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Quotes of the Day:
“I asked my mother why we couldn’t have books and she said, ‘The trouble with a book is that you never know what’s in it until it’s too late.'
I thought to myself, 'Too late for what?”
― Jeanette Winterson, Why Be Happy When You Could Be Normal?
“As it drew nearer, excitement grew intense. Swarms of adventurers expecting the overthrow of the Government crowded into Washington.”
― Thomas Dixon Jr., The Clansman: An Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan
“I spent thousands of hours studying a subject that is, somehow, too confusing for an academic but easily understood by a five-year-old—socialism is oppression. Even if it weren’t, it still wouldn’t work because you can’t entrust the same State that ruined capitalism to preserve socialism.”
― Seth Daniel Parker, The Greater Good: A Dystopian Novel of Divided America
1. Power and Perception: A Review of Sung-Yoon Lee’s “The Sister”
2. South Korea says US troops won’t be cut even if Trump wins presidency
3. North Korea Factor Fades Amid Seoul’s Trilateral Engagement
4. Kim Jong Un Shows Off Daughter After Reports She's His Presumptive Successor
5. N.K. leader taking offensive policy on S. Korea to divert public attention from internal woes: unification minister
6. N. Korea fires artillery shells from western coast for 2nd day: S. Korean military
7. N. Korean leader sends condolence message to Japanese PM over recent earthquake
8. 2.4 magnitude earthquake hits off southwestern coast: weather agency
9. US validates N. Korean SRBM usage in Russian assault on Ukraine
10. SpectralBlur: New macOS Backdoor Threat from North Korean Hackers
11. North Korea may surprise world with big nuclear moves
12. South Korea tells Russia to stop getting arms from North Korea
13. U.S. officials, experts pick N.K.-triggered crisis among plausible top-tier contingencies in 2024
14. Pentagon stresses 'main focus' on regional stability amid N. Korea's bellicose rhetoric
1. Power and Perception: A Review of Sung-Yoon Lee’s “The Sister”
I have to disagree with my friend Ken Gause. I think this is an excellent book and very important because it makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the Kim Family regime.. I think this is the only second (semi) negative review I have read. The other was a very negative one from John Feffer.All other reviews (many of which I have forwarded to my distribution list, have been excellent.
But I would say that there is no single book or research work that answers all the questions about the hard target of the Kim family regime. This complements many other important works about the regime such as Ken mentions from Bradley Martin and Robert COllins.
Power and Perception: A Review of Sung-Yoon Lee’s “The Sister”
https://www.38north.org/2024/01/power-and-perception-a-review-of-sung-yoon-lees-the-sister/
Book Review: The Sister
By Sung-Yoon Lee. PublicAffairs Hatchette Book Group, 2023. 304 pp.
Cover of “The Sister,” by Sung-Yoon Lee.
When I first heard of this book regarding Kim Yo Jong, a figure of growing prominence inside the North Korean regime, I was intrigued. She was obviously the sister of the Supreme Leader, but her profile had recently begun to expand beyond just being a gatekeeper and source of Mt. Paektu grandeur. The fact that someone had taken it upon themselves to write an entire book about her was impressive, although I did question whether there were enough sources available to do such a biography justice. After reading the book, I can recommend it for the novice, someone who is interested in learning the basic history of Kim Jong Un’s North Korea. Seasoned Pyongyang watchers, however, will not find much new in this book. The Sister relies on a well-worn narrative that already resides in the public realm, and the insights it does provide are often based on flights of speculation and armchair psychoanalysis.
When I wrote my 2015 book North Korean House of Cards, information on Kim Yo Jong was fleeting. There were some nuggets to be found in defector interviews, but it was like chasing shadows. She played a role in the regime. She occupied a privileged space inside her brother’s inner circle by virtue of her birth. But how much latitude there was for her to grow was a big question. Then 2018 rolled around, and her role as an ambassador, mouthpiece and power player began to come into focus. Kim Yo Jong was not just another actor within the Hermit Kingdom. She was someone of weight. Someone to focus on.
During my last trip to the peninsula in July 2023, I was able to talk to several Pyongyang watchers who focus on leadership politics. It is true, Kim Yo Jong’s role in the regime has grown. She has apparently amassed enough power and influence to step into a leadership role, at least temporarily, if something were to happen to Kim Jong Un. She would be able to serve on a regent structure or as a protector for his daughter, Kim Ju Ae. Whether she could do this for an extended period of time, however, is still in doubt. Whether she would contest Ri Sol Ju’s progeny’s claim to power is also not clear.
In his book The Sister, Sung-Yoon Lee attempts to construct a fully fleshed biography of this enigmatic woman. But in doing so, he strays beyond what we can say for certain. The Kim Yo Jong in his book is an evil character with decision-making power that would make her directly complicit with the wrongs perpetuated by the regime on its people, as well as responsible for the pariah status North Korea occupies in the international arena. In essence, she is a female co-dictator and “the most dangerous woman in the world.” In this author’s opinion, to ascribe this amount of power to Kim Yo Jong misses the mark. She no doubt plays a role inside the regime, one that is growing in prominence. She has access to her brother and is one of his most trusted advisers. But there are limits on what she can do and how far she can go because, in the end, she serves at the pleasure of the Supreme Leader.
“The Most Dangerous Woman in the World”
To support his thesis, Lee provides a number of instances where Kim Yo Jong has seemingly pushed the envelope in international decorum, slinging invective at the US and South Korea, the two perceived great threats to the regime. On top of this are stories of the young princess’ presumed authority to throw her weight around, even within the leadership. At one point, the author notes that on a whim, she could order the execution of members of the Central Committee, even though she ranked formally at the bottom of the party institution. While it is correct that informal power trumps formal power inside the North Korean regime, there are also checks and balances, especially when it comes to the leadership. Often misunderstood by outsiders, even the Supreme Leader must be careful in how he wields power lest he begin to rub up against legitimacy within the upper reaches of the leadership. If Kim Yo Jong were to take it upon herself to execute people without the say-so of her brother, she could create unwanted tension and instability at the top, akin to what happened when Jang Song Taek attempted to establish his own power base early in the Kim Jong Un era.
The author time and again points out how Kim Yo Jong was charming and engaging in 2018 when she led a delegation to the opening ceremony of the Olympic games in Pyeongchang, and then after the fall of summit talks in Hanoi became a foul-mouthed, invective-spewing critic of both the US and South Korea, threatening to move troops into the demilitarized zone or even attack the Alliance with nuclear weapons. He suggests that if she was ever to become Supreme Leader, she might prove to be “fiercer and more ruthless than her brother” (25). This fits well with the narrative that Kim Yo Jong is a scheming political operative, wooing enemies on the one hand while threatening them on the other—something seemingly out of character with the young twenty-something picking flowers during guidance inspections only years earlier.
A more likely explanation is that she is a woman who has been brought into the ranks of power and educated in how to support her brother. She has authority and latitude as the powerful vice director of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Propaganda and Agitation Department. She is responsible for crafting Kim Jong Un’s image. She takes responsibility for carrying sensitive messages to South Korea, be they offers of engagement or reading the riot act. But this should not be mistaken for power on her part. She acts at the behest of the Supreme Leader, who at times has punished her, removed her formal titles, and banished her from the public arena for education and refinement when she has made a misstep. On occasion, Kim Jong Un has stepped in to walk back her threats. This allegedly occurred in 2020 when Kim Jong Un walked back from his sister’s rhetoric about military conflict over the South’s release of leaflets. Whether this was by design or because Kim Yo Jong was too zealous in executing her orders is not clear. What is clear is that Kim Yo Jong does not have the power to personally make good on her threats, and she most definitely does not have command and control of the Korean People’s Armed Forces.
An Unfinished Portrait
A fundamental flaw in the book is that it ascribes state goals to the Kim family’s objectives. This is particularly true in chapter three, in which the author provides an overview of North Korean strategy to eventually reunify the peninsula under Pyongyang’s rule. It talks about the Korean War and the steadfast commitment to exerting North Korean rule south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). It holds out the often-touted strategies of force and blackmail as ways to achieve this ultimate goal. While this is a goal of the regime, the author fails to note that it moved from being the driving force behind North Korean strategy to an aspirational goal sometime in the 1980s.
The rush in the 1990s to accelerate the nuclear program, which continues to this day, is part and parcel of a strategy of regime survival, not reunification. Kim Jong Un’s two overarching goals, as were those of his father and grandfather, are regime survival and perpetuation of Kim family rule. Any action that violates these two objectives will simply not be undertaken. This includes escalation (through force or blackmail) that could lead to the US and its allies taking retaliation that would end the regime. Therefore, Kim Yo Jong can make threats on behalf of the regime. But in the end, she understands the Kim family equities. As long as a member of the Kim family, be it Kim Jong Un or Kim Yo Jong, sits atop the leadership in North Korea, it is highly unlikely that reunification of the Korean Peninsula will be on the agenda. It may be proclaimed from the top of Mt. Paektu, but like any echo, it will eventually fall silent.
Other than the obvious conservative point of view of the author, which in part explains the issues above, I think this book provides a useful, if thin, overview of North Korean history of the Kim Jong Un period. It makes a good companion piece to Anna Fifield’s The Great Successor. The narrative Lee presents is not so much a biography of Kim Yo Jong as the story of North Korean politics and foreign policy since Kim Jong Un assumed power in 2012. Sometimes disjointed in the telling, with little solid sourcing, prone to informal and folksy language, and overly focused on the brutality of the regime, the book is a useful read for international relations novices and those interested in the Kim family. The author makes good use of open-source media accounts to delve beyond the surface of events most people only have a headline understanding of. Besides a few claims based on defector testimony, the book provides little new information to the Pyongyang-watching community.
Some of the useful, if well-trodden, information Lee provides is about the Kim family and its role at the pinnacle of the regime by virtue of the Mt. Paektu bloodline. Useful thumbnail sketches of key members of the Kim family can be found in chapter four, entitled “All in the Family.” He separates fact from fiction in the telling of Kim Il Sung’s rise to power, not by virtue of his political and leadership skills, but with the assistance of his Soviet minders who brought him into the cauldron of Korean politics after the end of World War II and the Japanese withdraw from the peninsula. He removes the mythical trappings surrounding Kim Jong Il’s life to reveal a man who was more comfortable exerting power through informal means and somewhat removed from his people. Lee talks about the system of songbun that separates the North Korean population into strata based on loyalty to the regime: Those who can be trusted and those who must be watched. Finally, he highlights the lengths to which the Kim family has twisted the historical narrative to turn the regime from a simple dictatorship to a cult of personality. All of this is worth reading, but it only hits the wavetops to make a point. For anyone interested in delving deep into these topics, there are several books easily accessible in English, such as Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, Bradley K. Martin’s history of North Korea under the Kim regime, and Marked for Life: North Korea’s Social Classification System by Robert Collins.
Unanswered Questions
Kim Yo Jong serves as a touchstone throughout the book. Chapters devoted to the Kim family and North Korean history have paragraphs seemingly shoehorned into them to show the rise of Kim Jong Un’s sister. This is why I would characterize this book as more a description of the Kim family and North Korean politics under Kim Jong Un than a biography of Kim Yo Jong. A straight-line narrative beginning with the parallels between the Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung funerals and showing Kim Yo Jong’s growth into a figure on the political stage would have been easier to follow and more effective in revealing the dramatic transformation she has undergone, especially in the last few years.
Finally, the book does not really have a conclusion. Although the author tries to put himself in the head of the North Korean princess, giving motivation to her mannerisms and facial expressions, it is surprising that he does not speculate too much on what a post-Kim Jong Un period might look like. He says that Kim Yo Jong is well placed to exercise power for decades, possibly as a successor. But what does that mean? Does Kim Yo Jong have the power and authority to step into her brother’s shoes? Does she have the acumen and relationships throughout the leadership to consolidate her power? Is that something she would want to do, or would she be satisfied serving as a regent to her niece, Ju Ae? Would the military stand for a woman to step into the shoes of the Leader and Commander-in-Chief? These are the questions that intelligence analysts will be wrestling with if Kim Jong Un were to suddenly die or become incapacitated. And how much of a presence Kim Yo Jong would have on the political stage will be a central theme, both for the future of the Kim family and the stability of the North Korean regime.
2. South Korea says US troops won’t be cut even if Trump wins presidency
South Korea says US troops won’t be cut even if Trump wins presidency
By REUTERS South China Morning Post
January 6, 2024
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Reuters
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Published: 2:45pm, 6 Jan, 2024
But December’s National Defence Authorisation Act says the US administration requires congressional approval to scale back the 28,500 troops in South Korea, Kim said.
Strengthening ties between the United States, South Korea and Japan would help overcome any political changes in the US, he added.
At Camp David last August, US President Joe Biden and the leaders of South Korea and Japan agreed to strengthen military and economic cooperation.
The comments came in Kim’s reply to a question on a Politico report that Trump was considering letting North Korea keep its nuclear weapons, and offering financial incentives to stop making new bombs – which Trump has denied as “fake news”.
“Recognising North Korea as a nuclear power means that South Korea will have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons, and Japan [also],” Kim said, when asked about the views of some US experts.
These analysts argue that North Korea should be recognised as a nuclear state and call for disarmament talks.
Neither the US or South Korea can accept the prospect of recognising North Korea as a nuclear state, since that would trigger a domino effect leading to the collapse of the Non-Proliferation Treaty framework, Kim said.
The neighbours remain technically in a state of war since the Korean war from 1950 to 1953 ended in an armistice rather than a peace treaty.
3. North Korea Factor Fades Amid Seoul’s Trilateral Engagement
Excerpts:
In this trilateral engagement, two obstacles have emerged for South Korea. First, the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral, which was expected to strengthen security on the Korean Peninsula, has also contributed to regional insecurity, forcing Pyongyang, Moscow, and Beijing to come together and form a new informal partnership. Second, what started as a careful management strategy, intending to avoid risking Seoul’s relations with Beijing and crossing any red lines – like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea issues – while simultaneously expanding engagement with Seoul’s ally and partners beyond the region on security issues, has now sidelined the main threat South Korea faces, North Korea. This has put Seoul in a strategic bind.
The strategy adopted by Seoul ignored the implications of strengthening the U.S.-led trilateral, like altering the regional power dynamics, which has created more instability and, in effect, more regional insecurity. Nonetheless, under Yoon, Seoul will likely stick to the current path of engaging the United States and China in the two trilaterals. The approach under the conservative government in the current format aims to navigate Seoul’s political, security, economic, and technological challenges, clearly avoiding the core issue of solving the North Korea issue.
However, going forward, if Seoul continues with the current security approach on the Korean Peninsula – sidelining China and preferring the U.S. – it will make the North Korean challenge harder to handle. We’ve seen evidence of this already, as in a recent meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and North Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Myong Ho, where they talked about further boosting “strategic and tactical cooperation” with each other. In addition, depending on the U.S., which has pursued an oscillating strategy toward Pyongyang, between Biden’s no engagement and Trump’s expected agnostic engagement, will likely end up putting Yoon in an awkward position.
North Korea Factor Fades Amid Seoul’s Trilateral Engagement
thediplomat.com
South Korea’s current diplomatic strategy is overlooking its greatest security threat.
By Abhishek Sharma
January 05, 2024
From left: South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden, and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio pose for an official photo before their trilateral meeting at Camp David, Maryland, Aug. 18, 2023.
The foreign ministers of China, Japan, and South Korea met in Seoul for the first time since 2019. Their once-regular trilateral meetings had been on a four-year hiatus. While significant in its own right, the foreign minister meeting failed to give an exact date for the next trilateral leaders meeting, signaling that Beijing is not in a rush for a full-scale summit.
This get-together becomes crucial when countries are juggling a particular question: How do they manage relations with China? Many countries, including South Korea’s allies and partners, have frustrated themselves while solving this strategic enigma. U.S. President Joe Biden and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese have each met with Chinese President Xi Jinping seeking common ground. Still, not much has come out of these efforts.
Some countries in the region are trying to face the challenge by balancing between preferring ties with the United States and trade and commerce with China. But for South Korea, considerations go beyond the trade-offs while engaging with the two blocs. Seoul’s priority is – or should be – figuring out how to address its primary security threat: North Korea.
Currently, Seoul is focused on leveraging two different trilaterals – Japan-South Korea-U.S. and China-Japan-South Korea – to manage its economic and national security priorities. But, in the process, it risks avoiding the regional big picture, which is crucial to addressing the North Korean challenge.
China-Japan-South Korea: Aiming to Restart Engagement
With the revival of the trilateral with China, Seoul is attempting to lay down ground rules with Beijing to remove any misreading and attempt to make progress in bilateral relations. Seoul hopes trilateral institutionalization will help resolve trade and commerce issues, which have risen since the United States imposed tech restrictions on Beijing.
In its effort to re-adjust its foreign policy, Seoul recognizes the rising uncertainty due to U.S. domestic politics and Pyongyang’s rising adventurism. At the same time, it wants to avoid “strategic entrapment” – the risk of getting pulled into a U.S. security commitment – a possibility that has only increased as Washington reaches bipartisan consensus on the China question.
However, China is not necessarily reading the situation the same way as Seoul does. It wants to use the trilateral as leverage to shape Seoul’s behavior. Agreeing to a full summit is a way for China to dissuade its investment partners in East Asia from engaging in either the de-risking or decoupling process. At the July 2023 International Forum for Trilateral Cooperation, seen as a precursor to the full restart of the trilateral mechanism, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi invited South Korea and Japan to “board the express train of China’s high-quality development.”
Engaging with South Korea and Japan in a trilateral is a way for Beijing to restart cooperation at the regional level, which it sees necessary for its security and regional stability. This engagement was fast-tracked due to Beijing’s concern regarding the strengthening relations between South Korea and Japan. Beijing thought the honeymoon phase between Seoul and Tokyo would break under the weight of historical and legacy issues such as forced labor, “comfort women,” the Fukushima wastewater discharge, continued Yasukuni shrine visits by Japanese politicians, and territorial disputes. However, that wish failed. This has forced Beijing to change its language and strategy.
After weighing the pros and cons, China realized it could not afford to antagonize another neighbor like it has with the Philippines. As a result, Beijing is softening its relations with Seoul, a critical global leader in emerging technology and innovation. The goal is to ensure that China’s economic interests are not compromised due to the rising anti-China debate. At the same time, Seoul also sees the trilateral as a platform to engage with China. The overall aim of Seoul and Beijing is to maintain stability in their relations; isolating their ties from broader trends and revitalizing the China-Japan-South Korea trilateral is a step in that direction.
However, in this effort from both sides, the North Korea challenge has not received the same level of attention as it did under the earlier Moon administration in its trilateral engagement with Beijing. The focus is likely first to restart the trilateral rather than getting into the details of the issue that matters for Seoul.
Also, under President Yoon Suk-yeol, there has been a systematic sidelining of Beijing as the preferred partner to address the North Korean challenge. Instead, preference is given to the United States as a security ally to address the Pyongyang threat, prioritizing South Korea-U.S. relations and the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral.
Japan-South Korea-U.S.: Aiming to Expand Engagement
Even the U.S.-led trilateral, which started as an attempt to enhance cooperation between the United States and its East Asian treaty allies to counter North Korean aggression, has now expanded its agenda beyond the Korean Peninsula. As the trilateral agenda expanded beyond the North Korean issue, Seoul was made to confront the China question directly, which it has long avoided, even in its bilateral engagement with Beijing.
Many analysts have looked closely at the trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea to observe Seoul’s Indo-Pacific strategy commitment and regional security. Although the United States was pleased by the improved relations with its East Asian allies, how committed Seoul was to U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region was still a question in Washington. This doubt was primarily due to South Korea’s economic entanglement with China. However, after Seoul demonstrated renewed trust in alliance interests, we have seen the U.S. formulating a comprehensive strategy to constrain China’s access to strategic technologies, which needs broader cooperation from its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
The United States has strengthened its cooperation with its allies into new domains, forming a new security umbrella vision. To implement this vision in Northeast Asia, the trilateral agenda has expanded since 2022, including new domains of cooperation – defense, space, cyber, economy, and technology. The trilateral has even highlighted Seoul’s alliance compulsion in its diplomatic statements – a factor that was quietly stated behind closer doors previously. South Korea’s shift in approach toward, for example, Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea – from Seoul’s first standalone statement to the trilateral statement at Camp David – points toward a change in South Korea’s approach, coming out of this alliance compulsion.
In this bargain, South Korea has made remarkable progress in strengthening its regional cooperation with Japan and the United States at the highest level, particularly on the North Korean challenge, standing together on the same page. The Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral initially restarted in June 2022 with an established common ground and a shared objective, particularly to address the “evolving threat posed by [North Korea’s] unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile program.”
However, the trilateral is now moving to the next stage of regional comprehensive security and economic cooperation. This has put China at the center stage of the discussions. Initially, the focus was on the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea’s challenge, even though views were exchanged on China. But recently we have seen a shift in the trilateral’s focus, which points toward U.S. strategic goals, and thus risks compromising Seoul’s interests. The new stance also starkly contrasts with the agenda last shared in the 2017 trilateral meeting, where security was mentioned at the end of the sentence, and China and its role were seen positively in the context of the North Korean issue.
All this shows that the trilateral agenda has become quite malleable under the Indo-Pacific geopolitical dynamics, which risks undermining attempts to counter the rising threat from North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic weapons program.
Pursuing Closer Security Engagement With the U.S.
The Yoon administration’s foremost priority was navigating the dilemma of dependence on the Chinese economy and strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance, aiming to address its economic growth and security simultaneously. In this scenario, stronger trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan promised greater security for South Korea and a more committed U.S. alliance than ever before. Conversely, a trilateral relationship with China was seen as helping ensure its economic security, stable relations with Beijing, and stability in the Korean Peninsula.
In this trilateral engagement, two obstacles have emerged for South Korea. First, the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral, which was expected to strengthen security on the Korean Peninsula, has also contributed to regional insecurity, forcing Pyongyang, Moscow, and Beijing to come together and form a new informal partnership. Second, what started as a careful management strategy, intending to avoid risking Seoul’s relations with Beijing and crossing any red lines – like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea issues – while simultaneously expanding engagement with Seoul’s ally and partners beyond the region on security issues, has now sidelined the main threat South Korea faces, North Korea. This has put Seoul in a strategic bind.
The strategy adopted by Seoul ignored the implications of strengthening the U.S.-led trilateral, like altering the regional power dynamics, which has created more instability and, in effect, more regional insecurity. Nonetheless, under Yoon, Seoul will likely stick to the current path of engaging the United States and China in the two trilaterals. The approach under the conservative government in the current format aims to navigate Seoul’s political, security, economic, and technological challenges, clearly avoiding the core issue of solving the North Korea issue.
However, going forward, if Seoul continues with the current security approach on the Korean Peninsula – sidelining China and preferring the U.S. – it will make the North Korean challenge harder to handle. We’ve seen evidence of this already, as in a recent meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and North Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Myong Ho, where they talked about further boosting “strategic and tactical cooperation” with each other. In addition, depending on the U.S., which has pursued an oscillating strategy toward Pyongyang, between Biden’s no engagement and Trump’s expected agnostic engagement, will likely end up putting Yoon in an awkward position.
Authors
Guest Author
Abhishek Sharma
Abhishek Sharma is a research associate with the Centre for Air Power Studies, a think tank based in Delhi, India and a PhD candidate in Korean Studies at Delhi University
thediplomat.com
4. Kim Jong Un Shows Off Daughter After Reports She's His Presumptive Successor
When it comes to Kim Ju Ae (Kim Jong Un's daughter) we become like tabloid reporters and paparazzi trying to get a glimpse inside the celebrity family of the Kim regime.
I think we are making too much of this and reading too much into the activities we are seeing.
But I am disappointed in the NIS reporting and the new chief of the NIS, Ambassador Cho is likely just speaking NIS talking points which I think require further assessment and analysis.
But what no one is offering is the "so what?" So what does it mean if she is going to be designated as the successor? How will her possible designation influence regime decision making and how can we exploit this?
Kim Jong Un Shows Off Daughter After Reports She's His Presumptive Successor
South Korea's incoming spy chief says it appears the daughter is being prepared to eventually take the reins from her father
Published 01/05/24 07:48 AM ET|Updated 01/05/24 08:10 AM ET
Peter S. Green
themessenger.com · January 5, 2024
North Korea’s enigmatic and combative leader appears to be grooming his 10-year-old daughter to succeed him, South Korea’s spy agency said Thursday.
Kim Ju-ae, believed to have been born in 2013, has been in the spotlight for a little over a year, after her father, Kim Jong-un, brought her to watch a missile launch.
Since then she has accompanied him to various military events, and state-controlled media has been calling her Kim’s “respected” daughter, an apparent upgrade from her previous description as "most beloved.”
South Koreans watch a television screen showing a news broadcast with an image of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (L) and his daughter Ju Ae (R) attending a military parade held in Pyongyang to mark the 75th founding anniversary of its armed forces, at a railway station in Seoul on February 9, 2023.JUNG YEON-JE/AFP via Getty Images
That’s a sign in the notoriously cryptic North Korea that she is his favorite child, the incoming head of South Korea’s intelligence service said in a report handed to parliament, the Yonhap News Agency reported.
The news comes as the elder Kim has been threatening the U.S. and South Korea with nuclear annihilation if they try to overturn his despotic regime.
A video released Thursday by the North’s Korean Central News Agency shows the elder Kim with his daughter visiting a plant that makes portable launching systems for intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Family succession is a key factor in North Korea’s notoriously opaque power structure. Kim Jung-on is the grandson of the country’s founder, Kim Il-sung, who created the totalitarian Marxist state after Japan ended its occupation of Korea when it lost World War II.
It’s still early days to be certain about Kim’s succession, Cho Tae-yong, the South Korean spy chief, said in his report. Cho noted that Korea's leader is still young and appears to be relatively healthy, if not obese, and there are also many variables, including the existence of other siblings.
North Korea is a deeply patriarchal society, so it is not clear if Ju-ae will eventually succeed her father.
Cho said Kim is believed to have another child whose gender is unknown, without elaborating.
Ju-ae is known to be Kim's second child, but there are no confirmed details about his other children, including their gender.
The isolated country keeps a tight lid on almost all information and denies its people access to the outside world, though some North Koreans near the border with China are believed to be using mobile phones smuggled in from next door.
In March, the spy agency told lawmakers that it is looking into intelligence that Kim's first child is a son and it has yet to identify the gender of the third child.
Last month, South Korea’s Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho said the North's leader appears to be "in a hurry" to bring Ju-ae to the forefront in a bid to demonstrate his commitment to the third hereditary power succession as the country continues to struggle to feed its people, Yonghap reported.
themessenger.com · January 5, 2024
5. N.K. leader taking offensive policy on S. Korea to divert public attention from internal woes: unification minister
I concur with Minister Kim. We need to be paying attention to internal instability in north Korea while we maintain vigilance and a deterrence and defense posture to address the full range of contingencies.
As an aside this also gives us some thoughts on how to emplit the Kim Ju Ae situation - if there is internal friction over hereditary success that should be incorporated into the overall information and influence campaign. Show the Korean people in the north the alternatives and the path to get there.
N.K. leader taking offensive policy on S. Korea to divert public attention from internal woes: unification minister | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 6, 2024
SEOUL, Jan. 6 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un appears to have taken a more offensive policy stance toward South Korea to divert internal attention from economic difficulties and discontent over the hereditary power succession, Seoul's top point man on inter-Korean relations said Saturday.
Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho made the remarks in an interview with broadcaster KBS when asked about the intentions behind the North's leader defining inter-Korean ties as relations "between two states hostile to each other" at a year-end ruling party meeting.
Pyongyang fired 200 rounds of artillery shells into waters near the Northern Limit Line, the de facto maritime border between the divided Koreas, on Friday in its first major armed provocation this year.
"The North's internal situation is very difficult," Kim said.
Citing interviews with North Korean defectors in South Korea, Kim added, "There is a very negative perception on the (hereditary) succession of power. ... (The move) is intended to divert such discontent externally."
The Kim family has ruled North Korea since it was founded by the current leader's late grandfather Kim Il-sung in 1948.
The minister also dismissed a statement from the powerful sister of the North Korean leader this week that claimed the Yoon Suk Yeol government has provided the justification for the North's military development, calling it part of the North's psychological warfare.
"The government will sternly respond if North Korea continues such psychological warfare," he said.
Kim also downplayed concerns over Washington possibly recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state if former U.S. President Donald Trump wins the upcoming presidential election in November, noting that it would prompt nuclear development by South Korea and Japan.
This file photo, taken Dec. 7, 2023, shows Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho at the government complex in central Seoul. (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 6, 2024
6. N. Korea fires artillery shells from western coast for 2nd day: S. Korean military
The regime must continue to develop the perception of the threat from the South. That perceived threat is critical to maintaining the iron hold on the population.
N. Korea fires artillery shells from western coast for 2nd day: S. Korean military | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 6, 2024
SEOUL, Jan. 6 (Yonhap) -- North Korea fired some 60 artillery shells into waters off its western coast Saturday, South Korea's military said, conducting live-fire drills near the tensely guarded western border for the second consecutive day.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff said it detected the artillery firings in the North's southwestern coastal areas for an hour from 4 p.m.
On Friday, the North fired some 200 artillery shells near two South Korean western border islands of Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeong, prompting islanders to take shelter and the South Korean military to stage live-fire drills in response.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 6, 2024
7. N. Korean leader sends condolence message to Japanese PM over recent earthquake
Kim seems to be pursuing multiple lines of effort. In this case he wants to be perceived as a player on the world stage and this is for both external and internal propaganda consumption,
N. Korean leader sends condolence message to Japanese PM over recent earthquake | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 6, 2024
SEOUL, Jan. 6 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has sent a message to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida expressing his condolences over the recent series of deadly earthquakes in western Japan, state media reported Saturday, a rare move apparently aimed at painting himself as a global leader.
Kim sent the message to Kishida on Friday, expressing "deep sympathy" and "condolences" over the casualties and losses caused by the earthquakes at the start of the year, according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
"The message sincerely hoped that the people in the affected areas would eradicate the aftermath of earthquakes and restore their stable life at the earliest date possible," it said in an English-language dispatch.
North Korea, let alone its reclusive leader, rarely sends such messages to countries that it does not consider friendly.
A magnitude 7.6 earthquake hit Ishikawa prefecture on New Year's Day and was followed by a series of aftershocks that have left at least 94 people killed, according to reports.
Kim also sent a separate message to Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi the same day to express condolences over deadly terrorist bomb attacks in Iran earlier this week.
At least 84 people were killed in Iran's southeastern city of Kerman after two explosions went off Wednesday at a ceremony to commemorate Gen. Qasem Soleimani, who was assassinated by the United States in 2020.
North Korean Kim Jong-un speaks during a year-end ruling party meeting in Pyongyang, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency on Dec. 31, 2023. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 6, 2024
8. 2.4 magnitude earthquake hits off southwestern coast: weather agency
2.4 magnitude earthquake hits off southwestern coast: weather agency | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 6, 2024
SEOUL, Jan. 6 (Yonhap) -- A 2.4 magnitude earthquake hit off South Korea's southwestern coast Saturday, with no damage expected from the tremor, the state weather agency said.
The quake occurred at 8:02 p.m. in waters about 49 kilometers south off the southwestern island of Geomun, in Yeosu, South Jeolla Province, some 316 kilometers from Seoul, according to the Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA).
The epicenter was at a depth of 17 km.
The quake is not expected to cause any damage, the KMA said.
The red dot marks the area where a 2.4 magnitude earthquake struck off South Korea's southwestern coast on Jan. 6, 2024. (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · January 6, 2024
9. US validates N. Korean SRBM usage in Russian assault on Ukraine
US validates N. Korean SRBM usage in Russian assault on Ukraine
donga.com
Posted January. 06, 2024 07:46,
Updated January. 06, 2024 07:46
US validates N. Korean SRBM usage in Russian assault on Ukraine. January. 06, 2024 07:46. weappon@donga.com.
The White House declared that Russia utilized North Korea's short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with a 900-km firing range on Thursday in its attacks on the Ukrainian front. This declaration not only directly confirmed concerns about Russia's deployment of North Korean SRBMs but also vividly demonstrated, through practical combat, North Korea's strategic nuclear warhead missile capabilities, igniting serious repercussions.
John Kirby, NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications, stated that sources indicate North Korea recently provided Russia with ballistic missile launchers and several ballistic missiles. He mentioned that at least one missile was launched on December 30, 2023, followed by several more on January 2, 2024. In exchange for these missiles, which have an approximate firing range of 900 kilometers, North Korea appears to be seeking military assistance from Russia, including fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment or materials, and other advanced technologies. North Korea independently developed its short-range ballistic missiles, modeling them after Russia's Iskander missiles and the U.S. ATACMS.
Mr. Kirby condemned Russia's acquisition of missiles from North Korea, citing a direct breach of UN Security Council resolutions, emphasizing that the U.S., in collaboration with South Korea and Japan, is actively pursuing sanctions against these actions. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield highlighted that these violations will be addressed during the UN Security Council meeting scheduled for Wednesday.
한국어
donga.com
10. SpectralBlur: New macOS Backdoor Threat from North Korean Hackers
As Mac users we should be concerned.
SpectralBlur: New macOS Backdoor Threat from North Korean Hackers
thehackernews.com
Jan 05, 2024NewsroomEndpoint Security / Malware
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a new Apple macOS backdoor called SpectralBlur that overlaps with a known malware family that has been attributed to North Korean threat actors.
"SpectralBlur is a moderately capable backdoor that can upload/download files, run a shell, update its configuration, delete files, hibernate, or sleep, based on commands issued from the [command-and-control server]," security researcher Greg Lesnewich said.
The malware shares similarities with KANDYKORN (aka SockRacket), an advanced implant that functions as a remote access trojan capable of taking control of a compromised host.
It's worth noting that the KANDYKORN activity also intersects with another campaign orchestrated by the Lazarus sub-group known as BlueNoroff (aka TA444) which culminates in the deployment of a backdoor referred to as RustBucket and a late-stage payload dubbed ObjCShellz.
In recent months, the threat actor has been observed combining disparate pieces of these two infection chains, leveraging RustBucket droppers to deliver KANDYKORN.
The latest findings are another sign that North Korean threat actors are increasingly setting their sights on macOS to infiltrate high-value targets, particularly those within the cryptocurrency and the blockchain industries.
"TA444 keeps running fast and furious with these new macOS malware families," Lesnewich said.
Security researcher Patrick Wardle, who shared additional insights into the inner workings of SpectralBlur, said the Mach-O binary was uploaded to the VirusTotal malware scanning service in August 2023 from Colombia.
The functional similarities between KANDYKORN and SpectralBlur have raised the possibility that they may have been built by different developers keeping the same requirements in mind.
What makes the malware stand out are its attempts to hinder analysis and evade detection while using grantpt to set up a pseudo-terminal and execute shell commands received from the C2 server.
The disclosure comes as a total of 21 new malware families designed to target macOS systems, including ransomware, information stealers, remote access trojans, and nation-state-backed malware, were discovered in 2023, up from 13 identified in 2022.
"With the continued growth and popularity of macOS (especially in the enterprise!), 2024 will surely bring a bevy of new macOS malware," Wardle noted.
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11. North Korea may surprise world with big nuclear moves
From the crystal ball. Mine is still cloudy and I do not have the experts' clarity.
North Korea may surprise world with big nuclear moves
The Korea Times · January 6, 2024
North Koreans celebrate the New Year at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, Dec. 31, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. Speaking to The Korea Times recently, experts said this year will likely remain tense for the Korean Peninsula as Pyongyang is expected to redouble efforts for a military buildup after officially abandoning its efforts for peace through talks. Yonhap
Tense year lies ahead as Pyongyang redoubles efforts to build up arms
Editor’s note
This article is the first in a four-part series that provides an analysis of South Korea’s diplomatic situation with neighboring countries at the start of 2024. ― ED.
By Jung Min-ho
Pyongyang has left little room for second-guessing about what inter-Korean relations would be like this year. During a year-end ruling Workers’ Party meeting, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called for “overwhelming” war readiness against South Korea and the U.S.
As a means of building such military forces, he then told officials to redouble their efforts for “five top-priority tasks” for the year ahead. Among the plans are producing “supersized” nuclear warheads and developing submarines capable of launching an underwater nuclear attack.
All this suggests that North Korea might be preparing for its first nuclear weapons test since 2017, according to experts contacted recently by The Korea Times. With the North officially abandoning its peace efforts, the big question now is how much tension would rise on the peninsula rather than whether there would be any turnaround, they said.
“Among the top priorities, the ‘supersized’ nuclear warhead is the only weapon that has not been revealed. After his announcement, North Korea may move to test it before unveiling it to the world,” said Cha Du-hyeogn, a senior analyst at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a think tank.
North Korea’s latest nuclear test was estimated to have a yield of up to 100 kilotons, which is five times stronger than the atomic bomb detonated over the Japanese city of Nagasaki in 1945. Cha fears the new bomb under development — likely a thermonuclear type — would be far more powerful.
Experts said if Pyongyang ever decides to carry out another nuclear test in spite of apparent opposition from Beijing, the purpose would be to demonstrate its nuclear strike capability in a real-war situation.
“It is important to keep in mind that North Korea is doing all this to pressure U.S. politicians to recognize it as a significant threat they should deal with,” said Kim Jin-ha, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), a state-funded think tank.
“To convince them, North Korea could test its tactical nuclear weapon or test-launch its intercontinental ballistic missile at a normal angle (instead of a high angle) to demonstrate its ability to strike the U.S. mainland.”
Kim said one possible scenario for North Korea is to test-fire its Haeil-1 and Haeil-2 underwater drones, which he said are “capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.” They were believed to be inspired by the Poseidon, a Russian unmanned underwater vehicle equipped with a nuclear propulsion system and nuclear warhead.
Cheong Seong-chang of the Sejong Institute, a think tank, is another scholar who thinks that North Korea may well test the Hwasan-31, its nuclear warhead disclosed for the first time last March, in the coming weeks ― possibly on the occasion of Kim Jong-un’s 40th birthday on Jan. 8, or his deceased father’s on Feb. 16.
In his announcement, the North Korean leader set forth plans to launch three additional spy satellites in 2024 after the successful launch of its first in November.
He said it would be critical to establish a “reliable foundation” to build more nuclear weapons amid signs that it started operating a new light-water reactor at its main nuclear facility in Yongbyon. He also told officials to enhance submarine capabilities as his navy is trying to turn dozens of its mid-sized submarines into “tactical nuclear attack submarines.”
Experts have expressed concerns that all such efforts could be aided by its strong ties to the Kremlin, which is using North Korean ammunition for its war against Ukraine in exchange for the promises of its technical support for the regime. They also worry that this Cold War-like climate would deepen the division of the two Koreas even further.
What is suspected to be a Haeil "nuclear-armed" unmanned underwater vehicle is revealed during a military parade at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, July 27, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. Yonhap
‘Highly calculated provocations expected’
Despite its belligerent rhetoric, experts believe North Korea will largely avoid making blatant provocations in fear of retaliation from the Seoul-Washington combined forces.
The most likely scenario is that North Korea would plan something similar to its 2015 attack, in which two South Korean soldiers were seriously injured by a landmine in the demilitarized zone apparently planted in secret by the North Korean military, they said.
“For its political and diplomatic objectives, North Korea would want to stir up tensions. But I think it is unlikely to make big-scale provocations like its attack on South Korea's Cheonan frigate,” Cha said. “The risk of possible consequences is too great. Most likely, it would aim for something that could have a major political impact without causing many deaths.”
With critical elections scheduled for this year — in Taiwan, Russia, South Korea and the U.S. — North Korea will explore the best timing for its provocations while amplifying efforts to develop new weapons to increase its bargaining power in any future negotiations with a possibly new U.S. president — maybe Donald Trump — after its election in November, said experts. They added that the regime ultimately wants a nuclear disarmament deal with Washington.
According to Kim Jin-ha, North Korea’s attempt to align itself with Russia and China is another recent pattern that deserves extra attention.
“Instead of acting alone, North Korea has recently shown a tendency of acting in accordance with the messages from Russia and China, which appear to view it more importantly in their geopolitical strategies against the U.S.,” the KINU analyst said. “After Taiwan’s presidential election (scheduled for Jan. 13), North Korea is expected to watch closely how China reacts to the results.”
The Korea Times · January 6, 2024
12. South Korea tells Russia to stop getting arms from North Korea
South Korea tells Russia to stop getting arms from North Korea
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · January 5, 2024
By Kim Arin
Published : Jan. 5, 2024 - 17:07
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul (Yonhap)
South Korea on Friday called on Russia to halt its arms deal with North Korea following a White House announcement that North Korean ballistic missiles were used in Russian attacks against Ukraine.
A senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul said on this day that by hauling arms from North Korea, Russia was “contradicting” the United Nations Security Council resolutions despite being a permanent member.
The official said that the Foreign Ministry, together with its US counterpart, has been “closely following the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, including the ballistic missiles trade announced by the White House recently.”
“Russia’s arms trade with North Korea poses a serious threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and beyond, and we once again call for an immediate cessation,” the official said.
The official added that South Korea, which has a seat on the UN Security Council for the next two years, would be raising the issue of the arms deals between Russia and North Korea with the international community, including the US and Japan.
The White House said earlier the same day that Russia used North Korean short-range ballistic missiles to strike Ukraine.
A day prior, on Thursday, top security officials of South Korea, Japan and the US held a virtual meeting to discuss ways to respond to the transfer of arms from North Korea to Russia.
The South Korean presidential office said Kim Tae-hyo, the deputy director of national security, spoke with Kurt Campbell, the coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs on the US national security council, and Keiichi Ichikawa, the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s North American Affairs Bureau director-general, over the matter.
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · January 5, 2024
13. U.S. officials, experts pick N.K.-triggered crisis among plausible top-tier contingencies in 2024
These experts always seem to overlook the potential for north Korean internal instability and regime collapse as a possible contingency. Since no one will address it, it could be the black swan that catches us by surprise.
The full report can be downloaded here: https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/CFR_CPA_PPS24.pdf
U.S. officials, experts pick N.K.-triggered crisis among plausible top-tier contingencies in 2024 | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 5, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Jan. 4 (Yonhap) -- U.S. officials and experts have singled out a possible North Korea-triggered security crisis as one of top-tier contingencies deemed plausible this year, a U.S. think tank report showed Thursday, as Pyongyang has ratcheted up tensions through hardened rhetoric and its focus on military reinforcement.
The Center for Preventive Action under the Council on Foreign Relations released the report, entitled the "Preventive Priorities Survey 2024," where about 550 U.S. officials, experts and academics responded to the possibility of conflicts around the world that may need Washington's timely policy action.
The report put a potential North Korea-driven crisis on the "Tier I" list of eight contingencies. Contingencies were sorted into three tiers with Tier 1 being the top category involving events more likely to happen with "high" impacts on U.S. interests.
The top-tier list includes a protracted war between Israel and the Hamas militant group, an escalation of Russia's war in Ukraine as well as a cross-strait crisis, which could arise from China's increased pressure toward Taiwan.
"An acute security crisis in Northeast Asia triggered by North Korea's further development and testing of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles," the report said in its listing of Tier I scenarios in the year.
The report characterized the North Korea-related contingency as a "moderate"-likelihood one with a "high" impact.
Concerns about North Korea's potential saber-rattling have run deep as Seoul's National Intelligence Service raised the possibility of the recalcitrant regime engaging in provocative acts ahead of South Korea's parliamentary elections in April and the U.S. presidential vote in November.
The report's Tier II list includes an escalation in violence between Turkish forces and armed Kurdish groups within Iraq or Syria, and Chinese actions in the South China Sea, especially toward the Philippines, leading to an armed confrontation involving China, the United States, and U.S. allies.
On the Tier III list are potential cases involving Afghanistan, Haiti, Sudan, Somalia and other countries.
The survey was launched in 2008 to alert U.S. policymakers to potentially threatening sources of instability and conflict overseas so as to help them take timely action.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Dec. 31, 2023, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (C) attending a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 5, 2024
14. Pentagon stresses 'main focus' on regional stability amid N. Korea's bellicose rhetoric
I wonder if our statements of our opposition conflict are actually giving our adversaries reasons to provoke us and push us toward conflict.
Maybe what we should say is we want to ensure that we are strong enough to defeat any adversary to make them oppose any conflict.
We should not allow them to misunderstand or misinterpret our statements and think we will do anything to avoid conflict. We have to demonstrate the strategic resolve that we are willing and able to fight whenever and wherever necessary to defend US interests. And we can do that at the drop of a hat or the filing of a missile.
I fear sometimes our messages are intended more for domestic political groups and their interpretation allows our adversaries to "misunderestimate" us.
Pentagon stresses 'main focus' on regional stability amid N. Korea's bellicose rhetoric | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 5, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Jan. 4 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. Department of Defense on Thursday highlighted its "main focus" on maintaining regional stability and its opposition to conflict, as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has called for strengthening war preparation efforts.
In a press briefing, Maj. Gen. Patrick Ryder, the Pentagon press secretary, also said that America's extended deterrence will continue to help contribute "directly" towards regional security. Extended deterrence refers to the U.S.' commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend its allies.
"We are going to continue to stay very focused on working with our allies and our partners in the region to ensure that regional security, stability and prosperity are the main focus," he told reporters. "No one wants to see conflict in that region ... so that will continue to be our focus."
His remarks were in response to the North's tough rhetoric against Washington.
During a dayslong plenary session of the ruling Workers' Party's Central Committee last week, the North Korean leader called for stepped-up war preparation efforts, pointing to "unprecedented" U.S.-led confrontational moves against his country.
Kim also put forward a series of goals for 2024, including launching three additional military spy satellites and beefing up efforts to bolster his country's nuclear arsenal.
Maj. Gen. Patrick Ryder, the Pentagon's spokesperson, is seen answering questions during a daily press briefing at the Department of Defense in Washington on Aug. 22, 2023 in this captured image. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 5, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
