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Quotes of the Day:
"Any mind that is capable of real sorrow is capable of good."
– Harriet Beecher Stowe
"I believe that unarmed truth and unconditional love will have the final word in reality. This is why right, temporarily defeated, is stronger than evil triumphant."
– Martin Luther King, Jr.
"The thing about black history is that the truth is so much more complex than anything you could make up."
– Henry Louis Gates
1. Trump’s Second Term: Even More Engagement With North Korea Than Before?
2. Rep. Young Kim, Colleagues Honor Korean American Military Hero Col. Young Oak Kim
3. After Appalling Casualties, North Korean Troops Pulled from Front Lines in Kursk
4. North Korean Troops Vanish From Ukraine War’s Front Lines, Officials Say
5. Inside Kim Jong Un's ZOMBIE army
6. Massive rallies in Seoul oppose, urge Yoon's ouster
7. S. Korea's Navy, Marine Corps to take part in Cobra Gold drills in Thailand
8. Yoon's legal team requests recusal of 3 justices from impeachment case |
9. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Mockery and Jeers about Kim Jong-un's Daughter 'Ju-ae' Become Trending: "Some People Can Even Inherit a Country..." Seems to Reflect Dissatisfaction with Overwhelming Disparity
10. Fill the Vacuum: Establish a Sustained Naval Presence in the Yellow Sea (Korean West Sea)
11. Delicate tug of war: Addressing uncertainty of US-North Korea ties, policy ambiguity
12. North Korean Media, People's Artist's Representative Song 'Erasing Unification'
13. 150,000 Koreans in U.S. subject to Trump's deportation order: Report
14. Korea’s birth rates make the first turnaround in nine years
15. A bromance to Trump, but a headache to Kim?
16. Russian ship transporting North Korean weapons captured again at Najin Port
17. Hegseth reaffirms strong alliance with S. Korea during 1st phone talks with Seoul's defense chief
1. Trump’s Second Term: Even More Engagement With North Korea Than Before?
From our friends in the north Korean diaspora.
Since Rick Grennell has already traveled to Venezuela will he soon go to north Korea for POTUS?
I of course defer to the expert knowledge of our Korean friends from the north as their understanding of the regime is much greater than mine. However, I have to point out that these demands mean success for Kim's political warfare strategy and I remain deeply skeptical that we can ever get a deal with Kim that will be fully and completely honored given his stated objectives to dominate the Korean peninsula. I am not sure how th eUS can really maintain leverage after making these desired concessions to Kim, UNLESS it was part of our sophisticated political warfare strategy to solve the "Korea question."
One question I recommend the Trump administration ask as it evaluates all these proposals for a new north Korea policy and strategy: Is losing South Korea to the control of the north and influence of China in the US best interests? How does losing South Korea support the US winning in the Indo-Pacific?
Excerpts:
What Would Kim Jong Un Seek?
For Kim, the primary objective of any summit would be ensuring the survival and stability of his regime. This goal drives North Korea’s diplomatic strategy and shapes its demands in negotiations. Kim would likely push for sanctions relief tied to denuclearization commitments, particularly on coal, minerals, textiles, and labor exports.
Kim may also seek recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state, using arms reduction talks to secure international legitimacy. He could demand guarantees against military threats, a reduction in U.S.-South Korean military cooperation, and even phased U.S. troop withdrawals. Additionally, establishing formal diplomatic relations with the United States, such as opening a liaison office in Pyongyang, could be a priority for Kim to mitigate international isolation.
Trump’s Second Term: Even More Engagement With North Korea Than Before?
January 31, 2025
By: Ri Jong Ho, and Hyun Seung Lee
The National Interest · · January 31, 2025
Topic: Security
Blog Brand: Korea Watch
Region: Asia
Tags: Diplomacy, Engagement, North Korea, Trump, USS Pueblo, and Yongbyon
January 31, 2025
By: Ri Jong Ho, and Hyun Seung Lee
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Two North Koreans who once operated in the heart of its regime, bring firsthand insight into the Kim family’s rule and the dynamics of U.S.-North Korea diplomacy.
In a recent Fox News interview, President Donald Trump revealed his intention to reach out to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un again as he did in his first term in office. Could this signal another Trump-Kim summit?
During his presidency, Trump often touted his “friendship” with Kim as a cornerstone of his diplomatic strategy. Now, back in the Oval Office, Trump appears confident that Kim would welcome renewed engagement.
If such a summit materializes, what tangible outcomes could Trump, known for his “America First” agenda, realistically secure from Kim? The success of any future summit will depend on Trump’s ability to extract meaningful concessions from North Korea. Despite skepticism surrounding past negotiations, there are three key areas where progress could be made:
I) The return of the USS Pueblo
II) The dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility
III) The economic cooperation at the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone.
The USS Pueblo: A Symbolic Victory
One of the most symbolic opportunities for Trump would be reclaiming the USS Pueblo, a U.S. Navy ship seized by North Korea in international waters in 1968. The Pueblo has long been a point of contention, serving as a trophy of anti-American propaganda in Pyongyang. Its return would signify a major political and diplomatic victory. Trump, a president who thrives on grand gestures, could capitalize on such a move to solidify his image as a dealmaker.
The return of the Pueblo would also carry broader implications. For North Korea, surrendering such a high-profile asset would demonstrate a commitment to mending relations with the United States. While the gesture would be largely symbolic, its repatriation would resonate deeply with the American public and serve as a tangible marker of progress.
Yongbyon: The Linchpin of Denuclearization
Another potential achievement could be the irreversible dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. This site, central to North Korea’s nuclear program, was a key topic during the 2019 Hanoi Summit. While Yongbyon is an aging facility, its complete decommissioning would be the most significant denuclearization milestone since the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. Such a step could set the stage for further inspections of additional nuclear sites.
For Trump, securing the dismantlement of Yongbyon would reinforce his narrative as a leader capable of achieving what his predecessors could not. While some critics might argue that Yongbyon’s closure is insufficient given North Korea’s broader nuclear capabilities, its dismantlement would still mark a meaningful step and provide momentum for future negotiations.
Economic Cooperation: The Wonsan-Kalma Proposal
One of the most ambitious opportunities lies in the realm of economic cooperation. Trump could propose that the U.S. corporations invest in North Korea’s Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone. As one of Kim Jong Un’s most precious initiatives, the Tourist Zone has been touted as a symbol of North Korea’s economic aspirations and a well-known vacation spot for North Koreans, and soon enough, Russians. Linking U.S. investment to the development of this site could encourage North Korea to embrace reforms.
Such a proposal would signal a willingness to pair denuclearization with tangible economic incentives. For Kim, this deal could represent an opportunity to showcase progress domestically while securing a lifeline for North Korea’s struggling economy. For Trump, it would underscore his unconventional approach to foreign policy.
Would Kim Jong Un Accept Trump’s Proposal?
Predicting Kim Jong Un’s response requires understanding his psychological makeup and the internal dynamics of the North Korean regime. While Kim is an isolated dictator, he is acutely aware of the importance of projecting strength and legitimacy. Trump’s direct offer to reach out likely appeals to Kim’s ego, as a summit with the leader of the world’s most powerful nation bolsters his image as a global statesman.
Kim has previously used summits with Trump to strengthen his authority and secure political concessions, such as the suspension of U.S.-South Korean military exercises. Additionally, Trump’s interest in the Wonsan-Kalma project suggests that informal signals may already be exchanged. By engaging with Trump, Kim can pursue economic relief, gain concessions, and further stabilize his regime.
What Would Kim Jong Un Seek?
For Kim, the primary objective of any summit would be ensuring the survival and stability of his regime. This goal drives North Korea’s diplomatic strategy and shapes its demands in negotiations. Kim would likely push for sanctions relief tied to denuclearization commitments, particularly on coal, minerals, textiles, and labor exports.
Kim may also seek recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state, using arms reduction talks to secure international legitimacy. He could demand guarantees against military threats, a reduction in U.S.-South Korean military cooperation, and even phased U.S. troop withdrawals. Additionally, establishing formal diplomatic relations with the United States, such as opening a liaison office in Pyongyang, could be a priority for Kim to mitigate international isolation.
A Calculated Gamble
The success of a Trump-Kim summit will hinge on whether Trump can translate his rapport with Kim into concrete results. Securing the USS Pueblo, dismantling Yongbyon, and fostering economic cooperation in Wonsan would mark significant wins and bolster Trump’s legacy as a bold dealmaker.
However, the true test of Trump’s “friendship” with Kim lies in balancing North Korea’s demands with maintaining U.S. leverage. The stakes are high, but a successful summit could redefine U.S.-North Korea relations and strengthen Trump’s reputation as a leader willing to take calculated risks for peace and progress.
Ri Jong Ho is a former senior North Korean economic official who served under all three leaders of the Kim family regime, holding positions such as Executive Director of the Daehung General Bureau of the Korean Workers’ Party and Chairman of the Korea Kumgang Economic Development Group under the Defense Committee. A recipient of the prestigious Hero of Labor Award, he defected to South Korea with his family in 2014 and now resides in the Washington, D.C., area.
Hyun Seung Lee is a North Korean escapee and lead strategist at the Global Peace Foundation, with prior experience in North Korea’s shipping and mining sectors and as a sergeant in the DPRK Army Special Force. He defected in 2014 due to severe governmental purges, and he holds a Bachelor’s in Economics from Dongbei University of Finance and Economics and a Master’s in Public Administration from Columbia University.
Image Credit: Shutterstock.
The National Interest · by Lake Dodson · January 31, 2025
2. Rep. Young Kim, Colleagues Honor Korean American Military Hero Col. Young Oak Kim
From the text of the bill that can be read here: https://strickland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/STRIWA_002_xml.pdf
We need all Americans to think and act like Colonel Kim.
(5) When Kim reported to duty, his commanding officer gave Kim the option to transfer due to the historical conflicts between the Japanese and Koreans, but Kim stated, ‘‘Sir, they’re Americans and I am an American. And we’re going to fight for America.’’.
Rep. Young Kim, Colleagues Honor Korean American Military Hero Col. Young Oak Kim - Congresswoman Young Kim
youngkim.house.gov · January 29, 2025
Jan 29, 2025 | Press Releases
Washington, DC – Today, U.S. Representatives Young Kim (CA-40), Marilyn Strickland (WA-10), and Dave Min (CA-47) introduced a bipartisan bill to award the Congressional Gold Medal to Colonel Young Oak Kim for his extraordinary heroism, leadership, and humanitarianism.
“Colonel Young Oak Kim was a dedicated military hero, from helping liberate Rome from Nazi control during WWII to commanding a U.S. Army battalion during the Korean War. Even after his time in the military, he devoted his life to service, and I feel so blessed to have called him a good friend and mentor,” said Congresswoman Young Oak Kim. “I am humbled to use my voice to honor him, just as he told me to honor our shared name, country, and duty to public service. I am glad that all Korean American members of Congress could come together to work to award him this belated and well-deserved Congressional Gold Medal.”
“As the three Korean Americans in the U.S. House of Representatives, we have come together to recognize the exemplary legacy of Colonel Young Oak Kim. He is more than deserving of this high honor as a military hero during both World War II and the Korean War, and as a steadfast community leader and humanitarian,” said Congresswoman Strickland.
“Colonel Young Oak Kim was a hero and trailblazer who should have received the Congressional Gold Medal decades ago. Despite the discrimination he faced, he courageously fought for the U.S. Army — becoming the first officer of color to lead an Army battalion in battle. His sacrifices paved the way for the next generation of Korean Americans to serve their country. Colonel Kim’s story deserves to be told everywhere, and I am hopeful he will soon receive this long overdue recognition,” said Congressman Min.
Read the text of the bill here.
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3. After Appalling Casualties, North Korean Troops Pulled from Front Lines in Kursk
Now I am getting concerned. As I have mentioned many times, training is more important than combat experience. If the nKPA cannot turn combat experience into a training program for nKPA combat forces in north Korea then Putin's War will not have a significant impact on war on the Korean peninsula. But these reports could indicate the withdrawal from the front lines (if they are accurate) not only to lick their wounds, but to learn from their experience and develop a training program before they return to combat. As I have mentioned before, the best militaries continue to train even during wartime and when they are pulled from front line combat. They must train to ensure they develop and maintain their effective combat skills. Combat experience does not equal effective combat training. Combat experience is no substitute for sustained training. But this could be the beginning of developing a training program that could significantly enhance nKPA forces.
I am still skeptical that they will be able to transfer these lessons to a nKPA wide combat training program because of the limited resources in north Korea to dedicate to training but this indicates a learning organization. If military professionals can convince Kim to provide the resources for training in the north it will allow the nKPA to up their game for an attack on the South.
After Appalling Casualties, North Korean Troops Pulled from Front Lines in Kursk
January 31, 2025
By: Stavros Atlamazoglou
The National Interest · February 1, 2025
Topic: Military
Blog Brand: The Buzz
Region: Europe
Tags: Casualties, Kursk, North Korea, Russia, Ukraine, and Ukraine War
January 31, 2025
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Although the North Korean troops were highlighted as a decisive escalation in the conflict, their performance appears to have fallen well short of expectations.
The North Korean contingent that deployed to Russia to fight for Russian President Vladimir Putin has been taken off the line of contact after suffering high losses.
According to the Ukrainian military, the North Korean soldiers have no longer been observed fighting on the frontlines—days after Western estimates suggested that they had lost nearly half their combat capability after weeks of fighting with the Ukrainian military.
Where Are the North Koreans Now?
Ukrainian officials speculated that the North Korean troops that were fighting for the Kremlin had been pulled off the line after suffering heavy losses.
“The presence of DPRK troops has not been observed for about three weeks, and they were probably forced to withdraw,” a spokesperson for the Ukrainian military’s Special Operations Forces, Colonel Oleksandr Kindratenko, told CNN. Kindratenko did not speculate about where Pyongyang’s troops had gone, or what role they would play in the war’s future.
The Russian military leadership used the North Korean troops on the Kursk front. But their contribution was not enough to dislodge the Ukrainian forces and wipe out the salient in place since August.
“We are still in the Kursk region, the Russian forces were not enough to push us out,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last week during a speech in Davos, Switzerland. Zelensky added that the Russian forces in Kursk Oblast totaled approximately 60,000 Russian troops, in addition to the North Korean contingent.
Ukrainian troops fighting against the North Koreans have acknowledged their determination—but have also highlighted severe shortcomings in their training, which apparently is based on an older version of warfighting. The North Koreans have suffered particularly from Ukrainian drones and artillery.
North Korean Troops Changed the War
In the fall of 2024, the Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence services first revealed that North Korea had sent approximately 11,000 troops to Russia to support the Russian military. At the time, this revelation was seen as one of the most serious escalations in the Ukraine conflict. Though third parties had been supporting the two combatants—the United States and NATO sending arms to Ukraine, and Iran and North Korea sending them to Russia—this was the first time a third country actually sent their own troops to fight.
The escalation was so severe that the United States and NATO finally gave Kyiv the green light to use advanced long-range munitions against targets of military interest inside Russia. Even then, the Ukrainians were instructed to use the Western munitions only inside Kursk Oblast and elsewhere immediately adjacent to the line of contact.
And although the North Korean troops were highlighted as a decisive escalation in the conflict, their performance appears to have fallen well short of expectations. A combination of poor communication, bad leadership, and 1950s-era tactics saw them suffer catastrophic losses with little to show for it. According to a recent Ukrainian Ministry of Defense assessment, the North Korean troops lost more than 4,000 men in just a few weeks of fighting—or nearly 40 percent of the initial combat capability.
Extremely heavy casualties are a daily reality for the Russian forces fighting in Ukraine and Kursk. Russian leader Vladimir Putin is pursuing an attritional strategy that assumes high losses for his own forces. Each day, Ukrainian and American estimates suggest that Russian forces lose around 1,500 troops killed or wounded—with one estimate suggesting that they had lost as many as 2,200 troops in a single 24-hour period. Yet the attritional strategy hurts Ukraine, too—and as Russia’s population is three times greater than Ukraine’s, it appears that Putin can pursue such a strategy indefinitely.
About the Author: Stavros Atlamazoglou
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.
Image: Wikimedia Commons.
The National Interest · by Trevor Filseth · February 1, 2025
4. North Korean Troops Vanish From Ukraine War’s Front Lines, Officials Say
North Korean Troops Vanish From Ukraine War’s Front Lines, Officials Say
By Mike Eckel
(RFE/RL) — For months now, thousands of North Korean soldiers have been storming trenches, dodging artillery fire, fighting alongside Russian troops trying to dislodge Ukrainian forces from Russian territory.
When they first appeared last fall, the North Korean deployment worried Western officials, who feared they would pummel Ukrainian troops, already-beleaguered elsewhere the 1,100-kilometer front line, and force a retreat.
That didn’t happen. And now, North Korean troops are reportedly being pulled back from the front lines. The reason, according to a New York Times report on January 31, appears to be high casualties.
Ukraine authorities had mixed assessments of the Times report: One military intelligence official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told Current Time that North Korean troops indeed had been rotated out, due to “big losses” but characterized their movement as “standard operations.”
Ukraine’s special operation command, however, told RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service that North Korean troops had not been observed in areas where special forces were fighting for approximately three weeks: “Likely having suffered significant losses, they were forced to retreat.”
If a North Korean withdrawal, or even a major retreat, is confirmed, it would be a potentially embarrassing setback for Russian commanders — not to mention a blow to the notion that the North Korean troops would be able to make a decisive battlefield difference.
Here’s what we know so far.
From Pyongyang To Kursk
After weeks of Ukrainian warnings, bolstered by satellite images and other open-source intelligence, North Korean troops started appearing in Russian regions bordering Ukraine in mid-October. More than 11,000 in all, officials said at the time.
At the time, it wasn’t fully clear why Russian officials had turned to Pyongyang for help; some experts suggested President Vladimir Putin was trying to avoid calling a new mobilization, or sending conscripts into battle — something that would spark opposition inside Russia.
“This is an indication that he may be in even more trouble than most people realize,” then-U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in October, referring to Putin. “He went tin-cupping early on to get additional weapons and materials from” North Korea.
Ukrainian officials predicted they would end up in Kursk, a border region where Ukraine had surprised Russia with an invasion two months prior.
Have They Made A Difference On The Battlefield?
When Ukraine punched across the border in August 2024, its forces — some of which included Kyiv’s most experienced, battle-hardened units — quickly seized a sizable amount of territory in Kursk: about 1,300 square kilometers at its maximum.
It was the biggest invasion of Russian territory by a foreign military since World War II.
Russia’s defense was initially shambolic, and disorganized– which prompted surprise and outrage, particularly among local residents. But commanders redeployed units, slowly pushing Ukrainian troops back. North Korean soldiers deployed in October; Ukrainian officials reported first clashes with them in early November.
Russia and North Korea’s combined forces to date have retaken a little more than half the territory Ukrainian forces had seized in Kursk.
Days after the New Year, Ukrainian commanders ordered a new offensive in the Kursk region, to roll back North Korean gains.
The reasoning again was unclear, though some experts said it might have been to gain territory and jockey for position ahead of possible peace negotiations that U.S. President Donald Trump is pushing for.
“They operate according to Soviet tactics, they operate in platoons, companies. They take advantage of their mass presence,” Ukraine’s top military officer, General Oleksandr Syrskiy, said in an interview last month. “They are quite brave; of course, this is a problem.”
So How Bad Are North Korean Casualties?
Ukrainian officials claim to have inflicted substantial casualties on North Korean troops; President Volodymyr Zelenskiy put the number at more than 3,000 in late December.
Military intelligence has released images of items captured from North Korea troops — books, pamphlets, even cell phones — though little of their contents has been shared publicly.
In his interview, Syrskiy estimated about half of the 11,000-12,000 deployed troops had been killed or wounded.
But Ukrainian estimates have been impossible to verify.
Days before Zelenskiy gave his estimate, South Korea’s main intelligence service said around 1,100 North Koreans had been killed or wounded. The White House gave a comparable estimate on December 27: “more than 1,000 killed or wounded in this particular fighting in just the past week.”
Pulling North Korean troops back from front-line fighting could be a sign of how effective Ukrainian attacks have been, particularly if they’re prioritizing targeting Pyongyang’s soldiers.
But troop rotations are also normal in any battlefield: Exhausted soldiers need rest; units with high casualties need to be replenished or reorganized; ammunition and shells need to be stockpiled.
- Mike Eckel is a senior international correspondent reporting on political and economic developments in Russia, Ukraine, and around the former Soviet Union, as well as news involving cybercrime and espionage. He’s reported on the ground on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the wars in Chechnya and Georgia, and the 2004 Beslan hostage crisis, as well as the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
5. Inside Kim Jong Un's ZOMBIE army
You do have to appreciate the sensational rhetoric of the Daily Mail.
Photos at the link: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14348537/Kim-Jong-Uns-ZOMBIE-army-Ukrainians-admit-theyre-crack-shots-no-fear-North-Korean-troops-sacrifice-bait-drones-march-minefields-scream-leaders-no-wonder-thousands-dead-maimed.html?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=other
Inside Kim Jong Un's ZOMBIE army
Kim Jong Un's ZOMBIE army: Even Ukrainians admit they're crack shots who show no fear. But as North Korean troops sacrifice themselves as bait for drones, march into minefields and scream their leader's name, no wonder thousands are already dead or maimed
By PATRICK BISHOP FOR THE DAILY MAIL
Published: 19:03 EST, 31 January 2025 | Updated: 02:42 EST, 1 February 2025
Daily Mail · by Patrick Bishop · February 1, 2025
There is a grim joke doing the rounds on the Ukrainian front lines. 'Koreans like to eat dogs. Now the dogs are eating the Koreans.'
Battlefield canine scavengers have reportedly added the bloodied corpses of Kim Jong Un's North Korean footsoldiers to their regular diet of dead Russians.
True or not, it is a reflection of the disastrous performance of Kim's 11,000 or so supposedly elite forces since they arrived to bolster Russian forces in the Kursk area last October.
Up to now, they have suffered around 4,000 casualties, including 1,000 fatalities. Inadequately trained and led by Russian officers whose language they don't understand and who care even less for their allies' lives than they do for those of their own men, they have been easy prey for the Ukrainians' guns and drones.
Reports this week that some units are being temporarily withdrawn from one sector of the Kursk front for 'retraining' should come as no surprise.
For their suicidal ineptitude and apparent willingness to die has shocked even Ukrainian soldiers, well used to the meat-grinder tactics employed by the Russians who think nothing of hurling wave after wave of men into futile attacks, confident that in the end, sheer weight of numbers will prevail.
This latest element in this saga of slaughter is another reminder of what is at stake in a conflict, the scale and savagery of which no one could have predicted even five years ago.
On the one hand is a Russia whose leaders disdain notions of progress and who have fought with an appalling disregard for life that would have gladdened Joseph Stalin's black heart.
This grim aerial shot taken in Kursk is believed to show the corpses of North Korean troops
Pyongyang troops are seen in a video on a training exercise in Russia
Pictured: A North Korean soldier aims at a drone before he is killed
On the other is a proud new nation – for sure not without its faults and problems – but fighting doggedly on against the odds to secure a future based on values of freedom and decency.
Even after nearly three years of war, the story of the North Koreans still has the power to shock. The deployment of around 11,000 men, allegedly the cream of the Democratic People's Republic Of Korea [DPRK] army was a present from Kim to Putin to cement the warm new relationship between the two pariah states.
However the Kremlin was at pains to keep their arrival secret, probably fearing it would be seen as a sign to the world that they were running out of cannon
fodder. The DPRK troops were issued with fake Russian military IDs showing they came from republics in the far east of the country, which would explain their ethnic appearance.
The newcomers were supposed to help Moscow drive Ukrainian forces out of the territory they captured inside Russia's Kursk region in a surprise cross-border offensive six months ago.
But they soon came up against the terrifying lethality of 21st century warfare à la Ukraine and in particular the challenge posed by perhaps the biggest threat on the battlefield – the ubiquitous drones in all their deadly forms.
A chilling video taken from a surveillance drone issued by the Ukrainian military shows the stark reality.
It was recorded not in Kursk but on the Ukrainian border north east of Kharkiv where some North Koreans were apparently sent to reinforce Russian units suffering manpower shortages.
A dazed and helpless young Korean soldier crouches in a ditch. He looks up fearfully as he registers the presence of a grenade-carrying First-Person-View [FPV] drone.
He tries to cock his rifle then gives up and flattens himself on the ground. Next he is obliterated in a cloud of smoke and flame.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un speaks during a meeting of the country's ruling party, in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this photo released on December 29, 2024
The first North Korean prisoner of war was captured by the Ukrainian armed forces, South Korea's National Intelligence Service confirmed on 27 December 2024
North Korean soldiers march during a mass military parade in Pyongyang's Kim Il Sung Square to celebrate 100 years since the birth of North Korean founder, Kim Il Sung on April 15, 2012
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About 1,000 'elite' North Korean troops have been slaughtered in just three months fighting Ukraine
The victim was one of a ten-man squad, led by a Russian and accompanied by a translator. 'After the fight, which lasted about two hours, we saw four bodies lying face down on the ground,' said a Ukrainian officer who uses the call sign 'Kruzak'. The attackers withdrew, leaving their wounded behind – common practice in the Russian way of war – including the soldier in the video.
'He was hit with shrapnel and they left him,' said Kruzak. 'I think he was around 18 or 20 years old. Our drone flew over, to keep an eye on him. We didn't see any radio equipment on him, he probably lost it… he gave out a cry, probably 'help me', but nobody was around. It looks like he was trying to reload his rifle, but it was jammed. Maybe he wanted to kill himself, or maybe he wanted to try to hit the drone flying near him.
'I saw a lot of situations before when Russians made the same decision – suicide is a popular choice on the front when somebody on their side has a serious injury. Some refuse to give up, but most of them just try to die as quickly as possible. Then, one of our FPV drones made the last shot and killed him.' This gruesome episode is consistent with many other reports suggesting the North Koreans were ill-prepared for the hell they were stepping into. North Korea has an estimated 1.2 million citizens in uniform and national service is mandatory from the age of 17. But its troops have not been in battle since the Korean War which ended in 1953 and tactics are hopelessly out of date.
The military has clearly taken little account of the advent of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles [UAVs], the big new game-changer in modern warfare. Their way of dealing with them was revealed in handwritten instructions found by Ukrainian intelligence on a dead Korean and shared with Western media. They were labelled 'how to destroy drones' and suggested using one of their own soldiers as bait.
'When a drone is spotted… at a distance of about 10-12 metres, one out of three people should unconditionally lure it, and the other two should take aim and shoot,' it read.
Ukrainian troops recovered diaries and fake passports on slain North Korean troops
Purportedly the moment a North Korean soldier slips over in front of a Ukrainian drone
North Korean soldiers' faces revealed by drone cameras as they fight for Putin in the Kursk region on the border with Ukraine
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3,000 North Korean soldiers have been killed or wounded fighting for Putin, Zelensky says
It also proposed that troops should seek cover in shell holes 'since shells will not fall again in the same crater' – apparently oblivious to the fact that UAVs can spot any human or vehicle that is not under cover.
Orders found on other corpses make it clear that troops were expected to die rather than surrender. In one video in circulation, a Ukrainian soldier approaches a wounded North Korean face down on the ground, and tugs his leg to check if he is alive. The wounded man screams something in Korean, then explodes a hand grenade under his chin.
After analysing the video, South Korean intelligence reported that the soldier's last words were 'General Kim Jong Un!'
Papers found on the dead suggest that Pyongyang's mass brainwashing techniques have done a thorough job. One document reads: 'The hammer of death to the unknown and the puppet trash is not far off. We wield the powerful force that makes them tremble in fear.'
There are numerous declarations of loyalty to the Supreme Leader with one soldier writing that he would 'carry out the supreme commander's orders without hesitation'. Another vows: 'I will demonstrate unparalleled bravery to its fullest. World, watch closely.' Genuine sentiments or an insurance policy to protect families back home? We will never know.
But there is no doubting their fighting spirit and disregard of danger. So far only three North Koreans have been captured. All were wounded and one has subsequently died.
There have been accounts of infantrymen plodding nervelessly through Ukrainian minefields. In the judgment of Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine's Defence Intelligence Directorate, 'they are like biological robots'. Ukrainian soldiers have also reported cases of North Koreans removing their helmets and the heavy ceramic chest plates from their body armour in order to reduce weight and allow them to run at enemy positions.
Some Ukrainians have expressed grudging admiration for the Koreans' fanatical discipline and warned that they should not be underestimated.
Dramatic video showed the moment Ukraine assaulted North Koreans with drones in Kursk
Read More
Ukraine parades its 'first North Korean POW fighting for Putin in war'
'They are extremely resilient, extremely well-trained, and morally stable,' said Yuriy Bondar of the Galician Lions brigade, one of the first units to engage with them in the Kursk region, writing on Facebook. One thing they have learned in training is how to shoot. 'Their level of small arms proficiency is extremely high,' he said. 'The number of drones that the enemy managed to shoot down just using small arms is seriously surprising.'
But according to 'Kruzak', they 'don't look like heroes. They look like a group of crazy guys who don't have any experience on how to operate in war or how to move on the front line'.
The sight of the zombie-like arrivals from Kim's Hermit Kingdom marching to their deaths has at times moved him to something like pity.
'I feel sad about these people,' he said. 'Their life has been filled with propaganda. They live their life in jail. All information about the rest of the world is blocked on their internet and social media.'
Unconfirmed reports suggest North Korean troops have availed themselves of the unfettered access to the internet offered in Ukraine, and turned eagerly to pornography websites.
Whatever the case, they are hardly in an enviable position.
'They don't really know the situation, or anything about what's happening in Ukraine, said 'Kruzak'. 'In any case, they don't have any real choice. If Kim Jong Un sends them to join the Russian army, then they don't have much say in the matter. But in the end, we have to kill them. They have come here to try and kill us. They're not on a friendly visit.'
Putin has tried to present Russia's warm relationship with North Korea, celebrated in his lavish state visit to Pyongyang last summer, as part of an ambitious project to forge a new global axis involving North Korea, Iran and China that will create a new world order and weaken the West.
But his love-in with Kim looks more like a sign of weakness and desperation. Moscow relies on the millions of artillery shells it receives from North Korea to maintain the tempo of its offensive in eastern Ukraine. Pyongyang has also sent dozens of KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles as well as heavy guns, and more are on their way along with support units.
In return, the DPRK receives hard currency and illegal oil shipments which the regime desperately needs to stay afloat.
It is a grubby arrangement of necessity that signals Putin is running out of options as he carries his country into a fourth year of pointless conflict.
For Kim Jong Un the deal has many attractions. His gift of troops gives an opportunity for them to experience 21st century battle – no matter what the cost may be in lives. And the cash and energy flow from Moscow provides life support that will make him less vulnerable to pressure from the United States to force him to abandon his cherished nuclear weapons programme.
South Korean intelligence sources claimed recently that Pyongyang was planning to send even more troops to Russia and reports from the US say that they could be on the battlefield within as little as two months.
It seems that there will be plenty of pickings for the dogs of No Man's Land before winter is out.
Additional reporting: Boldizsar Gyori.
-Patrick Bishop presents the weekly Battleground Ukraine podcast with Saul David.
Daily Mail · by Patrick Bishop · February 1, 2025
6. Massive rallies in Seoul oppose, urge Yoon's ouster
The back of the envelope math seems to be starting to favor President Yoon.
Massive rallies in Seoul oppose, urge Yoon's ouster | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 1, 2025
SEOUL, Feb. 1 (Yonhap) -- Crowds of protesters gathered in central Seoul on Saturday in massive rallies, either opposing the ouster of impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol or urging his removal from office, following his recent indictment under physical detention.
An estimated 3 million people, according to organizers, thronged Seoul's central Gwanghwamun area, waving the Taegeukgi and the Stars and Stripes and calling for Yoon's release in a rally opposing his impeachment.
Last Sunday, prosecutors indicted Yoon with physical detention on insurrection charges over his short-lived declaration of martial law on Dec. 3. The following week, the National Assembly voted to impeach Yoon, prompting a Constitutional Court trial to decide whether to reinstate or permanently remove him from office.
"Yoon Suk Yeol will be made to come back if 10 million people gather on March 1. (We) can change everything, whether it's the Constitution or anything else," said conservative activist pastor Jeon Kwang-hoon, who spearheaded the rally, referring to a mass gathering he is planning on that date.
The police's unofficial estimate of the participants was 38,000.
Similar rallies in support of Yoon were also held near the National Assembly in Seoul's western Yeouido district and in front of the Seoul Central District Court in southern Seoul.
Waving the Taegeukgi and the Stars and Stripes, protesters chant slogans supporting impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol in a rally in Seoul's central Gwanghwamun area on Feb. 1, 2025. (Yonhap)
Also in Gwanghwamun, a separate rally urged a Constitutional Court ruling to oust Yoon, with 100,000 participants according to organizers. The police estimated the number at 6,000.
Participants called for the "immediate removal" of Yoon, while also criticizing acting President Choi Sang-mok for vetoing a parliamentary bill calling for a special counsel investigation into Yoon over the martial law declaration.
"Let us completely end, with the power of the people, the insurrection scheme by the anti-Constitution forces, including Yoon Suk Yeol and the (ruling) People Power Party," said Kim Min Moon-jung, who spearheaded the rally against Yoon.
Some 240 traffic police personnel were mobilized in Seoul as the mass rallies caused traffic congestion and other inconveniences.
Participants hold a rally calling for the immediate ouster of impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol in central Seoul on Feb. 1, 2025. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · February 1, 2025
7. S. Korea's Navy, Marine Corps to take part in Cobra Gold drills in Thailand
S. Korea's Navy, Marine Corps to take part in Cobra Gold drills in Thailand | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 1, 2025
SEOUL, Feb. 1 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Navy and Marine Corps will participate in an annual multinational exercise set to kick off in Thailand later this month, military officials said Saturday.
The Navy's 4,900-ton Nojeokbong landing ship carrying some 370 personnel departed for Thailand earlier in the day to join the Cobra Gold exercise, slated to take place in 11 regions in the country from Feb. 25 to March 7.
For the exercise led by the Thai and U.S. armed forces, the South Korean military plans to mobilize six assault amphibious vehicles, two K55 self-propelled howitzers and a K77 fire direction center vehicle.
The troops will take part in an array of field exercises, including amphibious landing drills with Thai, U.S. and Singapore troops, and joint naval operations.
The South Korean Marine Corps will also participate in the Cross Dock drills for the first time, during which Korean assault amphibious vehicles will be deployed to Singapore's amphibious transport dock.
The Cobra Gold drills will also include special operation drills, humanitarian civil assistance activities and cyber defense training.
Launched in 1982, the annual Cobra Gold exercise focuses on training multinational forces for a range of procedures aimed at stabilizing a region embroiled in a virtual armed conflict.
South Korea has formally taken part in the exercise since 2010 after attending it as an observer from 2002 to 2009.
This photo, provided by South Korea's Navy on Feb. 1, 2025, shows an assault amphibious vehicle being transported to the 4,900-ton Nojeokbong landing ship. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 1, 2025
8. Yoon's legal team requests recusal of 3 justices from impeachment case |
Will President Yoon get a fair hearing at the court?
Yoon's legal team requests recusal of 3 justices from impeachment case | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · February 1, 2025
SEOUL, Feb. 1 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol's legal team in his impeachment case said Saturday it has submitted a formal request to the Constitutional Court, urging three justices to recuse themselves, citing concerns over impartiality.
Yoon's team said it made a request Friday for the recusals of Justice Moon Hyung-bae, Justice Lee Mi-seon and Justice Chung Gye-seon over concerns of potential political bias.
The team pointed to Moon, the acting chief justice, of having engaged in social media interaction with Lee Jae-myung, head of the main opposition Democratic Party, in the past, raising suspicion of political impartiality.
Yoon's lawyers also raised concerns over Lee, noting that her brother is a vice chairman of a committee at the Lawyers for a Democratic Society and demanding the president's resignation.
For Chung, Yoon's team raised concerns that her husband, a lawyer, signed a public declaration calling for Yoon's impeachment.
The team argued the inclinations of the justices have already influenced the court's handling of the case.
Many legal watchers believe the Constitutional Court is unlikely to grant the request, as it has recently expressed concern over accusations targeting the court's judicial independence.
President Yoon Suk Yeol attends the fourth hearing of his impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court in Seoul, in this file photo taken Jan. 23, 2025, over his short-lived imposition of martial law in December. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · February 1, 2025
9. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Mockery and Jeers about Kim Jong-un's Daughter 'Ju-ae' Become Trending: "Some People Can Even Inherit a Country..." Seems to Reflect Dissatisfaction with Overwhelming Disparity
Indicators of potential resistance and instability?
The only thing Kim fears more than the ROK/US combined military is the Korean people in the north – especially when they are armed with information.
＜Inside N. Korea＞ Mockery and Jeers about Kim Jong-un's Daughter 'Ju-ae' Become Trending: "Some People Can Even Inherit a Country..." Seems to Reflect Dissatisfaction with Overwhelming Disparity
asiapress.org
1. Kim Jong-un and his daughter visit the 1st Air Force Division of the Korean People's Army in a flashy coat and sunglasses. Introduced as "with beloved daughter." Korean Central News Agency, December 1, 2023.
Kim Jong-un's daughter, whom South Korean authorities speculate is named 'Ju-ae', continues to appear in state media wearing luxurious attire. It has been reported that among North Korean middle and high school students, expressions mocking the daughter have become popular as they recognize the extreme disparity between their lives and hers. (By KANG Ji-won / HONG Mari)
◆ Leather Coat and Sheer Fabric... Appears in Luxurious Attire
Kim Jong-un's daughter first appeared in public in November 2022, wearing red shoes while holding her father's hand at a missile launch site. Since then, images of the young girl participating in official events have occasionally been reported in state media. She has been introduced with honorific titles such as "respected beloved child." Recently, on January 1, several photos were released showing her attending a New Year's celebration performance in Pyongyang, holding hands tightly with Kim Jong-un.
The South Korean government estimates that this daughter was born in 2013. She appears with a round face, sophisticated adult-like hairstyle that is always neatly styled, and luxurious clothing including leather coats and sheer fabric materials.
While the regime's method of exposure is clearly meant to put the daughter in the spotlight, it seems to be having unintended consequences in North Korean society. Among ordinary children, expressions of lamentation, mockery, and jeers about the enormous gap between their lives and Kim Jong-un's daughter's life have become popular.
◆ "Some People Can Inherit a Country Just Because They Have Good Parents"
Reporting partner A, who lives in the northern region of North Korea, shares:
"The phrase 'Some people can inherit even a country because they have good parents' has spread like a trend among children, referring to the daughter. When schools ask for various monetary contributions, parents can hardly afford it due to difficult living conditions. That's when they say this. As broadcasts frequently show someone eating well, dressing well, and receiving abundant parental love, children disparage their own circumstances and resent their parents, but even getting caught saying these things could cause problems for their parents."
*Note: While education is supposed to be free in North Korea, in reality, parents must bear a significant portion of educational costs and school expenses.
A continues: "Before the daughter appeared, when peers or friends asked for favors, the joke 'Are you the General?' spread like a catchphrase, but now that the daughter appears, jokes mocking her like 'Do you need something? Just say the word' have become common.
Adults limit themselves to saying things like 'She's lucky to be born to good parents,' but since children are immature, these expressions seem to have spread because they envy the daughter who can have everything she wants."
asiapress.org
10. Fill the Vacuum: Establish a Sustained Naval Presence in the Yellow Sea (Korean West Sea)
Fill the Vacuum: Establish a Sustained Naval Presence in the Yellow Sea
cimsec.org · by Guest Author
Notes to the New Administration Week
By William Martin
The Yellow Sea is a vital maritime lane for trade and security in Northeast Asia. A 2012 CNA study found that “nearly 57 percent of China’s total trade volume and over 70 percent of South Korea’s total trade volume emanates from the Yellow Sea.”1 It is also home to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Northern Theater Command (NTC).
Despite the strategic significance of these waters, for too long the United States has ceded maneuver space in the Yellow Sea to the PLA Navy. In recent years, China has increased its aggressive activity in this vital maritime lane, to the detriment of U.S. interests, the security of allies, and the maintenance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States and its allies must increase force presence along this key maritime terrain to disrupt PLA confidence in freely maneuvering through these waters as they conduct operations counter to U.S. interests.
China has begun installing physical structures in international waters that represent overlapping claims with South Korea, a major U.S. ally.2 This is reminiscent of actions in the South China Sea that allowed China to increase control of sea lanes there in violation of international law. Tensions between China and South Korea have been on the rise for years, including Chinese incursions across the 124th meridian, which has been a maritime control line between the two for decades.3 The PLA NTC routinely exercises with its carrier in the Yellow Sea, and has conducted joint exercises with Russia in the Sea of Japan, further raising tensions in the region.4
Although the U.S. Navy has conducted some recent exercises in the area, they have been restricted to the Korean coast and directed against the DPRK, without reference to PLA aggression.5 The U.S. Navy has long been absent from the broader areas where the PLA NTC is based, including international waters that are critical to U.S. allies and fundamental to regional stability.
Not only does the PLA NTC pose a significant and unaccounted-for threat in any contingency on the Korean Peninsula, those forces are also essential to the PLA’s Taiwan plans.6 The PLA NTC has already been seen performing vital missions during Taiwan scenario exercises, such as securing the Tsushima Strait.7 Moreover, the NTC controls one of the PLA’s two active carriers, several cruisers, scores of 5th generation fighter aircraft, and China’s most powerful destroyer variants.8 All of these assets could easily be sent to reinforce a Taiwan invasion, and the sea lanes they transit would remain largely uncontested. Increasing U.S. and allied presence in these international waters will strongly affect the PRC decision calculus regarding offensive operations against Taiwan.
It is critical for the United States to increase its naval presence in the Yellow Sea to disrupt the PLA’s belief in a near absolute freedom of maneuver through these critical waters. This requirement is not unlike ongoing actions to maintain allied freedom of action in the South China Sea and elsewhere.9 Such presence is fundamental to maintaining “peace through strength” in Northeast Asia.
William Martin is a pseudonym for a senior joint information planner and policy advisor for the Department of Defense. He holds a master of arts degree in history with a focus on East Asia.
The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the United States Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
References
1. Michael A. McDevitt, Catherine K. Lea, Abraham M. Denmark, Ken E. Gause, Bonnie S. Glaser, Richard C. Bush III, and Daniel M. Hartnett, The Long Littoral Project: East China and Yellow Seas, A Maritime Perspective on Indo-Pacific Security (CNA, September 2012).
2. Lee Min-seok, Kim Dong-hyun, and Park Su-hyeon, “Exclusive: Beijing Resumes Disputed Installations in West Sea amid S. Korea’s Turmoil,” The Chosun Ilbo, January 10, 2025, https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/01/10/2VZWCDVB2JEOBKDIM5TOW5S634/.
3. Lee Chul-jae and Park Yong-han, “Beijing Ships Cross the Line Again,” Korea JoongAng Daily, January 26, 2021,
4. Choi Hyun-june and Gil Yun-hyung, “As Theater for Shows of Force, Korea’s East Sea Becomes a New Powder Keg,” The Hankyoreh, November 30, 2024,
5. David Choi, “US, South Korean, Canadian Warships Train in Yellow Sea Ahead of Incheon Anniversary,” Stars and Stripes, September 15, 2023,
6. Ashton H.S. Cho and Yuan-Chou Jing, “Tipping the Balance? China’s PLA Northern Theater Command and the Korean Peninsula,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 36, no.2 (2024), https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART003084667
7. Ki-Yong Kim, “China’s Shandong Performs 5-Day Blitz Exercise Against Taiwan,” Donga Daily, September 18, 2023,
8. Marielle Descalsota, “Take a Look at China’s Biggest Destroyer, a $920 Million Cruiser That’s Said to Be the 2nd Most Powerful in the World After the USS Zumwalt,” Yahoo News, June 21, 2022,
9. Lt. j. g. Rebecca Moore, “Netherlands, US Naval Forces Conduct South China Sea Operations,” US Navy’s Pacific Fleet News, accessed January 21, 2025,
Featured Image: SEA OF JAPAN (Oct 6, 2022) The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), front, the Republic of Korea navy destroyer ROKS Sejong the Great (DDG 991) and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Chokai (DDG 176) transit the Sea of Japan during a trilateral ballistic missile defense exercise. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Gray Gibson)
cimsec.org · by Guest Author
11. Delicate tug of war: Addressing uncertainty of US-North Korea ties, policy ambiguity
In a tug of war both mass and technique are important. Who dominates in each category?
Excerpt:
The current state of U.S.-North Korea relations is fraught with uncertainty. The Trump administration’s mixed signals on denuclearization and its potential shift in security priorities could have profound implications for the future of the Korean Peninsula. In this context, South Korea must adopt a more proactive diplomatic stance, ensuring that its concerns are heard in Washington and that its security is not compromised in the negotiations. With the region on the edge of significant change, it is essential that all parties involved exercise caution, engage in constructive diplomacy and prioritize long-term peace and stability over short-term gains.
Delicate tug of war
The Korea Times · January 30, 2025
Addressing uncertainty of US-North Korea ties, policy ambiguity
The United States and North Korea are once again engaged in a delicate tug of war, each maneuvering to maintain the upper hand as they approach potential negotiations over the North’s nuclear program. At the heart of this struggle is the growing uncertainty surrounding the future of the Korean Peninsula. As the U.S. seeks shifting policies under President Donald Trump, the prospects of a summit between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un loom large. However, the mixed signals coming from Washington raise questions about the future direction of American diplomacy and its implications for regional stability.
A White House official recently emphasized that the Trump administration remains committed to the “complete denuclearization of North Korea.” This statement, made by National Security Council spokesperson Brian Hughes, stands in contrast to some of Trump’s previous comments, which included referring to North Korea as a “nuclear power.” This inconsistency in messaging has led to confusion about whether the U.S. is indeed pushing for complete denuclearization, or if it is shifting its focus toward a more pragmatic approach, such as arms reduction or a nuclear freeze. Trump’s apparent willingness to engage Kim in another summit has only added to the ambiguity, suggesting that diplomacy might be prioritized over punitive measures.
The uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy is not limited to North Korea. The recent foreign ministers’ meeting between the U.S., Japan, Australia and India (the Quad) notably omitted any mention of Pyongyang's denuclearization. This omission could indicate a potential shift in the security priorities of these nations, particularly the U.S. This shift, if it materializes, could focus more on managing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities through arms control agreements rather than pursuing the lofty goal of complete denuclearization.
Such a policy shift could dramatically alter the security dynamics of the Korean Peninsula. If the Trump administration moves toward arms reduction or nuclear freeze talks, it may signal a shift away from the all-or-nothing approach of complete denuclearization. While such an approach may be seen as more realistic, it also carries significant risks, as it could embolden North Korea to continue its nuclear ambitions while offering little in terms of concrete concessions.
At the same time, the U.S. is also questioning its military presence in East Asia. Vice President JD Vance’s comments about reducing the number of U.S. troops stationed overseas, including the 28,500 personnel stationed in South Korea, have stoked fears that the Trump administration may cut back on its military commitments in the region. This would not only reduce America’s ability to deter North Korean aggression and keep China in check but also increase South Korea’s security burden. Such a reduction in U.S. military presence could lead to further instability in a region already grappling with rising tensions and shifting alliances.
North Korea, for its part, is keenly aware of the changing dynamics. Following a long hiatus after Trump’s inauguration, North Korea recently test-fired tactical cruise missiles, signaling its readiness to resume its provocations. Kim Jong-un’s comments following the missile tests emphasized the importance of “war deterrence,” suggesting that North Korea is preparing for future negotiations, but also engaging in a war of nerves. Kim’s rhetoric reflects an ongoing strategy of bolstering North Korea’s position on the global stage while avoiding any immediate concessions to the U.S.
For South Korea, the evolving situation presents a host of challenges. The country is facing political instability at home, with the ongoing impeachment controversy surrounding President Yoon Suk Yeol, which has left the nation’s leadership in flux. This internal instability only complicates South Korea’s ability to respond to the shifting U.S. policies and regional security challenges. South Korea must work to ensure that its interests are not sidelined in the broader context of U.S.-North Korea negotiations. It is critical that Seoul remains actively engaged in shaping the diplomatic narrative and in advocating for policies that prioritize regional stability and security.
The current state of U.S.-North Korea relations is fraught with uncertainty. The Trump administration’s mixed signals on denuclearization and its potential shift in security priorities could have profound implications for the future of the Korean Peninsula. In this context, South Korea must adopt a more proactive diplomatic stance, ensuring that its concerns are heard in Washington and that its security is not compromised in the negotiations. With the region on the edge of significant change, it is essential that all parties involved exercise caution, engage in constructive diplomacy and prioritize long-term peace and stability over short-term gains.
The Korea Times · January 30, 2025
12. North Korean Media, People's Artist's Representative Song 'Erasing Unification'
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
But we should not be misled. While unification is being erased, the goal of domination of the Korean peninsula by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State remains. There is no change to the regime's hostile policy toward the South. There is only a clearer articulation of it if we listen closely and pay attention.
North Korean Media, People's Artist's Representative Song 'Erasing Unification'
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/human_rights_defector/north-korea-abandoned-unification-policy-songs-01312025152727.html
WASHINGTON-Jamin Anderson andersonj@rfa.org
2025.01.31
On January 26, Hwang Jin-young's funeral was held at the Shinmi-ri Patriotic Martyrs' Cemetery.
/ Korean Central News Agency
00:00 /04:14
Anchor : On the 27th , a funeral was held for the famous North Korean composer Hwang Jin-young . When North Korean state-run media reported on him , they did not mention his representative songs related to ' unification ' . There is analysis that this is part of the North Korean authorities' recent policy of ' erasing unification ' and intentionally excluding them from his achievements . Reporter Jamin Anderson reports .
[ Song ] From Baekdu to Hanna ( La ) , we are one people . How much have we parted , how many tears have we shed ? Goodbye, let's meet again , goodbye, let's meet again ...
The song ' Let's Meet Again ' composed by Hwang Jin-young, a People's Artist and Labor Hero and recipient of the Kim Il-sung Award from North Korea .
It is one of North Korea's representative songs, and contains the message, " We are one people, and when unification occurs, let's meet again . "
It was played immediately after former South Korean President Moon Jae-in's speech at the Rungrado Stadium in Pyongyang during the 2018 Inter-Korean Summit , and was also sung by Hyon Song-wol at the Samjiyon Orchestra's special performance in Seoul to celebrate the success of the 2013 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics .
Lee Hyun-seung, senior director of the North Korea Strategy Committee at the Global Peace Foundation who defected in 2014 , still remembers this song .
[ Lee Hyun-seung, member ] ' From Baekdu to Hanna, we are one people , how much is it to be separated? ...' Residents sing this song among themselves , at school, during mobilization in the countryside , and during military recreation time . People also sing and dance together in the mountains during holidays . I still remember the lyrics and melody of this song .
In addition to this, Hwang Jin-young composed several songs that emphasize unification and the identity of the Korean people, including “ We Are One ” and “ Baekdu and Hanna are My Homeland . ”
[ Lee Hyun-seung, member ] These songs were released by the North Korean regime and were publicly promoted . At the time, the Kim Jong-il regime's strategy regarding unification was that " our people should do something as one , " so they promoted these songs more . North Korea produced a music video called the " Mokran Video , " and all three songs were included in it .
However, North Korean state-run media reported on his funeral on the 26th , listing the titles of 18 songs he composed while alive , but excluding songs related to unification .
On January 26, the Rodong Sinmun reported the death of composer Hwang Jin-young, but did not mention any of his representative songs related to unification. / Capture from the Rodong Sinmun
In relation to this, Yoshihiro Makino, a visiting professor at Hiroshima University in Japan, analyzed to RFA, “General Secretary Kim Jong-un sent a wreath to the funeral to pay his respects , but did not mention any songs related to unification, which reflects the authorities’ move to ‘erase unification . ’”
[ Professor Makino ] Mr. Hwang Jin-young is highly regarded as a people's artist in North Korea . From Kim Jong-un's perspective, he cannot deny all of his father's achievements , but he is in a position where he must sort them out in relation to the South Korea policy he is currently pursuing . So, he cannot ignore the death of Mr. Hwang Jin-young , but it seems that all the songs about the nation or unification were omitted ( from the report ) .
In addition, according to an official from the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan ( Chongryon ) , it has been reported that students from Korean schools who performed on stage at the Lunar New Year performance held in Pyongyang in January received artistic guidance from North Korean authorities during the preparation process , but all songs related to unification were reportedly excluded .
North Korean authorities : Don't call it ' the place the general pointed to '
Ministry of Unification: “North Korea quietly proceeds with ‘erasing unification’ due to concerns over ideological confusion” Did
North Korea reflect ‘ two hostile countries ’ in its socialist constitution ?
North Korea has been actively working to " erase unification " since General Secretary Kim Jong-un defined inter-Korean relations as "two hostile relations" rather than "compatriots" at the Workers ' Party plenary meeting held in late 2023 .
Last year, changes followed, including the demolition of the 'Three Charters for National Reunification Monument' in Pyongyang , the deletion of the word 'Samcheolli' from the lyrics of the national anthem , ' Aegukga , ' and the renaming of ' Tongil Station ' on the Pyongyang subway to ' Moranbong Station . '
This same atmosphere seems to have been fully reflected in the coverage of Hwang Jin-young's funeral.
Meanwhile, RFA reported in February last year that North Korean authorities had banned songs related to unification, including the Kim Jong Il loyalty song "Where the General Points," which contains the lyrics " Unified country , one people . "
Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Editor Lee Gyeong-ha
13. 150,000 Koreans in U.S. subject to Trump's deportation order: Report
I had no idea.
Butunforauntely illegal is illegal
Friday
January 31, 2025
dictionary + A - A
150,000 Koreans in U.S. subject to Trump's deportation order: Report
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-01-31/national/diplomacy/150000-Koreans-in-US-subject-to-Trumps-deportation-order-Report/2232734
Published: 31 Jan. 2025, 17:46
- LEE SOO-JUNG
- lee.soojung1@joongang.co.kr
US President Donald Trump speaks in the press briefing room at the White House on January 30, 2025 in Washington, United States. [AFP/YONHAP]
Some 150,000 Koreans living in the United States are reportedly subject to deportations ordered by U.S. President Donald Trump, according to a local news report.
Of around 14 million migrants who were ordered to leave the United States, approximately 150,000 are presumed to be Korean nationals, reported Korea's Yonhap News.
The number includes 20,000 Korean adoptees who have not yet received U.S. citizenship.
Related Article
On Thursday, Kim Dong-suk, head of the civic group Korean American Grassroots Conference, told the news agency that Trump’s return to the Oval Office is a “disaster” for Koreans in the United States. Kim also noted that Korean communities in the United States “are gripped by fear.”
President Trump has heightened his rhetoric against undocumented migrants. Tom Homan, who is in charge of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, blamed what he called an open border for the entry of illegal drugs.
Kim said collective action among governors, congresspeople and senators is needed to deter the forced deportation of illegal immigrants. He also noted that joint efforts with other migrant groups could help solve the deportation crisis.
Kim told Yonhap News that Trump would “rearrange” Korea-U.S. bilateral ties to focus on what Washington gains in the relationship. He said demands from Washington would increase compared to the former Biden administration.
“President Trump will sign a deal with leaders of Russia, China and North Korea if those deals align with the national interests of the United States,” Kim said.
BY LEE SOO-JUNG [lee.soojung1@joongang.co.kr]
14. Korea’s birth rates make the first turnaround in nine years
Some good news.
Korea’s birth rates make the first turnaround in nine years
donga.com
Posted January. 31, 2025 07:28,
Updated January. 31, 2025 07:28
Korea’s birth rates make the first turnaround in nine years. January. 31, 2025 07:28. .
A man in his 30s, who works at a small company, got married about three years ago. “I won’t have children,” he said before his wedding. “I do not want to spend all his money and time raising children. Instead, he dreamed of always traveling around with his wife.” Contrary to his plans, he became a father around a month ago. Asked what changed his mind, he only smiled. When asked again if the expansion of government support, including parental benefits, affected his decision, he replied, “Giving money alone does not encourage me to become a parent. I have to admit that all the perks for my baby alleviate some of the financial burden.”
Last year, South Korea surely showed a turnaround in birth rates for the first time in nine years. Vice Chairman Joo Hyung-hwan of the Low Birth Rate and Aging Society Committee recently projected last year’s fertility rate to be 0.75 children. This metric, the average number of children a woman is expected to have in her lifetime, has constantly declined since 2015. The fertility rate, which once stood at 1.24, dropped to 0.72 as of 2023. It is welcome news that it has been starting to bounce back. If last year’s total fertility rate turns out to be 0.75, it would mean a faster upward trend, compared to the projections from 2022 to 2072 made by Statistics Korea that birthrates would go down to 0.65 (median projection) this year and turn around starting from 2026.
Nevertheless, a total fertility rate of 0.7 is still seriously low, which requires us to keep working against a potential demographic crisis. To maintain the current population, the country needs to keep a fertility rate at 2.1 at the minimum. If the figure persists at 0.7 for two generations, the number of potential parents who can bear and rear children will decrease to less than half the current levels. To be specific, 1,000 people in today's parent generation have 700 children, and those 700 will only give birth to 490 kids of their own. Although the overall population decline rate will change depending on mortality rates, immigration, etc., we are nowhere near ensuring the country’s long-term sustainability.
It is also uncertain whether last year’s recovery can continue. Some say that it may be an illusionary uptick due to a temporary increase in the population that can become parents as they enter the prime age for marriage. The country had seen more than 800,000 newborns a year until 1982, but experienced a decline to approximately 600,000 in 1990. Afterward, it witnessed a brief comeback to the 700,000 range from 1991 to 1995. Those born during this period are now 30 to 34 years old. As for today’s 24-year-olds, born in 2001, 560,000 births were recorded for that year. Following this, yearly births remained in the 400,000 range for a 15-year period.
Local municipalities across the country are set to continue their childbirth incentives this year as well. Goyang City in Gyeonggi Province, which gives a subsidy of one million won to the first child, has allocated 7.8 billion won for this year’s budget. Likewise, Busanjin-gu in Busan has decided to raise the childbirth congratulatory payments for second and third children by 300,000 won and 400,000 won, respectively. However, opponents say that cash-based support will only make a short-lived difference. As per an analysis by the Korea Institute of Local Finance on childbirth policies from 2009 to 2021, providing childbirth incentives of one million won only resulted in a 0.03 increase in the total fertility rate. Ironically, even the government agency, which was set up to oversee low birthrate policies, has reportedly voiced complaints about “work-life balance.” To keep the rebound trend going, it will be more important to closely examine our work culture.
한국어
donga.com
15. A bromance to Trump, but a headache to Kim?
A useful description of Kim's possible views.
Does anyone think that a real deal can be made that will prevent a north Korean attack on the US homeland? No matter how many concessions we provide Kim will never give up his nuclear and missile capabilities. Sure he might reduce his nuclear arsenal somewhat and may even give up a Hwasong missile system but he will always retain a nuclear capable ICBM system. A deal may look good on paper and to the maximum engagement pundits but the US and South Korea will remain at risk for as long as the Kim family regime remains in power.
Excerpts:
There are concerns that Trump may pursue a “small deal” in which North Korea agrees to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for partial sanctions relief. This would be a troubling outcome for South Korea, which has long pushed for complete denuclearization. However, it is important to note Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy. As a former real estate mogul, he prioritizes endgame wins over process-oriented diplomacy. Whether through a big deal or a small one, Trump will likely seek an agreement that at least neutralizes North Korea’s ability to strike the U.S. mainland.
Friday
January 31, 2025
dictionary + A - A
A bromance to Trump, but a headache to Kim?
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-01-31/opinion/columns/A-bromance-to-Trump-but-a-headache-to-Kim/2232118
Published: 31 Jan. 2025, 00:02
Park Won-gon
The author is a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University.
As soon as Donald Trump returned to the White House, he wasted no time in invoking North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. On his first day in office, Jan. 20, Trump responded to a reporter’s question by referring to North Korea as a “nuclear power” and confidently stating, “Kim Jong-un will be happy that I’m back.” But is that really the case?
On Jan. 23, Trump went a step further, expressing his willingness to engage in dialogue with North Korea. If sincere, this places the decision squarely in Kim’s hands. However, Kim’s feelings toward Trump likely extend beyond mere resentment to outright animosity. His response to Trump’s overtures has been strikingly hostile — launching a missile on Jan. 25 and making a high-profile visit to a nuclear facility, as reported on Jan. 29.
Kim’s deep-seated aversion to Trump can be traced back to February 2019, when Trump unilaterally walked away from the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi. The abrupt collapse of negotiations left Kim publicly humiliated. In its aftermath, he reportedly lamented, “Did I really endure over 60 hours on a train for this?”
Further insight into Kim’s sentiments comes from a North Korean directive intercepted in South Korea’s Chungbuk Comrades Association espionage case. On Mar. 12, 2019, Pyongyang issued orders to its espionage network, instructing operatives to expose Trump’s “ignorant and arrogant behavior” and to highlight his “thuggish and shameless nature.” Yet, just a few months later, in a personal letter to Trump on Jun. 10, Kim wrote, “I still believe in the magical power of our deep and special friendship.” If these reports are accurate, it suggests that even as Kim put on a diplomatic front, he remained haunted by the trauma of Hanoi.
North Korean children playing folk games at last years Lunar New Year celebration at the Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea Feb. 10, 2024. [AP/YONHAP]
Despite this, Trump has consistently maintained, both during and after his presidency, that he “gets along well” with Kim. This is likely infuriating for the North Korean leader. Trump, of course, is fully aware of this dynamic. His recent comments about Kim are not necessarily an attempt at reconciliation; rather, they serve as a form of psychological pressure. It may, in fact, be the opening move of a renewed “maximum pressure” campaign — reminiscent of Trump’s 2017 threats of “fire and fury.”
The current situation is reminiscent of the June 2019 U.S.-North Korea meeting at Panmunjom. At the time, Trump, while attending the G20 Summit in Japan, casually posted on social media: “I will be visiting the DMZ tomorrow, and if Chairman Kim sees this, I wonder if he would like to meet and shake hands?”
Despite having suffered a major setback in Hanoi just months earlier, Kim responded positively, and the Panmunjom meeting was set in motion. Many North Korea experts were caught off guard, as Kim — the absolute ruler of a monolithic regime — had, for the first time, answered a direct Twitter invitation from the leader of the “imperialist enemy.”
Kim’s willingness to engage, despite the diplomatic impropriety of Trump’s approach, led to speculation that he had fallen into the U.S. President’s trap. During the meeting, Kim requested a halt to U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. Trump “reaffirmed” his commitment to stopping the drills. However, the Dongmaeng 19-2 exercises proceeded as planned, and it later emerged that Trump had never issued an official order to suspend them.
Feeling deceived yet again, Kim vented his anger on South Korea, infamously deriding the Blue House as a “boiled cow’s head” (a North Korean idiom used to express utter contempt). These experiences remain fresh in Kim’s memory. Yet Trump, acting as if nothing had happened, continues to insist, “He liked me.” It’s no surprise that Kim would find this infuriating.
Even from a purely strategic standpoint, Trump’s recent remarks fall far short of what Kim would hope for. While Trump’s reference to North Korea as a “nuclear power” on his first day back in office was striking, it is more likely a calculated negotiation tactic than a genuine acknowledgment of North Korea’s nuclear status.
The U.S. government has previously referred to North Korea as a “de facto nuclear state” or an “illegal nuclear power.” But Trump’s words should not be taken at face value — his rhetoric is often improvisational. The White House’s clarification on Jan. 28 further reinforces this point: “President Trump, as he did in his first term, will pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea.” This is, in fact, a more explicit stance than that of the Biden administration, which maintained a vague commitment to Korean Peninsula denuclearization.
There are concerns that Trump may pursue a “small deal” in which North Korea agrees to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for partial sanctions relief. This would be a troubling outcome for South Korea, which has long pushed for complete denuclearization. However, it is important to note Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy. As a former real estate mogul, he prioritizes endgame wins over process-oriented diplomacy. Whether through a big deal or a small one, Trump will likely seek an agreement that at least neutralizes North Korea’s ability to strike the U.S. mainland.
The real question is whether North Korea would accept such terms. The United States will almost certainly demand verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program — Pyongyang’s primary means of striking the American mainland. Yet, if Kim concedes this point, he will be exposing himself to overwhelming U.S. retaliation, thereby rendering his nuclear arsenal strategically useless. A war confined to the Korean Peninsula, in which Pyongyang cannot credibly threaten Washington, would be suicidal for Kim’s regime.
In this context, Kim’s recent visit to a highly classified uranium enrichment facility is particularly telling. On Sep. 13, 2023, he toured the country’s nuclear weapons research institute and fissile material production sites, publicly showcasing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. The Jan. 29 state media coverage of his latest visit once again emphasized his commitment to the “relentless strengthening of the nuclear shield.”
This facility was a focal point of the failed Hanoi talks — Trump had demanded its disclosure, but Kim refused, leading to the breakdown in negotiations. By publicly revisiting the site now, Kim is sending a clear message: he will not make the same concessions as before. The North Korean leader is deliberately raising the stakes, ensuring that he will not suffer another diplomatic humiliation.
Trump’s return places Kim in a precarious position. Rather than heralding a triumphant “nuclear moment” for North Korea, it instead rekindles memories of past humiliations. And the more Kim dwells on those experiences, the more likely he is to fall into Trump’s trap once again.
Translated using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
16. Russian ship transporting North Korean weapons captured again at Najin Port
Members of the dark quad and fusion of foes at work.
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
Russian ship transporting North Korean weapons captured again at Najin Port
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/russia-ship-illicit-munition-north-korea-01312025142100.html
WASHINGTON-Cho Jin-woo choj@rfa.org
2025.01.31
Najin Port in the Rason Special Economic Zone in North Korea, photographed by Japan's Kyodo News in 2012.
/Yonhap, Kyodo News
00:00 /02:38
Anchor : A Russian cargo ship that was previously identified as having played a role in moving weapons from North Korea to Russia has been captured again in the North Korean port of Rajin . The international community is being urged to monitor whether it is continuing illegal trade banned by the UN and others . Reporter Jo Jin-woo reports .
It was on the 11th that a Russian cargo ship appeared in the North Korean port of Rajin .
According to photos taken by the U.S. commercial satellite Planet Labs, the 113-meter -long ship is anchored at Pier 2 of Rajin Port .
The ship disappeared the next day , and the containers that had been piled up at the dock the day before also disappeared, leading to analysis that the ship likely carried cargo to Russia .
Jacob Vogel, a private American satellite analyst, recently explained to Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 29th , “ The ship in question is the Maria , and Pier 2 of Rajin Port is where North Korean cargo containers are loaded onto Russian ships . ”
The Maria is a ship sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control for transporting weapons and military supplies from North Korea to Russia .
Despite continued warnings from the international community, it has once again been discovered that North Korea and Russia are continuing illegal trade .
“ Both the ship’s operator (JSC Sovfracht) and its owner (Ibex Shipping Inc) are sanctioned ,” said Bogle , adding that “ this is likely another shipment from North Korea to Russia . ”
However, he added that it is difficult to determine exactly what the cargo is based on satellite images alone .
ASA (ALLSOURCE ANALYSIS), a commercial satellite image analysis company in the U.S., also recently reported on the social networking service X that “ a Russian cargo ship presumed to be the Maria was captured in the North Korean port of Rajin on the 11th ,” suggesting that arms deals between North Korea and Russia are ongoing .
Related Articles
CSIS “ Cargo Ship Suspected of Illegal North-Russia Trade Captured ”
UN North Korea Sanctions Committee: “ 81 North Korea-Russia Joint Ventures Violating Sanctions ”
The Maria, previously identified as having played a role in transporting weapons from North Korea to Russia, is seen anchored at Pier 2 in the North Korean port of Rajin, as photographed by the U.S. commercial satellite Flatiron Labs on January 11. / Flatiron Labs
There are ongoing allegations that North Korea is providing additional weapons support to Russia .
Ukrainian intelligence officials said on the 23rd that North Korea was planning to provide additional troops and military supplies, including ballistic missiles, to Russia .
North Korea is expected to provide Russia with 150 additional KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles this year, following the 148 it already supplied to Russia last year .
The international community, including the United States, strongly criticizes arms transfers between North Korea and Russia .
These are the words of Robert Wood, Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations .
[ Deputy Ambassador Wood ( January 22 , 2024 )] Illicit arms transfers and potential technology transfers between North Korea and Russia undermine regional stability and the global nonproliferation regime . The Council must hold accountable all States that violate their obligations under UN Security Council resolutions .
In response, North Korea and Russia deny the arms deal, saying the United States is spreading false information without evidence .
Editor Park Jeong-woo , Web Editor Lee Gyeong-ha
17. Hegseth reaffirms strong alliance with S. Korea during 1st phone talks with Seoul's defense chief
(2nd LD) Hegseth reaffirms strong alliance with S. Korea during 1st phone talks with Seoul's defense chief | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 1, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS Pentagon readout in paras 7-8)
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, Jan. 31 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's acting Defense Minister Kim Seon-ho and new U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth held their first phone call Friday and reaffirmed the steadfast alliance between the two nations, Seoul's defense ministry said.
In the phone conversation, both sides concurred on the need to advance and deepen the level and scope of their bilateral alliance, which has stood as a "linchpin" for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region over the past 70 years, the ministry said.
Hegseth reaffirmed the U.S. ironclad commitment to defending South Korea and vowed to closely cooperate with Seoul to cement the bilateral alliance, it added.
This Jan. 25, 2025, file photo released by EPA shows U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth making remarks after taking the oath of office in Washington, D.C. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Noting North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile threats, the defense chiefs agreed that sustaining the alliance through their combined defense posture is more "important than ever" to effectively deter and respond to such threats.
For such a purpose, they agreed to continue to maintain and advance their trilateral security cooperation, also involving Japan, on the back of the South Korea-U.S. alliance.
The defense chiefs expressed concerns over North Korea and Russia's deepening military alignment, pledging to respond to the global security threat together with the international community.
In a separate readout, Pentagon spokesperson John Ullyot said that Hegseth reaffirmed the U.S.' commitment to defending South Korea under President Donald Trump's leadership, and that both sides reiterated their shared focus on maintaining a "strong" combined South Korea-U.S. defense posture.
"Both the Secretary and the Minister agreed to remain in close contact moving forward," the spokesperson said.
Hegseth took office last week as the first defense secretary in the second term of U.S. President Donald Trump, who returned to the White House earlier this month.
Acting Defense Minister Kim Seon-ho holds phone talks with new U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on Jan. 31, 2025, in this photo released by Seoul's defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 1, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
