Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“So far as I know. It's not enough to be able to lie with a straight face; anybody, with enough gall to raise on a busted flush can do that. The first way to lie artistically is to tell the truth – but not all of it. The second way involves telling the truth, too, but is harder: tell the exact truth, and maybe all of it …but tell it so unconvincingly that your listener is sure you are lying.”

- Robert A. Heinlein. Time Enough For Love

"We'll go down in history as the first society that wouldn't save itself because it wasn't cost effective."

- Kurt Vonnegut

"You can kill a man but you can't kill an idea."

- Sophocles

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 5, 2023

2. Our Bill Is the Best Way to Counter the TikTok Threat

3. Boeing names former U.S. diplomat to senior public policy role

4. Don’t let Beijing define the narrative of Taiwan’s relations with the world

5. Over-classified information hampers work with allies, top Marines say

6. Russia’s Vladimir Putin Blames U.S. for War in Ukraine

7. America’s Top Hostage Envoy Pursues Freedom for Detained U.S. Citizens in Increasingly Hostile World

8. China, Russia propaganda wither as cameras multiply, US admiral says

9. Big Balikatan: Annual US-Philippines exercise to be bigger than ever

10. With Russia’s Exit, Norway Becomes Europe’s Energy Champion

11. Taiwan Rivals Tsai and Ma in Overseas Travel Flurry

12. Opinion | Listen to Taiwan’s pleas, not China’s grumbles

13. EXPLAINED: Why Poland Is So Important

14. Special Forces Medic - "18D Training Today" | SOF News

15. Malaysia’s Prime Minister announces end to US Dollar dependence

16. Chinese Officials Flock to Twitter to Defend TikTok

17. The De-Dollarization of World Economy: Xi-Putin Agreement, Saudi Arabia’s Shift to Yuan

18. America and China Need to Talk

19. Deadly attack puts spotlight on Russia’s influential military bloggers

20. 441. The Risk of Success in Military Planning

21. 99 Spy Balloons: An Exploration of Disruptive Innovation on a Budget

22. Beyond Reapers and DJI Mavics: Are Scholars and Policymakers Ready for One-Way Attack Drones?

23. The Threat from Extremist Groups Is Growing. Service Members and Vets Are Getting Sucked into the Violence.

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 5, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2023

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces will withdraw from Bakhmut to avoid encirclement if necessary, but do not yet assess the need to do so.
Russian President Vladimir Putin framed Russia’s efforts to consolidate control of occupied territories of Ukraine as a matter of internal security and rule of law during a meeting with the Russian National Security Council.
Putin also attempted to portray Russia as a respected world power against the backdrop of Chinese officials downplaying close relations with Russia.
Putin dismissed Colonel-General Nikolai Grechushkin from his post as Deputy Head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations on April 5.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in positional battles along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces likely made gains in and around Bakhmut and continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.
Russian businessmen may be assuming a larger role in supporting the Russian MoD’s efforts to form irregular volunteer formations.
Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova continues to deny international allegations that Russia is forcibly deporting Ukrainian children to Russia.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 5, 2023

Apr 5, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 5, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark

April 5, 6:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces will withdraw from Bakhmut to avoid encirclement if necessary, but do not yet assess the need to do so. Zelensky stated during a press conference in Poland on April 5 that Ukrainian troops face a very challenging situation in Bakhmut, and that Kyiv will make the “corresponding decisions” if Ukrainian troops risk encirclement by Russian forces.[1] Zelensky’s statement is in line with other recent statements by Ukrainian officials that Ukrainian military command will order a withdrawal from Bakhmut when and if they deem a withdrawal to be the most strategically appropriate option. While it remains to be seen whether Ukraine’s defense of Bakhmut and its efficacy in fixing Russian forces in the area is worth Ukrainian losses (and we will likely be unable to assess this until observing the Ukrainian spring counteroffensive), Ukrainian military leadership continues to clearly signal that Ukrainian forces are still not encircled and have the option to withdraw as necessary.[2]

Russian President Vladimir Putin framed Russia’s efforts to consolidate control of occupied territories of Ukraine as a matter of internal security and rule of law during a meeting with the Russian National Security Council on April 5. Putin called for the continued economic, legal, and social integration of occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts into the Russian Federation and emphasized the importance of Russian “restoration” efforts in occupied areas in facilitating the integration process.[3] Putin also accused Ukraine of threatening civilians in occupied areas and highlighted recent ”terrorist attacks” against occupation officials and law enforcement agencies, referring to Ukrainian partisan attacks against occupation organs.[4] Putin emphasized the need for intensified law enforcement operations to guard against such attacks and called for the increased participation of local Ukrainian citizens in law enforcement processes, explicitly encouraging collaborators and informants in occupied areas. Putin has notably invoked the concept of “terrorism” and threats to Russian domestic security to justify domestic repressions and is likely setting conditions for further repressions and law enforcement crackdowns in occupied territories using similar framing.[5]

Putin also attempted to portray Russia as a respected world power against the backdrop of Chinese officials downplaying close relations with Russia. Putin held a televised meeting presenting ambassador credentials to the heads of 17 diplomatic missions on April 5, during which he highlighted Russia’s close relationship with Syria and cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to appeal to non-Western states.[6] Putin stated that Syria is a reliable partner with whom Russia reached several unspecified agreements during Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad's recent trip to Russia on March 14. Putin berated ambassadors from the United States and European Union states and claimed that the West is responsible for the war in Ukraine and geopolitical confrontation with Russia.

Chinese Ambassador to the EU Fu Cong stated on April 5 that the Russian–Chinese joint statement declaring there were “no limits” to their ties released in February 2022 was misrepresented, calling “no limits” a “purely rhetorical statement.”[7] Fu added that China does not support Russia’s war in Ukraine and is not providing Russia weapons. Fu’s statement is consistent with ISW’s March 21 assessment that Putin has not been able to secure the benefits from the no-limits bilateral partnership with China which he likely hoped for when meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Moscow between March 20 and March 22.[8]

The Kremlin is likely increasingly struggling to maintain loyalty among lower-level regional authorities as it continues to place the onus on funding the war on Russian federal subjects. Independent Russian outlet Verstka reported on April 5 that the Kremlin is developing a “program of privileges” in regional administrations to maintain loyalty among lower-level local officials.[9] Verstka stated that the Russian presidential administration demanded that regional administrations create “initiative groups” to cater to the needs of regional civil servants, and that regional vice-governors are being encouraged in an oddly framed measure to install vending machines in administration buildings, secure preferential bank loans for employees, and offer officials free city parking.[10] Verstka reported that these measures in large part are meant to mitigate growing discontent about the continued costs of the war.[11] ISW has previously observed that the Kremlin has repeatedly placed the onus on Russian regional authorities to mobilize and fund the war, and Russian regions continue to bear the brunt of the Kremlin’s decision-making demographically and economically.[12] Such efforts are likely meant to pay lip service to the burden placed on regional entities but are unlikely to stimulate a significant increase in support for the war at the regional and local levels.

Putin dismissed Colonel-General Nikolai Grechushkin from his post as Deputy Head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations on April 5.[13] ISW has also previously reported on recent investigations into and arrests of Russian Rosgvardia leadership, including Rosgvardia’s naval department head and Deputy Commander of Rosgvardia’s Central District.[14] Rosgvardia was notably created using personnel and resources from a variety of Russian security and military services, including the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM). The Kremlin may be attempting to oust a slate of Rosgvardia and EMERCOM officials that have fallen out of Putin’s favor in an effort to crack down on Russian domestic security control.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko arrived in Moscow on April 5 to meet with Putin and will meet with the Supreme Council of the Russia-Belarus Union State on April 6. Neither the Russian nor Belarusian governments published readouts by the data collection cutoff for this publication. ISW will provide updates on the meeting in the April 6 update.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces will withdraw from Bakhmut to avoid encirclement if necessary, but do not yet assess the need to do so.
Russian President Vladimir Putin framed Russia’s efforts to consolidate control of occupied territories of Ukraine as a matter of internal security and rule of law during a meeting with the Russian National Security Council.
Putin also attempted to portray Russia as a respected world power against the backdrop of Chinese officials downplaying close relations with Russia.
Putin dismissed Colonel-General Nikolai Grechushkin from his post as Deputy Head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations on April 5.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in positional battles along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces likely made gains in and around Bakhmut and continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.
Russian businessmen may be assuming a larger role in supporting the Russian MoD’s efforts to form irregular volunteer formations.
Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova continues to deny international allegations that Russia is forcibly deporting Ukrainian children to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in positional battles along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna frontline and southwest of Lysychansk on April 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Nevske (20km northwest of Kreminna), the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna), and south of Spirne (17km southwest of Lysychansk).[15] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces continued to advance through Ukrainian defensive positions on the outskirts of Makiivka (about 25km northwest of Kreminna) and near the Zhuravka gully.[16] Another Russian source claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance from the direction of Shypylivka (9km south of Kreminna) towards the Serebrianska forest area and near Torske (about 16km west of Kreminna).[17] The Russian source claimed that Russian forces also attacked near Nevske, Terny (about 21km northwest of Kreminna), and Makiivka. Geolocated footage showed Russian forces using the TOS-1 thermobaric rocket system and shelling Ukrainian positions south of Kreminna.[18]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to make gains in and around Bakhmut on April 5. Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have made advances north of Bakhmut both north of Khromove (2km west of Bakhmut) and northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[19] Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group fighters seized a school just west of the Metallurg Stadium in central Bakhmut.[20] Other Russian sources claimed that Wagner made gains in central and eastern Bakhmut and failed to advance near Ivanivske southwest of Bakhmut.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled ground attacks in Bakhmut, northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka (5km northwest), and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (2km southwest).[22] A Russian milblogger speculated that Russian forces may next attempt a double encirclement around Bakhmut by first encircling the surrounding area and cutting logistics lines to Chasiv Yar southwest of Bakhmut before cutting Ukrainian lines through Khromove northwest of Bakhmut.[23]

The recent allocation of TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems to Russian Airborne (VDV) forces on April 3 may include VDV forces operating around Bakhmut.[24] ISW has observed VDV forces, including the 76th and 106th Guards Airborne divisions, in the Bakhmut area, and combat footage posted on April 5 shows Russian forces using a TOS-1A to strike targets in Bakhmut.[25] ISW continues to assess that allocating this military-district level asset to operations in Bakhmut will not provide Russian forces a decisive offensive advantage.[26]

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on April 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka, northwest of Avdiivka near Novokalynove (11km northwest), west of Avdiivka near Sieverne (5km west), southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske (11km southwest), and west of Donetsk City near Marinka.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made unspecified advances near Sieverne and Pervomaiske, and attacked near Avdiivka, north of Avdiivka near Keramik (10km north), southwest of Avdiivka near Krasnohorivka (22km southwest), and in Marinka.[28] Some Russian milbloggers denied April 4 reports that Ukrainian forces made a breakthrough near Avdiivka, but geolocated footage from April 4 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced to positions west of Novobakhmutivka north of Avdiivka.[29] It remains unclear whether Ukrainian forces maintain positions in these areas, however.[30]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defenses in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on April 5. One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made unspecified gains from the Dorozhnyanka up the T0401 highway towards Hulyaipole, but ISW is unable to confirm these claims.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.[32] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in western Donetsk Oblast.[33]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued defensive operations and shelled along the frontline in southern Ukraine on April 5. Russian Eastern Group of Forces (Eastern Military District) Spokesperson Aleksandr Gordeev claimed that Russian troops in the Zaporizhia direction prevented a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group from penetrating Russian rear areas in an unspecified location.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts are building fortifications and defensive lines.[35] Russian forces also conducted routine shelling throughout western Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[36]

Russian sources accused Ukrainian troops of striking an object near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) with a drone on April 5.[37] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov posted RIA Novosti footage claiming that a Polish-produced drone fell a few hundred meters from the plant.[38] ISW has previously reported on Russian efforts to discredit Ukraine by accusing Ukrainian forces of irresponsible conduct near the ZNPP in an effort to consolidate Russia’s control over plant.[39]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials continue measures to support Russia’s ongoing spring conscription cycle amid continued crypto-mobilization efforts. Russian sources reported on April 4 that authorities in Samara and Chelyabinsk oblasts plan to conscript 3,500 residents, and that Russian officials in Kursk Oblast plan to conscript 2,000 residents and confiscate IDs to prevent potential conscripts from leaving the area.[40] Russian sources reported that Russian officials are increasing advertising campaigns for conscription and contract service, with a focus on promised benefits.[41] Russian media outlet Rotunda reported on April 4 that St. Petersburg officials held a meeting focusing on ways to incentivize foreign citizens to serve in the Russian military.[42] ISW previously assessed that Russian conscripts will not increase Russian manpower in the short term and that Russian forces are unlikely to deploy newly conscripted personnel to the war in Ukraine.[43] Russian officials are continuing crypto-mobilization efforts to avoid declaring a formal second wave of mobilization, although these efforts and the ongoing conscription cycle will likely compete for resources and add further pressure on Russia’s already taxed training capacity.

The Russian State Duma approved the first draft of a bill allowing all Russian personnel, including conscripts, to participate in Russian peacekeeping operations.[44] The bill removes the previous stipulation that only contract personnel could serve in these operations.[45] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed the bill on February 7, likely as a contingency plan to allocate manpower to peacekeeping operations and free up contractor personnel that could be deployed to Ukraine.[46] The Russian MoD is likely setting conditions to be able to commit newly conscripted personnel to peacekeeping operations, and it is highly unlikely that this measure is meant to slowly introduce conscripts into Ukraine by labeling it a ”peacekeeping” operation. It is also highly unlikely that the bill intends to set conditions for a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine. ISW has previously assessed that Russia’s redeployment of its “peacekeeping force” from Nargorno-Karabakh to Ukraine is eroding Russia’s influence with Armenia, and the Russian MoD likely desires additional reserves that can be committed to the area.[47]

Russian authorities appear to be increasingly concerned about information pertaining to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly arrested a married couple in Nizhny Tagil, Sverdlovsk Oblast on April 4 on charges of transferring military technical information about a defense industry enterprise to Ukrainian officials.[48] The FSB previously arrested Wall Street Journal correspondent Evan Gershkovich in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast on March 30 on charges that he collected information constituting a state secret about the activities of a Russian military-industrial complex enterprise.[49] One of Russia’s largest tank producers, Uralvagonzavod, is located in Nizhny Tagil and numerous defense industrial enterprises are located in Yekaterinburg, including Russia’s primary producer of self-propelled artillery systems, Uraltransmash; one of Russia’s leading optical enterprises, Urals Optical-Mechanical Plant; and Uralmash, which mass produced tanks during and after the Second World War.[50] Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a bill on March 18 increasing fines and jailtime for the misappropriation of Russian military assets, and ISW assesses that the Kremlin may use the premise of threats to Russia DIB assets and information to oust officials who have fallen out of favor and to further conceal the activities of Russian defense industrial enterprises.[51]

Russian businessmen may be assuming a larger role in supporting Russian volunteer recruitment efforts. The Moscow Times reported on April 5 that the head of the Russian Copper Company, Igor Altushkin, is reportedly the main sponsor of the “Ural” volunteer battalion operating in Ukraine.[52] Altushkin reportedly started creating the battalion after attending a closed meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in September 2022, during which Putin instructed Russian businessmen to finance volunteer formations.[53] Altushkin reportedly recruited from combat veteran organizations, specifically the Special Forces Veteran Foundation, after initially pivoting away from convict recruitment due to the Wagner Group’s monopolization of prison recruitment at the time.[54] The Moscow Times also reported that the owner of Russian outlet Tsargrad, Konstantin Malofeev, created a bonus fund for Russian assault battalions that conduct successful assaults in Ukraine.[55] The Russian MoD initially entrusted regional bodies with the campaign to form volunteer battalions beginning in the summer of 2022, but Russian regional bodies largely failed to generate consequential combat power for Russian operations in Ukraine.[56] The possible emergence of Russian business figures in the formation of irregular volunteer formations may suggest that the Kremlin has entrusted these figures with this effort out a lack of trust in regional bodies and the Russian MoD. These business figures could also be independently supporting these efforts to increase their individual standing with the Kremlin.

Crimean Occupation Head Sergey Aksyonov appears to be continuing efforts to expand his reported private military company (PMC). Aksyonov reportedly visited personnel of the Union of Donbas Volunteers on April 5 in an unspecified area of Ukraine.[57] Aksyonov has reportedly created his own PMC named Convoy under the leadership of Wagner associate Konstantin Pikalov as an official BARS (Russian Combat Reserve of the Country) unit, and the Union of Donbas Volunteers is heavily involved in recruitment efforts for BARS.[58] Russian State Duma Deputy Alexander Borodai heads the Union of Donbas Volunteers, and Aksyonov’s visit to the volunteers in Ukraine suggests deepening cooperation between Aksyonov and Borodai in supporting PMC “Convoy’s” operations in Ukraine. Malofeev reportedly has close connections with Borodai and his possible increased involvement in supporting the volunteer recruitment efforts may suggest that the Union of Donbas Volunteers will assume a larger role in the formation and support of irregular volunteer formations serving in Ukraine.[59]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova continues to deny international allegations that Russia is forcibly deporting Ukrainian children to Russia. Lvova-Belova claimed on April 4 that parents of children in occupied Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts willingly sent their children to rehabilitation camps in southern Russia and Crimea to protect them from hostilities.[60] Lvova-Belova claimed that some parents have struggled to remove their children from Russian camps due to logistical restraints and because Ukrainian military-aged men cannot leave Ukrainian territory.[61] Lvova-Belova claimed on April 5 that only 16 of 400 children remain in occupied Crimea after parents, volunteers, and legal representatives had escorted the others to unspecified location.[62] Lvova-Belova continues to claim that the Ukrainian government has yet to express interest in cooperating with Russia to return children to their homes.[63] Lvova-Belova also continues to falsely villainize the Ukrainian state as abandoning and brainwashing its children to hate Russia. Lvova-Belova stated during a press conference on April 4 that Ukrainian propaganda and a childhood in Ukraine caused her 16-year-old adopted son, whom she “adopted” (in truth abducted) from Mariupol, to express anti-Russia sentiment in public.[64]

Russian occupation authorities continue to paint further economic integration of occupied territories as advantageous for the average Ukrainian citizen. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on April 5 that farmers in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast received 4,000–5,000 rubles (about 50–60 USD) per ton of grain sold before occupation, but that farmers now receive 9,000–11,000 rubles (about 110–140 USD) per ton of grain sold under occupation.[65]

Russian and occupation authorities continue to announce new infrastructure projects for occupied territories in an effort to strengthen Russia’s defense industrial base. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on April 5 that Russian and LNR authorities will revive the Luhansk Aircraft Repair Plant, which has remained idle since 2014.[66] Pasechnik claimed that Russian state-owned engineering company United Engine Corporation has developed a plan to revive the plant and that the plant has already begun to service unspecified aircraft engines.[67] Pasechnik claimed that the Luhansk Aircraft Repair Plant will begin servicing Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopter engines by the summer and fully reach pre-war performance in 1.5 years.[68]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Russian forces are reportedly planning to redeploy 2,000 Russian troops from training grounds in Belarus to eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Spokesperson Andrii Demchenko stated on April 5 that of the 4,000 Russian personnel currently in Belarus, about 2,000 will redeploy to Donbas to participate in future hostilities.[69] Ukrainian intelligence previously reported that Russian forces deployed elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District), 6th Division of the 3rd Army Corps, and assorted territorial troops to train in Belarus.[70] Russian military command may have redeployed 2,000 troops from these formations to commit them to the frontline in Ukraine either in an attempt to sustain faltering offensive operations or to defend against a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Belarusian forces continued combat exercises throughout Belarus on April 5. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that a mechanized battalion of the 120th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade prepared to deploy to an unspecified designated area to carry out further tasks and that an unspecified anti-aircraft missile regiment will hold tactical exercises at the Brest Training Ground in Brest Oblast until April 7.[71] The Belarusian MoD also noted that military recruitment offices in Grodno Oblast continue to provide mobilization resources as part of a combat readiness verification exercise in an unspecified formation of the Belarusian Western Operational Command.[72]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-will-take-corresponding-dec...

[2] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/05/vorog-spryamovuye-informacziyu-pro-boyi-u-bahmuti-dlya-psyhologichnogo-vplyvu-ale-jomu-cze-ne-vdayetsya-ganna-malyar/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-will-take-corresponding-dec...

[3] https://kremlin dot ru/events/president/70870; http://duma.gov dot ru/news/56791/

[4] https://kremlin dot ru/events/president/70870; http://duma.gov dot ru/news/56791/

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013123; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121322

[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70868

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/05/world/europe/eu-china-embassador-russ...

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[9] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1720

[10] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1720

[11] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1720

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030723

[13] https://t.me/readovkanews/56248

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032923

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XvaP348ULJjaxc4Fch...

[16] https://t.me/rybar/45460

[17] https://t.me/wargonzo/11775

[18] https://t.me/mod_russia/25387 ; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/16...

[19] https://twitter.com/JagdBandera/status/1643301887729360898; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/648; https://www.instagram.com/p/Cqm2R1ggJpO/; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1643430571282923520; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1643431087211773954

[20] https://t.me/rybar/45460; https://t.me/milinfolive/98874

[21] https://t.me/wargonzo/11775

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XvaP348ULJjaxc4Fch...

[23] https://t.me/milchronicles/1739

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82257; https://t.me/mod_russia/24345; https://t.me/mod_russia/24379

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRwGWPma2WAM97XQow... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XvaP348ULJjaxc4Fch...

[28] https://t.me/readovkanews/56224; https://t.me/wargonzo/11775

[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82235; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23964; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1643580521593597953; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1643176563779698691; https://twitter... https://twitter.com/JagdBandera/status/1643313006875385868; https://t.m... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/11775

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yRwGWPma2WAM97XQow... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XvaP348ULJjaxc4Fch...

[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/25388

[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/25384

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XvaP348ULJjaxc4Fch...

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XvaP348ULJjaxc4Fch...

[37] https://t.me/vrogov/8568 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/56227 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46545; ...

[38] https://t.me/vrogov/8568 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/56227 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46545; ...

[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030323; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012723

[40] https://news dot rambler.ru/weapon/50494012-dlya-600-uklonistov-ot-armii-zakryli-vyezd-iz-kurskoy-oblasti-i-iz-strany/; https://t.me/news63ru/34475; https://t.me/news_74ru/50035; https://74 dot ru/text/world/2023/04/04/72189359/?utm_source=telegram&%3Butm_medium=messenger&%3Butm_cam

[41] https://t.me/astrapress/24408 ; https://t.me/Taygainfo/40523 ; https://t.me/astrapress/24414 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/10694 ;

[42] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-apr-3-4?cda=

[43] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023

[44] https://www dot rbc.ru/politics/04/04/2023/642c02889a794748e738ab99?from=from_main_4

[45] https://www dot rbc.ru/politics/04/04/2023/642c02889a794748e738ab99?from=from_main_4;

[46] https://www dot rbc.ru/politics/04/04/2023/642c02889a794748e738ab99?from=from_main_4;

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[48] https://t.me/readovkanews/56211 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/56213 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46542 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/04/fsb-zayavila-ob-areste-supruzheskoy-pary-v-nizhnem-tagile-podozrevaemoy-v-shpionazhe ;

[49] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023

[50] https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/industry/docs/rus95/y_list.htm

[51] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123

[52] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2023/04/04/izbezhavshii-sanktsii-uralskii-milliarder-altushkin-finansiruet-shturmovoi-batalon-minoboroni-a38930

[53] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2023/04/04/izbezhavshii-sanktsii-uralskii-milliarder-altushkin-finansiruet-shturmovoi-batalon-minoboroni-a38930

[54] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2023/04/04/izbezhavshii-sanktsii-uralskii-milliarder-altushkin-finansiruet-shturmovoi-batalon-minoboroni-a38930;

[55] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2023/04/04/izbezhavshii-sanktsii-uralskii-milliarder-altushkin-finansiruet-shturmovoi-batalon-minoboroni-a38930;

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-volunteer-units-an...

[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82231

[58] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032423

[59] https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/03/04/kremlins-balkan...

[60] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1282; https://t.me/malvovabelova/1283; http...

[61] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1282; https://t.me/malvovabelova/1283; http...

[62] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1282; https://t.me/malvovabelova/1283; http...

[63] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1282; https://t.me/malvovabelova/1283; http...

[64] https://t.me/stormdaily/59684; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/05/tyazhelo-kogda-rebenok-govorit-s-em-moskalenka-detskiy-ombudsmen-rf-o-zhizni-s-priemnym-podrostkom-iz-mariupolya

[65] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/935

[66] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/927

[67] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/927

[68] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/927

[69] https://suspilne dot media/436323-rf-vivede-z-bilorusi-blizko-2-tisac-svoih-soldativ-dla-ucasti-u-boah-na-donbasi-dpsu/

[70] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/vadim-skibitskiy-rosiya-mozhe-vesti-viynu-1679493967.html

[71] https://t.me/modmilby/25166; https://t.me/modmilby/25195

[72] https://t.me/modmilby/25176

Our Bill Is the Best Way to Counter the TikTok Threat

The Chinese company is spreading false claims about the Restrict Act in an effort to continue operating with impunity.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/our-bill-is-the-best-way-to-counter-the-tiktok-threat-restrict-act-ban-national-security-congress-trump-20b5ac27?page=1

By John Thune and Mark Warner

April 5, 2023 5:19 pm ET

We recently introduced bipartisan legislation in the Senate that has the best chance of mitigating TikTok’s clear national-security threat to the U.S. Where other bills have obvious constitutional problems and are likely to be struck down in the courts, the Restrict Act crafts a holistic, rules-based process that is narrowly tailored to foreign-adversary companies and is more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny.

In the few weeks since we introduced this bipartisan bill, and in the days following TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew’s testimony before a congressional committee, an intense, well-funded lobbying campaign from the Chinese company has misrepresented our bill in bad faith. It isn’t hard to figure out why: There’s money to be made by allowing TikTok to continue its current operations in the U.S. and not much to be made by protecting American citizens from national-security threats.

So how did we get here, and why do we think the Restrict Act is the best solution to deal with foreign-adversary technology threats?

When President Trump tried to ban TikTok by executive order in 2020, his efforts were ultimately struck down in court. The courts ruled that Mr. Trump didn’t have the legal authority to use an executive order based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act in the service of national security. That 1977 law was written before Congress could imagine the internet or the global digital landscape of the 21st century.

Americans might be surprised to learn that our bill gives the force of law to Mr. Trump’s initial executive order in 2019, which served as the basis for his effort to ban TikTok. Our bill is designed to modernize the president’s international economic authorities for the digital era, put significant guardrails on presidential authority, give Congress the authority to overturn certain decisions made by the president, and establish a risk-based process to deal with foreign-adversary technology.

This bill doesn’t target individual users of these platforms. It doesn’t target any individual user of a virtual private network. This bipartisan bill is focused on foreign companies that operate in six specific adversary nations (China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela). The Commerce secretary would have the ability to expand the list, but Congress would retain the authority to override any potential decision.

Perhaps the most blatant misrepresentation pushed by the TikTok lobby is that our bill targets individual domestic users, who could be thrown in jail for up to 20 years for accessing TikTok through a VPN. These criminal penalties are targeted at corporations and executives who conspire to evade a mitigation order or ban—not everyday Americans. Such penalties aren’t new—they are the same penalties already included in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Mr. Trump’s executive order banning TikTok and the penalties under the Export Control Reform Act—a law signed by President Trump and supported by 87 senators—as well as in other legislative efforts to ban TikTok.

We welcome the opportunity to improve or strengthen the Restrict Act. That is the purpose of regular order and the committee process. With matters of this magnitude, it’s important to get it right.

But we shouldn’t wait until there are 150 million users of a Chinese spy app before we take action. The four most-downloaded applications in the U.S. last month were all owned by Chinese corporations, and that trend will likely continue as these applications gain prominence. Our nation is behind the ball, and we continue to play Whac-A-Mole with serious national-security threats. Before TikTok, Congress took action against Huawei and ZTE, which threatened our nation’s telecommunications networks. Before that, it was Russia’s Kaspersky Lab, which threatened the security of government devices.

We are failing to meet the security challenges of yesterday, and we are falling behind the security threats of tomorrow.

Our nation needs the ability to combat foreign-adversary technology threats. That process isn’t in place, and codifying President Trump’s executive order—supported by President Biden—is a great place to start.

Mr. Thune, a Republican, is a U.S. senator from South Dakota. Mr. Warner, a Democrat, is a U.S. senator from Virginia.

WSJ Opinion: The Bipartisan Grilling of TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew

Boeing names former U.S. diplomat to senior public policy role

Apr. 04, 2023 5:11 PM ETThe Boeing Company (BA)FBy: Rob Williams NY, SA News Editor

aapsky

Boeing (NYSE:BA) on Tuesday appointed a former U.S. deputy secretary of state as a senior executive in public policy.

Steve Biegun, who worked as special envoy for North Korea before serving as the No. 2 State Department official in the Trump administration, was named Boeing’s (BA) senior vice president of global public policy.

"Steve will deepen our efforts in developing and executing a strategic global public policy plan while helping us strengthen important relationships with key stakeholders in the U.S. and around the world," Dave Calhoun, president and CEO of Boeing (BA), said in an email to employees. Reuters first reported about Biegun's new job.

Biegun will join Boeing (BA) on April 14 and be based at the company's headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.

He is joining Boeing (BA) from Macro Advisory Partners, where he works as a consultant on public policy issues. Earlier in his career, he led global government relations for more than a decade at Ford Motor Co. (F). He also served in various senior roles in support of the National Security Council and the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

The appointment comes as the aircraft maker navigates geopolitical tensions between the United States and China, two of its biggest markets. Boeing (BA) has more than 130 of its 737 Max narrowbody jets in inventory for Chinese airlines, but has been prevented from delivering them.

China Eastern Airlines and China Southern Airlines, both owned by China’s government, last week disclosed they would begin accepting deliveries of the 737 Max this year, Reuters reported.

Now Read: Raytheon, Boeing awarded $400M contract by U.S. Air Force

4. Don’t let Beijing define the narrative of Taiwan’s relations with the world

Conclusion:

Such engagement is an indispensable part of maintaining the status quo of a “robust unofficial relationship” between Washington and Taipei. Beijing’s efforts at intimidation should not be allowed to succeed in breeding hesitation to meet with Taipei’s officials, because such success will only breed more efforts to move the goalposts, undermine confidence in the US commitment to Taiwan, and isolate Taiwan from the international community.

New Atlanticist

April 3, 2023

Don’t let Beijing define the narrative of Taiwan’s relations with the world

By Markus Garlauskas

atlanticcouncil.org · by dmalloy · April 3, 2023

China is yet again ramping up its saber-rattling over the travels of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, who is sandwiching stops in New York and Los Angeles around her ongoing trip to Central America. But that should not deter US leaders—including Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy, who plans to meet with Tsai this week in Los Angeles—from staying the course and engaging with Taiwanese officials.

Unfortunately, the media coverage of her US stopovers is not helping, as it has been dominated by the rhetoric and dire threats emanating from Beijing. Just a quick sampling of top headlines about Tsai’s travels shows how prominent this theme has been in the Western media:

At first glance, with this sort of framing, it is easy to see how this situation could be misinterpreted. To those who do not track US-Taiwan relations closely, Tsai’s transit of the United States may seem to be a rare activity, a high-stakes display of diplomatic brinksmanship amid heightened tensions, or even an intentional poke in the eye to Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping.

This framing serves Beijing’s interest in seeking to isolate Taiwan and portray both Taipei and Washington as provocateurs. The truth is, as US State Department officials have repeatedly stated, such transits are not unusual. This is the seventh time for Tsai herself.

To be clear, the United States and its friends around the world should not ignore threats from Beijing, implicit or explicit. Responsible leaders should not be complacent about the threat that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) poses to the international order as a strategic competitor and as a potential military aggressor. They should have no illusions about Xi’s willingness to use coercion and force to achieve his goals and to change the status quo. Listening, watching, and carefully assessing Xi’s “red lines” is also an important endeavor that may help to prevent a miscalculation that could lead to the most devastating war in human history. However, no country in the world should allow the near-constant stream of threats and warnings emitting from Beijing to lead it to believe that actions that are reasonable, routine, and restrained are instead risky, worrisome, and escalatory.

The high-profile visit by then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan last August was a much more unusual occurrence than a president of Taiwan having meetings in the United States while in transit to another destination. In that case, the warnings and rhetoric beforehand were even more dire than today’s, including explicit threats of military action. In the end, Beijing only employed harsh rhetoric, modest economic coercion measures, and aggressive military exercises after the visit. In short, Beijing’s bark was worse than its bite. As experts have pointed out, the military activities in particular were also not so much a reaction “provoked” by the visit, but likely long-planned exercises that used Pelosi’s trip as a pretext and justification. Therefore, there is good reason to believe such activities would have happened sooner or later, regardless of her trip.

As the world considers how Beijing might react to Tsai meeting with McCarthy this week, it is important to keep that example in mind, rather than to exaggerate the risks. It is also important to keep in mind reports that McCarthy changed his own plans to meet Tsai in Taiwan in favor of meeting her in California. This would be enough of a concession to Beijing. To openly worry and fret about how Beijing would react to this meeting going forward—or worse yet, back away from such a meeting—is just playing into Beijing’s hands and encouraging more of the same threats. The United States has an obligation to set an example for its allies and partners that countries can weather the PRC reaction to such meetings and that such dire threats are more bluster than substance.

Before her departure, Tsai struck the appropriate note. “We are calm and confident, will neither yield nor provoke. Taiwan will firmly walk on the road of freedom and democracy and go into the world. Although this road is rough, Taiwan is not alone,” she said, according to Reuters.

Like Tsai herself, the leaders of the United States and its friends and allies around the world should remain calm, cool, and confident when it comes to meeting with Taipei’s officials at home or abroad. There is no reason to go out of the way to provoke Beijing with the timing, location, or optics of such visits. However, the United States should also not allow itself to be intimidated into avoiding such engagements, nor should it allow Beijing’s bluster to overshadow their legitimacy and importance.

Such engagement is an indispensable part of maintaining the status quo of a “robust unofficial relationship” between Washington and Taipei. Beijing’s efforts at intimidation should not be allowed to succeed in breeding hesitation to meet with Taipei’s officials, because such success will only breed more efforts to move the goalposts, undermine confidence in the US commitment to Taiwan, and isolate Taiwan from the international community.

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former senior US government official, serving as both an intelligence officer and strategist.

Over-classified information hampers work with allies, top Marines say

Defense News · by Irene Loewenson · April 5, 2023

NATIONAL HARBOR, Maryland — The military’s habit of labeling too much information as classified hinders cooperation with allies, Marine generals said Monday.

Marine Commandant Gen. David Berger, speaking at a panel at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space in National Harbor, Maryland, stressed the importance of collaborating with other countries.

“Sometimes we get in our own way, by over-classifying, over-compartmentalizing,” he said. “And yet we say our strategy is underpinned by allies and partners. You can’t have it both ways.”

Partnerships are less formal relationships than alliances and don’t involve a treaty, according to a Defense Department definition.

‘Unbelievably ridiculous’: Four-star general seeks to clean up Pentagon’s classification process

Gen. John Hyten, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hopes to see “significant improvement” this year on loosening classification standards in the infamously overclassified Pentagon.

By Aaron Mehta

Berger said that top leaders within the DoD have worked to adjust classification policies to make it easier for services to train alongside other nations.

At a separate panel Monday at the Sea-Air-Space conference, the one-star general in charge of strategy and plans for the service’s plans, policies and operations department raised a similar point about classification.

“We want to have the greatest combination of naval power that the world has ever seen,” Brig. Gen. Simon Doran said. “And the way we need to do that is we need to work to the greatest extent possible to reduce the classification of as much information so that we can share more with our allies and partners.”

The over-classification problem isn’t new, nor is it unique to the Marine Corps.

The Project On Government Oversight found in 2019 that the Pentagon — long inclined toward secrecy — increased its withholding of documents from journalists during the Trump Administration. The Project on Government Oversight, an independent watchdog, termed that tendency a “war on transparency.”

The Marine leaders’ comments echo what the deputy chief of U.S. Space Command said in January.

Lt. Gen. John Shaw said over-classification had recently prevented the command from sharing information with U.S. partners, as C4ISRNET reported

In 2020, nine four-star regional commanders wrote an internal memo asking intelligence agencies to declassify more information about “pernicious conduct” by China and Russia so the United States could sway support of American allies against them, Politico reported.

About Irene Loewenson

Irene Loewenson is a staff reporter for Marine Corps Times. She joined Military Times as an editorial fellow in August 2022. She is a graduate of Williams College, where she was the editor-in-chief of the student newspaper.

6. Russia’s Vladimir Putin Blames U.S. for War in Ukraine

Must be hard for Ambassadors to transmit this message with straight faces.

Russia’s Vladimir Putin Blames U.S. for War in Ukraine

The Kremlin leader tells new ambassadors to Moscow that Washington is intentionally undermining global security

By Ann M. SimmonsFollow

Updated April 5, 2023 1:52 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-vladimir-putin-blames-u-s-for-war-in-ukraine-f61cf634

Russian President Vladimir Putin told the new U.S. ambassador to Moscow that Washington was responsible for the war in Ukraine, in comments that underscored the extent to which the relationship between Washington and Moscow has frayed over the past year.

In a televised ceremony Wednesday to accept credentials for new envoys, the Russian leader lambasted the U.S. for pursuing a foreign policy that he said had intentionally destabilized the world.

“Relations between Russia and the U.S., which directly determine global security and stability, are experiencing a deep crisis, unfortunately,” he said at the credentialing ceremony for 17 new foreign ambassadors in Moscow, including U.S. Ambassador Lynne Tracy. “It stems from fundamentally different approaches toward creating a modern world order.”

The Russian leader said that while he didn’t want to disrupt the “gracious atmosphere” of the event, he couldn’t help but tell her that Washington was to blame for the war in Ukraine.

“The use of the United States in its foreign policy of such tools as support for the so-called color revolutions”—Moscow’s term for the pro-democracy upheavals that occurred in Ukraine in 2014 and elsewhere in subsequent years—“ultimately led to the Ukrainian crisis and additionally made a negative contribution to the degradation of Russian-American relations,” Mr. Putin said.

Standing behind a podium away from the ambassadors gathered in the Kremlin’s grand St. Alexander’s Hall, Mr. Putin told Ms. Tracy that Moscow has always “advocated building Russian-American relations solely on the principles of equality, respect for each other’s sovereignty and interests, and noninterference in internal affairs.”

Zelensky Visits Poland, Urges More Military Support for Ukraine

America’s Top Hostage Envoy Pursues Freedom for Detained U.S. Citizens in Increasingly Hostile World

A ‘wrongful detention’ designation for imprisoned WSJ reporter Evan Gershkovich would escalate his case to diplomat Roger D. Carstens

https://www.wsj.com/articles/americas-top-hostage-envoy-pursues-freedom-for-detained-u-s-citizens-in-increasingly-hostile-world-34bf26c2?page=1

By James T. AreddyFollow

, Aruna ViswanathaFollow

and Nancy A. YoussefFollow

April 6, 2023 5:30 am ET

When a hostile foreign nation or group releases an imprisoned U.S. citizen, the first American to welcome them home is typically Washington’s hostage deal maker in chief, Roger D. Carstens.

The special presidential envoy for hostage affairs was on a tarmac Dec. 8 in the United Arab Emirates to meet Brittney Griner when she arrived on a Russian plane after almost 10 months in captivity. Mr. Carstens told the freed basketball star that he was there to escort her home on behalf of President Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, according to a senior Biden administration official.

It was a similar story two months earlier on a Caribbean airstrip where Mr. Carstens met a clutch of U.S. oil-industry executives at the end of their five-year odyssey through Venezuelan prisons. And once China lifted a three-year exit ban on a brother and sister from Massachusetts in September 2021, Mr. Carstens was on the scene when they landed back in the U.S.

Mr. Carstens, 58 years old, is the public face of the U.S. government’s detainee diplomacy, an undertaking that in the past few years received its own office. His ambassadorial position was established by law in 2020, and his team gets involved when the U.S. government officially determines that an American citizen has been “unlawfully or wrongfully detained” by a foreign government.

READ EVAN GERSHKOVICH’S WORK

A sampling of the WSJ’s reporter’s coverage of Vladimir Putin’s Russia and a country at war.

Mr. Blinken said Wednesday that he had “no doubt” that Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, an American who was detained by Russian security services last week while on a reporting trip and accused of espionage, was wrongfully detained. The process to reach an official determination on his detention is pending.

The Journal and the U.S. government have vehemently denied wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Gershkovich and have called for his immediate release. Mr. Gershkovich is accredited to work as a journalist in Russia by the country’s Foreign Ministry.

A formal wrongful-detention designation is rare and can take months. Ultimately, the decision rests with the U.S. secretary of state.

Such a designation would shift supervision of Mr. Gershkovich’s case to Mr. Carstens, whose office has one primary task: winning the release of detained Americans.

Since assuming his position in March 2020, Mr. Carstens has had a hand in the release of more than two-dozen American detainees and hostages, sometimes following negotiated swaps such as the one that allowed Ms. Griner to exit Russian custody.

More Americans in recent years have been detained by foreign governments on what the U.S. considers to be bogus or politicized charges than have been taken captive by terrorism groups or criminal gangs, according to U.S. authorities and private assessments.

The growing practice of what the U.S. has called hostage diplomacy—by Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela and North Korea—prompted Mr. Biden last summer to declare it a national emergency.

Brittney Griner arriving in San Antonio following her release in a prisoner swap with Russia last December.

PHOTO: MIGUEL A. NEGRON/ASSOCIATED PRESS

When a foreign government detains an American citizen, release negotiations can often be conducted over diplomatic channels. But such detentions bring new layers of geopolitical complexity to those conversations. The terms of securing a release could involve a prisoner exchange or U.S. concessions such as policy changes, diplomatic attention or humanitarian aid.

And when the deal-making is occurring between rival superpowers, the stakes grow higher.

Mr. Carstens declined requests for an interview for this article. A West Point graduate and veteran of U.S. conflicts—including Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia—Mr. Carstens is on the road regularly and has visited such places as Venezuela and Syria, where normal U.S. embassy services are suspended.

Roger D. Carstens navigates the needs of the families of detained citizens and the U.S. government.

PHOTO: KARIM JAAFAR/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

“My office is like a hospital emergency room,” he told a conference audience last month in Qatar, meaning it does what is necessary. “We want this to be government not as usual.”

That horse-trading can be risky because it is seen as inviting repeat actions if hostile governments perceive U.S. policy as being pliable. Mr. Carstens in public comments has conceded that negotiating with captors might appear to break with traditional American convention to not negotiate with hostage takers—though the Biden administration has repeatedly said it has “no higher priority than the recovery and return of Americans held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad.”

Mr. Carstens’s job requires that he navigate the needs of the family and government.

“He spends time with families in the worst circumstances imaginable, often instead of spending time with his own family because of his dedication to this,” said a senior White House official who works with Mr. Carstens.

José Pereira, one of those freed by Venezuela, recalled how Mr. Carstens visited him and fellow Americans in a Caracas prison every three months, and when the U.S. official didn’t show up as expected on Sept. 30, they grew nervous. A day later, they were released. Once they were airborne toward the U.S., Mr. Carstens lent Mr. Pereira his mobile phone to alert folks in Texas that he had been freed. (Mr. Biden had already telephoned Mr. Pereira’s wife.)

Mr. Carstens also shepherds detainee cases through Washington bureaucracy and assuages their family members.

José Pereira and his wife, Mervis, in San Antonio last October shortly after his release from Venezuela.

PHOTO: PEREIRA FAMILY

Many detainee families, a major constituency for Mr. Carstens, give him high marks for personal attention to their plight, including quick responses to their questions. Mr. Carstens has said one of his goals is to respond to email within 24 hours.

The U.S. has become increasingly willing to engage nations despite strained relations when the freedom of citizens is at stake. “We separate the idea of diplomacy and our efforts to free Americans who are held overseas,” State Department spokesman Ned Price said in December.

Last September, Mr. Carstens drew attention to the work of the Vatican on behalf of hostages with a visit there that the State Department described as a chance to “engage with Holy See officials and stakeholders on matters related to the prevention and resolution of wrongful detention and hostage cases worldwide.”

Appointed in the final year of the Trump administration, Mr. Carstens stayed on to serve in the Biden administration. Known in Washington parlance as the SPEHA (pronounced SPEE-ha), Mr. Carstens has an ambassador rank at the State Department with a staff of around 30.

Designation by the U.S. government as a wrongful detainee is relatively rare. Some 99% of Americans held overseas face legal troubles where the U.S. doesn’t conclude that they have been treated improperly, though it does provide them with consular assistance.

Evan Gershkovich ‘Belongs in This Newsroom’: WSJ Journalists Speak Out

China, Russia propaganda wither as cameras multiply, US admiral says

c4isrnet.com · by Colin Demarest · April 5, 2023

NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. — The proliferation of cameras now in use around the world make it increasingly difficult for China and Russia to control the narrative in international disputes, according to a senior U.S. Navy intelligence official.

Photographs and other documentation of run-ins between Chinese and Russian forces and those of other countries have proven critical to debunking propaganda, establishing factual timelines and holding Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin to account, Rear Adm. Mike Studeman said April 5 at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space conference in National Harbor, Maryland.

Among recent examples, he said, was Russian harassment of a U.S. Air Force intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance drone, which splashed into the Black Sea after an in-air collision in March. Footage captured by the MQ-9 Reaper — and quickly made public — showed two Russian Su-27 jets flying erratically, dumping fuel and the crash that ultimately forced it down.

“The affected party or a monitoring party, essentially, now is able to take that and say, ‘This is what’s really going on. China, do you stand by it? Xi Jinping, do you stand by it? This is you, right?’” said Studeman, commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence. “There’s a statement: Sunlight is the best disinfectant. That applies right here.”

Cameras have recorded alleged war crimes by Russian troops in Ukraine and intercepts of aircraft across the world. China conducted more than 100 intercepts of U.S. aircraft in international airspace between 2021 and 2023, according to the admiral’s presentation at the conference.

U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mike Studeman discusses "Chinese high-risk behaviors" at the Navy League's Sea-Air-Space conference in National Harbor, Maryland, on April 5, 2023. (Colin Demarest/C4ISRNET)

Cameras, too, documented an attempted blinding by a Chinese ship of a Philippine coast guard crew in February. Luckily, Studeman said, the “Philippines and others are getting wise to this, and what they’re doing is they’re actually recording.”

“Their best weapon system is not a gun, it’s not a missile,” he said. “Their best weapon system is actually a camera or video camera to be able to show the world what’s really happening.”

Pentagon officials consider China and Russia premier national security threats. The U.S. military, as a result, spends countless hours monitoring their respective maneuvers, fortifications and investments.

If bad-faith behavior is not exposed, it will continue to “thrive in the shadows, like a mushroom,” said Studeman, who previously served as the director of intelligence at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

“Staying silent in this world that I just described, that China’s painting, is not an option,” he said, “and will not advance our security interests or those of any other nation out there.”

About Colin Demarest

Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

9. Big Balikatan: Annual US-Philippines exercise to be bigger than ever

Excerpts:

The Chinese Embassy separately warned in a recent statement that the Philippine government’s security cooperation with Washington “will drag the Philippines into the abyss of geopolitical strife and damage its economic development at the end of the day.”

The long-seething territorial conflicts have persisted as a major irritant in Philippine-China relations early in the six-year term of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Since Marcos took office last year, his administration has filed at least 77 diplomatic protests against China’s increasingly assertive actions in the disputed waters, out of more than 200 such protests that have been lodged.

The Philippines used to host two of the largest U.S. Navy and Air Force bases outside the American mainland. The bases were shut down in the early 1990s after the Philippine Senate rejected an extension, but American forces later returned for large-scale combat exercises with Filipino troops under a Visiting Forces Agreement.

Big Balikatan: Annual US-Philippines exercise to be bigger than ever

navytimes.com · by Geoff Ziezulewicz · April 5, 2023

More than 12,000 U.S. troops from all four branches will join thousands of their Philippine counterparts next week as part of the annual Balikatan exercise in and around the island nation, the largest iteration of the annual event in its 38 years.

This year’s exercise, which starts April 11, follows an announcement Monday that Manila will give U.S. forces access to four additional bases, all of which face the South China Sea, with multiple sites in northern Cagayan province less than 400 miles from Taiwan.

The new basing agreement has predictably irked China, which has increasingly sought to claim the international waters of the South China Sea as its own.

All told, 5,400 Philippine troops will join about 12,200 U.S. personnel in the 17-day Balikatan event, with just more than 100 Australian troops joining in as well, U.S. officials said in a release announcing the exercise.

That’s nearly double the 9,000 troops who took part in last year’s exercise.

A return to the Philippines

The longtime ally could again host U.S. naval forces in the not-too-distant future.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command officials did not immediately confirm whether any of this year’s maneuvers would take place on the Philippine bases now accessible to American forces under the deal announced this week.

Balikatan will feature the new 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment, a stand-in force created to reflect the requirements of an island-hopping fight against the Chinese military. Officials said late last year that the unit will reach initial operational capability by September.

The Navy will be steaming in the area with transport dock ships John P. Murtha and Anchorage carrying the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

On the Army side, an infantry brigade will take part in Balikatan, as will combat aviation and air defense artillery brigades.

The Air Force is sending its 13th Air Expeditionary Group, which includes fighter, attack, airlift, air control and engineering squadrons.

Special forces from all four services will also take part, according to officials.

The countries will operate together on maritime security missions and amphibious operations, as well as live-fire training and airborne operations, according to U.S. officials.

Forces will also practice counterterrorism, cyber defense, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance missions.

Marine Corps Cpl. Ethan Barker, right, and Staff Sgt. Gilter Rambo, a member of the Philippine military, establish a firing position with an M3A1 multi-rocket weapon system during the annual Balikatan exercise in the Philippines on April 3, 2022. (Cpl. Scott Aubuchon/Marine Corps)

While it remains unclear how Beijing will react to the large exercise in what it considers its own backyard, Chinese leaders have already pushed back on stronger ties between the two countries.

In a closed-door meeting in Manila with their Philippine counterparts last month, a Chinese Foreign Ministry delegation expressed its strong opposition to an expanded U.S. military presence in the Philippines and warned of its repercussions to regional peace and stability, Philippine officials said.

The Chinese Embassy separately warned in a recent statement that the Philippine government’s security cooperation with Washington “will drag the Philippines into the abyss of geopolitical strife and damage its economic development at the end of the day.”

The long-seething territorial conflicts have persisted as a major irritant in Philippine-China relations early in the six-year term of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Since Marcos took office last year, his administration has filed at least 77 diplomatic protests against China’s increasingly assertive actions in the disputed waters, out of more than 200 such protests that have been lodged.

The Philippines used to host two of the largest U.S. Navy and Air Force bases outside the American mainland. The bases were shut down in the early 1990s after the Philippine Senate rejected an extension, but American forces later returned for large-scale combat exercises with Filipino troops under a Visiting Forces Agreement.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

About Geoff Ziezulewicz

Geoff is a senior staff reporter for Military Times, focusing on the Navy. He covered Iraq and Afghanistan extensively and was most recently a reporter at the Chicago Tribune. He welcomes any and all kinds of tips at geoffz@militarytimes.com.

10. With Russia’s Exit, Norway Becomes Europe’s Energy Champion

Excerpts:

That money flows into a $1.3 trillion sovereign wealth fund formally called the Government Pension Fund Global but known to many as the oil fund. It holds, on average, 1.5 percent of 9,000 listed companies worldwide, and the government can tap its expected annual earnings to finance almost 20 percent of the state budget. This arrangement helps shield the Norwegian economy, which grew 3.3 percent in 2022, from the ups and downs of oil and gas prices.

But whether the Norwegian industry’s bumper profits will continue is another question. European gas prices have been falling for months, and are now around one-eighth of the peak they hit last summer. And the war may actually accelerate the continent’s shift from gas to renewable energy that was underway before the invasion.

The riches earned since the fighting started have angered some Norwegians. “We consider that profit as war profits,” said Rasmus Hansson, a member of Parliament from the Green Party. He suggested that the money should be invested in a fund to aid Ukraine and other countries affected by the war.

Producing oil and gas, as well as large amounts of hydropower, did not protect Norwegians from the soaring electric costs that hit most Europeans last year, because its markets are closely linked to its neighbors’.

With Russia’s Exit, Norway Becomes Europe’s Energy Champion

The New York Times · by Stanley Reed · April 6, 2023

The city of Stavanger is Norway’s energy hub. Credit...Thomas Ekstrom for The New York Times

It is now the continent’s largest supplier of natural gas, and last year the country’s energy earnings jumped $100 billion.

The city of Stavanger is Norway’s energy hub. Credit...Thomas Ekstrom for The New York Times

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Stanley Reed, who writes on energy from London, traveled to Oslo and Stavanger in Norway to report this article.

April 6, 2023

The new front line for Europe’s energy security is a modest office building overlooking a fjord in Stavanger, Norway. Inside, a company called Petoro oversees three dozen of the largest oil and natural gas fields in Europe, on Norway’s petroleum-rich continental shelf.

These operations — in Norwegian waters marked by massive offshore platforms and wells snaking thousands of feet below the surface — have been instrumental in helping Europe heat its homes and generate electricity since the onset of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

As Russia throttled back natural gas exports last year, Norway dialed them up, and it is now Europe’s main supplier of the fuel. Norway is also feeding greater quantities of oil to its neighbors, replacing embargoed Russian oil.

“The war and the whole energy situation has demonstrated that Norwegian energy is extremely important for Europe,” said Kristin Fejerskov Kragseth, the chief executive of Petoro, a state-owned company that manages Norway’s petroleum holdings. “We were always important,” she added, “but maybe we didn’t realize it.”

The significance of this elevated status is not lost on Norway, a nation of 5.5 million people, where energy represents about a third of economic output and where, not unlike Saudi Arabia, the government owns not only the oil and gas fields but also large stakes in companies extracting them. By increasing demand for this energy, the war in Ukraine has helped add about $100 billion to Norway’s oil and gas earnings.

Many in Norway have mixed feelings about this reliance on fossil fuels, and tensions over climate change and further exploring for petroleum dominated the last national election, in 2021. But the sudden importance of energy supplies appears to have given rise to a consensus that the country should continue, at least for a few years, producing robust amounts of petroleum.

The war “has changed the political sentiment,” said Ulf Sverdrup, the director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, a research organization. “Basically, Europe said: ‘Hey! We need your energy.’”

Equinor’s headquarters in Oslo. The company reported adjusted earnings of $75 billion last year, a record. Credit...Thomas Ekstrom for The New York Times

“We were always important, but maybe we didn’t realize it,” said Kristin Fejerskov Kragseth, the chief executive of Petoro, which oversees Norway’s extensive energy interests. Credit...Thomas Ekstrom for The New York Times

A small country with a border with Russia, Norway is not a member of the European Union, but it listens closely to its neighbors. After the war started, Brussels and European nations, especially Germany, which had depended heavily on Russian gas, leaned on Oslo for help.

“Norway’s contribution to Europe has been to uphold gas exports and to increase them,” Jonas Gahr Store, Norway’s prime minister, said in an interview.

The State of the War

Finland’s Entry to NATO: The Nordic country officially became the military alliance’s 31st member, in what amounts to a strategic defeat for President Vladimir Putin of Russia.
Drone Warfare: Using aerial drones to spot the enemy and direct artillery fire has become a staple of war for Ukraine and Russia, especially in the fiercely contested city of Bakhmut.
Killing of Pro-War Blogger: Russian authorities detained a suspect in the bombing that killed a popular military blogger in St. Petersburg and blamed Ukraine and Russian opposition activists for the attack.
Counteroffensive Challenges: With powerful Western weapons and newly formed assault units, Ukraine is poised for a critical spring campaign. But overcoming casualties and keeping troops motivated will be difficult tests.

Norway was already producing a high volume of gas, shipping it through undersea pipelines to northern Europe, but the government authorized additional output. Energy companies made adjustments that increased gas production at the expense of oil. The result was an 8 percent increase in gas production last year, which made Norway the source of about one-third of the gas consumed in Europe.

“We really kind of stepped up in terms of turning every stone,” said Anders Opedal, the chief executive of Equinor, Norway’s state-controlled energy producer.

Norway has reaped handsome financial rewards for coming to Europe’s aid. Just as energy companies like Shell and BP pulled in record profits last year, Petoro earned about $50 billion in 2022, almost three times what it made in 2021, and Equinor reported record adjusted earnings of $75 billion. Revenues from oil and gas contributed $125 billion to the Norwegian state in 2022, according to government estimates — about $100 billion more than in 2021.

New investments have reinvigorated Stavanger, where many jobs rely on the energy industry.Credit...Thomas Ekstrom for The New York Times

That money flows into a $1.3 trillion sovereign wealth fund formally called the Government Pension Fund Global but known to many as the oil fund. It holds, on average, 1.5 percent of 9,000 listed companies worldwide, and the government can tap its expected annual earnings to finance almost 20 percent of the state budget. This arrangement helps shield the Norwegian economy, which grew 3.3 percent in 2022, from the ups and downs of oil and gas prices.

But whether the Norwegian industry’s bumper profits will continue is another question. European gas prices have been falling for months, and are now around one-eighth of the peak they hit last summer. And the war may actually accelerate the continent’s shift from gas to renewable energy that was underway before the invasion.

The riches earned since the fighting started have angered some Norwegians. “We consider that profit as war profits,” said Rasmus Hansson, a member of Parliament from the Green Party. He suggested that the money should be invested in a fund to aid Ukraine and other countries affected by the war.

Producing oil and gas, as well as large amounts of hydropower, did not protect Norwegians from the soaring electric costs that hit most Europeans last year, because its markets are closely linked to its neighbors’.

“It was four times as expensive as a normal year,” said Svein W. Kristiansen, an owner of Smed T. Kristiansen, a family firm in Stavanger that makes parts for oil installations and offshore wind farms.

Norway should be able to maintain its high gas flows to Europe in the coming years. In 2020, the government put into effect temporary tax changes to ensure that the pandemic did not halt investment in the industry. These incentives have led to a burst of new drilling and development, worth an estimated $43 billion.

An oil and gas company based outside Oslo, Aker BP, plans to invest $19 billion to increase output by a third by 2028. “We are drilling exploration wells all the time,” said Karl Johnny Hersvik, the chief executive.

Over the next few years, output from these new fields should be enough to offset the declines from older ones, according to Mathias Schioldborg, an analyst at Rystad Energy, a Norwegian-based consulting firm. Scenarios modeled by the government show oil and gas output in Norway reaching a peak toward the end of this decade, followed by a long decline.

It is doubtful, though, that Norway can supply significantly more gas to Europe. The network of pipelines feeding Norwegian gas to the continent has little additional capacity.

Karl Johnny Hersvik, the chief executive of Aker BP, an oil and gas company that plans to invest $19 billion to increase output by a third by 2028.Credit...Thomas Ekstrom for The New York Times

Aker BP’s engineers monitor offshore drilling from Stavanger.Credit...Thomas Ekstrom for The New York Times

“We are running as much as we can and as hard as we can,” Mr. Hersvik said. The case for building additional pipelines to Europe is weak, he said, because around 20 years of operation would be needed to recoup the investment cost. “I sincerely hope we have solved this problem before that,” he said, referring to the war in Ukraine.

Pressures for Norway to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and curb the oil and gas industry are not likely to go away. Mr. Hansson, the Green Party legislator, said he thought Norway should phase out fossil fuels by around 2035 to safeguard the climate.

Environmental groups concede that natural gas production is needed because of the war, but they say the government should not use the energy crunch as leverage to develop new oil and gas fields that would produce fossil fuels for many years.

“Norway is locking Europe into what is really a problem for the climate,” said Frode Pleym, the head of Greenpeace in Norway.

Like most European countries, Norway has begun a transition to cleaner energy. The oil and gas industry is investing in offshore wind farms and seeking to cut emissions from oil and gas production by powering pumps and other gear with electricity instead of gas or diesel.

But this transition worries some people in the industry who suspect that renewable technologies won’t generate enough well-paid jobs to sustain the roughly 6 percent of the labor force now working in oil and gas.

Hilde-Marit Rysst, the leader of a union that represents 12,000 energy workers, said she worried about the impact of the energy transition on jobs. Credit...Thomas Ekstrom for The New York Times

Hilde-Marit Rysst, the leader of SAFE, a union that represents 12,000 energy workers, said working on petroleum platforms was more stimulating and rewarding than the work available in the renewable energy industry.

“You use your brain, your education and your experience,” she said. “It doesn’t look like you are going to get that from wind turbines.”

Stavanger, a pretty city with old wooden houses built around the fjord, has been Norway’s oil and gas hub for 50 years. It has been hit by job losses in last decade — first from the collapse of oil prices in 2014 and then from the pandemic — but new investments have reinvigorated the city.

Its mayor, Kari Nessa Nordtun, seems prepared to embrace whatever comes along. “I am a proud oil kid,” Ms. Nordtun said, but she also applauded companies that once focused on the oil business for “putting money and people into renewables.”

Still, there are nearly 50,000 jobs in the Stavanger region related to oil and gas compared with around 1,000 in green energy.

Analysts say the Norwegian government is pragmatic and likely to shape the country’s energy industry so that it stays in line with the energy policies of the European Union and the demand of European neighbors like Germany.

“For Norway to have a future,” said Mr. Sverdrup, the director of the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, “we have to be aligned to the future energy system in Europe.”

Stavanger’s mayor, Kari Nessa Nordtun, is “a proud oil kid” who also favors clean energy.Credit...Thomas Ekstrom for The New York Times

Henrik Pryser Libell contributed reporting from Oslo, and Erika Solomon from Berlin.

The New York Times · by Stanley Reed · April 6, 2023

11. Taiwan Rivals Tsai and Ma in Overseas Travel Flurry

No one seems to get upset about Ma's meeting with Chinese officials. (note sarcasm)

Excerpt:

At any rate, while Tsai on April 5 met with US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California during a stopover after visiting Guatemala and Belize, two of Taipei's dwindling group of official allies, Ma visited the hometown of his ancestors in Hunan Province and, despite the unofficial nature of his visit, held meetings with Chinese officials.

POLITICS

Taiwan Rivals Tsai and Ma in Overseas Travel Flurry

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/taiwan-tsai-ing-wen-ma-ying-jeou-travel-flurry?publication_id=23934&post_id=113042682&isFreemail=false

But Kuomintang likely too sidelined for mainland trip to matter

1 min ago

By: Jens Kastner

The current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the US is widely seen as strengthening Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ahead of the presidential election in January 2024 to the benefit of US geopolitical interests, while the former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou's simultaneous unprecedented trip to China is falling flat in positioning Ma’s Kuomintang (KMT) as the only power that can help Taiwan stay clear of war. The overseas trips by the two have acquired added importance with the island facing general elections next January 24 which are expected to give voters a choice between keeping the growing ties Tsai is forging with Washington or returning to the relatively safer haven of the Beijing-friendly Kuomintang.

In the longer run, even a dalliance with the KMT is unlikely to have much effect on Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s plans, however. As Steve Tsang, Director of the University of London’s SOAS China Institute, predicts, Ma’s visit may not help whoever will be the KMT candidate in the 2024 race, as it may make merely the KMT look too ready to compromise with Beijing and be taken advantage of to an island population that appears to have passed the point of going back to rejoining China as an obedient state.

“Xi Jinping has decided what he wants to do with Taiwan, and I doubt that either the Ma visit or the Tsai visit will change how Xi sees Taiwan and how he intends to deal with Taiwan in any significant way,” Tsang said. “When Xi is ready to seize Taiwan, he will attempt to do so, whether Taiwan will have a DPP or KMT administration will be incidental.”

At any rate, while Tsai on April 5 met with US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California during a stopover after visiting Guatemala and Belize, two of Taipei's dwindling group of official allies, Ma visited the hometown of his ancestors in Hunan Province and, despite the unofficial nature of his visit, held meetings with Chinese officials.

Since Russia’s February 2021 invasion of Ukraine, the US administration under President Joe Biden has been authorizing weapons sales to Taiwan in ever-shorter intervals and granting Taiwan near-formal recognition by facilitating high-profile meetings between Tsai and prominent US politicians. Meanwhile, the KMT has been warming up its China ties in a series of meetings between KMT officials and Chinese officials in China. These seem to have had some positive impact, as they were closely followed by China lifting import bans on a range of Taiwanese aquatic products and processed foods and agreeing to reestablish several direct flight routes between Taiwanese and Chinese cities. Ma’s trip to China is also framed by the KMT as contributing to reducing tension across the Taiwan Strait.

Neither Tsai nor Ma will be running in next year’s elections. So far, Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s vice president and the DPP chairman, has registered to run in the DPP’s presidential primary, along with Ko Wen-je, chairman of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) and former mayor of Taipei. The KMT remains undecided, with Hou Youyi, the mayor of New Taipei, seeming the most likely candidate. Terry Gou, the billionaire founder of major Apple supplier Foxconn, said he will seek the presidential nomination for the KMT, but his chances are slim, given that he left the KMT four years ago after losing in the primaries for the 2020 elections.

Multiple opinion polls conducted before the two political leaders’ trips to the U.S. and China respectively show Lai leading,, which tallies with an informal assessment by Asia Sentinel on April 5, the day Tsai met US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, which suggests that the DPP’s lead is being cemented.

Shen Yu-chung, a political scientist at Taiwan’s Tunghai University, thinks that overall, Tsai’s itinerary is more conducive to the DDP’s presidential election than Ma’s is to the KMT’s electoral prospects.

“Ma’s trip to the mainland did not receive any official approval from China, and although he used the terms ‘Republic of China’ and ‘former president’ many times when in mainland China, he did not receive a positive response from the Chinese Communist Party, meaning all that Ma has said is categorized as personal statement by China only,” Shen said. “By contrast, when President Tsai visited the US, she met McCarthy with a very high standard and was called ‘Taiwan's president’ and emphasized that the deepening of Taiwan-US relations is more in line with Taiwan's current interests.”

This, Shen went on to explain, can be expected to prove beneficial for the DPP in the election, as cross-strait relations will still be the main axis, and the role of the US is very important. “If the Kuomintang only follows the pro-China line, it will not be able to make a breakthrough in Taiwan-US relations, and it will still not be able to gain an advantage in the election,” Shen said.

Peter Fitzgerald, the owner of a Taipei-based exhibition booth builder company, also believes that Tsai’s trip is more popular among the Taiwanese public. He sees Ma’s trip as reflecting that the KMT has no plausible strategy, and he noted that although former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) had a promising start when becoming mayor in 2014, Ko has since lost much of his appeal.

“Ko started off good but became a narcist, as illustrated by him holding daily press conferences during Covid in which he would talk for an hour even nothing happened,” Fitzgerald said.

12. Opinion | Listen to Taiwan’s pleas, not China’s grumbles

I would use the Chinese protests in New York to show the Chinese people in the PRC what they cannot do in their own country. On the other hand they would probably interpret that as a weakness in America that America cannot defend itself from the superior Chinese system.

Excerpt:

Tsai said Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a “wake-up call” that forced Taiwan to think hard about how it would respond in a similar situation. But while military preparations proceed, she said, the international community needs to help Taipei fight the tactics Beijing is using right now, including cyberwarfare, information warfare and interference in domestic Taiwanese politics. And more countries must make it clear to China that nonmilitary aggression is also unacceptable to the international community and will incur serious economic costs.

“Our strategy, while also making the [military] preparations, is to tell [China] that is very costly and these nonmilitary means that you are taking are not going to be useful,” she said. “So Taiwan and the rest of the world have to get together to find a way to tell the Chinese that war is not an option.”

New Yorkers got a glimpse of Beijing’s efforts to demonize Tsai and drown out her message last week. Protesters, including groups connected to the Chinese Communist Party’s influence network, shouted insults outside her hotel. Chinese officials then cited those same protests as evidence that Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party are “troublemakers” who are using the United States to seek independence from China, aided by “some forces in the U.S.”

Opinion | Listen to Taiwan’s pleas, not China’s grumbles

The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · April 5, 2023

When Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen meets a group of senior U.S. lawmakers including House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) on Wednesday, Beijing will try to shift the focus to its own anger and perceived grievances. Instead, Americans should listen to what Tsai has to say: She is calling for more help to counter China’s efforts to intimidate Taiwan and interfere in its democracy.

Tsai’s meeting with members of Congress in Simi Valley, Calif., is referred to by the governments in Washington and Taipei only as a “transit” stop — a way of playing down the diplomatic significance of the trip. (She’ll be arriving in California from a tour of Central America.) This is indicative of the kind of nonsense Taiwanese leaders must go through to avoid provoking Beijing’s ire each time they visit the United States. The Wall Street Journal called her visit “purposely low-key.”

But Beijing’s response is never “low-key.” And Tsai’s restraint can mute her message, especially in an information environment awash with Chinese government propaganda. This dynamic was on display when Tsai visited New York last week to receive an award from the Hudson Institute. After discussions with the Biden administration, Tsai agreed to keep most press out. But my Post colleagues published some of her remarks, working from a recording they obtained.

What hasn’t yet been reported from the event is how Tsai described China’s escalating daily campaign of political, economic and psychological aggression against Taiwan, which is the main message she came to the United States to deliver. Tsai urged her American audience to understand that while the threat of military invasion can’t be ignored, China’s real plan is to force Taiwan to submit through nonmilitary means.

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“I think the Chinese have this belief that the best way to win the war is without war,” she said at the Hudson event, which I attended. “So what they want to do is to harass us, to apply pressure on us and to continue to do whatever that they can do to make us feel uneasy and scared. That’s their strategy.”

Tsai said Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a “wake-up call” that forced Taiwan to think hard about how it would respond in a similar situation. But while military preparations proceed, she said, the international community needs to help Taipei fight the tactics Beijing is using right now, including cyberwarfare, information warfare and interference in domestic Taiwanese politics. And more countries must make it clear to China that nonmilitary aggression is also unacceptable to the international community and will incur serious economic costs.

“Our strategy, while also making the [military] preparations, is to tell [China] that is very costly and these nonmilitary means that you are taking are not going to be useful,” she said. “So Taiwan and the rest of the world have to get together to find a way to tell the Chinese that war is not an option.”

New Yorkers got a glimpse of Beijing’s efforts to demonize Tsai and drown out her message last week. Protesters, including groups connected to the Chinese Communist Party’s influence network, shouted insults outside her hotel. Chinese officials then cited those same protests as evidence that Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party are “troublemakers” who are using the United States to seek independence from China, aided by “some forces in the U.S.”

None of that is true. Tsai is a sober, sophisticated, strategic leader who has done her best to balance defending Taiwan’s democracy in the face of enormous pressures with the need to avoid all-out confrontation with China. The Chinese Communist Party has done Taiwan and China an extraordinary disservice by refusing to engage with her over the past seven years. Now Beijing is trying to pick her successor in next year’s election and courting her political opposition.

“We have neighbors who also want to participate [in our elections],” Tsai said in New York. “So you end up having an additional party in our democracy and in our politics.”

Beijing is also trying to interfere in U.S. politics, planning to retaliate after the U.S. lawmakers meet with Tsai. The McCarthy meeting in California is meant to be less provocative than his planned trip to Taiwan (which might still happen), but that didn’t stop China’s top diplomat in Washington from warning last week that it “could lead to another serious confrontation in the China-U.S. relationship.” The saber-rattling has already started; 10 Chinese aircraft crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait on Saturday — a typically bellicose reaction to her stop in New York.

The Biden administration is trying to minimize Beijing’s reaction while working quietly to deepen cooperation with Taiwan and rally other countries such as Japan to the cause. But there are real concerns about the pace of defensive preparations, a backlog in weapons deliveries, disagreements about defensive priorities and a lack of U.S. attention to the trade and investment side of the relationship.

“We haven’t focused enough on the political and economic realms of how to support Taiwan and combat the type of coercive campaign that the PRC is constantly engaged in,” Russell Hsiao, executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute, told me. “We need to think more holistically about the ways in which we support Taiwan.”

By threatening war, Beijing plays into Washington’s reflex to think of Taiwan as an irritant in U.S.-China relations rather than as a proud but vulnerable democracy struggling for survival and a crucial contributor to the world economy. Beijing’s gaslighting must not distract Taiwan’s partners from the realization that the fight over Taiwan’s future is already well underway.

The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · April 5, 2023

13. EXPLAINED: Why Poland Is So Important

EXPLAINED: Why Poland Is So Important

Poland has been at the vanguard of so much European history – especially in the past century. Ukraine along with other countries are now following her lead.

by Kyiv Post | April 6, 2023, 10:04 am

kyivpost.com

Yesterday President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Poland, where he received the prestigious White Eagle award established more than 300 years ago.

The White Eagle is the oldest and highest decoration of the Republic of Poland, awarded for great civil and military merits for the country. It’s rarely given to non-Poles. And now Zelensky joins the ranks of Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa and Saint John Paul II as post-World War II recipients.

What has Zelensky done for Poland?

Apart from being a paradigm of courage and a role model on how to stand up to the Russian giant next door, Zelensky and Ukraine’s resistance have turned Poland into the geostrategic lynchpin of Europe.

Poland, along with the Baltic states, is leading the way in bringing aid to Ukraine. Whether it’s by actually supplying weapon systems, or merely announcing their willingness to do so, they oblige other NATO allies to follow suit.

The sleepy Polish town of Rzeszów has now become Grand Central Station for all manner of NATO materiel and personnel.

Poland was already allocating 2.42% of its GDP to its defense budget even before the Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. In January, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawieck declared that Poland will increase its defense spending to 4% of GDP.

As military analyst Hans Petter Midttun pointed out in Kyiv Post, “Poland’s army has 170,000 soldiers presently. On par with Germany today, it plans to build ‘the largest land army in Europe’ with 300,000 men and women comprising 250,000 professional soldiers and 50,000 civil defense personnel.”

In short, with Russia having scattered the geopolitical cards by flipping the table over, Poland is now a force to be reckoned with. And its clout will be felt increasingly in Brussels, both at the EU and NATO headquarters.

Does Ukraine acknowledge Poland’s help?

Constantly. In fact, Zelensky himself repeated at a press conference in Poland yesterday: “I will never get tired of thanking the ordinary Polish people who have been helping the ordinary Ukrainian people since the beginning of the Russian invasion. Ukraine will never forget your humane attitude towards Ukrainians.”

Since the first days of the full-on attack, millions of Ukrainian refugees have funneled through Poland to settle abroad. More than 1.5 million of them have chosen to stay in Poland.

By all accounts the Polish welcome has been extraordinary. Not only does one find blue and yellow flags all over Polish cities, but the train stations near the border are full of bulletin board notices in Ukrainian for available jobs.

Is there a risk of Ukraine fatigue?

Absolutely. With so many Ukrainians flooding into the country, combined with their ability to assimilate quickly into a culture with a similar language and many shared historical ties, some Poles are expressing fear of the “Ukrainianization of Poland.”

in Kyiv Post: “Ukrainians must heed the new realities that will culminate in the approaching Polish elections.”

The ruling Law and Justice party, which has been staunchly pro-Ukrainian, will likely form a coalition with the Konfederacja party.

“The initial enthusiasm to help Ukrainian refugees is waning in Poland. The Ukrainian war is a strain on Poland,” Borowski claims. “For its part, Konfederacja is trying to exploit the growing discontent in Polish society to its advantage. Grzegorz Braun, a prominent Konfederacja MP, openly protests against what he calls the Ukrainization of Poland.”

To aggravate matters, Moscow has long supported pro-Russian elements in Polish society that exploit historic antagonism between Ukraine and Poland.

Does that mean the Poles and Ukrainians have not always been friends?

The history between Poland and Ukraine is long, with intervals of enmity and alliance.

Before Moscow took control of Ukrainian lands in the late 17th century, most of the populated regions west of the Dnipro were colonized by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Poles, and before them the Lithuanians, had come in gradually after the Mongol invasion of 1240 destroyed Kyivan Rus, leading to a depopulation of now Ukrainian lands.

At one point, in 1648, the Cossacks rose up against the Polish nobility and began a campaign that led to years of war and chaos. For Poland is was the beginning of its decline from regional superpower to partition and absorption by neighboring empires. In fact, historians in Poland refer to the period after the Cossack uprising as “the Deluge”; whereas for the Cossacks that same infelicitous period came to be known as “the Ruin.”

When the dust had settled, Peter the Great and his new Russian Empire were the regional superpower.

Since then, both Poles and Ukrainians have had to contend with Moscow as an existentialist threat to their very identity.

Wasn’t there trouble in the 20th century?

Undeniably. Poland, which had been annihilated as a state in the 19th century, had just re-established itself after World War I. Ukraine tried to do the same, but was ultimately thwarted by the Bolsheviks.

As a result, the new Republic of Poland ruled over western Ukrainian lands that were not as homogenous as they are today.

The end of World War II saw major ethnic-cleansing all over Europe, and the area near what is today the Polish-Ukrainian border was no exception. Poles were forced to go west and Ukrainians were forced to go east. Poles, in particular, recall the Volhyn massacres perpetrated by Ukrainians. Ukrainians, too, saw their villages destroyed.

So today, while the younger generations have relegated the enmity to history books, many of the older people still remember their parents’ accounts.

How to go forward?

One of Ukraine’s staunchest Polish-American supporters was Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017), former National Security Advisor for U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

Brzezinski, whose family came from Ukraine’s Ternopil region, always understood that Ukraine and Poland must maintain a Western-leaning position in this era and remain united if they are to definitively break free from Russia’s yoke.

In December 2013, when the Maidan protests were in full swing, Brzezinski wrote: “The events in Ukraine are historically irreversible and geopolitically transformatory. Sooner rather than later, Ukraine will be truly a part of democratic Europe; later rather than sooner, Russia will follow unless it isolates itself and becomes a semi-stagnant imperialistic relic.”

Poland has led the way. Ukraine is following. And Russia? Who knows.

kyivpost.com

14. Special Forces Medic - "18D Training Today" | SOF News

Special Forces Medics are the best in the world. I remember attending a briefing at the JSOMTC and the commander (a medical doctor) said that they called the SF Medic a "wilderness doctor" who is capable of performing every medical procedure a doctor could perform in the "wilderness" using only the SF medic's aid bag.

One reason we train SF medics to such a high standard is because we expect an SF team to be deployed to remote areas where there is no evacuation possible that will give a wounded soldier the "golden hour."

Special Forces Medic - "18D Training Today" | SOF News

sof.news · by Guest · April 6, 2023

By How Miller.

Imagine, if you will, how excited I was to be invited to tour the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center (JSOMTC) on my trip to Fort Bragg. Training has evolved tremendously since I became a 91B4S Special Forces Medical Aidman in 1968. Their mission is to merely produce the finest medics in the world.

Thanks to fellow Chapter 78 member, Dennis DeRosia, having invited two head trainers, Mike Jones and Pat Buckles, to join his 91B vs 18D presentation at SFACON 2021 in Las Vegas, they were happy to return the favor and continue the process of highlighting what is on offer for today’s top candidates. My former teammate at A325 Duc Hue in Vietnam, Lew Chapman, and I were treated like extra special VIPs. We helped return the favor with a presentation of what it was like to be a 91B (medic) and 05B (commo man) on an A team at a fun working lunch in their lecture hall.

Nowadays this is an integrated SOF training, including providing SOCOM Medics to be Ranger Medics, SOAR Flight Medics, Civil Affairs Med SGTs, and other USASOC Medics, while some will continue on to be 18D Special Forces Medical Sergeants, or Naval Special Operations Independent Duty Corpsmen.

All students go first through the 9-month 68W1 course. That begins with National Registry EMT basic and ends with National Registry Paramedic civilian certification. The civilian certifications are a big improvement for transition back to civilian life after the service. As a 91B in those early days our qualifications were considered more of a state secret, resulting in no civilian authority recognizing our training and accomplishments. That caused many disappointments when trying to build on our experiences when “back in the world”. The 68W1 course culminates in testing for civilian certification in (ACLS) Advanced Cardiac Life Support and (ATP) Advanced Tactical Paramedic, which is a good intro to any medical facility. JSOMTC lays claim to the highest pass rate of any school in the country. In order to maintain the 68W1 MOS, every two years they return for refresher and updates and re-certification.

Photo: How Miller (author) tries out a sonogram machine. (Lew Chapman)

There are many facets to the training, including many medical subjects, hands-on training, and what we used to call OJT at several civilian hospitals. Experiences at the hospitals can vary from ambulance runs and Emergency Room duty to delivering babies and open heart surgery, depending on what is available when they are working in their assigned areas. There is a heavy emphasis on Trauma care.

A lot of the training is now done online, allowing for students to study and self-test at their own schedule. 100 percent correct answers are required to pass on to the next section (Each block requires a 75% GPA to pass onto the next iteration with an academic review board if you fall under the passing GPA), with reviews available to fill in any info that was missed or misunderstood. The pace of the material is intense, requiring focused attention and good scheduling skills, but this method actually allows for less travel and more studying. The instructors also make themselves available by cellphone or email for an unbelievable amount of time.

Our tour started in a very busy training area. Endotracheal intubations and starting IVs were being practiced when we visited one of the activity areas. The intubations were practiced on sophisticated manikins that showed exposed lungs and stomachs.

If one missed the trachea, the stomach would start to fill with air and expose the error. This was done in cooperation with one’s partner. Then the assistant became the intubater. When under fire, this is not an option, so cricothyroidotomies are becoming the go-to choice in combat if an airway can’t be cleared and maintained otherwise. I recall carrying a ballpoint pen in one of my pockets in case I needed to use the empty barrel to keep an airway open. I’m sure they have better ways now.

Starting the IVs was done in a different manner. One partner would actually start the IV on the other, under supervision, and then roles would be reversed and the patient would become the medic. You can imagine that method leads to a lot of care being taken not to hurt the partner in the hopes that he or she will also be that careful. I recall we used that method for lots of procedures, including nasal intubation.

Intraosseous fluid replacement is another innovation that saves many lives. Instead of a medic trying different vein locations to start an IV, which could ultimately prove too difficult to accomplish in the field, some injured soldiers can only be saved by injecting fluids or even blood directly into a bone. The device has a series of spikes along the circumference of the roughly quarter-sized circle, which are only for stability, so it will grab and hold on. In the center is a stiff, large-gauge needle through which the product is delivered.

The force needed to penetrate the bone is provided by the spring-loaded injector. There are a few bones that make for the most feasible sites. The two most preferred are the flat tibial surface along the shin and the sternum. If the soldier is in bad enough shape to need this, it most likely will not seem to hurt as much as it will when being removed. Quite often, the best location will be the sternum because it is easy to reach and provides a stable target.

If you were lucky enough to be selected to be an 18D (Special Forces Medical Sergeant), or an SOIDC (Special Operations Independent Duty Corpsman), another 3 months of Surgical, Dental, Disease and other subjects are in store for you, and could result in you receiving a BS degree. There is even a pathway to earning Physician Assistant credentials later on.

I’m a little murky on the field experiences of an NSOIDC, but I know that an SF medic on an A-team, now an ODA, is as good as it gets. You’re the closest thing to a doctor that many indigenous people will ever see. You can have a lot of responsibility, but you also have comprehensive training to prepare you. You also get all the free ammo you can carry.

The Surgical section was on a cycle break, but we got to tour the facility and see a couple of the surgical rooms and equipment. The portable sonogram that they use to guide their regional blocks reduces anesthetic use by about 80 percent. There were a few students practicing regional blocks on each other and using the sonogram. When they were done, we got to play with the portable ultrasound as well.

Regional blocks are a recent addition to potentially lifesaving tools. Besides giving a “local” anesthetic further up the nerves for some surgeries, by knowing the right locations and techniques, a whole area can be numbed, eliminating the need for general anesthesia sometimes. On the battlefield, sometimes a wound can be so painful as to incapacitate a soldier. In some cases, a regional block can numb the pain and allow the soldier to help get himself off the battlefield, freeing up others for a more vigorous defense.

Photo: Typical lab equipment for blood analysis, centrifuge not shown. (How Miller)

When we walked into the lab, which was not being used at the time, I said “Where’s the Lab?”

The only familiar things in sight were workbenches, a microscope and a bunch of cabinets. Apparently they still use reagents and centrifuges, but they were packed away, except for those in the ventilation hood. What they use now are a lot of electronic devices that do an incredible amount of analysis of blood samples, for example. They are compact enough to be useful in an ODA lab. These devices are constantly adding capabilities and they are expecting another significant upgrade soon.

In the hallway were numerous display cases showing the supplies that are typically available for use by the SF Medic. There is everything from syringes and swabs to autoclaves, sophisticated splints, and full kits and packs. I was searching for and delighted to find that the A team bible, the Merk Manual of diagnoses was available. The one we used was the eleventh edition, and a lot of that same information is in the current version.

Photo: The Hall of Heroes which honors SOF Medics that have died in combat. (How Miller)

We spent some time looking at the Hall of Heroes, SOF Medics that died in combat. A strong message of how serious the job is.

Later we met with Mike Jones, trainer Mike Jackson, and a group of trainees at Charlie Mike’s Pub. But that’s another story.

**********

This story by How Miller entitled “18D Training Today” was first published in the April 2023 issue of the Sentinel. This monthly publication is published by Chapter 78 of the Special Forces Association. You can subscribe to it at this link. Top photo, by How Miller, is of one of the 18D training surgical units.

sof.news · by Guest · April 6, 2023

15. Malaysia’s Prime Minister announces end to US Dollar dependence

An ominous warning? Will other countries follow suit?

Malaysia’s Prime Minister announces end to US Dollar dependence

msn.com · by Damilola Lawrence 1 day ago

Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim announced yesterday that the country will no longer rely on the US dollar to attract investments. Also, he stated that negotiations between Malaysia and other countries will take place using both parties’ respective national currencies.

To move towards this goal, he revealed that Bank Negara Malaysia is creating a proposal for using this method of trade during visits to China. Furthermore, he expressed that this move will be beneficial for the country in the long run.

Malaysia ditches US dollar in international trade negotiations

The fragility of the current US economy is evident in today’s jobs data, and this fragility is being further highlighted by international perspectives – most recently from Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim. In response to questions about countries no longer depending on the US dollar for trade transactions, Ibrahim stated that there is no reason to continue to rely on the American currency.

Furthermore, he suggested that nations should negotiate over an Asian Monetary Fund and use currencies from their respective countries instead, citing the economic strength of China, Japan, and others as a driving factor in this lessening dependence on the US dollar. As the country nears national debt default, it is becoming clearer just how much foreign countries rely on the US currency, and how this will affect future international trade. It is an interesting time for the US dollar as a whole.

msn.com · by Damilola Lawrence 1 day ago

16. Chinese Officials Flock to Twitter to Defend TikTok

This should be an indicator as to how important TikTok is to the Chinese Communist Party.

Chinese Officials Flock to Twitter to Defend TikTok

The New York Times · by Steven Lee Myers · April 6, 2023

The company has tried to distance itself, but the information push shows just how deeply invested Beijing is in its fate.

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Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is one of TikTok’s defenders who use Twitter to criticize the U.S. government.

By Sapna Maheshwari and

April 6, 2023, 5:00 a.m. ET

When members of Congress grilled TikTok’s chief executive last month on Capitol Hill, the app’s supporters sprang to its defense online.

The lawmakers were “old, tech-illiterate,” one said. “Out of touch, paranoid and self-righteous,” said another. The hourslong hearing “destroyed the illusion that US leads in cyber era,” read another post.

These particular barbs did not come from TikTok’s users — 150 million and counting in the United States — but from representatives of China’s government.

In an information campaign primarily run on Twitter, Chinese officials and state media organizations widely mocked the United States in the days before and after the hearing, accusing lawmakers of hypocrisy and even xenophobia for targeting the popular app, according to a report released on Thursday by the Alliance for Securing Democracy, a nonpartisan initiative from the German Marshall Fund.

TikTok, which is owned by the Chinese technology company ByteDance, has sought to assure American lawmakers that it is independent from China’s influence, and that it has extensive plans for securing Americans’ data and providing oversight of its content recommendations. Shou Chew, TikTok’s chief executive, explicitly said at the House hearing that ByteDance was “not owned or controlled by the Chinese government.”

China’s information push, however, showed just how deeply invested Beijing was in the company’s fate. Just hours before Mr. Chew’s testimony last month, China’s Commerce Ministry said it opposed a sale of TikTok in a direct rebuke of the Biden administration, which is pushing a sale.

Chinese officials “clearly feel a stake in it,” said Michael H. Posner, a former assistant secretary of state and now director of the Center for Business and Human Rights at the Stern School of Business at New York University.

The report from the Alliance for Securing Democracy found that Twitter accounts from Chinese diplomats and state media outlets posted nearly 200 tweets about TikTok in the week around the congressional hearing on March 23. That compared with fewer than 150 posts in all of January and February.

Chinese state media accounts also ran more than 30 stories about TikTok in outlets like China Daily, the report said. The researchers said in an interview that they had found similar content on Facebook and YouTube.

Chinese state media accounts also ran more than 30 articles about TikTok in outlets like China Daily, researchers found.Credit...China Daily

China’s effort has echoes of its defense of another Chinese company that has found itself in the cross hairs of American legal and political controversy: Huawei, the telecommunications giant, which the United States has identified as a potential national security threat.

The scale and tone of China’s criticism of the U.S. government have intensified, though, reflecting the sharp deterioration of relations between the two countries despite a halting effort last year by President Biden and the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, to reverse the decline.

“This is how the U.S. talks to the world,” a spokeswoman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hua Chunying, wrote last month on Twitter, in English, with the hashtag #TikTokHearing.

Representative Kat Cammack of Florida harshly criticized TikTok at a hearing last month.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

Her post, which was retweeted more than 1,200 times, included a clip from TikTok showing Representative Kat Cammack, Republican of Florida, who during the hearing called the app “an extension” of the Communist Party of China. When Mr. Chew asked for a chance to respond, Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Republican of Washington and the chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, said it was time to move on.

“What I think is surprising is how direct the attacks against U.S. lawmakers were,” said Etienne Soula, a research analyst at the Alliance for Securing Democracy and an author of the report. “It’s par for the course for them to go after the U.S. system in general, saying it’s dysfunctional, that democracy doesn’t work and that it’s not a real democracy.” It is far less common, he added, to see “very open insults.”

Chinese officials, including diplomats around the globe, have become adept at using social media — including platforms like Twitter and Facebook that are banned in China — to spread their political views to an international audience. The latest campaign, however, sought to directly influence the political debate in the United States.

Posts by officials and state media mocked the political process. At least one stoked speculation of a potential “Gen Z rebellion” if lawmakers or the administration succeeded in banning the app or forcing its sale, as the Biden administration had been proposing.

“China is careful not to interfere with other countries’ internal affairs or internal politics, so to have them weigh in so openly to encourage voters to riot — it’s outside the ordinary,” Mr. Soula said.

On TikTok itself, many users rallied behind the company’s chief executive, Shou Chew, who has become an unexpected celebrity.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

Apple’s chief executive, Tim Cook, in Beijing last month to attend the state-sponsored China Development Forum.Credit...Kyodo News

Other posts compared tense photos of the roughly five-hour hearing with pictures of Apple’s chief executive, Tim Cook, who was visiting China around the same time and smiling and posing with locals.

“Isn’t it clear which side supports free trade and which side is against it?” said a post from the Twitter account of Global Times, a nationalist paper owned by the Communist Party.

Still others sought to deflect attention from TikTok, asking why lawmakers were highlighting its risks to young people while “doing nothing on gun-control legislation.” They also called the criticism of the app “xenophobic.” (TikTok’s chief operating officer has also said calls to ban the app are xenophobic.)

More recently, Chinese state media outlets have continued to push the campaign on their Twitter accounts, with China Daily posting an article on March 31 titled: “US says China can spy with TikTok. It spies on world with Google.’”

On TikTok itself, many users also rallied behind the company and Mr. Chew, who has become an unexpected celebrity. The hashtag #TikTokBan has been viewed more than two billion times. Brooke Oberwetter, a spokeswoman for TikTok, said Mr. Chew’s popularity on the platform had increased organically.

The Alliance for Securing Democracy did not track Chinese propaganda on TikTok’s service as part of the report. Several Chinese media outlets already have accounts on the app. Their accounts and videos are identified with labels that say “China state-controlled media,” and their profiles have fewer followers than they do on Twitter, suggesting that the latter remains the principal platform for China’s global messaging.

Representative Jamaal Bowman of New York joined TikTok creators at the Capitol last month.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

“We label state-affiliated media so our community is clear if they are engaging with content that may be controlled or influenced by a government,” Ms. Oberwetter said. “This is an ongoing process, and we’ll continue to review new accounts and add labels as and when they join the platform.”

CGTN, the English-language channel of the Chinese state television network, posted a TikTok video on March 24 that featured defenses of the platform from some of the influencers the company flew to Washington to help defend it before the hearing.

CGTN posted a TikTok video that featured defenses of the platform from some of the influencers TikTok flew to Washington.Credit...CGTN, via TikTok

“When it comes to hot-button topics involving autocratic actors, it can be difficult to tell the difference between organic arguments and arguments derived from autocratic propaganda, even in open, democratic information spaces,” the Alliance for Securing Democracy said in its report. “Should geopolitical debates occur on Chinese-owned social media platforms like TikTok going forward, it could become even more difficult to differentiate between organic arguments and propaganda.”

The potential to shape public opinion is one of the major security concerns that American intelligence officials have raised about TikTok.

“If there are 150 million U.S. users, and God knows how many in the rest of the world,” Mr. Posner said, “it’s a platform for disinformation just waiting to be exercised.”

The New York Times · by Steven Lee Myers · April 6, 2023

17. The De-Dollarization of World Economy: Xi-Putin Agreement, Saudi Arabia’s Shift to Yuan

Not a good sign.

The De-Dollarization of World Economy: Xi-Putin Agreement, Saudi Arabia’s Shift to Yuan

moderndiplomacy.eu · by Kaleemullah · April 4, 2023

The global economy has been dominated by the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency for decades, but recent developments have raised questions about the sustainability of this system. The Xi-Putin agreement, Saudi Arabia’s willingness to sell oil to China in yuan, and recent developments have accelerated the de-dollarization of the world economy. While this shift may have positive implications for some countries, it also raises concerns about the impact of American sanctions on countries like Iran and North Korea.

The Xi-Putin agreement, signed in 2014, aimed to promote trade and investment between China and Russia using their own currencies, the yuan, and the roble, respectively. This move challenged the dominance of the US dollar in international trade and finance. The recent 2023 meeting between Presidents Xi and Putin further strengthened the partnership between China and Russia and raised concerns for the US as the two countries increase cooperation and trade using their own currencies.

Saudi Arabia’s shift towards selling oil in yuan is another significant development in the de-dollarization of the world economy. In 2023, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to increase cooperation on energy and trade, including Saudi Arabia selling oil to China in yuan. Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, has traditionally sold oil in US dollars. However, this shift could further reduce the dominance of the US dollar in international trade and finance, particularly in the oil market.

The de-dollarization of the world economy could have significant implications for China and other countries. As the world’s second-largest economy, China has been pushing for a more multipolar currency system to reduce its dependence on the US dollar. If more countries start to adopt alternative currencies for trade and investment, it could benefit China by reducing the need for it to hold large amounts of US dollars in its foreign exchange reserves. This could also lead to the internationalization of the yuan and give China greater influence in the global financial system.

However, the de-dollarization trend could also create challenges for other countries, particularly those with weaker currencies. If the US dollar loses its dominance in international trade and finance, it could lead to greater volatility in currency markets and make it more difficult for some countries to conduct international transactions. This could also lead to greater competition among alternative currencies, which could be a source of instability in the global financial system.

The impact on the US economy is also an important consideration. The dominance of the US dollar in international trade and finance has given the US significant economic power and has allowed it to exert influence over other countries through sanctions and other economic tools. If the de-dollarization trend continues, it could undermine this power and make it more difficult for the US to achieve its foreign policy goals. However, some experts argue that the impact on the US economy may be limited, as the US has other strengths, such as its technological innovation and its large consumer market.

In conclusion, the Xi-Putin agreement, Saudi Arabia’s shift towards selling oil in yuan, and recent developments have accelerated the de-dollarization of the world economy. While this shift may have positive implications for some countries, it also raises concerns about the impact on American sanctions on countries like Iran and North Korea. It could also create challenges for other countries and lead to greater volatility in currency markets. The impact on the US economy is an important consideration, as the dominance of the US dollar has given the US significant economic power. As the world moves towards a more multipolar currency system, it remains to be seen how this will affect the global economy in the long term.

Related Topics:China Economics Russia Saudi Arabia USA

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Kaleemullah

The writer is a student of economics at the national defense university Islamabad

18. America and China Need to Talk

Excerpts:

Chinese officials regularly express frustration with how Americans misunderstand China. Americans might not accept the Chinese point of view on a wide range of issues, but they are far more likely to reject it or adhere to simplistic pictures of China if they cannot obtain access to the country and deepen their understanding. They need visas to enter China, the ability to travel around the country and meet people, and have access to Chinese databases, publications, and archives. Similarly, the United States needs an “open door” policy to allow Chinese from all walks of life, even CCP members, to come to the United States. Only those Chinese citizens who pose genuine security risks should be restricted from visiting.

As they rebuild people-to-people links, the two governments should also find a path back to official dialogue by setting aside unreasonable preconditions and needless limits to the range of acceptable topics. Such communication is most crucial at the level of the executive branches in both governments. But members of the U.S. Congress and China’s National People’s Congress should also resume trips to the other country. Congressional delegations have long been a critical source of knowledge for both sides.

It is difficult to muster much optimism that Washington and Beijing will take these steps. For the foreseeable future, relations are most likely to continue deteriorating. And it would be naive to believe that renewed communication would necessarily yield increased mutual appreciation or respect; indeed, more knowledge could also reinforce negative views and add to tensions. But at a minimum, talking—and listening—would increase the chances that the two countries will find ways to peacefully manage their differences.

America and China Need to Talk

A Lack of Dialogue, Visits, and Exchanges Is Raising the Risk of Conflict

By Scott Kennedy and Wang Jisi

April 6, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Scott Kennedy and Wang Jisi · April 6, 2023

Relations between the United States and China have fallen to their darkest depths since the early 1970s, when U.S. President Richard Nixon met with Chinese leader Mao Zedong (and Nixon’s national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, met with Mao’s deputy Zhou Enlai) in a bid to end the hostility that had characterized the relationship since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) triumphed in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. The decades of détente and cooperation that eventually resulted from Nixon and Mao’s dialogue now seem like ancient history. Today, officials and commentators all over the world fear that not only is a cold war between the two powers inevitable but also that they will sooner or later come to blows, if not over Taiwan, then in the South China Sea or elsewhere. In the meantime, the economic juggernaut some called “Chimerica,” produced by the interdependence of the U.S. and Chinese economies, is gradually being dismantled by both countries’ growing technology restrictions, efforts to reroute supply chains, and focus on building up economic resilience.

Whether one believes that the United States and China are destined to be adversaries, might somehow find a pathway back to greater cooperation, or will have a more complicated relationship, it should be clear that it would be better for people from both countries—government officials, business leaders, scholars, and ordinary citizens—to have a greater understanding of each other. And there is no better way to build such mutual understanding than through face-to-face interactions and visits in which people can observe each other’s societies and speak at length in formal and informal settings about their perspectives and experiences.

In the three years since the COVID-19 pandemic began, such people-to-people contact among American and Chinese people has almost entirely vanished. Between 2019 and 2022, flights between the two countries declined by over 95 percent, scholarly exchanges dried up, the number of students from the United States and China studying in the other country plummeted, corporate employees abandoned China in droves, and the ranks of foreign correspondents dwindled in the wake of unprecedented expulsions by both governments. Online meetings have exploded in popularity but are no substitute for the real thing. The lack of face-to-face contact is not the source of tensions between their two countries, but it is an obstacle to stabilizing ties, avoiding a crisis, and cooperating on bilateral issues and global challenges such as climate change and public health.

Concerned about the trajectory of the U.S.-Chinese relationship and frustrated by our inability to do field research, we put our money (and masks) where our mouths are and endured almost 70 days of quarantine in China in order to make extended visits in the spring and fall of 2022—Kennedy to China, and Wang to the United States. We met with government officials, business executives, scholars, journalists, and foreign diplomats. At a time when Americans and Chinese were frequently talking about each other but hardly talking to each other, our visits offered a rare window into the state of the relationship. What we found was both disturbing and reassuring, and we came away believing that the path to a more constructive relationship flows through rebuilding the sinews of deep and comprehensive social interaction: people-to-people ties, face-to-face communication, cultural exchanges, and on-the-ground fieldwork and observation.

VIBE SHIFT

We have visited one another’s countries many times in the past three decades, and our most recent visits have left us with the strong impression that the past three years have been a period of substantial social ferment and transformation in both places. Protest and dissent are enduring facets of American life, but in recent years, public expressions of anger over pandemic restrictions, police brutality, and the 2020 presidential election produced an unusual amount of disorder and upheaval. Meanwhile, a rise in crime and ongoing gun violence have put many Americans on edge.

The changes in China have been even more dramatic. On the upside, the importance of the race to get ahead in professional and material terms seemed to recede as people focused more on their health and well-being, taking up exercise as never before and dressing more casually. Levels of smog and air pollution fell, and electric vehicles suddenly seemed ubiquitous. But more prominent were the signs of social strain. China’s “zero-COVID” policy left millions of citizens isolated and closed the country off from the rest of the world. The economy reeled as consumers avoided stores and private businesspeople held back from investing. After a lengthy lockdown in Shanghai in the spring of 2022, frustration with the restrictions grew, and in the fall of that year, some Chinese publicly protested. No one could have predicted the restlessness or the sudden end to zero COVID, which came in December, but it was clear that everyone was relieved to see that policy end.

Equally dramatic were the changes in the mood in both countries about the bilateral relationship. The pandemic isolated the two countries from each other and led to the creation of echo chambers on both sides: as tensions rose, the lack of contact made it difficult to empathize and see things from the other’s perspective. In both countries, a hawkish consensus began to harden into an orthodox view: U.S.-Chinese competition had transformed into an existential conflict.

Both Beijing and Washington believe the other is entirely to blame for the deterioration in ties and that their own actions are rational responses to the other’s unreasonable aggression. Chinese officials seem convinced that Washington’s goal is, in the words of Chinese leader Xi Jinping, to “contain, surround, and suppress China.” In this view, to maintain global hegemony, the United States seeks to loosen the CCP’s grip on power and limit China’s growth. The Chinese narrative starts with alleged U.S. “interference” in Xinjiang and Hong Kong in the 2010s, followed by the Trump administration’s tariffs and sanctions on Huawei and other tech firms, which have continued under the Biden administration.

Beijing is highly skeptical that Washington accepts the Communist Party’s rule as legitimate.

For its part, Washington is convinced that Beijing wants to unravel the post–World War II international order built on the rule of law, a market-based global economy, and the U.S. alliance system. The U.S. narrative begins with Washington’s invitation for China to join the World Trade Organization and become a “responsible stakeholder”—which, in the American view, was a benevolent gesture that Beijing essentially rejected by continuing to unfairly subsidize Chinese companies, restrict U.S. companies’ access to China’s markets, steal intellectual property, restrict human rights, and make aggressive military moves in the South China Sea and elsewhere.

These stories are more or less mutually exclusive, and neither side believes the other has much credibility when it comes to making commitments to improve ties. Washington believes China’s top leadership is firmly set on ending the period of harmonious coexistence with the United States and abandoning the pro-market agenda of the “reform and opening up” that began in the late 1970s. Beijing, meanwhile, is highly skeptical of U.S. assertions that Washington accepts the legitimacy of CCP rule and respects China’s right to develop. And Chinese officials have come to believe that one cannot trust the U.S. president to make good on any promises, since anything he does could be undone by Congress—or the next president.

Reverberating in the echo chambers on both sides of the Pacific is a note of profound fatalism, a sense that greater economic tensions and security conflict are inevitable. This view is creating a self-reinforcing vicious cycle, and as long as a sense of resignation pervades both capitals, breaking it may prove impossible.

STRAIT TALK

Consider the way the two policy communities view the war between Russia and Ukraine and tensions in the Taiwan Strait. In February 2022, Wang was visiting Washington when Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin released a joint declaration hailing their countries’ partnership with “no limits.” When Russian troops marched into Ukraine less than three weeks later, he found that it was hard for Americans to believe that Moscow had not informed Beijing of its plans. Some Americans expected China to condemn Russia’s “special military operation,” as China often asks other states to respect sovereignty rights and seek peaceful solutions to territorial disputes. But to Washington’s disappointment, China has pursued a different approach.

As Kennedy found in discussions in Beijing later in 2022, Chinese elites genuinely believed that NATO’s expansion had generated Russian anxieties about its security, prompting Putin’s decision to attack. At the same time, his conversations also revealed a surprising level of disagreement with Xi’s strong political support for Putin and unwillingness to condemn the invasion; several Chinese elites Kennedy spoke with saw this response as essentially turning a Russian strategic blunder into a Chinese one. That lack of consensus among Chinese officials and experts may help explain why Beijing has struggled to find a workable approach and steady message.

Discussions in Washington and Beijing also revealed very different impressions about the likelihood of conflict over Taiwan. In early 2022, a number of Americans expressed to Wang some apprehension that China might take advantage of Washington’s focus on the war in Ukraine to launch a military attack on Taiwan. Months later, after Nancy Pelosi, then the U.S. House speaker, visited Taiwan in August, quite a few Americans with whom Wang spoke, including senior U.S. military officials, speculated that Beijing might have a timetable for taking Taiwan by force. That speculation could have been based on U.S. intelligence reports but also have been provoked by some Chinese social media posts that called on the Chinese military to “liberate” Taiwan and fulfill the mission of national reunification.

In contrast, based on his conversations with CCP officials and experts, Kennedy concluded that the war in Ukraine was making China more restrained, not less. Some in China’s military seemed to believe that Washington was secretly goading Beijing into attacking Taiwan so that it would get bogged down in a “Taiwan trap” akin to the U.S. experience in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Moreover, experts on Chinese technology policy pointed out that even if the Chinese military faced no opposition in Taiwan and took the island without firing a shot, Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing capacity would not suddenly become the mainland’s. Semiconductor fabrication plans are too complex for even skilled outsiders to operate on their own, raw materials from suppliers and orders from customers would dry up quickly, and equipment providers could easily tweak a few lines of code or change the temperature in the facilities to make production impossible.

GET OUTSIDE YOUR BUBBLE

Our travels helped us understand why efforts to stabilize relations during the Biden presidency have so far failed and why they were derailed earlier this year when a Chinese high-altitude balloon was spotted over the American mainland and eventually shot down by the U.S. military. The paucity of contact and dialogue has made the relationship brittle; there is now hardly any margin for error or miscommunication. Given the chances of an accidental crisis, there is no time to waste in rebuilding connections between the two countries.

One place to start would be the simple matter of travel. Visas for China have become easier to obtain since January, and Washington has removed all COVID-related testing requirements for travelers from China. There are still far too few flights between the two countries, however; vast unmet demand has pushed the price of some round-trip economy-class tickets up to $7,000. Airlines in both countries want to add more flights but have been reluctant to do so because the two governments have yet to reach an agreement on lifting certain restrictions they imposed when the pandemic began. What is more, U.S. airlines are hesitant to add more flights because, as a result of the war in Ukraine, they are unable to fly between the United States and China via the shorter polar route, which gives Chinese airlines a competitive advantage. Washington and Beijing should press airlines to add at least a few more direct flights as soon as possible and keep working toward a more durable solution that would permit the restoration of flights to at least 80 percent of pre-pandemic levels by year’s end.

Beijing and Washington should also provide greater reassurance to American and Chinese students, scholars, businesspeople, medical experts, and journalists who wish to visit the other country that that they are welcome and that their activities will be protected and encouraged. For example, executives need assurances that their employees will be fairly treated and greater certainty about what business is and is not permitted. And scholars need greater clarity about how to comply with rules regarding collaborative research so as not to run afoul of national security concerns.

Members of the U.S. Congress and China’s National People’s Congress should resume trips to the other country.

Chinese officials regularly express frustration with how Americans misunderstand China. Americans might not accept the Chinese point of view on a wide range of issues, but they are far more likely to reject it or adhere to simplistic pictures of China if they cannot obtain access to the country and deepen their understanding. They need visas to enter China, the ability to travel around the country and meet people, and have access to Chinese databases, publications, and archives. Similarly, the United States needs an “open door” policy to allow Chinese from all walks of life, even CCP members, to come to the United States. Only those Chinese citizens who pose genuine security risks should be restricted from visiting.

As they rebuild people-to-people links, the two governments should also find a path back to official dialogue by setting aside unreasonable preconditions and needless limits to the range of acceptable topics. Such communication is most crucial at the level of the executive branches in both governments. But members of the U.S. Congress and China’s National People’s Congress should also resume trips to the other country. Congressional delegations have long been a critical source of knowledge for both sides.

It is difficult to muster much optimism that Washington and Beijing will take these steps. For the foreseeable future, relations are most likely to continue deteriorating. And it would be naive to believe that renewed communication would necessarily yield increased mutual appreciation or respect; indeed, more knowledge could also reinforce negative views and add to tensions. But at a minimum, talking—and listening—would increase the chances that the two countries will find ways to peacefully manage their differences.

SCOTT KENNEDY is Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
WANG JISI is Founding President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University.
They are the authors of Breaking the Ice: The Role of Scholarly Exchange in Stabilizing U.S.-China Relations, a forthcoming CSIS report from which this essay draws.

Foreign Affairs · by Scott Kennedy and Wang Jisi · April 6, 2023

19.Deadly attack puts spotlight on Russia’s influential military bloggers

Deadly attack puts spotlight on Russia’s influential military bloggers

The Hill · by Brad Dress · April 6, 2023

The apparent assassination of a prominent Russian military blogger over the weekend placed a spotlight on a group that serves an often overlooked but crucial role in Russia’s war machine.

Before he was killed in an explosion over the weekend, Vladlen Tatarsky was a blogger with hundreds of thousands of subscribers on Telegram who read his frequent updates on the war in Ukraine.

Tatarsky, whose real name was Maxim Fomin, relayed a pro-war agenda and an ultranationalist perspective to his followers, part of a network of patriotic Russian military bloggers who have risen to prominence during the war in Ukraine.

Although many of the bloggers are hawkish supporters of the war, the writers are sometimes critical of the Kremlin for its many setbacks and failures in Ukraine. Yet they are largely embraced by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Leon Aron, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said Russia’s “mil-bloggers” are able to “supplement” state-run media, which often sugarcoats the war on state-run television, and protect Putin from blame for setbacks on the battlefield.

“Putin keeps them [like] dogs who snap at the heels of the regular military,” Aron said. “This is a device for Putin to channel people’s anger towards the military, rather than himself.”

Russia’s military bloggers first garnered wider attention in 2014, when Russian-backed separatists launched an armed rebellion against the Ukrainian government in the eastern Donbas region.

The bloggers shot to further popularity after Russia invaded Ukraine last year and struggled to make headway, providing detailed updates as the Russian people were looking to understand the complexities of the war.

Bloggers post frequently on Telegram and often include maps, pictures and videos to accompany written analysis. Many of them have contacts deep in the military or on the front line.

Western media outlets and other organizations that provide war coverage, such as the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), sometimes cite the bloggers in articles for insight into Russian thinking.

And they are likely to remain a central cog in Russia’s propaganda machine as long as Putin sees their value, with the Kremlin able to elevate favorable bloggers by offering them television appearances.

Natasha Groom, a senior adviser with the nonprofit negotiation organization Inter Mediate, wrote in an analysis piece published in NATO’s Defense College that Russian bloggers offer “largely unfiltered updates and eyewitness accounts has transformed them into popular sources of information.”

“The pro-war bloggers are fulfilling multiple and nuanced functions in Russia,” Groom wrote in the article first published in January and updated last month.

“And while their influence should not be overstated, they are becoming an increasingly prominent factor in Russian domestic affairs and the information space.”

Some of the most popular blogger accounts include Rybar, with more than a million subscribers, Igor Girkin, Reverse Side of the Medal and The Grey Zone.

Bloggers also dive into issues outside the battlefield, discussing international and domestic news that relates to Russia or the war effort.

The popular Russian blog account The Grey Zone published a stern warning to readers on Finland’s accession on Tuesday to NATO, writing the alliance was now “a couple of hundred kilometers from the northern capital of Russia.”

Many bloggers are veterans of the Russian military and some are also affiliated with the mercenary company Wagner Group, as Tatarsky was. Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin is leading a vicious assault against Ukraine on the town of Bakhmut.

Those who are more critical of the armed forces for its numerous setbacks are careful not to cross the line, often targeting the Ministry of Defense or Kremlin officials but not Putin himself.

Girkin, a former Russian commander in Ukraine, stands out as a more publicly dissenting voice. He remarked this week that Russia was headed toward defeat and last year said the “fish’s head was rotten,” in a veiled reference to Putin.

But generally they keep their ire focused on military leadership.

After Russia lost significant combat power last fall from Ukrainian advances, bloggers slammed the Ministry of Defense for inadequacies. A deadly Ukrainian strike at a Russian base in Makiivka in January also led to intensive blogger criticism of military policies, including stationing a large number of troops in close quarters.

Kateryna Stepanenko, a Russia analyst with ISW, said Russian bloggers have become so dominant they are now even appointed to working groups, including for human rights councils.

And Russian bloggers are able to help not just with pro-war information, but also with recruitment drives and crowdfunding campaigns to support the war, Stepanenko added.

“Bloggers are very much integrated in the policy world,” Stepanenko said. “Putin has been tolerating these bloggers because he sees a purpose in them.”

Tatarsky, with nearly 600,000 subscribers, played a major part in this evolution of Russia’s military bloggers.

A former convict from Ukraine’s Donetsk region who served time for armed robbery, Tatarsky claimed he joined separatists when they freed him from jail. He would go on to become a military blogger and an author of several books.

Tatarsky advanced the pro-war message and helped proliferate radical political messages from the Kremlin, such as casting the war in Ukraine as an existential battle against an encroaching and decadent West.

In one of his last posts, Tatarsky quoted a Bible verse and referred to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his predecessor, Petro Poroshenko, as the “antichrist who kill Russians in the Donbass, dream of gay parades and transgender people.”

Tatarsky is also known for a video he posted to Telegram during an October ceremony marking the illegal annexation of four Ukrainian regions.

“We will win over all, we will kill everyone, we will rob everyone, and everything will be as we like,” he said at the time.

Tatarsky was killed on Sunday when a bomb inside a small sculpture crafted in his likeness exploded at a cafe in St. Petersburg, also injuring around 30 people, according to Russia’s Interior Ministry. The cafe was owned by Prigozhin.

Moscow has charged a Russian anti-war activist, Darya Trepova, in connection to the killing, accusing her of carrying out a terrorist attack facilitated by Ukraine. Kyiv has denied involvement in the murder.

Others have speculated that Russian agents may have been behind the attack. Tatarsky was critical of Russian generals and called to prosecute them, while being a Putin loyalist who attended several of the Russian president’s speeches, according to ISW.

Russia’s bloggers also operate in a tight-knit community, often sharing each other’s posts and feeding off the commentary and analysis.

The death of Tatarsky shocked and upset several bloggers, according to posts on their accounts.

Macron presses Xi to urge Russian peace in Ukraine Group of Democratic reps urge state department and OAS to back independent investigation into group’s secretary general

Alexander Kots, a Russian military blogger who also works with the Komsomolskaya Pravda tabloid, said he first met the “ridiculous-looking” Tatarsky a few years ago when he came into the publication’s offices.

Kots wrote on Telegram to his more than 650,000 followers that he was impressed by Tatarsky that day and stayed in touch with him, adding he and other bloggers “will not back down” following his death.

“Around him, he managed to gather a whole army of enthusiastic supporters who will certainly continue his work,” Kots said.

The Hill · by Brad Dress · April 6, 2023

20. 441. The Risk of Success in Military Planning

Conclusion:

Accurately forecasting the future is at best a difficult business “for even the very wise cannot see all ends.”2 The world is an open, often chaotic, system, impossible to fully predict. Doctrine and operational experience provide a solid foundation for military professionals but need continued revision. Risk of success evaluation in future planning will ensure the right resources are available and simultaneously provide commanders with robust options in advance of the actual conditions occurring.

APRIL 6, 2023 BY USER

441. The Risk of Success in Military Planning

https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/441-the-risk-of-success-in-military-planning/

[Editor’s Note: Army Mad Scientist welcomes today’s guest blogger LTC Christopher J. Heatherly with his thoughtful piece exploring what we are missing in contemporary military planning — assessing the risk of success. Using two historical use cases from the opening months of both the Korean conflict and Operation Iraqi Freedom, LTC Heatherly explores the pitfalls military staffs court in only mitigating the risk of failure in planning operations. While an instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, LTC Heatherly developed a useful mnemonic aid — E/W/M/R +/- (i.e., Ends/Ways/Means/Risk (success and failure) — to help future staff officers address both success and failure in risk mitigation to ensure more thorough plans are developed, affording Commanders a greater range of options. LTC Heatherly applies this tool to the Operational Environment and the on-going war in Ukraine, querying whether Ukraine and NATO are prepared for the risk of catastrophic success? — Read on!]

Introduction

American forces land in Inchon harbor one day after the Battle of Inchon began, 15 September 1950. / Source: U.S. Navy Photo via U.S. National Archives and Records Administration

The Korean War, 1950 — U.S. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur leads the United Nations authorized military intervention to repel North Korea’s Soviet Union- and People’s Republic of China-backed invasion of South Korea. Having been nearly thrown off the Korean peninsula at the Pusan Perimeter, MacArthur orders a bold amphibious assault into the North Korean rear at Inchon. The operation catches the North Koreans completely off guard and creates the conditions for a rapid multi-front advance into North Korea proper. UN forces seize the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and are postured to advance to the Chinese border. Ignoring all intelligence to the contrary, MacArthur briefs U.S. President Harry S. Truman there is scant risk of Chinese intervention.

Chinese troops cross the Yalu River into North Korea to fight in the Korean War, 1950. / Source: Wilson Center via 10th Anniversary of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Commemorative Book and Wikimedia Commons

Just days later, Chinese soldiers cross into North Korea while the USSR provides air cover and supplies. Under significant Chinese pressure, UN forces conduct a brilliant fighting withdrawal South. President Truman relieves General MacArthur for defying orders. General Matthew Ridgeway assumes command while the war largely stalemates along the 38th parallel. After three more exhausting years, the combatants sign a cease fire on 27 July 1953. North Korea remains a regional problem set for the United States to this very day.

My study of the Korean War points to a significant problem in Army doctrine, in that MacArthur’s staff did not include the risk of success in their operational planning for Inchon or the follow-on pursuit into North Korea. A more robust planning effort by a forward-thinking commander and staff would have clearly elicited the danger of advancing too far North, too fast to the Chinese border, thereby creating the conditions for Chinese and Soviet military intervention. Apart from the danger to UN forces on the ground, this situation — for the first time — put two nuclear nations into conflict with the potential for a wider war. Deliberate examination of the risk of success would have identified contingency planning requirements for the UN and underscored the absolute need for a UN dialogue with the USSR and China to prevent horizontal or vertical escalation.

Risk Doctrine

To be certain, U.S. Army doctrine is replete with discussion on risk. Based upon this doctrine, military professionals normally view risk through the lens of failure to achieve their stated intent or goals. For example, a commander may direct their plans team to develop contingency options should a course of action fail. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations, defines risk as:

“the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. When commanders accept risk, they create opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit operational initiative and achieve decisive results. The willingness to incur risk is often the key to exposing enemy weaknesses that an enemy considers beyond friendly reach. Understanding risk requires accurate running estimates and valid assumptions. Embracing risk as opportunity requires situational awareness and imagination, as well as audacity. Successful commanders assess and mitigate risk continuously throughout the operations process.” 1

As a concept, risk is part of the larger planning model employing ends, ways, and means to accomplish an assigned mission. Briefly explained, ends are the desired objectives or end states, ways are the methodology of employment, and means are the resources available to the unit. Commanders employ risk assessments to gauge “the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards,” which allows them to facilitate risk mitigation and determine when or where to accept identified risks. In a simple example of risk assessment, a battalion commander directs the staff to plan a 5-mile unit run to assess the physical fitness and morale of his unit. The staff conducts a risk assessment and identifies heat stroke as a potential risk and assigns the attached medical platoon to have assets available (e.g., ambulance, cooling station, water points) to mitigate the same risk factors. This risk assessment process was part of every officer education level throughout my career. While doctrinally and operationally sound, it is also an incomplete concept.

History Rhymes?

In late 2002, CENTCOM designated U.S. Army Central as CFLCC for military operations against Iraq. Beginning on March 19, 2003, controlling V Corps and I Marine Expeditionary Force, U.S. Army Central took only six weeks to complete the liberation of Iraq, moving faster than even Patton had during his great dash across France. The end of the campaign saw U.S. Army Central headquartered in Baghdad, directing its third occupation within 100 years. / Source: U.S. Army Photo via DVIDS

The 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, better known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, stands in my mind as the first time I considered the Army’s planning model to be deficient through direct experience. I was assigned as one of two liaison officers from the 1st Armored Division to V Corps from the series of pre-deployment exercises through the post-conflict occupation of Iraq. As part of these duties, I was seconded to the V Corps G2 ACE and later the Corps’ G5 plans team which provided a front row seat to the expected phases of a military operation — from Phase I (Shape) to Phase III (Dominate). From my perspective, V Corps developed a thorough plan through Phase III, but lacked clear guidance on the intent for Phase IV (Stabilize) and Phase V (Enable Civil Authority), nor did the Pentagon provide V Corps the necessary resources to account for the rapid collapse of Saddam Hussein’s government.

U.S. Army Soldiers from Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division take a knee to scan for enemy personnel prior to a Joint clearing operation with local Abna’a Al Iraq (Sons of Iraq) through a group of small villages south of Salman Pak, Iraq, Feb. 16, 2008. The village is known to have recently been occupied by insurgents. / Source: U.S. Army Photo by by Sgt. Timothy Kingston via Army.mil

The civil unrest that followed Hussein’s fall from power is well documented and further details are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say, U.S. forces were provided little direction and under resourced to restore control or prevent the widespread violence that engulfed Iraq. Similarly, the Iraqi ex-patriots expected to form Iraq’s new government and military lacked the all-important public appeal and capability to fulfill those roles. They simply disappeared from the battlefield. The ensuing power vacuum gave time and space for the multifaceted insurgency to form and virtually eliminate any chance for Iraq to develop a sustainable democratic government. The U.S.-installed Coalition Provisional Authority was dysfunctional (as evidenced by the acrimonious relationship between Paul Bremer and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez) and issued unsound directives, such as disbanding the entire Iraqi Army, which further contributed to a rapidly deteriorating security situation. U.S. forces remained in Iraq until 2021 and the nation itself faces continued unrest.

Summed up, the U.S. military of 2003 made the same mistake from 1950 of not considering the risk of success. Had the Department of Defense looked beyond Phase III, considered the consequences of a rapid Iraqi government collapse (with the inevitable resumption of centuries of interreligious-ethnic violence), installed professional, capable US and Iraqi leaders, and fully resourced the military (to include meaningful interagency participation) prior to initiating the operation, the coalition may have been able to rapidly restore central control and stop the insurgency at its onset.

Recommendations

Simply stated, the U.S. military should incorporate the risk of success into its planning methodology and doctrine. During my assignment as an instructor at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, I taught American and allied field grade officers the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP), as well as an introduction to Design Theory which, at the time, was still relatively new to the larger military. The students were generally familiar with the ends, ways, and means construct and experienced in the risk assessment process. To assist the students’ planning abilities, I developed a shorthand annotation as a mnemonic tool employing the traditional ends, ways, means, and risk model, albeit with a critical addition – namely, the risk of success. The tool read as “Ends/Ways/Means/Risk (success and failure)” or as E/W/M/R +/- in shorthand. The students’ inclusion of both success and failure in risk ensured more thorough plans development that also afforded a greater range of options to the commander during the inevitable unforeseen conditions, whether challenges or opportunities, which arise during a military operation.

The E/W/M/R +/- theory is just as applicable today as it might have been in the Korean War or Operation Iraqi Freedom. World attention is currently focused on the criminal Russian invasion of Ukraine. In contrast to the expectations of most experts, Kyiv successfully defeated Moscow’s invasion and now threatens to retake territory lost in the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and the Donbass. Where the West once feared the risk of failure if Ukraine fell to Russian territorial aggression, it must now consider the risk of success should the Ukrainian military enjoy further battlefield victories which reclaim ground Moscow considers sovereign territory. The U.S. military and its allies should also consider the risk of catastrophic success should Vladimir Putin be removed via internal or external actors. It is unlikely Putin would be replaced in a smooth transition of authority, with several actors looking to assume power and some Russian states seeing an opportunity for independence. As with Iraq in 2003, the absence of a strong central authority will again create conditions for interethnic/religious or intra/interstate conflicts with the added wildcard of Russia’s vast weapons of mass destruction arsenal. Western leaders must be prepared to address the very real challenges such a power shift could create — either via direct or indirect ends, ways, and means. A more holistic approach to risk planning could help identify and set conditions to act before they occur.

Conclusion

Accurately forecasting the future is at best a difficult business “for even the very wise cannot see all ends.”2 The world is an open, often chaotic, system, impossible to fully predict. Doctrine and operational experience provide a solid foundation for military professionals but need continued revision. Risk of success evaluation in future planning will ensure the right resources are available and simultaneously provide commanders with robust options in advance of the actual conditions occurring.

If you enjoyed this post, check out the following related content:

The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict, along with its source document

History Doesn’t Repeat Itself, but it Does Rhyme, by Aaron Horwood

The Hermit Kingdom in the Digital Era: Implications of the North Korean Problem for the SOF Community, by Colonel Montgomery Erfourth and Dr. Aaron Bazin

Insights from Ukraine on the Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare

Four Models of the Post-COVID World

The Future Operational Environment: The Four Worlds of 2035-2050

About the Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Heatherly enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1994 and earned his commission via Officer Candidate School in 1997. He has held a variety of assignments in Joint forces land component command, special operations, Special Forces, armored, and cavalry units. His operational experience includes deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, South Korea, Kuwait, Mali, and Nigeria. He holds master’s degrees from the University of Oklahoma and the School of Advanced Military Studies.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), or U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF).

1 ADP 3-0, Operations, 31 July 2019, pages 2-11 through 2-12, Headquarters, Department of the Army, retrieved 11 Dec 2022. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN18010-ADP_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf

2 Tolkien, JRR. 1994. The Fellowship of the Ring, page 58. New York. Houghton, Mifflin, Harcourt.

21. 99 Spy Balloons: An Exploration of Disruptive Innovation on a Budget

Excerpts:

Returning to the Chinese balloon that traversed an entire continent before finally being shot down, officials have confirmed that it was difficult to spot on radar and verified that reconnaissance was one of its primary functions. Given the versatility in payloads that modern aerostatics can manage, a surveillance platform was the least threatening option to detect in US airspace.

Aerostatic platforms are not flashy or particularly sophisticated, but that is what makes them so valuable as a strategic asset. They were once a cutting-edge innovation that was soon outpaced by dynamic air assets. Then, their low cost and rapid production at scale saw them return to large-scale conflict as an extremely productive improvised weapon. Today, with even greater capabilities than ever before, balloons represent a disruptive branch of implements at a fraction of the cost of apex platforms designed for similar results. When forecasting future threats and anticipating the shape of the next conflict, it is easy to overlook the simple and proven approaches. Even if US military innovation efforts continue to revolve around seeking advantages in technology, it is imperative to avoid expecting others to do the same.

99 Spy Balloons: An Exploration of Disruptive Innovation on a Budget - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Joe McGiffin · April 6, 2023

The Chinese spy balloon incident might no longer be gracing newspaper front pages or leading newscasts to the extent it did in the initial days after the balloon was spotted high in the sky over Montana. But even as it becomes yesterday’s news, it should inform discussions about strategic innovation today. Before being shot down after crossing the entire North American landmass, the balloon had been transmitting information back to Beijing in real time, providing detailed information on strategic military installations across the United States. On the bright side, though, at least that was all it did. Balloon reconnaissance is the first and oldest military use of aerostatics. Today, it is not out of the question that a balloon just like that one could carry a different payload over the continental United States—for instance, one that could take out half the West Coast’s power grid before North American Aerospace Defense Command even registered it as a threat.

The notion of disruptive military innovation typically calls to mind a list of scientific developments bordering on fiction, like nth-generation fighter platforms with supporting autonomous drone swarms, quantum computing, or fully integrated sensor-shooter networks. This approach to disruptive innovation involves developing a weapon or system so advanced that an adversary cannot hope to defend against it. However, there is a cheaper approach to achieving that same effect, and balloons are a prime example. Aerostatics are an underappreciated form of disruptive innovation, but an especially noteworthy one because of their extremely high rate of return: major impact with a minimal price tag.

The US Strategy of Innovation

Pursuit of superior military technology has been a staple in US defense strategy since World War II. First came the atomic bomb, which became central to the first offset strategy, aimed at neutralizing the Warsaw Pact’s numerical advantages. Next were advances in intelligence technologies and precision weapons, on which the second offset strategy was based. These, in turn, resulted in the overmatch capabilities used to dominate in the Gulf War. Most recently, the third offset strategy aimed to overcome China’s antiaccess and area-denial capabilities by leveraging robotics, autonomy, data tools, and other technologies. This pattern of offset strategies indicates that the US military and its industrial complex do not draw distinctions between future capability and technological innovation, feeding the avid pursuit of next-generation weaponry.

Yet, fixating military innovation on revolutionary or high-tech weapons is problematic for generating options and anticipating threats. Yes, the Gulf War was a successful endeavor by most empirical metrics. US and coalition forces achieved decisive victory in just forty-three days, largely by leveraging information warfare, precision munitions, and dominant battlefield maneuver enabled by decades of investment in military technologies. However, such a quick and decisive victory is far from a guaranteed outcome, especially against a more evenly matched enemy, which makes it a poor basis on which to justify the logic of the American approach to strategy and innovation. While hypersonic weapons, autonomous platforms, and an integrated sensor-shooter network all hold incredible potential, they are expensive and do not guarantee success.

An opposing approach centers on improvisation, which is effectively innovation on a budget. Improvisation is how actors develop new strategic and tactical options despite lacking the resources to compete along the normal research and development route. As long as there has been asymmetric conflict, there has been improvisation—a creative use of limited resources and means to achieve a military advantage over an otherwise superior force. For instance, virtually every recorded asymmetric maritime conflict involving armadas of wooden vessels has seen ships converted into fireships. More recently, the extensive use and constant refinement of improvised explosive devices during the US wars in the Middle East and their subsequent global proliferation epitomize the potential of low-cost innovation.

The War Balloon Then . . .

Balloons and other aerostatics have a long history as both high-tech and improvised weapons platforms. Curtis Peebles provides a fantastic survey of aerostatics in military history in The Moby Dick Project, a book published by the Smithsonian Institute Press. Over 125 years before Billy Mitchell fought convention to weaponize airplanes as bombers, balloon proponents began pushing for the military applications of aerostatics and faced the same pushback. France used tethered balloons for reconnaissance at the end of the eighteenth century, until Napoleon discontinued their use, not seeing their value as worth the cost of maintaining a balloon corps. By the 1850s, countries were exploring other uses: long-distance signaling, disseminating propaganda, and even bombardment. During the US Civil War, combined with the telegraph for superior information sharing, Union forces benefitted immensely from their use of aerostatics. Not only did it give timely information that aided in operations, but Confederate forces were compelled to take time and effort to conceal their movements and battle positions as well as to build decoys in order to maintain some opacity in their maneuvers.

Once the airplane became a viable military reconnaissance platform during World War I it seemed as though balloons would become obsolete, relegated to the limited role of a tethered surveillance. Surprisingly, though, their role expands again in World War II, no doubt owing to how economical their mass production became with advances in plastics and rubber manufacturing. On the defense, balloons were used for airspace denial; London’s barrage balloon flotilla was an integral piece of a British air defense system aimed at keeping German fighters and bombers away from strategic locations during the Blitz.

Balloons offered even more applications as unmanned autonomous platforms. The Japanese FuGo fire balloons enjoy a certain amount of notoriety, especially Americans whose families lived on the West Coast during World War II. Mass-produced with ingenious self-ballasting mechanisms and bomb fuses, these platforms aimed to set rampant forest fires across California, Oregon, and Washington for a negligible cost in resources and manpower. Less well known, is the successful British Operation Outward. According to Peebles, for what amounts to around $127 apiece in today’s currency, the British equipped barrage balloons with either a tow cable (to short out power lines) or a bomb payload and floated them across continental Europe, seeking to wreak havoc on strategic centers of gravity with little expenditure of time or effort and with little risk. While the exact impact of Operation Outward is unknown, the cost of the operation almost certainly paled in comparison to the amount of damage to German power grid infrastructure.

. . . The War Balloon Now

Military aerostatics never went away, but a disproportionate—or worse, exclusive—fixation on high-tech innovation leaves little room to acknowledge them as a durable strategic capability. Today’s balloons are capable of carrying significant payloads at stratospheric altitudes, with a negligible radar signature and concealed from visual observation. Advances since World War II have made them far more effective at their historic roles and even opened the door to other applications. For a relatively low cost, a strategic actor could produce a multifunctional aerostatic flotilla capable of executing an array of missions in support of multi-domain operations:

Balloons could form a superior, discrete reconnaissance network that provides better information than satellites because of their ability to sustain observation by hovering over a target. Optics and communications systems have evolved well beyond the crude binoculars and telegraph employed during the Civil War. These advances have only made aerostatic reconnaissance platforms that much more economical to deploy and sustain compared to satellites.
A constellation of balloons enabling internet access and communications could be deployed to augment ongoing multi-domain operations temporarily and provide redundancies for nodes that enable command and control. This application has some potential benefits for the ongoing development of a Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) network.
Employed as decoys and radar-spoofing platforms, aerostatics can confuse enemy automated and manned platforms and be used to conceal higher-priority assets. Being able to confuse enemy systems dilutes antiaccess and area-denial capabilities and disrupts the enemy’s decision-making cycle, giving friendly forces an advantage in tempo and initiative.
At the extreme end of the application spectrum, balloons could be used to deploy nuclear warheads that, when discharged at flight altitude, would generate an electromagnetic pulse capable of neutralizing power grids in a five-hundred-mile radius, softening defensive lines prior to a large-scale combat operation and crippling infrastructure.
Lastly, balloons could be nested into future drone swarms for command and control or resupply purposes or used to launch hypersonic weapons. Because of their ability to sustain flight, balloons are incredible forward-staging assets for strategic weapons and communications.

Rethinking Aerostatics—and Disruptive Innovation

Returning to the Chinese balloon that traversed an entire continent before finally being shot down, officials have confirmed that it was difficult to spot on radar and verified that reconnaissance was one of its primary functions. Given the versatility in payloads that modern aerostatics can manage, a surveillance platform was the least threatening option to detect in US airspace.

Aerostatic platforms are not flashy or particularly sophisticated, but that is what makes them so valuable as a strategic asset. They were once a cutting-edge innovation that was soon outpaced by dynamic air assets. Then, their low cost and rapid production at scale saw them return to large-scale conflict as an extremely productive improvised weapon. Today, with even greater capabilities than ever before, balloons represent a disruptive branch of implements at a fraction of the cost of apex platforms designed for similar results. When forecasting future threats and anticipating the shape of the next conflict, it is easy to overlook the simple and proven approaches. Even if US military innovation efforts continue to revolve around seeking advantages in technology, it is imperative to avoid expecting others to do the same.

Captain Joe McGiffin serves as the plans officer at the Modern War Institute.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: US Air Force Public Affairs

mwi.usma.edu · by Joe McGiffin · April 6, 2023

22. Beyond Reapers and DJI Mavics: Are Scholars and Policymakers Ready for One-Way Attack Drones?

Excerpts:

Even in the context of the conventional conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine uses one-way attack drones as part of their irregular campaign against Russia’s rear bases and supply lines. As early as June Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil and military targets with improvised one-way attack drones to get around their lack of other long-range strike options. To get around Russia’s massive naval superiority, Ukraine attacked Russia’s Black Sea fleet with OWA drones in conjunction with drone boats, forcing the Russian navy to rethink their operations. These drones either came from Ukraine’s fledgling drone industry or were purchased commercially and modified.

Scholars and policymakers need to consider the implications of OWA drones for US defense policy. The March 23 and January 20 attacks in Syria show that the United States and other countries will need to think about air defense when providing security force assistance to partners that involves co-locating their personnel. The wars in Yemen and Ukraine show that actors like Iran can produce and proliferate large numbers of drones to US adversaries without being a leader in drone technology. Scholars need to move on from simplistic classifications of drones based on weight and focus more on analyzing the implications of technologies currently on the battlefield. If scholars want to inform policymakers about the strategic implications of drone technologies, they will need to look beyond Reapers and Mavics.

Beyond Reapers and DJI Mavics: Are Scholars and Policymakers Ready for One-Way Attack Drones? - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Marcel Plichta · April 6, 2023

On March 23rd an Iranian-made one-way attack (OWA) drone struck a US-led coalition base in Syria, killing a US contractor and injuring five US servicemembers and another US contractor. It was not the first time an OWA had been used in this way. On January 20th three drones had attacked another coalition base in southern Syria. Two were shot down, but the third injured two Syrian fighters in the base. The model of drone was initially unidentified, but later footage of the January attack revealed that they were Qasef-2ks, a kind of OWA drone.

Practitioners may be intimately familiar with the Qasef and other OWA drones, but their recent use in Syria and Ukraine, where actors have used these drones in large numbers and to great effect, should be prompting scholars, commentators, and many policymakers to rethink how they conceptualize drones. Previously, even as the number and variety of drones expands, scholars of irregular warfare have overwhelmingly studied how actors use only two kinds of drones, which do not include OWAs. The first is the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV), like the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper. According to most scholarship, UCAVs are primarily used by states to conduct counterterrorism, and therefore studies focus on their utility in counterinsurgency contexts. On the opposite end of the spectrum, some scholars look at how insurgent and terrorist groups use quadcopters like those made by the Chinese company DJI to increase the lethality and reach of their attacks.

Both drone types are important to study, but one-way attack drones are different. Whereas UCAVs are extremely expensive to operate and quadcopters have limited range and payload, OWA drones are a low-cost way for nonstate actors and proxy forces to strike targets hundreds of miles away with better precision than a rocket or mortar. The opportunities and challenges presented by OWA drones merit further analysis, as they are a growing part of irregular warfare and irregular tactics from Yemen to Ukraine. While practitioners have started pouring money into air defenses that can counter one-way attack drones effectively, a lack of scholarship has left many policymakers without a clear understanding of what one-way attack drones are, what they are used for, and how their low cost, high precision, and ease of proliferation will make them a key part of future conflicts.

One-way attack drones are a broad category, but share the feature that they crash into or explode above their target, and therefore cannot be reused. The category includes drones of all shapes and sizes, but those with the greatest potential to challenge even the most advanced militaries are fixed wing, cheaply built, and can travel hundreds of miles. The Shahed-136, for example, which has quickly become the mascot for drones of this type, probably costs around $30,000 USD each and is estimated to be able to fly up to 2,000 kilometers, although no known attack has tested that maximum range. Most importantly, Iran’s OWAs are a precision strike capability that is compact enough to proliferate across the world, and simple enough for everyone from nonstate actors to the Russian army to make use of them.

Iran’s OWA drone program is frequently referenced in the media because the Iranian government sent hundreds to Russia for use against Ukraine, but these drones present more challenges in an irregular context. Iran’s drones are used extensively in Yemen, where the Iran-backed Houthi rebels launch them in conjunction with missiles against the Yemeni government, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The drones are both part of an effort by the Houthis to coerce its stronger adversaries without a conventional battle, and a proxy effort by Iran, which seeks inexpensive ways to wrongfoot its regional rivals. A major part of Saudi Arabia’s recent rapprochement with Iran is reportedly a desire to halt the flow of one-way attack drones to the Houthis from Iran.

One-way attack drones take advantage of the assumptions of modern air defense: that conventional militaries will primarily use a small number of extraordinarily capable systems, like advanced cruise missiles, strike aircraft, or UAVs, rather than large numbers of less capable systems. Over the course of several years, the Houthis launched hundreds of drones at oil and military facilities to degrade Yemeni military capabilities and coerce Saudi and Emirati leaders to cease support to the Yemeni government. While the Saudis in particular claim most drones were shot down, the intensity of the campaign led the Saudi military to plead for more air defense systems to protect their borders and is one of the reasons they have sought a way out of the conflict for years.

The blind spot scholars and commentators had for one-way attack drones came into play when the United States announced that Russia would acquire Iranian drones in mid-2022. Few observers looked beyond Iran’s UCAV fleet when analyzing the implications of the transfer for the conflict. Even after Shaheds started showing up in Ukraine, they tend to be folded into broader articles about drones overall, rather than studied as a system with a unique purpose.

Russia’s attacks in October turned heads. Russia used dozens of Shahed one-way attack drones to target civilians in Kyiv. As was the case in Yemen, the drones were used in preponderance to get through conventional air defenses, or to support missile strikes. Even if most were shot down, those that made it through killed civilians; subsequent attacks peaked towards the end of the year and led the Ukrainian government and international donors to prioritize well-intentioned but tactically dubious efforts to specifically counter Shaheds.

Even in the context of the conventional conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine uses one-way attack drones as part of their irregular campaign against Russia’s rear bases and supply lines. As early as June Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil and military targets with improvised one-way attack drones to get around their lack of other long-range strike options. To get around Russia’s massive naval superiority, Ukraine attacked Russia’s Black Sea fleet with OWA drones in conjunction with drone boats, forcing the Russian navy to rethink their operations. These drones either came from Ukraine’s fledgling drone industry or were purchased commercially and modified.

Scholars and policymakers need to consider the implications of OWA drones for US defense policy. The March 23 and January 20 attacks in Syria show that the United States and other countries will need to think about air defense when providing security force assistance to partners that involves co-locating their personnel. The wars in Yemen and Ukraine show that actors like Iran can produce and proliferate large numbers of drones to US adversaries without being a leader in drone technology. Scholars need to move on from simplistic classifications of drones based on weight and focus more on analyzing the implications of technologies currently on the battlefield. If scholars want to inform policymakers about the strategic implications of drone technologies, they will need to look beyond Reapers and Mavics.

Marcel Plichta is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews and a former analyst at the US Department of Defense. He has previously written for Foreign Policy, Defense One, and the Modern Warfare Institute. All information provided in this article has been provided by third parties since the author’s departure from the Department of Defense.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Photo: US Marine Corps

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irregularwarfare.org · by Marcel Plichta · April 6, 2023

23. The Threat from Extremist Groups Is Growing. Service Members and Vets Are Getting Sucked into the Violence.

The Threat from Extremist Groups Is Growing. Service Members and Vets Are Getting Sucked into the Violence.

military.com · by Travis Tritten,Drew F. Lawrence,Konstantin Toropin,Steve Beynon · April 5, 2023

"Nothing shall deter us from our duty in this eternal struggle -- not death nor prison," Brandon Russell wrote from his jail cell in May 2020. "We are always comforted by the thought of knowing we did the right thing in fighting this wretched System."

The former National Guard soldier was serving a five-year sentence after a former roommate told law enforcement that Russell had explosives and warned them that he had threatened to kill and conduct bombings while cruising neo-Nazi chatrooms.

In a cooler in the garage of the Tampa, Florida, apartment they shared, Russell had HMTD, an explosive used almost exclusively by terrorists that can be made with common materials such as camp stove fuel, hair bleach and over-the-counter supplements.

Russell, who at the time of his arrest served in the Florida National Guard, had turned the apartment into something of a boot camp for the three men he ushered into the neo-Nazi organization he founded, Atomwaffen Division.

The men used Old Glory as a doormat. A Nazi flag hung on the wall, and Russell had a framed picture on his dresser of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, who had also been a soldier before becoming a terrorist. Their white supremacist group believes violence, terrorism and murder are necessary to eliminate non-white minorities and cause society's collapse.

Russell seemingly went everywhere in his Army uniform, wanting to project an image of "Mr. All-American," one of the roommate's parents would recall. Beneath that uniform, on his right shoulder, the leader had an Atomwaffen Division shield tattoo.

He was released in 2021, but was arrested again in February of this year, along with an alleged female accomplice, and charged with masterminding a plan to blow up Baltimore's electric grid. The goal was to cause as much suffering as possible in the city during times of extreme heat or cold, according to prosecutors.

This story is the second installment in a series on the rise of extremism and the role of troops and veterans. Part 1 looked at how extremist groups are targeting and radicalizing those who have served their country in uniform. Sign up here so you don't miss our next major report.

Atomwaffen, which federal authorities say also now goes by the name the National Socialist Order with an unknown number of members given its disparate cell structure, is just one example of the growing and urgent threat that violent extremists pose to the U.S., according to experts and federal authorities.

And at the lead of some of those organizations, pushed to the front both because of their skills and the respect their service engenders, are service members and veterans like Russell.

"I and several of my closest colleagues for a couple of years now have been kind of looking at each other nervously and saying, 'You know, this feels like the '90s,'" said Amy Cooter, a senior research fellow at the Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism at Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

"This feels like what this movement felt like in the lead-up and the immediate aftermath of Oklahoma City," she said in a recent interview, referring to the deadly bombing by McVeigh in 1995.

McVeigh, who served in the Gulf War, was a "good soldier" who was "real career-oriented," a veteran who served with him told The Associated Press just after the bombing. But after failing to become a Green Beret, McVeigh left the service and turned his hatred against the federal government, traveling to the botched FBI siege of the Branch Davidians compound at Waco, Texas, in 1993 to hand out anti-government flyers.

He murdered 168 people, including 19 children who were mostly in a second-floor daycare center, with a Ryder rental truck packed with explosives that he detonated in front of an Oklahoma City federal building -- the deadliest act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history, according to the FBI.

It was the high-water mark for the last great surge of violent extremism in America. But McVeigh's story looks terrifyingly similar to cases popping up now across the country.

The U.S. intelligence community deemed racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism -- with adherents such as white supremacists, Nazis and other racist groups -- the "most lethal threat" to Americans in its annual 2023 threat assessment released in March.

The groups "believe that recruiting military members will help them organize cells for attacks against minorities or institutions that oppose their ideology," the intelligence report says.

But the Pentagon and Congress remain divided over how seriously to take the threat, even as violent plots are foiled and agencies, watchdog organizations and advocates issue increasingly urgent warnings.

The military services have held stand-downs and issued new policies, but then balked at using up precious time and funding on more elaborate efforts to stamp out white supremacists, Nazis and other hate groups, rather than caring for other pressing issues such as the current recruiting crisis.

"The department did not want to really have to engage this to begin with for a variety of reasons, mainly because it does distract from a lot of the other business and work that they're trying to do," a former official familiar with the Defense Department efforts to combat extremism told Military.com, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

A protester who declined to give his name stands outside the Oregon State Capitol wearing a Hawaiian shirt and carrying a flag with a Hawaiian flower print on one stripe, both symbols associated with the boogaloo movement, on Sunday, Jan. 17, 2021, in Salem, Ore. (AP Photo/Noah Berger)

A Message in Blood

New extremist organizations such as Atomwaffen, the Boogaloo movement and the Base, a neo-Nazi group, have picked up where the anti-government militias of the '80s and '90s left off. They seek a violent overthrow of the government or a civil war so they can recreate society, usually into a white supremacist or fascist state.

The accelerationist groups -- the term denotes that they wish to bring about that civil war swiftly -- have sprung up in the aftermath of the Unite the Right extremist group gathering and protests in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017. The event was the largest gathering of white supremacists in recent memory, and many of the torch-bearing participants were young men.

But the event, which culminated in a white supremacist driving through a crowd and killing a counter-protester, sent existing groups into disarray.

"The radicals that are left are looking away from those groups and looking toward more active and dangerous paths, such as we've seen in the Hard Reset," said Rick Eaton, a senior researcher and the head of the digital terrorism and hate research team at the Simon Wiesenthal Center, a human rights organization.

The Hard Reset is a manifesto put out by groups such as Atomwaffen on the social media messaging system Telegram through a series of channels nicknamed Terrorgram by both users and experts. The latest iteration of the terrorist how-to magazine published in July included "tactics, techniques, and procedures" on how to bring about societal collapse, as well as 47 pages promoting attacks on infrastructure, according to the Global Network on Extremism and Technology, an initiative at the Department of War Studies at King's College London.

"It's definitely more disturbing than it's ever been, and the willingness to commit violence combined with the general levels of, you know, violent shootings and things in this country are not helping," said Eaton, who has studied extremism at the Wiesenthal center for 37 years.

FBI cases involving domestic terrorism have skyrocketed -- going from 1,981 in 2013 to 5,557 in 2020. Just a year later, in 2021, the number of cases climbed to 9,049, according to a report by the Government Accountability Office.

Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists were responsible for 94 deaths and 111 injuries over the past decade, the agency reported.

Steven Carrillo, a follower of accelerationist ideology, was an Air Force sergeant at Travis Air Force Base in California in 2020 when he pulled up to a federal courthouse in Oakland, California, in a white van and opened fire on security guards, killing one. He murdered a county sheriff's deputy a week later, all part of a plan to incite a civil war, and was sentenced to 41 years in prison in August.

While on the run before his arrest, Carrillo had scrawled in blood that he believed murdering police, whom he called domestic enemies of the Constitution, would spark conflict between Americans, according to PBS' Frontline.

The list of veterans caught up in extremism in recent years doesn't end there. Two veterans and a soldier are accused of being a Boogaloo movement cell that planned to blow up public infrastructure and terrorize a Black Lives Matter protest in Las Vegas. William Loomis, an Air Force veteran; Stephen Parshall, a Navy veteran; and Andrew Lynam, who was in the Army Reserve, were arrested in 2020 and are still awaiting trial.

Lynam, who was a soldier at the time, told an undercover agent that "their group was not for joking around and that it was for people who wanted to violently overthrow the United States government," according to court documents.

Groups such as the Oath Keepers militia and Patriot Front have preyed on veterans for recruitment, hoping to take advantage of their tactical experience and prestige. Those groups use the language of patriotism and service to appeal to the same character traits that got many to serve the country in the military.

But while experts warn of the gathering threat, extremism has become politically charged after former soldier Stewart Rhodes, the founder of the Oath Keepers militia, and other veterans were convicted of seditious conspiracy for breaking into the U.S. Capitol and disrupting Congress on Jan. 6, 2021, at the urging of former President Donald Trump.

The siege of the Capitol and the disruption of Congress was a stunning development and the most violent attack on the building since British troops set fire to the House and Senate during the War of 1812.

Trump sold the lie that the presidential election was stolen from him and convinced extremists in the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys extremist groups -- as well as hundreds of average Americans -- to attempt to stop the transfer of power to President Joe Biden. Now, Trump is the assumed front-runner in the Republican race for president in 2024.

Just four months after Jan. 6, the Pentagon announced a new working group to combat extremism in the military, after it became clear some troops and veterans were involved in the Capitol insurrection. That included Air Force veteran Ashli Babbitt, 35, who was shot and killed by outnumbered Capitol police as she and other rioters broke down doors to the Speaker's Lobby and House floor, where lawmakers were huddled.

Lloyd Austin, Biden's defense secretary and the first Black person to hold the position, also ordered a one-day stand-down for troops across the services to talk about military values and the oath of service and to get a better understanding of extremism in the ranks.

The Republicans on the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee protested the moves, claiming the anti-extremism effort was part of a political narrative and that it was devastating to military morale. Some continue to question whether extremism is really a top threat.

In March, U.S. intelligence officials briefed senators on the 2023 risk assessment. Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., one of many GOP critics of efforts to root out extremism in the military, needled the officials over the report findings on racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist groups.

"Are you serious? You seriously think that racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists are the most lethal threat that Americans face?" Cotton said during a public hearing.

"So, yes, sir, in terms of the number of people killed or wounded as a consequence," Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said.

'Destroying Kids' Careers'

The Pentagon's extremism working group wrapped up in December 2021. Austin determined that "very few" troops are involved in extremism, but also noted that even a small number of cases can have an outsized effect on unit morale and cohesion -- and can pose a danger to other service members.

The working group report found fewer than 100 cases of "prohibited extremism activity" in service members over the prior year.

The Defense Department inspector general also reported 281 extremism investigations during just the first nine months of 2021, in what has been some of the only additional data released publicly on the issue in the military. Of those cases, 92 involved some sort of punishment by the military and 83 were referred to civilian law enforcement.

But Jon Lewis, a research fellow at the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, said in a recent interview that the numbers alone fail to recognize a core tenet of terrorism: The quantity of extremists is immaterial to their potential impact.

"It's a prominent, significant issue because it doesn't take 35 guys piling into a U-Haul," Lewis said. "It doesn't take a mass mobilization movement of 30,000 people to the U.S. Capitol. You just need a couple people. You just need one or two with easy access to firearms and a target."

At the Pentagon, military guidance was overhauled at Austin's order to include a voluminous new definition of prohibited extremist activity across the services.

Troops were explicitly barred from advocating or using violence to overthrow the government or push a racist, sexist or discriminatory ideology. Recruiting for extremist causes, extremist paraphernalia such as flags and bumper stickers, and posting or sharing extremist information online are all banned.

But it remains to be seen how the new guidance will be used. The challenge for the military is how to identify the activity in a total force of about 2.3 million, and how to deal with troops who do break the rules, many of them being young adults barely out of high school.

"They're typically junior enlisted that saw some memes or a Reddit thing or watched something on YouTube, heard a guy say something. And the question is whether or not they have full-on engaged in any actual activity," the former government official told Military.com.

If a service member has not fully participated in extremism, then "you're not trying to go out and just destroy these kids' careers," the official said. Instead, intervention to correct and educate them may be a better choice for the military.

"The other piece of the issue is ... within the potential extremist activity movement or issue, the majority of bad actors tend to be veterans -- the vast majority," they said.

But sometimes the most dangerous extremist threats do begin with posts online, and that activity, when not caught or flagged, can end in violence.

U.S. Attorney Brian Moran stands next to a poster that was mailed to the home of Chris Ingalls, an investigative reporter with KING-TV in Seattle, Wednesday, Feb. 26, 2020, during a news conference in Seattle. (AP Photo/Ted S. Warren)

Alligator Alley and a Florida Nuclear Plant

One of Brandon Russell's first online screen names was "Odin," a reference to the powerful Norse god of wolves and ravens.

That's how Alan Arthurs remembers hearing about him. Arthurs' son Devon was one of Russell's roommates. Devon, who is now imprisoned in Florida and charged with a double murder, let the name slip during a car ride together. It was a decade ago -- before the deaths and criminal charges -- when his son was still just a wayward teenager.

"I said, 'Excuse me, what?' I thought, wait a minute, who would have the audacity to use that as their screen name?" Arthurs told Military.com in a recent interview. "And that's when all of a sudden I looked at Brandon, or any communication he was having with Brandon, in a different way."

But Devon looked up to Russell like he was amazing. As if he really was a god.

"One of the big trends that I think you see there, and then you continue to see in the neo-fascist acceleration space -- so Attomwaffen and the Base as examples -- is individuals like Brandon Russell ... intentionally targeting younger individuals or even sometimes minors, for recruitment," Lewis said.

Even in Russell's early posts on the now-defunct Iron March website, a notorious online gathering place for neo-Nazis, the former Guardsman tried to present himself as some type of master strategist and influential figure, Lewis said.

"When you really boil it down, it is power and control," he said.

When reached for comment, Russell's attorney Ian Goldstein said, "Due to the pending charges, we have no comment at this time."

In May 2017, Devon Arthurs was arrested for allegedly killing two of his three roommates, sparing only Russell.

"All I know is I got a phone call -- I was at the office -- from Devon telling me that he had shot them," said Arthurs, recalling a conversation with his son immediately after the incident.

It was after his arrest that Devon would describe details of bombing plots the men allegedly hatched, and Russell would head to prison on explosives charges.

Devon told authorities that, before he killed his two roommates in the Tampa apartment, they had planned to attack power lines along the long stretch of Interstate 75 in South Florida known as Alligator Alley.

Those original Atomwaffen members also planned to attack a Florida nuclear power plant, Devon Arthurs said.

Russell would continue on with the effort after his arrest and imprisonment, authorities claim.

He had chosen a new screen name after serving his 60 months on the explosives charges. This time, while out on supervised release, he was going by the name "Homunculus" on encrypted communications.

In June, Russell allegedly started encouraging a FBI informant via encrypted chat to attack electrical substations in a way that would cause maximum damage. The plot would allegedly grow to five electrical substations, according to prosecutors, leading to his February arrest.

Russell and others in the violent accelerationist movement have also found ways to reach out beyond their neo-Nazi and fascist peers and threaten those in the public who oppose them.

Kris Goldsmith, an Iraq combat veteran, runs Task Force Butler, a nonprofit that researches extremism. His work caught the attention of Russell, he said in a recent interview, and the neo-Nazi targeted his family.

"One of the last things he did before he was picked up by the FBI for planning terrorist attacks, was he shared my home address and photos of my family with his network at Atomwaffen," Goldsmith said.

After Russell posted Goldsmith's information, someone called the police pretending to be Goldsmith, claiming he had a weapon and was going to kill himself. A SWAT team was called out to Goldsmith's house at night while he and his wife were in bed.

The dangerous practice is called "swatting" and is used by Atomwaffen against perceived enemies, such as churches, Islamic centers, universities, journalists and public officials. A Texas man described as an Atomwaffen division leader by federal authorities was recently sentenced to three and a half years in prison for swatting attacks on 134 locations across the U.S.

"Our dogs were barking like f---ing crazy," Goldsmith remembered. He got up and went downstairs to see what had gotten them so excited, running right into armed members of the SWAT team.

"I look outside, and I see a man in dark clothing wearing tactical gear and carrying an AR-15. He points it at my face," he said.

-- Travis Tritten can be reached at travis.tritten@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @Travis_Tritten.

-- Drew F. Lawrence can be reached at drew.lawrence@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @df_lawrence.

-- Konstantin Toropin can be reached at konstantin.toropin@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @ktoropin.

-- Steve Beynon can be reached at Steve.Beynon@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @StevenBeynon.

military.com · by Travis Tritten,Drew F. Lawrence,Konstantin Toropin,Steve Beynon · April 5, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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By Scott Kennedy and Wang Jisi

VIBE SHIFT

STRAIT TALK

GET OUTSIDE YOUR BUBBLE

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