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Quotes of the Day:
“That is a great mystery,” said Doctor Winter. “That is a mystery that has disturbed rulers all over the world—how the people know. It disturbs the invaders now, I am told, how news runs through censorships, how the truth of things fights free of control. It is a great mystery.”
- John Steinbeck, The Moon is Down
(I would urge all naysayers of psychological warfare, psychological operations, and influence operations to reflect on the above quote. Yes it is a mystery as to how it happens, but like the air power theory of the bomber, the message always finds a way to get through.)
“Anyone taken as an individual, is tolerably sensible and reasonable. But as a member of a crowd, he at once becomes a blockhead.”
- Friedrich Schiller.
"Re-examine all that you have been told... dismiss that which insults your soul."
-Walt Whitman
1. VOA: [Washington Talk] “South Korea’s security strategy to ‘face the threat’… Xing Haiming vulgar words and actions”
2. Int'l Red Cross 'ready to reengage' with N. Korea as soon as access granted: official
3. Congratulations on Eighth Army Founding Day, June 10, 2023
4. S. Korea, Poland mull joint development of wheeled armored vehicles: official
5. Rapid Deployment of New Weaponry: Korea Showcases FA-50 Jets and K239 Chunmoo Missile Systems for Poland
6. Japan Seeks 'Normalization Of Diplomatic Relations' With Kim Jong Un
7. [Translation] [Scarlatoiu] US journalist Claudia Rosett and the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests
8. North Korean defector shares his views on relations with the U.S.
9. British insurance salesman kept North Korea’s fleet ‘afloat’
10. The Sister by Sung-Yoon Lee review – North Korea’s propaganda queen
11. South and North Korea Take Leadership Roles at the United Nations: Differences are Striking
12. North Korea and Russia: A relationship built to last?
13. The Bizarre Reality of Getting Online in North Korea
14. S. Korean, U.S. special operations generals stage 'friendship' parachute jump
1. VOA: [Washington Talk] “South Korea’s security strategy to ‘face the threat’… Xing Haiming vulgar words and actions”
VOA's Eunjung Cho hosted Mark Tokola and me to discuss the ROK's new National Security Strategy, unification, China, and more.
In English with Korean subtitles.
As always the target audience is the leite in Pyongyang.
https://www.voakorea.com/a/7131244.html
Moderator: Cho Eun-jung / Interviewer: David Maxwell (Vice President, Asia-Pacific Strategy Center), Mark Tokola (Vice President, Korea-American Economic Research Institute)
2. Int'l Red Cross 'ready to reengage' with N. Korea as soon as access granted: official
I think we are talking about a big "IF" here. If KJU will agree to allow them to help.
(Yonhap Interview) Int'l Red Cross 'ready to reengage' with N. Korea as soon as access granted: official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · June 10, 2023
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, June 10 (Yonhap) -- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) remains ready to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea and resume projects suspended during the coronavirus pandemic whenever the reclusive country reaches out for aid, an official at the organization has said.
In an interview with Yonhap News Agency, Olivier Ray, the ICRC's director for mobilization, movement and partnerships, also said that the group maintains contact with the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Ray is currently on his first official visit to Seoul to discuss South Korea's humanitarian assistance and increasingly active role on the global stage with high-ranking officials from both government and aid organizations, particularly as it was recently elected as a nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council.
"As of today, the ICRC does not have access to the DPRK due to the COVID-related restrictions that the government has imposed since 2020," he said during the interview held at the ICRC's Seoul office, referring to the North's official name. "But we remain in contact with the DPRK Red Cross Society, we have some information through that channel and we are ready to reengage whenever we have access."
Olivier Ray, director for mobilization, movement and partnerships at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), poses for a photo at the ICRC Seoul office on June 9, 2023, in this photo provided by the ICRC. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The director also said that North Korean authorities are aware of the ICRC's willingness to resume operations in Pyongyang.
"The authorities know that when they are ready, we are ready to send a mission to analyze the needs and reassess the condition of our presence," he said.
The Geneva-based ICRC is known for its commitment to humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of war, and has operated an office in Pyongyang since 2002.
Regarding escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula and growing provocations from the North, Ray stressed the importance of "active neutrality" and making a "clear distinction between those who carry weapons" and civilians in need of humanitarian assistance.
"Our position is clear, we are in favor of the prohibition of nuclear weapons in general for all states," he said. "If we start mixing the concepts, it is a dangerous path towards selecting which victims you will assist."
"And so a child in need of assistance because of war will always be a legitimate beneficiary of humanitarian aid," he added.
In case of military conflict on the Korean Peninsula the ICRC will stay committed to dispatching highly trained "surge teams" or rapid deployment teams from Switzerland with the aim of arriving within 24 hours to help civilians, according to the director.
"We usually say we are the first ones in and the last ones out," he said. "The rapid deployment team will come support, and that's true in any context in any crisis, they will come support the ICRC office in close collaboration with the national (Red Cross) society to deliver at scale because the ICRC has the experience of international armed conflict, negotiating access to the front-line and treating the war-wounded."
Such teams were swiftly deployed to assist civilians in Kyiv when Russia invaded Ukraine and the ICRC now maintains several hundred workers and experts in Ukraine, he added.
Tensions have been running high on the peninsula in recent weeks with the recalcitrant country making a botched attempt to launch a purported military spy satellite last week, triggering air raid sirens in both South Korea and Japan.
This photo, provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross, shows Olivier Ray (2nd from L), director for mobilization, movement and partnerships, visiting a clinic in Ukraine on Aug. 30, 2022. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
With regard to South Korea's growing role on the international stage, Ray said South Korea has a "specific legitimacy and responsibility" on issues related to war and the protection of civilians not only as an emerging economy but as a "first time experiencer" of armed conflict.
"So whether it's on the humanitarian development and peace nexus, on the responsible use of artificial intelligence in the military and on arms trade and arms export, international humanitarian law, including in the cyberspace, all of these are important topics where Korea has an interest and we have an interest, and it's important to bring Korea's voice to the international fora," he said.
He also expressed appreciation to Seoul for its largest-ever contribution to the ICRC last year of more than 10 million Swiss francs.
"We are very grateful for that financial support and we know that Korea has an ambition to have a strong overseas development assistance and to build a real humanitarian policy," he said.
Before joining the ICRC, Olivier was the senior adviser for global affairs to French President Emmanuel Macron, leading on multilateral matters that ranged from global health and environment issues to humanitarian issues, international development projects, and human rights.
Formed in 1863, the ICRC is one of the oldest global humanitarian organizations and is mainly involved in protecting victims of conflicts and providing them with assistance. It opened its offices in North and South Korea in 2002 and 2015, respectively.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · June 10, 2023
3. Congratulations on Eighth Army Founding Day, June 10, 2023
Certainly a storied unit.
Congratulations on Eighth Army Founding Day, June 10, 2023
https://kdva.vet/2023/06/10/congratulations-on-eighth-army-founding-day-june-10-2023/
JUNE 10, 2023 ANNOUNCEMENT
Congratulations on Eighth Army Founding Day, June 10, 2023
On June 10, 1944, Eighth Army was founded under the command of Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger during World War II. Today, under the command of Lieutenant General Willard Burleson, Eighth Army stands as America’s ground force in Korea. The Korea Defense Veterans Association is very thankful for the professionalism and service of this great force, and we stand with each Soldier in support of the ROK-U.S. Alliance.
Millions of U.S. Army Soldiers and KATUSAs (Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army) have rotated into their formations all across South Korea during the Korean War, served on patrols in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and fought against North Korean attacks and provocations. Each Veteran of the Eighth Army knows the hardships, the realistic training, camaraderie, and life-long memories of serving in the “Land of the Morning Calm.” Most will say that serving in Korea was worth it because of the great country that these Veterans helped build and protect.
Americans can thank Eighth Army Veterans for helping to build a more secure and better life for Americans directly because of the “Pacific Victors” in Korea. So, KDVA asks its members and supporters to please take a few minutes on June 10th to remember our Soldiers who serve professionally and selflessly in a vital country. Please also consider joining our cause for the Alliance and our Veterans as we continue working “Together for the ROK-U.S. Alliance” (https://kdva.vet/join-kdva/).
Curtis M. Scaparrotti
General, U.S. Army (Retired)
Chairman & President
Korea Defense Veterans Association
Pdf – KDVA Congratulatory Message for 8A Founding
4. S. Korea, Poland mull joint development of wheeled armored vehicles: official
The ROK Arsenal of Democracy at work
S. Korea, Poland mull joint development of wheeled armored vehicles: official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · June 10, 2023
SEOUL, June 10 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and Poland appear to be considering a joint project to develop wheeled armored vehicles, the state arms procurement agency said Saturday.
Officials from South Korea's Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) visited the state-owned Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ) late last month and discussed the joint development of the South Korean Army's K808 wheel-type armored vehicles, called "Baekho," according to the agency.
The K808 vehicles were among a list of export items included in an initial deal signed with Poland to export 1,000 K2 tanks in July last year.
"As discussions of the joint development came from the Polish side, they appear to be wanting (wheel-typed armored vehicles) with improved performance instead of buying the current model," a DAPA official said.
Poland has been intensifying its arms procurement efforts after it sent military aid to Ukraine in the wake of Russia's invasion of the country.
Last year, South Korea signed major deals with Poland to supply South Korean weapons systems, including K2 battle tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers and FA-50 light attack aircraft.
This undated file photo, provided by the Army, shows a wheeled armored vehicle being tested by the Army TIGER brigade. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · June 10, 2023
5. Rapid Deployment of New Weaponry: Korea Showcases FA-50 Jets and K239 Chunmoo Missile Systems for Poland
More on the ROK Arsenal Of Democracy.
Rapid Deployment of New Weaponry: Korea Showcases FA-50 Jets and K239 Chunmoo Missile Systems for Poland | Defense Express
en.defence-ua.com
During the visit of the Polish government delegation to Korea, two examples of weaponry that Warsaw had purchased were showcased, with a remarkably short turnaround time for their deployment. These include the FA-50 light fighter aircraft and the K239 Chunmoo missile system.
Out of a total order of 12 aircraft, the first two FA-50 jets have already been manufactured and are scheduled to participate in an aviation show in Radom starting on August 27. It is worth noting that a group of Polish pilots is already undergoing training for these aircraft. The swift delivery of these machines is quite impressive, considering that the order was placed as recently as September 2022. In comparison, the queue for new F-16 aircraft is currently being formed for delivery after 2027.
It should be noted that Poland has spent $700 million on the acquisition of these 12 FA-50 light fighter jets in the Block 10 version, which have limited combat capabilities. The FA-50 Block 10 aircraft can utilize AIM-9 missiles for air-to-air combat and employs rockets and bombs, including high-precision ones, for hitting ground targets.
The main contract, worth $2.3 billion, includes the joint production of 36 aircraft in the FA-50PL version, which is identical to the Block 20. Only this version will be equipped with a full range of weaponry, including AIM-120 missiles for air-to-air combat and Joint Strike Missiles, making it a fully functional and versatile aircraft.
In addition to the fighter jets, the Koreans also showcased the K239 Chunmoo missile system, which is mounted on Polish Jelcz chassis and is intended to be integrated into the Polish Topaz combat management system. Warsaw placed an order for 218 of these vehicles in November 2022 at an undisclosed price.
The K239 Chunmoo missile system on the Jelcz chassis / open source
The K239 Chunmoo missile system is conceptually similar to the HIMARS system but accommodates two packages. It enables the launch of 130 mm unguided rockets, 227 mm American GMLRS rockets or unguided M26 rockets, along with their Korean 239 mm counterparts. Additionally, it has the capability to launch 400 mm Korean ballistic missiles or ATACMS missiles. Poland also has plans to localize the production of the K239 Chunmoo system and its munitions in the future.
Moreover, Poland is adding 486 Korean K239 Chunmoo systems to its existing inventory of 486 American HIMARS systems, out of which 18 will be in their original configuration, while the remaining 468 will be mounted on Jelcz chassis. The contract for these launchers, which includes nearly 1,000 GMLRS rockets, over 500 GMLRS-ER rockets and around 50 ATACMS missiles, amounts to a total cost of $10 billion for the country.
en.defence-ua.com
6. Japan Seeks 'Normalization Of Diplomatic Relations' With Kim Jong Un
Japan Seeks 'Normalization Of Diplomatic Relations' With Kim Jong Un
benzinga.com · by Navdeep Yadav
On Thursday, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida expressed his willingness to hold talks with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un for "normalization of diplomatic relations."
What Happened: Kishida told an upper house committee, according to Nikkei Asia, “A leaders’ summit with General Secretary Kim should be realized at an early date without wasting opportunities, so I intend to continue pursuing high-level talks under my direct control.”
Kishida’s recent advocacy for dialogue with Kim is not the first time he has expressed such sentiments. Late last month, the Japanese leader said he is willing to meet Kim without any "preconditions."
However, this time, the prime minister said he aimed to “wipe the slate clean following an unfortunate past and realize normalization of diplomatic relations,” emphasizing the need for a comprehensive resolution to the abduction, nuclear weapons, and missile concerns as a precondition.
Kshida wants to talk with Kim to resolve the long-standing issue of North Korea's past abductions of Japanese nationals. Kishida said abductees’ families are aging, adding, “The abduction issue is a human rights issue with a time limit.”
Why It Matters: Last month, after Japan offered to hold talks with Kim, North Korea responded quickly, indicating the isolated nation’s willingness to improve bilateral ties with the U.S. ally.
In a statement, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Sang Gil said that if Tokyo “seeks a way out for improving the relations, there is no reason for the DPRK and Japan not to meet.”
Japan recognizes 17 citizens officially that have been abducted by Pyongyang, and there has been no progress on this issue for almost ten years now.
In the 2014 Stockholm Agreement, North Korea committed to reopening investigations into the abductees. However, Kim unilaterally halted these probes in 2016.
benzinga.com · by Navdeep Yadav
7. [Translation] [Scarlatoiu] US journalist Claudia Rosett and the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests
All Korea watchers are saddened by Cluadia's pasing. She was a provocative voice for freedom.
[Translation] [Scarlatoiu] US journalist Claudia Rosett and the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests
https://www.rfa.org/korean/commentary/greg/gscu-06052023105739.html
On Saturday, May 27, the world-renowned American newspaper reporter Claudia Rosett passed away at the age of 67. Rosett reported that she risked her life on June 4, 1989, in Tiananmen Square, where a massive number of young people sacrificed and lost their lives to bullets fired by Chinese soldiers during a demonstration for democracy. In 1994, Rosett reported on North Korean dispatched lumberjacks while investigating a concentration camp in a forest in Russia. Her report portrayed the deeply concerning human rights of North Korean dispatched workers overseas who were subjected to forced labor for nearly 30 years.
Rosett was a journalist who was at the forefront of the fight for human rights and democracy during a period of an anti-communist, anti-dictatorship revolution. Only North Koreans who were completely isolated from the outside world were not dreaming of freedom yet, but the winds of freedom started blowing even to China. On April 14, 1989, 34 years ago, intellectual Chinese people and university students led a demonstration in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square demanding freedom, openness, and democracy. The Tiananmen Square protest began after the formal communist party General Security Hu Yaobang’s death. The former General Secretary Hu advocated reform and openness but was forced to step down from his position due to opposition faced by the conservative communist party. After former General Security Hu died in April 1989, the Chinese people gathered in Tiananmen Square to mourn him, and it was there that the protest started for freedom, reform, and openness.
On June 4, 1989, many of the young people gathered in Tiananmen Square were injured and killed because of the Chinese government's armed suppression. Claudia Rosett and other foreign correspondents reported on the massacre carried out by Chinese authorities that night. The Chinese government officially announced that more than 240 civilians were killed and 7, 000 were injured in the Tiananmen Square massacre. However, Rosett and foreign correspondents reported that the number of civilians killed and wounded was much higher. 34 years later, China began pushing for economic reform and formally addressing the massacre, but it has rejected several political and social reforms, particularly in COVID-19 prevention. In contrast, in 1989, when the Soviet Union disintegrated, Eastern Europeans started on the road to freedom.
In 1989, young East and West Germans took hammers and demolished the Berlin Wall, which symbolized the division between East and West Germany. There were peaceful changes in Cesko Slovensko, and in the case of Romania, the bloody revolution overthrew dictator Nicolae Ceausescu’s communist regime which cost thousands of lives. I was a freshman in the Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Bucharest during the bloody anti-communist revolution in December 1989. During the protest, Chinese language students graffitied the words “Don’t forget Tiananmen” on the University wall. Moreover, Romanian students, workers, and soldiers took lessons from the Tiananmen Square Democracy Demonstration and overthrew the communist dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu. Many Eastern European countries underwent a difficult transition in the 1990s. Eventually, Magyar, Polska, Hrvatska, Cesko, Slovensko, Slovenia, Litva, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, and Bulgaria had some success in their reform policies toward liberal democracy and the free market after joining the European Union. 34 years after the Tiananmen Square Democratization movement and the collapse of communist dictatorship in Eastern Europe, North Korea is the only remaining country that has not evolved since the post-Cold War era and does not accept political, social, and economic reforms.
The ultimate goal of the Kim family, whose power has been passed down twice thus far, is to maintain and protect the regime. North Korea wastes many of its scarce resources in developing nuclear weapons and missiles while putting citizens at risk of starvation, inhibiting industrial and economic growth, and suppressing human rights, all in the name of the regime. The Kim family, who has been pursuing a post-communist, post-industrial society and chasing dynastic politics, will one day meet a fate similar to those of past Eastern European dictatorships unless it accepts political, economic, and social reforms and openness.
Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Team Lee Kyung-ha
Translated by Narae Kim, HRNK Intern
8. North Korean defector shares his views on relations with the U.S.
This is part 2. I sent out part 1 a couple of days again. It is at this link: https://www.npr.org/2023/06/07/1180840741/former-north-korean-agent-gives-his-first-interview-since-defecting-in-2014
It is too bad we could not have arranged a visit to the White House for him. He will have to settle for a selfie in front of it.
North Korean defector shares his views on relations with the U.S.
NPR · by By · June 8, 2023
NPR's Mary Louse Kelly continues her talk with Kim Hyun-woo, who — until 2014 — held a senior post in North Korea's Ministry of State Security. This is his first interview.
MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST:
Ask any just-arrived tourist in this town top 10 things they want to see, and the White House probably makes the list. Kim Hyun Woo, who just landed for his first ever visit to the U.S., is no different.
KIM HYUN WOO: (Through interpreter) When I've been, you know, dreaming of visiting U.S., there are some places I would - I really wanted to visit in the United States, in D.C. I wanted to visit the White House.
KELLY: But Mr. Kim, who you hear there and throughout this next conversation speaking through an interpreter - he's no ordinary tourist. He spent 17 years working for North Korean intelligence at the Ministry of State Security. He defected in 2014, lives today in South Korea. He now works at a government-funded think tank in Seoul. And it is the South Korean embassy here in Washington that has organized his visit. Kim Hyun Woo told me that while he's here, he hopes to strike up conversations with ordinary Americans on the street.
KIM: (Through interpreter) And my request is that people in the U.S. will not forget the people in North Korea but continue to remember them, pray for them and support them.
KELLY: Yesterday on the program, you heard Kim's views on life inside North Korea, which he continues to monitor from his post in Seoul - today, his views on relations with the U.S.
Your country and my country have had a very difficult relationship for many years. Do you see any path toward new diplomacy, new engagement between Washington and Pyongyang?
KIM: (Through interpreter) I do have hopes that there could be new changes in the diplomacy between North Korea and the United States.
KELLY: What gives you this hope?
KIM: (Through interpreter) The source of my hope is that even as we speak, the current both South Korean government and the U.S. government has - despite the situations going on, has been consistent in their stance that dialogue and diplomacy - the door to diplomacy and negotiations with North Korea without condition is always open. In that, I find hope that even though, obviously, right now the North Korean state has not been responsive to those calls for diplomacy, if South Korea and U.S. continues to open the door and make diplomatic outreach to North Korea, eventually there's going to be a shift in North Korea's response from passivity to more engagement. And that is the source of my hope.
I recognize that there is view that the possibility of successful negotiations and diplomacy between North Korea-U.S. or North Korea and South Korea is low as of now. And yet my hope is that with persistent efforts to continue works for diplomatic negotiations with North Korea, those persistency and patience would eventually bear fruits and would lead to a breakthrough in the diplomatic gridlock. One thing more concrete I want to add is, especially right now, when there is a diplomatic stalemate at the official channels, in order to create a breakthrough, what we need is a two-track diplomacy in which, if the official diplomatic channels is missing gridlock, we need to engage in widening opportunities for informal, indirect private channels of diplomacy. That should be happening in parallel with the official diplomatic channels.
KELLY: Is that part of what you're doing?
KIM: (Through interpreter) Unfortunately, I cannot be involved in informal channels because North Korea view me as a traitor. So they would not want to talk with me ever.
KELLY: What about nuclear weapons? The U.S. has tried and tried to get North Korea to walk away from its nuclear weapons program. Do you see any scenario in which they would?
KIM: (Through interpreter) My view is that it is very difficult for North Korea to agree and implement denuclearization. And the reason is because North Korea's current regime views denuclearization - so giving up the nuclear arsenal - as causing severe risk to their own regime stability and governance over the country.
KELLY: You just told me North Korea sees you as a traitor. Are you a traitor to North Korea? I wonder, when you use that word, what that means to you.
KIM: (Through interpreter) The question opens up a wound in my heart. From North Korea's regime's perspective, yes, I am a traitor. Yes. And from the perspective of my relatives in North Korea, I am a bad person. But, yes, for myself, I do not use those labels. I do not think those labels apply to me.
KELLY: Do you believe you'll ever go home?
KIM: (Through interpreter) That's my hope. I always have the hope of one day returning back to my hometown, my home city. But realistically, I know it's very difficult. And perhaps to quicken the day of my return, my ability to return back to North Korea, more so I need - we need support and attention from the United States. For me to one day return back to North Korea, I can only hope to rely on consistent commitment from South Korean government and from United States government.
KELLY: Is there any risk to you or to your family from talking to me, from giving open interviews?
KIM: (Through interpreter) Yes, it can be. And to be honest, before coming, yes, I did think about the risk to myself, my own safety and my family's safety before I decided to accept the interview. Yes, I did think about this.
KELLY: And I'll note we have agreed not to share certain details of Kim's story in order to protect his safety. Before Mr. Kim left our studios, I did have one last question.
You said you wanted to see the White House. Will you get to see the White House?
KIM: (Through interpreter) For this week, visiting inside White House - unlikely. So my more realistic, little, smaller hope is at least be able to walk in front of the White House, where the tourists are, and take a self photo. But for the future trips, I do hope to one day visit inside the White House.
KELLY: This is a very American thing to do - to take a selfie outside the White House. So you will be in good company.
KIM: Oh.
KELLY: You're giving me a thumbs up. There we go. Mr. Kim, thank you.
KIM: Thank you.
KELLY: Thank you.
(SOUNDBITE OF HOPPIPOLLA'S "MARCHEN")
KELLY: Kim Hyun Woo defected from North Korea in 2014 after serving 17 years in North Korean intelligence. This was his first interview.
(SOUNDBITE OF HOPPIPOLLA'S "MARCHEN")
NPR · by By · June 8, 2023
9. British insurance salesman kept North Korea’s fleet ‘afloat’
British insurance salesman kept North Korea’s fleet ‘afloat’
Financial Times · by Christian Davies · June 8, 2023
A British marine insurance salesman and football club owner “kept North Korea’s foreign trade fleet afloat” in apparent violation of UN sanctions, years after the UK government was made aware of suspicions over his activities.
David Skinner, who died in 2016, ran a company called DGS Marine which issued fraudulent insurance certificates for at least 29 North Korean ships in the five years preceding his death, according to documents and emails obtained by Danish newspaper Information and seen by the Financial Times.
“It is no exaggeration to say that for years, David Skinner kept North Korea’s foreign trade fleet afloat,” said Hugh Griffiths, a former co-ordinator of the UN panel that monitors North Korea sanctions.
A former employee of the company told Information that the true number of North Korean ships that were issued certificates by the company was closer to 100.
The certificates were fraudulent because DGS Marine was not licensed to issue insurance in any of the jurisdictions from which it operated. Despite this, the certificates were accepted by ports around the world.
DGS Marine was domiciled first in Liechtenstein and then the British Virgin Islands, with operations in the UK, Cyprus, the British Virgin Islands, Dubai, India, Vietnam, Germany and Denmark.
Skinner was a veteran of the marine protection and indemnity industry, according to industry publication TradeWinds. He worked for established marine insurers including Standard, Skuld and West of England, as well as German insurer Hanseatic, before founding DGS Marine in the late 2000s.
The North Korean ship the O Ka San. Skinner’s company issued certificates to the ship several months after the UN prohibited the issuing of insurance to any ships sailing under the North Korean flag © NK Pro
In 2014, he became the majority owner of semi-professional football club Greenwich Borough, which under his ownership was sponsored by DGS Marine. The club is best known for launching the career of former Crystal Palace, Arsenal and England striker Ian Wright.
In at least two instances, DGS Marine continued to issue insurance certificates to ships controlled by a North Korean company called Ocean Maritime Management, even after Ocean Maritime Management was targeted by UN Security Council sanctions in 2014 for smuggling weapons to Cuba.
The FT has also seen copies of certificates issued by DGS Marine to two North Korean ships, the Won San 2 and the O Ka San, in June and August 2016 respectively — several months after the UN prohibited the issuing of insurance to any ships sailing under the North Korean flag.
“These were clear and obvious sanctions breaches,” Griffiths told the FT. “UN Security Council resolution 2270 expressly prohibited insuring North Korean ships, and the maritime insurance communities had been made aware of this.”
Internal documents from DGS Marine show that its relationship with the North Koreans was established in 2011, when the company held a meeting in London with representatives of the Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC), North Korea’s state-owned insurance monopoly.
KNIC, which had an office in Blackheath in south-east London, was later sanctioned by the UN and designated as an affiliate of Office 39, a cell within the Workers’ Party of Korea to raise money for the dictatorship’s ruling Kim family.
The UK froze KNIC’s assets in 2017 after the EU accused it of “generating substantial foreign exchange revenue which could contribute to [the country’s] nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes”.
DGS Marine’s activities were first made public in 2012, when the Telegraph published allegations that Skinner’s company had violated EU sanctions by insuring Iranian ships carrying exports of crude oil from areas controlled by the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad.
According to correspondence seen by the FT, UK Treasury officials wrote to DGS Marine about the allegations soon after that.
Skinner responded by sending documents purporting to show that the Iranian tankers’ insurance had been cancelled at the end of 2011, when the EU sanctions came into force.
Weeks later, Treasury officials wrote to Skinner again, this time with evidence received “via colleagues in the US government” that appeared to show that DGS Marine had in fact continued to insure one of the tankers months after the contracts were supposed to have been cancelled.
But the officials appear to have accepted at face value Skinner’s assurances that it was the documentation provided by the US government, rather than those provided by Skinner himself, that had been forged.
“On the basis that the certificate provided to you is indeed a forgery, then we would agree that there is no evidence of any breach by DGS Marine,” an official from the Treasury’s Asset Freezing Unit wrote to Skinner.
DGS Marine continued to operate for another four years, until Skinner’s sudden death in 2016 at the age of 52. Control was passed to his son Nicolas, but the company collapsed soon after. Nicolas Skinner did not respond to a request for comment.
“The UK authorities, as well as EU member states such as Denmark and Cyprus failed to identify DGS Marine as a serial sanctions violator,” said Griffiths. “The UK failure is particularly egregious because they were warned by the US, yet took Skinner at his word.”
The UK Treasury declined to comment on the case but officials noted that the UK had overhauled its enforcement structure from 2016, setting up the Office for Financial Sanctions Implementation and introducing new enforcement powers.
Additional reporting by Chris Cook in London
Video: North Korea and the triads: gangsters, ghost ships and spies | FT Film
Financial Times · by Christian Davies · June 8, 2023
10. The Sister by Sung-Yoon Lee review – North Korea’s propaganda queen
More on Professor Lee's forthcoming book.
The Sister by Sung-Yoon Lee review – North Korea’s propaganda queen
A biography of Kim Yo-jong goes beyond personalities to examine the Kim dynasty’s roots and its possible future
The Guardian · by Rachel Aspden · June 10, 2023
How to make sense of North Korea? It is not only the world’s loosest nuclear cannon, but a hereditary communist dictatorship, a patch of darkness in east Asia’s night‑time sea of light, one-third of George W Bush’s “axis of evil”, a state little larger than Ohio with the world’s fourth-largest military, a so-called hermit kingdom where less than 1% of its exploited and terrorised population has access to the internet. The west has often gone for the easiest answer: to mock it. It’s hard to imagine another human rights-abusing, nuclear-enabled regime being the backdrop for crass Hollywood comedies. But the ruling Kim dynasty has provided a reliable laughing stock for big-budget films from Team America: World Police, in which a screaming alien cockroach bursts from the corpse of a puppet Kim Jong-il, to The Interview, where hapless journalist James Franco is sent on a CIA mission to assassinate Kim Jong-un but ends up partying with him to a Katy Perry CD.
The Sister, a detailed, insightful study by the US-based scholar Sung‑Yoon Lee, sets out to debunk this “profound condescension bordering on racism”. It uses the rise of the newest star in the Kim family business – the current supreme leader Kim Jong-un’s younger sister, Kim Yo-jong – to parse her country’s strange present and possible future, beyond the grotesque headlines. Over the past decade, Kim Yo-jong, now in her mid-30s, has become second only to her brother in terms of power and influence, and – controversially in a rigidly patriarchal society – his possible successor. As the head of the regime’s propaganda arm and a highly visible lead on its foreign policy, the “princess” has inevitably been portrayed with sexist overtones as somewhere between a charming, charismatic pop star and a sadistic power behind the throne.
But rather than simply recycling the Kims’ cult of personality, The Sister underlines its roots in the trauma inflicted on Korea by the US and the USSR as they divided up its territory in the closing days of the second world war. On 11 August 1945, three American officers “poring over a small National Geographic map of east Asia … less-than-methodically determined that the 38th parallel running east-west across the peninsula was likely to be the northernmost line acceptable to Stalin”. The hastily drawn border between north and south sparked the devastating Korean war and sealed the peninsula’s fate as a permanent proxy battleground for rival superpowers. When the Soviets chose Kim Il-sung – a Russian‑speaking former guerrilla leader and Red Army major – to lead the new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, its future became entwined with that of the “Mount Paektu bloodline” today headed by his grandson.
The myth-building needed to create a semi-divine dynasty from scratch was extreme, and Lee is excellent on the regime’s reliance on suppressing, distorting and manipulating information – “North Korea is a state built on bold and blatant falsehoods,” he writes. Unmentionable truths include the fact that Kim Il-sung’s parents were Christian, that Kim Jong-un’s mother was born in Japan and that his aunt defected to the US – all “crimes” that would have entire ordinary North Korean families executed or sent to the gulags. And then there’s the famously decadent lifestyle enjoyed by the ruling family while the majority of its people endure poverty and hunger. (Lee mentions in passing the eye-popping fact that he attended an international school in Switzerland with the current leader’s elder half-brother.)
While propaganda, now often overseen by Kim Yo-jong, is the regime’s favoured weapon of internal repression and external attack, its nuclear arsenal – which Kim Jong-un calls his “treasure sword” – is its ultimate guarantor. Over the past 18 months, the regime has dramatically escalated both its aggressive rhetoric and its testing of banned weapons, tools of blackmail and extortion familiar from an exhausting carousel of failed diplomatic initiatives that Lee, who has advised successive US administrations, describes in detail. His vivid account of surreal, intractable negotiations with the Kim siblings underlines The Sister’s central insight: Kim Yo-jong is very much part of the family. Even if she steps into the role of the first female supreme leader, change will not come at her hands.
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The Guardian · by Rachel Aspden · June 10, 2023
11. South and North Korea Take Leadership Roles at the United Nations: Differences are Striking
Excerpt:
Although the biggest headlines resulting from the North Korean appointment at the WHO were focused on inter-party squabbles for the U.S. presidential nomination, the attention did reinforce the clear message that human rights in North Korea remain a major issue of concern. And the contrast with South Korea’s two-year appointment to the UN Security Council only served to highlight the stark differences on the Korean peninsula between South and North.
South and North Korea Take Leadership Roles at the United Nations: Differences are Striking - Korea Economic Institute of America
keia.org · · June 8, 2023
South and North Korea Take Leadership Roles at the United Nations: Differences are Striking
Published June 8, 2023
Author: Robert King
Category:
Recently, both South Korea and North Korea have been chosen to serve in leading positions in the United Nations at the Security Council and World Health Organization. The different roles and status of the two Koreas in the UN tells a great deal about the standing and the reputation of Seoul and Pyongyang in the world community.
On Tuesday June 6, the United Nations voted on a slate of countries to take the rotating member country positions on the UN Security Council with South Korea securing one of the non-permanent seats. Serving on the 15-member Security Council is the pinnacle of leadership, recognition and respect in the United Nations. Under terms of the UN Charter, 5 of the 15 members are the permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and any one of these countries can veto action by the Security Council. The other ten seats are held by countries which are elected to serve two-year terms on the Council, with five elected each year. The non-permanent members do not have a veto over council actions.
With 193 member countries in the UN, serving in one of the prestigious rotating Security Council positions is highly sought after, but it is an infrequent opportunity. The rotating seats on the Security Council are allocated geographically, and regional groupings of nations agree among themselves on how the regional Council seats should be allocated. Larger, wealthier, and more influential countries tend to serve more frequently in these key positions. The process for selecting the rotating council members is where diplomatic give and take play out.
The UN Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Council may convene at any time on any issue that is considered a threat to peace. In contrast to decisions that are taken in the General Assembly, all Member States are obligated under the UN Charter to carry out Security Council decisions.
South Korea Will Again Serve on the Security Council; North Korea Is Still Subject to Security Council Sanctions
Both North and South Korea are relatively new members of the United Nations, largely because of conditions in Korea – occupied by Japan (1910-1945), followed by the division of the peninsula into two separate states after World War II. While the UN was heavily involved in the Korean War and in efforts to resolve the status of Korea, neither South nor North Korea were initially members of the United Nations due to the divisions of the Cold War. The breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, however, finally created the political space to allow the simultaneous admission of both Koreas as members of the UN in 1991. Although the United Nations will mark 77 years since its founding this year, it has only been 32 years since the two Koreas have been members of the organization.
This is particularly significant because this week, South Korea was elected by the UN General Assembly to serve a two-year term as a member of the Security Council (2024-2025). This is the third time that South Korea will serve on the Council. South Korea was a member of the council 1996-1997 and again 2013-2014. This is a tribute to the diplomatic skills and international savvy of South Korean diplomats, as well as the commitment of the South Korean people and their government to play a positive role in the international community.
North Korea, throughout its existence, has been the object of United Nations concern and attention, and Pyongyang has seldom played a positive role in supporting and encouraging the high-minded international goals of the organization. While South Korea looks forward to a third term as a member of the Security Council, North Korea has been the subject of nine major sanctions resolutions in response to the country’s nuclear and missile activities since 2006, and the Security Council has issued numerous other warnings. Because of Pyongyang’s response to past UN Security Council resolutions and calls for action on security threats posed by the North, it is unlikely that North Korea could be elected to a temporary seat on the Security Council.
North Korean Diplomat to Serve on World Health Organization Executive Board
The 193 member countries of the United Nations range from the largest and most powerful countries in the world, to tiny sovereign nations. (The Pacific island nation of Tuvalu has the smallest population of any UN member-country with a current estimated population of 11,900 and a land area of about ten square miles.) Despite the vast differences between UN member countries, there has been a conscious effort to engage all UN member countries in the organization’s activities.
The decision was made at the end of May to include a North Korean official on the Executive Board of the World Health Organization (WHO). The North Korean physician was one of a slate of nine individuals who were approved en bloc at a WHO meeting in Geneva. WHO Executive Board members are individuals who hold qualifying credentials, and they are selected for their health care expertise, although clearly they are nominated by their country of citizenship and they play a political as well as a technical medical role. The North Korean who will be a member of the board is identified as a doctor, though not a great deal is known about him.
It would be unthinkable that North Korea could serve on the UN Security Council since North Korea’s nuclear and missile ambitions are of major concern to the Security Council and the frequent subject of UN sanctions. It is less problematic to consider a North Korean official serving on the WHO Executive Board, although Pyongyang’s poor handling of the COVID pandemic, and particularly its refusal to accept WHO offered COVID vaccinations and medical aid, raises real questions about a North Korean official on the Executive Board. North Korea had no other source of vaccine for its people, and clearly Pyongyang’s response in rejecting UN help was far from exemplary.
The U.S. representative at the WHO assembly explicitly expressed concern pointing at the North Koreans: “The U.S. takes this opportunity to reinforce the expectation of members of the executive board and calls on the government of the DPRK to respect human rights, fulfil its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and engage in serious and sustained diplomacy.” The North Korean delegate responded with a much less diplomatic statement charging that the United States was “satanic,” and he called the U.S. statement an “abuse” of WHO procedures.
Following the WHO vote to approve the slate of Executive Board Members, including the North Korean official, the South Korean foreign ministry issued a statement raising Pyongyang’s concerns: “It is questionable whether North Korea, which has consistently violated U.N. Security Council resolutions, meets the standards of the WHO executive board that must comply with international norms and contribute to improving global health.”
The response of the international human rights community was also quick and even more negative in responding to the North Korean selection. Hillel Neuer, executive director of UN Watch, an independent non-governmental human rights group in Geneva, said, “What this means is that one of the world’s most horrific regimes is now a part of a group that sets and enforces the standards and norms for the global governance of health care. It is an absurd episode for a key U.N. agency that is in much need of self-reflection and reform.”
The 34-member WHO Executive Board are not government representatives of different countries, but they are expected to be health specialists who serve because of their educational and technical expertise.
U.S. Presidential Politics Increases Media Attention for North Korea’s WHO Appointment
The North Korean appointment would likely have gone largely unnoticed if the only reaction had been the South Korean Foreign Ministry statement and comments from international human rights organizations. One of the most bizarre responses to North Korea’s selection to serve on the Executive Board of the WHO, however, was a comment from the former U.S. President Donald Trump. As the New York Post observed: Trump triggered a “political furor with a Truth Social post about news that North Korea has been elected to the executive board of the World Health Organization.” The former president proclaimed, “Congratulations to Kim Jung Un!”
While there was little response from the foreign policy experts in the United States or elsewhere to the former president’s comment, the former president’s congratulations provoked a very strong and very negative rejoinder from other leading U.S. Republican presidential candidates. Former Vice President Mike Pence told Fox News, “No one should be praising the dictator in North Korea. . . This is a time when we ought to make it clear to the world that we stand for freedom and we stand with those who stand for freedom.”
Nikki Haley, who Trump appointed to serve as the U.S. representative to the United Nations in New York, observed, “You don’t congratulate a thug.” She continued, Kim Jong-un “is a terrible individual. He’s terrible to his people, he’s terrible to our allies in the world, and I don’t think he deserves congratulations.” Haley called the decision to appoint North Korea to the WHO board a “total farce.” Florida governor Ron DeSantis expressed surprise at the Trump statement adding “Kim Jong-un is a murderous dictator.” He then went on to suggest that the North Korean appointment indicates another reason why the United States should not be involved in international bodies like the World Health Organization.
Although the biggest headlines resulting from the North Korean appointment at the WHO were focused on inter-party squabbles for the U.S. presidential nomination, the attention did reinforce the clear message that human rights in North Korea remain a major issue of concern. And the contrast with South Korea’s two-year appointment to the UN Security Council only served to highlight the stark differences on the Korean peninsula between South and North.
Robert R. King is a Non-Resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). He is former U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights (2009-2017). The views expressed here are his own.
Photo by Mark Garten from United Nations Photo on flickr Creative Commons.
keia.org · by Troy Stangarone · June 8, 2023
12. North Korea and Russia: A relationship built to last?
North Korea and Russia: A relationship built to last?
https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/north-korea-and-russia-a-relationship-built-to-last?utm_source=pocket_saves
nkhiddengulag.org
By Maria Del Carmen Corte (HRNK Satellite Imagery Analysis Associate), Ava Jane Moorlach (HRNK Research Intern), and Kathy Yu (HRNK Research Intern)
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research
June 8, 2023
Following the one-year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the 73rd anniversary of the Soviet-North Korea arms agreement on March 17, it has become crucial to consider North Korea’s role in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The categorical denial of any weapons accords between Russia and North Korea is both concerning and significant in the context of the ongoing conflict. In January 2023, media outlets highlighted the remarkable denial of North Korea arming Russia, the first denial of the Russo-North Korean arms trade issued in the months following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[1]
What does the Kim regime stand to gain from its relationship with Russia, and what repercussions may result from the continued growth of this relationship? This article examines prospects for Russo-North Korean relations, particularly in light of Moscow’s recent decision to suspend the New START treaty.[2]
North Korea has a long history of arms dealings. It has been denounced for exporting weapons to various countries in violation of international sanctions. North Korea was a major supplier of weapons to the Middle East throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and it armed communist regimes in Africa and Asia throughout the Cold War.[3] After the Soviet Union’s dissolution, North Korea’s economy became increasingly dependent on arms dealership, narcotics trafficking, and cyber operations. According to Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., professor of political science at Angelo State University, “for decades, North Korea has proliferated weapons, including conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and chemical agents, to states such as Iran and Syria.”[4] Notably, Pyongyang has continued to pursue arms deals in Africa in recent years.[5]
The international community responded to North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 with UN Security Council Resolution 1718. This resolution imposed harsher sanctions, implemented an arms embargo, and intensified scrutiny of Pyongyang’s weapons program.[6] Despite sanctions and diplomatic pressure, North Korea has continued to develop and export weapons, including ballistic missiles and conventional weapons such as tanks and artillery. In April 2008, the United States also released evidence to suggest that North Korea had assisted Syria in the construction of a covert nuclear reactor.[7] Allegations of arms trafficking by North Korea have continued to surface in recent years, causing serious concern among the international community.
North Korea’s Arms Trade with Russia
North Korea’s arms trade has evolved throughout the course of its short history. Its origins can be traced to Soviet state-building north of the 38th parallel after World War II. The USSR commenced its relationship with North Korea in its efforts to consolidate a communist hegemony. Moscow saw Pyongyang as an important ideological and natural resource-rich ally. Between the end of Japanese occupation in 1945 and before the Korean War in 1950, North Korea was heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. Moscow provided monetary and military resources to the burgeoning state as a means of control. The Soviets used the lack of stability in the region to their advantage by directly influencing the origins of the North Korean state and its military. The first disclosed trade of USSR-manufactured weaponry in exchange for North Korean raw materials was in 1949.[8] This began to formalize Russo-Korean arms sales.
The sale of weaponry intensified during the Korean War. Armed with Soviet weaponry, North Korea invaded the South. The military structure of North Korea was modeled directly off of the Soviet military, at the behest of the USSR. The Soviet contribution of arms was crucial to the war effort. The contribution of MiG-15 warplanes kept the critical USSR access point open on North Korea’s northern border.[9] The border between the two nations is less than 20 miles long. However, it was a major route for Moscow to supply arms, money, and resources to the war effort.
The Soviet Union’s relationship with North Korea evolved over changes of leadership in both countries. Historical records indicate that the relationship was distrustful and complex rather than harmonious.[10] Bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea became tense during this period, primarily due to ideological differences and strategic disagreements. North Korea criticized the Soviet Union for what they perceived as a “capitulation” during the Cuban Missile Crisis.[11] Additionally, Kim Il-sung’s opposition to Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization efforts further distanced North Korea from Moscow. While bilateral relations experienced significant tensions as a result, they did not reach a point of complete severance.[12]
The bilateral relationship deteriorated rapidly with the fall of the USSR. Pyongyang had relied heavily on agricultural and energy resources from Moscow. The Soviet Union’s fall in the early 1990s precipitated the breakdown of North Korea’s public distribution system. This directly contributed to the Arduous March, which South Korea’s Unification Ministry estimates resulted in the loss of between 506,000 and 1,125,000 lives.[13] North Korea became increasingly isolated and withdrew from the global stage. The post-Soviet government in Moscow, driven by limited resources and strategic considerations, displayed a greater emphasis on developing investment and commercial relations with South Korea rather than maintaining close diplomatic ties with the isolated nation.[14] Moscow established diplomatic relations with Seoul in September 1990. While maintaining a presence in North Korea held importance, both for political leverage in the relationship with South Korea and other considerations, Russia shifted its focus towards fostering economic partnerships and investment opportunities with South Korea. There was continuous communication between Russia and North Korea, with Russia maintaining a large diplomatic mission in Pyongyang.
Kim Jong-un has attempted to improve and upgrade relations with Russia following his father’s death in 2011. For several years, his relationship with Vladimir Putin was largely uneventful. However, in recent years, North Korea has been a vocal supporter of Russia’s war in Ukraine. It was one of five countries to recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. North Korea also voted against the UN General Assembly resolution that called on Russia to withdraw its military forces from Ukraine.[15] This vocal support sits in direct opposition to Pyongyang’s ardent denial of its arms trade with Russia. The Vice Director of Military Foreign Affairs at North Korea’s Ministry of National Defense vocally admonished allegations of arms trading as attempts by hostile countries to tarnish North Korea’s reputation and invoke UN Security Council resolutions.[16] To date, North Korea has systematically denied all allegations of arms exports to Russian forces in Ukraine.
North Korea’s Evolving Weapons Trade Amidst the Russia-Ukraine War
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, North Korea capitalized on the growing rift between the United States and Russia by deepening its alliance with Moscow, intensifying nuclear-weapons rhetoric, and leveraging the Sino-Russian partnership to its advantage. It is unsurprising that North Korea has remained in a position of relative strength since the outset of the conflict, leaving the United States with few viable options for advancing nuclear negotiations.[17]
North Korea has made significant strides in its weapons program, conducting tests of its newly developed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system on March 10,[18] followed by the launch of its first suspected ICBM since 2017 on March 24.[19] At the same time, North Korea passed a new law that refurbished and clarified its nuclear precepts and regulations on nuclear weapons. With the passage of the law, Kim Jong-un stated that the country’s status as a nuclear weapons state “has now become irreversible” and that there would “never be any declaration of giving up our nukes or denuclearization” in future negotiations.[20]
As Ukrainian forces targeted bridges leading to the occupied city of Kherson to disrupt Russian supply routes, and in the midst of attacks surrounding the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Kim Jong-un sent a congratulatory message to Vladimir Putin on the 77th anniversary of Korea’s liberation in August 2022. Kim expressed warm greetings and reaffirmed the strong strategic and tactical cooperation, support, and solidarity between the two countries.[21]
Since September 2022, declassified American intelligence has indicated that Russia has purchased rockets and artillery shells from North Korea on a large scale. The weapons supplied to Russia, however, appear to be rudimentary and unsophisticated.[22] An order was issued in October 2022 to North Korean shell-producing factories to produce more conventional artillery shells, including grenades, rockets, and anti-aircraft shells.[23] Two leading shell factories, the Kanggye General Tractor plant, and the Chanjagang Machine Tools Factory in Manpo, were among the factories that received the order.[24]
This was notable for three reasons. Firstly, the timing of the order was unusual and unexpected. In the final quarter of the fiscal year, from October to December, factories typically prepare for end-of-year reviews and are focused on meeting annual quotas rather than beginning new production projects.[25] Secondly, the order demanded finished products, rather than the intermediate goods the factory typically produces.[26] Thirdly, the products were not moisture-proofed, a typical practice to ensure the longevity of munitions in storage.[27] Taken together, this indicates that North Korea produced weapons intended for immediate use.
In November 2022, satellite imagery showed a train crossing the Tumangang Friendship Bridge (Korea-Russia Friendship Bridge) for the first time since it was closed in February 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This passage across the only land connection between North Korea and Russia drew the attention of the White House and 38 North. That month, the White House made a statement claiming that North Korea attempted to conceal its activities by funneling weapons through the Middle East and North Africa.[28]
North Korea’s Ministry of Defense has repeatedly denied exporting weapons to Russia. The basic agreement between North Korea and Russia also prohibits the participation of North Koreans in the war, and North Korea also appears to have delayed sending workers to Ukraine to participate in reconstruction projects. This suggests that North Korea may be concerned with the perception of sending mercenaries to directly aid Russian troops in Ukraine.[29]
Three insights can be drawn from these observations. First, economic sanctions on Russia have successfully choked its ability to produce and access weapons, forcing it to turn to allies such as Iran and North Korea.[30] Second, this situation provides some insight into North Korea’s dire economic situation following the COVID-19 pandemic. The economic situation in North Korea, particularly in regard to the impact of sanctions, is a complex issue that Joshua Stanton explores in depth in HRNK’s latest report, The Root of All Evil.[31] Third, it suggests a strengthening of Russo-North Korean relations and a potential avenue for continued future partnership.
Concluding Remarks
Despite the recent denial of any weapons deal between the two countries, North Korea-Russia relations are highly likely to endure. However, the strength of this relationship depends on the result of the conflict in Ukraine. North Korea’s arms trade with Russia has been a significant aspect of the bilateral relationship, which has persisted despite international sanctions and diplomatic pressure. While the historical record shows a sometimes volatile, distrustful and complex relationship between the two countries, Kim Jong-un has attempted to reestablish closer relations with Russia, particularly by supporting Russia's war in Ukraine.
In light of Russia's recent decision to suspend the New START treaty, it is imperative to assess prospects for the alliance between North Korea and Russia, especially on the heels of the commemoration of the 1949 Soviet-North Korean arms agreement. The 75th anniversary milestone underscores the significance of historical ties between the two nations as well as the urgency of a comprehensive reexamination of the bilateral relationship.
Maria Del Carmen Corte is the Satellite Imagery Analysis Associate at HRNK and a recent MALD graduate of Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where she studied International Security and Humanitarian Affairs with an emphasis on the Korean Peninsula. Ava Jane Moorlach is a Research Intern at HRNK and current student at American University studying Interdisciplinary Studies in Communication, Legal Institutions, Economics, and Government. Kathy Yu is a Research Intern at HRNK and a rising senior at Duke University pursuing a Bachelor's Degree in Economics, a minor in History, and earning a certificate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics.
[1] Timothy W. Martin, “North Korea Says It Isn’t Supplying Russia with Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-says-it-isnt-supplying-russia-with-weapons-11663820755.
[2] Amy Mackinnon, “Putin’s New START Announcement and the Future of Arms Control,” Foreign Policy, February 23, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/21/putin-new-start-announcement-arms-control-nuclear-weapons-united-states-war/.
[3] Paul Iddon, “North Korea’s Enigmatic Role in the Middle East Arms Market,” Middle East Eye, January 20, 2023. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/north-korea-enigmatic-role-middle-east-arms-market; Samuel Ramani, “North Korea’s Enduring Economic and Security Presence in Africa,” 38 North, June 24, 2021. https://www.38north.org/2021/06/north-koreas-enduring-economic-and-security-presence-in-africa/.
[4] Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “North Korea’s Illegal Weapons Trade: The Proliferation Threat From Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs, June 6, 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-06-06/north-koreas-illegal-weapons-trade.
[5] Salem Solomon, “Sanctioned and Shunned, North Korea Finds Arms Deals in Africa,” VOA News, March 22, 2017. https://www.voanews.com/a/sanctioned-and-shunned-north-korea-finds-arms-deals-in-africa/3777262.html.
[6] UN Security Council, “Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006),” accessed May 24, 2023. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718; Kelsey Davenport, “UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea,” Arms Control Association, last updated January 2022. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea; Natalia Slavney, “North Korea’s Trading of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Open-Source Information Analysis of Sanctions Implementation,” 38 North, September 1, 2022. https://www.38north.org/2022/09/north-koreas-trading-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-open-source-information-analysis-of-sanctions-implementation/. Resolution 1874 expanded the arms embargo after the second nuclear test in 2009.
[7] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Background Briefing with Senior U.S. officials on Syria’s Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea’s Involvement,” April 24, 2008. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Speeches%20and%20Interviews/20080424_interview.pdf.
[8] “March 17, 1949: Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the DPRK Regarding Extending a Loan by the Soviet Union to the Government of the DPRK to Pay for Equipment and Materials as Well as the Military Property Supplied to Korea,” Wilson Center Digital Archive. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/agreement-between-government-ussr-and-government-dprk-regarding-extending-loan-soviet.
[9] Mark O’Neill, “Soviet Involvement in the Korean War: A New View from the Soviet-Era Archives,” OAH Magazine of History 14, no. 3 (2000): 20–24.
[10] Joseph M. Ha, “Soviet Perceptions of North Korea,” Asian Perspective 6, no. 2 (1982): 105–31.
[11] James Person, “The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Origins of North Korea’s Policy of Self-Reliance in National Defense,” Wilson Center, accessed June 8, 2023. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/north-korea-and-the-cuban-missile-crisis.
[12] Andrei Lankov, “Soviet-DPRK Relations: Purges, Power, and Dissent in North Korea’s Formative Years,” Sino NK, March 29, 2013. https://sinonk.com/2013/03/29/lankov-on-ussr-dprk-50s-60s/.
[13] Suk Lee, “The DPRK Famine of 1994–2000: Existence and Impact,” Studies Series 05-06 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005). https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/827/1/0000605327.pdf; Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2005). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hunger_and_Human_Rights.pdf.
[14] Kim Tong-Hyung, “Russian-North Korean relations since the Korean War,” Associated Press, April 24, 2019. https://apnews.com/article/24932ed50a424a12a243cc1434c71b49.
[15] Artyom Lukin, “Russia and North Korea: Moving Toward Alliance 2.0?,” 38 North, September 27, 2022. https://www.38north.org/2022/09/russia-and-north-korea-moving-toward-alliance-2-0/.
[16] Hyung-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, “N. Korea denies US claims it sent artillery shells to Russia,” Associated Press, November 7, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/europe-united-states-south-korea-moscow-north-e9b82adb07b67f64b83853e6a8108ecc.
[17] Mike Chinoy, “Kim Jong Un Is Putin’s and Xi’s New Best Friend,” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/12/north-korea-russia-china-partnership-putin-xi-kim/.
[18] Betsy Klein and Maegan Vazquez, “US Assesses North Korea Launches Constitute Use of New ICBM System,” CNN, March 10, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/10/politics/north-korea-biden-administration/index.html.
[19] Samuel Ramani, “North Korea’s Enduring Economic and Security Presence in Africa,” 38 North, June 24, 2021. https://www.38north.org/2021/06/north-koreas-enduring-economic-and-security-presence-in-africa/.
[20] Kelsey Davenport, “North Korea Passes Nuclear Law,” Arms Control Association, October 2022. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-10/news/north-korea-passes-nuclear-law.
[21] “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Sends Congratulatory Message to President of Russian Federation,” Korean Central News Agency, August 15, 2022.
[22] Julian E. Barnes, “Russia Is Buying North Korean Artillery, According to U.S. Intelligence,” The New York Times, September 5, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/politics/russia-north-korea-artillery.html.
[23] Seulkee Jang, “N. Korea May Be Producing Munitions for Export to Russia,” Daily NK, November 24, 2022. https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-may-producing-munitions-export-russia/.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] “Train crosses North Korea border into Russia after arms report, think tank says,” Reuters, November 5, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/train-crosses-north-korea-border-into-russia-after-arms-report-think-tank-2022-11-04/.
[29] Seulkee Jang, “N. Korea orders trading companies in Russia to select personnel to send to Ukraine,” Daily NK, February 2, 2023. https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-orders-trading-companies-russia-select-personnel-send-ukraine/.
[30] Michael Georgy, “Iran Agrees to Ship Missiles, More Drones to Russia,” Reuters, October 18, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/exclusive-iran-agrees-ship-missiles-more-drones-russia-defying-west-sources-2022-10-18/.
[31] Joshua Stanton, The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2023). https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/RoAE_Web_0407.pdf.
13. The Bizarre Reality of Getting Online in North Korea
Do not let this kind of information dissuade us from an information and influence activities campaign.
The Bizarre Reality of Getting Online in North Korea
New testimony from defectors reveals pervasive surveillance and monitoring of limited internet connections. For millions of others, the internet simply doesn't exist.
Wired · by Condé Nast · June 8, 2023
For 25 million North Koreans, the internet is an impossibility. Only a few thousand privileged members of the hermit kingdom’s society can access the global internet, while even the country’s heavily censored internal intranet is out of reach for the majority of the population. Getting access to free and open information isn’t an option.
New research from South Korea-based human rights organization People for Successful Corean Reunification (Pscore) details the reality for those who—in very limited circumstances—manage to get online in North Korea. The report reveals a days-long approval process to gain internet access, after which monitors sit next to people while they browse and approve their activities every five minutes. Even then, what can be accessed reveals little about the world outside North Korea’s borders.
Documentation from the NGO is being presented today at the human rights conference RightsCon and sheds light on the regime with the most limited internet freedoms, which fall far below the restrictive and surveilled internet access in China and Iran. For millions of people in North Korea, the internet simply doesn’t exist.
“I was taught about the World Wide Web, and even had to memorize it for an exam, but I only knew about the internet in theory,” one North Korean defector who left the country told Pscore researchers. “I knew it was a sort of network where you can search but didn’t actually know what it was.” Another said they didn’t “know the concept of Wi-Fi,” let alone have any clue about Google.
Getting an accurate picture of what happens within Kim Jong Un’s sealed-off state is incredibly challenging. Officials control all information flows and present state propaganda to the world. Analysts turn to those who escape and defect, at great personal risk, for a glimpse of North Korean reality. Pscore’s internet freedom report is based on 24 face-to-face interviews with defectors and a survey of 158 others. All left North Korea between 2012 and 2022.
The report says North Korean researcher Kim Suk-Han—all defector names within the research are pseudonyms for safety reasons—used the internet five times when they were living in the country. They had used the internet while on a trip to China and so had high expectations, they told the researchers. Instead, they faced limited access and constant surveillance.
“A librarian sits between two internet users and continuously monitors what people on both sides are searching up,” Kim said in testimony to the researchers. “Every five minutes, the screen freezes automatically, and the librarian must do a fingerprint authentication to allow further internet use.” A state security officer was also always nearby, they said.
People were allowed to use the internet for an hour, and if someone wanted more time, they would need to obtain new permission, Kim said. It took around two days to get permission from authorities to use the internet, a task requiring approvals from various officials. If someone applied too often, they would be made to wait, Kim said. “Every Korean website is blocked, and only Chinese or English websites are available.”
Over the past decade, there has been an increased number of digital devices in North Korea. Around 50 to 80 percent of adults may now have mobile phones, allowing them to text and call family members. Yet the use of these phones is highly controlled—data speeds are low, with devices capturing screenshots every few minutes and code that only allows government-approved content to be shown. And internet penetration is at nowhere near the same level.
“North Korean people cannot use it, not because of the infrastructure or not because of the country’s poor conditions,” says Nam Bada, the secretary general of Pscore and editor of the report. “It is only because of the governmental policy.”
A few dozen families with connections to Kim Jong-Un and some foreigners have unrestricted access to the global internet, while a “few thousand” people—including government officials, researchers, and students studying IT—can access a surveillance-heavy version of it, according to the report and previous research. North Koreans like Kim who are allowed some foreign travel, usually for business, can sometimes access the global web while abroad.
Mitch Haszard, a senior threat intelligence analyst at security firm Recorded Future, which has previously analyzed North Korean internet traffic, says Chinese and Russian internet service providers hook the country up to the global network, and access by foreign visitors makes up some of what can be seen externally. This may have changed during the Covid-19 pandemic when there were fewer foreigners in North Korea and its borders were closed.
According to multiple defectors quoted in the Pscore report, global internet access is only available in certain locations and buildings within North Korea. One person claimed internet connections at the National Academy of Sciences in Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital, were only available on the second floor, and just eight computers were connected. Around five people were granted use, they said.
Another defector told the Pscore researchers that when they got permission to travel to Pyongyang to use the internet, they tried to download medical research papers but could only access the titles of the papers and the author names. “I knew the concept of the global internet when I was in North Korea, but I didn’t know that so much information was exchanged through it,” said Shin Yong-Rok, another defector.
Martyn Williams is a senior fellow with the Stimson Center and 38 North project who has extensively studied technology in North Korea but was not involved with the report. Williams says the testimonies track with those of other defectors but add new details about the levels of surveillance people face. In general, Williams says, internet access “appears to be available for officially sanctioned uses, such as some universities, research establishments, and likely some trade organizations and other establishments.” University students Williams spoke to have previously said that they are required to state why they need to use the internet and are monitored when they get online.
Williams points to a 2020 North Korean law that has ramped up the country’s efforts to stop foreign information from being accessed in the country. In recent years, outside information—including TV shows and South Korean content—has been smuggled across the border using USB drives, giving people a glimpse of the outside world. “The new law levies harsh penalties, up to and including death, on people caught with foreign information,” Williams says. (In 2021 it was reported that a man who smuggled copies of the dystopian Netflix thriller Squid Game into North Korea and sold them was sentenced to death.)
While tightly controlled access to the internet is available for a few thousand “elites,” the local intranet is marginally more accessible—in theory, at least. Known as Kwangmyong, the intranet offers only a handful of websites. “Citizens can access [the intranet] from their phones or from computers,” Williams says. “Over the years, we’ve seen lots of websites shown and offered, and it appears that many major sectors of the government have their own sites with official information.” Some online shopping has recently become available, according to reports.
Defectors told Pscore that intranet prices were generally too high for most people, meaning a lot of access happens at official buildings, such as universities and libraries, where surveillance levels are high. People willing to take the risk can try to get around the system. “I’ve secretly played the game [Dota] twice through the intranet with people in another region,” said one defector, given the pseudonym Jung Woo-Jin. “I’ve only played three times. If you play more, your IP will be exposed by using more than a certain time, then your place will be recorded.” Most people included in the study said intranet use is impractical.
Pscore’s report lists around two dozen recommendations, addressed to both North Korea and international countries, for improving internet freedom. The report pushes for more connectivity within the country, advising North Korea to stop monitoring people and to connect the intranet to the global internet. If a full internet connection cannot be provided, a censored model like China’s would be a better last resort, the report says.
The report adds that countries should work to create a “legal framework” for international access and recognize internet access as a law-backed human right. Nam, the Pscore secretary general, says increasing internet access could benefit health care and education and improve people’s human rights, such as freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly.
Globally, 5.3 billion people regularly use the internet, or around 66 percent of Earth’s population. For years, official bodies have declared internet access to be a human right—with the United Nations saying there should be full connectivity by 2030. “The real problem is how to translate these commitments into reality,” says Barbora Bukovská, senior director of law and policy at human rights organization Article 19. “This includes issues such as making the internet affordable, getting people online, acquiring minimum digital skills and literacy, or achieving equality in access for marginalized groups and those at risk of discrimination.”
Bukovská says North Korea’s human rights record indicates that mandating internet access at a global level would likely not make much difference—bigger change within the country would be needed to implement such changes. But for those who have managed to leave the country, the difference is stark. “People will long for any new information, such as science and technology information,” defector Kim Suk-Han told researchers, “which are accessible through the internet.”
Wired · by Condé Nast · June 8, 2023
14. S. Korean, U.S. special operations generals stage 'friendship' parachute jump
Dpes anyone know Brig. Gen. Derek N. Lipson, the incoming SOCKOR Commander? I have not served with him. I would be happy to assist him in his preparation.
(LEAD) S. Korean, U.S. special operations generals stage 'friendship' parachute jump | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · June 8, 2023
(ATTN: ADDS more info in last 2 paras)
SEOUL, June 8 (Yonhap) -- The top South Korean and American special operations commanders conducted a "friendship" parachute jump earlier this week, a U.S. military unit here said Thursday, as the two countries mark the 70th anniversary of their alliance.
In a Facebook post, the U.S. Special Operations Command-Korea (SOCKOR) said that South Korea's Special Warfare Command Commander Lieut. Gen. Son Sik and SOCKOR Commander Major Gen. Michael E. Martin staged a high altitude low opening (HALO) freefall on Monday.
It did not specify where the event took place.
South Korea's Special Warfare Command Commander Lieut. Gen. Son Sik, U.S. Special Operations Command-Korea (SOCKOR) Commander Major Gen. Michael E. Martin and other officials pose for a photo as they meet to stage a joint "friendship" parachute jump on June 5, 2023, in this photo captured from the Facebook account of SOCKOR. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
"Together, we are prepared to defend our Homelands as a combined and ready force," the U.S. unit said.
The "friendship" event included core infiltration training with South Korean and U.S. special operations forces executing static line jumps and HALO jumps, it added.
SOCKOR has also released a set of photos showing Martin taking part in a "friendship" dive with South Korea's Naval Special Warfare-Flotilla Command chief Rear Adm. Park Hu-byeong in Changwon, about 300 kilometers southeast of Seoul, on May 30.
Martin, who took the SOCKOR helm in June 2021, will leave the commander post next Monday, according to his unit. He will move to the U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, where he will serve as the J3 director of operations. Brig. Gen. Derek N. Lipson is set to replace him.
"This command is unlike any other, and I am proud of the work we have done in maintaining peace and stability in the region together," he was quoted by his office as saying.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · June 8, 2023
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