Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The writer is delegated to declare and to celebrate man's proven capacity for greatness of heart and spirit—for gallantry in defeat, for courage, compassion and love. In the endless war against weakness and despair, these are the bright rally flags of hope and of emulation. I hold that a writer who does not believe in the perfectibility of man has no dedication nor any membership in literature."

John Steinbeck

"Don't worry about siding for or against the majority. Worry about taking up any of their irrational beliefs."

- Marcus Aurelius

"Anyone who has the power to make you believe absurdities has the power to make you commit atrocities."

- Voltaire

1. This is Not Your Father’s Cold War - It’s Irregular

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 5, 2023

3. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 5, 2023

4. Mao’s Legacy Is a Dangerous Topic in China

5. The Next Fear on A.I.: Hollywood’s Killer Robots Become the Military’s Tools

6. U.S. signals that it could work with China on Ukraine are a good thing

7. Little Lithuania Stands Tall Against Russia and China

8. THAAD: How the U.S. Military Would Kill Russian or Chinese Missiles

9. Biden to Tap Air Force General as Next Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

10. U.S. Military Has Formed Chain of Honor Which Must Be Strengthened, Biden Says

11. China's aircraft carriers play 'theatrical' role but pose little threat yet

12. Who are Russia’s supporters?

13. Ukraine Says It Shot Down Russia’s Most Sophisticated Missile for First Time

14. US Submarines Are Popping Up More Often and It's Not Clear Why

15. Opinion: Kremlin Clarifies that Drones over Kremlin Was False Flag Operation

16. "Learning really well": Reznikov on Russians adapting to Ukraine's new capabilities

17. China falls down press freedom index as Asian Communist states dominate bottom ranks

18. Orders of Disorder – Who Disbanded Iraq’s Army and De-Baathified Its Bureaucracy?

19. The President Can’t Counter China on His Own

20. Raider Without a Cause: Why is America Buying the B-21?

21. Special Operators Well Suited for Strategic Level of Warfare

1. This is Not Your Father’s Cold War - It’s Irregular

Fri, 05/05/2023 - 11:08am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/not-your-fathers-cold-war-its-irregular

This is Not Your Father’s Cold War - It’s Irregular

By Paul Burton

As the U.S. national security establishment grapples with the change of the global environment from the post-Cold War U.S.-led unipolar world to a multipolar one, much of the investment of capital – fiscal and intellectual – has been on large scale combat operations between peer nations. Yet, if the past is prologue, much of the competition, and even conflict, between great powers will likely fall into the category of Irregular Warfare. How to approach the Irregular Warfare problem today presents significant challenges and great opportunities. In the DOD, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has much of the responsibility for the preparation of forces to conduct and execute Irregular Warfare (IW); its forces are purpose-built for this environment. The Special Operations Activities that presently fall under IW are: Counter Insurgency (COIN), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Counter Terrorism (CT), and Stability Operations. Arguably, during the execution of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and later Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) most of the Irregular Warfare “campaigns” were CT and COIN directed at Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). As the national security establishment contends with the use of irregular approaches to compete with its adversaries, the current definition of IW activities serves to limit strategic thinking; a broader approach to IW is necessary for the U.S. to accomplish its strategic objectives.

There are three main options and ways for SOF to approach the re-emerging challenge of competing with peer adversaries below the level of armed conflict. First, Special Operations Forces (SOF) can set the conditions to enable the General Purpose Force (GPF) to be successful in high intensity traditional war. This is largely accomplished through engagement with partner nations and supportive groups. Second, resist and disrupt peer competitors by conducting activities that would be considered strategic and operational level disruption, including proxy wars. Finally, there is a combination of the approaches applying the degree of emphasis on UW or FID depending on the trans-regional or regional friction points that can be applied against a competitor; essentially, creating pockets of stability or instability.

One of the challenges of this shift to a peer competition, particularly below armed conflict, is that SOF have not been focused on this way of thinking since the fall of the Berlin wall over three decades ago. The West won chapter one in this struggle, but only recently have acknowledged there is a second chapter called competition. This has created a void in both SOF and GPF thought processes to provide indirect and irregular solutions for this second chapter. If SOF are struggling with the transition, especially in defining our role, the larger service components will have greater challenges, if only because of the scale of their formations. What are the service components’ responsibilities in this method of warfare; will they abdicate their role seeing SOCOM as the Title 10 USC executer of this warfare? Furthermore, the term Irregular Warfare seems to be a challenge for many of our inter-agency partners and partner nations Perhaps another term like “Irregular Activities” is more palatable at the policy level, while the DOD contribution remains warfare. Do we need to re-examine terms, through a historical lens, like Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) or Political Warfare? There must be an agreed upon definition because SOF’s operations need to be nested in titles, authorities, permissions, and precedence, the latter being what organization has traditionally conducted these activities. The definitional will likely be criticized as insufficient or incorrect, but we should not let that impede application against our competitors. Another challenge is that our competitors have a completely different threshold for the definition of warfare, with no regard for our lexicon. They have already stated that they are at war with the United States. This definitional disconnect places the United States at an Inter-agency synchronization and execution disadvantage. If the very agencies that should be executing counter peer competitor actions don’t acknowledge a problem, it is hard to convince them to actually counter it. There needs to a concerted attempt to educate many policy makers and executers, across the whole of government and inform the US public that there is a threat. The shift of the last several National Security Strategies to named peer competitors has accurately re-oriented the national security establishment and SOF focus on the IW effort and de-emphasized VEO operations. Documents such as the newly published JCS Joint Concept for Competing are a start, but there is more to be done. You can write all the policy you want, but if you don’t do anything, that inaction becomes an action in itself and the nation can “lose without fighting”.

The new environment is “not your father’s Cold War,” it is faster and more complex. At the national level not only has the strategic thought process atrophied, but we have also dismantled some the interagency capabilities we used to fight and conduct the conflict from 1946 to 1990. The binary global concept of the Cold War era does not sufficiently address the new problem set. Defining the DOD role in this present challenge and especially the SOF contribution at the campaign level must be addressed. A policy of containment is no longer an option and a new policy of flexible “constrainment” must be developed where pockets of disruption or instability and stability are created to impose costs for a broader long-term goal. Do our present strategies of short-term objectives facilitate the implementation of an effective counter strategy to slow or stifle competitor’s regional and global objectives? The very structure of our political process and command cycle place us at disadvantage in comparison to implementation continuity when compared to our competitor.

Could the United States disengage on the ground and sea in certain areas to transfer the cost of stability to our competitor? I commonly refer to the United States Navy as the largest Police Force in the world, providing unprecedented maritime security since the end of WWII. Should we purposely create areas or pockets of disruption, instability, or conflict to deny access to key markets and materials thus slowing or denying expansion or “imposing costs” for a purpose.

The United States has the capacity and capability to effectively conduct irregular activities and irregular warfare. The current challenges our nation faces are: education of policy executers and the public, delineation of roles and responsibilities for both inter-agency and service components and managing success by not exceeding a conflict threshold in setting conditions, or intermediate objects in our long-term strategy in the Combatant Commands regions and globally. The need for a whole of government deterrence campaign outweighs the Inter-Agency reluctance to conduct IW. Finally, we must statutorily mandate action, the new IW center is a start, but just a start. We will have to think our way out of this challenge, not shoot our way forward to failure, and how we define success in a long-term irregular strategy is the challenge at hand.

This the first in a series of articles on Irregular warfare.

The opinions expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not reflect any organizations viewpoint.

About the Author(s)

Paul Burton

Paul Burton is a retired Special Forces Colonel and is still active in the community.

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 5, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2023

Key Takeaways

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to have deprioritized the Bakhmut offensive in favor of preparing to defend against an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive, putting the Wagner Group and Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in a potentially difficult position.
Wagner’s continued persistence within Bakhmut is incongruent with the overall slow-down in the pace of Russian operations elsewhere in Ukraine as conventional Russian forces appear to largely be shifting focus to prepare to receive the much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Recently dismissed former Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev is reportedly serving as deputy commander of the Wagner Group, likely as part of Wagner’s campaign to retain access to Russian military supplies.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu ordered newly-appointed Deputy Minister for Logistics Alexei Kuzmenkov to control the supply of weapons and equipment to Russian forces in Ukraine.
Russian occupation authorities announced the forced removal of 70,000 civilians in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to areas deeper in the Russian-occupied rear under the guise of evacuations.
The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) proposed a draft bill aimed at appealing to growing anti-migrant sentiments in Russia and supporting the Russian military’s efforts to recruit migrants.
Russian Human Rights Council head Valery Fadeev reportedly stated that Russian authorities should regulate Telegram channels similarly to how Russia censors state-controlled media.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Kreminna and Avdiivka and made marginal gains within Bakhmut.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks near Bakhmut.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed it prevented a Ukrainian assassination attempt against an occupation deputy of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on May 5.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues his own personal force generation efforts aimed at securing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s favor.
Russian occupation authorities continue measures to strengthen social control of occupied territories.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 5, 2023

May 5, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 5, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 5, 2023, 6pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to have deprioritized the Bakhmut offensive in favor of preparing to defend against an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive, putting the Wagner Group and Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in a potentially difficult position. Prigozhin released a series of videos on May 4 and 5 announcing that Wagner will withdraw from Bakhmut on May 10 unless Wagner receives necessary supplies and launched particularly acerbic and emotional attacks against Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, and the Russian MoD establishment writ large.[1] Prigozhin’s palpable desperation in the videos, one of which shows the corpses of recently deceased Wagner fighters, marks a significant rhetorical inflection in his continued pleas for increased Russian MoD support for Wagner in Bakhmut. His visible and visceral anger suggests that the Russian MoD has likely deprioritized Bakhmut and shifted operational focus elsewhere in the theater in ways that may seriously compromise Wagner’s ability to operate effectively. Wagner has not ceased efforts to completely capture Bakhmut despite reduced access to ammunition and other necessary supplies, however. Prigozhin has shown no willingness to switch to the defensive within the city.

Wagner’s continued persistence within Bakhmut is incongruent with the overall slow-down in the pace of Russian offensive operations elsewhere in Ukraine as conventional Russian forces appear to be largely shifting focus to prepare to receive the much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive.[2] Aside from very limited and localized attacks in the Kreminna area and near Donetsk City, Russian forces have largely ceased offensive operations throughout the theater, likely signifying a transition to the defensive.[3] It would be an operationally sound decision for the Russian MoD to begin withholding and stockpiling ammunition and supplies in order to prepare for any Ukrainian counteroffensive actions, and Prigozhin’s desperate statements indicate that the Russian MoD is likely doing so. ISW has recently reported that Prigozhin began appealing to the Russian MoD to provide Wagner with necessary ammunition once again after a brief period during which it seemed that relations between Prigozhin and Russian military leadership had improved.[4] Prigozhin’s renewed anger reached its peak in the May 4 video of Prigozhin essentially screaming at Gerasimov and Shoigu and accusing them of the deaths of Wagner fighters.[5]

The losses suffered by Wagner in Bakhmut, alongside the likely de-prioritization of the Bakhmut effort by the Russian MoD, may leave Prigozhin and Wagner in a particularly bad spot. It is not immediately clear whether Prigozhin actually intends to withdraw from Bakhmut on May 10 or whether he made the announcement in a last-ditch attempt to secure MoD support. If Wagner does withdraw, then it will likely need Russian MoD equipment to protect and facilitate the retrograde. The Russian military lacks the reserves needed to man positions Wagner might abandon in Bakhmut, moreover. The massive losses suffered by Wagner in Bakhmut for the sake of tactical gains, as well as the overall shift of the Russian military towards a more cautious posture preparing for defensive operations, appears to be offering Ukrainian forces opportunities for fruitful counterattacks in various areas of the front. Ukrainian forces appear to be seizing some of these opportunities, as noted below, but ISW does not assess that these counterattacks are necessarily part of the anticipated counteroffensive. NB: ISW uses the term “counterattack” to describe tactical actions by Ukrainian forces to make limited gains in local areas. It uses the term “counteroffensive” to describe operational-level undertakings composed of many distinct tactical actions intended to achieve operationally or strategically significant gains. ISW has so far observed reporting only of Ukrainian counterattacks.

Recently dismissed former Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev is reportedly serving as deputy commander of the Wagner Group, likely as part of Wagner’s campaign to retain access to Russian military supplies. A Wagner-affiliated Russian milblogger published footage on May 4 and 5 purporting to show Mizintsev acting as Wagner deputy commander and discussing logistical and tactical issues with Wagner fighters in the Bakhmut area.[6] Prigozhin publicly offered the command position to Mizintsev following his dismissal on April 27, and Prigozhin claimed on May 5 that Mizintsev in his capacity as head of logistics supplied Wagner with low quality ammunition.[7] Prigozhin may have appointed Mizintsev as Wagner deputy commander in an effort to leverage Mizintsev‘s understanding of and relationships within the Russian military’s logistics apparatus to retain access to ammunition and supplies amid an apparent reprioritization away from Wagner’s area of responsibility. Mizintsev was reportedly dismissed after Commander of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Mikhail Teplinsky, a likely anti-Gerasimov figure, conducted readiness checks that revealed that the Russian Northern Fleet lacked supplies, possibly indicating that Mizintsev fell out of favor with both factions within the MoD and joined Wagner to retain a command role in Ukraine.[8] The changes likely occurring within the Russian military’s logistics apparatus associated with the reprioritization of supplies for defensive operations will likely impede Mizintsev‘s presumed efforts to retain Wagner’s access to supplies.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu ordered newly-appointed Deputy Minister for Logistics Alexei Kuzmenkov to control the supply of weapons and equipment to Russian forces in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on May 5 that Shoigu gave Kuzmenkov the order during an inspection of forces and military equipment in the Southern Military District.[9] The Russian MoD reported that Kuzmenkov presented Shoigu with new tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and other equipment and claimed that Russian military-industrial enterprises have repaired equipment at a rate faster than that of equipment losses. Shoigu likely met with Kuzmenkov to accelerate the conservation and reprioritization of logistics and sustainment processes ahead of expected upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. Shoigu’s meeting with the new head for logistics amid Wagner’s attempt to retain access to the Russian military’s logistics apparatus further suggests that Wagner will struggle to maintain its current level of provisions from the MoD.

Russian occupation authorities announced the forced removal of 70,000 civilians in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to areas deeper in the Russian-occupied rear under the guise of evacuations. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation Head Yevgeny Balitsky and Deputy Head Andriy Kozenko announced on May 5 that Russian authorities will conduct a partial evacuation of 70,000 Ukrainian civilians of vulnerable populations, including families with children, the disabled, and the elderly, from 18 settlements along the southern bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir and along Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) roughly 20-40 kilometers from the front line.[10] Kozenko claimed that authorities have already begun evacuating civilians from the Polohy Raion to Berdyansk.[11] The locations of these settlements so far from the current front lines suggest that Russian forces plan to conduct a controlled, fighting withdrawal from their current positions to a prepared line of defense rather than trying to hold the current line of contact in the event of a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive. Kherson Oblast occupation authorities had similarly used the guise of evacuation to justify the forced relocation of Ukrainians from the frontlines in Kherson Oblast during Ukraine’s counteroffensive in October and November 2022, citing threats of Ukrainian strikes and frontline hostilities.[12] These Russian preparations do not necessarily indicate that Ukrainian forces will attack in or prioritize this area. Russian and occupation authorities will likely capitalize on growing Russian fear over a prospective Ukrainian counteroffensive to justify further mass relocations of Ukrainian civilians.

The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) proposed a draft bill aimed at appealing to growing anti-migrant sentiments in Russia and supporting the Russian military’s efforts to recruit migrants. The MVD submitted a draft bill on May 5 that would allow employers to deprive migrant employees of their work permits and create expanded administrative supervision over the residence of foreign citizens in Russia.[13] The draft bill states that the administrative supervision regime is aimed at establishing the whereabouts of foreign citizens illegally staying in Russia, although a Russian source claimed that the measure will allow Russian officials and police to freely enter the homes of migrants.[14] The MVD added an explanatory note to the bill in which it argued that ”illegal migration is closely related to such negative phenomena as terrorism, extremism, human trafficking, [and] drug trafficking.”[15] The reasoning offered for the bill is similar to Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin’s recent accusation that migrants destabilize Russia by importing terrorism and extremist ideologies.[16] The bill is reflective of growing domestic ramifications from the wide acceptance of the Kremlin’s ”Russification” ideology, which ISW previously assessed is increasingly manifesting itself in how Russian authorities and ultranationalists negatively portray ethnic minorities and migrants in Russia.[17] Russian officials also disproportionally focus recruitment efforts on migrant communities, and the bill could set conditions for Russian officials to leverage jeopardized migration statuses to coerce migrants into signing contracts with the Russian military.[18]

Russian Human Rights Council head Valery Fadeev reportedly stated that Russian authorities should regulate Telegram channels similarly to how Russia censors state-controlled media. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on May 5 that Fadeev called for Russian authorities to “analyze the activities of Telegram channels” to consider introducing legislation to regulate Telegram.[19] Russian First Deputy Chairman of the Civic Chamber on Media and Mass Communication Alexander Malkevich supported the regulation of Telegram channels claiming that traditional forms of media and “new media” should be on an equal footing because ”new media” has "only rights and no obligations." Fadeev’s support of Telegram censorship is also notable because prominent Russian milblogger Alexander Kots also serves on the Russian Human Rights Council. ISW has previously reported on efforts on the part of Russian authorities to stimulate self-censorship in the information space.[20]

Key Takeaways

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to have deprioritized the Bakhmut offensive in favor of preparing to defend against an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive, putting the Wagner Group and Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in a potentially difficult position.
Wagner’s continued persistence within Bakhmut is incongruent with the overall slow-down in the pace of Russian operations elsewhere in Ukraine as conventional Russian forces appear to largely be shifting focus to prepare to receive the much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Recently dismissed former Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev is reportedly serving as deputy commander of the Wagner Group, likely as part of Wagner’s campaign to retain access to Russian military supplies.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu ordered newly-appointed Deputy Minister for Logistics Alexei Kuzmenkov to control the supply of weapons and equipment to Russian forces in Ukraine.
Russian occupation authorities announced the forced removal of 70,000 civilians in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to areas deeper in the Russian-occupied rear under the guise of evacuations.
The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) proposed a draft bill aimed at appealing to growing anti-migrant sentiments in Russia and supporting the Russian military’s efforts to recruit migrants.
Russian Human Rights Council head Valery Fadeev reportedly stated that Russian authorities should regulate Telegram channels similarly to how Russia censors state-controlled media.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Kreminna and Avdiivka and made marginal gains within Bakhmut.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks near Bakhmut.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed it prevented a Ukrainian assassination attempt against an occupation deputy of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on May 5.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues his own personal force generation efforts aimed at securing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s favor.
Russian occupation authorities continue measures to strengthen social control of occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[21] Ukrainian Severodonetsk Raion Military Administration Head Roman Vlasenko reported ongoing fighting near the Kreminna forest area and Bilohorivka.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 4 that Russian forces conducted positional battles near Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna) and the Zhuravka gully (18km west of Kreminna).[23] Footage published on May 4 purportedly shows elements of the 88th Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating in the Siversk (17km southwest of Kreminna) direction.[24]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces made additional gains within Bakhmut as of May 5. Geolocated footage published on May 5 shows that Russian forces have advanced in northwestern Bakhmut towards Khromove (directly west of Bakhmut).[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions east of Novomarkove (12km northwest of Bakhmut), west of Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued fighting in Bakhmut, and Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Markove (14km northwest of Bakhmut), Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), and Niu York (30km southwest of Bakhmut).[27] Geolocated imagery posted on May 4 shows a destroyed Ukrainian bridge over the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal west of Bakhmut near Chasiv Yar.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces blew up the bridge, but the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck an unspecified bridge near Chasiv Yar.[29] ISW has not observed signs of a Ukrainian withdrawal from positions east of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal, suggesting that Ukrainian forces retain at least one critical ground line of communication (GLOC) into Bakhmut.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks near Bakhmut. The milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks to constrain Russian positions near Bohdanivka, Hryhorivka, Ivanivske, and Klishchiivka (5km southwest of Bakhmut).[30] ISW has not observed any confirmed Ukrainian counterattacks in these areas and has previously assessed that reports of Ukrainian counterattacks elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast appear to be a part of an ongoing pattern of localized Ukrainian counterattacks.[31] See topline note on terminology.

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Novomykhailvika (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[33]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 5.[34] Ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from positions west of Mykilske (27km southwest of Donetsk City) to the outskirts of the settlement during limited counterattacks on May 4, though ISW is unable to confirm this claim.[35]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that it prevented a Ukrainian assassination attempt against an occupation deputy of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on May 5.[36] The FSB claimed that its operatives stopped two agents of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) before they were able to attack an unnamed member of the ZNPP’s occupation leadership board.[37] The FSB likely made these claims in order to obfuscate a May 3 report from the Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) personnel at the ZNPP found that Russian forces placed military weapons, equipment, and explosives in the turbine room of the ZNPP’s Reactor No. 4.[38]

Russian sources claimed that Russian air defense shot down a drone over the Belbek Airfield in Sevastopol, occupied Crimea, on the night of May 4. [39] Satellite imagery posted between April 9 and May 4 shows that Russia has lost at least three oil storage tanks at the Sevastopol oil terminal.[40]

Russian forces continued artillery fire along the line of contact in southern Ukraine on May 5.[41]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues his own personal force generation efforts aimed at securing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s favor. Kadyrov posted footage on May 4 purporting to show another group of volunteers who trained at the Special Forces University in Gudermes, Chechnya deploying to Ukraine.[42] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has recently excluded Chechnya from the list of regions where additional guarantees and compensations for servicemen are provided.[43] Kadyrov may have agreed to the exclusion of Chechnya from additional benefits to decrease the recruitment cost of Kadyrov’s parallel military structures for the MoD. Putin likely pressured Kadyrov during a March 13 meeting to increase the role of Chechen fighters in combat operations in Ukraine, and Kadyrov appears to be using Chechnya’s role in the Russian military sphere to launch a renewed campaign to regain national attention.[44] Kadyrov met with representatives of the National Research Center “Kurchatov Institute” on May 4 to discuss Chechen contributions to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB).[45]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue measures to strengthen social control of occupied territories. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky signed a decree on May 4 banning the sale of hard liquor in retail stores throughout occupied Zaporizhia Oblast from May 5 to August 3, 2023.[46] Balitsky warned that individuals and enterprises violating the ban will face fines ranging from 20,000 to 300,000 rubles (about $258 and $3,875, respectively) and that the only exceptions to the ban are retail sales of beer, cider, and mead.[47] Balitsky’s anti-alcohol measures closely mirror similar efforts in the Soviet Union, which sought to improve the health and productivity of Soviet citizens, as well as tighten control of the public.

Occupied Kherson Oblast Ministry of Health continues the medical examinations of Ukrainian children in occupied Kherson Oblast, likely to facilitate the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of rehabilitation.[48] Occupied Kherson Oblast Ministry of Health stated on May 4 that doctors arrived from the Adygea Republic to support examinations on 4,336 Ukrainian children through the end of May.[49] The occupation Ministry of Health stated that Russian doctors from Tver Oblast and occupied Crimea will also travel to occupied Kherson Oblast to assist in the examination effort.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated on May 5 that Russian and Belarusian Air and Defense forces conducted joint patrols in Belarusian airspace as part of an ongoing combat readiness check.[50]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/896; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/900; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/895

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050223; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050123; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042523;

[5] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/895

[6] https://t.me/brussinf/5932 ; https://t.me/grey_zone/18527; . https://t.me/brussinf/5934 ;

[7] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/900

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050123 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023

[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/26197; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/05/05/shoygu-poruchil-derzhat-na-osobom-kontrole-postavki-boepripasov-posle-togo-kak-prigozhin-zapisal-videoobraschenie-gde-krichit-na-nego-matom; https://t.me/mod_russia/26198

[10] https://t.me/readovkanews/58209; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9303; https://t.me/milinfolive/100217; https://t.me/bazabazon/17409; https://t.me/astrapress/26231; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5976595; https://t.me/milinfolive/100229; https://t.me/astrapress/26243

[11] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5976595; https://t.me/milinfolive/100229; https://t.me/astrapress/26243

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5

[13] https://t.me/sotaproject/58357 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5976548 ;https://www.pnp dot ru/social/mvd-predlagaet-vzyat-migrantov-pod-administrativnyy-nadzor.html ; https://regulation.gov dot ru/projects#npa=138054

[14] https://regulation.gov dot ru/projects#npa=138054 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/58357

[15] https://www.pnp dot ru/social/mvd-predlagaet-vzyat-migrantov-pod-administrativnyy-nadzor.html ; https://regulation.gov dot ru/projects#npa=138054

[16] https://kursdela dot biz/news/2023-04-12/ubiystvo-shkolnika-kak-inostrantsy-uchatsya-v-chelyabinske-bez-znaniya-russkogo-2900732; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/895222

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041223

[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2023

[19] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/17682485; https://t.me/readovkanews/58185

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2023

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qkvWT9i9wK2Shv6hDqnHY8ECjJYTDzZtSoBfEYMYP9okSAWmwfoExbac7V6jZ3BUl

[22] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10256

[23] https://t.me/rybar/46624

[24] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/10471

[25] https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1654486039774330883; https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1654493927360065540; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1654490165384032257

[26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84808; https://t.me/wargonzo/12314

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qkvWT9i9wK2Shv6hDqnHY8ECjJYTDzZtSoBfEYMYP9okSAWmwfoExbac7V6jZ3BUl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fQp6UGYR7agqX25eRk9s4Fc68MQNUsUowqJGLeevcgiHBM2zaEhyc6XRiTpam9izl

[28] https://t.me/vrogov/9211; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47305; https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1654406722172203008; https://twitter.com/foosint/status/1654416355058151424; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1654443403952660482?s=20; https://t.me/sashakots/39641; https://t.me/mod_russia/26193

[29] https://t.me/vrogov/9211; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47305; https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1654406722172203008; https://twitter.com/foosint/status/1654416355058151424

[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84808; https://t.me/wargonzo/12314

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2023

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qkvWT9i9wK2Shv6hDqnHY8ECjJYTDzZtSoBfEYMYP9okSAWmwfoExbac7V6jZ3BUl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fQp6UGYR7agqX25eRk9s4Fc68MQNUsUowqJGLeevcgiHBM2zaEhyc6XRiTpam9izl

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/12314

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qkvWT9i9wK2Shv6hDqn... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fQp6UGYR7agqX25eRk...

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qkvWT9i9wK2Shv6hDqn... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fQp6UGYR7agqX25eRk...

[36] https://t.me/readovkanews/58202 ; https://t.me/rybar/46638 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84784; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9301; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36497

[37] https://t.me/readovkanews/58202 ; https://t.me/rybar/46638 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84784; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9301; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36497

[38] https://snriu.gov dot ua/en/news/russian-occupants-located-military-equipment-and-explosives-in-the-turbine-room-of-znpp-unit-4

[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84700; https://t.me/basurin_e/1253; https://t.me/razvozhaev/2700 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84800; https://t.me/epoddubny/15839

[40] https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1654162786061099008?s=20

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fQp6UGYR7agqX25eRk9s4Fc68MQNUsUowqJGLeevcgiHBM2zaEhyc6XRiTpam9izl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0qkvWT9i9wK2Shv6hDqnHY8ECjJYTDzZtSoBfEYMYP9okSAWmwfoExbac7V6jZ3BUl; https://t.me/mod_russia/26194; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/84718

[42] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3595

[43] https://t.me/sotaproject/58262; https://regulation.gov dot ru/projects#npa=137996

[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031323

[45] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3597

[46] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1052

[47] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1052

[48] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9144; https://t.me/Minzdrav_Kherson_ru/104

[49] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9144; https://t.me/Minzdrav_Kherson_ru/104

[50] https://t.me/modmilby/26868

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MAY 5, 2023

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-5-2023

May 5, 2023 - Press ISW

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 5, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson, Roy Eakin, and Virginia Wang of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: May 3, Noon ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on Chinese Communist Party paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

The Military Service Law reform that came into effect on May 1 may enable faster Chinese mobilization during the event of a conflict.
Li Ganjie replaced Chen Xi as Director of the Central Organization Department (COD) on April 26, possibly to bolster the implementation of Xi’s aim to have a technologically self-reliant China.
Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Chairman Ko Wen-je's reluctance to participate in a KMT-led “opposition alliance” may bolster the Democratic Progressive Party’s standing in the upcoming presidential election.
Potential KMT presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih's rhetoric on US-Taiwan relations and national security furthers the popular domestic discussion about the role of the United States in Taiwan’s national security.
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators are considering stronger punishments for espionage that could increase the cost of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led espionage attempts in Taiwan.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

CCP Leadership Activity

The Military Service Law reform that came into effect on May 1 may enable faster Chinese mobilization during the event of a conflict. The Military Service Law reform stated that all levels of government in conjunction with military agencies should cooperate to implement the reforms and standardize local conscription organizations.[1] This indicates that the CCP bureaucratic apparatus aims to enhance its capability to deliver information in a timely fashion across locations such as universities and local party offices. The reformed Military Service Law also emphasized recruiting “high-quality soldiers” with pertinent technological prowess, especially college students.[2] This portion of the reform fits within existing PLA efforts to technologically modernize the force and its personnel. The Military Service Law reform does not indicate that Xi ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to prepare for imminent military conflict around Taiwan.

The Military Service Law reform indicates that Xi learned the necessity of bureaucratic coordination for mobilization from Putin’s force generation challenges in Ukraine. Putin’s mobilization notice system relied on the physical delivery of the notices to individuals, with limited testing of digitally delivering summonses.[3] This opened the door for mobilization evasion.

Li Ganjie replaced Chen Xi as Director of the Central Organization Department (COD) on April 26, possibly to bolster the implementation of Xi’s aim to have a technologically self-reliant China. The replacement is one of the last major personnel switches stemming from the 20th Party Congress that occurred in October 2022. The COD oversees CCP personnel appointments. Li has used his nuclear engineer degrees in party organs, such as Director General of the Department of Nuclear Safety Management of the State Environmental Protection Administration, which contrasts with Chen who did not extensively apply his chemical engineering background after becoming party secretary at Tsinghua University in the early 1990s.[4] Successfully advancing Xi’s vision would degrade the business environment in China for foreign companies, however, because this implementation will involve selective enforcement of the anti-espionage law. The law includes the broad and unspecific use of “foreign agents,” which enables the CCP to track and gather data on foreign companies’ trade secrets and their employees.[5] A business environment less permissive for foreign companies would reduce the inflow of foreign capital that Xi aims to translate into improved domestic technological production and development.

The personnel change likely does not represent a shift in Xi's ideological thinking because Chen Xi now plays a key role in training party cadre who will implement Xi’s ideological campaigns. Xi outlined that the most recent party education campaign on “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” will aim to improve bureaucratic functioning, crackdown on alleged corruption, and must be implemented in a wholistic rather than staged manner.[6] He also emphasized leading party cadre giving lectures to promote intra-party education.[7] Chen will help fulfill this portion of the campaign by serving as head of the prestigious Central Party School that trains party cadre.[8] Chen’s removal from the COD but continued leadership at the Central Party School indicates Xi approves of Chen’s ability to interpret and transmit his intent as General Secretary onto the rising elite party cadre.

Other

Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu met with Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization defense ministers’ meeting to discuss Sino-Indian border disputes. The Indian Ministry of Defense meeting readout implicitly accusing China of violating existing agreements generated claims in Chinese state media of India inaccurately portraying itself as the victim on the international stage.[9] These claims in Chinese state media will not set conditions for substantive progress on resolving Sino-Indian border disputes. No new agreements came out of Li’s attendance at the SCO.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

TPP Chairman Ko Wen-je's reluctance to participate in a KMT-led “opposition alliance” may bolster the DPP’s standing in the upcoming presidential election. This is a low confidence assessment as the KMT has not yet selected its presidential candidate and the election is several months away. KMT Chairman Chu Li-luan (Eric Chu) proposed an alliance consisting of non-DPP figures that could include Ko. The coalition aims to unite non-DPP figures and parties to win the 2024 Taiwanese presidential and legislative elections. Chu did not specify if the potential “coalition” would feature a united presidential ticket. Ko initially said he was willing to speak with Chu during a May 1 speech, but later said that he did not want to hear about “blue-white cooperation” on May 2. He maintained this rhetoric on May 3 by comparing “blue-white cooperation” to “dividing up the spoils of power” and noting that his TPP is “not without opportunity” since it polls show that 20 percent of Taiwanese support the TPP.[10] Blue-white cooperation” refers to potential cooperation between Ko and the KMT. An “opposition alliance” between the KMT and Ko is reminiscent of the 2004 unified pan-blue presidential ticket between KMT candidate Lien Chan and People-First Party Chairman Soong Chu-yu (James Soong) that attempted to unseat sitting DPP President Chen Shui-bian.[11] The coalition failed to win the 2004 election.[12]

Chu’s proposed alliance recognizes Ko Wen-je's popularity with segments of the KMT voting bloc. A February poll showed that 47 percent of Ko’s supporters would support potential KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih compared to 32 percent supporting DPP nominee Lai Ching-te.[13] While Ko and the KMT both call for cross-strait dialogue with China, Ko diverges from the KMT on the issue of the 1992 Consensus. The KMT supports the 1992 Consensus with the belief that it refers to one China with “different interpretations.”[14] Ko claimed that the 1992 Consensus “has been smeared in Taiwan” and that no consensus exists.[15] These divergent views on the 1992 Consensus would pose a substantial hurdle to an “opposition alliance” forming a uniform cross-strait policy approach and may alienate “deep blue” KMT voters. An alliance with the KMT would also contradict Ko’s campaign rhetoric calling for a ”coalition government” to unite Taiwan by making Ko explicitly side with one side of the Taiwanese political spectrum.[16] This failure to form a potential ”opposition alliance” could aid DPP presidential nominee William Lai by splitting the KMT-leaning pan-blue vote.

Potential KMT presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih's rhetoric on US-Taiwan relations and national security furthers the popular domestic discussion about the role of the United States in Taiwan’s national security. Hou called for Taiwan to maintain both a “very good relationship with the United States” and “stability in the Taiwan Strait.”[17] He also stressed the importance of national security by saying that “only by safeguarding national security can economic development continue.”[18] Hou’s position is more moderate compared to other potential KMT presidential nominees like Gou Tai-ming (Terry Gou), who questioned if Taiwan’s close relations with the United States could endanger Taiwan’s security.[19] The internal KMT debate discussion is occurring as ruling DPP candidate Lai Ching-te promotes continuity with current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s policies, which promotes close security, diplomatic, and economic cooperation with the United States.[20] A focus on security or the United States’ commitment to Taiwan within internal Taiwanese political debates make a figurative referendum on Taiwan’s relations with the United States an important component of the upcoming 2024 Taiwanese presidential election.

Other

DPP legislators are considering stronger punishments for espionage that could increase the cost of CCP-led espionage attempts in Taiwan. DPP Legislators Lo Chih-cheng, Liu Chao-hao, Tsai Yi-yu, Chuang Jui-hsiung, and Wang Mei-hui held an expert hearing on “Suggestions on How to Improve National Security with Repeated Light Sentences in Communist Espionage Cases” on May 2.[21] Taiwanese Institute for National Defense and Security Research Director Su Zi-yun stated during the hearing that the average sentence for Taiwanese espionage suspects is 18 months while espionage cases in the United States and Europe receive on average 19-year sentences.[22] Taiwanese Ministry of Justice Deputy Minister Tsai Pi-chung noted that judges should be required to “impose heavy sentences” if there is clear evidence that a suspect engaged in espionage against Taiwan. Chinese agents attempt to recruit retired and serving Taiwanese military personnel to become informants and recruit other Taiwanese military personnel. The Taipei District Court previously sentenced a major general in the Taiwanese Air Force and Lieutenant Colonel in the Taiwanese Army for spying activities and attempting to recruit Taiwanese military personnel to support espionage activity in January.[23] Both suspects received sentences that were shorter than two years.[24] The hearing displays recognition of the threat posed by CCP espionage efforts to Taiwanese security and the inadequacy of the Taiwanese legal system‘s current tools to fight espionage. Potential Taiwanese espionage law revisions are not made in coordination with the United States.

[1] http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/gffw/16219539.html

http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/jwgfdyb/16216356.html

[2] http://www.mod dot gov dot cn/gfbw/gffw/16219539.html

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[4] https://english.mee dot gov.cn/About_SEPA/leaders_of_mep/liganjie/

https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3218592/chen-xi-presidential-aide-who-built-chinas-new-technocracy

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/20thpartycongress_c...

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update...

[6] http://www.qstheory dot cn/dukan/qs/2023-04/30/c_1129581895.htm

[7] http://www.qstheory dot cn/dukan/qs/2023-04/30/c_1129581895.htm

[8] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3218592/chen-xi-presidential-aide-who-built-chinas-new-technocracy

[9] https://pib.gov dot in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1920322

https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202304/1289946.shtml

[10] https://www dot storm.mg/article/4785113

[11] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2002/12/15/0000187226

[12] https://web dot cec.gov.tw/english/cms/pe/24832

[13] https://www.tpof dot org/%e9%81%b8%e8%88%89/%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e9%81%b8%e8%88%89/%e5%a6%82%e6%9e%9c%e6%9f%af%e6%96%87%e5%93%b2%e9%80%80%e5%87%ba2024%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e5%a4%a7%e9%81%b8%ef%bc%882023%e5%b9%b42%e6%9c%8821%e6%97%a5%ef%bc%89/

[14] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2022/09/12/2003785161

[15] https://www.csis dot org/events/fireside-chat-dr-ko-wen-je-chairman-taiwan-peoples-party-and-former-mayor-taipei

https://www.storm dot mg/article/4780293

[16] https://news dot ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4284921

[17] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4288582

[18] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4288582

[19] https://www.storm dot mg/article/4779885

[20] https://news dot ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4246962

https://www.reuters dot com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-president-says-will-work-with-us-forge-closer-economic-ties-2022-09-08/

https://apnews dot com/article/taiwan-tsai-john-bolton-china-c90641d1f2bd3d3d708734191a967e63

[21] https://news dot ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4288397

[22] https://news dot ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4288397

[23] https://news dot ltn.com.tw/news/society/breakingnews/4180564

[24] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/society/breakingnews/4180564

Mao’s Legacy Is a Dangerous Topic in China

Foreign Policy · by Tania Branigan · May 6, 2023

Discussing the Cultural Revolution has become increasingly risky.

MAY 6, 2023, 6:00 AM

By Tania Branigan, a Guardian leader writer and author of Red Memory: Living, Remembering and Forgetting China's Cultural Revolution.

“For Chinese people, history is our religion,” the intellectual Hu Ping has argued. “We don’t have a supernatural standard of right and wrong, good and bad, so we view History as the ultimate judge.” The Chinese Communist Party has finessed this tradition. It sees history not as a record, still less a debate, but a tool. It can be adjusted as necessary yet appears solid and immutable: Today’s imperatives seem graven in stone, today’s facts the outcome of a logical, inexorable process. The contingencies and contradictions of the actual past are irrelevant. The truth is what the Party says, and what the Party chooses to remember.

This article is adapted from Red Memory: The Afterlives of China’s Cultural Revolution by Tania Branigan (W.W. Norton, 304 pp., .95, May 2023).

This article is adapted from Red Memory: The Afterlives of China’s Cultural Revolution by Tania Branigan (W.W. Norton, 304 pp., $29.95, May 2023).®

Its current narrative is enshrined in the National Museum of China. It stands in Tiananmen Square, directly opposite the Great Hall of the People, where grand political ceremonies are held; across the way hangs the portrait of late Chinese leader Mao Zedong, stretching 4.5 by 6 meters and reputedly 1.5 tons in weight. The picture morphed through a few incarnations before Mao approved its final template at the height of the Cultural Revolution. Now it is replaced with an identical version each year, just before October’s National Day celebrations. At least one spare is kept at the ready in case it is damaged, as in 1989, when dissidents pelted it with eggs (and paid with years in prison). Come what may, Mao continues to surveil his successors and his country. Most assume that the picture will hang there as long as the Party hangs on to power, so symbolic that the leadership would never dare remove it.

For centuries, this part of the city has been the political heart of the nation. The square lies in front of the Forbidden City, home of the emperors, on Beijing’s north-south central axis. Under Mao its size was quadrupled to 400,000 square meters, making it the world’s largest city square. The Great Hall of the People and what were then the twin Museums of the Chinese Revolution and Chinese History were completed in the same year, 1959, as part of a monumental building program marking the Party’s tenth year in power. It had established already that its rule depended not only on the promise of a better future, but also on a shared understanding of that pledge’s contrast with former misery. So the grand museums were erected, and workers and peasants were encouraged to dwell on long-gone injustices in rituals of “recalling past bitterness and cherishing present happiness.” The people were still developing their political consciousness. Sometimes they included the terrible famine just past in their list of miseries, but officials would quickly set them straight, reminding them that Past Bitterness meant the years before the Party came to power.

Mao is seen at a Red Guard rally in Tiananmen Square in 1966

Mao is seen at a Red Guard rally in Tiananmen Square in 1966. His followers wave their “Little Red Books” as he passes. Keystone/Getty Images

For Chinese people, Tiananmen Square is their history. It saw the nationalist student protests of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, Mao’s proclamation of the founding of the People’s Republic thirty years later, the mass rallies by Red Guards. Foreigners mainly associate it with the bloody crackdown on the protests which erupted here in 1989, attacking corruption and demanding reform and even democracy. When Chinese troops launched the final assault to clear the square, hundreds of soldiers poured in from behind the museum building.

Turning its guns against its citizens finally demolished the Party’s mandate: its claim to serve the people, already fatally undermined by the Cultural Revolution. Its rule now rests upon its promise of economic well-being and its restoration of national pride. The more conflicted and uncertain the former, with China’s years of double-digit growth rates well behind it and the effects of rapacious capitalism glaring, the more essential the latter. Since 1989 the Party has redoubled its commitment to patriotic education, portraying the Communist triumph over foreign aggression. It has rewritten textbooks and opened a swathe of red history sites. Officials and schoolchildren are bussed to places such as Shaoshan, Mao’s birthplace, and the former revolutionary base at Yan’an.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, born of the revolution, has embraced his party’s heritage. His first public act on assuming power was to escort the Politburo Standing Committee to the National Museum’s landmark exhibition: the Road to Rejuvenation, conceived a few years earlier but now promoted from its more modest home in the Museum of Military Affairs. A photograph blazoned across state media showed the seven men posed with such exquisite awkwardness that they could have been on show themselves. At the heart of the narrative was China’s Hundred Years of Humiliation at the hands of foreign bullies and its liberation by the Party. It was the story of the country’s suffering through the Opium Wars and subsequent imperialist aggressions; of how China had been brought to its knees; and how, through the sacrifices of heroic Party members, it had thrown off its shackles and returned to glory. It set the theme of Xi’s leadership: the Chinese dream of wealth and power. The last room portrayed both the glories and the comforts of modern China, from a space capsule for its taikonauts to a glass case of mobile phones.

“History has proven that without the Communist Party of China, the People’s Republic of China would never have come into being, nor would socialism with Chinese characteristics,” the exhibition concluded. The last six decades had been blurred into one broad advance, the sharp and deadly political clashes reshaped into a gentler, happier tale of historical inevitability under the Party’s benign leadership. It was not the historical inevitability of Karl Marx, with the triumph of the proletariat; rather, the notion that authoritarian power had brought greatness to the Chinese nation again. It was no coincidence that the Museums of the Chinese Revolution and of Chinese History had been fused into a single National Museum.

A man admires “The Founding Ceremony" painting that depicts Mao declaring the formation of the People's Republic of China on the gate of the Forbidden City overlooking Tiananmen Square

A man admires Dong Xiwen’s “The Founding Ceremony“ in a museum in Beijing on June 27, 1996. The painting depicts Mao declaring the formation of the People’s Republic of China on the gate of the Forbidden City overlooking Tiananmen Square in 1949. Goh Chai Hin/AFP via Getty Images

When it was rebuilt, in the late 2000s, the architects were instructed to ensure the result was larger than any other in the world. Nothing about the museum is human-sized. The ceilings are so high, the spaces so expansive, that weekend crowds look like model railway passengers clustering at a real station. The exhibition spanned four giant halls, but there was one small—very small—section titled “Setbacks and Progress in the Exploration of Socialist Construction.” It daintily posed the question of how the Chinese people, under CCP leadership, “overcame hardships,” without, of course, elucidating those hardships, still less exploring the causes. It did not educate; it confirmed, discreetly, and to a very limited degree. Only if you already knew your history could you see what it deigned to acknowledge.

A glass case held three documents dated 1961, including one captioned: “Liu Shaoqi’s notes from a meeting held during his investigations in Changsha and Ningxiang, Hunan.” This was part of Liu’s research into the Great Famine, and it helped to end the disaster, but it paved the way to his own death in the Cultural Revolution, thanks to a vengeful Mao.

There was little more on this second great disaster of the era. An exhibition which made space for two dozen different mobile phones could find only a dingy corner for the Cultural Revolution; and it dared not show the catastrophe itself, only its aftermath. High on the wall was a photo of Mao’s heir, Hua Guofeng, and other leaders, following the Gang of Four’s fall, and another of joyful youths massing in the square to celebrate the purge.

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No country faces its past honestly, and some in China have asked why the West was transfixed by the Maoist trauma recorded in books like Wild Swans when it appeared uninterested in slave narratives. America’s self-image as a beacon of democracy is undimmed by its cozying up to dictators, plots to oust or kill elected leaders, and backing of murderous anti-communist purges. More Britons believe the empire was a source of pride than shame; a benevolent institution, not created at gunpoint to enrich ourselves but rolled out to bring railways, cricket, and Shakespeare to the globe’s four corners. The West didn’t consciously conceal as China did; in its arrogance, it rarely noticed there was something to forget. We had often preferred to export our greatest sadism, and to allow others to enrich us by means we never questioned or recognized.

In Britain, convenience, implicit bias, and power differentials were enough to produce the distortions and erasures. In China, explicit orders and self-censorship did the work. The Cultural Revolution was not a totally forbidden subject, as discussion of the 1989 crackdown was. People found spaces in which they could operate by picking their times, shunning the spotlight, bending the rules, and having the right connections. The haziness of the line between forbidden and permitted was partly a by-product of China’s size and the multiple levels of bureaucracy. But it was also deliberate. While some were adept at exploiting grey areas, many shrank back further. It was simply easier and more efficient to make people censor themselves.

Beijing residents inspect the damage in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989

Beijing residents inspect the damage in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, following a violent military crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations.Manuel Ceneta/AFP via Getty Images

Blur the boundaries and you could also move them without acknowledging the shift. In some ways the Cultural Revolution had become less risky territory. Online discussion proliferated. One professor, though barred from launching a course called “The Cultural Revolution,” won approval by simply retitling it “Chinese Culture, 1966-1976.” But in most ways it had become harder to talk about. The amnesia about the Cultural Revolution is more recent than it seems. In its immediate aftermath, a flood of memoirs and novels had laid bare trauma and oppression, handily confirming the wisdom of the Party’s turn from Mao to market under Deng Xiaoping.

Then, in the early eighties, a campaign against bourgeois liberalism began to target such “scar literature.” In 1988 a regulation warned that, “from now on and for quite some time, publishing firms should not plan the publication of dictionaries or other handbooks about the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’.” In 1996 researchers held a symposium on the anniversary; ten years later they were warned off. In 2000 Song Yongyi, a repentant Red Guard turned historian, was held for more than five months due to his work, despite his American citizenship. And in 2013 Xi would issue a warning against “historical nihilism.”

The official Party verdict on the Cultural Revolution called it a catastrophe, which isn’t surprising. By the time it was formulated, Deng was in charge. He had been purged not once but twice, and his son has used a wheelchair since “falling” from a third-floor window while imprisoned by Red Guards. But Deng didn’t want to brood on what had happened: “The aim of summarizing the past is to lead people to unite and look ahead,” he instructed those drafting the judgement. It acknowledged that the events had caused “the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the country and the people since the founding of the People’s Republic.” It was “initiated by a leader laboring under a misapprehension and capitalized on by counter-revolutionary cliques.” Laboring under a misapprehension. It was worse than a crime, then; it was a mistake. Mao’s errors were acknowledged but could not be dwelled upon.

Conventional wisdom has it that the Party had no other way to square this circle: Mao was both Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin. Chinese communism’s triumphs and disasters cannot be separated; he stands for both and still commands love and respect from many. To cut him off would saw away the roots which anchor the Party’s power, as well as raising dangerous questions about other leaders’ failure to stop him. Cloaking the Party in Mao’s aura also veiled its rejection of its past and its adoption of the things it once sought to destroy. Instead of acknowledging its turn to the market, the Party proceeded as though nothing had happened: Deng said his reforms were upholding Mao Zedong Thought. Mao’s preservation, psychically and even physically, made sense in terms of the Party’s own past: the Lenin/Stalin dilemma. But it addressed a larger problem too. Allowing people to judge their history acknowledges their right to judge things in general. Permit them to repudiate Mao, and they may repudiate you.

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Foreign Policy · by Tania Branigan · May 6, 2023

5. The Next Fear on A.I.: Hollywood’s Killer Robots Become the Military’s Tools

Excerpts:

“If we stop, guess who’s not going to stop: potential adversaries overseas,” the Pentagon’s chief information officer, John Sherman, said on Wednesday. “We’ve got to keep moving.”

His blunt statement underlined the tension felt throughout the defense community today. No one really knows what these new technologies are capable of when it comes to developing and controlling weapons, and they have no idea what kind of arms control regime, if any, might work.

The foreboding is vague, but deeply worrisome. Could ChatGPT empower bad actors who previously wouldn’t have easy access to destructive technology? Could it speed up confrontations between superpowers, leaving little time for diplomacy and negotiation?

“here’s a series of informal conversations now taking place in the industry — all informal — about what would the rules of an A.I. safety look like,” said Eric Schmidt, the former Google chairman who served as the inaugural chairman of the Defense Innovation Board from 2016 to 2020.Credit...Mike Blake/Reuters

“The industry isn’t stupid here, and you are already seeing efforts to self-regulate,’’ said Eric Schmidt, the former Google chairman who served as the inaugural chairman of the Defense Innovation Board from 2016 to 2020.

“So there’s a series of informal conversations now taking place in the industry — all informal — about what would the rules of an A.I. safety look like,” said Mr. Schmidt, who has written, with former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, a series of articles and books about the potential of artificial intelligence to upend geopolitics.

The Next Fear on A.I.: Hollywood’s Killer Robots Become the Military’s Tools

The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · May 5, 2023

News Analysis

U.S. national security officials are warning about the potential for the new technology to upend war, cyber conflict and — in the most extreme case — the use of nuclear weapons.

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“If we stop, guess who’s not going to stop: potential adversaries overseas,” the Pentagon’s chief information officer, John Sherman, said on Wednesday. Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

In 40 years at The Times, David Sanger has written extensively on the intersection of geopolitics, nuclear weapons and arms control.

May 5, 2023, 3:52 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON — When President Biden announced sharp restrictions in October on selling the most advanced computer chips to China, he sold it in part as a way of giving American industry a chance to restore its competitiveness.

But at the Pentagon and the National Security Council, there was a second agenda: arms control. If the Chinese military cannot get the chips, the theory goes, it may slow its effort to develop weapons driven by artificial intelligence. That would give the White House, and the world, time to figure out some rules for the use of artificial intelligence in everything from sensors, missiles and cyberweapons, and ultimately to guard against some of the nightmares conjured by Hollywood — autonomous killer robots and computers that lock out their human creators.

Now, the fog of fear surrounding the popular ChatGPT chatbot and other generative A.I. software has made the limiting of chips to Beijing look like just a temporary fix. When Mr. Biden dropped by a meeting in the White House on Thursday of technology executives who are struggling with limiting the risks of the technology, his first comment was “what you are doing has enormous potential and enormous danger.”

It was a reflection, his national security aides say, of recent classified briefings about the potential for the new technology to upend war, cyber conflict and — in the most extreme case — decision-making on employing nuclear weapons.

But even as Mr. Biden was issuing his warning, Pentagon officials, speaking at technology forums, said they thought the idea of a six-month pause in developing the next generations of ChatGPT and similar software was a bad idea: The Chinese won’t wait, and neither will the Russians.

“If we stop, guess who’s not going to stop: potential adversaries overseas,” the Pentagon’s chief information officer, John Sherman, said on Wednesday. “We’ve got to keep moving.”

His blunt statement underlined the tension felt throughout the defense community today. No one really knows what these new technologies are capable of when it comes to developing and controlling weapons, and they have no idea what kind of arms control regime, if any, might work.

The foreboding is vague, but deeply worrisome. Could ChatGPT empower bad actors who previously wouldn’t have easy access to destructive technology? Could it speed up confrontations between superpowers, leaving little time for diplomacy and negotiation?

“here’s a series of informal conversations now taking place in the industry — all informal — about what would the rules of an A.I. safety look like,” said Eric Schmidt, the former Google chairman who served as the inaugural chairman of the Defense Innovation Board from 2016 to 2020.Credit...Mike Blake/Reuters

“The industry isn’t stupid here, and you are already seeing efforts to self-regulate,’’ said Eric Schmidt, the former Google chairman who served as the inaugural chairman of the Defense Innovation Board from 2016 to 2020.

“So there’s a series of informal conversations now taking place in the industry — all informal — about what would the rules of an A.I. safety look like,” said Mr. Schmidt, who has written, with former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, a series of articles and books about the potential of artificial intelligence to upend geopolitics.

The preliminary effort to put guardrails into the system is clear to anyone who has tested ChatGPT’s initial iterations. The bots will not answer questions about how to harm someone with a brew of drugs, for example, or how to blow up a dam or cripple nuclear centrifuges, all operations the United States and other nations have engaged in without the benefit of artificial intelligence tools.

But those blacklists of actions will only slow misuse of these systems; few think they can completely stop such efforts. There is always a hack to get around safety limits, as anyone who has tried to turn off the urgent beeps on an automobile’s seatbelt warning system can attest.

Though the new software has popularized the issue, it is hardly a new one for the Pentagon. The first rules on developing autonomous weapons were published a decade ago. The Pentagon’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center was established five years ago to explore the use of artificial intelligence in combat.

Some weapons already operate on autopilot. Patriot missiles, which shoot down missiles or planes entering a protected airspace, have long had an “automatic” mode. It enables them to fire without human intervention when overwhelmed with incoming targets faster than a human could react. But they are supposed to be supervised by humans who can abort attacks if necessary.

Patriot missiles, which shoot down missiles or planes entering a protected airspace, have long had an “automatic” mode. But they are supposed to be supervised by humans who can abort attacks if necessary.Credit...Sean Murphy/Associated Press

The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Iran’s top nuclear scientist, was conducted by Israel’s Mossad using an autonomous machine gun, mounted in a pickup truck, that was assisted by artificial intelligence — though there appears to have been a high degree of remote control. Russia said recently it has begun to manufacture — but has not yet deployed — its undersea Poseidon nuclear torpedo. If it lives up to the Russian hype, the weapon would be able to travel across an ocean autonomously, evading existing missile defenses, to deliver a nuclear weapon days after it is launched.

So far there are no treaties or international agreements that deal with such autonomous weapons. In an era when arms control agreements are being abandoned faster than they are being negotiated, there is little prospect of such an accord. But the kind of challenges raised by ChatGPT and its ilk are different, and in some ways more complicated.

In the military, A.I.-infused systems can speed up the tempo of battlefield decisions to such a degree that they create entirely new risks of accidental strikes, or decisions made on misleading or deliberately false alerts of incoming attacks.

“A core problem with A.I. in the military and in national security is how do you defend against attacks that are faster than human decision-making,” Mr. Schmidt said. “And I think that issue is unresolved. In other words, the missile is coming in so fast that there has to be an automatic response. What happens if it’s a false signal?”

The Cold War was littered with stories of false warnings — once because a training tape, meant to be used for practicing nuclear response, was somehow put into the wrong system and set off an alert of a massive incoming Soviet attack. (Good judgment led to everyone standing down.) Paul Scharre, of the Center for a New American Security, noted in his 2018 book “Army of None” that there were “at least 13 near use nuclear incidents from 1962 to 2002,” which “lends credence to the view that near miss incidents are normal, if terrifying, conditions of nuclear weapons.”

For that reason, when tensions between the superpowers were a lot lower than they are today, a series of presidents tried to negotiate building more time into nuclear decision making on all sides, so that no one rushed into conflict. But generative A.I. threatens to push countries in the other direction, toward faster decision-making.

The good news is that the major powers are likely to be careful — because they know what the response from an adversary would look like. But so far there are no agreed-upon rules.

Anja Manuel, a former State Department official and now a principal in the consulting group Rice, Hadley, Gates and Manuel, wrote recently that even if China and Russia are not ready for arms control talks about A.I., meetings on the topic would result in discussions of what uses of A.I. are seen as “beyond the pale.”

Of course, even the Pentagon will worry about agreeing to many limits.

“I fought very hard to get a policy that if you have autonomous elements of weapons, you need a way of turning them off,” said Danny Hillis, a famed computer scientist who was a pioneer in parallel computers that were used for artificial intelligence. Mr. Hillis, who also served on the Defense Innovation Board, said that the pushback came from Pentagon officials who said “if we can turn them off, the enemy can turn them off, too.”

So the bigger risks may come from individual actors, terrorists, ransomware groups or smaller nations with advanced cyber skills — like North Korea — that learn how to clone a smaller, less constricted version of ChatGPT. And they may find that the generative A.I. software is perfect for speeding up cyberattacks and targeting disinformation.

Tom Burt, who leads trust and safety operations at Microsoft, which is speeding ahead with using the new technology to revamp its search engines, said at a recent forum at George Washington University that he thought A.I. systems would help defenders detect anomalous behavior faster than they would help attackers. Other experts disagree. But he said he feared it could “supercharge” the spread of targeted disinformation.

All of this portends a whole new era of arms control.

Some experts say that since it would be impossible to stop the spread of ChatGPT and similar software, the best hope is to limit the specialty chips and other computing power needed to advance the technology. That will doubtless be one of many different arms control formulas put forward in the next few years, at a time that the major nuclear powers, at least, seem uninterested in negotiating over old weapons, much less new ones.

The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · May 5, 2023

6. U.S. signals that it could work with China on Ukraine are a good thing

Excerpt:

China’s posture on the war in Russia has generally aligned with Moscow’s interests, and it’s possible that the talk of peacemaking will remain empty rhetoric. But there’s little cost in leaving the door open to talking. The war is constantly evolving, and China’s perception of the consequences of the war is too. The U.S. can help nudge China in the direction of peace by signaling openness to talking.

U.S. signals that it could work with China on Ukraine are a good thing

We don’t know if China will help with Ukraine. But it’s good the U.S. hasn’t ruled it out.

May 5, 2023, 1:49 PM EDT

By Zeeshan Aleem, MSNBC Opinion Writer/Editor

msnbc.com · by Zeeshan Aleem, MSNBC Opinion Writer/Editor

The U.S. is sending out signals that it’s open to working with China to end the war in Ukraine. While some analysts are dubious of Beijing’s recent overtures to play the role of peacemaker, it’s a positive development. There are a number of benefits to the U.S. adopting an open-minded posture toward talking with a great power that has leverage over Russia.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken told The Washington Post on Wednesday that he had an open attitude toward working with China on Russia. “In principle, there’s nothing wrong with that if we have a country, whether it’s China or other countries that have significant influence that are prepared to pursue a just and durable peace. … We would welcome that, and it’s certainly possible that China would have a role to play in that effort. And that could be very beneficial,” Blinken said. He also said there were “positive” items in China’s 12-point peace plan released in February.

Ukraine’s highly anticipated spring offensive could create new diplomatic opportunities for negotiating an end to the war.

That’s an important change in tone from the secretary. China’s rhetorical pivot this year toward offering to play the role of peacemaker in the war this year has been received with skepticism and some pushback — including from Blinken himself. While he is probably still skeptical, his new statements sound more open.

Blinken may have been heartened in part by Chinese President Xi Jingping’s phone conversation with Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy, which he called “a positive thing” because it was a potential sign of greater even-handedness. But broader issues of timing could be a factor as well. Ukraine’s highly anticipated spring offensive could create new diplomatic opportunities for negotiating an end to the war. And concerns about U.S. military aid to Ukraine eating into the U.S. weapons stockpile might make those opportunities more urgent.

There are a few further benefits to sounding open to working with China, even if it’s unclear whether China has the capacity to work toward peace, or even seriously intends to. First, the U.S. knows that this could be an opportunity to create a wedge between Beijing and Moscow. “If the U.S. dismisses China’s role [in diplomacy over the war] out of hand, it will push them closer to Russia,” Trita Parsi, the executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a Washington think tank, explained to me. China has a complicated set of conflicting interests on Russia — there's an argument, for example, that a prolonged war benefits Beijing by distracting the U.S. and deepening Russia’s dependence on China. But there’s also the argument that peace benefits China more, by strengthening Russian President Vladimir Putin's beleaguered position and lessening instability in the region.

Second, to whatever extent China has any intention of helping negotiate a meaningful peace, it’s important to keep the door open. Thanks to international sanctions, Russia has come to rely more and more on energy sales and trade with China. Just as the U.S. could play a role in pressuring Ukraine to adopt certain diplomatic positions, Parsi says, China can do so with Russia. Even with China in far closer alignment with Russia, having Beijing as partners in negotiation could be strategically advantageous.

China’s posture on the war in Russia has generally aligned with Moscow’s interests, and it’s possible that the talk of peacemaking will remain empty rhetoric. But there’s little cost in leaving the door open to talking. The war is constantly evolving, and China’s perception of the consequences of the war is too. The U.S. can help nudge China in the direction of peace by signaling openness to talking.

msnbc.com · by Zeeshan Aleem, MSNBC Opinion Writer/Editor

7. Little Lithuania Stands Tall Against Russia and China

Conclusion:

Mr. Landsbergis has a message for Americans: “We’re all connected” by “an unseen geopolitical thread” that binds the world. “A Ukrainian victory or loss will affect my country, will affect South Korea, will affect Taiwan, will affect Japan, will affect Israel, will affect the United States, will affect . . .” His voice trails off, then starts again: “We cannot get tired. We cannot stop supporting Ukraine. We have to continue that until they win.”

Little Lithuania Stands Tall Against Russia and China

Gabrielius Landsbergis, the Baltic nation’s foreign minister, explains why his country never bought into ‘the end of history’ and what Ukraine and Taiwan have in common.

By Tunku Varadarajan

May 5, 2023 3:53 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/lithuania-stands-against-russia-and-china-landsbergis-taiwan-ukraine-war-362976d3?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

Lithuania is a Baltic country of just under 2.8 million people, a million fewer than live in the city of Los Angeles. It won its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and existed for the next three decades on the margins of international attention, patronized in the European Union (which it joined in 2004) by heavyweights like France and Germany.

The war in Ukraine changed all that, redrawing the moral and diplomatic map of Europe in significant ways. With France and Germany leading from behind—the latter chronically indecisive and hostage to Russian energy supplies—the front-line states of the eastern flank have been left to mount a robust European defense of Ukraine. Along with Poland, the Baltic states—Estonia and Latvia as well as Lithuania—have been most vocal in their condemnation of the invasion; and they’ve committed materiel to the war effort in unstinting ways and hosted large numbers of Ukrainian refugees. In doing so, they’ve earned the wrath of Russia, which they regard as proof of a moral duty well done.

“We still have a very clear historic memory of my country being under occupation,” says Gabrielius Landsbergis, 41, Lithuania’s foreign minister, in a Zoom call from his chancery in Vilnius. “I’m a youngish politician, but I remember it, as does the current young generation in Parliament.” His children “only read about it,” but Lithuanians have national nightmares of Russian attacks, “not just the tanks in Ukraine, and in Georgia, but here in the capital city.”

Mr. Landsbergis was 9 when Soviet tanks rolled into Vilnius in an attempt to disperse massed protesters calling for independence. Fourteen Lithuanians died at the hands of Soviet troops on Jan. 13, 1991, now commemorated as Freedom Defenders Day. Eight months later, Russian President Boris Yeltsin recognized Lithuania’s sovereignty. United Nations membership followed days later. The foreign minister’s paternal grandfather, Vytautas Landsbergis, now 90, was the first head of state of independent Lithuania.

That experience gives Lithuanians an “additional layer of understanding of what we’re up against, and what Ukraine is up against,” the foreign minister says. It also explains why Lithuania is the world’s only country in a state of open confrontation with both Russia and China. Lithuania sees itself as standing up to bullies who would snuff out the sovereignty of other nations. Its political position was strengthened late last month when China’s ambassador to France said on French television that “previously Soviet states have no effective status in international law.”

China’s animus against Lithuania is easily explained. In November 2021, the government gave its imprimatur to the opening of a Taiwan Representative Office in Vilnius. Such an office is commonly described in the media as a de facto embassy, but Mr. Landsbergis takes care to call it “nondiplomatic.” It is the sole Taiwanese representative office in Europe to use “Taiwan,” as opposed to “Taipei,” the only name China considers permissible. Even in the U.S., Taiwan’s representatives adhere to Beijing-approved nomenclature.

The Chinese reaction was swift, disproportionate and vengeful. China ceased all trade with Lithuania overnight, recalled its ambassador from Vilnius and expelled Lithuania’s from Beijing. “It was a hand-brake situation,” Mr. Landsbergis says, “a full stop.” He believes it was unprecedented: “Going from 100% of trade to zero trade—that’s never happened.” It caused “a lot of stress to businesses” and “a lot of stress to the government, trying to figure out how to deal with the situation.”

As it floundered to deal with the economic shock, Lithuania found that it wasn’t friendless. Australia, Japan and South Korea opened their ports to ships that could no longer dock in China: “Last year, our trade with the Pacific grew by 40%.” Booming trade with Singapore prompted Lithuania to open an embassy there.

“We were decoupled by China,” Mr. Landsbergis says, “but we showed that it was possible to withstand it, and not lower our threshold when it comes to values.” Taiwan still has its office in Lithuania, and trade relations with China have been restored, although the ambassadors haven’t returned.

Why did Lithuania, alone in Europe, poke China in the eye? Mr. Landsbergis doesn’t care for that characterization; he says his country isn’t “poking China in the eye, but allowing people to feel dignified by calling themselves the way they see themselves. And if they see themselves as Taiwanese, be it politically or culturally, it’s not my place to ask, but to give them that dignity.” He says Vilnius’s position on Taiwan derives from its national values and belief in a “rules-based world order.” He directly compares Taiwan to Ukraine. “The sovereignty of countries is one of our main values,” he says, as is the “dignity of people, which usually comes up when we’re talking about the people in Taiwan” and their desire to be “recognized as a democratic community.”

China, Mr. Landsbergis says, accused Lithuania of violating “their One China policy. We said that every country has a One China Policy and we did not violate the policy that Lithuania has. So this is a political dispute, but it goes deeper than that, to an attempt to suppress identity.”

He also bristles at the thought of taking dictation on policy from Beijing. “Will we be able to talk about Hong Kong? About Xinjiang? Will we be able to look into human-rights abuse? Maybe that will become an out-of-the-question question that will merit sanctions from China.” That “might start affecting our sovereignty. And this is where we are.”

The European debate over Taiwan has turned in Lithuania’s direction. In late March, the EU agreed to institute a process to allow for trade retaliation against countries that use punitive measures against its member states. “We’ve seen in the last two years that Taiwan has become more and more a topic that is being debated in Europe,” Mr. Landsbergis says. Latvia and Estonia followed Lithuania in leaving a forum called 17+1, set up by China to build its relations with Eastern European countries. This week the Czech foreign minister said “the 14+1 has neither substance nor future.” In March, a 150-member delegation of Czech parliamentarians visited Taiwan. The Czechs have also negotiated a major arms deal with the Taiwanese.

When the Soviet Union fell, a triumphalism prevailed in much of the West, exemplified by Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 essay and 1992 book about “the end of history.” Mr. Landsbergis says that Lithuania, “being a reborn country after years of occupation,” never bought into that: “Maybe I’m flattering my country, but I tend to believe that we feel the wind of geopolitical upheaval maybe better than others. Maybe that’s because we were born out of it. And it’s still alive, very much alive.”

As Mr. Landsbergis observed President Emmanuel Macron of France travel to China and perform what many in the free world regard as a kowtow—including an exhortation to Europe to be more than “just America’s followers”—he thought of earlier attempts to wean Russia off its old habits and transform it into a market democracy. “There is a lot of naiveté, a lot of wishful thinking that we will—with trade, with diplomacy, and interaction in the multilateral arena—drag and lock them closer to the West.” These methods “failed tremendously” with Russia, and “we should not be making exactly the same mistake with China.”

The foreign minister tweeted recently that China, which has offered to mediate in the Ukraine war, “is not trying to help Russia or anybody else: China only helps China.” Xi Jinping aims “to create an alternative to Pax Americana,” a Pax Sinica,” which Mr. Landsbergis later rendered “Pax Cynica.” In our conversation, he explains that China seeks to set up a new global order based on “the might-is-right principle. It is presented as an ‘order,’ but in that order, only the strong win. And this is definitely not the world which would be safe for my country.”

What keeps Lithuania safe above all is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It’s “based on trust, trust that your back is covered,” Mr. Landsbergis says. “And that is so valuable when you are a front-line country like us.”

Asked if he thinks U.S. leadership is in decline internationally, Mr. Landsbergis says, “Oh no! I think it’s back. It’s very much back, at least where I stand. When it comes to Europe, the United States has shown, as in the past, that they’re here for us.” American participation was “decisive” in the two world wars, and we’re “seeing history repeat itself, in a different form.” Although U.S. troops aren’t fighting there, “Ukraine is immensely supported by the United States, not just militarily but politically, diplomatically and financially as well.”

Mr. Landsbergis isn’t fazed by the apparent domestic discord in the U.S.—especially in the Republican Party—over the extent of American support for Ukraine. He has met U.S. lawmakers from both parties and has found that dissension over Ukraine is overstated. “In some cases, headlines do not tell the truth,” he says. “At least from where I stand, I feel that there is more consensus than we get to read sometimes.”

What about Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis’s reference to the Ukraine war as a “territorial dispute”? “Well, I would probably give it time,” Mr. Landsbergis says. “For some politicians, the mindset is forming.” And Mr. DeSantis did walk the comment back.

Mr. Landsbergis believes the “spirit of Reagan is still alive” in Ronald Reagan’s party. It’s alive in Lithuania too. Reagan said his theory of the Cold War was “We win, they lose.” Mr. Landsbergis says Ukrainian victory means “winning the whole territory back, including Crimea. It’s rebuilding what was destroyed and punishing those who are guilty for the act itself, for the aggression.”

If Ukraine turns back the Russians, “we will not then be forced to defend a country like Lithuania, or a country like Poland, the next time around.” We mustn’t “give in to an idea that Russia is unbeatable,” he says, noting that in the 20th century “Russia was beaten in Afghanistan; it was beaten in Japan in 1905.”

Mr. Landsbergis has a message for Americans: “We’re all connected” by “an unseen geopolitical thread” that binds the world. “A Ukrainian victory or loss will affect my country, will affect South Korea, will affect Taiwan, will affect Japan, will affect Israel, will affect the United States, will affect . . .” His voice trails off, then starts again: “We cannot get tired. We cannot stop supporting Ukraine. We have to continue that until they win.”

Mr. Varadarajan, a Journal contributor, is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and at New York University Law School’s Classical Liberal Institute.

THAAD: How the U.S. Military Would Kill Russian or Chinese Missiles

THAAD began in 2008 as an Army program and has since transitioned to the Missile Defense Agency and now defends Israel, Romania, United Arab Emirates, and South Korea.

19fortyfive.com · by Kris Osborn · May 5, 2023

THAAD, Explained – Defending against incoming ballistic missiles requires a layered and integrated approach involving surveillance, air attack, and ultimately ground-fired interceptors.

THAAD: Protecting the Base

It is a complex, tactical challenge as forward operating bases, force concentrations, and ammunition and supply depots can all fall victim to ballistic missiles.

Defense is complex because, although missiles typically follow a predictable “parabola-” like trajectory, it can be tough to intercept in time, even if they are seen.

Naturally, the most dangerous ones are those with some kind of precision guidance, something not associated with Iraq’s Scud missiles fired during the Gulf War which helped inspire the creation of THAAD, or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense.

THAAD is a ground-launched missile battery that can target and intercept attacking missiles by tracking the missile’s flight path and shooting a kinetic energy interceptor, which by virtue of its sheer speed and force, can disable or destroy an incoming missile without needing an explosive.

Kinetic Trajectory

It’s called a Hit-to-Kill approach, wherein the force of a collision achieves the desired battlefield effect without using a warhead. THAAD conducts intercepts through what is known as the terminal phase of flight, meaning a portion of an incoming missile’s trajectory wherein it re-enters the earth’s atmosphere or simply descends onto its targets from lower altitudes. Of course, many ballistic missiles’ flight path remains purely within the boundaries of the earth’s atmosphere, certain weapons such as an ICBM descend back into the earth’s atmosphere from space where it transits what’s referred to as the mid-course phase.

The boundary of the earth’s atmosphere is roughly 60 miles above the surface of the earth, so THAAD’s range of 120 miles and a flight ceiling of 93 miles make it optimal for tracking and destroying missiles as they re-enter the earth’s atmosphere from space.

THAAD began in 2008 as an Army program and has since transitioned to the Missile Defense Agency and now defends Israel, Romania, United Arab Emirates, and South Korea.

In more recent years, THAAD developer Lockheed has been engineering a special, upgraded Extended Range (ER) variant of the weapon designed to counter advanced enemy attacks such as hypersonic weapons. A THAAD ER could become effective against a “rudimentary” hypersonic weapon within several years. AviationWeek explained that the Pentagon is also looking at laser weapons and railguns as potential methods of defending against hypersonic attacks.

THAAD and the Hypersonic Threat

Defending hypersonic attacks with an interceptor such as THAAD is likely to prove extremely difficult given the speed with which attacking hypersonics transition from one radar aperture or “field of regard” to another.

In recent years, the Pentagon has been working intensely to try to engineer methods of achieving a “continuous target track” on hypersonic missiles traveling more than five times the speed of sound. For example, the Pentagon and MDA have been working on various satellite networking possibilities through the arrival of Medium-to-Low-Earth Orbit Satellites which can proliferate at lower altitudes to form a “mesh” network of data-sharing nodes in space.

Should the networking be fast enough to establish a continuous track on hypersonic missiles using high-fidelity sensors and high-throughput data transmission, then some kind of intercept of a hypersonic weapon may be possible.

THAAD, however, is unlikely to prove extremely successful as an interceptor unless it is able to establish much greater speed and target tracking technology to keep pace with hypersonic attacks.

Kris Osborn is the Military Affairs Editor of 19FortyFive and President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

19fortyfive.com · by Kris Osborn · May 5, 2023

9. Biden to Tap Air Force General as Next Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

He seems eminently qualified to me. Perhaps someday such an announcement will not need to include a discussion of his race.

Biden to Tap Air Force General as Next Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

Charles Q. Brown Jr. would be second Black general to serve in post

By Gordon LuboldFollow and Andrew RestucciaFollow

Updated May 4, 2023 11:48 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-to-tap-air-force-general-as-next-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-2feda02?mibextid=Zxz2cZ

WASHINGTON—President Biden is expected to nominate Air Force Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, succeeding Army Gen. Mark Milley and becoming the second Black general in the post, according to U.S. officials.

Gen. Brown is currently the chief of staff of the Air Force. If he is nominated and confirmed by the Senate, two Black men would lead the Pentagon for the first time ever. Lloyd Austin is serving as the first Black defense secretary.

While Gen. Brown was long expected to be the next chairman, Mr. Biden also interviewed Gen. David Berger, the Marine commandant, for the job.

Although the chairmanship doesn’t follow a strict rotation, it was unlikely that Mr. Biden would choose another Army general to succeed Gen. Milley. The current vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs is a Navy admiral, making it less likely that Mr. Biden would nominate another sailor.

The expected nomination of Gen. Brown, who goes by CQ, was earlier reported by Politico. The Pentagon declined to comment. “When President Biden makes a final decision, he will inform the person selected and then announce it publicly,” the White House said in a statement. “That hasn’t happened yet.”

Gen. Brown would be elevated to the post when Gen. Milley’s four-year term ends in September. He would be the second Black man to be the Pentagon’s top officer, following Colin Powell, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs between 1989 and 1993.

Gen. Brown is a jet-fighter pilot who has also flown a number of different aircraft, with 130 hours of combat missions. The normally quiet general surprised some inside and outside the Pentagon when he made a video following the murder of George Floyd in May 2020 to discuss how Mr. Floyd’s death affected him and the nation, weaving his personal experiences into the clip, including the discrimination he experienced personally throughout his career.

“I want to hear what you are thinking about and how together we can make a difference,” Gen. Brown said at the video’s conclusion.

As chairman, Gen. Brown would inherit a Pentagon that is steeped in the war in Ukraine even as it attempts to restore the military’s focus on competition with China in the Indo-Pacific. There the U.S. military is lagging behind in some regards, including shipbuilding and some capabilities such as hypersonics. Some military services are weathering a recruiting challenge in the midst of a robust labor market.

Gen. Brown would be seen as a contrast to Gen. Milley, a gruff Army officer who was a prominent figure in the last years of the Trump administration, marked by the pandemic, the protests after Mr. Floyd’s death and the attack on the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. During the Biden administration, Gen. Milley helped oversee the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the war in Ukraine that began last year.

Gen. Brown has had some assignments in the Indo-Pacific, including commanding a fighter wing in South Korea in 2007-08. Between 2018 and 2020, he served as commander of Pacific Air Forces, which is the air component of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and as the executive director of Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff in Hawaii, home to the command. He served in several assignments in Southwest Asia and the Middle East and at U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for both regions, in Tampa, Fla.

Write to Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com and Andrew Restuccia at andrew.restuccia@wsj.com

Appeared in the May 5, 2023, print edition as 'Air Force General Is Picked to Head The Joint Chiefs'.

10. U.S. Military Has Formed Chain of Honor Which Must Be Strengthened, Biden Says

U.S. Military Has Formed Chain of Honor Which Must Be Strengthened, Biden Says

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

The military has forged a chain of honor and the leaders of today must ensure each generation of military leaders makes that chain stronger, President Joe Biden said at the Combatant Commanders Dinner at the White House last night.

The Commander-in-Chief meets with the assembled military and civilian leaders each year. The dinner is in conjunction with the Senior Leaders Conference at the Pentagon.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders and senior officers stand on the steps of the Pentagon, May 3, 2023.

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The president said the chain of honor becomes stronger when there are no artificial restraints on service. He noted the military is marking the 75th anniversary of President Harry S. Truman's executive order banning segregation in the military. It is also 75 years since women were integrated into the military. Finally, he noted it is 50 years since the all-volunteer force became a reality.

"Each one of you over the years — [knows] this chain has grown stronger," Biden said. "And as a mark of these milestones, … I challenge you to keep strengthening that chain in big and small ways — to keep sharpening our military edge in the field and across the forces, to keep taking on the challenges of today and tomorrow."

The president said it is not a hyperbole to state the U.S. military is the finest the world has ever seen. "I think other leaders around the world who don't share the same view as we do, are beginning to understand that," he said.

But the credit belongs to the men and women of the force. Defense leaders have a "sacred obligation … to prepare those we send into harm's way and take care of them and their families when they come home — and to care for them in a way that they deserve," the president said.

The president also thanked the commanders for their impressive leadership of the past year as Russia has continued its war on neighboring Ukraine. "You've armed, you've equipped, and you've trained a proud and brave Ukrainian army and helped them preserve their liberty and their democracy," he said. "I have to admit to you, I was a little bit surprised just how … courageous, how amazingly brave, not only the military is but … the Ukrainian people. They're just doing an incredible job."

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He also noted the smooth process of evacuating the U.S. embassy in Khartoum, Sudan and "the treatment and capabilities and commitments of our armed forces helping American people anywhere in the world," Biden said. "You probably don't think about it, but you're just remarkable, remarkable, remarkable group of people."

"You continue to take terrorists off the battlefield with precision and professionalism, protecting our nation and our allies and interests against the enduring threat," he said. "And each and every day, you put our nation in the strongest possible strategic position around the world."

The president also noted the critical day-to-day work strengthening of American alliances from NATO to Japan and the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and Australia. This work continues even as the combat environment grows to include space and the cyber world.

Biden noted that two of the combatant commanders, Army Gen. Christopher Cavoli, the commander of U.S. European Command and Marine Corps Gen. Michael Langley of U.S. Africa Command, "couldn't be with us tonight because they're standing guard right now. They're at their posts, dealing with the war in Europe and the crisis in Sudan."

Biden also thanked the spouses and families of the commanders. "You also serve," he said. "You also sacrifice. You also strengthen our nation."

More than 50 defense and national security leaders attended the Combatant Commander Dinner. In addition to the combatant commanders and their spouses, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and the civilian leadership of the Defense Department also attended. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commandant of the Coast Guard were also there.

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

11. China's aircraft carriers play 'theatrical' role but pose little threat yet

Since all warfare is based on deception, perhaps this is what they want us to think. (the next evolution of hiding and biding?)

Excerpts:

Instead, China's carriers are more of a propaganda showpiece, with doubts about their value in a possible conflict with the U.S. over Taiwan and about whether China could protect them on longer-range missions into the Pacific and Indian oceans, the attaches and analysts told Reuters.

China's Defence Ministry did not respond to questions about its carrier program, though dozens of articles in state-linked journals reviewed by Reuters reveal awareness among Chinese military analysts about shortcomings in the country's carrier capability.

While some regional press coverage, partially based on Chinese state media reports, portrayed recent drills around Taiwan as active patrols and a military challenge to the U.S. and its allies, the Chinese carriers are effectively still in training mode, eight of the experts said.

Landing of aircraft at night and in bad weather, for instance - crucial to regular offshore carrier operations - remain far from routine, several of the attaches and analysts said.

China's aircraft carriers play 'theatrical' role but pose little threat yet

Reuters · by Greg Torode

HONG KONG, May 5 (Reuters) - When China sailed one of its two active aircraft carriers, the Shandong, east of Taiwan last month as part of military drills surrounding the island, it was showcasing a capability that it has yet to master and could take years to perfect.

As Beijing modernizes its military, its formidable missile forces and other naval vessels, such as cutting-edge cruisers, are posing a concern for the U.S. and its allies. But it could be more than a decade before China can mount a credible carrier threat far from its shores, according to four military attaches and six defence analysts familiar with regional naval deployments.

Instead, China's carriers are more of a propaganda showpiece, with doubts about their value in a possible conflict with the U.S. over Taiwan and about whether China could protect them on longer-range missions into the Pacific and Indian oceans, the attaches and analysts told Reuters.

China's Defence Ministry did not respond to questions about its carrier program, though dozens of articles in state-linked journals reviewed by Reuters reveal awareness among Chinese military analysts about shortcomings in the country's carrier capability.

While some regional press coverage, partially based on Chinese state media reports, portrayed recent drills around Taiwan as active patrols and a military challenge to the U.S. and its allies, the Chinese carriers are effectively still in training mode, eight of the experts said.

Landing of aircraft at night and in bad weather, for instance - crucial to regular offshore carrier operations - remain far from routine, several of the attaches and analysts said.

And in a conflict, China's carriers would be vulnerable to missile and submarine attacks, some of the experts said, noting the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has not perfected protective screening operations, particularly anti-submarine warfare.

"Unlike other parts of their military modernisation, there is something politically theatrical about their carrier deployments so far," said Trevor Hollingsbee, a former British naval intelligence analyst.

"Carrier operations are a very complicated game, and China's got to figure this out all by itself. It still has a long, long way to go."

At times, China's carrier pilots have relied on land-based airfields for takeoffs or landings, as well as for extra air cover and surveillance, the attaches told Reuters on the condition of anonymity as they were not authorised to speak publicly.

And though China's Liaoning and Shandong carriers have each sailed into the western Pacific in recent months, approaching U.S. bases on Guam, they remained within range of coastal Chinese airfields, according to Rira Momma, professor of security studies at Takushoku University's Institute of World Studies, who reviewed Japanese defence ministry tracking data.

Both the Liaoning - a refitted ex-Soviet vessel - and the Chinese-built Shandong have jump ramps for take offs, which limit the number and range of aircraft on board.

Anti-submarine helicopters operate from both carriers and China's Type 055 cruisers but the carriers have yet to deploy an early warning aircraft, relying so far on land-based planes, the 10 experts said.

A new plane, the KJ-600, designed to perform a similar role to the E-2C/D Hawkeye launched from U.S. carriers, is still in testing, according to the Pentagon's latest annual report on China's military.

FROM SKI JUMPS TO CATAPULTS

As the Liaoning and Shandong gradually increase the tempo of their drills, China is preparing for sea trials of its next-generation carrier, the 80,000-tonne Fujian, state media reported last month. The Fujian is significantly larger, though conventionally powered, and will launch aircraft from electromagnetic catapults.

The ship, which the Pentagon report said could be operational by 2024, is expected to carry new variants of the J-15 jet fighter, replacing the existing model that foreign analysts consider underpowered.

"The Fujian, with its more modern capabilities, will be just another test bed for a good few years," said Collin Koh, a defence scholar at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

"It won't be until we see the next generation of carriers that the Chinese designs and the PLAN's intentions will really settle down."

The carrier program reflects the ruling Communist Party's aim of making the People's Liberation Army (PLA) a "world class" military by 2049, part of President Xi Jinping's vision of building "a great modern socialist country".

One indication of China's ambitions, the attaches said, will be if carriers built after the Fujian are nuclear-powered like U.S. ones, allowing global range.

A study published in December by the non-partisan U.S. Congressional Research Service noted that China would use its carriers to project power "particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing U.S. forces" and "to impress or intimidate foreign observers".

Several countries operate aircraft carriers but the U.S. remains the most dominant, running 11 carrier battlegroups with global reach.

China, by contrast, could use its carriers primarily in the Asian theatre, working in tandem with submarines and anti-ship missiles to attempt to control its near seas.

The Shandong's appearance off Taiwan's east coast to stage mock strikes last month surprised some analysts, given the island's proximity to land-based airfields. But, in the short term at least, China's military would struggle to defend the carrier out in the western Pacific in a clash with U.S. and allied forces.

"China's objective with the deployment of the Shandong is clear, it is a symbol of its political anger" over U.S. engagement with Taiwan, said Yoji Koda, a retired admiral who commanded the Japanese fleet.

In a battle, he said, it "would be a very good target for U.S. and Japanese forces, and they would take it down at the very beginning."

A U.S. defence official, speaking on the condition of anonymity as they were not authorised to talk publicly, said while China had made progress with its carriers, it had yet to master operations in difficult conditions or how to protect the vessels.

One question was how the ships would be relevant in a conflict, the official said.

HOPES AND SHORTCOMINGS

Chinese military and government researchers appear aware of the challenges, according to a Reuters review of over 100 recent articles published in dozens of publicly available Chinese defence journals.

The official PLA Daily in October published an interview with an aircraft carrier aviation unit where the deputy chief of staff, Dai Xing, acknowledged "many shortcomings in preparing for war", and a gap between sailors' training level and combat requirements.

A September editorial published in a magazine run by a PLA weapons manufacturer, titled "Four great advantages the PLA has in attacking Taiwan", did not mention the role of Chinese carriers. Instead, it said, China's land-based ballistic missiles would be enough to overwhelm potential intervention from U.S. carriers.

Two earlier editorials in the same publication, Tank and Armoured Vehicle, noted that China's carriers would remain in their infancy for the foreseeable future and that other surface ships would be more useful in a conflict in the East China Sea.

Other articles in similar publications outline pilot recruitment and training problems, vulnerabilities to submarine attack and command issues - which some foreign analysts say is a problem for a navy that still sails with political commissars with executive authority.

When at sea, U.S. carriers fly almost constantly, routinely operating fighter, electronic-warfare and surveillance aircraft to create a protective screen around the battlegroup.

Beyond the expense and danger of such operations, one key element is mastering devolved command systems, particularly in a crisis such as a fire or crash onboard when planes are airborne and the flight deck is disabled.

The U.S. has spent decades perfecting such systems, having expanded carrier operations after their importance was highlighted in the Allied victory over Japan in the Pacific in World War Two.

"The continuous operation of its carriers sits at the very core of what makes the U.S. military absolutely preeminent," said Singapore-based defence analyst Alexander Neill, an adjunct fellow with Hawaii's Pacific Forum think tank.

In the medium term, China is likely to start sending battlegroups into the Indian Ocean, where China's presence is minimal beyond routine submarine operations, the attaches and defence analysts said.

Operating far from the security of land-based airfields would test China's capability, but preparations are underway.

The pier at China's first major offshore military base in Djibouti was recently extended, and could now fit a carrier, the Pentagon report noted.

Reporting by Greg Torode in Hong Kong, Eduardo Baptista in Beijing and Tim Kelly in Tokyo; additional reporting by Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart in Washington; editing by David Crawshaw and Gerry Doyle

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Greg Torode

12. Who are Russia’s supporters?

Graphic at the link: https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/03/31/who-are-russias-supporters?utm_medium=social-media.content.np&utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=editorial-social&utm_content=discovery.content.evergreen

Excerpts:

Only Belarus, Iran and North Korea (all classed as supporting Russia) have actually provided the Kremlin with arms (compared with 31 countries that have announced weapon shipments to Ukraine). The rest of Russia’s camp is made up mostly of failing states and opportunists that will provide little more than abstentions on UN votes and other symbolic gestures of solidarity.

Who are Russia’s supporters?

They may be numerous, but do not offer much to the Kremlin

The Economist

To read more of The Economist’s data journalism visit our Graphic Detail page.

ON THE SURFACE it appears quite baffling. In the year since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s diplomatic resilience has left many wringing their hands. Sergei Lavrov, the country’s foreign minister, went on a charm offensive across various countries; Vladimir Putin, the president, welcomed China’s leader in March. In one sense Russia can rightly boast about strengthening diplomatic ties. Data published in March by EIU, our sister company, showed that the number of countries actively condemning Russia had fallen since its previous analysis a year ago (see map). But these countries are of little real use to Mr Putin and his warmongering.

EIU considers whether and how governments have supported Russia’s actions or echoed its narratives—for example by avoiding calling the war an “invasion”. It finds that seven countries have moved into the Russia-leaning camp—those which are friendly towards Russia even if they do not openly endorse its war—since last year (see chart). Some, like South Africa, were initially neutral; others, such as Botswana, have strayed from West-leaning. Eight more countries, most prominently Turkey, have gone from supporting the West into the neutral camp. Overall, the number of countries condemning Russia has dropped from 131 to 122 in the past 12 months.

Fortunately, when it comes to international relations, quality trumps quantity. The most powerful country that Russia has managed to keep sweet is China, which remains Russia-leaning by EIU’s measures. But Xi Jinping, China’s leader, seems primarily focused on poking the West and leveraging the conflict to his advantage, rather than providing meaningful support to the war effort. Mr Xi has so far rebuffed requests from Russia to offer assistance, such as supplying weapons or troops (though the West remains wary of the possibility). Similarly, India, classed as neutral, is more keen on benefiting from trade deals than being forced to choose sides. Turkey, also listed as neutral, has increased trade with Russia while also supplying Ukraine with armaments, from missile-carrying drones to rockets and artillery shells.

Only Belarus, Iran and North Korea (all classed as supporting Russia) have actually provided the Kremlin with arms (compared with 31 countries that have announced weapon shipments to Ukraine). The rest of Russia’s camp is made up mostly of failing states and opportunists that will provide little more than abstentions on UN votes and other symbolic gestures of solidarity.

Together, Russia’s side and the neutral camp contain most of the world’s population, but they account for just one-third of global GDP. With few exceptions (namely China) Mr Putin’s pals are unlikely to be able to match the West’s fundraising capacity for Ukraine (see chart). America alone has provided more than $33bn-worth of training and equipment since Russia’s invasion, and some 50 other countries have given or committed more than $13bn in security assistance as of September. On paper Russia has gained a worrying amount of support over the past year. In practice, however, its friendships look hollow. ■

The Economist

13. Ukraine Says It Shot Down Russia’s Most Sophisticated Missile for First Time

Good job Patriot.

Ukraine Says It Shot Down Russia’s Most Sophisticated Missile for First Time

The New York Times · by Marc Santora · May 6, 2023

The Air Force said it intercepted the missile with a newly delivered U.S.-made Patriot air-defense battery, the first time Kyiv has said it used the advanced weapon.

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Ukrainian firefighters and police officers in Kyiv inspecting a piece of debris, thought to be from a missile or drone, on Thursday.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine

May 6, 2023Updated 6:18 a.m. ET

Ukraine used a newly delivered Patriot air-defense system to intercept the most sophisticated missile in Russia’s arsenal for the first time over Kyiv this week, the Ukrainian Air Force said on Saturday.

It was the first time Ukraine said that its military had used the advanced American-made missile system, long coveted by the Ukrainians. Lt. Gen. Mykola Oleshchuk, the commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, said that the Patriot system was used to shoot down a hypersonic Kinzhal missile fired by Russia over the capital on Thursday.

“I congratulate the Ukrainian people on a historic event,” General Oleshchuk said in a statement posted on the Telegram messaging app. “Yes, we have shot down the ‘unparalleled’ ‘Kinzhal.’”

There was no immediate confirmation from Ukraine’s Western allies, including the United States, of the use of the Patriot or whether it had hit a hypersonic missile. The U.S. military’s European Command did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The Patriot is by far the most expensive single weapon system that the United States, Ukraine’s main military benefactor, has supplied to Ukraine, at a total cost of about $1.1 billion: $400 million for the system and $690 million for the missiles.

Ukraine had been pleading with the Pentagon to provide it with Patriot systems since the start of the war and the White House approved the request in December. Last month, Ukraine confirmed that the first Patriot systems had arrived. For more than a year, Ukraine had no air-defense system that could counter Russia’s arsenal of ballistic or hypersonic missiles like the Kinzhal.

A Patriot air defense system in Warsaw in February.Credit...Kacper Pempel/Reuters

The powerful explosion that officials said was air defense firing in the skies above central Kyiv rattled windows and jolted people out of bed. Fragments from the explosion littered the streets not far from the government quarter in the heart of the city and were collected by teams of forensic experts.

General Oleshchuk said the military waited to report that the Patriot had been used to protect operational security. He urged the public not to share information about air defenses as they work to counter Russian missiles and drones.

“We will definitely report what, where, with what, and when it was shot down,” he said. “All in its own time.”

While Kyiv and other cities across Ukraine have been bombarded with missiles, rockets, drones and bombs for more than a year and thousands of civilians have been killed in Russian onslaughts, the repeated attacks on Kyiv by Russian drones over the past two weeks have put many in the city on edge.

Ukraine has become adept at shooting down Russian cruise-missiles and drones — often knocking some 70 to 80 percent of them out of the sky in any particular attack — but the ones that make it through the complex air defense network can do tremendous damage.

The Kinzhal, or Dagger, is a modified version of the Russian Army’s Iskander short-range ballistic missile, which is designed to be fired from truck-mounted launchers on the ground. Launching the missile from a warplane at high altitude, instead of from the ground, leaves it with more fuel to use to reach higher speeds.

A Russian jet carrying a Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missile during the Victory Day parade in Moscow in 2018.Credit...Associated Press

Russia originally developed the Kinzhal to breach American missile defense systems. They are hypersonic — meaning they travel at more than five times the speed of sound, and Russia has hinted at much higher speeds — and can maneuver in flight, making them all but impossible to shoot down.

Ukraine’s Air Force has said that Russia has used around 50 Kinzhals over the course of the war, including during the sustained assault on the Ukrainian energy grid in the fall and winter.

Depending on where Russia fires a Khinzal from, it can reach the Ukrainian capital in a matter of minutes.

The Patriot system works most effectively as part of what the U.S. military calls a “layered defense” that includes other air defenses used to down or thwart drones and warplanes, as well as a range of cruise and ballistic missiles, U.S. officials say. Its general ability to counter weapons like Russia’s Kinzhal hypersonic missile is as yet unknown.

Following the U.S. pledge to provide the Patriot systems, Ukrainian soldiers were dispatched to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, for a 10-week crash course in how to use them. They completed the training at the end of March and those soldiers are now training others in Ukraine.

One single interceptor missile costs about $4 million, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Each launcher costs around $10 million.

After explosions over the Kremlin last week, Russian officials accused Ukraine of staging a drone attack with U.S. guidance and called for aggressive retaliation. Ukrainian officials have said the episode was likely staged by the Russians.

A picture taken during a visit organized by the Russian military to a center for the preparation of documents for the registration in Berdiansk, Ukraine, in August 2022.Credit...Sergei Ilnitsky/EPA, via Shutterstock

Here’s what else is happening in Ukraine:

Russification efforts: Ukraine’s military said on Saturday that Russian officials are intensifying pressure on Ukrainian civilians in illegally annexed areas to obtain Russian passports, with occupation authorities in the town of Starobilsk going from home to home to enforce a new edict that allows for those who do not cooperate to be removed from their homes.

The claim could not be independently verified. Russia has not allowed international journalists or organizations to access areas under its control.

Ukrainian officials said investigators have been gathering evidence in recent days about efforts to force people to pledge allegiance to the Russian Federation by getting a passport or be considered foreigners without legal residency. President Vladimir Putin of Russia signed a decree on April 27 that says those who refuse can be deemed a threat and “deported,” according to the policy.

The New York Times · by Marc Santora · May 6, 2023

14. US Submarines Are Popping Up More Often and It's Not Clear Why

The strategic messaging does not have to be minimal. We just need to be creative. As I have previously written - the message is when the SSBN is in port - Kim is safe from that SSBN. But when it is underway in an unknown and undetected location underwater in the vicinity of the Korean tTheater of Operations.it is just awaiting orders to strike all the leadership targets in north Korea. With all due respect to our great submariners we need professional PSYOP and influence operators to design the strategic communications plan for these "visits."

Excerpts:

Increased visibility could have its downside, especially the South Korea visit, said Brent Sadler, the Heritage Foundation’s senior research fellow for naval warfare and a Navy veteran with numerous submarine tours.

The visit would expose the vessel to North Korean or Chinese monitoring and they “could use the knowledge to hold our submarines on deterrent patrols far away at risk,” Sadler said. The strategic messaging of support for South Korea “would be minimal” for the US “to take some significant risks to send such a boat that far forward,” he said.

US Submarines Are Popping Up More Often and It's Not Clear Why

msn.com · by Tony Capaccio 4 hrs ago

(Bloomberg) -- A US nuclear-armed submarine will make a publicly announced visit to South Korea within months, prompting debate about the wisdom of a heightened public role for what’s long been known as the Navy’s “silent service.”

Pentagon officials confirmed that one of the Navy’s 14 Ohio-class vessels will visit, as President Joe Biden signaled in announcing a “Nuclear Consultative Group” during last month’s White House visit by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.

The submarines, nicknamed Boomers, gained the silent service description because they are designed to glide undetected, and their port calls have seldom been disclosed — much less trumpeted — by their usually taciturn commanders. Each of the subs carries up to 20 D-5 Trident ballistic missiles.

The US has occasionally showcased its submarines in the past, but the pace picked up in the last year with publicized port visits by nuclear-armed Ohio-class submarines as well as Los Angeles-class subs carrying conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles.

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The Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review endorsed such demonstrations last year.

“We will work with Allies and partners to identify opportunities to increase the visibility of U.S. strategic assets to the region as a demonstration of U.S. resolve and commitment, including ballistic missile submarine port visits and strategic bomber missions,” it said.

On April 18, days before the US-South Korea proclamation, the US Navy announced that the Ohio-class USS Maine made an on-surface logistics stop at the naval base in Guam.

Ronald O’Rourke, chief naval forces analyst for the Congressional Research Service, cited “unusual Navy actions late last year to publicize the presence” of nuclear-armed vessels “in the Arabian Sea, at Diego Garcia, at Gibraltar and in the Atlantic.”

He said it’s not clear whether the upcoming South Korea visit is part of such a new “public signaling strategy” or a one-time decision “reflecting circumstances specific to the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.”

‘Red October’

The Navy has long been fond of the publicity it gains from cooperating with filmmakers on movies from “The Hunt for Red October” in 1990 to the 2018 potboiler “Hunter Killer.”

Ohio-class submarines are the US Navy’s largest ever. At 560 feet long (171 meters) and displacing 18,750 tons when submerged, they dwarf the cruisers and destroyers used in World War II surface combat. Their Trident missiles can be configured to hold as many as 14 nuclear warheads, each capable of being guided to a different target, and boast a range of 4,000 nautical miles (7,400 kilometers), according to the Navy.

Most of the Navy’s subs “still hide in the oceans, but from time to time they have made port calls, and soon they will add South Korea to the growing list,” said Hans Kristensen, director of the Federation of American Scientists Nuclear Information Project.

It’s part of a new assignment “that contradicts their core mission of staying undetected,” he said. “But nuclear signaling is now considered so important because of competition with Russia and China that even the ‘silent service’ will occasionally show itself.”

It also may reflect efforts to counter the reality that the US submarine force is shrinking and having readiness problems, said Bryan Clark, a former special assistant to the chief of naval operations and now a naval fellow with the Hudson Institute.

“Those concerns are true, but US submarines are still the quietest and most sophisticated in the world,” he said.

Increased visibility could have its downside, especially the South Korea visit, said Brent Sadler, the Heritage Foundation’s senior research fellow for naval warfare and a Navy veteran with numerous submarine tours.

The visit would expose the vessel to North Korean or Chinese monitoring and they “could use the knowledge to hold our submarines on deterrent patrols far away at risk,” Sadler said. The strategic messaging of support for South Korea “would be minimal” for the US “to take some significant risks to send such a boat that far forward,” he said.

(Updates with mention of nuclear posture review in fifth paragraph. A previous version of the story was corrected to show that the submarine carries 20 Trident missiles.)

OPINION: Kremlin Clarifies that Drones over Kremlin Was False Flag Operation

The truth in Russia is always easy to discern because the Kremlin always lies, as in the most recent case concerning drones over Moscow, which looks like an obvious false flag operation.

https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/16700

By Anders Aslund

May 6, 2023, 11:30 am | Comments ( 1)

Opinion: Kremlin Clarifies that Drones over Kremlin Was False Flag Operation

kyivpost.com · by Anders Aslund

The truth in Russia is always easy to discern because the Kremlin always lies, as in the most recent case concerning drones over Moscow, which looks like an obvious false flag operation.

May 6, 2023, 11:30 am |

In this file photo taken on April 12, 2023 A "No Drone Zone" sign is pictured in front of the Russian national flag atop the Federation Council building, the upper chamber of Russia's parliament, in central Moscow. Kirill KUDRYAVTSEV / AFP

If the Kremlin makes a statement, you know that the opposite is the truth.

The Kremlin’s instant accusation that Ukraine was responsible for the drone attack in Moscow on the night of May 3 / 4, when they could not possibly know anything is yet another manifestation of its endemic lying.

President Volodymyr Zelensky and numerous other Ukrainian officials have forcefully stated that Ukraine was not involved. It seems very likely that it was a Russian false flag operation, although it could have been done by independent Russian partisans, who are accused of blowing up one factory after another all-around Russia.

Most revealingly is the, frankly risible, claim by the Kremlin that the attack was an attempt on Putin's life. Everyone knows that Putin lives in his bunker in Novoe Ogarevo, outside Moscow. Ukrainian intelligence would not make this most amateurish of mistakes.

Another revealing fact is that according to the video that circulated on the internet two men were climbing the roof of the Senate when the "missile" struck and they were unperturbed. Why were two men on the roof of a Kremlin building at 2:30 am in the middle of the night? Could they have been firemen sent up to extinguish any fire because the Kremlin command knew this was about to happen?

They were right as the "bombs" were little more than fireworks. In the aftermath, no damage was visible on the dome of the Senate building, where Putin’s Kremlin office is located.

If this was actually a hostile act, we would have expected the usual wild manhunt and the arrest of the usual suspects – there has been no evidence of this. That suggests that the actual culprits were known as with the apartment block bombings of September 1999, which were all too obviously instigated by the FSB, then under the leadership of Nikolai Patrushev, Putin’s old friend and now his National Security Secretary.

The eminent Russia researchers and authors John Dunlop, David Satter, Yuri Felshtinsky, and Alexander Litvinenko (later murdered by the FSB) have all written credible books about these accommodation bombings, that lay all the blame on Putin and Patrushev, who have remained truly enamored with false flag operations since that success.

The Russian military has now become famous for its incompetence, but they have three Panshir air defense systems nearby at the Ministry of Defense buildings. Why were they not activated? Presumably, they were not supposed to be activated, which says it all.

I lived in Moscow in May 1987 (as a Swedish diplomat), when the 18-year-old German Mathias Rust freely crossed the USSR border and landed his small private plane on the Red Square. Two days later a furious President Mikhail Gorbachev sacked the minister of defense and head of air defense. Ten days later, Anton Gerashchenko recalls that 34 officers and generals were held accountable. So far, however, the Kremlin has not uttered any criticism against the air defense. Why? Was it not supposed to act?

Instead, immediately after the drone attacks, hardliners such as former President Dmitry Medvedev and Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin called for the assassination of Ukrainian leaders. The now-deranged Medvedev led the choir: “After today’s terrorist attack, there are no options left other than the physical elimination of Zelensky and his clique.”

British intelligence claims that Russia has tried to kill Zelensky at least ten times, but that is difficult if you are too corrupt even to carry out murder. If they had been serious, they would have called for the sacking of the incompetent Russian air defense officers, which they did not.

If you carry out a false flag operation you are supposed to follow up, as if it was genuine, to give you at least marginal credibility, but the Kremlin stooges are so full of themselves that they did not even bother to try to be credible.

How could they instantly know that Ukraine was behind the attack? How could they believe that anybody would be so dumb as to expect Putin in the Kremlin at night? Why were two men on the dome of the Senate Building in the middle of the night? Why were the buildings not damaged? Why did they not seek and arrest any suspect culprits? Why hasn’t any responsible air defense generals been sacked? How pathetic, Putin!

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from market Economy to Kleptpcracy.”

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

Anders Aslund

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum and Adjunct Professor Georgetown University. A leading specialist on the East European economies, he has authored 15 books, most recently Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy. He has advised the Russian and Ukrainian governments and earned his D.Phil. from Oxford University.

16. "Learning really well": Reznikov on Russians adapting to Ukraine's new capabilities

"Learning really well": Reznikov on Russians adapting to Ukraine's new capabilities

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3705470-learning-really-well-reznikov-on-russians-adapting-to-ukraines-new-capabilities.html

"Learning really well": Reznikov on Russians adapting to Ukraine's new capabilities

06.05.2023 07:42

Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov of Ukraine noted that the Russians "are learning very well" as the war against Ukraine keeps raging.

The minister spoke in an interview with Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Komarov, Ukrinform reports.

"They (Russians) are learning really well. When we got HIMARS this summer, which inflicted damage at a 80 km range, the situation changed because we started destroying their command and control posts. But then they moved all their control points, all their depots, all their logistical routes 120 km back so that we could not reach them with HIMARS. Why are we convincing our partners that we need a batch of ‘longer-range’ weapons, at least 150 km. We also ask for a 300-km range (ATACMS) but so far our partners are hesitating because, unfortunately, they still keep thinking that every time they give us weapons, this can lead to another escalation," the head of the Ministry of Defense emphasized.

Reznikov also noted that each time it is necessary to convince international partners that Ukraine will use the weapons purely for "protection and self-defense."

According to the minister, Ukraine officials should every time emphasize during talks with partners that the nation’s Defense Forces will employ those weapons only to liberate the Russian-captured Ukrainian territories and that they will not target the Russian territory.

It should be recalled that on May 5, the EU approved the allocation of EUR 1 billion worth of ammunition for Ukraine.

17, China falls down press freedom index as Asian Communist states dominate bottom ranks

Graphics at the link: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/press-freedom-05032023122827.html

China falls down press freedom index as Asian Communist states dominate bottom ranks

Xi Jinping's China sits one place above North Korea, while Hong Kong's independent media is consigned to history.

By Gu Ting for RFA Mandarin and Chingman for RFA Cantonese

2023.05.03

rfa.org

UPDATED AT 2:25 p.m. EDT on 2023-05-03

China fell four places on a global press freedom index released on Wednesday, joining fellow Asian Communist nations North Korea and Vietnam at the bottom of a Paris-based media freedom watchdog’s annual scorecard, published on World Press Freedom Day.

Reporters Without Borders described China as "the world’s biggest jailer of journalists and one of the biggest exporters of propaganda content." The People's Republic of China fell to 179th place on the index, just one place above bottom-of-the-class North Korea.

“Independent journalists and bloggers who dare to report ‘sensitive’ information are often placed under surveillance, harassed, detained, and, in some cases, tortured,” said the group, which uses its French acronym RSF.

The report noted that the Asia-Pacific “continues to have some of the world’s worst regimes for journalists.” But press conditions around the world are deteriorating, including in the United States, which dropped three places to 45th amid legal challenges and widespread threats of violence.

"The last three places are occupied [by] Vietnam (178th), which has almost completed its hunt of independent reporters and commentators; China (down 4 at 179th) ... and, to no great surprise, North Korea (180th)," RSF said.

In Vietnam – like China, a one-party state that adapted its media governance model from the Soviet Union – “traditional media are closely controlled by the single party” and “independent reporters and bloggers are often jailed,” RSF said.

“The many topics subject to censorship include political dissidents, cases of corruption involving senior officials, the single party’s legitimacy, relations with China and, of course, human rights issues,” the report said, calling Vietnam the world’s third largest jailer of journalists, with 40 now behind bars.

Strongmen in Cambodia, Myanmar

North Korea, a near perennial bottom dweller in the index, is “a totalitarian regime that bases its power on surveillance, repression, censorship and propaganda,” said RSF.

“North Koreans can still be sent to a concentration camp for looking at an online media outlet based outside the country,” it said.

RSF said the strongmen rulers of Cambodia, which slid five places to 147th, and Myanmar, which edged up three slots to 173rd, played a key role in their countries’ low rankings with attacks on their critics.

“The democratic transition that started at the end of the 1980s allowed the emergence of a press that flourished until the long-serving Prime Minister Hun Sen launched a ruthless war against independent journalism before the 2018 elections,” the report said of Cambodia.

“Radio stations and newspapers were silenced, newsrooms purged, journalists prosecuted – leaving the independent media sector devastated,” said RSF, adding that Hun Sen has used similar tactics ahead of elections this year.

The Myanmar military junta formed by Senior Gen. Ming Aung Hlaing after coup d’état on Feb. 1, 2021, “obliterated the fragile progress towards greater press freedom that had been seen since the previous military junta disbanded in 2011,” the watchdog group said.

The junta “tolerates no alternative to its narrative” and has revived prior censorship policies toward local media, while “Min Aung Hlaing openly promotes a policy of terror towards journalists who do not toe the junta’s line,” said RSF.

In a statement marking the day, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called on Russia to immediately release Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich.

"Imprisonment is not the only threat reporters face," he said.

"Journalists covering violent conflict and corruption are subjected to intimidation and abduction, often perpetrated with impunity. Elsewhere, journalists face discrimination, censorship, and weaponized justice systems. Governments around the world have used various tools of repression to force media outlets to close," Blinken said in a statement.

Quitting journalism in China

The index was released as journalists in China told Radio Free Asia that many in the business are now changing careers, at least in part because of all-encompassing controls on media reporting by the propaganda arm of the ruling Chinese Communist Party.

"My former classmates in journalism school and all of my colleagues from when I was a reporter [have changed jobs]," Fudan University journalism school graduate Zhang Jia said.

"One reason is that you don't make enough, as the media has gone into decline," Zhang said. "Another is that there is no longer any freedom of the press.

"Journalists tend to go and work in corporate public relations, or marketing departments, or live streaming," Zhang said.

Copies of the Apple Daily newspaper, featuring Hong Kong media tycoon Jimmy Lai, are displayed at a newsstand in Hong Kong, Aug. 11, 2020. Credit: Kin Cheung/AP

A former journalist from the southwestern province of Guizhou, who asked to be identified only by his surname Zhao, said there was far more scope for Chinese journalists to make a difference during the relatively politically liberal 1980s."I was a journalist in the 1980s," Zhao said. "When I first started working in news, I felt that I was still allowed to say stuff, that I was still in the game” despite existing censorship at the time.

Zhao said the media environment went rapidly downhill in the political crackdown that followed the 1989 Tiananmen massacre that ended weeks of student-led mass protests in and around Tiananmen Square and in other Chinese cities.

"Two general secretaries later, it's all gone," he said in a reference to former leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who practiced a less comprehensive form of censorship than the current leadership under Xi Jinping.

Xi, in power since 2012, “has restored a media culture worthy of the Maoist era, in which freely accessing information has become a crime and to provide information an even greater crime,” the RSF report said.

“China’s state and privately owned media are under the Communist Party’s ever-tighter control, while the administration creates more and more obstacles for foreign reporters,” it added.

State media made no visible mention of World Press Freedom Day, which comes as Wuhan citizen journalist Fang Bin was released from a three-year jail term for reporting on the emerging COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Fellow citizen journalist Zhang Zhan, also sentenced for reporting on pandemic-struck Wuhan, is still serving a four-year jail term in Shanghai.

The campaign group Hong Kong Media Overseas called on the international community to pay attention to the ongoing criminalization of independent journalism in the once-freewheeling city under a draconian national security law imposed by Beijing in 2020.

"Once home to one of the freest media centers in Asia, Hong Kong has joined the dismal roll call of places where press freedom has largely been extinguished," the group said in a statement.

It said 28 journalists have been arrested and charged with offenses, some carrying heavy penalties, since the crackdown began in the wake of the 2019 protest movement.

Hong Kong journalists are frequently subjected to "physical intimidation ... by unidentified persons, which contributes to the atmosphere of fear surrounding the practice of journalism," said Hong Kong Media Overseas.

Journalists from Myanmar and Vietnam told RFA that they had experienced the harassment and dangers underscore in Wednesday's report.

“Since it was like you were arrested today and killed tomorrow, most journalists fled," said a former BBC reporter who left Myanmar to continue reporting from a neighboring country. As they had to run to liberated areas in Kayin or Kayah regions closest to them and left for the third countries from there, it’s a very sad situation for the Myanmar media world.” the reporter said, referring to two Myanmar states bordering Thailand.

"It seems that the Vietnamese government disregards all international criticism of its human rights violations," a journalist in Vietnam told RFA, speaking anonymously for security reasons.

The international community should impose "concrete sanctions on economics, politics and culture to force Hanoi to improve its human rights records, including freedom of the media and information," added the journalist.

Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Additional editing by Paul Eckert and Jim Snyder.

rfa.org

18. Orders of Disorder – Who Disbanded Iraq’s Army and De-Baathified Its Bureaucracy?

Sun Tzu: “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win”

(note that there are lessons for the nKPA after regime collapse or doing post-conflict operations)

Excerpts:

A quick and easy war was unrealistic from inception, however. Many of those who participated in the policymaking process at the time suggested that the actual effect of CPA Orders 1 and 2 has been overblown. The orders themselves weren’t the real problem; they were a symptom of the utter lack of planning before the invasion and lack of a clear decision-making process after. “Everything was designed by people in Washington who had never been to Iraq,” Garner recalled. “It was a poorly conceived and poorly thought-out series of orders.”

The orders were in fact also symptoms of an even larger problem: the nearly impossible challenge that the United States had taken on in choosing to invade Iraq. The collapse of Saddam’s regime demanded some sort of replacement, and the process of devising a replacement would inevitably involve endless hard choices, unexpected obstacles, and unintended consequences—no matter how much planning Washington did. Although the slapdash planning and undersized U.S. military footprint certainly left no margin for error, wiser decisions might not have been enough. It is impossible to prove a counterfactual, but although a narrow de-Baathification plan and a concerted effort to save the Iraqi army might have been better policies, they certainly would have been no guarantee of peace in Iraq.

The two orders were the first of what would ultimately end up being 100 such edicts from the CPA, which lasted 14 months, until June 2004, when authority was finally handed over to an interim Iraqi government. By the fall of 2003, the insurgency—made up of former regime elements and disbanded soldiers—was in full swing. The rest is history: the Abu Ghraib scandal and other revelations of U.S. war crimes, the U.S. troop surge, the American withdrawal, the rise of the Islamic State, all against the backdrop of persistent political instability and violence and the growing influence of Iran, the leading U.S. adversary in the region.

With the benefit of 20 years of hindsight, CPA Orders 1 and 2 are best thought of not as errors that, if avoided, could have saved Iraq. Instead, they were early indicators that the Bush administration’s grand visions for the country were merely paper wishes, out of touch with the post-invasion reality. The orders’ murky origins were emblematic of a chaotic policymaking process that led to a war that was both needless and poorly planned. In truth, the Iraq war was doomed before the first American soldier crossed the border.

Orders of Disorder

Who Disbanded Iraq’s Army and De-Baathified Its Bureaucracy?

By Garrett M. Graff

May 5, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Garrett M. Graff · May 5, 2023

The history of Iraq was already being rewritten by L. Paul Bremer on his flight into Baghdad. It was May 2003, and Bremer, an experienced former ambassador and bureaucratic player—he’d served as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s chief of staff—was just weeks into his new role as presidential envoy to the freshly liberated country. After a flurry of briefings in Washington and a final Oval Office meeting with President George W. Bush, “Jerry,” as everyone called Bremer, had flown into Qatar and on to Kuwait and then Iraq. Bremer’s diplomatic career had taken him to most Middle Eastern capitals, but this was the first time he’d ever seen Baghdad. He had spent the previous two weeks trying to learn as much as he could about the country he would now rule.

Aboard the U.S. Air Force C-130, Bremer edited two draft documents he intended to issue when he arrived. One provided for “de-Baathification,” prohibiting senior officials from Saddam Hussein’s party from participating in the new Iraq. The other disbanded the Iraqi army and other security organs. Looking out the plane windows, Bremer and his deputy, Clay McManaway, saw fire after fire stretching toward the horizon. “Industrial-strength looting,” McManaway yelled over the churn of the propellers. “Lots of old scores to settle.”

In a way no one on the flight could have realized, these succinct observations would go a long way toward explaining the ultimate consequences of the documents in Bremer’s briefcase. Over the last 20 years, as the United States has reckoned with the human toll and costly legacy of its disastrous war of choice in the Middle East, those two infamous decisions of Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority—CPA Order 1, de-Baathifying the Iraqi state, and CPA Order 2, dissolving the Iraqi military—have been held up as some of the worst mistakes of the war. They are seen as sparks that would ignite the insurgency to come and set Iraq aflame for years, a period of disorder that would claim the lives of thousands of U.S. troops and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians.

And yet the orders that paved the way for all that chaos and bloodshed have remained shrouded in mystery. At the time, not even senior U.S. leaders such as CIA Director George Tenet and Secretary of State Colin Powell understood where they had come from or who had approved them. Two decades later, after piecing together memoirs from key participants, archival documents, and fresh interviews with a dozen former top U.S. officials, a more complete origin story is finally available.

The two orders, it turns out, had very different backstories and very different paths through the policymaking process. Although both were drafted by relatively unknown mid-level Pentagon officials, the de-Baathification order emerged from the murky world of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s office, whereas the order disbanding the country’s military and security apparatus was finalized on the ground in Iraq. Perhaps surprisingly, although both orders overturned the White House’s prewar plans, neither was seen as a particularly big deal at the time by those who rolled out the new approach. Like much of the U.S. misadventure in Iraq, the story of CPA Orders 1 and 2 is a tale of belated planning, misplaced assumptions, and bungled execution—all occurring amid a rapidly deteriorating situation on the ground.

THE WORST-LAID PLANS

Exactly why the United States chose to go to war in Iraq is a question that can never be fully resolved. A complex mix of factors drove U.S. officials: varying personal worldviews, genuinely held strategic theories, self-interested lobbying by Iraqi exiles, long-standing grievances against Saddam, post–Cold War hubris, dubious intelligence, and the climate of fear and patriotism induced by the 9/11 attacks.

Publicly, however, the war was justified on the straightforward grounds that Saddam was continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction. After 9/11, the possibility that a dictator with a history of warring with his country’s neighbors and sheltering terrorist groups might someday possess a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon was deemed unacceptable. Indeed, proposals to invade Iraq were bandied about in the Bush administration as early as the days after September 11, while fires still burned at the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. On the night of 9/11, in fact, Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense and a co-author of a 1997 Weekly Standard article about Saddam titled “Overthrow Him,” asked for intelligence about Iraq’s ties to terrorists. By the summer of 2002, an invasion seemed all but inevitable.

A rough plan had been decided on and shared with the public: the war would be quick and largely bloodless (at least for the United States), and the oil revenues of the newly freed Iraq would pay for the reconstruction. There was little appetite inside the Bush administration for any Marshall Plan–style nation building. Instead, it hoped to mimic the approach that had seemed to work in Afghanistan: a fast and overwhelming invasion followed by a quick transition to friendly local leaders. In Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, a Taliban critic living in exile, was chosen as the country’s interim leader within weeks of the U.S. invasion. In Iraq, many in the Bush administration saw the most promising equivalent as Ahmed Chalabi, an exiled opponent of Saddam who was close with several neoconservatives.

By early 2003, as invasion forces gathered in the Middle East, Pentagon officials were working through plans for that light-touch occupation, what they called “Phase IV” operations—phases one through three focusing on the buildup and initial combat operations. This postwar planning project, codenamed Eclipse II, was modeled after Project Eclipse, the Allied plan for Germany after World War II. The archetype had taken years to develop, starting in 1943, when victory was hardly even in sight. But work on the 2003 version was rushed and poorly resourced, a last-minute effort to imagine a post-Saddam Iraq that did not begin until tanks and troops were already crossing the Atlantic.

As army planners grappled with the question of how to handle the thousands of mostly Sunni officials who made up the Baath Party, they found a clear parallel in postwar Germany. During World War II, officials had quickly realized that any effort to “de-Nazify” the defeated country had to be narrowly implemented. Some ten percent of all Germans formally belonged to the Nazi Party and millions more to other Nazi-aligned labor and professional associations. Because getting rid of all of them was administratively untenable, U.S. officials decided to remove and punish the worst actors while leaving untouched the less zealous bureaucrats who had joined the Nazi Party for mere career purposes. In keeping with this precedent, early drafts of Eclipse II envisioned a similarly narrow de-Baathification in Iraq.

AFTER VICTORY

The job of overseeing Phase IV fell to Jay Garner, a retired U.S. Army general who headed the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, or ORHA, a caretaker administration for Iraq established on the eve of the invasion. Garner had a celebrated history in the country. At the end of the Gulf War, he commanded a task force there aimed at helping the Kurdish population. But his new mission was much harder. Appointed only in January 2003, he had just weeks to assemble a working plan to govern 25 million Iraqis and a country the size of California.

ORHA started almost from scratch, even though across the Potomac from the Pentagon, the State Department had spent most of 2002 drawing up its own extensive postwar plan—a 13-volume, 1,200-page report developed at a cost of $5 million and with the help of more than 200 Iraqi exiles, including lawyers, engineers, and doctors, divided into 17 working groups. The State Department effort, known as the Future of Iraq Project and overseen by Thomas Warrick, harshly criticized Chalabi and—seemingly as a result—was all but sidelined by the Pentagon. Garner said later that he was told by Rumsfeld to ignore the Future of Iraq Project. His request to add Warrick to his team was denied.

Instead, the Pentagon’s new and hurried collective postwar plans, such as they were, were presented to the National Security Council on March 10, 2003, just a week before the invasion. Called “mega brief four,” the presentation was overseen by Frank Miller, the NSC’s senior director for defense policy and arms control. Miller’s sprawling briefing covered de-Baathification as well as the future of Iraq’s foreign ministry, intelligence services, police, judiciary, and military. It even envisioned a truth and reconciliation commission modeled on the one that South Africa had established after apartheid.

Like de-Nazification, officials decided, de-Baathification would focus on the party elite while leaving the lower echelons intact. Garner’s view was that the United States could probably succeed by removing just the top two leaders from each ministry or agency. “We were talking about a pretty limited number, something like the top one-and-a-half percent,” recalled Larry Di Rita, one of Rumsfeld’s top aides. Miller remembered it the same way: “What we recommended was de-Baathification was to be carried out with a light hand.”

To Douglas Feith, the Pentagon’s undersecretary of defense for policy, the planners’ decisions about de-Baathification appeared straightforward amid the run-up to the war. To him, the proposed measure for a narrowly targeted removal of Baathist officials seemed modest and sensible. “Nobody said they should be killed, imprisoned, or dispossessed,” Feith recalled in an interview. “The penalty was that you couldn’t work in the new government. It wasn’t enormously draconian, given that the Baath Party had done a lot of terrible things.” In Feith’s recollection, the decision attracted little interagency debate amid the many other harder policy questions. “The things I remember are the things that were controversial,” he said. “I don’t remember de-Baathification being in that category. It was handled by an interagency group, and there was consensus.”

Garner inspecting Khanzar, Iraq, April 2003

Odd Andersen / Pool / Reuters

Garner didn’t think de-Baathification would be a major issue for the United States either. His prediction was based on his experience during the Gulf War, when Kurds and Shiites rose up and killed large numbers of Baathists. As he recalled in an interview, he assumed that once again, they would eliminate the worst officials themselves. “A lot of the bad guys will be dead,” he remembered thinking. Garner talked with Rumsfeld about a loose plan to retain the technocrats, with some vetting, and Rumsfeld agreed.

Much more challenging, however, was the issue that Feith himself presented in “mega-brief four”: what to do about the Iraqi army. It was, participants recall, one of the hardest postwar questions they confronted. The Iraqi military was huge—estimated at around a half-million regular and irregular troops, in addition to a bloated officer corps that included thousands of generals. The enlisted ranks were comprised mostly of Shiites, who were overseen by a predominantly Sunni officer corps loyal to Saddam. Training was poor; discipline, brutal. It was an open question whether the army was salvageable or whether it would be best to disband it altogether and replace it with a new army built from scratch according to Western standards and no longer segregated along sectarian lines. “There were strong arguments on both sides of the debate—both reform and dissolve,” Feith said. “It wasn’t obvious to me what the right answer was.”

After studying the issue, U.S. planners decided to keep the military, assuming they’d be able to use its organizational structure, bases, personnel, and equipment as a foundation of reconstruction efforts. Besides, in the Gulf War, the Iraqi military had surrendered en masse. Tens of thousands of prisoners of war had been placed in the custody of U.S. forces, and U.S. planners expected that something similar would happen again, and this time the soldiers-turned-prisoners could be put to work on reconstruction.

As part of those March meetings, Rumsfeld asked Feith to brief Bush and the NSC on Garner’s conclusion that the army was worth salvaging. As Feith recalled, “We had an enormous job to do on reconstruction, and the Iraqi military has facilities, it has transportation, it has personnel with skills.” Among its ranks were experts on communications technology, roads, construction, and so on. “Those were all things Garner stressed we would need to draw on for reconstruction.”

In just three weeks, the U.S.-led coalition surged into Baghdad and the Iraqi government collapsed.

The Pentagon even lined up a northern Virginia defense contractor, Military Professional Resources Inc., which had helped rebuild the Croatian army in the 1990s, to oversee the effort to reform the Iraqi army. “I left with the approval of both Rumsfeld and the president to bring the Army back,” Garner recalled. “Our thought was not to bring the generals back—maybe just one or two—and vet the colonels well, but from the rank of lieutenant colonel down, we wanted to bring them all back.”

Meeting with reporters at the Pentagon on March 11, Garner outlined the conversations that week at the White House, telling the press that the United States hoped to quickly hand back control to the Iraqis. “We intend to immediately start turning some things over, and every day, we’ll turn over more things,” he said. He went on to explain that the Iraqi military would be kept intact and used for reconstruction—in part, he pointed out, to avoid putting so many jobless men on the street. The goal, he said, was to hand Iraq back to Iraqis within “months.”

On the eve of war, there was a broad consensus among top officials in the White House and the Pentagon: de-Baathification would be narrowly tailored, and the Iraqi army would be kept intact. No one of prominence was arguing otherwise.

FACTS ON THE GROUND

The invasion began on March 20, and in just three weeks, the U.S.-led coalition surged into Baghdad and the Iraqi government collapsed. Nearly everything had gone according to plan—perhaps even better than planners had anticipated. But the pictures from the capital quickly turned alarming. Looting was widespread, and the U.S. military seemed almost invisible as Iraqi government buildings burned. U.S. officials dismissed the civil unrest as a temporary phase—even a sign of strength, as Iraqis were able to make new personal choices. “Freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things,” Rumsfeld famously told reporters. “Stuff happens.”

As the days passed, however, the scenes from Baghdad only got messier, and Garner never got a chance to put his plans into action. He clashed with Chalabi, who was backed by Feith, Rumsfeld, and Vice President Dick Cheney and who sought to wrest control of the country for himself. (“We met in Nasiriyah on the 15th of April and immediately despised each other,” Garner recalled.) Garner was also confronting the problem that the United States had no detailed plan for how to handle post-invasion Iraq, nor did it have anywhere near enough troops to maintain order. The assumptions of Eclipse II had turned out to be wildly optimistic, and there were no contingency plans for dealing with a suddenly lawless country.

Garner thought that time was running out; the United States was, bafflingly, already pulling troops out of the country, back to Kuwait, even as security remained shaky. On his first day in Baghdad, he met with the local U.S. commander, who told him that U.S. forces were stretched thin protecting nearly 250 different sites across the country. As Garner saw it, “Right now, we’re liberators, and at some point the window for liberation closes, and our job is to slow that close.” He went on: “When it closes, we’re then occupiers, and we can’t do what we need to do if we’re occupiers.”

But Garner’s group, ORHA, was severely understaffed, in part because Rumsfeld had opposed assigning many State Department staffers, including Warrick, to it. Garner tried to move ahead as best he could, but he was being deliberately kept out of the loop by higher-up U.S. officials at the Pentagon who were now rethinking some of the basic decisions that had been made about postwar Iraq. As the RAND Corporation’s official history of the occupation later concluded, “No one in Washington had kept Garner apprised of the major changes in approach to the occupation being considered there, in part because no one in Washington short of Secretary Rumsfeld had been charged with keeping Garner so informed.”

Blamed for failing to bring order quickly to Iraq, Garner had fallen out of favor in D.C. On April 24, on one of the first days that Garner was actually in Baghdad, Rumsfeld called Garner and told him that he was being replaced by Bremer as the presidential envoy to Iraq. Garner had always known he would eventually be replaced—as he’d joked to Feith, Bush wanted a “person of stature” to run Iraq—but he never imagined his appointment would last only days. Garner was a victim of not only D.C. bureaucratic politics but also Iraqi realities. The light touch envisioned for ORHA was a pipe dream—the organization’s very name, emphasizing “reconstruction and humanitarian assistance,” now seemed wildly optimistic, given that what Iraq needed above all was any sign of a functioning authority.

THE NEW SHERIFF

Bremer would represent a fresh start for the United States in Iraq, and he would lead a stronger and higher-stature organization, something now called the Coalition Provisional Authority, the successor to ORHA. In a sign of the shoot-from-the-hip decision-making of that time, when the Bush administration established the CPA, it never bothered to issue an actual order closing ORHA; the office just functionally ceased to exist.

Bremer’s appointment surprised almost everyone in Washington. The real decision-making circles at the time were so small—largely confined to the offices of Cheney and Rumsfeld—that even top administration officials learned the news at the same time as the public. Driving to CIA headquarters after the announcement, Tenet phoned Powell, asking, “What do you know about this guy, Paul Bremer?” But the appointment—and the massive mandate that went with it—was consistent with the evolving approach of Rumsfeld and Cheney. As Robert Grenier, who represented the CIA in the interagency process for Iraq, recalled, “I remember very specifically the vice president saying, ‘It’s a choice between legitimacy and control, and we should opt for control.’”

From his pre-departure meetings in Washington, Bremer concluded that Iraq needed a tougher approach and more sweeping reforms than what Garner had sought. The briefings made him feel like he was headed for a country falling apart. Iraqis were facing electricity and water shortages, and looters prowled the streets. The security apparatus hadn’t surrendered en masse; it had simply melted away. Iraq needed a firmer hand—and fast.

Sacked Iraqi soldiers protesting, Baghdad, June 2003

Andrea Comas / Reuters

As far as Bremer could tell, every assumption that the United States had made about Phase IV was proving false. The hope had been that the Iraqi state would largely survive the invasion intact and the United States could step in gently to provide food and aid, secure the oil infrastructure, and then hand the keys back to Iraqis. “It was important to remember the name of Jay Garner’s ORHA—the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance,” Bremer recalled in an interview. “The assumption behind that title was that we’d face the same situation we faced after the first Gulf War: mass attacks on the oil fields, mass humanitarian and refugee movement.”

Walter Slocombe, one of Bremer’s top aides, participated in the hurried briefings in D.C. as he and his boss prepared to head to Baghdad. He recalled being astounded by what he learned: Iraq had no functioning government or military, and its economy and infrastructure were crippled by sanctions, corruption, and mismanagement. Every Baath Party office and military base had been destroyed or looted by fleeing soldiers and opportunistic Iraqis. Virtually all the equipment was gone. “They took the wiring out of the walls,” Slocombe recalled. “They even stole the urinals.”

It only seemed logical, then, that Bremer and Slocombe recommended scrapping the earlier plans for retaining the Iraqi army in favor of training up a new army. After the two presented their new plan to Rumsfeld, who approved it, Slocombe and others at the Pentagon began to draft what would become the fateful order to dissolve the Iraqi army. “We decided, ‘Let’s start from the ground up,’” Slocombe said. “If the army was intact, the whole story would be different. I don’t know how, but it would be different.”

WHOSE ORDER?

And then there was the Baathist problem. On May 1, the day Bush declared the end of major combat operations in front of a banner reading “Mission Accomplished,” Bremer was beginning his meetings in D.C. That morning, an article appeared in The New York Times by the reporter Judith Miller. It quoted Chalabi criticizing Garner’s limited approach to de-Baathification and reported that the Iraqi exile had been lobbying the Bush administration for a more thorough cleansing. Further complaints came in the following days, as Garner’s team appointed a controversial former party official to be minister of health and reinstalled old Baath Party leaders at Baghdad University—conscious choices made by the team in Iraq and justified on the grounds that any rebuilding effort required functioning institutions in the meantime.

On May 9, bowing to the pressure, Rumsfeld publicly promised a more extensive vetting process. That same day, during a meeting at the Pentagon, Feith handed Bremer an order for a broader de-Baathification than originally envisioned, an order that Feith said had been signed off by the interagency process. To Bremer, it was a small, insignificant moment in a time of much harder questions; he was merely being given a fait accompli to announce at the right time. “Since Feith was handing me the paper, I had assumed it was written somewhere inside the Pentagon,” Bremer recalled. “I looked at it, and Feith told me the decree had been cleared through the interagency process.”

The problem was, no one outside of a small circle of aides seems to have seen the document before Feith handed it to Bremer. There was, in fact, no formal interagency process at all. “It didn’t come from the White House,” Miller, of the NSC, said. “It would have come from my desk or from my people if that was true.”

Instead, the draft order appears to have originated from the office of William Luti, the deputy undersecretary of defense for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. Specifically, the proposed order would have been overseen inside Luti’s office by a special policy section known as the Office of Special Plans. A team of roughly 15 people, the Office of Special Plans was led by Abram Shulsky, a veteran of the Reagan administration. Although it was deliberately given an oblique name, the group focused primarily on Iraq and Iran. Luti declined to be interviewed for this article, but Shulsky recalled in an interview that the draft order didn’t follow any normal process. “There was not a real interagency process,” Shulsky said. “It would have been informal at that point.”

Bremer touring the ancient city of Babylon, Iraq, May 2003

Alexander Zemlianichenko / Pool / Reuters

As Shulsky recalled, the order’s more far-reaching language was influenced in part by memories of the aftermath of the Gulf War, when the United States had encouraged a Shiite uprising against Saddam but then backed away from supporting efforts to overthrow the regime. This time, Washington would make sure that the Shiites understood that Saddam's regime was gone for good.

The original order handed to Bremer had applied some rough math about how much of the bureaucracy had to be removed—math influenced not just by postwar Germany but also by the experience of rebuilding eastern European countries such as Poland after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The draft order envisioned that the top three layers of Baathist leaders would be excised from Iraq’s future officialdom and that those in the fourth layer would be considered on a case-by-case basis.

As Bremer prepared for his trip to Iraq, he felt confident that he had been empowered with great presidential authority and that his mission was to achieve lasting change in Iraq. The original, far more optimistic U.S. plans for postwar Iraq had been scrapped, but he and other officials were confident that success was still within reach.

MISSION CREEP

When Bremer arrived in Iraq aboard that Air Force cargo plane, he was fixated above all on the country’s toppled dictator. Even as U.S. troops occupied most of the country, Saddam and many of his top officials, including his two sons, Uday and Qusay, remained on the run. Against this backdrop, the modest de-Baathification efforts proposed over the winter in Washington seemed inadequate. U.S. officials feared that the Baath Party might not yet be consigned to the ash heap of history. So did ordinary Iraqis, who worried that the Americans would quickly depart, allowing Saddam to rise from the ashes, return to power, and punish anyone who had cooperated with the invaders. As Bremer recalled of the dictator on the lam, “He was a presence—or an absence, more accurately—in everything we were doing.” Hence the draft order for a broad de-Baathification that Bremer carried in his briefcase, a measure that would demonstrate that Saddam and his party had no path to resurrection.

Bremer wanted to come out of the gate with “high-octane orders,” recalled Di Rita, the Rumsfeld aide, who shared a temporary room with Bremer in Baghdad. But when Bremer circulated the draft de-Baathification order with other U.S. military leaders on the ground, he met immediate resistance. It reached far deeper into the Iraqi bureaucracy than anything the White House had originally debated and approved in March. Now, all senior party members would be removed from their positions and banned from future employment. Worse, officials occupying the top three layers of leadership in every ministry and all other government institutions, including universities and hospitals, would be interrogated for any links to the Baath Party and subject to possible criminal investigation.

What had once been a narrowly targeted effort to remove Saddam’s cabinet and inner circle now had the potential to touch every local government building in the country. Garner, who had agreed to remain in place for a brief transition to Bremer, was not happy with the order. Minutes after reading the draft order, Garner recalled, he and the CIA station chief in Baghdad, Charles Seidel, descended on Bremer’s office to protest. “You’re not going to be able to run the country,” Garner said. “Mr. ambassador,” Seidel added, “you’ll have 50,000 enemies in this city before the sun sets.” But as Bremer saw it, he had been given an order by Washington; it was his job to follow it. On May 16, Bremer signed CPA Order 1.

The other draft order, the one disbanding the Iraqi army, also seemed justified to Bremer, Slocombe, and Feith in light of the on-the-ground reality. Bremer could see that, although some of Iraq’s civil ministries still functioned, its security organs—military, internal security, and intelligence forces—were a different matter. The early hopes that Iraq’s army might help with reconstruction and humanitarian relief had proved hollow. Instead, the military was gone: its personnel had melted away and its facilities and materiel had been looted or destroyed. “There was never a question of keeping the Iraqi army intact,” Slocombe said. “In Pentagon jargon, they had ‘self-demobilized.’”

U.S. Army scouts patrolling Shahravan, Iraq, June 2003

Radu Sighet / Reuters

By now, it seemed to Bremer that it would be just as hard to reconstitute the old Iraqi army as it would be to start from scratch. But a fresh start would avoid saddling the force with the unnecessary baggage of ties to Saddam and a sectarian hierarchy. Feith explained how his and others’ thinking had changed since the winter: “All the arguments in favor of keeping the military—facilities, transportation—those arguments had disappeared. There were new facts on the ground.”

Other participants dispute that the Iraqi army was really gone for good. Miller, for example, pointed out that the Americans had dropped leaflets and handed out flyers encouraging Iraqi soldiers to go home and wait for orders to return to their bases. “We told people, ‘Go away, and we’ll call you back,’” he said. The U.S. military had already initiated conversations with friendly Iraqi officers about reconstituting the force. One of Garner’s aides, a colonel named Paul Hughes, was hard at work contacting old units. As Garner recalled, “We had about 40,000 soldiers ready to come back.”

Bremer’s decision would cut off those discussions and ultimately create lasting bitterness among Iraq’s erstwhile officer corps.

AN INTERAGENCY MYSTERY

Like the de-Baathification order, the idea of disbanding the Iraqi military met resistance on the ground in Iraq. Garner and his team felt that it would undo everything they had been working on. “There was new Iraqi leadership that had emerged saying, ‘We’re willing to work with you,’” recalled Michael Barron, then an Army colonel who served as a senior adviser to the CPA. “We were looking to bring back those security forces—the army and the police—under new leadership working with the American-led coalition. Order no. 2 took the rug out from under all that.”

Garner, along with Seidel and some U.S. military personnel, favored involving friendly Iraqi generals in the new force. But Bremer and Slocombe concluded that doing so was impractical. In their view, the oppressed Shiite conscripts who had happily gone home during the invasion were not going to rally to the summons of a bunch of Sunni senior officers tied to the ancien régime.

Although there was no typical formal interagency process for approving CPA Order 2, Slocombe remembered informing everyone necessary in both Washington and Baghdad of the plan to disband the army. Communications technology in 2003 in Iraq was still dicey, but the draft was sent to the Pentagon, and Slocombe said he spent many phone calls pacing up and down outside the Republican Palace in Baghdad where the CPA was setting up shop, listening to final changes to the document.

Rumsfeld and Bush both wanted to give Bremer space to make decisions, particularly as he was just getting started.

“I can vividly remember standing outside in 120-degree heat going over, on a shaky satellite link, ‘happy-to-glad’ changes with people in the Pentagon,” he said, using the bureaucratic parlance for minor edits. “The draft of the order was cleared in Baghdad, including by the senior military leadership. The mere fact that someone says, ‘I concur,’ doesn’t mean they think it’s a good idea, but they can’t say they didn’t know about it.”

The top civilian leaders at the Pentagon, who had received the presidential OK back in March to keep the military intact, were on board with Bremer’s new vision, accepting the same arguments he did about the changed circumstances. Grenier recalled a conversation with a staffer in Luti’s office who deadpanned, “If we bring back the leadership of the Iraqi army, it will be to shoot them.” Yet even though Defense Department officials carefully reviewed the order—Slocombe recalled the text kicking around the CPA offices for about a week before Bremer pushed the team to finalize it—they don’t appear to have ever shared it with principals outside the Pentagon.

When Bremer announced the pending order on a video conference with the national security team back at the White House, the revelation stunned other leaders in the administration. “No one else around the table—excluding Don Rumsfeld and Doug Feith and possibly the vice president—knew what was going on,” Miller explained. “This was presented to the war cabinet as, ‘This is what we’re going to do.’” Even the president seemed taken aback. After ten or so seconds of silence, Bush said to Bremer, “Jerry, you’re the guy on the ground.”

IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE

To Feith, it was a signature moment in the war, a key indication of how the next phase of the occupation would unfold. Rumsfeld and Bush both wanted to give Bremer space to make decisions, particularly as he was just getting started. Rumsfeld was in some respects a micromanager, Feith recalled, but the defense secretary’s inclination stopped at the water’s edge, and he tended to defer to people running operations on the other side of the world. As Feith put it, “He wanted to protect Jerry Bremer from people wielding, as the saying goes, ‘five-thousand-mile screwdrivers.’”

Looking back, Bremer said his regret about CPA Order 2 stems primarily from not having readied what he saw as the second stage of the order: a plan for paying the disbanded army. He and Slocombe never intended to turn the entire Iraqi military out on the street but envisioned issuing the former soldiers some form of a stipend. (As Slocombe put it, “We know if you don’t pay the army, someone else will.”) But amid the post-invasion chaos, the mechanisms to do so weren’t in place yet, as both Bremer and Slocombe were the first to admit. The CPA had no reliable records of the military’s ranks, nor was the oil revenue flowing yet to pay them. Runaway inflation of the Iraqi dinar further complicated whatever back pay, retirement pensions, or stipends the CPA might want to institute. Plus, Slocombe said, it would have been politically awkward to pay ex-regime soldiers before there was any sort of process in place to compensate their victims.

As if on cue, soon after the edict was issued, disbanded soldiers across the country protested for pay. Behind the scenes, the CPA scrambled to assemble an order of battle for the Iraqi army. Bremer said he recalls the very moment in mid-June when Meghan O’Sullivan, one of his aides, walked into his palace office with a giant spreadsheet at last outlining the Iraqi military—the first step in starting up the payments to former soldiers, which ultimately lagged CPA Order 2 by more than a month. “One of my regrets was that we didn’t at the same time announce a plan to put all those people on pensions,” Bremer said. “We delayed the announcement of the pay, because we didn’t have the money. That was a mistake.” When the payments did begin, he pointed out, they quickly quieted the soldiers’ protests.

CPA Order 1 faced its own implementation problems. In the months that followed, de-Baathification proved even more extreme and problematic than what the text of the order called for. Chalabi and his allies had seized control of the process—a process for which the United States had offered no clear guidelines. By April 2004, Bremer himself publicly admitted that the order had been “poorly implemented” and applied “unevenly and unjustly.”

Slocombe confessed that he and others were surprised at how de-Baathification worked out. “In practice, it was abused and it was used as a device to get rid of people, like school superintendents in mid-size cities,” he said. “It was our failure to recognize that in any society, there’d be a considerable amount of score settling and favor trading.” But, Slocombe maintained, that doesn’t mean it was the wrong thing to do. “No one said dissolving the Nazi Party was a big mistake.”

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Bremer’s two signature orders marked a turning point in the Bush administration’s adventure in Iraq. Gone were any illusions of a quick in-and-out operation; now, the orders signaled, the United States would be staying for a long occupation aimed at fundamentally remaking Iraq. A rapid handover had been replaced by an open-ended rebuilding. “The irony of CPA 1 and CPA 2 is that Bremer completely overturned the president’s vision for Iraq,” Miller said. “I don’t know if we would have ever been able to be in and out quickly, but we never had the opportunity to try.”

A quick and easy war was unrealistic from inception, however. Many of those who participated in the policymaking process at the time suggested that the actual effect of CPA Orders 1 and 2 has been overblown. The orders themselves weren’t the real problem; they were a symptom of the utter lack of planning before the invasion and lack of a clear decision-making process after. “Everything was designed by people in Washington who had never been to Iraq,” Garner recalled. “It was a poorly conceived and poorly thought-out series of orders.”

The orders were in fact also symptoms of an even larger problem: the nearly impossible challenge that the United States had taken on in choosing to invade Iraq. The collapse of Saddam’s regime demanded some sort of replacement, and the process of devising a replacement would inevitably involve endless hard choices, unexpected obstacles, and unintended consequences—no matter how much planning Washington did. Although the slapdash planning and undersized U.S. military footprint certainly left no margin for error, wiser decisions might not have been enough. It is impossible to prove a counterfactual, but although a narrow de-Baathification plan and a concerted effort to save the Iraqi army might have been better policies, they certainly would have been no guarantee of peace in Iraq.

The two orders were the first of what would ultimately end up being 100 such edicts from the CPA, which lasted 14 months, until June 2004, when authority was finally handed over to an interim Iraqi government. By the fall of 2003, the insurgency—made up of former regime elements and disbanded soldiers—was in full swing. The rest is history: the Abu Ghraib scandal and other revelations of U.S. war crimes, the U.S. troop surge, the American withdrawal, the rise of the Islamic State, all against the backdrop of persistent political instability and violence and the growing influence of Iran, the leading U.S. adversary in the region.

With the benefit of 20 years of hindsight, CPA Orders 1 and 2 are best thought of not as errors that, if avoided, could have saved Iraq. Instead, they were early indicators that the Bush administration’s grand visions for the country were merely paper wishes, out of touch with the post-invasion reality. The orders’ murky origins were emblematic of a chaotic policymaking process that led to a war that was both needless and poorly planned. In truth, the Iraq war was doomed before the first American soldier crossed the border.

GARRETT M. GRAFF is the author of Watergate: A New History.

Foreign Affairs · by Garrett M. Graff · May 5, 2023

19. The President Can’t Counter China on His Own

Excerpts;

As China’s brazen invasion of American airspace with its spy balloon and Xi’s defiance of U.S.-led sanctions against Russia have demonstrated, China has lost respect for the United States. The fact that so many American companies and financial institutions are still willing to do business as usual with China is also taken by Beijing as a sign of American weakness.

Congress can play a crucial role in changing this perception by investigating and exposing Chinese wrongdoing and legislating to stop it. In a time of significant political polarization in the United States, it is heartening that a bipartisan consensus has formed around the need to secure the country and protect the American way of life from the CCP.

The President Can’t Counter China on His Own

Congress Must Commit to America’s Bipartisan China Strategy

By Robert C. O’Brien and Arthur Herman

May 5, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Robert C. O’Brien · May 5, 2023

There is a growing bipartisan awareness in the United States that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s totalitarian global ambitions make it the most dangerous threat the free world has faced since the Cold War, and perhaps ever. In recognition of that threat, U.S. President Donald Trump’s National Security Council announced a comprehensive China strategy in May 2020 and later declassified its Indo-Pacific strategy. These documents were built around three key objectives: protecting the U.S. homeland, preserving the peace through a policy of strength, and advancing American prosperity by reshoring the key pillars of the U.S. economy.

To his credit, U.S. President Joe Biden has implemented the broad outline of his predecessor’s strategy and has scored some notable successes in confronting an increasingly aggressive China. Among them are the AUKUS defense agreement with Australia and the United Kingdom, a ban on advanced semiconductor exports to China, the blacklisting of the chip maker YMTC and 21 other major Chinese players in the artificial intelligence chip sector, and a series of bilateral agreements with Pacific allies to improve mutual defense.

Now, Congress can build on these steps by passing measures to that will advance the China strategy outlined by Trump and largely embraced by Biden, protecting the U.S. homeland from Chinese threats and strengthening Washington’s military and economic position vis-à-vis Beijing. The House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party—led by its chairman, Mike Gallagher, Republican of Wisconsin, and ranking member, Raja Krishnamoorthi, Democrat of Illinois—will be the focal point of this effort. But Congress as a whole should use this opportunity to advance an agenda for protecting the American way of life from China’s undue influence, preserving the United States’ stature as the free world’s indispensable superpower, and advancing the U.S. national interest.

SURVEILLANCE APPS AND PROPAGANDA FARMS

The first and most urgent step is to ban TikTok, WeChat, and every other Chinese app from American phones. Disguised as social media, TikTok could in fact be used to surveil millions of Americans and compromise the phones of U.S. military personnel, FBI Director Christopher Wray told the Senate Intelligence Committee in March 2023. Indeed, TikTok’s reach—potentially spying on 100 million Americans—makes the Chinese spy balloon’s transit over the continental United States early this year look like child’s play. TikTok executives deny that their parent company, ByteDance, is controlled by the Chinese government and that the CCP uses the app to aid its intelligence efforts. Such claims are difficult to credit, however; a former head of a unit within TikTok’s safety operations told The Washington Post that senior managers at the company were “lying” to U.S. government officials about data privacy and said that “a truly leakproof arrangement for Americans’ data would require a ‘complete re-engineering’ of how TikTok is run.” (ByteDance said these allegations were “unfounded.”)

The House of Representatives has advanced a bill to ban TikTok, and Senator Josh Hawley, Republican of Missouri, has introduced similar legislation in the Senate. But Congress should not neglect other malign Chinese social media apps, including WeChat, which is popular with Chinese living abroad and which the CCP uses to target dissidents in this diaspora, according to a study by Monmouth University. (WeChat denies storing users’ chat logs or surveilling their communications.)

Once it has addressed the pressing dangers posed by Chinese surveillance apps, Congress should turn its attention to China’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic. U.S. lawmakers should expand their investigation of the origins of COVID-19 in China, including any possible role of U.S. research grants in developing the virus that causes the disease. The House Oversight Committee, which is currently conducting this investigation, should seek to expose both the source of the virus and the Chinese government’s subsequent cover-up, which contributed to the disease’s silent spread to the United States and around the world between October 2019 and January 2020.

The first and most urgent step is to ban TikTok.

Next up should be a ban on the sale of U.S. farmland to Chinese companies. The United States has 900 million acres of farmland that produce more than $177 billion in exports. Alarmingly, in terms of the dollar value of land, Chinese ownership of U.S. farmland leapt more than 20-fold between 2010 and 2020, from $81 million to $1.8 billion. Beijing’s large-scale backing of these investments shows that they are part of a broader strategy that threatens to give China control over a significant amount of the U.S. food supply as well as footholds near American military bases from which the CCP could conceivably conduct surveillance.

The Promoting Agriculture Safeguards and Security Act, sponsored by the Republican representatives Elise Stefanik of New York and Rick Crawford of Arkansas, would if enacted bar China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia from purchasing U.S. agriculture companies or land. It would also increase oversight of other foreign acquisitions and require the U.S. secretary of agriculture to publicly disclose all foreign agribusiness purchases. This bill or similar legislation banning Chinese ownership of U.S. farmland should be passed with haste.

Another vulnerability that must be addressed concerns telecommunications. Congress should enact laws requiring all telecom companies to dismantle cell towers that include Chinese-made components, beginning with those near sensitive military installations. According to CNN, a recent FBI investigation found that equipment from the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei—which is already banned from all U.S. government devices—is capable of disrupting Department of Defense communications, including those of the agency that oversees the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Congress should ban the installation of all Chinese equipment in U.S. telecommunications systems and appropriate funding to reimburse carriers for the cost of moving to trustworthy vendors.

Congress must take action against Confucius Institutes.

Congress should also highlight the dangers posed by companies connected to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, a powerful scientific research institution that works extensively with the Chinese military and intelligence services. All companies connected to the CAS should be added to the U.S. Commerce Department’s so-called Entity List, prohibiting them from access to strategic American technologies.

The most ubiquitous CAS-affiliated company is Lenovo, the world’s market leader in personal computer sales. Lenovo was founded in 1984 by a group of CAS engineers and now controls roughly 15 percent of the market in the United States, potentially endangering the sensitive personal and enterprise data of millions of Americans and businesses. Adding Lenovo to the Entity List would send a strong signal that Washington is no longer going to allow Beijing to spy on Americans under the guise of commercial enterprise.

Finally, Congress must take action against Confucius Institutes. Since 2004, the Chinese government has sponsored such institutes on college campuses around the world, providing teachers, textbooks, and operating funds. A 2017 report by the nonprofit National Association of Scholars found that Confucius Institutes undermine academic integrity and import censorship directly into the U.S. education system. Any American college or university that hosts such institutions should be banned from receiving federal funding, including student loans and Pell grants.

NEW MISSILES, OLD SHIPS

It is not enough to guard against Chinese threats on the home front, however. The United States must pursue peace through strength to deter Chinese adventurism in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Although much would be required to implement such a policy, two crucial needs stand out: deploying hypersonic missiles and rebuilding the U.S. Navy. The Trump administration made the development and deployment of hypersonic missiles the United States’ top defense priority. At the time, China had taken the lead in developing hypersonic platforms. But since then, the Air Force Air Launched Rapid Response Weapon and the Army and Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike—both advanced hypersonic missiles—have achieved significant progress in their test programs.

The United States must maintain its momentum in this critical area while also seeking new paths for innovation in hypersonic weapons. In addition, Washington must fund efforts to devise effective countermeasures to the development of Chinese hypersonic missiles. In all of these areas, Congress can encourage the Department of Defense to cooperate with allied countries such as Japan and the United Kingdom. Although research and development are important, deploying sufficient quantities of hypersonic missiles across the armed forces must be the United States’ main objective. Swiftly achieving this goal is vital to restoring deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

At the same time, Washington must strengthen the Navy. Naval supremacy is critical to U.S. power. Having an advantage on the high seas deters foes such as China, which is determined to become the world’s leading naval and land power. After decades of a declining U.S. fleet size (and given the fragility of the American shipbuilding industrial base), it will take years to reach the force level required to sufficiently deter China. Even the highly accelerated shipbuilding plan the Trump administration submitted to Congress in December 2020 would have taken until 2031 to reach 355 battle force vessels, the number that many experts agree is the minimum for the Navy to maintain its global role. Congress should look to the Trump administration’s 2020 plan, which sought to extend the life of existing ships and platforms, as a blueprint for increasing the size of the U.S. fleet.

The United States must pursue peace through strength.

To that end, Congress should immediately direct the Navy to extend the life of more than half a dozen viable Los Angeles-class submarines (and provide the funds for it to do so). Such an effort will help the Navy avoid a submarine shortage. Addressing the maintenance backlog on Virginia-class submarines should be another top priority. The fact that so many of these subs have been awaiting maintenance for years is a national disgrace and hinders the United States’ ability to defend Taiwan and other partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Congress should also invest in numerous vertical missile launching systems for its surface vessels to deter and, if necessary, fight China. For less than $1 billion per ship, the United States can extend the lives of Ticonderoga-class cruisers. Retiring this class of ships without replacing their vertical launching systems would hand the CCP a naval victory of enormous significance without a shot being fired. The Navy’s leadership seems intent on doing just that, so Congress has no choice but to forcefully intervene.

Lastly, Congress should push the Navy to establish a Rapid Capabilities Office to streamline bureaucratic acquisition processes. Naval procurement is characterized by an inability to harness commercial innovation and an unwillingness to tolerate the necessary risk to field new technology quickly. Such an office could deliver meaningful new capabilities for unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles within two or three years, for example.

RE-SHORING AND FRIEND-SHORING

Just as important as bolstering U.S. naval power is preserving the economic might that underpins it. Last year, the Biden administration proposed and Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, giving the U.S. semiconductor industry a $50 billion boost. Federal incentives will help bring this critical manufacturing capability back to the United States. But the United States must continue to re-shore, near-shore, and friend-shore production and manufacturing not just of semiconductors but also of pharmaceuticals, rare earth elements, and batteries, which are critical to the electric and autonomus vehicle industries. Congress should look to pass legislation similar to the CHIPS Act for these and other vital sectors.

Lawmakers must also take care not to alienate major technology companies. The Pentagon and the intelligence community rely on the resources and expertise of leading American developers to maintain the United States’ advantage in key areas such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, cyber, robotics, and autonomous systems. Through its “China 2025” project, Beijing seeks to dominate each of these sectors within the next few years.

Congress must therefore stop targeting U.S. technology companies in the specious name of “competition.” Instead, it needs to find ways to incentivize those firms in their innovation race with Chinese competitors. The Open App Markets Act, an antitrust bill proposed by Senator Amy Klobuchar, Democrat of Minnesota, is not the way to do this: it would leave Americans’ phones open to Chinese hacking and malware and hurt U.S. companies without addressing the real danger from TikTok and other Chinese behemoths.

Lawmakers must not alienate major technology companies.

Legitimate issues such as foreign influence, political bias in online content moderation, and misinformation on social media should be addressed with narrow legislation. But those concerns should not be used as an excuse to hamper the best technology innovators when the United States need them on its side, not on the sidelines.

Congress must also act to stop the massive flows of U.S. capital into Chinese markets. Foreign direct investment by American companies into China more than doubled between 2008 and 2021, from over $50 billion to just under $125 billion. BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, and other firms invest billions of dollars from U.S. retirement accounts in companies that are keeping the Chinese economy afloat.

Congress must discourage public and private investment in the CCP’s totalitarian state—for instance, by pressing the U.S. Treasury Department to deny tax credits for investments in China. In 2020, Congress passed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, which requires foreign companies listed on stock exchanges in the United States to comply with stronger regulatory and audit practices. But Congress should insist that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which audits publicly traded companies in the United States, scrutinize U.S.-listed Chinese companies and delist them after three years if they fail to comply with the same audits as American corporations.

SECURING THE FUTURE

As China’s brazen invasion of American airspace with its spy balloon and Xi’s defiance of U.S.-led sanctions against Russia have demonstrated, China has lost respect for the United States. The fact that so many American companies and financial institutions are still willing to do business as usual with China is also taken by Beijing as a sign of American weakness.

Congress can play a crucial role in changing this perception by investigating and exposing Chinese wrongdoing and legislating to stop it. In a time of significant political polarization in the United States, it is heartening that a bipartisan consensus has formed around the need to secure the country and protect the American way of life from the CCP.

ROBERT C. O’BRIEN served as U.S. National Security Adviser from 2019 to 2021.
ARTHUR HERMAN is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. He served as a Senior Adviser on the National Security Council from 2020 to 2021.

Foreign Affairs · by Robert C. O’Brien · May 5, 2023

20. Raider Without a Cause: Why is America Buying the B-21?

Sat, 05/06/2023 - 10:26am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/raider-without-cause-why-america-buying-b-21

Raider Without a Cause: Why is America Buying the B-21?

By Tom Ordeman, Jr.

Un-Asked, Un-Answered

In 2014, the U.S. Air Force began development of the B-21 Raider, its next generation stealth bomber. However, despite having socialized a set of requirements, identified a vendor, and set a per-unit price that will inevitably skyrocket, any serious discussion of whether a need for this platform actually exists has taken place - pun intended - largely under the radar.

In fact, for many of the same reasons that have led some scholars to argue the controversial position that the Air Force should be amalgamated back into the other services, serious doubts underscore the alleged requirement for a new fleet of heavy bombers. Instead, the United States can - and should - assume minimal risk by letting this platform hibernate with the projected retirement of B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit, and long-term sustainment of the B-52 Stratofortress fleet; and channel the projected $113 billion price tag into versatile solutions that are more appropriate to modern conditions.

A Brief History of Heavy Bombing

Heavy bombing developed during the interwar period. Improvements in aircraft capabilities, paired with conjectural doctrine from the likes of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell, led designers to load ever larger payloads aboard ever more capable aircraft. The "massive bombardment" concept suggested that, in addition to demolishing military targets, heavy bombing of an enemy's industrial base would cripple their capacity to wage war while simultaneously eroding public support for the enemy's war effort. However, sustained and costly bombing campaigns failed to produce such results in Germany or Imperial Japan.

The events of August 1945 seemed to vindicate massive bombardment proponents, as coincidental timing fed a perception that two atomic bomb attacks in relatively quick succession compelled a Japanese surrender. In reality, devastating though the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, Japan's decision to surrender likely revolved more so around the August 9th decision by the Soviet Union - formerly a neutral party in the Pacific Theater, and the party whom Tokyo hoped would arbitrate the final settlement - to declare war on Japan. Nonetheless, air power advocates proliferated the claims - at worst, half-truths - that two atomic bombs had saved at least one million American and Japanese lives by eliminating the need for an invasion; and also, that the atomic bomb constituted the missing link that made massive bombardment viable.

By 1947, air power advocates managed to parlay this narrative into the establishment of an independent United States Air Force. Advocates continued to advance embellished claims that a single aircraft carrying a single atomic weapon could win a war on its own. In an entirely sincere move that assumes a twinge of lunacy with the benefit of historical perspective, some zealots went so far as to recommend the dissolution of the other military services on the grounds that USAF assets fielding atomic weapons could accomplish the other services’ strategic objectives.

The strategic winds began to shift as the scarcity of American fissile material ended, as did the American monopoly on atomic weapons. Massive conventional bombardment failed to deliver quick or compelling results in Korea. Douglas MacArthur's inclination to use atomic weapons against North Korea and China led to his controversial, albeit justified, dismissal by President Truman. A decade of massive conventional bombardment similarly failed to produce satisfactory results in Vietnam.

Meanwhile, developments in missile technology made massive bombardment by way of heavy bombers largely obsolete, or at least primitive by comparison. For a variety of reasons, America retained the capability to deliver nuclear weapons via aircraft. Albert Wohlstetter's seminal 1958 treatise, The Delicate Balance of Terror, described the sheer volume of infrastructure - bombers, refueling aircraft, fortified bases, et cetera - required to ensure the bomber fleet's capacity to reliably hold the Soviet Union at risk, ensuring deterrence. The Air Force continued to develop the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a single unit of which could accomplish the same mission with greater accuracy, a smaller operational footprint, and no human crew, all while stationed on American soil.

Already in 1954, the U.S. Navy had deployed Regulus I cruise missiles aboard two submarines, USS Grayback and USS Growler, before deploying the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) aboard George Washington class submarines beginning in 1957. While nuclear strategists continue to affirm the value of each leg of the nuclear triad (bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs) when working in concert, bombers remain the most primitive leg. Elsewhere, the French government eliminated land-based ballistic missiles in 1996, now relying upon a deterrent duad, while the United Kingdom discontinued air-based nuclear deterrence in 1998 to rely solely upon its SLBM force. Both countries now rely primarily upon a submarine-based Continual At-Sea Deterrence (CASD) posture, which strategists generally agree to be the most stable form of modern deterrence.

Technological progress also overtook massive bombardment. During the 1950s, increasing yields compensated for shortfalls in precision targeting. By the late 1970s, and more so by the early 1990s, improvements in precision targeting - particularly the introduction of the Global Positioning System - allowed for the reduction of yields to the scale of conventional weapons. For example, in Afghanistan and Iraq, American forces utilized the BLU-82B “Daisy Cutter” and GBU-43/B “MOAB” in cases where combatant commanders might have previously considered the use of tactical nuclear weapons. By 2002, the Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review acknowledged America's adjuncts to nuclear weapons by redefining the American strategic triad: the nuclear triad consisted of a single unified leg, joined by conventional capabilities as the second leg, and robust national survivability as the third.

As a persistent taboo against the battlefield use of nuclear weapons constituted an increasingly ironclad precedent, the Air Force eventually shifted its nuclear posture to one of maintenance while the service’s overall focus shifted to other priorities: air supremacy, space operations, and an eventual attempt to govern military information systems. By 2014, the Air Force’s nuclear enterprise found itself in a state of such disarray that a series of scandals led the service’s senior leadership team to intervene. Lip service aside, the Air Force had sent a clear message to its nuclear crews: Air Force leaders no longer considered nuclear deterrence to be the service’s most important mission. The role that had justified the Air Force’s establishment as an independent service was now something of an afterthought.

Modern Capabilities Meeting Modern Needs

The Air Force wants to procure the B-21 Raider to serve two ostensible purposes: the delivery of nuclear and conventional ordnance. The Air Force's recent schizophrenia over the mission that secured its independence notwithstanding, let us start with the nuclear question.

American forces - primarily the Air Force - currently field three air-launched nuclear weapons: the B61 and B83 gravity bombs, which can be launched from virtually any aircraft with wings (and at least one rotary wing platform); and the AGM-86 Air-Launched Cruise Missile, fielding the W80 warhead, which currently launches exclusively from the B-52H Stratofortress. The B-52H is expected to serve into the 2050s, so the failure to procure the B-21 would lead to no foreseeable disruption to existing USAF nuclear bombing capabilities.

This leaves the conventional mission, for which the United States maintains and procures a much more diverse range of platforms. Whether in nuclear or conventional operations, massive bombardment has long since fallen into disrepute. Remember, for example, the 2015 debates in which Senator Ted Cruz advocated for "saturation bombing" against the Islamic State, while Candidate Donald Trump advocated for something less printable, and anyone with even a passing understanding of modern warfare asked themselves what decade these candidates were living in. Didn't they realize that America relies upon precision strikes?

So, what purpose would the B-21 Raider actually serve? The projected aircraft replicates both nuclear and conventional capabilities that are better served by lighter, more cost-effective fighter-bomber aircraft. One key indicator is the difference between the F-15E Strike Eagle and the B-1B Lancer in Afghanistan: whereas the Air Force managed to repurpose the Lancer to perform precision air strikes, the Strike Eagle carried a more versatile range of ordnance, including a 20mm cannon, and provided these capabilities at a lower hourly cost than the Lancer. This is to say nothing of the low cost, with comparable loiter capabilities, of both manned turboprop aircraft and remotely-operated platforms.

The Invisible Elephant in the Room

As one Naval Aviator noted, speaking on the condition of anonymity, "The capabilities of the B-21 are a long way from a necessity, but the ease with which a stealthy bomber can penetrate a contested target is a capability that's really nice for a combatant commander to have." This is a fair observation, but merits a sober appraisal of stealth, rather than an a priori assumption of its long-term dominance.

In 1999, an F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter was downed in Serbia by a Russian-built Isayev S-125 "Neva" surface-to-air missile, which was first fielded in 1961. Whereas the F-117A utilizes 1970s technology, the F-22 Raptor reputedly fields much more advanced stealth technology, and entered active service in 2005. However, between 2009 and 2013, several fourth generation aircraft - a U.S. Navy E/A-18 Growler, a French Rafale, and an Emirati Mirage 2000 - scored simulated kills against Raptors during exercises.

While debate regarding the long-term viability of stealth technology continues, it would be irresponsible to say, without reservation, that "stealth is dead." Indeed, boilerplate answers to any challenge regarding the criticality of stealth platforms tend to cite studies about modern air defenses, and predictions that America's fourth generation aircraft will not reliably survive them by 2028. However, the aforementioned record of stealth aircraft against 1960s vintage surface-to-air missiles and 1980s vintage fighter aircraft calls the logic behind these concerns into question.

Nonetheless, given America's current range of stealth options, most of which have only recently entered service, does one more stealth airframe, built for an obsolete mission profile, to the tune of over $100 billion just to procure the platform, make sense? For that price tag, what other options - modern options - might be available? Could a flight of F-22 or F-35 airframes, or the proposed F-15 "Silent Eagle" variant, match the penetrative abilities of the existing B-2 or projected B-21 airframes? Could an unmanned option, dispatched on a one-way itinerary - for example, a retired, remotely-operated F-16 that was restored to flight status - accomplish a terminal strike mission against a deep target? Could proposed flights of integrated fourth and fifth generation fighters, or some combination of crewed and remotely-operated platforms, confuse advanced air defenses such that key initial targets could be eliminated?

These, and other questions, seem to have been dismissed outright without even being entertained to any degree of strategic rigor. Additionally, the logic behind the B-21's procurement assumes two factors that have not been in evidence in recent years: the quality of Russian and Chinese air defense systems, notably the Russian S-400; and the likelihood of a direct confrontation between America and a so-called "near peer" adversary.

In the former instance, not only has Russian equipment proved unreliable in recent decades, but the war in Ukraine has put the unabashed dysfunction of Russian military systems on public display. For example, the Soviet Union engaged in a concerted Soviet industrial espionage effort to steal stealth technology during the late Cold War era. However, recent footage of supposed Russian stealth aircraft revealed visible screws, rivets, and other stealth-compromising features, leading analysts to speculate that Russia actually leverages unreliable and labor-intensive stealth coatings. This is to say nothing of the opportunities afforded by the capture and likely exploitation of Russia’s most capable systems, which may allow Western engineers to apply electronic warfare solutions in lieu of reliance on additional stealth airframes.

Elsewhere, Chinese equipment has yet to be tested in combat. While some Chinese systems pass muster at first glance, real questions persist about Beijing’s capacity to produce capable weapon systems. For example, unsubstantiated assumptions that the Shenyang FC-31 aircraft is a like-for-like copy of the F-35 Lightning II appear to rely upon lists of programs compromised by Chinese industrial espionage, rather than a sober appraisal of what it would take to translate those compromised technologies into operational capabilities. As maritime historian Andrew Lambert noted in a 2021 interview:

"The Chinese fleet is a diversion from their real agendas, which are domestic... They're not spending much money on this. This is a very cheap navy. There's a lot of stuff, but it's not expensive stuff. Second hand rusty Russian aircraft carriers, Chinese copies of rusty Russian aircraft, bit of photoshop… Roughly the same number of destroyers and frigates as the Americans, but not in the same ballpark in terms of capability."

The unspoken implication is that anything short of a direct confrontation - a confrontation that Russia, China, and America are all incentivized to avoid - would involve proxy conflicts and "small wars" in which American air supremacy would likely be a foregone conclusion. Thus, the options provided to combatant commanders by stealth aircraft may remain attractive, but the requirement for those capabilities to be incarnated into a heavy bomber may not warrant the high price tag - particularly if more novel solutions can be made to meet the same need at a fraction of the cost.

Better Options for the Money

As noted above, the projected cost to procure up to one hundred B-21 aircraft is $113 billion, which should be expected - like virtually every modern military procurement initiative - to balloon over time. As the heavy bomber concept has effectively outlived its usefulness, and the capabilities provided by the proposed platform are replicated - at lower cost - in other aircraft, a reasonable strategic justification to spend this significant amount of money on the B-21 Raider has yet to be provided.

Conversely, to replace the existing fleet of eighteen Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines with twelve Columbia-class boats is projected to cost approximately $110B. Funds currently allocated to the B-21 could be redirected to the Columbia-class procurement effort, halving the Pentagon's cost to sustain nuclear deterrence via a commitment to CASD. On this note, readers should also consider the strategic utility provided by the four Ohio-class hulls that were converted to carry conventionally cruise missiles and special operations personnel following the withdrawal of their original nuclear arsenals.

Back ashore, the Air Force's long-neglected ICBM fleet is long overdue for a major overhaul. America's current ICBM, the LGM-30 Minuteman, originally entered service in 1962, and the current LGM-30G Minuteman III incarnation was first deployed in 1970, receiving upgrades during the intervening decades. The Minuteman's intended replacement, the LGM-118 Peacekeeper, first deployed in 1985. The SALT II treaty's moratorium on Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs), coupled with the Peacekeeper's high operating costs, led the United States to procure only half of the proposed Peacekeeper fleet, and to retire that fleet by 2005. This may have made sense in the 1980s, but four decades later, corrective efforts are now overdue. Funds currently earmarked to procure the B-21 would go a long way toward truly modernizing the Minuteman inventory, or else leveraging technological advances to procure a modern equivalent.

These are only two closely related alternatives to procuring the B-21. Indeed, either the Air Force specifically, or the Pentagon more generally, could find no shortage of projects at which to direct more than $100 billion. The A-10 Thunderbolt II, which Air Force brass have fought for decades to scrap, cannot be fully decommissioned without a suitable replacement, for which $100 billion would go a long way. These funds could facilitate the redevelopment of the Marine Corps' replacement for the aging Amphibious Assault Vehicle, or additional attack submarines for the Navy, or initial replacements for the Army's aging M113 armored personnel carrier. The list of better uses for the funds allocated to the B-21 is long and distinguished.

Abandoning Obsolete Paradigms

Owing to American nostalgia for the Second World War - from the Doolittle Raid, to the flights of Enola Gay and Bockscar - for more than three quarters of a century, bombers have represented American strength in the air. Acknowledging the need to discontinue the procurement of heavy bombers feels counter-intuitive, perhaps even ludicrous, on its face. Of course, despite the failure of charge after charge, the same arguments were made during the First World War with regard to horse cavalry. Decades later, after numerous advances had rendered massive, heavily-armored vessels with massive guns conspicuously obsolete, similar arguments were made about the battleships. The tactical and strategic landscapes change with time, and no platform is sacred, particularly if treating any such platform as a holy bovine prevents limited resources from being applied to more effective options.

Heavy bombers have played a key role in defending American interests since the 1930s. However, current strategic and tactical conditions render them obsolete, and as a result, current plans to procure the B-21 Raider amount to little more than nostalgia, rather than strategic necessity. Instead of spending more than $100 billion to procure this airframe for a mission profile that has vacated the realm of strategic necessity, the time has come to mothball the concept of heavy bombing, and to redirect those funds toward more appropriate priorities.

About the Author(s)

Tom Ordeman, Jr.

Tom Ordeman, Jr. is an Oregon-based information security professional, freelance military historian, and former federal contractor. A graduate with Distinction from the University of Aberdeen’s MSc program in Strategic Studies, he holds multiple DoD and industry security certifications. Between 2006 and 2017, he supported training and enterprise risk management requirements for multiple DoD and federal civilian agencies. His research interests include the modern history of the Sultanate of Oman, and the exploits of the Gordon Highlanders during the First World War. His opinions are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of any entity with which he is associated.

21. Special Operators Well Suited for Strategic Level of Warfare

Excerpts;

We commend to you the newly released Joint Chiefs of Staff document, “Joint Concept for Competing,” which focuses on the strategic level of warfare. It articulates that the United States must adapt to the realities of long-term strategic competition or risk ceding strategic influence, advantage, and leverage to our adversaries.

The concept additionally emphasizes using military capabilities to proactively probe adversary systems for vulnerabilities, establishes behavioral patterns that can be exploited in a crisis to conceal U.S. intentions until it is too late for an adversary to respond to them effectively, and shifts the competition to where the United States can maximize its initiative and leverage its advantages.

This is exactly what the Special Operations Forces were and are designed to do. SOF can reach and sustain themselves in some of the most difficult locations around the globe, creating dilemmas for our adversaries.

These highly skilled and trained men and women are at the tip of the spear of this long-term strategic competition. Their focus on long-term strategic competition also reflects the Defense Department’s assessment of the changing character of war. Future conflict with one or more near-peer competitors will likely be trans-regional, multi-domain and multi-functional, with contested and degraded logistics and communications. Accordingly, special operators will not only be expected to deploy in small, dispersed units but also potentially in non-permissive and technologically disconnected operating environments.

Special Operators Well Suited for Strategic Level of Warfare

nationaldefensemagazine.org

5/2/2023

By Michael Bayer

Defense Dept. photo

The heart of the National Defense Industrial Association’s mission is to provide ethical forums to connect government and industry to ensure warfighters in the nation’s service have the platforms, services, capabilities and technologies they need so they never engage in a fair fight against any competitor. For those in the defense industry, your profession is also a national service, only from a different angle.

Over the last several months, NDIA has been focusing the national conversation on the return to great power competition to the investments the U.S. defense industrial base needs to enable the greater responsiveness and resilience that now requires. For that reason, we have dedicated this issue to that part of the Joint Force that is on the leading operational edge of executing the 2022 National Defense Strategy — the men and women of U.S. Special Operations Command.

The nation calls on them for the most dangerous and sensitive missions, and they sustain a heavy operational tempo. While special operations personnel comprise less than 3 percent of the joint force, they account for almost 50 percent of U.S. deployed forces.

During this spring’s congressional budget hearings for the Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and SOCOM, the recurring topic was the strategic adjustments the command’s civilian and military leadership are making to better posture the force to execute its missions in an era of great power competition. In doing so, the community is returning to its root core competencies of integrated deterrence and campaigning against strategic competitors, core priorities of the National Defense Strategy.

Integrated deterrence entails working seamlessly across the spectrum of conflict in all warfighting domains and theaters and engaging all instruments of U.S. national power and those of our allies and partners.

We commend to you the newly released Joint Chiefs of Staff document, “Joint Concept for Competing,” which focuses on the strategic level of warfare. It articulates that the United States must adapt to the realities of long-term strategic competition or risk ceding strategic influence, advantage, and leverage to our adversaries.

The concept additionally emphasizes using military capabilities to proactively probe adversary systems for vulnerabilities, establishes behavioral patterns that can be exploited in a crisis to conceal U.S. intentions until it is too late for an adversary to respond to them effectively, and shifts the competition to where the United States can maximize its initiative and leverage its advantages.

This is exactly what the Special Operations Forces were and are designed to do. SOF can reach and sustain themselves in some of the most difficult locations around the globe, creating dilemmas for our adversaries.

These highly skilled and trained men and women are at the tip of the spear of this long-term strategic competition. Their focus on long-term strategic competition also reflects the Defense Department’s assessment of the changing character of war. Future conflict with one or more near-peer competitors will likely be trans-regional, multi-domain and multi-functional, with contested and degraded logistics and communications. Accordingly, special operators will not only be expected to deploy in small, dispersed units but also potentially in non-permissive and technologically disconnected operating environments.

Therefore, I commend the commentary on page 34 by Special Operations Command Acquisition Executive James Smith, who makes it clear the command’s civilian and military leadership is explicitly focused on improving the resilience and survivability and enhancing the lethality of our nation’s most important treasure, our men and women in uniform.

This reflects the special ops community’s central truth: people are more important than hardware. For example, SOCOM’s science-and-technology integrated priority list includes a focus area on building personnel’s physical and cognitive endurance to sustain themselves in austere operating environments.

I also want to highlight NDIA’s focus on the fiscal year 2024 budget priority of multiyear procurement authority for certain categories of munitions. Munitions capacity has never been a more strategic topic. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the violent conflict that ensued has graphically revealed how quickly peer-level sophisticated combat can deplete national munitions stockpiles, and how difficult it is to replenish those stockpiles given the current production capacity of the United States and its allies and partners.

Therefore, the association is committed to working with our government partners and members to address current capacity requirements for the European theater and to accelerate building credible deterrent capacity in the near and moderate term for the Indo-Pacific. We would love members and readers to join in this effort.

Please join us for the third Annual Future Force Capabilities Conference and Exhibition, scheduled for Sept. 25-28, in Huntsville, Alabama.

The conference is hosted by the NDIA Armaments, Robotics, Munitions Technology Divisions as well as the Global Demilitarization and Fuzing communities.

The conference’s agenda includes capabilities briefings, keynote remarks, expert panels, technical paper presentations, exhibits and a live-fire demonstration. This terrific event provides unparalleled opportunities to engage in discussions around the entire life cycle of munitions: from fuzes to reduction of obsolete and excess munitions.

There is so much work to be done, and here at NDIA, we are rolling up our sleeves. Join us!

Michael Bayer is NDIA’s board chair and president of Dumbarton Strategies.

Topics: Special Operations

nationaldefensemagazine.org

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

About the Author(s)

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 5, 2023

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CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, MAY 5, 2023

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About the Author(s)

Special Operators Well Suited for Strategic Level of Warfare

nationaldefensemagazine.org

5/2/2023

By Michael Bayer

Defense Dept. photo

The nation calls on them for the most dangerous and sensitive missions, and they sustain a heavy operational tempo. While special operations personnel comprise less than 3 percent of the joint force, they account for almost 50 percent of U.S. deployed forces.

Integrated deterrence entails working seamlessly across the spectrum of conflict in all warfighting domains and theaters and engaging all instruments of U.S. national power and those of our allies and partners.

This is exactly what the Special Operations Forces were and are designed to do. SOF can reach and sustain themselves in some of the most difficult locations around the globe, creating dilemmas for our adversaries.

Please join us for the third Annual Future Force Capabilities Conference and Exhibition, scheduled for Sept. 25-28, in Huntsville, Alabama.

The conference is hosted by the NDIA Armaments, Robotics, Munitions Technology Divisions as well as the Global Demilitarization and Fuzing communities.

There is so much work to be done, and here at NDIA, we are rolling up our sleeves. Join us!

Michael Bayer is NDIA’s board chair and president of Dumbarton Strategies.

Topics: Special Operations

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