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Quotes of the Day:
“He said to people: you’re free. And they said hooray, and then he showed them what freedom costs and they called him a tyrant and, as soon as he’d been betrayed, they milled around a bit like barn-bred chickens who’ve seen the big world outside for the first time, and then they went back into the warm and shut the door...”
― Terry Pratchett, Feet of Clay
“Tyranny is the exercise of some power over a man, which is not warranted by law, or necessary for the public safety. A people can never be deprived of their liberties, while they retain in their own hands, a power sufficient to any other power in the state.”
― Noah Webster
“The paralysis of potential is essential to the manufacturing of victims.”
― Stefan Molyneux
1. North Korea's New Hwasong-18 ICBM: Flying High Thanks to Russia?
2. U.S. expresses serious concern over signs of N.K. commissioning light-water reactor
3. 70 pct of N.K. defectors in Seoul have hard time making ends meet: think tank
4. Yoon's approval rating inches up to 38.8 pct: poll
5. N. Korea will likely keep amassing nuclear warheads until next negotiation
6. Demographic dystopia
7. Koreans shouldn't underestimate themselves
8. Japan-South Korea Cooperation: Strength in Unity, Danger in Division
9. Pacific Power Play: Japan’s Defense Overhaul And South Korea’s Global Arms Ascent – Analysis.
10. Colonel Benjamin Studdard Malcom, 94 (Author of "White Tigers, My Secret War in North Korea")
11. Russia’s Own Troops Are Being Blown Up By Low Quality Artillery Ammo From North Korea
1. North Korea's New Hwasong-18 ICBM: Flying High Thanks to Russia?
Conclusion:
What does all of this mean? North Korea has now shown us that they are determined to upgrade and modernize their ballistic missile force – both ICBMs and shorter-range missiles. The game has changed significantly because, unlike any other time in Pyongyang’s ballistic missile history (even during the Cold War), we are likely to see large-scale technical support and military assistance from the Russians, mainly for two reasons: Russia’s desperation to get large amounts of military equipment and ammunition from the North Koreans, and Kim Jong-eun’s insatiable desire to continue to modernize and upgrade his ballistic missile force. Thus, this is a story that continues to be written.
North Korea's New Hwasong-18 ICBM: Flying High Thanks to Russia?
There is evidence to suggest Russia might be helping North Korea with its Hwasong-18 ICBM. What does that mean for Asian regional security?
The National Interest · by Bruce E. Bechtol · December 23, 2023
North Korea recently conducted a successful launch of what, for them, is the most sophisticated ICBM yet. The missile, designated the Hwasong-18 by Pyongyang, completed a flight that involved the system flying on a lofted trajectory that, if measured on a standard trajectory, would give it the range to target all of the United States.
There has been much discussion about this launch, and with good reason. Key questions evolving around the Hwasong-18 include but are not limited to: how did the North Koreans develop this capability, was there in fact, outside assistance (most likely from the Russians), how is this more or less of a threat then what has until now been Pyongyang’s most successful ICBM (the Hwasong-15), and does this change the current balance of military forces on the Korean Peninsula?
I believe it is essential to focus on these questions and address other issues surrounding its continued existence.
Here Comes the Hwasong-18
If one is to look at the Hwasong-18, it appears to be very much like the Russian Topol-M ICBM (SS-27 Mod 2). According to Theodore Postol, writing for CSIS, this missile is very similar in appearance and dimensions to the aforementioned Russian missile, has similar flight trajectory data, and depending on exact capabilities, may be able to carry a similar payload.
Further, the rather sudden addition of a solid-fuel ICBM in the North Korean arsenal, capable of successful launches almost from the beginning of its existence, does not seem likely.
It is also unlikely that the North Koreans rolled out of bed one morning and suddenly came up with the sophisticated technology and engineering to build and launch a solid-fuel ICBM on their own. Thus, any analyst who has been following North Korea since the genesis of its programs is likely to have the common sense to know that such technology was probably developed with the assistance of an outside entity. Given the design and appearance of the missile, those outside entities were likely Russians, and it is doubtful that assistance to the North Koreans for this missile development was given without the Russian government’s approval.
Is more Russian assistance likely for this and other North Korean missile systems? As I stated in an earlier essay for The National Interest , “…in recent months, Kim Jong-un visited Russia, where one of his key stops was a space launch facility. Reportedly, the Russians assisted the North Koreans with rocket engine challenges and may have even assisted with communications and command and control capabilities vital to launching and utilizing a satellite system in orbit. We should not be surprised if this assistance continues and in fact increases in terms of scope, focus, and technology.”
My quote was directly related to satellite technology, but why would the Russians not assist the North Koreans with their ballistic missile technology? This is, as we all know, one of Kim Jong-eun’s highest priorities, and he likely will ask for this continued assistance as part of the payment for the massive weapons and ammunition shipments the DPRK is currently sending to Russia.
Earlier this week, the South Korean Defense Minister stated that "[N]orth Korea succeeded in flying a missile a long distance and developing a solid fuel missile, but it has not yet been verified whether it is capable of re-entering the atmosphere and accurately striking a target." This is an interesting assessment, but the fact is that according to assessments by most analysts, the Hwasong-15 does have re-entry capability. The Hwasong-18 also very likely has re-entry capability, and the only way to prove or disprove this is for the North Koreans to launch a missile with a nuclear payload to an empty spot in the ocean where it successfully detonates. In the international community, nobody wants that, but prudent analysis brings us to the assessment that the Hwasong-18 does have re-entry capability. There have been other assessments that this latest launch may mean the Hwasong-18 will be “operationally deployed.” North Korean rhetoric notwithstanding, there is no way to know that. But what is almost inevitable is that we will see more launches of this system – and the more launches we see, the more capable North Korea’s engineers and rocket specialists will become in operating the Hwasong-18.
The Hwasong-18 ICBM Threat
Is this missile more of a threat than North Korea’s most reliable missile before it (the Hwasong-15)?
The Hwasong-15 has proven to be a reliable missile since its launch in 2017. The heavier Hwasong-17 has proven to be far less reliable in its tests. But it is important to note that what many analysts have stated are the key upgrades for the Hwasong-18 – faster loading because of solid fuel, fewer vehicles to deploy, and more accessible transportation via transporter-erector-launcher – may not be what makes this missile more of a threat.
In fact, if this missile has at least several of the capabilities of the Russian Topol-M ICBM (SS-27 Mod 2), these capabilities will be a challenge to American missile defense. As Postol from CSIS states, “[T]his missile is equipped to penetrate existing U.S. ballistic missile defenses with countermeasures and deliver multiple thermonuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. A Hwasong-18 missile force will require the U.S. to consider additional concepts for missile defense including the use of airborne drone interceptors (“airborne patrol”).”
Postol also acknowledges sophisticated decoy countermeasures and a sophisticated guidance system that the North Korean missile would have if the Russians shared this technology. If the Hwasong-18 has even some of these capabilities, that would make it an upgrade over the Hwasong-15. Liquid fuel missiles are still very mobile, and it is even possible that they could be fueled underground, safe from allied collection systems. The North Koreans have always been very good at hiding launch patterns when they wanted to do so.
Does this change the current balance of forces on the Korean Peninsula? It is certainly possible, given the technology observed thus far and upgrades that the Russians could easily pass to the North Koreans. That said, if these capabilities are confirmed, the countermeasures that could be initiated by both South Korea and the United States would likely be quite rapid.
North Korea's Growing ICBM Arsenal Is a Clear Threat
What does all of this mean? North Korea has now shown us that they are determined to upgrade and modernize their ballistic missile force – both ICBMs and shorter-range missiles. The game has changed significantly because, unlike any other time in Pyongyang’s ballistic missile history (even during the Cold War), we are likely to see large-scale technical support and military assistance from the Russians, mainly for two reasons: Russia’s desperation to get large amounts of military equipment and ammunition from the North Koreans, and Kim Jong-eun’s insatiable desire to continue to modernize and upgrade his ballistic missile force. Thus, this is a story that continues to be written.
About the Author
Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. is a professor of Political Science at Angelo State University. He is also the president of the International Council on Korean Studies and a fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies. The author of five books dealing with North Korea, his latest work is North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa.
The National Interest · by Bruce E. Bechtol · December 23, 2023
2. U.S. expresses serious concern over signs of N.K. commissioning light-water reactor
U.S. expresses serious concern over signs of N.K. commissioning light-water reactor | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by CHANG JAE SUN · December 24, 2023
WASHINGTON/SEOUL, Dec. 23 (Yonhap) -- The United States has expressed serious concern over North Korea showing signs of starting the operation of a new light-water nuclear reactor in a possible attempt to produce nuclear weapons fuel.
International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi said Thursday that the agency has detected more signs of the North commissioning the light-water reactor (LWR) at the North's main Yongbyon nuclear complex, such as warm water being discharged from it.
The North's "commissioning of a new light-water nuclear power plant raises serious concerns, including safety," the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Vienna said in a statement. "The DPRK's unlawful nuclear & ballistic missile programs continue to pose a grave threat to international peace & security."
Without the IAEA's monitoring and assistance, "significant risks extend to the DPRK, the region, & the global nuclear industry," the mission said, referring to the North by the acronym of its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The IAEA chief said the discharge of warm water from the light-water reactor is "indicative the reactor has reached criticality," adding that the "LWR, like any nuclear reactor, can produce plutonium in its irradiated fuel, which can be separated during reprocessing."
"So this is a cause for concern," he said.
Grossi also said the further development of the North's nuclear program, including the construction and operation of the LWR, is a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and urged Pyongyang to fully comply with its obligations under the resolutions.
This satellite image, released by 38 North on Nov. 24, 2021, shows North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex, north of Pyongyang. North Korea appears to be continuing the operation of a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at the complex, the U.S. monitoring website said the same day, citing the release of steam and water seen in recent satellite imagery. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
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en.yna.co.kr · by CHANG JAE SUN · December 24, 2023
3. 70 pct of N.K. defectors in Seoul have hard time making ends meet: think tank
This requires urgent attention by the Korean government and the Korean people.
70 pct of N.K. defectors in Seoul have hard time making ends meet: think tank | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Jae-eun · December 24, 2023
SEOUL, Dec. 24 (Yonhap) -- Around one-fifth of North Korean defectors in South Korea live in Seoul, but close to 70 percent of them have a hard time making ends meet, a think tank report showed Sunday.
The Seoul Institute, a research center established by the Seoul city government, analyzed residential data of North Korean defectors provided by the Ministry of Unification and conducted a survey on those aged between 19 and 60 living in Seoul from Dec. 15, 2022, to Jan. 16, 2023.
According to the report, 20.6 percent of 31,362 North Korean defectors were living in the country's capital and 69.4 percent of them said they had a hard time financially supporting themselves over the past year.
Four out of 10 people, or 37.7 percent, were recipients of the government's basic living subsidies, while more than half, or 58.7 percent, were living on a monthly living cost of under 1 million won (US$769.80), the report showed.
In terms of their housing situation, only 5.7 percent said they own a home, while close to half, or 46.3 percent, said they were living in government rental homes.
The most cited hardships that defectors residing in Seoul faced were "saving money and building assets," followed by "social stigma and discrimination," and "earning opportunities to generate income."
Despite such difficulties, 90.4 percent said they are "strongly willing" to live in Seoul for the next 10 years, the survey also showed.
Participants examine job postings on a bulletin at a job fair for North Korean defectors held in Seoul, in this file photo taken Dec. 1, 2023. (Yonhap)
fairydust@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Jae-eun · December 24, 2023
4. Yoon's approval rating inches up to 38.8 pct: poll
Yoon's approval rating inches up to 38.8 pct: poll | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Jae-eun · December 24, 2023
SEOUL, Dec. 24 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol's approval rating inched up from the previous week to 38.8 percent, a poll showed Sunday.
The rating rose by 0.8 percentage point from a week earlier, while the negative assessment fell by 0.9 percentage point to 58.2 percent, according to the survey conducted by RnSearch and commissioned by broadcaster CBS on 1,020 people aged 18 and over from Wednesday to Friday.
The negative assessment of Yoon was higher than the positive assessment in all age groups, except for respondents over 70, the survey also showed.
The approval ratings of the two major rival parties moved in opposite directions.
Support for the ruling People Power Party (PPP) was 38.1 percent, up 3.5 percentage points, while that of the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) fell 0.6 percentage point to 45.7 percent.
The proportion of people who do not support any party came to 12.2 percent.
Meanwhile, former Justice Minister Han Dong-hoon, designated to be the ruling party's interim leader, was cited as the most suitable person for the position with 34.3 percent of support, followed by Construction Minister Won Hee-ryong with 9 percent, according to the survey.
The survey has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points, with a credibility rate of 95 percent.
President Yoon Suk Yeol gives a speech at an event in Seoul on the government's housing supply measures on Dec. 21, 2023, in this photo provided by the presidential office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
fairydust@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Jae-eun · December 24, 2023
5. N. Korea will likely keep amassing nuclear warheads until next negotiation
Yes, Kim Jong Un would be happy with arms control negotiations. To him it will mean success for his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies and he will double down to continue to seek political and economic concessions from the ROK, US, and international community as he continues his military advances while subverting the ROK and the ROK/US alliance to establish favorable conditions for his domination of the Korean peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State, We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
N. Korea will likely keep amassing nuclear warheads until next negotiation
The Korea Times · December 24, 2023
North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex, north of Pyongyang, is seen in this satellite image released by 38 North on Nov. 24, 2021. North Korea appears to have recently started operating its new light-water reactor at the facility, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency and experts. Yonhap
Pyongyang aims to seek disarmament talks after US presidential election: experts
By Jung Min-ho
North Korea appears to have started operating a new light-water reactor at its main nuclear facility in Yongbyon in a move obviously aimed at expanding its capacity to produce fuel for nuclear bombs.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, a global nuclear watchdog, there have been increased levels of activity at and near the reactor such as a strong discharge of warm water in what appears to be the regime’s latest violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Speaking to The Korea Times on Sunday, analysts said establishing another such reactor was likely part of North Korea’s stated plan to “exponentially increase” the number of its nuclear warheads. They also said Pyongyang is expected to focus on that task for at least a year until it feels it has accumulated enough of them for a potential disarmament negotiation with a — possibly new — U.S. president after its election in November.
“After a fruitless Hanoi summit with the United States, North Korea seems to have changed its policy goal to seek a nuclear disarmament deal. That means the more nuclear warheads it has, the more bargaining power it gets, ahead of its possible negotiation with the U.S.,” said Cho Han-bum, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), a state-funded think tank.
“So it is reasonable to think that it will likely stick to that plan and try to use its full capacity to produce as many as possible.”
Buried in low-lying hills about 100 kilometers north of Pyongyang, Yongbyon is home to the North’s five-megawatt nuclear reactor designed to extract plutonium ― a key ingredient for atomic bombs. The construction of its second reactor began more than a decade ago. It is known to have a bigger capacity than the first, meaning that it could expedite the speed of producing more such weapons.
North Korea is thought to have already amassed dozens of nuclear warheads. Two scholars at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, a state-funded think tank, said the regime has so far built 80 to 90 nuclear warheads in their joint analysis published in January.
That number could double within several years, according to Kim Jin-ha, another researcher at the KINU.
“The worst-case scenario could unfold for South Korea if the U.S. decides to reach a nuclear disarmament negotiation with North Korea under a new president,” the analyst said. “That means North Korea would be able to keep some of its nuclear weapons with a de facto U.S. recognition while the South has no such weapons.”
A Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile lifts off during a drill at an unknown location in North Korea, Monday, in this photo released the next day by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. Yonhap
Meanwhile, North Korea has also been stepping up efforts to develop the delivery means of its nuclear weapons, with the apparent aim of undermining Washington's security protection guarantees to South Korea.
Just a week ago, Pyongyang launched a solid-fuel Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile ― its most advanced weapon built to threaten the U.S. homeland with nuclear attack.
In a message sent on Saturday (local time) to Yonhap, a South Korean news agency, the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in Vienna expressed concerns over the operation signs of the new North Korean reactor.
Asked about the possibility of North Korea conducting its first nuclear weapons test since 2017, analysts said the likelihood isn’t high, given that it has little technical need for another test. But they said the possibility should not be ruled out.
“If North Korea decides to conduct another test, it will likely do so in the coming weeks as it will mark the 40th birthday of its leader Kim Jong-un in January. If the past is any guide, U.S. elections were not a significant factor for North Korea to determine its six previous test dates,” Cheong Seong-chang, an analyst at the Sejong Institute, a think tank, said.
The Korea Times · December 24, 2023
6. Demographic dystopia
Demographic dystopia
The Korea Times · December 24, 2023
Nation must launch ‘50 million Koreans’ project
Statistics Korea said the nation’s population will fall to 36.2 million in 2072 from the current 51.3 million. And this was only the median estimate. The low estimate says the population might barely exceed 30 million, returning to a similar level from the 1960s.
Koreans might regard the lower projection as the more likely one. The nation has so far been proving the worst-case scenario to be right regarding its demographics.
Korea has various world records courtesy of its demographic changes — the lowest in terms of good indicators and the highest regarding bad ones. The country tops the global list for an aging population, while at the same time hitting rock bottom for birthrate. Korea is the only country with a fertility rate below 1, and its share of people who are 65 and older will be nearly half the population 50 years from now.
Non-Koreans seem even more concerned than Koreans about this country’s possible disappearance from the map. One compared it to the Middle Ages when Europe was swept by the Black Death. Another called Korea a “mass suicide society.” Yet another said Korea “traded joy for a miracle.”
However, Koreans themselves show interest briefly and then forget.
Most are too busy living in the present to worry about the future. Still, political leaders’ silence on this issue of national survival defies the public’s understanding. Especially so because these politicians are most responsible for the current situation. A problem that is set to occur half a century later seems to fail in attracting the interest of large political parties whose foremost concern is the quadrennial elections. If this persists, Korea is doomed to extinction.
Even ordinary Koreans know — and experience daily — the reason for the crisis. In a nutshell, it is the hellish competition that is Korean society. To be included in the top 10 percent, or 1 percent, Korean students must enter one of the best three universities and the most popular departments, like medicine. To do so, they must live in Seoul or its vicinity, where housing prices and living costs are the highest. Decent jobs are increasingly hard to find in Korea’s dual employment structure that mass-produces part-timers and gig economy workers.
President Yoon Suk Yeol was right to prioritize reforming education and labor. However, his approaches were wrong. For instance, he should have called for large companies to ensure better employee work-life balance and incentivized smaller companies to follow suit instead of encouraging people to work more under the pretext of a more flexible labor system.
He also should have focused on strengthening public education, not forcing schools to make entrance exams easier. Cutthroat competition is inevitable in a society that ranks everything, including universities.
No less important is gender equality. Younger people, especially women, are reluctant to marry. In a country that looks down on out-of-wedlock births, fewer marriages will lead to a "baby bust." Korean women, who are just as educated as the men but are expected to do 80 percent of the housework and receive only 60 percent of men’s wages at work, are staging a baby strike of sorts. The country must shed its patriarchal tendencies first to ensure its sustainability.
President Yoon, who partly won the election with anti-feminist rhetoric, should rethink. He must strengthen, not abolish, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, with a focus on protecting working mothers.
Two more figures show why Korea faces a demographic dystopia. Korea has reportedly spent 280 trillion won ($215 billion) since 2006 to boost its birthrate. However, OECD statistics show the nation’s direct spending on depopulation remains 64 percent of the average of the club of rich countries. Korean workers’ use of maternity or paternity leave is only 17 percent of the OECD average. It seems as though Korea’s figures must be exaggerated, or successive governments spent the money in a wrong and wasteful way.
Yoon must name a senior secretary to be responsible for demographic affairs in the presidential office and set up a quasi-ministry under the prime minister. The whole government — and nation — must tackle this issue.
Despite a far larger population and a higher birthrate than Korea’s, Japan launched the “100 million active Japanese” project in 2015.
Experts say the next 10 years will be the final “golden moment” for Korea to stop or at least slow its demographic downfall. The nation must declare 2024 the first year for the “50 million Koreans” project.
The Korea Times · December 24, 2023
7. Koreans shouldn't underestimate themselves
Koreans shouldn't underestimate themselves
The Korea Times · December 24, 2023
By John Alderman Linton
I joined the pre-medical program at Yonsei University in March 1980, a chaotic time on the campus marked by frequent protests. After barely passing my second year of pre-med, I advanced to Yonsei’s medical school, but my studies were extremely demanding.
Yonsei was the first Korean school I’d ever gone to. And while I was a fluent speaker of Korean, I’d never had to wrestle with the written form of the language. As a result, it was very hard to learn anatomical terms and keep up with my biochemistry class, with its focus on rote memorization.
Putting my nose to the grindstone, I applied myself diligently in my first year at medical school, but I ended up having to repeat the year. Other students were whispering about how “that Westerner” had failed the exams. The whole experience was humiliating and psychologically draining.
However, I was determined not to be discouraged by the setback, and I returned to the classroom to repeat the first year of medical school. After the lecture began, I was surprised to find quite a few familiar faces in the seats around me. At least 30 of the 180 students in that first year had been held back, just like me.
After our first day of lectures, we gathered at a pub near the school to swap stories about our failure the previous year, which kindled lasting friendships. One reason I’ve enjoyed such strong support during my 32 years at Severance is that I’ve maintained connections not only with those who were admitted with me and graduated with me but also with those who had to repeat a year with me.
The second year of medical school brought clinical coursework along with the basic science coursework, which was a relief for me. Since many of these courses focused on conceptual understanding, rather than simple memorization, my studies grew easier.
Then in my fourth year, I confronted my biggest obstacle yet: the Korean medical licensing exam. The test itself wasn’t so difficult, but the medical names written in Chinese characters felt as daunting as Mount Everest.
I devoted three months to memorizing the Chinese character names. Then on the day of the exam, my Korean reading speed was so slow I had to rush through the questions without enough time to recheck my answers. Luckily, I passed the exam, feeling as joyful as if ten Christmases had come all at once.
But the basic science component of the U.S. medical licensing examination was scheduled to be administered just ten days later. I spent those few days cramming as much as I could, but I came in just one point shy of a passing grade.
So in 1987, I moved to the States to better prepare for the exam. My financial difficulties made it hard to focus on my studies, and I eventually enrolled in a Kaplan test prep school where I listened to recorded lectures to prepare me for the basic science exam. That was the toughest time in my life — I was so broke I sometimes had to make do with a sandwich for lunch.
Three months later, I sat for the exam at the ferry terminal in New York as one of 3,000 foreign medical graduates. Only 4% passed, just 120 of those 3,000 test takers.
After that, I applied and interviewed at a huge number of medical residency programs. Finally, I landed a position at a program with only five positions available for 3,000 applicants. Once I was in my residency, my financial situation stabilized and life in the U.S. gradually improved, although I did spend four years in the high-crime neighborhood of Harlem.
Back then, none of the U.S. medical school graduates in my program knew or cared where Korea was, nor were they aware that Yonsei University was a respectable medical school. They treated me like I’d graduated from some fly-by-night school in Central or South America.
Faced with their snobbery and prejudice, I pushed myself even harder but felt helpless to change their attitudes.
But then it came time for our in-service exam. A few days after the exam, the program director scrawled my name on the chalkboard. I’d gotten the top score on the evaluations.
I froze in shock the moment I saw my name up there on the chalkboard. This was the guy, you’ll recall, who had to redo his first year of medical school at Yonsei University in Korea!
My first-place performance shocked all the graduates of U.S. medical schools, and I didn’t have to deal with any snobbery or prejudice from that day forward.
I stepped into the bathroom as tears filled my eyes. From that point forward, I held my head up high, confident that I could hold my own against any graduates of U.S. schools. I may have flunked my first-year exams in Korea, but I’d outperformed the Americans at my residency.
The tenacious effort I’m describing here is the source of Korea’s strength. When Koreans without any particular qualifications immigrate to the United States, more than 80 percent buy a new car within the year, and more than 80 percent are homeowners within five — something that Americans often struggle to do in 30 years. That’s because Koreans have an amazing capacity for working hard work on a level that immigrants from other countries can’t match.
I’m always amazed by the Korean people, as well as exceedingly grateful for the education I received at Severance and from my professors.
Given the unmatched excellence of the Korean nation, the question remains why do Koreans underestimate themselves so much.
Human society has undergone greater changes over the past 50 years than at any time in history. And during those same years, Korea has risen up from the ashes of war to join the ranks of the world’s most advanced nations.
Along with great achievements in national development, Korea has greatly contributed to the development of humanity as a whole. That’s something Koreans should take pride in. It’s reason for us to square our shoulders, stand up straight and speak assertively. It’s reason for us to be leaders, not followers.
Whenever I deliver a lecture, I remind Koreans to set aside their defeatist attitude and remember the excellence of the Korean people. It’s time we stopped selling ourselves short.
John Alderman Linton, an American-Korean whose Korean name is Ihn Yo-han, is a director at Yonsei University Severance Hospital International Health Care Center.
The Korea Times · December 24, 2023
8. Japan-South Korea Cooperation: Strength in Unity, Danger in Division
It strikes me that one of the fundamentals of north Korean strategy is that it is always waiting for the next administration in the US. It keeps hoping that the next administration will bend and break.
Despite our decades of failure to denuclearize the north we have successfully resisted appeasing the regime to the extent that it desires.
Excerpts:
As things stand, countries like North Korea can simply wait for a change in leadership to exploit division to their own ends. It is vital that this ability be taken away. Regardless of whether pressure or inducement is being pursued, the policy objectives of Japan and South Korea are more likely to be achieved with unity. Sanctions and deterrence are less effective with a weak link, and the inducement power of individual states is not strong enough to produce meaningful, long-term change so long as there is the chance that it will be undone later. Unity – real unity without exploitable fault lines – is key to both effectively inducing and pressuring. Again, if the pot is taken away, it can no longer be stirred by adversaries that only wish harm on both South Korea and Japan.
A foundation of shared values is an important first step, and with the institutionalization of trilateral cooperation promoted by the Biden administration there is hope that at least some of the benefits of the Kishida-Yoon thaw will be lasting. Nonetheless, for the benefits of the rapprochement to be permanent, real, and lasting, then resolutions, however hard they may be, need to be found. Doing so is the only way to safeguard both Japanese and South Korean values and interests in the long-term.
Japan-South Korea Cooperation: Strength in Unity, Danger in Division
thediplomat.com
Deepened trilateral cooperation between the U.S. and its two key East Asian allies is a positive development, but the fragility of Japanese and South Korean leadership underscores the importance of long-term reconciliation.
By James Kaizuka
December 23, 2023
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol (left) and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio attend a joint press conference after their summit in Tokyo, Japan, Mar. 16, 2023.
To say that Japan-South Korea relations went through a rough patch in the late 2010s and early 2020s would be quite an understatement. From trade and territorial disputes, to the radar lock incident, the situation was made all the worse by ongoing historical disputes, which resurfaced with high-profile court cases. It seemed at one point almost inconceivable that the bilateral relationship would ever recover.
This makes the seemingly rapid turnaround pulled off by the Kishida Fumio and Yoon Suk-yeoul administrations all the more impressive; within months of each taking office, the resumption of so-called shuttle diplomacy, the resolution of the Abe-Moon era trade disputes, and even trilateral summits including the United States were all on the table. In the wake of China’s continued military expansion, Russia’s renewed imperial aggression, and North Korea’s recurrent belligerence, these moves toward reconciliation are in the obvious interests of both Japan and South Korea.
However, the seemingly miraculous ointment that has been used by the two leaders has some very large flies in it.
Chief among these is the inherent unpopularity of both Kishida and Yoon; in a recent poll, Yoon sits at a 36.3 percent approval rating while the ongoing slush fund scandal has seen Kishida’s approval rating slip to just 26 percent. Even if these issues were to be overcome, outstanding historical issues still simmer, other fault lines such as the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute remain unresolved, and in any case it would be unreasonable to expect that years of acrimony could be washed away so quickly.
An even greater issue is the potential for the eventual political successors to Kishida and Yoon to undo their work. Of the leading contenders to replace Kishida, at least two are members of Nippon Kaigi, which promotes the exact kind of historical revisionism to which South Korea is very sensitive, and the leadership of South Korea’s opposition Democratic Party has made plain it does not support Yoon’s Japan policy.
Consequently, while seemingly positive at the moment, the foundation of this rapprochement is very much built on sand; if it is to last, more must be done by both Japan and South Korea to resolve outstanding issues.
History, Reconciliation, and Shared Values
The United States has long screamed the question from the sidelines to Japan and South Korea: “Why can’t you two just get along?”
The answer is, of course, primarily historical. For all the proclamations of a “future-oriented relationship,” history remains a defining factor. South Korea’s liberal party, now in opposition, in particular continues to run on a platform that it perceives primarily as based around seeking justice from Japan for past historical issues, and some argue that this sometimes devolves into wider anti-Japanese sentiment.
Whether this is the case or not, the scale of sensitivity in South Korea cannot be overstated – the 2019 trade dispute, tied heavily to a dispute over compensation for wartime forced labor, led to a wide-scale boycott movement of Japanese products, even causing a 17.9 percent decline in travel to Japan. The former United States Ambassador to South Korea Harry Harris, of Japanese ancestry, even came under fire for a mustache that was perceived to bear a resemblance to those of colonial-era figures. For their part, Japanese politicians making historical revisionist statements or paying visits to Yasukuni Shrine have further stoked controversy. The legacy of the colonial period cannot be easily forgotten.
History is immutable, and reconciliation will not come easily or quickly. Yet it remains important to the long-term relationship and the interests of both nations to resolve these issues. The goal of this article is not to pronounce on which side should do more to resolve historical issues and to achieve reconciliation or to suggest means for the two to reconcile. However, as a practical acknowledgement of the nature of Japan-South Korea relations and the limits of what can be expected in terms of cooperation, it is important to raise this point. At the very least, it should tell us to not expect too much too quickly, and it highlights the potential dangers to any current bilateral or trilateral cooperation. If the issues of history are not dealt with, then a return to the acrimonious Abe-Moon era is far from off the cards, and such an outcome is only to the benefit of the shared adversaries of both Japan and South Korea.
Despite these historical issues, Japanese and South Korean values on present day issues are in broad alignment.
When Yoon proclaimed that South Korea and Japan shared universal values and pursued common interests, it was no mere soundbite. Both countries espouse similar values in their respective policy documents relating to areas such as overseas aid, defense, and foreign policy, emphasizing freedom and human rights. Both rank as leading democracies along with Taiwan and are important standard-bearers of democratic values in a region rife with autocracy. Both heavily value their relationships with the United States and support the preservation of a rules-based international order.
These are shared ideals that can be built on; they are a solid foundation for an alliance not only of interests, but of values – values that both countries see as worth promoting and defending. The effective defense of these values demands a united response, and acrimony between two of the staunchest defenders of these values over historical issues is an abrogation of responsibility on the part of those charged with defending them. For the limits of Japan-South Korea cooperation to be fully broken, real, lasting solutions to the historical disputes between the two must be found and viewed as vital matters of national security.
Unity and Shared Values as National Security
China, Russia and North Korea – nuclear-armed states with territorial ambitions, unstable governments, or both – represent three of the world’s most dangerous security challenges, and they are arguably becoming more closely aligned with each other. While I myself have argued that such alliances of narrow interest do not last compared to alliances built on values, these countries nonetheless present long-term threats in that they are each dangerous even on their own. Neither Japan nor South Korea alone has the strength to effectively deter or induce any of these, and only through the preservation of a friendly, united relationship can the objectives of either be fulfilled.
Autocratic states have long tried to sow mutual division and hatred. In particular, China’s invitation to then-South Korean President Park Geun-hye to attend a military parade in Tiananmen Square in 2015 raised immediate alarm bells in Washington and Tokyo, and Beijing has attempted to weaponize the shared history of Japanese colonialism in its other interactions with South Korea. It also practices influence operations in South Korea, aimed at dividing society, and it would be little stretch to imagine that such influence operations may be used to undermine the Japan-South Korea relationship as well. Both Russia and North Korea also invest heavily in influence operations, and it can be expected that efforts to drive wedges between Japan, South Korea, and the United States will continue.
These tactics, however, are only effective because policymakers have failed to resolve outstanding historical issues; without a pot to stir, it is inevitable that such efforts would decline in effectiveness. This is why the resolution of these issues is a vital matter of national security for both Japan and South Korea – creating a genuinely friendly and positive relationship is the best way to guard against those who would seek to wedge-drive. A change in leadership in Japan or South Korea would be little threat if future leaders were not faced with the imminent problem of historical disputes.
Whether Pressure or Inducement, Unity is Key
As things stand, countries like North Korea can simply wait for a change in leadership to exploit division to their own ends. It is vital that this ability be taken away. Regardless of whether pressure or inducement is being pursued, the policy objectives of Japan and South Korea are more likely to be achieved with unity. Sanctions and deterrence are less effective with a weak link, and the inducement power of individual states is not strong enough to produce meaningful, long-term change so long as there is the chance that it will be undone later. Unity – real unity without exploitable fault lines – is key to both effectively inducing and pressuring. Again, if the pot is taken away, it can no longer be stirred by adversaries that only wish harm on both South Korea and Japan.
A foundation of shared values is an important first step, and with the institutionalization of trilateral cooperation promoted by the Biden administration there is hope that at least some of the benefits of the Kishida-Yoon thaw will be lasting. Nonetheless, for the benefits of the rapprochement to be permanent, real, and lasting, then resolutions, however hard they may be, need to be found. Doing so is the only way to safeguard both Japanese and South Korean values and interests in the long-term.
GUEST AUTHOR
James Kaizuka
James Kaizuka is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Leeds with specializations in Japanese aid, Japan-North Korea relations, and Japan-Vietnam relations.
9. Pacific Power Play: Japan’s Defense Overhaul And South Korea’s Global Arms Ascent – Analysis
Can both be partners in the Arsenal of Democracy?
Excerpts:
In a significant shift from its historical military pacifism, Japan published a new national security strategy in December 2022, overturning six decades of tradition. However, Prime Minister Kishida emphasized that the country remains committed to a self-defense posture. The report from Japan’s Defense Ministry identifies China as its “greatest strategic challenge.” Kishida has further emphasized the importance of acquiring a “counterstrike capability” to effectively deter potential attacks from China.
As Japan redefines its defense posture, South Korea emerges as a noteworthy player in the global arms market. President Yoon Suk Yeol’s ambitious goal of positioning South Korea among the world’s top four weapons suppliers is backed by substantial achievements. From being ranked as the ninth-largest arms exporter globally to experiencing a remarkable 74% surge in arms sales from 2018-22, South Korea’s endeavors to strengthen its defense industry’s export-driven characteristics are bearing fruit. With a focus on economic value, increased employment, and long-term competitiveness, South Korea’s success in arms exports, projected to continue in 2023, highlights the nation’s evolving role in shaping regional security dynamics. Together, these developments underscore the dynamic nature of militarization in the Pacific, influencing the strategic calculus of nations in response to evolving security challenges.
Pacific Power Play: Japan’s Defense Overhaul And South Korea’s Global Arms Ascent – Analysis
By Syed Raiyan Amir
eurasiareview.com · December 23, 2023
The geopolitical landscape in the Pacific is undergoing a significant transformation as nations like Japan and South Korea navigate complex security challenges through substantial increases in defense spending and strategic policy shifts. In Japan, the approval of a 16.5% surge in defense spending for the fiscal year 2024, coupled with the Defense Buildup Program, reflects a decade-long commitment to fortifying national security in the face of escalating threats from China, North Korea, and Russia.
This comprehensive plan encompasses key pillars such as stand-off defense capabilities, air and missile defense, and sustainable maneuvering and deployment capabilities. Concurrently, Japan’s relaxation of arms export restrictions signals a departure from historical norms, allowing for the shipment of domestically produced weaponry, including Patriot air defense missiles, to allies like the United States.
Japan has given approval for a 16.5% increase in defense spending for the fiscal year 2024, marking a new record for the tenth consecutive year in its pursuit of the Defense Buildup Program. The approved budget of 7.95 trillion yen ($55.9 billion) is aimed at addressing heightened military threats from China, North Korea, and Russia, within what Tokyo describes as the “most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.”
This increase, inclusive of U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses, amounts to a significant 16.5% rise, totaling $7.92 billion compared to the current fiscal year. The budget plan, set to be passed by the bicameral legislature in the coming months, is the second year of the Defense Buildup Program, which outlines a five-year period with a total defense spending of $302 billion through fiscal year 2027. The plan focuses on seven key pillars to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, including stand-off defense capabilities, comprehensive air and missile defense, unmanned asset defense, cross-domain operational capabilities, command and control functions, maneuvering and deployment capability, and sustainability.
Under the stand-off defense capabilities pillar, the Ministry secured funds to develop homegrown stand-off missiles, including an upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile. The Integrated Air and Missile Defense system is set to receive $8.77 billion for addressing new aerial threats, with allocations for the next-generation fighter program, a medium-range air-to-air guided missile, and the procurement of additional F-35A and F-35B fighter aircraft. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is allocated substantial funds, including $2.62 billion for two Aegis system-equipped vessels and $1.22 billion for two New FFM multirole frigates. The new frigates, totaling 12, will succeed the Mogami-class and feature improved capabilities, longer-range missiles, and enhanced anti-submarine capabilities.
The JMSDF also earmarked $298 million to modify its Izumo-class helicopter carriers into aircraft carriers capable of supporting Lockheed Martin F-35B fighter operations. The transformation is expected to be completed by fiscal year 2027. Meanwhile, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) focuses on strengthening security in the Nansei Islands, particularly in response to potential contingencies with China. A budget of $121.6 million is allocated to procure three maneuverable boats for swift and reliable transportation in the event of an invasion of Japan’s southwestern islands. Despite challenges such as the depreciation of the yen and rising prices, officials emphasize that there will be no reduction in the number of major weapons and equipment for fiscal year 2024, based on the Defense Buildup Program outlined in December 2022.
Japan has relaxed restrictions on arms exports, allowing the shipment of domestically produced missiles and artillery to countries, including the United States, as part of a significant policy overhaul—the most extensive in nearly a decade. The move, announced on December 22, 2023, coincides with the cabinet’s approval of a record increase in defense spending for the next year, surpassing 16 percent, reaching $56 billion. This decision comes amid escalating security tensions in the Indo-Pacific region.
The amended regulations permit Japan to export Patriot air defense missiles to the United States, a move considered pivotal in reinforcing the Japan-US alliance. While restrictions still prohibit the export of weapons to nations at war, the adjustment facilitates the United States in providing additional military aid to Ukraine. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi emphasized the significance of the policy change, stating that it not only enhances Japan’s security but also contributes to peace and stability in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
On December 22, 2023, the cabinet’s approval of the 2024 defense budget of 7.95 trillion yen aligns with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s objective to double defense spending to 2 percent of the gross domestic product by 2027, following the NATO standard. This budget increase supports the deployment of long-range cruise missiles capable of targeting China and North Korea. Japan’s motivation for this substantial defense expansion stems from concerns over China’s military ambitions, heightened by the Ukraine war and the potential threat to Taiwan.
North Korea’s missile launches and the prospect of future nuclear tests have also contributed to Tokyo’s decision to bolster defense spending. This shift in policy represents a departure for Japan, traditionally adhering to a stance against exporting lethal weapons, and signifies a break from its post-World War II principle of restricting the use of force to self-defense. Notably, the Patriot missile defense system, produced in Japan under license from U.S. companies Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, is among the weaponry supplied to Ukraine by the West.
Previously limited to exporting only components, the revised guidelines now permit the export of completed products to countries where patent holders are based, with re-exports to third countries requiring Tokyo’s permission. The ruling party has contemplated these changes for months, considering potential obstacles in exporting next-generation fighter jets developed with Britain and Italy. Additionally, there are reports of Japan considering the export of 155mm artillery shells, produced under a license from BAE Systems, to the United Kingdom.
Meanwhile, in the previous year, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol publicly set an ambitious objective of becoming one of the world’s top four weapons suppliers, following the United States, Russia, and France. While this goal might have seemed challenging just a few years ago, recent substantial deals between Seoul and its domestic arms industries have made it appear more attainable.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ranked South Korea as the ninth-largest arms exporter globally for the period 2018-22. Among the top 25 exporters, South Korea and China were the only two Asian nations. Notably, South Korean arms sales experienced a remarkable 74 percent surge in the five-year span from 2018-22 compared to 2013-17. The South Korean government initiated efforts in the late 2000s and early 2010s to bolster the export-driven nature of the country’s defense industry.
Kim Jae Yeop, Senior Researcher at the Sungkyun Institute for Global Strategy in Seoul, explained that these endeavors aimed not only to generate significant economic value, such as increased employment and profits for the Korean defense industry, but also to enhance its long-term competitiveness amid fierce global competition among numerous arms suppliers. These efforts appear to be yielding positive results, with Kim characterizing 2022 as a year of “unprecedented success for arms exports to foreign markets.” Defense exports in the past year reached $17.3 billion, more than doubling the $7.25 billion achieved in 2021. The trajectory is expected to continue upward in 2023, attributed to the sale of fighters to Malaysia, ground vehicles to Australia, and a rumored air defense system sale to Saudi Arabia.
Previously on August 31st, Japan’s Defense Ministry made a request for an approximately $53 billion budget for its upcoming defense fiscal year. This marks a record-breaking 13 percent increase and is the 12th consecutive annual rise in budgetary requests. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida explained that this substantial spending boost is part of a comprehensive five-year plan amounting to nearly $295 billion, aimed at fortifying Japan’s defense capabilities in response to escalating threats in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite a long-standing self-imposed cap of 1 percent of GDP, Japan aspires to allocate 2 percent of its GDP to defense spending. Within this year’s budget proposal, over $5 billion is earmarked for the development of a fleet of standoff missiles, nearly $9 billion is allocated to enhance the nation’s air and missile defense systems, and approximately $500 million is invested in next-generation fighter jets through a broader agreement with the United Kingdom and Italy.
In a significant shift from its historical military pacifism, Japan published a new national security strategy in December 2022, overturning six decades of tradition. However, Prime Minister Kishida emphasized that the country remains committed to a self-defense posture. The report from Japan’s Defense Ministry identifies China as its “greatest strategic challenge.” Kishida has further emphasized the importance of acquiring a “counterstrike capability” to effectively deter potential attacks from China.
As Japan redefines its defense posture, South Korea emerges as a noteworthy player in the global arms market. President Yoon Suk Yeol’s ambitious goal of positioning South Korea among the world’s top four weapons suppliers is backed by substantial achievements. From being ranked as the ninth-largest arms exporter globally to experiencing a remarkable 74% surge in arms sales from 2018-22, South Korea’s endeavors to strengthen its defense industry’s export-driven characteristics are bearing fruit. With a focus on economic value, increased employment, and long-term competitiveness, South Korea’s success in arms exports, projected to continue in 2023, highlights the nation’s evolving role in shaping regional security dynamics. Together, these developments underscore the dynamic nature of militarization in the Pacific, influencing the strategic calculus of nations in response to evolving security challenges.
eurasiareview.com · December 23, 2023
10. Colonel Benjamin Studdard Malcom, 94 (Author of "White Tigers, My Secret War in North Korea")
Another great American has passed.
Colonel Benjamin Studdard Malcom, 94
- Dec 22, 2023 Updated Dec 22, 2023
waltontribune.com
Retired Colonel Benjamin Studdard Malcom, 94, of Peachtree City peacefully passed away at his home on Monday, Oct, 30, 2023.
He was born to the late Jamie and Mamie Malcom on a farm in Monroe on Dec. 20, 1928. The farmhouse had no electricity until 1936. He rode a bicycle to school form 1936-1945.
Colonel Malcom was a career officer who served in the United States Army from 1950-1979. He served with distinction in staff and command positions throughout the United States, Europe, and during combat tours-in Korea and Vietnam.
In 1950, he graduated from North Georgia College where he earned his Bachelor's Degree in Education. He also earned a Master’s Degree in Political Science from Auburn University.
He was a graduate of the Infantry Officer's Basic and Advanced Courses, the U.S. Army Rotary Wing Aviation Course, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. War College.
Some of the awards and decorations that he received during his service time from July 25, 1950 to July 31, 1979 include: the Silver Star, Bronze Star, Combat Infantryman's Badge (He was also the first Special Forces Soldier to ever receive the CIB-it was recommended in 1952 and awarded to him in 1965.), Aviation Badge, Airborne Badge, and 4 awards of the Legion of Merit.
Colonel Malcom is still known throughout the Armed Forces for laying the foundation for today's Special Forces Operations.
He wrote a book in 1996 called "White Tigers, My Secret War in North Korea" about his operations during the Korean War with Special Forces and the CIA. His wife, Joyce typed the book for him and, it is now in the third printing, the History Channel did a one-hour documentary film on the book in 2005, and the film has been shown more than 150 times on national television.
He went on a speaking circuit and spoke about 20 times each year across the nation. He also taught four classes per year at the John F. Kennedy Special Forces School, Fort Bragg, N.C. from 1997-2020. The Special Forces School consider his operations in North Korea so important and relevant to current training that they have recalled Colonel Malcom back to active duty several times a year since his retirement in 1997. His operations in North Korea also brought major recognition to Special Forces, the U.S. Military, and the U.S. Government. His final position on active duty was as Garrison Commander of three U.S. Army installations: Fort McPherson and Fort Gillem, in Georgia, and Fort Buchanan in Puerto Rico. He was inducted into the Georgia Military Hall of Fame in 2020.
After his retirement from active duty, he worked for four years as an Executive to the Chairman of the Board of Rollins, Inc., Atlanta, GA, a Fortune 500 Company.
Colonel Malcom married the love of his life, Joyce Swint Malcom, in 1955, and they were married for 56 years, traveling the world together. They moved 24 times in his 29 years of service and lived overseas for six years, three of those years they lived in Paris, France. Joyce passed away October 15, 2011. They have one son, Ben T. Malcom, who survives them. He lives in Peachtree City, GA with his family.
It only seems fitting that a Celebration of Life was held on his birthday, Wednesday, Dec. 20, 2023 at 1 p.m in. the chapel at Carmichael-Hemperley Funeral Home & Crematory in Peachtree City with full military honors. At a later date and time, he will be inurned next to his wife at Rest Haven Cemetery in Monroe.
In lieu of flowers, the family asks that donations be made to the scholarship fund at the University of North Georgia. Please make checks payable to: UNG Foundation, P.O. Box 1599, Dahlonega, GA 30533.
Fond memories and expressions of sympathy may be shared at www.carmichaelhemperleypeachtree.com for the Malcom family.
The Walton Tribune | December 23-24, 2023
waltontribune.com
11. Russia’s Own Troops Are Being Blown Up By Low Quality Artillery Ammo From North Korea
Can we exploit this?
Russia’s Own Troops Are Being Blown Up By Low Quality Artillery Ammo From North Korea
kyivpost.com
Just last month Russian troops were pictured thanking North Korea for the artillery shells. That sentiment may well have now changed.
by Kyiv Post | December 23, 2023, 4:30 pm |
Photo: illustrative.
Russia’s increasing reliance on artillery ammo from North Korea is causing serious problems as its low quality means some shells are tearing gun barrels apart and injuring gunners, Ukraine’s military has said.
In a post on Facebook, Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, said the problem was particularly rife among troops of the “Dnepr" grouping of forces operating around the southern Kherson region where they are battling a Ukrainian bridgehead.
He said: “Due to insufficient ammunition of their own production, Russian occupation troops are forced to use low-quality artillery and mortar attacks supplied from North Korea.
“Due to the unsatisfactory condition of such ammunition, there are unique cases of their tearing directly in the barrels of the occupiers' cannons and mortars, which leads to the loss of weapons and personnel.”
Last month presumably uninjured Russian soldiers posted videos on social media thanking North Korea for their new rockets and artillery shells – though evidence suggested the potentially inferior quality meant firing adjustments were needed.
In one video, a Russian soldier could be seen standing in front of a pile of rockets and thanking their “friends” from North Korea for the weapons.
#Russia / #Ukraine : A #Russian soldier released a new video of 122mm Grad rockets which were recently obtained by Russian Troops.
The rockets appear to be rare R-122 HE-FRAG rockets with F-122 fuzes. These are produced and supplied #NorthKorea/#DPRK .#UkraineRussiaWar pic.twitter.com/jzaIpMJUfn
— War Noir (@war_noir) November 8, 2023
In October, Ukraine Weapons Tracker discovered photos of artillery shells used by Russian troops and identified them as North Korean made.
According to the Ukrainian military publication “Vodogray,” the shells were copies of the Soviet 122mm OF-462 and 152mm OF-540 projectiles.
Other Topics of Interest
One of the Kremlin's soldiers can be seen snagging his clothing while trying to dismount from an APC before being unceremoniously dragged along the road.
They also retrieved field manuals that showed the required range corrections by using different charges for some projectiles.
The fact that these shells appeared on the front line instead of stockpiles within Russia could also signify Russia’s dwindling supply of artillery shells; Russia has been relying on its artillery superiority in its current invasion of Ukraine, with some sources putting it at ten to one heavy guns earlier this year.
Ukraine’s military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov said in September that they are certain North Korea had supplied 122mm and 152mm artillery shells, as well as Grad rockets, to Russia.
US intelligence believed that North Korea had sent a thousand containers of weapons to Russia, as reported earlier by Kyiv Post.
kyivpost.com
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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