|
Quotes of the Day:
“I told you once that I was searching for the nature of evil. I think I’ve come close to defining it: a lack of empathy. It’s the one characteristic that connects all the defendants. A genuine incapacity to feel with their fellow man. Evil, I think, is the absence of empathy.”
– G. M Gilbert
“Do not be too moral. You may cheat yourself out of much life. Aim above morality Be not simply good; be good for something.”
– Henry David Thoreau
"America was born of revolt, flourished on dissent, became great through experimentation."
– Henry Steele Commager
1. U.S.-led guerrilla unit named as Korean War hero for next month
2. What to Make of Russia’s New Security Agreements
3. Current, former KCTU officials indicted for alleged ties with N. Korean agent
4. S. Korea to send inquiry to China's DeepSeek over data privacy concerns
5. Ukraine Military Situation Report | North Korean Military Involvement Special Edition
6. Charlotte man accused of helping North Korean regime
7. S. Korea flies its most capable Surion helicopter variant yet
8. Yoon meets senior aides at detention center
9. Court assigns Yoon's case to criminal division overseeing other martial law cases
10. Spy chief, top security adviser called to testify at Yoon's impeachment trial
11. Editorial: Are U.S.-South Korea joint military drills at risk again?
12. Gov't demands parliamentary reconsideration of bill on special counsel probe into Yoon
13. Leaders of N. Korea, Vietnam exchange messages to mark 75th anniv. of diplomatic ties
14. Readout of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's Call With Republic of Korea Acting Minister of National Defense Kim Seon-ho
15. North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Facility in Operation… Coolant Discharged
16. Kim Jong Un approves new satellite development plan with Russian cooperation
17. Trump’s landmark deal: Why denuclearization requires a global approach
1. U.S.-led guerrilla unit named as Korean War hero for next month
It is great to see this heroic unit honored.
One of the things I looked forward to every year while I was assigned to the Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR) was traveling to Ganghwa Island every year to pay respects to the members of the 8240th at the memorial there.
It was so fascinating to hear their stories. In the photo below is the late Commander Park who was a high school teacher on the north side of the Han River Estuary which was then in South Korea as it was below the 38th parallel. When north Korea attacked he brought his high school students to the South and they joined the 8240th. Commander Park was given airborne training by US forces and he conducted some 61 jumps into north Korea over the course of the war and then walked back every time to friendly lines with the intelligence he gathered.
U.S.-led guerrilla unit named as Korean War hero for next month | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 31, 2025
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's veterans ministry said Friday it has designated the U.S. 8240th Army Unit, a U.S.-led guerrilla force, as the Korean War hero for February in recognition of its contributions during the 1950-53 conflict.
Formed in 1951, the irregular task force, made up of U.S. and South Korean officers as well as Korean volunteers, aimed to disrupt North Korean and Chinese forces through guerilla warfare after Chinese troops entered the war in late 1950.
Mostly composed of South Korean fighters, the unit operated along the eastern and western coasts, deploying 32 teams with over 20,000 personnel in more than 4,000 operations, which included intelligence gathering and sabotage missions, according to the ministry.
The unit's operations forced North Korea to divert over 20,000 troops to coastal defenses, weakening their front-line capabilities, it said.
After the 1953 armistice, the unit was reorganized to serve as the foundation for the South Korean Army's 1st Combat Group -- now known as the 1st Special Forces Brigade.
South Korea has recognized the contributions of the guerrilla operatives, awarding military honors to 65 members of the unit, according to the ministry.
This undated photo provided by the veterans ministry on Jan. 31, 2025, shows the U.S. 8240th Army Unit. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 31, 2025
2. What to Make of Russia’s New Security Agreements
Excerpts:
Third, there were notable differences between the three agreements and no attempt to link any of them. Iran’s had no formal defense commitments; North Korea’s had a mutual defense commitment but no mention of nuclear weapons; Belarus’ had a mutual defense commitment with an explicit nuclear component. The tradeoffs may appear similar, but Iran’s deal shows wariness toward Russia despite the perceived necessity for cooperation. The North Korea agreement shows a desire to expand ties significantly while the policy window is open and leverage remains on Pyongyang’s side. The deal with Lukashenko reveals an authoritarian leader who is willing to trade some of his autonomy for guarantees of regime survival. At their core, these are not alliance commitments based on shared values or common interests beyond maximizing what can be gained through bilateral, transactional deals.
While it will be important to monitor the future trajectory of these relationships, these key takeaways help observers recognize the starting point that these agreements represent: Russia’s growing reliance on partners, transactional trade-offs, and the absence of cohesion among the lot. Ultimately, these treaties highlight Russia’s shifting security practice – one driven more by practical necessity than by strategic design.
What to Make of Russia’s New Security Agreements
thediplomat.com
The treaties with Iran and Belarus are different from the one Russia reached with North Korea, and there has been no attempt to link any of them.
By Michael MacArthur Bosack
January 29, 2025
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (left) escorts Russian President Vladimir Putin after his arrival in Pyongyang, North Korea, June 19, 2024.
Subscribe for ads-free reading
Earlier this month, Russia signed a new treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership with Iran. Covering multiple areas of cooperation, this agreement is set to underwrite Iran-Russia security ties for the next two decades and is the latest of Russia’s similar treaties with other partners. It follows the signing of a comparable deal with North Korea last June and the agreement on a mutual defense pact with Belarus in December.
The conclusion of these treaties in short succession begs several questions: Why the sudden influx of formal security-related agreements for Russia? Does this signal the formation of a new military coalition? What is to be made of it all? An examination of the agreements themselves is instructive and helps answer those questions with three key takeaways.
First, it is necessary to remember why governments formalize security agreements in the first place. One reason is to lock in security tradeoffs, the core premise being that a legal instrument will guarantee commitment to the negotiated provisions. The parties to those agreements may also be seeking to signal those commitments to external players, sometimes for a deterrent effect and other times to avoid the risk of misinterpretation of what the agreement entails.
The Kremlin signed its Treaty on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with North Korea in June 2024. This agreement called for deepening ties across all domains of cooperation but importantly included mutual defense commitments; in other words, it is a formal alliance pact. The world has seen how the two governments are exercising those commitments with North Korea’s support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
The agreement just signed between Iran and Russia is also a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, but with three key differences from the North Korea deal. First, although it provides for nonaggression and consultation amid conflict, it does not include a formal defense commitment. Second, the agreement specifies a 20-year duration, whereas the North Korea deal did not indicate a termination date. Third, there was significantly more detail on the parameters of how Iran-Russia security cooperation would proceed. This specificity is important in signaling the boundaries of potential Iran-Russia ties both to its partners and adversaries alike.
The agreement with Belarus was fundamentally different from the other two. Rather than pursue a single comprehensive agreement, Presidents Aleksander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin agreed upon 10 supplemental agreements to existing legal arrangements this past December. The most important was a mutual defense agreement that formally incorporated a nuclear component.
So, what should observers take away from Russia’s recent flurry of security deals?
The first key takeaway is that the timing and format of the agreements were unusual for Russia. These were all treaty-level agreements concluded within about six months of each other. Until recently, the Kremlin under Vladimir Putin has preferred to play looser in its security commitments; for example, Putin downgraded the 1961 alliance treaty with North Korea to an amorphous “Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation” in 2000. The Kremlin also preferred to handle other security commitments via the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a group in which Belarus is a part and which Russia had invited Iran to join back in 2007. The fact that the Kremlin went ahead with the conclusion of these treaty-level agreements signals a policy shift.
The second key takeaway is that this policy shift extends from the Russia-Ukraine War. All the agreements involved countries directly supporting Russia’s war effort: Belarus has permitted the movement of Russian forces through its territory; Iranian Shahed suicide drones have plagued Ukrainian cities; and North Korea’s materiel and personnel support have continued to supplement Russia’s war effort. There would invariably be trade-offs for this cooperation, and the increased Russian dependency upon its partners forced a change in approach. With this window for policy change opened, the governments in Moscow, Minsk, Tehran, and Pyongyang took the opportunity to underwrite security trade-offs via formal deals.
Third, there were notable differences between the three agreements and no attempt to link any of them. Iran’s had no formal defense commitments; North Korea’s had a mutual defense commitment but no mention of nuclear weapons; Belarus’ had a mutual defense commitment with an explicit nuclear component. The tradeoffs may appear similar, but Iran’s deal shows wariness toward Russia despite the perceived necessity for cooperation. The North Korea agreement shows a desire to expand ties significantly while the policy window is open and leverage remains on Pyongyang’s side. The deal with Lukashenko reveals an authoritarian leader who is willing to trade some of his autonomy for guarantees of regime survival. At their core, these are not alliance commitments based on shared values or common interests beyond maximizing what can be gained through bilateral, transactional deals.
While it will be important to monitor the future trajectory of these relationships, these key takeaways help observers recognize the starting point that these agreements represent: Russia’s growing reliance on partners, transactional trade-offs, and the absence of cohesion among the lot. Ultimately, these treaties highlight Russia’s shifting security practice – one driven more by practical necessity than by strategic design.
Authors
Guest Author
Michael MacArthur Bosack
Michael MacArthur Bosack is the Special Adviser for Government Relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies and founder of the Parley Policy Initiative.
Subscribe for ads-free reading
thediplomat.com
3. Current, former KCTU officials indicted for alleged ties with N. Korean agent
The work of north Korea's United Front Department and the Cultural Engagement Bureau.
Current, former KCTU officials indicted for alleged ties with N. Korean agent | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 31, 2025
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- Prosecutors on Friday indicted a current and former official of a major umbrella union for allegedly receiving orders from a North Korean agent they met in China in 2018.
The Suwon District Prosecutors Office said it indicted the two individuals, associated with the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), without detention on charges of violating the National Security Act.
The two are accused of traveling to Guangzhou, China, in September 2018 to meet the agent with another former KCTU official, identified by the surname Seok. The two officials allegedly conducted activities under the agent's orders after returning to South Korea.
The prosecution said it confirmed their activities through an investigation after receiving the case from the National Intelligence Service (NIS).
It said it has also acquired 90 documents of North Korea's orders and 24 reports for North Korea in connection to the case by cooperating with the NIS and the police.
Last November, Seok was sentenced to 15 years in prison for conducting espionage activities under instructions from North Korea from 2017 to 2022.
A court emblem is seen in this undated file photo. (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 31, 2025
4. S. Korea to send inquiry to China's DeepSeek over data privacy concerns
Is DeepSeek a tool of Chinese unrestricted warfare?
S. Korea to send inquiry to China's DeepSeek over data privacy concerns | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · January 31, 2025
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's data protection authority plans to send an inquiry to DeepSeek, a Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) startup, amid growing concerns over the company's data collection practices, according to officials Friday.
According to the officials, the Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC) under the interior ministry plans to send an official inquiry to DeepSeek's headquarters in China, requesting detailed information on the startup's policy on personal data collection.
The PIPC also plans to ask how DeepSeek uses personal data for AI training purposes.
A commission official said the move comes in response to the rapid rise in South Korean users of DeepSeek and the increasing concerns over potential privacy risks.
"Depending on the response, we will take further steps such as a fact-finding review or an investigation if necessary," the official said.
Major international media outlets have reported that government institutions and companies worldwide are restricting access to DeepSeek over fears of data leaks and privacy violations.
According to DeepSeek's privacy policy, the company collects various forms of personal information, including users' names, birth dates, email addresses, phone numbers and passwords for AI model training.
The company also gathers keyboard input patterns, audio data, uploaded files and chat histories. The policy states that DeepSeek reserves the right to share such data with law enforcement and public agencies at its discretion.
This file photo from Jan. 22, 2025, shows a meeting of the Personal Information Protection Commission under the South Korean interior ministry. (Yonhap)
odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · January 31, 2025
5. Ukraine Military Situation Report | North Korean Military Involvement Special Edition
Jan 29, 2025
Hudson Institute
Ukraine Military Situation Report | North Korean Military Involvement Special Edition
Can Kasapoğlu
Below Senior Fellow Can Kasapoğlu offers a military situation report about the war in Ukraine.
Executive Summary
• Moscow-Pyongyang cooperation: North Korea will likely send fire-support combat formations and drones to the Russian region of Kursk.
• North Korean rules of engagement: Pyongyang has reportedly ordered its soldiers to avoid being taken alive at all costs, meaning they often blow themselves up.
• Battlefield update: The Russian military is pressing on in Velyka Novosilka, which may soon fall if Ukraine does not make a game-changing move.
• Intelligence agencies clash: Ukrainian intelligence detained a Russian spy network collecting data about Ukraine’s F-16 air warfare assets.
1. Assessing North Korea’s Role in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
More details are emerging as North Korea continues its direct involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
One interesting aspect is North Korean forces’ rules of engagement. Open-source indicators reveal that Pyongyang has ordered its fighters to avoid being taken as prisoners of war at all costs. In many cases, North Korean troops have blown themselves up to avoid being captured alive. This strict discipline explains the limited number of North Korean troops who have been taken prisoner—and the high number of North Korean casualties, which according to Ukrainian officials is near 4,000, enough to fill a brigade.
Tactical engagement visuals from the battlefield suggest that while the Korean People’s Army often makes mistakes while fighting under frequent drone strikes, its unit cohesion has been solid: Pyongyang’s troops have maintained their composure when exposed to Ukraine’s heaviest blows. Ukrainian troops who have engaged North Korean forces have said that Pyongyang’s fighters are far more disciplined than most of their Russian counterparts. The Ukrainian Special Forces Command’s X account recently posted the diary of an elite North Korean fighter who was killed in action in the Russian region of Kursk. His writings reveal a brainwashed commitment to the Workers’ Party of North Korea and to leader Kim Jong Un, highlighting the strict indoctrination Pyongyang’s military enforces.
Ukrainian personnel also praise North Korean troops’ marksmanship. Visuals of captured North Korean equipment suggest that the Kremlin has provided better infantry kits to Pyongyang’s fighters than it has given its own Russian servicemen. Nonetheless, uploads from the battlefield suggest that Ukraine’s first-person-view (FPV) drones have caught North Korean forces off guard, leading to mounting casualties at the hands of Ukrainian drone operators.
South Korean intelligence services have concluded that Pyongyang’s next move will likely involve sending loitering munitions to augment its light infantry, though it is unknown which systems. In recent years, North Korea has developed a loitering munitions baseline that resembles the Iran Shahed kamikaze drones that hit Ukraine nearly every day. Pyongyang is also seeking to replicate the Russian Lancet drone warfare system.
General Kyrylo Budanov, the chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, has assessed that Pyongyang will likely combat-deploy artillery and rocket troops to Kursk. Thus far North Korea has transferredKN-23 short-range ballistic missiles, 170mm-class Koksan heavy artillery, and 240mm-class multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) to the Russian military. Previous editions of this report have presented open-source intelligence findings regarding these systems and concluded that North Korea would send fire-support troops to reinforce its current contingent in Kursk.
United States Defense Intelligence Agency assessments have emphasized North Korea’s tube artillery and rocket systems capabilities. Massed artillery and rocket salvos remain central to North Korea’s battle plan for a war on the Korean Peninsula. Open-source intelligence recently detected North Korean civilian trucks equipped with concealed 122mm-class rockets inside Russia. These platforms could menace Ukrainian defenses in urban and semi-urban battlefields.
In a war driven by artillery, Pyongyang’s fire-support troops could pose serious risks to the Ukrainian military, which is already fighting North Korea’s elite light infantry units. This report will continue to assess North Korea’s military role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, especially in Kursk.
2. Battlefield Assessment
The tactical situation shifted in the Kremlin’s favor over the past week. Russia made gains in Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Despite conflicting reports from the area, it is clear that the Russian military has fought hard in Velyka Novosilka and has captured multiple positions along Ukraine’s defensive lines. The fight for the town is ongoing, but it is likely that Russia will soon capture it.
In Pokrovsk, the Russian military has maintained an offensive footing, with few signs emerging that the campaign there is anywhere near drawing to a close. In this theater, Russia is ramping up its use of fiber-optic-cable-connected FPV drones against Ukrainian heavy armor. These drones are resilient against electronic warfare (EW), and Ukrainian FPV operators are attempting to engage and kinetically intercept them.
Fighting continued in Kursk with high material losses and casualties. In Kharkiv, the Russian military has been attempting to make the most of its bridgeheads along the Oskil River. Nonetheless, no meaningful changes have occurred in the battlefield geometry in this area.
Ukraine also continued to launch long-range salvos deep into Russian territory. A drone storage facility in Oryol and the Ryazan oil refinery are among Ukraine’s most recent high-value targets. The Ukrainian Intelligence Service (SBU) also ran counterespionage operations against subversive Russian networks operating in Ukraine. Recently, SBU agents detained a group reported to belong to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) for spying on Ukraine’s F-16 combat aircraft.
6. Charlotte man accused of helping North Korean regime
Charlotte man accused of helping North Korean regime
By Michael Praats, wsoctv.com and Hunter Sáenz, wsoctv.com
January 28, 2025 at 5:23 pm EST
wsoctv.com · by Opens in new window · January 28, 2025
CHARLOTTE — A Charlotte man faces a potential of 60-years in federal prison for his alleged his role in a conspiracy, sponsored by the North Korean (DPRK) government to evade sanctions and ultimately funneling millions of dollars to the country. Emanuel Ashtor is accused of helping facilitate a scheme hiring North Korean workers for IT positions in the U.S. for more than 60 different companies.
North Korea prepares to send more troops to Russia after suffering casualties, South Korea says
The scheme involved the hiring of North Korean IT workers and obtaining contracts for remote working jobs around the country using false identification and technology to make it appear workers were located in the U.S.
Ashtor is just one of several people indicted in the ongoing case. Others include a Mexican citizen living in Sweden, another U.S. Citizen from New York, and two North Korean IT workers.
Cash
The arrest warrant for Ashtor shows he lives in an upscale apartment in SouthPark. He is accused of conspiracy to damage a protected computer, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and mail fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and conspiracy to transfer false identification documents.
Ashtor is accused of registering the company Vali Tech Inc. using his name, as well as an unnamed victim’s who the FBI said Ashtor did not have permission to use.
Vali Tech then signed contracts with outside companies to employ North Korean workers using false identification, and even employed a North Korean IT Worker, Jin Sung-Il, using a fake passport with Ashtor’s New York address as his place of residence, according to the indictment. Sung-Il used the name Kelsey Bane on the fake documents.
Fake passports North Korea North Korean IT workers used fake documents to obtain jobs remotely in the US (US Government)
Law enforcement traced a laptop sent from unwitting third-party companies to Ashtor’s home Wi-Fi in North Carolina and then allowed the Sung-Il to log in remotely.
Despite earning millions of dollars throughout the course of the scheme, the North Korean government kept 90% of the earnings paid to the IT employees, according to court records.
VIDEO: Senior credit card fraud on the rise
Senior credit card fraud on the rise
©2025 Cox Media Group
wsoctv.com · by Opens in new window · January 28, 2025
7. S. Korea flies its most capable Surion helicopter variant yet
S. Korea flies its most capable Surion helicopter variant yet
Defense News · by Gordon Arthur · January 31, 2025
CHRISTCHURCH, New Zealand — Korea Aerospace Industries’ production line for the Surion helicopter is receiving a shot in the arm thanks to the development of two new versions for South Korea’s military, plus production for a new export customer.
When KAI first mooted the Surion in 2007, officials voiced ambitious plans to export 300 helicopters over 25 years. Unfortunately, those dreams are nowhere close to being realized, as just two have been sold overseas so far.
Nonetheless, new variants like the Marine Attack Helicopter (MAH) – heavily armed and designed to support Korean amphibious operations – will keep KAI’s production facility ticking over.
The armed MAH is the most capable version of the Surion helicopter yet, and KAI engineers recently oversaw the maiden flight of the first of three prototypes. The company announced the milestone in mid-January, even though the flight actually occurred Dec. 17.
Now, development of the 19,200lb (8,709kg) MAH will proceed with a series of comprehensive tests slated to conclude in August 2026. Kang Koo-young, KAI’s President, said, “Now that we’ve reached an important turning point for successful development, we’ll conduct more fair and reliable flight test evaluations to create an aircraft that our military and citizens can trust.”
The MAH has a chin-mounted 20mm cannon, plus stub wings that carry rockets, air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles.
Development of the MAH commenced in October 2022, with ground testing starting last October. It benefited from systems integration work performed earlier on KAI’s Mirion light armed helicopter, of which South Korea’s army formally received the first two on Dec. 26, 2024. The Mirion is an armed version of the Airbus H155.
For its part, the MAH is based on the MUH-1 Marineon multirole helicopter already used by Korea’s Marine Corps, with KAI noting advantages in terms of training and logistics.
KAI handed over the last of 30 Marineon helicopters in June 2023, and a year later it announced completion of production of 210 KUH-1 Surions for the country’s army.
KAI is also working on the Korean Mine Countermeasures Helicopter version of the Surion. A key piece of its equipment is Northrop Grumman’s Airborne Laser Mine Detection System that detects, classifies and localizes floating and near-surface moored mines.
However, Surion export orders have lagged far behind domestic demand. Cho Hyun-ki, a Defense Acquisition Program Administration official, had said last year: “We’ll do our best to ensure that Surion can flap its wings overseas.”
Its first successful flutter duly occurred last December when KAI signed the Surion’s first export contract worth 136 billion won (US$92.7 million). A stock exchange filing confirmed Iraq was buying just two helicopters suitable for firefighting. These are to be delivered by March 2029.
Surion civil orders are keeping the production line going too, with the Korea Coast Guard operating nine Surions and the Korea Forest Service four aircraft. Each agency ordered one addition Surion last month, these due for handover in December 2027. In total, South Korean government agencies have contracted for 35 Surions.
About Gordon Arthur
Gordon Arthur is an Asia correspondent for Defense News. After a 20-year stint working in Hong Kong, he now resides in New Zealand. He has attended military exercises and defense exhibitions in about 20 countries around the Asia-Pacific region.
8. Yoon meets senior aides at detention center
(LEAD) Yoon meets senior aides at detention center | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 31, 2025
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES with latest remarks throughout)
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol met his senior aides at the Seoul Detention Center on Friday and urged them to carry on their work without being discouraged, a senior presidential official said.
Yoon made the call during his meeting with Chung Jin-suk, his chief of staff, National Security Adviser Shin Won-sik and three other senior aides at the center in Uiwang, south of Seoul.
It marked the first visit by Yoon's aides since the impeached president was formally detained on Jan. 19 over allegations of insurrection and abuse of power related to his short-lived imposition of martial law last month.
"The presidential office is at the center of state affairs, so do not be discouraged and do your best in your respective positions," Yoon was quoted as saying by the official. "This is also a place where people live. I am doing well."
Yoon also asked them whether the medical system functioned well during the Lunar New Year holiday without causing inconvenience to elderly people, according to the official.
The Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials lifted restrictions on Yoon's meetings with visitors last Friday, but general visits were limited during the Lunar New Year holiday, which ended Thursday.
In this file photo, a justice ministry's vehicle carrying President Yoon Suk Yeol comes out of the Seoul Detention Center in Uiwang, south of Seoul, on Jan. 23, 2025. (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 31, 2025
9. Court assigns Yoon's case to criminal division overseeing other martial law cases
Court assigns Yoon's case to criminal division overseeing other martial law cases | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 31, 2025
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- The Seoul Central District Court on Friday assigned impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol's martial law case to one of its criminal panels, making the division responsible for all cases related to last month's brief episode.
Yoon's case was assigned to the court's criminal collegiate division 25 earlier in the day, following his indictment Sunday for allegedly leading an insurrection through his Dec. 3 martial law declaration.
The division has been tasked with other cases related to martial law, including those of former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, Cho Ji-ho, head of the National Police Agency, and Kim Bong-sik, former chief of the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency.
Other than military officers undergoing trial at a military court for their alleged involvement in martial law, all other officials charged with insurrection will stand trial before the same division.
Yoon is accused of colluding with former Minister Kim and others to incite a riot by declaring emergency martial law on Dec. 3. He is also accused of mobilizing military and police personnel during martial law to prevent lawmakers from voting to reject the decree among other allegations.
A court sign is seen outside the Seoul Central District Court in southern Seoul on Jan. 31, 2025. (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 31, 2025
10. Spy chief, top security adviser called to testify at Yoon's impeachment trial
Spy chief, top security adviser called to testify at Yoon's impeachment trial | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 31, 2025
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- The Constitutional Court has approved the spy agency chief and top security adviser as witnesses to testify at the impeachment trial of President Yoon Suk Yeol, a court official said Friday.
National Intelligence Service (NIS) Director Cho Tae-yong and National Security Adviser Shin Won-sik will be required to appear at the trial on Feb. 13 and Feb. 11, respectively, court spokesperson Cheon Jae-hyun said in a media briefing.
Cho and Shin are the two top officials who have been added to the witnesses' list for the high-stakes trial that will ultimately determine whether to remove Yoon from office or reinstate him over his botched attempt at imposing martial law on Dec. 3.
The court also approved former Third Deputy NIS Director Baek Jong-wook and Kim Yong-bin, secretary-general of the National Election Commission, as witnesses, Cheon said. Baek and Kim are suspected of involvement in the alleged "election fraud" Yoon has cited as a reason for his martial law decree.
Former Interior Minister Lee Sang-min is also among the witnesses approved by the court for the trial.
Since the impeachment trial began on Dec. 27, the court has held six hearings, including the two preparatory hearings. Yoon has attended the last two main trial sessions. The next hearing is scheduled for next Tuesday.
Police are on duty in front of the Constitutional Court in Seoul on Jan. 31, 2025. (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 31, 2025
11. Editorial: Are U.S.-South Korea joint military drills at risk again?
The Chosun Ilbo editorial board is alluding to Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy to split the ROK/US alliance while subverting South Korea government society though either recruited supports (eithe r agents of useful idiots).
Kim does not really care about the training specifically. He only cares about the training for two reasons (and it is not the perception of the threat to him). One it weakens readiness and if it drive US forces off the peninsula because they cannot change he knows this will improve his chances of successful execution of his attack plans. It is a target for him to exploit to support his political warfare strategy to undermine the ROK/US alliance.. We are very misguided if we think that ending training will be a beneficial concession that will result in a change in Kim Jong Un's behavior. Suspending exercises will only prove to Kim that his political warfare strategy is working.
Excerpt:
The most alarming part is that Kim is fully aware of what Trump wants. North Korea is likely to push for an end to joint drills and a reduction—or even withdrawal—of U.S. forces in South Korea, all while maintaining its nuclear arsenal. If Trump and Kim stage another summit vowing denuclearization, some domestic factions will be eager to celebrate it as a breakthrough for peace, unaware of the potential dangers. South Korea faces growing national security risks as such uncertainties threaten the stability of the U.S.-South Korea alliance.
Editorial: Are U.S.-South Korea joint military drills at risk again?
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/01/31/AQMZ64BEX5GKLFGUNHDYFGRTCQ/
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2025.01.31. 08:30
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un recently inspected nuclear facilities in the country./News1
A U.S. Defense Department official said that U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises could be subject to change depending on the Trump administration’s policies and the potential impeachment of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, according to RFA. Fred Fleitz, vice chair of the America First Policy Institute and a close associate of U.S. President Donald Trump, also stated the U.S. could consider suspending joint drills if negotiations with North Korea became viable.
Following recent U.S.-South Korea air force drills, Pyongyang issued a statement warning of “strong countermeasures” against the U.S. The underlying message was clear: if the U.S. seeks dialogue with North Korea, it must halt joint military drills. A similar scenario unfolded seven years ago during the U.S.-North Korea summit. Pyongyang’s nuclear program remained intact while joint drills were suspended. It could happen again this time.
The U.S. and North Korea are already hinting at the possibility of another summit. President Trump has referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power” and signaled a willingness for another summit. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has been visiting nuclear facilities and stressed the need to fortify its “nuclear shield.” His message: “There will be no denuclearization.”
The U.S.-South Korea security alliance had been in a state of near collapse for four years during the Moon Jae-in administration, following the U.S.- North Korea Singapore Summit in 2018, when Trump and Kim pledged to “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Not a single live-fire drill was conducted at the regimental level or higher over four years. Drills were limited to computerized war simulations, and some exercises were renamed to avoid provoking Pyongyang, such as the “Hong Gil-dong” drill, which North Korea does not even acknowledge as a drill.
The commander of the U.S. Forces Korea once expressed concern, warning that reliance on computer-based virtual drills could leave troops unprepared for real-world combat. The U.S. military typically does not engage in combat alongside forces that have not trained extensively with them.
Suspending U.S.-South Korea joint drills has long been a key objective for the Kim regime. Meanwhile, Trump views alliances through a transactional lens. He has exaggerated the costs of operating U.S. military aircraft, arguing that joint drills are too expensive. Trump has also expressed skepticism about whether U.S. troops should be stationed in South Korea. He suspended joint drills during the Singapore Summit while making claims that suggested he wanted to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea.
The most alarming part is that Kim is fully aware of what Trump wants. North Korea is likely to push for an end to joint drills and a reduction—or even withdrawal—of U.S. forces in South Korea, all while maintaining its nuclear arsenal. If Trump and Kim stage another summit vowing denuclearization, some domestic factions will be eager to celebrate it as a breakthrough for peace, unaware of the potential dangers. South Korea faces growing national security risks as such uncertainties threaten the stability of the U.S.-South Korea alliance.
#사설
12. Gov't demands parliamentary reconsideration of bill on special counsel probe into Yoon
(LEAD) Gov't demands parliamentary reconsideration of bill on special counsel probe into Yoon | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · January 31, 2025
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; ADDS more info throughout; CHANGES photo)
By Kim Han-joo
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- The Cabinet on Friday demanded the National Assembly reconsider an opposition-proposed bill that calls for a special counsel probe into President Yoon Suk Yeol on his failed martial law attempt last month.
The motion demanding reconsideration was approved during a Cabinet meeting, chaired by acting President Choi Sang-mok, who emphasized that there is no probable cause for appointing a special counsel, as Yoon has already been arrested and indicted on insurrection charges.
"At this point, as judicial proceedings are still ongoing, many have pointed out that it is difficult to justify the need for a separate special counsel," Choi said.
Acting President Choi Sang-mok chairs a Cabinet meeting at the government complex building in Seoul on Jan. 31, 2025. (Yonhap)
Choi also pointed out that the bill contains elements that may be unconstitutional and raise concerns over the potential disclosure of state secrets.
The revised bill, proposed by the main opposition Democratic Party (DP), was passed by the opposition-controlled parliament on Jan. 17, despite unanimous opposition from lawmakers of the ruling People Power Party. The opposition bloc currently dominates the 300-member parliament with 192 seats.
It marks the seventh time that the acting president has exercised his veto power since assuming interim leadership last month.
Typically, motions like these are approved during Cabinet meetings chaired by the prime minister and sent to the president for endorsement before being returned to the National Assembly for a revote.
The latest bill omits allegations that Yoon has committed "treason" by attempting to provoke a deliberate conflict with North Korea, which were previously part of a bill rejected by Choi last month.
The ruling party had criticized the DP-proposed bill as being "overly broad" and said it would propose its own version that does not include insurrection charges against Yoon.
On Sunday, prosecutors indicted and detained Yoon on charges of leading an insurrection after receiving the case from the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials, which does not have a legal mandate to indict a president.
Yoon is charged with conspiring with former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun and others to incite an insurrection by declaring an unconstitutional and illegal state of emergency, despite the absence of any signs of war, armed conflict or a comparable national crisis.
Yoon, who is also facing an impeachment trial, has become the first sitting president in South Korea's history to be indicted while in detention.
khj@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · January 31, 2025
13. Leaders of N. Korea, Vietnam exchange messages to mark 75th anniv. of diplomatic ties
Leaders of N. Korea, Vietnam exchange messages to mark 75th anniv. of diplomatic ties | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 31, 2025
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- The leaders of North Korea and Vietnam have exchanged messages of greetings to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two leaders while declaring 2025 as a year of friendship, Pyongyang's state media reported Friday.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un sent his warm celebrations in a message to Vietnamese President Luong Cuong on the occasion of the anniversary of the diplomatic relationship that was forged on Jan. 31, 1950, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
Declaring this year as a year of friendship, Kim voiced hope that the bilateral relations will "steadily develop."
"This conforms to the common aspiration and desire of the peoples of the two countries to develop the friendly and cooperative relations which were forged and consolidated in the joint struggle for socialism onto a new, higher stage," the North's leader said.
In a message to Kim reported by the KCNA, the Vietnamese leader said their traditional relations had been "cultivated by the leaders of several generations of the two countries with much effort," including former Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh and the North's state founder Kim Il-sung.
Cuong said both sides will celebrate a year of friendship "jointly and successfully through significant exchanges and cooperative activities."
After forging diplomatic relations in 1950, North Korea and Vietnam maintained close communist ties for over decades. But their relationship turned frosty due largely to Vietnam's establishment of diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1992.
The bilateral relations began improving in the 2000s and were fully normalized on the occasion of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's trip to Hanoi in February 2019 for his summit with then U.S. President Donald Trump.
This file photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on March 2, 2019, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (L) attending a welcoming banquet held at the International Convention Center in Hanoi the previous day to celebrate his visit to Vietnam. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 31, 2025
14. Readout of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's Call With Republic of Korea Acting Minister of National Defense Kim Seon-ho
Readout of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's Call With Republic of Korea Acting Minister of National Defense Kim Seon-ho
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4049075/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseths-call-with-republic-of-korea-actin/
Jan. 31, 2025 |
Department of Defense Spokesman John Ullyot provided the following readout:
On January 30, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth held an introductory call with the Republic of Korea (ROK)'s Acting Minister of National Defense Kim Seon-ho. The Acting Minister congratulated the Secretary on his appointment and the two leaders discussed the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Secretary Hegseth reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to defending the ROK under President Trump’s leadership and both leaders also reiterated their shared focus on maintaining a strong combined U.S.-ROK defense posture. Both the Secretary and the Minister agreed to remain in close contact moving forward.
15. North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Facility in Operation… Coolant Discharged
Satellite imagery at the link.
This isia Google translation of an RFA report.
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/north-korea-yongbyon-nuclear-center-reactor-01302025154000.html
North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Facility in Operation… Coolant Discharged
WASHINGTON-Jamin Anderson andersonj@rfa.org
2025.01.30
The Yongbyon nuclear facility in North Korea's Hyunganbuk-do Province, photographed by the U.S. commercial satellite Planet Labs on January 30, 2025. The reactor and experimental light-water reactor are seen in operation.
/ Planet Labs, Image creation – Jacob Bogle
00:00 /03:37
Anchor : As North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un visited a nuclear facility on the 29th and reiterated his stance to strengthen nuclear response , satellite images have captured the nuclear reactor and experimental light-water reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear facility continuing to operate into the new year . Reporter Jamin Anderson reports .
This is a photo taken by the U.S. commercial satellite Planet Labs of the Yongbyon nuclear facility in North Pyongan Province on the 30th .
The recent heavy snowfall in the area has left the entire town covered in white snow.
The Kuryong River, which flows next to the nuclear facility, is also frozen, but large areas of snow and ice near the 5-megawatt reactor can be seen melting, exposing the river .
This is the northern pumping station connected to the 5MW reactor , and it has been discovered that hot water used as cooling water is being discharged .
Additionally, satellite images showed steam rising from the turbine generator building next to the 5MW reactor .
Jacob Vogel, a satellite image analyst in the United States, told Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 30th , “ This means that the entire process of the reactor is in progress . ”
The 5MW reactor is said to have the capacity to produce 6kg of plutonium per year .
As North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong-un recently inspected a nuclear material production site and a nuclear weapons research institute, the Korean Central News Agency reported on the 29th , and active operation conditions at the Yongbyon nuclear facility were also confirmed .
The Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) also appears to be operational .
Strong currents and steam generated by cooling water discharged into the Kuryong River can also be clearly identified in the southern waterway connected to the light water reactor.
The experimental light-water reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear facility is known to be a facility designed to increase the production of nuclear material needed to manufacture nuclear warheads.
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in the United States analyzed in a report last January that the experimental light-water reactor “ could produce 20 kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year once fully operational , which is enough to manufacture 5-10 nuclear weapons per year . ”
Therefore, if the 5MW reactor and experimental light-water reactor in Yongbyon are fully operational and producing a total of 26kg of plutonium per year , this means that North Korea can manufacture up to 13 nuclear warheads per year based on the explosive yield of 15 kilotons during the 2016 nuclear test .
The Yongbyon nuclear facility in North Korea's Hyonganbuk-do Province, as seen by the U.S. commercial satellite Planet Labs on January 30, 2025. Snow is melting on the roofs of the 5MW reactor, experimental light-water reactor, and turbine generator buildings. / Planet Labs, Image credit – Jacob Bogle
Also, satellite images taken on the 30th show snow on most of the building roofs , but the snow on the roofs of the 5MW reactor , experimental light water reactor , and turbine generator buildings has melted .
Taking this into account, along with the cooling water discharge, the analysis suggests that it is highly likely that all of these facilities are in operation.
Earlier, IAEA ( International Atomic Energy Agency ) Director General Rafael Grossi said in November last year that there were signs that the centrifuge enrichment facility in Yongbyon in North Korea was continuing to operate , supporting the IAEA's analysis .
North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility in Hyonganbuk-do Province, as seen by the U.S. commercial satellite Planet Labs on November 24, 2024, December 14, 2024, and January 20, 2025. (From top to bottom) / Planet Labs, Image credit – Jacob Bogle
The coolant leak has been clearly visible since November 24 in high-resolution satellite images taken by Planet Labs .
Then , on December 14 and January 20 , strong water streams were observed being discharged into the Guryong River through the pumping station .
Regarding this, analyst Bogle assessed, “ Assuming that the reactor was operated continuously from November to January , North Korea likely produced enough plutonium for three nuclear weapons during this period . ”
“North Korea renovates Yongbyon nuclear facility… laying foundation for nuclear material stockpiling” North
Korea’s Yongdok-dong nuclear facility construction … possibility of expanding nuclear capabilities
IAEA “ Continuing to observe signs of light- water reactor operation at North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility ”
Meanwhile, according to the Korean Central News Agency on the 29th, General Secretary Kim inspected in detail the current status and plans for nuclear material production and announced his position to continuously strengthen the nuclear response system .
However, the communication did not disclose specific local guidance dates and locations.
Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Editor Lee Gyeong-ha
16. Kim Jong Un approves new satellite development plan with Russian cooperation
Does this indicate that Russia will support the regime's ICBM development? Is this "cover" activity?
Kim Jong Un approves new satellite development plan with Russian cooperation - Daily NK English
The proposal seeks Russian state support in three key areas - high-resolution sensor technology, metals for small satellite production, and delivery vehicle improvements - confirming concerns about North Korea's reliance on Russian assistance for its satellite program
By Jeong Tae Joo -
January 31, 2025
dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · January 31, 2025
Rodong Sinmun reported on Mar. 10, 2022, that Kim had visited the National Aerospace Development Administration (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
North Korea appears to be accelerating its military reconnaissance satellite program through Russian cooperation, with plans for new deployments this year.
According to a Daily NK source in North Korea, the National Aerospace Development Administration (NATA) submitted a proposal that received Kim Jong Un’s approval on Jan. 18. The directive has been distributed to scientific research agencies in the defense and military sectors involved in satellite development.
The proposal addresses technical limitations identified during launches following the successful deployment of the “Malligyong-1” reconnaissance satellite, outlining research and development plans for additional satellite launches this year.
The source revealed that NATA conducted a thorough analysis of deficiencies in orbital deployment and high-resolution observation capabilities during the 11th General Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee last month. Since the year began, the agency has focused intensively on addressing these shortcomings.
“The proposal details plans to fill technical gaps, particularly in launch vehicle capabilities and observation equipment, through Russian cooperation,” the source said.
These developments appear to confirm earlier concerns about North Korea seeking Russian assistance to overcome technical hurdles in its satellite program. NATA’s proposal specifically seeks Russian state support in three key areas: high-resolution sensor technology, metals for small satellite production, and improvements to delivery vehicle reliability and stability.
“Following the proposal’s distribution, research divisions received specific assignments aimed at enhancing new launch vehicles, improving observation equipment, and ensuring reliable satellite operations. These goals build on lessons learned from the Malligyong-1 launch,” the source explained.
The source added that while NATA will handle basic research and Russian cooperation, the Academy of National Defense Science will focus on designing launch vehicles and precision observation equipment.
However, the program faces both technical and financial obstacles. “While party policy mandates developing and launching satellites using domestic technology and resources, some experts believe that successfully launching military reconnaissance satellites this year or next will be difficult without external technology and support,” the source said.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · January 31, 2025
17. Trump’s landmark deal: Why denuclearization requires a global approach
This is the most flawed strategic assumption about north Korea and Kim Jong Un that I have ever read:
Sixth, Alperovitch and Radchenko’s proposal is based on the premise that nuclear weapons are an end unto themselves when in reality, nuclear weapons are a means of survival for the DPRK. Should Trump offer a deal providing a better chance of survival without nuclear weapons, Kim Jong-un will accept it.
Accepting this assumption means victory for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy and will put not only South Korea at great risk, but all US interests in East Asia will be at great risk.
Trump’s landmark deal: Why denuclearization requires a global approach - Daily NK English
Trump has a golden opportunity to strike a bold and audacious deal with Kim and achieve permanent peace and stability in Northeast Asia
By Chan Young Bang, Ph.D. - January 31, 2025
dailynk.com · by Chan Young Bang, Ph.D. · January 31, 2025
President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un stand on the North Korean side of the DMZ in Panmujom on June 30. Image: Rodong Sinmun
In the December 2024 New York Times opinion article, “Trump-Kim, Part II, Could Shake Up the World,” Dmitri Alperovitch and Sergey Radchenko propose a plan for the Trump administration to strike a deal with North Korea. The authors’ arguments can be summarized as follows:
1) The United States should abandon its goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea in favor of a moratorium. In exchange, the U.S. would lift sanctions, normalize diplomatic and trade relations, and offer a peace treaty to end the Korean War, thereby establishing permanent peace and stability in the region.
2) The U.S. can use the DPRK as a wedge to undermine the nascent coalition of America’s adversaries, including North Korea, Russia, and China. Alperovitch and Radchenko regard the DPRK as the coalition’s “weak link.”
While well-intentioned, this approach is flawed and ultimately risks undermining regional stability and global security. The Trump administration would encounter a dead end if it pursued this path. This is for six reasons.
First, the authors misconceived that the DPRK’s hostile relations with other countries with different systems are a result of the development of its nuclear weapons and that eliminating nuclear weapons will result in permanent peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. In fact, nuclear weapons are the outcome of North Korea’s confrontational foreign policy, which is a result of its ruling ideology of juche – which North Korea claims is a scientifically advanced, sublimated form of conventional socialism armed with class struggle. As Mikhail Gorbachev once said, foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy, which is the embodiment of ideology. Similarly, Eduard Shevardnadze stated: “Coexistence based on such premises as nonaggression, respect of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and so on is incompatible with class struggle.” Consequently, to ensure permanent peace and stability in the Korean peninsula, the ruling ideology of the DPRK which is the root cause of hostility must be altered; the sole introduction of a moratorium would not solve this.
Second, the North Korean economy, adapted from the Soviet Union’s, is an extractive system based upon the state owning the means of production – an embodiment of the ideology of class struggle. No country with such a system has ever achieved economic development. As recent Nobel prize laureates Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson explained in their book, Why Nations Fail, an extractive system impedes economic development since only a few chosen members receive benefits to the detriment of most people. The DPRK uses resources to reinforce its military power rather than fostering economic development. Further, North Korea’s economic disparity with the South is staggering with the South’s GDP being nearly 60 times larger than the North’s – a fact precluding the establishment of peaceful coexistence between the two countries.
Third, for the DPRK, nuclear weapons, which have been enshrined in the constitution since 2023, are a “treasured sword” that serves as a means of securing the regime’s legitimacy. Therefore, a moratorium freezing the development of nuclear weapons, as proposed by the authors, would require counterbalancing if North Korea wishes to prevent its demise. Economic development would provide an alternative form of legitimacy. Achieving it requires market-oriented reforms, which in turn necessitate a radical altering of the DPRK’s hostile ideology of class struggle.
Fourth, the U.S. does not have all the necessary ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ to exert pressure on North Korea and form a wedge between the DPRK, China, and Russia alliance. The primary means of exerting pressure on North Korea is sanctions. Since 2006, the UN Security Council has passed nine resolutions imposing comprehensive sanctions on North Korea; the U.S. alone can neither lift nor impose new sanctions. Furthermore, ‘carrots’ in the form of a peace treaty between the two Koreas, security guarantees from Russia and China, and development funds primarily from South Korea and Japan need the support of all the stakeholders; the U.S. cannot act alone. Moreover, the authors underestimate China’s influence over North Korea. Despite the sanctions, China remains North Korea’s largest trading partner, accounting for 98% of its trade. Furthermore, it is the only socialist country with which North Korea is bound by a comprehensive treaty – the Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. Therefore, China will be unwilling to support a policy that significantly weakens its leverage over the DPRK. A successful North Korea strategy requires formulating a package deal that Kim Jong-un cannot refuse and that all members of the Six-Party Talks will endorse.
Fifth, previous attempts to negotiate moratoria between the U.S. and the DPRK all failed and there is no evidence that a new moratorium would succeed. President Clinton, in 1994, developed the Agreed Framework with then-North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in which the DPRK committed to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for Washington providing two light-water reactors. Yet the U.S. grew suspicious of North Korea, so the reactors were not delivered and the agreement fell apart with the DPRK eventually expelling IAEA experts and withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Sixth, Alperovitch and Radchenko’s proposal is based on the premise that nuclear weapons are an end unto themselves when in reality, nuclear weapons are a means of survival for the DPRK. Should Trump offer a deal providing a better chance of survival without nuclear weapons, Kim Jong-un will accept it. Kim’s open, frank discussions with both then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in are a living testimony that he is genuinely willing to give up his nuclear program. Ignoring Kim’s previous declarations results in a flawed premise and weakens the authors’ proposal.
Trump has one viable option for any deal with Kim to achieve strategic success: to devise a package deal that upon acceptance would ensure the DPRK a better chance of survival as a non-nuclear weapon state. This deal would include security guarantees, the lifting of sanctions collectively through the UN, and sufficient development funds appropriated over ten years largely from South Korea and Japan with the condition that North Korea implements market-oriented reforms to achieve economic development. Such a deal would provide sufficient incentives to denuclearize as Kim would be able to:
1) Protect the sovereignty and shield the integrity of the DPRK by achieving rapid sustained economic development;
2) Achieve the finest possible legacy for himself and North Korea by improving the lives of millions by bringing them into a prosperous middle-class;
3) Establish a foundation for economic modernization that ensures the integrity of the succession beyond Kim’s tenure and the longevity of the DPRK;
4) Provide benefits to all stakeholder nations by making the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free with the removal of U.S. ground troops, establishing permanent peace, stability, and joint economic prosperity.
Trump has a historic opportunity to consummate a landmark deal that will define his presidency and legacy. Such a deal calls for a bold and audacious plan that ensures the DPRK’s survival and is a win-win for all stakeholders involved. A U.S.-led moratorium would be not only fragile but also undermine regional and global stability and security. On the other hand, a comprehensive package deal within the framework of the Six-Party Talks would finally lead to long-awaited peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
Chan Young Bang, Ph.D.
Dr. Chan Young Bang is the founder and President of KIMEP University, Principal Investigator at the DPRK Strategic Research Center, and a former economic adviser to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the first President of Kazakhstan. His current research focuses on nuclear non-proliferation and the economic development of the DPRK (North Korea). He is the author of more than 60 articles and nine books on the global prospects for achieving peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. His latest English-language books include Transition Beyond Denuclearization: A Bold Challenge for Kim Jong Un and A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons: Perspectives on Socioeconomic Development which were published by Palgrave Mcmillan in 2020 and 2023, respectively.
dailynk.com · by Chan Young Bang, Ph.D. · January 31, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
