Quotes of the Day:

“Stupid is knowing the truth, seeing the truth, but still believing the lies” 

- Morgan Freeman

"The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the social worker-judge." 

- Michel Foucault 

“The liberal international order has realistically been under pressure for some time. Post–Cold War optimism that undemocratic countries would liberalize economically and politically, as global trade flourished, was misplaced. Instead, authoritarians have exploited perceived weaknesses in the international system to invade neighbours, co-opt international bodies to legitimize their own regimes and challenge democracies’ resolve to enforce rules.

- Akshay Singh”

1. Preparing the Department of Defense for Irregular and Special Warfare

2. Global Competition Reshaping Special Operations

3. Reed: Tuberville military holds may have contributed to Marine commandant’s hospitalization

4. No updates on top Marine general’s condition after hospitalization

5. China: ‘Israel’ omitted from online maps

6. CCG Conferences Report:The Eighth China Global Think Tank Innovation Forum, Beijing

7. Israel’s Multiple Advances into Gaza: An Operational Plan Comes into Focus by Mick Ryans

8. Reports of Putin’s death might not be greatly exaggerated

9. How AUKUS Plus could add to Indo-Pacific coalition building

10. American Commandos Are in Israel Helping to Locate Hostages, Pentagon Says

11. See inside the stereotyping machines pushing American bias across the internet

12. Getting Serious About Enhancing U.S. Defense Partnerships

13. What Went Wrong? Three Hypotheses on Israel’s Massive Intelligence Failure

14. Ukraine pleads with the U.S. to ramp up support against Russia

15. US military still fleshing out SOF, cyber, space 'triad' at the joint level

16. Filipinos who fought for the U.S. in WWII never saw benefits. A new bill seeks to change that

17. The U.S. Navy is Falling Behind China, and the Pentagon Knows It

18. U.S. Aircraft Carriers and Warships Are On the Move And That’s A Problem for Iran

19. U.S. military and diplomatic leaders urge a divided Congress to send aid to both Israel and Ukraine

20. What we know about Hamas' huge rocket arsenal

21. SOCOM: United States Special Operations Command

22. Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must EvolveManeuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve

23. Senators warn of Chinese effort to recruit US service members as former JBLM soldier faces trial in spy caseS

24. US-Philippine defense treaty is losing credibility

25. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 31, 2023

26. Iran Update, October 31, 2023

1. Preparing the Department of Defense for Irregular and Special Warfare

One hour video at the link.

Chris Miller and Mark Mitchell discuss the future of irregular and special warfare at the Hudson Institute. Heavy emphasis on civilian oversight and Sec 922. You can hear the rice bowls breaking.

The one hour discussion is on Youtube here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MonAH6uw0XM

Preparing the Department of Defense for Irregular and Special Warfare

PAST EVENT

HUDSON INSTITUTE

OCTOBER 31, 2023

https://www.hudson.org/events/preparing-america-special-operations-forces-next-generation-irregular-warfare-ezra-cohen

Over the past 22 years, the United States Department of Defense has optimized the American Special Operations Forces (SOF) for the Global War on Terror. While terrorist threats remain—especially from Iranian proxies—the DoD is now calling upon SOF to return to its irregular warfare roots to counter nation-states. Civilian control and leadership of special operations is key to expediting this transformation, and Congress has elevated the role of assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict (ASD SO/LIC) to include acting as the service secretary for special operations.

Hudson Adjunct Fellow Ezra Cohen, who served as ASD SO/LIC, will be joined by two other previous ASD SO/LICs, Mark Mitchell and former Acting Secretary of Defense Chris Miller, to discuss civil-military relations within the special operations community, the transition from counterterrorism to irregular warfare, and how to optimize intelligence forces and SOF for the next generation of challenges.

2. Global Competition Reshaping Special Operations

This is all great. 

Excerpt:

SOF’s value proposition lies in their “really small units … hyper enabled units,” he said. “But really, we need to think of it in the context of revamped organizations and units that are modular and can be really tailored to the type of environment.”

One area SOF will need to adjust is in better understanding man and machine teaming, Maier said.

“So, everybody's on the AI and unmanned, uncrewed system,” he continued. “What [are] the SOF-peculiar pieces of that? How do we use the combination of our deep training and ability to use a lot of different skill sets — the ability to interoperate with those types of technologies, and then be able to do that in the context of the joint force … filling those kill chain gaps that the joint force can't by itself get to? I think that's really where we're trying to go on this journey.”

Then there is this. I am sure the ASD went into more detail than journalist reported.  

SOF’s traditionally demonstrated value proposition has been the ability to solve “hard problems on the battlefield for the nation, create options for our senior leaders,” he said.

“In some cases that's been associated, perhaps too much, with things like direct action and the movies that get made that often cast SOF as one particular type of tool,” he continued. “And I think we're going to need to continue to find ways to bring more of that capability and technology combined in small units, as I said, to really do innovative things.”

Yes, solving or contributing to solving complex political military problems is the essence of SOF.

My recommendation is that the ASD should recognize the fundamental value proposition of the two "SOF trinities."  

First:

Irregular Warfare

Unconventional warfare

Support to political Warfare

Second, the comparative advantage of SOF (and in particular SF, PSYOP, and CA)

influence

governance

and support to indigenous forces and populations.

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/two-special-operations-trinities

Most of the force will not be hyper enabled with all these great new technologies for direct action. They will be operating in the human domain where they must outthink competitors and adversaries while still being able to outfight enemies.

And the essence of the majority of SOF can be summed up in this unconventional warfare philosophy:

Essence of UW

•UW is fundamentally problem solving; using unique, non-doctrinal and non-conventional methods, techniques, people, equipment to solve (or assist in solving) complex political-military problems

ØAnd creating dilemmas for our adversaries

•UW is fundamentally about influencing behavior of target audiences (which can include a population, a segment of the population, a political structure, or a military force); therefore, these action arms of IO/PSYOP/CA are integral. 

Lastly, while we have raised counterterrorism and direct action capabilities to the highest level (which we must absolutely sustain), we should not forget that terorrism is really an element of political warfare. It most often takes place in irregular warfare, adversary unconventional warfare, and political warfare because it is fundamentally a form of political violence.

We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider `target audience' that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism

And really lastly, I would like to emphasize this point from the ASD. We conduct scientific analysis to assess effects, develop force structure, and "speaking analytics" lends itself very well to analysing large scale combat operations and conventional warfare. The science does not easily apply to irregular warfare and most things not related to conventional warfare. Things such as relationships and influence are not easily quantifiable and therefore cannot be account for in the science of analytics. It is incumbent upon SOF to demonstrate relatively quantifiable effects from what is mostly quantifiable and often not quantifiable in the seem time frames as large scale combat operations. unfortunately many if not most of our effects are anecdotal and not scientific data.

Excerpt:

Maier said, for example, in the context of experimentation and exercises, being able to “speak analytics” has never been a strong suit for SOF, “because we didn’t need it to be.” Now, they need to be able to “speak to those that speak numbers, in numbers, and show and demonstrate in numbers.”

When asked if he felt SOF were adequately represented on the resourcing side, Maier said, in short, no.

Okay finally, the ASD tweeted this out. Below are my two tweets in response. Below the article I have pasted thet traditional SOF imperatives which is what we should be emphasizing. Since I cannot access the Joint Electronic Library or Army Doctrine without a CAC I cant verify if the SOF imperatives are in current doctrine. The excerpt below is from Army SOF doctrine in 2012.

HON Chris Maier

@ASD_SOLIC

·

15hLots of great discussion at #SOLIC2023 focused on strengthening deterrence, #SOF force design for the future, and the importance of the cognitive domain. Underpinning it all is the first SOF Truth: humans are more important than hardware @NDIAToday

David Maxwell

@DavidMaxwell161

Good points. However, I think we have drilled the SOF Truths into the ground. It is time to move to the next level and focus on the SOF imperatives. That gets to the next level of SOF understanding.

David Maxwell

@DavidMaxwell161

Since most are unfamiliar with the SOF imperatives here is a short tutorial. However what everyone should do is dig out their old FM 31-20 (1990) written by Glenn Harned when he was at DOTD and study the detailed explanations of the imperatives. https://quartermaster.substack.com/p/the-quartermaster-thursday-6-june#:~:text=BLUF%3A%20The%20SOF%20Truths%20and,and%20govern%20behavior%20and%20values….

Global Competition Reshaping Special Operations

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Laura Heckmann

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

10/31/2023

By

NDIA President and CEO David Norquist (left) and Chris Maier, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict (right)

NDIA photo

WASHINGTON, D.C. — With the United States focused squarely on great power competition, Special Operations Forces are navigating a transition from a counterterrorism-focused force to one that can fight both peer adversaries and Pentagon bureaucracy.

Special Operations Forces are at an inflection point, Chris Maier, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, said at the National Defense Industrial Association’s SO/LIC Symposium Oct. 31.

A different adversary has driven SOF to look at a “different set of tools than has often been associated with the community,” Maier said, adding a “significant challenge” lies in getting “that value proposition for a different fight out there.”

Maier noted that Gen. Bryan Fenton, commander of Special Operations Command, has expressed frustration that SOF are still seen as the counterterrorism forces “across not only the interagency, but across allies and partners as well.”

“I think we can do a lot more than that,” Maier said.

Part of SOF’s evolution will include exercises in analytics and “being able to talk not to the policy and operational side of the Pentagon, but the resourcing and programming side of the Pentagon, because that’s, at the end of the day, an element of strategic competition … in who's going to be most relevant for the type of fight we're going to confront,” Maier said.

SOF’s value proposition lies in their “really small units … hyper enabled units,” he said. “But really, we need to think of it in the context of revamped organizations and units that are modular and can be really tailored to the type of environment.”

One area SOF will need to adjust is in better understanding man and machine teaming, Maier said.

“So, everybody's on the AI and unmanned, uncrewed system,” he continued. “What [are] the SOF-peculiar pieces of that? How do we use the combination of our deep training and ability to use a lot of different skill sets — the ability to interoperate with those types of technologies, and then be able to do that in the context of the joint force … filling those kill chain gaps that the joint force can't by itself get to? I think that's really where we're trying to go on this journey.”

SOF will need industry’s to help “really tailor some of these technologies,” he said, including the “profound” use of AI and unmanned systems.

“I think we need to understand more, not only how we can do things more uncrewed and unmanned and be able to just expand the aperture of what an individual operator unit can do, but we also have to be prepared to counter the adversary’s ability to do this.”

Above all else, SOF’s people remain their greatest advantage, and adapting their workforce to a changing strategic environment has meant an adapted approach to how they interact with the Pentagon, he said.

“The Pentagon's really two worlds,” Maier said. “It's the policy and operation side, which SOF has flourished on and has long standing connections, and then there's the resourcing and programming side, that's doing things like developing budgets.”

SOF will have to live in both, he said.

“And I think we need to think of the value proposition and that innovation in both those realms, so being able to bring more capability to the fight.”

SOF’s traditionally demonstrated value proposition has been the ability to solve “hard problems on the battlefield for the nation, create options for our senior leaders,” he said.

“In some cases that's been associated, perhaps too much, with things like direct action and the movies that get made that often cast SOF as one particular type of tool,” he continued. “And I think we're going to need to continue to find ways to bring more of that capability and technology combined in small units, as I said, to really do innovative things.”

Programming and resourcing is the “less glamorous side,” he said, but is one that SOF will have to utilize to “show, not just tell, but show how we can be efficient. How we can do things that the rest of the force can’t do.”

Maier said, for example, in the context of experimentation and exercises, being able to “speak analytics” has never been a strong suit for SOF, “because we didn’t need it to be.” Now, they need to be able to “speak to those that speak numbers, in numbers, and show and demonstrate in numbers.”

When asked if he felt SOF were adequately represented on the resourcing side, Maier said, in short, no.

“But I think we have the authorities to be more effective in that space,” he said. “It's a matter of now catching up with the resources and talents.”

Growing advocacy in the Pentagon has improved SOF’s ability to make resourcing and programming decisions, he said, but it needs to continue to grow.

Currently working with “a handful of dozens of people, 40 to 50 people,” their resources are “not on the level of analytic machines that the services have,” he said. “And we’re gonna have to grow that, and we’re gonna have to do it in a classic SOF way, which would be innovative, efficient, and really pick and choose where we’re going to invest and really do well in those areas, so that we can really advocate for this community in those forms.”

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Laura Heckmann

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IMPERATIVES

ADRP 3-05 Special Operations 31 August 2012

1-75. SOF imperatives are the foundation for planning and executing SO in concert with other forces, interagency partners, and foreign organizations. Although the imperatives may not apply to all SOF operations, ARSOF commanders must include the applicable imperatives in their mission planning and execution:

Understand the operational environment. SO cannot shape the operational environment without first gaining a clear understanding of the theater of operations, to include civilian influence and enemy and friendly capabilities. SOF achieve objectives by understanding the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time variables within the specific operational environment, and develop plans to act within the realities of specific operational environments. ARSOF must identify the friendly and hostile decisionmakers, their objectives and strategies, and the ways in which they interact. The conditions of conflict can change, and ARSOF must anticipate these changes in the operational environment and exploit fleeting opportunities.

Recognize political implications. Many SO are conducted to advance critical political objectives. ARSOF must understand that their actions can have international consequences. Whether conducting operations independently or in coordination with partners, SOF must consider the political effects of their actions. SOF must anticipate ambiguous strategic and operational environments where military factors are not the only concern. SO frequently create conditions

for nonmilitary activities to occur within indigenous populations and for civil institutions to achieve U.S. and HN objectives. The advancement of the political objective may take precedence over the military disadvantages.

Facilitate interagency activities. Most SO occur in an interagency environment where the U.S. Government departments and agencies are working toward common national objectives as part of a country team effort. ARSOF must actively and continuously coordinate their activities with all relevant parties—U.S. and foreign military and nonmilitary organizations to ensure efficient use of all available resources and maintain unity of effort.

Engage the threat discriminately. SO missions often have sensitive political implications. Therefore, commanders must carefully select when, where, and how to employ ARSOF. SO may be applied with precision to minimize collateral effects and in a concealed or clandestine manner (or through the actions of indigenous military or other security forces) so that only the effects are detectable.

Anticipate long-term effects. ARSOF must consider the broader political, economic, informational, and military effects when faced with dilemmas because the solutions will have broad, far-reaching effects. These forces must accept legal and political constraints to avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical success. SOF must not jeopardize the success of national and geographic combatant commander long-term objectives with a desire for immediate or short-term effects. SO policies, plans, and operations must be consistent with the national and theater of operations priorities and objectives they support. Inconsistency can lead to a loss of legitimacy and credibility at the national level.

Ensure legitimacy and credibility. Significant legal and policy considerations apply to many SO activities. Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. The United States cannot sustain its assistance to a foreign power without this legitimacy. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates foster legitimacy and credibility through decisions and actions that comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, HN laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the ROE. However, the concept of legitimacy is broader than the strict

adherence to law. The concept also includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government or resistance organization. The people of the nation and the international community determine its legitimacy based on collective perception of the credibility of its cause and methods. Without legitimacy and credibility, ARSOF will not receive the support of the indigenous elements that are essential to success.

Anticipate and control psychological effects. All SO have significant psychological effects that are often amplified by an increasingly pervasive electronic media environment and the growing influence of social media. Some actions may be conducted specifically to produce a desired behavioral change or response from a selected target audience. Commanders must consider and incorporate the potential psychological effects and impacts of messages and actions into all their activities, anticipating and countering adversary information, as needed, to allow for maximum control of the environment.

Operate with and through others. The primary role of ARSOF in multinational operations is to advise, train, and assist indigenous military and paramilitary forces. The supported non-U.S. forces then serve as force multipliers in the pursuit of mutual security objectives with minimum

U.S. visibility, risk, and cost. ARSOF also operate with and through indigenous government and civil society leaders to shape the operational environment. The long-term self-sufficiency of the partner nation forces and entities must assume primary authority and accept responsibility for the success or failure of the mission. All U.S. efforts must reinforce and enhance the effectiveness, legitimacy, and credibility of the supported foreign government or group.

Overview of Special Operations

Develop multiple options. SOF must maintain their operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options and contingency plans. They must be able to shift from one option to another before and during mission execution, or apply two or more simultaneously, to provide flexible national and regional options while achieving the desired effects.

Ensure long-term engagement. ARSOF must demonstrate continuity of effort when dealing with political, economic, informational, and military programs. They must not begin programs that

are beyond the economic, technological, or sociocultural capabilities of the HN to maintain without further U.S. assistance. Such efforts are counterproductive. SO policy, strategy, and programs must, therefore, be durable, consistent, and sustainable.

Provide sufficient intelligence. Success for SOF missions dictates that uncertainty associated with the threat and other aspects of the operational environment must be minimized through the application of intelligence operations and procedures. Because of the needed detailed intelligence, ARSOF typically must also access theater of operations and national systems to alleviate shortfalls and to ensure that timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence is provided. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is often the only source that can satisfy critical SOF intelligence requirements, whether from overt or controlled sources. The key to effective intelligence support is for SO to fully use the entire intelligence support system and architecture. ARSOF units also provide intelligence through area assessments, SR, and post-operational debriefing of units.

Balance security and synchronization. Insufficient security may compromise a mission. Excessive security may cause the mission to fail because of inadequate coordination. SOF commanders must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution. 

3. Reed: Tuberville military holds may have contributed to Marine commandant’s hospitalization

Reed: Tuberville military holds may have contributed to Marine commandant’s hospitalization

By JOE GOULD and CONNOR O’BRIEN

10/31/2023 03:02 PM EDT

Politico

The situation shows “the fallacy and the danger” of the Alabama senator’s tactics, the Senate Armed Services chair said.

Marine Gen. Eric Smith, testifies during the Senate Armed Services hearing on his nomination to lead the U.S. Marine Corps, on June 13, 2023, on Capitol Hill. | Mariam Zuhaib/AP

10/31/2023 03:02 PM EDT

A top Senate Democrat said that the Marine Corps commandant’s recent medical emergency may be due in part to the fallout from Sen. Tommy Tuberville’s hold on top military promotions, which has forced several top officers to hold down multiple jobs.

Senate Armed Services Chair Jack Reed (D-R.I.) leveled the accusation a day after the service disclosed that Gen. Eric Smith, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was hospitalized on Sunday. There was no immediate word of when Smith would be released or return to work.

“One of the reasons, I think contributed to his condition was he was doing two jobs at once,” Reed said in a brief interview. “I’ve read where he was working from 5 a.m. to 11 p.m. As a result, if he had, as is normal, an assistant, he could switch off.”

The New York Times, citing people familiar, said Smith had an apparent heart attack while jogging on Sunday. The service has declined to go into specifics, citing the family’s privacy.

Reed said Smith’s medical emergency underscored, “the fallacy and the danger” of Tuberville’s (R-Ala.) tactic of delaying top military nominees from being confirmed. Tuberville has maintained the blockade over the Pentagon’s abortion travel policy, ensnaring more than 300 generals and admirals at the upper rungs of the armed forces.

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer has the option of holding votes on individual nominees, but has argued that doing so for so many nominees would allow the Senate to do nothing else.

The Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday that Tuberville is asking his colleagues to support an effort to quickly confirm Lt. Gen. Christopher Mahoney for the No. 2 position in the Marine Corps. A spokesperson for Tuberville, Steven Stafford, later confirmed the news.

Stafford declined to respond to Reed’s comments.

Because the service’s No. 2 is one of the unfilled jobs, Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, deputy commandant for combat development and integration, is serving as acting commandant. This means he will continue to run Marine Corps Combat Development Command, while effectively acting as the assistant commandant and the commandant.

Smith, who had been the assistant commandant and serving as commandant in an acting role, was confirmed for the top job in late September.

In a statement released Tuesday afternoon, Heckl said the Corps’ thoughts and prayers are with Smith.

“In typical Marine fashion, I am the next Marine up,” Heckl said. “This is what we do, as so many have done before us throughout the history of our Corps. We must continue the march forward on behalf of our fellow Marines and Nation, regardless of the situation or the uncertainty that we may face.”

“That is what our Commandant wants,” he continued, “and what the citizens of our Nation require of each and every one of us.”

Some of Tuberville’s Republican colleagues are trying privately to persuade him to refocus his blockade on civilian nominees at the Pentagon rather than uniformed officials.

The group includes Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), who reiterated on Tuesday that he still disagrees with Tuberville’s tactics of delaying military picks.

“I have been among those trying to convince Sen. Tuberville to express his opposition some other way, by [holding] people who actually make policy as opposed to our military heroes who’ve sworn to stay out of politics,” he said.

Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.), a Senate Armed Services member, said he spoke with Schumer and several Republicans Tuesday in an effort to resolve Tuberville’s holds. He said Smith’s health was part of those conversations.

“We’re talking about … that we have a commandant who’s in the hospital, and we don’t have a vice commandant, so the Marine Corps essentially doesn’t have any leadership,” Kelly said. “I mean, when was the last time that happened?”

Senate Armed Services ranking member Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) said Tuesday that Smith’s illness was part of talks to move forward on nominees.

“It’s a factor, and we remain concerned and hopeful for the general. But that’s an individual situation that needs to be resolved while we look at the overall picture,” Wicker said.

Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) said Tuesday he would, in the wake of Smith’s hospitalization, push his colleagues even more vigorously to break Tuberville’s logjam. He also pointed to nine open positions at Central Command, where there have been attacks on U.S. troops by forces supported by Iran.

“I am so angry as much as I am saddened that the Marine Corps will be handicapped by the absence of a commandant, potentially,” said Blumenthal, another senior Senate Armed Services member. “The potential as well for an absence in the commandant position just reemphasizes how the Tuberville hold is a desperate threat to our national security.”

Blumenthal said he has, with colleagues, have drafted a potential solution to Schumer, but he declined to discuss the details with reporters Tuesday. He said there has been an “increasing interest” from Republicans.

“We have a plan that I have worked to draft, and I am going to continue to press for the Senate to address some legislation,” Blumenthal said.

POLITICO

Politico

4. No updates on top Marine general’s condition after hospitalization

Of course general Smith's health is the priority but the circumstances surrounding his health issues are troubling and even more troubling is that some who are creating those circumstances do not recognize their contributions to the problems.

No updates on top Marine general’s condition after hospitalization

marinecorpstimes.com · by Irene Loewenson · October 31, 2023

Two days after the top Marine general was hospitalized after reportedly experiencing a serious heart problem, the Marine Corps has yet to provide an update on the commandant’s condition.

Gen. Eric Smith, 58, was hospitalized after experiencing a “medical emergency” Sunday evening, leaving Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl performing the duties of Marine commandant, the Corps said Monday afternoon.

Marine spokesman Maj. Jim Stenger declined to answer questions from Marine Corps Times about Smith’s condition or the nature of the medical emergency, citing “the family’s wishes to remain private.”

The U.S. Naval Institute and The New York Times reported Monday that Smith was hospitalized for a heart attack, citing confirmation from unnamed defense officials.

RELATED

Top Marine general hospitalized, leaving 3-star in charge

Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl is the interim acting commandant following Gen. Eric Smith's medical emergency Sunday evening.

The Times reported that Smith collapsed while running near his residence at Marine Barracks Washington.

Noah Gray, a spokesman for D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services, said in a statement Tuesday that emergency service personnel “responded to a cardiac arrest” near an intersection a block away from Smith’s residence at Marine Barracks Washington on Sunday at 4:58 p.m.

In a sudden cardiac arrest, which can occur after a heart attack, the heart malfunctions and stops beating, according to the American Heart Association.

Gray said his department doesn’t identify its patients.

“Bystanders called 911 and began CPR after witnessing an adult male collapse on the sidewalk while running” in the area of 7th Street and G Street Southeast, Gray said.

Gray said that EMTs and paramedics performed CPR on the man and took him to a nearby hospital.

A spokeswoman for Marine Barracks Washington referred Marine Corps Times to Stenger.

Earlier in the day of his medical emergency, Smith was supporting runners at the Marine Corps Marathon in Arlington, Virginia. The weather was so warm and muggy that marathon organizers closed the race early.

Heckl said in a statement Tuesday his thoughts and prayers were with Smith and his family.

“In typical Marine fashion, I am the next Marine up,” Heckl said. “This is what we do, as so many have done before us throughout the history of our Corps. We must continue the march forward on behalf of our fellow Marines and Nation, regardless of the situation or the uncertainty that we may face.”

Vacancies at Marine Corps headquarters

In July, Smith, then the assistant commandant, became the acting commandant following the legally required departure of his predecessor, now-retired Gen. David Berger.

He was the White House’s pick to become the next commandant, but his confirmation was held up in the Senate by Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Alabama.

Tuberville has placed a hold on confirming 378 senior military nominees through the typical process of providing unanimous consent, in protest of a Pentagon policy of providing time off and travel reimbursements for troops who seek abortions out of state.

The Senate in September confirmed three top nominees, including Smith, by voting on them individually.

While Smith simultaneously was the acting commandant and the assistant commandant, he told reporters that he was maintaining a schedule that was “not sustainable” and sleeping approximately five hours a night.

RELATED

As both the No. 1 and No. 2 Marine, his schedule is ‘not sustainable’

“I don’t mind breaking my own back,” said Gen. Eric Smith, who is both the acting and assistant commandant. “It’s just, I have to make good decisions.”

The Senate hasn’t confirmed the nominee for assistant commandant, Lt. Gen. Christopher Mahoney, meaning Smith essentially still was holding down the top two jobs in the Marine Corps.

“The workload remains the same,” Smith said Friday at the Military Reporters & Editors conference in Washington. “There’s still the two full-time jobs filled by one person.”

Heckl, the three-star general who stepped into Smith’s role Sunday, also is the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, overseeing the Marine Corps’ modernization initiative.

Steven Stafford, a Tuberville spokesman, told Marine Corps Times Tuesday that the senator is leading an effort to force an individual vote, likely on Thursday, on Mahoney’s confirmation.

By law, when there is a vacancy in the offices of both the commandant and the assistant commandant, the most senior officer in Marine Corps headquarters performs the duties of commandant until the official commandant returns or the Senate confirms a replacement.

The Marine Corps said Heckl took over because he was the most senior officer at Marine Corps headquarters.

Several senators and congressional representatives issued statements wishing Smith a speedy recovery, with some Democrats criticizing Tuberville for his refusal to confirm nominees through the unanimous consent process.

Sen. Ben Cardin, D-Maryland, said Tuesday on X, formerly known as Twitter, “Gen. Smith has been working 18+ hour days without a confirmed Deputy, another consequence of @SenTuberville’s military holds. When our top military leaders are impacted, so is our national security.”

Stafford, the Tuberville spokesman, told Marine Corps Times on Tuesday, using a nickname for the former college football coach, “Coach is praying for a swift recovery, and he is confident in the abilities of General Heckl to get the job done.”

Well-wishes also came from the top enlisted Marine leader, Sgt. Maj. Carlos Ruiz, who said Monday in a video message to Marines, “I want to assure you that the Corps’ leadership is in good hands.”

Ruiz said Smith “experienced a medical emergency and is currently receiving care at a local hospital” but didn’t provide further details.

“I know that all Marines will join me in wishing Gen. Smith a swift recovery so he can return to duty,” Ruiz said. “I also know that Marines across our Corps are professional warfighters, who will remain focused on the important work each of you are doing every day.”

Heckl noted in his statement that all orders remained in effect, adding, “Stay the course!”

About Irene Loewenson

Irene Loewenson is a staff reporter for Marine Corps Times. She joined Military Times as an editorial fellow in August 2022. She is a graduate of Williams College, where she was the editor-in-chief of the student newspaper.

5. China: ‘Israel’ omitted from online maps

Graphics/maps at the link: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231031-china-israel-omitted-from-online-maps/?utm

Are these companies doing it on their own or at the direction of the party?

China: ‘Israel’ omitted from online maps

middleeastmonitor.com · October 31, 2023

Online maps prepared by several Chinese companies have omitted the name Israel from the land of historic Palestine, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) yesterday.

The report noted that internet users in China have expressed bewilderment that the name “Israel” doesn’t appear on online digital maps from leading Chinese websites such as the country’s dominant search engine Baidu and trading platform Alibaba. This, it is said, represents “an ambiguity that matches Beijing’s vague diplomacy in the region and contrasts with its attentiveness to maps generally.”

China has REMOVED ISRAEL from its online maps, including Baidu and Alibaba! pic.twitter.com/UwcD86N3Pz

— Hend F Q (@LadyVelvet_HFQ) October 31, 2023

“Baidu’s Chinese language online maps demarcate the internationally recognised borders of Israel, as well as the Palestinian territories, plus key cities, but don’t clearly identify the country by name,” said the WSJ. It added that such was the case with Alibaba’s Amap online maps “where even small nations like Luxembourg are clearly marked.”

The newspaper said that it had contacted both companies for comment, but has yet to receive a response. It acknowledged, though, that it is unclear whether it is a new development, although it has garnered a lot of attention online from Chinese social media users since Israel’s bombardment of the Gaza Strip started more than three weeks ago.

The development comes amid reports of anti-Zionist and in some cases anti-Semitic sentiments being on the rise on Chinese social media platforms. China’s state-run media has also blamed the US for fuelling the largely one-sided conflict “while perpetuating tropes of Jewish control of American politics.”

Israel is no longer a country on China’s leading online digital maps, including on Baidu and Alibaba. pic.twitter.com/YQLwj40jz8

— Clash Report (@clashreport) October 30, 2023

Carice Witte, the executive director of SIGNAL Group, an Israeli think tank focusing on China, was quoted by the New York Times as saying: “If China felt that it was dangerous and problematic to allow anti-Semitic comments to flourish, the censors would stop it. Clearly, the government is conveying the message that it’s tolerated.”

The Chinese government has refused to condemn the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas, despite calls from the occupation state to do so. Instead, it has been more direct in blaming Israel for the latest outbreak of violence and devastation while calling for an immediate ceasefire.

“This response is consistent with China’s decades-long diplomatic support for Palestine and calls for a two-state solution, even as China and Israel have developed a close economic relationship since establishing diplomatic ties in 1992,” observed US-based The China Project.

middleeastmonitor.com · October 31, 2023

6. CCG Conferences Report:The Eighth China Global Think Tank Innovation Forum, Beijing

The conference report from China and the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) which organized the forum.

CCG Conferences Report

The Eighth China Global Think Tank Innovation Forum, Beijing, October 23 & EU-China Think Tank Exchanges, October 24, 2023

https://ccgupdate.substack.com/p/ccg-conferences-report?utm

CCG UPDATE

NOV 1, 2023

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After four years, the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) re-convened the Global Think Tank Innovation Forum by involving the largest number of international and Chinese think tanks in this series and since the abolishment of Covid restrictions in order to re-engage dialogues, resume in-person exchanges, and deepen understanding in challenging times. 

Despite that official interactions between the United States and China have also resumed in recent months, both international and Chinese thought leaders who participated in the Forum manifested significant concerns regarding on-going tensions between the US and China, and also between Europe and China. 

The fact is that less than two weeks before the conferences dramatic upheaval erupted in the Middle East while the war in Ukraine continues unabated. This backdrop complicated the already challenging global context by testing alliances and adherence to international norms. Even though a thaw in official relations between the US and China has enabled recent in-person exchanges between US cabinet officials and Chinese officials on a range of issues of common interest, the level of concern among think tank experts remains high. 

Thought leaders from China and the US acknowledge that each has contributed to the tensions and that mutual steps need to be taken by each side to improve the situation. We have confidence that exchanges we have had together in Beijing lay the basis for future dialogues to generate useful proposals for improving the relations among our countries, to strengthen global governance and to shift the political dynamics. With all of our open sessions streamed online in and outside of China by CCG, we hope officials from our countries may gain from our experience and find ways forward to strengthen the world as a single international community.

Recent years have witnessed the United States and China, the world’s two largest economies, being locked in escalating strategic competition that is rooted in the geopolitical realism characteristic of systems of balance of power. The continuously increasing intensity of confrontational narratives between the United States and China and vice versa threaten to bifurcate the international community, pressuring countries to choose sides, when in fact the current context requires that the international community becomes whole, unified and stronger to address the current panoply of risks. The bilateral polemics have not only dominated geopolitics, but have permeated, overwhelmed and undermined global relations in general and global governance for multilateral problem-solving in particular.

Internationally, CCG partnered with two entities -- the China-West Dialogue (CWD), and the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels -- to flesh out and facilitate exchanges among leading think tank experts from China and around the world. Over fifty think tanks from twenty countries participated in the two-day event, as well as over twenty think tanks from China. Domestically, the partner for the first-day event is the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC).

The China-West Dialogue (CWD) draws together thought leaders from China, Canada, Chile, Europe, the UK, Japan, Korea and the United States. It seeks to define an “alternative framework” for China-West relations at a moment when the toxic US-China bilateral relationship dominates geopolitics and global governance, stalling progress and disrupting coordination vital to addressing global systemic risks. The CWD’s fundamental goal is to reshape the narratives and behaviors of US-China relation from friction to function by engaging other middle and major powers in “reframed” China-West relations in multilateral processes and other public forums. 

This reframing of the bilateral relationship into a pluralized China-West relationships enables new political dynamics to over-ride the binary, bipolar dynamics by generating complexity and professionalism instead of polemics. As a result, Europe’s role in international relations and geopolitics as an independent player and equivalent power becomes crucial to inducing these new dynamics. 

The EU-China Think Tank Exchanges, a separate event held at the same vennue in the following day funded by the European Union and in partnership between CCG with EPC, enabled a gathering of thought leaders on EU-China relations and global governance.

The combination of the two days’ exchange benefited from the complementarities between the reframing efforts of the China-West Dialogue and the importance of pluralism in its alternative framework and the pivotal roles that Europe plays in actualizing that dynamic, elucidated by European participants.

The meetings reaped the benefits of the synergies generated by the CWD contributions on the first day and the EPC focus on Europe-China relations and cooperation on the second day. In turn, the CWD contributions derived from its four year history consisting of thirty zoom sessions involving more than sixty participants from seventeen countries, the involvement of twenty CWD regulars in the VIth Global Solutions Summit in Berlin last May including a strong delegation from CCG, a full-day workshop in Boston at the end of July to generate an outline for a CWD vision statement, and the full day focus on CWD findings in Beijing on Monday October 23. This will be followed by a workshop to be held in Washington in late November.

Over a period of three years, the EPC, together with its Chinese think tank partners led by the CCG, encouraged experts, analysts and policymakers from Europe and China to discuss issues such as post-COVID-19 cooperation, climate action and environment, global economy, digitalisation, connectivity, human rights and peace and security in international affairs, among many others. A series of structured exchanges between intellectual and strategic thinkers promoted the EU-China dialogue and supported mutual understanding and joint action in several relevant and cross-cutting policy areas and issues of mutual concern. This will be followed by other exchanges to be held online and in Europe. (Enditem)

Pledge your support

All the open sessions of the two-day event have been streamed online by CCG and remain available domestically. Photos are also available. CCG will share the English-language transcripts of the open sessions via its newsletters, like below.

7. Israel’s Multiple Advances into Gaza: An Operational Plan Comes into Focus by Mick Ryan

Excerpts:

At some point in the future, Israel will compete its operations in northern Gaza. After completing the northern Gaza operation, the IDF has options to withdraw, handover over to an international force, or continue south.

But the government of Israel also appreciates that despite its desire to destroy Hamas in all of Gaza, its allies only have limited strategic endurance for supporting this. Therefore, Israel has probably prioritized northern Gaza in case that only has time to clear part of Gaza. It will reassess its way forward once it looks like this operation is close to conclusion.

Regardless of whether there are other phases after this Battle for Gaza City, the coming days and weeks are likely to see a lot of tough, bloody fighting ahead on the ground - and under the ground. We will also continue to see a bitter information war that rages around the world, as well as multiple diplomatic initiatives, such as the one to potentially insert a peacekeeping force post-hostilities. 

For now, Israel appears to be pushing ahead with its declared intent to destroy Hamas.

Israel’s Multiple Advances into Gaza

An Operational Plan Comes into Focus

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/israels-multiple-advances-into-gaza?r=7i07&utm

MICK RYAN

OCT 31, 2023

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Image: @ClashReport at Twitter/X

Today, cities envelop the armed forces. Armies are simply not big enough to surround whole cities. Battles for cities now take place inside cities themselves, as contracted forces converge on decisive points. Because forces have shrunk, the urban battle has coalesced into a series of localized micro-sieges in which combatants struggle over buildings, streets and districts.

Anthony King, Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century.

Over the past 48 hours or so, the IDF’s plan for Gaza – or at least this phase of the plan – has become clearer.

The plan developed by the IDF, and now being executed, appears to be to isolate Gaza City and northern Gaza in the initial phase of the advance. This isolation is a component of a wider strategy, which Charles Knight and Katja Theodorakis have described as “SLICE-ing (strategize, locate, isolate, constrict and eliminate).”

As the most recent maps from War Mapper demonstrate, the Israeli’s are conducting an advance into Gaza on three separate axes:

1. Axis of Advance 1 is the advance south parallel to the coast from the north of Gaza.
2. Axis of Advance 2 is the advance into north-eastern Gaza towards Beit Hanouh.
3. Axis of Advance 3 is the advance into eastern Gaza, south of Gaza city, in the direction of the coast.

Gaza Map Showing Israeli Advances (Source: @War_Mapper at Twitter/X)

To provide a sense of scale, the distance from Gaza’s northern border on Axis of Advance 1 to its meeting point with the Israeli troops on Axis of Advance 3 is approximately 18 kilometres. This might not seem far, but it is almost entirely built-up urban areas. It will neither be a fast nor an easy distance to advance across.

The Axis of Advance 3 distance is much shorter – around 7.5 kilometres, and its largely through much less densely developed areas. This can be seen from the map, which shows the Israeli’s have almost completed this thrust to the coastline.

The Southern Cordon

The southern operation is an essential part of this phase of the Israeli mission to destroy Hamas. Isolating portions of urban areas, while conducting operations in the urban environment, is a key principle for these kinds of operations. As the U.S. joint doctrine on this subject notes:

Selectively isolate key portions of the urban environment. Control the influx into the urban environment of people, materiel, and information that could help support the adversary.

While the advance to the coast may proceed rapidly, this operation only gets harder from hereon. The Israelis will need to establish southern and northern facing cordons. The southern facing troops will have to prevent Hamas fighters moving north to assist those in northern Gaza, while allowing emergency humanitarian supplies in.

At the same time, the northern facing cordon will need to facilitate the flow south of civilian refugees while seeking to stop Hamas fighters escaping in the same direction. Not only will it be a significant task to identify Hamas fighters likely to be using refugees as cover to escape, but the Israelis will also need to be prepared for Hamas attacks on check points designed to kill large numbers of IDF personnel and civilians.

This cordon, in essence, provides for a siege of northern Gaza while Israeli forces fight their way through the city. This is a topic that has recently been examined by Amos Fox in an excellent article in War on the Rocks. He notes that:

Sieges, however, are neither an anomaly of contemporary armed conflict, nor something that is the result of bad tactics or attritionalist ways of warfare. A survey of armed conflict finds that 60 sieges of various sizes and duration have accompanied conflict since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, all 60 of those sieges occurred in urban areas. Given that arc…it is not a stretch to assume that sieges will maintain a central position within the looming conflict.

While a different mission from that taking place in the north of Gaza, this southern cordon mission will not be an easy one. And it will play a crucial role in the operations further to the north, as well as the Israeli operations to follow.

The Northern Axes of Advance

While setting this southern cordon, and establishing a siege of northern Gaza, the IDF will also be seeking to find Hamas infrastructure in northern Gaza and to intercept Hamas fighters heading south. This will involve crewed and uncrewed aircraft as well as electronic recon, and HUMINT. It will also involve ground operations on, above and below ground level.

This advance and clearance of northern Gaza will take some time - possibly weeks or months. In this time, Israel will need to balance the military effectiveness of its operations to destroy Hamas (and any other hostiles), avoiding civilian casualties while also keeping an eye on the inevitable strategic clock (the patience of allies) that is ticking. 

In the 2021 Israel-Gaza crisis, after nine days of war, President Biden apparently informed the Israeli Prime Minister that: “Hey, man, we are out of runway here.” After Netanyahu insisted on continuing the war, Biden then informed him, “It’s over.” A ceasefire followed two days later. As I have written in previous articles, Israel may have ‘more runway’ now because of the horrendous attacks it suffered on 7 October, but that runway is not infinite. It will need to achieve its military objectives and set the foundations for longer term political goals before the strategic clock runs out.

At this point, it is useful to consider what might be Israel’s operational measures of success for its northern Gaza operation. I would note, these are measures of success focussed on the Gaza military operation. There should also be more strategic measures of success, such as those focussed on diplomatic and informational objectives.

First, Israel will want to destroy as much of the Hamas leadership as possible. This is a key part of degrading the overall organisation, noting that the full destruction of Hamas (and the ideas it stands for) is probably impossible. But in killing Hamas leaders, Israel slows down its regeneration and punishes those responsible for 7 October.

Second, Israel will want to destroy Hamas stocks of munitions and other materiel. Israel has estimated that Hamas has used about 50% of its missile and rocket stocks since 7 October. As such, there are still thousands of rockets being hidden around Gaza, which the Israelis will want to find and destroy. Finding these stockpiles will reduce the chances of rocket attacks on Israel (at least from Gaza) and will also provide useful material for Israel’s strategic influence campaigns.

Third, Israel will want to find and destroy Hamas supporting infrastructure. This includes the tunnel network but also includes safe houses, bunkers and other facilities used to support Hamas command and control, operations, production and dissemination of propaganda, fund raising and logistics.

Fourth, Israel will seek to minimise civilian casualties. Despite the information campaign from Hamas and others about Israel deliberately targeting civilians, the Israelis do have multiple processes for warning civilians about impending military strikes. This new piece, published by the Liber Institute at West Point, explores this issue in some detail. It is also worth noting – as Economist Defence Editor Shashank Joshi has pointed out – “warnings are just one part of the picture. Warning or not, an attack still has to be lawful in other respects.”

Fifth, given reports of talks about an international force for Gaza, a final measure of success might be activities to set the conditions for the entry and establishment of an international peacekeeping force once Israel has destroyed Hamas. As US Secretary of State has told a Senate Appropriations Committee:

We can’t have a reversion to the status quo with Hamas running Gaza. We also can’t have — and the Israelis start with this proposition themselves — Israel running or controlling Gaza.

Concurrent Operations

The current operational plan that the Israelis appear to be executing has another benefit. While most attention at the moment is being paid to Israel’s preparations for a likely assault into Gaza, this is not be the only security challenge that will be concerning Israeli leaders. As large and as capable as the IDF is, Israel will want to avoid fighting on a second or third front if it is decisively engaged in Gaza combat operations.

But, if Hezbollah and its supporters in Iran see an opportunity to open a second front against Israel, they might do so. Israel’s political and military leaders will be ensuring that they have sufficient forces in northern Israel to deter such an attack.

And the West Bank is hardly a quiet and calm area. There has been a recent surge in violence on the West Bank, from protests and settler violence. A range of other actors, including the Syrians and Iranians, also pose a threat to Israel.

Therefore, by focussing on just part of Gaza, Israel has kept a large proportion of its mobilised troops in reserve. It could use this reserve to reinforce Gaza operations or for contingencies in northern Israel or the West Bank.

What is the Next Phase?

At some point in the future, Israel will compete its operations in northern Gaza. After completing the northern Gaza operation, the IDF has options to withdraw, handover over to an international force, or continue south.

But the government of Israel also appreciates that despite its desire to destroy Hamas in all of Gaza, its allies only have limited strategic endurance for supporting this. Therefore, Israel has probably prioritized northern Gaza in case that only has time to clear part of Gaza. It will reassess its way forward once it looks like this operation is close to conclusion.

Regardless of whether there are other phases after this Battle for Gaza City, the coming days and weeks are likely to see a lot of tough, bloody fighting ahead on the ground - and under the ground. We will also continue to see a bitter information war that rages around the world, as well as multiple diplomatic initiatives, such as the one to potentially insert a peacekeeping force post-hostilities. 

For now, Israel appears to be pushing ahead with its declared intent to destroy Hamas.

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8. Reports of Putin’s death might not be greatly exaggerated

Be careful what you ask for. But the first reports are always wrong.

What comes next if by some chance this report is accurate?

Reports of Putin’s death might not be greatly exaggerated

BY ALEXANDER J. MOTYL, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 10/31/23 9:30 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4283716-reports-of-putins-death-might-not-be-greatly-exaggerated/

Is Russian President Vladimir Putin dead?

According to a mysterious Russian Telegram channel called “General SVR” and Valery Solovey, a prominent Russian political analyst, the answer is yes.

In fact, the Russian president supposedly breathed his last on Thursday, Oct. 26. The Putin we see now is thus actually his double, who, Solovey claims, has been filling in for the sickly real Putin for several months.

Few Russian or Western analysts believe General SVR and Solovey (who some say are one and the same person). After all, they have no concrete evidence supporting their sensational claims. They do provide remarkably detailed accounts of Putin’s supposed death that enhance their verisimilitude, but imaginative crackpots and secret police provocateurs would be expected to do the same.

The problem is that Solovey strikes one as anything but a crackpot or a dupe of the Federal Security Service. He has a biting sense of humor, speaks well, argues logically and generally comes across as the kind of professor every student would want. Other than his claims regarding Putin’s death and the supposed exile of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the deceased head of the mercenary Wagner Group, to an island off the coast of Venezuela, his analyses of Russia’s internal politics are invariably smart and incisive.

So, if Solovey isn’t a madman or a puppet, he must be one of two remaining possibilities.

As a would-be opposition leader who may or may not really believe that Putin is dead, Solovey may be determined to sow confusion in the ranks of Russian elites and among ordinary Russians, leading them to wonder whether the great leader is still alive and to question whether the man claiming to be Putin really is Putin — thereby undermining his legitimacy.

With Russia’s presidential elections scheduled for March 2024, popular doubt about Putin’s health and existence can only complicate the Kremlin’s plans regarding just who should run and what margin of victory should there be. Unsurprisingly, Putin’s spokesman, the ever-mendacious Dmitry Peskov, felt compelled to deny rumors of Putin’s death and the existence of Putin doubles as fake news. But, since Peskov is always assumed never to tell the truth, was the denial a confirmation, or was it really a denial?

The other possibility is that Solovey and General SVR are not bona fide independent democratic oppositionists, as they claim to be. They may in fact be agents of the security services or spokesmen for powerful elites able to provide Solovey — who lives in Moscow and, despite his savage criticism of Putin, has managed to avoid arrest — with protection. The intended effect of the death claim would be the same — doubt, confusion and delegitimation — but the fact that the instigators could be establishment elites has more worrisome implications for Putin and the political system.

Two democrats in cahoots with a handful of others in Russia can effectively spread rumors, but cannot upend the existing system. In contrast, elite efforts to delegitimize the current regime bespeak a significant crack within what appears to outside observers as a monolithic regime.

And that, in turn, means that the post-Putin power struggle has already broken out, even if the real Putin is still alive. It’s broken out because the elites, both those supporting Putin and those opposing him, believe that Putin is too enervated, too weak or too politically moribund to make a difference.

Would the elites providing cover to Solovey be democratically inclined or, at least, opposed to retaining the existing Putinite system? Given Russia’s political culture, given that its population has been taught to despise liberalism and democracy for over two decades, and given the high likelihood that establishment elites may be out to merely reform the system and not replace it, chances are that Solovey’s possible protectors are conservative reformers who would want to dismantle the worst aspects of Putinism and try to end the war against Ukraine before the number of Russian dead exceeds 300,000. Solovey himself describes his politics as liberal conservative, which may also be the appropriate modifiers to describe his protectors.

Regardless of whether Putin is physically dead or alive, the brouhaha over his rumored death clearly shows that he’s in serious trouble. Hundreds of thousands of Russians have read General SVR’s and Solovey’s claims. Many more are discussing them. Seeds of doubt about the “grandpa in the bunker,” as Putin’s critics call him, have been planted.

And just as the general and Solovey have no proof of Putin’s death, their critics have no proof of his life, as one can always claim that the man claiming to be the real Putin is really a doppelganger.

Russian politics is becoming even more bizarre than usual. Strap on your seatbelts: The next few weeks and months are likely to be even more full of surprises.

Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.”

9. How AUKUS Plus could add to Indo-Pacific coalition building

Conclusion:

In the rapidly changing global strategic environment, coalition-building is the key to shaping the existing and emerging regional order. This process takes a long time and foreign policy signalling becomes imperative in policy coordination and strategic collaboration. In this context, the United Kingdom’s proposal to partner with other nations should be encouraged in the future.

How AUKUS Plus could add to Indo-Pacific coalition building

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/11/01/how-aukus-plus-could-add-to-indo-pacific-coalition-building/?utm

1 November 2023

Author: Kei Koga, NTU

The idea of ‘AUKUS Plus’ has re-emerged after the UK Foreign Affairs Committee issued a 2023 report saying the United Kingdom should extend cooperation ‘to partners such as Japan and South Korea’ as part of AUKUS ‘Strand B’ — or ‘Pillar Two’. This strand focuses on military technology cooperation with close allies on cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, quantum and undersea innovations, hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, electronic warfare capabilities and further information sharing.

While ‘Pillar One’ — which is concerned with nuclear-powered submarine building — remains exclusive to AUKUS’ core of Australia, United Kingdom and the United States, the possibility of Pillar Two cooperation has opened public discussion about partnership enlargement. Neither such cooperation nor enlargement will materialise anytime soon unless there is an abrupt shift in the Indo-Pacific’s balance of power.

Still, the United Kingdom’s statement illustrates the evolution of its Indo-Pacific strategy ‘Tilt’. Tilt indicates the United Kingdom’s renewed commitment to the Indo-Pacific, and its aim to garner regional support for UK involvement and to shape a regional balance of power in its favour. More importantly, this move plays a role in shaping the direction of regional coalition-building efforts.

The United Kingdom understands that the possibility of AUKUS membership expansion is still in its initial stages, with the report recommending that the UK government ‘[propose]’ the idea to the United States and Australia. There are challenges to overcome before the proposal is considered seriously among the core three.

There is yet to be consensus about the expansion. Australia, the initiator of the security coalition, has previously alluded to membership expansion in Pillar Two, but eventually dismissed the idea. Former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison stated in March 2023 that the inclusion of Japan would be ‘premature’ and that AUKUS should prioritise institutional consolidation.

For his part, US National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific Kurt Campbell touched on the idea of including other countries in Pillar Two of AUKUS. Yet he remained ambiguous about timing and stated that it should be done under the condition that a potential member shows a substantive contribution to AUKUS.

It is still not clear whether AUKUS is the best platform to expand cooperation with Japan, South Korea and others. The United States, Japan and South Korea have gained political momentum and further strengthened their trilateral cooperation, as illustrated in the 2023 joint statement ‘The Spirit of Camp David’. Their strategic cooperation now includes supply chain resilience, artificial intelligence and quantum computing — which resonates with Pillar Two of AUKUS.

Given the existence of these platforms, there is no real urgency for AUKUS and the US–Japan–South Korea trilateral cooperation to converge. For now, the United States is well-positioned to become a hub to coordinate the two trilateral frameworks and guide them towards future cooperation.

The expansion of AUKUS might be perceived as a unified diplomatic front against China. Of course, there is no question that the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom have taken a firm stance against China’s assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region and its threat to the existing international order.

Japan remains cautious but has clearly expressed serious concerns about China’s strategic posture, which it considers ‘unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge’ to its security and the existing international order. South Korea, under the Yoon administration, has also shown its strategic interest in engaging with AUKUS. Hence, the creation of AUKUS Plus is gaining diplomatic momentum.

That said, Japan and South Korea, being geographically close to and having substantial economic interactions with China, need to carefully manage their relationship with AUKUS. At least in the short term, they must provide a convincing rationale for any shifts toward AUKUS to avoid unnecessarily deteriorating their relations with China.

A history of recurring remarks pushing for AUKUS membership expansion suggests that, regardless of the United Kingdom’s strategic intentions, these statements function as a foreign policy signal for coalition-building. For example, there were domestic political changes in South Korea in 2022 and such statements allowed AUKUS members to gauge South Korea’s new strategic posture.

The statements can check for any changes in member states’ political desire for the creation of AUKUS Plus. This is particularly helpful since the strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond continues to evolve. The United States and the United Kingdom are distracted because of existing and emerging regional crises, such as in Ukraine and Israel. These may push them to facilitate larger coalition-building efforts.

Such statements stir public discourse within and outside the three core members, shedding light on various country-specific perspectives on AUKUS, including its benefits, costs and concerns. Japan has expressed interest in joining AUKUS Pillar Two efforts, yet any collaboration over nuclear-powered submarines would likely face public pushback because of sensitivities to nuclear-related norms.

In the rapidly changing global strategic environment, coalition-building is the key to shaping the existing and emerging regional order. This process takes a long time and foreign policy signalling becomes imperative in policy coordination and strategic collaboration. In this context, the United Kingdom’s proposal to partner with other nations should be encouraged in the future.

Kei Koga is Head of Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme and Associate Professor at the School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

10. American Commandos Are in Israel Helping to Locate Hostages, Pentagon Says

American Commandos Are in Israel Helping to Locate Hostages, Pentagon Says

A Defense Department official, Christopher P. Maier, declined to say how many U.S. Special Operations forces were currently in Israel. But other U.S. officials say the Defense Department has dispatched several dozen commandos in recent days.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/31/us/politics/us-israel-hostages.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm

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A demonstration outside the United Nations last week symbolizing the kidnapped hostages in Israel.Credit...Brittainy Newman for The New York Times

By Eric Schmitt

Reporting from Washington

• Oct. 31, 2023

American commandos on the ground in Israel are helping locate the more than 200 hostages seized during Hamas’s surprise cross-border attacks on Oct. 7, the Pentagon’s top special operations policy official said on Tuesday.

“We’re actively helping the Israelis to do a number of things,” Christopher P. Maier, an assistant secretary of defense, told a special operations conference in Washington. He said that a main task was to help Israel “identify hostages, including American hostages. It’s really our responsibility to do so.”

Mr. Maier declined to say how many U.S. Special Operations forces were currently in Israel. But other U.S. officials say the Defense Department has dispatched several dozen commandos in recent days, in addition to a small team that was in Israel on Oct. 7 conducting previously scheduled training.

The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, said the commandos would join F.B.I., State Department and other U.S. government hostage-recovery specialists in their discussions with Israeli counterparts.

The U.S. Special Operations forces are not assigned any combatant roles in Israel, but they are talking through with their Israeli counterparts “what is going to be a very complex fight going forward” in Gaza, Mr. Maier said.

In his discussions with his Israeli counterpart, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin II has stressed the need for careful consideration of how Israeli forces conduct a ground invasion of Gaza, where Hamas maintains an intricate network of tunnels under densely populated areas.

“We will work with them as much as possible to help advise them on those types of activities,” Mr. Maier said.

Several Western countries have secretly moved small teams of their own special forces closer to Israel to help with any potential rescue operation and to be nearby to assist in any large-scale evacuations of their citizens from Israel or Lebanon.

Mr. Maier said U.S. Special Operations forces in the region are also poised “to help our own citizens get out of places and to help our embassies be secure.”

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt

11. See inside the stereotyping machines pushing American bias across the internetSee inside the stereotyping machines pushing American bias across the internet

Please go to the link to the images. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/interactive/2023/ai-generated-images-bias-racism-sexism-stereotypes/?itid=hp-top-table-main_p001_f005https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/interactive/2023/ai-generated-images-bias-racism-sexism-stereotypes/?itid=hp-top-table-main_p001_f005

See inside the stereotyping machines pushing American bias across the internet

AI image generators like Stable Diffusion and DALL-E amplify bias in gender, race and beyond, despite efforts to detoxify the data fueling these results.

By Nitasha Tiku, 

Kevin Schaul and 

Szu Yu Chen

Nov. 1 at 6:00 a.m.

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Artificial intelligence image tools have a tendency to spin up disturbing clichés: Asian women are hypersexual. Africans are primitive. Europeans are worldly. Leaders are men. Prisoners are Black.

These stereotypes don’t reflect the real world; they stem from the data that trains the technology. Grabbed from the internet, these troves can be toxic — rife with pornography, misogyny, violence and bigotry.

Every image in this story shows something that doesn't exist in the physical world and was generated using Stable Diffusion, a text-to-image artificial intelligence model.

Stability AI, maker of the popular image generator Stable Diffusion XL, told The Washington Post it had made a significant investment in reducing bias in its latest model, which was released in July. But these efforts haven’t stopped it from defaulting to cartoonish tropes. The Post found that despite improvements, the tool amplifies outdated Western stereotypes, transferring sometimes bizarre clichés to basic objects, such as toys or homes.

“They’re sort of playing whack-a-mole and responding to what people draw the most attention to,” said Pratyusha Kalluri, an AI researcher at Stanford University.

Christoph Schuhmann, co-founder of LAION, a nonprofit behind Stable Diffusion’s data, argues that image generators naturally reflect the world of White people because the nonprofit that provides data to many companies, including LAION, doesn’t focus on China and India, the largest population of web users.

[Inside the secret list of websites that make AI like ChatGPT sound smart]

When we asked Stable Diffusion XL to produce a house in various countries, it returned clichéd concepts for each location: classical curved roof homes for China, rather than Shanghai’s high-rise apartments; idealized American houses with trim lawns and ample porches; dusty clay structures on dirt roads in India, home to more than 160 billionaires, as well as Mumbai, the world’s 15th richest city.

AI-GENERATED IMAGESprompt:

A photo of a house in ...

United States

China

India

Show more

“This will give you the average stereotype of what an average person from North America or Europe thinks,” Schuhmann said. “You don’t need a data science degree to infer this.”

Stable Diffusion is not alone in this orientation. In recently released documents, OpenAI said its latest image generator, DALL-E 3, displays “a tendency toward a Western point-of-view” with images that “disproportionately represent individuals who appear White, female, and youthful.”

As synthetic images spread across the web, they could give new life to outdated and offensive stereotypes, encoding abandoned ideals around body type, gender and race into the future of image-making.

Predicting the next pixel

Like ChatGPT, AI image tools learn about the world through gargantuan amounts of training data. Instead of billions of words, they are fed billions of pairs of images and their captions, also scraped from the web.

Tech companies have grown increasingly secretive about the contents of these data sets, partially because the text and images included often contain copyrighted, inaccurate or even obscene material. In contrast, Stable Diffusion and LAION, are open source projects, enabling outsiders to inspect details of the model.

Stability AI chief executive Emad Mostaque said his company views transparency as key to scrutinizing and eliminating bias. “Stability AI believes fundamentally that open source models are necessary for extending the highest standards in safety, fairness, and representation," he said in a statement.

Images in LAION, like many data sets, were selected because they contain code called “alt-text,” which helps software describe images to blind people. Though alt-text is cheaper and easier than adding captions, it’s notoriously unreliable — filled with offensive descriptions and unrelated terms intended to help images rank high in search.

[ AI can now create images out of thin air. See how it works. ]

Image generators spin up pictures based on the most likely pixel, drawing connections between words in the captions and the images associated with them. These probabilistic pairings help explain some of the bizarre mashups churned out by Stable Diffusion XL, such as Iraqi toys that look like U.S. tankers and troops. That’s not a stereotype: it reflects America’s inextricable association between Iraq and war.

Misses biases

Despite the improvements in SD XL, The Post was able to generate tropes about race, class, gender, wealth, intelligence, religion and other cultures by requesting depictions of routine activities, common personality traits or the name of another country. In many instances, the racial disparities depicted in these images are more extreme than in the real world.

For example, in 2020, 63 percent of food stamp recipients were White and 27 percent were Black, according to the latest data from the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation. Yet, when we prompted the technology to generate a photo of a person receiving social services, it generated only non-White and primarily darker-skinned people. Results for a “productive person,” meanwhile, were uniformly male, majority White, and dressed in suits for corporate jobs.

AI-GENERATED IMAGESprompt:

A portrait photo of ...

a person at social services

a productive person

Show more

Last fall, Kalluri and her colleagues also discovered that the tools defaulted to stereotypes. Asked to provide an image of “an attractive person,” the tool generated light-skinned, light-eyed, thin people with European features. A request for a “a happy family” produced images of mostly smiling, White, heterosexual couples with kids posing on manicured lawns.

Kalluri and the others also found the tools distorted real world statistics. Jobs with higher incomes like “software developer” produced representations that skewed more White and male than data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics would suggest. White-appearing people also appear in the majority of images for “chef,” a more prestigious food preparation role, while non-White people appear in most images of “cooks” — though the Labor Bureau’s statistics show that a higher percentage of “cooks” self-identify as White than “chefs.”

Cleaner data, cleaner results

Companies have long known about issues with the data behind this technology. ImageNet, a pivotal 2009 training set of 14 million images, was in use for more than a decade before researchers found disturbing content, including nonconsensual sexual images, in which women were sometimes easily identifiable. Some images were sorted into categories labeled with slurs such as “Closet Queen,” “Failure,” “mulatto,” “nonperson,” “pervert,” and “Schizophrenic.”

ImageNet’s authors eliminated most of the categories, but many contemporary data sets are built the same way, using images obtained without consent and categorizing people like objects.

Efforts to detoxify AI image tools have focused on a few seemingly fruitful interventions: filtering data sets, finessing the final stages of development, and encoding rules to address issues that earned the company bad PR.

For example, Stable Diffusion drew negative attention when requests for a “Latina” produced images of women in suggestive poses wearing little to no clothing. A more recent system (version 2.1) generated more innocuous images.

AI-GENERATED IMAGESprompt:

A photo of ...

a Latina (version 1.5)

a Latina (version 2.1)

Show more

Why the difference? A Post analysis found the training data for the first version contained a lot more pornography.

Of the training images captioned “Latina,” 20 percent of captions or URLs also included a pornographic term. More than 30 percent were marked as almost certain to be “unsafe” by a LAION detector for not-safe-for-work content. In subsequent Stable Diffusion models, the training data excluded images marked as possibly “unsafe,” producing images that appear markedly less sexual.

The Post’s findings track with prior research that found images of sexual abuse and rape in the data set used for Stable Diffusion 1, as well as images that sexualized Black women and fetishized Asian women. In addition to removing “unsafe” images, Ben Brooks, Stability AI’s head of public policy, said the company was also careful to block child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and other high-risk imagery for SD2.

Filtering the “bad” stuff out of a data set isn’t an easy fix-all for bias, said Sasha Luccioni, a research scientist at Hugging Face, an open source repository for AI and one of LAION’s corporate sponsors. Filtering for problematic content using keywords in English, for example, may remove a lot of porn and CSAM, but it may also result in more content overall from the global north, where platforms have a longer history of generating high-quality content and stronger restrictions on posting porn, she said.

“All of these little decisions can actually make cultural bias worse,” Luccioni said.

Even prompts to generate photos of everyday activities slipped into tropes. Stable Diffusion XL defaulted to mostly darker-skinned male athletes when we prompted the system to produce images for “soccer,” while depicting only women when asked to show people in the act of “cleaning.” Many of the women were smiling, happily completing their feminine household chores.

AI-GENERATED IMAGESprompt:

A portrait photo of a person ...

playing soccer

cleaning

Show more

Stability AI argues each country should have its own national image generator, one that reflects national values, with data sets provided by the government and public institutions.

Reflecting the diversity of the web has recently become “an area of active interest” for Common Crawl, a 16-year-old nonprofit that has long provided text scraped from the web for Google, LAION, and many other tech firms, executive director Rich Skrenta told The Post. Its crawler scrapes content based on the organization’s internal ranking of what’s central to the internet, but is not instructed to focus on a specific language or country.

“If there is some kind of bias in the crawl and if it’s not probing as deeply into, say, Indian websites,” that is something Common Crawl would like to measure and fix, he said.

The endless task of eradicating bias

The AI field is divided on how to address bias.

For Kalluri, mitigating bias in images is fundamentally different than in text. Any prompt to create a realistic image of a person has to make decisions about age, body, race, hair, background and other visual characteristics, she said. Few of these complications lend themselves to computational solutions, Kalluri said.

Kalluri believes it’s important for anyone who interacts with the technology to understand how it operates. “They’re just predictive models,” she said, portraying things based on the snapshot of the internet in their data set.

[See why AI like ChatGPT has gotten so good, so fast]

Even using detailed prompts didn’t mitigate this bias. When we asked for a photo of a wealthy person in different countries, Stable Diffusion XL still produced a mishmash of stereotypes: African men in Western coats standing in front of thatched huts, Middle Eastern men posed in front of ancient mosques, while European men in slim-fitting suits wandered quaint cobblestone streets.

AI-GENERATED IMAGESprompt:

A photo of a wealthy person in ...

Africa

the Middle East

Europe

Show more

Abeba Birhane, senior advisor for AI accountability at the Mozilla Foundation, contends that the tools can be improved if companies work hard to improve the data — an outcome she considers unlikely. In the meantime, the impact of these stereotypes will fall most heavily on the same communities harmed during the social media era, she said, adding: “People at the margins of society are continually excluded.”

About this story

The Washington Post generated images using the ClipDrop API to access Stable Diffusion XL1.0. Each prompt created seven to 10 images which are presented here in the exact appearance and order as the model output. Images that used older models relied on the Stable Diffusion v1-5 through the Stability API.

Jeremy B. Merrill contributed to this report.

Editing by Alexis Sobel Fitts, Kate Rabinowitz and Karly Domb Sadof.

Artificial intelligence image tools have a tendency to spin up disturbing clichés: Asian women are hypersexual. Africans are primitive. Europeans are worldly. Leaders are men. Prisoners are Black.

These stereotypes don’t reflect the real world; they stem from the data that trains the technology. Grabbed from the internet, these troves can be toxic — rife with pornography, misogyny, violence and bigotry.

Every image in this story shows something that doesn't exist in the physical world and was generated using Stable Diffusion, a text-to-image artificial intelligence model.

Stability AI, maker of the popular image generator Stable Diffusion XL, told The Washington Post it had made a significant investment in reducing bias in its latest model, which was released in July. But these efforts haven’t stopped it from defaulting to cartoonish tropes. The Post found that despite improvements, the tool amplifies outdated Western stereotypes, transferring sometimes bizarre clichés to basic objects, such as toys or homes.

“They’re sort of playing whack-a-mole and responding to what people draw the most attention to,” said Pratyusha Kalluri, an AI researcher at Stanford University.

Christoph Schuhmann, co-founder of LAION, a nonprofit behind Stable Diffusion’s data, argues that image generators naturally reflect the world of White people because the nonprofit that provides data to many companies, including LAION, doesn’t focus on China and India, the largest population of web users.

[Inside the secret list of websites that make AI like ChatGPT sound smart]

When we asked Stable Diffusion XL to produce a house in various countries, it returned clichéd concepts for each location: classical curved roof homes for China, rather than Shanghai’s high-rise apartments; idealized American houses with trim lawns and ample porches; dusty clay structures on dirt roads in India, home to more than 160 billionaires, as well as Mumbai, the world’s 15th richest city.

AI-GENERATED IMAGESprompt:

A photo of a house in ...

United States

China

India

Show more

“This will give you the average stereotype of what an average person from North America or Europe thinks,” Schuhmann said. “You don’t need a data science degree to infer this.”

Stable Diffusion is not alone in this orientation. In recently released documents, OpenAI said its latest image generator, DALL-E 3, displays “a tendency toward a Western point-of-view” with images that “disproportionately represent individuals who appear White, female, and youthful.”

As synthetic images spread across the web, they could give new life to outdated and offensive stereotypes, encoding abandoned ideals around body type, gender and race into the future of image-making.

Predicting the next pixel

Like ChatGPT, AI image tools learn about the world through gargantuan amounts of training data. Instead of billions of words, they are fed billions of pairs of images and their captions, also scraped from the web.

Tech companies have grown increasingly secretive about the contents of these data sets, partially because the text and images included often contain copyrighted, inaccurate or even obscene material. In contrast, Stable Diffusion and LAION, are open source projects, enabling outsiders to inspect details of the model.

Stability AI chief executive Emad Mostaque said his company views transparency as key to scrutinizing and eliminating bias. “Stability AI believes fundamentally that open source models are necessary for extending the highest standards in safety, fairness, and representation," he said in a statement.

Images in LAION, like many data sets, were selected because they contain code called “alt-text,” which helps software describe images to blind people. Though alt-text is cheaper and easier than adding captions, it’s notoriously unreliable — filled with offensive descriptions and unrelated terms intended to help images rank high in search.

[ AI can now create images out of thin air. See how it works. ]

Image generators spin up pictures based on the most likely pixel, drawing connections between words in the captions and the images associated with them. These probabilistic pairings help explain some of the bizarre mashups churned out by Stable Diffusion XL, such as Iraqi toys that look like U.S. tankers and troops. That’s not a stereotype: it reflects America’s inextricable association between Iraq and war.

Misses biases

Despite the improvements in SD XL, The Post was able to generate tropes about race, class, gender, wealth, intelligence, religion and other cultures by requesting depictions of routine activities, common personality traits or the name of another country. In many instances, the racial disparities depicted in these images are more extreme than in the real world.

For example, in 2020, 63 percent of food stamp recipients were White and 27 percent were Black, according to the latest data from the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation. Yet, when we prompted the technology to generate a photo of a person receiving social services, it generated only non-White and primarily darker-skinned people. Results for a “productive person,” meanwhile, were uniformly male, majority White, and dressed in suits for corporate jobs.

AI-GENERATED IMAGESprompt:

A portrait photo of ...

a person at social services

a productive person

Show more

Last fall, Kalluri and her colleagues also discovered that the tools defaulted to stereotypes. Asked to provide an image of “an attractive person,” the tool generated light-skinned, light-eyed, thin people with European features. A request for a “a happy family” produced images of mostly smiling, White, heterosexual couples with kids posing on manicured lawns.

Kalluri and the others also found the tools distorted real world statistics. Jobs with higher incomes like “software developer” produced representations that skewed more White and male than data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics would suggest. White-appearing people also appear in the majority of images for “chef,” a more prestigious food preparation role, while non-White people appear in most images of “cooks” — though the Labor Bureau’s statistics show that a higher percentage of “cooks” self-identify as White than “chefs.”

Cleaner data, cleaner results

Companies have long known about issues with the data behind this technology. ImageNet, a pivotal 2009 training set of 14 million images, was in use for more than a decade before researchers found disturbing content, including nonconsensual sexual images, in which women were sometimes easily identifiable. Some images were sorted into categories labeled with slurs such as “Closet Queen,” “Failure,” “mulatto,” “nonperson,” “pervert,” and “Schizophrenic.”

ImageNet’s authors eliminated most of the categories, but many contemporary data sets are built the same way, using images obtained without consent and categorizing people like objects.

Efforts to detoxify AI image tools have focused on a few seemingly fruitful interventions: filtering data sets, finessing the final stages of development, and encoding rules to address issues that earned the company bad PR.

For example, Stable Diffusion drew negative attention when requests for a “Latina” produced images of women in suggestive poses wearing little to no clothing. A more recent system (version 2.1) generated more innocuous images.

AI-GENERATED IMAGESprompt:

A photo of ...

a Latina (version 1.5)

a Latina (version 2.1)

Show more

Why the difference? A Post analysis found the training data for the first version contained a lot more pornography.

Of the training images captioned “Latina,” 20 percent of captions or URLs also included a pornographic term. More than 30 percent were marked as almost certain to be “unsafe” by a LAION detector for not-safe-for-work content. In subsequent Stable Diffusion models, the training data excluded images marked as possibly “unsafe,” producing images that appear markedly less sexual.

The Post’s findings track with prior research that found images of sexual abuse and rape in the data set used for Stable Diffusion 1, as well as images that sexualized Black women and fetishized Asian women. In addition to removing “unsafe” images, Ben Brooks, Stability AI’s head of public policy, said the company was also careful to block child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and other high-risk imagery for SD2.

Filtering the “bad” stuff out of a data set isn’t an easy fix-all for bias, said Sasha Luccioni, a research scientist at Hugging Face, an open source repository for AI and one of LAION’s corporate sponsors. Filtering for problematic content using keywords in English, for example, may remove a lot of porn and CSAM, but it may also result in more content overall from the global north, where platforms have a longer history of generating high-quality content and stronger restrictions on posting porn, she said.

“All of these little decisions can actually make cultural bias worse,” Luccioni said.

Even prompts to generate photos of everyday activities slipped into tropes. Stable Diffusion XL defaulted to mostly darker-skinned male athletes when we prompted the system to produce images for “soccer,” while depicting only women when asked to show people in the act of “cleaning.” Many of the women were smiling, happily completing their feminine household chores.

AI-GENERATED IMAGESprompt:

A portrait photo of a person ...

playing soccer

cleaning

Show more

Stability AI argues each country should have its own national image generator, one that reflects national values, with data sets provided by the government and public institutions.

Reflecting the diversity of the web has recently become “an area of active interest” for Common Crawl, a 16-year-old nonprofit that has long provided text scraped from the web for Google, LAION, and many other tech firms, executive director Rich Skrenta told The Post. Its crawler scrapes content based on the organization’s internal ranking of what’s central to the internet, but is not instructed to focus on a specific language or country.

“If there is some kind of bias in the crawl and if it’s not probing as deeply into, say, Indian websites,” that is something Common Crawl would like to measure and fix, he said.

The endless task of eradicating bias

The AI field is divided on how to address bias.

For Kalluri, mitigating bias in images is fundamentally different than in text. Any prompt to create a realistic image of a person has to make decisions about age, body, race, hair, background and other visual characteristics, she said. Few of these complications lend themselves to computational solutions, Kalluri said.

Kalluri believes it’s important for anyone who interacts with the technology to understand how it operates. “They’re just predictive models,” she said, portraying things based on the snapshot of the internet in their data set.

[See why AI like ChatGPT has gotten so good, so fast]

Even using detailed prompts didn’t mitigate this bias. When we asked for a photo of a wealthy person in different countries, Stable Diffusion XL still produced a mishmash of stereotypes: African men in Western coats standing in front of thatched huts, Middle Eastern men posed in front of ancient mosques, while European men in slim-fitting suits wandered quaint cobblestone streets.

AI-GENERATED IMAGESprompt:

A photo of a wealthy person in ...

Africa

the Middle East

Europe

Show more

Abeba Birhane, senior advisor for AI accountability at the Mozilla Foundation, contends that the tools can be improved if companies work hard to improve the data — an outcome she considers unlikely. In the meantime, the impact of these stereotypes will fall most heavily on the same communities harmed during the social media era, she said, adding: “People at the margins of society are continually excluded.”

About this story

The Washington Post generated images using the ClipDrop API to access Stable Diffusion XL1.0. Each prompt created seven to 10 images which are presented here in the exact appearance and order as the model output. Images that used older models relied on the Stable Diffusion v1-5 through the Stability API.

Jeremy B. Merrill contributed to this report.

Editing by Alexis Sobel Fitts, Kate Rabinowitz and Karly Domb Sadof.Please go to the link to the images. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/interactive/2023/ai-generated-images-bias-racism-sexism-stereotypes/?itid=hp-top-table-main_p001_f005https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/interactive/2023/ai-generated-images-bias-racism-sexism-stereotypes/?itid=hp-top-table-main_p001_f005

12. Getting Serious About Enhancing U.S. Defense PartnershipsGetting Serious About Enhancing U.S. Defense Partnerships

Conclusion:

The war in Ukraine has helped to expose ways in which the U.S. defense establishment needs to shift to address the ongoing conflict and potential future conflicts. Particularly as the United States looks to fulfil its security commitments to partner states, it is evident that alliance-wide capabilities are essential to ensuring that militaries can operate together, and that there is sufficient production capacity across the American, partner, and allied defense industrial bases. The U.S. National Defense Strategy recognizes this need and places appropriate focus on building allied capability. Moreover, as the United States takes a “small yard, high fence” approach to focusing controls around the most sensitive technologies, it should readily seek cooperation in areas outside the scope of those restrictions. Implementing this approach will be challenging as it revisits long-ingrained practices and policies that have their own constituencies. But making these changes will be an essential step to ensure that the United States and its network of allies and partners can deter and win the conflicts of today and tomorrow.

Getting Serious About Enhancing U.S. Defense Partnerships - War on the Rocks

RAANAN HOROWITZ AND STAN CROW

warontherocks.com · by Raanan Horowitz · November 1, 2023

The role of U.S. allies and partners lies at the center of the U.S. defense strategy, as their military cooperation provides the United States with an edge that near-peer competitors like China and Russia cannot match. Yet, despite years of efforts by senior Department of Defense officials to make the defense acquisition system more agile and flexible, the system retains a culture inherently resistant to foreign cooperation because it was built for a prior era of U.S. technological dominance.

We have both served or currently serve as executives for defense and aerospace firms with interests in this issue. Our experience has provided insight into U.S. defense cooperation with its allies and partners and we are writing this piece to provide advice and support for the U.S. goal of enhancing such cooperation. The Biden administration and Congress should enact a series of regulatory and process changes to make good on the promises of the U.S. defense strategy for “early and continuous” cooperation with allies and partners. First, reduce the regulatory barriers to partner cooperation by updating U.S. export controls and making it easier to share technology and information with select U.S. allies and partners. Second, limit the classification designation “Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals” (better known as NOFORN) in defense requests for proposals. Third, identify specific lanes of cooperation that the Department of Defense seeks to prioritize with partners and establish expedited procedures to share information and technology, a process already carried out in the AUKUS partnership with the United Kingdom and Australia. Fourth, ingrain considerations of potential allied development or production cooperation at the inception of an acquisition program instead of as an afterthought at the end. Starting with the end in mind would determine whether there is alignment with any partners and their defense industries where co-development or co-production could yield cost savings, enhance production resilience, improve interoperability, and/or increase the speed of deployment. Such benefits are all-important enablers in U.S. efforts to counter and deter Russian and Chinese aggression.

Become a Member

Revisiting U.S. Technology Controls in the Current Environment

The U.S. export control system was developed in the mid-1970s when the United States, particularly the federal government, was responsible for the vast majority of global research and development spending. However, now the United States conducts about 31 percent of the world’s research and development, with much of that activity in a globalized commercial sector. The barriers to technology sharing mean that the United States runs the risk of losing access to allied innovation and production capacity, delaying the deployment of capabilities by doing everything on its own, and hobbling efforts to improve interoperability across allied forces.

Moreover, allies and partners find U.S. export control rules to be onerous and cumbersome. The United Kingdom, with which the United States has a special relationship and which partners closely with Washington on technology controls, spends nearly $500 million each year on navigating the U.S. export control system. Expending such effort and resources just to navigate a foreign bureaucracy creates a major disincentive for U.S. allies and allied industries to work with the Department of Defense. The disincentive is even worse for companies focused on commercial innovation because the appeal of accessing the considerable U.S. defense market is dampened by being tied down by U.S. technology restrictions and the risk of losing control over their intellectual property.

Both the Biden administration and Congress are taking important steps to reduce or mitigate the regulatory barriers to leveraging the defense industrial base of U.S. allies and partners, but significant work will be needed to implement change.

AUKUS: An Important Start to Improving the System

The AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States has created particular impetus around reducing barriers to defense cooperation. The fact that such barriers persist for two countries that are close U.S. allies, part of the U.S. National Technology Industrial Base, and Five Eyes intelligence partners is indicative of how U.S. technology sharing restrictions fail to distinguish between the countries Washington seeks to partner with and those it does not. An Australian security think tank also noted that the Australian defense community sees the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations as the biggest impediment to realizing the level of defense integration promised under AUKUS.

In this context, AUKUS, specifically the arrangement’s “Pillar II” on advanced defense technologies, is serving as a test of whether the United States can shift its approach to allied defense cooperation. Hence, the administration and Congress have concentrated their efforts on AUKUS to reduce the friction in the U.S. system regarding technology and information sharing. For example, with congressional support, the administration is seeking to allow transfers to Australia and the United Kingdom to be pre-approved, rather than subject to the traditional case-by-case review, if those transfers are related to specific areas of AUKUS cooperation, such as hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing.

In another effort, Sen. James Risch and Sen. Bill Hagerty introduced the TORPEDO Act in May, which creates both license exemptions and open general licenses to expedite the transfer of certain U.S. defense items to the United Kingdom and Australia. The bill also authorizes the State Department to use existing funding to hire additional personnel to review defense license requests. While a positive step, Congress should follow the advice of former Assistant Secretary of Commerce Kevin Wolf and appropriate funding for interagency licensing authorities to hire additional personnel to keep up with the increasing volume of exports and the pace of change of export control lists. Increased defense cooperation would entail more transfers of technology and licensing authorities will need enough personnel to prevent bottlenecks and delays.

These important steps to streamline cooperation in the context of AUKUS should ultimately be broadened to cover lanes of cooperation between the United States and other allies and partners. Once the United States has identified defense cooperation partners for specific capabilities or technologies, the expeditious procedures being put in place to facilitate AUKUS should be used for those cooperative efforts as well. Specific examples exist today like the Department of Defense’s Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate, which has successfully leveraged cooperation between the United States, Australia, Canada, Israel, Singapore, and the United Kingdom to develop and field counterterrorism capabilities, taking advantage of economies of scale to reduce development costs. The technologies involved in this counterterrorism cooperation should be identified and made subject to streamlined technology transfer processes with the cooperating states, demonstrating that the United States treats its defense partners differently from those who are not partners. The United States could also leverage the shipbuilding and heavy manufacturing capabilities of Japan and South Korea to co-develop surface naval vessels valuable for protecting the region from Chinese territorial aggression. Finally, technologies developed through NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, intended to leverage dual-use technologies for alliance defense capabilities, should also be afforded streamlined procedures in its focus areas, which currently include energy resilience, sensing and surveillance, and secure information sharing.

The United States and the partners involved in these lanes of cooperation should not only pre-approve transfers of relevant technologies to other countries in the group — they should also pre-approve the re-export of those technologies within the group. Despite the impetus to enhance allied interoperability, U.S. re-export restrictions often prevent the sharing of American defense technology between allies, even when such sharing is in U.S. interests. Such expedited procedures do not need to be a one-size-fits-all approach. Close allies with similar export control systems, such as those involved in AUKUS, may have expedited procedures for a broad range of technologies subject to the cooperative effort. Other partnerships might use expedited procedures for less sensitive technologies or current-generation capabilities, while maintaining tighter restrictions over the more sensitive aspects of cooperation. Finally, if the Department of Defense is serious about attracting the participation of foreign defense firms to enhance defense cooperation, it should be open to working with foreign partners across its acquisition efforts. That means that rapid acquisition programs leveraging private capital and commercial innovation through programs such as the Defense Innovation Unit should accept bids from companies based in countries that are engaged in such lanes of cooperation with the department.

Beyond AUKUS, there are additional signs of regulatory reforms that should reduce the disincentives for defense firms in U.S. allies and partners to work with the Department of Defense to develop and deploy capabilities. As part of its Foreign Military Sales reform, the department has indicated that it “will review and update relevant policies and empower accountable officials to improve the efficiency of the review and release of technology to allies and partner nations.” The extent to which this process will be helpful will depend on the details, including whether such efficiencies are implemented across the agencies responsible for export controls, including the Departments of State and Commerce. But even that is not enough. Because industry is at the forefront of technological innovation and influences the pace at which new technologies become available and obsolete, industry should be involved in such reviews.

One of the administrative barriers to cooperation that has seeped into the Department of Defense’s culture is related to information protection and the ubiquitous use of the dissemination control marking “Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.” In 2005, the Defense Department found that the extensive and incorrect use of this designation impeded information sharing with allies and partners and the department tried to limit its use to intelligence information. That effort did not go far enough, as a 2013 departmental review of classification procedures found that the “Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals” designation was “seemingly the most misunderstood” dissemination control marking and was potentially detrimental to sharing with coalition partners. To address this detriment, in 2016 the then-chief of Air Force Space Command, Gen. John Hyten, reviewed and had nearly all of the “Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals” designations removed from the command’s documents, as Space Command placed significant focus on allied cooperation. Recent Department of Defense acquisition cases show an even more indiscriminate attempt to limit foreign partner contribution by defining potential programs as “closed to foreign participation at all levels,” thus inhibiting even the ability to objectively assess the merits of leveraging technology contributions from trusted allies. Department of Defense leadership should conduct a department-wide review and make clear that information should only be labeled “Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals” when there is ample reason to withhold information from even America’s closest allies. The department should also consider providing clarification guidance to minimize the use of overarching and indiscriminate limitations on the participation of trusted allies and partners.

Making “Integration by Design” Operational

Even if the regulatory barriers addressed above are reduced or mitigated, the U.S. defense acquisition process is not pre-disposed towards expanding cooperation automatically. So long as the incentive structure for acquisition managers remains focused on developing and producing exquisite U.S. defense capabilities, eliminating regulatory barriers is not enough. Instead, the Department of Defense needs to begin to consider the prospect for co-development and co-production with allies and partners at the start of an acquisition program, not at the end. Such an approach would be consistent with the Integrated by Design approach promoted by Gen. Charles “CQ” Brown, who was recently nominated to serve as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The intention of being integrated by design is to be able to work seamlessly with U.S. allies and partners at the earliest stages of technology development and personnel training, so interoperability is already baked into alliance military capabilities. To help accomplish this goal, Brown introduced the idea of co-funding capability development by pooling funds from multiple partners.

The Department of Defense should take three important steps to help shift the culture in the acquisition community towards integration by design: 1) expand its outreach regarding partner defense and acquisition planning; 2) use that information to identify potential opportunities where co-development/co-production would be beneficial to the force; and 3) standardize this cost/benefit analysis in the department’s acquisition processes.

Being able to consider the prospect of allied cooperation at the start of an acquisition program, whether through co-development, co-production, or co-funding, requires understanding the defense needs, goals, and plans of U.S. allies and partners. Some of the department’s Foreign Military Sales reform efforts will be helpful in this regard. For example, it intends to “incorporate ally and partner requirements into ongoing efforts to expand DIB [defense industrial base] production capacity,” as well as conducting five-year predictive analyses of partner demand. Efforts to enhance understanding of partner defense needs ahead of time would also provide the information necessary to assess whether co-development, co-production, or other forms of partner cooperation may provide greater benefits than a solely U.S. acquisition. Take care of the most from the least of the mountain range.

To be used effectively, the additional information gleaned regarding partner defense and acquisition plans should be analyzed for possible cooperation opportunities as a standard practice upon initiating an acquisition program. If cooperation can yield cost savings, enhance interoperability, improve the speed of delivery, or provide production resilience, the Department of Defense should explore with the potential partner(s) how such cooperation might be achieved. The Space Force’s forward-leaning approach to working with allies is illustrative. At a time when the U.S. government was seeking ways to close gaps in its space monitoring capabilities in the face of anti-satellite threats, Japan was seeking to develop its own space situational awareness capacity. This convergence in need led to a 2020 agreement under which Japan would host two U.S. space domain-awareness payloads aboard one of its quasi-zenith satellites, which comprise Japan’s regional global positioning system. Space Force delivered both payloads to Japan this year. While this hosted payload arrangement can achieve cost savings, it is also intended to serve as a “pathfinder” and “pacesetter” for future bilateral defense cooperation in space.

The benefits from such defense cooperation do not mean that cooperative efforts should be pursued in all cases. There will certainly be acquisition efforts where such cooperation will not add significant value or is simply a bridge too far for the parties involved. Going back to the example of the Japanese satellites, what is key is that the defense acquisition system is poised to identify such opportunities and take advantage of them when they arise, with the full support of the executive and legislative branch oversight bodies.

Shifting Department of Defense culture will also have to include ensuring that personnel are incentivized to consider partner cooperation as a standard part of the acquisition process. As a recent George Mason University report recommended, the military services should add factors for evaluating partner cooperation to the performance appraisals for program executive officers and program managers overseeing an acquisition program. At present, while acquisition managers are not disincentivized from considering partner cooperation, such consideration will not become a standard part of the acquisition process unless there is an expectation that potential partnerships will be evaluated.

Making the necessary regulatory, process, and cultural changes will not be easy or automatic. The export control bureaucracy spans several departments and agencies, with vested interests and bureaucratic inertia around longstanding policies. And the defense acquisition process has been fairly resistant to change and reform. Breaking such inertia requires the White House to demonstrate that it is serious about the focus on allies and partners in its defense strategy and implementing initiatives such as AUKUS by holding agencies accountable for regulatory and process changes. Congress is also a critical player given its oversight role in Foreign Military Sales and major defense exports. Streamlining the congressional notification procedure, which can add valuable time to transferring technology, while ensuring that Congress still receives the information it needs to conduct its role is an effort that the administration and Congress should work together to achieve.

Conclusion

The war in Ukraine has helped to expose ways in which the U.S. defense establishment needs to shift to address the ongoing conflict and potential future conflicts. Particularly as the United States looks to fulfil its security commitments to partner states, it is evident that alliance-wide capabilities are essential to ensuring that militaries can operate together, and that there is sufficient production capacity across the American, partner, and allied defense industrial bases. The U.S. National Defense Strategy recognizes this need and places appropriate focus on building allied capability. Moreover, as the United States takes a “small yard, high fence” approach to focusing controls around the most sensitive technologies, it should readily seek cooperation in areas outside the scope of those restrictions. Implementing this approach will be challenging as it revisits long-ingrained practices and policies that have their own constituencies. But making these changes will be an essential step to ensure that the United States and its network of allies and partners can deter and win the conflicts of today and tomorrow.

Become a Member

Raanan Horowitz is president and chief executive officer of Elbit Systems of America, a leading provider of high-performance products and systems for defense, homeland security, and medical diagnostics applications. He also serves on the Board of Governors of the Aerospace Industries Association and the Board of Directors of the National Defense Industrial Association, and is a member of the Wall Street Journal CEO Council.

Stan Crow has an extensive background in global collaboration in defense, space, and technology development. He is the former chief executive of Northrop Grumman Japan, worked in McKinsey & Company’s aerospace and defense practice in London and Los Angeles, and served in the U.S. Air Force.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Raanan Horowitz · November 1, 2023

13. What Went Wrong? Three Hypotheses on Israel’s Massive Intelligence Failure

Excerpts:

If it took years to plan the October 7 attack, as appears the case, how did no one notice? Despite Hamas’s denial and deception activities and improved operational security, there were some troubling indicators. Why were they dismissed? One likely culprit is confirmation bias, leading intelligence analysts “to undervalue or ignore evidence contradicting an early judgment and value evidence that tends to confirm already held assessments.” For example, a CNN investigation analyzed propaganda video and satellite imagery that showed expansion of and increased activity at multiple Hamas training camps in Gaza over the past two years. When questioned, an Israel Defense Forces spokesperson claimed the findings were “nothing new.” This suggests Israeli analysts saw what they had seen before—training that did not signal a catastrophic event. One cannot help but wonder how dark the clouds were before the storm.

Many questions remain, requiring after-action reviews and an investigation similar to that conducted by the 9/11 Commission to fully analyze these intelligence and security failures. But there are certainly lessons to be learned—not just for the Israeli intelligence and security apparatus but for intelligence services globally. Countering terrorism requires intelligence agencies to confront biases, fight complacency, and think creatively regarding the evolving nature of terrorist attacks and how, when, and why terrorist organizations will deploy a range of tactics in the future.

What Went Wrong? Three Hypotheses on Israel’s Massive Intelligence Failure - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Haleigh Bartos, John Chin · October 31, 2023

The scale of Israel’s intelligence failure—why the Israeli government did not act more preemptively on at least one known intelligence warning—is almost as shocking as the brutality and success of the Hamas attack itself on October 7. As the Israel Defense Forces expand their ground incursion into Gaza, and with the death toll in the ensuing war already in the thousands, it is not premature to reflect on the specific missteps that made “Israel’s 9/11” possible. A full reckoning will require months if not years of investigation but as scholars of terrorism, armed conflict, and political science, we highlight three potential major intelligence failures that any intelligence investigation should focus on to learn from this failure.

As Amy Zegart points out, major surprise attacks are “almost never really surprises.” Such appears to be the case with the October 7 attack. On October 9, Egyptian intelligence said publicly that it had given Israel repeated high-level warnings of a pending attack—“something big”—before the Gaza-based Hamas struck, including a direct phone call from Cairo’s intelligence minister to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in late September. US intelligence also warned its own policymakers of unusual Hamas activity and of a general increased threat from Hamas based on multiple streams of intelligence, including information that it received from Israel—though reports notably did not include any tactical details. It is difficult to understand what prevented Israeli security forces from acting. Israeli security officials probably made three critical mistakes.

A Dated Picture of Hamas Capabilities and Intentions

Israeli leaders almost certainly believed Israel’s military superiority would be able to repel any attack from paramilitary forces. In turn, this led to complacency, assuming Hamas would not launch a major attack because Hamas could not defeat Israel. As Amos Yadlin, the former Israeli chief of military intelligence, notes, Netanyahu appears to have convinced himself that “Hamas is not that dangerous, we can live with it. Every three, four years, we’ll do a round of exchange of fire. But this is not the most dangerous enemy of Israel.” If true, this was a fatal miscalculation. In an echo of the 1973 intelligence failure that led Israel to be surprised by Arab attacks initiating the Yom Kippur War, Israel miscalculated both Hamas’s capabilities and its intentions—and its own defense capability.

Underestimating Hamas’s Capabilities

In 1973, Israel did not to respond to intelligence warnings that attacks from its Arab neighbors were imminent. Because Arab militaries had previously performed poorly, Israel assumed that it could block any assault and its enemies would be deterred by Israel’s military superiority. A similar logic regarding Hamas may have spread within the current Israeli security apparatus. Yes, Hamas’s military wing had launched many terrorist attacks in Israel since the 1990s, but none demonstrated the organization or capability needed to conduct an attack as sophisticated as it did on October 7. However, Israeli leaders and other observers have been well aware that Tehran had been increasing aid to support Hamas for years. Israel nevertheless very clearly underestimated how much such resources boosted Hamas’s current military capabilities and command and control.

Misunderstanding Hamas’s Intentions

Hamas intentions may have been, and may still be, severely misunderstood. Israeli leaders may have calculated that Hamas would not wage such an attack in part because Israel was providing economic incentives for peace (namely, by overseeing the transfer of Qatari funding to Gaza). Israel may have come to believe that Hamas’s intentions had softened, or that Hamas could be contained without progress toward a two-state solution. Hamas leaders such as Ismail Haniyeh and Khaled Meshal between 2006 and 2014 expressed openness to an indefinite truce (hudna) with Israel under a two-state solution based on 1967 borders. It isn’t clear they really meant it, and since then there was no progress toward a two-state solution. More importantly, permanent peace with Hamas could not and cannot be bought; research on actors with “sacred values” such as Hamas militants shows that material incentives for peace backfire and invoke moral outrage.

For Hamas, accommodation with Israel was clearly tactical (short-term), not strategic (long-term). As Bruce Hoffman points out, Hamas’s genocidal intentions have never been a secret, but are baked into its “DNA”—its 1988 founding covenant and the group’s revised 2017 charter. Almost two decades ago, in his classic Inside Terrorism (2006), Hoffman identified Hamas as a religious terrorist group with an antisemitic and millenarian mission of jihad to destroy Israel and kill Jews. Hamas’s rise since the 1990s represents the “Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.” Since then, a secular-nationalist conflict has morphed into a religious one. Recent research by Monica Duffy Toft (aided by one of us) shows that conflicts where religion is central (as has been the case with Hamas) are deadlier and less likely to end in durable peace.

Rather than peace, it is likely that Hamas (and its backers in Iran) wanted war, anticipating a major Israeli military response to its October 7 attack, which it could weaponize in information war against the Israelis to gain sympathy for the Palestinian cause internationally and erode support for Israel. On the eve of October 7, Hamas was increasingly isolated. Domestically, only 29 percent of Gazans expressed trust in the Hamas government and only 24 percent said they would vote for Ismail Haniyeh over Mahmoud Abbas or a rival Fatah candidate, according to a recent Arab Barometer survey. Internationally, the Palestinian cause was being sidelined as a result of the Abraham Accords. As Audrey Kurth Cronin points out, Hamas very likely wanted to provoke an overreaction by Israel that would impair Arab-Israeli “‘normalization’ in the Middle East,” including the ongoing US-brokered talks for a Saudi-Israeli peace deal that had made progress in 2023. Israeli leaders underestimated how committed Hamas was to reversing its diplomatic isolation.

Tricked by Hamas’s Denial, Deception, and Improved Operational Security

Denial and deception activities seek to mislead intelligence operations, including by adulterating intelligence channels with disinformation. Hamas did just this in at least two identifiable ways. First, according to one Israeli source, Hamas deceived Israel by giving “a public impression that it was not willing to go into a fight or confrontation with Israel while preparing for this massive operation.” Second, Hamas used improved operational security tactics. Intelligence shared with the United States indicates that a small cell of Hamas operatives communicated for two years via hardwired phones embedded in the network of tunnels underneath Gaza; this group reportedly avoided using cells phones and computers in order to evade detection. This denied collection by Israeli intelligence officials. As a result, Hamas apparently was able to prepare the October 7 attack in secret without arousing Israeli suspicions.

Confirmation Bias and Hamas Preparations for War

If it took years to plan the October 7 attack, as appears the case, how did no one notice? Despite Hamas’s denial and deception activities and improved operational security, there were some troubling indicators. Why were they dismissed? One likely culprit is confirmation bias, leading intelligence analysts “to undervalue or ignore evidence contradicting an early judgment and value evidence that tends to confirm already held assessments.” For example, a CNN investigation analyzed propaganda video and satellite imagery that showed expansion of and increased activity at multiple Hamas training camps in Gaza over the past two years. When questioned, an Israel Defense Forces spokesperson claimed the findings were “nothing new.” This suggests Israeli analysts saw what they had seen before—training that did not signal a catastrophic event. One cannot help but wonder how dark the clouds were before the storm.

Many questions remain, requiring after-action reviews and an investigation similar to that conducted by the 9/11 Commission to fully analyze these intelligence and security failures. But there are certainly lessons to be learned—not just for the Israeli intelligence and security apparatus but for intelligence services globally. Countering terrorism requires intelligence agencies to confront biases, fight complacency, and think creatively regarding the evolving nature of terrorist attacks and how, when, and why terrorist organizations will deploy a range of tactics in the future.

Haleigh Bartos is an associate professor of the practice in CMIST at Carnegie Mellon University. She has fifteen years of experience working to support policy and studying national security. She teaches courses on policy writing and national security at CMU, including Writing for Political Science and Policy, Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa, and In the News: Analysis of Current National Security Priorities.

John Chin is an assistant teaching professor of political science in CMIST at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the lead author of an Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état (2022). He has published in top political science journals, most recently a coauthored article in the Texas National Security Review on “Understanding National Security Strategies Through Time.”

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image: Damage to house from Hamas rocket fire in 2012 (credit: Israel Defense Forces)

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Haleigh Bartos, John Chin · October 31, 2023

14.  Ukraine pleads with the U.S. to ramp up support against Russia

Ukraine pleads with the U.S. to ramp up support against Russia

By LARA SELIGMAN

10/31/2023 02:27 PM EDT

Politico

Kyiv wants Marine Corps training, more air defense and longer-range missiles.

Ukrainian soldiers adjust a national flag atop a personnel armoured carrier on a road near Lyman, Donetsk region on Oct. 4, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. | Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images

10/31/2023 02:27 PM EDT

Ukrainian officials and allies in Europe are ramping up their lobbying campaign in the U.S. for new weapons and training, as Washington’s support for the war appears imperiled by new House leadership and a crisis in the Middle East.

In the most recent example, a delegation of Ukrainian officials, troops and advisers visited America’s capital late last week to share Kyiv’s latest wish list: U.S. Marine Corps training on conducting ship-to-shore operations; new air defenses to take down the Russian glide bombs that are devastating Ukrainian forces; and the long-range, single-warhead version of the Army Tactical Missile System the Biden administration secretly shipped to Ukraine last month.

The representatives who came to the U.S. were aware that they needed to tailor their message to the moment.

In an interview, Roman Tychkivskyy, a former Ukrainian marine who now works for Ukraine’s defense ministry, compared Russians to Hamas, the terrorist group that killed 1,400 Israelis in a surprise attack on Oct. 7. It’s not just Kyiv that is at stake, he argued: If Russia rolls through Ukraine, it will also threaten Europe.

“It’s not just war, it’s genocide,” said Tychkivskyy, calling the cooperation between Russia, North Korea and Iran, which supports Hamas with funding and weapons, a new “axis of evil.”

“We definitely know Russia will not stop on Ukraine. If it will be the case for Ukraine to fall, they will continue,” he said.

The visit is part of a larger pressure campaign by Ukraine and its allies to secure additional aid as international support seems to be wobbling. Ukraine’s much-anticipated spring counteroffensive started late, giving Russian forces time to dig in, and has made limited progress. Top U.S. military officials have estimated Kyiv has only a few weeks left before winter weather sets in and stalls the fighting.

At the same time, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has diverted attention from Kyiv’s plight. Sunday brought more bad news for Ukraine, when new House Speaker Mike Johnson signaled he would bring a standalone bill on aid for Israel to the floor this week, sidelining new assistance for Kyiv.

The Pentagon said Tuesday it has a little more than $5.4 billion in remaining presidential drawdown authority to spend on military aid for Ukraine; President Joe Biden has asked Congress for an additional $60 billion for Kyiv in a sweeping emergency funding request that also includes aid for Israel.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself has recently stepped up his calls for help, meeting on Monday with several lawmakers as Congress debates further assistance. In a post on social media, he repeated the argument that Russia threatens not just Ukraine but all of Europe.

“Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, U.S. assistance has helped stop the aggressor and unite the world. Robust and long-term support will achieve a common victory and the restoration of stability in Europe and the world,” Zelenskyy wrote on Monday.

European politicians are also ramping up their campaign to boost support for Ukraine. One group says it plans to tour the U.S. to make the argument to the American people that sending military aid to Kyiv will create jobs in America.

That aid is essential for Ukraine to continue pushing back Russian invaders, the Ukrainian delegation said in an interview.

At the top of Kyiv’s latest wish list is new air-to-air capability to take down an increase in GPS-guided Russian glide bombs, which can be launched from aircraft far away from the battlefield. This new capability has resulted in heavy casualties for Ukrainian forces in recent weeks.

“You have to take down the bomber,” Tychkivskyy said. “You need fighter jets, you need air-to-air missiles.”

Andriana Susak-Arekhta, a Ukrainian special forces weapons sergeant who was wounded by an anti-tank mine during a mission near Kherson last December, said the U.S. must also accelerate its training of F-16 pilots. Ukrainian pilots this month began learning to fly the jets, but they won’t arrive on the battlefield realistically until next year; a Pentagon spokesperson said Tuesday that the training would take five to nine months.

That is not soon enough, she said.

Initially told she would not survive her injuries, Arekhta is now headed back to the front lines to fight for her country after nine months of painful rehabilitation. After more than 10 surgeries, she now has eight titanium plates in her spine.

“My hand is metal, my spine is metal, my jaw is metal,” Arekhta said. “I’m the iron lady.”

In addition to air defenses, Ukraine says it also needs the long-range, single-warhead version of the ATACMS, the group said. Ukraine has already successfully used the medium-range variant tipped with cluster bombs to hit dispersed, vulnerable targets, including 18 Russian helicopters sitting at two separate airfields this month.

But Ukraine has a limited number of those weapons. And the long-range, single-warhead ATACMS will help Kyiv’s forces to hit better-protected targets — such as aircraft or helicopters in hardened shelters — located deeper into Russian-held territory, said Ihor Semak, a junior sergeant who commands the second division of a grenade launcher platoon.

However, Pentagon officials have resisted sending the long-range version, which can hit targets up to roughly 200 miles away, in order to maintain enough munitions in its own stockpiles. The Defense Department no longer uses the version the U.S. sent to Ukraine, called the Anti-Personnel/Anti-Materiel variant, in its war plans.

In addition, Kyiv wants U.S. Marine Corps training on amphibious operations to help their forces successfully cross the Dnipro River and take advantage of Russia’s weak defenses on the eastern side, Tychkivskyy said.

The United Kingdom’s Royal Marines are already training hundreds of Ukrainian marines to conduct the complicated operations that crossing the rivers of southeastern Ukraine requires. The U.S. Marines should join in that effort, he said.

Retaking territory across the Dnipro is key to putting pressure on Russian forces on the coast of southeastern Ukraine, with the ultimate goal of reaching the Sea of Azov and cutting off the Russian land bridge, the group said.

“Once we are able to cross the river successfully and move the troops to the other side, there’s not many obstacles for us to move fast, closer to Crimea,” Tychkivskyy said.

Gabriel Gavin, Jacopo Barigazzi and Eric Bazail-Eimil contributed to this report.

POLITICO

Politico

15. US military still fleshing out SOF, cyber, space 'triad' at the joint level

Should have named it a trinity instead of a triad. Or it could be a threesome. (note attempt at humor).

US military still fleshing out SOF, cyber, space 'triad' at the joint level

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · October 31, 2023

The so-called modern triad — an idea pioneered by the Army that includes a combination of special operations, cyber and space forces — is still mostly conceptual at the joint level, according to a senior Department of Defense official.

The traditional term “triad,” in U.S. military parlance, refers to the air-, land- and sea-based legs of the Pentagon’s nuclear arsenal. The Army began conceptualizing a new triad over a year ago as a partnership between the unique — and global — capabilities of space, cyber and SOF.

“I think we’re beginning to explain it better. I think it’s still largely a concept at this point. And while I give huge credit to [Lt. Gen.] Jon Braga and [Army Special Operations Command] for really leading within the Army, I think Special Operations Command at that kind of joint SOF level, is increasingly demonstrating leadership in this space,” Chris Maier, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, said at the NDIA SO/LIC Symposium Tuesday.

“I think we are going to need to fill out more of what we mean by this and … really show what this means and show how [it] closes kill chains or solves problems for the joint force beyond just something that is unique,” he said.

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Officials had discussed the notion of the triad beginning to blossom at the joint level between U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Space Command. However, Maier noted that although the SOF and cyber relationship is well established, space might be harder to integrate.

“I think we have more success in a lot more places we can point to on SOF-cyber, because, frankly, cyber has been around longer and it’s more user friendly,” he said. “Space is, I think, from my perspective — and I say this as humbly as I can, because I’m certainly not a space expert — but I think that’s going to be the harder piece of this triad to bring in.”

Special operations forces have long utilized cyber and related signals intelligence capabilities to track targets by gaining access to their cell phones and other devices as well as using other cyber tools to perform various tasks.

There is an appetite to flesh out the new triad concept at the joint level, Maier said, noting that leadership of each community is on board with it.

The Army, for its part, has said it aims to double the amount of experimentation with the triad over the next year, advancing the model and techniques to inform future doctrine for operations and the service’s warfighting concept for 2030-2040.

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · October 31, 2023

16. Filipinos who fought for the U.S. in WWII never saw benefits. A new bill seeks to change that.

It is amazing that any indigenous forces and populations want to work with us with the way we treat friends. partners, and allies. Special Forces have to be very careful about promises made to indigenous forces. 

Note the 2009 act that was passed. This was a direct result of the efforts of CSM Tim Strong who was the CSM of JSOTF-P. WIth the support of the American Embassy he strongly and aggressively advocated for support to Filipino veterans such as the Alamo Scouts and other guerrillas.

But as this article shows we really can do more. And then there are the Korean partisans, and the tribes in Vietnam and INDOCHINA, and lately Afghanistan.

Filipinos who fought for the U.S. in WWII never saw benefits. A new bill seeks to change that.

The U.S., which recruited tens of thousands of Filipino servicemen to fight with it in World War II, rescinded the promise of benefits and citizenship after the war ended.

NBC News · by Kimmy Yam

A group of bipartisan lawmakers announced on Monday that they are introducing a bill that would help fulfill a U.S. promise to Filipino veterans who fought alongside American troops during World War II.

The Filipino Veterans Fairness Act aims to grant benefits to the remaining veterans and the families of the hundreds of thousands of Filipino servicemen who were recruited by the U.S. in the early ‘40s, in part by promising full access to veterans’ benefits and citizenship. The pledge, however, was rescinded by Congress in 1946 and only partially fulfilled in recent decades.

“During World War II, over 250,000 Filipino troops bravely fought under U.S. command, saving countless lives during their service. It’s unacceptable that these veterans were stripped of the benefits they were entitled to,” Rep. Kevin Mullin, D-Calif., who spearheaded the bill, said in a news release. “I cannot imagine the pain Filipino veterans and their families felt and the irreparable harm caused by this unjustified disparate treatment.”

A U.S. Marine speaks to a group of Filipino soldiers on Corregidor Island in the Philippines in May 1942.U.S. Marine Corps / AP

The bill, co-sponsored by Rep. Ed Case, D-Hawaii and Rep. James Moylan, the Republican delegate from Guam, would offer a need-based death pension to the remaining survivors. It would also expand the kinds of military documentation accepted for benefits’ eligibility.

Kevin Nadal, president of the Filipino American National Historical Society, said that the Filipino veterans’ fight to secure their benefits has dragged on for decades. In the meantime, the number of Filipino WWII veterans has dwindled to less than 2,000, making the restoration of their benefits all the more urgent.

The Philippines was an American colony until 1934, when the U.S. promised to grant it independence within the next 10 years. But before doing so, Nadal explained, the Pentagon recruited both Filipino Americans and Filipino nationals to fight under U.S. command due to a substantial part of the war being fought in the Philippines, which Japan had invaded. It’s estimated that up to 1 million Filipinos died in the war.

Panay guerilla leaders in conference with American Division G-2 soldiers in Panay, Philippines, around the 1940s. U.S. Navy / Getty Images

The U.S. changed its tune with the conclusion of the war. Congress passed the Rescission Act in 1946, stripping many Filipino veterans and their families of benefits due to budget concerns and prompting the ongoing efforts to restore them.

Then, in 1990 President George H.W. Bush enacted a law granting citizenship to Filipino nationals who fought in the war. And in 2009, Barack Obama signed a law granting a lump sum of $15,000 to surviving Filipino veterans who are American citizens and $9,000 to noncitizens. But claiming these benefits has been nearly impossible and many have been denied access to them, Nadal said, due to the lack of proper documentation.

“Some people, there just were not any proper records that they served in the military. And part of that is because of the war itself and the destruction of many buildings and places that would have had those records,” Nadal said.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur talks to a group of Filipino guerrillas on Luzon Island in the Philippines on Jan. 29, 1945. U.S. Army Signal Corps / AP

Nadal said that while legislation looking to ease access to the promised benefits to Filipino veterans has previously been proposed, getting to pass the bill has been an uphill battle. Other U.S. veteran groups, like LGBTQ service members, have also struggled to receive care and other financial benefits. And some lawmakers in the past have been hesitant to green-light the idea of funding for Filipino nationals, arguing that the onus is on the Filipino government to provide benefits to veterans.

“Racial biases may or will influence people’s perceptions of whether or not they deserve those benefits or those rights,” Nadal said.

“Many lawmakers just never viewed [Filipinos] as being equals to the Americans. They never viewed them as being citizens. They never viewed them as taking the same amount of risk and sacrifice as U.S. born soldiers,” he added.

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NBC News · by Kimmy Yam

17. The U.S. Navy is Falling Behind China, and the Pentagon Knows It

The U.S. Navy is Falling Behind China, and the Pentagon Knows It

19fortyfive.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · October 31, 2023

The Pentagon recently released its annual report on China’s military developments and its findings are clear: China is eager to continue earning its keep as the Pentagon’s “pacing challenge,” while our military struggles to keep up.

China’s Naval Developments

Among a list of rapid developments in Beijing’s nuclear arsenal, growing missile capabilities, and widespread force modernization, the report indicates a few troubling trends when it comes to the differences in the size and strength of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) versus the United States Navy.

When it comes to putting hulls in the water, Beijing is far and away ahead of the United States. China has continuously outpaced the U.S. in shipbuilding capabilities and shipyard capacity.

Indeed, the shipbuilding divide between China and the United States is vast. A recently declassified intelligence slide from the Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that China has 232 times the shipbuilding capability of the United States, owing to its much larger shipbuilding manufacturing industry.

The Pentagon’s China power report revealed that in the last year alone, Beijing’s navy increased the size of its fleet by 30 ships. By comparison, the U.S. Navy has grown by just two ships since last year.

China’s Accelerated Ship Building

The Pentagon estimates the size of the PLAN is north of 370 ships, making it the largest Navy in the world, whereas the U.S. has a combat-ready fleet size of 291.

Though the class and capability of those 30 new PLAN ships vary, 15 were modern surface combatants – including Reinhai class cruisers, Luyang class destroyers, and a third aircraft carrier, Fujian.

Furthermore, the report also indicates that the PLAN is expected to keep growing from 395 ships by 2025 to 435 by 2030.

While China’s navy is expected to increase by nearly 20 percent in just a half-decade, the Navy’s FY24 shipbuilding plan projects that it will keep getting smaller. Our fleet will shrink to 285 ships in 2025 and remain less than its size today, at 290 ships in 2030, as ship retirements consistently outpace new ship construction.

Alongside the growing and increasingly capable PLAN, China has continued its practice of military-civil fusion, which blurs or eliminates barriers between government and commercial sectors to build a more capable military at a rapid clip. The Pentagon’s report highlighted that in recent years China has focused on equipping civilian roll-on/roll-off boats (ROROs) with ramps modified to enable large vehicles to disembark while at sea.

If that sounds like the quiet build-up of amphibious capability, that’s because it is. The China Power report highlights that this development is “consistent with the PRC’s exploratory approach to testing multi-dimensional Taiwan seizure concepts.”

Similarly, the U.S. Marine Corps cannot secure enough funding for its amphibious warships. This forced Congress to intervene earlier this year to shore up funding for a new amphibious transport dock.

The report also highlighted that China is likely conducting “near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols” with its undersea fleet of six nuclear-powered submarines and 48 diesel-powered submarines. Despite pending retirements of older hulls, the PLAN submarine fleet is expected to increase to 80 submarines by 2035, “… due to an expansion of submarine construction capacity.”

China’s trends are consistently opposite our own, with the U.S. submarine fleet expected to stand at just 57 boats in 2030. While the U.S. Navy’s entirely nuclear submarine fleet is more advanced and capable than the mixed fleet of the PLAN, the recent submarine depot maintenance backlog has rendered nearly 40 percent of the U.S. submarine fleet inoperable.

The U.S. Navy is one of the most effective deterrents to Chinese military action against Taiwan. However, if these trends don’t change, and soon, the Indo-Pacific will become more dangerous as Beijing will find itself in a far more advantageous position. The U.S. Navy is shrinking within the same timeline in which the report estimates that Beijing will pursue “full reunification” with Taiwan.

Not to be forgotten about recent trends vis-à-vis American and Chinese military power: the U.S. consistently overestimates how capable its armed forces will be in the near term, and regularly underestimates the speed at which Beijing is increasing its hard power capabilities.

Year after year the U.S. Navy remains saddled with shrinking and increasingly uncertain budgets. A strong Navy big enough to change the calculus of Xi Jinping regarding the benefits of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan will require robust budgets enacted on time. This will be far cheaper than any war in the South China Sea.

Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness. She is also a regular guest lecturer at universities, a member of the board of advisers of the Alexander Hamilton Society, and a member of the steering committee of the Leadership Council for Women in National Security.

19fortyfive.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · October 31, 2023

18. U.S. Aircraft Carriers and Warships Are On the Move And That’s A Problem for Iran

U.S. Aircraft Carriers and Warships Are On the Move And That’s A Problem for Iran

The added U.S. Navy presence is to deter a potential escalation of the Israel-Hamas War from Iran, as well as its proxy forces in the region but is also to prevent further attacks against U.S. forces that are now stationed in Syria and Iraq

19fortyfive.com · by Peter Suciu · October 31, 2023

The Mighty Ike Has Entered the Mediterranean Sea – Part of the Largest Collection of U.S. Warships in the Region in Decades: The Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group (IKECSG) is now sailing in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea after transiting the Strait of Gibraltar over the weekend. By direction of the Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, IKECSG will transit to U.S. Central Command to demonstrate its readiness to flex to any contingency, the U.S. Navy announced this week.

“Our arrival in the Mediterranean, en route to CENTCOM, provides reassurance to our allies and partners that we are committed to ensuring their security and well-being,” said Rear Adm. Marc Miguez, commander, Carrier Strike Group 2 (CSG-2), IKECSG. “Our presence, along with that of the Gerald R. Ford Carrier strike group, demonstrates the combat power and proficiency of the Navy’s deployed forces.”

The strike group is comprised of the flagship aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN69), the guided-missile cruiser USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), the guided-missile destroyers USS Mason (DDG 87) and USS Gravely (DDG 107) of Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 22, Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 3 with its nine squadrons, and the Information Warfare Commander.

Deterring Threats in the Middle East

The Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier departed Norfolk, Virginia, on Oct. 14, and was initially believed to be heading into a deployment in the waters of U.S. European Command to replace the carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) and its strike group as part of a scheduled deployment.

However, the October 7 terrorist attack on Israel, which was carried out by the Palestinian militant group Hamas, led to fears that the conflict could engulf the region. As a result, CVN-78 will remain on station in the eastern Mediterranean off the coast of Israel.

The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, with the amphibious assault ship USS Bataan’s ready group, is also on station nearby, the Navy Times reported. USS Bataan (LHD-5) and USS Carter Hall (LSD-50) entered the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden on Friday and joined USS Mesa Verde (LPD-19). The 26th MEU is based in North Carolina and includes the command element; the aviation combat element, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron, 162 (Reinforced); the ground combat element, Battalion Landing Team 1/6; and the logistics combat element, Combat Logistics Battalion 22. The Marines aboard the vessels are trained to evacuate civilians in conflict zones.

Show Of Force

The massing of the vessels in the Eastern Mediterranean will be the largest collection of U.S. warships in decades, according to USNI News.

The added U.S. Navy presence is to deter a potential escalation of the Israel-Hamas War from Iran, as well as its proxy forces in the region but is also to prevent further attacks against U.S. forces that are now stationed in Syria and Iraq.

Headed Back to the Gulf

The current plan from the Pentagon calls for IKECSG to move through the Suez Canel into the U.S. 5th Fleet region of operations.

It will be the first time a U.S. carrier strike group will operate in the Middle East since USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) left the region following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.

Author Experience and Expertise

A Senior Editor for 19FortyFive, Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

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19. U.S. military and diplomatic leaders urge a divided Congress to send aid to both Israel and Ukraine

U.S. military and diplomatic leaders urge a divided Congress to send aid to both Israel and Ukraine

BY MARY CLARE JALONICK

Updated 5:33 PM EDT, October 31, 2023

AP · October 31, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — The nation’s top military and diplomatic leaders urged an increasingly divided Congress on Tuesday to send immediate aid to Israel and Ukraine, arguing at a Senate hearing that broad support for the assistance would signal U.S. strength to adversaries worldwide.

The testimony from Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken to the Senate Appropriations Committee came as the administration’s massive $105 billion emergency aid request for conflicts in the two countries encountered roadblocks.

While there is bipartisan support in the Democratic-led Senate for aid to both Ukraine and Israel, the request faces deep problems in the Republican-led House. New Speaker Mike Johnson has proposed focusing on Israel alone, and slashing money for the Internal Revenue Service to pay for it.

As the congressional divisions deepen, Blinken and Austin warned that the consequences of failing to help Ukraine in its war with Russia and Israel as it strikes back against Hamas would be dire. Inaction, they said, would threaten the security of the U.S. and the rest of the world.

“We now stand at a moment where many are again making the bet that the United States is too divided or distracted at home to stay the course,” Blinken said. “That is what is at stake.”

Austin said that if the United States fails to lead, ”the cost and the threats to the United States will only grow. We must not give our friends, our rivals, or our foes any reason to doubt America’s resolve.”

President Joe Biden has requested $14.3 billion for Israel, $61.4 billion to support Ukraine, $9.1 billion for humanitarian efforts in Gaza and elsewhere and $7.4 billion for the Indo-Pacific, where the U.S. is focused on countering China’s influence. Some of the Ukraine funding would go toward replenishing domestic stockpiles of weapons that have already been provided.

The White House has also requested around $14 billion to protect the U.S. border. That money would be used to boost the number of border agents, install new inspection machines to detect fentanyl and to increase staffing for processing asylum cases.

But the House is trying to set aside much of Biden’s request for now to focus on a roughly $14.5 billion package for Israel. That plan faced immediate resistance among Senate Democrats — and put pressure on the Senate Republicans who support the Ukraine aid but are conscious of growing concerns about it within their party.

Speaking on the Senate floor, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer said the House proposal “is clearly designed to divide Congress on a partisan basis, not unite us.” He said he hopes Johnson realizes he made a “grave mistake” and reverses course.

The two Cabinet secretaries argued that the aid should be tied together because the conflicts are interconnected. Blinken said that assisting Ukraine and Israel will strengthen the U.S. position against Iran, which is the biggest financial backer of Hamas.

“Since we cut off Russia’s traditional means of supplying its military, it has turned more and more to Iran for assistance,” Blinken said. “In return, Moscow has supplied Iran with increasingly advanced military technology, which poses a threat to Israel’s security. Allowing Russia to prevail with Iran’s support will embolden both Moscow and Tehran.”

Austin said the money would help Israel and Ukraine defend themselves against aggression — and also replenish U.S. stockpiles.

“In both Israel and Ukraine, democracies are fighting ruthless foes bent on their annihilation,” Austin said. “We will not let Hamas or Putin win. Today’s battles against aggression and terrorism will define global security for years to come.”

Senate Appropriations Chairwoman Patty Murray, D-Wash., said at the start of the hearing that she and the panel’s top Republican, Maine Sen. Susan Collins, were drafting “strong bipartisan legislation” that would include aid for both countries.

“Make no mistake, we need to address all of these priorities as part of one package — because the reality is these issues are all connected, and they are all urgent,” Murray said.

Blinken and Austin were repeatedly interrupted by dozens of protesters in the room who called for Israel to end its bombardment of the Gaza Strip, and the hearing was suspended as the demonstrators were escorted out. “Cease-fire now!” they yelled. “Save the children of Gaza!”

After the protesters were removed, Blinken said he heard “the passions expressed in this room and outside this room.” He said that the U.S. is committed to protecting civilian life, “but all of us know the imperative of standing up with our allies and partners when their security, when their democracies, are threatened.”

Some Republicans have expressed concerns that the humanitarian aid could end up in the wrong hands. Tennessee Sen. Bill Hagerty asked Blinken to guarantee that “not one dime” of taxpayer money will go to Hamas and terrorist activities.

Blinken said that the U.S. has an ability to track the aid. “The overwhelming majority of assistance so far is getting to people who need it, and we need more,” he said. “The needs are desperate.”

Despite growing questions about the Ukraine aid within the Republican conference, Senate GOP Leader Mitch McConnell has forcefully advocated tying the aid for Ukraine and Israel together. He hosted Oksana Markarova, the Ukrainian ambassador to the United States, at an event in Kentucky on Monday and told the audience, “this is a moment for swift and decisive action.”

Senate Republicans who support the Ukraine aid are uncertain of the path forward. Sen. John Thune of South Dakota, the No. 2 Senate Republican, said there are a significant number of Republicans “who believe that these are all vital national security interests and priorities of the United States.” At the same time, trying to pass all of them together is complicated, he said.

Republican Sen. Joni Ernst of Iowa said she wants to see Ukraine aid passed, and “I don’t care how it happens.” She said she is open to the IRS cuts that Republicans proposed for the Israel funding in the House.

Senate Republicans who have opposed additional Ukraine aid threw support behind the House approach. “We have a Republican majority in the House, we need to follow the speaker,” said Florida Sen. Rick Scott.

Missouri Sen. Josh Hawley said he wanted to see the U.S. focus on the Pacific and Asia rather than Ukraine, arguing that China posed a long-term threat. “We can do more in Ukraine or we can do what we need to do in the Pacific,” he said.

Further complicating the package, a group of Senate Republicans have been negotiating border security measures that would go beyond Biden’s request, an attempt to help control the influx of migrants.

Maine Sen. Susan Collins, the top Republican on the Appropriations panel, supports tying the aid to the two countries together. But added border security is needed as well, she said. “This real threat to our homeland must also be addressed,” Collins said.

The House could pass its Israel aid package by the end of the week. In an interview on Fox News on Tuesday, Johnson said he hopes “most if not all” of the Democrats join Republicans in voting for it. He said he would call Schumer to discuss it.

“This is a matter of good versus evil,” Johnson said.

Blinken made a quick trip to Johnson’s office after his Senate testimony — an effort to push a combined aid package to the new speaker, according to State Department spokesman Matthew Miller.

The secretary would only say as he left that it “was a very good meeting. I appreciate the opportunity.”

___

Associated Press writers Kevin Freking, Stephen Groves, Lisa Mascaro, Tara Copp and Matthew Lee contributed to this report.

AP · October 31, 2023

20. What we know about Hamas' huge rocket arsenal

I asked Dr. Bruce Bechtol about this article. I mentioned there was no reference to north Korea even though we know north Korea is proliferating weapons to conflict zones around the world to include Hezbollah and Hamas.  He provided these insightful comments.

The article does mention this: "In addition to these weapons, Hamas is also believed to possess a number of rockets acquired from abroad. These include 107mm rockets acquired with an 8-kilometer range acquired from Iran, 122mm rockets with 12-40-kilometer ranges acquired from various countries..."

We (as you know) have actually seen spent North Korean 122MM rocket shells.  I guess the authors consider this part of "abroad."

The lack of references to North Korea is probably just poor research. Everyone seems focused on Iran. Iran Iran Iran.  

Also, this just focuses on the rockets, not the ATGM (Bulsae) from North Korea, and not the tunnels, which most now acknowledge came from technical expertise gained from the North Koreans, provided to them through Hezbollah.

One last thing, the article says Hamas is largely not using guided munitions. Okay, read this, and read why the Israelis killed this guy in 2018. He was working with the North Koreans to acquire guidance systems:

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/world/asia/hamas-mossad-malaysia.html

"Western and Middle Eastern intelligence officials said that Mr. Batsh may have been involved in negotiating North Korean arms deals through Malaysia. Egypt recently seized a shipment of North Korean communications components used for guided munitions destined for Gaza, they said. One intelligence official said that Mr. Batsh had helped mediate the deal."

If one is to be good at this type of analysis, one has to be able to connect the dots. That is a skill most in the press do not have

What we know about Hamas' huge rocket arsenal

By Tom O'Connor

Senior Writer, Foreign Policy & Deputy Editor, National Security and Foreign Policy

Newsweek · by Tom O'Connor · October 31, 2023

The military wing of the Palestinian Hamas movement has debuted a new torpedo, said to have been used for the first time in combat against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as war continues to consume the Gaza Strip.

It's only the latest addition, however, in a large, diverse and expanding arsenal of weapons that the group has used against Israel throughout a decades-long conflict.

Since being formed amid the First Intifada uprising against Israel in the 1980s and later taking control of Gaza in 2007, Hamas has managed to amass these weapons in spite of the IDF's longstanding attempts to institute a blockade of the coastal Palestinian territory. Israel and the United States have long accused Iran of helping Hamas' military force, the Al-Qassam Brigades, acquire such weapons, and Hamas officials have openly praised the Islamic Republic for its assistance, though the group has first and foremost credited indigenous ingenuity for acquiring such a stockpile.

The new torpedo, which first emerged in reports back in 2021, was previewed Monday by Al-Qassam Brigades spokesperson Abu Obaida during a 10-minute address in which he lauded his force's ongoing resistance against an escalating IDF campaign following Hamas' unprecedented October 7 attack on Israel.

Called "Al-Asef" or "the Storm" in Arabic, the torpedo was later showcased in a short promotional video that appeared to show Al-Qassam Brigades divers dragging the projectile across the shore into the sea before cutting to the weapon firing through the water.

A follow-up clip claimed to show the actual combat use of the Al-Asef, which was adorned with the words "Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood" after the ongoing operation launched earlier this month, along with the date October 30, 2023. The partially censored footage showed men in plain clothes configuring the torpedo in an undisclosed room and later dragging it into the ocean.

A still from an undated video released by Hamas' military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, purports to show four divers, some armed with Kalashnikov-style assault rifles, demonstrating the new "Al-Asef" torpedo at an undisclosed seaside location. Izz ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades

While Hamas has previously demonstrated limited naval capabilities, including at least one naval landing at the southern Israel kibbutz of Zikim during the October 7 surprise attack, rockets have long been the signature weapon of the group.

Fabian Hinz, a research fellow specializing in defense and military analysis at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, shared with Newsweek a list of known rockets in Hamas' possession, including those domestically produced with foreign assistance and others acquired from abroad.

On the shorter-range side in the domestically produced category is a weapon that takes its name after the same man that inspired the Al-Qassam Brigades' title. Also called Qassam as an ode to Syrian Muslim preacher Izz ad-Din al-Qassam whose clashes with British colonial authorities in Mandatory Palestine helped inspire a late 1930s Arab revolt, the Q-12 and Q-20 rockets have an estimated range of 12 kilometers and 20 kilometers, respectively.

The Qassam line of rockets, which first emerged in the early 2000s with particularly limited ranges, have been a mainstay of Hamas' attacks against Israel.

As with most of Hamas' ostensibly domestically assembled arsenal, the S-40 rocket is also designated after its range, which is estimated to be 40 kilometers, and was used in 2019 to target Jewish settlements near the Gaza Strip as well as the Israeli cities of Ashkelon, Ashdod and Beersheba, according to a Sky News Arabic report published earlier this month. The Sajjeel-55, with a range of 55 kilometers, was reportedly seen even earlier during the third major Gaza war in 2014.

A graphic based on the research of International Institute for Strategic Studies research fellow Fabian Hinz shows rockets known to be in Hamas' possession as of its last major clash with Israel in May 2021. International Institute for Strategic Studies

That conflict, called "Operation Protective Edge" by Israel, was previously the deadliest of several conflicts fought between Hamas and the IDF since the latter's disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and the group's takeover of the territory two years later. It was sparked by clashes that erupted in the wake of Hamas' abduction and killing of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank, which is under the control of the rival Fatah-led Palestinian National Authority.

The war came just two years after Israel launched the eight-day "Operation Pillar of Defense" in Gaza in 2012 after Hamas retaliated with rocket fire to the IDF's killing of Al-Qassam Brigades second-in-command Ahmed al-Jabari. During this flare-up, Hamas used the M-75 rocket, putting Tel Aviv in range. Jabari was also commemorated as the namesake of the J-80 and J-90 rockets.

With a range of 85 kilometers, the SH-85, is also believed to be named after another Al-Qassam Brigades subcommander, Mohammed Abu Shamala, who was killed during the 2014 Gaza war. Also slain during that conflict was senior Hamas official, Ra'ed al-Attar, whose name would be lent to the A-120 rocket first used to strike Jerusalem during 2021 clashes between Hamas and the IDF.

The A-120 bears a resemblance to the even further-range R-160, which debuted during the 2014 war and takes its name from Hamas official Abdel-Aziz Rantissi, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike a decade earlier. The Al-Qassam Brigades has more recently used the R-160 to strike Israel's northern city of Haifa during the current conflict.

The longest-range weapon known to exist in Hamas' stockpile, however, is the Ayyash-250, named after Yahya Ayyash, also known as "the Engineer," pioneered the Al-Qassam Brigades' bombmaking efforts until his assassination by Israeli Shin Bet agents using an exploding cell phone in 1996. The Al-Qassam Brigades has shown footage of the Ayyash-250 conducting long-range strikes amid the ongoing war.

In addition to these weapons, Hamas is also believed to possess a number of rockets acquired from abroad. These include 107mm rockets acquired with an 8-kilometer range acquired from Iran, 122mm rockets with 12-40-kilometer ranges acquired from various countries, the Fajr-5 rocket with a 75-kilometer range acquired from Iran and the M302 rocket acquired with a 180-kilometer range acquired from Syria.

While these weapons remain a threat to the IDF, Hinz told Newsweek that, "if you look at what's being fired now, it almost all seems to be locally made." That's because foreign assets tend to be larger, less wieldy and more difficult to smuggle into the tightly controlled borders of Gaza, he said.

A picture taken Monday from Israel's southern city of Sderot shows rockets fired from northern Gaza toward Israel. JACK GUEZ/AFP/Getty Images

Hinz said the full degree of Hamas' smuggling networks are still not entirely known, but that they extend all the way to Iran, Iraq and Syria and across the waters of the Mediterranean into Libya, Sudan and Egypt, which borders Gaza and its intricate network of underground tunnels. Documentaries over the years have shown the group purporting to assemble parts from water pipes, old grenades from World War I shipwrecks and even ammonium chloride smuggled through Israel itself.

Further highlighting Iran's role, Hinz pointed to apparent intelligence leaks that appear to show the work of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Unit 340, including Persian-language blueprints and motor tests of relatively unsophisticated rocket technology that would be far more suited for Hamas' efforts than those of the Islamic Republic's armed forces. Iranian officials have also frequently acknowledged that they provided Hamas with more than just rhetorical support, though they have said Tehran played no role in planning the October 7 assault.

Such rockets have been primarily used to target Israeli cities and military positions outside of Gaza, but Hinz said Hamas' stockpile could also prove beneficial in confronting a deepening IDF incursion into the Palestinian territory itself, especially by targeting "large staging areas" of Israeli troops. One particularly devastating weapon could be the use of improvised rocket assisted munitions (IRAMs) that utilize small rockets with large warheads, trading accuracy for impact.

Through both foreign assistance and homegrown skills, Hamas has managed to develop "a pretty diverse arsenal," according to Hinz.

"It's still very simple technologically," Hinz said. "We haven't seen anything with guidance, so they're technically rockets and not missiles, which is a bit surprising. Perhaps they're keeping some stuff in the background, which will only be revealed later. We'll see."

Responding to Newsweek's question during a press briefing Tuesday, IDF Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Conricus said that "we understand that Hamas continues its efforts to acquire new and to enhance additional capabilities."

"We understand that they will try to deliver surprises on the battlefield," he added. "We know that they have had access to advanced weaponry, and we are taking active countermeasures against it in all dimensions, air, land, sea, cyber, all of the domains."

Uncommon Knowledge

Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground.

Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground.

Newsweek · by Tom O'Connor · October 31, 2023

21. SOCOM: United States Special Operations Command

This article is from Grey Dynamics. I think you might be better served reviewing the USSOCOM Fact Book at this link: https://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2023%20Fact%20Book.pdf

SOCOM: United States Special Operations Command

greydynamics.com · by George Englehart · October 31, 2023

1.0 Introduction

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the organization that oversees all components of American special operations forces. It was created in the 1980s as a Unified Combatant Command and since then has increased the coordination, efficiency, and efficacy of special operations training and missions.

2.0 SOCOM History

The Special Operations Command was founded in 1987 after years of debate and discussions among American military and political leadership over the need to organize special operations forces. Several factors led to the creation of SOCOM, most prominently was the failure of Operation Eagle Claw.

2.1 Operation Eagle Claw

On November 4, 1979, nearly 3,000 Iranian students stormed the United States Embassy in Tehran and took 63 American personnel hostage.

The United States feared for the safety of all the hostages and as a result, on April 16, 1980, after months of being held, U.S. President Jimmy Carter approved a military rescue operation to free the hostages and end the crisis, codenamed Eagle Claw

Operation Eagle Claw used various special operation-capable units from the 75th Ranger Regiment, Delta Force, and members of the CIA Special Activities Division. At the time, special operations units across the military were uncoordinated and unstructured.

As a result, logistical challenges and variables on the ground were especially harmful to the operation. Eight service members died in the operation in addition to one helicopter, one transport aircraft, and five helicopters captured by the Iranian military.

2.2 The Need for Change

In the aftermath of Operation Eagle Claw, the U.S. Congress felt a need for military reform. After a two year review, the U.S. Senate published “Defense Organization: The Need for Change” [source]. The review called for organizational reforms to the special operations community, and recommended a unified command for special operations forces.

After a year of debate on what the future of special operations would look like, a new command was agreed to by Congress and senior defense officials. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) would unify all special operations forces under one umbrella, headed by a four-star general. In 1987, President Ronald Reagan created the United States Special Operations Command on April 13, 1987 and appointed General James Lindsay, of the US Army, to be its first commanding general.

3.0 SOCOM’s Purpose

The main purpose of SOCOM, and reason for its creation, is a unified command of special operations forces. This allows the special operations community to coordinate their missions and apply different units according to their specialities. According to the command’s website, their mission “develops, and employs, the world’s finest SOF to conduct global special operations and activities as part of the Joint Force, in concert with the U.S. Government Interagency, Allies, and Partners, to support persistent, networked, and distributed combatant command operations and campaigns against state and non-state actors all to protect and advance U.S. policies and objectives.”

3.1 Core Operations and Activities

The Special Operations Command conducts a wide variety of operations and activities. The different branch’s contributions to special operations allow them to provide a range of capabilities. SOCOM focuses primarily on the following activities:

• Civil Affairs
• Counterinsurgency
• Counterterrorism
• Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Direct Action
• “Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions employing specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets”
• Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
• Foreign Internal Defense
• Hostage Rescue and Recovery
• Military Information Support Systems
• “planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives”
• Security Force Assistance
• Special Reconnaissance
• Unconventional Warfare
• Preparation of the Environment

Throughout the Global War on Terror (GWOT), special operations units have carried out all types of mission sets. SOCOM commanders have found that an organized and coordinated structure between the branches improved their capabilities and ability to establish dominance in any situation.

4.0 SOCOM Organization

As part of its reason for creation, SOCOM has united the special operations forces across the U.S. military. Most branches have made significant contributions to SOCOM and provide different capabilities. This network has allowed SOCOM to be successful in applying individual units’ skill sets to accomplish their mission.

The commander of SOCOM manages and coordinates the various components of the special operations community. Under the umbrella of SOCOM leadership are the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Naval Special Warfare Command (NSW), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC). Additionally, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is within the larger SOCOM organization.

To ensure efficiency, SOCOM units are organized by region:

• Special Operations Command – Africa (SOCAFRICA)
• Special Operations Command – Central (SOCCENT)
• Special Operations Command – Europe (SOCEUR)
• Special Operations Command – Korea (SOCKOR)
• Special Operations Command – North (SOCNORTH)
• Special Operations Command – Pacific (SOCPAC)
• Special Operations Command – South (SOCSOUTH)

4.1 Army

The Army has made a significant contribution to SOCOM since its creation. The Army’s special operations forces have been America’s leading unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency experts. Their value has only become more apparent as the world has seen a rise in insurgent and guerilla warfare.

4.1.1 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne)

The 1st Special Forces Command is home to seven special forces groups (Green Berets), two psychological operations groups, a civil affairs brigade, and a special operations sustainment brigade.

The mission of the command is to “organize, equip, train, and validate forces to conduct full-spectrum special operations in support of SOCOM.” Their distinct capabilities allow them to work closely with groups to fight against hostile actors. Prior to the formation of SOCOM, they played a major role alongside MACV-SOG in the Vietnam War and alongside the CIA’s Special Activities Division in GWOT. The special forces units are deployed as small ODA teams, Operational Detachment (Airborne), with individuals bringing their own area of expertise.

Green Berets have hone their unique capabilities through their training pipeline. Candidates in the Special Forces qualification course complete extensive language and cultural training for their specified area of operation. Proficiency in the customs and language of their region is what makes the soldier-diplomats, as they are sometimes referred to, so effective in building rapport with unconventional warfare groups.

The training culminates in an exercise known as Robin Sage. Robin Sage is a two week long litmus test for candidates aspiring to earn the green beret. “Candidates are placed in an environment of political instability characterized by armed conflict, forcing Soldiers to analyze and solve problems to meet the challenges of this ‘real-world’ training” [source]. The candidates training is put to the test, from language competency, to small-unit tactics, to decision making.

The Special Forces training creates a component of SOCOM that is highly experienced and qualified to provide unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and direct action capabilities.

4.1.2 75th Ranger Regiment

The 75th Ranger Regiment is the preeminent light infantry unit component of SOCOM. The regiment specializes in direct action raids, often in pursuit of high-value targets (HVT). Their secondary mission sets include airfield seizure, special reconnaissance, personnel recovery, and site exploitation. Their capabilities allow them to bridge the gap between special operations and conventional operations.

The Ranger Regiment has been one of the most used units of the United States military, and for good reason. A Ranger battalion can deploy within 18 hours notice in support of any SOCOM mission. Given this capability, December 17, 2021 marked the 7,000th consecutive day of combat operations for the regiment [source].

4.1.3 Army Special Operations Aviation Command

The Army’s aviation component of SOCOM is one that often does not get enough recognition despite their enormous contribution. The most prominent component of the command, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, provides air movement of special operations troops, supplies, and equipment.

In order to accomplish their challenging air missions, the command use a variety of highly capable aircraft:

• MH-47 Chinook (Modified Heavy Assault versions)
• MH-6 Little Bird (Attack versions)
• MH-60 Blackhawk (Assault and Attack versions)
• MQ-1C Gray Eagle Drones

4.2 Navy

The Navy’s special operations command enables unique maritime capabilities for SOCOM. Their units’ storied histories demonstrate how, when coordinated with other units, they can increase the success of any operation.

4.2.1 Navy SEALs

Navy SEALs are one of, if not the, most well known unit within SOCOM. Their long history and strong maritime capabilities have made them a valuable part of the special operations community. The SEALs have a number of mission sets and capabilities, but their reputation for maritime operations distinguish them from other units. They train extensively to specialize in small unit operations, direct action, amphibious reconnaissance, and high-value target operations.

The SEALs roots come from World War II, where Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) would clear beaches of obstacles and provide deep reconnaissance. Over the years, the SEAL teams evolved and expanded, providing the military with a highly capable maritime special operations unit. In the GWOT, SEAL teams contributed extensively to direct action, high-value target, and hostage rescue operations.

The command consists of eight SEAL teams, two SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams (SDV), and additional reconnaissance and support teams. The SDV teams carry out additional training on a crewed submersible which deliver operators and their equipment on maritime operations.

The SEAL teams are highly capable in any environment, but their speciality in maritime environments distinguishes them from other units and provides SOCOM with confidence in accomplishing any mission in a maritime environment.

4.2.2 Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen (SWCC)

SWCC teams operate small craft for special operations missions in support of SEAL teams. They are a trained assault force capable of direct action missions through coastlines or rivers. They also carry out visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations in open water, maritime interdiction, search and rescue, and personnel recovery operations.

4.3 Air Force

The Air Force special operations units have become vital to air superiority in conflict. Air Force special operators enable a wide range of air operations such as air support, reconnaissance, and combat medic support. Their components have seen consistent deployment in support of other units within SOCOM.

4.3.1 Combat Controllers (CCT)

Air Force Combat Controllers are the premier on-the-ground air power coordinators in SOCOM. They specialize in air-ground communication in covert and austere environments. CCTs often deploy alongside other units from SOCOM in order to facilitate airfield seizure, airstrike control, and communications. CCTs train as air-traffic controllers and can coordinate missions with any air platform operated by the United States military.

Air Force CCTs support a variety of operations including direct action, combat search and rescue, close air support, airfield establishment, and special reconnaissance. CCTs have established their value in numerous ways, among the most important in recent history has been their ability to deploy behind enemy lines and establish airfields and coordinate complex air support missions.

4.3.2 Pararescuemen (PJ)

The PJs specialize in personnel recovery within SOCOM. Their primary roles include combat search and rescue, combat medic, personnel recovery, and hostage rescue operations. Their motto “these things we do that others may live” encompasses the spirit of the unit, who are willing to put themselves in the line of fire to provide care for, and extract wounded servicemembers.

Pararescuemen further distinguish themselves through their constant training in real world scenarios. When not deployed to combat, pararescuemen apply their capabilities to humanitarian crises and urgent rescue missions. Whether it be rescuing fishermen overboard in the open ocean or climbers stuck on one of the tallest mountains in the world, PJs are in a constant state of operations.

The PJs also have one of the longest training courses of SOCOM units due to the required medical training. Their training includes field surgery, pharmacology, combat trauma treatment, and more, certifying them as paramedics.

4.3.3 Special Reconnaissance (SR)

The Air Force’s Special Reconnaissance units provide wide ranging reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. The unit originally deployed as Special Operations Weathermen, meteorologists trained to operate in hostile environments in support of SOCOM operations.

Although little is publicly known about the details of the SR mission, the units do provide battlefield intelligence, develop targets, and support global access, air, space, and cyberspace superiority.

4.4 Marine Corps

The Marine Corps are a somewhat new addition to SOCOM. The Raiders trace their roots to World War II, where they provided amphibious light infantry capabilities behind enemy lines. After being re-established during GWOT, the Raiders have become an integral part of SOCOM.

4.4.1 Marine Raider Regiment

Although they are proven to be a valuable resource, Marine Raiders have slowly found their place in SOCOM. The Raiders have combined the capabilities of the Green Berets and Navy SEALs in support of direct action, special reconnaissance, and foreign internal defense operations.

In 2005, the Marine Corps decided to provide a component to SOCOM. Through an experimental unit, Detachment-1, made up of experienced Force Recon members, the Marine Corps found the unit to be highly capable and a valuable part of SOCOM.

5.0 SOCOM Summary

The United States Special Operations Command was created out of the need for a unified special operations command. An organized structure that allows for coordination and expertise in a wide range of warfighting capabilities makes it one of the most valuable components of the United States military. A dedicated budget provides a greater degree of flexibility for the high-risk and important missions often tasked to special operation units.

Conflict around the world is fought in unconventional ways, making coordinated special operations units more important. As the United States transitions away from the GWOT and focuses on near-peer conflict, SOCOM will take on a new mission but its critical role in succeeding on the battlefield will remain.

greydynamics.com · by George Englehart · October 31, 2023

22. Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve

As an aside, I read on social media (attributed to Don Vadnergrift) that William Lind is coming out with a new Maneuver Warfare Handbook (with a foreword from LTG Jim Dubik). I recall buying his first edition in the early 1980s as a young officer. It cost an exorbitant amount at the time, something like $35 for a small paperback book that was like a manual. I thought it was important to have for my professional development.

Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve

The attrition versus maneuver argument is an irrelevant distraction.

By Colonel Pat Garrett, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)

November 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/11/1,449

usni.org · November 1, 2023

Maneuver warfare is a fraud, and maneuver as a warfighting function is dead. At least, that is what some scholars and military analysts claim. We disagree. However, there are ongoing changes in the character of war fueling perceptions that should be addressed. Warfare’s changing character often alters the balance between offense and defense, and the U.S. military faces one of these periodic shifts today.

These changes require professionals to think creatively about the implications. As warfare evolves, remaining ready in the face of technological change is key to the profession of arms. The challenges posed in today’s operating environment complicate maneuver and should stimulate updates to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1: Warfighting.

Current Debate

A U.S. Marine with the Maritime Special Purpose Force, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, provides security in an urban environment training course on Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in November 2022. While there are higher costs for urban operations, both movement and offensive maneuver are still possible in steel and masonry canyons. U.S. Marine Corps (Rafael Brambila-Pelay).

Since its post-Vietnam advent, maneuver warfare has always been a contested concept, despite its successful imprint on U.S. Marine Corps and Army doctrine.1 The roots of this 40-plus year argument can be traced back to the post–World War I writings of Basil Liddell Hart.2 The war’s massive human and matériel toll, accentuated by both sides’ pursuit of attrition strategies, propelled his search for alternatives that might produce more decisive results at reduced costs. Over the course of history, Hart found, “in all decisive campaigns, the dislocation of the enemy’s psychological and physical balance has been the vital prelude to his overthrow.”3 This concept of dislocation lies at the heart of today’s maneuver warfare.4

Attrition as a strategy received further criticism after Vietnam, where the decade-long U.S. attempt to wear down North Vietnam’s war-making abilities manifestly failed to achieve its desired aim, even though the United States had overwhelming combat and logistical superiority. Both the Army and Marine Corps turned their conceptual focus back to the burgeoning Soviet threat in Europe and the Middle East. The Army’s AirLand Battle concept sought to leverage new technologies, especially deep-attack systems, integrated with mechanized maneuver forces.5 Prompted by writings from Vietnam veterans, as well as ideas from Bill Lind and John Boyd, the Marine Corps began to explore maneuver warfare.6 The latter stressed decision-making and cognitive factors often overlooked in U.S. military theory.7 Despite the status it has achieved in Marine Corps doctrine, maneuver warfare has generated critics over the past decade.8

Several scholars have recently resurrected this debate, once again underscoring attrition and the physical destruction of an adversary as a surer path to victory. These critics have three substantial arguments. First, including the term “cognitive paralysis” as a method or goal in emerging concepts is suspect. This evolution from dislocation to paralysis appeared in the emerging Army multidomain operations concept.9 Academics have found trying to gain “strategic paralysis” against major competitors problematic. They contend that imposing multiple dilemmas to paralyze an enemy must be rethought in favor of attrition, explicitly questioning the historical basis of Hart and Boyd’s writings.10

Second, they argue the changing character of war makes maneuver harder to execute successfully.11 The proliferation of new intelligence, surveillance, target-acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities makes offensive maneuver easier to detect and robs maneuver warfare of any chance of surprise.

Finally, they contend maneuver warfare is irrelevant to urban operations, which they presume to be a prominent future operating environment given the record density of population in cities.12 More than 55 percent of the world now lives in a city, and the World Bank projects that level will exceed two-thirds by 2050.13 This density seems to make canalizing ground formations inevitable, which appears to offset the mobility advantages of mechanized armies.14

What the Critics Get Right

Today’s attrition advocates are correct that technology trends improve targeting and surveillance and enhance the range and precision of strike assets. The “sense-to-strike” function is now a tightly compressed kill chain.15 Offensive maneuver forces will be hard pressed to obtain decisive results. This will be particularly true for offensive operations that require penetrating prepared and layered defenses, such as seen in the Russia-Ukraine war.16 The critics also are correct in noting the importance of endurance, logistics, and munitions inventories.17

The critics are right about the aspirational stretch behind strategic paralysis, too, and will be happy to hear that the Army has dropped it as a theory of victory. That service’s latest doctrine now states:

Multidomain operations fracture the coherence of threat operational approaches by destroying, dislocating, isolating, and disintegrating their interdependent systems and formations, and exploiting the opportunities these disruptions provide to defeat enemy forces in detail.18

While the primacy given to destruction in this definition may satisfy the critics, more important is the emphasis on four different and parallel defeat mechanisms in pursuit of disruption and the reduced coherence of the adversary’s ability to command. Marine Corps doctrine has been aligned with this since 1997.19

Why Attrition Is Insufficient

The firepower/attrition versus maneuver argument is a red herring. Black and white distinctions between destruction and maneuver, or physical and psychological effects, are oversimplified and overlook the interactive and reciprocal effects of actual combat. Attrition is too often used as a synonym for fires, which by themselves are a necessary but rarely sufficient component in warfare.20 Reducing an adversary’s capability is required to produce the shock or loss that induces him to recognize that the campaign cannot be continued. Under certain circumstances, a strategy of attrition may be necessary and effective.21 More often, the synergy of combinations is needed.

Second, arguments about the growing difficulty of conducting maneuver given the ongoing technology revolution are not easily dismissed. The current technological shift favors defense.22 Yet, the same was true in 1863 at Gettysburg, 1904–5 in Manchuria, and along the Western Front from 1914 to 1918. Following each battle, the military profession evolved its tactics and weapons to regain maneuver on the battlefield.23 Yet, there are situations in which offensive maneuver is required: to recover a salient, improve positional advantage, or overcome an attempted fait accompli against a U.S. ally.24 The challenge is how to design a force that can generate both fires and maneuver to succeed in an operating environment that privileges the defense.

Critics too often conflate the maneuver warfare concept with maneuver/movement. The former “seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions.”25 Rapid movement is part of it, but so is firepower/destruction. The key is to avoid applying fires purely in an extended grinding down of an enemy’s defenses and instead focus on rendering the enemy incapable of effective counteraction “by shattering their moral, mental, and physical cohesion—their ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole.”26

Third, attrition is a two-edged sword; like tempo, it is relational. It is not a one-sided game. Ultimately, it is a function of interaction with an opponent who is attempting to reduce U.S. capacity as well. Current Marine Corps doctrine does not ignore attrition; in fact, it explicitly recognizes that modern warfare “often involves extremely high attrition of selected enemy forces.” The distinction is that the focus is not on a slow and expensive reduction of the enemy’s matériel, but on the disruption it causes. Instead of pursuing the cumulative destruction of each enemy platform as the victory mechanism, the aim is “to attack the enemy ‘system’”—to incapacitate the enemy systemically.”27

Finally, urbanization is a legitimate concern; urban combat somewhere in the future is a near certainty.28 The experiences of Mogadishu, Fallujah, and Mosul give plenty of cause for concern. However, maneuver into and around cities is feasible, including air, subterranean corridors, and riverine options. True, there are many “surfaces” and higher costs for urban operations, but both movement and offensive maneuver are possible, if often difficult, in steel and masonry canyons.29 Moreover, urban operations are hard for a defender whose command and logistics likewise can be isolated and exploited. There are ways to crack this nut if the Marine Corps prepares for it, including unmanned and remote options.30 Understanding the “flows” of urban systems is important, and unmanned systems and sensor packages can help facilitate effective fire and maneuver.31

Yet, while attrition may be necessary, it is not on its own sufficient. Truly monodimensional solutions are theoretically possible but historically rare. We do not discount the value of fires, but the record for liberating territory and achieving decisive results purely through attrition is thin at best.32 Even in the most grinding campaigns, outcomes typically turn on the degree to which attrition and maneuver successfully complement each other. Instead of a return to the costly and stagnant operational designs that sparked Hart’s writings, there are several promising elements for a combination approach, one focused on the disruption of the adversary’s ability to direct the combination of fires and maneuver—a true system-disruption objective.

U.S. Marines with Combat Logistics Battalion 2, Combat Logistics Regiment 2, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, conduct a three-mile hike during Marine Rotational Force-Europe 23.1 in Setermoen, Norway, in January 2023. The Marine Corps must design a force that can generate both fires and maneuver to succeed in any operating environment. U.S. Marine Corps (Christian M. Garcia)

The Solution

Given favorable terrain and time for proper preparation, ongoing developments in sensing, precision, and speed of engagement favor the defense. Force design and doctrine must account for that. Mobile and armored platforms are needed but must be rethought with respect to weight, speed, sensing, and firepower tradeoffs.33

Technology, especially robotics, affords options that allow offensive maneuver to offset the inherent advantages of the defense.34 No single approach is likely to be effective alone, especially crossing the more transparent “dead zone” across future battlefields. As General Sir Patrick Sanders, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army, underscores: “Success will be determined by combined arms and multi-domain competence.”35

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Mark Milley, finds this consistent with the new U.S. Joint Warfighting Concept, which calls for expanded maneuver as a key tenet.36 This challenges commanders to think creatively about “maneuver through land, sea, air, space, cyber, the electromagnetic spectrum, information space, and the cognitive realm.”37

To succeed, maneuver forces increasingly will need to employ unmanned systems. Improved mobile air defense and counter–unmanned aerial systems will facilitate maneuver, while robotics, lethal autonomous unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, and advanced electronic warfare capabilities will enable mobility. These unmanned systems can maneuver in swarms and complicate targeting, forcing expenditure of high-cost munitions to kill cheaper unmanned systems.38 Ultimately, these trends mean that “maneuver” will be reflected across the full array of warfighting domains.

The ongoing fight in Ukraine offers a glimpse of the future. Some military analysts characterize the war as attrition-based and the antithesis of maneuver warfare. Some even see Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive as a strategy of attrition.39 Certainly, the war has featured intensive expenditures of artillery ammunition.40 But the stunning Ukrainian counteroffensive to capture Kharkiv in September 2022 should be seen as an exemplar of maneuver warfare given the feints, deception, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System strikes, and maneuver forces used. Operational surprise was used against weak Russian elements (a gap) that led to their rapid collapse.41 As noted in Time:

The Russians were caught off guard. Many fled in disarray, leaving behind weapons and equipment. Local reports painted a humiliating picture of retreat, describing soldiers stealing civilians’ clothes, bicycles, and cars to escape. In six days, the Ukrainian military retook an estimated 3,000 square km of Russian-held territory, including strategically important rail hubs used to resupply its forces.42

This was classic dislocation and a manifestation of maneuverist thinking. As Russian operations against Kyiv clearly demonstrate, firepower is not enough.43

Today, Ukraine is doing much more than just matching Russia’s methods. Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s Chief of Defence Staff, recently characterized Ukraine’s latest approach as “starve, stretch and strike.” In the first phase, the Ukrainians struck deep against Russian command-and-control nodes and logistics to dislocate its commanders and starve the defenders of supplies. In the “stretch” phase, the Ukrainians are probing Russian lines seeking gaps and forcing Russian reactions that are potential mistakes. In the culminating phase, precision fires and full domain maneuver from the trained assault brigades and overhead drones will exploit the defender’s disrupted defense. Liddell Hart would be satisfied.

Recommendations

Reports of the death of maneuver warfare are premature, but its continued utility depends on adaptation.44 Updating maneuver warfare to “system disruption warfare” would better stress disrupting adversary systems across all domains. This comports with existing Marine Corps doctrine. “Surfaces and gaps” must be thought of in all dimensions, including time, and domains, not simply as dashing through weak spots in a cloud of dust, driving for the enemy’s rear.45 Moreover, combined arms must shift from simple “steel-on-target” thinking to degrading an opponent’s ability to observe and disrupting the coherence of his whole system. This is not to diminish firepower and lethality, but instead to promote the integration of all warfighting functions across all domains.

The ongoing transformation articulated in Force Design 2030 must address these ongoing changes in war’s character.46 The Marine Corps’ capabilities priortized for transformation, such as long-range precision fires, advanced loitering munitions, and electronic warfare, support ongoing trends.47 Other changes in warfare will require careful consideration to ensure the Marine Corps remains relevant and ready for the future.

To position itself for this future, the Marine Corps needs to absorb lessons from Ukraine, as well as understand China’s systems-confrontation approach.48 When updating MCDP-1 Warfighting, Hart’s original version of bidimensional dislocation should be retained, as well as the importance of the human dimension. War remains fundamentally a contest of human wills—there is more to war than blowing up targets. Leadership, military command, morale, and the will to fight are key ingredients of success, as Ukraine demonstrates. Prioritizing the destruction of matériel deemphasizes moral and cognitive factors, an all-too-common orientation within some circles in the U.S. military.49

Properly understood and updated, maneuver warfare remains critical to the future. Seizing the initiative, seeking an information advantage, exploiting tempo, and employing surprise and deception remain relevant. The recent Hamas attack on Israel shows that surprise can still be achieved, regardless of new intelligence and sensing capabilities. But the means required to knock an adversary off balance and generate the series of violent shocks that break his ability to respond must be applied in an expanded set of domains.

One soldier who pronounced the death of maneuver quipped that “philosophies do not win battles.”50 True, but it takes intellectually prepared commanders to win battles, and that is what this debate is about. The maneuver warfare doctrine of the 1980s was an effort to reshape forces with the hardware and software to defeat large-scale opponents. That challenge is no less relevant today and even more urgent.

1. Craig Tucker, “False Prophets: The Myth of Maneuver Warfare and the Inadequacies of FMFM-1 Warfighting,” Ft. Leavenworth Command and Staff College, 1995; Wilf Owens, “The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud,” Small Wars Journal, 5 September 2008; and Maj Joseph Williams, USMC, “Mindlessness in Maneuver Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette (August 2021): 63–5.

2. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991), 5–6; Richard Swain, “B. H. Liddell Hart and the Creation of a Theory of War, 1919–1933,” Armed Forces & Society 17, no. 1 (Fall 1990): 35–51; and Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 645–95.

3. Brian Bond, Liddell-Hart: A Study of His Military Thought (London: Cassell, 1979), 55.

4. Hart, Strategy, 5–6.

5. Huba Wass de Czege, “Army Doctrinal Reform,” in The Defense Reform Debate, Asa Clark, ed. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 101–104.

6. Marinus, “Marine Corps Maneuver Warfare: The Historical Context,” Marine Corps Gazette (September 2020): 85–7. See also William Lind, The Maneuver Warfare Handbook (London: Routledge, 1985).

7. Antulio J. Echevarria Jr., War’s Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 169–92. For an exposition on Clausewitz and Boyd, see Martin Samuels, “The Finely-Honed Blade: Clausewitz and Boyd on Friction and Moral Factors,” MCU Expeditions, 2020.

8. LtCol Thaddeus Drake, USMC, “The Fantasy of MCDP 1,” Marine Corps Gazette (October 2020): 33–36: Williams, “Mindlessness in Maneuver Warfare,” 63–65; and LtCol Nate Lauterbach, USMC, and Heather Venable, “Why Attack Weakness? A Reconsideration of Maneuver and Attrition,” Marine Corps Gazette (September 2021): 98–101.

9. On creating simultaneous multiple dilemmas, in Air Force doctrine see Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-99, Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All-Domain Operations, Curtis LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, 2020, 1.

10. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Manoeuvre versus Attrition in U.S. Military Operations,” Survival (August/September 2021): 131–48; Heather Venable, “Paralysis in Peer Conflict? The Material Versus the Mental in 100 Years of Military Thinking,” War on the Rocks, 1 December 2021; and Michael Kofman, “A Bad Romance: U.S. Operational Concepts Need to Ditch Their Love Affair with Cognitive Paralysis and Make Peace with Attrition,” Modern Warfare Institute, 31 March 2021.

11. Gady, “Manoeuvre versus Attrition,” 132; and Amos C. Fox, “Manoeuvre Is Dead?” The RUSI Journal 166, 6-7 (2021): 16–17.

12. Anthony King, Urban Warfare in the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 84.

13. Tadros Wahba et al., Demographic Trends and Urbanization (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2021), 9.

14. Fox, “Manoeuvre Is Dead?” 15–16.

15. Chris Brose, The Kill Chain, Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare (New York: Hachette, 2020), 198–203.

16. Stephen Biddle, “Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver,” War on the Rocks, 22 November 2022.

17. Antulio J. Echevarria, “It’s Time to Recognize Sustainment as a Strategic Imperative,” War on the Rocks, 15 February 2023.

18. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations (Washington DC: Headquarters, U.S. Army, October 2022), 1–2.

19. Marinus, “Defeat Mechanisms,” Marine Corps Gazette (July 2021): 101–6; and LtCol Frank Hoffman, USMC (Ret.), “Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare,” Parameters 51, no. 4 (Winter 2021/2022): 49–66.

20. Lamar Tooke, “Blending Maneuver and Attrition,” Military Review 80, no. 2 (March-April 2000): 10–11; and J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., “The Issue of Attrition,” Parameters 40, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 5–19.

21. On attrition, see Carter Malkasian, A History of Modern Wars of Attrition (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); and Cathal Nolan, The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017), passim.

22. Col T. X. Hammes, USMC (Ret.), “The Tactical Defense Becomes Dominant Again,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 103 (4th Quarter 2021): 10–17.

23. Paul Lockhart, Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare (New York: Basic Books, 2021), 181–86; and Peter Hart, Fire and Movement; The British Expeditionary Force and the Campaign of 1914 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015).

24. Biddle, “Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver.”

25. U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1: Warfighting (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), 4-4.

26. MCDP 1, Warfighting, 4-5.

27. MCDP-1, Warfighting, 4-5.

28. Fox, “Manoeuvre Is Dead?” 6.

29. For counterarguments, see John Spencer, “Maneuver Warfare and the Urban Battlefield,” Modern Warfare Institute, 11 March 2021.

30. Russell Glenn, Heavy Matter: Urban Operations’ Density of Challenges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2000); Russell Glenn and Todd Helmus, A Tale of Three Cities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007); and Gian Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army: How the Past Can Inform the Present and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), xiii-xiv.

31. David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015), 52–115.

32. Surprisingly, the pro-attrition crowd spends little time looking at the history of their preferred option. On air power limitations, see Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). On developments against limited opponents see Phil Haun, Colin Jackson, and Timothy Schultz, eds., Air Power in the Age of Primacy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

33. For some ideas about reconceptualizing the tank, see Azar Gat, The Future of the Tank and the Land Battlefield, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv, 20 July 2023.

34. See Col T. X. Hammes, USMC (Ret.), “Technologies Converge and Power Diffuses: The Evolution of Small, Smart, and Cheap Weapons,” Policy Analysis, no. 786 (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2016).

35. GEN Patrick Saunders, British Army, RUSI Land Warfare Conference, keynote speech, London, 26 June 2023.

36. GEN Mark A. Milley, USA, “Strategic Inflection Point,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 110 (3rd Quarter, 2023): 6–15.

37. Milley, “Strategic Inflection Point,” 12.

38. Eric Schmitt, “The Future of War Has Come in Ukraine: Drone Swarms,” Wall Street Journal, 8 July 2023; and David Hambling, “Ukraine Wins First Drone vs. Drone Dogfight Against Russia,” Forbes, 4 October 2022.

39. Franz-Stefan Gady and Michael Kofman, “Ukraine’s Strategy of Attrition,” Survival 65, no. 2 (April/May 2023): 7–22.

40. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Ukraine at War: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory,” RUSI Special Report (July 2022), 3–4; “Artillery Is Playing a Vital Role in Ukraine,” Economist, 2 May 2022; and Adam Pasick, “A Grinding Artillery War in Ukraine,” The New York Times, 6 May 2022.

41. Julian E. Barnes, Eric Schmidt, and Helene Cooper, “The Critical Moment Behind Ukraine’s Rapid Advance,” The New York Times, 13 September 2022; and Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,” Institute for the Study of War, 9 September 2022.

42. Simon Schuster and Vera Bergengruen, “Inside the Ukrainian Counterstrike that Turned the Tide of the War,” Time, 26 September 2022.

43. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Julian E. Barnes, and Natalia Yermak, “Russia Learns Firepower Alone Is Not Enough,” The New York Times, 18 June 2023.

44. For a thorough assessment of maneuver warfare, see Christopher Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” in Mikael Weissmann and Niklas Nilsson, eds., Advanced Land Warfare; Tactics and Operations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2023).

45. Lawrence Freedman, “There Is Only One Way to Win a War of Attrition,” New Statesman, 1 August 2023.

46. Gen David Berger, USMC, Force Design 2030 (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020); HON Robert Work, “Marine Force Design Overdue Despite Critic’s Claims,” Texas National Security Review 6, no. 3 (Summer 2023); and Berger, Force Design Annual Update 2023 (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 5 June 2023).

47. Shashank Joshi, “A New Era of High-Tech War Has Begun,” Economist, 9 July 2023, 2–3.

48. Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018). See HON Robert Work, “A Joint Concept for Systems Warfare,” Center for a New American Security, December 2020.

49. For a balanced perspective on the human and moral dimensions of war, see Mick Ryan, War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First-Century Great Power Competition and Conflict (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022), 165–208.

50. Fox, “Manoeuvre Is Dead?” 7.

usni.org · November 1, 2023

23. Senators warn of Chinese effort to recruit US service members as former JBLM soldier faces trial in spy case

Senators warn of Chinese effort to recruit US service members as former JBLM soldier faces trial in spy case

Stars and Stripes · by Gary Warner · November 1, 2023

Three senators warned the Pentagon on Tuesday, Oct. 31, 2023, that China is making aggressive efforts to recruit current and recent members of the U.S. military to spy against the United States. (U.S. Army)

Three senators warned the Pentagon on Tuesday that China is making aggressive efforts to recruit current and recent members of the U.S. military to spy against the United States.

“These actions by the [Chinese Communist Party] to gain insight on and exploit U.S. national security information and tactics present a current and ongoing threat to our national security,” Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., a member of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, wrote in a letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Air Force Gen. Charles “CQ” Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sens. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., a former Army captain, and Mark Kelly, D-Ariz., a former Navy captain, also signed the letter.

The senators are requesting a briefing from the Pentagon by Dec. 15 on the issue and what steps can be taken within the Defense Department to curb attempts by Chinese intelligence agents to meet and recruit U.S. service members, especially those who are leaving the military and looking for employment.

The letter follows a federal judge in the U.S. District of Western Washington setting a Jan. 2 trial date for a former sergeant in the military intelligence section of Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., accused of stealing and then trying to offer top secret documents to China.

Joseph Daniel Schmidt, 29, was arrested Oct. 6 when he stepped off a flight from Hong Kong to San Francisco. A grand jury in Seattle had earlier charged him with felony possession of secret documents that he is accused of taking from his position with the 109th Military Intelligence Battalion at Lewis-McChord.

When Schmidt worked at Lewis-McChord, he would deal with communications from possible spies or others with knowledge of Chinese military and intelligence apparatus, according to court documents filed in his case. Schmidt “directly supported the Indo-Pacific Command, the U.S. Department of Defense’s geographic combatant command that covers the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean region,” according to a court affidavit.

In a hearing on Monday, Schmidt was ordered to remain confined in a federal security facility until the trial. He faces 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine on each of his two charges.

In another recent case, a sailor serving at Naval Base Ventura County in Port Hueneme, Calif., pleaded guilty to providing intelligence information to the Chinese in exchange for cash, according to the Justice Department.

Petty Officer Wenheng Zhao, 26, of Monterey Park, Calif., admitted to sending plans for a military exercise in the Indo-Pacific region to a Chinese intelligence agent for more two years — from August 2021 to May 2023.

Zhao worked in the Navy as a technician who installed and maintained electronic equipment at U.S. military bases. He would take photographs of computer display screens with “operational orders” for U.S. military units. He also sent installation blueprints and a diagram of a radar station at the U.S. military base in Okinawa.

He faces up to 20 years in prison and will be sentenced Jan. 8, federal officials said.

The three senators wrote an additional danger is service members who have key intelligence or technical skills and are contacted by the Chinese through intermediators with international job opportunities that can seem legitimate.

“The Chinese government has reportedly used companies that are both overtly and covertly backed by the Chinese Communist Party, including using deliberately innocuous and vague job descriptions and promising lucrative pay, to deceive veterans into working for the People’s Liberation Army,” they wrote.

The United States is not the only nation facing attempts to recruit former military personnel.

“Similar targeted recruiting of military veterans has also been exposed in the United Kingdom, where the Chinese have sought to hire former pilots to teach NATO aircraft and aerial doctrine,” according to the letter.

Shaheen is trying to amend the Senate version of the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, an annual, must-pass policy bill for the Pentagon, to prohibit service members from employment with security and military services of the Chinese Communist Party.

The NDAA amendment was added after a recent Air Force report that the Chinese have sought to recruit service members specifically to work on areas of their expertise while in the U.S. military.

“We urge you to take all action that is immediately available to resist this targeted recruitment of veterans and separating service members,” the senators wrote.

Stars and Stripes · by Gary Warner · November 1, 2023

24. US-Philippine defense treaty is losing credibility

Excerpts:

Washington’s commitment to go to war over some rocks and reefs in the South China Sea lacks credibility. The area is simply not economically or strategically important enough to risk US survival.

Transforming the Philippines alliance into a purely defensive one would better secure American interests, improve its credibility, and reduce regional tensions. America should act now before it’s too late.

US-Philippine defense treaty is losing credibility

US pledge to wage war with China over Philippine-claimed rocks and reefs in South China Sea is hurting not helping the alliance

asiatimes.com · by Quinn Marschik · October 31, 2023

Following its predecessors, the Biden administration threatened to go to war with China after a Chinese coast guard vessel scraped a Philippines ship on a resupply mission near a shoal in the South China Sea.

Shortly thereafter, a Chinese fighter flew within 10 feet of a US bomber above the disputed tract of reefs and islets.

While US-China relations appear to be emphasizing diplomacy, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Washington and US representation at China’s Xiangshan Forum, its premier defense conference, a possible conflict over sandbars is likely top of mind.

However, the US pledge to go to war with a nuclear-armed China over largely uninhabited rocks and reefs – stemming from post-colonial disputes – is not credible, harms US interests and creates unnecessary regional tensions.

The United States going to war with China to defend the Philippines’ claims to rocks and reefs in the South China Sea is not credible. These islets are largely uninhabited – save for a grounded ship Manilla uses to press its claims – and strategically irrelevant.

The Sierra Madre, the grounded ship used by the Phillippines as a guard station on the Second Thomas Shoal. Photo: US Naval Institute

Although trillions of dollars in global trade traverse these waters annually, an overwhelming majority goes to China. Additionally, ships are moving objects, they can change their course. Though more expensive, merchant ships can often go around the South China Sea to reach destinations in Southeast and Northeast Asia, as well as the United States.

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Strategically, controlling the small bits of territory makes little difference. While they can serve as military outposts and bases, these locations are highly vulnerable to missile bombardments. Resupplying these military installations would be difficult, as supply vessels would have to worry about missile and submarine attacks.

Their size also makes them poor staging grounds for wider invasions. If China were to invade the Philippines, it would unlikely be able to muster enough troops on the rocks for a successful landing.

More importantly, the risks to US survival are too high and opportunity for tangible gains too little for Washington to be serious about its threat to defend disputed rocks and reefs.

America is highly unlikely to risk nuclear war or an equally deadly conventional war over a single Filipino ship or plane – let alone a small group.

The United States did not declare war on North Korea when it sank a South Korean ship and bombarded an island, nor did Washington mobilize when a Chinese boat – likely linked to China’s government – collided with two Japanese coast guard vessels in 2010.

Such moves would set negative precedents for US allies, signaling that Washington is willing to back their territorial claims – even potentially irredentist and imperialist ones – and disproportionality at the expense of US interests.

Just like the Philippines, China cares far more about its South China Sea claims than the United States for nationalist and territorial integrity reasons. The islets are also an essential pillar of China’s Century of Humiliation narrative and factor into the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy.

As such, the disputed territory is part of Beijing’s “core interests” – national interests in which China will use force to defend. Moreover, China’s geographic proximity – despite the US military presence in the Philippines – gives it the edge.

Instead of focusing on defending rocks and reefs in the Western Pacific, Washington should reorient its alliance with Manilla to be purely defensive and aimed at protecting the Philippines’ home islands. The new policy could enhance military training, defensive planning and coordination, and defensive arms sales centered on the Filipino homeland.

At the same time, Washington should publicly and privately signal that America would only come to the Philippines’ aid if one of its main islands is attacked unprovoked. This would likely restrain the Philippines from risking activities that could embroil it in a conflict with China and, therefore, reduce regional tensions.

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Further underscoring the purely defensive nature of the alliance, Washington should also rule out using its bases in the Philippines as a staging ground to defend Taiwan. Manilla would not only agree with this, but it would be in the Philippines’ interest. It could help protect them from becoming collateral damage from a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

The Philippine Coast Guard vessel BRP Cabra encounters two Chinese Coast Guard ships blocking its path on August 22, 2023, while sailing to the Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed South China Sea. Photo: Twitter Screengrab / Jakarta Post

This would also help reduce tensions in the South China Sea – as closer US-Philippines defense ties are likely contributing to increased Chinese assertiveness. Southeast Asian nations would also appreciate reduced regional tensions to focus on improving their people’s livelihoods, which would also improve America’s standing in the economically important region.

Washington’s commitment to go to war over some rocks and reefs in the South China Sea lacks credibility. The area is simply not economically or strategically important enough to risk US survival.

Transforming the Philippines alliance into a purely defensive one would better secure American interests, improve its credibility, and reduce regional tensions. America should act now before it’s too late.

Quinn Marschik is a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities.

asiatimes.com · by Quinn Marschik · October 31, 2023

25. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 31, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-31-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's response to the October 29 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan suggests that Russian officials may be increasingly concerned about the weakening of authoritarian control in regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 31.
• Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on October 31.
• Russian authorities detained two suspects for the murder of a Ukrainian family in occupied Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted combined missile strikes against Sevastopol and elsewhere in occupied Crimea on October 30.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka.
• Former Wagner Group fighters continue to redeploy to Ukraine as part of other Russian formations.
• Russian occupation officials continue efforts to eradicate Ukrainian language and culture in occupied Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 31, 2023

Oct 31, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 31, 2023

Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 31, 2023, 4:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's response to the October 29 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan suggests that Russian officials may be increasingly concerned about the weakening of authoritarian control in regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation. Kadyrov responded to the riots in Dagestan by praising Russian President Vladimir Putin's accusation that the West orchestrated the situation to destabilize Russia.[1] Kadyrov later called on Chechen security forces to immediately detain instigators of any potential riots in Chechnya or to "fire three warning shots in the air and after that, fire the fourth shot in the head."[2] Kadyrov's reactions to the riots in Dagestan suggest that he is first and foremost concerned with maintaining the perception of his unwavering support of Putin and secondly with demonstrating the strength of his authoritarian rule over Chechnya by threatening a violent response to potential future riots.[3]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Bakhmut directions.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi to discuss the situation on the front in the Kupyansk, Avdiivka, and Kherson directions.[5]

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on October 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M missiles and an S-300 air defense missile at targets in Ukraine.[6] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Yurii Malashko reported that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City with a missile.[7] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Shahed-131/136 drones at targets in Khmelnytskyi and Poltava oblasts and that Ukrainian air defenses activated in these oblasts.[8]

Russian authorities detained two suspects for the murder of a Ukrainian family in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on October 30 that Russian authorities detained two Russian military contract servicemen originally from the Russian Far East as suspects for the murder on October 29 in Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast.[9] The Investigative Committee stated that the preliminary investigation indicates that the motive of the murders was of a “domestic” nature. A Russian insider source claimed on October 31 that the two detainees were a part of the Russian 155th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet).[10] Attacks on civilians hors de combat (in rear areas far removed from active combat zones) by representatives of an occupying power constitute a clear violation of multiple international legal norms and very likely rise to the level of a war crime or crime against humanity.[11]

A court in Uzbekistan has reportedly sentenced the first Uzbek citizen to prison for serving as a mercenary for Russian forces in Ukraine. A court in Uzbekistan found an Uzbek man, who reportedly served in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) military from 2014-2015, guilty of violating the Uzbek law against mercenarism.[12] Relatives of the convicted man claimed that he did not participate in the war in Ukraine and was in Russia during the indicated years.[13] This sentencing may heighten tensions between the governments of Russia and Central Asian countries as Russian authorities have increased efforts to coerce Central Asian migrants into Russian military service.[14]

Key Takeaways:

• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's response to the October 29 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan suggests that Russian officials may be increasingly concerned about the weakening of authoritarian control in regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 31.
• Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on October 31.
• Russian authorities detained two suspects for the murder of a Ukrainian family in occupied Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted combined missile strikes against Sevastopol and elsewhere in occupied Crimea on October 30.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka.
• Former Wagner Group fighters continue to redeploy to Ukraine as part of other Russian formations.
• Russian occupation officials continue efforts to eradicate Ukrainian language and culture in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on October 31. Ukrainian officials, including the Ukrainian General Staff, reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and Nadiya (16 west of Svatove) but did not conduct any offensive actions in the Lyman direction.[15] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces attacked near Synkivka, Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna) on October 30 but did not specify an outcome.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 30 that positional battles continued near the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[17]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 31. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Synkivka, Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna), and Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[18]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut but did not make any confirmed advances on October 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut.[19] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces consolidated control over positions east of the railway line near Andriivka and marginally advanced south of the settlement.[21]

Russian forces counterattacked near Bakhmut on October 31 but did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Pivdenne (23km southwest of Bakhmut).[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Berkhivka (4km north of Bakhmut).[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage purportedly showing elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division operating north of Bakhmut.[24]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Avdiivka but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on October 31. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near the Avdiivka waste heap northwest of Avdiivka.[25] Russian milbloggers diverged in their claims about the intensity of fighting in the Avdiivka direction, with one milblogger claiming that the tempo of operations is increasing while another claimed it was decreasing.[26]

Russian sources continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 31 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on October 30 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of Avdiivka.[27] Additional geolocated footage published on October 30 indicates that Russian forces advanced southwest of Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka).[28] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 30 and 31 that Russian forces are advancing near the Avdiivka Coke Plant immediately north of Avdiivka.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 31 that Russian forces are not actively attacking the coke plant and are still preparing for a ground assault.[30] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of the Avdiivka industrial zone.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are also advancing near Krasnohorivka, Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka), Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[32] One Russian source criticized other sources on October 29 for writing “victorious” reports about the ongoing operation and preemptively claiming that Russian forces have captured certain positions, suggesting that some Russian correspondents still have a negative perception of the tactical situation near Avdiivka.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 31 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Keramik (10km northwest of Avdiivka), Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Tonenke, Sieverne, and Pervomaiske.[34]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks west or southwest of Donetsk City on October 31.

Russian forces continued ground attacks west and southwest of Donetsk City on October 31 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage published on October 30 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced south of Novomykhailivka (20km southwest of Donetsk City).[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 31 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka (just west of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka.[36] A Russian news aggregator claimed that there were positional battles on Marinka’s western outskirts on October 30.[37]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 31.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 31 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Prechystivka (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), Zolota Nyva (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), and Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[38] A Russian media aggregator claimed that there was fighting near Pryyutne (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) on October 30.[39]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 31 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[40] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Robotyne, Verbove (9km east of Robotyne), Novoprokopivka (3km south of Robotyne), Kopani (6km northwest of Robotyne), and Nesteryanka (12km northwest of Robotyne).[41]

Russian forces counterattacked in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 31 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to restore lost positions near Robotyne.[42] A BARS-13 (Russian Combat Reserve) affiliated source claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and pushed Ukrainian forces back from positions near Verbove.[43] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted a successful counterattack from Verbove in the direction of Robotyne.[44] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claimed Russian advances.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions and continue ground activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as of October 31. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) and near the Antonivsky roadway and railway bridges.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing near Krynky and the Antonivsky Railway Bridge and that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian defenses near Pishchanivka (14km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and Poyma (12km southeast of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[46] Ukrainian Crimean-based “Atesh” partisan group stated on October 31 that elements of the Russian 126th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps, either of the 18th Combined Arms Army or the Black Sea Fleet), which is based near Simferopol, are currently operating in the Kherson direction.[47]

Russian forces continued airstrikes with glide bombs against targets on the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 31. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched 45 glide bombs at targets in Kherson and Bersylav raions over the past day.[48]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted combined missile strikes against Sevastopol and elsewhere in occupied Crimea on October 30.[49] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that sources stated that Ukrainian forces damaged a Russian S-300 air defense system near Molochne (71km northwest of Sevastopol).[50]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Former Wagner Group fighters continue to redeploy to Ukraine as part of other Russian formations. A prominent Russian milblogger wrote an article for Kremlin-affiliated outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda on October 30 detailing the experience of several former Wagner fighters who have returned to Ukraine under the control of various other Russian formations.[51] The milblogger cited a Russian commander in the Kreminna area of Luhansk Oblast who stated that there are "plenty" of former Wagner fighters in his sector of the front and that former Wagner fighters are signing new contracts and returning to combat zones. The milblogger also noted that over 170 former Wagner fighters are reportedly fighting in the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz regiment as part of the "Kamerton" detachment.[52] The article notes that some Wagner fighters have entered contracts with Rosgvardia, some have entered volunteer formations, and some have become part of the regular Russian forces.[53]

A Ukrainian HIMARS strike on October 29 reportedly destroyed an entire battalion of mobilized soldiers from Chuvashia. A Chuvashia-based Telegram channel announced on October 31 that the Russian 1st battalion of the 1251st Motorized Rifle Regiment lost over 120 soldiers killed and wounded in a Ukrainian HIMARS strike on the battalion's convoy in an unspecified location in Ukraine.[54] The Telegram channel and other Russian opposition outlets stated that the Chuvashian regional government has remained silent about the issue, calling attention to efforts by many regional authorities to obfuscate the scale of Russian losses in Ukraine.[55]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 31 that Russian forces will soon receive infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) that will be equipped with electronic warfare (EW) systems that provide special protection from FPV drones.[56] The milblogger claimed that the Kurganmashzavod enterprise in Kurgan Oblast will produce these special IFVs.[57]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to eradicate Ukrainian language and culture in occupied Ukraine. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated on October 27 that “[he] will not allow the Ukrainian language to reappear as a state or privileged language” in occupied Donetsk Oblast and claimed that no schools in occupied Donetsk Oblast have chosen to teach Ukrainian language.[58]

The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on October 31 that more than 400,000 Ukrainian citizens have passed through 17 Russian filtration centers in occupied Donetsk Oblast since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[59] The Resistance Center stated that Ukrainian citizens are subjected to pressure and torture at these filtration centers.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian sources continue to claim that the antisemitic riots in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan on October 29 were the result of a Ukrainian information operation.[60] Telegram founder Pavel Durov announced on October 30 that Telegram blocked the “Utro Dagestan” channel, which played a major role in organizing the antisemitic riots, due to “call[s] for violence.”[61]

Russian Chief of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov reiterated boilerplate rhetoric in a routine briefing about alleged American military-biological activities in Ukraine and other countries in Africa and the Middle East.[62]

Russia is continuing efforts to intensify Russian social and cultural influence over Russian-occupied Transnistria, Moldova. Russian newswire TASS reported on October 27 that the Chisinau-based Russia House transferred 2,500 modern Russian textbooks to Transnistria last week in order to facilitate the transfer of schools in Transnistria to Russian educational standards.[63] A prominent Russian milblogger responded to the report and claimed that it is a positive sign of the development of Russian "soft power" in Transnistria, but the Moldovan Foreign Ministry condemned the transfer of textbooks as "unacceptable".[64] The Kremlin frequently weaponizes discourse surrounding Transnistria in an attempt to destabilize Moldova, as ISW has previously reported.[65]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

A Ukrainian military observer stated on October 31 that as of October 29, there are 1,800 to 2,000 Belarusian military personnel along the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, including two air assault battalions of the 38th Separate Air Assault Brigade, two combined tactical detachments of the 5th Separate Special Purpose Brigade, a tactical group of the 51st Artillery Brigade, and a rocket artillery battery of the 336th Rocket Artillery Brigade.[66]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

26. Iran Update, October 31, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-31-2023

Key Takeaways:

1. Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted indirect fire attacks into Israel at their usual rate. Palestinian militias continued to launch attacks on the Erez military site from the northern Gaza Strip after the IDF advanced from there on October 29.
2. Israeli forces advanced into Beit Hanoun in the northeastern Gaza Strip to conduct clearing operations. Israeli forces also extended their positions along the coastal line in the northwestern Gaza Strip.
3. Local media and Palestinian militias claimed to engage Israeli forces moving westward south of Gaza City.
4. Palestinian militants clashed with Israeli forces at their usual rate in the West Bank. Students held large, anti-Israel demonstrations across the West Bank.
5. Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks into Israel as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets.
6. Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran are creating the expectation in the information environment that Hezbollah will escalate against Israel on or around November 3, possibly by increasing the rate of attack or by using more advanced systems.
7. The Houthis launched drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles targeting Israel, marking the third attempted Houthi attack since the war began.
8. An unidentified US military official reported that unidentified militants attacked US troops in four separate locations on October 30.
9. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian traveled to Qatar for further political coordination with Hamas leadership.

IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 31, 2023

Oct 31, 2023 - ISW Press

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Iran Update, October 31, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Brian Carter, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments and in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted indirect fire attacks into Israel at their usual rate. Palestinian militias continued to launch attacks on the Erez military site from the northern Gaza Strip after the IDF advanced from there on October 29.
2. Israeli forces advanced into Beit Hanoun in the northeastern Gaza Strip to conduct clearing operations. Israeli forces also extended their positions along the coastal line in the northwestern Gaza Strip.
3. Local media and Palestinian militias claimed to engage Israeli forces moving westward south of Gaza City.
4. Palestinian militants clashed with Israeli forces at their usual rate in the West Bank. Students held large, anti-Israel demonstrations across the West Bank.
5. Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks into Israel as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets.
6. Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran are creating the expectation in the information environment that Hezbollah will escalate against Israel on or around November 3, possibly by increasing the rate of attack or by using more advanced systems.
7. The Houthis launched drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles targeting Israel, marking the third attempted Houthi attack since the war began.
8. An unidentified US military official reported that unidentified militants attacked US troops in four separate locations on October 30.
9. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian traveled to Qatar for further political coordination with Hamas leadership.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted indirect fire attacks into Israel at their usual rate on October 31. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for 12 indirect fire attacks. The al Qassem Brigades military spokesperson said that the group will continue to strike Israel with rockets of all ranges.[1] Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for another nine indirect fire attacks. The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—claimed to launch mortars into southern Israel.[2] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) shot and killed a person attempting to cross from the Gaza Strip into Israel at the Reim junction, which is the first ground infiltration attempt that CTP-ISW has recorded since October 21.[3]

Palestinian militias continued to launch attacks on the Erez military site from the northern Gaza Strip after the IDF advanced from there on October 29. The al Qassem Brigades detonated an IED and fired anti-tank munitions at IDF tanks east of Erez.[4] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether the attacks occurred in the Gaza Strip or Israel. The Saraya al Quds Brigades fired mortars at the Erez site.[5]

Hamas and PIJ leaders boasted about Palestinian militia resistance in the Gaza Strip. A Hamas senior leader Daoud Shihab said the resistance is on the verge of achieving a major strategic victory in the Gaza Strip.[6] Saraya al Quds military spokesperson Abu Hamza stated that the group’s jihad will continue no matter how long the war lasts.[7]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Israeli Ground Operations in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces advanced into Beit Hanoun in the northeastern Gaza Strip to conduct clearing operations. Israeli infantry and tanks maneuvered through Beit Hanoun on October 31.[8] Local media reported that Palestinian militias engaged the IDF north of Beit Hanoun.[9] The New York Times noted that lines of armored vehicles traveled on the Salah al Din road running north to south in the Gaza Strip and in the northeastern corner of Beit Hanoun.[10] The al Qassem Brigades attacked an IDF unit clearing a building in the area.[11] The IDF said its forces engaged in fierce battles deep inside the Gaza Strip and eliminated military infrastructure and seized weapons, including IEDs.[12] The al Qassem Brigades military spokesman said that militants have introduced various types of lethal explosive devices to the battle.[13]

Israeli forces extended their positions along the coastal line in the northwestern Gaza Strip. The New York Times satellite imagery showed dozens of armored vehicles cutting through open fields and amassing in urban spaces.[14] Israeli vehicles are seen as far south as the neighborhood of al Karama, according to the New York Times.[15] The Hamas-run Gazan Interior Ministry claimed that the IDF advanced to al Karama from the northwestern Gaza Strip.[16] The Saraya al Quds Brigades launched mortars at IDF vehicles west of al Karam.[17]

Local media and Palestinian militias claimed to engage Israeli forces moving westward south of Gaza City. The al Qassem Brigades, Saraya al Quds Brigades, and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade attacked IDF forces in the central Gaza Strip.[18] Al Qassem Brigades militants claimed to destroy four vehicles with anti-tank munitions at the Netzarim junction, although CTP-ISW has seen no evidence that these claims are true.[19] A Palestinian journalist claimed that the IDF is operating inside outposts near the al Nour resort and near the Tika hospital after advancing westward from Samouni neighborhood.[20] The Hamas-run Interior Ministry claimed that Israeli vehicles on the Sala al Din road are trying to reach the al Rashid Street less than three kilometers away on the coast.[21] The locations of clashes are consistent with the Israeli-declared evacuation zone north of the HeBesor stream.[22]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian militants clashed with Israeli forces at their usual rate in the West Bank on October 31. CTP-ISW recorded ten small arms clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces.[23] Palestinian militants also conducted three IED attacks on Israeli forces.[24] The al Quds Brigades and the Tulkarm Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted a combined small arms attack on Israeli forces in Shuweika near Tulkarm, indicating growing coordination between the two groups.[25] This was the first combined attack between the al Quds Brigades and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in the West Bank since October 19.[26]

Students held large, anti-Israel demonstrations across the West Bank on October 31. Students held 14 anti-Israel demonstrations in major cities in the West Bank, including Bethlehem, Jenin, and Tulkarm.[27] These are consistent with the rate of demonstrations that CTP-ISW has observed in the last few weeks.

Senior Hamas leader Daoud Shehab said on October 30 that the al Quds Brigades is “leading the way” in the West Bank.[28] This remark is noteworthy in that it reflects a prominent Hamas official framing PIJ as one of the lead Palestinian militias fighting Israel in the West Bank. The al Quds Brigades has regularly claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in the West Bank since October 7.[29] CTP-ISW has consistently reported on the close coordination between Hamas and PIJ throughout the war.

 This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted nine attacks into Israel as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets. LH claimed four mortar and anti-tank missile attacks on IDF positions in northern Israel on October 31.[30] Unknown militants conducted four anti-tank, rocket, mortar, and small arms attacks into northern Israel as well.[31] Unknown militants also fired two rockets, which the IDF reported did not cross into Israeli territory.[32] The IDF continues to conduct airstrikes and artillery on militants, who are attempting to launch indirect fire from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.[33]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

LH and Iran are creating the expectation in the information environment that LH will escalate against Israel on or around November 3, possibly by increasing the rate of attack or by using more advanced systems. LH has released two dramatic videos in recent days ahead of LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s planned speech on November 3, which creates the expectation of a significant announcement on the Israel-Hamas War.[34] This speech is significant in that it will be Nasrallah’s first public statement on the war. Iranian state media has further amplified the news of the upcoming speech and the dramatic videos, describing them as a “sign of future events.” Iranian state media also compared Nasrallah’s upcoming speech to the one he delivered at the beginning of the 2006 Israel-LH war.[35] Nasrallah’s speech and the two LH videos come as LH is coordinating extensively with Hamas, PIJ, and the IRGC Quds Force in Beirut.[36] The speech and videos also come as the Houthi movement threatened that it will ”continue its strikes with rockets and drones until the Israeli aggression stops” during its statement claiming responsibility for three attacks against Israel since October 18.[37] Iranian state media has framed the Houthis’ statement as a declaration of war against Israel.[38]

It is possible that Nasrallah will make an escalatory statement on November 3, promising retaliation against Israel but refrain from taking any immediate action different from what LH has been already doing along the Israel-Lebanon border. LH and Nasrallah have used a similar pattern of rhetoric previously. For example, Nasrallah said in April 2023 that Israeli actions in early that year “may push the region into a major war.”[39] LH did not conduct any major escalatory moves in the weeks following this statement. An unspecified source “familiar with [LH] thinking” claimed to Reuters on October 26 that LH does not want Lebanon’s destruction or to see Lebanese civilians fleeing from southern Lebanon, where LH maintains prominent influence.[40]

The Houthis launched drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles targeting Israel on October 31.[41] Israel intercepted the drones and missiles using its Arrow anti-ballistic missile system and fighter jets.[42] Users on social media posted an image showing a destroyed Quds-4 cruise missile in Jordan on October 31.[43] The Houthi movement possesses drones, ballistic, and cruise missiles capable of hitting Israel.[44] This marks the third attempted Houthi attack on Israel since the war began.

An unidentified US military official reported that unidentified militants attacked US troops in four separate locations on October 30. CTP-ISW previously reported that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two separate rocket attacks targeting US forces stationed at Ain al Asad airbase and Conoco Mission Support Site on October 30.[45] The following text details the attacks that CTP-ISW has not yet reported.

• Local Syrian and Iraqi social media accounts reported that unidentified militants conducted a rocket attack on US forces stationed at al Omar oil field on October 30.[46] The militants launched between five and 15 rockets at the US position. CTP-ISW has recorded at least five attacks targeting US forces stationed at al Omar oil field since October 18, one of which was claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. Eye of Euphrates claimed that Iranian sleeper cells active in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-held territory have similarly attacked US forces stationed at al Omar oil field in recent days, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[47]
• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a second attack targeting US forces stationed at Ain al Asad airbase on October 30.[48] The group’s statement claimed its forces conducted a drone strike on Ain al Asad airbase and successfully hit their target. Local Iraqi outlet Shafaq reported that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq launched two drones in the attack and that both were downed by the defensive systems at the airbase.[49]

The secretary general of the Iranian-backed Iraqi Badr Organization, Hadi al Ameri, argued that International Coalition forces should leave Iraq in a statement given to local media on October 30.[50] Ameri claimed that there was no longer any justification for International Coalition forces to remain in Iraq to support counter-ISIS operations because Iraqi security forces defeated ISIS at its height in 2015. The United States currently has non-combat troops stationed in Iraq operating in an advisory capacity to support counter-ISIS missions under Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR).[51] Ameri also asserted that International Coalition forces present in Iraq are limiting the growth of Iraqi security institutions.

Ameri argued that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on US forces were a “natural reaction” to US support for Israel. The Badr Organization threatened to attack US forces in the region if the United States intervened in the Israel-Hamas war on October 9.[52] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reported that the United States will “take further necessary measures” to protect US forces stationed in the Middle East if Iranian-backed attacks continue.[53]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian traveled to Qatar for further political coordination with Hamas leadership. Abdollahian met with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Doha on October 31, marking the second time these officials have met there since October 15.[54] Abdollahian warned about the possible expansion of the Israel-Hamas war, stating that members of the Axis of Resistance “do not necessarily wait for political decisions” to act against Israel. Abdollahian also criticized US calls for restraint, claiming that the United States is “practically a party in the war.” These statements are consistent with the ongoing Iranian information operation to frame the United States and Israel as responsible for any further escalation of the war.[55]

Abdollahian also met with other unspecified senior Hamas officials, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman bin Jassim al Thani during his visit to Qatar.[56] Abdollahian last traveled to Qatar on October 14 following his diplomatic tour to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria to coordinate with senior leaders in the Axis of Resistance, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[57] Abdollahian will travel to Turkey after concluding his current visit to Qatar.[58]

27.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com