Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“We live in a world in which speed is prized above almost all else, and acting faster than the other side has itself become the primary goal. But most often people are merely in a hurry, acting and reacting frantically to events, all of which makes them prone to error and wasting time in the long run. In order to separate yourself from the pack, to harness a speed that has devastating force, you must be organized and strategic. First, you prepare yourself before any action, scanning your enemy for weaknesses. Then you find a way to get your opponents to underestimate you, to lower their guard. When you strike unexpectedly, they will freeze up. When you hit again, it is from the side and out of nowhere. It is the unanticipated blow that makes the biggest impact.”

- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies Of War

“First, as is often said, a samurai must have both literary and martial skills; to be versed in the two is his duty.”

- Miyamoto Musashi

"Joy can only be real if people look upon their life as a service and have a definite object in life outside themselves and their personal happiness."

- Leo Tolstoy

1. The Inflection Point: A speech that may well define Biden’s presidency

2. Biden Lights the Beacon, for Israel, Ukraine and the World

3. Biden Wanted to End ‘Forever Wars.’ Now He Looks Like a Wartime President.

4. Learning from LSCO: Applying Lessons to Irregular Conflict

5. AP visual analysis: Rocket from Gaza appeared to go astray, likely caused deadly hospital explosion

6. With Putin by His Side, Xi Outlines His Vision of a New World Order

7. Why We Should Fear China More Than Middle Eastern War

8. Israel Is About to Make a Terrible Mistake

9. Hamas’s Hostage-Taking Handbook Says to ‘Kill the Difficult Ones’ and Use Hostages as ‘Human Shields’

10. Yes, the U.S. Can Afford to Help Its Allies

11. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 20, 2023

12. Iran Update, October 20, 2023

13. Hold Hamas and all of its enablers accountable

14. Why We Need to Disarm the Anti-China Discourse (Blatant Chinese Propaganda)

15. Are Fears of A.I. and Nuclear Apocalypse Keeping You Up? Blame Prometheus.

16. Don’t Count on China’s Belt and Road Initiative to Disappear

17. Interactive Map: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

18. Putin, Kim Jong Un Portraits Pop Up at West Bank Protest Over Israel as Russia Says It's in Talks with Hamas on Hostages

19. Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives

20. American in Gaza Details Life While Waiting for the Border to Open: 'We Are Extremely Afraid for Our Lives'

1. The Inflection Point: A speech that may well define Biden’s presidency

Conclusion:

And so it was a bit disorienting for some of us who are conservative and who were shaped by the Reagan era—and in my case, who worked as a young man in the Reagan administration—to see our foreign-policy principles championed last night not by the Republican Party but by the Democratic president, who spoke with impressive moral force and moral clarity. Our journey through the looking glass continues.

The Inflection Point

A speech that may well define Biden’s presidency

By Peter Wehner

OCTOBER 20, 2023, 10:10 AM ET

The Atlantic · by Peter Wehner · October 20, 2023

The significance of President Joe Biden’s Oval Office address to the nation last night was signaled in the opening sentence: “We’re facing an inflection point in history.”

What followed was a speech that may well define Biden’s presidency.

The proximate cause for the speech was Biden’s desire to urge Americans to stand with Israel in its war against Hamas and Ukraine in its war against Russia. The president is expected to ask Congress for emergency assistance for the two nations in a $100 billion spending package. But the speech was not primarily about money; it was about America’s teleology, about how Biden sees the role of the United States in a world that is fraying and aflame.

Biden used phrases loaded with meaning. America is “the arsenal of democracy,” he said, invoking a phrase from a 1940 speech by Franklin D. Roosevelt. But in case that wasn’t clear enough, Biden said America is “the essential nation” and the “indispensable nation.” It “holds the world together,” Biden said. Israel and Ukraine are 1,200 miles apart. The conflicts are quite different; Ukraine is battling a world power, and Israel a terrorist organization. But Biden twinned the two conflicts, presenting the outcome of these wars as vital to America’s national security.

Elliot Ackerman: The arsenal of democracy is reopening for business

“History has taught us that when terrorists don’t pay a price for their terror, when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and death and more destruction,” he said, while promising to keep American troops out of harm’s way. “They keep going. And the cost and the threats to America and the world keep rising.”

Biden displayed “a passion, emotion and a clarity that is usually missing from the president’s ordinarily flat and meandering speeches,” according to David Sanger of The New York Times. In an act of extraordinary solidarity, Biden has traveled to both Israel and Ukraine in the midst of their wars. One gets the sense that Biden believes this isn’t just America’s moment; it is his moment. It is as if he has found his purpose.

Biden’s speech illustrated the profound shifts we’re seeing in American politics and within the two major parties. The commander in chief Biden most sounded like was Ronald Reagan, using phrases such as “pure, unadulterated evil” to describe the actions of Hamas (Reagan described the Soviet Union as the “evil empire”) and “beacon to the world” to describe America (Reagan often described the United States as a “shining city on a hill”).

Meanwhile, Republicans have become the more isolationist party, deeply wary of America providing moral leadership in the world. In last fall’s midterm elections, well over half of voters for Republican candidates—56 percent—said the U.S. should take a less active role in world affairs.

From the December 2022 issue: A new theory of American power

It is the American right, much more than the American left, that is disparaging of NATO, critical of aid to Ukraine, and appeasement-minded toward Russia. Donald Trump—the dominant and defining figure in the GOP—has repeatedly praised Vladimir Putin, among other brutal dictators, holding Putin up as a model and, at various points, denigrating America in the process. He even sided with Russian intelligence over U.S. intelligence at a joint press conference with Putin in Helsinki.

And so it was a bit disorienting for some of us who are conservative and who were shaped by the Reagan era—and in my case, who worked as a young man in the Reagan administration—to see our foreign-policy principles championed last night not by the Republican Party but by the Democratic president, who spoke with impressive moral force and moral clarity. Our journey through the looking glass continues.

The Atlantic · by Peter Wehner · October 20, 2023

2. Biden Lights the Beacon, for Israel, Ukraine and the World

Conclusion:

And spare a thought for Biden, whether you’ll vote for him next year or not. He’s trying to do what’s right, rejecting hate in all its forms, and using American power for good in the world. As he said, the US is a beacon — still.

Biden Lights the Beacon, for Israel, Ukraine and the World

The US president will bundle support for Israel and Ukraine because there’s no other way, and because they really are connected.

October 19, 2023 at 10:46 PM EDT

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-10-20/biden-lights-the-beacon-for-israel-ukraine-and-the-world?srnd=opinion&sref=hhjZtX76

By Andreas Kluth

Just hours after returning from Israel, US President Joe Biden spoke from the Oval Office to remind Americans of something many in this polarized nation have begun to doubt. It’s that the US is a “beacon to the world — still.” It’s that America is the “essential,” the “indispensable” nation.

Abroad, “American leadership is what holds the world together,” Biden said, in explaining why the US must keep supporting both Israel and Ukraine. And at home, America must reject hatred in all forms, including anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. “I see you. You belong,” Biden said, looking into the camera as though meeting the eyes of every Jewish and Muslim American.

The strategic purpose of Biden’s speech was to connect, in the minds of Americans, two foreign conflicts that threaten to become unlinked in the chaotic politics of a divided nation and Congress. One is the “pure, unadulterated evil” of the attacks by Hamas against Israel on Oct. 7, and the need to stand with Israel as it sets out to destroy that terrorist organization. The other, no less evil, is the ongoing war of aggression and subjugation by Russian President Vladimir Putin against Ukraine.

The need for Biden’s address, however, can only be understood against the backdrop of domestic US politics. Congress is in chaos — the House can’t even find a Speaker and the legislature as a whole can’t pass a budget — because a cabal of extremists beholden to former president Donald Trump keeps sabotaging rules and decorum. Some of those same Republicans — taking their cues from Trump — also want to stop supporting Ukraine, even as they want to increase aid to Israel.

To keep the help flowing to both, Biden will shortly send a bundled budget request to Congress. It will ask for many billions to Israel and Ukraine at the same time. It may even throw in support for Taiwan against China and measures to secure the US-Mexican border against uncontrolled migration — something Republicans obsess over.

In principle, such bundling is unworthy of republican governance as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton once imagined it. Separate topics should be studied and debated separately, not hidden in omnibus and minibus bills stuffed with pork or in amalgamated budget requests. Cramming several big but discrete problems into one law smacks of desperation.

And yet desperation describes the state of US policymaking today, owing largely to the legacy of Trump and his minions in the House. So Biden can be forgiven for stooping from the lofty oratory of his speech to the legerdemain of this legislative ploy. He’s doing it at a time of global polycrisis, when the world needs a leader and no country but America can rise to the occasion.

In that role, Biden knew he was simultaneously addressing various foreign audiences from the Oval Office. There are the Israelis, of course. In Tel Aviv, Biden empathized with their “all-consuming rage,” the same rage Americans felt after Sept. 11, 2001. But he also cautioned the Israelis to learn from America’s mistakes back then, and not to let rage be their counselor in the difficult fight to come.

Another audience is the innocent Palestinians, especially those now trapped in the Gaza Strip, and Arabs and Muslims elsewhere. Biden made clear that he recognizes and values their humanity and dignity just as much. When this is over, he explained, the Palestinians must one day have their own state, and it must thrive in peace.

Biden was also addressing the West’s foes. His greatest strategic imperative as US president is now to prevent the war in Israel from spreading. So he had messages for Beirut, Damascus and Tehran, and by extension Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang. It was simply, as he said earlier this week: “Don’t.” In lieu of an “or else” he’s parked two aircraft-carrier armadas in the Eastern Mediterranean.

There’s Iran, which arms Hamas and Hezbollah and other proxies against Israel and the US, but also equips the Russians with drones for use against Ukrainian civilians. And there’s Chinese President Xi Jinping, who’s just been hosting his “ no-limits friend” Putin in Beijing, and casts a covetous eye at Taiwan and the South China Sea. Further out in the strategic offing, there’s North Korea, which is nowadays also supplying Russia with ammo for Ukraine.

At the United Nations and beyond, these rogues and tyrants have each other’s backs. If Beijing today keeps the economies of Russia and Iran afloat despite Western sanctions, it’ll expect their help in return if and when it attacks Taiwan. In that way, Biden implied, these conflicts really are connected, and it falls to America to rally the free world in defense.

Biden’s speech won’t end the partisan and intra-partisan bickering roiling Congress and the nation. But with luck, he’ll nudge the national debate toward something that resembles reason. So let the White House bundle Israel and Ukraine in one law, this time. And let Congress rise to the occasion despite its in-House saboteurs and pass it.

Let the Ukrainians, with American support, ward off the imperialist Kremlin, and let Israel destroy Hamas while also embracing a vision for a flourishing Palestinian state. Let the Iranian mullahs stand back — and ordinary Iranians stand up against their mullahs. Let Xi Jinping stay on his side of the Taiwan Strait.

And spare a thought for Biden, whether you’ll vote for him next year or not. He’s trying to do what’s right, rejecting hate in all its forms, and using American power for good in the world. As he said, the US is a beacon — still.

Biden Wanted to End ‘Forever Wars.’ Now He Looks Like a Wartime President.

Israel and Ukraine conflicts threaten to divert administration attention and resources from domestic priorities, China

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/biden-wanted-to-end-forever-wars-now-he-looks-like-a-wartime-president-8710eaf

By Sabrina SiddiquiFollow

and Vivian SalamaFollow

Updated Oct. 21, 2023 12:04 am ET

WASHINGTON—President Biden entered the White House with the goal of ending the “forever wars” that had consumed America for two decades and instead focusing on domestic priorities and girding the U.S. to compete with China.

The Hamas-Israel war—and Biden’s response—risks overwhelming that agenda.

Following Hamas’s onslaught on Israel two weeks ago, Biden has given steadfast U.S. support to Israel, illustrated this week by his unprecedented wartime visit to Tel Aviv and embrace of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israeli bombardment of Gaza, Hamas’s stronghold, nevertheless has magnified a humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian enclave, and the conflict threatens to spread.

After an explosion at a Gaza hospital that each side blamed on the other, a planned Biden meeting with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and other Arab leaders in Jordan fell apart, skewing the trip’s optics in favor of Israel. Biden tried to balance that impression by announcing a $100 million humanitarian-assistance package for the West Bank and Gaza and issuing pleas to Israel to minimize civilian casualties.

The conflict is the second hot war Biden has invested with U.S. power and prestige—if not American troops—after Russia’s assault on Ukraine. By Thursday, Biden was looking very much the wartime president, sitting in the Oval Office behind the Resolute desk and appealing to the American public and Congress to support Israel and Ukraine.

465. Learning from LSCO: Applying Lessons to Irregular Conflict

https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/465-learning-from-lsco-applying-lessons-to-irregular-conflict/

[Editor’s Note: Two years ago, Army Mad Scientist featured a podcast and associated blog post with Dr. Brent L. Sterling, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and author of Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts, discussing how militaries learn (or don’t!) from foreign conflicts, what pitfalls await those trying to learn from historical conflicts, how focusing only on “relevant” observations hampers our creativity in analyzing warfare, and what strategists can do to avoid past mistakes.

Since then, Russia invaded and continues to wage Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) in Ukraine. Our pacing challenge, China, is observing, learning, and tailoring its People’s Liberation Army accordingly — check out the TRADOC G-2’s China Landing Zone and review the thirty-plus snapshots captured to date addressing what China is learning from Russia’s war against Ukraine and the implications for the U.S. Army and the Joint Force (note that a DoD Common Access Card [CAC] is required to access this information).

But others are learning and adapting, too! Less than two weeks ago, HAMAS launched its massed surprise attack on Israel across multiple domains. Army Mad Scientist welcomes returning authors Ian Sullivan and Kate Kilgore with today’s timely post exploring the contemporary LSCO lessons HAMAS has learned and applied to the irregular conflict battlespace — Read on!]

HAMAS’s October 7th attacks on Israel demonstrate that the ability to conduct coordinated, massed operations in multiple domains is no longer the sole purview of nations with sophisticated militaries. HAMAS leveraged large volumes of fires to enable its invasion of Israeli territory and the deadliest attacks on Israel ever committed. The attack, and Israel’s response, could also propagate hybrid threats from surrounding countries and other violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and may even develop into a conflict on multiple fronts. The initial stages of the Israel-HAMAS conflict indicate that many Operational Environment factors previously thought inherent to large-scale combat operations between nation-states may be increasingly present in irregular conflicts.

Elements of Surprise: Deception, Operational Security, and Proximity

Limited indications and warnings (I&W) can allow an adversary with fewer net resources and capabilities to gain short-term advantage. HAMAS employed multiple deception and operational security measures in the planning phase and quickly capitalized on opportunities presented by other regional events to deny Israel’s sophisticated intelligence apparatus’s ability to detect the impending attack. In addition to exercising operational security measures limiting the use of electronic communications, HAMAS leaders likely waited to give fighters any orders until a few hours before the operation.[i] The Gaza Strip’s proximity to Israel—where border fences are often within walking distance from Palestinian houses—and use of bulldozers, which are commonly present near border areas, also provided HAMAS the ability to obfuscate detection and move rapidly.[ii] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) response to the attacks on October 7th were initially slow, as many IDF troops previously stationed near Gaza had been redeployed to border areas near the West Bank in response to rising tensions in previous weeks.[iii] It took several hours for the IDF to respond to the initial attacks and over two days of fighting to push HAMAS militants out of Israeli territory.[iv]

Massed Effects Across Multiple Domains Overwhelm Defenses and Countermeasures

Eight Qassam rocket launchers in Gaza, seven equipped with operating systems and one armed and ready to launch / Source: IDF via Wikimedia Commons and Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic License

Advantages in time and space also allowed HAMAS to exploit an opportunity to overwhelm Israel’s defenses and countermeasures by massing effects across multiple domains. Prior to the wave of rockets which enabled the infiltration of Israeli territory, HAMAS used large numbers of commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to systematically drop small bombs on Israeli observation points, communication towers, security cameras, and weapons systems along Israeli border fortifications.[v] Then, over a period of 70 minutes, HAMAS launched more than 3,000 Qassam rockets—built from industrial piping, do-it-yourself rocket fuel comprising sugar and potassium nitrate fertilizer, and commercial explosives that can be quickly launched by a small number of militants—and military-grade battlefield rockets into Israeli air space from positions on land and in the Mediterranean.[vi] Although many of the rockets were intercepted, they were launched in a higher concentration than Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system previously faced at one time.[vii] These saturation salvos overwhelmed the Iron Dome’s ability to engage and interdict all of the rockets. Many Israeli air defense batteries expended their available missiles and were forced to reload, creating gaps in air defense coverage that was exploited by HAMAS fighters to breach Israel’s defensive fortifications.[viii] Videos of the attacks posted to social media by HAMAS also show Al-Zawari one-way attack (OWA) UAVs launched simultaneously with the rocket barrages, creating complex dilemmas for Israeli defenses, while others show UAVs being employed for top-attack to drop anti-tank munitions on Israeli Merkava Mk 4 main battle tanks.[ix] In the days since the initial attacks, HAMAS has continued to launch UAVs and indirect fires at targets in southern Israel.[x ]

Harnessing Multiple Domains to Amplify Kinetic Effects

HAMAS has also employed cyber and electronic warfare capabilities to enable its attacks, indicating that VEOs can increasingly access and leverage multiple domain capabilities to amplify kinetic effects and foment fear. In early 2023, the Gaza Strip based hacking group Storm-113 used fake LinkedIn profiles to send malware to employees of Israeli energy, defense, and telecommunications companies, allowing them to establish backdoor access to networks.[xi] Additionally, multiple hacktivist groups launched DDoS attacks that took Israeli government websites temporarily offline.[xii] Pro-Palestinian hackers also attacked the Israeli app designed to alert citizens of rocket strikes, sending fake notifications designed to look like legitimate military alerts reporting a nuclear weapon had been launched at Israel.[xiii] During the rocket strikes and efforts to breach Israel’s border defenses, HAMAS operatives jammed IDF communications networks at its headquarters in southern Gaza.[xiv] Since October 7th, many international hacktivist groups—some of which are allegedly connected to Russia—claim they have launched cyberattacks targeting Israeli energy infrastructure and missile alert systems.[xv] HAMAS used commercial UAVs to record their rocket and ground attacks and footage of violence, kidnappings, and killings, which they posted to Telegram. Users quickly spread the content to various other social media platforms, maximizing the impact of HAMAS’s terror campaign.[xvi] Conversely, these videos—in addition to those recorded by victims or collected by Israel’s vast network of surveillance cameras along its border recorded facial data of HAMAS fighters involved in the attacks—will enable Israel to identify, locate, and target them in the coming weeks.[xvii]

Increased Lethality of Irregular Conflict in Urban Areas

Screenshot from video footage depicting smoke over the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of Israeli airstrikes on the Palestinian city / Source: Tasnim News Agency via Wikimedia Commons and Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license

The fighting, concentrated in an area with numerous Israeli kibbutzes and villages and the densely populated Gaza Strip, also suggests that conflicts with irregular forces may be increasingly lethal. Surprise and opportunity enabled a few hundred HAMAS operatives to conduct the deadliest attack in Israel’s history, leaving more than 1,300—most of whom were civilians—killed.[xviii] In the days since the initial attack, Israel has conducted air strikes and bombings on reported HAMAS operating locations in Gaza, where the population density is estimated at over 21,000 people per square mile and targets are often located in close proximity to other structures.[xix] The Israel Air Force estimates they dropped 6,000 bombs on Gaza—equivalent to the total number of air strikes during the 50-day Israel-Gaza conflict in 2014—between October 7th and 12th alone.[xx] Simultaneously, concern over whether militants in the West Bank may act against Israel is increasing. On October 11th, the Israeli government issued the largest compulsory mobilization since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, calling up 360,000 reservists[xxi]—some of whom were living or vacationing overseas—to re-establish territorial security.[xxii]

Competing for Narrative Advantage

As both sides work to establish narrative advantage, ubiquitous information and misinformation have played a very large role in the conflict. Since the attack, social media and traditional news sites are flooded with content which runs the gambit between truth and falsehood, generated by both combatants and third parties.[xxiii] During the attacks, both HAMAS-linked profiles and Israeli victims posted graphic depictions of violence online in granular detail.[xxiv] In the wake of Israel’s retaliatory strikes and declaration of war on HAMAS, years-old photos and videos taken from past conflicts in different countries have been reported as footage from the current conflict.[xxv] Accusations of false news or mischaracterization are found on hundreds of Pro-Israel and Pro-Palestine posts alike—regardless of whether posts are truly misinformation—contributing to ideological division in the information space and diverging perceptions of truth.[xxvi] A large share of the information circulating about the conflict does not come from the combatants or the populations of Israel and Palestine, but from individuals and organizations outside of the region entirely.[xxvii]

Tension between Escalation and Blowback

A brace of Merkava MBTs supporting dismounted IDF infantry — from a previous operation / Source: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0

As the IDF prepares to deploy thousands of troops into Gaza, it could find itself in a fight where the demands of operating in densely populated terrain could further provide its adversaries with narrative ammunition to chip away at regional stability and Israel’s international support. Israeli air strikes and blockade measures—designed to drive HAMAS militants out from hiding by cutting off water, power, and food supplies in the Gaza Strip—have already drawn international criticism.[xxviii] Escalating operations could encourage militants located in the West Bank, who were already incensed regarding expanding Israeli settlements in the region, to open a second front in the Israel-HAMAS war.[xxix] Hizballah began shelling the border between Israel and Lebanon, and many other VEOs in the region have expressed support for HAMAS.[xxx] While Iran denies having any role in the recent attacks, Tehran has expressed support for the operation and has long politically and financially supported HAMAS. For over a year, Iran provided military training, logistics support, technical training for rocket and UAV manufacturing, and tens of millions of dollars’ worth of weapons to HAMAS.[xxxi] Further Israeli military operations in Gaza could draw increased accusations that Israeli actions constitute human rights infringements against Palestinian civilians in Gaza, likely complicating Arab-Israeli normalization efforts.[xxxii] The 2020 Abraham Accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain could be adversely affected, and efforts to establish an Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement may have been paused indefinitely.[xxxiii] These events could lead to further destabilization in the region, possibly allowing Iran to exert pressure on Israel from multiple directions and gain increased influence.[xxxiv]

LSCO Echoes Resonating Across the Operational Environment

Though the Israel-HAMAS war in Gaza is still in its very early phases, it has already indicated that many recent evolutions in the Operational Environment observed in Large-Scale Combat Operations are similarly applicable to irregular conflicts. The initial stages of a large-scale conflict in the Indo-Pacific could involve limited indications and warnings, an adversary capable of leveraging time, space, distance, and the ability to converge effects across multiple domains, and a saturated and fragmented global information fight. VEOs also now have access to more lethal capabilities that may enable them to exert temporary advantages over a more capable nation’s military. The democratization of cyber, EW, and information capabilities allow increasing numbers of actors to create effects in multiple domains and amplify the impact of kinetic actions. Information’s ubiquity in the national and international spaces also expands the battlefield, enabling increased participation from outside actors and broadening the international audiences whose perceptions may be critical in the information fight. As the Israel-HAMAS war continues to develop, observations regarding changes or continuity in irregular wars will gain fidelity. It already seems clear, however, that VEOs are working to refine their capabilities just as regular militaries are, and recent large-scale conflicts have provided ample lessons for leveraging changes in the Operational Environment to their advantage.

If you enjoyed this post, check out some of today’s co-authors’ previous blog posts:

Gaming Information Dominance, China’s Economic Ascendency through 2040, and Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1), by Kate Kilgore

“Once More unto The Breach Dear Friends”: From English Longbows to Azerbaijani Drones, Army Modernization STILL Means More than Materiel, How China Fights and associated podcast, How Russia Fights 2.0 and associated podcast, China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage, and “No Option is Excluded” — Using Wargaming to Envision a Chinese Assault on Taiwan, by Ian Sullivan

… as well as the following related content:

Extremism on the Horizon: The Challenges of VEO Innovation, by Colonel Montgomery Erfourth and Dr. Aaron Bazin

On Surprise Attacks Below the “Bolt from the Blue” Threshold, by Lesley Kucharski

Other People’s Wars: The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts and associated podcast, with Brent L. Sterling

Death From Above! The Evolution of sUAS Technology and associated podcast, with COL Bill Edwards (USA-Ret.)

Unmanned Capabilities in Today’s Battlespace

Insights from the Robotics and Autonomy Series of Virtual Events, as well as all of the associated webinar content (presenter biographies, slide decks, and notes) and associated videos

Insights from Ukraine on the Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare

Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and associated podcast

Insights from the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in 2020 (Parts 1 and 2)

Jomini’s Revenge: Mass Strikes Back! by proclaimed Mad Scientist Zachery Tyson Brown

How Big of a Deal are Drone Swarms?, A New Age of Terror: The Future of CBRN Terrorism, and A New Age of Terror: New Mass Casualty Terrorism Threats, by proclaimed Mad Scientist Zachary Kallenborn

The Convergence: The Future of Ground Warfare and associated podcast, with COL Scott Shaw

The Dawn of the Loitering Munitions Era, by proclaimed Mad Scientist SGM Daniel S. Nasereddine

Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far…, Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events, and all of this series’ associated content and videos

The Future of War is Cyber, by CPT Casey Igo and CPT Christian Turley

About the Authors:

Ian M. Sullivan is the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). He holds a BA from Canisius University in Buffalo, NY, an MA from Georgetown University’s BMW Center for German and European Studies in Washington, DC, and was a Fulbright Fellow at the Universität Potsdam in Potsdam, Germany. A career civilian intelligence officer, Mr. Sullivan has served with the Office of Naval Intelligence, Headquarters U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) National Counterterrorism Center, the Central Intelligence Agency, and at TRADOC. He is a member of the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service and was first promoted to the senior civilian ranks in 2013 as a member of the ODNI’s Senior National Intelligence Service.

Kate Kilgore is a U.S. Army TRADOC G2 analyst. Her work to build the Army’s understanding of the threat spans topics including Homeland Defense, Large-Scale Combat Operations, and the developing Operational Environment. Kate has also supported Army-level tabletop exercises at USARPAC and USARNORTH as a member of the TRADOC G2 Red Cell. Kate graduated with a bachelor’s degree from Indiana University, where she studied Law, International Politics, and Soviet Studies. She grew up in an Army family and has lived all over the United States and Germany.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

[i] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/10/09/hamass-attack-was-an-israeli-intelligence-failure-on-multiple-fronts

[ii] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/10/09/hamass-attack-was-an-israeli-intelligence-failure-on-multiple-fronts

[iii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-israel-was-duped-hamas-planned-devastating-assault-2023-10-08/

[iv] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67056987

[v] https://www.businessinsider.com/hamas-drones-take-out-comms-towers-ambush-israel-2023-10

[vi] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2023/10/09/how-hamas-leveraged-cheap-rockets-and-small-drones-to-ambush-israel/?sh=7c03dd0d6be2

[vii] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/israels-iron-dome-air-defense-system-overwhelmed/story?id=103872036

[viii] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/israels-iron-dome-air-defense-system-overwhelmed/story?id=103872036

[ix] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2023/10/09/how-hamas-leveraged-cheap-rockets-and-small-drones-to-ambush-israel/?sh=7c03dd0d6be2

[x] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-15-2023

[xi] https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/pro-hamas-hackers-send-fake-rocket-alerts-knock-websites-offline/ar-AA1hWGFe

[xii] https://www.axios.com/2023/10/10/hackers-ddos-israel-hamas-conflict

[xiii] https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/pro-hamas-hackers-send-fake-rocket-alerts-knock-websites-offline/ar-AA1hWGFe

[xiv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-israel-was-duped-hamas-planned-devastating-assault-2023-10-08/

[xv] https://time.com/6322175/israel-hamas-cyberattacks-hackers/

[xvi] https://www.businessinsider.com/hamas-drones-take-out-comms-towers-ambush-israel-2023-10

[xvii] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/opinion/israel-hamas-.html

[xviii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-reservists-drop-everything-rush-home-following-hamas-bloodshed-2023-10-12/

[xix] https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/11/middleeast/maps-population-density-gaza-israel-dg/index.html

[xx] https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/13/middleeast/israel-gaza-hamas-war-friday-intl-hnk/index.html

[xxi] More than the U.S. combined reserve force

[xxii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-reservists-drop-everything-rush-home-following-hamas-bloodshed-2023-10-12/

[xxiii] https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2023/10/11/hamas-attacks-israel-bombs-gaza-and-misinformation-surges-online/

[xxiv] https://www.vox.com/technology/2023/10/12/23913472/misinformation-israel-hamas-war-social-media-literacy-palestine

[xxv] https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2023/10/11/hamas-attacks-israel-bombs-gaza-and-misinformation-surges-online/

[xxvi] https://apnews.com/article/social-media-gaza-israel-hamas-misinformation-cb5192215d0f89d8a413606d0ec73cf4

[xxvii] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/oct/13/instagram-threads-misinformation-israel-hamas

[xxviii] https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/13/middleeast/israel-gaza-hamas-war-friday-intl-hnk/index.html

[xxix] https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/11/analysis-why-did-hamas-attack-now-and-what-is-next

[xxx] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/second-front-hamas-war-hezbollah-turmoil

[xxxi] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/09/iran-support-hamas-training-weapons-israel/#:~:text=The%20Palestinian%20militants%20behind%20the,Western%20and%20Middle%20Eastern%20intelligence

[xxxii] https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/13/middleeast/israel-gaza-hamas-war-friday-intl-hnk/index.html

[xxxiii] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-did-hamas-attack-israel-and-why-now/

[xxxiv] https://www.newsweek.com/iran-israel-hamas-multi-front-conflict-1833381

5. AP visual analysis: Rocket from Gaza appeared to go astray, likely caused deadly hospital explosion

Please go to the link to view the visuals. https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-hospital-rocket-gaza-e0fa550faa4678f024797b72132452e3

AP visual analysis: Rocket from Gaza appeared to go astray, likely caused deadly hospital explosion

AP · October 21, 2023

Shortly before 7 p.m. Tuesday, a volley of rockets lit up the darkened sky over Gaza. Videos analyzed by The Associated Press show one veering off course, breaking up in the air before crashing to the ground.

Seconds later, the videos show a large explosion in the same area – the site of Gaza’s al-Ahli Arab Hospital.

Who is to blame for the fiery explosion has set off intense debate and finger pointing between the Israeli government and Palestinian militants, further escalating tensions in their two week-long war.

The AP analyzed more than a dozen videos from the moments before, during and after the hospital explosion, as well as satellite imagery and photos. AP’s analysis shows that the rocket that broke up in the air was fired from within Palestinian territory, and that the hospital explosion was most likely caused when part of that rocket crashed to the ground.

A lack of forensic evidence and the difficulty of gathering that material on the ground in the middle of a war means there is no definitive proof the break-up of the rocket and the explosion at the hospital are linked. However, AP’s assessment is supported by a range of experts with specialties in open-source intelligence, geolocation and rocketry.

“In the absence of additional evidence, the most likely scenario would be that it was a rocket launched from Gaza that failed mid-flight and that it mistakenly hit the hospital,” said Henry Schlottman, a former U.S. Army intelligence analyst and open-source intelligence expert.

WHAT AP FOUND

The AP reached its conclusion by reviewing more than a dozen videos from news broadcasts, security cameras and social media posts, and matching the locations to satellite imagery and photos from before the explosion.

A key video in the analysis came shortly before 7 p.m. local time, when the Arabic-language news channel Al Jazeera was airing live coverage of the Gaza City skyline. As a correspondent speaks, the camera pans to zoom in on a volley of rockets being fired from the ground nearby.

(Al Jazeera)

One of the rockets appears to veer from the others, away from the distant lights of Israel and back toward a darkened Gaza City, where electricity has largely been cut. The camera follows the light from the rocket’s tail as it arches in the sky upwards and toward the left. Suddenly, the rocket seems to fragment, and a piece appears to break off and fall. Another fragment shoots sharply up and to the right, blazing before it explodes in a fireworks-like flash, leaving a brief trail of sparks.

A small explosion is then seen on the ground in the distance, followed two seconds later by a much larger blast closer to the camera. The corner of the scroll at the bottom of the live broadcast reads 6:59 p.m. Gaza time.

(Al Jazeera)

Using maps and satellite imagery, the AP was able to match the view of the explosion from Al Jazeera’s live camera feed to an upper floor of the building that houses Al Jazeera’s Gaza bureau, which is less than a mile (1.5 kilometers) from the al-Ahli Arab Hospital. Using other buildings visible in the frame, the AP was able to confirm that the larger explosion seen at 6:59 p.m. was in the precise direction of the hospital.

A second video, taken from a camera inside Israel at the exact time as the Al Jazeera footage and obtained by the AP, shows a barrage of at least 17 rockets being launched from inside Gaza before a large explosion lights up the horizon on the Palestinian side of the border. The camera is on a building in Netiv Ha’asara, an Israeli community footsteps from the border wall, and faces southwest, confirming that the rocket launches and explosion were in the direction of Gaza City.

Video from an Israeli town just footsteps from the border wall shows a barrage of at least 17 rockets being launched from inside Gaza. (Dudi Peled)

A third video by Israeli news station Channel 12 — taken from a camera on the upper floor of its building in Netivot, a town about 10 miles (16 kilometers) southeast of the hospital in Gaza City — also captured the barrage of rockets fired at 6:59 p.m.

Seen together, the three videos show multiple rockets were launched from inside Gaza before one appears to have come apart in midair about three seconds before the explosion at the al-Ahli Arab Hospital.

Hamas’ military wing al-Qassam Brigades said in a social media post at 7 p.m. that “al-Qassam Brigades strikes occupied Ashdod with a barrage of rockets.” Minutes later, it posted that “al-Qassam Brigades strikes Tel Aviv in response to Zionist massacres against civilians.”

At 7 p.m., one minute after the explosion, Hamas’ military wing al-Qassam Brigades said in a post to its Telegram channel that it “fired at occupied Ashdod with a barrage of rockets.” Ashdod is an Israeli coastal city about 30 miles (50 kilometers) north of Gaza.

Minutes later, Islamic Jihad, a militant group that works with Hamas, also posted on Telegram that it had launched a rocket strike on Tel Aviv in response “to massacre against civilians.” Over the next hour, there were five more posts from the militant groups announcing rocket attacks against Israel.

Israel’s military has repeatedly said it did not strike the hospital and blamed an errant rocket fired from within Gaza by the Islamic Jihad. Israel’s assessment, backed by U.S. intelligence and President Joe Biden, also cited the lack of both a large crater and extensive structural damage that would be consistent with a bomb dropped by Israeli aircraft.

Hamas calls Israel’s narrative “fabricated” and accuses it of punishing the hospital for ignoring a warning to evacuate two days earlier, though it has not released any evidence to support its claims.

Hamas spokesperson Ghazi Hamad told the AP the group would welcome a United Nations investigation into the cause of the blast.

“Look at the stupid position that was taken by the President of the United States of America who said, ‘I agree with Israel’s version’ without any investigation,” Hamad said. “Unfortunately, the Western world is full of hypocrisy.”

WHAT THE EXPERTS SAY

AP ran its visual analysis by a half-dozen experts who all agreed the most likely scenario was a rocket from within Gaza that veered off and came apart seconds before the explosion.

Andrea Richardson, an expert in analyzing open-source intelligence who is a consultant with the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, said specific landmarks visible in the videos show where the rockets were launched.

“From the video evidence that I have seen, it’s very clear that the rockets came from within Gaza,” said Richardson, a human rights lawyer and experienced war crimes investigator who has worked in the Middle East. She added that the timing of the rocket launches, the explosion and the first reports that the hospital had been hit also seemed to confirm the sequence of events.

While still potentially lethal, the explosive warheads carried by the homemade rockets used by militants in Gaza can be relatively small when compared with the munitions used by large militaries like those of the U.S. and Russia. With Gaza’s borders and ports blockaded for the past decade, the militants often build rockets inside Gaza using whatever parts and materials they can scavenge, including underground water pipes.

Justin Crump, a former British Army officer and intelligence consultant, said the failure rate of such homemade rockets is high.

“You can see obviously it fails in flight, it spins out and disintegrates, and the impacts on the ground follow that,” said Crump, CEO of Skyline, a London-based strategic advisory firm. “The most likely explanation is this was a tragic accident.”

Such a scenario unfolded last year, when Islamic Jihad-fired rockets malfunctioned and killed at least a dozen Gaza residents. The AP reported at the time that live TV footage showed the militant rockets falling short in densely packed residential neighborhoods.

THREE-SECOND GAP

Some of the questions about who is to blame focus on the three-second gap between the rocket’s explosive breakup in the sky and the explosion on the ground at the al-Ahli Arab Hospital, and whether those two events are linked, especially because the videos analyzed by AP don’t appear to show a trace of light that follows the rocket to the ground.

Outside experts said it’s not possible to rule out with absolute certainty that the rocket launches occurring near the hospital and the timing of the explosion seconds later are just a coincidence. However, they also noted there is no evidence to support that scenario.

Richardson said the timestamps on videos showing the rocket launches from within Gaza, the midair malfunction and the large explosion striking the hospital below within seconds of each other provided a logical chain of events.

“An incredibly small timeframe,” she said.

Intelligence analyst Schlottman said the most likely scenario remains that it was a militant rocket that somehow had some kind of malfunction mid-flight and then landed on the hospital.

“We have video of when the explosion happened and the only rocket visible in that video was the one that kind of had that diverging trajectory,” he said. “We cannot possibly exclude other scenarios. ... Just what we have right now points to that.”

EVIDENCE ON THE GROUND

About 10 minutes after the multiple rocket launches from Gaza were captured on video Tuesday night, posts began to appear on social media. The AP verified a video taken from a balcony near the hospital that shows the moment of impact, with the loud whizzing sound followed by a huge fireball and the clap of a massive explosion. AP could find no visual evidence to support speculation that the blast was triggered by a car bomb or other such device.

Video taken from a balcony near al-Ahli Arab Hospital shows the moment of impact. (Verified user-generated content)

“Oh God! Oh God!” a man’s voice exclaims in Arabic. “The hospital!” says a second male voice.

Other videos and photos reviewed by AP appear to show the explosion in the hospital’s central parking lot and courtyard, where civilians had taken refuge after orders to evacuate the city. Some footage shows burning cars and more than a dozen dead bodies, including those of children.

Flames engulf vehicles in the immediate aftermath of an explosion at al-Ahli Arab Hospital. (Verified user-generated content)

AP photos taken the morning after Tuesday’s explosion showed no evidence of a large crater at the impact site that would be consistent with a bomb like those dropped by Israeli aircraft in other recent strikes. The hospital buildings surrounding the outdoor area at the center of the explosion were still standing and did not appear to suffer significant structural damage.

Video from the scene showed no evidence of a large crater at the impact site that would be consistent with a bomb like those dropped by Israeli aircraft in other recent strikes. (AP)

A small crater photographed in the hospital’s parking lot appeared to be about a meter across, suggesting a device with a much smaller explosive payload than a bomb. While Israel’s extensive arsenal includes smaller missiles that can be fired from helicopters and drones, there has been no public evidence of such missile strikes in the area around the al-Ahli Arab Hospital on Tuesday night.

David Shank, a retired U.S. Army colonel and expert on military rockets and missiles, said the large fireball captured on video at the hospital could potentially be explained by the fact the malfunctioning militant rocket impacted prematurely and was still full of propellant. That highly volatile fuel then ignited when it hit the ground, setting off a large explosion but leaving a relatively small crater.

After Hamas’ Oct. 7 surprise attack on southern Israel that killed 1,400, with another 200 people taken hostage, Israel’s military said it dropped more than 6,000 bombs on Gaza in the first week of the war alone, and Gaza officials say that campaign has so far resulted in more than 4,100 deaths.

Hamas spokesman Hamad said that Israeli officials had threatened al-Ahli Arab hospital and other medical facilities, and ordered their evacuation before the deadly blast. He argued that the missiles belonging to Hamas and the Islamic Jihad would not have been capable of inflicting such damage.

Al-Ahli Arab Hospital’s operators posted on its website that the facility’s cancer center was struck by Israel three days before the deadly blast, leaving a hole in an exterior wall and an unexploded artillery shell next to an ultrasound machine.

IRON DOME THEORY

Speculation has circulated on social media in the days since the explosion that the breakup of the rocket and the explosion on the ground was caused by Israel’s Iron Dome defense system, which is designed to shoot such rockets out of the sky.

Israel has said it does not use its Iron Dome system within Gaza, but to intercept and destroy rockets coming into Israeli airspace.

Experts also noted multiple videos from around the time of the hospital explosion showed no visible evidence of Iron Dome missiles being fired from Israel into the airspace over Gaza.

John Erath, the senior policy director at the Center for Arms Control and an expert on missile defense, said that while it might be technically possible for Iron Dome to intercept a missile over Gaza, it would be unlikely in this case because the projectile was very early in its flight path – still on the way up – and the system is designed to only intercept projectiles it determines are on a flight path to a populated part of Israel.

“I’m not saying that it’s impossible,” Erath said. “But based on my understanding of how the system works, it is unlikely.”

David Shank on the Iron Dome theory

Shank, a retired U.S. Army colonel and expert on military rockets and missiles, explains whether it’s likely the explosion was caused by Israel’s Iron Dome defense system. (AP)

Added missile expert Shank: “They don’t engage a target unless it’s going to impact a critical asset such as a population area, maybe a power grid, maybe a military base.”

“It’s technically designed to take the best shot that gives it the highest probability of kill,” he said. “And for Iron Dome ... that is not over Gaza.”

___

AP Global Investigative Reporter Michael Biesecker reported from Washington. Reporter Danica Kirka in London contributed.

__

Contact AP’s global investigative team at Investigative@ap.org.

AP · October 21, 2023

6. With Putin by His Side, Xi Outlines His Vision of a New World Order

Excerpts:

In Mr. Putin, Mr. Xi has a like-minded partner driven by shared grievances toward the West who is willing to push back against what they both perceive as American hegemony. Mr. Xi sought to tout China as a force for stability in the world, with Mr. Putin alongside him — never mind that Russia upended European security when he launched an invasion of Ukraine 21 months ago.

“Ideological confrontation, geopolitical rivalry and bloc politics are not a choice for us,” Mr. Xi said in a speech at the opening of the forum at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

...

“What we stand against are unilateral sanctions, economic coercion and decoupling and supply chain disruption,” Mr. Xi said, clearly referring to efforts by the United States and its Western allies to pressure China. Washington and Beijing are engaged in an intense rivalry over trade, technology and the status of Taiwan, and China has protested bans imposed by the United States on exports of semiconductors to China.

...

As for Mr. Putin, his trip has yet to yield any new economic deals with China. But it has already brought diplomatic dividends for him, allowing the Russian leader to present himself as a global power broker despite Western efforts to isolate him. He also met with other Asian leaders in Beijing.

“The forum has clearly shown that Russia remains a massive country with massive resources, and that they are very far from isolation,” said Artem Lukin, an international relations professor at Far Eastern Federal University, in Vladivostok, Russia. “Asia, and the Global South in general, are clearly showing that the war in Ukraine is not their concern, and that they are more interested in doing business with Russia.”

With Putin by His Side, Xi Outlines His Vision of a New World Order

China’s close ties with Russia in countering American dominance point to a geopolitical rift that could shape the conflict between Israel and Hamas.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/world/asia/putin-xi-china-russia.html?

0:02

0:17

The forum was centered on China’s foreign policy initiative, which aims to expand Beijing’s influence abroad with infrastructure projects.CreditCredit...Andres Martinez Casares/EPA, via Shutterstock

By David Pierson, Anatoly Kurmanaev and Tiffany May

Oct. 18, 2023

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

The leaders of China and Russia hailed each other as “old” and “dear” friends. They took swipes at the United States and depicted themselves as building a “fairer, multipolar world.” And they marveled at their countries’ “deepening” trust.

China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, used a Beijing-led conference of leaders from mostly developing countries on Wednesday to showcase his ambitions to reshape the global order, as the world grapples with a war in Ukraine and a crisis in Gaza. He cast his country as an alternative to the leadership of the United States. And he gave a prominent role to President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, underscoring how central their relationship is to Mr. Xi’s vision.

The event, the Belt and Road Forum, is centered on China’s signature foreign policy initiative, which aims to expand Beijing’s influence abroad with infrastructure projects. Mr. Putin was treated as the guest of honor and often pictured by Mr. Xi’s side. The two leaders also met for three hours in Beijing on Wednesday.

While Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi huddled, President Biden landed in Israel on a visit aimed at preventing the war between Israel and Hamas from spreading. Though Mr. Xi did not publicly remark on the war, Mr. Putin, at a news briefing, blamed the United States for increasing tensions in the Middle East by sending warships to the region. He said that such regional conflicts were “shared threats that only strengthen Russo-Chinese relations.”

In Mr. Putin, Mr. Xi has a like-minded partner driven by shared grievances toward the West who is willing to push back against what they both perceive as American hegemony. Mr. Xi sought to tout China as a force for stability in the world, with Mr. Putin alongside him — never mind that Russia upended European security when he launched an invasion of Ukraine 21 months ago.

“Ideological confrontation, geopolitical rivalry and bloc politics are not a choice for us,” Mr. Xi said in a speech at the opening of the forum at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

More on China

Xi’s Vision: With President Vladimir Putin of Russia at his side, China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, used a Beijing-led conference of leaders from mostly developing countries to showcase his ambitions to reshape the global order.
Belt and Road Initiative: Xi Jinping enhanced China’s sway in the world by lending money for infrastructure to developing countries. Now he’s collecting debts and rethinking his signature aid initiative.
A Shift to Thrift: Chinese consumers are spending less and saving more to counteract the impact of the country’s slumping economy. That’s a worrying sign for Beijing.
Tibetan Buddhism: An 8-year-old boy is now at the heart of a struggle between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Communist Party. Here’s what to know about the tensions.

“What we stand against are unilateral sanctions, economic coercion and decoupling and supply chain disruption,” Mr. Xi said, clearly referring to efforts by the United States and its Western allies to pressure China. Washington and Beijing are engaged in an intense rivalry over trade, technology and the status of Taiwan, and China has protested bans imposed by the United States on exports of semiconductors to China.

Image

The Great Hall of the People in Beijing, where Mr. Xi told forum attendees, “Ideological confrontation, geopolitical rivalry and bloc politics are not a choice for us.”Credit...Ng Han Guan/Associated Press

Mr. Xi’s friendly display with Mr. Putin at the Beijing forum reaffirms a partnership, not long ago hailed by the leaders as having “no limits,” that has contributed to the splintering of countries into opposing blocs. Mr. Putin, at the start of his meeting with Mr. Xi on the sidelines of the conference, said that China and Russia needed to coordinate their foreign policies more closely, given what he called the “current difficult conditions.”

The conference was virtually absent of European Union countries, largely because of the divisiveness of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary, an authoritarian-leaning friend of Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi, was the only European Union leader to attend.

Represented instead were nearly 150 developing nations. China has disbursed close to $1 trillion through the Belt and Road initiative, largely in loans, to build power plants, seaports, and other infrastructure across Asia, Africa and Latin America, but some countries are finding their debt obligations onerous.

As for Mr. Putin, his trip has yet to yield any new economic deals with China. But it has already brought diplomatic dividends for him, allowing the Russian leader to present himself as a global power broker despite Western efforts to isolate him. He also met with other Asian leaders in Beijing.

“The forum has clearly shown that Russia remains a massive country with massive resources, and that they are very far from isolation,” said Artem Lukin, an international relations professor at Far Eastern Federal University, in Vladivostok, Russia. “Asia, and the Global South in general, are clearly showing that the war in Ukraine is not their concern, and that they are more interested in doing business with Russia.”

Image

Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary, left, was the only national leader from the European Union to attend the conference.Credit...Grigory Sysoev/Sutnik, via EPA, via Shutterstock

At the same time, Mr. Putin also sought to signal his geopolitical autonomy from China, his country’s more powerful neighbor. He outlined Russia’s own grandiose infrastructure plans in the region and called for foreign investment, without stating plans to join China’s existing projects. Later on Wednesday, he called the two visions “complementary.”

The question of how far China and Russia’s alignment extends has come into focus in the question of how the world should respond to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, which is becoming another wedge between Washington and Beijing.

Beijing and Moscow have avoided condemning Hamas for its attack on Israel this month. They have criticized Israeli airstrikes in Gaza and called for a revival of talks for a Palestinian state.

For China, its criticism of Israel reflects its rising assertiveness and desire to curry favor with countries in the Middle East, analysts say. China has tried to play a bigger role in the Middle East to fill a vacuum left by the exit of U.S. troops, most notably in Afghanistan. In March, China helped broker a deal to restore diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two archrivals. Beijing has also offered to mediate between Israelis and Palestinians, though efforts have failed to gain traction.

“The crux of the issue lies in the fact that justice has not been returned to the Palestinian people,” China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, said last week in a phone call with Celso Amorim, an international affairs adviser to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil.

On Sunday, Mr. Wang told his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, that Israel’s retaliation in Gaza had “already gone beyond self-defense.” He also called on Israel to halt the “collective punishment of the people of Gaza.”

Image

Destroyed buildings after Israeli airstrikes in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Tuesday. China and Russia have both called on Israel to halt the strikes in the Gaza Strip.Credit...Yousef Masoud for The New York Times

The pointed remarks signal a shift away from China’s stated policy of noninterference in another country’s internal affairs. China typically treads carefully when it comes to conflict in other countries, often opting for neutrality and anodyne statements about supporting peace. The strategy provides China more flexibility by limiting its adversaries. It also allows China to deflect criticism about its domestic policies, such as its crackdown on freedoms in Hong Kong and human rights abuses in the regions of Tibet and Xinjiang.

China’s stance will play well in the Muslim world, where it has faced some criticism in the past over its treatment of Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Historically, China has maintained closer ties to the Palestinians. It recognized a Palestinian state in 1988, four years before establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. Chinese support for the Palestinian cause goes back to the days of Mao Zedong, who saw kinship in the struggle with Western-backed powers.

“They’re doing this as a way to signal to the Global South that China will support those countries in a way that they probably shouldn’t expect Western countries in general, and the U.S. in particular, to support them,” said Jonathan Fulton, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council.

Olivia Wang contributed reporting.

David Pierson covers Chinese foreign policy and China’s economic and cultural engagement with the world. More about David Pierson

Anatoly Kurmanaev is a foreign correspondent covering Russia’s transformation after its invasion of Ukraine. More about Anatoly Kurmanaev

Tiffany May covers news from Asia. She joined The Times in 2017. More about Tiffany May

A version of this article appears in print on Oct. 19, 2023, Section A, Page 4 of the New York edition with the headline: With Putin by His Side, Xi Outlines His Vision of a New World Order. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

7. Why We Should Fear China More Than Middle Eastern War

Excerpts:

China hawks tend to argue that losing a war over Taiwan would be much worse than our post-9/11 debacles, worse than letting Vladimir Putin hold the Donbas and Crimea permanently. You cannot definitively prove this, but I think they’re right: The establishment of Chinese military pre-eminence in East Asia would be a unique geopolitical shock, with dire effects on the viability of America’s alliance systems, on the likelihood of regional wars and arms races and on our ability to maintain the global trading system that undergirds our prosperity at home.

And it’s at home where I fear the effects of such a defeat the most. America has experience losing wars of empire — in Vietnam and Afghanistan, for example, where we were extending ourselves without putting our full might into the fray. But we have no experience being defeated in straightforward combat, not guerrilla war, by a great-power rival and ideological competitor.

Whatever anxieties you have about our current political divisions, whether you fear left-wing disillusionment with America or right-wing disillusionment with democracy or both, such a defeat seems more likely than anything to accelerate us toward a real internal crisis. Which is why, even with other foreign crises burning hot, a debacle in East Asia remains the scenario that the United States should be working most intensely to avert.

Why We Should Fear China More Than Middle Eastern War

By Ross Douthat

Opinion Columnist and host of the “Matter of Opinion” podcast

nytimes.com · by Ross Douthat · October 21, 2023

A Chinese flag against a bright blue sky, with the back of a soldier’s head in the foreground.

On Thursday, Joe Biden gave a speech linking the Israel-Hamas conflict and the Russian invasion of Ukraine and framing American involvement as part of a grand strategy to contain our enemies and rivals. “When terrorists don’t pay a price for their terror, when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression,” he declared, “they keep going. And the cost and the threats to America and the world keep rising.”

Broadly speaking, Biden is correct; the United States has a strong interest in preventing rival powers from redrawing maps or undermining America’s democratic allies. But the difference between the president’s strategic analysis and the kind I’ve tried to offer recently is twofold: the general absence, in Biden’s words, of any acknowledgment of difficult trade-offs and the specific absence of any reference to China as a potentially more significant threat than Russia or Iran.

These absences are not particularly surprising. It’s normal for American presidents to say chest-pounding things like “There is nothing, nothing beyond our capacity” rather than to talk about possible limits on our strength. And since we don’t actually want to be at war with China, it makes a certain sense to avoid lumping Beijing in with Moscow and Tehran.

But presidential rhetoric and policy are inevitably linked, and the China threat that doesn’t exist in Biden’s speech barely exists in his funding request: The administration is asking Congress for over $60 billion for Ukraine, $14 billion for Israel and just $2 billion for the Indo-Pacific. Likewise, a president’s rhetoric lacunas inform political priorities, at least within his own coalition. If you can’t talk about why we need to worry about Chinese power alongside Russian or Iranian aggression, the people who listen to you may assume there’s nothing to worry about.

So let me explain why I worry about China and why I keep insisting that a strategy of containment in the Pacific should be a priority, even when other threats seem more immediate.

Start with the geopolitical background. It makes sense to talk about China, Iran and Russia as a loose alliance trying to undermine American power, but it is not a trio of equals. Only China is an arguable peer of the United States, only China’s technological and industrial might can hope to match our own, and only China has the capacity to project power globally as well as regionally.

Moreover, China offers a somewhat coherent ideological alternative to the liberal-democratic order. The Putin regime is a parody of Western democracy, and Iran’s mixture of theocracy and pseudodemocracy holds little broad appeal. But China’s one-party meritocracy can advertise itself — maybe less effectively since Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power but still with some degree of plausibility — as a successor to democratic capitalism, an alternative model for the developing world.

These general strategic realities obviously aren’t as threatening as actual aggression. But the threat China poses to Taiwan, in particular, has different implications for American power from the threat Russia poses to Ukraine or Hamas poses to Israel. Whatever happens in the Ukrainian conflict, America was never formally committed to Ukraine’s defense, and Russia cannot realistically defeat NATO. Whatever misery Iran and its proxies may inflict upon the Middle East, they are not going to conquer Israel or drive American power out of the Levant.

But America is more committed (with whatever public ambiguity) to the defense of Taiwan, and that expectation has always been in the background of our larger alliance system in East Asia. And while six experts may give six different opinions, there are good reasons to think that China is open to invading Taiwan in the near future and that America could join such a war and lose outright.

China hawks tend to argue that losing a war over Taiwan would be much worse than our post-9/11 debacles, worse than letting Vladimir Putin hold the Donbas and Crimea permanently. You cannot definitively prove this, but I think they’re right: The establishment of Chinese military pre-eminence in East Asia would be a unique geopolitical shock, with dire effects on the viability of America’s alliance systems, on the likelihood of regional wars and arms races and on our ability to maintain the global trading system that undergirds our prosperity at home.

And it’s at home where I fear the effects of such a defeat the most. America has experience losing wars of empire — in Vietnam and Afghanistan, for example, where we were extending ourselves without putting our full might into the fray. But we have no experience being defeated in straightforward combat, not guerrilla war, by a great-power rival and ideological competitor.

Whatever anxieties you have about our current political divisions, whether you fear left-wing disillusionment with America or right-wing disillusionment with democracy or both, such a defeat seems more likely than anything to accelerate us toward a real internal crisis. Which is why, even with other foreign crises burning hot, a debacle in East Asia remains the scenario that the United States should be working most intensely to avert.

nytimes.com · by Ross Douthat · October 21, 2023

8. Israel Is About to Make a Terrible Mistake

Excerpts:

That is why I believe that Israel would be much better off framing any Gaza operation as “Operation Save Our Hostages” — rather than “Operation End-Hamas-once-and-for-all” — and carry it out with surgical strikes and special forces that can still get the Hamas leadership, but also draw the brightest possible line between Gazan civilians and the Hamas dictatorship.

Hamas has not only taken Israelis hostage; it’s taken Gaza’s civilians hostage as well. They did not have a vote in Hamas’s savage kidnapping of Israeli grandmothers and babies. Take a moment and listen to this Center for Peace Communications and Times of Israel series “Whispered in Gaza” from January — interviews with Gazans about what they really think of Hamas’s corrupt and despotic leadership. Israel has to respect and build on their views if it hopes to build anything sustainably positive in Gaza from this war.

But Israel today is in raw survival mode. We Americans can advise, but Israel is going to do what it is going to do.

...

Bottom line: Netanyahu has a completely incoherent strategy right now — eliminate Hamas in Gaza while building more settlements in the West Bank that undermine the only decent long-term Palestinian alternative to Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, which Israel needs to safely leave Gaza.

If this is the season of war, it also has to be a season for answers about what happens the morning after. I am hardly the only one who wants to know. As the Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari wrote in an essay this week in Haaretz about Netanyahu’s government: If it “does dream of exploiting victory to annex territories, forcefully redraw borderlines, expel populations, ignore rights, censor speech, realize messianic fantasies or turn Israel into a theocratic dictatorship — we need to know it now.”

OPINION

THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Israel Is About to Make a Terrible Mistake

Oct. 19, 2023

nytimes.com · by Thomas L. Friedman · October 19, 2023

President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sit side by side in front of the American and Israeli flags.

I have great admiration for how President Biden has used his empathy and physical presence in Israel to convince Israelis that they are not alone in their war against the barbaric Hamas, while also trying to reach out to moderate Palestinians. Biden, I know, tried really hard to get the Israeli leadership to pause in their rage and think three steps ahead — not only about how to get into Gaza to take down Hamas but also about how to get out — and how to do it with the least civilian casualties possible.

While the president expressed deep understanding of Israel’s moral and strategic dilemma, he pleaded with Israeli military and political leaders to learn from America’s rush to war after Sept. 11, which took our soldiers deep into the dead ends and dark alleys of unfamiliar cities and towns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, U.S. officials left Jerusalem feeling that while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel understands that an overreach in Gaza could set the whole neighborhood ablaze — and is probably the most cautious of Israel’s leaders today — his right-wing coalition partners are eager to fan the flames in the West Bank. Settlers there have killed at least seven Palestinian civilians in acts of revenge in the last week, and the Israeli military is even more hawkish than the prime minister now and is determined to deliver a blow to Hamas that the whole neighborhood will never forget. Meanwhile, Israel’s right-wing minister of finance is refusing to transfer tax money owed to the Palestinian Authority, sapping its ability to keep the West Bank under control, which it has done up to now.

Color me very worried. No, color me extremely worried.

Because in the first week of this war the Supreme Leader of Iran and the leader of the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah, appeared to be keeping very tight control on their militiamen both on the border with Israel and in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. But as the second week has gone on, U.S. officials have picked up increasing signs that both leaders may be considering letting their forces more aggressively attack Israeli targets, and maybe American targets if the United States intervenes.

Have no doubt: the possibility of a regionwide war that could draw the United States in is much greater today than it was five days ago, senior U.S. officials told me. As I write on Thursday night, The Times is reporting that a U.S. Navy warship in the northern Red Sea on Thursday shot down three cruise missiles and several drones launched from Yemen that the Pentagon said might have been headed toward Israel. More missiles likely from pro-Iranian militias were fired at U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria and at Israel from Lebanon.

Israel is not likely to let Iran use its proxies to hit Israel without eventually firing a missile directly back at Tehran. If that happens, anything can happen. Israel is believed to have submarines in the Persian Gulf.

What makes the situation triply dangerous is even if Israel acts with herculean restraint to prevent civilian deaths in Gaza, it won’t matter. Think of what happened at Gaza City’s Ahli Arab Hospital on Tuesday.

As the Israeli columnist Nahum Barnea pointed out to me, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (P.I.J.) achieved more this week with an apparently misfired rocket “than it achieved in all of its successful missile launches.”

How so? After that rocket failed and fell on the Palestinian hospital in Gaza, killing scores of people, Hamas and the P.I.J. rushed out and claimed — with no evidence — that Israel had deliberately bombed the hospital, setting streets ablaze across the Arab world. When Israel and the United States offered compelling evidence a few hours later that the P.I.J. accidentally hit the Gaza hospital with its own rocket, it was already too late. The Arab street was on fire and a meeting of Arab leaders with Biden was canceled.

Imagine what will happen when the first major Israeli invasion of Gaza begins in our wired world, linked by social networks and polluted with misinformation amplified by artificial intelligence. No wonder pro-American Arab leaders are beseeching Biden to beseech the Israelis to act in ways that leave them some space to continue to work with Israel.

That is why I believe that Israel would be much better off framing any Gaza operation as “Operation Save Our Hostages” — rather than “Operation End-Hamas-once-and-for-all” — and carry it out with surgical strikes and special forces that can still get the Hamas leadership, but also draw the brightest possible line between Gazan civilians and the Hamas dictatorship.

Hamas has not only taken Israelis hostage; it’s taken Gaza’s civilians hostage as well. They did not have a vote in Hamas’s savage kidnapping of Israeli grandmothers and babies. Take a moment and listen to this Center for Peace Communications and Times of Israel series “Whispered in Gaza” from January — interviews with Gazans about what they really think of Hamas’s corrupt and despotic leadership. Israel has to respect and build on their views if it hopes to build anything sustainably positive in Gaza from this war.

But Israel today is in raw survival mode. We Americans can advise, but Israel is going to do what it is going to do.

Where I have a vote — just one — is in America. The president, in his prime-time speech Thursday night, vowed to ask Congress for an additional $14 billion in assistance for Israel to get through this war, along with an immediate injection of $100 million in new funding for humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in Gaza and the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

I’m all for helping Israelis and Palestinian civilians at this time — but not without some very visible strings attached.

If Israel needs weapons to protect itself from Hamas and Hezbollah, by all means ship them. But in terms of broader economic aid for Israel, it should be provided only if Israel agrees not to build even one more settlement in the West Bank — zero, none, no more, not one more brick, not one more nail — outside the settlement blocs and the territory immediately around them, where most Jewish settlers are now clustered and which Israel is expected to retain in any two-state solution with the Palestinians. (Netanyahu’s coalition agreement actually vows to annex the whole of the West Bank.)

I am well aware that Hamas has been committed to eliminating the Jewish state since its inception — not because Israel has expanded settlements in the West Bank. But if Israel has any hope of nurturing a Palestinian leadership that could replace Hamas in Gaza in the long term and be an effective partner for a two-state solution, then the settlement project has to stop and it has to stop now.

As for the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, it needs, as soon as possible, to elect or appoint a new leadership — one with the competence to build decent Palestinian institutions in a noncorrupt fashion that earns its people’s respect and legitimacy. The Palestinian Authority, which is ready to coexist with the Jewish state, needs to be able to actually win a free and fair election against Hamas in the West Bank or Gaza.

Without those two sets of conditions being met, there’s no future for moderation in this corner of the world, no chance of a sustainable peace and no chance of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia — no matter if Israel eliminates every single Hamas leader, foot soldier and rocketmaker or no matter how sympathetic one might be to the Palestinian cause.

The keystone of Bibi Netanyahu’s 15 years as prime minister has been strategically expanding settlements to prevent any prospect for a contiguous Palestinian state ever coming into being.

In doing so, the Israeli leader knowingly and blatantly acted against U.S. interests. He was willing to destabilize America’s allies, Jordan and Egypt, to pursue more settlements. He was willing to risk America’s biggest diplomatic achievement, the Abraham Accords, if the pact meant halting settlements. He has shown no willingness yet to halt settlements to secure a historic breakthrough with Saudi Arabia.

Folks, Israel is a wealthy country today and money is fungible. For way too long U.S. economic and military aid has allowed Netanyahu to have his cake and eat it too — to fund the insane settlement project, and maintain an advanced military, while not having to raise taxes on the whole Israeli public to pay for it all. While Israel got U.S. aid in one hand, the budget of its Ministry of Defense paid to build roads for settlers with the other hand. Uncle Sam’s wallet, indirectly, was the slush fund for Netanyahu’s politics.

So no, we’re not telling Netanyahu what to do in Gaza — Israel is a sovereign country. We’re just going to tell him what we’re not going to do anymore — because we happen to be a sovereign country too.

America has been indirectly funding Israel’s slow-motion suicide — and I am not just talking settlements. Look at what Netanyahu did last June. To buy off the ultra-Orthodox parties he needs in his coalition to keep himself out of jail on corruption charges, Netanyahu’s government gave the ultra-Orthodox and the settlers “an unprecedented increment in allocations … including full funding of schools to not teach English, science and math," explained Dan Ben-David, a macroeconomist who has focused on the interaction between Israel’s demography and education at Tel Aviv University, where he heads the Shoresh Institution for Socioeconomic Research. “This budgetary increment alone is more than Israel invests each year in higher education altogether — or 14 years of complete funding for the Technion, Israel’s M.I.T.,” Mr. Ben-David said. “It is completely nuts.”

Bottom line: Netanyahu has a completely incoherent strategy right now — eliminate Hamas in Gaza while building more settlements in the West Bank that undermine the only decent long-term Palestinian alternative to Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, which Israel needs to safely leave Gaza.

If this is the season of war, it also has to be a season for answers about what happens the morning after. I am hardly the only one who wants to know. As the Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari wrote in an essay this week in Haaretz about Netanyahu’s government: If it “does dream of exploiting victory to annex territories, forcefully redraw borderlines, expel populations, ignore rights, censor speech, realize messianic fantasies or turn Israel into a theocratic dictatorship — we need to know it now.”

nytimes.com · by Thomas L. Friedman · October 19, 2023

9. Hamas’s Hostage-Taking Handbook Says to ‘Kill the Difficult Ones’ and Use Hostages as ‘Human Shields’

This needs to get more press.

Hamas’s Hostage-Taking Handbook Says to ‘Kill the Difficult Ones’ and Use Hostages as ‘Human Shields’

The document, which I obtained from an Israeli official, also suggests that Hamas did not plan to take hostages back to Gaza.

By Graeme Wood

The Atlantic · by Graeme Wood · October 19, 2023

A hostage-taking manual that an official in the Israel Defense Forces told me was recovered in the aftermath of the Hamas attack suggests that the group’s hostage-taking on October 7 did not go according to plan. Right now over 200 hostages are thought to be in Hamas’s hands in Gaza. The manual suggests that the group at first intended not to spirit all of them into Gaza, but instead to take them hostage where they were found inside Israel, possibly for a protracted standoff.

The Atlantic obtained a copy of the manual from an IDF official, who vouched for its authenticity and who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the materials. Israel’s President Isaac Herzog had earlier referred to the document in an interview on CNN, calling it “an instruction guide, how to go into civilian areas, into a kibbutz, a city, a moshav [agricultural coop].” He said it described “exactly how to torture them, how to abduct them, how to kidnap them.”

Graeme Wood: What is Israel trying to accomplish?

The hostage-taking, according to the manual, is to take place “in the field,” in areas that have been “cleansed” and brought under control. After bringing together the hostages, it says, they should be culled (“kill those expected to resist and those that pose a threat”) and bound and blindfolded, then “reassured,” to keep them docile. “Use them as human shields,” it says, and use “electric shocks” to force compliance.

“Kill the difficult ones,” it adds. It specifically notes the need to separate women and children from men—confirmation that the snatching of children was planned from the start, and not the product of some kind of excess fervor following battlefield success. It specifies that only senior field commanders should negotiate with Israeli authorities, and then only with the advice of their own superiors, presumably still in Gaza. The final section, which has circulated online but was not included in the IDF version, advises the hostage-takers to threaten to kill prisoners if they revolt, or if Israel attacks or tries to gas them. (The document otherwise matches the one I received from the IDF, which would not authenticate the final section.)

The manual is printed out and marked “confidential” on top. It is written in Arabic, and it includes a guide to Israeli military ranks and weaponry. There is one small handwritten comment on the first page, and the graphics on the cover suggest that it was an official production of the unit that created it. It is impossible to tell whether the manual was a guide for all hostage-taking operations, or only for those at the site where it was recovered. The document bears a cover with the seal of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and a watermark from something called the “al-Quds Battalion.”

All of the manual’s instructions suggest that the scenario originally envisioned was a standoff within Israeli territory. There were such standoffs over the course of the attack, such as in Kibbutz Be’eri, but none lasted for days, as the attackers seem to have expected. A whole section is devoted to “supplies,” in particular the hoarding of food and drinks, flashlights, batteries, and other equipment useful in holding out during a protracted siege. “Don’t use your own supplies to feed the hostages,” it cautions, “except in an emergency.”

The apparent discrepancy between the situation Hamas seems to have planned for, and the one that is still unfolding, explains some of the haphazard nature of the hostage-taking. Hostages were brought into Gaza with improvised transport, including SUVs, golf carts, and motorbikes. No such improvisation is mentioned in the manual I obtained: the Hamas members appear not to have expected that they could transfer their victims in such a disorderly manner, or indeed transfer them at all. Just as nearly all Israelis were shocked at how little resistance Hamas encountered, Hamas itself was likely put off balance by their quick dominance of the battlefield and ability to continue dominating it for hours, without encountering the full force of the resistance of a modern military.

Graeme Wood: Hamas may not have a step two

The al-Quds Battalion barely exists online. Subunits of armed groups in Israel and Palestine proliferate and subdivide rapidly, so the existence of a new named group is not itself unusual. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), another group with a significant presence in Gaza, has an al-Quds “brigade” (saraya). And on October 6—the day before the Hamas atrocities—PIJ announced that an al-Quds “battalion” (katiba) would operate in the West Bank. But this manual is clearly marked as an al-Qassam Brigades operational manual.

A Quranic quote appears on the cover: “Our forces will certainly succeed” (37:173). The author of the manual foresees the hostage situation ending—he does not say how—with Hamas leaving the site. He says to mark the burial sites of Hamas’s dead, so they can be disinterred and moved after Israel’s eventual withdrawal from the land. But the effect of Hamas’s success was not predictable either by its perpetrators or by its victims. Two hundred hostages, ranging from little babies to old women, is an order of magnitude more hostages than Israel ever contemplated, in its worst nightmares, and Israel’s conviction that Hamas must now be eliminated is in large part due to the enormity of this crime. The hostage-takers carried out a more successful operation than they expected, possibly even more successful than they wished.

The Atlantic · by Graeme Wood · October 19, 2023

10. Yes, the U.S. Can Afford to Help Its Allies

Excerpts:

So what of the idea that the U.S. should back away from helping because it’s all too much trouble? Because the country that during the Cold War defended both Germany and Japan with its Army and Navy is now too feeble to aid two friendly democracies that ask only for material and technical assistance to defend themselves? Because a few dozen Republican House members and a handful of Republican senators are intimidated by Donald Trump and addled by social media?

For the U.S. to back away from its commitments for these reasons would be simply shameful.

The United States can succeed. The United States is succeeding. There’s never a good time to yield to bad-faith isolationism, but for a great nation animated by high ideals, this moment would be an especially bad time to do so.

Yes, the U.S. Can Afford to Help Its Allies

In fact, it can’t afford not to.

By David Frum

The Atlantic · by David Frum · October 20, 2023

As his address to the nation from the Oval Office last night underlined, President Joe Biden is expected to send a defense-appropriations request to Congress for perhaps as much as $100 billion to support Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, and to improve U.S. border security. It’s a big request—and it will galvanize a debate about whether the United States is doing too much.

Existing critics of Ukraine aid are already complaining that to add an effort to resupply Israel will prove too crushing. Is that true?

Let’s carefully tally American resources and American commitments.

Thanks to its remarkable rebound from the coronavirus pandemic, the American economy will this year produce $27 trillion in goods and services. In the fiscal year that ended on September 30, the U.S. spent about $850 billion of that $27 trillion on national defense. That rounds out at a little more than 3 percent of GDP. That’s only about half of the burden of defense spending that the U.S. shouldered during the final decade of the Cold War.

Franklin Foer: Inside Biden’s ‘hug Bibi’ strategy

To date, aid to Ukraine has cost a fraction of that percentage. By mid-September, the total value of the aid provided to Ukraine by the U.S. amounted to about $75 billion. Nearly a third of that sum (about $23 billion) was the value of old equipment from Pentagon stockpiles, material that was on its way to becoming obsolete anyway. The remainder included funding U.S. government operations to support Ukraine—training, logistics, and so on—and direct assistance to the Ukrainian government.

If the president now asks for another $75 billion over the next two years, that will represent about a 4 percent share of the defense budget for that period—or roughly one-tenth of one penny for every dollar of national output. The United States should be able to cope.

And what about the Israeli piece of this budget request?

In normal years, U.S. assistance to Israel is worth about $3 billion. Almost all of that is spent by Israel to buy U.S.-made weapons and equipment. Israel is reportedly requesting an emergency supplement of $10 billion—in the larger scheme of things, a fraction of a fraction.

Nor will aid to Israel compete with the needs of Ukraine. Ukraine wants heavy equipment from the U.S. to fight conventional land battles. Kyiv needs fighter jets, tanks, armored personnel carriers, missiles, and ammunition, ammunition, and more ammunition. According to a senior Pentagon source, the Israeli emergency request involves very different items from the U.S. inventory: principally, precision-guided munitions for Israel’s air force, components for its Iron Dome anti-missile defense system, and intelligence resources and advisers for its hostage-situation response. Israel is receiving some fighting vehicles and artillery shells, too, but on a completely different scale from anything Ukraine requires. Ukraine needs about 1.5 million shells a year; Israel wants a few thousand more shells on hand in case Hezbollah starts shooting from the Lebanon hills. Blasting away in Gaza would be brutal and futile.

The critics of American military-aid spending also grumble that its partners do not contribute enough. That image some Americans have of free-loading allies is false.

Total European Union contributions to Ukraine are roughly double the total of U.S. commitments. EU countries are providing many weapons systems, including eventually some two dozen F-16 fighters. They are also covering most of the cost of sustaining the Ukrainian economy.

Casey Michel: Make Russia pay

Alongside the EU, the United Kingdom has spent $5.6 billion on military assistance to Ukraine in 2022 and 2023. Japan’s multiyear commitment—mostly economic and humanitarian—will add up to about $7 billion. The Canadian commitment to Ukraine will total about $7 billion over the years 2022–26.

Aside from all of this, the U.S. still has spare capacity, and can deliver more inventory to Ukraine without any risk to its own national security. Of the 2,200 F-16 aircraft purchased by the United States since the 1970s, fewer than 900 still remain in service. The Air Force would dearly like to retire and replace 125 of those 900. Donating those 125 to Ukraine would accelerate the Air Force’s wished-for modernization programs.

Costs, of course, have to be measured against benefits. The money to Ukraine is buying a powerful reinforcement of peace in Europe and across the world. The money to Israel will buy a similar deterrent to rogue aggression in the Middle East.

President Biden issued a one-word caution to Hezbollah and Iran about exploiting Hamas’s aggression against Israel: “don’t.” That warning has been bolstered by sending two carrier groups and a deployment of Marines to the region. Biden’s admonition has even more force because of what the Iranians have seen in Ukraine: a global alliance defending a democratic ally in defiance of Russia’s energy embargoes, nuclear blackmail, and disinformation warfare.

Some in the U.S. foreign-policy community harbor a fantasy that the U.S. can enhance its credibility with China by abandoning Ukraine. (One such dreamer, Elbridge Colby, was treated to a glowing profile in Politico recently.) This is like suggesting that a business can improve its credit by defaulting on some of its debts. Ukraine’s self-defense has delivered a needed check to authoritarian aggressors all around the world.

David Frum: What Ukraine needs now

Democracy needs some wins against its most violent enemies. Ukraine and Israel both offer opportunities for the U.S. to realize valuable security gains without risking a single American soldier. Obviously, it’s important for American policy makers to proceed cautiously. Russia wields a nuclear deterrent. Gaza is a bad place to fight a ground war. But precisely by its generosity, the U.S. has earned the right to dissuade its partners from launching operations that seem ill-advised.

So what of the idea that the U.S. should back away from helping because it’s all too much trouble? Because the country that during the Cold War defended both Germany and Japan with its Army and Navy is now too feeble to aid two friendly democracies that ask only for material and technical assistance to defend themselves? Because a few dozen Republican House members and a handful of Republican senators are intimidated by Donald Trump and addled by social media?

For the U.S. to back away from its commitments for these reasons would be simply shameful.

The United States can succeed. The United States is succeeding. There’s never a good time to yield to bad-faith isolationism, but for a great nation animated by high ideals, this moment would be an especially bad time to do so.

The Atlantic · by David Frum · October 20, 2023

11. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 20, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2023

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces launched a renewed offensive push near Avdiivka on October 20 and marginally advanced, indicating that the Russian military command remains committed to offensive operations in the area despite heavy materiel and personnel losses.
Ukrainian forces continued larger-than-usual ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 20 and established a confirmed presence in a settlement on the east bank.
Russian and Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that the Russian units defending the east bank of Kherson Oblast are relatively less combat effective than other Russian forces elsewhere on the front.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, on October 19 to discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine with Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, around Avdiivka, west of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made limited advances in some areas.
Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin argued on October 20 that Russian authorities should strip migrants of acquired Russian citizenship if they are unwilling to fight in Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 20, 2023

Oct 20, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 20, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark

October 20, 2023, 4:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on October 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces launched a renewed offensive push near Avdiivka on October 20 and marginally advanced, indicating that the Russian military command remains committed to offensive operations in the area despite heavy materiel and personnel losses. Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows that Russian forces secured minor advances west of Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka).[1] Russian milbloggers and a Ukrainian military observer claimed that Russian forces captured a Ukrainian stronghold near the waste heap just northeast of Avdiivka, advanced to a rail station north of Avdiivka, and advanced near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant south of Avdiivka.[2] One prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), south of Avdiivka, near Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka), and near Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka), however.[3] Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to one kilometer on the Stepove-Berdychi line (8-10km northwest of Avdiivka) on October 19 and that fighting is ongoing near Berdychi on October 20.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka, Novokalynove, Stepove, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Sieverne.[5]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 20 that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed almost 50 Russian tanks and over 100 armored vehicles during the past day of fighting near Avdiivka.[6] Ukrainian soldiers operating in the Avdiivka area reported on October 20 that Ukrainian forces have destroyed 200 Russian armored vehicles in the past four days.[7] Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash stated that Russian forces are attempting to repair damaged equipment while still in the field.[8] Footage published on October 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian TOS-1 thermobaric artillery system near Avdiivka.[9] A Russian milblogger complained that Russian counterbattery fire near Avdiivka is decreasing in effectiveness due to poor communication and the failure to stockpile munitions ahead of the offensive effort, very likely exacerbating material losses in the area.[10] The initial Russian offensive operations in the Avdiivka area on October 10 also resulted in high verified Russian equipment losses, and the fact that Russian forces regrouped and re-launched assaults after the initial attacks suggests that either Russian forces believe they can feasibly take Avdiivka, or that the Russian military command is poorly prioritizing offensive operations regardless of cost.[11]

Ukrainian forces continued larger-than-usual ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 20 and established a confirmed presence in a settlement on the east bank. Geolocated footage published on October 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced into northeastern Krynky (27km east from Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[12] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are establishing a foothold near Krynky and continue to maintain their presence near the Antonivsky roadway and railway bridges.[13] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces temporarily advanced further into Krynky up to the Kozachi Laheri-Krynky-Korsunka road before Russian airstrikes pushed Ukrainian troops back to the northern outskirts of the settlement.[14] Another Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing near Pishchanivka (14km east from Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and that a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group is operating on the southern outskirts of the settlement.[15] The prominent Russian milblogger suggested that Russian forces only maintained positions on the southern outskirts of Pishchanivka as of the afternoon of October 18, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 19 that Russian aviation struck Pishchanivka, implying that Ukrainian forces were still operating in the settlement.[16] ISW has not observed any other visual confirmation of Ukrainian forces maintaining positions in east bank settlements other than Krynky, however.

Russian and Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that the Russian units defending the east bank of Kherson Oblast are relatively less combat effective than other Russian forces elsewhere on the front. A Ukrainian military observer stated that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces is primarily comprised of elements of the 49th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) and likely elements of the newly created 18th Combined Arms Army.[17] The majority of the 49th Combined Arms Army (CAA) has been deployed to east bank Kherson Oblast since Russian forces withdrew from the west (right) bank, and elements of the 49th CAA’s 205th Motorized Rifle Regiment have since suffered significant casualties.[18] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on August 21 that the Russian military was likely forming the new 18th CAA from other units currently operating in Kherson Oblast, and it is unlikely that the new units of the 18th CAA are entirely comprised of fresh forces or staffed to doctrinal end strength.[19] The deployment of the 18th CAA to Kherson Oblast is reminiscent of the rushed deployment of the newly created 25th CAA to the Kupyansk and Lyman directions in early September 2023, and the 18th CAA likely faces similar issues with a lack of personnel, equipment, and proper training.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly of 70th Motorized Rifle Division of the 18th CAA, are defending against Ukrainian activities near Krynky.[21] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 1st Battalion of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are operating near the Antonivsky railway bridge.[22] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment have been defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and have likely suffered significant casualties.[23]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances northwest of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne), though ISW has not observed evidence to confirm this claim.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[25] Russian sources reported Ukrainian attacks south of Bakhmut on the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line and south of Orikhiv near Robotyne, Novoprokopivka, and Verbove.[26]

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, on October 19 to discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine. Russian media reported that Putin met with the Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander for Russian forces in Ukraine Army General Valery Gerasimov, who told Putin that Russian troops are "solving problems in accordance with the operation plan."[27] Various elements of the SMD are notably currently deployed in critical areas of the frontline — elements of the SMD's 8th Combined Arms Army are conducting offensive operations near Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast, elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army are defending against ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and elements of the 49th Combined Arms Army are operating in the Kherson Oblast direction as of late August 2023.[28] Putin's publicized visit with Gerasimov indicates that Gerasimov is still the active figurehead of Russian operations in Ukraine and was likely meant to posture the effectiveness and involvement of the Russian military leadership as Russian forces pursue offensive and defensive operations along multiple sectors of the front. ISW will provide additional updates on Putin's visit to Rostov-on-Don once more readouts become available.

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces launched a renewed offensive push near Avdiivka on October 20 and marginally advanced, indicating that the Russian military command remains committed to offensive operations in the area despite heavy materiel and personnel losses.
Ukrainian forces continued larger-than-usual ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 20 and established a confirmed presence in a settlement on the east bank.
Russian and Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that the Russian units defending the east bank of Kherson Oblast are relatively less combat effective than other Russian forces elsewhere on the front.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, on October 19 to discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine with Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, around Avdiivka, west of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made limited advances in some areas.
Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin argued on October 20 that Russian authorities should strip migrants of acquired Russian citizenship if they are unwilling to fight in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 20 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), west of Svatove near Nadiya (15km west of Svatove), near Makiivka (20km southwest of Svatove), and near Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna).[29] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued attacks near Synkivka, Ivanivka, Nadiya, and Makiivka, and one Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces approached the outskirts of Lyman Pershyi (8km northeast of Kupyansk).[30] Ukrainian military observer Konstantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) and 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) continued attacks north of the Yahidne-Ivanivka area (22km southeast of Kupyansk) but failed to break through towards the N26 Kupyansk-Svatove road.[31] Mashovets noted that Russian forces have shifted their focus towards Petropavlivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and the Stepova Novosilka-Kurylivka direction (directly east of Kupyansk).[32]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 20.[33] Mashovets claimed that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to 400m in an unspecified part of the Kupyansk-Svatove line, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Ukrainian advances on this frontline in recent days.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut on October 20 and did not make confirmed advances. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks on the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line (7-13km south of Bakhmut).[35] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces advanced up to the railway line east of Klishchiivka.[36] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Air Assault (VDV) Brigade are defending west of Zaitseve (5km east of Klishchiivka), indicating that the 83rd VDV Brigade is likely split across at least two axes, including in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[37]

Russian forces continued counterattacks near Bakhmut on October 20 and recently marginally advanced. Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Klishchiivka.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Klishchiivka.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Khromove (2km west of Bakhmut), and Klishchiivka.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces shot down a Ukrainian Mi-8 helicopter in the Bakhmut area, possibly near Chasiv Yar (12km west of Bakhmut).[41]

See topline text for updates on the Avdiivka area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on October 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff and Russian sources reported that Russian forces attacked in Marinka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) and near Novomykhailivka (25km southwest of Donetsk City).[42]

The Russian MoD claimed on October 20 that Russian forces repelled limited Ukrainian attacks near Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast in the past week.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 20. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[44]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 20 but did not make confirmed advances. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian units captured positions in an unspecified area in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area in the past week, though ISW has not observed evidence of recent Russian advances in this sector to confirm this claim.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces achieved some successes near Pryyutne (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), although ISW has not observed evidence to support this claim.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Zolota Nyva (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), Staromayorske, Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and Poltavka (28km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and southwest of Staromayorske.[48] The Russian “Vostok” Battalion, which reportedly operates in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, claimed that operations in the Velyka Novosilka are limited to minor skirmishes and artillery duels because Russian forces in the area lack the reserves for offensive actions due to offensive operations in other sectors of the front.[49]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances northwest of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne), though ISW has not observed evidence to confirm this claim.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia direction).[51] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne and Verbove.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne).[53]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 20 but did not make any confirmed or claimed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Robotyne and Verbove.[54] Footage published on October 19 and 20 purportedly shows elements of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and mobilized personnel of the 387th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely of the 7th VDV Division) operating near Verbove.[55]

See topline text for updates on Kherson Oblast.

Russian occupation officials claimed that Ukrainian forces launched missiles targeting Russian rear areas in southern Ukraine on October 20. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces launched between 10 to 15 missiles at Russian occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea and that Russian forces shot down five missiles over occupied Kherson Oblast.[56] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed that Russian air defenses shot down a missile over the Black Sea near occupied Lyubymivka, Crimea.[57]

Russian Aerospace (VKS) forces are beginning airspace patrols over the Black Sea, in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin's October 18 announcement that VKS forces are beginning to patrol the airspace over the Black Sea with MiG-31 aircraft armed with Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile systems.[58] Satellite imagery published on October 15 shows that Russian forces deployed four MiG-31 aircraft to the Belbek airfield in occupied Sevastopol.[59] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on October 20 that the Russian military constantly moves aircraft due to fears of Ukrainian missile strikes and that the deployment of MiG-31 aircraft at Belbek airfield will have little effect on Russian operations.[60]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin argued on October 20 that Russian authorities should strip migrants of acquired Russian citizenship if they are unwilling to fight in Ukraine.[61] The Russian State Duma proposed a bill on August 28 that would deprive individuals of their acquired Russian citizenship for evading military registration and mobilization, prompting varied reactions of support and opposition among Russian sources.[62] Russian authorities regularly conduct raids on migrant communities in Russia and issue summonses to those with acquired Russian citizenship who have not yet registered with military registration and recruitment offices.[63] Bastrykin’s comments are likely meant to further pressure individuals with acquired citizenship to register with Russian military registration and recruitment offices. Russian authorities are also currently coercing migrants and foreigners living in Russia to fight in the war in Ukraine in exchange for Russian citizenship.[64]

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec announced on October 20 that it completed tests of the “Koalitsiya-SV” self-propelled artillery system and claimed that Rostec is prepared to start serial production of the system.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that the new artillery system has a wider range and is more accurate than previous systems, and one prominent milblogger expressed hope that the production of the system will address poor Russian counterbattery capabilities.[66] Russian sources routinely complain about poor Russian counterbattery capabilities throughout the frontline in Ukraine, and Russian forces are unlikely to systematically improve these capabilities in the near term.[67]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to pressure residents in occupied Ukraine to accept Russian passports. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on October 20 that residents will be obligated to use a Russian passport to receive housing certificates and will not be able to use Ukrainian identification documents.[68]

Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated on October 20 that Ukrainian partisans blew up a Russian military vehicle near the Russian-controlled airfield in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[69]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Ukrainian Commander of the Northern Group of Forces Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev stated on October 20 that Russian forces currently have deployed three Su-30 attack aircraft and two Su-24 reconnaissance aircraft on Belarusian territory.[70]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

12. Iran Update, October 20, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-20-2023

Key Takeaways:

Palestinian militias continued indirect fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel on October 20. Hamas also released two American hostages held in Gaza, marking the first time Hamas has released any hostages since its October 7 attack into Israel.
Clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli security forces in the West Bank increased following Hamas calls for protests on October 18. The Israel-Hamas War may be driving Palestinian militia coordination in the West Bank.
Iranian-backed militants targeted US forces stationed at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and al Harir Air Base on October 20, marking the third consecutive day of attacks against US forces in the Middle East. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have threatened to continue attacks on US forces in the Middle East.

IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 20, 2023

Oct 20, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, October 20, 2023

Johanna Moore, Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Amin Soltani and Brian Carter

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments and in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Key Takeaways:

Palestinian militias continued indirect fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel on October 20. Hamas also released two American hostages held in Gaza, marking the first time Hamas has released any hostages since its October 7 attack into Israel.
Clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli security forces in the West Bank increased following Hamas calls for protests on October 18. The Israel-Hamas War may be driving Palestinian militia coordination in the West Bank.
Iranian-backed militants targeted US forces stationed at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and al Harir Air Base on October 20, marking the third consecutive day of attacks against US forces in the Middle East. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have threatened to continue attacks on US forces in the Middle East.

Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias continued indirect fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel on October 20. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas' militant wing—claimed ten rocket, mortar, and drone attacks. Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad—claimed responsibility for another seven rocket attacks. This rate of attacks is consistent with the rates that CTP-ISW has observed in recent days. Both groups continue to frame these attacks as being in response to Israeli “massacres” against civilians.

The al Qassem Brigades claimed responsibility for the first armed drone attack since October 15, which destroyed an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) tank.[1] The al Qassem Brigades released a propaganda video and two photographs on October 20 of its drones and drone attacks and threatened further attacks.[2] The al Qassem Brigades has used these drones to strike IDF soldiers and infrastructure in attacks since October 7.[3]

Hamas released two American hostages held in Gaza, marking the first time Hamas has released any hostages since its October 7 attack into Israel. Hamas military spokesperson Abu Ubaida released a statement on October 20 claiming that it had released the hostages after Qatari mediation efforts.[4] Ubaida also said that the hostage release was in response to US President Joe Biden‘s “false allegations” about the group during Biden’s address on October 19.[5] Hamas continues to hold over 200 other hostages.

IDF airstrikes continue to kill Hamas leadership and operatives in Gaza. The IDF killed senior Hamas engineer Mahmoud Zavih on October 20.[6] The IDF reported that Zavih was responsible for weapons production for Hamas' military wing, the al Qassem Brigades.[7] The IDF said the leader “exchanged knowledge with other terrorists in the Middle East,” suggesting the leader supported the weapons production effort of other Axis of Resistance groups in the region.

The IDF is degrading Hamas’ naval capabilities which Hamas could use to target Israeli gas rigs and other infrastructure, according to an Israeli journalist.[8] An IDF airstrike on October 19 killed a member of Hamas’ naval branch in Gaza who the IDF claimed was plotting maritime attacks.[9] The IDF also killed another member of Hamas’ naval branch in Gaza who participated in Hamas’ attack into Israel on October 7.[10] Hamas has worked to develop its naval capabilities in recent years. The IDF reported in 2021 that Hamas for the first time developed unmanned sea vessels to launch attacks in Israel.[11]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and marches in the West Bank.

Clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli security forces in the West Bank increased following Hamas calls for protests the day before. CTP-ISW recorded 17 distinct clashes and 12 demonstrations in the West Bank on October 20. Many demonstrators condemned the Israeli raid on the Nour Shams refugee camp on October 19 where six Palestinians and one Israeli officer died.[12] Unspecified militants detonated an IED targeting an IDF convoy at the camp overnight.[13] Hamas called for protests in support of the Gaza Strip across all cities and towns in the West Bank on October 20, as part of Hamas’ effort to expand fighting against Israel to the West Bank.

The Israel-Hamas War may be driving Palestinian militia coordination in the West Bank. The IDF said on October 17 that it arrested 440 wanted for arrest Palestinians in the West Bank—including 220 Hamas-affiliated Palestinians individuals—since the war began on October 7.[14] The Palestinian Authority Health Ministry noted that Israeli security forces killed 41 West Bank Palestinians between October 7 and October 17.[15] The UN added on October 14 that the week following October 7 was the deadliest week for Palestinians in the territory since at least 2005.[16] CTP-ISW is closely monitoring the risk of conflict expanding in the West Bank.

Palestinians held Hamas and Fatah flags at a demonstration in Hebron and Yatta condemning Israeli attacks and in support of Gaza. The IDF dropped leaflets in Hebron warning it will find and catch anyone who identifies themselves as a member of Hamas.[17] Hamas chairman Khaled Mashaal called on Fatah to defeat Israel together.[18] The Hamas and Fatah signed a reconciliation deal on October 13 after having been at odds for more than a decade.[19]
Hamas claimed that al Qassem Brigades fought in the Nour Shams camp on October 19.[20] The PIJ-affiliated Tulkarm Brigade said that several Palestinian groups supported them during the fighting.[21] This is the first coordinated small arms clash that a Palestinian militia has claimed in the West Bank since October 7.
Hamas continued to message that the resistance in the West Bank and Gaza must work together. Hamas’ Political Bureau leader Ismail Haniyeh delivered a speech on October 9 praising the mass popular movement in support of Gaza over the past few days, noting that Israeli aggression extends to the West Bank.[22] Coordinated Palestinian resistance in the West Bank supports Hamas’ stated objectives to expand the war to the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Attacks from Lebanon into northern Israel risk further escalation between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH). Two attacks in northern Israel killed at least one IDF soldier and wounded three more.[23] The IDF soldier killed in action on October 20 marks the sixth IDF soldier killed in action on the Israel-Lebanon border since October 7.[24] LH released a statement on October 19 that warned that violation of “Lebanon’s security” will not go unanswered, which suggests that LH will continue to respond to Israeli airstrikes that the IDF conducts in response to LH attacks.[25] LH targeted IDF positions with two Kornet anti-tank guided missiles near Natua and Barnit in retaliation for IDF shelling of southern Lebanon.[26] The attack killed one IDF soldier and wounded another, according to LH.[27] The IDF responded with airstrikes against LH positions.[28] At least one unspecified militant infiltrated Israel on October 20 for the first time since October 13 near Margoliot, seriously injuring one IDF soldier.[29]

LH conducted 18 attacks targeting civilian and military infrastructure in northern Israel on October 20, which is consistent with its rate of attacks since October 15.[30] CTP-ISW recorded between three and five attacks daily between October 12 and October 14.[31] CTP-ISW has recorded between nine and 20 attacks targeting northern Israel daily since October 15.[32]

The IDF intercepted an unspecified drone crossing the Israel-Lebanon border near the Upper Galilee region on October 20.[33]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iranian-backed militants targeted US forces stationed at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and al Harir Air Base on October 20, marking the third consecutive day of attacks against US forces in the Middle East.[34] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq - an umbrella group of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias - targeted US forces stationed at Al Harir Air Base in Iraqi Kurdistan on October 20 in a drone attack.[35] It claimed to have launched two drones targeting the air base and reported that both drones “hit their target.”[36] This is the fourth attack claimed by the Islamic Resistance of Iraq during the last three days.[37] Militants from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeted Al Harir Air Base and Ain al Asad in Iraq and the al Tanf Garrison and Conoco Mission Support Site in Syria on October 18 and 19.[38]

Unidentified militants targeted US forces stationed at BIAP in a rocket attack on October 20.[39] Iraqi Security forces found the rocket launch site in Jihad neighborhood, which is adjacent to the airport.[40] The counter-rocket artillery mortar (C-RAM) system at BIAP engaged two rockets, destroying one.[41] This is the first attack on BIAP since October 7. No group has claimed the attack on BIAP at the time of publication.

Iranian-backed militias have conducted eight attacks over the past three days across the Middle East in a multi-theater escalation against the United States and Israel. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to conduct attacks on US forces in the region if the United States intervened in the Israel-Hamas war, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[42] Iranian-backed Iraqi groups are currently behaving as though the United States has crossed this red line. Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri warned on October 19 that continued Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip could force “other actors,” including “resistance groups,” to engage in the conflict, echoing previous regime rhetoric about the possibility of a conflict expanding.[43]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have threatened to continue attacks on US forces in the Middle East. Tura News, affiliated with Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah, circulated a warning of additional attacks on US forces in Iraq “in the next few days.”[44] Iranian-backed Badr Organization released a promotional video repeating the group’s threat to attack the United States if it intervenes in the Israel-Hamas war.[45]

Ashab al Kahf released a statement on October 20 threatening to conduct improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on US forces.[46] Ashab al Kahf is a member of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq which claimed the one-way drone attack on US forces stationed at Ain al Asad Air Base on October 18.[47] Ashab al Kahf claimed 3 IED attacks targeting US logistics convoys in Iraq between July and August 2023.[48]

IRGC-QF Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani warned Syrian President Bashar al Assad during his visit to Syria on 15 October that Iran intends to use Syria as a second front if the Israel-Hamas war expands geographically.[49] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) began directing militias to the southwestern Syrian border immediately after the Hamas-led attack into Israel on October 7. Iranian officials have since messaged that a multi-front war against Israel is becoming more likely.

Najafi reported that Ghaani established a joint operations room in Syria during his visit on October 15.[50] The IRGC will oversee this operations room, according to Iranian state-news journalist Mostafa Najafi.[51] An unspecified Iranian intelligence official said that Iran will start a “limited” ground operation from the Golan Heights and notably not from Lebanon if the situation escalates to protect LH.[52]
Syrian opposition media reported on October 19 that the Axis of Resistance, in coordination with the Syrian regime, plan to surprise Israel and create a narrative in which the Axis represents the main resistance to Israel.[53] Iranian-backed militias are deployed along the southwestern Syrian border in Rif Dimashq and Daraa province.[54] CTP and ISW have tracked the IRGC and LH from Syria and Iraq deploying to the border of Syrian and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights since October 9.

Iranian-backed militias have relocated ammunition and equipment to residential areas in Deir ez Zor City and Hatla, Deir ez Zor Province on October 19 according to a report from anti-regime news outlet Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).[55] According to local sources cited by SOHR, Iranian-backed militias began transferring weapons to residential areas in fear of a possible retaliation from US forces. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq targeted US forces stationed at al Tanf Garrison and Conoco Mission support site in eastern Syria on October 19, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[56] US forces have targeted Iranian-backed militia weapons storage facilities in Syria in retaliation for strikes on US positions in Syria previously, most notably during the last escalation cycle between the United States and militias in March 2023.[57]

LH and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) arrived in al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province, Syria on October 19. LH militants were transferred from Idlib Province, Rif Dimashq Province, and Hatla, Deir ez Zor Province.[58] Popular Mobilization Forces arrived in al Mayadin from Iraq the same day.[59]

PMF supporters traveled to the Iraq-Jordan border near Trebil, Iraq to stage a sit-in in support of the Palestinian people.[60] Sadrist Movement leader Moqtada al Sadr called for Iraqis to hold a sit in on the border with Palestine and remain “until the siege is lifted.”[61] Jordanian authorities did not comment on any convoys traveling to the border; however, Jordanian security forces closed the al Karameh Border Crossing with the West Bank according to Iraqi Kurdistan-based Shafaq news.[62]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) spokesperson Nasser Abu Sharif stated that the potential for normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia motivated Hamas’ October 7 attack during an Iranian conference on the Israel-Hamas war in Qom on October 20.[63] Sharif argued that the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia would have dealt a devastating blow to the Palestinian cause. He also mentioned that many unspecified intra-Palestinian issues also “justified” the Al Aqsa Flood operation. Sharif further claimed that LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah is awaiting a simple “phone call” from resistance leaders before attacking Israel, consistent with Iranian and Axis of Resistance rhetoric about the potential expansion of the conflict since October 13.[64] Sharif finally claimed that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has forbidden Palestinian groups from granting any concessions or retreating, consistent with CTP-ISW's previous assessment that the Palestinian resistance is preparing for a prolonged conflict with Israel.[65]

Iranian Friday prayer leaders echoed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s recent claim that the United States is responsible for Israeli actions against the Gaza Strip during their sermons on October 20. Khamenei accused the United States of determining Israel’s “current policy” vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip during a speech on October 17, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[66] Mashhad Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Alam ol Hoda emphasized that the United States, not Israel, is the “main perpetrator” of killings and bombings in the Gaza Strip.[67] Varamin Friday Prayer Leader Mohsen Mahmoudi similarly claimed that the United States is “the root of all Israeli crimes."[68] Pardis Friday Prayer Leader Hossein Hosseini asserted that Israel is carrying out attacks against women, children, and hospitals in the Gaza Strip “under the heads of American statesmen.”[69] This coordinated rhetoric from Friday prayer leaders suggests that Khamenei and his inner circle are directing this messaging campaign. Friday prayer leaders receive guidance for the content of their sermons from the Office of the Supreme Leader.

Iranian officials and media are criticizing US President Joe Biden’s October 18 visit to Israel and framing it as part of US-Israeli preparation for an Israeli ground invasion into the Gaza Strip. Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian described Biden’s visit as “provocative” during a meeting with his Lebanese counterpart Abdallah Bou Habib on the sidelines of the emergency Organization of Islamic Cooperation meeting in Jeddah on October 18.[70] Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani similarly stated that Biden’s visit highlighted US plans to “complicate” the situation in the Middle East during a phone call with his Iraqi counterpart Thabet al Abbasi on October 20.[71]

State-run outlet IRNA claimed on October 20 that the purpose of Biden’s visit to Israel was to “strengthen” Israeli attacks against Hamas.[72] Qods Friday Prayer Leader Hamza Mohammadi claimed on October 20 that Biden gave the Israeli government “the green light” for a ground invasion into the Gaza Strip.[73] Regime outlets recirculated Western reporting on October 19 that Biden told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Washington is “fully in support” of a ground invasion.[74]

Iranian officials have begun comparing Israel to ISIS and Hitler after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu labeled Hamas as “ISIS” and “the new Nazis” on October 17.[75] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian compared Israel to ISIS while claiming that Israel attacked a Greek Orthodox church in the Gaza Strip on October 20.[76] Iranian Chief Rabbi Younes Hamami Lalehzar separately stated that Israel cannot represent Judaism “just as ISIS cannot represent Islam” during an interview with English-language Press TV on October 20.[77] Passive Defense Organization Head Brigadier General Gholam Reza Jalali described Israel as “a new Hitler in the region” in a speech on October 20.[78] The above rhetoric is consistent with Iranian accusations since October 11 that Israel is committing war crimes and genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

Iranian media recirculated Western and Syrian reporting on the October 19 Iranian-backed militant attacks on US military assets. State-controlled Islamic Republic News Agency recirculated the sUS Defense Department’s announcement that it had intercepted several Houthi missiles and drones on October 19.[79] The Iran-backed Houthis launched at least three land-attack cruise missiles and eight drones “potentially” targeting Israel.[80] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency recirculated Western and Syrian media reporting on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase, Anbar province, Iraq as well as the Conoco Mission Support Site in Syria.[81] The Islamic Resistance of Iraq fired three drones targeting the al Tanf Garrison, Syria and three one-way drones targeting Conoco Mission Support Site on October 19.[82] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias also launched an unspecified number of rockets targeting US forces at the Ain al Asad Airbase.[83]

13. Hold Hamas and all of its enablers accountable

Excerpts:

Why are U.S. officials contorting themselves into pretzels to claim there is no evidence of Iran’s “direct involvement,” when one need only look at the Iranian regime-linked Kayhan newspaper, which claimed that former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani had designed the recent “al Aqsa Flood” operation before this death, in hopes that an “unprecedented” land-air-maritime attack would extinguish Israel?

The paper, whose leadership is appointed by the Supreme Leader himself, is understood to be a voice for the IRGC. It also claimed the offensive is just part of the “imminent conquest” of Israel that was promised last year. It boasts that the operation included first-time planning and coordination among various “resistance factions” aligned with Iran and will have strategic implications for the world.

Even if reports that Iran assisted in the incursion or gave its final go-ahead turn out to be inaccurate or simply Iranian bluster, Iran’s long-term support for Hamas in its goal to destroy Israel makes it complicit. Hamas has benefitted from Iranian military training, logistical help, and tens of millions of dollars in weaponry.

Iran’s decades of support to its terrorist proxies matter. It’s time to drop the charade and hold the Islamic Republic accountable for the crimes of Hamas and other terrorists.

Hold Hamas and all of its enablers accountable

BY MARY BETH LONG, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR 10/20/23 07:30 AM ET

thehill-com.cdn.ampproject.org

One of the things I love most about America is its nearly limitless capacity for charity and empathy. Americans are consistently among the world’s most generous donors to those in need or crisis. And particularly now, no one should shy away from sympathy for and support to Gazans.

But one should not confuse sympathy for the destitute or imperiled with support for terrorists.

Especially in times of high emotion, frank-speaking should not be abandoned for fear of hurt feelings. The facts matter now, as much or more than ever: Hamas is as responsible for the suffering of Gazans as anyone.

Moreover, no one should be shocked by Israel’s response to Hamas’ Oct. 7 invasion — least of all Hamas.

Indeed, some argue persuasively that the “al-Aqsa Flood” operation against Israel — which included systematic and savage attacks on Israeli families and hostage-taking, not to mention horrific acts of barbarism against young and old alike — was deliberately designed and executed to horrify and shock the world. It was designed to elicit an immediate and ferocious response from Israel.

It was also designed to provoke the world. Only hours after Hamas militia had posted videos of the execution of festival-goers, the murder of innocents, and triumphant, gun-waving youth celebrating over the unconscious bodies of half-naked girls, Hezbollah and other Iranian satellites threatened to get involved in the conflict if the international community and particularly the U.S. fail to constrain Israel’s response.

Even worse, much of the world has gone along with this nonsense.

Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran not only demand an examination of the appropriateness of Netanyahu’s every act, but insist through their representatives and proxies that we ignore their own role as instigators of this pogrom as well as their deliberate and continued sacrifice of Gazans.

And because many in the international community believe the only way to peace is through a rule-based order (as we have been taught), media and demonstrators focus almost exclusively on the plight of Palestinians and Israel’s next moves. This is a mistake.

It is past time Americans and the West understood that a “rule-based order” is not something Iran or Hamas believe in. Nor is “restraint” in conflict — quite the opposite. For Hamas the rules of war, “proportionate response,” and the sanctity of civilian life are weapons to be used against others — in this case, to tie Israel’s hands — not rules to abide by.

To support its cause, Hamas also engages in outright lies and truth-bending propaganda to blame Israel and others for the very crimes it continues to commit. Sadly, it has yet to be held to account.

Instead, Hamas continues to cynically benefit from sympathy for Gazans, even as it is putting those same Gazans in mortal danger by deliberately hiding among them.

How much respect or concern does Hamas have for people living in Gaza? Here’s a hint: Hamas’s deputy chairman outrageously released a statement claiming that “ordinary” Palestinians — not Hamas — were the ones responsible for the killing of civilians and hostage-taking on Oct. 7.

And Hamas’ strategy appears to be working. Has anyone publicly asked Hamas whether, having made the decision to attack Israeli civilian enclaves, it undertook preparations to ensure that its people (not just its leadership and those not happily ensconced in Qatar) would be prepared for Israel’s retaliation by storing water, food, or energy for its populace? Did the organization putatively in charge of Gaza prepare routes to safety or medical care?

Where are the calls for Hamas to account for its apparent lack of preparation for Gazans’ predictable needs in the aftermath of its attack — particularly given its demands that civilians remain in place?

What about the international aid received by Gaza and the huge sums apparently spent on weaponry while this operation was presumably being planned? Are Israel and the rest of the world supposed to be more responsible for the post-offensive needs of Gazans than Gaza’s own leadership?

To be clear, all those who commit atrocities should be held to account — including the perpetrator of the recent bombing of the hospital in Gaza — regardless of what side they are on.

But has anyone had the stomach to say to Iran, Hamas, and their apologists that, as a practical matter understood by belligerents for millennia, he who starts a conflict cannot dictate how his adversary will respond?

Is the so-called government of Gaza, as instigator, not at least as responsible for putting its citizens in danger as the Israelis are?

Is it possible to imagine a discussion centered on whether, having initiated innumerable violations of the laws of war, the leadership in Gaza has a right to expect anything less from Israel?

Finally, while attempting to minimize the impact of the conflict on innocents and its broadening into a regional conflagration, Americans should not allow their government to stray into self-delusion on the potential strategic implications of the war.

Why are U.S. officials contorting themselves into pretzels to claim there is no evidence of Iran’s “direct involvement,” when one need only look at the Iranian regime-linked Kayhan newspaper, which claimed that former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani had designed the recent “al Aqsa Flood” operation before this death, in hopes that an “unprecedented” land-air-maritime attack would extinguish Israel?

The paper, whose leadership is appointed by the Supreme Leader himself, is understood to be a voice for the IRGC. It also claimed the offensive is just part of the “imminent conquest” of Israel that was promised last year. It boasts that the operation included first-time planning and coordination among various “resistance factions” aligned with Iran and will have strategic implications for the world.

Even if reports that Iran assisted in the incursion or gave its final go-ahead turn out to be inaccurate or simply Iranian bluster, Iran’s long-term support for Hamas in its goal to destroy Israel makes it complicit. Hamas has benefitted from Iranian military training, logistical help, and tens of millions of dollars in weaponry.

Iran’s decades of support to its terrorist proxies matter. It’s time to drop the charade and hold the Islamic Republic accountable for the crimes of Hamas and other terrorists.

Mary Beth Long is former assistant secretary for international security affairs at the Department of Defense and chair of NATO’s High Level Group, as well as a former CIA case officer. She is founder of Askari Associates LLC.

thehill-com.cdn.ampproject.org

14. Why We Need to Disarm the Anti-China Discourse (Blatant Chinese Propaganda)

Here is a blatant information operation activity from China. Someone flagged this for me with this background.

Interestingly, the bio's of the two authors leaves Cale Johnson blank, but a quick Google search indicated that he is a producer now for CGTN, China's state television's foreign operations.

And Lawson Adams, 24, spent some time with the NSA on Oahu.

Why We Need to Disarm the Anti-China Discourse

From expanding military bases in the Philippines to building a fleet of AI drones to target China, militarists are creating conditions for a hot war in the Pacific.

CALE HOLMES

LAWSON ADAMS

Oct 21, 2023

commondreams.org · by Cale Holmes · October 21, 2023

Philippine soldiers take position on a beach during a joint exercise between Australian and Philippine troops at a naval base in San Antonio town, Zambales province, on August 25, 2023.

(Photo: Ted Aljibe/AFP via Getty Images)

From expanding military bases in the Philippines to building a fleet of AI drones to target China, militarists are creating conditions for a hot war in the Pacific.

Lawson Adams

Oct 21, 2023Common Dreams

Oct 21, 2023

From racist tweets to rising hate crimes, the media’s anti-China propaganda has created a climate of aggression. Two weeks ago, a man drove a car into the Chinese consulate in San Francisco, yelling “Where’s the CCP?” Arab Americans have been targeted during the Persian Gulf War, the War on Terror, and U.S.-backed atrocities in Palestine. It’s no surprise that Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders are in the crosshairs of white supremacy as the U.S. targets China. Back in April, a Columbia University found that three in four Chinese Americans said they’d suffered racial discrimination in the past 12 months.

When the Trump administration launched the China Initiative to prosecute spies, the Department of Justice racially profiled Chinese Americans and Chinese nationals. Between 2018 and 2022, the number of Chinese researchers who dropped their affiliation with U.S. institutions jumped 23 percent. The Biden administration has ended the initiative, but the Department of Justice and the congressional anti-China committee are still targeting political leaders in the Chinese community.

As Biden continues the crackdowns of his predecessor, his administration is also escalating in the Asia-Pacific region. From expanding military bases in the Philippines—including one potential base in the works intended to join contingencies in Taiwan—to building a fleet of AI drones to target China, militarists are creating conditions for a hot war in the Pacific. As the U.S. prepares for war, Forbes published an article on September 25 about an aircraft carrier “kill chain” and its potential use in a war with China. In February, CNN journalists accompanied a U.S. Navy jet approaching Chinese airspace. As a Chinese pilot warned the U.S. to keep a safe distance, an American soldier remarked: “It’s another Friday afternoon in the South China Sea.”

Not only are we normalizing U.S. aggression. We’re also relying on the military-industrial complex as an unbiased source. Pro-war propaganda is derailing China-U.S. ties, increasing anti-Asian hate, and hiding the realities of public opinion across the Pacific.

After launching the AUKUS military pact between Britain and Australia in 2021, as well as stiff export controls designed to limit China’s economy last year, the U.S. began 2023 with what appeared to be an olive branch. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was scheduled to visit China in February. Then came the “spy balloon.”

A Chinese balloon was blown off course and eventually shot down by the U.S. military. The Wall Street Journal and NBC uncritically printed and broadcasted statements from US Air Force Brigadier General Pat Ryder about the balloon's surveillance capabilities. On February 8, citing three unnamed officials, The New York Times said “American intelligence agencies have assessed that China’s spy balloon program is part of global surveillance.” The same story mentions the U.S. State Department’s briefings to foreign officials that were “designed to show that the balloons are equipped for intelligence gathering and that the Chinese military has been carrying out this collection for years, targeting, among other sites, the territories of Japan, Taiwan, India, and the Philippines.”

On April 3, the BBC and CNN published conflicting stories on the balloon that cited anonymous officials but contained inconsistencies about its ability to take pictures. It wasn’t until June 29 that Ryder admitted no data had been transmitted. In September, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley told CBS the balloon wasn’t even spying. This matched China’s statements about the balloon, as well as that of American meteorologists. But the damage was done. Blinken had postponed his trip to China. He eventually went in June, after a trip to Papua New Guinea, where its student protesters rejected his plans to militarize their country under a security pact.

War profiteers are edging us closer to a conflict. From sending the Patriot weapons system to Taiwan to practicing attacks with F-22 Raptors in the occupied Northern Marianas Islands, Lockheed Martin is raking in lucrative contracts while residents of the region fear an outbreak of war.

On May 26, Blinken made a speech, referring to China as a “long-term challenge.” Politico went further, publishing a piece on May 26, called “Blinken calls China ‘most serious long-term’ threat to world order” with a same-day USA Today article also taking the liberty of using challenge and threat interchangeably.

A Princeton University study found Americans who perceive China as a threat were more likely to stereotype Chinese people as untrustworthy and immoral. Intelligence leaks about a China threat combined with the age-old Yellow Peril syndrome have allowed for incessant Sinophobia to dominate our politics.

Misinformation, the other pandemic

In May 2020, Trump told a scared country with 1 million recorded COVID-19 cases and almost 100,000 dead that the pandemic was China’s fault. Again, our leaders cited undisclosed intelligence. For its part, CNN showed images of wet markets after The Wall Street Journal published an op-ed by Walter Russell Mead called “China Is The Real Sick Man of Asia.” A year later, Politico eventually acknowledged Trump cherry-picked intelligence to support his claims but the Biden administration ended up also seeking to investigate the lab leak theory. And the media went along with it.

For The Wall Street Journal, pro-Iraq War propagandist Michael Gordon co-authored an article claiming that “three researchers from China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology became sick enough in November 2019 that they sought hospital care.” An anonymous source said, “The information that we had coming from the various sources was of exquisite quality.” But the source admits it’s not known why researchers were sick.

The article relies on the conservative Hudson Institute’s Senior Fellow David Asher’s testimony and the fact China has not shared the medical records of citizens without potential COVID-19 symptoms. It is even admitted that several other unnamed U.S. officials find the Trump-era intelligence to be exactly what it is—circumstantial.

A year earlier, during the 2020 Democratic presidential primaries moderated by CNN, Dana Bash asked Bernie Sanders: “What consequences should China face for its role in its global crisis?” She asked the question referencing how Wuhan’s authorities silenced Dr. Wenliang but failed to mention China’s People’s Supreme Court condemned the city’s police for doing so. She also didn’t acknowledge how Wuhan Institute of Virology’s Shi Zhengli revealed in July 2020 that all of the staff and students in her lab tested negative for COVID-19. Shi even shared her research with American scientists. Georgetown University COVID-19 origin specialist Daniel Lucey welcomed Shi’s transparency: “There are a lot of new facts I wasn’t aware of. It’s very exciting to hear this directly from her.”

But from the Page Act of 1875, which stereotyped Chinese as disease carriers, to job discrimination during the pandemic, it is Asian Americans who ultimately pay the price for the media’s irresponsibility and participation in medical racism. They are already among the casualties of the new cold war. But that war not only threatens residents of the U.S. but the entire planet too.

Profit, not principle

This summer, the U.S. armed Taiwan under the Foreign Military Transfer program, reserved for sovereign states only. This violates the one-China policy which holds that both sides of the Taiwan Strait acknowledge that there is one China. Biden is also trying to include Taiwan weapons funding in a supplemental request to Congress. Weapons sales to Taiwan go back to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, as well as Reagan administration’s assurances that the U.S. will keep sending weapons but not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing. In 1996, a military standoff between the U.S. and China erupted in the Taiwan Strait, followed by an increasing flow of lethal weaponry up to the present.

The New York Times published a story on September 18, mentioning Former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, which it says was “a show of support for the island.” Never mind that the majority of Taiwan residents surveyed by the Brookings Institute felt her visit was detrimental to their security. The media also often ignores voices from Taiwan who don’t want war, favor reunification, or reject attempts to delete Chinese history in their textbooks.

Still, Fox News continues to give a platform to lawmakers like Representative Young Kim who wrote a piece on September 20 advocating for more military patrols in the South China Sea. On October 17, The Washington Post published a story about the Pentagon releasing footage of Chinese aircraft intercepting U.S. warplanes over the last two years. The story does not share the context of U.S. expansionism or how multiple secretaries of defense have threatened Beijing over its disputed maritime borders. Microsoft is even getting in on the action, with articles from CNN and Reuters last month uncritically sharing the software company’s claims that China is using AI to interfere in our elections, despite no evidence shared with the voting public.

It demonstrates how war profiteers are edging us closer to a conflict. From sending the Patriot weapons system to Taiwan to practicing attacks with F-22 Raptors in the occupied Northern Marianas Islands, Lockheed Martin is raking in lucrative contracts while residents of the region fear an outbreak of war. RTX supplies Israel’s Iron Dome and is now designing engineering systems for gunboats in the Pacific. When arms dealers make money, victims of imperialism die. With strong links to the military, it’s hard to imagine that Microsoft, News Corp, and Warner Bros. Discovery would care as long as their stocks go up too. Intelligence spooks and media moguls don’t know what’s best for people or the planet. And it’s time for a balanced and nuanced understanding of China. That begins with disarming the discourse and keeping the Pacific peaceful.

Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.

Cale Holmes

Lawson Adams

Lawson Adams is a 24-year-old college student in Los Angeles California. Two of his four years in the Navy were spent working at the NSA in Oahu, Hawaii as a Chinese language analyst.

Xenophobia cold war communism pacific region racism china

commondreams.org · by Cale Holmes · October 21, 2023

15. Are Fears of A.I. and Nuclear Apocalypse Keeping You Up? Blame Prometheus.

A short weekend read for contemplation and reflection.

Are Fears of A.I. and Nuclear Apocalypse Keeping You Up? Blame Prometheus.

nytimes.com · by A.O. Scott · October 21, 2023

This painting shows a large man, naked except for an orange cloth draped around his groin and over one shoulder, kneeling on a flat boulder next to a much smaller, darker naked figure who slumps on the ground with closed eyes. The large man is holding a flaming torch aloft in his right hand.

Prometheus was the Titan who stole fire from the gods of Olympus and gave it to human beings, setting us on a path of glory and disaster and incurring the jealous wrath of Zeus. In the modern world, especially since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, he has served as a symbol of progress and peril, an avatar of both the liberating power of knowledge and the dangers of technological overreach.

Mary Shelley subtitled “Frankenstein,” her Gothic tale of a prototypical mad scientist and his monster, “The Modern Prometheus,” underlining the hubris of the monster’s inventor as well as his idealism — while also emphasizing the fragile humanity of his creation. Shelley’s husband, the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley, was less ambivalent. In the preface to his verse drama “Prometheus Unbound,” he described his hero as “the type of the highest perfection of moral and intellectual nature, impelled by the purest and the truest motives to the best and noblest ends.” Prometheus was an emancipator, a rebel on behalf of humanity against Zeus’ tyranny.

More than 200 years after the Shelleys, Prometheus is having another moment, one closer in spirit to Mary’s terrifying ambivalence than to Percy’s fulsome gratitude. As technological optimism curdles in the face of cyber-capitalist villainy, climate disaster and what even some of its proponents warn is the existential threat of A.I., that ancient fire looks less like an ember of divine ingenuity than the start of a conflagration. Prometheus is what we call our capacity for self-destruction.

“Oppenheimer,” Christopher Nolan’s chronologically fragmented portrait of the physicist often called the father of the atomic bomb, begins with a quote evoking the punishment Zeus inflicted on his rebellious fellow immortal. (Since he could not die, Prometheus underwent the same torment every day, his liver devoured by an eagle.) The analogy is an established part of Oppenheimer’s legend: Nolan’s film is based on “American Prometheus,” Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin’s gripping and authoritative biography.

Annie Dorsen’s theater piece “Prometheus Firebringer,” which was performed at Theater for a New Audience in September, updates the Greek myth for the age of artificial intelligence, using A.I. to weave a cautionary tale that my colleague Laura Collins-Hughes called “forcefully beneficial as an examination of our obeisance to technology.” Something similar might be said about “The Maniac,” Benjamín Labatut’s new novel, whose designated Prometheus is the Hungarian-born polymath John von Neumann, a pioneer of A.I. as well as an originator of game theory.

Labatut’s book is classified as fiction. Nolan’s “Oppenheimer,” like every Hollywood biopic, takes some liberties with the literal record. But both narratives are grounded in fact, using the lives and ideas of real people as fodder for allegory and attempting to write a new mythology of the modern world.

Von Neumann and Oppenheimer were close contemporaries, born a year apart to prosperous, assimilated Jewish families in Budapest and New York. Von Neumann, conversant in theoretical physics, mathematics and analytic philosophy, worked for Oppenheimer at Los Alamos during the Manhattan Project. He spent most of his career at the Institute for Advanced Study, where Oppenheimer served as director after the war.

It may seem curious that two such geniuses — twin progenitors of potential human annihilation — should have occupied the same campus, but it’s also fitting. Not only because the institute, tucked into a few hundred pastoral acres in the shadow of Princeton University, gathered so many brilliant thinkers into its orbit — Albert Einstein and Kurt Gödel most famously. More than most intellectual bastions, the institute is a house of theory. The Promethean mad scientists of the 19th century were creatures of the laboratory, tinkering away at their infernal machines and homemade monsters. Their 20th-century counterparts were more likely to be found at the chalkboard, scratching out our future in charts, equations and lines of code.

The consequences are real enough, of course. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed at least 100,000 people. Their successor weapons, which Oppenheimer opposed, threatened to kill everybody else. But the intellectual drama of “Oppenheimer” — as distinct from the dramas of his personal life and his political fate — is about how abstraction becomes reality. The atomic bomb may be, for the soldiers and politicians, a powerful strategic tool in war and diplomacy. For the scientists, it’s something else: a proof of concept, a concrete manifestation of quantum theory.

Oppenheimer wasn’t a principal author of that theory. Those scientists, among them Niels Bohr, Erwin Schrödinger and Werner Heisenberg, were characters in Labatut’s previous novel, “When We Cease to Understand the World.” That book provides harrowing illumination of a zone where scientific insight becomes indistinguishable from madness or, perhaps, divine inspiration. The basic truths of the new science seem to explode all common sense: A particle is also a wave; one thing can be in many places at once; “scientific method and its object could no longer be prised apart.”

At their congresses and conferences, debating in train cars and cafes, these quantum revolutionaries are like the gods of Olympus: consumed with their own rivalries and passions, all but oblivious to the ordinary mortal world around them. Oppenheimer’s designation as Prometheus is precise. He snatched a spark of quantum insight from those divinities and handed it to Harry S. Truman and the U.S. Army Air Forces.

His punishment came not at the hands of those he had robbed, but rather from the recipients of his gift. In “Oppenheimer,” during the hearings that will cost him his security clearance and exile him from the center of American public life, most of his scientific colleagues remain by his side. (The notable exception is Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb and as such another potential Prometheus.) It’s the lawyers, bureaucrats and Washington courtiers who bring him down. Like the original Prometheus, Oppenheimer survives his disgrace, and ends the movie as a flawed, haunted, regretful creature, carrying a flicker of inextinguishable, theoretical guilt. If we blow up the world, it might still be his fault.

Labatut’s account of von Neumann is, if anything, more unsettling than “Oppenheimer.” We had decades to get used to the specter of nuclear annihilation, and since the end of the Cold War it has been overshadowed by other terrors. A.I., on the other hand, seems newly sprung from science fiction, and especially terrifying because we can’t quite grasp what it will become.

“The Maniac” is an origin story of sorts, one that resembles the story of the bomb. An idea — in this case the idea of a thinking machine, with Alan Turing as its primary theorist — slips into reality, not with a bang, but with the clicking of counters in a game of Go. That exquisitely complicated, deceptively simple game is for Labatut where the full, jarring potential of A.I. takes shape; its combination of logic, intuition, strategy and surprise makes it the kind of activity that seems both definitively human and almost superhuman, a bit like quantum physics itself.

Von Neumann, who died in 1957, did not teach machines to play Go. But when asked “what it would take for a computer, or some other mechanical entity, to begin to think and behave like a human being,” he replied that “it would have to play, like a child.” His Promethean transgression, conducted in a computer lab in Princeton, involved a contraption called MANIAC. The name was an acronym for “Mathematical Analyzer, Numerical Integrator and Computer,” which doesn’t sound like much of a threat. But von Neumann saw no limit to its potential. “If you tell me precisely what it is a machine cannot do,” he declared, “then I can always make a machine which will do just that.” MANIAC didn’t just represent a powerful new kind of machine, but “a new type of life.”

If Oppenheimer took hold of the sacred fire of atomic power, von Neumann’s theft was bolder and perhaps more insidious: He stole a piece of the human essence. He’s not only a modern Prometheus; he’s a second Frankenstein, creator of an all but human, potentially more than human monster.

Should we be afraid of it? The myths don’t provide much reassurance, at least in their modern retelling. “Technological power as such is always an ambivalent achievement,” Labatut’s von Neumann writes toward the end of his life, “and science is neutral all through, providing only means of control applicable to any purpose, and indifferent to all. It is not the particularly perverse destructiveness of one specific invention that creates danger. The danger is intrinsic. For progress there is no cure.”

nytimes.com · by A.O. Scott · October 21, 2023

16. Don’t Count on China’s Belt and Road Initiative to Disappear

Conclusion:

The BRI is not set to fade away, and it has already changed China’s position in the world. It will continue to do so moving forward. Rather than hoping it will diminish, it is imperative that Europe, the United States, Japan, and their allies think about how to compete with an evolving BRI that is likely to play a sizable roll in the digital and green transitions of much of the Global South, not just focus on the traditional infrastructure that has dominated its first decade.

Don’t Count on China’s Belt and Road Initiative to Disappear

The BRI is not set to fade away. It has already changed China’s position in the world, and it will continue to do so moving forward.

thediplomat.com · by Jacob Gunter · October 20, 2023

While China hosted a multitude of partners at the Belt and Road Forum this week in Beijing, many of us in Western capitals are pouring over a decade of entrails to try to determine the fate of Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy – the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The initiative has developed over the last 10 years to cover much of the globe and to bring China’s financial, industrial, and commercial strength to bear in infrastructure development.

However, as the years have passed, the scale of BRI activity has ebbed, and some have predicted (or even hoped for) the policy’s imminent fading into the ether. As we enter the second decade of the BRI and consider its impact, we should keep in mind three things.

First, the diminishing amount of capital allocated to the BRI is not indicative of the initiative’s failure. Over the years, the BRI has been compared to the Marshall Plan, and while hardly a one-to-one comparison, there is some value in this framing. The vast bulk of the capital injected into the Marshall Plan came in a surge over just a few short years, and it would be absurd to judge it as a failure because the scale of capital flows diminished over time. The BRI should similarly be judged not on capital flows, but on the impact that the projects under its umbrella have had.

Those impacts are, of course, not universally positive for both China and the host country, and benefits are often more aligned with Beijing’s interests than anyone else’s. China has a trade deficit with only 20 countries, and many BRI countries have seen their own deficit with China balloon over the last decade. The picture gets even messier when looking at the details of bilateral debt relationships. Nevertheless, the BRI was not intended to be a never-ending stream of large-scale infrastructure projects, and not all of them were pursued with commercial interests in mind.

Second, measuring the success of the BRI based on the efficiency of a traditional return on investment is using the wrong yardstick. Instead, BRI projects should be measured by their contribution to Beijing’s broader strategic goals. Underlying much of the BRI is Beijing’s goal to securitize its economic ties with the rest of the world. Part of that is China’s fear of further restrictions on exports in key markets. Similarly, Beijing fears losing access to essential inputs like energy, minerals, and food, much of which is provided by the United States, Canada, Australia, and other rivals. In that sense, one key aim of the BRI was to cement China’s economic ties with a multitude of partners keen to avoid choosing sides in the China-U.S. rivalry.

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To that end, the BRI has been quite successful. Much of the BRI’s transportation infrastructure – like ports, railways, and highways – have facilitated expanded bilateral trading relationships, and while new partners in the Global South cannot fully replace developed markets, they can make a dent. Similarly, the BRI has done a lot to expand production and transportation capacity for oil and gas, iron, copper, cobalt, and lithium, and foodstocks like soybeans. We might view some of that as unfounded paranoia or as having poor return on investment, but Beijing sees these as critical steps for China’s economic security.

Third, the BRI is likely to evolve as Beijing’s own strategic goals develop. The first decade of the BRI focused heavily on building up the traditional infrastructure needed to facilitate stronger bilateral trade ties. The second is likely to focus more on what Beijing calls the “Digital Silk Road” (DSR). This has been a part of the BRI for some time, but there is a growing strategic imperative to prioritize it moving forward. For similar reasons, we may see a stronger focus on green energy projects to bolster China’s exports of its solar panel and wind turbine production capacity.

As China’s telecoms and digital champions face growing scrutiny or outright restrictions in the United States, Europe, Japan, and elsewhere, it will become essential to focus on more neutral markets. As critical firms like Huawei and ZTE finish building out China’s own 5G network, they will need to unlock demand overseas to keep the revenue flowing that they need for R&D to close critical technology gaps with the U.S. and allies (like in semiconductors). One way to facilitate that is to push the DSR harder and use China’s state-run banks to finance 5G build-out along the BRI. All the better that China’s digital champions may be able to piggy-back and expand China’s digital ecosystem to other markets.

The BRI is not set to fade away, and it has already changed China’s position in the world. It will continue to do so moving forward. Rather than hoping it will diminish, it is imperative that Europe, the United States, Japan, and their allies think about how to compete with an evolving BRI that is likely to play a sizable roll in the digital and green transitions of much of the Global South, not just focus on the traditional infrastructure that has dominated its first decade.

GUEST AUTHOR

Jacob Gunter

Jacob Gunter is a lead analyst at MERICS. He covers China’s political economy, industrial policy, innovation, self-reliance, decoupling, and examines how the EU can better economically compete with China in third markets.

thediplomat.com · by Jacob Gunter · October 20, 2023

17. Interactive Map: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Please go to this link to view the new interactive map. https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375

Interactive Map: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

storymaps.arcgis.com

Interactive Map: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

This interactive map complements the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW daily produces with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.

ISW’s daily campaign assessments of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, including our static maps, are available at understandingwar.org ; you can subscribe to these daily reports and other updates here . For additional insights and analysis from ISW, follow us on Twitter @TheStudyofWar . For media inquiries, please email press@understandingwar.org

Note for iPhone, iPad, and iOS users: This map does not work if lockdown mode is enabled. Turn off lockdown mode to view this map.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine

as of October 20, 2023, 3:00 PM ET

18. Putin, Kim Jong Un Portraits Pop Up at West Bank Protest Over Israel as Russia Says It's in Talks with Hamas on Hostages

Everything is interconnected.

Putin, Kim Jong Un Portraits Pop Up at West Bank Protest Over Israel as Russia Says It's in Talks with Hamas on Hostages

Protesters waved Russian and Hamas flags to express their fury about Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza Strip and US support for Israel

Published 10/20/23 11:07 AM ET|Updated 20 hr ago

Luke Funk

themessenger.com · October 20, 2023

Palestinian protestors in the West Bank waved Russian and Hamas flags and carried portraits of Russia's President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to express their fury about Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza Strip and U.S. support for Israel.

Putin cropped up as Russia told Israel it was negotiating with Hamas for the return of some hostages.

View post on Twitter

Protesters took to the streets of Hebron to show solidarity with the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip. After the rally, some protesters threw stones at Israeli forces and set tire fires.

A CNN reporter was confronted by one crowd.

On Thursday, Russia's foreign minister proposed regular security talks with North Korea and China to deal with what he described as increasing U.S.-led regional military threats, as he met North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his top diplomat in Pyongyang.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was on a two-day trip to North Korea's capital with a focus on how to boost defense ties following a September summit between Kim and Putin, the Associated Press reported.

Kim has been boosting the visibility of his partnerships with Moscow and Beijing as he attempts to break out of diplomatic isolation and insert Pyongyang into a united front against Washington.

People wave Russian, Palestinian, Fatah and Hamas flags, and carry portraits of Russia's President Vladimir Putin and North Koren leader Kim Jong Un, as they take to the streets of the occupied West Bank city of Hebron to show solidary with the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip on October 20, 2023, amid ongoing battles between Israel and the Hamas movement.Photo by HAZEM BADER/AFP via Getty Images

Kim, in turn, has been boosting the visibility of his partnerships with Moscow and Beijing as he attempts to break out of diplomatic isolation and insert Pyongyang into a united front against Washington.

Meanwhile, an Israeli border police officer was killed during a military raid into a refugee camp in the northern West Bank, the police and border guards said in a joint statement.

Israeli forces killed at least seven Palestinians during the daylong raid Thursday of the Nur Shams camp, and prevented ambulances from retrieving the wounded, according to Palestinian state media.

themessenger.com · October 20, 2023

19. Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives

Very much worth the 54 minutes to listen to this podcast.

Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Ben Jebb and Adam Darnley-Stuart · October 20, 2023

This week’s episode of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines how states weaponize strategic narratives to control the information space and achieve their interests.

Our guests begin by addressing how recent changes in the information environment have enabled revisionist states to wage information warfare. They then talk about how states like the UAE, Russia, and China are able to leverage networked information systems to spread political chaos within civil societies. Finally, our guests conclude with a discussion about how autocratic regimes are exploiting vulnerabilities within constitutional democracies to sow discord, and what liberal societies can do to gird themselves against foreign information operations.

Dr. Andreas Krieg is a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London and a fellow at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies. He has spent over a decade throughout the Middle East and North Africa, working with regional policymakers and community leaders, and studying the pernicious effects of information operations. Dr. Krieg is the author of Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives, which serves as the anchor for episode 90.

Dr. Andrew Whiskeyman is an associate professor at the National Defense University’s College of Information and Cyberspace where he teaches on the topics of leadership, disruptive technology, and information warfare. Before entering the halls of academia as a professor, served in the U.S. Army for over 27 years, and was the Chief of the Information Operations Division within U.S. Central Command.

Ben Jebb and Adam Darnley Stuart are the hosts for this episode. Please reach out to Ben and Julia with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

20. American in Gaza Details Life While Waiting for the Border to Open: 'We Are Extremely Afraid for Our Lives'

American in Gaza Details Life While Waiting for the Border to Open: 'We Are Extremely Afraid for Our Lives'

'We feel abandoned to fight on our own for our safety and the safety of our son,' said Abood Okal, stuck in Gaza with his wife and 1-year-old boy

Published 10/21/23 10:25 AM ET|Updated 37 min ago

Aaron Feis

themessenger.com · October 21, 2023

A Massachusetts man stranded in Gaza with his wife and their 1-year-old son is pleading for help getting out of the war-torn territory, where he and his family spend their days among 40 people crammed into a single home.

Abood Okal, wife Wafaa Abuzayda and baby Yousef were visiting family in Gaza on October 7 when Hamas terrorists attacked Israel, killing over 1,400 people and drawing retaliatory airstrikes as well as a tight blockade.

They’re among hundreds of Americans who remain trapped in Gaza, and throngs of people packed into the territory’s southern half since Israel warned those in the north to clear out.

Okal and his family have been sharing a home near the Rafah crossing with about 40 other people all waiting for the border to open, he told CNN on Saturday, pleading for a lifeline from the U.S. State Department.

“We feel like our lives have little to no value,” he told the outlet, saying that he felt the U.S. government could be doing more to secure passage for him, his family and the other Americans in Gaza.

“We feel abandoned to fight on our own for our safety and the safety of our son, especially since President Biden didn’t seem to influence any of the parties to secure a safe passage for the hundreds of Americans stranded in Gaza or to even acknowledge our presence and the need to get us to safety,” Okal previously told CNN in a separate interview.

It appeared on October 14 that a deal to let foreign nationals out of Gaza through the Rafah border crossing into Egypt was imminent, only for the arrangement to break down.

Since, an agreement was reached to allow limited humanitarian aid into Gaza via the same crossing, with the first of the desperately-needed shipments beginning Saturday, when the Egypt-Gaza border was opened briefly to allow 20 aid trucks to enter the territory.

Abood Okal and Wafaa Abuzayda, and 1-year-old son, YousefCourtesy of Sammy Nabulsi

But those in Gaza are still forbidden from leaving, including Okal, his family and other foreign nationals.

“This family and all of the others are in a dire and dangerous situation, both from without and from within the confines of their own shelter,” attorney and family friend Sammy Nabulsi told the Milford Daily News.

Okal told CNN that, on the State Department’s advice, he and his family had made two attempts to cross at Rafah — braving dangerous conditions and using some of their precious little fuel — only to find the crossing closed.

"We’ve been told by the State Department twice to head to the Rafah crossing as it would be open and we would be able to cross,” Okal told NBC Boston. “Twice we’ve gone and waited for 10 hours, eight hours, in the sun, in open borders, open air, with war planes flying over to find out the crossing never opened.”

Meanwhile, his young son has battled an ear infection, and runs for food have become increasingly dangerous amid retaliatory Israeli airstrikes that have killed more than 4,100 people in Gaza.

“Yesterday we went for a food supply run, my brother and I, which is a risky errand to run,” Okal told NBC Boston earlier this week.

“While we were at the market trying to shop as fast as we can to pick up whatever supplies we could find, there were three bombings via air strikes that happened nearby that were so close that we basically thought about ‘OK, we’ve already made the trip one way, do we turn back now and basically go home or do we continue to find food and this way it’s not in vain?’”

The danger is present even at the family’s cramped, makeshift home, which was nearly struck by a bomb on Thursday.

"Glass shattered [and] the walls of the house cracked. Doors popped out of frame,” Okal told NBC Boston. “We thought this was supposed to be a safe zone but that’s not the case."

Okal told CNN that he now lives in fear for his life and the lives of his family, while awaiting a way back home.

“We are extremely afraid for our lives as the ground invasion seems imminent with no place safe for us to go and no evacuation plan on the horizon,” he said.

themessenger.com · October 21, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

The Inflection Point

A speech that may well define Biden’s presidency

By Peter Wehner

OCTOBER 20, 2023, 10:10 AM ET

Biden Lights the Beacon, for Israel, Ukraine and the World

Biden Wanted to End ‘Forever Wars.’ Now He Looks Like a Wartime President.

Israel and Ukraine conflicts threaten to divert administration attention and resources from domestic priorities, China

465. Learning from LSCO: Applying Lessons to Irregular Conflict

AP visual analysis: Rocket from Gaza appeared to go astray, likely caused deadly hospital explosion

WHAT AP FOUND

WHAT THE EXPERTS SAY

THREE-SECOND GAP

EVIDENCE ON THE GROUND

IRON DOME THEORY

David Shank on the Iron Dome theory

___

__

With Putin by His Side, Xi Outlines His Vision of a New World Order

More on China

Why We Should Fear China More Than Middle Eastern War

OPINION

THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Israel Is About to Make a Terrible Mistake

Oct. 19, 2023

Hamas’s Hostage-Taking Handbook Says to ‘Kill the Difficult Ones’ and Use Hostages as ‘Human Shields’

The document, which I obtained from an Israeli official, also suggests that Hamas did not plan to take hostages back to Gaza.

By Graeme Wood

Yes, the U.S. Can Afford to Help Its Allies

In fact, it can’t afford not to.

By David Frum

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 20, 2023

IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 20, 2023

Hold Hamas and all of its enablers accountable

Why We Need to Disarm the Anti-China Discourse

Misinformation, the other pandemic

Profit, not principle

Are Fears of A.I. and Nuclear Apocalypse Keeping You Up? Blame Prometheus.

Don’t Count on China’s Belt and Road Initiative to Disappear

Interactive Map: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Putin, Kim Jong Un Portraits Pop Up at West Bank Protest Over Israel as Russia Says It's in Talks with Hamas on Hostages

Protesters waved Russian and Hamas flags to express their fury about Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza Strip and US support for Israel

Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives - Irregular Warfare Initiative

American in Gaza Details Life While Waiting for the Border to Open: 'We Are Extremely Afraid for Our Lives'​

'We feel abandoned to fight on our own for our safety and the safety of our son,' said Abood Okal, stuck in Gaza with his wife and 1-year-old boy

American in Gaza Details Life While Waiting for the Border to Open: 'We Are Extremely Afraid for Our Lives'