which had supplied 40 percent of the European Union’s natural gas, tried to use that dependency to pressure the bloc to withdraw its support of Ukraine.

The United States and its allies used their domination of the global financial system to remove major Russian banks from the international payments system.

The Port of Chornomorsk near Odesa, last year. In 2021, Ukraine was the largest wheat exporter in the world.Credit...Laetitia Vancon for The New York Times

Harvesting grapes at a vineyard in South Australia. China blocked Australian exports of wine and other goods after the country expressed support for Taiwan.Credit...Adam Ferguson for The New York Times

China has retaliated against trading partners by restricting access to its enormous market.

The extreme concentrations of critical suppliers and information technology networks has generated additional choke points.

China manufactures 80 percent of the world’s solar panels. Taiwan produces 92 percent of tiny advanced semiconductors. Much of the world’s trade and transactions are figured in U.S. dollars.

The new reality is reflected in American policy. The United States — the central architect of the liberalized economic order and the World Trade Organization — has turned away from more comprehensive free trade agreements and repeatedly refused to abide by W.T.O. decisions.

Security concerns have led the Biden administration to block Chinese investment in American businesses and limit China’s access to private data on citizens and to new technologies.

And it has embraced Chinese-style industrial policy, offering gargantuan subsidies for electric vehicles, batteries, wind farms, solar plants and more to secure supply chains and speed the transition to renewable energy.

“Ignoring the economic dependencies that had built up over the decades of liberalization had become really perilous,” Mr. Sullivan, the U.S. national security adviser, said. Adherence to “oversimplified market efficiency,” he added, proved to be a mistake.

While the previous economic orthodoxy has been partly abandoned, it is not clear what will replace it. Improvisation is the order of the day. Perhaps the only assumption that can be confidently relied on now is that the path to prosperity and policy trade-offs will become murkier.

A solar farm in Yanqing district, in China. The country makes 80 percent of the world’s solar panels.Credit...Gilles Sabrié for The New York Times

Patricia Cohen is the global economics correspondent based in London. Since joining The Times in 1997, she has also written about theater, books and ideas. She is the author of “In Our Prime: The Fascinating History and Promising Future of Middle Age.”

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Failures of Globalization Shatter Long-Held Beliefs

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The New York Times · by Patricia Cohen · June 18, 2023

3. In China, Blinken Holds Talks to Restart High-Level Diplomacy

Will SECSTATE meet with Xi?

Diplomacy may not be a gift but if we want it more than China, the CCP is likely to demand some kind of concessions. We certainly have different views on diploamcy and I am not sure Dr. Chen Weiss's views align with Xi's.

Excerpts:

“Diplomacy is not a gift but an indispensable means of understanding the other side and tackling difficult issues,” said Jessica Chen Weiss, a Cornell University professor who has studied Chinese politics and was an adviser in the State Department for one year on China policy. “Re-establishing channels of communication is the bare minimum needed to reduce the growing risk of miscalculation and crisis.”

China has rebuffed attempts by the Biden administration to establish so-called guardrails to prevent potential accidents in contested areas like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea from spiraling out of control. Analysts say Beijing views its unpredictability and growing appetite for risk as a useful deterrent to persuade the United States to think twice about patrolling the waters and skies around China.

China has repeatedly blamed the United States for the deterioration in bilateral ties. No issue rankles Beijing more than Washington’s perceived growing support for Taiwan, the de facto independent island claimed by China. Beijing has also sought to push back against Washington’s efforts to restrict its access to advanced semiconductor chips and manufacturing equipment, as well as deepening defense ties with regional partners like Japan, Australia and the Philippines.

Analysts said China may have been driven to meet with Mr. Blinken for a number of reasons. Pressure may be mounting on Beijing to stabilize ties because of China’s worsening economy. Other countries have also been imploring China and the United States to break the cycle of hostility. Mr. Xi may have also wanted to steady the relationship so that he’s received like a global statesman if he chooses to attend a leaders’ summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group of nations in San Francisco in November.

“China has spent the past several months blaming the United States for all that is wrong in the relationship and inside China more broadly. Now, China’s leaders need to carve out political space to pivot toward more direct communication,” said Ryan Hass, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who was director for China at the National Security Council under President Obama.

In China, Blinken Holds Talks to Restart High-Level Diplomacy

By Edward Wong and David Pierson

Edward Wong is reporting from Beijing and David Pierson from Singapore

The New York Times · by David Pierson · June 18, 2023

The talks between Antony J. Blinken, the secretary of state, and Wang Yi, Beijing’s top foreign policy official, were a prelude to a likely meeting with China’s leader, Xi Jinping.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken meeting with China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, in Beijing on Monday.Credit...Pool photo by Leah Millis

By Edward Wong and

Edward Wong is reporting from Beijing and David Pierson from Singapore

June 18, 2023, 10:57 p.m. ET

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met on Monday with Wang Yi, the top foreign policy official in China, in the second day of high-level diplomatic talks in Beijing between the two governments to try to rebuild channels of communication that crumbled during an explosive clash over a Chinese spy balloon early this year.

The talks on a rainy morning in the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse were a prelude to a likely meeting between Mr. Blinken and Xi Jinping, China’s leader, in the afternoon. The two governments have not formally announced that meeting, but American and Chinese officials have spoken of the planning for it in optimistic tones in recent days. They have said the two days of diplomacy in Beijing would ideally lead to a series of visits soon to the Chinese capital by other cabinet-level American officials.

The efforts to establish regular top-level diplomacy come at a pivotal point in the fraught relationship between the two nations. Bilateral relations between the United States and China are at their lowest point in decades. Tensions soared in February when the Pentagon announced that a Chinese surveillance balloon was drifting across the continental United States, then ordered American fighter jets to shoot it down.

Mr. Blinken canceled a scheduled visit to Beijing hours before leaving as U.S. lawmakers voiced fury over the balloon. That infuriated Chinese officials, who said the entire episode spoiled progress made four months earlier in Bali, Indonesia, when President Biden and Mr. Xi agreed to try to stabilize ties. Chinese officials have continued to say the balloon had been launched for weather research and had floated off course.

Relations were further strained in February when Mr. Blinken confronted Mr. Wang on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference to tell him Washington believed China was considering providing lethal support to Russia for its war in Ukraine. China responded by freezing some important diplomatic exchanges and intensifying anti-American rhetoric.

The two men appeared to be cordial on Monday, when they walked together down a hallway with a red carpet into a meeting room. As with Mr. Blinken’s long meeting in the same statehouse compound with Qin Gang, the Chinese foreign minister, on Sunday, delegations from the two governments sat at long tables facing each other.

Mr. Blinken and Mr. Qin had made progress by Sunday night on rebuilding regular diplomacy, even as they spoke candidly in the seven-and-a-half hour meeting about the areas of conflict in the relationship, according to readouts from each government and a briefing by State Department officials to reporters traveling with Mr. Blinken.

On Sunday, Mr. Blinken met with China’s foreign minister, Qin Gang, right, for more than seven hours.Credit...Pool photo by Leah Millis

The U.S. officials said the two governments had agreed to have working groups and diplomats meet soon on a range of issues, including people-to-people exchanges and journalist visas. The U.S. officials also said they and Chinese counterparts had agreed to expand direct flights between the two nations.

The two days of meetings may arrest the downward spiral in ties. Analysts say it will take much more for the two sides to overcome the mistrust that weighs on the relationship, but aiming to rebuild a foundation of high-level diplomacy is a worthwhile start.

“Diplomacy is not a gift but an indispensable means of understanding the other side and tackling difficult issues,” said Jessica Chen Weiss, a Cornell University professor who has studied Chinese politics and was an adviser in the State Department for one year on China policy. “Re-establishing channels of communication is the bare minimum needed to reduce the growing risk of miscalculation and crisis.”

China has rebuffed attempts by the Biden administration to establish so-called guardrails to prevent potential accidents in contested areas like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea from spiraling out of control. Analysts say Beijing views its unpredictability and growing appetite for risk as a useful deterrent to persuade the United States to think twice about patrolling the waters and skies around China.

China has repeatedly blamed the United States for the deterioration in bilateral ties. No issue rankles Beijing more than Washington’s perceived growing support for Taiwan, the de facto independent island claimed by China. Beijing has also sought to push back against Washington’s efforts to restrict its access to advanced semiconductor chips and manufacturing equipment, as well as deepening defense ties with regional partners like Japan, Australia and the Philippines.

Analysts said China may have been driven to meet with Mr. Blinken for a number of reasons. Pressure may be mounting on Beijing to stabilize ties because of China’s worsening economy. Other countries have also been imploring China and the United States to break the cycle of hostility. Mr. Xi may have also wanted to steady the relationship so that he’s received like a global statesman if he chooses to attend a leaders’ summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group of nations in San Francisco in November.

“China has spent the past several months blaming the United States for all that is wrong in the relationship and inside China more broadly. Now, China’s leaders need to carve out political space to pivot toward more direct communication,” said Ryan Hass, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who was director for China at the National Security Council under President Obama.

“Beijing sees it as in its interest to communicate directly to manage stresses in the relationship and build an on-ramp for President Xi to meet with President Biden in the fall,” Mr. Hass added.

Edward Wong is a diplomatic correspondent who has reported for The Times for more than 24 years from New York, Baghdad, Beijing and Washington. He was on a team of Pulitzer Prize finalists for Iraq War coverage. @ewong

David Pierson covers Chinese foreign policy and China’s economic and cultural engagement with the world. @dhpierson

The New York Times · by David Pierson · June 18, 2023

4. Biden: We won’t ‘make it easy’ for Ukraine to join NATO

Make it easy? I do not understand the comment. Ukraine has paid more in blood and treasure to defend against Russian aggression than any NATO member.  

And I do not understand this statement below either. Do we think this will somehow convince China to become a responsible member of the international community?

Excerpt:

Biden indicated to reporters that the balloon may not have been an intentional spying effort by the Chinese government.

“I don’t think the leadership knew where it was, and knew what was in it, and knew what was going on,” Biden said. “I think it was more embarrassing than it was intentional.”

Biden: We won’t ‘make it easy’ for Ukraine to join NATO

By GISELLE RUHIYYIH EWING

06/17/2023 11:49 AM EDT

Politico

The president added that the U.S. has “done a lot” to make sure Ukraine has the “ability to coordinate militarily.”

President Joe Biden speaks to members of the media before boarding Air Force One at Andrews Air Force Base, Md., for a trip to Philadelphia, Saturday, June 17, 2023. | Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP Photo

06/17/2023 11:49 AM EDT

President Joe Biden on Saturday said his administration would not “make it easy” for Ukraine to join NATO, adding that the war-torn nation must meet the same standards as other member states.

Asked in a gaggle in Philadelphia about easing Ukraine’s path to joining the transatlantic alliance — likely in reference to the Membership Action Plan, a key obstacle in Ukraine’s efforts — Biden said: “No. Because they’ve got to meet the same standards. So we’re not going to make it easy.”

According to the MAP, candidate nations must make military and democratic reforms before consideration for NATO membership. Last week, Biden officials said the president was “open to” waiving the requirement for Ukraine, which this week launched a counterattack amid Russia’s war of aggression.

Biden added that the U.S. has “done a lot” to make sure Ukraine has the “ability to coordinate militarily.”

Biden on Saturday also conveyed a hopeful outlook on U.S.-China relations ahead of Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to Beijing this weekend.

Blinken had been set to visit China in February but the trip was canceled after a U.S. fighter jet downed a Chinese spy balloon off the coast of the Carolinas.

Biden indicated to reporters that the balloon may not have been an intentional spying effort by the Chinese government.

“I don’t think the leadership knew where it was, and knew what was in it, and knew what was going on,” Biden said. “I think it was more embarrassing than it was intentional.”

In addition to Blinken’s visit, Biden indicated that he would meet with China’s President Xi Jinping again “over the next several months” to discuss how to “get along” despite “legitimate differences.”

Upon arrival in Philadelphia, where Biden is scheduled to headline a rally with labor unions and overfly the site of the I-95 bridge collapse, the president was greeted by adviser Anita Dunn, Sen. Bob Casey, Rep. Brendan Boyle, Gov. Josh Shapiro and Sen. John Fetterman.

At a press briefing with the Pennsylvania officials following the aerial tour of the I-95, Biden said “there’s no more important project right now in the country, as far as I’m concerned,” and said he was directing his team “not figuratively, but literally, to move heaven and earth to get this done as soon as humanly possible.”

Biden also committed that the federal government would “reimburse 100 percent” of the first phase of I-95 reconstruction, and then “90 percent” of the expenses thereafter.

Asked earlier whether he anticipated a contentious presidential campaign, Biden quipped: “It depends on who the nominee is.”

POLITICO

Politico

5. Japan’s grand strategy as a declining power

Excerpts:

This emergent grand strategy remains nameless because the country is yet to address many crucial questions before it can be fully described, let alone conceptualised.

One of the main questions is whether Japan is able to use the elevated influence it anticipates to better manage its tension-prone bilateral relationship with China. Relaxed self-restraints, a stronger US–Japan alliance and more active regional diplomacy all constitute a signal to Chinese leaders that Japan remains a formidable neighbour, despite its relative decline, and one with which even a vastly superior China must coexist.

To emphasise this ‘coexistence’ message, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government held a summit with China’s leader Xi Jinping and established a direct hotline between the two countries’ defence organisations. Further progress on Japan’s China policy — beyond these symbolic steps — could produce a positive spillover effect on other aspects of its grand strategy. It would make East Asian states more comfortable about partnering with Japan and give Tokyo greater confidence in steering the US alliance. The lift of Japan’s influence would also add further pressure on China to take Japan more seriously.

Japan’s grand strategy as a declining power | East Asia Forum

eastasiaforum.org · by Yusuke Ishihara · June 18, 2023

Author: Yusuke Ishihara, NIDS

The Yoshida Doctrine is no longer fit to understand Japan’s grand strategy. Its precepts emerged under former prime minister Shigeru Yoshida as an interim grand strategy in the aftermath of Japan’s defeat in the Second World War and was designed to help to realise the country’s economic recovery and redevelopment.

The Yoshida Doctrine prescribed that Japan maintain two principles. First, the continuation of a US military presence to guarantee Japan’s national security. Second, that it would eschew a resource-consuming and politically destabilising military build-up. To implement the latter principle, Japan gradually established a number of policy self-restraints, such as a defence budget ceiling of 1 per cent of GDP and the choice not to acquire long-range missiles and nuclear weapons.

The Yoshida Doctrine’s original economic purpose was achieved by the 1970s, though Tokyo retained it for a number reasons, including assuaging its regional neighbours’ worries about its potential as a military menace as it became the region’s largest economic power.

The continuation of the Yoshida Doctrine was far from easy. Many Japanese leaders had serious discomfort about its foundations — including the useful, yet constraining, security treaty with Washington which legally sanctioned a US military presence in Japanese territory. While some Japanese policymakers did imagine Japan’s future without the security treaty, Tokyo judged that the country should stick to the alliance framework. One reason was to contribute to regional stability by rendering its self-restraints more credible in the eyes of neighbours.

To complement this reassurance, Japan also exercised self-restraint in regional multilateralism by carefully avoiding any outright leadership and respecting Southeast Asian countries’ initiatives. This reassurance logic of the Yoshida Doctrine survived the end of the Cold War.

Over the last decade, some key assumptions underpinning the Yoshida Doctrine have become outdated because of Japan’s relative decline.

‘Declinism’ is an unstated thesis in Japanese domestic debates on its grand strategy, but its influence on the country’s strategic thinking and practices is unmistakable in two respects.

First, Japanese leaders’ imagination about their available military options has stretched as Japan’s self-restraints have eased. Tokyo’s recent decisions to acquire long-range missiles and abolish the 1 per cent GDP ceiling on defence spending, reversing decades-old policy positions, are examples of Japan’s changing view on the reassurance imperative.

Second, Japanese leaders’ imagination about Japan’s broader strategic options has shrunk. Unlike during Japan’s economic ascent, no members of the Japanese government are entertaining departing from the defence treaty with the United States. Instead they emphasise how Japan’s eroding self-restraints will bring Tokyo and Washington even closer together as military allies. A weakened Japan cannot imagine any other option but to embrace the United States, especially in dealing with China’s rising power.

Tokyo’s willingness to strengthen its military alliance with Washington further does not mean Japan simply supports US pushback against China. Despite Japan’s relative material decline, it seeks a comprehensive influence on Washington’s thinking.

Japan’s acquisition of longer-range strike capabilities, combined with the growing geopolitical importance of its location next to Taiwan, is making Tokyo an essential ally for US–China strategy. This allows Japan to seek to have greater say in strategic discussions and coordination. As a close ally, Tokyo has also been voicing its concerns about Washington’s democracy-versus-autocracy narrative and signalling its reservations about the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

Tokyo’s attempt to relax self-restraints and expand its influence is not only observable in Japan–US bilateral interactions. The same trend emerged earlier in Japan’s regional economic diplomacy. The most obvious example is the leading role played by former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s government in saving the Trans-Pacific Partnership after the US withdrawal in 2017. Abe was not constrained by regional suspicions about Japanese ambitions or a desire to avoid any regional political backlash.

As these common trends suggest, Japan’s emergent grand strategy focuses on mitigating the negative impact its diminishing material strength has on its international influence by overturning many longstanding self-restraints.

This emergent grand strategy remains nameless because the country is yet to address many crucial questions before it can be fully described, let alone conceptualised.

One of the main questions is whether Japan is able to use the elevated influence it anticipates to better manage its tension-prone bilateral relationship with China. Relaxed self-restraints, a stronger US–Japan alliance and more active regional diplomacy all constitute a signal to Chinese leaders that Japan remains a formidable neighbour, despite its relative decline, and one with which even a vastly superior China must coexist.

To emphasise this ‘coexistence’ message, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government held a summit with China’s leader Xi Jinping and established a direct hotline between the two countries’ defence organisations. Further progress on Japan’s China policy — beyond these symbolic steps — could produce a positive spillover effect on other aspects of its grand strategy. It would make East Asian states more comfortable about partnering with Japan and give Tokyo greater confidence in steering the US alliance. The lift of Japan’s influence would also add further pressure on China to take Japan more seriously.

If Japan succeeds, its emergent grand strategy as a declining power could become more than an attempt to balance China. As Kishida has alluded, his gaze is set not on ‘a converged single set of values’, but on creating a modus vivendi in Asia which would at least prevent regional disagreements from escalating into catastrophe and enable peaceful coexistence, including between Japan and China. Whether and how Japan can cultivate this endeavour, despite its decline, will shape the nature of the country’s new grand strategy and its effect on the transition of the regional order in Asia.

Yusuke Ishihara is a Senior Fellow at The National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent the official positions of NIDS.

eastasiaforum.org · by Yusuke Ishihara · June 18, 2023

6. Is Myanmar the Front Line of a New Cold War?

This is strategic competition in the gray zone. This type of competition is going to be more likely for the foreseeable future than an invasion of Taiwan. Who in DOD is responsible for campaigning to win in this kind of struggle competition in the gray zone? Do we understand what kind of war is being fought by multiple parties here? Who is orchestrating the supporting military campaign in support of competitive statecraft in our interagency?

Tim Heinneman continues his pilot team work in Burma for whenever we decide to do something. Maybe support to the resistance is something we should consider.

Excerpts:

The United States, for its part, should understand that it can no longer dismiss Myanmar as strategically unimportant. Given the country’s location at the meeting point of South Asia and Southeast Asia, a stable Myanmar is essential for stability in the region at large. As a first step, the United States should turn more attention to Myanmar, as it pledged to do in the BURMA Act, and persuade its allies and partners to align their policies.

Yet the U.S. government should not view the civil war as a zero-sum competition with China, whose geographic proximity to and major interests in Myanmar make it a necessary part of any settlement. On the contrary, Washington should try to coordinate its Myanmar policy with Beijing, if only to build the necessary guardrails to preclude escalation. U.S. officials should make their case by appealing to the pragmatism of Chinese leaders: The United States and China’s shared interest in regional stability means the junta must go. And since the junta will consider a peaceful negotiated settlement only if it sees no path to military victory, U.S. assistance to the resistance forces under the BURMA Act is not a threat to China but is instead in line with Beijing’s own goals. Moreover, Beijing should be well aware that the junta’s complete lack of popular support makes it a risky long-term partner.

For Southeast Asian states, keeping Cold War dynamics from fracturing the region should be a paramount concern, one that takes precedence over increasingly unworkable norms around noninterference and consensus. Recent moves by Thailand to rehabilitate the junta are the exact wrong approach, giving the regime a false sense that it can hold on to power. Instead, ASEAN’s interest in regional stability points to one solution only: removing Myanmar’s main destabilizing agent, the junta, from power.

Is Myanmar the Front Line of a New Cold War?

How America and China Are Reshaping the Burmese Civil War

By Ye Myo Hein and Lucas Myers

June 19, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Ye Myo Hein and Lucas Myers · June 19, 2023

Ever since the Burmese military seized power in a coup in early 2021, the country has been caught in a deadly tailspin. What began as peaceful mass protest against the junta flared into armed resistance, with much of the country descending into renewed civil war. The conflict has since turned into a protracted insurgency, with newer pro-democracy forces fighting alongside ethnic armed groups that have battled central authorities for decades. Amid growing signs of a strategic stalemate, both the junta and the resistance appear determined to fight on. Neighboring states have tried to mediate, but a negotiated peace is not in sight.

For much of the last two years, the Burmese crisis received minimal attention from the United States and China, despite unfolding at a time of intensifying great-power tensions. Washington and its partners have voiced support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy faction, yet geopolitical considerations have limited their willingness to take forceful action against the junta. Although Beijing favors the military dictatorship in some respects, it initially opted to wait and see, too.

But this great-power restraint is now breaking down. Misperceiving several developments as indications that the antiregime forces are American proxies, Beijing is moving with increasing determination to shore up the junta. The result is what one might call Cold War–ization: the civil war is attracting outside meddling by great-power rivals, each fearing that inaction would benefit the other side.

This puts other countries in the region, particularly those in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, in a bind. One of ASEAN’s core tenets has been that it should not be forced to choose between the United States and China. Instead, the group values maintaining good relations with both great powers. But as Myanmar’s civil war takes on aspects of a Cold War proxy conflict—a situation brought on in part by the unwillingness of governments in the region to unite against the junta early on—the country’s neighbors may soon face that exact choice: not just between a junta and a pro-democracy resistance but between China and the United States. For Washington and its allies, meanwhile, the entrenchment of a military junta beholden to China would portend diminished influence and greater instability throughout Southeast Asia.

A RENEWED CIVIL WAR

The February 2021 coup set Myanmar on a path to conflict and devastation. The putschists enjoyed scarce support among the population, which rallied behind deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets in peaceful protest. Members of the ousted government banded together with several other political and ethnic groups to proclaim a civilian National Unity Government to restore democracy. The military’s answer was to unleash relentless and often indiscriminate violence on its opponents.

By the spring of 2021, Myanmar was careening toward a renewed civil war, with opponents of the military dictatorship taking up arms and vowing to fight back rather than retreat. The resistance found allies among the country’s almost two dozen ethnic armed groups—organizations located along Myanmar’s periphery, some with close economic and political ties to neighboring China, that have fought for increased autonomy or outright independence ever since Myanmar’s founding in 1947.

Although facing a ruthless and better-equipped adversary, the pro-democracy and ethnic armed groups quickly gained a foothold in many rural areas, especially along the country’s borders with India, China, and Thailand. As early as mid-2021, the junta’s leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, conceded that his forces did not control the entire country. They have since held their ground in the countryside but have struggled to take cities and towns, in part because they are outgunned by the regime’s heavy artillery and at the mercy of its air force. As of late spring 2023, the two parties appear to have reached a strategic stalemate.

DOUBLE GAMES

The United States’ approach to post-coup Myanmar has consisted of a cautious and pragmatic balancing act between values and interests. Washington opposes the junta, yet it is also wary of alienating its allies and partners in the region, some of whom have maintained engagement with the Burmese military since the coup.

High-level U.S. officials have met with Burmese opposition resistance leaders, and the U.S. government has issued targeted sanctions against high-ranking military officials. But the sanctions have left untouched the junta’s most prized asset: Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, a military-owned firm that generates some $1.5 billion in annual revenues and offers the regime much-needed access to foreign currency. Washington has also refrained from imposing secondary sanctions on those who do business with the junta, such as Thai energy companies and Singaporean financial firms.

This restraint on the part of the United States is likely meant to placate other countries in the region, particularly Thailand, whose government—itself brought to power in a coup in 2014—remains supportive of the Burmese junta and maintains close economic ties to the regime. Important U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, India, and Japan, have voiced their “concern” about the Burmese crisis but fear that excessive pressure would open the regime to greater Chinese influence. As a result, they have maintained or, in the case of India, expanded their economic and diplomatic ties to the junta and are unlikely to provide support to the Burmese resistance.

Not unlike the United States, China has viewed the chaos in Myanmar with ambivalence. Beijing enjoyed good relations with Aung San Suu Kyi’s government before its overthrow. From the Chinese perspective, the outbreak of a civil war next door—China and Myanmar share a 1,300-mile border—was bad news for regional stability and for China’s multibillion-dollar investments in Myanmar under the Belt and Road Initiative. China was and remains one of the Burmese military’s leading arms suppliers, but it has never quite trusted the military’s leadership, which it views as too unpredictable. Beijing also supports some of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, including by acquiescing to an underground cross-border arms trade.

For this and other reasons, leaders in Beijing opted to hedge their bets in the aftermath of the coup. Although they never denounced the junta or explicitly called for a return to civilian rule, they opened a backchannel to the National Unity Government and pressured the regime not to dissolve Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy. When fighting between the junta and an ethnic armed group led to the accidental shelling of a Chinese border town, Beijing reportedly warned the junta that another such incident would draw “the necessary response.” Chinese leaders also kept the ruling generals at arm’s length. When Wang Yi, then the Chinese foreign minister, visited Myanmar in the summer of 2022, he declined to meet with Min Aung Hlaing, the junta’s leader, a move that was seen at the time as a major diplomatic snub.

CHINA GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE

The complex array of American and Chinese interests at play in Myanmar allowed the country to mostly avoid the gravity well of U.S.-Chinese competition, at least for a while. The warring parties on the ground may view their fight as part of a global struggle between democracy and autocracy, a fact most evident in the resistance’s vocal support for Ukraine and the junta’s Russian sympathies. But the same has not been true of Washington and Beijing, for whom the civil war has been an exercise in balancing and hedging, not in proxy warfare. In September 2021, the United States and China even collaborated to block the junta from taking over Myanmar’s seat at the United Nations.

Things have taken a turn for the worse over the past year, however, as Beijing has abandoned its initial caution and embraced the junta. Driving this shift is China’s perception that the United States has itself changed course and that Washington now fully supports—and is solidifying its influence over—the pro-democracy resistance. Two developments in particular have triggered Beijing: new U.S. legislation on Myanmar and last year’s decision by the National Unity Government to open an office in Washington.

In truth, neither step signals a meaningful shift in U.S. policy. The law in question, the 2023 BURMA Act, reiterates Washington’s goal of reversing the coup and calls for the provision of nonlethal military aid (mostly communications equipment) to antiregime forces. Yet the law mandates neither lethal military support nor sanctions on the junta’s oil and gas business, and even the disbursement of nonlethal aid has lagged. U.S. efforts on behalf of Myanmar’s rebels are negligible—practically nonexistent—in comparison with the support the United States is providing to Ukraine, for instance, in its war against Russia. As for the National Unity Government’s new office in the U.S. capital, its goal is to coordinate and amplify the resistance’s advocacy, but whether it succeeds in this task is another question.

These caveats notwithstanding, Beijing’s reaction has been to throw its weight more forcefully behind the junta, ending two years of relative disengagement. In May, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang met with Min Aung Hlaing, declaring that China would help Myanmar “achieve reconciliation under the constitutional and legal framework”—diplomatic code for supporting the military regime. Earlier this year, the junta banned Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, which it would likely not have done without feeling that it had Beijing’s assent. According to insiders, Chinese interlocutors have also urged the pro-democracy resistance not to grow too close with the West.

Beijing’s new special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, has gone on the offensive, too. In recent months, Deng has held a flurry of meetings with junta leaders and representatives of several ethnic armed groups and is reportedly pushing for cease-fires between these parties. That outcome would benefit the regime and hobble the resistance: a truce with Chinese-aligned ethnic armed groups would drive a wedge between them and their pro-democracy allies, whose fighters rely on the ethnic armed groups for training, manpower, and equipment (a large portion of which is of Chinese origin or is built using Chinese-made parts. The regime, on the other hand, would be fighting on fewer fronts at once and could redeploy its soldiers to the most important hot spots. The result would be an emboldened junta, confident of its chances for survival and willing to fight on.

GET OFF THE FENCE

China’s newfound interest and engagement in Myanmar brings to mind Cold War–era conflicts in Southeast Asia, such as wars in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Then as now, rival domestic factions curried favor with and sought support from rivaling superpowers—which were often receptive to these efforts, driven by a fear that the other side would otherwise gain a leg up.

Myanmar today is no exception. Competition between China and its rivals—above all, the United States and India—is reshaping domestic politics in many countries in the Indo-Pacific as local actors feel compelled to pick sides. The Maldives and Sri Lanka have for years been caught in a geopolitical push and pull between India and China. The question of Chinese influence, and of embracing or rejecting China’s growing regional ambitions, has become a political lightning rod elsewhere in South Asia, parts of Southeast Asia, and Oceania. But the stakes are particularly high in an armed conflict such as Myanmar’s, where China’s growing involvement risks prolonged suffering and additional great-power tensions.

Given the state of U.S.-Chinese relations and the ideological dimension of Myanmar’s civil war, it was perhaps inevitable that the warring parties would become entangled in broader geopolitical rivalries. But substantial culpability lies with regional actors who have long since abdicated responsibility and thereby ceded the playing field to Beijing. ASEAN has performed especially poorly. Owing to the bloc’s focus on consensus building and noninterference, it has proven incapable of exerting any serious pressure on the junta. Its flagship diplomatic initiative in the conflict, an unworkable 2021 agreement known as the Five-Point Consensus, quickly lost steam because it lacked enforcement mechanisms. Meek attempts at backdoor diplomacy by the Indonesian government, which currently chairs ASEAN, have failed to make progress, too. Meanwhile, several autocratic ASEAN member states appear eager to rehabilitate the junta within the organization, including Thailand and Laos, which is set to assume the role of chair for 2024.

Instead of endless dithering and talk of engaging “all stakeholders,” ASEAN members and other countries in the region should face the facts. First, the Burmese military is the structural and proximate cause for the violence that has repeatedly engulfed Myanmar for three-quarters of a century. Second, the military is incapable of achieving battlefield victory, as evidenced by its failure to consolidate control over rural areas, defeat the ethnic armed groups, and suppress popular resistance despite its overwhelmingly superior firepower. Its removal from power is the only realistic option for achieving long-term peace in the country. The diplomatic efforts of ASEAN and other states should reflect that reality. ASEAN could learn from the African Union, which in 2019 suspended Sudan for its military’s failure to hand over power to civilians.

Washington should try to coordinate its Myanmar policy with Beijing.

Finally, ASEAN will risk obsolescence if it sticks to seeking cooperation and striving to accommodate both great powers. This approach is already proving ineffective in the South China Sea in the face of aggressive Chinese territorial expansion. In Myanmar, ASEAN needs to make some hard choices and get off the fence. China’s diplomatic efforts to shore up the junta, if successful, will only drag out the conflict and consolidate a regime beholden to China’s revisionist geopolitical goals. That outcome, in turn, would likely portend greater pressure on other states in the region to align with either Washington or Beijing—an outcome that no one within ASEAN wants.

The United States, for its part, should understand that it can no longer dismiss Myanmar as strategically unimportant. Given the country’s location at the meeting point of South Asia and Southeast Asia, a stable Myanmar is essential for stability in the region at large. As a first step, the United States should turn more attention to Myanmar, as it pledged to do in the BURMA Act, and persuade its allies and partners to align their policies.

Yet the U.S. government should not view the civil war as a zero-sum competition with China, whose geographic proximity to and major interests in Myanmar make it a necessary part of any settlement. On the contrary, Washington should try to coordinate its Myanmar policy with Beijing, if only to build the necessary guardrails to preclude escalation. U.S. officials should make their case by appealing to the pragmatism of Chinese leaders: The United States and China’s shared interest in regional stability means the junta must go. And since the junta will consider a peaceful negotiated settlement only if it sees no path to military victory, U.S. assistance to the resistance forces under the BURMA Act is not a threat to China but is instead in line with Beijing’s own goals. Moreover, Beijing should be well aware that the junta’s complete lack of popular support makes it a risky long-term partner.

For Southeast Asian states, keeping Cold War dynamics from fracturing the region should be a paramount concern, one that takes precedence over increasingly unworkable norms around noninterference and consensus. Recent moves by Thailand to rehabilitate the junta are the exact wrong approach, giving the regime a false sense that it can hold on to power. Instead, ASEAN’s interest in regional stability points to one solution only: removing Myanmar’s main destabilizing agent, the junta, from power.

• YE MYO HEIN is Visiting Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace.
• LUCAS MYERS is Senior Associate for Southeast Asia at the Wilson Center.

Foreign Affairs · by Ye Myo Hein and Lucas Myers · June 19, 2023

7. Will Russia’s Break With the West Be Permanent?

My flippant response is as long as Putin is in power.

Excerpts:

The breakup between Russia and the West has acquired an aura of permanence. For Putin’s Russia to rethink its ties to the West, the West would have to withdraw its military support for Ukraine and agree to a neutral Ukraine or a divided Ukraine in which Russia has dominion over at least half of the country.

This is highly unlikely to happen. For the West to rethink its ties to Russia, Russia would have to end the war, participate in the war crimes trials of Russians, turn Putin over to The Hague, and pay war reparations to Ukraine. This, too, is highly unlikely. No matter how long the war continues, and regardless of how it ends, it will almost certainly leave in place a crucial new reality of twenty-first-century international relations. Russia will be absent from the West and the West absent from Russia, an abyss of hostility between them.

Will Russia’s Break With the West Be Permanent?

Putin Has Created a Rupture That Will Be Difficult to Repair

By Michael Kimmage and Maria Lipman

June 19, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Michale Kimmage and Maria Lipman · June 19, 2023

The war that is currently raging between Russia and Ukraine began in 2014. It started with a clash between Russia and Ukraine over Ukraine’s orientation, so important to Moscow that it risked its working relationship with the West by annexing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine—and so important to the West that it levied sanctions on Russia and made efforts to isolate Russia diplomatically. In 2022, Russia widened the war. The tremor of conflict in 2014 turned into an earthquake as far as Russia and the West were concerned. The Kremlin now presents itself as at war with the “collective West,” and in support of Ukraine, the West is eager to isolate Russia as much as it can.

Although it is not the only driver of Russia’s dramatic break with Europe and the United States, the war has radically exacerbated this rupture. Russia’s internal transformation under Russian President Vladimir Putin long predates Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and its consequences will be felt long after the war is over. This transformation is Russia’s departure from the West—a shift even more all-encompassing than was the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. One half of this story is Russia’s separation from Europe and the United States and its loss of contact with people, governments, institutions, and companies in the West. The other half is the newly anti-Western tenor of Russian life, a trend that is both spontaneous and government mandated. The speed with which these changes have taken place is unprecedented in Russian history.

In a dramatic intensification of its 2014 drive to stigmatize and isolate Russia, the West made cutting off the country an explicit policy goal. As of 2023, Russia is led by a man the International Criminal Court has designated a war criminal. The country is enmeshed in an escalating war that has horrified and terrified many people in the West. For as long as this Russia is in evidence, Western leaders will distance it from their markets, bar it from gaining access to their technology, and keep its ruling elite and broad swaths of its economy under sanctions.

The rising wall of separation extends, at times, to Russians per se. In May, PEN America canceled a panel discussion with two Russian writers, both of them strong opponents of the war, at its annual World Voices Festival in New York. The organization had come under pressure from Ukrainians who had been invited to a separate event at the festival and who had threatened to withdraw if Russians also participated, regardless of whether they were supporters of Putin’s war. The decision was startling given PEN’s mission to protect literary freedom and its charter’s claim that “in all circumstances, and particularly in time of war, works of art, the patrimony of humanity at large, should be left untouched by national or political passion.” The more such episodes there are—banning Russians from public events simply because of their nationality—the more the Kremlin can gloat about its decision to separate itself from the West. As long as the war continues, there will be no way to undo this profound parting of the ways.

Putin’s zeal for detaching Russia from Europe and the United States is mostly beyond the West’s control. Breaking with the West has become synonymous with his regime, a part of its political and ideological essence. The forces driving this break will be immensely difficult for any Putin successor to reverse, assuming that a leader who is not expressly anti-Western can still come to power in Russia. For decades, conflict between Russia and the West may be an entrenched aspect of the international order.

TO EUROPE WITH LOVE

Against the grain of the present moment, modern Russia was built in dialogue and contact with Europe. Beginning in the seventeenth century under Peter the Great and continuing under Catherine the Great in the eighteenth century, Russia strove to be ever more European. Thanks to their efforts, Russia joined the European state system. In 1812, Russia defeated Napoleon and then joined with Prussia and Austria to guarantee the continent’s stability. In the nineteenth century, Russia became one of Europe’s indispensable nations, a major component of the balance of power after the Congress of Vienna and an organic part of pre–World War I European diplomacy.

In the nineteenth century, Russia made significant contributions from within European culture, especially with its literature, music, and ballet. Such were the achievements of Anton Chekhov, Leo Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Ivan Turgenev, Pyotr Tchaikovsky, and many others. This efflorescence of Russian culture was stimulated by contact with European ideas and European works of art. And Russia’s ruling house was dynastically linked to several of its western European counterparts. Nicholas II, Russia’s tsar at the outbreak of World War I, was a first cousin of Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany and King George V of the United Kingdom. The aristocratic, integrated, open-ended Europe these leaders shared would be completely overturned by World War I and the upheavals that followed it.

In the twentieth century, the Soviet Union was paradoxically European. Although anathema to the postwar governments of Europe and the United States, the Soviets’ reigning ideology—communism—was a Western creation. Inspired by Karl Marx, the Bolsheviks dreamed of a world communist revolution and held special expectations for Germany, Marx’s homeland, and for its proletariat. Soviet leaders measured the Soviet Union’s modernization by Western criteria. American methods of mass industrial production left their mark on the Soviet imagination, and the Bolsheviks had a formidable dedication to highbrow European culture, encompassing Bauhaus and neoclassical architecture, the European canon of literature and philosophy, and elements of European and American modernism. In the 1920s, the Soviet Union was at the forefront of the European avant-garde in the visual arts, film, and theater.

The Soviet Union was paradoxically European.

After Joseph Stalin consolidated power around 1928, he reluctantly gave up on the dream of a worldwide proletarian revolution, consigning himself to “socialism in one country,” but he continued to rely on Western engineers and Western technology. Stalin was suspicious of Europe by nature and might have preferred a “fortress Soviet Union.” Yet geopolitics—in the form of Nazi Germany’s designs on Soviet territory—tethered him to Europe. By 1945, a victorious Soviet Union had brokered a deal with the Allies. It kept the countries of Eastern Europe isolated from the rest of the continent while also entrenching the Soviet Union in European politics. After Stalin’s death, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev returned to the idea of Soviet internationalism, an element of which was the partial opening of the Soviet Union to Europe in the 1950s. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 affirmed Europe’s existing borders, leaving Soviet control of the Warsaw Pact nations uncontested. With it, the United States and Western Europe accepted and codified the Soviet Union’s status as a European power.

Among the unexpected outcomes of Soviet life was the emergence inside the Soviet Union of a grassroots fascination with the West. By the 1970s, the Cold War had lost much of its bite, and the Soviet Union increasingly struggled to compete with the cultural and consumerist elan of the West: its cigarettes, its blue jeans, and its popular music. To a degree, the regime tried to suppress this westernization of Soviet taste and attitude. Though they threatened the regime’s monopoly on ideology, Western influences were very hard to contain, and the children of communist elites were among the first to embrace them. In the 1980s, an affection for the West amplified Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, paving the way for the peaceful breakup of the Soviet Union.

From 1991 to at least the early 2010s, Russia westernized rapidly. In the 1990s, for the first time since the collapse of the Russian Empire, Western political structures became the general model for Russia’s leaders—contested elections, political parties, a parliament—even though the Kremlin subsequently did a great deal to manage each of these political structures. Russia’s economy became deeply interconnected with European markets, and its popular culture opened itself to Western influence from cuisine, to fashion, to entertainment. The Internet made the West easily accessible to Russians, including those without the means to travel to Europe or the United States. Nowhere was Russia’s westernization more vivid than in Moscow and Saint Petersburg—which had been renamed Leningrad in 1924 but had its prior, European name restored in 1991. In the post-Soviet period, both cities had evolved into European megalopolises.

PUTIN’S PIVOT

Putin, a native son of Saint Petersburg, Peter the Great’s vaunted “window on Europe,” had argued in 2000 that he could not imagine his country “in isolation from Europe.” Although Russia’s foreign policy grew more aggressive toward the West after 2014, this transition had a limited effect on Russian society, which remained generally open to the West. Even as late as 2021, countless academic and business ties persisted. Tourists went from Europe to Russia and from Russia to Europe. Commodities and ideas continued to be exchanged.

Putin may not have sought an abrupt break with the West at the outset of his invasion of Ukraine. Rather, his strategic purpose was probably to achieve greater independence for Russia or, as he might put it, greater “sovereignty” from the United States and from Europe. Apparently convinced that the campaign would be short and successful, he may have envisioned a relationship with the West that was damaged by the war but not irreparably so. The West had never radically severed ties with Russia—not after Putin’s war against Georgia in 2008, nor even after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its invasion of the Donbas in 2014, or its meddling in the U.S. election in 2016. But the risks that Putin was taking in 2022 were far greater. Even a quick triumph in Ukraine would have had far more serious repercussions with the West than anything he had previously done.

By the time of the invasion, however, Putin had also been seeking to construct a Russia that was increasingly anti-Western in political form and that could exist apart from the West and in conflict with the West. That project dates back at least to the winter of 2011–12, when Putin was orchestrating his return to the presidency amid large antigovernment protests. Newly embattled, Putin strengthened his hold on power by branding protesters (most of them westernized urbanites) unpatriotic, by increasing the level of domestic political repression, by promoting greater cultural conservatism, and by pursuing an increasingly extreme foreign policy. Genuine Russian euphoria over the annexation of Crimea in 2014 consolidated Putin’s vision for the country, further alienating pro-Western intellectual and political voices.

In today’s Russia, there is no longer any counterforce to anti-Western hostility.

When the West rebuked Russia for the annexation of Crimea and imposed sanctions on Moscow, Putin could present himself as prophetic. His thesis that the West was out to weaken Russia, which he had articulated years earlier, was now given fresh narrative energy: Russians would have to fend for themselves against a West purportedly intent on keeping their country weak and submissive. If this was a break with the West, though, it was still a relatively mild break. After 2015, Russia’s relations with the West for the most part normalized, especially through energy ties with Europe. Once the war in eastern Ukraine stalemated, further crises did not seem imminent. The Normandy Format—the diplomatic group composed of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine that was supposed to work toward a settlement of the Donbas conflict —plodded along. Even intense competition in Syria did not significantly complicate Russia’s relations with the West.

During the topsy-turvy Trump administration, much was changing under the surface. Russia acquired an increasingly dark reputation in the United States, and a degree of anti-Russian hysteria found a home in American politics. At the same time, the military relationship between Ukraine and the United States was deepening, and the NATO alliance continued to expand under President Donald Trump, presenting setbacks for Putin. All the while, Russia was becoming more authoritarian. In retrospect, it is clear—even if it was not so at the time—that Putin’s patience with the West was wearing thin.

When the 2022 invasion of Ukraine almost immediately turned sour for the Kremlin, and Western leaders rushed to sever ties with Russia, Putin did not have to improvise in his domestic policy. In his wartime actions at home, he could simply synthesize and intensify existing approaches. He ratcheted up repression to the point of destroying independent media—rendering any public criticism of the government punishable by arrest or the threat of arrest. He militarized the cultural conservatism he had long been nurturing. And he made anti-Westernism a fulcrum of his domestic policy, presenting the West as dangerously decadent and Western governments as ruthlessly aggressive in their will to disempower Russia. According to this narrative, the West was bent on destroying the Russian people through a proxy war or even—so the Kremlin has claimed—by developing biological weapons for use against Russia.

Russia’s decoupling from the West is more than a harried response to sanctions.

Nearly sixteen months into the war, ordinary Russians harbor substantial and most likely enduring anger and resentment toward the West. In the later decades of the Soviet Union, the government largely failed to convince Soviet citizens of an implacably hostile West and, in the 1980s, the barriers between the Soviet Union and the West were weakening. But since February 2022, Russian institutions—scientific, educational, cultural, athletic—have lost the option of partnering with Western counterparts. Contact has been severed on both sides. The Kremlin wants to keep the West at bay, and the West has erected a sanctions regime that makes institutional cooperation with Putin’s Russia impossible; even Western businesses and institutions unaffected by sanctions have chosen not to maintain a presence in the country. In today’s Russia, there is no longer any counterbalancing force to anti-Western hostility.

Russia’s decoupling from the West is more than a harried response to sanctions. And it is not exactly a turn to autarky. Since the start of the war, Moscow has developed—not diminished—its relations with the outside world. Although it can no longer trade with Europe and the United States or harness Western technology for its own modernization, there are many parts of the world with which Russia can increase trade, including China, India, and even Turkey, a member of the NATO alliance. There are many non-Western paths available to Russia in the prosecution of the war and in the sustenance of its economy. Putin appears to see this reorientation as the foundation for Russia’s long-term strength and autonomy. Once it is accomplished, Russia will be a “unique country-civilization… performing a historically unique mission aimed at […]building a multipolar international system,” in the language of the Russian Concept of Foreign Policy, which the Kremlin adopted in 2023. A unique Russia will have freed itself from a West that Putin may sincerely believe is in chronic decline.

The weak link in Putin’s project of uprooting Russia from the West is neither economic nor military. The current sanctions regime notwithstanding, the Kremlin will find ways to continue the war. The more embedded Russia becomes in non-Western economic structures, the more its military will be able to carry on. The weak link for Putin is cultural. For 300 years, Russia’s emulation of and immersion in Western culture has been integral to its own evolution: China and the so-called global South cannot replace Europe as a model for Russia’s culture. A modern Russia that has turned its back on the West is a Russia that has turned its back on itself. Despite Putin’s self-image as Russia’s savior, as the political leader who can win what he terms his country’s “battle for self-determination and for the right to be itself,” his radical anti-Westernism is in fact creating a Russia that has never been.

THE WEST STRIKES BACK

In Europe and the United States, Russia’s flight from the West was not wished for prior to 2022. The metaphor of an off-ramp for tensions with Moscow—invoked widely in 2014 when disagreements over Ukraine first arose—implied that there was some common destination for Russia and the West. Russia had swerved onto the wrong road and needed to be redirected, or it needed to redirect itself. U.S. President Joe Biden spent his first few months in office trying to mend relations with Russia, giving the green light to Germany with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and meeting with Putin in Geneva in June 2021, after which Russia and the United States established working groups on strategic stability. A functional relationship with Putin seemed possible.

After the war began, however, the West’s posture changed dramatically. In addition to aiming for Russia’s “strategic defeat” in Ukraine, Western leaders and policymakers embraced the unspoken end goal of either eliminating Russia from Europe or making Russia’s presence in Europe as small as possible. The sanctions and travel restrictions they have imposed have made it much harder for Russian businesses to operate in European countries. Their efforts to circumscribe Russian influence in Moldova and in the Balkans acquired new urgency, and outside of Austria, the notion that some European states could be neutral was no longer acceptable. Switzerland provided military aid to Ukraine. Finland and Sweden, worried about Putin’s recklessness, applied for NATO membership, while the notion of NATO as the security umbrella for all of Europe, including Ukraine, has been gaining momentum.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded to the 2022 invasion with an appeal to Russians outside the Kremlin. He has since made it clear that Putin’s Russia must be kept as economically and culturally far from Europe as possible: Ukraine’s entry into Europe and Russia’s exit from Europe have become two sides of the same geopolitical coin. The taint of war has also altered the valence of Russian culture in Europe and the United States—for whatever reason, much more so than was the case during the Cold War.

Although the United States refused to send its athletes to Moscow in 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Russian writers like Boris Pasternak and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn continued to be lionized as voices of conscience. It is hard to imagine any contemporary Russian writer or Russian cultural figure being treated in a similar way. In some quarters, a cloud of suspicion has formed over core parts of the Russian classical canon, including such writers as Alexander Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky. Some cultural institutions now approach these figures not as examples of Russia’s contributions to the West but as specimens of Russia’s eternal imperialism or as writers who have lent a patina of sophistication to Putinism. The effect is to make them less European, less Western, and more “foreign.”

FROM CONFLICT TO CHASM

The breakup between Russia and the West has acquired an aura of permanence. For Putin’s Russia to rethink its ties to the West, the West would have to withdraw its military support for Ukraine and agree to a neutral Ukraine or a divided Ukraine in which Russia has dominion over at least half of the country.

This is highly unlikely to happen. For the West to rethink its ties to Russia, Russia would have to end the war, participate in the war crimes trials of Russians, turn Putin over to The Hague, and pay war reparations to Ukraine. This, too, is highly unlikely. No matter how long the war continues, and regardless of how it ends, it will almost certainly leave in place a crucial new reality of twenty-first-century international relations. Russia will be absent from the West and the West absent from Russia, an abyss of hostility between them.

• MICHAEL KIMMAGE is Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Senior Nonresident Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. From 2014 to 2016, he served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, where he held the Russia/Ukraine portfolio.
• MARIA LIPMAN is Senior Visiting Fellow at George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies and Co-Editor of the institute’s Russia.Post.

Foreign Affairs · by Michale Kimmage and Maria Lipman · June 19, 2023

8. IntelBrief: UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy to be Adopted During UN “CT Week”

Excerpts:

This week the United Nations General Assembly will adopt a resolution on the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy (GCTS), a comprehensive framework document that is intended to shape the policies and activities not only of individual states, but also a myriad of UN bodies.

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In addition to the thematic counterterrorism issues, the GCTS also addresses the UN’s own counterterrorism architecture, which to many appears to be a Byzantine network of entities spanning the UN Security Council, which has its own counterterrorism bodies, such as the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), and the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), tasked with coordinating nearly forty UN bodies on counterterrorism issues. In Vienna, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has its Terrorism Prevention Branch. The proliferation of bodies and activities has generated debate about the impacts and effectiveness of UN counterterrorism efforts, and whether they deliver a suitable return on investments. The response, of course, often varies among different stakeholders, including states, communities, and civil society organizations, or UN bodies, either at Headquarters or the many field missions affected by this work. The UN is confronting numerous global challenges, from skyrocketing humanitarian needs to climate crises, conflict, and fragility. As terrorist threats move from the Levant to the Sahel, the confluence of many of these threats in the same places, and the fact they serve to amplify one another, calls for a more integrated approach encompassing conflict prevention and mitigation, development, and peace and security. As the UN Secretary-General and his teams deliberate on the future of UN peace operations and a New Agenda for Peace, for example, it will be important to ensure that efforts like the GCTS review can make a meaningful and impactful contribution to strengthening the UN’s added value. Following the successful conclusion of the negotiations, states are scheduled to adopt the GCTS review resolution in the UN General Assembly later this week.

IntelBrief: UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy to be Adopted During UN “CT Week” - The Soufan Center

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · June 19, 2023

June 19, 2023

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AP Photo/John Minchillo

Bottom Line Up Front

• This week the United Nations General Assembly will adopt a resolution on the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy (GCTS), a comprehensive framework document intended to shape the policies and activities of individual states as well as a myriad of UN bodies.
• For many diplomats, it is the review process and negotiations, more than the outcome, that serves to offer opportunities to shape the international discourse on counterterrorism. Over the past decade, the reviews have increasingly focused on protection of human rights and civil society, integrating gender as a cross-cutting issue, and the impacts of inequalities.
• This eighth review of the GCTS, co-led by Canada and Tunisia (each review has been led by one or two states as ‘facilitators’), has been overshadowed in large part by the war in Ukraine, leaving many diplomats keen on a “technical rollover.”
• As the UN Secretary-General and his teams deliberate on the future of UN peace operations and a New Agenda for Peace, for example, it will be important to ensure that efforts like the GCTS review can make a meaningful and impactful contribution to strengthening the UN’s added value.

This week the United Nations General Assembly will adopt a resolution on the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy (GCTS), a comprehensive framework document that is intended to shape the policies and activities not only of individual states, but also a myriad of UN bodies. The resolution is scheduled for adoption following a UN High-Level conference on counterterrorism on Monday and Tuesday and a series of events hosted by governments, civil society, and other international organizations as part of a UN “CT Week.” The GCTS was originally adopted by consensus (with no dissent) in 2006 and was notable for bringing together four critical strands of efforts into one comprehensive strategy: prevention (with a focus on addressing underlying causes, or “conditions conducive to terrorism”); legal, criminal justice measures, anti-terrorism financing, and border management; counterterrorism capacity-building for states; and the promotion and protection of human rights. It was the combination of these four pillars, reflective of strategies adopted in the United Kingdom and several European states, rather than a singular focus on kinetic counterterrorism efforts, that made the GCTS an important normative framework for the international community.

Every two years (with one exception due to the COVID-19 pandemic), states review the GCTS and adopt a resolution that aims to highlight current counterterrorism challenges and dynamics and offer UN entities and states an updated “roadmap” for action. The evolution of Islamic State, the challenges associated with foreign terrorist fighters, including prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration strategies, the advent of emerging technologies (including drones), and the increased focus on gender, all shaped deliberations on reviewing the GCTS in past years. Although a nonbinding resolution, beyond the normative function, the GCTS can create a mandate for action, inform resource allocations, and create a basis for dialogue between the UN, counterterrorism practitioners, and government officials.

For many diplomats, it is the review process and negotiations, more than the outcome, that serves to offer opportunities to shape the international discourse on counterterrorism. Over the past decade, the reviews have increasingly focused on protection of human rights and civil society, integrating gender as a cross-cutting issue, and the impacts of inequalities, including gender, in creating a hospitable environment for terrorism and violent extremism. Somewhat unsurprisingly, Western states have often championed these developments and called for greater engagement with civil society actors and communities most directly affected by terrorism and counterterrorism efforts. Other regions have often prioritized a focus on narrower security concerns or on development and capacity-building priorities. Fierce debates have often raged on many of these elements and, unsurprisingly, geopolitical fissures have at times loomed large over negotiations.

This eighth review of the GCTS, co-led by Canada and Tunisia (each review has been led by one or two states as ‘facilitators’) has been overshadowed in large part by the war in Ukraine, leaving many diplomats keen on a “technical rollover” that doesn’t warrant reopening the text for negotiation but includes only minor updates to dates, titles, or events, for example. Nonetheless this review has highlighted a few areas of increased focus: far-right violence (or acts motivated by xenophobia, racism, intolerance, or on the basis of religion or belief, XRIRIB, in UN parlance); disinformation and emerging technologies; increased civil society engagement and drones. While the current international security environment and incidents where states have misused counterterrorism legislation to suppress dissent, target opponents, and shrink civic space raises questions about the extent to which states abide by these kinds of frameworks – or even their more binding treaty obligations – the precedent of adoption by consensus has been an important normative statement and created a common framework for extensive international capacity-building, technical assistance, policy development and legal and political cooperation on counterterrorism. However, to date there has been no strategic assessment from the UN on the impacts of the GCTS – or indeed, its wider counterterrorism activities (including the activities of Security Council bodies). Following the precedent set during the adoption of the GCTS in 2006, every review resolution has been adopted by consensus, setting up an important common norm on terrorism-related issues.

In addition to the thematic counterterrorism issues, the GCTS also addresses the UN’s own counterterrorism architecture, which to many appears to be a Byzantine network of entities spanning the UN Security Council, which has its own counterterrorism bodies, such as the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), and the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), tasked with coordinating nearly forty UN bodies on counterterrorism issues. In Vienna, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has its Terrorism Prevention Branch. The proliferation of bodies and activities has generated debate about the impacts and effectiveness of UN counterterrorism efforts, and whether they deliver a suitable return on investments. The response, of course, often varies among different stakeholders, including states, communities, and civil society organizations, or UN bodies, either at Headquarters or the many field missions affected by this work. The UN is confronting numerous global challenges, from skyrocketing humanitarian needs to climate crises, conflict, and fragility. As terrorist threats move from the Levant to the Sahel, the confluence of many of these threats in the same places, and the fact they serve to amplify one another, calls for a more integrated approach encompassing conflict prevention and mitigation, development, and peace and security. As the UN Secretary-General and his teams deliberate on the future of UN peace operations and a New Agenda for Peace, for example, it will be important to ensure that efforts like the GCTS review can make a meaningful and impactful contribution to strengthening the UN’s added value. Following the successful conclusion of the negotiations, states are scheduled to adopt the GCTS review resolution in the UN General Assembly later this week.

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · June 19, 2023

9. Why Nepalis Are Fighting on Both Sides of the Russia-Ukraine War

Why Nepalis Are Fighting on Both Sides of the Russia-Ukraine War

A long tradition of serving in foreign militaries – and a lack of options at home – has drawn young Nepalis into the conflict. 

thediplomat.com · by Birat Anupam · June 17, 2023

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Almost one month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, reports emerged that a Nepali youth named Pratap Basnet was fighting for Ukraine. His story was widely noticed in Nepal. Nepal’s stated foreign policy is neutrality and non-alignment. However, on the Ukraine issue, Nepal’s government sided with the United States and the Western world to criticize Russia’s military attack on Ukraine’s territory.

Recently, evidence has emerged of Nepali youths joining Russian forces. On May 16, Russia authorities made it easy to access Russian citizenship after one year of military service in Russia. Since then, hundreds of Nepali youths have joined Russian forces as contract soldiers. Some of them are retired from the Nepal Army.

One Nepal Army retiree said he was working as a security guard in Dubai when he was lured to Russia by the more attractive offers. He traveled to Moscow as a tourist and joined the army at a Russian recruitment center. He noted that lowered standards made it possible for him to enlist. “Previously they would look for Russian language proficiency. Now English is also okay for it,” the retiree told me over Telegram. (He later blocked me after deciding against further contact with a journalist).

He is now in a military training camp in Russia. “Training is not hard for me as I have gone through similar training in Nepal Army also,” he said. “But weapons here are more modern than what I would get in Nepal Army training.”

There is no publicly available data on the number of Nepali youths joining Russian forces. But it is an open secret that Nepali youths are enlisting as private citizens.

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Nepal has a long tradition of sending its youths to serve as soldiers for the British and Indians through formal channels. Nepali youths have been drafted into the British Army since 1815 as “British Gurkhas.” This tradition carried over after India achieved independence through the “Indian Gorkhas.” Nepal’s Gurkha Contingent has also been actively engaged in the Singapore Police since 1949, again through the British connection.

However, Nepal does not have any other bilateral agreements to send its youths to serve in foreign militaries. Yes, Nepal is the second largest troops-contributing country for the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces all around the world. But Nepal does not send its military to non-U.N. missions.

Nepal’s former Chief of Army Staff Purna Chandra Thapa, in an interview with me, had rejected the idea of Nepal sending its military for non-U.N. missions which he said was contrary to Nepal’s official foreign policy.

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Despite Nepal’s neutral foreign policy priority, Nepali youths are not just working in foreign militaries through formal channels but are also joining foreign forces as private citizens. For example, it is estimated that thousands of Nepali youths have joined the Foreign Legion of the French Army, even though there is no official agreement between Nepal and France toward this end.

In the United States also, Nepal ranks as one of the top sources of immigrants willing to join the U.S. Army as a path to get U.S. citizenship. Based on the data of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Nepal ranked seventh in this regard, behind the Philippines, Mexico, China, South Korea, Jamaica, and Nigeria.

These instances illustrate that there is nothing unique about the Russia-Ukraine war that is drawing Nepali youth to join. Rather, Nepal’s young men have long shown a willingness to enlist in foreign forces. There are three main reasons for this dynamic.

First, Nepal has a long history of fierce fighting and pride in martial prowess is part of the national psyche. Modern Nepal was formed after military conquests of dozens of principalities. Besides domestic fighting experience, Nepalis fought with the collective forces of Tibet and China in 1791. On behalf of the British, Nepali youths have fought in almost all of Britain’s wars since 1815. The same is true for India since its independence. Whether officially or privately, Nepal has a long tradition of sending soldiers to fight for foreign armies, making it an easily thought-of option for today’s youth.

And those youth are in desperate need of options. Young Nepalis cannot find enough resources and opportunities in Nepal. Unemployment, low pay, and lack of vacancies in Nepal’s own military are other factors driving Nepali youths out of Nepal to enlist with foreign forces.

It seems like Nepali youths are eager to join all active militaries – irrespective of ideological lines – if they can secure respect and good payment. That is why we see Nepali youths fighting alongside both Ukrainian and Russian forces.

Birat Anupam

Birat Anupam is the senior English language reporter at Nepal’s official news agency, National News Agency. Follow him on Twitter @birat_anupam.

thediplomat.com · by Birat Anupam · June 17, 2023

10. US reliance on China’s capital goods rules out decoupling

A number of graphs and charts at the link: https://asiatimes.com/2023/06/us-reliance-on-chinas-capital-goods-rules-out-decoupling/

US reliance on China’s capital goods rules out decoupling

Drive to revive American industry won’t get far without even greater imports of Chinese-made manufacturing equipment

asiatimes.com · by David P. Goldman · June 18, 2023

NEW YORK – The bad news is that America hasn’t invested much in manufacturing during the past 20 years. The worse news is that most of the manufacturing capital equipment that America uses came from imports.

Not only does the US have a US$1 trillion trade deficit, but about $300 billion of that deficit comes from imports of capital goods, namely goods that make other goods.

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Federal subsidies for chip fabrication plants and green energy have recently bulked up the numbers for factory construction, but orders for capital equipment remain depressed. The subsidy-driven increases in factory building help explain an enormous surge in US imports of capital goods.

America’s dependence on foreign capital goods reached an all-time high in 2022, as capital goods imports exceeded domestic production of capital goods for home use, according to Asia Times’ calculations.

To reduce its $1 trillion trade deficit, the US would have to invest in capital goods. But it would need to import most of these capital goods, which means that the trade deficit would have to increase in the short term in order to shrink in the long term.

That rules out a broad “decoupling” from China, which accounts for the largest share of America’s trade deficit. Decoupling has become a shibboleth in US politics, and calls for a trade cutoff with China will grow shriller as the 2024 presidential election approaches.

But advocates of a broad decoupling are arithmetically challenged: America’s atrophied capital goods industry can’t supply the needs of existing production.

Rather than trying to de-couple existing industries from China at a prohibitive cost, America should direct its investment resources to leadership in key Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies and leapfrog China in strategic industries.

The US now imports as many capital goods as it produces at home for domestic customers. That is, imports of almost $900 billion of capital goods now equal US manufacturers’ annual orders for nondefense capital goods (excluding aircraft).

Nearly $500 billion of capital goods made in the United States are exported (again, excluding aircraft), so the net supply of capital goods to domestic users (domestic production minus exports) is roughly $300 billion. That’s about equal to the trade deficit in capital goods.

“Orders Net of Exports” in the above chart means domestic nondefense capital goods production (ex-aircraft) for domestic use, that is, net of exports. This is now smaller than the volume of capital goods imports (ex-aircraft).

It’s important to note that the numbers shown in nominal dollars in the above charts look much smaller after taking into account inflation. The chart below shows US manufacturers’ orders for nondefense capital goods (again excluding aircraft) in constant 1982 dollars (using the Producer Price Index for Private Investment Goods).

Deflated, the volume of orders stands at an annualized $450 billion, a 30% decline from the 2013 level. Most of that decline reflects the boom and bust of fracking.

Capital spending by industrial companies in the S&P 500 has also fallen substantially from previous peaks.

China is one of America’s largest suppliers of capital goods, which include everything from industrial machinery to circuit boards.

Mexico exports a great deal of semi-finished goods to the US which fall under the rubric of capital goods. A growing part of Mexico’s exports to the US, however, represent the re-export of Chinese goods to Mexico.

Asia Times showed in an April 6, 2023 study (“The Great Re-Shoring Charade”) that Mexico, Vietnam, India and other “friend-shoring” venues increased their imports from China in lockstep with their exports to the United States.

A granular analysis of individual industries would be required to specify America’s degree of dependence on Chinese imports. Last year, China exported nearly $140 billion of electronic devices and equipment to the US, as well as $125 billion of industrial machinery, boilers, and power plant equipment.

A cutoff of Chinese imports would thus create immediate and devastating supply shortages across a wide range of US industries.

Follow David P Goldman on Twitter at @davidpgoldman

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asiatimes.com · by David P. Goldman · June 18, 2023

11. US is losing Asia’s multilateral trade game

US is losing Asia’s multilateral trade game

China-led RCEP is doing more to promote digital and other trade than America’s vague and unenforceable IPEF

By ULFAH AULIA And SHEILA ALIFIA

JUNE 19, 2023

asiatimes.com · by Ulfah Aulia · June 19, 2023

Digital trade has reduced the costs of engaging in international trade, facilitated the coordination of global value chains and connected a greater number of businesses and consumers globally.

Digital technologies will undoubtedly create new products, services, markets and opportunities for business development. The United States and China have sought to capitalize on this growth potential, albeit with varying levels of success.

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Digital economy contributes to more than 15% of global GDP according to the World Bank — much of this comes from digital trade, which spans from the trade of technological goods to digitally-enabled services.

Recently, approaches to digital trade are diversifying, especially in China and the United States. Both have increased their influence in digital transformation through various economic frameworks, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).

RCEP is a thorough trade agreement that goes beyond trade liberalization, including digital trade. The IPEF is also a substantial economic partnership that covers diverse sectors such as digital trade.

The IPEF was initiated by the United States on May 23, 2022, inviting Australia, Brunei Darussalam, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam to join the framework. The IPEF aims to define shared objectives around four pillars — trade, supply chains, clean economy and fair economy.

The trade pillar highlights the urgency of digital trade cooperation and aims to promote an inclusive digital economy by increasing access to the internet and information, facilitating digital trade, resolving discriminatory practices and enhancing the security and resiliency of digital infrastructure.

Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework aims to counterbalance China’s rising power and influence in Southeast Asia. Image: Facebook

Through the IPEF, the United States differentiates itself from China’s data sovereignty approach by encouraging free and open data flow. The IPEF seeks to reduce localization requirements and limitations on cross-border data flows to promote more open digital trade.

The IPEF further affirms its commitment to supporting reliable cross-border data flows, an inclusive digital economy with sustainable growth and responsible utilization of emerging technologies — it is more extensive than RCEP.

By contrast, as the largest trading bloc, RCEP offers tariff adjustments, dispute settlement mechanisms and trade remedies that induce better cooperation and commitment to achieve common objectives. All ASEAN members and five external partners — Australia, China, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand — have signed it.

RCEP addresses digital trade as electronic commerce, referencing trade in traditional commodities delivered with the assistance of digital technologies.

RCEP will create digital economy opportunities by promoting cooperation in research and training activities, capacity building and empowering small and medium-sized enterprises to utilize e-commerce platforms.

This is an important benefit as digital trade is relatively new in the global trade regime and most RCEP members need different levels of assistance for digital transformation. China plays a significant role in influencing the digital economy system for RCEP members. Its digital economy model has become the leader in the Indo-Pacific region.

Several major Chinese companies — including WeChat and Alipay — have pioneered cross-border payments and developed practices that others can emulate. China’s digital economy has also produced many business opportunities.

By asserting its influence in RCEP, China is expected to contribute to the revitalization of the digital trade regime in the Indo-Pacific region. Because of China’s growing influence, the IPEF may have been created because of the Biden administration’s concern about its weakening influence in Asia, rather than because of economic considerations.

RCEP comes with a take-it-or-leave-it approach which obliges member states to comply with provisions outlined in the agreement. But in implementing e-commerce provisions, RCEP respects the national interests of member states to determine appropriate measures that suit their circumstances.

In contrast, the IPEF adopts a flexible approach that allows member states to opt out from any pillar they are not interested in, exemplified by India’s refusal to join Pillar 1 focused on trade. This renders some commitments of the framework unexecuted.

If there is no guarantee that domestic reforms will be implemented equally, member states will be reluctant to initiate reformative steps, resulting in ineffective partnerships. The lack of economic incentives — including tariff adjustments — reduce the framework’s appeal to member states.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi talks to then-Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (center) and Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha during the third RCEP Summit in Bangkok on November 4, 2019, on the sidelines of the 35th ASEAN Summit. Photo: AFP / Manan Vatsyayana

Regarding compliance mechanisms, RCEP members can resort to trade remedies and dispute settlement mechanisms. But RCEP’s e-commerce chapter does not fall under the jurisdiction of its dispute settlement mechanisms, making any disputes over interpretation and implementation subject to good faith negotiation.

RCEP’s upcoming five-yearly general review allows member states to re-evaluate whether these dispute mechanisms should apply to e-commerce-related disputes.

Yet the absence of dispute settlement mechanisms or other trade remedies in the IPEF signifies its unenforceability. It is undecided whether the IPEF will adopt a binding dispute settlement mechanism or any trade remedies.

The IPEF does not offer tariff adjustments or traditional market access commitments, creating hesitation about whether the provisions will be enforceable. Trade agreements tend to be ineffective without retaliatory tariff measures as a deterrent — the absence of these aspects will only make it difficult for the IPEF to achieve its objectives.

The United States needs to put in more effort to counter China’s regional influence as the IPEF has not offered viable benefits such as tariff adjustments, mutual market access, capacity building and technical assistance in developing digital trade frameworks — all are present in RCEP.

The IPEF should discuss trade liberalization, compliance mechanisms and tangible incentives to become a prominent economic framework.

Ulfah Aulia is a research assistant at the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) based in Jakarta. Sheila Alifia is a non-affiliated researcher based in Jakarta.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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asiatimes.com · by Ulfah Aulia · June 19, 2023

12. Australian special forces to wear 'Big Brother' cameras into battle as part of drastic effort to expose misconduct

I remember attending a conference some years ago and one of the speakers said it was only a matter of time before we reached this level where SOF would be wearing body cams to document their fighting. 

Australian special forces to wear 'Big Brother' cameras into battle as part of drastic effort to expose misconduct

• SAS soldiers to wear body cams to expose misconduct 
• Body cams was a recommendation of the Brereton Inquiry

By JESSE HYLAND FOR DAILY MAIL AUSTRALIA

PUBLISHED: 20:33 EDT, 18 June 2023 | UPDATED: 21:09 EDT, 18 June 2023

Daily Mail · by Jesse Hyland For Daily Mail Australia · June 19, 2023

Australia's special forces will be forced to wear brand new body cameras in a bid to expose misconduct on the battlefield.

The measure is one of the recommendations highlighted in the Brereton Report, which looked at alleged war crimes committed by Australian troops in Afghanistan.

The move has outraged some soldiers and veterans who believe body cameras will be a hindrance during the heat of battle and undermine trust between soldiers and their superiors.

Australia's special forces will be fitted with new body cameras as one of the recommendations detailed in the Brereton Report (pictured, body camera footage from Australian SAS forces in Afghanistan)

The chief of the Australian defence force, General Angus Campbell, was highly-supportive of the move back in November.

'I think it is a very good idea. It creates a degree of objectivity and a capacity for learning, development and record keeping,' he said at the time.

'That's a separate pathway to other review mechanisms which need to be strengthened and he recommends that as well.

'That material would become a digital archive, permanently and securely held so that if claims were to arise, they would be, they would contribute to understanding what may have happened.'

He advised the Chief of Army at the time to introduce 'an interim capability for body-worn cameras that is available for employment on short duration, specified tasks by the end of 2023', The Australian reported.

The introduction of the cameras lagged after a lack of support from the Morrison government before the recommendation was revisited once Labor came into office.

The measure has sparked backlash, with Liberal MP and former soldier Andrew Hastie warning it would break trust of the defence personnel.

He explained that the Brereton Report 'identified a breakdown in moral and ethical standards'.

'That's a human problem, not one solved by technology, such as body and helmet cams,' he said.

'Trust needs to be rebuilt. We don't need technology as a substitute for command and accountability.'

The chief of the Australian Defence Force, General Angus Campbell (pictured), was highly-supportive of the measure back in November

Liberal MP and former soldier Andrew Hastie (pictured) warned that the measure would undermine the trust amongst defence personnel

One SAS veteran told the publication that cameras would negatively affect the ability of soldiers to make quick decisions on the battlefield.

'The battlefield is not a domestic police setting. The battlefield is chaotic and uncontrolled and there aren't really any nice rules that apply,' he said.

'The point is, the soldier probably won't take the risks they need to take if they think everything they're doing is going to be reviewed afterwards in an armchair.

Another SAS veteran agreed, describing the measure as a 'flawed, knee-jerk reaction' that wouldn't work.

He added that the only reason these recommendations were being made was because of the actions of a 'small number of f***wits'.

Defence claims the cameras are set to be rolled out under the department's special forces reform program.

The Brereton report found 'credible' evidence that 25 current or former Australian SAS soldiers unlawfully killed 39 Afghan civilians and prisoners between 2005 and 2016.

The Brereton report found 'credible' evidence that 25 current or former Australian SAS soldiers unlawfully killed 39 Afghan civilians and prisoners between 2005 and 2016

The report recommended administrative action be taken against ADF personnel where there is credible evidence of misconduct, but not enough for a criminal conviction (pictured, an Australian soldier from the Special Operations Task Group is pictured during the Shah Wali Kot offensive in May 2013)

Those killings included cases where new SAS patrol members were allegedly told to shoot a prisoner to achieve their first kill in a practice known as 'blooding'.

There was also evidence some soldiers carried 'throw downs' such as weapons and military equipment to make it appear the person killed was a legitimate target.

The report recommended administrative action be taken against ADF personnel where there is credible evidence of misconduct, but not enough for a criminal conviction.

It also recommended Australia compensate the families of Afghan people unlawfully killed and for various service medals to be stripped away from some individuals and groups.

Daily Mail · by Jesse Hyland For Daily Mail Australia · June 19, 2023

13. Bank of China halts transfers from Russia to EU, US, UK, and Swiss banks

I leave it to the economics and finance experts to assess and explain.

Bank of China halts transfers from Russia to EU, US, UK, and Swiss banks — Novaya Gazeta Europe

novayagazeta.eu

The Bank of China has restricted transactions for Russian bank clients to banks located in the EU, US, Switzerland, and the UK, RBC reports, citing Modulbank and Finam representatives.

UniCredit and Akibank also reported the same limitations.

According to the Modulbank spokesperson, the restrictions affected all the banks that use the Bank of China as the main correspondent bank for yuan transactions.

“The decision was not made by China, but rather by the EU and the US. That is how they are trying to ramp up the sanction pressure by choking off alternative channels in the form of yuan,” Pavel Semyonov, chairman of the board of Modulbank, said.

The Finam bank indicated, in turn, that the Bank of China had terminated transactions in Chinese yuan, US dollars, Hong Kong dollars, and euros through the correspondent accounts of the Chinese bank.

Experts point out that currency transfers to the Western countries via BoC could have been used by Russian companies to settle foreign trade transactions in absence of any other legal ways to do so.

novayagazeta.eu

14. A psychologist says she broke down in tears when she learned the horrors that 2 castrated Ukrainian soldiers endured, says report

The trigger warning is in the headline. The brutality of the Russians is just unbelievable.

A psychologist says she broke down in tears when she learned the horrors that 2 castrated Ukrainian soldiers endured, says report

Business Insider · by Isobel van Hagen

Ukrainian soldiers fire a cannon near Bakhmut, an eastern city where fierce battles against Russian forces have been taking place, in the Donetsk region, Ukraine, May 15, 2023.

AP Photo/Libkos, File

• A Ukrainian psychologist described the horrors two soldiers went through in a new report by The Times.
• Anzhelika Yatsenko cried when she learned the young men were castrated while prisoners of Russia.
• It was "the first time I behaved not like a professional psychologist," she told The Times.

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A Ukrainian psychologist described the horrors her patients were forced to go through in a new report that details the impacts of sexual violence against men in the Ukraine war.

Two Ukrainian soldiers, who had been prisoners in Russian captivity, were referred to 41-year-old psychologist Anzhelika Yatsenko after they were released in a prisoner swap, Christina Lamb, The Sunday Times chief foreign correspondent, reported.

The soldiers struggled to tell their psychologist, who specializes in troubled young men, what happened to them. When Yatsenko, who works in Poltava, finally learned what had happened to the two young fighters who had been castrated, she said it was so horrible that she struggled to act professionally, The Times reported.

"I knew from previous cases they had probably been tortured," Yatsenko said. "As someone who gets referred the hardest cases, mostly men under 35, it's very hard to surprise me."

But when the fighters, 25 and 28 years old, told her what they had experienced, it was "the first time I behaved not like a professional psychologist."

"I'd never heard anything so horrible. I told them I needed the bathroom and went and cried and cried. I didn't want them to see as they might think there's no hope," she told The Times.

The two soldiers had been brutally beaten, and drunken Russians castrated them with a knife while they were imprisoned — at the time, they thought they might die. After their return, they were suicidal, The Times reported.

The torture does not just take a physical toll, Yatsenko, but also the painful psychological effect of no longer being able to be sexually active.

The experience of the tortured prisoners of war highlights an often minimized aspect of the cruelty of war. While sexual violence against women and girls is widely covered in the context of war, sexual violence against men is less well-documented.

On both sides of the conflict, prisoners of war have faced violent and inhumane conditions — some may amount to war crimes, the UN recently found.

The story of the treatment of these soldiers comes as Ukraine's counteroffensive is underway, and the Ukrainian forces try to break through and liberate Russian-held territory.

Ukraine is facing a "very difficult fight," a US military official recently said. "It is a very violent fight. And it will likely take a considerable amount of time at high cost."

Russia Ukraine Ukraine War

More...

Business Insider · by Isobel van Hagen

​15. Special Operations News Update - June 19, 2023 | SOF News

Special Operations News Update - June 19, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · June 19, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: Marines swim during the Caribbean Coastal Warrior exercise in Savaneta, Aruba, May 18, 2023. The bilateral event with Dutch Marines expands the participants’ knowledge and proficiency when operating in littoral and coastal regions. Photo by Marine Corps Cpl. Cassidy Shepherd.

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

Ridge Runner in ‘Vandala’. About 300 special operations troops are taking part in a military exercise in West Virginia during June 2023. The Ridge Runner Irregular Warfare Exercise sees participation from the Texas-based 5/19th Special Forces Group, 92nd Civil Affairs, 6th PSYOP, and US Marines. There are also SOF troops from the UK, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Observers from several other countries are present as well. The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and Irregular Warfare Center is supporting the exercise as well as the West Virginia National Guard. “Irregular Warfare infiltrates West Virginia this month”, MetroNews, June 7, 2023.

Marine Force Reconnaissance. The history, organization, structure, training, and equipment of this specialized unit is explained. “Marine Force Reconnaissance: Swift, Silent, Deadly”, Grey Dynamics, June 3, 2023.

NSW RHIB Strikes Jetty – 5 Go to Hospital. Five Naval Special Warfare sailors were injured on Friday, June 16, 2023, in a routine night time training exercise when their inflatable boat struck San Diego’s Zuniga Point jetty. The injuries are non-life threatening. “Five special warfare sailors injured in boat training mishap”, Navy Times, June 16, 2023.

USSOCOM Leaders Visit NSW. The U.S. Special Operations Command commander Gen. Bryan Fenton and senior enlisted leader, Command Sgt. Maj. Shane Shorter, visited Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) and Naval Special Warfare Center (NSWCEN) in early June. During their visit the toured NSW Center and NSW Group One. “USSOCOM Commander Visits Naval Special Warfare Command, Validates Value of Rigours Training”, DVIDS, June 5, 2023.

Prince Joins SOF Mag Advisory Committee. Erik Prince, a former SEAL and founder of Blackwater USA, is now a member of the Soldier of Fortune Magazine Advisory Committee. Prince sold Blackwater in 2010 and established Frontier Resource Group. Read more in “Soldier of Fortune Advisory Committee: Meet Blackwater Founder Erik Prince”, SOFMAG, June 8, 2023.

SEALs Train Up on NEO. East-coast based Naval Special Warfare Operators recently conducted a comprehensive training exercise focused on non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). In the midst of the recent crisis in Sudan the SEALs conducted a NEO rescuing embassy personnel in Khartoum. “US Navy SEALs Conduct Nightime Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation Training”, NSW, June 7, 2023.

Palantir Contract. The US Special Operations Command has awarded a contract to Palantir Technologies to deliver technology solutions to support enterprise capabilties. The contract is worth up to $463 million. “US Special Operations Command Awards Contract to Palentir”, PR Newswire, June 5, 2023.

International SOF

ROK and U.S. SOF Conduct ‘Friendship’ Jump. South Korea’s Special Warfare Command Commander Lieut. Gen. Son Sik and SOCKOR Commander Major Gen. Michael Martin staged a high altitude low opening (HALO) jump. (Yonhap News Agency, June 8, 2023).

Fuerzas Comando 23. The annual special operations forces competition supported by U.S. Southern Command and Special Operations Command South began on June 12, 2023 in the Dominican Republic. Twenty two countries are competing in the SOF skills competition.

New Boats for Greek SOF? Two new SOF craft may soon be available for Greece. One is an interceptor and the other a troop transport. “Greek Shipbuilder Reveals New Special Operations Craft Designs”, Naval News, Jun 15, 2023.

UK ‘Ditching’ C-130 SOF Aircraft. A cost-cutting measure to ditch a special forces aircraft is being criticized as “perverse” and “extrodinary”. Some UK security analysts believe the removal of the aircraft will leave a capability gap at a time of rising security risks. The A400 is to replace the C-130 but there will be ‘niche capabilities’ that will have gaps. (Sky News, Jun 14, 2023).

Australian SAS War Crimes Case. The “trial of the century’ concluded earlier this month in Sydney where a man commonly described as Australia’s most decorated living soldier had brought a libel case against Australian newspapers. Ben Roberts-Smith, a former member of the Special Air Service Regiment, lost his case in court. Douglas Guilfoyle, a Professor of Law and International Security at the University of New South Wales Canberra, explains the context in which the case arose, what the Court found, and what comes next. “The Libel Case Confirming Australian War Crimes in Afghanistan”, Articles of War, Lieber Institute West Point, June 14, 2023.

SOF History

OSS. On June 13, 1942, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) replaced the COI. It was placed under the Joint Chiefs of staff (JCS). The Office of the Coordinator of Information was an intelligence and propaganda agency of the United States government founded on July 11, 1941 by President Roosevelt.

Army’s Birthday. The Army’s birthday was celebrated on June 14th. The U.S. Army was founded on June 14, 1775, when the Continental Congress authorized enlistment of expert riflemen to serve the United Colonies for one year.

Combat Divers and Their ‘Skimpy’ Swim Trunks. The very brief swim gear worn by today’s combat divers came into fashion in World War II when Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) swimmers used them as they reconned landing beaches on Pacific islands. The UDT shorts are still used today – by combat divers of all of the services. But the use of tiny briefs goes beyond the UDT shorts – the Rangers and the Marines have their version for physical training. Read more in “UDT Shorts, Silkies, and Ranger Panties: A Risque Military Fashion Trend”, Coffee or Die Magazine, June 14, 2023.

SF Greenlight Teams. During the Cold War Green Berets practiced infiltration behind enemy lines by high altitude low opening (HALO) parachute jumps with Special Atomic Demolition Munitions (SADMs). Read more in “Special Forces Parachuted With Nukes Strapped to Them During the Cold War”, The WarZone, June 9, 2023.

Ukraine Conflict

Ukraine Offensive. The long-awaited spring offensive by the Ukraine military has begun. It apparently is currently concentrated in the southeastern region along the front lines with some modest gains. It isn’t the explosive punch deep into Russian-held territory that some had anticipated. Social media reports indicate that much of the offensive power of Ukraine has still not been committed. Many analysts believe the Ukrainians are conducting feints and reconnaissance in force operations in a prelude to a deep strike with some of its newly-formed and NATO trained brigades. CNN World provides a brief on the attacks with a map depicting where the current offensive is underway. (June 17, 2023).

CRS Report – Central Asia: Implications of Russia’s War in Ukraine. The Congressional Research Service has published a report that decribes the difficult position – economically and diplomatically – that five Central Asian states now find themselves since the Russian’s have renewed their offensive in Ukraine. The five countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – share historical, economic, and military ties with Russia. However, since their indepence from the Soviet Union in 1991, they have generaly sought to balance relations between Russia, China, and other powers. Central Asian states are now seeking to diversify their trade relationships and establish transit routes that bypass Russia. They are also seeking to engage with other partners in the security sphere. CRS R47591, June 9, 2023, PDF 35 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47591

Commentary

Role of SOF in IW and GPC. Sal Artigia has penned an essay on SOF’s role in IW in an era of strategic competition. He says that SOF’s distinct capabilities offer several advantages in IW. He advocates a balanced approach that includes a comprehensive, whole-of-government strategy that leverages all elements of national power – and that SOF should be a key component of this strategy. “The Role of Special Operations Forces in Irregular Warfare within the Framework of Great Power Competition”, LinkedIn Pulse, June 10, 2023.

Changing Role of SOF. The Department of Defense is focused on the Indo-Pacific region and competition with China. It is placing less emphasis on CT and COIN. It didn’t take long for the ‘knives’ to come out and see proposals for the reduction of SOF forces. There is the possiblity that ARSOF will see a 10% budget reduction in the coming years. These proposed reductions would mainly affect logistical and intelligence enablers. Read more in “From Counterinsurgency to Conventional Warfare: The Changing Role of U.S. Special Operations Forces”, SOFREP, June 10, 2023.

Ellsberg, the Papers, Phoenix Program, and Green Berets. Jeff Stein, the founding editor of SpyTalk.co, writes how the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg (who just passed away) prompted him to write a book about Green Berets accused of the homicide of a suspected Vietnamese double agent in 1969. “Flipped: How Dan Ellsberg changed my life”, SpyTalk, June 17, 2023.

National Ranger Memorial Monument Defaced. The names of four Confederate soldiers are no longer visible on a monument to U.S. Army Rangers at Fort Moore (formerly known as old Fort Benning). Historic figures who are a part of the U.S. special operations history had their names erased on the memorial – John Mosby, William Quantrill, George Bowman, and Jackson Bowman. A letter was sent to Kevin McCarthy, Speaker of the House, expressing concern of the move by the U.S. Army to remove the names by the National Ranger Memorial Foundation in May 2023. “Confederate names no longer visible on Ranger monument”, GPB News, June 16, 2023.

IW Education and SOF. As the contours of global power dynamics evolve, U.S. SOF find themselves increasing deployed in contexts characterized by irregular warfare. The era of strategic competition has presented new challenges. A key component of SOF being able to contribute in this environment is a sound education in irregular warfare. “The Imperiative for Irregular Warfare Education in Special Operations Forces”, by Sal Artiaga, LinkedIn Pulse, June 17, 2023.

JSOU, Wargaming, and Social Science Experiments. The Joint Special Operations University recently embedded aspects of the DoD’s ‘Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Strategic Plan and Implementation framework into the JSOU’s Special Operations Planning Course (SOPC). “Wargaming as a Social Science Experiment”, by Andrew Crabb, Small Wars Journal, June 16, 2023.

Fixing the Sahel Region. Jihadist terrorist groups continue to expand their influence and this region of Africa remains a terrorist hot zone, spilling into other regions like Coastal West Africa. This past year has been one of the most active yet for some of the jihadist organizations. Compounding the situation is the meddling of China and Russia. Tammy Palacios provides her perspective on the security situation and shares some recommendations on the way forward for the United States. “Integrating U.S. Military Assistance With Conflict Prevention and Stabilization in the Sahel”, Newlines Institute, June 15, 2023.

National Security

USMC Force Design 2030. The annual update to the Marine Corps Force Design document has been released. Force Design 2030 Annual Update, USMC, June 2023, PDF, 30 pages. Watch a video that explains the update. DVIDS, June 3, 2023, 2 mins. The vision of the Marines is to become lighter, faster, and more tech savy. Incorporating robotics and artificial intelligence is a big focus.

CRS Report – Securing the Border. The Congressional Research Office has updated a ‘Legal Sidebar’ entitled The President’s Authority to Use the National Guard or the Armed Forces to Secure the Border. PDF, June 15, 2023, 4 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10121

2024 Defense Budget in House. The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense has passed an $826 billion Pentagon budget for fiscal 2024. There are a lot of good things in the budget – raising the pay of junior enlisted troops, more funds for combating the flow of fentanyl into the U.S., and other measures. There are some items that set up the Congress for a fight over the next several months – Democrats are likely to oppose the ban on things like drag queen story hours for children or a ban on the use of drag queens as military recruiters. So there will be negotiations and compromise over the next several months on a bill that both the Republican controlled House and Democratic controlled Senate can agree on.

New Fast Attack Sub. The Navy christianed its newest Virginia-class fast-attack submarine on June 17, 2023 in Groton, CT. The Virginia-class subs are built to conduct a a variety of missions. Among these tasks are special operations support, ISR, and irregular warfare. “Navy to Christian Submarine Iowa”, U.S. Department of Defense, June 16, 2023.

SOCCENT, Central Asia, and Influence Campaigns. The National Security Fellowship (NSF) at Seton Hall University partnered with a deep technology firm that specializes in advanced network analytics and simulations to work on a project fro Special Operations Command Central. The team focused on how SOCCENT could counter Russia and China’s influence with the Central Asian states. They studied on how to quantify the strategic messaging and determine the positive or negative sentiment of Russian and Chinese influence in each of the Central Asian states. “NSF Project Enhanced with Data Analytics”, Diplomacy News, June 14, 2023.

Pentagon’s ‘Perception Management Office’. Kit Klippenstein, an investigative journalist at The Intercept, provides an interesting (and alternative) perspective on the Influence and Perception Management Office (IPMO) launched in March 2023. The office is described as providing advice on strategic and operational influence and perception management matters to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security. “Exposed: Disturbing details of the Pentagon Perception Management Office”, Monthly Review, June 14, 2023.

Conflict in Burma. Since the army’s 2021 takeover of government rule almost 4,000 civilians have been killed in the unrest in Myanmar. A lot of the fighting takes place in the ethnic regions along the countries borders. Newly formed militia groups have been attacking government troop outposts and convoys. In the past week almost 30 civlians have been killed in the violence.

U.S. Service Members Injured in Syria. Twenty-two members of the military were injured on Sunday, June 11th. The injuries happened during a helicopter mishap in northeastern Syria. Ten of the injured were evacuated to higher care facilities outside of the CENTCOM AOR. (@CENTCOM Twitter, June 12, 2023).

Old Salt Coffee is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. The company offers a wide range of coffee flavors to include Green Eyes Coffee, a tribute to those Navy special operations personnel who operate in the night.

Upcoming Events

June 21-22, 2023

Warrior East

ADS

August 5, 2023. Perdido Key, Florida

Deep Dive 2023 Combat Diver Reunion

CDF

August 12, 2023

11th Special Forces Group Reunion

Fort Meade, MD

October 16-20, 2023

SOAR XLVII

Special Operations Association

December 8, 2023

Winter Cruise

Combat Diver Association

SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.

Books, Pubs, and Reports

CRS Report – Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2023. The Congressional Research Service has updated a report on the hundreds of instances in which the U.S. has used military force abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict. The report provides a general survey of past U.S. military ventures abroad. CRS R42738, June 7, 2023, PDF, 58 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42738

CRS Report – U.S. Army’s Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) System. The Congressional Research Service has published a report on the IFPC system. This system protects high-value military sites against enemy cruise missile (CM), unmanned aerial system (UAS), and rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) attacks. It is a mobile, ground-based weapon system and bridges the gap between short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12421

Book Review – By All Means Available. Veteran strategist, CIA operative, and Green Beret Michael G. Vickers tallies achievements and missteps across the Cold War and the war on terror. “Where Did We Go Wrong in Afghanistan?”, New York Times, June 18, 2023. (subscription)

Videos, Podcasts, and Movies

Video – Lessons in U.S. Intelligence and Special Operations. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), YouTube, June 16, 2023, one hour. “In 1984, Michael Vickers took charge of the CIA’s secret war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After inheriting a strategy aimed at imposing costs on the Soviets for their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Vickers transformed the covert campaign into an all-out effort to help the Afghan resistance win their war. In By All Means Available, Vickers recounts his remarkable career, from his days as a Green Beret to his vision for victory in Afghanistan to his role in waging America’s war with al-Qa’ida at the highest levels of government.”

https://www.youtube.com/live/atxKIvSQJ-0?feature=share&t=205

Video – Facing the Khmer Rouge. Major General (Ret) Kenneth Bowra shares his experience in opposing the Khmer Rouge with the Cambodian Army (FANK). Savage Game Design, YouTube, June 10, 2023, one hour. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wdRFKNXctDA

Podcast – Communications Networking. Advances in technology have almost entirely eliminated the fundamental Right of Privacy. A communications expert weighs in on how to reduce or eliminate evesdropping by setting up a secure network so you can communicate with family and friends. The Pinelander, June 15, 2023, one hour.

https://pinelander.podbean.com/e/episode-075-communications-networking/

Podcasts

SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command

https://linktr.ee/sofcast

The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing

https://www.thepinelander.com/

Irregular Warfare Initiative

https://irregularwarfare.org/category/podcasts/

The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command

https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA

Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385

SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.

sof.news · by SOF News · June 19, 2023

16.  Blinken meets China's Xi Jinping in final day of high-stakes Beijing visit aimed at cooling simmering tensions

Blinken meets China's Xi Jinping in final day of high-stakes Beijing visit aimed at cooling simmering tensions | CNN

CNN · by Kylie Atwood,Simone McCarthy · June 19, 2023

First pictures emerge as Blinken-Xi meeting is underway

Chinese leader Xi Jinping and top American diplomat Antony Blinken met in Beijing on Monday, in a potentially crucial step toward patching US-China ties after they cratered in the wake of a dispute over a Chinese surveillance balloon earlier this year.

Blinken is the first US Secretary of State to visit Beijing in five years and his talks with senior Chinese officials are seen as a key litmus test for whether some sort of detente can be forged at a time of lingering distrust.

Uncertainty around whether Xi and Blinken would meet during the two-day visit further highlighted the fraught US-China relations and a failure to schedule a face to face would have been seen by Washington as a slight, breaking with a number of previous visits from top American diplomats.

The meeting, which took place at Beijing’s cavernous Great Hall of the People, was only publicly announced by the US about an hour before it went ahead. It lasted roughly half an hour, beginning at 4:34 p.m. local time and ended at 5:09 p.m., a State Department official said.

“The two sides made progress and reached agreement on some specific issues. This is very good,” Xi said, speaking to Blinken in broadcast remarks as the two delegations sat across from one another at a long table, with the Chinese leader at its head.

Xi said he hoped Blinken, through his visit, could “make positive contributions to stabilizing US-China relations” adding that “state-to-state interactions should always be based on mutual respect and sincerity.”

The two global powers have been increasingly at loggerheads over a host of issues ranging from Beijing’s close ties with Moscow to American efforts to limit the sale of advanced technologies to China.

Key among those concerns has been repairing fractured lines of communication, which have broken down over the past year, especially when it comes to high-level military exchanges – raising concerns in Washington that a mistake or accident could quickly spin into conflict.

Earlier this year a Chinese surveillance balloon – detected floating across the US and hovering over sensitive military sites before ultimately being shot down by an American fighter plane – sent relations plunging to a new low and resulted in Blinken scrapping an earlier Beijing visit.

This time, the diplomatic mission went forward.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, June 19, 2023. REUTERS/Leah Millis/Pool

Leah Millis/Reuters

“A choice needs to be made”

A roughly three-hour meeting between Blinken and China’s top foreign affairs adviser Wang Yi earlier Monday underscored the deep challenges in overcoming the mistrust and friction that has come to characterize the relationship.

The Chinese government’s growing clout internationally and increasingly authoritarian controls at home have pushed the US to reframe how it manages its relations with the power in recent years.

Repeating Beijing’s typical rhetoric, Wang blamed Washington’s “wrong perception” of China as the “root cause” of the decline in the two sides’ relations and demanded the US stop “suppressing” China’s technological development and hyping the “China threat,” according to a readout from Chinese state broadcaster CCTV.

“We must reverse the downward spiral of China-US relations, promote a return to a healthy and stable track, and jointly find the right way for China and the United States to co-exist in the new era,” Wang said, adding that Blinken’s visit came at “a critical juncture in US-China relations, where a choice needs to be made between dialogue or confrontation, cooperation or conflict.”

Wang also reiterated that Taiwan is one of one of China’s “core interests,” over which it “has no room for compromise or backdown.”

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken gives a speech at the Helsinki City Hall in Helsinki, Finland, on June 2, 2023.

Emmi Korhonen/Lehtikuva/AFP/Getty Images

China eyes Blinken's imminent visit with deep distrust and low expectations

The self-ruling democratic island, which China’s ruling Communist Party claims but has never controlled, has increasingly been another flashpoint in the US-China relationship.

During the meeting, Blinken underscored the need for the countries to “responsibly” manage their competition through “open channels of communication” to ensure it “does not veer into conflict,” State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said in a statement.

The US would continue to use its diplomacy to “stand up for the interests and values of the American people,” Blinken said, according to the statement, which described the talks as “candid and productive” and said they including discussion of potential cooperation on shared transnational challenges.

Advancing dialogue?

Overall, Wang’s comments took a more combative tone than those of China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang, who met with Blinken the previous day. Qin said both sides agreed to “advance dialogue, exchanges and cooperation” and “maintain high-level interactions,” according to a readout from Beijing.

Blinken’s Sunday meeting with Qin, which stretched more than five hours and then wrapped with a working dinner, resulted in progress “on a number of fronts,” with both sides showing a “desire to reduce tensions,” a senior State Department official told reporters Sunday.

“Profound differences” between the US and China, however, were also clear during the meeting, the official added.

Neither side have mentioned concrete agreements so far.

While Qin holds the title of Foreign Minister, he wields less power than Wang, who directs the country’s foreign policy through his position among party’s core leadership.

Blinken’s original scheduled visit in early February had been agreed on as a follow-up to an amicable face-to-face between US President Joe Biden and China’s Xi on the sidelines of the G20 in Bali in November.

US sailors recover a suspected Chinese high-altitude surveillance balloon that was downed by the United States off the coast of South Carolina, on February 5, 2023.

U.S. Fleet Forces/U.S. Navy/Reuters

As Beijing's intelligence capabilities grow, spying becomes an increasing flashpoint in US-China ties

That meeting – the first in person between the two leaders as presidents – was seen a pivotal step in restoring certain lines of communication, which Beijing last year severed last year following a visit from then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan.

Both the US and China have played down expectations of a major breakthrough during Blinken’s visit.

Ahead of the meeting, Washington was careful to manage expectations, with a senior State Department official last week telling reporters that he does not expect “a long list of deliverables.”

Meanwhile, both sides are also navigating how the meetings play to their respective domestic audiences.

In the US, how strongly to counter China has become the topic of heated political debate – with some lawmakers slamming the Biden administration for sitting down with Beijing.

China views Washington as actively trying to thwart its development, and is also very much aware the US is headed into a presidential election cycle, where hawkish rhetoric against it may intensify further.

Its officials also meet Blinken in an environment where China’s state media and official rhetoric have long portrayed Washington as a bad-faith actor responsible for destabilizing ties.

CNN’s Philip Wang, Jennifer Hansler, Nectar Gan, Mengchen Zhang and Martha Zhou contributed to this report.

CNN · by Kylie Atwood,Simone McCarthy · June 19, 2023

17. Moral Injury, Afghanistan, and the Path Toward Recovery

Conclusion:

While Afghanistan continues to fade from America’s collective memory, the war looms large for tens of thousands of America’s veterans. For 20 years, U.S. soldiers were ordered to rebuild Afghanistan and, following the mantras of population-centric counterinsurgency, they grew close with their Afghan allies. Then, in the blink of an eye, the war ended disastrously, with their allies trapped behind enemy lines. While Americans, by and large, have moved on, far fewer veterans have turned the proverbial page.

Moral Injury, Afghanistan, and the Path Toward Recovery - War on the Rocks

KATHERINE SELBER AND WILL SELBER

warontherocks.com · by Katherine Selber · June 19, 2023

On Aug. 31, 2021, the last American plane departed Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, bringing America’s latest, longest war to an ignominious end. Since that day, Afghanistan has quickly faded from America’s rearview mirror. Over the last 20 years, the United States spent two trillion dollars and lost 2,439 servicemembers there. 3,500 military widows were left without their spouses, 6,000 children without at least one parent, and 14,000 parents without their sons or daughters. But despite this grim toll, the United States has only just begun to bear the brunt of its two-decade-long war. In fact, for countless Afghanistan veterans, the trauma from the war continues unabated.

The fall of Afghanistan, specifically the chaotic nature of the Noncombatant Evacuation Operations and the abandonment of tens of thousands of Afghan allies, left thousands of Afghanistan veterans to face an old but largely forgotten mental health condition: moral injury. This diagnosis refers to the damage done to a person’s conscience when witnessing or participating in an event that violates their moral or ethical code. And it is currently wreaking havoc on America’s Afghanistan veterans. If steps are not taken to address this problem, the result will be a disgruntled veteran population more prone to mental health problems, substance abuse, incarceration, and radicalization.

The three elements of a more effective response are simple but difficult. First, there should be more research and funding for moral injury. Second, the American government and the Department of Defense should be more candid in acknowledging the failure of America’s war in Afghanistan and in addressing the plight of Afghan allies still at risk. Third, the Department of Defense should provide institutional heft by encouraging the creation of structured spaces, like commander’s calls or down days, in which veterans, active-duty personnel, and others can discuss the war, its ending, and its consequences. Senior military leaders can lead the way by discussing these topics virtually in order to help lower-echelon commanders follow in their footsteps.

Become a Member

Moral Injury

The study of moral injury as a psychological condition began when Vietnam veterans reported feeling distress as a result of violating their core beliefs during combat. According to the U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs, moral injury occurs when people, usually in traumatic or unusually stressful circumstances, “fail to prevent, or witness events that contradict deeply held beliefs and expectations.” Although studies have increased over the past decades, there is still no commonly accepted definition of moral injury, in part because of its overlap with post-traumatic stress disorder. Both conditions often negatively impact a person’s well-being and mental health and are associated with an increased risk of suicide, depression, and anxiety. Some research also suggests that moral injury may be present in up to 90 percent of post-traumatic stress cases, and acts as an obstacle to successful treatment.

That said, there are notable differences between the two conditions. According to Jonathan Shay, who coined the term, moral injury emphasizes the specific role of the servicemember involved. It features a betrayal of what’s right over a critical issue by someone in a position of authority. As a result, moral injury often leads to a profound questioning of one’s life, along with a prolonged period of shame or guilt. This condition, when not addressed, can also become “the story” that veterans use to describe their entire military experience and transition.

America’s chaotic withdrawal exacerbated moral injury diagnoses among Afghanistan veterans, 41 percent of whom now display symptoms of it according to one study. The withdrawal left many veterans humiliated, betrayed, angered, and deeply dissatisfied with the outcome of the war. And it may partly explain why nearly 76 percent of Afghanistan veterans report feeling like strangers in their own country.

Moral injury issues associated with the Afghanistan withdrawal exacerbate the range of other, better-known mental health and substance abuse problems stemming from America’s “War on Terror.” Moreover, the betrayal associated with moral injury makes veterans susceptible to targeting by extremist groups. The modern white power movement targeted Vietnam War veterans with a call to “bring the war home,” that emphasized “the elite’s betrayal of servicemembers” following the fall of Saigon. Today, the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers are making similar pitches to disaffected veterans following another lost war. While the rate of extremism in the military and veteran population is still small, a sizable portion of the defendants connected with the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol are veterans. Moreover, this problem may worsen as more Iraq and Afghan veterans leave the services in the coming decade.

Increased Research and Funding

The first step in mitigating the impact of moral injury is better understanding the condition. First and foremost, researchers should address the lack of consensus over defining moral injury and develop consistent and trusted standards for measuring it. After this, more should be done toward understanding the relationship between moral injury and post-traumatic stress disorder, so as to better develop specific treatments for moral injury. Promising approaches that deserve more study prioritize moral repair and spiritual well-being. Finally, it is important for bureaucratic reasons that treatment can be measured and outcomes tracked. In this vein, the challenge of classifying moral injury according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychological Association should be overcome, as this will drive training and reimbursement for treatment.

The U.S. government can play its role in addressing these gaps by providing the necessary funding. Direct support would help to compensate for the lack of community-based, organized, and funded efforts to complement the limited work of the Veterans Affairs Administration. After two decades, some critical services still do not have sufficient staff with cultural competency to help veterans deal with a wide range of conditions, much less moral injury. Finally, partnerships between U.S. government entities, corporations, foundations, and community-based veteran service organizations can enhance best practices and better direct funding, while also building stronger community and regional networks to support veterans and families.

Validating Conversation

After the fall of Kabul, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told Congress that it was time to accept some uncomfortable truths about America’s war in Afghanistan. On the first anniversary of the fall, Austin stated that “many people have hard questions about the costs of the war and what their sacrifices meant. These are important discussions, and I hope we will keep having them with thoughtfulness and respect.” Similarly, articles in this publication have urged senior leaders to help guide the all-volunteer force through its first lost war. But despite this, nearly two years on, the silence remains deafening. The lack of frank, open discussions about America’s war in Afghanistan exacerbates many veterans’ moral injury. Rather than validating their sense that something went wrong, refusing to acknowledge it contributes to a sense of betrayal.

Accordingly, senior defense leaders should begin talking frankly about America’s failure in Afghanistan. First, government officials should admit that the Taliban defeated the United States and that the United States abandoned its Afghan allies. Countless journalists and foreign policy intellectuals have dubbed America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan a devastating defeat. They have noted that forces aligned with the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks not only drove American troops out of Afghanistan, but now possess more advanced military equipment and control more territory than they did in 2001.

But in the face of this consensus, U.S. military and civilian leaders refuse to admit defeat. Instead, they use euphemistic language to soften the blow. While this is understandable considering the delicate nature of the subject, the lack of frank, honest language robs veterans of the validation they deserve. America’s war in Afghanistan was more than a “strategic failure,” it did not simply “conclude,” and it did not just “wind down . . without all the goals satisfactorily completed.”

Senior American military officials should also discuss the abandonment of America’s Afghan allies on the battlefield. Tragically, the United States did not uphold its sacred principle of leaving no man behind. Between 200,000 and 300,000 special immigrant visa applicants are still waiting for their applications to be processed. While they wait, they face constant threats from the Taliban. Furthermore, there are countless Afghan allies who do not qualify for the special immigrant visa and remain underground because of their association with the former government and the United States. These include, but are not limited to, Afghan Special Operation Forces, Afghan Air Force personnel, and civil society members, particularly female rights activists.

Speaking the truth should also be followed by concrete action. The Department of Defense can take specific steps to hold itself accountable for not only the evacuation of Kabul but for the entire 20-year war. In this regard, the department’s release of a classified after-action report on the Noncombatant Evacuation Operations is a welcome first step. The bipartisan Afghan War Commission can also take a lesson in candor from the Dutch government’s recent report on Afghanistan. If it does so, this will provide the Department of Defense with a non-partisan blueprint for accountability.

Importantly, speaking the truth about America’s longest war will only reach the intended audiences if structured spaces are created for such dialogue. This means providing the institutional heft for these discussions to be effective. For example, the Air Force has a Bridge Chat program, which is designed to initiate and guide discussions on important topics in the service and society. Furthermore, numerous services have used Bryan Doerries’ Theater of War. These productions employ Greek tragedies to discuss sensitive topics with civilians and could also be used to help servicemembers and veterans discuss their experiences in Afghanistan.

Whatever venue is chosen, senior military leaders should lead by example on this subject. Following the murder of George Floyd, former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein and former Chief Master Sgt. Kaleth Wright filmed a series of videos entitled “A Conversation: CSAF & CMSAF.” The videos featured Goldfein, who is Jewish, and Wright, who is black, having a candid dialogue on some of the most sensitive issues in America. Both leaders were praised for their frank discussion, which only boosted Wright’s sterling reputation among airmen.

In a similar spirit, even a simple speech by high-ranking officials on Afghanistan would pay dividends. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley’s widely lauded apology for his role in responding to the Lafayette Square protests stands out as an example that could be emulated. Senior military leaders played a central role in creating moral injury. By leading these conversations, they can also play a pivotal part in moral recovery.

Conclusion

While Afghanistan continues to fade from America’s collective memory, the war looms large for tens of thousands of America’s veterans. For 20 years, U.S. soldiers were ordered to rebuild Afghanistan and, following the mantras of population-centric counterinsurgency, they grew close with their Afghan allies. Then, in the blink of an eye, the war ended disastrously, with their allies trapped behind enemy lines. While Americans, by and large, have moved on, far fewer veterans have turned the proverbial page.

American society and its government, including senior military officers, should take concrete steps to mitigate the resulting moral injury. This means providing veterans with the resources, the honesty, and the opportunities for conversations that they deserve. While these three steps alone will not ameliorate two decades’ worth of damage, they will begin a necessary reckoning.

Become a Member

Dr. Katherine Selber is a professor of social work at Texas State University and a founding member of the university’s Veteran Advisory Council. For the past 14 years, she has provided leadership for developing its award-winning program for student veterans to help them transition. She received the Texas Patriot Award honoring her work with veterans from the Texas Veterans Commission.

Lt. Col. Will Selber is a U.S. Air Force Central Command foreign area officer with multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. He is a member of Operation Sacred Promise, a non-governmental organization focused on evacuating trusted Afghan allies.

The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Air Force or the Department of Defense.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Katherine Selber · June 19, 2023

18. Pentagon’s Secret Service Trawls Social Media for Mean Tweets About Generals

Excerpts:

“In relation to extremist forums, Flashpoint has maintained misattributable personas for years on these platforms,” the FBI memo says. “Through these personas, Flashpoint has captured and scraped the contents of these forums.” The memo noted that the FBI “does not want to advertise they are seeking this type of data collection.”

According to the Protective Services Battalion document, the Army also does not want to advertise its interest in broad data collection. The redacted copy of the contract document, while public, is marked as CUI, for “Controlled Unclassified Information,” and FEDCON, meant for federal employees and contractors only.

“Left unregulated, open-source intelligence could lead to the kind of abuses observed in other forms of covert surveillance operations,” said Siatitsa, of Privacy International. “The systematic collection, storage, and analysis of information posted online by law enforcement and governmental agencies constitutes a serious interference with the right to respect for private life.”

Pentagon’s Secret Service Trawls Social Media for Mean Tweets About Generals

A document shows the Protective Services Battalion uses sophisticated surveillance tools that can pinpoint anyone’s location.

The Intercept · by Daniel Boguslaw, Sam Biddle, Ken Klippenstein · June 17, 2023

When the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley enters into his scheduled retirement later this year, one of the perks will include a personal security detail to protect him from threats — including “embarrassment.”

The U.S. Army Protective Services Battalion, the Pentagon’s little-known Secret Service equivalent, is tasked with safeguarding top military brass. The unit protects current as well as former high-ranking military officers from “assassination, kidnapping, injury or embarrassment,” according to Army records.

Protective Services’s mandate has expanded to include monitoring social media for “direct, indirect, and veiled” threats and identifying “negative sentiment” regarding its wards, according to an Army procurement document dated September 1, 2022, and reviewed by The Intercept. The expansion of the Protective Services Battalion’s purview has not been previously reported.

The country’s national security machinery has become increasingly focused on social media — particularly as it relates to disinformation. Various national security agencies have spent recent years standing up offices all over the federal government to counter the purported threat.

“The ability to express opinions, criticize, make assumptions, or form value judgments — especially regarding public officials — is a quintessential part of democratic society.”

“There may be legally valid reasons to intrude on someone’s privacy by searching for, collecting, and analyzing publicly available information, particularly when it pertains to serious crimes and terrorist threats,” Ilia Siatitsa, program director at Privacy International, told The Intercept. “However, expressing ‘positive or negative sentiment towards a senior high-risk individual’ cannot be deemed sufficient grounds for government agencies to conduct surveillance operations, even going as far as ‘pinpointing exact locations’ of individuals. The ability to express opinions, criticize, make assumptions, or form value judgments — especially regarding public officials — is a quintessential part of democratic society.”

Protective details have in the past generated controversy over questions about their cost and necessity. During the Trump administration, Education Secretary Betsy DeVos’s around-the-clock security detail racked up over $24 million in costs. Trump’s Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Scott Pruitt ran up over $3.5 million in bills for his protective detail — costs that were determined unjustified by the EPA’s inspector general. The watchdog also found that the EPA had not bothered to “assess the potential dangers posed by any of these threats” to Pruitt.

Frances Seybold, a spokesperson for the Army Criminal Investigation Division, pointed The Intercept to a webpage about the office, which has been renamed the Executive Protection and Special Investigations Field Office. Seybold did not respond to substantive questions about social media monitoring by the protective unit.

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The procurement document — published in redacted form on an online clearinghouse for government contracts but reviewed without redactions by The Intercept — begins by describing the Army’s need to “mitigate online threats” as well as identify “positive or negative sentiment” about senior Pentagon officials.

“This is an ongoing PSIFO/PIB” — Protective Services Field Office/Protective Intelligence Branch — “requirement to provide global protective services for senior Department of Defense (DoD) officials, adequate security in order to mitigate online threats (direct, indirect, and veiled), the identification of fraudulent accounts and positive or negative sentiment relating specifically to our senior high-risk personnel,” the document says.

The document goes on to describe the software it would use to acquire “a reliable social media threat mitigation service.” The document says, “The PSIFO/PIB needs an Open-Source Web based tool-kit with advanced capabilities to collect publicly available information.” The toolkit would “provide the anonymity and security needed to conduct publicly accessible information research through misattribution by curating user agent strings and using various egress points globally to mask their identity.”

The Army planned to use these tools not just to detect online “threats,” but also pinpoint their exact location by combining various surveillance techniques and data sources.

The document cites access to Twitter’s “firehose,” which would grant the Army the ability to search public tweets and Twitter users without restriction, as well as analysis of 4Chan, Reddit, YouTube, and Vkontakte, a Facebook knockoff popular in Russia. Internet chat platforms like Discord and Telegram will also be scoured for the purpose of “identifying counterterrorism and counter-extremism and radicalization,” though it’s unclear what exactly those terms mean here.

The Army’s new toolkit goes far beyond social media surveillance of the type offered by private contractors like Dataminr, which helps police and military agencies detect perceived threats by scraping social media timelines and chatrooms for various keywords. Instead, Army Protective Services Battalion investigators would seemingly combine social media data with a broad variety of public and nonpublic information, all accessible through a “universal search selector.”

These sources of information include “signal-rich discussions from illicit threat-actor communities and access to around-the-clock conversations within threat-actor channels,” public research, CCTV feeds, radio stations, news outlets, personal records, hacked information, webcams, and — perhaps most invasive — cellular location data.

The document mentions the use of “geo-fenced” data as well, a controversial practice wherein an investigator draws a shape on a digital map to focus their surveillance of a specific area. While app-based smartphone tracking is a potent surveillance technique, it remains unclear how exactly this data might actually be used to unmask threatening social media posts, or what relevance other data categories like radio stations or academic research could possibly have.

The Army wasn’t just looking for surveillance software, but also tools to disguise the Army’s internet presence as it monitors the web.

The Army procurement document shows it wasn’t just looking for surveillance software, but also tools to disguise the Army’s internet presence as it monitors the web. The contract says the Army would use “misattribution”: deceiving others about who is actually behind the keyboard. The document says the Army would accomplish this through falsifying web browser information and by relaying Army internet traffic through servers located in foreign cities, obscuring its stateside origin.

According to the document, “SEWP Solutions, LLC is the only vendor that allows USACID the ability to tunnel into specific countries/cities like Moscow, Russia or Beijing, China and come out on a host nation internet domain.”

The data used by the toolkit all falls under the rubric of “PAI,” or publicly available information, a misnomer that often describes not only what is freely available to the public, but also commercially purchased private information bought and sold by a wide constellation of shadowy surveillance firms and data brokers. Location data gleaned from smartphone apps and resold by the unregulated mobile ad industry provides nearly anyone — including the Army, it appears — with an effortless, unaccountable means of tracking the phone-owning public’s movements with pinpoint accuracy, both in the U.S. and abroad.

A recently declassified report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence outlines the dramatic and invasive surveillance efforts conducted by the U.S. government through the purchase of data collected in the private sector. Through contracts with private entities, the government has skirted laws enshrining due process, allowing federal agencies to collect cellular data on millions of Americans without warrants or judicial oversight.

While the procurement document doesn’t name a specific product, it does show that the contract was awarded to SEWP Solutions, LLC. SEWP is a federal software vendor that has repeatedly sold the Department of Defense a suite of surveillance tools that closely matches what’s described in the Army project. This suite, marketed under the oddly named Berber Hunter Tool Kit, is a collection of surveillance tools by different firms bundled together by ECS Federal, a major federal software vendor. ECS and three other federal contractors jointly own SEWP, which resells Berber Hunter.

Related

U.S. Marshals Spied on Abortion Protesters Using Dataminr

ECS also sells a PAI toolkit under the brand name Argos, whose three main features listed on the ECS website all feature prominently in the Army contracting document. It is unclear if Argos is a rebrand of the Berber Hunter suite, or a new offering. (Neither ECS nor SEWP responded to a request for comment.)

Job listings and contracting documents provide a rough sketch of what’s included in Berber Hunter. According to one job post, the suite includes software made by Babel Street, a controversial broker of personal information and location data, along with so-called open-source intelligence tools sold by Echosec and Zignal Labs. Last year, Echosec was purchased by Flashpoint Intel, an intelligence contractor that reportedly boasted of work to thwart protests and infiltrate private chat rooms.

A 2022 FBI procurement memo reviewed by The Intercept mentioning the bureau’s use of Flashpoint tools closely resembles what the Army says in the procurement document about the monitoring of “extremist” chat rooms.

“In relation to extremist forums, Flashpoint has maintained misattributable personas for years on these platforms,” the FBI memo says. “Through these personas, Flashpoint has captured and scraped the contents of these forums.” The memo noted that the FBI “does not want to advertise they are seeking this type of data collection.”

According to the Protective Services Battalion document, the Army also does not want to advertise its interest in broad data collection. The redacted copy of the contract document, while public, is marked as CUI, for “Controlled Unclassified Information,” and FEDCON, meant for federal employees and contractors only.

“Left unregulated, open-source intelligence could lead to the kind of abuses observed in other forms of covert surveillance operations,” said Siatitsa, of Privacy International. “The systematic collection, storage, and analysis of information posted online by law enforcement and governmental agencies constitutes a serious interference with the right to respect for private life.”

The Intercept · by Daniel Boguslaw, Sam Biddle, Ken Klippenstein · June 17, 2023

19. McMaster: Blinken China trip ‘may portray a bit of weakness’

McMaster: Blinken China trip ‘may portray a bit of weakness’

BY JULIA MUELLER - 06/18/23 4:37 PM ET

The Hill · · June 18, 2023

Former national security adviser H. R. McMaster on Sunday said Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to China “may portray a bit of weakness” amid heightened tensions between Beijing and Washington.

“I think China’s sending a message, ‘Hey, we’re in charge now. You’re finished’ to the West and to the United States. And, and I think it’s indicative of what they hope to achieve … which is to create kind of an exclusionary area of primacy across the Indo-Pacific region. They’ve laid claim to the ocean in the South China Sea, for example,” McMaster, who served in the Trump administration, said on CBS’s “Face the Nation.”

“So I think this really calls for us to have a strong response, I think … with Secretary Blinken’s visit there, it may portray a bit of weakness,” he said.

Pressed on what he meant by the comment, McMaster said he thinks China is hoping to, with Blinken’s trip, “create a perception that we’re going there to pay homage to the Chinese Communist Party, because they want to use that kind of perception of China’s strength relative the United States to bludgeon countries in the region and say, ‘Hey, time to bandwagon with us. This is our era,’ what they call the ‘new era of international relations.'”

Blinken on Sunday kicked off meetings with Chinese officials that a U.S. State Department spokesperson called “candid, substantive, and constructive.”

It’s the first trip to China by a U.S. secretary of state since 2018. Blinken had planned to visit in February, but rescheduled amid controversy over a Chinese surveillance balloon that the U.S. military shot down after it spent days floating through American airspace.

Tensions between Beijing and Washington have been heightened by the balloon incident, among other issues, as well as by China’s relationship with Russia and by friction in the Indo-Pacific, particularly with regard to Taiwan, the self-governed island China claims as its own. White House national security spokesman John Kirby warned earlier this month that China has been getting more aggressive in the South China Sea around the island, heightening the risk of conflict.

“It’s important to have diplomacy with China. But let’s have also diplomacy with countries that might be sitting on the fence to say, Hey, your choice, really, at this moment is not between Washington and Beijing. It’s between sovereignty and servitude,” McMaster said on Sunday.

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McMaster also said that the U.S. relationship with China is “worse” than its relationship with Russia during the Cold War.

“It’s worse. Because it’s a more difficult problem set because of the way that our economies have become interconnected, in large measure based on these flawed assumptions about the nature of relationship, and especially the intentions of the Chinese Communist Party,” McMaster said.

The U.S. thought that it could determine China’s party through engagement, he said, but “the Chinese Communist Party leadership had aspirations that went far beyond anything in reaction to what we do. And China really does want to establish itself as it sees it at the center.”

The Hill · ​ · June 18, 2023

20. Secretary Antony J. Blinken And People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping Before Their Meeting

Secretary Antony J. Blinken And People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping Before Their Meeting

https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-peoples-republic-of-china-president-xi-jinping-before-their-meeting/?utm_source=pocket_saves

REMARKS

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE

GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE

BEIJING, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

JUNE 19, 2023

PRESIDENT XI:  (Via interpreter) Mr. Secretary, welcome to China. Director Wang Yi and State Councilor Qin Gang have met or held talks with you at length, and generally speaking the two sides have had candid (inaudible) discussions. The Chinese side has made our decision clear, and the two sides have agreed to follow through the common understandings President Biden and I had reached in Bali. The two sides have also made progress and reached agreement on some specific issues. This is very good. 

It’s safe to say that interactions should always be based on mutual respect and sincerity. I hope that through this visit, Mr. Secretary, you will make more positive contributions to stabilizing China-U.S. relations. 

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Mr. President, thank you for receiving us today. President Biden asked me to travel to Beijing because he believes that the United States and China have an obligation and responsibility to manage our relationship. The United States is committed to doing that. It’s in the interest of the United States, in the interests of China, and in the interest of the world. 

Over the past few days I have had candid and constructive conversations with State Councilor Qin Gang and Director Wang Yi. We covered a broad range of both bilateral and global issues. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the way forward with you. Thank you.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com